JAPAN'S COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: CONVERGENCE TOWARDS GLOBAL COOPERATION?

by

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June 2000

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Since the end of the Cold War, the world poses a new, multipolar, political environment. Japan, a major economic power, embarked on multilateralism in the 1970s, when the unquestioned and unlimited U.S. support for Japan's one-sided economic foreign policy diminished. This process revealed cultural and traditional shortcomings in Japan's foreign policy conduct. The concept of Comprehensive National Security, created in 1980 was utilized to overcome these shortcomings, but did not succeed substantially. The European Community created European Political Cooperation (EPC) to match economic and political influence. An immobile bureaucracy and the tendency of EU member states to retain certain sovereignty rights rendered EPC relatively unsuccessful. The EU sought to overcome these problems with the new Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP). However, changes in decision making were marginal and consequentially did not improve CFSP in comparison to EPC. EU-Japan economics as well as political cooperation suffered from incompatibilities between the EU and Japan in the conduct of policy making. Only major reform attempts by both, leading to a higher degree of compatibility and the limitation on moderate goals offer the chance of successful cooperation. Global cooperation seems only achievable in the long term.

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Only major reform attempts by both, leading to a higher degree of compatibility and the limitation on moderate goals offer the chance of successful cooperation. Global cooperation seems only achievable in the long term.
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<tr>
<td>ACP countries</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia – Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South – East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia – European Meeting</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General of the European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>EALAF</td>
<td>East Asia – Latin America Forum</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EMS</td>
<td>European Monetary System</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
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<td>ETP Japan</td>
<td>Executive Training Program in Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Export Promotion Program</td>
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<td>FAWEU</td>
<td>Forces Answerable to the Western European Union</td>
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<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters (SCAP)</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>Government Section (GHQ)</td>
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<td>G7/8</td>
<td>Group of Seven/Eight industrialized nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGC</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEDO</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MITI</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>MSA</td>
<td>Mutual Security Assistance Act</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North-Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN SC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Socialist Soviet Republics</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There are three major powers in the economic realm, the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Whereas the United States matches its economic power with military power, the European Union and Japan are military dwarfs. Furthermore, the absence of coercive power generates a lack of political influence in both the European Union and Japan.

Since the end of the Cold War, the bipolar world order has been replaced by a multipolar order in which, despite its power, the United States can not unilaterally shape world affairs. In this environment many states look for alternatives to the United States when they seek solutions of economic or political problems. Their fear of the United States' hegemony and the absence of the Soviet counterweight propel this search. Measured by their economic strength the European Union and Japan are natural candidates of states searching for support other than the United States'.

Whenever these demands were voiced, the European Union as well as Japan always provided economic support, but were slow or even impotent to provide political or military support.

To understand these inhibitions, it is necessary to look into the development of Japan's foreign and security policy since World War II. Deeply marked by the devastation of the war, Japan adopted an all-out pacifistic, and non-involvement policy solely hinged on the U.S.-Japan security alliance. This arrangement was even enhanced by the emerging Cold War, in which Japan posed as a strong point for U.S. presence in
Asia. U.S.-Japan relations followed the formula that Japan would provide economic backup for the United States, and the United States would in exchange provide defense for Japan. Japan used this arrangement to revitalize its economy and economically support all non-communist countries in Asia. Japan's reluctance in taking a share in the United States' military burden, as well as Japan's growing trade surplus vis-a-vis the United States was tentatively tolerated, in order to preserve Japan's stabilizing role in Asia.

In the 1970s, the United States started to demand a more even burden sharing in the area of defense, and pressed Japan to reduce its trade surplus. Furthermore, at the end of the Cold War, the United States lessened its political involvement in the region. Japan started to reorient its exclusively bilateral foreign policy towards multilateral involvement. In this process Japan started to formulate a broader approach towards security policy. The report on Comprehensive National Security was the result of this process. Japan's sole economic orientation, at that time, had become a political paradigm. Comprehensive National Security was maintained as the leading concept incorporating all aspects of security, however the established paradigm could not be overcome shortly. Cultural norms and the successful tradition of economic orientation induced a certain resistance becoming more compatible in international politics. Consequentially, Japan came to appreciate cooperation with the other politically less influential economic power, Europe.

The European Union experienced a movement from economic community towards economic union. The European Member States of the European Community
benefited largely from economic unification. However, they were slow to complement this development with a stronger political profile. European Political Cooperation was created in acknowledgement that the economic giant, Europe, needed a political voice, but did not accomplish much, due to the member states' resistance to surrender sovereignty. The end of the Cold War and a mounting demand for improvements in economic, foreign and defense policy propelled the European Community to further unite in the European Union, and to launch the Common Foreign and Security Policy and, eventually, the European Security and Defense Identity. However, modi of operations that caused a very cumbersome decision making process were maintained and transferred to the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as to the European Security and Defense Identity. Consequentially, the EU could not considerably gain in profile in these areas. This might change when the EU reforms, planned for the year 2000, can accomplish further unification.

Domestic obstacles in Japan and in the European Union rendered economic as well as political cooperation, at best, moderately successful. A broad range of initiatives were taken, and announcements made. Substantial accomplishments were not achieved. The most prominent feature of EU-Japan cooperation is incrementalism. Only two initiatives, a common position in the World Trade Organization and Japan's contribution to the peace process in former Yugoslavia, amounted to tangible achievements in EU-Japan cooperation.

In this situation both sides will have to embark on substantial reforms to provide for more compatibility in their policy making processes. Furthermore, a tentative
approach via regional cooperation in the mid term, and global cooperation in the long
term seems to be the only viable solution in the attempt to validate comprehensive EU-
Japan cooperation.
I. INTRODUCTION

As this thesis research project began, one contemplated questions about whether it was appropriate to compare the foreign and security policies of Japan and the European Union. In one sense they seem to be too different to warrant any meaningful comparison.

Japan, on the one hand, is a nation state anchored in a bilateral security alliance with the United States, existing in an environment that has some residual Cold War risk factors and no perspective for the immediate emergence of multilateral security structures, like those existing in Europe.

Furthermore, Japan is the second largest national economy of the world. However, with regard to Japan’s foreign and security policy stature, it is a low profile state. This discrepancy created certain problems for Japan in post-Cold War years. Especially since Japan’s ally, the United States, pressed Japan to adopt a higher foreign and security profile.

In other words Japan is forced to define itself as an all out global player instead of being the global trader, which it was in the four decades of the Cold War. To achieve this end Japan has to develop a certain degree of political and military presence without aggravating its neighbors, concerned about reemerging Japanese expansionism.

The European Union, on the other hand, is a transitional structure developing from a mainly economic-oriented confederation moving towards a political union. It is starting to supplement a common market and currency with a Common Foreign and
Security Policy and a European Security and Defense Identity, which are designed to create a European voice in the world.

The European Union, as a group of nation states with strong economic, integrative ties, started to formulate a more concise foreign and security policy at the end of the Cold War. This initiative was driven by the notion that further economic integration (a common currency) would have to be matched by further political integration, a development justified by the fact that the EU is already perceived as an entity by other international actors. In this sense, the EU represents an economic global player, which will become the world’s largest single economy when the economic and financial integration is completed.

Even these short sketches of the nation state of Japan and the states of the EU on its way to unification, give an idea of the vast differences between both as political actors.

However, there are striking similarities between Japan and the European Union, which warrant the comparisons made in this thesis’ analysis. These similarities partially stem from very different origins, but take very similar forms in their actual shape. Both, Japan and Europe are economic giants and political dwarfs searching for an adequate role in world politics. This process is examined in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

In chapter two of this thesis Japan’s foreign and security policy development since World War II (WW II) will be analyzed.

In chapter three the European Union’s foreign policy developments culminating in the new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will be analyzed.
In chapter four EU-Japan cooperation in the economic as well as the political area will be analyzed in order to identify the potentials to deepen existing cooperation, and to propose cooperative initiatives in the area of foreign and security policy.

Since both, Japan as well as the EU are newcomers on the foreign and security policy world stage, it seems logical, despite all other differences between the two, to analyze whether these two actors emerging from the economic league can form a team in the foreign and security policy league. All the chapters in this thesis shall examine the factors shaping their efforts and influencing their prospects.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

A. INTRODUCTION

Mitsubishi, Sony, and Toshiba are household names all over the world. Quality products at affordable prices, and groups of Japanese tourists, holding cameras in front of their faces, are common images when the West defines Japan or the Japanese. However, when asked about Japan’s role in world politics, most Westerners have real problems to provide a satisfactory answer.

Is there more to Japan than cars, electronics, computers and strange visitors? Why does Japan have such a high profile in economics and such a low profile in politics?

This chapter will analyze why, and how Japan developed its current stature in the world. External, domestic, and cultural factors leading to Japan’s obsession with economics and its relative absence from world politics will be portrayed.

Finally, barriers, which will have to be removed domestically as well as externally for Japan to become a normal nation, a nation beyond cars, cameras, and computers, will be identified. Furthermore, initiatives the Japanese have to take to overcome their economic single-mindedness will be discussed.
B. JAPAN'S APPROACH OF BECOMING AN ECONOMIC POWER

1. Emergence of the Yoshida Doctrine

   a. Occupation and Japan's Post-War Constitution

   The most prominent goal of the U.S. for early occupation policy was to prevent Japan's rearmament and the resurgence of militarism. To ensure this end, the U.S. occupation administration provided for a constitution that was designed to prevent these two threats once and for all.

   Japan's new constitution "was drafted by personnel of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power's (SCAP) General Headquarter's (GHQ) Government Section (GS) in early 1946. After debate in the Diet,¹ it was promulgated in November 1946 by the Japanese government."² The important point is that foreigners, i.e., American occupation personnel, drafted the constitution and that debate in the Diet and promulgation by the government were more or less formal acts.

   A cornerstone of later foreign policy development is Article 9, the sole article of Chapter II, "Renunciation of War," which states:

---
¹ The Japanese Parliament (Diet, a German word, describing the alimentation of members of parliament.
² Duus, 156.
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.³

Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru⁴ artfully used this constitutional provision as well as the publics pacifism to create a foreign policy doctrine⁵ that centered exclusively on economics.


Japan’s raising strategic importance for the U.S. at the advent of the Cold War in Asia in 1950 offered a unique chance for Yoshida to consolidate his future course for Japan’s foreign policy. In the ensuing negotiations for a peace treaty Yoshida took the position

that Japan could make minimal concessions of passive cooperation with the Americans in return for an early end of the occupation, a long - term guarantee of its national security, and the opportunity to concentrate on all - out economic recovery.⁶

⁴ Prime Minister: 22 May 1946 to 24 May 1947, 14 February 1948 to 10 December 1950 (four terms), Duus, 160.
⁵ For the discussion of the appropriateness of Yoshida’s concept as a doctrine, see Pyle, 25 – 26.
⁶ Ibid., 23.
In the negotiations for the peace treaty and a security treaty, Yoshida kept his stance. He made minimal concessions to the U.S. side and bluntly refused its proposal to create a regional defense alliance in Asia mirroring NATO in Europe.\(^7\) Despite considerable pressure from the U.S., Yoshida succeeded holding his ground by invoking apprehensions about rearment articulated by Japan’s neighbors as well as by forces in the U.S. and Europe. Furthermore he was able to exploit anti rearment protests by the Japanese left enhancing anxieties in Japan as well as in the U.S. about domestic instability and a slide in Japan’s polity to the left, if not towards communism.

Three main issues of Yoshida’s policy became clear during the negotiations:

1. Japan’s economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal. Political - economic cooperation with the United States was necessary for this purpose.

2. Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political strategic issues. Not only would this low posture free the energies of its people for productive industrial development, it would avoid divisive internal struggles - what Yoshida called ‘a thirty-eighth parallel’ in the hearts of the Japanese people.

3. To gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan would provide bases for the U.S. army, navy, and air force.\(^8\)

\(^7\) Ibid., 24.
\(^8\) Ibid., 25.
The peace treaty and the security treaty, both signed in short succession by Japan and the U.S. in September 1951, clearly reflected Yoshida’s guidelines.

Provision for U.S. bases, a veto right for the U.S. against the stationing of other foreign troops on Japanese soil, the right to intervene in domestic disorder and extraterritoriality for U.S. soldiers and their dependents in Japan were the concessions\textsuperscript{9} for a minimal force contribution. This was the transformation of the National Police Reserve (75,000 men) of occupation to the National Security Force (110,000 men in January 1952).\textsuperscript{10}

\textit{c. Consolidating the Economic Agenda}

Yoshida’s persistence to follow and maintain his doctrine again became evident when the U.S. tried to pressure Japan to expand its security forces shortly after the peace and security treaty were signed. In October 1951, the U.S. Congress passed the Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) Act, a program to aid allies through weapons and equipment supplies and training.\textsuperscript{11} The United States used the MSA act to pressure Japan into extending and converting its National Security Force of 110,000 men to a defense force of 350,000 men\textsuperscript{12}.

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 29.
Furthermore the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) favored the MSA, because they saw a chance to invigorate Japan’s economy after a certain stalemate caused by a decline in procurement orders due to a lessening demand in the closing stage of the Korean War. Technology transfers, and armament orders promised to boost Japan’s economy. However, Yoshida withstood domestic as well as U.S. pressure. Notwithstanding this position, Japan eventually yielded to U.S. pressure and signed the MSA agreement, passed the Defense Agency Establishment Law, the Self Defense Forces Law and created the National Defense Agency with ground, maritime, and air self-defense forces in March 1954.\textsuperscript{13}

Yoshida’s policy, however, scored only partial success, because the Japanese self-defense forces were not 350,000 strong as originally requested, but only 42,000 men were added to the National Security Forces, comprising the then 152,000 strong self-defense forces.

\textit{d. A First Test for the Yoshida Doctrine}

The persistence of Yoshida’s ideas became evident long after his retirement in 1950. Prime Minister Kishi Nobosuke, an anti-Yoshida conservative, tried to eliminate or at least modify the unequal aspects of the U.S.-Japan security treaty by a

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 30.
revision in 1960.\textsuperscript{14} Even though the Kishi government achieved a moderate revision of the ‘54 treaty in 1960, it government resigned due to tumultuous demonstrations against the new treaty.\textsuperscript{15}

This upheaval showed that addressing a change in Japan’s foreign and security posture was not obtainable for the time being. Thus the next two Prime Ministers\textsuperscript{16} returned to the Yoshida Doctrine and "consolidated \textit{[it]} into a national consensus."\textsuperscript{17} Both ignored recommendations of Yoshida critics to revise Article 9 of the constitution, and embarked solely on "economic nationalism on which the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the bureaucracy, the political opposition, and the populace generally could achieve substantial agreement."\textsuperscript{18}

Prime Minister Sato refined the Yoshida Doctrine by adding the three non-nuclear principles (no production, no possession, no introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japan’s soil)\textsuperscript{19} and the three principles of arms exports (no arms exports to communist countries, countries covered by UN arms embargoes, and countries involved or about to be involved in armed conflicts).\textsuperscript{20} Prime Minister Miki Takeo\textsuperscript{21} even "extended this ban on weapons exports to all countries and defined arms to include not only military equipment but also parts and fittings used in this equipment."\textsuperscript{22} A further

\textsuperscript{14} Green and Cronin, 330 – 332.
\textsuperscript{15} Beasley, 237 – 238.
\textsuperscript{17} Pyle, 32 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{19} Green and Cronin, 374.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 370.
\textsuperscript{22} Pyle, 33.
refinement was fixing defense expenditure to less than 1 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in the National Defense Program Outline 1976.

In 1976 Defense Agency Director General Sakata Michita called upon the cabinet to adopt the National Defense Program Outline to improve the quality of the armed forces and more clearly define their strictly defensive role. For this program to gain acceptance, Sakata had to agree to a ceiling on military expenditures of 1 percent of the gross national product and a prohibition on exporting weapons and military technology.²³

Until the end of the 1970s the Yoshida Doctrine had become an institutionalized national consensus, an iron rule followed by politicians quasi in a 'political reflex'.

2. From Yoshida Doctrine to New Internationalism

a. Equal Economic Status with the West Accomplished

Confident that Japan had at least caught up with the Western industrial economies, some of the political, business, and bureaucratic leaders were beginning to grope in the 1980s for a broader conception of Japanese national interest than that represented by the Yoshida strategy or the resurgent political nationalism. These internationalists were every bit as intent on pursuit of the Japanese national interest as the political nationalists, but they began to define this interest in broader terms because of changed conditions in the international system and particularly because of Japan's rapid rise in the system."²⁴

²⁴ Ibid., 65 – 66.
Japan's effort to match the West solely in the economic realm after the devastating failure of keeping pace in the military and power politics area until World War II was finally crowned by success in the 1970s. Despite severe economic crises during the first (1974) and second oil crises (1979),\textsuperscript{25} the economic-centered policy approach proved viable and the measures taken to overcome the crises had succeeded.

These accomplishments gave boost to Japanese self-confidence and a certain reemergence of nationalism. However, the new nationalism was distinctly different compared to the nationalism of the 1930s. The earlier nationalism was more or less generated to compensate for Japan's backwardness vis-a-vis the more developed and powerful western nations. In this context, it was a means to focus Japanese efforts to compete with these western nations, especially in the military area. Whereas the new nationalism of the late '70s and early '80s was a reaction to the fact that Japan did reach equal economic status western nations. It originated in the belief that Japanese values and ways proved to be superior to western ways, evident through Japanese success.

The Yoshida Doctrine as a means to provide an optimum environment for economically matching the West obviously had outlived its usefulness. As a result of this very fact "the cabinet of Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi (1978 - 1980) began the effort to define a new purpose for Japan's recently acquired economic power."\textsuperscript{26} To achieve this goal Ohira assigned several commissions to research and formulate Japan's new agenda of addressing its role in the 21st century. Ohira's nine research groups embarked on the

\textsuperscript{25} Beasley, 263 - 265.
\textsuperscript{26} Pyle, 68.
following subjects: culture, urban living, family life, lifestyle, science and technology, macroeconomic management, economic foreign policy, pan-Pacific solidarity, and Comprehensive national security.\textsuperscript{27} The Report on Comprehensive National Security published July 2, 1980\textsuperscript{28} aimed at breaking the Yoshida Doctrine’s solely economic orientation by addressing a broader field of security relevant areas.

\textit{b. The Report on Comprehensive National Security}

The report started with an explanation of the "comprehensive nature of national security policy."\textsuperscript{29} The comprehensive nature of national security policy lies in its embracing "security in the narrow sense [\textit{military}] and economic security."\textsuperscript{30}

The new aspect in this approach is that it merged already existing, but separately pursued facets of security. Defense, on the one hand, was a means of addressing military security needs (security in the narrow sense) since Japan’s rearmament. Economic security, on the other hand, was the \textit{big} theme of the Yoshida Doctrine. The report, however, merged these formerly independent security aspects rather loosely. It identified three levels of efforts to be taken to produce security.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{28} Nagatomi, 223 – 265.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 223.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 223, (emphasis added).
Security policy [as in security in the narrow sense]

First-level efforts-creation of a more peaceful international order:
• International cooperation
• Cooperation with countries that may become enemies, i.e., arms control and confidence building measures.
Second-level efforts - intermediary measures:
• An alliance, or cooperation with countries sharing common political interests.
Third-level efforts - self-reliant efforts:
• Consolidation of denial capability, i.e., capability to prevent the easy establishment of a fait accompli; at its base, fostering of denial capability of the state and society as a whole, i.e., a strong will to protect the state’s independent existence even by making sacrifices.

Economic security policy

First-level efforts - management and maintenance of the interdependent order:
• Maintenance of the free-trade system
  Resolution of the North-South problem
Second-level efforts - intermediate measures:
• Promotion of friendly relations with a number of nations that are important to a nation’s economy
Third-level efforts - self-reliant efforts:
• Stockpiling
• A certain degree of self-sufficiency
• Basically, the maintenance of the nation’s economic strength, i.e., maintaining productivity and competitive export power.  

Furthermore the report indicated that a tacit balance between the levels of effort in each group or between groups has to be developed, because efforts of certain levels might be contradictory as well as complementary in certain situations. Only a truly comprehensive approach taking into account all efforts and their interdependent effects would provide a balanced management of overall security.

31 Ibid., 230, (emphasis added).
After identifying these management mechanisms, the report addressed conditions, tasks and specific areas to be covered by comprehensive national security. These specific areas to be covered by Comprehensive Security are:

Relations between Japan and the United States, Strengthening defense capability, Relations with China and the Soviet Union, Energy security, Food security, Countermeasures for large scale earthquakes - crisis management systems.  

In summary the Report on Comprehensive National Security was a real effort to overcome the strict division between economic foreign policy of the Yoshida Doctrine and military security exclusively linked to issues of the U.S. - Japan alliance. Despite the very careful wording, bordering on purposeful ambivalence, the report indeed paved the way for an integrated approach for dealing with security.

However, the report is far from the formulation of a strategy suggesting future policy guidelines and proposing definite measures to be taken inside a clearly defined timeframe. This ambivalence is reflected by very different interpretations by Japanese officials, economists, and scholars as to what kind of real measures the report should lead.  

This ambivalence contained in the report originates in the deep shock created by the 1960 upheaval, which lingered on, preventing a bolder attempt to address a major change in the composition of Japanese foreign and security policy. Japan seemed

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32 Ibid., 241 – 264.
33 For the limited, and broadly interpretable nature of the report as well as critique of its lack of clear vision, see interviews conducted by Barnett, Robert W. Beyond War. (McLean: Pergamon – Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1984), 21 – 123.
paralyzed or, at least, reluctant to change. Changes as the report clearly shows were only achievable in small, incremental steps. Moreover, these steps were only taken when outside pressure (gaiatsu)\textsuperscript{34} was applied. The oil crises of 1973 and 1979, the 1979 revolution in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same year, applied this kind of pressure and contributed to Ohira’s move, trying to define a new foreign and security policy for Japan.

\textit{c. External Pressure and Incrementalism}

Former MITI vice minister Amaya observed that it becomes obvious that almost all liberalization policies effected by Japan in the postwar period were implemented due to foreign pressure. Trade liberalization in the early 1960s and capital liberalization in the 1970s, for example, were undertaken reluctantly by industry or the government because of pressure from outside. Financial and communications liberalization in the 1980s, meanwhile, was commenced because of pressure from the U.S.\textsuperscript{35}

The examples found in financial and economic areas can be supplemented by examples in the military security area as well (see sub-subsections 1.b. and 1.c.). It is not likely that this reactive pattern might change soon. Its cultural footing,\textsuperscript{36} its long and successful tradition in guarding the "catch up" process of Japan from major disruptions, and the unique structure of decision making processes in Japan grant a longevity to it.

\textsuperscript{34} Pyle, 111.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 111.
A one and a half-party system in which factions of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) very often assumed the function of opposition parties in other democracies, renders political decision-making cumbersome and sometimes indecisive. Whereas the election-winning party in a European democracy mostly has a solid majority to decisively alter the course of the state, the LDP very often is blocked by its own factions opposing and frequently blocking the prime minister's and his cabinet's political agenda. Decision-making is primarily driven by a consensus characterized by the smallest common denominator of the factions involved. An overall reactive policy was, and is, nearly always the result of outside pressure (gaiatsu).

Controversial issues not pressed from the outside can be kept dormant for the sake of political harmony and the achievement of a consensus where the smallest common denominator is easily agreeable for all groups concerned. This feature of Japanese political culture leads to incrementalism. Incrementalism describes a tendency to figuratively advance with small steps instead of trying a big leap.

This approach, however, makes Japan's foreign policy quite cumbersome in dealing with western democracies which, for certain, follow a more agile approach, enabling them to address issues preventively and push for a decision even in the absence of outside pressure. As a consequence, western countries very often mistook the incrementalism and reactiveness of Japanese policy as signs of obstructionism. In Japan's early, postwar days when the Yoshida Doctrine took shape, obstructionism was surely a conscious part of Japanese policy. In later years, at least in the 1980s, incrementalism and

37 Mochizuki, 17 – 23.
the reliance on outside pressure had become a quasi-organic feature of Japanese foreign policy.

Acknowledging this fact, it is not a surprise that the Report on Comprehensive National Security does not resemble a strategy proposal *western style* but a very sensitive *suggestion* to attempt building a consensus along certain lines of discussion.

*d. Japan's Problem Entering the International Stage*

These strong differences in decision-making processes and approaches towards developing initiatives between Japan and western countries, especially the United States, accounted for a lot of frustration on both sides.

Japan's new internationalists, who wanted to enter the international stage and assume their proper place as a leader, globally or at least regionally for the time being, were severely hampered by their political culture. Breaking the pattern by embarking on a more proactive policy seemed necessary and at the same time nearly impossible.

Public opinion towards Japan in western countries increasingly deteriorated in the 1980s. Accusations of Japan having a "free ride"[^38] on U.S. security guaranties without taking a fair share of the burden, but getting richer through a mounting

[^38]: Olsen, 59.
trade surplus, were getting stronger. In Europe, Japanese aggressive export policy became a public nuisance as well.

During this time of mounting tensions Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro entered office.

His term represented a marriage of the political nationalism that had opposed the Yoshida strategy since 1950 and the new internationalism that was a product of the neo conservative ideas articulated in the Ohira commissions.\textsuperscript{39}

Nakasone acknowledged that the Pax Americana\textsuperscript{40} was in decline and that Japan’s foreign policy needed a reorientation, a grand design\textsuperscript{41} that would be able to thoroughly replace the Yoshida Doctrine. Furthermore, the U.S. not only increasingly criticized Japan’s foreign and trade policy, but European countries did as well.\textsuperscript{42}

To beat Japan’s slow decision-making process, circumvent its bottom - up consensus building, and neutralize hampering, and sometimes obstructing party factional influence and bureaucratic inertia, Nakasone employed a new style of leadership.

1. He adopted a high profile, top-down, some would say presidential-style, leadership. Nakasone projected a strong personal element.

2. He used foreign policy responsibilities of his office to maximum advantage, engaging in a steady succession of diplomatic forays. Though often more rhetoric than reality, more show than substance, more promise than performance, these diplomatic activities gave Japanese foreign policy a more activist cast.

\textsuperscript{39} Pyle, 85.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, 88, and Nagatomi, 224.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid, 88, and Hunsberger, 188.
\textsuperscript{42} Burks, 189 – 191.
3. Nakasone appointed an unusual number of government commissions, semiprivate study councils, and private advisory boards to highlight his pet proposals and to bring forth largely predetermined policy recommendations. The Diet has no say in the appointment of members to these private groups. But even when official ad hoc councils were set up, Nakasone found ways to influence their composition. He chose prominent academics, opinion leaders and businessmen whose views were sympathetic to his own for advisory panels to deal with such controversial issues as defense, education, the Yasukuni Shrine, and the structure of the economy.\textsuperscript{43}

With these instruments at hand Nakasone started to implement his grand design.\textsuperscript{44} This grand design consisted of four stages of development, establishing a new national consensus putting Japan in a leading position in the world.

The first feature was the acknowledgement that Japan had matched the West and had to assume a leading role\textsuperscript{45} in the new "information society - Jojo Shakai,"\textsuperscript{46} which was to be created for the twenty-first century. The information society would include revolutionary changes in technological and economic development driven by Japan’s lead in technological research and development. The term information society as the catch phrase for a second industrial revolution, encompassing a new high tech civilization lead by Japan in the twenty-first century, was a theme already addressed in the Ohira commissions. Nakasone’s vision was now to replace the Western industrial society by a Japanese-created and led post-industrial high-tech civilization. The timeline to create this development was mid to long term, twenty to thirty years.

\textsuperscript{43} Pyle, 88 – 89.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 89 – 103.
\textsuperscript{45} Japan’s proper place in the international hierarchy, see Benedict.
\textsuperscript{46} Pyle, 90.
To start the creation of the new information society and to ensure Japan’s leadership, several information technology projects were initiated by MITI. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) at the same time installed thirty-nine research teams "to study the next stage of civilization."\(^{47}\)

The development of most western countries towards an information society of global proportions could already be predicted by various stages of information technology and electronic automation in industrial production in the mid '80s. Nakasone’s point was that Japan should use its equal status in this area to assume global leadership.

According to his design, the first feature of technological leadership had to be supplemented by a second feature to prepare Japan for global leadership by reforming its institutions creating an "international state - Kokusai Kokka".\(^{48}\)

Nakasone sought a liberalization of institutions partly because he was convinced that they were often inefficient remnants of the catch-up process, partly because they were inflaming projectionist sentiment in other countries, and partly because, by opening up the nation's institutions and practice liberalization would better qualify Japan for international respect and leadership.\(^{49}\)

This second feature, being a genuine and consistent move to support technological leadership was, however, in part forced by gaiatsu - outside pressure. Japan’s trade surplus with the United States and other countries was mounting and the

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 91.
\(^{48}\) Ibid., 91 - 92.
\(^{49}\) Ibid., 92.
above mentioned protectionism became a tangible threat to Japan's export oriented economy.

At this point Nakasone again resorted to a private council to prepare a report proposing changes in Japan, sufficient to open the country, introduce reforms, and reduce trade frictions. Nakasone, who bypassed his ruling LDP and the bureaucracy by using this private advisory group, presented the group's recommendations at the 1986 economic summit with President Reagan in Washington.²⁰

The reactions encountered in Washington during the summit, as well as in Tokyo later on, were a clear sign that achieving this second feature of his design would not easy. To avoid further domestic criticism, Nakasone reiterated the report's proposals as a mid to long-term target. Western critiques that the proposals were lacking detail, were met by a follow-up report in 1987, which was more specific. However, reactions to the second feature of Nakasone's design clearly showed that becoming an international state, which nevertheless was acknowledged as a necessary precondition for global economic leadership, would create considerable domestic resistance, and thus need "strong political leadership and popular support."²¹

The third feature of Nakasone's design was to regain national self-confidence by creating a new "liberal nationalism".²²

The catch-up effort compelled the Japanese to borrow large quantities of knowledge and institutions from Western countries to replace the inherited wisdom and values of their own culture. To the Japanese with their

²⁰ For further background on this report (the Maekawa Report) see LaFeber, 379 – 385.
²¹ Pyle, 93 and LaFeber, 380.
²² Pyle, 94.
culturally ingrained sense of hierarchy and status, this demeaning condition created a peculiar sense of inferiority and loss of pride.\textsuperscript{53}

To change this sense of inferiority and create a more cosmopolitan, self-confident generation Nakasone sought to reform the educational system. The result of this reform process would not only be a Japan proudly entering the twenty-first century, aware of its traditions and values, but also a Japan cosmopolitan, open and flexible enough to meet other peoples on even ground, understanding their ways without being aloof. The Importance of gaining international leadership in this context was an effort to facilitate positive aspects of Japanese tradition and pride without slipping into pre-war nationalistic patterns of xenophobic arrogance and racial hubris. Nakasone's idea was not so much nationalistic in a conventional sense, but a selective traditionalism combined with internationalism in order to bridge the past and the future, making Japan's national character internationally interoperable without loosing its 'Japaneseness'.

The fourth and last feature of Nakasone's grand design was "to adopt an active role in strategic affairs."\textsuperscript{54} His initiative was twofold. One part consisted of bold announcements abroad claiming strategic commitments, and speeches stirring up national pride and patriotism demanding a more assertive role in foreign and security affairs. The second part consisted of more tangible initiatives to enhance Japan's stature in the security area. These were a loan to South Korea "explicitly linked to the strategic defense of Japan."\textsuperscript{55} Another was initiating "cabinet approval for the transfer of purely military

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 101.
technology to the United States in what symbolized a major modification of the three principles on arms exports.  

Furthermore, Nakasone tried to increase defense spending above the one percent of GNP limit. He wanted "Japan to defend itself with a truly autonomous defense." Strong opposition from factions of the LDP forced him to abandon this initiative for the time being. However, after rallying more support for his plan he, at least, achieved a partial, mainly symbolic success. "In December 1986, the cabinet decided on a 1987 defense allocation that would exceed one percent of the projected GNP - by four one - thousandths of a percentage point."

Nakasone addressed the crucial question of constitutional revision repeatedly as an important matter to gain strategic significance for Japan in the twenty-first century. However, in clear acknowledgement of political reality, i.e. strong opposition inside as well as outside the ruling party, he did not attempt to really bring constitutional revision to a decision.

Nakasone's Grand Design, in summary, was based on the Report on Comprehensive National Security, but went past it by showing a way to really execute it and surpass the Yoshida Doctrine by bringing Japan politically onto the international stage. However, he misunderstood the rigidity of the Japanese system. As a result changes were again incremental and limited. The Yoshida Doctrine was just modified "around the edges."

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56 Ibid., 101.  
58 Pyle, 103 and Hunsberger, 104 – 105.  
59 Ibid., 104.
There were, however, really tangible results like the modification of the arms export principles, the breakthrough of the one-percent defense spending ceiling, liberalization of trade barriers and a heightened awareness and discussion of security issues. Despite these accomplishments, judged by Nakasone's rhetoric and the explicit goals of his grand design - a complete reorientation of Japanese purpose and stature - his achievements were inadequate.

A factor supporting the adherents of the Yoshida Doctrine was the basic acknowledgement by the U.S. of the division of roles in the U.S.-Japan relationship.

American financial weakness raised demands for a greater equality in the Japanese-American partnership, although it was accepted that Japan would continue to play a strategically and militarily subordinate role. Indeed, until 1990, the equation: Japanese economic strength plus American military strength equals Asian/Pacific stability and security, was the officially accepted version of the optimum operation of the mutual security system.  

However, with the end of the Cold War the strategic situation in Asia changed considerably, and Japan increasingly faced a growing complexity of the military situation around its islands and the mounting pressure from the U.S. to take a stronger part in security affairs of the region. The clear-cut, bipolar situation of the Cold War gave way to a less predictable security environment that needed other concepts than the above-cited equation.

A remarkable fact is that Japan's threat perception, guided by the strategic assessment of the U.S. during the Cold War, did not greatly lessen. The destabilizing
effect of the continued division of the Korean peninsula, and the increasingly erratic behavior of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the 1990s, prevented Japan from becoming comfortable with its political environment. Furthermore, Japan's economic diplomacy providing for stability and influence in the region was not as influential as anticipated by Japan. A major revision of Japan's security policy and a reevaluation of different approaches towards security, bilateral vs. multilateral, had to be addressed in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War.

C. POST COLD WAR – JAPAN TRIES TO BECOME A NORMAL POWER

1. Multilateral (Security) Ties of Japan - Positioning for Future Options.

   a. Regional Cooperation: Japan and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)/ASEAN Regional Forum (ASEAN ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Group (APEC), and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)

   Japan belonged to the western, democratic camp as a partner and stronghold of the U.S. during the Cold War. However, "in the 1970s Japan's focus began
to shift from preoccupation with bilateral relations to the issues raised by the question of links with ASEAN as a whole.\textsuperscript{61}

In 1967, ASEAN was established. Member countries are (1999): Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Holding observer status is Papua-New Guinea. Countries acting as dialogue partners are Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and the United Nations Development Program.

Relations with the countries of the region began on a purely bilateral basis, but acquired a regional emphasis in the mid-sixties, especially after the formation of ASEAN. Henceforth Japanese policy pursued a twin-track approach, with the regional aspect acquiring greater salience as ASEAN developed its identity.\textsuperscript{62}

The establishment of ARF in 1994, which institutionalized the security dialogue, complemented Japan's changing view toward security policy. Japan's broadened security definition, including economic and financial means, conceptualized in the Comprehensive National Security Report, matched the development of ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

The establishment of APEC in 1989 as a "response to the growing interdependence among Asia-Pacific economies"\textsuperscript{63} provided the full member Japan with a means to create a counterweight to ASEAN where it is \textit{just} a dialogue partner. This fact

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 103.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 99.
contributes to the notion that to some extent APEC and ASEAN are contending institutions.  

An important initiative in Northeast Asia in which Japan takes part is KEDO, which was established in 1995. In this program, the United States, Japan, and South Korea presently financially support the North Korean nuclear energy program to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. KEDO provides an example for the combination of economic and security issues in order to stabilize the Northeast Asian sub region. It serves to lock parties into a routine and prevent them from acting out on national whim, as Ogura points out. In this sense KEDO is the first really combined security initiative in accordance with the idea of "Comprehensive Security".

b. Interregional Cooperation: Japan and the East Asia – Latin America

Forum (EALAF), the Asia – Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Japan is a member of EALAF as well. It constitutes an interregional, economic cooperation venue, which enables Japan to reach out toward South America. Japan, furthermore, is a full member of ASEM. This forum enables Japan to monitor initiatives of the European Union (EU) in Asia, and influence these initiatives where Japanese interests are concerned.

64 Walter, "Japan's Position", 6.
After the end of the civil war in former Yugoslavia (1991 - 1996), Japan volunteered to take part in the rebuilding process of Bosnia Herzegovina. As a case in point, Japan is, after the EU and the U.S., the third largest contributor of aid to former Yugoslavia.67 This engagement was even extended to personnel support, when Japan dispatched 25 election supervisors to support the OSCE election monitoring efforts in Bosnia Herzegovina in September 1998.68

Consequently, the EU invited Japan to be an observer to the OSCE and the Council of Europe due to its contribution to the peace process in former Yugoslavia. In this capacity Japan took part in the 1994 OSCE-Summit for the first time.69 These facts can be taken as evidence for Europe’s acknowledgement of Japan's ability to act as a bridge between Asia and the West (Europe).

c. Global Cooperation: Japan and the United Nations (UN), The World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Group of Seven (G7)

Japan has been a member of the UN since 1956. Furthermore Japan is the second largest financial contributor to the UN. Hence, Japan has been applying for a permanent seat in the United Nation’s Security Council (UN SC) since 1994. The biggest

67 Hoffmann, 4.
69 Hoffmann, 5.
hurdle in achieving a seat in the UN SC is the fact that a SC member has to be ready to take part in collective defense operations. This, however, is a contribution Japan can not provide, according to the current interpretation of its constitution.

As a consequence of these limitations Japan passed the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992. This law enables Japanese Self Defense Forces to take part in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). Accordingly Japanese soldiers took part in UN operations in Angola, Cambodia, Rwanda, Mozambique, and the Golan Heights. However, due to remaining, constitutional restrictions, Japanese peacekeepers are not allowed to take part in active military, i.e., peace enforcing, operations. Hence, a first step has been taken, a maximum of 2000 troops are earmarked for UN duty, and the path is prepared for global participation. A further initiative to gain a permanent SC seat is Japan’s strong promotion of a general reform of the UN to prepare its institutions and procedures, including the number of permanent SC seats, to match the 21st century’s challenges.

The bond between the UN and Japan was further strengthened with the appointment of three Japanese to leadership positions in UN organizations: Akashi Yasushi, who was special representative for Cambodia and then for Bosnia negotiations and in 1995 became adviser to the UN secretary-general; Ogata Sadako became the UN’s high commissioner for refugees; and Nakajima Hiroshi was made head of the World Health Organization.

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70 Green and Cronin, 155 – 157.
71 Walter, “Die Beteiligung”, 2 - 5
73 Hunsberger, 123.
The WTO, IMF, and G7 are economic bodies of a global capacity. However, when seen in relation to Japan’s broader security definition, they have a certain security value. Japan as a global economic power necessarily has a vested interest in shaping global economic affairs. Non participation in these bodies would endanger Japan by being marginalized or taken advantage of by other global economic players. Furthermore, participation enables Japan to implement economic security measures in accordance with its Comprehensive National Security concept.

Japan embraces all these developments, on the one hand, to participate, and establish a prominent role in the economic and security affairs of Asia. On the other hand, Japan understands itself as a bridge between Asia and the Western world, pointed out by Prime Minister Hosokawa at the APEC summit in 1994.74

Consequently, it is apparent that Japan started to position itself as early as the late 1970s into multilateral bodies to supplement its basically rigid position as an U.S. ally. All the multilateral bodies Japan joined are mostly of an economic nature – or as in the case of ARF – concerned with non-committing security dialogues, which fit the economic part of Japan’s Comprehensive National Security concept as well as Japan’s principle of non-involvement in collective security arrangements.

74 Walter – “Japan’s Position”, 2.
2. Post Cold War - Development of the U.S. - Japan alliance

a. Finding a New Role

The end of the Cold War triggered discussion in Japan about whether current policies should and could be maintained in the way of the previous decades. Especially trade imbalances, which had been of concern between Japan and the U.S., but never reached a point where the U.S.-Japan Alliance was really questioned, now became a pressing issue.\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore the end of the East – West confrontation and the diversification of multiple risks and threats made a redefinition of Japan's security arrangements necessary.\textsuperscript{76} The outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis highlighted the problem of Japan's asymmetric security policy. The "money or blood question"\textsuperscript{77} was answered in favor of money.

Japan ultimately made a $13 billion contribution to the war effort or $100 per capita. A special tax was imposed to provide the payment. Japan was the only country to raise taxes to pay its part of the bill for the war.\textsuperscript{78}

Among the American public Japan's contribution was not appreciated, because the Japanese government had not been able to clarify its role in a crisis like the Persian Gulf conflict. Hunsberger states that the Japanese government lacked that ability,

\textsuperscript{75} Kaifu, 32 – 33.
\textsuperscript{76} Iklé and Nakanishi, 81.
\textsuperscript{77} Numata, 13.
\textsuperscript{78} Hunsberger, 65.
because Japanese politics had no basic doctrine of foreign policy, and the Japanese government lacked skill in crisis management, decision making, and explaining its views to the Japanese public and the world. During the Gulf crisis the Japanese government frequently changed its stance because of the shortcomings in its decision-making system, bureaucratic inefficiency, and differences in opinion between the Prime Minister's office and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 79

As a result of these image-damaging events the International Peace Cooperation Law was passed. Again gaiatsu had forced Japan's politicians into action. The reactive character of Japanese foreign policy again was evident. Furthermore, mounting criticism of Japan's free ride on U.S. security guaranties, especially in connection with U.S. - Japan trade imbalances, added more pressure onto Japan with regard to the U.S. Japan security relationship.

In early 1994 Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro appointed a blue-ribbon advisory group chaired by Higuchi Hirotarō to examine the future of Japanese defense policy with an eye to revising the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), the policy framework for defense planning. Hosokawa believed a thorough reassessment was needed because of the dramatic international political and economic changes that had transpired since the NDPO was approved in 1976. In addition, the realignment of political forces after the split within the Liberal Democratic Party provided a favorable domestic context for the review. In joining the non-LDP governing coalition led by Hosokawa, the Socialist party had abandoned its policy of unarmed neutrality and agreed to support the maintenance of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. 80

On the basis of Higuchi's report, working level discussions between U.S. and Japanese officials under the Nye initiative 81 defined the new NDPO, which was

79 Ibid., 65.
80 Mochizuki, 8 – 9.
81 Mochizuki, 13 and Ennis, 38 – 41.
approved by the Japanese parliament in 1995. The most significant feature of the new NDPO was that the areas of Japanese operations in support of the U.S. - Japan security arrangements were "areas surrounding Japan." This formulation stirred some critique of the Cabinet Legal Affairs Bureau saying that it should not be understood as exceeding the constitution's limitation to strict self-defense. However, the same formula came up in the 1997 Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation of 1978. The agreement provided for Japan to facilitate public and private installations, facilities, and services in times of crisis. The argument that erupted, especially among more pacifistic circles, was that the vague formulations were chosen to undermine constitutional restrictions and to open a backdoor to circumvent them in times of crisis.

Even today, this particular critique reveals a sore spot in the whole U.S.-Japan security discussion. It is, at least in Japan, not a completely open, and public discussion.

A review of the constitution or the security treaty may temporarily aggravate the work of bureaucrats, but a public debate about these matters may be just what is necessary to raise the consciousness of Japanese citizens and politicians.

The process of discussing the constitution, Japan's role in the post Cold War world, and whether Japan wants to be a security junior partner, or an equal partner of

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84 Ibid., 9 and 14.
85 Wilkinson, 50 – 55.
86 Mochizuki, 22.
the United States should be more comprehensive than the revision of the guidelines suggest. An approach consistent with the Comprehensive National Security concept would make a strengthened defense role of Japan much more palpable for the Japanese public.

As vital as these [defense cooperation] matters are, maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region requires more than military means.\textsuperscript{87}

This approach should not be too difficult, because even the coordination draft of the United States Armed Forces Joint Vision 2020 incorporates Comprehensive Security when it states that

the complexity of future operations also requires that, in addition to operating jointly, our forces have the capability to effectively participate as one element of a unified effort. This integrated approach brings to bear all elements of national power - military, diplomatic, information, and economic - to achieve our national objectives unilaterally when necessary, while making optimum use of the skills, resources, and legitimacy provided by multinational forces, regional and international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations when possible.\textsuperscript{88}

This seems especially odd when seen in context with Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999 Diplomatic Bluebook.\textsuperscript{89} Its general layout reflects an improved, developed, and more sophisticated version of Comprehensive National Security. However, the bluebook displays a certain division between Japan-U.S. overall relations and Japan-U.S. security arrangements. This creates the impression of a dual but

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 23 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{88} Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 - 16.
unconnected role of the United States in Japan's security and foreign relations considerations. On the one hand, Japan maintains a distinctive style of security ties with the United States, but on the other hand Japan maintains diplomatic, economic, and other relations with the United States on the same footing as with other countries. This observation leads to the conclusion: whereas the Bluebook represents an evolved version of Comprehensive National Security, a disintegration of security and other cooperation aspects with regard to the United States has been presumably chosen to reduce the overall influence of the U.S. on Japanese policy. The prevailing asymmetry in Japan’s foreign and security policy shows that Comprehensive National Security is still not completely implemented.

**D. FINAL REMARKS**

The development of Japan's foreign and security policy after World War II was ultimately determined by the U.S. enforced peace constitution and Yoshida Shigeru's policy facilitating this constitution to relentlessly pursue a narrowly defined policy of economic equality with the West, in particular the United States. His ability to facilitate the constitution, the Cold War, and the United States' need to maintain bases in Japan, creating a Japan-U.S. security arrangement, granted success for his vision. This success solidified his vision, or doctrine, into a political paradigm that became at least dubious when Japan caught up with western, industrialized nations and was in need of a broader foreign and security approach. At that point, the paradigm turned out to be a curse.
Devoid of all flexibility after three decades of Yoshida Doctrine, Japanese politicians were not able to decisively change direction. However, this inability is not exclusively attributable to the sacrosanct Yoshida Doctrine. Several unique features of Japanese culture played a supportive role. A hierarchical social system, group orientation, consensus oriented decision-making, and factionalism in a one and a half party system provided fertile ground for structural rigidity of the political system. Yoshida had used this system to yield incremental steps away from his course when outside pressure was applied. The marriage of the Yoshida Doctrine and Japanese political culture had become so close that changes of the doctrine were only possible using its minimalist development approach.

Two highlights in this development away from the Yoshida Doctrine were first, the concept of Comprehensive National Security, modifying the doctrine, and hinting at a different course for Japan's foreign and security policy. Another highlight was Prime Minister Nakasone's bold attempt to decisively change Japan's future course according to the Comprehensive Security Concept. Unfortunately, his achievements have only been incremental. Analyzing the 1999 Diplomatic Bluebook of the Japanese government shows that Comprehensive National Security prevailed as a valid concept for Japanese foreign and security policy. However, certain inconsistencies in the United States' role as an ally on the one hand, and as a subject of Japan's international relations on the other hand, shows how distant Japan is from being a normal, post-Yoshida state.

Japan's reliance on outside pressure to cause change might turn out to be disastrous in the future. A severe crisis of Gulf War dimensions, for instance war on the
Korean peninsula, might surpass Japan’s abilities to react in a more suitable way than it did to the Gulf crisis. A public discussion leading to the revision of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution flanked by intensive diplomatic efforts to dispel apprehensions of Japan’s neighbors seem necessary to prepare Japan for adequate, armed crisis management. Furthermore, Japan should abandon its resistance against membership in collective, committing security arrangements. Only the inherent containment provided by such an arrangement might eventually dispel the resistance of Japan’s neighbors against a more visible military role by Japan in the region.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY

A. INTRODUCTION

The devastation of World War II was perceived by the European nations as the
culmination of centuries of rivalry and contesting power politics, resulting in a long
succession of European wars. It was clear to all Europeans that a continuation of this
pattern was impossible and would eventually lead to total destruction. The only
alternative to confrontation seemed to be cooperation. So the Western European nations
embarked on an enterprise to create a unified Europe.

Now, at the start of the twenty-first century, European unification is a success
story. The European Union is the single largest economy of the world. The European
Union is an appreciated trade partner, a sought after aid donor, and participation in this
union is the ultimate goal of many newly democratized East European countries.

But does this economic giant wield political influence, which is commensurate to
its economic power? The answer is definitely - no.

What hindered Europe in developing its political stature at the same pace as its
economic stature grew?

This chapter will analyze the development of European unification in the
economic as well as in the foreign and security area. In order to answer this question,
development patterns will be identified and their influence on prospects for an increase in political unity will be addressed.

Finally initiatives currently being undertaken to match European foreign and security policy with European economic strength will be portrayed, and their prospects for success evaluated.

B. EUROPE BECOMES AN ECONOMIC POWER

World War II (WW II) was itself a catalyst for a renewed interest in European unity. It led to the argument that nationalism and nationalist rivalries, by ending in war, had discredited the independent state as the foundation of political organization, and that what was needed was a concerted effort to develop a comprehensive continental community.\textsuperscript{90}

This principle attitude was supplemented by rising tensions between the U.S. and the USSR resulting in the Cold War. The subsequent split between Western and Eastern Europe added pressure to the necessity of defining common interests among Western European countries. Furthermore, the Western European countries were convinced that only U.S. assistance combined with cooperation between them could initiate economic recovery after the devastation of WW II.

1. Emergence of the European Community

The Treaty of Dunkirk between Britain and France (1947) and later augmented by the admission of the Low Countries in the Treaty of Brussels (1948) were directed at a possible reemergence of German aggression. In 1948 the Cold War redirected the security concerns of European countries and the U.S.. To counter the threat posed by the Soviet Block, the U.S. and European countries formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).\(^9\) The Truman Doctrine granting U.S. support and aid for the free world, and NATO as a protective shield for Western Europe created the preconditions for closer European cooperation.

The first tangible result of the move toward European cooperation was the establishment of the intergovernmental Council of Europe in 1949. A year earlier the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established to coordinate the distribution of U.S. aid given by the European Recovery Program, the Marshall Plan.\(^2\) The U.S. insisted that European countries participating in the Marshall Plan should organize the distribution of aid themselves to maximize synergetic effects of such support. This coordinative task was assigned to the OEEC.

The intergovernmental nature of the European Council as well as the OEEC did not satisfy those political forces in Europe, which favored a closer supranational cooperation eventually leading the way towards a real, political union of Europe. The

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first step in this direction was an initiative by the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, to merge the coal and steel resources of France and West Germany. The so-called Schuman Plan succeeded in 1951 when six European states\(^{93}\) signed the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

The ECSC was the first Western European organization in which European states "yielded some sovereignty to a supranational authority."\(^{94}\)

The institutional structure - including an assembly and supreme judicial body - adopted by the ECSC was to serve as a model for all future developments.\(^{95}\)

The Treaties of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) marked the next step on the way to European integration in 1957. Both communities were structured on the constitutional structures of the ECSC,

with the quasi - executive and supranational European Commission intended to be the motor force of integration; its authority was counterbalanced by the Council of Ministers, representing the Member states. Facing these executives was, first, a much weaker Assembly with no significant decision - making powers, which soon adopting the title of European Parliament (EP), engaged in a perpetual struggle to enlarge its own authority; and second a European Court of justice which rapidly, through the ruling that EEC law took precedence over national law, asserted itself as a major bonding force.\(^{96}\)

\(^{93}\) France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.


\(^{95}\) Ibid., 5.

\(^{96}\) Ibid., 6 - 7 and Macridis, 355 - 356.
Until the early to mid '60s, the three European communities were quite successful. Internal tariff barriers had almost been dismantled and internal European trade flourished. This success-story persuaded other European states to seek membership in the European communities. France under the leadership of President Charles de Gaulle vetoed British admission in 1963 and 1967; "because of its Commonwealth links and [close] relationship with the U.S. [it] was not sufficiently committed to Europe or to EEC objectives."97

Furthermore, he rejected the move toward qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers, which was envisioned to come into force in 1966 by the Treaty of Rome. De Gaulle feared that abandoning the previously practiced unanimity vote in the Council would cancel France's veto right on decisions and as a consequence carried the risk that the other Council members might outvote France.

In 1966 "the Luxembourg Compromise was agreed, France resuming its seat (in 1965 de Gaulle vacated France’s seat in the council to force the continuation of unanimity vote) in the Council in return for retention of the unanimity requirement where very important interests are at stake."98

In the previous year a positive move had been accomplished when a treaty to merge the executives of the three European Communities was signed in Brussels. This treaty entered into force in July 1967 and provided for greater cohesion in the European Communities now presenting itself as the European Community (EC). In 1968, the last

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97 Ibid., 7 (emphasis added).
remaining custom duties in intra-Community trade were replaced by a common customs tariff.

Subsequently de Gaulle's retirement (1969) opened the way for further enlargement of the EC. In 1973 Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the EC. The 1974 Paris Summit marked another point on the way towards integration. The Community's Heads of State agreed to meet three times a year forming the European Council. This marked the growing interest of the member states to facilitate the EC as a common forum. Furthermore, the Paris Summit gave "the go-ahead for direct election to the European Parliament by universal suffrage."

In 1981 Greece and in 1986, Spain and Portugal joined the Community. In 1985 the Community reached a point in its development where a revision of the Treaty of Rome seemed necessary "to revitalize the process of European integration." As a consequence the European Council founded an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to draw a Single European Act (SEA) encompassing a package of amendments to the Treaty of Rome.

100 Ibid., 4.
101 Ibid., 9 – 10.
a. The Single European Act and the initiative for a European Monetary Union

The SEA was signed by the member states in 1986 and entered into force in 1987. The most important feature of the SEA was the clear commitment to "January first, 1993 as the date by which a full internal market was to be established." The "collapse of European communism and the impending reunification of the two Germanys, and second the revitalized Commission under the effective and single minded leadership of Delors" gave fulfillment of the provisions of the SEA new urgency. The most important initiative in this context was Jacques Delors report to the European Council on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1989.

The EMU had already been on The Hague’s summit agenda in late 1969. However,

the turbulence that beset the international monetary system after 1970, generating a world of floating currencies, brought the EC’s plans for EMU to an abrupt end by the middle of the decade. Its attempts in 1972 to establish a zone of monetary stability (the 'snake') never got off the ground and the structure was already dead when it was abandoned in 1976. The European Monetary System (EMS) of 1979, while successful, was a more modest design and only a first step back on the right road.

104 The currency 'snake' is set up, the Six agreeing to limit the margin of fluctuation between their currencies to 2.25 %, see “European Documentation - Europe in ten points.”

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To overcome earlier consensus problems, which had hampered the creation of a monetary union, and to forward political union, the European Council established two IGCs. One was to draft a proposal on EMU, and the second to draft a proposal on political union promoting the transition from an entity based on economic integration towards a political union "including a common foreign and security policy." Both IGCs proposals were due to the Maastricht summit in December 1991.

2. From Community to Union – The Treaty on European Union

It [the Maastricht summit] had the task of finalizing a radical overhaul of the Treaty of Rome that would constitute a framework for European union that would incorporate political measures and EMU, determine a timetable for implementation of the changes, and launch the EC along a new security dimension. By and large these objectives were achieved. The Treaty on European Union set 1999 as the deadline for EMU implementation, but with strict monetary criteria being imposed upon the Member States. It extended EC competence in several policy areas, established a new Cohesion Fund to assist the poorer Member States, satisfied the condition for further integration set in the Treaty, and transformed the EC into the European Union (EU), where by the EC and its supranational institutional structure would be paralleled by two pillars of intergovernmental cooperation directed by the European Council, one dealing with a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the other with Home Affairs and Justice.

Until 1992 the history of the EC had been a success-story, despite turbulence impairing its development. The de Gaulle crisis in 1965 – 1967, the shelving of the EMU,


and the subsequent, and more moderate approach of the EMS, among others, can be interpreted as drawbacks which dampened the enthusiasm of unionists, and revealed the scope of what was possible for the development of a unified Europe. Nevertheless, the range of trading agreements clearly show that the European Community and, since 1993, the European Union "is a major player in the global economy, accounting for a substantial proportion of world trade." \(^{109}\)

\textit{a. Trade Agreements, an example of successful Economic Foreign Policy}

The EC's trade agreements have a certain development and economic aid component.

Having an open and dependent economy, the Community became aware of its extreme vulnerability in 1973 as a result of the oil crisis and the solidarity established between Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OPEC) and the third world. Thereafter it systematically tried to avoid the confrontation between industrialized and developing countries. \(^{110}\)

The four Lome Conventions concluded between 1975 and 1989 linked sixty-six African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP countries) to the EC.

In addition to trade provisions one of Lome's original features is to give preferential treatment to the poorest ACP countries: twenty-two of the


thirty-one least developed countries according to UN standards benefit from the convention.\textsuperscript{111}

For example, during the third Lome Convention period 1985 - 1990, the EU was the largest provider of official development aid. The EC spent 0.51 percent of its GNP in comparison to the U.S. with 0.29 percent and Japan with 0.23 percent of their respective GNPs on development aid.\textsuperscript{112}

These figures clearly indicate not only the importance credited to economic security for Europe, but also measures to create a politically stable environment through the promotion of prosperity and development.

The problems that delayed the implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht arose, with strict criteria that the member states had to fulfil to join the common currency. Fears of emergence of a division of common currency members and non-members disrupting the common market and of loss of monetary sovereignty (or more precisely national identity) delayed the inauguration of the EU until November 1993. In addition, acute differences of opinion over foreign policy issues, most notably towards the former Yugoslavia, suggested that there were limits to effective consensus, a feeling reinforced by arguments over how far and in what way the EU ought to go down the common defense and security road.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 363.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, 362 and for more recent figures on single European Member State’s contributions see Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen der EU und Japan – Statistiken (Tokyo: Japan External Trade Organization, 1995).
Economic cooperation and gradual integration obviously made the abandonment of sovereignty less painful due to the more immediate visible gains; whereas, losing sovereignty in the area of foreign and security policy was considered more visible, and of lesser immediate benefit and thus less desirable.

However, the EC has conducted a coordinated foreign policy since 1970. The main difference compared to the economic policy of the EC lay in the basic structure of the European Communities (ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM) which had supranational constitutions and the European Political Cooperation (EPC) based on an intergovernmental structure.

C. THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION – SUPPLEMENTING

ECONOMIC POLICIES WITH FOREIGN POLICIES

Represented by the Commission, it (the EC) spoke with one voice in international trade negotiations, and after the 1970 Davignon Report on policy cooperation, the Member States, through European Political Cooperation (EPC), developed an impressive and on balance quite successful structure and pattern of collaboration on, and coordination of, foreign policy, with: regular meetings of foreign ministers and the issuing of common instructions to their ambassadors in other countries; regular consultations among ambassadors in foreign countries and at the UN; and adoption of a single EC representation in international fora and conferences, especially in the UN.114

114 Ibid, 8, (emphasis added).
1. European Political Cooperation – Europe speaks with one voice

Since 1970 the scope of the EPC has steadily broadened. This trend became evident with the foreign ministers meeting much more frequently than the four times per year as concluded in 1970. The most visible achievement of the EPC was in "East-West relations particular within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)."\(^{115}\)

EPC was able to obtain the recognition of European unification by the USSR in exchange for the recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it succeeded in linking military confidence-building measures with the protection of human rights in the form of free exchange of ideas and persons between East and West.\(^{116}\) Critiques, however, were formulated due to the slow reaction of EPC in face of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland.

Steady improvements can be measured by a more coordinated voting behavior of the Europeans in the General Assembly of the UN. Thus "creating at the UN the impression of being a united, coherent, and efficient group."\(^{117}\)

The preference of the EC for multilateral fora is also evident in its relations with ASEAN. Contacts between the EC and ASEAN have existed since 1977 and were

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\(^{117}\) Ibid., 361.
intensified in 1978 culminating in a Cooperation Agreement signed in 1980.\textsuperscript{118} Due to broad convergence in economic as well as political interests concerning the Southeast Asian region, this interregional relationship was qualified as very successful and attributed model-character for interregional cooperation in general.\textsuperscript{119} EC-ASEAN relations are dual-track relations conducted by the EC in the economic area and by the EPC in the political area. This dualism, however, did not disrupt the approach of ASEAN to deal with one entity, Europe, due to sufficient coordination between both areas of conduct.

An attempt to bring political cooperation within the framework of the Community, i.e., to initiate a transition from intergovernmental to supranational procedures and to merge foreign policy with security, eventually with defense, was initiated through the Genscher-Colombo-Plan in 1981. The proposal didn’t find sufficient support among the member states and eventually failed,\textsuperscript{120} which became evident in the single European Act of 1986.

\textsuperscript{118} Regelsberger, 325 – 340.
\textsuperscript{119} Lukas, 258.
a. EPC and the Single European Act – The reluctance to incorporate defense issues

The Single European Act (SEA) confirmed the established pattern of EPC. EPC remains a voluntary cooperation between member-states of the Community in the field of foreign policy and is pledged to seek consensus through consultation and exchange of information before each member-states decides on its final position." The SEA states that the political and economic aspects of European security can be dealt with within the framework of EPC. Furthermore, the political and strategic dimensions of Euro-American relations do not fall within the EPC's scope.122

Understanding this reluctance to incorporate military aspects of security and defense into the EC framework or into the EPC stems from an earlier unsuccessful attempt.

b. The European Defense Community - An unsuccessful attempt to create a Western European Army

During the ECSC negotiations, the international climate changed for the worse as conflict broke out in Korea. Concerned with a strengthening of NATO, the U.S. called for a West German military contribution. To avoid an independent West German army, France proposed a European Defense Community (EDC), modeled upon the ECSC, which would establish a Western European army that would include West German military units which would, however, be under

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122 Ibid., 354.
an integrated Western European and not an independent West German command.\textsuperscript{123}

The idea received some support and led to the proposal of the creation of a European Political Community (EPC),\textsuperscript{124} thus completing a comprehensive, supranational structure encompassing economic (ECSC), political (EPC), and defense (EDC) issues. France, the creator of EDC, was at the same time its terminator when the French parliament rejected the ratification of the EDC treaty in 1954. The problem of West Germany military integration to contain the re-emergence of German militarism remained.

To solve this problem the Treaty of Brussels in 1948 was joined by West Germany and Italy, and modified to become the Western European Union (WEU). Furthermore, West Germany became the fifteenth member of NATO in 1955. West Germany’s membership in NATO as well as in WEU dispelled the anxieties that previously initiated the foundation of the EDC. NATO, the larger – as well as more influential – security alliance, due to the membership of the U.S., provided the predominant security envelope for Western Europe. The only reason not to abolish the WEU was that it contained a binding mutual assistance clause, which surpassed the less committing assistance clause of NATO. Until 1984 WEU was quasi-dormant and all defense and security concerns of Western Europe were addressed through NATO. This fact is eventually the cause for EC and EPC reluctance to widen their scope into military


\textsuperscript{124} Not to be confused with European Political Cooperation (EPC), which came into effect in 1970.
security. Such a change in the military security structure of NATO might have diminished U.S. resolve to defend Western Europe and/or invited the USSR to try to split the transatlantic security partnership and endanger Western European security.

The demise of the Warsaw Pact and eventually the Soviet Union changed this rigid security pattern in Western Europe.


While the Soviet Union broke up and its major successor, Russia, became increasingly internally focused, the U.S. too seemed to be in retreat from Europe, its major objectives there now achieved. What was left was the EC - the object of every European non-member states' interest, with the potential to build on its role as a major trading power and become a more complete international actor.125

1. The Treaty on European Union Introducing the Common Foreign and Security policy

As earlier mentioned, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) or Maastricht Treaty included three pillars. First the EC, second the Common Foreign and Security Policy (the former EPC), and third Home Affairs and Justice. The first pillar retained its supranational constitution, whereas the second and third pillars featured an

integovernmental structure. Thus external as well as internal security remain mainly a cooperative effort. A result of the pillar structure

is that there are now four Commissioners with direct external relations portfolios and several more whose portfolios have external aspects. Under the Maastricht arrangements, therefore, there are now at least three centers of foreign policy activity within the Union, all loosely connected and bound by the objective of consistency, but also, in a sense, all rivals with one another.\footnote{Allen, David "The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union," in: The European Union Handbook ed. Philippe Barbour (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1996), 47.}

This diversification is as well evident in the fact that the European Commission, which became a participant in the CFSP process,\footnote{Ibid., 47.} however, retained its pillar one foreign policy responsibilities. Furthermore, member states as well as the Commission have their diplomatic representations abroad.\footnote{The Commission maintained over 100 at the time of the Maastricht Treaty - see Ibid., 47.}

Besides the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice play a less important role in CFSP than in pillar one. Despite the fact that the Council as well as the Commission were charged with the task of ensuring consistency in the implementation of a common foreign policy, it became evident in the years after the TEU came into force in 1993 that this consistency did not go into effect as planned. An Intergovernmental Conference scheduled for 1996 aimed at institutional reforms to address these shortcomings.

Common positions and joint actions, as instruments of CFSP, were introduced by the TEU. A Common position dealing with foreign and security policy has to be adopted
unanimously by the Council, and member states are required to comply with the common position. Furthermore, joint actions are actions coordinated by the member states and incorporate resources of all kinds to reach specific objectives in the area of CFSP. In contrast to common positions they have a more practical value and include materiel measures to achieve goals set by these common positions.129

These new features of CFSP help to focus common foreign and security policy by supporting it with established instruments. However, the need to agree unanimously to the implementation of common positions as well as joint action show that decision making in CFSP does not differ largely from that of EPC. The smallest common denominator keeps being the baseline in CFSP decision-making.

Meanwhile, Austria,130 Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. Despite their different foreign policy experience as neutral states, they managed to conform to both community and intergovernmental methods incorporated by the pillar structure of the EU.131

This enlargement from 12 to 15 Member States underlined the necessity of structural reform. Those forces in the EU who gave deepening precedence before enlarging the Union gained by pointing out that decision making would become even more difficult with this enlargement. Reforms for streamlining institutions, procedures

130 An example of the prospective of a neutral member state see Skuhra, Anselm. "Oesterreich und die Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU (GASP)." Oesterreichische Zeitschrift fuer Politikwissenschaft. Volume 25, no 4, 1996.
and decision-making, especially after the disappointing inability to reach a consistent stance during the Bosnia War, gave more urgency to this initiative. As a result an Inter-Governmental Conference addressed the areas where reforms should be made.

2. The 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference and the Amsterdam Treaty

The Inter-Governmental Conference of 1996 aimed at introducing more coherent instruments and methods of more efficient decision making in CFSP. The most important reform of the IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the TEU was that qualified majority\textsuperscript{132} vote was introduced into CFSP decision-making; whereas, unanimous vote stays the principle decision-making method. This procedure is amended by the possibility of "constructive abstention,"\textsuperscript{133} which means that a decision will not be blocked if a member state formally declares its abstention from a decision-making vote. Furthermore, even if not taking part in the decided measure, the member state is obliged to accept the binding nature of the measure for the rest of the Union, and it has to abstain from any action conflicting with the implementation of the decision.

If one third of the weighted votes\textsuperscript{134} in the Council are tied by abstention of member states, the intended measure can not be implemented. Qualified majority applies to two decision-making cases; first, for the application of a common strategy defined by the European Council, and second for implementation of a joint action or common


\textsuperscript{133} "SCADplus: The Amsterdam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide", 4, and "SCADplus: GLOSSARY", A.

\textsuperscript{134} "SCADplus: GLOSSARY", W.
position which is already adopted by the Council. However, if a member state has reason to object to a majority voting, due to national policy, it can state its reasons and the Council can refer the decision by a qualified majority to the European Council. The matter will then be decided unanimously by the heads of state and government, or shelved for later decision.

These amendments to the CFSP decision-making process do not represent a breakthrough, but mere smoothing the edges. The principle of unanimous vote is only supplemented in very limited areas of decision-making, and the veto-clause is retained for member states, which see vital national policies at stake, rendering the reform more symbolic than substantial.

When the inherent problems of the decision-making process were overcome and foreign and security measures were decided among member states, the implementation became easier, because the Amsterdam Treaty introduced institutional and procedural features which improved this process.

The most prominent of the institutional features introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty is the High Representative for the CFSP or short "Mr./Ms CFSP". The position of High Representative for the CFSP is held by the Secretary-General of the Council. His responsibility is to assist the Presidency of the Union in all matters of CFSP. He is virtually the EU’s foreign and defense minister. The High Representative for the CFSP relieves the foreign minister of the member state holding the presidency from the overload of his domestic and Union duties. In acknowledging the insufficiency of the

small EPC secretariat, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the policy-planning and early warning unit to support the High Representative for the CFSP as a further new institutional feature.

The policy-planning and early warning unit was created to address the embarrassing shortcomings in consistency, reaction speed, and lack of impact of the Union, evident in the crisis and ensuing war in Yugoslavia in the early 90s. The policy-planning and early warning unit’s task is to improve the generation of information, joint analysis of international issues, and their impact on European policy, and to prepare consistent, effective, and timely reactions to international developments by the Union. Specialists of the General Secretariat, the member states, the Commission and the Western European Union (WEU) comprise the unit.\textsuperscript{136}

As a procedural feature the Petersberg tasks have been incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty. In the 1992 Petersberg Declaration the WEU member states declared their "determination to develop the Western European Union (WEU) as the defense arm of the EU and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO).”\textsuperscript{137}

WEU member states agreed to provide conventional forces for common defense according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (NATO) and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty (WEU), as well as for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.\textsuperscript{138} Furthermore,

\textsuperscript{137} "SCADplus: GLOSSARY", P.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
the Amsterdam Treaty states in Article 17 the prospect of developing a common defense and the integration of the WEU into the European Union.

As a further procedural feature, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced Common strategies.

The European Council, now has the right to define, by consensus, common strategies in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. The objectives, duration, and means to be made available by the Union and Member States for such common strategies must be specified. The Council is responsible for implementing common strategies through joint actions and common positions adopted by a qualified majority. It also recommends common strategies to the European Council.\textsuperscript{139}

Common strategies constitute guidelines for CFSP and help in focusing measures and evaluating progress. A common strategy for Russia to consolidate strategic partnership aiming at securing peace and security for Europe has been published. Further common strategies concerning the Ukraine, the Mediterranean region, and the West-Balkans are in preparation.\textsuperscript{140} The areas covered by these common strategies show that the CFSP clearly concentrates on the proximity of the EU. A certain asymmetry between pillar one, economic (foreign) policy which clearly has a global agenda, and pillar two, which at least until now pursues a regional approach, is obvious.

This, however, seems to be a sensible decision. First, because the most immediate crisis potential for Europe’s security originates from these adjacent areas. Second,

\textsuperscript{140} Weber, 68 – 69.
because instruments to support the foreign policy of the EU with adequate power projection capabilities are not yet existing.

As a result, the EU is, parallel to defining areas of strategic interest, developing the means to militarily support these interests as expressed in Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty.

3. The Western European Union – The Military Arm of the EU

On The 30th anniversary of the Brussels Treaty, the foreign and defense ministers of the WEU decided to reactivate the WEU and develop a more visible European contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance. As a result of this reactivation, new members were admitted (Spain and Portugal in 1988), an Institute for Security Studies was founded (1989), a Satellite Center was installed (1991), and the decision was made to create a European Corps (EUROCORPS) (1991).\(^{141}\)

Parallel to negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, WEU ministers published two declarations, which linked the WEU to the EU. In the first declaration they stated that,

WEU will be developed as the defense component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defense policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.\(^{142}\)

\(^{141}\) Weber, 78—79.

The second declaration opened the way for further enlargement of WEU.

States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility to participate fully in the activities of WEU.\textsuperscript{143}

The Maastricht Treaty in 1993 as well as the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 formally confirmed "WEU’s role as providing the EU with access to an operational capability, complementing its own diplomatic and economic means for undertaking the Petersberg tasks."\textsuperscript{144}

As practical measures in this context, the EUROCORPS with 50,000 troops became operational in November 1995,\textsuperscript{145} and the establishment of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR by France, Spain and Italy were decided in May 1995.\textsuperscript{146} All these forces are part of the Forces answerable to Western European Union (FAWEU); they can operate under WEU or NATO command or under provisions of the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).\textsuperscript{147}

However, during the Kosovo conflict huge shortcomings in European capabilities became overwhelmingly evident. As a consequence, the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was created to accelerate the buildup of European military capabilities, including a 60,000 troop rapid reaction force, command and control facilities, strategic

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 1.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{145} Including units of France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Luxembourg.
\textsuperscript{146} Weber, 71–76.
\textsuperscript{147} "SCADplus: GLOSSARY", E.
air transport, and an air strike capability. All these measures are to be achieved in 2003.¹⁴⁸ Until the end of 2000, a further integration of WEU into the EU is scheduled. As a first step in this process, the High Representative for the CFSP became Secretary of the Western European Union in dual function.

All these initiatives, reforms and measures seem to hint at the fact that the European Union is heading towards a more even balance between economic power and political/military power. Even if the EU succeeds at in creating the means to yield political and military power, the institutions for their effective use are not yet in place.

E. FINAL REMARKS

The buildup of rapid reaction forces, command structures and so forth for the EU might distract from the fact that basic decision-making procedures, until now, have not changed. Maastricht as well as Amsterdam did not streamline decision-making processes in the second and third pillar of the EU in so that fast reaction in these two policy areas will become possible. Furthermore, more institutions and procedures were created eventually adding to the time lapse between the occurrence of an event or problem and the agreement on a measure or solution that could be implemented. Evidence for this problem can be found in those cases that started the reform processes in the EU. Slow reaction to the Afghanistan occupation by the Soviets, and slow reaction bordering on the inability to react efficiently at all to the Bosnia and Kosovo crises were all due to

¹⁴⁸ Weber, 59 - 70
apprehension by single European member states impeding concise European Union reactions by following their own national sovereign foreign policy interests. Because of the prevailing intergovernmental constitution of pillar three and especially pillar two, the CFSP casts doubt on the hope that the next crisis would see a European Union acting swiftly, forcefully and efficiently. Besides these doubts in the reforms of the Amsterdam Treaty concerning institutions and procedures there is a further point of concern, about membership in the various bodies concerned with European Policy. As has been explained, EU, CFSP, Police and Judicial Cooperation, EMU, and WEU are independently developed bodies, which do not encompass the same members. Of the 15 EU members, only 10 are members of the WEU. One member of the EU is a NATO member, but not a WEU member. Four EU members are neither WEU nor NATO members. Eleven EU members are members of EMU, but four are not. This confusing picture can be easily further blurred if membership in the Council of Europe, OSCE, Baltic Council, and so on is incorporated. Even if concentrating solely on EU, WEU, and NATO membership, it becomes clear that a huge coordination effort is necessary to establish a concise position as Europe, vis-a-vis non European countries.\textsuperscript{149} This effort will be impossible when 12 to 15 new members enter the EU. A major reform of the EU is necessary to prevent a total paralysis of it when membership rises to 27 or even to 30.\textsuperscript{150} The Inter-Governmental Commission, which was agreed upon in the Amsterdam Treaty, has to prepare these reforms and admissions of new member states providing its

\textsuperscript{149} Biscop, 263 – 266.
proposition until the end of 2000. One of the most important tasks will be to introduce majority vote for all areas of EU policies; without this decision the mentioned paralysis especially in pillars two and three will be unavoidable.\textsuperscript{151} However, just majority vote will not suffice to initiate further European integration. Germany’s Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer portrayed a vision for a unified Europe on 12 May 2000 in Berlin.\textsuperscript{152} In this speech, he proposed the creation of a European Federation, transforming the European Council into a real European government, and the European Parliament into a bicameral legislative. He offered solutions of differing intensity with regard to the extent of sovereignty loss for the member states and even suggested a development in several stages finally resulting in an European Federal State. His suggestions, which had been coordinated with the French Government, resulted in different reactions. Most EU member states agreed with Fischer’s vision, but Britain and the Scandinavian countries voiced reservations. However, all Member States agreed upon the necessity to implement substantial reforms prior to the admission of new members. As a consequence, the work of the IGC during the year 2000 will be crucial for Europe’s future. The most favorable case will be a European federation as soon as possible. The least favorable case will be a status quo EU, with 30 Member States.

In case a European federation can be created, it should be accomplished immediately, because the ratification process, including referenda in various member states, will take 18 months, and the conversion of the EU towards a European Federal


State will surely take another two to three years. During this transitional phase the new Europe will be vulnerable to outside disruptions. In case of a major failure to achieve thorough reforms Europe will not be halted on a status quo, but thrown back and rendered even less effective, especially if the number of member states will be increased.

If Europe does not want to end up being marginalized politically as a economic giant and political dwarf, the publication of the IGC proposal "will be the moment of truth"\textsuperscript{153} for Europe.

IV. COOPERATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND JAPAN

A. INTRODUCTION

Japan and Europe are two economic giants. Looking at Europe as an economic entity, acting as such, and at Japan as an economic power, certain areas of cooperation should be identifiable. Indeed, Europe-Japan economic cooperation is undoubtably, a developed factor in world economy. In the first part, an analysis of the areas of cooperation will show where common interests and mutual problems led to cooperation, and whether this cooperation reveals patterns, which are transferable to foreign and security policy.

In the second part, possible areas of common political, and security interests, convergence in policy-making, and decision making, and foreign and security policy structures will be scrutinized.

The question to be answered will be: Are there foreign and security policy areas that should be addressed in a concerted effort, and are respective patterns of conducting foreign and security policy compatible enough to render EU-Japan cooperation successful?
B. ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN

Japan recognized the ongoing process of European cooperation very early, by accrediting Japan's Ambassador in Belgium as its first representative to the three European Communities (EEC, ECSC, and EURATOM).\textsuperscript{154} The EC established the Delegation of the European Communities in Tokyo in 1974 as an answering move, to coordinate and regulate EC-Japan trade issues. Further initiatives were the Export Promotion Program (EXPROM) set up by the European Commission in 1979, and in 1986, at the first EC-Japan Ministerial Meeting, where the Commission launched a fellowship scheme enabling young scientists to work in Japanese research bodies and universities. Additionally, the EC-Japan Center for Industrial Cooperation was established in Tokyo in 1987.

Two of these early initiatives, EXPROM and the EC/EU\textsuperscript{155}-Japan Center for Industrial Cooperation, are good examples to display EC/EU-Japan cooperation.

1. The Export Promotion Program

Entering the Japanese market can be a challenge, with high entry costs, specific business and consumer cultures, but it also holds substantial rewards for those EC/EU companies who succeed in establishing a market presence in Japan. Given the importance of their partnership, it is in the global interests of both the EC/EU and Japan that trade-flows in both directions are healthy and prosperous. Since 1979, the European Commission has therefore encouraged European enterprises' efforts to


\textsuperscript{155} EC/EU will be used in combination, because EXPROM and the EC – Japan Center for Industrial Cooperation were founded during EC – times and are still existing, after the EC became the EU.
penetrate the Japanese market and given them concrete assistance through the EXPROM program.\textsuperscript{156}

To accomplish this goal EXPROM incorporated three initiatives: the EC/EU Gateway to Japan Export Promotion Program, the Executive Training Program in Japan (ETP Japan), and EXPROM Ad-Hoc activities.

The EC/EU Gateway to Japan campaign is an initiative to introduce new, innovative products to the Japanese market. The campaign supports this by complementing and enhancing export promotion programs executed by EC/EU Member States. Gateway to Japan concentrates on export areas with demand, and high potential in Japan. These areas are:

- Medical Equipment
- Material Handling Equipment
- Waste Management Technologies
- Marine Equipment
- Construction Materials
- Packaging Machinery
- Food
- Drinks
- Information Technologies
- Outdoor Life & Entertainment Equipment.\textsuperscript{157}


\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 1
To gain access to the Japanese market in these above-mentioned product areas, *Gateway to Japan* launched product-related initiatives:

- Trade missions and participation at international trade fairs an each sector
- Regular introductory seminars and briefings an each EC/EU Member State to prepare companies for the Japanese market
- Sectoral market studies available free to all participants in campaign activities
- Access to customized services to give in-depth product specific market research.\(^{158}\)

Target groups of the *Gateway to Japan* campaign are small and medium sized enterprises, which are the backbone of the European economy. These enterprises would not be capable of gaining market access in Japan on their own. *Gateway to Japan* provides a platform to promote their products and find customers and partners in Japan. Japanese authorities cooperate with *Gateway to Japan* by aligning their import initiatives with the campaign.

During the 1980s, more than 500 European companies entered the Japanese market through *Gateway to Japan*. Predictions for the end of the year 2000 expect another 1000 European businesses to be introduced to the Japanese market.\(^{159}\)

The second initiative under the umbrella of EXPROM is the *Executive Training Program (ETP Japan)*. This program is designed "...to enable European companies to understand and better navigate Japan's unique and complex business culture and

\(^{158}\) Ibid., 2
\(^{159}\) Ibid., 3.
ETP Japan encompasses two training sections to achieve this goal: first, a 12 month advanced Japanese language course, at university level; second, a 6 month in-house training in Japanese companies.

A precondition for companies intending to send their young executives to the ETP Japan program is a track record of business activities in Japan, or a clear and realistic business plan for engagement in Japan. If companies meet these preconditions, the EC/EU funds the majority of the costs for the first participant of a company, and then continues to fund 50% of the costs for the second participant. All further participant's training-costs have to be provided by the dispatching company. Acknowledging the vast costs that such a training program produces, and keeping in mind that EXPROM initiatives are especially aimed at small and medium businesses, makes the importance of the ETP Japan program apparent. It contributes to the effort to reduce the danger of failure for small and medium businesses undertaking the risky enterprise of entering the Japanese market.

A supplementary measure to Gateway to Japan and ETP Japan initiatives are EXPROM Ad-Hoc activities. These are directed at particular products and sectors that are not covered by the Gateway to Japan initiative. However, due to limited resources for these ad-hoc activities, the EC/EU Commission introduced very severe conditions that have to be met by applicants. The enterprises applying for EC/EU funding (up to 50% of the project expenditures) have to envisage a clear solidly-researched prospective to be accepted in the Japanese market.

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160 Ibid., 1.
2. EC/EU-Japan Center for Industrial Cooperation

In 1987 the Directorate General of the EC and the Japanese Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) established the EC/EU-Japan Center for Cooperation in Tokyo. This center runs management training courses in Japan for EC/EU managers. These courses are: "Japan Industry Insight, a comprehensive training course on the Japanese business environment and culture; and topical missions on specific subjects - Challenge Towards World Class Manufacturing, Market and Product Strategy, Meet Asia in Japan, Distribution and Business Practices." Furthermore the center offers language training and in-company training programs in Japan and Europe - "Vulcanus in Europe training Japanese engineering students in European companies; and Vulcanus in Japan training EC/EU engineering students in Japanese companies." Additional activities are:

- Alternative energy research programs.
- A secretariat for the EC/EU-Japan Industrialists Round Table meetings.
- A Business Information Service, which provides assistance with inquiries on Japanese and EC/EU business and industry.
- The publication of JOHOGEN, the EC/EU-Japan Center directory of sources of information on Japanese trade and technology.
- A quarterly newsletter detailing the Center's activities.
- Seminars on issues facing EC/EU companies in Japan and Japanese companies in Europe.

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162 Ibid., 1.
163 Ibid., 2.
These initiatives seem to be quite impressive; however, Japan - European
relations, until the 1980s, mainly took place in the bilateral realm. EC legislation played a
restrictive, coordinating role in segments of the economies of member states, but it did
not cover all aspects of their external trades. This fact left open certain loopholes for
Japanese businesses to penetrate member-states' economies. The economic exchange of
EC-member states with Japan differed to a wide extent, and was determined by a variety
of historical and political factors that will not be incorporated in this thesis. However,
common to all EC member state's trade relations was that Japan accumulated a huge trade
surplus. This surplus, varying from country to country, gave cause for increasing
objections against Japanese trade offensives and Japanese reluctance to open its markets.

Nevertheless, since the foundation of the EC until the EC-Japan Joint Declaration
of July 18, 1991, all attempts by EC member states to develop a thoroughly coordinated
Japanese trade-policy failed, due to the protectionistic objections of single member states.
When Japan's trade surplus grew bigger in the '70s, these complaints and objections grew
in number. Many anti-dumping suits against Japanese enterprises, and repeated
complaints against Japan's aggressive export-policy, and Japan's obstructive import-
barriers, accentuated relations between Europe and Japan until the end of the 80s.
Nevertheless, at the end of the 80s several developments persuaded both Europe and
Japan to reconsider their relation. The anticipation of the completion of the economic and
monetary union, and the devaluation of the Yen, between 1986 and 1988, which
decreased Japan's trade surplus, enabled the EC to reevaluate its protectionistic attitude.
Further arguments for closer cooperation were Japan's new role as the world's biggest creditor and its technological lead.

3. The Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan – From Economic to Comprehensive Cooperation

The decision for more cooperation found its manifestation in the "Joint Declaration on relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan" which was signed on July 18, 1991 at the first EC-Japan Summit in The Hague. In this declaration, a new basis to improve and intensify political and economic relations between Japan and the EC was created.

The declaration states common values in its preamble, which are "freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights", "attachment to market principles, promotion of free trade, and the development of a prosperous and sound world economy". While acknowledging the "growing world-wide interdependence," Japan and the EC identify "the need for heightened international cooperation". They affirm their "common interest in security, peace and stability of the world," and document their will to set up "a just and stable international order in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter."164

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In a second part of the declaration, the EC and Japan address general principles of dialogue and cooperation. The main point in this part is the intention "to inform and consult each other on major international issues, which are of common interest to both Parties, be they political, economic, scientific or other."\textsuperscript{165}

After these basic acknowledgements, the objectives of the dialogue and cooperation are defined. The objectives cover three major areas: political cooperation, economical cooperation, and transnational cooperative projects.

Political cooperation is to be achieved by strengthening the United Nations and other international organizations. The main focus lies on enhancing policy consultation and, wherever possible, policy coordination on international issues which might affect world peace and stability, including international security matters such as the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the non-proliferation of missile technology and the international transfer of conventional weapons \textit{[and]} cooperating, in relation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, for the promotion of peace, stability and prosperity of the region.\textsuperscript{166}

Economic cooperation aims at strengthening the open multilateral trading system, by rejecting protectionism, in general, in the area of EC-Japan trade, "at the removal of obstacles whether structural or other, impeding the expansion of trade and investment."\textsuperscript{167}

Intensification of relations in economy related and other areas such as: academic, cultural and youth exchange programs, environmental affairs, conservation of resources

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 1.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 2.
and energy, cooperation in the fight against terrorism and drug-related crimes, and support for developing countries is envisaged.

To achieve all these objectives a framework for dialogue and consultations has been arranged.

Annual meetings shall be held by:

- The President of the European Council and the President of the Commission with the Japanese Prime Minister.
- The Commission with the Japanese Government at ministerial level.

Bi-annual meetings shall be held by:

- The Foreign Ministers of the Community and the member of the Commission responsible for external relations with the Japanese Foreign Minister.

Furthermore, "the representatives of Japan [will] be briefed by the Presidency of European Political Cooperation following ministerial political cooperation meetings, and Japan will inform the representatives of the Community of Japanese Government's foreign policy."\(^{168}\)

\(^{168}\) Ibid., 3.
This declaration gave EC-Japan relations a new spin. The most important feature was the commonly declared will to cooperate in the political area. Whereas a relationship in economic areas had been difficult, as described above, the addition of political cooperation gave problem-solving initiatives in the economic area new force. This reinvigorated drive in EC-Japan relations became evident with the Second EC-Japan Summit in London, July 4, 1992, when the proposed dialogue circle was executed for the first time. The most pressing theme of EC-Japanese economic cooperation was attacked when concepts for a deregulation process became part of the agenda. Because, deregulation was a prominent and difficult issue, it took an additional two years until both sides were ready to launch a formal deregulation dialogue. In the meantime, the High-level Forum on Science and Technology was set up (1993), and the third EC-Japan Summit monitored the progress of the agreed cooperation, preparing institutionalized deregulation talks. Meanwhile the European Community had become the European Union.

This *domestic* event, on the one hand, pushed EC-Japan proceedings into the background for a while, but they, on the other hand, produced an initiative to attack EU-Japanese economic problems with renewed urgency. The launch of a deregulation dialogue in 1994 can be judged as a sign of this new spirit.

However, this is just a little part of those improvements the Joint Declaration had in mind. There is plenty of room for improvement for further deregulatory cooperation.
4. Institutional Aspects and their Impact on Economic Cooperation

The Commission and the Japanese bureaucracy have several features in common. One of them is a well-developed departmentalization. The main economic Directorate Generals have their counterparts in Japan. DG II\textsuperscript{169} deal of course with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DG III with MITI and DG IV with the Fair Trade Commission.\textsuperscript{170}

These commonalties and the impressive array of initiatives for economic cooperation should render this cooperation quite successful. However, Japan's political culture and the construction of the EU heavily impacted economic cooperation. On the Japanese side incrementalism, cumbersome decision-making, and the tendency to initiate change only in the presence of external pressure are well reflected in the painfully slow advance of EU - Japan economic cooperation. On the European side, a certain tendency towards protectionism is discernable. This protectionism was understandable during times of huge Japanese trade surplus. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Japan experienced a recession that definitely reduced this trade surplus, which should enable the EU to pursue a more non-discriminatory policy. Nevertheless, "the EU must recognize the constraints presented by alternative models of industrial production and, by the same token, recognize that Japanese capitalism differs in distinctive ways from European variants of capitalism."\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{170} Wilks, 41.
\textsuperscript{171} Wilks, 46.
Despite these differences, a positive aspect became evident since the Joint Declaration of 1991. The EU and Japan worked together in improving their economic relations. Even if progress was mainly incremental, and hampered by huge cultural, and procedural differences, improvement has been achieved.

Japan's reliance on external pressure is an important factor in EU-Japan development of economic relations. Until now Europe has obviously not been able to apply sufficient pressure on Japan to induce substantial changes in Japan's traditional trade policy. This might change, since Japan experienced a recession made worse by being severely hit by the Asian financial crisis. If this recession persists and the EU is able to apply enough pressure, more than incremental changes in EU-Japan economic cooperation might take place.

A further aspect that can influence EU-Japan economic cooperation is that economically weaker member states of the EU might not embark on more openness, and cooperation with Japan. Fear of negative influences on their respective economies, i.e., loss of employment, and a decrease in competitiveness of production might lead these countries to vote against stronger and more open cooperation between the EU and Japan. Event though, EU (pillar one) decisions are taken by qualified majority, such a vote might fail when too many domestic, economic issues of too many European member states seem to be at stake.

The EU might eventually be best served by adhering to Japanese incrementalism and following a tacit long-term strategy of improving EU-Japan economic cooperation the Japanese way.
There is, however, a promising starting point for EU-Japan cooperation. This is the point where outside pressure has already propelled both the EU and Japan to cooperate: the WTO. Since the WTO conference in Seattle failed, both the EU and Japan see their interests threatened. Both joined forces to promote a new negotiation round which became evident in the EU-Japan joint Statement on the WTO, delivered during the January 2000 Ministerial Meeting,\textsuperscript{172} and Trade Commissioner Lamy’s speech during the March 2000 Brussels/Tokyo videoconference.\textsuperscript{173}

An EU-Japan interest convergence in WTO negotiations might truly lead to a kind of global cooperation that will surpass bilateral difficulties, and even lead to a creative, shaping role for EU-Japan joint initiatives in this forum.

C. POLITICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN

1. EC-Japan Relations under European Political Cooperation

Since the implementation of EPC in 1970, EU-Japan political cooperation mainly took the shape of consultations in the Japan-Western Europe-U.S. triangle. These consultations generally provided mutual information and originated in common values.


Substantial cooperation came about in 1979, because of the hostage-taking in the U.S. embassy in Teheran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The EC sought Japan's cooperation in formulating an answer to the request by the U.S. for support in the Iran crisis. Coordinated economic sanctions were agreed upon, and a joint diplomatic initiative in form of a demarche was conducted in Teheran.\textsuperscript{174} EC-Japan political cooperation declined after this peak in coordinated efforts. In 1983 an intensification of the EC-Japan cooperation took shape when the EC accepted the Japanese proposal for consultations at foreign minister level to be held every half year. Japan gained a special status that only the U.S. held at that time. In 1984 ministerial meetings were supplemented by regular consultations of the political directors of the EC and the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

An indication that EC-Japan contacts were mostly of a diplomatic, procedural nature is apparent when conference locations became a major issue. The Japanese government wished to hold ministerial meetings alternatively in Tokyo and Brussels. The EC refused this proposal due to the time consuming traveling involved and proposed to perform ministerial meetings in conjunction with the ministerial spring session of OECD in Paris and the UN general assembly meeting in autumn. Further meetings were held at World Economy Summits and ASEAN dialogue meetings. At least the meeting of political directors was conducted alternately in Tokyo and in the capital of the respective presidency of the EC. Nevertheless this procedure could not be maintained due to the same restrictions which applied to ministerial meetings. Japan was not satisfied with this

\textsuperscript{174} Regelsberger, 154.
development because it deprived Japan of the status of a special non-European partner like the U.S. However, Japan retained one privilege of special non-European partners: The individual briefing of the Japanese ambassador in the Presidency’s capital. Normally third countries were briefed collectively, and consequentially not that thoroughly.175

These diplomatic niceties show that EC-Japan cooperation under EPC were mainly concerned with procedural aspects and thereby fitted into the not very substantial framework that can generally be attributed to EPC.

2. EU-Japan Relations under the Maastricht-Amsterdam Treaties


Both sides tried to coordinate their positions in multilateral fora, such as ASEM, ASEAN ARF, UN, OSCE, and the Council of Europe. However, this political dialogue until now had not produced tangible results in the form of joint actions. This was partially caused by Japan’s difficulties to match CFSP structures. The lowest common denominator approach of CFSP decision-making created doubts in Japan about the efficiency of the EU as a foreign policy actor. As a result Japan tended to resort to bilateral initiatives with large EU Member States.

175 Ibid., 159 – 160.
Due to time constraints on the Japanese side several meetings of the consultation circle were canceled, therefor a thorough strengthening of the political dialogue and the preparation of common approaches could not be achieved. Despite these inhibitions, areas of cooperation have been identified. During the 8th EU-Japan Summit, Kosovo, Russia, and the Korean Peninsula were named as areas where the EU and Japan should cooperate.

Japan greeted the EU's initiative to establish a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, and confirmed its willingness to contribute to the rebuilding process and to EU efforts to improve peace and stability in the region. This intention follows the track already taken by Japan in Bosnia-Herzegovina and will deepen Japan's participation in European regional fora. Japan's sustained assistance in the rebuilding process of former Yugoslavia is very well received by the EU as well as by the U.S., because this process demands large financial contributions and its duration will be at least mid-term.

Both the EU and Japan confirmed a common interest in promoting reform processes in Russia to support and improve Russia's political and economic transformation. EU interest in a stable and economically viable Russia is high, because assistance might further Russia's consent to an EU enlargement into Eastern Europe. Beyond this fact, there are first signs for a further improvement of EU – Russia relations. Russia's new president, Vladimir Putin, announced a new foreign policy course of his administration. He stressed that Russia, being part of European culture, should not stand

apart from Europe. He supplemented this basic announcement with a vision that joining
the EU and eventually NATO might be possible in the long term. With these positive
signs at hand, the EU has a vital interest in contributing to the success of this new
administration.\textsuperscript{178}

Japan's interest in a stable Russia is driven by two considerations. First, Russia
will eventually overcome its economic and political problems and \textit{rediscover} that it is a
European as well as an Asian country. Consequentially, Japan must be interested in
positioning itself as a partner of Russia in Asian matters in order to prevent confrontation
when Russia returns to Asia. Second, the open question of the return of Japan's Northern
Territories\textsuperscript{179} has to be settled. Attempts to solve this problem with Putin's predecessor,
President Yeltsin, failed.\textsuperscript{180} Japan's positive involvement in Russia might lead to
successful negotiations concerning the return of the Northern Territories under Japanese
sovereignty.

The Korean Peninsula can create a mirror image of former Yugoslavia insofar as
tensions between North and South Korea have an immediate impact on Japan's security,
like disorder in former Yugoslavia impacts on European security. EU assistance in easing
North – South relations, contributions to KEDO, and diplomatic intermediary services
can provide real reciprocity to Japan's involvement in Europe.

This common foreign policy agenda might be regarded as too limited, requiring
broader cooperation to be attempted. However, EU-Japan political cooperation until now

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{178} "Russlands neuer Praesident setzt auf die Karte Europa." \textit{IAP-Dienst Sicherheitspolitik}, 4/00.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{179} Part of the Kuril Islands chain, currently occupied by Russia.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{180} Mendl, 56 – 57.}
has not achieved very much, besides diplomatic consultations and common announcements. A limited agenda of issues of real concern seem to be more suited to inspire joint initiatives. It has to be determined whether EU-Japan political cooperation acknowledges these areas of common interest as a test-bed for cooperative efforts, and if real achievements can be made.

D. FINAL REMARKS

Cooperation between the EU and Japan is a very cumbersome process. Regardless of the area, or duration of cooperation, it seems to be overwhelmingly difficult to join forces for the EU and Japan.

Economic cooperation suffers basically from three problems. First, the trading giants, EU and Japan, have common interests on the world market, as can be seen in the example of their joint initiative to promote a further WTO round after the Seattle disaster. At the same time, the EU and Japan are export competitors in the markets of third countries, and they are import competitors for raw materials. Second, incompatibilities in their respective economies render initiatives to gain market access to each other’s market highly complicated, and frustrating. Third, slow and complicated decision-making processes, contesting interests of their respective bureaucracies of political factions in Japan, the Member States in the EU, and the individual corporations on both sides create a network of resistance, which dooms EU-Japan economic cooperation to ultimate incrementalism.
It would be wrong to blame one side or the other for this pattern of conduct. Fast solutions and sudden breakthroughs are not in store for EU-Japan economic cooperation. However, approaching each other incrementally might lead to certain acceleration in the cooperation process, i.e., the nearer they draw, the greater gravitation forces become.

Political cooperation, which is much younger than economic cooperation, suffers from the same incompatibilities, as does economic cooperation.

In this area, a certain asymmetry becomes obvious. Japan's engagement in former Yugoslavia is not matched by a similar move on the EU side. This fact might aggravate Japan and should be overcome as soon as possible. Both the EU and Japan's involvement in multilateral arrangements like ASEAN ARF, ASEM on the political side, as well as APEC on the economic side, do not figure as platforms for a stronger EU engagement in order to match Japan's efforts in Europe. It will be an immediate task of the European Union's CFSP to identify projects where a substantial contribution to EU-Japan political cooperation can be made in the Asian region. As noted above, the Korean peninsula could provide opportunities for the EU to be proactive in Asia.

A further point might obstruct successful EU-Japan cooperation in the political as well as in the economic area.

Because of Japan's culturally based hierarchical outlook, and Japan's notion of assuming world leadership in the twenty-first century can easily aggravate EU-Japan cooperation. It is doubtful whether the EU, especially after further unification, will accept taking a second rank place after Japan. Very sensible diplomatic efforts will be necessary to balance positions. For instance, Japan on the one hand accepts European leadership in
all initiatives in and around the European region, while the EU on the other hand accepts Japan's leadership in initiatives in the Asian region. This very simple outline surely has to be refined taking the role of the U.S. in both regions into account. China as well should play an important role in these considerations.

An alternative model might be a shared approach, where the EU and Japan act as equals. This, however, seems to be the least likely approach, taking Japan's rigidity in these matters into consideration. A strengthened EU might as well not embark on this course.

A serious world event, for example the breakdown of Russia or China, which would apply a huge amount of outside pressure on Japan and, at the same time, propel the EU into action, leading to a real breakthrough in political cooperation, is highly undesirable for both sides. Both, the EU as well as Japan should appreciate that the reliance on external forces as motor for improvements in cooperation might severely backfire on them, especially if these forces are of a magnitude that exceeds both their capacities for coordinated crisis management.
V. CONCLUSION

Using the title of this thesis: Japan's Comprehensive National Security and the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy - Convergence towards Global Cooperation?

The answer is neither a yes nor a no. The positive part of a possible answer is that the EU and Japan, being two of the three leading world economies with close, multiple ties to the third economic world power, the U.S., should closely work together. They should work together, not so much as the trans-Atlantic and the trans-Pacific junior partner of the U.S., but as two corners of a triangle.

The same can be said for the foreign and security area. The post-Cold War era created a multipolar world order. The U.S., as the remaining superpower, has exceedingly to rely on partners to manage the world order of the twenty-first century. Pax Americana is in decline, while multilateral and regional structures emerge all over the world. The EU, despite many shortcomings, is one of the most successful regional constructs.

As a consequence of these developments, it is logical to demand stronger roles of the EU and Japan. Burden sharing, if not power sharing are the operational terms often heard. Political, security, and economic triangulation, to keep the world from falling apart, are the demands being faced by the U.S., the EU, and Japan. Japan and the EU, as was shown in this thesis, are at the moment not able to face up to this challenge. Both, regardless of their status as a nation state or a confederation of states, are bound by
domestic inhibitions preventing them from taking decisive steps toward a global role that would be approximately as strong as that of the U.S.

Japan is a closed society, which successfully facilitated its unique culture and historical experience to single-mindedly embark on the process of becoming an economic superpower. After the end of the Cold War, this aggressive absention from the political world stage became Japan's curse. To view the world largely through trade terms became inadequate at the end of the Cold War. However, the U.S. in particular, and the world at large, did not accept Japan's paradigm, the peace constitution, the renunciation of war, and the strict absention from collective security arrangements, any longer.

In response Japan joined multilateral fora to position itself for the chance to gain political stature. At the same time Japan clung to its way of conducting politics domestically. Japan tried to become an open-closed society. An open-closed society is a contradiction in terms, which can clearly be seen in Japan's relations with the EU. Japan searches for cooperation with Europe. Japan's cooperation agenda is rich: closer economic cooperation including reciprocal market access on more even terms of trade, and closer political cooperation including cooperative initiatives of a trans-regional scope. The list of achievements, in contrast, is short. Unless Japan really opens up, and reforms its domestic composition, its ability for broader cooperation, and especially in the political and security area, all initiatives towards a higher foreign policy profile will fail or, at least, progress painfully, insufficiently slow.

The EU, despite all its differences compared to Japan, displays a very similar set of obstacles to more cooperation. The internal composition of the EU is as cumbersome
as that of Japan. Both suffer from an awfully slow and minimalistic decision making process. Both are hampered by excessive factionalism, in Japan by factions in the ruling party, in the EU by member states valuing their national agenda over EU interests. Both are trade nations refusing real free trade while clinging to protectionism where openness might be risky. Both are military dwarfs unable to back their political agenda, where existent, with military credibility.

What are necessary measures for the EU and Japan to become full-fledged corners of an EU - U.S. - Japan triangle? The answer is reform. The EU has already started to reform. CFSP is surely the nucleus of a development toward more political influence. The incorporation of WEU into the EU is surely the right move toward a higher military profile. The focus of CFSP initiatives on the European region and its immediate neighbors, and neighbor regions, clearly show that the EU soberly acknowledges its current limitations in foreign and security policy matters. However, all these initiatives display a certain impetus that must be maintained. Germany’s Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer offered a good platform for maintaining the EU unification process with his proposals on forming a European Federation. The end of the year 2000 may show whether EU development keeps up its speed or whether it will grind to a catastrophic halt. This halt in EU development would destroy any prospect for substantial improvements in EU-Japan cooperation. At best it would cement the current status quo of marginal achievements and incremental development. A substantial enlargement of the EU without major reforms might even further reduce these prospects for incremental developments in EU-Japan economic and political cooperation.
Japan has to reform as well. Many of Nakasone's proposals continue to be valid if Japan wants to play a bigger role in world affairs. The biggest hurdle here seems to be Japan's tendency to need outside pressure to substantially change. The forcful opening of Japan to the West in the mid-nineteenth century clearly proves that by applying an adequate amount of outside pressure, Japan can be turned around. Japan's post World War II development shows a similar pattern. U.S. occupation and its overall pressure on Japan again turned Japan around. To begin with, at the moment there is no single country willing or able to apply that amount of pressure in an civilized way i.e., short of war, onto Japan to achieve major, comprehensive changes. Subsequently, an unplanned, uncontrolled catastrophe, i.e., a regional or global war, is clearly in no country's interest, neither in Asia or elsewhere in the world, and thus poses no alternative to induce real change in Japan.

Consequently, even if the EU succeeds in becoming the European federation or better an European federal state, EU-Japan cooperation will remain very limited. A sensible recommendation acknowledging this prospect is for the EU and Japan to embark on cross regional cooperation.

The EU or its successor organization, on the one hand, should strive to enhance Japan's involvement in southeast Europe and Russia. Japan, on the other hand, should strive to deeply involve Europe in promoting peace and stability in northeast Asia.
European experience with the unification of Germany might be helpful in developments on the Korean Peninsula, especially since inter-Korean dialogue has improved.  

This recommendation does not mean that Europe and Japan should abandon the idea of global cooperation once and for all, but for the time being, and under conditions displayed in this thesis, a more limited approach seems to be better suited to yield tangible results more rapidly.

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\textsuperscript{181} For further information on the North-South Korean Summit meeting see "Koreas praised for historic first meeting, talks continue." Available [Online]: <http://www.cnn.com/2000/asianow/east/06/13/Koreasummit.04/index.html> [14 June 2000].
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