THESIS

STUDY OF THE U.S. NAVY'S PHILIPPINES
ENLISTMENT PROGRAM, 1981-1991

by

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June 2000

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This thesis examines the U.S. Navy’s Philippines Enlistment Program (PEP) from 1981 through 1991, and its possible reestablishment. The study reviews the 100-year history of United States-Philippine relations, including participation in the two World Wars. The U.S. Navy recruited approximately 35,000 Filipinos under PEP between 1952 and 1991, when the program ended. Special data files were constructed for the study by the Defense Manpower Data Center in Monterey, California. Approximately 3,600 Filipinos who were recruited through PEP were then compared to a sample of 250,241 other Navy recruits over the period from 1981 through 1991 in the following main areas: educational attainment prior to enlistment, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores, continuation and promotion rates, and separation characteristics. Results show that PEP recruits, when compared as a group with the sample of other Navy recruits, have: higher educational attainment prior to enlistment, higher AFQT mean scores; higher short-term and long-term continuation rates; more rapid promotion rates; and relatively fewer separations for adverse reasons. The study concludes that PEP was highly successful in recruiting "ideal" members of the Navy, based on the selected criteria. It is recommended that action be taken to assess the possible reestablishment of the U.S. Navy's Philippines Enlistment Program.
STUDY OF THE U.S. NAVY'S PHILIPPINES
ENLISTMENT PROGRAM, 1981-1991

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ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

A. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Navy is experiencing significant difficulty in recruiting and retaining enlisted personnel. Indeed, although Navy personnel strength has been reduced by approximately one-third over the past 10 years, many Navy ships routinely deploy with less than their authorized manpower.\(^1\) Part of the problem relates to the Navy’s demand for manpower. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, has stated that personnel shortages are degrading the Navy’s deployed readiness.\(^2\) At the same time, the Navy has struggled to recruit the requisite number of volunteers—evidenced most dramatically by a shortfall of nearly 7,000 recruits for Fiscal Year 1998.\(^3\)

The Navy’s recruiting difficulties of the late 1990s have been attributed largely to a booming U.S. economy and record-low U.S. unemployment rates.\(^4\) Navy enlisted service may not be a primary career option for many of today’s high school graduates. Meanwhile, Navy recruiters are trying to find creative solutions to meet their recruiting quotas, while Navy personnel planners also struggle to find new inducements for enlistees to stay in service and make the Navy a career choice.


\(^3\) MCPO Robbins, Military Readiness Issues.

The U.S. Congress also recognizes the problems of recruiting and personnel retention, and has taken steps to improve the general attractiveness of military service. For example, in 1999, Congress passed several House Resolutions that would authorize major reforms in military pay and benefits in FY-2000. One of these resolutions, the FY-2000 National Defense Authorization Act, included substantial pay raises for military personnel starting January 2000. President Bill Clinton signed this Act in November 1999. Furthermore, certain members of military Congressional committees are contemplating the reinstatement of conscription as a way of solving the military's manpower problems.

The Philippines Enlistment Program (PEP) was a continuing source of enlisted recruits for the U.S. Navy from 1952 to 1991. This program was established as part of the Republic of the Philippines-United States Military Bases Agreement (RP-US MBA) of 1947. The RP-US MBA governed the general operation, administration, and utilization of all former U.S. military facilities located in the Republic of the Philippines. Under Article 27 of the RP-US MBA, PEP allowed the U.S. Navy to recruit a specified number of Philippine Nationals, or Filipinos, every year for enlistment. This specified number was mutually agreed upon by the Philippine and U.S. governments. Likewise,

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this yearly quota could also be changed upon mutual agreement by both governments. As it turned out, the number of quotas varied by as much as 400 to 2,000 recruits annually, over the 40 years that PEP existed.

Normally, the U.S. Armed Forces may only recruit U.S. citizens or permanent residents (legal immigrants), as defined by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), for enlisted service. Only the U.S. Navy was allowed to recruit Filipinos directly from their country of origin, even if they had not been lawfully admitted to the United States as permanent residents. The other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces did not have a similar, continuous recruiting program. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) was also allowed to recruit Filipinos under Article 27 of the RP-US MBA, but the USCG did not use the program for an extended period.

PEP provided a continuing supply of enlisted recruits for the U.S. Navy during its period of operation. When the Philippine government terminated the RP-US MBA in September 1991, all U.S. military facilities were required to close down within one year. Likewise, all U.S. military forces in the Philippines were required to leave the country within one year after termination of the agreement. In November 1992, Subic Bay Naval Base, the last existing U.S. military installation in the Philippines, was shut down.

Because PEP existed by authority of an article under the RP-US MBA, it similarly ended in 1992 and stopped the flow of Filipino recruits to the U.S. Navy. The program has not been reestablished. Additionally, it appears that the U.S. Navy has no

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8 Ibid.

9 Exchanges of Notes between the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines and the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period of November 18, 1952 through July 25, 1972. These notes set some of the annual quotas for Philippine Nationals recruited for U.S. Navy enlistment during that period.
plans for reestablishing the program, or establishing a similar program with the Republic of the Philippines, or with any other foreign country.

B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study examines the reasons why the U.S. Navy established PEP with the Republic of the Philippines, and why the program was terminated after 40 years of existence. The thesis also describes the issues surrounding the PEP, and how these issues affect the U.S. Navy, the Filipinos who were recruited into the U.S. Navy under this program, and the Philippine government. Most importantly, this study analyzes the program's "effectiveness" in terms of enlisting "ideal," "high-quality" recruits and servicemembers, based on selected recruit entry-level, and short- and long-term criteria. These criteria include educational attainment prior to enlistment, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores, promotion and continuation rates, and number of discharges or separations for adverse reasons. The purpose of this thesis, then, is to analyze the possible advantages and disadvantages of reestablishing PEP as one option for expanding the Navy's supply of qualified manpower. Conclusions are drawn and recommendations made on the potential utility of reestablishing PEP.

It should be emphasized that the focus of this thesis is exploratory. In theory, a program that once worked well for the U.S. Navy could be useful yet again, especially considering the Navy's current and anticipated problems in recruiting and retention.

C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter II presents the background, history, and origins of PEP, based on an extensive literature review. Chapter III discusses the research methodology used for this study and presents the results of the data analysis. Chapter IV analyzes the issues
surrounding PEP and how these issues affected the U.S. Navy, the Philippine Nationals who were recruited under the program, and the Philippine government. Finally, Chapter V presents a summary of the results, conclusions drawn from the study, and several recommendations for future action.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

To fully understand the background of the U.S. Navy’s Philippines Enlistment Program (PEP), it is important to know certain shared experiences of the Philippines and the United States. The common history of the two countries has helped to shape their present relationship, and may be an indicator of future ties. Also, this intertwined history has influenced the views of Filipinos toward the United States and Americans, as well as the views of Americans toward the Philippines and Filipinos. More importantly, this history resulted in the establishment of PEP.

B. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The origins of PEP could be traced as far back as the American colonization of the Philippines. The growth of the United States as a world power toward the end of the 19th century, and the distaste with which the U.S. viewed Spanish colonial conduct were matched by America’s vigorous worldwide commercial penetration and a desire to help those who were oppressed in foreign lands. Even before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, U.S. politicians had considered the risks and benefits of intervention in Spain’s empire. Relations between Washington and Madrid had already been worsened by the latter’s growing impatience with American commercial infiltration overseas. Thus, a serious explosion that occurred aboard the USS Maine, while lying at Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898 provided an opportunity for the United States to intervene.
As a result of the incident, the United States demanded the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba. In response, Spain declared war on the United States on April 24, 1898.10

C. THE END OF SPANISH COLONIAL RULE IN THE PHILIPPINES

Commodore George Dewey, commander of the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Squadron, was ordered to proceed from Hong Kong to the Philippines to destroy the Spanish Fleet based there. The Battle of Manila Bay took place six days later, on May 1, 1898. After a seven-hour battle, the commander of the Spanish Fleet surrendered to Dewey. 11

With the defeat of the Spanish Fleet, Dewey waited for military land forces from the United States for the invasion of Manila. When the U.S. forces arrived, Philippine revolutionaries (who had been fighting for freedom from Spanish colonial rule since 1896), joined in the battle to defeat the Spaniards and drive them from the Philippines. General Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the revolutionaries, was given assurances by high-ranking U.S. military and government officials that the United States had no interest in colonizing or remaining permanently in the Philippines after the Spaniards left the country. On August 13, combined American military and Philippine revolutionary forces captured Manila. The war with the Spaniards outside Manila lasted for another eight months. On December 10, 1898, the Treaty of Paris was signed between the United States and Spain. Spain abandoned Cuba and ceded its colonies of the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico to the United States. In compensation, Spain received $20


11 Ibid.
million from the U.S. Thus, under the administration of President William McKinley, the United States acquired its first overseas colonies.

D. AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY BEGINS

Before the Treaty of Paris, President McKinley appeared undecided on what to do with the Philippines once Spain left the country. In reality, many Americans with vested interests in the Philippines pressured McKinley into taking the country from Spain. These included persons with economic interests who were thinking of expanding American business in the Orient; those with religious interests who wanted the Philippines as a base of operations for American Protestant missionaries; and most importantly, those with military interests who wanted to have the Philippines as America’s first line of defense. In the end, McKinley instructed the American peace commissioners at the Paris meeting to demand from Spain the cession of the Philippines to the United States.

Coincidentally, after one night of solitary prayer and vigil, President McKinley came to the conclusion that the Filipino people were incapable of self-government. He decided that abandoning the Philippines would leave the country open to European intervention or to anarchy and indigenous misrule.

With the Treaty of Paris concluded to the satisfaction of American interests, President McKinley issued his so-called "Benevolent Assimilation" Proclamation on

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12 Ibid., p. 111.

13 As a historical note, the Philippines became a sovereign nation after it gained independence from the United States in 1946. At present, Guam and Puerto Rico are still U.S. territorial possessions.


15 Lightfoot, The Philippines, p. 111.
December 21, 1898. This proclamation was the first official indication of American policy toward the Philippines. It stated expressly the intention of the United States to stay in the Philippines after Spain departed, by exercising the right of sovereignty over the Filipino people. The United States would now assume control and disposition over the government in the Philippines. At the same time, McKinley instructed his military commanders in the Philippines to extend American sovereignty over the entire country by force.  

The "Benevolent Assimilation" proclamation was sent by President McKinley to General Elwell S. Otis, who was then the U.S. military governor of the Philippines. Otis announced America's decision to retain the Philippines, assuring Filipinos that "the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild way of justice and right for arbitrary rule." Nevertheless, many Filipinos were concerned about the "true intentions" of the United States toward the Philippines. General Otis responded to this concern by modifying the proclamation to soften its tenor, and deliberately delayed its publication until January 4, 1899. General Aguinaldo issued a counter-proclamation the very next day, vigorously protesting the implementation of American sovereignty over his country and its people.  

Additionally, on January 23, 1899, the First Philippine Republic was established in Malolos, Bulacan, just outside Manila, with General Aguinaldo as the Republic's first President. The Filipino people and revolutionaries, led by General Aguinaldo, wanted freedom and self-government for the Philippines after 400 years of Spanish colonial rule.

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16 Agoncillo and Alfonso, History, p. 257.

Many Filipinos were not pleased that their country, which was supposed to be a free and independent nation after Spain left, was not included or consulted in the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain. Indeed, the Philippine Revolutionary Movement against Spain, which began in 1896, was progressing well even before Commodore Dewey arrived. American intervention only helped to hasten Spain’s departure from the Philippines.\(^\text{18}\)

During the Treaty of Paris negotiations, the Philippine government delegation was not allowed inside the room where the treaty was being negotiated, and was barred from presenting their country’s case. Their position was that Spain had no right to cede a free, sovereign, and independent country to another nation. After the treaty was signed, the Philippine delegation went to the United States to work against the treaty’s ratification by the U.S. Congress.\(^\text{19}\) This effort, too, proved unsuccessful.

**E. THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR**

Back in the Philippines, General Otis and General Aguinaldo failed to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations, and tensions between them and their military forces increased. Armed conflict between the two groups became inevitable.\(^\text{20}\) What followed is now known as the "Philippine Insurrection" in the United States. In the Philippines, it is known as the "Philippine-American War," or the "War of Philippine Independence."


\(^{19}\) Zaide, *Philippine Political*, p. 192.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 213.
Hostilities began on February 4, 1899, when an American soldier, on routine patrol with another U.S. soldier, shot and killed a Filipino in the town of San Juan del Monte, near Manila, on a bridge that separated the Filipino and American military encampments. Minutes later, Filipinos started firing at the American lines. The next day, American military commanders, led by General Arthur MacArthur (father of General Douglas MacArthur), without even attempting to investigate the incident, ordered their troops to advance against the Filipinos. In the name of the First Philippine Republic, General Aguinaldo declared war against the Americans.

The Philippine-American War lasted until 1902. The Filipinos fought bravely and valiantly against the better-trained, better-equipped, and more numerous American occupation forces. However, the Filipinos, who enjoyed a few victories early in the war, were simply overwhelmed by American military might. Later in the conflict, General Aguinaldo disbanded the regular Philippine forces, and the Filipinos resorted to guerilla tactics against the superior American forces. They excelled in this method of fighting, since they knew the terrain of their country very well. They fought in small, scattered bands, harassing American outposts at night and ambushing American patrols in the hills. After these surprise attacks, they returned to their homes and mingled among the peaceful inhabitants. Later, in response to secret signals of their leaders, they would reassemble to


23 Zaide, Philippine Political, p. 213.
raid the American garrisons. The effectiveness of Filipino guerilla warfare contributed to prolonging the war for more than three years.\textsuperscript{24}

To bring the Philippine-American War to an end, the American military leaders in the Philippines conceived and executed a plan to capture General Aguinaldo. A team of five Americans, pretending to be prisoners of war, accompanied by a large group of Filipino collaborators, infiltrated Aguinaldo’s camp in Palanan, Isabela. After the collaborators talked their way inside the camp and overpowered the General’s bodyguards, the Americans revealed their true identities, and promptly arrested Aguinaldo in the name of the United States. Upon being brought to General Arthur MacArthur, who replaced General Otis as U.S. military governor of the Philippines, Aguinaldo reluctantly took an oath of allegiance to America, and encouraged his subordinate military commanders to lay down their arms. He did this to prevent the further bloodshed of his people.\textsuperscript{25}

The capture of Aguinaldo, however, did not bring the war to an immediate end, as the American leaders had anticipated. A few of Aguinaldo’s commanders continued fighting to the very end, using mainly guerilla tactics. In response, the American military commanders resorted to brutality and atrocities. They pursued a ruthless policy of concentrating civilians within military "zones," burning hostile villages, and destroying crops and work animals, with the primary objective of starving out the guerillas.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 218.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 224.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
The most famous of these atrocities was committed by General Jacob H. Smith. In retaliation for a massacre of American soldiers by Filipino guerillas and native sympathizers, General Smith ordered his men to turn the island-province of Samar into a "howling wilderness." He ordered them to burn villages and kill anyone over ten years of age. Filipino prisoners of war were also brutally tortured, and at times, summarily executed. Because of his overall responsibility for the atrocities in Samar, and under pressure from both the American media and public opinion, General Smith was convicted by a court-martial upon returning to the United States. Shortly thereafter, he retired in disgrace.\(^ {27} \)

The Philippine-American War was America's first overseas ground war. Additionally, many U.S. historians have called it as America's first "Vietnam."\(^ {28} \) For the first time, the relatively large, well-equipped, and better-trained U.S. military forces were subjected to guerilla tactics by a poorly-equipped and less-trained enemy force. More than six decades later, this same form of "unconventional" warfare would be waged against the U.S. military in Southeast Asia. The military "zoning" of Filipino civilians was similar to the U.S. Army's "strategic hamletting" policy in South Vietnam. During the height of the Philippine-American War, 70,000 U.S. soldiers were involved. By the conflict's end, at least 200,000 Filipino civilians had been killed.\(^ {29} \)

Before the Philippine-American War ended, President McKinley was assassinated in September 1901, during his second term in office. His Vice President, Theodore "Teddy"


\(^ {28} \) Miller, "Benevolent Assimilation," p. 268.

\(^ {29} \) Karnow, In Our Image, p. 12.
Roosevelt, took over as President of the United States during the last few months of the conflict, and hostilities came to an end on April 16, 1902. In the province of Batangas, General Miguel Malvar, the last Filipino holdout, realized the futility of further resistance. With his tattered flag and tired, hungry men, he finally surrendered to the Americans. After General Malvar’s surrender, President Roosevelt declared the "Philippine Insurrection" officially over on July 4, 1902.

F. AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

The U.S. conquest of the Philippines had been as cruel as any conflict in the annals of imperialism, but it hardly ended before the Americans began to atone for its brutality. Inspired by a sense of moral obligation, the United States believed that it was responsible for bestowing the spiritual and material "blessings of democracy" on its new possession. Before President McKinley’s untimely death in 1901, he directed William H. Taft, the first American civilian governor-general of the Philippines, to carry out his proclamation of "Benevolent Assimilation" by "uplifting and civilizing" the Filipino people. Taft received instructions to promote the "happiness, peace, and prosperity" of the natives in conformity with "their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices." Taft announced that "we hold the Philippines for the benefit of the Filipinos...." After William McKinley’s death, Taft continued to implement McKinley’s mandate of "Benevolent

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30 Zaide, Philippine Political, p. 225.
31 "Philippine Army, 100 Years." [http://www.army.mil.ph/history_chapter02.htm].
32 Karnow, In Our Image, pp. 196-197.
Assimilation" under President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration, which advocated a strong foreign policy.\textsuperscript{33}

American leaders also began the task of preparing the Filipino people for successful democratic self-government and ultimate independence. This involved an economic and social revolution, and the creation, by Filipinos and Americans, of a new political and social state unlike any that had previously appeared in Asia. To achieve this objective, it was necessary to devise or improve certain instruments that would help to achieve independence and freedom.\textsuperscript{34}

The first of these instruments was a system of public education. The underlying intent was that a true democracy could only rest upon an enlightened electorate. For practical and ideological reasons, English became the medium of instruction, as well as the language of government, business, trade, and commerce. To accomplish this end, American teachers were "imported" from the United States. The first 1,000 of them arrived on the U.S. Army transport ship "Thomas," and hence became popularly known as the "Thomasites." These volunteers, who were the precursor of the modern day American Peace Corps, fanned out across the countryside to set up public schools. This public school system increased the literacy rate that was quite low during the Spanish colonial period. Before the American occupation, the country’s literacy rate was 20 percent. Within two generations, it rose to 40 percent. In the late 1950s, it rose to more than 60 percent. The use of English for most forms of official oral and written


\textsuperscript{34} Smith, \textit{Philippine Freedom}, p. 41.
communication made the language an instrument of national unification. To
this day, English remains the principal language of government, science, business, and
education.\textsuperscript{35} This system of public education which used English for instruction was
probably the most consequential of American innovations. Filipinos appreciated its value
when they saw Filipino graduates given opportunity under the U.S. colonial
administration. Schooling for their sons and daughters soon became the foremost
ambition of many Filipino families, and presently remains a major national motivation.\textsuperscript{36}

The public school system also played a vital role in the establishment of a public
health system. Schools were the initial places of instruction in hygiene and sanitation.
They were also the places in which advances in medicine, such as the smallpox vaccine,
were first introduced. American teachers were not usually medically trained, but they
developed an outlook for health problems particular to the Philippines. Their Filipino
pupils, in turn, became "medical missionaries" in their respective families. Moreover, the
schools were able to cooperate fully with the public health agencies that were set up.
Many school buildings were used partly as clinics and dispensaries. Throughout the
country, there was a general recognition that a good public health program was an
essential component of a properly functioning state.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., pp. 42-51.


\textsuperscript{37} Smith, \textit{Philippine Freedom}, pp. 54-56.
Under Spanish colonial rule, religious instruction in the Roman Catholic faith was taught in schools, thereby making Catholicism the predominant religion in the Philippines prior to the American occupation. Invoking the democratic principle of separation of church and state, the Americans disallowed religion to be taught in public schools. Due to Spanish influence, however, devout Catholic Filipinos protested and threatened to boycott the schools. As a compromise, Governor-General Taft (who continued in his post as U.S. governor-general of the Philippines after Theodore Roosevelt succeeded William McKinley as President) allowed priests to teach the faith after regular school hours, a concession that still bothered many Americans. Even then, the Philippine educational system was finally free of church control, after more than three centuries under Spain.\(^{38}\) Later on, William H. Taft would succeed Theodore Roosevelt as President of the United States.

To further demonstrate its benevolence, the U.S. launched many practical programs to improve the Filipinos’ way of life. Americans bought and redistributed the rural estates held by the Spanish Catholic friars, whose excesses had provoked Filipinos into rebelling against Spain. To improve the economy, the U.S. constructed dams and irrigation facilities, expanded markets, developed mines and timber concessions, built roads, railways, ports, and bridges. Their legal reforms gave the country, for the first time in its history, an honest judiciary under native magistrates. They introduced a tax system to make the country self-sustaining, and renovated its financial structure. Unlike the Europeans elsewhere in Asia, who plundered colonies for their own profit, the Americans displayed a genuine concern for the welfare of the Filipinos. Their

\(^{38}\) Karnow, *In Our Image*, p. 201.
expenditures on health helped double the population during the period from 1900 to 1920, and literacy rates rose dramatically throughout the land. Fearful of mutinies, Europeans typically forbade native troops to outnumber their own soldiers, and maintained their own forces at the expense of their colonies. In the Philippines, however, Filipinos outnumbered Americans serving as army regulars and police by the 1920s.³⁹

Americans were banned by law from acquiring huge tracts of land in the Philippines. This was in sharp contrast to Britain’s mobilization of “coolies” on Malayan rubber plantations, or France’s forced recruitment of native labor to cultivate rice fields in French Indo-China (now Vietnam). Americans avoided such schemes as the opium monopolies, maintained by the British, French, and Dutch in their Asian colonies to raise revenues. At the same time, European colonizers harshly repressed the natives in their colonies, thereby inciting defiance. Filipinos, on the other hand, renounced violent opposition to U.S. supremacy after the Philippine-American War, because they correctly concluded that American rule would not be harsh.⁴⁰

In the Philippines, American leaders also introduced a civil service system, with promotions based strictly on merit and seniority. Filipinos were properly trained for every major administrative post. In 1914, a total of about 2,500 Americans were employed in the Philippine Civil Service. The administration of Governor-General Francis B. Harrison tried to "Filipinize" the Civil Service, thereby opening the U.S. colonial administration to Filipinos. Harrison reduced the number of American workers in the Civil Service to about 600 in six years. When the Philippines became a

³⁹ Ibid., p. 197.

⁴⁰ Karnow, In Our Image, p. 197.
Commonwealth in 1935, only a handful of Americans were left in the Service. Filipino civil servants, who had long years of good training and experience, continued to run the service in an orderly and professional manner.\footnote{Smith, \textit{Philippine Freedom}, pp. 69-71.}

Because of his instinctive sympathy and genuine concern for their welfare, Governor-General Harrison endeared himself to the Filipino people during his tenure from 1913 to 1921. Later on, in testimony to the Filipinos' worth, he authored a book entitled "The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence."\footnote{Introduction to speech by Francis B. Harrison, "Rizal as Author, Patriot, and Scientist." [http://www.univie.ac.at/Voelkerkunde/Asian-Pacific/aufi/Rizal/r-scient.htm/htm].}

The U.S. established a representative government composed of a Filipino majority (with a few Americans), but subject to the American governor-general's veto. This democratic form of government, patterned after that in the U.S., provided for separation of powers and divided functions into executive, legislative, and judicial branches to provide the necessary checks and balances. The legislative power rested in a bicameral, all-Filipino legislature composed of the Philippine Senate and the Philippine House of Representatives. Judicial power was exercised by the Philippine Supreme Court (with a Filipino Chief Justice and both Filipino and American associate justices), and its subordinate courts. Cases decided by the Philippine Supreme Court were still subject to final decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.\footnote{Zaide, \textit{Philippine Political}, pp. 249-250.} At present, many Philippine government, political, and public educational institutions closely resemble those of the United States.
In 1934, amid considerable clamoring and lobbying by Filipinos for independence, the U.S. Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act. This Act established a 10-year transition and preparation period, as well as the creation of a Philippine Commonwealth, beginning in 1935. After the 10-year period, the United States would grant complete independence to the Philippines. Shortly after the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth, elections were held for a purely Filipino government, although residual United States powers still rested with the U.S. High Commissioner.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{G. WORLD WAR I AND THE CREATION OF A PHILIPPINE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT}

During the First World War, the Filipino people manifested their gratitude to America. When the U.S. entered the war in 1917, the Philippine Legislature rallied to America's support and authorized funds for the construction of a destroyer and a submarine for the U.S. Navy. Filipinos contributed $500,000 to the American Red Cross and purchased $20,000,000 in Liberty Loans. During that same year, the Philippine Legislature activated and organized the Philippine Militia and the Philippine National Guard Division, for possible service in the war. Many Filipino students and laborers in the United States volunteered to serve in the U.S. Army. In Hawaii, more than 4,000 able-bodied Filipinos volunteered for U.S. Army service, even if they could have legally claimed exemption. Additionally, about 6,000 Filipinos enlisted in the U.S. Navy.\textsuperscript{45}

Although the United States entered World War I late in the conflict, two Filipinos serving in the U.S. Army had the chance to prove their loyalty and dedication to the

\textsuperscript{44} Lightfoot, \textit{The Philippines}, pp. 116-117.

\textsuperscript{45} Zaide, \textit{Philippine Political}, pp. 252-253.
United States. Private Tomas Claudio from Morong, Rizal Province was seriously wounded in the Battle of Chateau Thierry in Flanders, France, and died shortly thereafter. He was the first Filipino to die while fighting under the American flag. Lieutenant Basilio J. Valdes, a soldier and a surgeon, served in base hospitals in France during the war, treating the wounded under the auspices of the American Red Cross. Although a physician by profession, Valdes rose from the ranks to become Philippine Army Chief of Staff in 1939, attaining the rank of Major General during that same year. In fact, the U.S. Congressional Medal of Honor has been awarded to three Filipinos during the American colonial period. Two of these had been awarded before World War I ended.

To further prepare the Philippines for independence, Americans realized that a properly trained and equipped military force was required to defend the country against foreign aggression. In 1905, an Officer's School for the Police Force of the Philippines was established in Manila, with a U.S. Army officer as its first superintendent. It had a nine-month curriculum. In 1908, the school was transferred to the mile-high Baguio City, the country’s summer capital, and was later renamed as the Philippine Constabulary Academy (PCA) in 1928. PCA's structure, organization, training, regulations, cadet honor code, and even its uniforms were patterned after those of the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point. Its course of instruction was lengthened to three years. After graduation, PCA graduates were usually assigned to law enforcement and peacekeeping duties throughout the country. In 1936, during the Philippine

46 Ibid., p. 253.

47 "Philippine Army, 100 Years."

Commonwealth period, the school was transferred to its present location on the outskirts of Baguio City, and was finally renamed as the Philippine Military Academy (PMA). PMA was a four-year, college-level institution that awarded a bachelor's degree and an officer commission to its graduates, as it continues to do so at present. To this day, many similarities remain between USMA and PMA. Because of these similarities, PMA became known as the "West Point of Asia."

Shortly after the Philippines became a Commonwealth in 1935, its first President, Manuel L. Quezon, enacted Commonwealth Act Number 1, the National Defense Act. This Act required the Philippine Commonwealth government to adequately provide for the defense of the country by establishing the Philippine Army and Navy, as well as the Philippine Military Academy, among other things. To assist him in his defense plans, Quezon sought and secured the services of General Douglas MacArthur, after MacArthur completed his tour of duty as U.S. Army Chief of Staff. MacArthur became President Quezon's chief military adviser and "Field Marshall" of the Philippine Armed Forces. Prior to being U.S. Army Chief of Staff, MacArthur had served in the Philippines. As a Major General in command of the U.S. Army's Philippine Department, he was in charge of all U.S. Army units in the Philippines. Although General MacArthur had formulated a well laid-out plan that included training and the acquisition of modern weapons and equipment for the Philippine armed forces, his goals were not reached before hostilities with Japan broke out. Mainly because of financial difficulties, the Philippine

49 Philippine Military Academy Website. [http://www.pixie.com/~jlaputt/history.htm].

Commonwealth government was unable to fully support MacArthur's plans.\textsuperscript{51} By late 1941, as the grim threat of war loomed ominously over the Pacific, all units of the Philippine armed forces had been incorporated with the regular U.S. military command in the Philippines.

\textbf{H. WORLD WAR II AND THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION}

The day after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor by in December 1941, they invaded the Philippines in another surprise attack. This time, the Japanese did not merely intend to neutralize American military capability in the Philippines. They intended to occupy the country permanently. Due partly to the miscalculations and indecision of General MacArthur and his military staff, most of the aircraft of the U.S. Army Air Force in the Philippines were destroyed on the ground by Japanese bombers during the first few hours of the invasion, before they could be utilized to repel the invaders. The destruction of U.S. military air power in the Philippines gave the Japanese forces complete air superiority in their campaign to take the country. The initial Japanese bombings also destroyed several ships of the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Fleet, most of which were based in the Philippines under the command of Admiral Thomas C. Hart. The ships that remained undamaged were ordered to leave the country for safer waters. Admiral Hart himself departed the Philippines by submarine shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{52}

The U.S. Army forces in the Philippines, together with their Philippine Army counterparts, were left on their own to oppose the Japanese invasion, with virtually no naval or air support. General MacArthur, who by then was recalled into the U.S. Army


\textsuperscript{52} "Admiral Thomas Charles Hart." [http://www.microworks.net/pacific/biographies/thomas_hart.htm].
and designated as Commander-in-Chief, United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), had overall command of the combined Filipino and American forces in resisting the Japanese aggressors. Together with 11,000 Filipino and American troops, he transferred USAFFE headquarters from Manila to the Malinta Tunnel on the "impregnable" island fortress of Corregidor. Located at the entrance to Manila Bay, Corregidor, officially named as "Fort Mills" by the U.S. Army, was also known as the "Gibraltar of the East."\(^{53}\)

Although the numerically superior Filipino and American defenders put up a valiant defense on the Bataan peninsula, they capitulated to the well-trained and better-equipped Japanese Imperial Forces after four months of fighting. Their defeat was caused by inadequate planning and war preparations, poor training and discipline, outmoded weapons and equipment, a shortage of food and supplies,\(^{54}\) no reinforcements, and no naval and air support. The shortage of food and medical supplies made malnutrition and disease rampant. As a result, hunger and sickness also contributed largely to American and Filipino casualties.\(^{55}\)

In March 1942, before Bataan fell, General MacArthur was ordered by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to retreat to Australia, where he would continue directing the defense of the Philippines, and organize reinforcements to strike back against the Japanese. Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright IV, MacArthur's senior field commander at Bataan, was left behind to lead the combined Filipino-American forces in

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\(^{53}\) Karnow, In Our Image, p. 292.


defending the Philippines against the Japanese invasion. After turning over command of the Bataan forces to Major General Edward P. King, Wainwright moved to Corregidor to take over MacArthur's former headquarters, which was renamed from USAFFE to USFIP (United States Forces in the Philippines) after General MacArthur's departure.56

Many military historians agree that the prolonged resistance of the Filipinos and Americans in the defense of the Philippines delayed the Japanese military timetable for advancing southward. From December 1941 to May 1942, the Japanese Imperial Army was obliged to commit large forces to the Bataan-Corregidor conquest, instead of mobilizing south. As a result, Australia was saved from a planned Japanese invasion.57 Additionally, in terms of casualties, the "battling bastards of Bataan" and the men of the Corregidor garrison made the Japanese pay a very high price for conquering the Philippines. Because of the stubborn tenacity that the Filipinos and Americans displayed against the aggressors, the commander-in-chief of the Japanese invasion forces had to request reinforcements from Tokyo.58

In the heat of battle at Bataan, one Filipino distinguished himself above the rest. On January 16, 1942 Sergeant Jose Calugas, a member of the U.S. Army's Philippine Scouts, saw a defensive battery gun position bombed and shelled by the advancing Japanese, until one gun was put out of commission and all its cannoneers were killed or wounded. Calugas, a mess sergeant from another battery, voluntarily and without orders ran 1,000 yards across the shell-swept area to the disabled gun position. Upon reaching his


57 Smith, Philippine Freedom, p. 106.

58 Morton, United States Army in World War II.
objective, he organized a volunteer squad that placed the gun back in commission and fired effectively against the enemy, although the position itself remained under constant and heavy enemy fire. For his actions "above and beyond the call of duty" on the Bataan peninsula, Sergeant Calugas was awarded the U.S. Congressional Medal of Honor, making him the third Filipino to receive the award.\textsuperscript{59}

The famous Philippine Scouts (PS) were composed of Filipinos who enlisted as regular members of the U.S. Army. Philippine Scout units were usually commanded by American officers and a few Filipino graduates of West Point. Because they were paid at regular U.S. Army rates, the Scouts fared better economically than did other individuals from their villages. With a few exceptions, Scout units were fully segregated racially. By law, their service was restricted to the Philippines except in time of war. The first company-sized units were established during 1899-1900 to supplement regular American forces fighting in the Philippine-American War. From 1919-1920, the Scouts were reorganized into infantry and field artillery regiments. Later on, a cavalry regiment was formed. Service and support units such as quartermaster, coast artillery, medical, and an integrated Filipino-American military police company were also established. The Philippine Scouts developed into an "elite" unit of the U.S. Army in the Philippines. With a total strength of 10,000 men, the Philippine Scouts composed the backbone of regular American forces in the Philippines prior to World War II. Aside from the established Scout regiments, a few PS supporting units were attached to the U.S. Army's Philippine Division, formerly commanded by General Wainwright. All PS units participated in the defense of the Bataan peninsula during the Japanese invasion. Much

\textsuperscript{59} Medal of Honor Recipients, 1863-1973, p. 513.
to their credit, remarkably few Philippine Scouts deserted when faced with certain death or capture by Japanese forces. It would have been very easy for individual Scouts to simply shed their uniforms and blend into the local civilian population. Many Philippine Scouts who evaded capture joined various guerilla organizations, where they continued to fight against the Japanese. After the Second World War, the Philippine Scouts were disbanded.\textsuperscript{60}

The 26th Cavalry Regiment, a Philippine Scout unit, left a permanent mark in history. The regiment was the last U.S. Army cavalry unit to engage in an organized horse-mounted charge in actual combat, which occurred during action at Bataan. Prior to the outbreak of war, all other cavalry units were dismounted and converted to armor, infantry, or service units. The men of the 26th Cavalry fought as both mounted and dismounted cavalry, until they were essentially destroyed as an effective fighting force.\textsuperscript{61}

After their defeat at Bataan on April 9, 1942, over 75,000 Filipino and American soldiers, with five American and six Filipino general officers, laid down their arms and became prisoners of war (POWs). The battle-weary and starving troops, many of whom were disease-ridden, could no longer effectively resist the Japanese. Then followed the infamous "Death March," the inhumanity of which shocked civilized mankind. The POWs, suffering from hunger, thirst, disease, and fatigue, were forced to march through 60 miles of treacherous terrain to the main Japanese POW camp at Capas, Tarlac. Along the route, they were joined by POWs who surrendered at other locations. Before the march, the Japanese soldiers confiscated valuables and other personal effects, such as

\textsuperscript{60} Phil Abbey, "The Philippine Scouts-U.S. Army (1900-1946)."

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
rings and jewelry. During the march, the POWs were given neither food nor water. Hundreds of soldiers, too weak to walk any further, were beheaded, bayoneted to death, or brutally beaten by their Japanese guards along the way. Filipino civilians who tried to give food, water, or any kind of aid or comfort to the prisoners along the route of the Death March were also beaten or killed on the spot, to discourage other civilians from similar acts of compassion and generosity. Almost 17,000 men died on the march, which lasted about five days for most POWs, and longer for others.  

At the end of the march, the POWs were crowded into railway boxcars and taken to a concentration camp another 20 miles away. Many died of suffocation in the boxcars before they even reached the POW camp. The prison camp was overcrowded, and it lacked basic sanitation and hygiene facilities for the captives. Prisoners were fed once a day on starvation rations, but the lack of water made the situation worse. Due to hunger, thirst, disease, and the brutalities of the Japanese camp guards, nearly 2,000 Americans and 25,000 Filipinos died within three months of internment. Because the Philippines became so isolated, the barbarity of the Death March would only be known to the outside world after one year. By the end of World War II, about 58 percent of allied prisoners would die under Japanese custody. In comparison, only two percent of allied captives in Europe would die as German POWs.  

General King, the senior U.S. officer who surrendered the Filipino-American forces at Bataan, completed the Death March trek together with his men, and also became a

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63 Zaide, Philippine Political, pp. 346-347; Karrow, In Our Image, pp. 302-304.

POW. Just like the other prisoners, King was also subjected to less than humane
treatment by the Japanese camp guards. 65 Some historians consider the fall of Bataan and
the subsequent loss of the Philippines to the Japanese during World War II as the U.S.
Army’s greatest defeat. 66

The most senior Filipino officer who made the ultimate sacrifice for freedom during
World War II was Brigadier General Vicente Lim, the first Filipino graduate of West
Point. After graduation from West Point, Lim was assigned to the Philippine Scouts,
where he spent most of his U.S. Army career. After retiring with the rank of Major, Lim
joined the newly-established Philippine Army to assist in its organization, training, and
development. Later on, he attained the rank of Brigadier General. Before Japan invaded
the Philippines in 1941, Lim assumed command of the Philippine Army’s 41st Infantry
Division. 67 Although the 41st Division was untried in combat, it was engaged in some of
the heaviest fighting on the Bataan peninsula, where it was badly routed by the enemy.

As a POW, General Lim was executed by the Japanese. 68

Shortly after Bataan fell, the Corregidor garrison surrendered on May 6, 1942.

Because he refused to leave his men before the surrender of the island garrison, General
Wainwright was captured by the Japanese. After Japanese forces finally gained a

65 Karnow, In Our Image, p. 305.

66 Mark Willey, "The Sacrifice of Bataan."

67 “Philippine Army, 100 Years.”
[http://www.army.mil.ph/history].

68 Jonathan M. Wainwright IV, General Wainwright’s Story: the Account of Four Years of Humiliating
foothold on Corregidor and started advancing toward his headquarters, Wainwright
cabled President Roosevelt with the inevitable news:

With broken heart and with head bowed in sadness, but not in shame, I
report to Your Excellency that today I must arrange terms for the
surrender of the fortified islands of Manila Bay.

He also sent a final radio message to General MacArthur, who was now in Australia:

I have fought for you to the best of my ability from Lingayen Gulf\textsuperscript{69} to
Bataan to Corregidor. Goodbye, General.\textsuperscript{70}

The defeated Filipino and American defenders of Corregidor were spared the same
fate as their Bataan comrades. They were not made to undergo the dreaded Death March.
Instead, they were transported directly to various POW camps.\textsuperscript{71}

The Japanese Imperial Army held General Wainwright as a POW for most of the
duration of its Philippine occupation, making him the highest-ranking American captive
of World War II. He was later transferred to POW camps in Formosa (now Taiwan) and
Manchuria, where he was rescued by advancing allied forces in August 1945.

Wainwright’s status as a high-ranking officer did not exempt him from scanty rations,
beatings, and emotional harassment at the hands of his captors, until the end of the war.\textsuperscript{72}

After witnessing the Japanese surrender on board the USS Missouri on September 2,
1945, Wainwright returned to the Philippines to receive the formal surrender of the
Japanese occupational commander. Fearful of being branded as a coward for

\textsuperscript{69} The site of the major Japanese landings in the Philippines during World War II.

\textsuperscript{70} Museum of Tolerance Online, Multimedia Learning Center, Simon Wiesenthal Center.

\textsuperscript{71} Karr, In Our Image. p. 303.

\textsuperscript{72} Stephen J. Kapp, "Jonathan M. Wainwright: Hero of Bataan."
surrendering on Corregidor, he reluctantly returned to the United States. Instead, he was given a hero's welcome. In a "surprise" ceremony at the White House, President Harry S. Truman promoted him to full General. During the same ceremony, Truman also awarded him the Congressional Medal of Honor, for the defense of the Philippines. For five long months, against all odds, he led his ragtag army of Filipino-American troops at Bataan and Corregidor in fighting a modern, better-trained, and well-supported enemy force almost to a standstill.\textsuperscript{73}

The Bataan epic illustrated the unique political and psychological quality in the relationship between the Americans and the Filipinos. At the outbreak of World War II, the British, French, and Dutch soon forgot their Far East empires as they resisted German aggression in their homelands. Nationalists in their Asian colonies emerged, many rallying behind the Japanese against their European colonial masters. In stark contrast, the fight for Bataan united Filipinos and Americans against the Japanese. The spectacle of American soldiers fighting and dying alongside their own troops touched Filipinos deeply, and encouraged many of them to continue fighting as guerillas after the fall of Bataan. To this day, many World War II Filipino veterans evoke the memory of Bataan to symbolize their special relationship with the United States. At the same time, the shared experiences of the Death March and internment as POWs have worked to forge even closer links between the Philippines and the United States.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{73} Arlington National Cemetery Website, "Jonathan Mayhew Wainwright IV." [http://www.arlingtoncemetery.com/jwainv.htm].

\textsuperscript{74} Karnow, \textit{In Our Image}, p. 302.
As another note of interest, the U.S. Navy commissioned two of its ships as the "USS Bataan." Both of these ships commemorate those who served and sacrificed for freedom in the gallant but futile defense of the Philippines during the Second World War.

In the long run, the greatest benefits that came out of Bataan were not military, but political and social. Filipinos and Americans fought side by side for a common cause. Americans who survived at Bataan have testified, again and again, that the loyalty and bravery of their Filipino compatriots were magnificent. Similarly, Filipinos have testified that they were fighting, not just for the United States, and not just for the Philippines, which had been invaded, but for liberty itself. After Bataan, Filipinos were no longer American "wards." They became American allies.75

As previously mentioned, not all Filipino and American troops surrendered to the Japanese. Some were able to evade capture and form guerilla resistance units. These units organized all over the country, under the command of American and Filipino officers. A few Filipino civilian leaders also formed their own units. At first, the guerillas did little but harass local Japanese patrols or gather local information, if connected to the rudimentary intelligence network left behind by General MacArthur's forces. As MacArthur prepared to retake the Philippines, this intelligence network grew, and guerilla action against the Japanese increased.76 The same forms of unconventional warfare the Filipinos used against the Americans during the Philippine-American War were now used against the Japanese.

75 Smith, Philippine Freedom, p. 107.
The intelligence that Filipino and American guerilla units provided on the Japanese occupational forces in the Philippines proved invaluable to General MacArthur's strategy and planning to liberate the country. This intelligence was relayed through U.S. Navy submarines, which operated in Philippine waters from the beginning of the war, and kept steady contact with resistance units. In fact, MacArthur was reported to have said that "we had history's most effective fifth column working for us in the Philippines." In turn, these submarines delivered weapons, equipment, ammunition, and other vital supplies needed by the guerillas in their operations against the Japanese.\(^77\)

To suppress the guerilla movement and discourage civilian support for it, the Japanese military resorted to atrocities and brutality in dealing with captured guerillas and known sympathizers, as well as the local population. These atrocities and brutalities were usually committed by the Japanese secret police, known as the "Kempei Tai," the equivalent of the German "Gestapo." Consequently, many captured guerillas and civilians perished during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. As the resistance movement grew, the Japanese became more ruthless. They began executing ten Filipino civilians at random, in retaliation for every Japanese soldier killed by the guerillas. But the resistance movement continued, and even increased its activities.\(^78\)

I. LIBERATION AND INDEPENDENCE

On October 20, 1944, just before the Battle of Leyte Gulf, General MacArthur, with his superior military, naval, and air forces, landed on the island-province of Leyte in the central part of the Philippines, and began his campaign to liberate the country. After the


Leyte landing, American and Filipino guerilla units linked up with MacArthur’s invasion forces. Together they started seeking and engaging the Japanese, many of whom had previously fled to the mountains to make their final stand. They also began to liberate the American and Filipino prisoners in POW camps throughout the Philippines. The Japanese resisted fiercely, but to no avail. Their lines of supply and communications had been previously cut off by MacArthur. After more than four months of fighting, mostly on the main island of Luzon, Japanese resistance finally ended in March 1945.\textsuperscript{79}

The bloodiest and most devastating fighting between American and Japanese forces took place in the battle for Manila. General MacArthur’s decision to surround the city with his advancing armies left the cornered Japanese forces no means for escape or retreat. As such, they had no other option but to heavily defend Manila and fight to the last man. To support the advance of MacArthur’s forces and to inflict as much casualties as possible on the Japanese defenders, Manila was subjected to the fury of American bombers, artillery, and armor. The city was totally leveled. So many buildings had been razed that American and Filipino troops could see from one end of the city to another. The battle for Manila was the only occasion in which American and Japanese forces fought each other in a city. The fighting was street to street and building to building. It was the largest action of its kind waged by the American or Japanese armies.

Considering Manila’s relatively small land area of 188 square miles,\textsuperscript{80} the casualty count in the battle for the city was quite high. A total of 6,500 Americans, 20,000 Japanese,

\textsuperscript{79} Karrow, \textit{In Our Image}, pp. 313-322.

\textsuperscript{80} The Public Purpose, Demographia Website, "Top 85 World Urbanized Areas: 1985: Population, Land Area, and Density." [http://www.demographia.com/db-wldua85.htm].
and 100,000 (out of a total resident population of 750,000) Filipino civilians died during the U.S. siege. The destruction of Manila was considered to be on the same scale as that of Stalingrad, Warsaw, and Berlin.\footnote{Michael D. Hull, "The Battle for Manila" Book Review. [http://www.thehistorynet.com/reviews/bk_battle4manila.htm].} In fact, next to Warsaw, Manila was the most heavily damaged city of World War II.\footnote{Karnow, In Our Image, p. 240.}

Elements of the renowned U.S. First Cavalry Division were the first units to enter Manila. The First Cavalry's "flying column" was reported to be advancing at speeds of up to 50 miles per hour in their drive toward the Philippine capital, after slicing through more than 100 miles of enemy-held territory in the suburbs. Upon crossing the city limits, First Cavalry troops drove the Japanese out of Malacanang Palace, before the desperate enemy succeeded in burning it to the ground. The official residence of the Spanish and American governor-generals, and later the first President of the Philippine Commonwealth, was saved from total destruction. After the palace was retaken, cheering Filipinos emerged and helped the Americans set up a defensive perimeter around the palace grounds, to prevent its recapture by Japanese troops. In their advance through Manila, the men of the First Cavalry also liberated the 4,000 (mostly civilian) prisoners interned at the University of Santo Tomas, a Spanish colonial-era university that was used by the Japanese as a POW concentration camp. Later on, they cleared the historic Manila Hotel, General MacArthur's pre-war residence, of entrenched Japanese soldiers.
First Cavalry troopers also "liberated" the Philippine legislative building and the world-famous "San Miguel Beer" brewery.\textsuperscript{83}

After the liberation of the Philippines in March of 1945, General MacArthur immediately restored the civil government of the Philippine Commonwealth, amidst the ruins of war. The next year, in accordance with the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, the Philippines finally gained independence and became a sovereign nation, after almost 50 years as a colony of the United States. On the morning of July 4, 1946, during formal ceremonies in Manila, the U.S. flag was lowered for the last time. In its place, the flag of the new Republic of the Philippines was raised.\textsuperscript{84}

J. THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II: THE MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEFENSE TREATIES

Independence legislation for the Philippines included authorization for the United States to retain several military reservations in that country, by leasehold and agreement. Accordingly, on March 14, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines-United States Military Bases Agreement (RP-US MBA) was signed by representatives of both countries. Under this agreement, the U.S. retained several military bases outside Manila.\textsuperscript{85} The major installations that remained were Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station (with the adjoining Cubi Point Naval Air Station constructed later), both located in Northern Luzon.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{83} William H. Boudreau, "First Cavalry Division Website." [http://www.metronet.com/~harryb/1st_team/1stndx02.html].

\textsuperscript{84} Karnow, \textit{In Our Image}, p. 323.

\textsuperscript{85} Smith, \textit{Philippine Freedom}, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 134.
The RP-US MBA, together with two other major treaties, the Military Assistance Agreement of March 21, 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951, made the Philippines, in effect, America's staunchest ally in the Pacific. Also, through its military bases in the Philippines, the U.S. was able to check the spread of communism in Asia. The strategic location, size, capabilities, and missions of these bases made them a major cornerstone of U.S. military policy and strategy for the Western Pacific, and later, the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf regions.87

K. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CLARK AIR BASE AND SUBIC BAY NAVAL BASE

Clark Air Base became the headquarters of the Thirteenth Air Force, which saw action in the southwest Pacific during World War II. The installation evolved from the former Fort Stotsenberg, a U.S. Army garrison constructed in 1902-1903 for cavalry units sent to fight in the Philippine-American War. The importance of air power in future conflicts prompted the Army to construct an airfield, hangars, and aircraft support facilities in 1917. In 1919, the airdrome portion of the base was named Clark Field. After World War II, it was renamed Clark Air Base.88

Subic Bay was constructed by the Spaniards in 1868 as a naval base outside Manila. During the Philippine-American War, the U.S. Navy took over the installation. It was developed and fortified to become a major repair, maintenance, refueling, and logistical hub, as well as a regular port of call, for homeported and visiting U.S. Navy ships. A training camp for U.S. Marines was also built. In 1956, construction was completed on the massive Cubi Point Naval Air Station and its 8,000-foot runway, perceived by many

87 Bresnan, Crisis in the Philippines, pp. 239-240.

as an impossible undertaking that could never be accomplished. Because Cubi Point was "carved" out of the rugged, mountainous, and thickly forested area adjacent to Subic Bay, construction was a most difficult feat. In terms of earthmoving, the construction of Cubi Point was equivalent to that of the Panama Canal. 89

During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, Clark and Subic were taken over by the Japanese and were used as bases of operations to support Japan’s expansionism in the Pacific. In fact, the first "kamikaze" attacks (which were flown against U.S. Navy ships during the Battle of Leyte Gulf) originated from Clark Field and other captured airfields in the Philippines. 90 In March 1945, after the surrender of all Japanese forces in the Philippines, the Americans regained control of these installations, and utilized them to support the U.S. advance toward the Japanese home islands. Over time, Clark and Subic Bay became the largest American military installations overseas. 91 During the Korean and Vietnam wars, and most recently, the Persian Gulf war, these bases played a major role in supporting U.S. and allied forces engaged in those conflicts.

The closure of all U.S. military installations in the Philippines marked the end of an era in Philippine-U.S. relations—an era that began in 1898, when President William McKinley made his fateful decision to acquire the Philippines as a colony of the United States. That era came to a close with the disestablishment of Subic Bay Naval Base in late 1992, thereby ending almost 100 years of permanent U.S. military presence in the Philippines.


L. U.S. NAVY RECRUITMENT OF PHILIPPINE NATIONALS

Article 27 of the RP-US MBA authorized the U.S. Navy to recruit a specified number of Philippine Nationals (PNs) annually for enlistment. At first, the U.S. Navy did not see any immediate need for recruiting Filipinos through its new enlistment program. However, the expanded personnel requirements generated by the Korean War compelled the Navy to use PEP. In 1952, the first group of 1,000 Filipinos was enlisted. In 1954, the quota was increased to 2,000 Philippine Nationals, and that number has been the upper limit ever since. Over the years, until PEP’s termination, the number of annual quotas varied, until it steadied at 400 annually from 1983 to 1990.

Due to the great interest in the U.S. Navy in the Philippines, competition among Filipinos for enlistment under PEP was intense. As such, eligibility policies and screening for PEP applicants were more stringent as compared with the requirements for those who enlisted through the Navy’s other recruiting programs. The following qualifications were required, and no waivers of any kind were granted:

Sex and Age - should be male at least 18 but not more than 26 years old on the date of enlistment. Filipino women were not eligible for PEP.

Education - should be at least a high school graduate. High school undergraduates were ineligible to apply. It should be noted that there is no General Education Development (GED) Program in the Philippines.

Aptitude and Language - should have a minimum score of 64 (out of 100) on the

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92 The terms Philippine Nationals (PNs) and Filipinos may be used interchangeably. Both these terms, as well as the term "PEP enlistees" or "PEP recruits," will be used to refer to citizens of the Republic of the Philippines who were recruited by the U.S. Navy through its Philippines Enlistment Program.

Enlistment Screening Test (EST), a pre-screening written examination. Those who made the cut-off score were interviewed by the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Recruiting Station and one other recruiter to ascertain their proficiency in speaking and understanding English. Successful candidates were then tested with the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), for which a minimum percentile score of 50 (population mean) was required.\textsuperscript{94} After the AFQT, successful candidates were given a second English language interview by recruiters to select final enlistees. Additional testing, administered at the former Recruit Training Command (RTC) in San Diego, California was used to determine a PEP recruit’s qualifications for assignment to training in a Navy rating (or occupation).

\textbf{Physical} - should meet all enlistment physical and medical qualifications.

Particular attention was given to diseases of the lungs, which was a disqualifying factor if the applicant was found to have any of these diseases during the exam.

\textbf{Character} - should have a clear police record, as certified by law enforcement authorities from every place of residence since age 14. Additionally, Filipinos were required to secure a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine equivalent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Any adverse police record or involvement with the law was disqualifying.

\textbf{Dependency} - should be single, never married, and have no one dependent for financial support. Additionally, both parents of the applicant (or the living parent if the other one was deceased), were required to sign a notarized form stating that

\textsuperscript{94} The candidates were tested with the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) from the time when it was used as the Department of Defense standard in the late 1970s. The AFQT is a composite of math and verbal subtests from the ASVAB.
they are not dependent on the applicant for financial support. This form was submitted by the applicant to the recruiters, and became an official part of the PEP recruit's Navy enlisted service record.\textsuperscript{95}

Except for the Seaman Apprenticeship Training Program, no Navy rating, school, or training was guaranteed to PNs prior to their enlistment. Specific ratings, schools, and training, or changes to the Airman or Fireman Apprenticeship programs, were to be determined after the second enlistment test was administered at RTC San Diego, subject to availability of quotas and eligibility of the Filipino recruits.\textsuperscript{96} In comparison, recruits who enlisted through other programs may be "guaranteed" their choice of entry rating prior to enlistment, as well as basic and advanced training ("A" and "C" schools) for that rating. A rating or training "guarantee" is usually given as an enlistment incentive, based on a prospective recruit's personal preferences, eligibility and qualifications (i.e., ASVAB scores), and entry-level personnel shortages in particular Navy ratings.

In September 1991, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 came up for review and possible renewal by the Philippine Senate. The Philippine Senate decided not to renew the treaty. Subsequently, on December 31, 1991, the Philippine government issued the required one-year termination notice of the 1947 agreement. Plans for a withdrawal of all U.S. Navy assets in the Philippines were immediately implemented.\textsuperscript{97} Previously, the U.S. Air Force had evacuated Clark Air Base. The extremely heavy

\textsuperscript{95} U.S. Navy Recruiting Manual (CRUTTMAN), COMNAVCURITCOM Instruction 1130.8 (series), Chapter 6. This chapter, which is no longer in use, provided procedures and guidelines for administering the U.S. Navy's Philippines Enlistment Program.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{97} Chief of Naval Operations, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, February 3, 1992. Copy of memorandum provided by Mr. Robert Phillips, Code 3561, Commander, Navy Recruiting Command.
volume of ash and dust generated by the eruption of a nearby volcano earlier that year caused extensive damage to the facility, leaving it in ruins.\textsuperscript{98}

\textbf{M. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS}

By the time the RP-US MBA was terminated by the Philippine government, a total of 180 recruits remained in the PEP pipeline. The majority had completed processing and were awaiting shipment to recruit training in San Diego. The rest were in the process of meeting only minor requirements for processing. Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, then the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), recommended to Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III that shipping of these individuals to recruit training should be completed by March 1992, before the deadline for all U.S. military forces to leave the Philippines. RTC San Diego also confirmed that they could receive this accelerated number of PEP recruits for training. Since the Filipinos were not considered to be legally contracted by the U.S. Navy until the day they are shipped to recruit training, the Navy had no commitment to enlist any of the people being processed. However, in the interest of minimizing tensions between the Republic of the Philippines and United States caused by the termination of the RP-US MBA, Admiral Kelso recommended to Secretary Garrett that the processing and shipping of these individuals be completed before March 1992.\textsuperscript{99}

In early 1999, the Philippine Senate ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)\textsuperscript{100} between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States. VFA advocates military cooperation between the Philippines and the United States as vital to the political,

\textsuperscript{98} "Clark Air Base, Philippines." [http://www.clarkab.org/].

\textsuperscript{99} Memorandum for SECNAV from CNO, February 3, 1992.

\textsuperscript{100} "Visiting Forces Agreement." [http://www.dfa.gov.ph/vfa].
economic, and security partnership between the two countries. It also enables the Republic of the Philippines to bolster the stability of the Pacific area in a shared effort with its neighbor-states. Among other things, VFA allows temporary visits of U.S. military personnel to conduct joint military training and exercises with the Philippine armed forces.

VFA is more restrictive than the RP-US MBA of 1947. This newly-ratified treaty does not allow unrestricted access or unhampered movement of U.S. military forces in the Philippines, as did the RP-US MBA. Neither does it allow basing agreements for U.S. military forces to stay permanently in that country. Nor does it pave the way for the restoration of former U.S. military facilities in the Republic of the Philippines that were closed with the termination of the RP-US MBA. Most significantly, VFA contains no provision allowing the U.S. Navy, or any other branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, to recruit Filipinos for enlisted service.

Since 1901, the conditions for recruiting Filipinos in the U.S. Navy have been regulated by several Presidential Orders and interstate agreements. Nevertheless, one thing has remained constant throughout the years: Filipinos have always served with distinction, and their record in the U.S. Navy is impressive. Indeed, of the 3,746 Philippine Nationals who have enlisted in the Navy since 1979, a total of 3,024 were still on active duty as of late 1989—an astounding 10-year retention rate of 81 percent. Additionally, the first-term attrition rate—that is, the failure of a recruit to complete his

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or her first term of service—has been as low as five percent for PEP recruits.\textsuperscript{102} This compares with a rate of about 30 percent for Navy recruits as a whole.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{102} Rear Admiral Francis B. Donovan, U.S. Navy, \textit{Special Immigrant Status for Aliens Who Have Served in the Armed Forces}. Testimony given before the Immigration Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, September 21, 1989. During that time, RADM Donovan was concurrently Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command; Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, and Training; and Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel. Copy of testimony provided by Mr. Robert Phillips, Code 3561, Commander, Navy Recruiting Command.

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III. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND RESULTS

A. DATA

The raw data for this study were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Monterey, California, in late 1999. A Statistical Analysis System (SAS) program was written to read and manipulate the data. SAS is a statistical software program that enables the user to control data access and to analyze and present data.\textsuperscript{104} SAS is most useful in studying very large numbers of observations with several parameters or variables.

The data consisted of two major cohort groups. The primary cohorts were composed of recruits who enlisted in the U.S. Navy in Fiscal Years (FYs) 1981, 1986, and 1991, through the Philippines Enlistment Program (PEP), and through all other U.S. Navy enlistment programs. The secondary cohorts were composed of recruits who enlisted in the Navy during Fiscal Years 1981 through 1991, through PEP and through other enlistment programs. From this point onward, PEP enlistees are identified as "PEP," and all other enlistees are identified as "OTHER." To establish common parameters for both groups, both cohorts were restricted to individuals with the following characteristics upon enlistment:

a) Male, 18-26 years old;

b) Single with no dependents;

c) Had a high school diploma (or had higher education);

d) Did not require any kind of waiver for enlistment, and;

e) Was in initial enlistment and had no prior service in the U.S. Armed Forces.

In addition, both groups were limited to persons who had continuous, unbroken service at the various observation points of five, ten, and fifteen years. The 11-year observation period from 1981-1991 (inclusive) was chosen due to the following reasons:

a) PEP terminated in 1991, and;

b) The 11-year (inclusive) observation period provided equally-spaced observation points at the five-, ten-, and fifteen-year marks. These observation points were deemed sufficient for predicting short-term and long-term characteristics of both recruit groups.

The characteristics listed above were actually eligibility requirements for PEP recruits, as discussed in Chapter II. At the same time, the non-prior service and unbroken service characteristics were typical of individuals who joined the Navy under PEP.

Therefore, the OTHER enlistees who were chosen for this study also had the same entry-level characteristics, for purposes of having a common baseline for comparison. OTHER enlistees who were previously married (a cause for disqualification under PEP), but were single and had no dependents as of the time of data collection, may have been included in the OTHER recruit samples. There is no way of determining from the database whether OTHER enlistees were previously married or not. The database classifies persons only as single with no dependents at the time of enlistment.

The figures from DMDC may not exactly match data maintained by Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC). This is especially true for PEP enlistees in 1981, due to changes in data coding that may have corrupted some of the automated records. Also, some PEP enlistees who may have been recruited close to the end of one fiscal year
may have been recorded as having enlisted in the following fiscal year. Conversely, some PEP enlistees who were recruited close to the beginning of a certain fiscal year may have been recorded as having enlisted in the previous fiscal year.

B. METHODOLOGY

The methodology for the primary study group involved verifying educational attainment levels and AFQT scores upon enlistment, and determining basic percentages and averages for each category. After the five-, ten-, and fifteen-year points, the PEP and US enlistees were tracked to determine the following:

a) Number and percentage who were still on active duty, as compared with the original cohort;

b) Paygrade attained by those still on active duty; and

c) For those who were no longer on active duty, the general reason why they separated from the Navy.

Separation from the Navy was determined from the Reentry Code (RE-Code) taken from each individual’s latest terminated enlistment, or from the latest DD Form 214, Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty. Specifically, the 1981 enlistees were tracked for separation as of 1986, 1991, and 1996. The 1986 enlistees were tracked for separation as of 1991 and 1996. Finally, the 1991 enlistees were tracked as of 1996.

OTHER enlistees for all observations are composed of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens. These two distinct groups were combined for the purpose of this study, since both U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens could enlist under any regular Navy enlistment program, except PEP. The only difference is that permanent resident aliens are not allowed to hold Navy ratings requiring U.S. citizenship (a similar
restriction placed on PEP enlistees). Permanent residents may apply for ratings requiring U.S. citizenship, as well as for officer commissioning programs, after becoming naturalized (again, a similar provision that also applied to PEP enlistees). The OTHER recruit group includes 2,688 individuals of Filipino ethnicity who enlisted during Fiscal Years 1981 through 1991 (either as permanent residents or U.S. citizens) through different U.S. Navy recruiting programs. In comparison, there were 3,620 PEP recruits who enlisted during the same period.

C. RESULTS

Table 1 shows the numbers of PEP and OTHER recruits who enlisted in Fiscal Years 1981 through 1991. As can be observed, the numbers of PEP recruits who enlist each year are much smaller than the numbers of OTHER recruits.
Table 1. Number of PEP and OTHER Recruits by Fiscal Year of Entry, 1981-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year of Entry and Recruit Group</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>20,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>16,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>21,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>21,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>23,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>25,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>25,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>26,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>28,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>23,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>19,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PEP</td>
<td>3,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total OTHER</td>
<td>250,241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
Table 2 compares PEP and OTHER recruits who have one or more years of college prior to enlistment, as well as those who scored 50 or higher on the AFQT. All figures are in percent.

Table 2. Percentage of PEP and OTHER Recruits Who Completed One or More Years of College Prior to Enlistment, and Those Who Scored AFQT 50 or Higher, by Fiscal Year of Entry, 1981, 1986, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year of Entry and Recruit Group</th>
<th>Completed One Or More Years of College&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>AFQT 50 or Higher&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

a. Includes recruits who had attended college for one or more years.

b. Includes recruits who scored at or above the 50th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).

c. OTHER recruits are those who enlisted through different U.S. Navy recruiting programs (other than PEP), and who had the same entry-level characteristics as PEP recruits.

Table 2 shows that, as a group, a greater percentage of PEP enlistees than OTHER enlistees in FYs 81, 86, and 91 had one or more years of college education at the time of service entry. Table 1 also shows, that, as a group, PEP enlistees have generally higher AFQT scores than the OTHER enlistees, except for FY-91. It should be noted that a relatively large number of PEP enlistees had "unknown" AFQT scores in FY-91 (36
persons, or about 12 percent of all PEP enlistees for this Fiscal Year), as recorded in the data files. Based on the trend of increasing scores over the period, it is likely that the missing cases may have operated to reduce the true proportion of PEP enlistees with an AFQT score of 50 or higher during FY-91. However, the educational data on the OTHER recruits may not be entirely accurate. In 1987, database coding for educational attainment levels of all recruits was changed, partly to be able to record in separate categories OTHER recruits who had documentation of some college prior to enlistment, but did not present proper documentation of high school graduation. In comparison, PEP recruits are required to present documentation of high school graduation prior to enlistment, especially because there is no GED certification program in the Philippines. They are also required to present documentation of any college work completed. As such, records of their pre-enlistment educational attainment are probably more complete and more accurate as compared with some of the OTHER recruits.

Table 3 compares retention statistics for all the cohort groups. The statistics in Table 3 show that Filipinos who enlisted through PEP have a consistently higher retention rate than do all other (OTHER) recruits who enlisted under different Navy recruiting programs. For example, 94.0 percent of PEP recruits who enlisted in FY-81 were still on active duty with the Navy as of FY-86; 88.0 percent were still on active duty as of FY-91; and 77.1 percent were still on active duty by FY-96. In comparison, 28.6 percent of OTHER recruits who enlisted in FY-81 were still on active duty with the Navy as of FY-86; 16.6 percent were still on active duty as of FY-91; and 12.5 percent were still on active duty as of FY-96. The data for the 1986 and 1991 recruit groups are read similarly. Because all observations were made on a fiscal-year basis, not all personnel
observed had the same number of years of active duty. For example, all personnel observed at the five-year observation point may have anywhere from five years (60 months) of active duty to one day less than six years (almost 72 months).

Table 3 compares continuation (retention) rates of PEP and OTHER recruits at selected points in time, and at regular intervals of five years, up to the 15-year point, as applicable. This table shows that PEP recruits who enlisted in Fiscal Years 1981, 1986, and 1991 have much higher short and long-term continuation rates as compared to OTHER recruits who enlisted during those same fiscal years.

Table 3. Continuation Rates (Percent) of PEP and OTHER Recruits at Selected Points, by Fiscal Year of Entry, 1981, 1986, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year of Entry and Recruit Group</th>
<th>Percent of Recruits Still on Active Duty as of*</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td></td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by DMDC.

* Continuation rates (percent) are as of end of Fiscal Year indicated.

Tables 5 through 10 show advancement (promotion) and continuation statistics for PEP and OTHER recruits. To view the advancement statistics in the proper perspective, Table 4 is presented first. Table 4 provides the minimum Time in Rate (TIR) periods that
an individual is required to spend in one paygrade, before becoming eligible for
advancement to the next higher paygrade:

\textbf{Table 4.} Minimum Time in Rate (TIR) Requirements For Advancement to the Next
Higher Paygrade, E-1 to E-9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advancement From Paygrade</th>
<th>To Paygrade</th>
<th>Minimum TIR (Months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-1</td>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>E-8</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-8</td>
<td>E-9</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Advancement to paygrades E-2 and E-3 is approved by the Commanding Officer, upon the individual meeting certain standard requirements. Advancement to E-4, E-5, and E-6 and above is vacancy-driven, and depends upon an individual meeting standard requirements, being recommended for advancement by the Commanding Officer, and making the cut-off score on a Navy-wide advancement examination. Advancement to E-7 has the same requirements as advancement from E-4 through E-6, including screening by a selection board. Advancement to E-8 and E-9 requires only completion of standard requirements, recommendation by the Commanding Officer, and screening by a
selection board. No examination is required for advancement to these two most senior enlisted paygrades.  

Table 5 compares advancement and continuation rates for PEP and OTHER recruits who enlisted in FY-81, as of FY-86. Table 5 shows that, in FY-81, a total of 249 PEP enlistees were recruited. By FY-86, 18.9 percent of PEP recruits had attained paygrade E-4; 69.9 percent had attained paygrade E-5; and 2.4 percent had attained paygrade E-6. During that same fiscal year, 20,539 OTHER recruits enlisted. By FY-86, 9.2 percent of these OTHER recruits had attained paygrade E-4; 17.6 percent had attained paygrade E-5; and 0.7 percent had attained paygrade E-6. The data in Tables 6 through 11 are read in the same way as the data in Table 5.

Table 5. Advancement of PEP and OTHER Recruits Who Entered in Fiscal 1981 as of Fiscal 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

Table 6 compares advancement and continuation rates of PEP and OTHER recruits who enlisted in FY-81, as of FY-91. As indicated in Table 6, of the 249 PEP recruits who enlisted in FY-81, 88 percent were still on active duty as of FY-91. In FY-91, 59.4 percent of the 249 original recruits had attained paygrade E-6, and 9.2 percent had attained paygrade E-7. In comparison, 16.6 percent of the 20,539 OTHER recruits who

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enlisted in FY-81 were still on active duty as of FY-91. Out of this 20,539 total, 8.8 percent had attained paygrade E-6, and 1.0 percent had attained paygrade E-7 in FY-91.

**Table 6. Advancement of PEP and OTHER Recruits Who Entered in Fiscal 1981 as of Fiscal 1991**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>E-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

Table 7 compares advancement and continuation rates for PEP and OTHER recruits who enlisted in FY-81, as of FY-96 (the 15-year comparison point). Table 7 shows that, in FY-96, 77.1 percent of all 249 PEP recruits who originally enlisted in FY-81 were still on active duty with the Navy. Of the 249 PEP enlistees in FY-81, 27.7 percent had attained paygrade E-7 by FY-96, and 2.4 percent had attained paygrade E-8. In comparison, 20,539 OTHER recruits enlisted in FY-81. In FY-96, 12.5 percent of them were still on active duty with the Navy. Of the 20,539 OTHER recruits who enlisted in FY-81, 3.4 percent had attained paygrade E-7 by FY-96; and 0.2 percent had attained paygrade E-8 by this same Fiscal Year.
Table 7. Advancement of PEP and OTHER Recruits Who Entered in Fiscal 1981 as of Fiscal 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>E-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

Table 8 compares continuation and advancement rates for PEP and OTHER recruits who enlisted in FY-86, as of FY-91. As seen in Table 8, a total of 358 PEP recruits enlisted in FY-86. In FY-91, 92.5 percent of them were still on active duty with the Navy. Out of the original 358 who enlisted in FY-86, 16.5 percent had attained paygrade E-4 in FY-91; 71.2 percent had attained paygrade E-5; and 4.7 percent had attained paygrade E-6. In comparison, 25,816 OTHER recruits enlisted during FY-86. By FY-91, 15.1 percent of them were still on active duty with the Navy, 11.9 percent had attained paygrade E-4; 20.2 percent had attained paygrade E-5; and 0.6 percent had attained paygrade E-6.

Table 8. Advancement of PEP and OTHER Recruits Who Entered in Fiscal 1986 as of Fiscal 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
Advancement rates for PEP and OTHER recruits who enlisted in FY-86 are shown in Table 9. As seen here, out of the total of 358 PEP recruits who enlisted in FY-86, 81.0 percent were still on active duty with the Navy by FY-96; 44.7 percent out of this total had attained paygrade E-6; and 3.9 percent had attained paygrade E-7. In comparison, out of the total of 25,816 OTHER recruits who enlisted in FY-86, 15.1 percent of this total were still on active duty by FY-96, 5.5 percent had attained paygrade E-6; and 0.3 percent had attained paygrade E-7 during FY-96.

**Table 9.** Advancement of PEP and OTHER Recruits Who Entered in Fiscal 1986 as of Fiscal 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>E-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

Table 10 shows advancement and continuation rates of PEP and OTHER recruits who enlisted in FY-91, as of FY-96. As shown by this table, out of the 303 PEP recruits enlisted in FY-91, 84.8 percent of them were still on active duty with the Navy as of FY-96, 34.3 percent had attained paygrade E-4; 49.5 percent had attained paygrade E-5; and 0.3 percent had attained paygrade E-6. In comparison, out of 19,863 OTHER recruits who enlisted in FY-91, 27.7 percent were still on active duty as of FY-96, 15.2 percent had attained paygrade E-4; 11.2 percent had attained paygrade E-5; and 0.1 percent had attained paygrade E-6.
Table 10. Advancement of PEP and OTHER Recruits Who Entered in Fiscal 1991 as of Fiscal 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

Tables 5 through 10 show that PEP recruits who enlisted in Fiscal Years 1981, 1986, and 1991 had relatively higher advancement rates, in all cases examined, than did OTHER recruits who enlisted in the same years. And, in most cases, the difference is quite dramatic.

The Reentry Codes (RE-Codes) for all recruits who separated or were discharged from the Navy were also compared. RE-Codes are administratively assigned for each servicemember’s latest terminated enlistment. These codes usually determine whether or not the individual is eligible for reenlistment or further military service, regardless of whether or not the member desires to reenlist. If the member does not reenlist or does not immediately reenlist after the termination of an enlistment, the RE-Code is entered into his or her DD-214, the Certificate of Release or Discharge From Active Duty. The DD-214 is prepared for the member by the personnel office before discharge or separation. After the separating servicemember reviews and signs the form, a personnel officer witnesses it, also by signing. The signed DD-214 becomes the only official record of a member’s period(s) of military service. RE-Codes could have values from 1 to 7, which are explained as follows:
a) RE-1 (series): Eligible for reenlistment.

b) RE-2: Ineligible for reenlistment because of status, i.e., retirement or entry into a (commissioned or warrant) officer program.

c) RE-3 (series): Eligible for reenlistment except for disqualifying factor, such as parenthood, hardship, physical disability, physical readiness test (PRT) failures, erroneous enlistment, and other non-adverse reasons. These separations are usually considered involuntary on the part of the servicemember. RE-3 (series) codes were also given to personnel who opted to leave the military service for the Voluntary Separation Incentive or the Special Separation Benefit (monetary separation incentive programs) during the military's downsizing period.

d) RE-4: Ineligible for reenlistment unless with prior approval of the Chief of Naval Personnel. A RE-4 code is assigned for misconduct, disciplinary, legal, or other adverse reasons, or if the character of service during an enlistment was less than honorable.

e) RE-5, RE-6, and RE-7: Not applicable, since there were no persons identified in the database with these codes.\textsuperscript{106}

RE-Codes were taken from each individual's latest terminated enlistment and are current as of September 1998. Unknown or unavailable RE-Codes were assigned a value of zero (0) or nine (9). A "zero" or "nine" value for a RE-Code means that the individual was discharged on or before September 1998, but his latest RE-Code is unknown or unavailable. It could also mean that the individual was still on active duty as of September 1998; therefore, he has no assigned RE-Code, since his latest enlistment term was not over by the time the observations were recorded. The DMDC database has no

\textsuperscript{106} Certificate of Discharge or Release from Active Duty (DD-214), BUPERS Instruction 1900.8, 28 June 1993. This instruction provides procedures for completing and issuing the DD-214.
means of determining which of the observations with "zeros" or "nines" for RE-Codes were still on active duty or were discharged as of September 1998. As such, the numbers of individuals with "zeros" or "nines" for RE-Codes were not included in computing percentages.

Table 11 indicates the number of PEP and OTHER recruits with invalid RE-Codes. Invalid RE-Codes were less than five percent of total observations for each group of recruits, except for the OTHER recruit group in FY-81, and the PEP recruit group in FY-91. The relatively higher numbers of invalid observations for these two groups (as compared to their total number of observations) may have caused the percentages of valid observations to be lower, and may affect the accuracy of the data.

**Table 11. Number of PEP and OTHER Recruits With Invalid Reentry (RE) Codes as of September 1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year of Entry and Recruit Group</th>
<th>Total Observations</th>
<th>Invalid RE-Codes*</th>
<th>Total Valid Observations Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981 PEP</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 OTHER</td>
<td>20,539</td>
<td>2,214</td>
<td>18,325</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 PEP</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 OTHER</td>
<td>25,816</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>24,520</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 PEP</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 OTHER</td>
<td>19,863</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>19,029</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

* As previously discussed, RE-Codes characterize the latest terminated enlistment, and could have values ranging from 1 to 4 in this study.
In Table 12, the percentages for all RE-Codes were computed using the number of "Total Valid Observations" from Table 11. Out of 239 PEP recruits (all of whom had valid RE-Codes) who enlisted in FY-86, 84.5 percent were RE-1; 11.3 percent were RE-2; 1.7 percent were RE-3; and 2.5 percent were RE-4. In comparison, out of 18,325 OTHER recruits (all of whom had valid RE-Codes) who enlisted in FY-86, 59.9 percent were RE-1; 2.0 percent were RE-2; 10.5 percent were RE-3; and 27.6 percent were RE-4. The succeeding rows of data are read similarly. The percentages of RE-1 (eligible for reenlistment) and RE-4 (ineligible for reenlistment because of adverse reasons) codes are of special interest here. As shown by Table 11, a considerably greater percentage of PEP recruits (more than 84 percent) than OTHER recruits (less than 60 percent) were recommended for reenlistment. Also, a noticeably lower proportion of PEP recruits had RE-4 codes assigned to them (less than 6 percent), as compared with their OTHER counterparts (more than 24 percent). Basically, this indicates that a smaller proportion of PEP recruits were separated or discharged from the Navy due to adverse reasons as of September 1998.
Table 12. Percentage of PEP and OTHER Recruits by Reentry (RE) Code as of Latest Reenlistment, September 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year of Entry and Recruit Group</th>
<th>Reentry Code (RE) Percentages</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 PEP</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 OTHER</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 PEP</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 OTHER</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 PEP</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 OTHER</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

a. RE-1: Eligible for reenlistment.

b. RE-2 and RE-3: Ineligible for reenlistment; involuntary separation because of non-adverse reasons.

c. RE-4: Ineligible for reenlistment; separation because of adverse reasons.

The secondary, supplementary cohort (all PEP and OTHER recruits who enlisted during the period from 1981 through 1991) was tracked only after each recruit’s four-year point, the minimum term of enlistment for PEP recruits.<sup>107</sup> Retention and promotion statistics, as well as RE-Codes, were also verified after four years. The educational attainment levels and AFQT scores of the recruits upon initial enlistment were likewise

<sup>107</sup> CRUITMAN, Chapter 6.
examined. Once again, invalid observations for each variable (i.e., educational attainment levels and AFQT scores) were not included in computing percentages.

Table 13 indicates that PEP recruits generally have higher pre-enlistment educational attainment levels and AFQT scores, as compared with OTHER recruits. However, as previously mentioned, educational attainment data for OTHER recruits may not be complete and accurate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year of Entry and Recruit Group</th>
<th>One or More Years of College(^a)</th>
<th>AFQT 50 or Higher(^b)</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>20,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>16,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>18,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>21,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>23,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>25,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>25,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>26,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>28,798</td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>23,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>19,863</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

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a. Includes recruits who had attended college for one or more years.

b. Includes recruits who scored at or above the 50th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).
After four years of active Naval service, the continuation and advancement rates were observed for all PEP and OTHER recruits. Table 14 presents these observations. In FY-81, 249 PEP recruits were enlisted, and, after four years, 94.0 percent of them were still on active duty with the U.S. Navy. Also, after four years, 31.7 percent of PEP recruits had attained paygrade E-4; 58.2 percent had attained paygrade E-5; and 0.40 percent had attained paygrade E-6. In comparison, 20,539 OTHER recruits enlisted in FY-81; and, after four years, 37.7 percent of them were still on active duty with the Navy. Also, after four years, 16.9 percent of OTHER recruits attained paygrade E-4; 17.0 percent had attained paygrade E-5; and 0.10 percent had attained paygrade E-6. The succeeding rows of data in Table 14 are read the same way.
Table 14. Advancement and Continuation Rates (Percent) of PEP and OTHER Recruits Who Entered in Fiscal Years 1981-1991, After Four Years of Active Duty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year of Entry and Recruit Group</th>
<th>Percent at Paygrade (After Four Years*)</th>
<th>Percent Still on Active Duty</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 PEP</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 OTHER</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 PEP</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 OTHER</td>
<td>18.9</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 PEP</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 OTHER</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 PEP</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 OTHER</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 PEP</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 OTHER</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 PEP</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 OTHER</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 PEP</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 OTHER</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 PEP</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 OTHER</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 PEP</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 OTHER</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 PEP</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 OTHER</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 PEP</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 OTHER</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

* Percentages are for recruits in each category after four years (and less than five years) of active duty in the Navy. For example: 1981 as of end of 1995; 1982 as of end of 1996; and so on.
Table 14 also shows that the four-year retention rate of PEP recruits (for the 1981-1991 period) is much higher than that of OTHER recruits. In all but one year (1991), greater than 93 percent of PEP recruits were still on active duty after four years. In contrast, less than 40 percent of all OTHER recruits who enlisted during these same fiscal years were still on active duty with the Navy after four years of service. The lowest four-year continuation rate for PEP recruits was just under 87 percent, among those who entered the Navy in 1991. This compares with about 28 percent for OTHER recruits who enlisted in the same year.

Table 14 also shows that PEP recruits had a more rapid advancement rate to paygrade E-5 than did their OTHER counterparts for these fiscal years. It is interesting to note that a majority of PEP recruits generally achieve paygrade E-5 after four years. This is true for all but two groups of PEP recruits (those who enlisted in 1990 and in 1991). As many as 71 percent of PEP recruits who enlisted in 1987 were promoted to E-5 after four years of service. The highest promotion rate to E-5 for any group of OTHER recruits—18 percent—occurred for those who enlisted in 1985. In fact, proportionately more OTHER recruits are at paygrade E-4 than at E-5 for all entry years except 1981. The relatively high promotion rates for PEP recruits are particularly noteworthy, since Philippine Nationals could enlist only in paygrade E-1, even if they completed college credits that would otherwise qualify them to enlist in paygrades E-2 or E-3. In contrast, OTHER recruits were allowed to enlist in paygrades E-2 or E-3, depending on the number of college credits completed prior to enlistment. They could also enlist in these higher paygrades if they satisfactorily participated a Junior Reserve Officer's Training
Course (JROTC), or the Naval Sea Cadet Program (NSCP).\textsuperscript{108} There is no U.S. Navy
JROTC or U.S. NSCP in the Philippines.

A slightly greater percentage of PEP recruits than other recruits had attained
paygrade E-6 among those who enlisted in FYs 81, 82, 85, 87, and 88. In FY-90, no PEP
or OTHER recruit attained paygrade E-6. In FYs 83, 84, 86, 89, and 91 no PEP recruit
attained paygrade E-6. As seen here, promotion to E-6 after four years is quite unusual.
The small percentage of PEP and OTHER recruits who attained paygrade E-6 after four
years were probably composed of OTHER recruits who were allowed to enlist in
paygrades E-2 or E-3, or PEP and OTHER recruits who were promoted after spending
only the minimum amount of time in each lower paygrade.\textsuperscript{109} They could also be
composed of those who enlisted into Accelerated Advancement Programs (AAPs) for
certain Navy ratings. AAPs usually guarantee promotion to paygrade E-4 and E-5 after
completion of the appropriate basic and advanced training schools for that particular
Navy rating, and after meeting standard requirements for promotion to those paygrades.
Because most AAP ratings require U.S. citizenship, PEP recruits are not allowed initial
enlistment in these ratings.\textsuperscript{110}

The RE-Codes for this secondary cohort were also tracked after four years. Table 15
records the number of invalid RE-Codes (those with values of "zero" or "nine") for PEP
and OTHER recruits who enlisted during Fiscal Years 1981-1991. Once again, all RE-
Codes are current as of September 1998.

\textsuperscript{108} \textbf{CRUITMAN}, Chapters 3 and 4.

\textsuperscript{109} Interview between Navy personnel specialist, U.S. Navy Personnel Support Activity Detachment,

\textsuperscript{110} Telephone conversation between recruiters from the Navy Recruiting Station, Salinas, CA, and the
Table 15. Number of PEP and OTHER Recruits With Invalid Reentry (RE) Codes as of September 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year of Entry and Recruit Group</th>
<th>Total Observations</th>
<th>Invalid Reentry (RE) Codes*</th>
<th>Total Valid Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 PEP</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>20,539</td>
<td>2,214</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 PEP</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>16,197</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 PEP</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>18,453</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 PEP</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>21,601</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 PEP</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>23,783</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 PEP</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>25,816</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 PEP</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>25,499</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 PEP</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>26,030</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 PEP</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>28,798</td>
<td>1,097</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 PEP</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>23,662</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 PEP</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>19,863</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

* As previously discussed, RE-Codes characterize the latest terminated enlistment, and could have values of 1 to 4 in this study.
Table 16 provides a percentage breakdown for RE-Codes assigned to PEP and OTHER recruits who enlisted during the Fiscal Years 1981-1991. As in Table 12, Table 16 shows that a relatively large percentage (from 84 to 96 percent) of PEP recruits who enlisted in Fiscal Years 1981-1991 were recommended for reenlistment as of September 1998, indicated by their RE-1 Codes. In comparison, between 58 and 67 percent of all OTHER recruits who enlisted during this same period were recommended for enlistment as of September 1998. Also, a much lower percentage (usually less than 3 percent) of PEP recruits were given RE-4 codes as of September 1998, as compared with their OTHER counterparts (consistently above 21 percent).
Table 16. Percentage of PEP and OTHER Recruits by Reentry (RE) Code as of Latest Reenlistment, September 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year of Entry and Recruit Group</th>
<th>Reentry Code (RE) Percentages</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 PEP</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 PEP</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 PEP</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 PEP</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 PEP</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 PEP</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 PEP</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 PEP</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 PEP</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 PEP</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 PEP</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

a. RE-1: Eligible for reenlistment.

b. RE-2 and RE-3: Ineligible for reenlistment, separation because of non-adverse reasons.

c. RE-4: Ineligible for reenlistment; separation because of adverse reasons.
D. SUMMARY

In this chapter, PEP recruits are compared with OTHER U.S. Navy recruits according to several measures of quality or effectiveness. (It should be noted that OTHER recruits are limited to those who have the same background characteristics and qualifications that are required of PEP recruits.) The comparison was conducted for individuals from both groups who entered the Navy in Fiscal Years 1981 through 1991. The results show, that PEP recruits have, on average:

a) Much higher short-term and long-term continuation rates;

b) Consistently more rapid promotion rates, especially to paygrade E-5;

c) A much higher percentage of reenlistment recommendations as of September 1998; and,

d) A much lower proportion of RE-4 Reentry Codes (ineligible for reenlistment, usually for adverse reasons) to characterize their latest terminated enlistments, as of September 1998.

The relatively high retention rates of Filipinos support a previous study by Emilson Espiritu (1997) regarding first-term attrition rates among racial/ethnic minorities in the U.S. Navy. Filipinos observed in the Espiritu study were composed of both PEP recruits and those who enlisted through all other U.S. Navy recruiting programs. The previous study determined that Filipinos who entered the Navy in FY-83 through FY-92 had the lowest attrition rate (13.5 percent) among Asian ethnic groups, and, arguably, among all other ethnic groups. Of the 6,248 Filipinos who enlisted in these fiscal years, just over 13 percent left the Navy prior to completing their first term of service (within 48

---

months of their initial enlistment). This compares with 30.6 percent for the majority of all Navy recruits during the same period. Also, this study determined that Filipinos record the lowest attrition rates across all AFQT categories for all Asian ethnic groups. Their "high quality" recruit attrition rate was 13.9 percent, and their "low quality" recruit attrition rate was 13.2 percent.\textsuperscript{112} By comparison, the rates for the majority of recruits were 27.6 and 34.9 percent, respectively. Additionally, this previous study determined that Filipinos who enlisted in those fiscal years had the lowest attrition rate (8.4 percent) due to "Failure to Meet Minimum Behavior and Performance Criteria," among all Asian ethnic groups, and among all other ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{113} This could probably explain why a relatively low percentage of Filipinos in the present study were assigned RE-4 Codes to characterize their enlistments.

E. CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) statistics could suggest that, as a distinct racial/ethnic group, Filipinos are drawn more to enlist in the U.S. Navy than in any other branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. Table 17 shows the representation of ethnic Filipino enlisted personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces.

\textsuperscript{112} A "high-quality" recruit is defined by the Department of Defense as one whose AFQT score is in the 50th percentile or higher. A "low-quality" recruit is one who scores below the 50th percentile.

\textsuperscript{113} Espiritu, Study of First Term Attrition, pp. 30-61.
Table 17. Ethnic Filipino Enlisted Personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces as of February 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of Service</th>
<th>Total Enlisted</th>
<th>Total Ethnic Filipino Enlisted Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>394,510</td>
<td>3,188</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>310,415</td>
<td>13,845</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>153,241</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>282,367</td>
<td>4,147</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Services</td>
<td>1,140,533</td>
<td>22,296</td>
<td>2.0*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.

* This percentage was determined from dividing the total number of ethnic Filipino enlisted personnel in all services (22,296) by the total number of enlisted personnel in all services (1,140,533).

As of February 2000, there were a total of 310,415 enlisted personnel in the U.S. Navy. Out of this 310,415 total, 13,845 enlisted personnel (4.5 percent) were of Filipino ethnicity. The succeeding rows of data are read in the same manner. As Table 1 shows, the Navy has the largest number and percentage of ethnic Filipino enlisted personnel.

Although the total U.S. Army enlisted population was much larger than the U.S. Navy, the Army had a much smaller number (and percentage) of ethnic Filipinos than the Navy. The combined total number of ethnic Filipino enlisted personnel in the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Marine Corps amounted to 8,451, or 61.4 percent of the total number of ethnic Filipino enlisted personnel in the U.S. Navy.

The DMDC figures did not specify how many of the 13,845 Filipinos in the Navy were recruited through PEP. However, PEP may have contributed significantly to the much larger number of Filipinos in the U.S. Navy, as compared with the combined total
number of Filipinos in the other branches of the U.S. Armed Services. As shown in Table 1, there were 3,620 PEP recruits (who enlisted in Fiscal Years 1981 through 1991) observed in this study. In comparison, there were 2,688 out of a total of 250,241 individuals identified as ethnic Filipinos in the OTHER recruit group, who enlisted during the same period.

The number of ethnic Filipinos in the U.S. Navy has declined somewhat in recent years, although the proportion has remained relatively stable. In FY-97, there were a total of 14,359 ethnic Filipino enlisted personnel in the U.S. Navy (4.3 percent of 334,225 enlisted personnel),\(^\text{114}\) as compared with a total of 13,845 Filipinos (4.5 percent of 310,415 enlisted personnel) in February 2000. In addition to the Navy's downsizing, PEP's termination may have also contributed to the decreasing numbers of Filipinos in the U.S. Navy. PEP recruits (as well as all other recruits) who enlisted in the 1970s were eligible to retire in the 1990s, after serving at least 20 years on active duty. Those who enlisted in the 1980s will be eligible for 20-year retirement starting in the year 2000.

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IV. ISSUES AFFECTING THE U.S. NAVY'S PHILIPPINES
ENLISTMENT PROGRAM

A. INTRODUCTION

During the period of its implementation, a number of social, political, logistical, legal, and other issues affected the U.S. Navy's Philippines Enlistment Program (PEP). These issues principally affected the U.S. Navy, the United States government, the Philippine government, and the Filipinos recruited for enlistment through PEP. If PEP is reestablished, these same issues will probably emerge again. As such, these issues will have to be confronted and resolved by all organizations and personnel concerned with the program's reestablishment.

B. PEP RECRUIT CHARACTERISTICS

The results of the data analysis in Chapter III have consistently shown that as a distinct group compared with all other recruits, Filipinos who enlisted through PEP in Fiscal Years 1981-1991 are of "higher quality" than OTHER recruits, based on selected criteria, measures, and characteristics.

The characteristics of PEP recruits complement the findings of a previous study, which determined that Filipino servicemembers have generally high positive attitudes toward the Naval service and the U.S. Navy as an institution. These attitudes prevailed despite their perceptions that their chances for advancement do not always equal those of American servicemembers. Filipinos also showed a tendency to expect less and be more satisfied with their present situation than their American counterparts. However, this tendency should not be interpreted as insensitivity to inequities or a lack of aspirations.
Filipinos view the same things differently as compared with their American counterparts. This is probably due to their wide range of experiences with different social systems and economic conditions. Filipino servicemembers appreciate their jobs, as well as their work, and are generally satisfied with the status quo of their work situation. On the other hand, Filipinos are also eager for advanced in-service education and training, and assignment to more highly technical fields.¹¹⁵ By these measures, and as determined by the previous study, it may be concluded that the program for recruiting Philippine Nationals was advantageous to the U.S. Navy.

C. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

The American influence is most profound in the Philippines, where the United States left a lasting impression. America’s imperial legacy is most alive in Manila, the country’s capital, where the U.S. presence is almost as dynamic today as it was during the American colonial period. Public buildings, with their stately Greek columns, were copied from those in Washington, DC by Daniel Burnham, a celebrated American city planner of the late 19th century. Burnham also conceived and designed the mile-high Baguio City, the country’s summer capital. The public park in the center of the city is named after him. The elegant Manila Hotel, designed in 1912 by William Parsons, one of Burnham’s students, is a favorite venue for Rotary Club luncheons, high-class conventions, exclusive school alumni dinners, and June weddings. The Army and Navy Club, near the Manila Hotel, could have been imported directly from Florida.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Szalay and Bryson, Filipinos in the Navy, pp. 1-2.

¹¹⁶ Karnow, In Our Image, p. 16.
The suburbs of Manila resemble the outskirts of Los Angeles, and upper-class residential districts may remind one of Beverly Hills. One of the fanciest of these districts, Forbes Park, is named for a former American governor-general. Taft Avenue and Harrison Plaza also carry the names of former U.S. governor-generals. Streets honor U.S. Presidents Washington, McKinley and the two Roosevelts, as well as John D. Rockefeller, Henry Ford, Thomas Edison, and Alexander Graham Bell. Bridges commemorate General Douglas MacArthur and William Atkinson Jones, an obscure Virginia congressman who, in 1916, sponsored legislation that pledged eventual independence for the Philippines.\footnote{Karnow, In Our Image, pp. 16-17.}

Many well-to-do Filipinos emulate American ways, customs, and traditions. A significant number of Filipino men and women have American first names. Those with Spanish and Filipino first names often adopt American nicknames. The more affluent Filipinos prefer imported consumer goods, especially those that are "Made in the U.S.A," to similar, locally-produced (and sometimes less expensive) products. The Philippine "Statehood Movement" once claimed to have five million members advocating that the Philippines becomes a state of the U.S.A. Nearly every Filipino has a "relative" somewhere in the United States. Captured communist rebels, outlawed in the Philippines, have escaped from government prisons and fled to the United States, rather than to Hanoi, Beijing, or Moscow during the Cold War era.\footnote{Ibid., p. 17.}

Many young Filipinos share an ambition of attending and completing college at a local educational institution. Even then, U.S. Ivy League credentials, especially in
business administration and related majors, are the passport to lucrative jobs in Makati City, the country’s major business and financial district. However, nothing illustrates America’s impact on the country as vividly as does the widespread use of English. As previously mentioned, English is the language of politics, government, business, and education in the Philippines. Even communist insurgent leaders used English versions of Karl Marx\textsuperscript{119} and Mao Zedong\textsuperscript{120} to denounce America. Proficiency in English became a mark of distinction for many Filipinos.\textsuperscript{121} A large number of Manila’s daily newspapers are published in English. Many radio and television (TV) stations broadcast in English, or in English and the vernacular, depending on the program. American network shows, as well as local ones, compose regular TV programming. Movie theaters show American as well as Filipino films.

America transmuted the pop culture of the Philippines. By the 1920s, Filipino comics characters were modeled on American ones. American soap operas, directed at housewives (as in the United States), became a regular afternoon radio feature during the American colonial period. Presently, complete with all kinds of commercials, American soap operas continue to be a staple of daytime Philippine TV.\textsuperscript{122}

Superb entertainers, Filipinos adapted to the arrival of the Americans by taking up vaudeville as a form of entertainment. Performers were billed as the Filipino "Sophie Tucker," "Al Jolson," or "Fred Astaire." Subsequent years came up with Filipino "Bing

\textsuperscript{119} Founder of modern socialism and Communism.

\textsuperscript{120} Former Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party.

\textsuperscript{121} Karnow, \textit{In Our Image}, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., pp. 18-19.
Crosbys," "Glenn Millers," "Guy Lombardos," "Elvis Presleys," and "Barbara Streisands." Many Filipino music groups appeared as "clones" of U.S. groups, adjusting their singing and musical style to suit Filipino tastes. In town fiestas\textsuperscript{123} throughout the country, marching high school bands led by youthful drum majorettes play John Phillip Sousa's compositions with gusto.\textsuperscript{124} John Phillip Sousa was a musical genius who composed 135 marches and conducted the U.S. Marine Corps Band from 1880-1892. His more famous works include "The Washington Post," "Semper Fidelis," and "The Stars and Stripes Forever," which was adopted as the official march of the United States, in accordance with the U.S. Constitution.\textsuperscript{125}

Because of this very strong American influence, it may not have been too difficult for Filipinos who enlisted in the U.S. Navy to adjust to the American culture and way of life. This could also be another possible reason why the retention rate of PEP enlistees is quite high.

A previous study regarding Filipinos in the U.S. Navy also looked at the motivation level of Filipino servicemembers. This previous study determined that Filipinos considered a U.S. Navy enlistment as a prestigious occupation. As such, many of them are highly motivated, as shown by the pride they exhibit in serving with the U.S. Navy.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{123} Town fiestas in the Philippines are public festivities traditionally based on celebrations of religious events. They are usually highlighted by a parade, led by a marching band, through the town's main thoroughfares.

\textsuperscript{124} Karnow, \textit{In Our Image}, p. 19.


\textsuperscript{126} Szalay and Bryson, \textit{Filipinos in the Navy}, p. 49.
The majority of immigrants who arrive in the United States speak a different language. Thus, learning English represents the most critical communication problem for them. As a result of the American colonization of the Philippines, the public education system in that country was based on the use of English as a medium of instruction and communication. Because of the widespread use of English in the Philippines, Filipinos who enlist in the U.S. Navy have a good command of the English language, thereby eliminating the language barrier experienced by many immigrants of other countries. The Filipinos' English vocabulary, fluency, and skill in written expression of ideas in English closely matches the performance of American-born servicemembers with comparable educational backgrounds.\textsuperscript{127}

D. LOGISTICAL ISSUES

The U.S. Navy Recruiting Station (NRS) in the Philippines was located inside the former U.S. Naval Station, Subic Bay (NSSB). Another NRS in the Philippines was located inside the former U.S. Naval Air Station at Sangley Point, Manila Bay. Both recruiting stations administered PEP. After the Navy closed Sangley Point in 1971, the NRS in Subic Bay continued to administer the program.\textsuperscript{128}

As a tenant command of NSSB, NRS depended on the naval station's infrastructure to support its operations. Mail service was provided by the Subic Bay Fleet Post Office (FPO). Recruit physical and dental exams were provided by the Naval Hospital and Naval Dental Clinic in Subic Bay, respectively. Physical security of the NRS building after normal working hours was the responsibility of the base security police and the U.S.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., pp. 2, 51.

\textsuperscript{128} "U.S. Naval Air Station, Sangley Point, Republic of the Philippines." [http://web2.airmail.net/irs/SANGLEY.HTML].
Marine Barracks. Utilities such as electricity, water, and telephone services were provided by the U.S. Navy Public Works Center, Subic Bay.

PEP applicants were not allowed to enter the base individually. They would respond to Navy recruiting notices soliciting PEP applications posted in major newspapers throughout the country, and then wait for a notice from NRS Subic Bay to report for testing and processing on scheduled dates. During these dates, they would wait as a group outside NSSB's main gate, where official U.S. Navy transportation would arrive and bring them to the recruiting station. They had to show their appointment notices to the vehicle driver to be transported to the NRS. After each processing appointment, they would be transported back to the main gate, also as a group. When they were finally accepted for enlistment, the Filipinos would report to NRS Subic Bay on a Monday, and stay at a "holding barracks" located in the same building as the recruiting station. They would then undergo final processing and some form of indoctrination to recruit training and Navy life, given by the recruiters. They observed reveille and taps with a full workday in between, complete with lectures, chaplain visits, physical training, watchstanding, etc. Meals were provided by the Naval Station's enlisted dining facility or "galley." This short indoctrination and orientation period was known as a "mini-boot camp." The following Friday, they would finally be shipped to the now-disestablished Recruit Training Command (RTC) in San Diego, California. They were transported out of the Philippines via military or military-chartered commercial aircraft departing from Clark Air Base, Cubi Point Naval Air Station, or from the Manila International Airport. Air transportation to RTC San Diego, the only authorized RTC for Filipinos to undergo
recruit training, was arranged by the Navy Passenger Transportation Office (NAVPTO), Subic Bay.

To reestablish the PEP, the U.S. Navy may have to provide the same kind of infrastructure, services, and logistics to support the program. Since there are no existing U.S. military installations in the Philippines, this could be both difficult and expensive to accomplish. At the very least, transportation of PEP enlistees would become more costly. Due to the disestablishment of RTC San Diego, they would have to be transported farther east to RTC Great Lakes, Illinois, the Navy's only existing RTC.

Even with the supporting infrastructure of Naval Station Subic Bay, many considered the U.S. Navy's recruiting program for Philippine Nationals to be difficult and expensive.\textsuperscript{129} Yet, the Navy continued to recruit through this program for 40 years. Presumably, PEP was seen to have enough benefits to outweigh its costs, considering that it existed for four decades—and it may have continued to exist, if not for the termination of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.

\section*{E. POLITICAL ISSUES}

The U.S. Navy may encounter a great political challenge in reestablishing PEP. As previously mentioned, after the program's termination, the Navy was no longer allowed by any statute to recruit foreign nationals (who have not been lawfully admitted to the United States as permanent residents) for enlistment. As such, reestablishing PEP would require U.S. Congressional approval, since program reinstatement requires a change to current U.S. immigration laws. Requesting and finally obtaining authority to reestablish this program is expected to undergo a usually lengthy legislative process. Even then,

\footnote{129 Briefing sheet for CNO from RUPERS-231G dated January 7, 1992. Copy of briefing sheet provided by Mr. Robert Phillips, Code 3561, Commander, Navy Recruiting Command.}
there is no guarantee that Congress will enact such legislation. There is also the possibility of a "spillover" or "snowball" effect. If Congress allows the Navy to reestablish PEP, other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces that may also be experiencing recruiting and retention shortfalls may also request authority to establish similar recruiting programs. Legislators may not be willing to allow too many exceptions to current statutes.

F. ECONOMIC ISSUES

The greatest advantage of PEP to Filipinos may be economic in nature. Income distribution in the Philippines is uneven, with a very small percentage of the population holding the country's wealth. In 1994, the richest 20 percent of the population received 52 percent of the country's total income, nearly 11 times the share received by the poorest 20 percent. The country's poverty rates are higher than those of its Southeast Asian neighbors, whose average incomes have grown more rapidly than in the Philippines. The poverty rate has declined over time; however, the rate of decline has been lower than in other countries, and income inequality has been persistent through the years. Although the poverty rate was in the middle of a representative sample of Asian countries in the early 1970s, there was very slow progress in reducing the rate of poverty over the following two decades. This resulted in a poverty rate that was higher than in other Asian countries the Philippines was initially compared against.\(^{130}\) In comparison to the United States, Philippine unemployment rates are high, and average annual household incomes are low. High monetary inflation rates, which were usually in double digits until only recently, have consistently plagued the economy. Because of its status as a

developing or "Third World" country, the Philippine government relies on various loans from the International Monetary Fund/ World Bank (IMF/WB) to stimulate its economy and to fund various socio-economic projects meant to enhance the overall quality of life of its people.

Table 18 compares basic economic indicators of the Philippines with those of the United States. All figures are from most recent estimates.

**Table 18. Comparison of Basic Economic Indicators in the Philippines and the United States, 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Annual Household Income (in U.S. Dollars)</td>
<td>$3,080&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$38,885&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate (Percent)</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate (Percent)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (Percent)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.2&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The poverty rate for the Philippines and the United States is determined in the same manner as for most other countries. The poverty rate is the percentage of families determined to be in relative poverty, as indicated by each country's poverty line or threshold. The threshold is that critical level of income needed by a family to satisfy its basic, minimal needs. If the family's income is less than that family's threshold, then that
family, and every individual in it, is considered poor.\textsuperscript{131} It should be noted that the average annual household income in the United States and the Philippines, as well as the standard and cost of living in the two countries, are different. Additionally, the basic, minimal needs of a family in the United States and in the Philippines may also be different. Therefore, the actual threshold or poverty line in the two countries may not be the same.

Because of the prevailing economic conditions in the Philippines, many Filipinos have sought employment overseas to find better-paying jobs and improve their personal economic situation. During the past three decades, more than 10 million Filipino workers have gone abroad.\textsuperscript{132} This number averages to more than 330,000 workers every year for the past 30 years. In comparison, current statistics estimate the present Philippine labor force at 48.6 million workers.\textsuperscript{133}

These overseas Filipino workers range from the highly-skilled or professional workers, to the semi-skilled and low-skilled ones. They have remitted a total of 10 billion U.S. dollars to the Philippine economy for the past 30 years.\textsuperscript{134} Similarly, Filipinos recruited under PEP may consider a U.S. Navy enlistment as an excellent employment opportunity, with a regular income and job benefits that most local employers may find difficult to match. This may explain why the number of PEP


\textsuperscript{133} National Statistics Office-Philippines Website. [www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/lf9904tx.html].

\textsuperscript{134} Tiongco, \textit{Filipino Overseas Workers}, p. A5.
applicants always greatly exceeded the annual program quotas. It may also explain why the retention rates of PEP enlistees were consistently high. In fact, a previous study of Filipinos in the U.S. Navy determined that the sizable difference between U.S. and Philippine income levels constitutes a principal incentive for enlistment.\textsuperscript{135}

G. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT ISSUES

One disadvantage Filipinos encounter upon enlisting concerns their educational attainment. Even if they have some college work completed, as in the case of most PEP recruits, they were allowed to enlist only in paygrade E-1.\textsuperscript{136} In comparison, a recruit who enlists as a U.S. citizen or permanent resident may be allowed to enlist in paygrade E-2 or E-3, depending on the number of college credits completed prior to enlistment or with satisfactory participation in a Junior ROTC Program or the Naval Sea Cadet Program.\textsuperscript{137} Philippine educational institutions, however, are not accredited in the United States. To change their enlistment paygrade to E-2 or E-3, based on their college credits, Philippine Nationals need to have their credits reviewed and accredited by a U.S. educational institution at their own time and expense, while at RTC San Diego. The accreditation documents are required to be submitted on or after classification day, but before completion of recruit training. During classification day, which usually occurs during the third week of recruit training, PEP enlistees retake the ASVAB to determine their eligibility for Navy occupations and related schools and training. But the very

\textsuperscript{135} Szalay and Bryson, Filipinos in the Navy, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{136} CRUITMAN, Chapters 3 and 4.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., Chapter 3.
nature of recruit training does not give Filipinos the time or the opportunity to have their Philippine college courses accredited while at RTC San Diego.\textsuperscript{138}

H. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP ISSUES

Most of the disadvantages and limitations experienced by Filipinos recruited under PEP result from their immigration status, upon enlisting in the U.S. Navy. As such, a detailed and thorough discussion of U.S. immigration and citizenship issues regarding PEP enlistees and their immediate family members is important to understanding the mostly adverse effects these issues had on Philippine Nationals recruited for enlistment under PEP.

Because PEP enlistees are not lawfully admitted to the United States as permanent residents under current immigration laws, they are considered non-resident aliens (NRAs). Eligibility for permanent residence is determined by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Permanent residents have the right to reside and seek gainful employment in the United States or any of its territories or possessions (e.g., Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, U.S. Virgin Islands, etc.). They are in possession of an Alien Registration Receipt Card, or Form I-551, issued by INS. This form is more popularly known as a "green card." After a certain period of time as a permanent resident, an individual may apply for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Eligibility for naturalization is also determined by INS.

PEP enlistees can only remain in the United States while serving in the U.S. Navy. If they terminate their enlistment or fail to reenlist for any reason, they will be deported to their country of origin. This applies even if their enlistments are terminated.

\textsuperscript{138} Based on the author's personal experiences as a PEP enlistee.
involuntarily, through no fault of their own, for reasons such as physical disability incurred while on active duty. If an enlistment is terminated, they can only remain in the U.S. if they acquire permanent resident status or U.S. citizenship. If they have a spouse and children who are also NRAs, their families will also be deported, unless the spouse and children acquire permanent resident status or U.S. citizenship before the termination of the servicemember’s enlistment. All children of PEP enlistees are born while the servicemember is on active duty, since entry into PEP requires that the individual have no dependents prior to enlistment. Children born in the United States or any of its territories or possessions are considered U.S. citizens by birth, even if both parents are non-U.S. citizens. Children born to military parents in U.S. military facilities overseas may also be considered U.S. citizens, if at least one parent is a U.S. citizen. If neither parent is a U.S. citizen, a child born to a servicemember overseas may not be a U.S. citizen.¹³⁹

If a PEP enlistee eventually marries another non-resident alien from the Philippines or from any other third country, his spouse can join him in the U.S. for six months at a time, under a "visitor for pleasure" or "B-2" visa granted by INS. A B-2 visa does not allow the spouse to seek gainful employment while in the United States. Upon expiration of this visa, the spouse may apply for Indefinite Voluntary Departure status from INS, which likewise does not allow her to apply for permission to work. Applications for work permits by B-2 visa holders are not automatically approved. Permission rests with the local INS District Director. After Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, stiffer penalties were imposed upon U.S. employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens, or those who hired aliens without work permits. Consequently, INS

¹³⁹ *U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act*, Title VIII, Section 1440, United States Code.
officials became less willing to grant work permits to spouses of PEP enlistees who entered the United States with B-2 visas.

The severe hardships experienced by Filipinos came to the attention of the Navy and the American public, as well as the Philippine media, during the late 1980s. After a Petty Officer (who was recruited under PEP) died while on active duty, his wife received a deportation order from the INS. Presumably, she did not particularly want to go back to the Philippines, so she appealed to INS for revocation of the order. Navy officials supported her appeal in this lengthy and complex case, which came down to the fact that neither she nor her deceased husband had any kind of immigration status which allowed them to stay in the United States permanently. The case was resolved when INS finally allowed her to remain in the U.S. and eventually apply for U.S. citizenship.\(^{140}\) The threat of deportation may also explain why the retention rate of PEP enlistees is very high. However, this explanation could only be confirmed by conducting surveys or interviews with these individuals.

When Filipinos are assigned to overseas locations, their spouses are required to obtain entry documents or visas from the host nation as third-country nationals, so they could join the servicemembers in their overseas assignments. These visas from the host nation often do not permit spouses of PEP recruits to seek gainful employment.\(^{141}\)

As non-U.S. citizens, Philippine Nationals are not allowed entry into Navy ratings that require U.S. citizenship.\(^{142}\) U.S. citizenship is required for any rating that requires a

\(^{140}\) Donovan, *Special Immigrant Status.*

\(^{141}\) Ibid.

\(^{142}\) Ibid.
U.S. security clearance. Before March 1971, Filipinos were recruited mainly as Stewards in the Navy. Beginning in March 1971, they were permitted to enlist in any of 23 Navy ratings that do not require U.S. citizenship. However, as early as 1969, Filipino Stewards who were already serving on active duty were given the opportunity and encouraged to transfer into one of 23 Navy ratings that do not require U.S. citizenship.\textsuperscript{143} This opportunity was offered for them to meet their aspirations, which have been raised by the climate of equal opportunity.\textsuperscript{144} Since 1971, about 30 Navy ratings (that do not require U.S. citizenship) have been opened to Filipinos recruited under PEP. These ratings are also open to other non-U.S. citizen servicemembers who enlist as permanent residents.\textsuperscript{145}

As non-U.S. citizens, Filipinos were likewise disallowed from applying for officer commissioning programs, which also require U.S. citizenship, even if they were otherwise eligible. As such, most PEP enlistees could be found in "odd" Navy ratings, because citizenship requirements could not and would not be met for ratings they might desire or for ratings for which they are best qualified.\textsuperscript{146}

Upon enlistment in the U.S. Navy, Filipinos waived their civil and political rights as Philippine Nationals. They were not allowed to participate or vote in any election in the Republic of the Philippines while on active duty with the U.S. Navy. Their full civil and political rights as Filipino citizens would only be restored upon termination of their U.S.

\textsuperscript{143} E-mail message from Mr. Robert Phillips, Code 3561, Commander, Navy Recruiting Command to author, December 13, 1999.

\textsuperscript{144} Szalay and Bryson, \textit{Filipinos in the Navy}, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{145} \textit{U.S. Navy Enlisted Advancement Manual}, Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{146} Donovan, \textit{Special Immigrant Status}.
Naval service, if they had not attained U.S. citizenship prior to termination. Upon enlistment, they were made to sign a document notifying them of this restriction. This document, witnessed by a recruiter, became an official part of their Navy enlisted service record.\textsuperscript{147} Additionally, as non-U.S. citizens, PEP enlistees were not considered part of any elected U.S. legislator's political constituency. Likewise, they cannot vote in any U.S. election. Therefore, PEP enlistees may have found it difficult to find any political advocates in the Philippines or in the United States who could address their common concerns and problems, and become "champions" for them.

Upon obtaining U.S. citizenship, PEP recruits may enter into Navy ratings formerly closed to them as non-U.S. citizens. They may also apply for officer commissioning programs for which they are eligible. However, enlisting in the U.S. Navy did not guarantee that a PEP enlistee would become a naturalized U.S. citizen; nor does enlisting improve his chances of becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen. Filipinos who were accepted for enlistment were also made to sign a document notifying them of this condition. This document became a permanent part of their Navy service records, after being witnessed by a Navy recruiter.

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act or INA (Title VIII, Section 1440, United States Code)\textsuperscript{148}, foreign nationals or aliens on active duty with the U.S. Armed Forces may apply for naturalization as U.S. citizens, even if they have not been lawfully admitted into the United States for permanent residence, provided that:

a) They have served at least four years of active duty;

\textsuperscript{147} \textsc{Cruitman}, Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{148} U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Website. [http://www.ins.usdoj.com].
b) They reenlist or extend their reenlistments to incur a total of eight years active
duty;

c) Their character of service was honorable, as documented by an honorable
discharge from their previous enlistment;

d) They reenlist within the United States or any of its territories or possessions; and

e) They served (for at least one day) during a period in which "the Armed Forces of
the United States are engaged in military operations involving armed conflict with a
foreign hostile force," as provided for in INA. The period of hostilities in which alien
servicemembers may qualify for U.S. citizenship was specified by Executive Order of the
President of the United States.

The most recent major periods of hostilities specified by Presidential Executive
Order were the Korean War (25 June 1950 to 01 July 1955), the Vietnam War (28
February 1961 to 15 October 1978), and, most recently, the Persian Gulf War (02 August
1990 to 11 April 1991). The longest period of hostilities in which alien servicemembers
were eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship was during the Vietnam War era. As such,
many Filipinos who enlisted through the PEP during the Vietnam War era, or who were
already on active duty during that period, were able to become U.S. citizens, after
meeting all the other eligibility requirements. The period of Vietnam War hostilities was
officially declared ended on October 15, 1978, also by Executive Order. Filipinos who
enlisted under the PEP after that date no longer had the option and privilege of applying
for U.S. citizenship based on their Naval service. The effect on Filipinos was dramatic.
Before that date, about half of the 361 Filipino officers who were on active duty in the
U.S. Navy in 1990 received their commission through an enlisted program. Between
October 15, 1978 and September 1989, only two Filipinos achieved officer status through an enlisted program.\textsuperscript{149}

After 15 October 1978, Filipinos in the U.S. Navy could only apply for "special immigrant" status after serving in the U.S. Navy for 15 years. Special immigrant status, which would also be granted to their accompanying spouses and children, would make them permanent residents and allow them to stay in the United States. However, they would have to apply for special immigrant status in their country of origin, at the INS office usually co-located at the U.S. diplomatic mission. This means that they may have to take leave in the Philippines to submit their applications. Since the processing of immigrant visas usually takes some time, they have to go back to their U.S. Navy duty stations while waiting for their applications to be processed. They would then have to return to the Philippines later for a scheduled interview with U.S. immigration officials and final processing. This created a great inconvenience for Filipinos who might have applied for special immigrant status under this law. The option of applying for special immigrant status was mainly intended for host-country nationals hired by U.S. diplomatic, economic, or cultural missions overseas, or for those who were hired as civilian employees at U.S. military or federal government installations abroad. Special immigrant status was probably offered to these individuals as a reward for their loyalty and length of service to the United States as federal civilian employees for at least 15 years.

In comparison, naturalization eligibility requirements are less stringent for service members who enlist after being lawfully admitted to the United States as permanent

\textsuperscript{149} Donovan, \textit{Special Immigrant Status}.
residents. Permanent residents become eligible for U.S. citizenship after they have served honorably for at least three years in any branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. They do not have to reenlist for a subsequent term of service to qualify for naturalization.

After the October 15, 1978 cut-off date, several legislative attempts were initiated to address this inequity and give PEP recruits an opportunity to become U.S. citizens by virtue of their Naval service. None were successful in spite of Navy support.\textsuperscript{150}

On February 2, 1987 the President of the United States issued Executive Order 12582, specifying a short period of hostilities from October 25 to November 2, 1983. This was to allow alien servicemembers who participated in the Grenada Invasion (Operation "Urgent Fury") to apply for naturalization. The Executive Order specified not only a specific period, but also a specific geographical location, for eligibility. As such, only Filipinos who were serving in the specific location of the Grenada hostilities during those dates were eligible to apply.

A Filipino Petty Officer (PO) who was on active duty during that time, but did not serve in the specified geographic location with any of the military forces involved in the Grenada hostilities, applied for naturalization anyway. INS did not respond to his application, arguing that he was not eligible to apply for citizenship under this Executive Order. Through his lawyer, the PO demanded a hearing with INS at the local U.S. District Court on his application. He and his lawyer contended that the President is authorized to determine only the \textit{period} of hostilities that qualify alien servicemembers for U.S. citizenship, but not the specific \textit{place} of service during such hostilities.

\textsuperscript{150} Hoshaw, C.R., Office of the Chief of Naval Personnel (OP-136E), \textit{untitled point paper} for the Chief of Naval Personnel dated August 31, 1989. Copy of point paper provided by Mr. Robert Phillips, Code 3561, Commander, Navy Recruiting Command.

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The language of the law seemed to support their contention. In fact, the law's legislative history discouraged any attempt to limit eligibility based on place of service. The statute was last amended in 1981, when lawmakers gave the President the authority to designate periods of conflict, but not specific geographical locations, that would make alien servicemembers eligible for U.S. citizenship. Geographic limitations were disallowed by legislators to provide more equitable treatment to all members of the Armed Forces based solely on the dates of honorable active duty service, rather than on the basis of the specific geographical locations of such service.\textsuperscript{151}

The study was not able to find out if this particular PO was naturalized on the basis of his active duty service during the Grenada invasion. However, on May 2, 1994 the President of the United States issued Executive Order 12913, which revoked and voided Executive Order 12582 effective the same date Executive Order 12582 was signed (February 2, 1987), although Executive Order 12913 was signed almost seven years later. Executive Order 12913 seemed to address the case of the PO mentioned above, since it mentioned his last name in the first paragraph. Executive Order 12913 reads:

By the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including Section 1440 of Title 8, United States Code, and in consideration of Matter of (last name of PO), 910 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1990), I hereby order as follows:

Section 1: Executive Order 12582 is revoked and shall be treated as void, effective February 2, 1987.

Section 2: Revocation of Executive Order No. 12582 is not intended to affect the status of anyone who was naturalized prior to the date of publication of this order in the Federal Register.\textsuperscript{152}

Presumably, Executive Order 12913 legally and effectively disbarred the Petty Officer in question from further pursuing his application for naturalization under Executive Order 12582, if he had not attained U.S. citizenship by the time Executive Order 12913 was signed.

Mainly through Navy support, legislative relief finally came for Philippine Nationals in the U.S. Navy, when Congress passed the Armed Forces Immigration Adjustment Act of 1991 (AFIAA-91). As an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act, AFIAA-91 provided special immigrant status to certain non-resident aliens who were serving in the U.S. Armed Forces after October 15, 1978, the cut-off date for the Vietnam hostilities. Basic eligibility requirements for special immigrant status were as follows:

a) The servicemember should have performed at least six years of active duty;

b) He or she should reenlist or extend his reenlistment to incur a total of 12 years active duty; and

c) The character of his or her service was honorable.

Special immigrant status would also be granted to the servicemember’s accompanying spouse and children. To make the application process convenient for the servicemember and his or her family, the AFIAA did not require them to apply at the U.S. diplomatic mission in their country of origin. They were allowed to apply at the INS district office closest to their duty stations. It seemed that the AFIAA was intended mainly to benefit Filipinos who were recruited through the PEP, since they composed the

\textsuperscript{152} National Archives and Records Administration Website. [http://www.nara.gov].
majority of non-resident aliens serving in the Armed Forces. A minority was composed of citizens of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). Under the Compact of Free Association between the United States and the RMI/FSM, citizens of these two island-nations may be recruited in their respective countries, or while visiting or residing in the United States.\footnote{Reply to Media Query dated November 1, 1990. Released by the U.S. Navy Public Affairs Office, Washington, DC 20370-5005. Copy of reply provided by Mr. Robert Phillips, Code 3561, Navy Recruiting Command.}

After becoming a "special immigrant," and therefore acquiring permanent resident status, Filipino servicemembers could immediately apply for naturalization. They were immediately qualified for U.S. citizenship, since they would have completed at least three years of active duty service by the time they become permanent residents. The statutes governing naturalization of permanent residents serving on active duty with the U.S. Armed Forces would now apply to them. With the passing of AFIAA-91, the door to U.S. citizenship was finally opened for PEP enlistees whose Naval service was performed outside a specified period of hostilities.

On November 22, 1994 the President of the United States issued Executive Order 12939, which specified the period of hostilities for the Persian Gulf conflict. All non-resident alien servicemembers who were on active duty during Operations "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm," from 02 August 1990 to 11 April 1991, became eligible for naturalization. This time, true to the spirit and intent of the law, Executive Order 12939 specified only a period of hostilities, without specifying a place of service for those hostilities, to qualify alien servicemembers for U.S. citizenship. This provided another opportunity for PEP enlistees to become U.S. citizens. Filipinos who had at least four
years of active duty, and who had performed any part of their Naval service during the period of the Persian Gulf hostilities, were qualified to apply for naturalization. They were qualified, provided they obligated themselves for a total of eight years of service, and upon meeting all other eligibility requirements. Presumably, Filipinos who were qualified used this new opportunity to become U.S. citizens, if they had not applied for special immigrant status (and subsequent naturalization) under the provisions of AFIAA-91.154

I. ISSUES CONCERNING THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

In late 1999, the author of this study interviewed two Philippine diplomatic officials to determine the possible issues that the Philippine government may encounter, if the U.S. Navy were to reestablish PEP. The results of these interviews are discussed below.

The Philippine Government would likely support the reestablishment of PEP. Indeed, historically, PEP has been a very good employment and economic opportunity for eligible Filipinos. Filipinos usually consider serving with a "world power" as a rare and extraordinary experience, and as an opportunity that is not available to every Filipino. The experiences of many Filipinos who have served or are still serving with the U.S. Navy have been quite positive. Furthermore, reestablishing PEP would strengthen the traditionally close historical, political, military, and cultural ties between the Philippines and the United States.

Previously, PEP enlistees, as well as all other Philippine citizens earning income in the United States, were required to pay income taxes to the Philippine Government.

154 More information on immigration and naturalization of alien servicemembers can be found at the INS website (http://www.ins.usdoj.com). More information on Presidential Executive Orders can be found at the National Archives and Records Administration website (http://www.nara.gov).
These taxes were required in addition to the income taxes they paid to the federal
government of the United States. Only Filipinos who became naturalized U.S. citizens
became exempt from this "double taxation" policy. In 1999, this "double taxation" policy
for Filipinos earning income overseas was repealed by the Philippine Government. Only
Filipinos who earned or derived income in the Philippines were subject to Philippine
taxation laws. Filipinos who earn or derive their income abroad are no longer subject to
Philippine income tax laws.

J. HOW A NEW PHILIPPINES ENLISTMENT PROGRAM WOULD
BE CREATED

The Philippine government would probably welcome the reestablishment of PEP,
provided that:

a) The U.S. government makes the first move toward the program's reestablishment.

The Philippine government would not initiate action or request the U.S. Navy to recreate
the program, and;

b) Filipinos are treated fairly and granted the same opportunities for promotion,
assignment, and career progression, development, and enhancement as U.S. citizen-
servicemembers. And, Filipinos should be restricted in their Navy careers only by U.S.
citizenship and security clearance requirements.

An agreement between both governments to reestablish the PEP should not be based
on Article 27 of the former, terminated RP-US MBA of 1947, which established the
original program. A new, separate agreement would have to be established by the
governments of both countries, although the provisions for recruiting may be similar to
the original PEP. An agreement recreating the program may take the form of a labor
agreement between the two governments. A new PEP could not be included as a provision of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the United States. This is because VFA mostly contains only provisions governing the conduct of U.S. military personnel visiting the Philippines for official purposes.

A request by the U.S. government to reestablish PEP would be considered by the Philippine government only as an offer, which obviously could be declined. Furthermore, if the program were reestablished, both governments would likely have the unconditional option of terminating the program, with adequate advance notice provided by the government requesting termination.

As with the previous PEP, the yearly recruiting quotas of a new program should be considered only as a "ceiling." The U.S. Navy could recruit less than the maximum number, but not more. Further, there should be no pressure or obligation from the Philippine government for the U.S. Navy to meet its yearly recruiting quotas. Likewise, there should be no pressure or obligation from the U.S. government for the Philippine government to assist the U.S. Navy in its recruiting efforts or in meeting its yearly recruiting quotas. Again, as with the previous PEP, annual quotas could be changed, upon agreement of both governments.

Overall, a new PEP would likely be mutually beneficial to the Philippine and United States governments. It would also be likely beneficial to the Filipinos who are recruited for enlistment under the program. No major legal or political obstacles would prevent the Philippine government from approving the PEP's reestablishment. Any obstacles that may be encountered would likely be minor, and could be easily resolved.
K. SUMMARY

Issues that would affect the reestablishment of PEP are varied and could be complex. Although these issues may be unrelated to each other, they could combine to produce diverse effects for all organizations or parties involved with PEP's implementation.

The greatest benefits the Navy derived from PEP were the "highly desirable" qualities of Philippine Nationals who enlisted under the program. These "highly desirable" qualities have been examined and documented by at least two previous studies of Filipinos in the U.S. Navy.

Aside from legal reasons caused by the termination of the RP-US MBA of 1947, PEP had to be discontinued for logistical reasons as well. With the closure of Naval Station Subic Bay and its tenant Navy Recruiting Station (which screened, tested and processed all PEP applicants and enlistees), the U.S. Navy lost the supporting infrastructure to continue recruiting Philippine Nationals through PEP.

Philippine government officials who were interviewed regarding PEP's reestablishment considered PEP as a very good employment and economic opportunity for Filipinos recruited through the program. They believe that the Philippine government would likely welcome PEP's reestablishment, subject to certain conditions. The relatively high unemployment rate and lower income levels in the Philippines provided an incentive for Philippine Nationals to enlist through the program. Additionally, the Philippine diplomatic officials who were interviewed believed that a new PEP would strengthen the traditionally close historical ties between the United States and the Philippines.
The greatest disadvantage of PEP was experienced by Filipinos who were recruited under the program. Their immigration status as non-resident aliens did not give PEP recruits any kind of legal or political protection during their enlistment, even if they were regular members of the U.S. Armed Forces. In fact, most PEP recruits (and their families) have experienced adverse effects resulting from their immigration status. Their career opportunities in the U.S. Navy were severely limited. Several attempts had been made to address this inequity, which especially affected PEP recruits who enlisted after the end of the Vietnam hostilities on October 15, 1978. However, it was only in 1991 that the U.S. Congress passed legislation giving PEP recruits the legal right and privilege of becoming naturalized U.S. citizens by virtue of their U.S. Naval service.
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

This study explores reestablishing the Philippines Enlistment Program (PEP) as a partial solution to the Navy's current and anticipated recruiting and retention shortfalls. PEP had its origins in the shared history of the Philippines and the United States, which began in 1898 and continues to the present day. The U.S. Navy began recruiting Filipinos in 1901, shortly after the Philippines became a colony of the United States. The strong military ties between the two countries began during World War I, and carried on through World War II. After the Philippines became an independent nation in 1946, the U.S. Navy continued recruiting Philippine Nationals under a 1947 bilateral agreement that allowed the United States to operate and maintain major military bases in the Philippines. U.S. Navy recruiting of Philippine Nationals was terminated when the bilateral agreement ended in 1991. Throughout the period covered by this study (1981-1991), Filipinos who enlisted under PEP—when compared with all other U.S. Navy recruits who possessed the same background characteristics and entry-level qualifications—have consistently exhibited the following characteristics:

a) High educational attainment levels and high AFQT scores. Specifically, the percentage of PEP recruits with one or more years of college prior to enlistment ranged from 23.6 percent to 82.9 percent. In comparison, the percentage of all other U.S. Navy recruits with one or more years of college ranged from less than one percent to 1.5 percent. However, as previously discussed in Chapter 3, the educational attainment data
for all other recruits observed in this study may not be accurate. Also, the percentages of PEP recruits with AFQT scores of 50 or higher ranged from 53.8 percent to 71.6 percent. In comparison, the percentages of other recruits with AFQT scores of 50 or higher ranged from 39.0 percent to 62.1 percent.

b) High short-term and long-term continuation rates. These high continuation rates complement an earlier study showing that Filipinos in the U.S. Navy have very high continuation rates. Other historical data also confirm the relatively high continuation rates and low attrition rates of Filipinos in the Navy. Specifically, this study determined that the average 5-year continuation rate of PEP recruits was 91.2 percent, as compared with 29.9 percent for all other recruits. The 15-year continuation rate for PEP recruits was 77.1 percent, as compared with 12.5 percent for all other recruits.

c) More rapid advancement (promotion) rates. For example, the four-year promotion rate to paygrade E-5 for PEP recruits ranged from 33.7 percent to 71.3 percent. In comparison, the four-year promotion rate to paygrade E-5 for all other recruits ranged from 6.4 percent to 18.3 percent.

d) Less RE-4 Reentry Codes (ineligible for reenlistment, usually due to adverse reasons) to characterize their latest terminated enlistments. Specifically, usually less than 3 percent of PEP recruits were given RE-4 Codes upon separation. In comparison, consistently more than 21 percent of all other recruits were given RE-4 Codes.

B. CONCLUSIONS

As proven by history, the military ties between the United States and the Philippines are very close and very strong. Forged before World War I, developed during the interwar years, and put to the ultimate test during World War II, these ties carried the
Filipinos and the Americans in the Philippines through the dark years of the Japanese occupation of that country. These ties remained strong throughout the humiliating defeat and tragic surrender of Filipino-American troops at Bataan and Corregidor, the brutality of the Death March, the horrors of Japanese concentration camps, and the atrocities of the Japanese occupation. In the end, their unbreakable will and indomitable human spirit triumphed above all adversity. These same military ties made both countries continue their military alliance after World War II, and long after the Philippines was granted independence by the United States.

The historical evidence and the results of this study (which covered an 11-year period) suggest that PEP would be a very worthwhile recruiting program for the U.S. Navy. Indeed, PEP provided a steady supply of "high-quality" recruits for the Navy from 1981-1991. Presumably, the program also provided the same kind of "high-quality" recruits during years not covered by this study.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. Navy could reestablish the Philippines Enlistment Program as a partial solution to current and anticipated recruiting shortfalls. PEP recruits could be programmed for enlistment into Navy ratings that do not require U.S. citizenship and that are identified as having a shortage of entry-level personnel. The documented pre-enlistment and in-service characteristics exhibited by Filipinos should make them "ideal," "highly desirable" Navy recruits and servicemembers.

Reestablishing PEP could be costly, especially if the U.S. Navy decides to set up the supporting infrastructure in the Philippines to begin recruiting operations. However, the program could be expected to "pay for itself" after some time, due to the "high quality" of
PEP recruits, their high retention rates, and other factors that make them "ideal" and "highly desirable" recruits. Following in this line, a cost-benefit analysis could be undertaken to determine if the U.S. Navy would save in the long run, should PEP be reestablished. Such analysis would also determine the "break-even point," or the time when the savings the Navy realizes from the program might begin to be greater than the cost in establishing it.

A Life Cycle, Cost Analysis should also be undertaken. This type of analysis would help to quantify the costs incurred for recruiting, training, assigning, and replacing a theoretical recruit who enlists in the Navy and separates during different times over a 20-year career. It is likely that a Life Cycle, Cost Analysis would show that the U.S. Navy could realize significant savings with recruits who stay in the service longer, since the costs of recruiting, training, and assigning replacements for recruits who leave the Navy before completing 20 years of active duty would be significant.

One limitation of this study is that it did not examine the history of Navy ratings in which PEP recruits are initially allowed to enlist. As previously discussed, PEP recruits (as well as other recruits who enlist as permanent residents) are allowed to enlist only in ratings that do not require U.S. citizenship. A new PEP would most likely allow Filipinos to enlist only in these Navy ratings, did the former PEP. This follow-on study could compare the educational attainment, AFQT scores, promotion and continuation rates, and separation trends of all PEP enlistees in these ratings, and compare them with the same characteristics of all other recruits who initially enlist in these same Navy ratings. A follow-on study that examines recruit data by Navy ratings (in which PEP recruits are initially allowed to enlist) would supplement the findings of this study.
Presumably, the results and findings of this follow-on study would be similar to the results and findings of this study.

To minimize the costs of a new PEP, the U.S. Navy may not need to establish the full infrastructure to support recruiting operations in the Philippines. A small recruiting office staffed with a minimal number of personnel could be set up to accept and initially screen applications in the Philippines. At regular intervals, groups of PEP applicants could be sent to Navy recruiting stations in Guam or Japan (the countries closest to the Philippines) for further screening, testing, and processing. The U.S. military facilities in those areas could be tasked to provide the required administrative and logistical support for the reestablished PEP. Support would include providing air and ground transportation, billeting, and meals for applicants during the testing and processing period. Navy medical and dental facilities in these locations could provide enlistment physical and dental examinations. Those who are finally accepted for enlistment would then be shipped to RTC Great Lakes for recruit training. Those who are not accepted would be transported back to the Philippines, also at Navy expense. Transportation of applicants to and from the recruiting station, to RTC Great Lakes for those accepted for enlistment, and back to the Philippines for those who were not accepted, would be via U.S. Navy aircraft or U.S. Navy-chartered commercial aircraft.\(^{155}\)

It may be prudent and more cost-effective for the Navy to send a significantly large number of PEP applicants to Guam or Japan for testing and processing at any one time. Normally, only 68 percent of all enlisted applicants (for all enlistment programs) are finally accepted for enlistment, and make it to active duty. The remaining 32 percent fail

testing and processing at various stages due to several reasons, and do not qualify for enlisted service.\textsuperscript{156}

If the Navy were to reestablish PEP, the choice of Guam over Japan as a PEP applicant testing and processing site would be preferred, for the following reasons:

a) Transporting third-country nationals into U.S. military facilities in Japan for recruit testing and processing may require some form of bilateral agreement between the governments of the United States and Japan. Because it is a U.S. territorial possession, no such agreement is required for Guam.

b) Guam's tropical climate is similar to that of the Philippines. PEP applicants who are transported to Japan during the cold winter months may be unable to immediately acclimatize and adapt to the abrupt change in weather during the processing and testing period. As such, they may develop physical conditions or problems that could make them fail the recruit physical exams. For the same reason, PEP applicants accepted for enlistment should not be sent to RTC Great Lakes for basic training during the relatively colder months of December through February.

Should a new PEP be established, the former PEP could serve as a useful model for reestablishing a new, similar program. However, the following changes should be implemented for the benefit, protection, and general welfare of Philippine Nationals, who experienced the greatest disadvantages from enlisting through the former program:

a) The U.S. Navy should provide PEP recruits who earned college credits in the Philippines with a means of having their college courses accredited by a U.S. accrediting institution. Ideally, this should be done for applicants who have been finally accepted for

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
enlistment. Otherwise, accreditation should be completed during recruit training. This would give PEP recruits due recognition and credit for their college work by allowing them to enlist in paygrades E-2 or E-3, as provided for other recruits who enlist with college credits. Accreditation of Philippine college courses could be provided as a cost option during basic training, with PEP recruitsshouldering the cost through their Navy pay and allowances. By not giving PEP recruits the option of having their Philippine college courses accredited to enable them to enlist in paygrades E-2 or E-3, the Navy may find it difficult to project its desired image as an "equal opportunity employer."

b) Philippine Nationals recruited under a new PEP should also be given "guarantees" for enlistment into their desired Navy ratings, as well as basic and advanced ("A" and "C") schools and training for these desired ratings, subject to the PEP recruits’ personal preferences, qualifications (i.e., ASVAB scores), eligibility, and entry-level vacancies in their desired ratings. As previously mentioned, recruits who enlist through other Navy programs are given enlistment "guarantees," subject to the same criteria specified above. Enlistment guarantees should be given upon completion of ASVAB testing (during PEP applicant processing). Providing enlistment "guarantees" to PEP recruits (as the Navy does to all other qualified recruits) should also be considered by the Navy as an "equal opportunity" issue.

c) The U.S. Navy should reexamine some of the eligibility criteria and restrictions under the former PEP, especially with respect to their applicability and relevance to a new PEP. The eligibility criteria for PEP may have been appropriate from 1952 to 1991. However, in the light of present equal opportunity trends, as well as social, demographic, and political changes, the enlistment eligibility criteria may need to be revised. For
example, the U.S. Navy could allow qualified Filipino women to enlist under a new PEP, as women in the Navy are being given more career opportunities. This is considering that ethnic Filipino women (who are permanent residents or U.S. citizens) are allowed to enlist through U.S. Navy recruiting programs for which they are qualified. Allowing qualified Filipino women to enlist under a reestablished PEP may be another "equal opportunity" issue the Navy may want to examine.

d) PEP recruits should not be "stripped" of their Philippine political and civil rights as a condition of their U.S. Navy enlistment. If U.S. citizen-servicemembers have the right to vote and communicate their personal concerns to their elected U.S. legislators, PEP recruits should also retain the right and the opportunity to exercise their political and civil rights in their own country as Philippine Nationals, and to voice their personal concerns to their elected Philippine legislators, until they become naturalized U.S. citizens. Removing the political and civil rights of PEP recruits as a condition of U.S. Navy enlistment may not be consistent with current Navy equal opportunity policy and initiatives.

e) Navy recruiting authorities should abolish the "mini-boot camp," which was required for all successful applicants under the former PEP. Upon satisfactory completion of the required enlistment screening, testing, and processing, PEP recruits should be sent immediately to RTC Great Lakes for basic training. As previously discussed, Filipinos easily adjust and adapt to life in the U.S. Navy, as well as to the American culture and way of life. Therefore, a "mini-boot camp" may not be necessary for them. Additionally, abolishing the "mini-boot camp" would shorten the processing time for PEP recruits, thereby saving some of the Navy's precious logistical and financial
recruiting resources. A brief indoctrination and orientation session (without simulating
the conditions and atmosphere of actual recruit training) may be given to accepted
applicants, before transporting them to RTC Great Lakes. Another option would be to
incorporate indoctrination and orientation with the PEP applicant screening, testing, and
processing schedule. This option assumes that most (if not all) PEP applicants will
successfully complete all required screening, testing, and processing requirements, and
will be finally accepted for U.S. Navy enlistment.

f) Entry characteristics (e.g., educational attainment, AFQT scores, RE-Codes),
should be accurately entered in the appropriate Navy databases, or other databases
requiring such data. A relatively large number of invalid, missing or unknown data for
PEP and OTHER recruit characteristics in the database used for this study. This was
especially true with PEP recruit AFQT scores, and OTHER recruit educational attainment
data. More complete and more accurate data entry and coding for recruit entry
characteristics in Department of Defense personnel databases should in turn provide more
accurate and more conclusive studies comparing PEP recruits with recruits who enlist
through different Navy recruiting programs.

g) PEP recruits whose enlistments are terminated involuntarily should be given the
option of remaining in the United States as permanent residents, if they have not attained
permanent resident status or U.S. citizenship prior to the termination of their enlistments.
This option should be given to PEP recruits who have to be separated from the Naval
service for reasons such as medical conditions or physical disabilities incurred while on
active duty and that prevent further military service, provided the condition or disability
was not incurred as a result of misconduct. If a PEP recruit dies while on active duty, his
surviving spouse and children, if any, should likewise be given the option of staying in
the U.S. as permanent residents, if they have not attained permanent residency or U.S.
citizenship prior to the servicemember’s death. This should help in easing the great
suffering, loss, and displacement that would be experienced by the deceased
servicemember’s family, if they were to be deported to their country of origin, in
accordance with current U.S. immigration laws.

Congress and senior policy officials should seriously consider reestablishing the U.S.
Navy’s Philippines Enlistment Program—a most vital, worthwhile, and very successful
recruiting program, which can provide a steady supply of "high-quality" sailors for the
U.S. Navy. The reestablishment of PEP at this time could benefit all concerned: it could
help the Navy meet its requirement for highly-qualified recruits and longer-term, career
personnel; it could help a number of Philippine Nationals find valuable employment,
training, and career opportunities in the U.S. Navy; and it could additionally help to
strengthen the continuing friendship and traditional alliance between the United States
and the Philippines. Arguably, no two other nations have shared, or may ever share, a
similar, long-lasting historical relationship.
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