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Untrained and Unavailable:
The Impact of Operations Other Than War (OOTW)
On Forces Destined to Support Combat CINC's
by

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The Contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Untrained and Unavailable: The Impact of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) on Forces Destined to Support CINC's (U)

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OOTW, peacekeeping, training, CINC, Bosnia, Kosovo, Air Force, Army, training, readiness

Combative Commander's-in-Chiefs (CINC's) are apportioned forces in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). These scarce resources are based upon a mission need within a specific geographical region, and in some cases these forces are designated in more than one region. What happens when these forces are unavailable to the CINC because of long term mission commitment in operations other than war (OOTW) particularly peacekeeping? What happens when apportioned forces returning from OOTW missions are assigned to a combat theater before completing their post-ootw training program? These are two critical questions that CINC's are faced with every day.

Of the Army's ten active divisions, up to five are committed to peacekeeping missions, and unprepared to conduct their JSCP mission. Similarly, the Air Force has conducted "air occupation" operations over Iraq since the end of the Gulf War. The strain on manpower and equipment is so severe that units assigned in major theaters are being pulled away to conduct these missions. Commanders estimate that a unit redeploying from OOTW may require up to a year to regain its combat proficiency.

This paper does not argue the issue of conducting peacekeeping operations. It explores the background that led the services to this dilemma, and then analyzes four potential solutions that the military leadership can explore to resolve the situation. These options range from deploying complete units vice ad hoc task forces to assigning a single organization with this mission much like another Korean scenario.
INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on a very volatile subject: Military preparedness in terms of current and potentially future military capabilities. American Armed Forces, particularly the Army and Air Force, are conducting operations that are detracting from their ability to conduct their prescribed missions outlined in the National Military Strategy. If these nonstandard missions are the proximate cause of the problem, then funds and training, or the inability to train are the relevant issue.

The Army is deeply committed to operations in the Balkans and Southwest Asia (SWA) while the Air Force has been conducting air occupation operations over Iraq since the end of the 1991 Gulf War. Both services, particularly the Army, are experiencing serious side effects as a result of these missions. The senior leadership of both services openly acknowledge that their force is near the limit of its capabilities. Extended operations, declining resources, shrinking force structure and a strategic mission that hasn’t changed since the Cold War are issues that directly impact the military’s ability to accomplish its directed missions.

Units that are conducting peacekeeping operations and operations other than war (OOTW) require extended preparation and training in missions that are non-standard, and require an equally extensive retraining period after completing an OOTW mission. Consequently, if any of these units are called upon to fulfill their Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) mission while conducting OOTW, they will be untrained, improperly manned and ill-equipped and ultimately unable to fulfill their mission.

The intent of this work is to highlight the impact these missions have on the operational commander, and recommend potential solutions. This paper will explore four alternatives that may provide a solution for the operational commander. If a change is not made to the current situation the end result will be an Armed Force unable to conduct its prescribed mission. This
establishes the relevance for this thesis.

**BACKGROUND**

Since the end of the Gulf War the United States Air Force and Navy have conducted a newly invented military mission: "No Fly Zones" (NFZ). This operation was initiated after the 1991 Gulf war to protect Kurds from Iraqi reprisals. The mission eventually spread to both a northern and southern NFZ over Iraq in what can be arguably called an "air occupation" of Iraq. Under the auspices of United Nations resolutions, our airman and pilots have enforced two "no fly zones" over Iraq in order to prevent Iraq forces from rebuilding or threatening its neighbors. These missions have continued unabated since 1991 and have no known end date. Brigadier General David A. Deptula, the former commander of Operation Northern Watch, described the northern NFZ mission as, "...a parole officer living in a house with a convicted criminal." 1 In 1993 "Operation Deny Flight" imposed a NFZ over Bosnia-Herzegovina to separate those warring factions. Parts of that mission still continue today as well.

On the 27th of November, 1995, President William Jefferson Clinton announced his decision to commit 20,000 United States troops as a part of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia.2 Nearly four years later, as 1999 closed and the 21st Century began, 4500 American soldiers remained deployed in Bosnia. Meanwhile in that same year, nearly 6500 soldiers began our country's newest peace keeping operation in Kosovo. What both of these operations have in common is they both lack a clearly defined end state, and therefore no exit strategy. On 4 February 1999, President Clinton stated:

Decisions on future reductions will be taken in light of progress on Implementation of the Peace Agreement. Any and all reductions of US forces in the short or long term will be made in accordance with my Administration’s policy that such reductions will not jeopardize the safety of US armed forces serving in BiH (Bosnia-Herzegovina).3
THE PROBLEM

Title X of the United States Code (USC) dictates that the services are responsible for training and equipping their respective forces, and ultimately having them prepared for employment among the various CINC-doms. The two critical resources that are essential to accomplish this mission are funding and time. When those two are constrained or restrained, the results are predictable. Without funding, the Services can neither procure the necessary equipment nor can it fund the essential training it requires. Accomplishing the necessary training requires a finite amount of time. If that time is not available or significantly reduced because of a crisis, then that force will be less prepared than required. All of this is a component of the current OOTW scenario that is having a dramatic impact on Service readiness and availability.

The United States Army is currently conducting three major OOTW missions. Besides operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Army conducts a quarterly deployment of more than 1100 soldiers to Kuwait to train with the Kuwaiti military. The Air Force likewise supports three major contingency operations. In addition to their Bosnia/Balkan support, they have been conducting two Southwest Asia (SWA) operations since 1991. Initially, the Air Forces in Europe exclusively supported the Balkans missions while CONUS-based units assumed the SWA mission, but a lack of a clear end-date forced the Air Force to tap all their forces world-wide. The obvious CINC-related impact is enormous.

The current National Military Strategy (NMS) dictates that the Army be able to, "deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large scale, cross border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames..." The Army’s total force structure, including the National Guard and reserve, are required to complete that mission. That force has been dictated as, "...
corps with ten active divisions (six heavy, two light infantry, one airborne, and one air assault); and two armored cavalry regiments, and fifteen National Guard enhanced separate brigades."7 The NMS is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s document for prescribing his “advice on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces in implementing the guidance in the President’s A National Security Strategy for a New Century.”8

The 1997 NMS highlights two critical elements for the employment of our military force.

First, the force must be used judiciously and decisively. Military missions must be clearly stated with achievable military objectives... Finally,...we must ensure that the conditions necessary for terminating military involvement and withdrawing military forces are clearly established.9

Both points are critical if a force is to successfully accomplish a mission, and be prepared to conduct the next, and yet, when asked at his Senate confirmation hearings about an exit strategy from Bosnia, GEN Henry Shelton responded, “I’m not exactly aware of what our exit strategy is...We have nine or ten months to develop that.”10 That was 1997 and the ten months GEN Shelton was referring to was the President’s latest end date for the Bosnia mission; now more than two years ago. At no place in the NMS is conducting peace keeping operations in Bosnia or anywhere else specifically discussed, and no where is conducting extended multi-year peace keeping operations mentioned. Yet, this is the keystone document that the military services use to initiate their long range strategic planning for forces and equipment and build their respective future year defense plans (FYDP) to support these forces and build the JSCP. The US Army in particular finds itself conducting missions that it neither resourced nor trained to do.

An article in the August 30th, 1999, Army Times, claimed that Forces Command (FORSCOM) units would be providing forces to support Bosnia through October 2002, while US Army Europe (USAEUR) would provide 6500 soldiers for Kosovo through July 2001.11 This last point is one that will be explored in detail later because it directly impacts on the Services ability to train.
Funding has become a significant hurdle of the peace keeping equation. Because these are non-standard and supposedly short term operations, funding for these missions comes directly from the currently approved budgets. The inability to forecast these missions and therefore forecast funding has put the Armed Forces at the brink of disaster. GEN Shelton testified before Congress that if the Pentagon had to continue paying for Bosnia out of its own budget, readiness would suffer, and in his own words he warned that the situation would become "severe". Shelton added that unless Congress approved supplemental funding the Army would have to divert dollars from training and maintenance accounts. The end result would be a drop in readiness of some divisions to C-3 (the second worst overall rating possible), and recovery would take a long time. In what can only be described as a "gloom-and-doom" forecast, the Clinton Administration forecast that reduced training, slowed maintenance, and major furloughs would result if the Pentagon continued to pay for Bosnia without supplemental funds. The totals that they were requesting in 1998 amounted to nearly $2 billion- a mere fraction of the total budget, but with an impact as large as the entire budget. The Army has been sacrificing short term readiness and training in an effort to maintain it's planned modernization, but even modernization efforts have been adversely affected.

The peace keeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo currently consume nearly half of the Army's deployable divisions at a time. That sentence bears repeating. The peace keeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo currently consume nearly half of the Army's deployable divisions at a time. There are only 5500 soldiers in Bosnia and only 6500 in Kosovo. How does that equate to nearly half of the Army's divisions? Unfortunately it's all too simple. In fact it's symptomatic of the strategic over-reach that is consuming the American military, and directly impacting on the Service's ability to train and prepare for their JSCP missions. An author noted in a critical critique of the Service's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),

A greater focus ... would produce a military different than the one the QDR
envisions. Failing to give peace operations their due results in the paradox of a 1.4 million person military that has trouble keeping 40,000 troops deployed in such operations."

Let’s start by examining the Bosnia mission first. For a heavy division to field a force of 3500 soldiers requires the equivalent of a typical ground maneuver brigade. The brigade typically numbers more than 5500 at full strength. The military today is experiencing significant recruiting and retention problems even in its front-line and “premier” organizations. This creates manpower shortages that must be made up from other organizations within the brigade. When the brigade cannot fill the shortage, the requirement goes to the other like-units in the division. With greater frequency these shortages are forced off the post, and when that occurs, the requirement is passed all the way up to Forces Command (FORSCOM) Headquarters. FORSCOM then selects another post to fill that personnel requirement. So now another organization that was only partially filled to begin with is forced to give up more soldiers, and in essence function with less and less. And the personnel support structure does not back fill the shorted organization. The cascading effect on the personnel side is as debilitating as the funding one.

Training is a unit’s priority task. Because of the dissimilarity of missions and mission tasks peace keeping mission mandates the vast majority of organizations, particularly combat arms units, complete a new mission training program. Combat Arms units, principally Armor, Field Artillery, Mechanized Infantry and Attack Aviation, completely change their training focus. They no longer conduct training in their primary mission. They place their major piece of equipment into long term storage and train on missions that are more akin to those performed by police. And these units do not retrain on their respective skills for up to a year.

The train-up for an active duty force normally starts at least six to nine months prior to the deployment, and National Guard units require much longer training time. Typically, active duty units have long range training calendars that plan significant activities out to two years. National Guard units require a three year calendar to conduct the same training program as their
active duty counterparts. The 49th Armored Division of the Texas National Guard assumed the
duties of Division Headquarters for the SFOR beginning in March 2000. This unit conducted on-
site visits in Bosnia for more than a year in preparation of assuming the mission. This isn’t an
anomaly. Secretary of Defense William Cohen acknowledged the training difficulty when he
said,

Peace keeping is not our primary mission. Peacekeeping involves a different type
of training and capabilities. There has been some gap in...the training for the
peacekeeping mission which is not necessarily consistent with the war-fighting
mission we’ve had in the past."  

Back to our Bosnia model. To provide the training support, the division has to commit an
additional brigade along with equipment and personnel from the other parts of the division to the
equation to ensure mission success. Additionally the division has to create a rear-detachment
division headquarters for command and control while at the same time building a 24-hour war
time division staff out of the division’s assets, and the division is essentially combat ineffective
for any real world contingency that it has been designated for. That is division number one. Add
to that total the force that is already in Bosnia and the total is now two divisions.

The division that is coming out of Bosnia was trained to execute peace keeping
operations, a non-standard mission. Now that they are back at their home station they must
retrain themselves to conduct their real world mission. That could take the division as long as the
initial train-up for Bosnia took, partly because of mandatory readiness training that could not be
accomplished in Bosnia such as tank gunnery, Bradley gunnery or field artillery gunnery. In the
case of the 1st Cavalry Division that ended their year-long Bosnia mission in August 1999, the
leadership predicted that the division would not attain C-1 deployment status until the 2nd
quarter of FY 2000. That raises the total to three divisions unavailable and unable to fulfill their
JSCP mission.

The Kosovo operation is like the Bosnia mission in terms of unit requirements. It
consumes the resources of both of USAEUR divisions to operate the Kosovo peace keeping mission. This leaves the US Army in Europe incapable of conducting any corps contingency missions. That brings the total number of active divisions committed to the Balkans to five. This has many in Congress as well as the Pentagon concerned. One unnamed “senior US Army official” stated that peacekeeping

...threatened preparedness for a two-MTW scenario. The real issue is the impact [peacekeeping] has on our mission. The army can handle the first war. But the second MTW is at risk.16

Couple this already difficult situation with the additional request from NATO for additional troops for Kosovo.17 The issue could not be more serious at the operational level considering that the latest estimates are that these force will be committed to Kosovo for ten years or more.18 The Air Force is in similar disarray.

The number of Air Force personnel deployed in support of OOTW has more than quadrupled since 1989 (3,400 to 14,600) while the total end strength of the Air Force has declined 33 percent. Initially the units in Europe conducted the Bosnia mission while CONUS units provided the crews and aircraft for the two SWA OOTW missions. That scenario is no longer viable. The Air Force is scrambling to fill these missions and has taken forces out of the Pacific theater as well as activate Reserve components to accomplish the mission. Just as in the Army’s case, the OOTW missions are not complimentary with their combat missions and have degraded the overall training level of the aircrews. The GAO report stated that aircrews would require at least a one to three month retraining period after redeploying from OOTW missions to regain their mission proficiency.19

Operation Northern Watch (ONW) flew more than 7500 sorties last year. Despite the obvious priority that this operation has for equipment and support it was adversely impacted by competing requirements when the Kosovo campaign took center stage. Assets that were essential to ONW were diverted to Kosovo. These assets included aerial tankers, radar jamming aircraft and tactical fighters. GEN Deptula reported that the diversion was significant enough that his
unit did not fly for a "period of several weeks." 30

The purpose of ONW and the corresponding southern component Operation Southern Watch (OSW) is to preclude Iraq from conducting air operations or moving its forces without United nations approval. By creating a situation where that mission could not be accomplished means that the mission is not important or that there aren’t enough assets to go around, and could arguably be called a mission failure. This only serves to illustrate the difficulty the Air Force is experiencing in fulfilling its commitments.

An additional impact that was highlighted by the report pertains to shortened life-cycle for the aircraft conducting OOTW. Although the study only mentioned Air Force aircraft, but the Army helicopter fleet conducting Balkans operations are equally effected. Essentially the issue is one of over use. When aircraft are procured they have an anticipated “useful life” that is expressed in total-airframe-hours. That number is divided by the number of years that the service expects the aircraft to be in service yielding the flight-hours-per-year value. The service further use this value to plan, fund and procure spare parts. Helicopters are factored in the same way yet historically airplanes have a longer life than helicopters. Units that are conducting OOTW missions are flying their aircraft at more than quadruple the annual rate. 31 Additionally, aircraft may be retired before their normal useful life causing shortages in some units.

The short term implication from a CINC-perspective is that aircraft logistics may be a significant issue. Units that have exceeded their flying hour projections are running out of spare parts and more importantly the funds to procure them. Maintainers are relying more and more on cannibalization to repair aircraft. The impact will be a much lower aircraft availability rate and a longer period of time to recover from the OOTW-caused excess. The retraining issue was again highlighted in a 1999 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report. Their report was a compilation of interviews and observations from all units that have conducted the Bosnia mission. Their report concluded:
The recovery period during peacetime operations varies from several weeks to more than 1 year, depending on the service and type of unit. For example, in the Army an infantry battalion reported that it would take up to 14 months to recover its warfighting skills, an aviation unit estimated that would take 9 months, and a signal battalion estimated it would take 4 months.22

This is an incredible conclusion! From the CINC’s perspective, units absolutely essential to their area of operations (AO’s) are either not available or worse, untrained.

Clearly, the units conducting OOTW will be required if a major regional conflict erupts, or even more probable, a show of “national resolve” is required. The plan that is currently the accepted option is that units that are involved in OOTW would be redeployed from those missions and engaged in CINC missions. The 1997 QDR identified several key issues that it deemed as critical if US forces were going to transition from OOTW to major theaters. The one key issue that is unresolved is strategic mobility.

In the April 1996 Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress, DOD said, “Diversion of strategic lift assets needed for withdrawal from an ongoing operation can impact on the arrival of forces and sustainment stocks to support a Major Regional Contingency.” In 1998, the European Command (EUCOM) initiated a study to determine its ability to redeploy from Bosnia and then deploy in support of a combat operation. Their analyses indicated that it would require 90 days to conduct this operation: forty-five days to redeploy and an additional 45 days to retrain and reconstitute.24 Consider in this equation that EUCOM has interior lines. CONUS-based units would require a much longer redeployment period. Sealift support would have to be mustered and then sent to a European port for embarkation and then sailed to a port in the US for debarkation. Add to that the time required to move that equipment to home station by rail, and the equation becomes extreme.

OPTIONS

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Changing the NMS or ending peacekeeping operations or gaining a significant increase in funds are not options that are being explored in this work. They definitely set the environment that we must work in. That leaves training or training-related areas as the only viable area that the Services can impact that will provide a solution to the incredible dilemma they are facing. Four options that will allow units to be ready and available to a CINC while conducting ground OOTW missions followed by an analysis of the Air Force’s effort to resolve their mission difficulties with the Expeditionary Air Force (EAF).

*Option I: Deploy Units As Entire Units*

Currently units deployed to OOTW are not deployed with their entire complement of equipment or personnel. As was already mentioned, many units cannot fill the required personnel positions mandated by the gaining theater. One of the reasons is that there are some critical skills and grades deemed essential to OOTW that do not exist in the active divisions. Many of these are in the psychological operations and country-building and civil affairs arena. If units deployed to OOTW in the same manner that they deployed to a combat theater a strong argument could be made that they would require less retraining time to hone their combat mission skills. A unit with its organic equipment and personnel all in one location can oversee maintenance and lower level skill training with a higher level of expected proficiency than if the unit was sub-divided.

The redeployment issue would likely not be an issue. Instead of redeploying back to home-station and then deploying to a theater, a complete unit could deploy directly from its OOTW location. The potential difference in strategic deployment assets may have a positive cascading effect on other missions. Obviously, strategic assets would still be required to move this force, and diverting assets to move one unit could have a deleterious effect on a strategic deployment.
There is still the issue of back-filling the departing unit. It is logical to assume that if the NCA deems an OOTW operation essential then the mission would have to be handed over to another unit. The National Guard would seem a likely substitute since they have already been conducting these missions and are heavily involved in many special skill areas, yet that may not be possible. As was detailed earlier, the National Guard unit currently in Bosnia took more than a year in preparation just to assume their role, and in the case of the 49th Armored Division, they did not deploy any of their own combat forces.

This additional reliance on the reserves and National Guard has created its own backlash. Long deployments have created problems with units finding sufficient volunteers to fill their ranks. This has prompted the Pentagon to restrict Army Reserve and National Guard unit deployments to no longer than “six-month maximum tour of active regular troops in a noncombat situation.” Unless the NCA initiates a national call-up of the reserves to support a crisis the reserve forces won’t continue as a viable alternative.

**Option 2: Deploy Entire Unit as a Training Center Rotation**

Retaining the whole-unit plan as described in Option 1, another option is to develop a deployment scenario that is like a unit rotation to one of the combat training centers (CMTC’s). This option provides a training environment that is not unlike the one that most combat units conduct now. A schedule is provided to the Major Commands (MACOMS) two or more years in advance. Using this event as the focal point, units can establish training programs that will provide units the ability to sequence training requirements. This may sound to some as nothing different that is done today. The difference is that units would only be deployed to OOTW for a relatively short duration: six weeks vice six months. Just like a rotation to a CMTC, the unit would deploy, draw equipment, conduct intensive training in the OOTW environment, and then
redeploy back to home station.

The obvious benefits of this mission are that units are not committed for extended period of time, and can quickly be reintegrated back into CINC-strategic mission. There will still be turmoil at home stations, but this can be mitigated by using complete units vice ad hoc organizations. A shorter deployment would also mean that the reserves and National Guard would be a more viable option. Keeping the deployment duration’s to sixty instead of 180 days would provide more units with training opportunities while reducing the public resistance by employers and families.

This option has some significant costs associated with it. First and probably foremost, the increase need for strategic lift as well as fast sealift puts an additional strain on an already razor thin margin. Some of this might be mitigated if propositioned (PREPO) equipment was moved into the theater and used by like units. This would be full sets of organic equipment, and not scaled-back OOTW-specific equipment. The key to this option is training and deploying as a whole unit, and then training with organic equipment; otherwise, it would be no different than the current situation.

Another concern would be that all of the Army’s divisions (with the exception of a ready reaction brigade) would have to be available for the missions. All units currently conduct training at a CMTC so this should not be any different.

**Option 3: Assign OOTW Mission to One Unit**

Another possible option would be to assign the OOTW mission to one unit alone. As was outlined earlier, neither the Bosnia nor the Kosovo mission requires more than a division’s worth of deployed forces. If one unit had sole responsibility for training and conducting this mission then the other four divisions currently required to support these missions would be available to
conduct their CINC missions. This option would force the designated division to field their forces from within their own organization and preclude the building of ad hoc command and control structures. The senior leadership would likewise have to ensure that this unit was filled with personnel at the same levels as the rest of its divisions; otherwise, the mission would suffer causing a backlash in the personnel replacement system. This division could also be “permanently” assigned to this region precluding strategic deployment costs, and enhancing long term stabilization within units.

The obvious drawback to a permanently stationed unit would be what to do when the mission is over. If a unit was permanently stationed in the region, a status-quo attitude might prevail, and the military would create a second “Korean peninsula”. This would create an additional short-tour area that personnel managers would have to manage. From the CINC’s perspective, a permanent force would not adversely impact his mission. The units that were JSCP’d to his theater would be readily available and trained.

Option 4: Use the Marines in OOTW Assignments

A final ground option would be to share the OOTW responsibility with the Marines. Although the Marines are much smaller than the Army the Marines offer many unique capabilities that are not organic to the present Army divisions. The Marines are a much lighter force with much of their training directly related to OOTW skills. Likewise, the Marines are a much lighter force in terms of combat equipment. Their primary infantry vehicle is the Light Attack Vehicle (LAV’s) instead of the Army’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV). The LAV is better suited for urban operations where the majority of OOTW is conducted. Additionally, the Marines have fewer LAV’s and tanks in their division than a typical Army battalion making them an easier force to deploy.
The Marines deploy with their own organic air support which has a double benefit. First they have helicopters that can perform the necessary for day-to-day missions as well as provide the theater operational reserve package. Additional helicopters would not be required from other services. Secondly, their F-18 Squadrons could provide the air support package currently being provided by the Air Force. This would relieve the Air Force of a mission drain.

The Marines have invested heavily in propositioned equipment which would allow their deployment to many OOTW areas with little difficulty in terms of time or strategic lift assets. If the situation required their redeployment to another area their propositioned equipment would enable a rapid transfer from OOTW to combat operations.

The Marines should not be the only force. Their strategic and operational mission skills are necessary in every CINC plan, but their participation would reduce the overall burden on the other two services which ultimately aids the CINC.

*Air Force Expeditionary Air Force (EAF)*

Air force efforts to mitigate the impact of OOTW while attempting to accomplish their CINC missions center around the establishment of the Expeditionary Air Force (EAF). The Air Force calls for the eventual reorganization into ten EAF's of which two would be operational at any one time. The EAF deployment is built around a schedule similar to the Navy's Carrier Battle Group deployment schedule. The designated EAF goes through a lengthy training cycle culminating with a certification and then deployment or to an “on-call” status for a period of 90 days. Meanwhile, there are other units in the training sequence ready to replace the standing EAF's. The entire EAF cycle repeats every 15 months. In the event of a designated national crisis the Air Force could stand up additional EAF’s under a shortened train-up schedule.

The EAF is not an organic entity per se. In other words the units that comprise the EAF are not co-located on a single Air Force Base. Likewise, the subunits may change every rotation.
This allows the Air Force to mix and match units depending upon mission requirements and probably more important, available units. This command structure relies on the entire Air Force structure- active, reserves, and Air National Guard- to fulfill its obligations.

Obviously, the EAF can reduce some of the personnel turbulence that occurs with OOTW, but does it still provide the CINC with combat ready forces? The answer is not clear because this structure is too new to have any sufficient data. A cogent argument could be made either way. As was discussed earlier, once a unit deploys to OOTW it ceases to train or conduct its wartime mission. This hasn't changed with the EAF. What has changed is the duration of the deployment, which should reduce the skill degradation of individuals and units. Also the time necessary to regenerate a unit to "fully trained" status should be less than the current 45 days. Additionally information and analysis in the coming months will provide a keener insight into this issue.

THE CONCLUSION

The senior leadership in the military and Congress seem to be heading the services towards a military that is lighter, less costly, and more easily deployed. That would reduce some of the difficulties that the Army, in particular, has. If the 2001 Quadrennial Review changes the NMS to something other than a 2-MRC scenario then the issue may also be moot. Until all those potentials become reality, then the services must determine a course of action that will allow them to accomplish their JSCP and CINC-directed missions.

As early as 1996, critical work was being published on the subject of the need for an exit strategy from Bosnia. George Kenney, an author for The Nation, posed his view of what an exit strategy would look like. He offered two options: cut our losses and really get out or commit
ourselves to staying as long as it takes to stabilize the region. He feels that Clinton has already chosen the latter, and it would be hard to argue with Kenney’s estimation. In what can be described as cynical-clairvoyance, Kenney states that "...we may as well start teaching Bosnian history to the next generation of peace keepers.” This admittance to a unstated long-term occupation in the Balkans has led many to question the current force structure and ultimately the current QDR.

When Les Aspin was still the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, he authored a report that dealt specifically with the sizing of American conventional forces in the post cold war era. In what can be described as prophetic, Rep. Aspin stated:

The other uses of military force generally require much smaller forces. Increasingly, these other missions will require special capabilities that will affect equipment choices, personnel expertise and training, R&D and other details of what could be called force shaping.

The Secretary of the Army, The Honorable Louis Caldera, (USMA Class of 1978) has acknowledged the precarious position that the Army is in. Responding to opinions that the Army is becoming less relevant in national security, Caldera noted, ”We need to be a full spectrum force in which every unit is capable of contributing along every point of the spectrum from humanitarian system to high intensity conflict.” Both Caldera and the new Army Chief of Staff, GEN Shinsheki have intimated that a new Army will emerge in the next QDR. This force will be less reliant on heavy forces and much more deployable which is an indication that the post-Cold War era is indeed over and that our next National Military Strategy will have to address something other than the two-MRC if the United States Army is to continue to be a viable force in the next ten to twenty years.

If the units identified to conduct future Bosnia rotations is any indication, the Army leadership appears headed toward selecting Option 3. The 3rd Infantry Division has been
identified to conduct multiple rotations starting next year. What is not known is whether or not any other option was considered, or if status quo was invoked.
ENDNOTES


5. GAO, 28.


7. Shalikashvili, 23.

8. Shalikashvili, 1.

9. Shalikashvili, 12.


13. Mann, 94.


19. General Accounting Office, Impact of Operations Other than War on the ServicesVaries. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness and Management Support (Washington: 1999), 28. This report is a 45 page compilation of the effects on all the services from conducting extended peace keeping operations, and its potential effect on executing other missions. This document highlights key critical issues with Air Force personnel and equipment issues as well as the overall readiness of the force.


21. GAO, 12. The Air Force estimates are that units are consuming 2 years worth of flying hours in a 6-month deployment.

22. GAO, 9.

23. GAO, 21.

24. GAO, 21.


26. GAO, 2.


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