THE ARG AS SELF-CONTAINED FORCE PACKAGE:
RECONFIGURING THE ARG TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ORGANIC SELF PROTECTION CAPABILITIES

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in Partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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The ARG as Self-Contained Force Package: Reconfiguring the ARG to Provide Adequate Organic Self Protection Capabilities (Unclassified)

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The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) has insufficient force protection capabilities to successfully carry out its missions without excessive risk of catastrophic loss. Doctrinally the ARG is protected by external assets, which in reality are seldom available. Therefore, the ARG should be reconfigured to provide adequate organic force protection capabilities. Recommend augmenting the ARG with an AEGIS cruiser, 2 LAMPS MK III helicopters, and an SSN.
INTRODUCTION

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, the United States finds itself facing a world with vastly different challenges than during the years of the Cold War. These challenges and their relevance to U.S. naval forces was first articulated by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the Marine Corps in the joint Navy and Marine Corps white paper, ...From the Sea, September, 1992. This document changed the focus of U.S. naval forces from blue water operations against the Soviet Navy to smaller scale expeditionary operations in the littoral regions, and restructured naval forces to expand on and capitalize upon their traditional expeditionary roles and capabilities.¹ The CNO also stated that in addition to the traditional operational capabilities of forward deployment, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and sealift, four key operational capabilities were required to successfully execute the new direction of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps: Command, Control, and Surveillance (C²S), Battlespace Dominance, Power Projection, and Force Sustainment.²

In 1996, guidance was issued for all branches of the armed forces by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the document Joint Vision 2010, a template for the individual Services to implement a joint warfighting plan. This guidance lists four operational concepts: Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics.³

Most recently, strategic and operational concepts were redefined in the 1997 National Military Strategy of the United States of America, the U.S. military's blueprint for the future. This strategy identified four strategic concepts that govern the use of U.S. forces to meet the demands of the strategic environment: Strategic Agility, Overseas Presence, Power Projection, and Decisive Force.⁴
As one examines these concepts for current and future military operations, it is clear that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps were ahead of their time with their extremely accurate assessment of future roles and operational requirements. This would imply that naval forces would be on the cutting edge of force packaging and employment to fully support these new strategic and operational objectives. However, that is not the case.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that naval amphibious forces, one of the premier components of U.S. naval overseas presence, power projection, strategic agility, dominant maneuver, and precision engagement, are inadequately structured to carry out their assigned functions in accordance with joint and Navy doctrine, due to their lack of force protection capabilities. Further, this paper examines the Navy's amphibious warfare plan, which deals with concepts and issues affecting the employment of amphibious forces to the year 2010 and beyond, and argues that this plan still neglects to adequately address the issue of force protection. Although naval amphibious task forces (ATF) vary in size and composition from a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (approximately 46,000 Marines and Sailors) to an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) (approximately 3,000 Marines and Sailors), certain facts hold true for ATF's of all sizes. This paper will focus on the smallest amphibious task force, the Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (ARG/MEU(SOC)), to illustrate the deficiencies in amphibious force protection, as it is the commonly deployed amphibious force package. At any given time there are a minimum of two ARGs deployed around the world conducting independent operations. Although this paper focuses on the ARG/MEU(SOC), as mentioned above, many of the issues contained herein are endemic to the larger amphibious force packages, and therefore, certain extrapolations will be made accordingly.
ARG/MEU(SOC) COMPOSITION, MISSIONS, AND CAPABILITIES

The modern day ARG consists of three ships: a General/Multi-Purpose Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA or LHD), an Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD), and a Dock Landing Ship (LSD), which are capable of embarking a maximum of 2,803 to 3,134 troops (depending on individual ship configuration). The landing force is a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), comprised of four elements: a Command Element, an Air Combat Element (ACE), a Ground Combat Element (GCE), and a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE), generally numbering approximately 2200 to 2500 troops. In addition, there are normally a number of detachments with specialized capabilities that are integral to the MEU(SOC): a Tactical Air Control Squadron (TACRON), a Naval Beach Group, an Assault Craft Unit (ACU), a Beach Master Unit (BMU), an Amphibious Construction Battalion (PhibCB), a Naval Coastal Warfare Group (NCWGRU), an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group (EODGRU), and a Naval Special Warfare Group (NAVSPECWARGRU).

The ARG/MEU(SOC) maintains a forward deployed posture on a routine basis under operational control of one of the Regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINC). By virtue of its forward presence and self-contained capability, the ARG/MEU(SOC) can be the first force to react to a crisis or area of concern, providing the CINC with a variety of flexible deterrent options, in addition to the traditional combat and combat support capabilities. Its SOC certification confirms its ability to carry out a total of 29 specific missions falling under four broad categories: amphibious operations, direct-action operations, military operations other than war (MOOTW), and supporting operations. The rapid response standard is six hours from mission receipt/warning order to execution. Once ashore the landing force has supplies to last 15 days.
The three ARG ships (LHA/LHD, LPD, LSD) provide assault shipping for the MEU(SOC). The LHA and LHD class ships carry both air and surface assault craft. LPD and LSD class ships are optimized for surface assault, but are also able to support the landing force airlift assets. The LPD is particularly suited for helicopter support, maintaining a dedicated air department.

Surface assault assets consist of the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), and Landing Craft Utility (LCU). The AAV provides the principal surface lift capability and carries the initial assault force to an objective. LCACs facilitate the high speed movement of combat support and combat service support from ships to beach landing zones. The LCU provides high-volume heavy-lift capability, but is limited by a top speed of eleven knots. It is also extremely valuable in operations such as non-combatant evacuation (NEO) and humanitarian assistance, as it can carry upwards of 400 people (350-400 combat loaded troops) and conduct independent operations for up to ten days.

Air assault assets consist of the AV-8B Harrier, the AH-1W Cobra, the UH-1N Huey, the CH-46E Sea Knight, and the CH-53E Super Sea Stallion. The AV-8 and AH-1 are used primarily for close air support (CAS). The CH-46 and CH-53 are troop transport helicopters, with the CH-53 having an additional heavy lift capability. The UH-1 is used primarily for command and control, but has a troop transport and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) capability.

**THE FORCE PROTECTION PROBLEM**

Force protection is one of the most visible and sensitive issues that the U.S. Military faces today. With the end of the Cold War, it is frequently difficult to put a face on the enemy, and the civilian leadership and public-at-large does not expect, and may not accept, American casualties in a hazy operation with no apparent national interests. The position of the
U.S. Military is stated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Joint Vision 2010:

The American people will continue to expect us to win any engagement, but they will also expect us to be more efficient in protecting lives and resources while accomplishing the mission successfully. Commanders will be expected to reduce the costs and adverse effects of military operations, from environmental disruption in training to collateral damage in combat. Risks and expenditures will be even more closely scrutinized than they are at present.17

A similar position, and the ramifications of inadequate force protection is put forth by Under Secretary of the Navy, The Honorable Jerry MacArthur Hultin:

Today, with the [level of] public concern [displayed for the three kidnapped] soldiers [in Kosovo], ask yourself how our nation would respond were a large number of our people to die if we lost a whole ship's crew to mines. What would be the reaction to the sinking of an LPD and its reinforced company of Marines? An entire operation might be shut down. Not by a great enemy dug in on the shore with overwhelming advantage. No, the public opinion shift caused by a single mine--an asymmetric threat--could do the trick.18

Another key aspect of the force protection scenario is to consider the type of threats that amphibious forces must be defended against, both now and in the future. Today, the proliferation of highly lethal weapons has increased the risks associated with operating in the littorals dramatically. With the increase in sales of Kilo-class and Type 209 diesel submarines, a number of small states now possess a viable submarine threat. In addition, the proliferation of highly lethal weaponry includes anti-ship cruise missiles (Silkworm, Exocet), sea mines, long-range artillery, mobile theater ballistic missiles (TBM) (Scud), hand-held anti-air missiles (SA-7, Stinger), advanced tactical jet aircraft (MIG-29, MIG-31, Mirage), and more. In the future, advanced technology will make potential adversaries even more dangerous to U.S. forces, as stated in Joint Vision 2010:

Greater global interaction will strongly influence the nature of future threats. Wider access to advanced technology along
with modern weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the requisite skills to maintain and employ it, will increase the number of actors with sufficient military potential to upset existing regional balances of power... The application of these technologies against us may also prove surprising. Our adversaries will have an independent will, some knowledge of our capabilities, and the desire to avoid our strengths and exploit vulnerabilities. We anticipate the probability of facing technological or operational surprise will increase in the period ahead. In sum, the U.S. must prepare to face a wider range of threats, emerging unpredictably, employing varying combinations of technology, and challenging us at varying levels of intensity.¹⁹

These passages illustrate the basic nature of the force protection problem, the national and senior military leadership's recognition of the threats, and the emphasis placed on successfully implementing sound force protection policy and architecture.

**NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS FORCE PROTECTION**

While the preceding section illustrates the nature and importance of force protection in general, this section will address the issue of force protection with respect to naval amphibious forces, and in particular the ARG/MEU(SOC). Joint doctrine states:

Naval operations in the landing area (such as beach reconnaissance, hydrographic survey, removal of beach and underwater obstacles, and mine clearance) normally require an allocation of surface assets that can provide command and control, naval surface fire support, air, and as required, artillery support. Additionally, allocations of aircraft and escort ships must be made to support protection of the ATF (Amphibious Task Force) from hostile air, surface, or subsurface attack.²⁰

The preceding paragraph illustrates the extensive support required by naval amphibious forces. Similarly, it implies that the amphibious force is incapable of providing these services for itself, which is extremely significant. This means that an amphibious force operating independently has inadequate self protection capabilities against air, surface, or subsurface threats, and is therefore vulnerable to these types of attack by hostile forces. Future plans for naval amphibious forces continue this policy of
dependence on external support for force protection, noting that protection of amphibious forces in the year 2010 is a mission that will fall, to a large extent, on the assets of the aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG). It is the position of this paper that this policy is fundamentally flawed for several fundamental reasons:

1. There is not always a CVBG around.

2. The CVBG/ARG do not adequately work-up together, so the CVBG is not trained to provide effective support.

3. CVBG force protection capabilities are focused on protecting the aircraft carrier (CV).

EXTERNAL SUPPORT: CVBG AVAILABILITY

To illustrate the first point, it is helpful to examine how the ARG/MEU(SOC) generally is employed. Amphibious forces routinely operate independently in high-threat, potentially hostile areas with no external support, often at great distances from the nearest CVBG, making real-time support virtually impossible. During a standard deployment cycle, the ARG/MEU(SOC) and CVBG do not deploy together, transit together, or return together. In fact during the course of a typical six-month deployment, the two forces will most likely never operate together, and may not even see each other. The most likely scenario is that the CVBG and ARG will deploy several weeks apart, transit at different speeds (on different routes), operate in different areas, and return home separately. An example of this occurred in 1994, and involved the USS Tripoli (LPH-10) ARG and the 15th MEU(SOC). The Tripoli ARG/15th MEU(SOC) was diverted to the crisis in Rwanda, providing humanitarian assistance in support of Operation Support Hope. Ironically, shortly after the CVBG operating in the Arabian Gulf departed the region, Iraqi forces began massing on the Kuwaiti border. Since the Tripoli ARG was now the only naval asset in the vicinity, it was ordered to the Arabian Gulf
at best speed. Upon arrival, the ARG/MEU(SOC) positioned itself visibly off
the coast of Kuwait and began conducting operations as a display of force,
becoming the first naval asset to participate in Operation Vigilant Warrior.
Soon other naval assets arrived to take over the operation, and the
ARG/MEU(SOC) was relieved on station. However, it is worth emphasizing that
with no external support or augments for force protection, the Tripoli
ARG/15th MEU(SOC) was called upon by the CINC to respond to the immediate
crisis, and they stood alone as the sole naval asset to challenge Iraqi
aggression.\textsuperscript{23}

**EXTERNAL SUPPORT: ADEQUATE TRAINING**

To demonstrate the second point, it is helpful to look at what naval
doctrine specifies with regard to training and readiness, and then determine
if the ARG/CVBG training process is adequate to train the two forces to
effectively operate together. A basic tenet of naval doctrine states the
need for naval forces to be fully trained and proficient in all mission areas
prior to deployment:

A strength of our naval forces lies in their immediate
availability to respond to contingencies through tangible
readiness. Our deploying forces certify their proficiency
in their advertised capabilities by carrying out specific
tasks and missions prior to departure. They have established
their readiness before they enter their theater of operations.
When they do arrive, they are trained and organized to operate
as a cohesive force.\textsuperscript{24}

This implies a close level of cooperation during the pre-deployment
training cycle. However, in actual practice, there is minimal interaction
between the ARG and the CVBG during this critical training period. An
example of this occurred during work-up's for the USS Abraham Lincoln
CVBG/USS Essex ARG/15th MEU(SOC) Western Pacific (WESTPAC) deployment in
1998.\textsuperscript{25} The work-up cycle consisted of three exercises: COMPTUEX, FLEETEX,
and JTFEX. For COMPTUEX and FLEETEX, there was no interaction between the
ARG and CVBG whatsoever. For the JTFEX, however, one ship from the CVBG was assigned to the ARG to provide support. While the augmented ARG operated off the coast of Camp Pendleton, the remainder of the CVBG operated south of San Clemente Island, approximately 100 miles away. This exercise was very critical for the ARG, as the 15th MEU was conducting its SOCCERT (SOC certification) during this exercise. This MEU certification process required the ARG to remain underway two days longer than the CVBG. Unfortunately, when the CVBG was done with its JTFEX requirements, it did not join the ARG to conduct amphibious support training for the final two days of the ARG/MEU's JTFEX. Instead it pulled into port, while the ARG (with its single escort) stayed underway for the final two days as the MEU finished its SOCCERT. It is doubtful that this level of interactive training resulted in the CVBG/ARG becoming a "cohesive force" as specified in the passage above, yet both forces were judged to have successfully completed the work-up cycle and certified to be trained sufficiently to be proficient at joint Navy/Marine task force operations.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT: CVBG ADEQUACY

Finally, assuming that there is a CVBG to provide support for the ARG/MEU(SOC), depending on the situation, will the CVBG be able to keep the amphibious forces safe? This is a legitimate question, as the primary force protection mission of any CVBG is to safeguard the aircraft carrier. Therefore, the only assets available to the ARG are those in excess of the CVBG's own force protection requirements. For this reason, the CVBG may not be able to offer adequate protection for the ARG if there are tangible threats to the CV at the same time.

Even though the defensive capabilities of the CVBG are robust and redundant, they are still finite. If a three ship ARG is absorbed by the CVBG, this increases the number of ships requiring protection by
approximately 50%, yet adds almost no defensive capability to the force. If the CVBG must protect the ARG when it is conducting amphibious operations and has additional boats and aircraft operating, the task is even more difficult.

The problem becomes acute when considering force protection for a larger amphibious force. For example, if an operation requires only a slightly larger ATF created by combining two ARGs, the difficulty in providing adequate force protection increases dramatically. Now the CVBG has six ships with limited defensive capabilities to protect, and it still must protect the carrier. If this ATF is conducting operations which are separated by even modest distances, it may be beyond the capability of the CVBG to provide adequate force protection for itself and the amphibious forces without exposing the CV to an unacceptable level of risk. Eventually, as the ATF grows larger it may require an augmented CVBG, or multiple CVBGs to provide adequate protection for the amphibious forces.

ORGANIC ARG FORCE PROTECTION:

UNACCEPTABLE RISK AND ADVERSE OPERATIONAL IMPACT

As noted above, amphibious forces normally operate independently, often beyond the range of external support. This means that in a real-world scenario they may have to rely on organic force protection capabilities in a hostile environment, even though these capabilities have been identified as inadequate. Not only does this expose the ARG/MEU(SOC) to unacceptable levels of risk, it may also adversely affect operational capabilities through the redirection of critical assets.

At the unit level, the ships of the ARG are fundamentally lacking in defensive capabilities, most notably in the areas of undersea warfare, air warfare, and surface warfare. The ARG has no ships that possess towed-array sonar systems, no advanced air search radar, and no long range surface-to-air missile. The ARG has no naval gun larger than 25mm, no organic Navy air
assets for surface search, armed attack, or torpedo delivery. Additionally, when the ARG is conducting amphibious operations and the ships are ballasted down to launch boats, LCAC's, or AAV's, they are severely restricted in their ability to maneuver, and the vast majority of the personnel are totally absorbed in the amphibious operation. This puts them in a vulnerable position only a few miles off the shore, relatively immobile, poorly armed, and facing task saturation. This is clearly unacceptable.

Therefore, the ARG is forced to using whatever assets it possesses for force protection, normally MEU(SOC) assets assigned to the landing force. It is not unusual to find AH-1 Cobras used for anti-surface warfare against small boat threats, to see Stinger teams on the superstructure of the ARG ships conducting anti-air warfare, or other uses of assets for which they were not designed. This reallocation of ARG/MEU(SOC) assets for force protection missions takes vital capabilities away from their primary mission areas, reducing readiness for amphibious operations. This is extremely significant when one considers how few assets are available for the landing forces under ideal circumstances.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

From the above exposition it is recommended that the composition of the ARG/MEU(SOC) be revisited. In order to create a modern ARG that provides maximum flexibility and utility to the warfighting CINC, the Navy and Marine Corps must structure the ARG so that it is able to defend itself while successfully carrying out its wide array of missions. An operational planner should not have to worry about what assets he has in the area to augment the ARG, and what ripples that will cause in subsequent plans. Instead, the CINC should be able to move the ARG like a chess piece, and know that wherever he puts that piece it can stand on its own. Further, the ARG should be able to
be added to existing force packages (including other ARGs) without undue concerns about force protection.

Therefore, it is the recommendation of this paper that the ARG be immediately restructured to augment the current three ship ARG with an AEGIS cruiser equipped with two SH-60B LAMPS MK III helicopters. The natural choice for this mission would be the 12 oldest AEGIS cruisers, CG-47 through CG-58. The addition of a single AEGIS cruiser and its helicopters to the ARG team would provide a quantum increase in SUW, USW, and AW capabilities. In the air defense arena alone, the ability of the cruiser to protect the entire ARG under an envelope of standard missiles would be unprecedented. Finally, the cruiser's SH-60B LAMPS MK III helicopters would provide a tremendous increase in undersea warfare capability (including the absolutely critical capability to deliver an air-launched, anti-submarine torpedo), surface search, electronic surveillance measures (ESM), and command and control.

Additionally, the ARG should be augmented with the addition of one nuclear attack submarine (SSN). An SSN assigned to the ARG would make open water transits markedly safer by the addition of a potent USW and SUW capability, and in the amphibious operating area the SSN would be tremendously valuable for shallow water ASW, special operations support, and land attack.

**OPPOSING VIEWS AND REBUTTAL**

Critics point to any plan to restructure the ARG with existing assets as unfeasible, arguing that there are not enough ships in the Navy's inventory to satisfy current mission requirements, let alone augment the ARGs. In response to the lack of surface combatants in the Navy inventory, there is no denying that this is a serious problem. In fact, the leadership of the surface warfare community has identified the requirement for an additional 20 warships (DDG-51 class) to handle new missions and protect the
shipbuilding industrial base. This is a real problem, and must be addressed now to alleviate greater shortfalls in the future. However, the need for ARG protection is justified based on the high value of each unit, the unacceptability of the loss of even one of these assets, and the fact that the ARG can be protected without sacrificing the defense of the CVBG. If the 12 oldest AEGIS cruisers were allocated for ARG defense, it would still leave the 15 newest AEGIS cruisers available for the twelve CVBGs and other missions. When complemented with the 25 AEGIS destroyers currently operating, this would provide 3 AEGIS platforms per battle group. This is more capability than should realistically be required to meet any anticipated real world threat against the CVBG, and the odds will only get better as the 13 additional AEGIS destroyers currently under construction or authorized are brought on line.

A similar argument can be made against the inclusion of an attack submarine in the ARG. Opponents would say that the ARG does not have a credible need for submarine support, and even if it did there are not enough submarines to go around, either. In response to the point of view that the ARG does not need submarine support, one could argue that the ARG stands to benefit much more from the inclusion of an SSN in its basic composition than does the CVBG. As mentioned above, one SSN provides the ARG with a credible blue water USW and SUW capability, as well as a littoral USW, land attack, and special operations capability which it does not now possess. Whereas the CVBG has other assets to provide these capabilities, the ARG does not, hence the benefit would be greater. Further, the ARG could be augmented with an SSN simply by changing the current practice of sending two SSNs with each CVBG to a policy that sends one with each CVBG and one with each ARG.

Finally, there are those who argue that the problem of ARG force protection will not exist in the future, that all the issues are being
addressed by modernization, and who point to the introduction of new platforms and technologies like the LPD-17 class amphibious transport and the DD-21 class land attack destroyer to bolster the position. While it is true that the capabilities of the ARG will increase as new systems like the LPD-17, DD-21, AAAV (advanced AAV), and V-22 Osprey (tilt-rotor) come on line, this position that these developments will fix the problem may be the most dangerous course of all. This is not a problem that will go away if it is not talked about for awhile. One of the most troubling aspects of the Naval Amphibious Warfare Plan is that while the technology advances, the basic attitude toward the defense of the ARG does not change. In the Naval Amphibious Warfare Plan, the ARG of 2010 is described in the following way:

"Amphibious shipping will consist of 36 ships constituting 12 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG). The ARG will consist of an LHD or LHA, an LPD, and an LSD." However, this is also the definition of the ARG of 1995. While it is true that the ships in the ARG of 2010 will be more capable, they are still amphibious assault ships, and they will not be able to conduct multi-mission force protection while simultaneously launching an amphibious assault. In the same way an aircraft carrier is vulnerable while conducting flight operations, and requires escorts solely to provide force protection, the same is undeniably true for an ARG. Unless the threats go away, the need to configure the ARG to provide organic force protection will be just as relevant in 2010 as it is today.

CONCLUSIONS

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) is a vital asset in our national security arsenal. It is an outstanding example of a joint, expeditionary, force package, able to respond rapidly to a wide variety of missions and project power ashore.
However, in its current configuration, the ARG has insufficient resources to adequately defend itself. Further, since it normally operates in the high-risk littoral environment, near potentially hostile coastlines, without external protection, the ARG is at risk of being successfully attacked by any number of conventional threats such as diesel submarines, patrol boats, coastal missile batteries, or enemy air assets. Because a successful attack by any of these sources could cause catastrophic damage resulting in unacceptably large numbers of casualties and/or the loss of multi-billion dollar assets for which there is no replacement, this policy of allowing the ARG to operate independently without sufficient force protection should not be continued.

In conclusion, the ARG faces a greater number of deadly threats than ever before, and the future promises to be even more dangerous. Therefore, it is imperative that the Navy shift current assets to restructure the ARG as an independent force package, to make it a more capable, effective, and survivable force package. This will give the CINCs the flexibility they need to tailor the force package to meet the threat without undue fear of loss or casualties. Finally, organic amphibious force protection must be aggressively supported and defended in future plans and acquisition programs to ensure the ARG of 2010 and beyond never sails into harm's way without adequate defensive capabilities.
NOTES

1 Department of the Navy, ...From the Sea, September, 1992, 3.

2 Ibid., 7.

3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 1996, 1.


7 Ibid., 18.

8 Ibid., 20.

9 Ibid., 15.

10 Ibid., 16.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.


14 The Naval Amphibious Warfare Plan, 17.

15 Ibid., 17, 59-61.

16 Ibid., 17.

17 Joint Vision 2010, 8.


21 The Naval Amphibious Warfare Plan, 38.

22 Author's personal experience while deployed with the Tripoli ARG, on USS Cleveland (LPD-7), 1994-1996.

23 The Naval Amphibious Warfare Plan, Annex G, 84.

25. Author's personal experience while deployed with the Lincoln Battle Group, on USS Valley Forge (CG-50), 1998.


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