NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

THE NGO/MILITARY RELATIONSHIP AND COMPLEX CONTINGENCIES: A TOOL REVIEW

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature

07 February 2000

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NGO/Military Relationship and Complex Contingencies: A Tool Review

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. military is now involved in interagency coordination with other government offices, Non-Governmental Organizations, Private Volunteer Organizations and International Organizations to an extent undreamed of in 1990. This is a review of factors driving that involvement and, as a result, the tools that are developing for interagency coordination in cases of complex contingencies with a focus primarily on the NGO-military relationship. The review includes a critique of the tools and recommendations on how those tools should be used. It concludes with suggestions on how to improve the process, focusing primarily on the contributions made by the Center Of Excellence Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs.
INTRODUCTION

Throughout the last decade of the twentieth century, the importance of interagency coordination has significantly increased as the world has tried to harness synergistic efforts to solve the problems of complex contingencies and humanitarian emergencies. As a result, the U.S. military is now involved with other government offices, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) and International Organizations (IOs) to an extent undreamed of during the Cold War. Obvious questions for the military about this involvement include: what is driving it; what has been learned so far; what tools exist to address it; and, ultimately what is the best way to do it. This paper will address each of those questions, concluding with recommendations on how to improve the process and suggesting that a little known organization, the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, is the key to improving coordination with NGOs.

DRIVING FACTORS

The number of complex contingencies has rapidly grown from sixteen during the Cold War period (1947-1989) to forty-five (1989-1997). This phenomena has led to major U.S. military operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. To help tackle the challenges of complex contingency operations, Joint Doctrine addresses the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander's role as facilitator of interagency coordination and indirectly task him to use Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) as force multipliers.

Addressing the question of whether relief and peace operations are appropriate roles for the U.S. military is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that given
the U.S. military’s experience of the past ten years, the global political environment\(^7\) and the Lake doctrine,\(^8\) there can be every expectation that the military will continue to be called on to address future complex contingencies.\(^9\)

The mandate to address interagency coordination goes beyond joint doctrine. Secretary of Defense Cohen reported to Congress in 1997 that “the Department Of Defense actively seeks to improve the capabilities of the international community to deal effectively with humanitarian crisis by developing closer ties with and providing assistance to international agencies, non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations and other federal agencies that contribute.”\(^{10}\) Secretary Cohen’s remark not only recognized the need for coordination but also complied with Presidential Decision Directive 56.

In May 94 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-25, *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* published instructions regarding formation of a comprehensive peace operation policy. In May 1997, PDD-56 *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations* spelled out how complex crisis management would be executed at the executive level. PDD-56 assigns coordination authority to the National Security Council (NSC), providing a single U.S. official with overall responsibility for coordinating the numerous agencies involved in peace operations. The NSC member chairs an Executive Committee (ExCom) tasked with creating a comprehensive interagency political-military plan. In addition, PDD-56 requires the NSC-led interagency group to undertake joint training, joint planning and rehearsing, and joint operations in order to facilitate civil-military and interagency coordination.\(^{11}\)
PDD-56 has not been fully implemented though its approach was used in preparing for the Haitian intervention. It has many weaknesses, among which the portions of PDD-56 processes that have been used have not included NGOs or outside international organizations. Additionally, PDD-56 does not solve the stovepipe issues. Once the ExCom reaches a consensus in Washington, each participating agency passes guidance directly to its respective operators outside Washington, who must meet then in the region where the military is being committed to organize and develop the basis for cooperation with local representatives of other US or international agencies. Presently there is no regional operational-level body to coordinate and support the various mandates generated in Washington passed to the field for execution. However, when instability threatens a region, it is the military that is called to act and restore order and the problems of coordinating, integrating, and fielding a coherent national effort can fall directly on each regional Commander-in-Chief (CINC).

Since 1995, the JSCAP has formally tasked all CINCs to develop deliberate plans for Humanitarian Assistance in foreign countries, plans that must address working with PVOs and NGOs. Their sheer power and resources warrant the attention paid to these organizations. Some NGOs have more constituents than smaller member-nations of the UN and can galvanize governments to develop policies that may have a direct impact on the decision to use military force. Additionally, the number of NGOs is enormous and growing daily. The total number of internationally recognized NGOs is nearly 29,000. If one counts every grassroots community-level NGO, the number can be in the millions.
NGO resources include money, food and the advantage of having access to information from natives working within the area of operation. Joint Publication 3-08 reports that NGOs contribute between $9 and $10 billion each year and “because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation.” ¹⁸ These resources include foodstuffs and personnel, often native, working within the country. For example, just within the UN: UNHCR has over 5,000 employees working in 122 countries; World Food Program delivered 2.7 million tons of food in 84 countries; the Food and Agricultural Organization administers approximately $2 billion annually in food stuffs drawn mostly from government surpluses; and UNICEF employs about 6,200 persons in 133 countries. The International Red Cross Society has 650 personnel in its headquarters and about 7,800 personnel worldwide, the majority of them locally hired.¹⁹

Joint doctrine recommends that “the geographic combatant commander and combatant command staff should be continuously engaged in interagency coordination and establishing working relationships with interagency players long before crisis action planning is required.”²⁰ Given the overwhelming number of NGOs, including them in the planning process and establishing relationships may seem daunting to military planners. Fortunately, experts agree that a small number do about 95 percent of the work in typical humanitarian operations.²¹ An unpublished Rand study commissioned by the U.S. Air Force categorized NGOs identifying “Core-Team” as the NGOs that are “highly competent, broadly capable and predisposed to cooperate with the military.”²² The study lists 13 organizations that fall into this category (see Appendix A).
And finally, above and beyond doctrine, directives and common sense the Commander has no option that includes ignoring NGOs...they are a “fact on the ground.” For instance there were 28 NGOs in northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort, 49 in Operation Restore Hope (increasing to 90 by the time the military departed), 300 currently in the former Republic of Yugoslavia and over 700 in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.²³

As a result of these factors, CINC’s have expanded their agenda to include a certain amount of NGO liaison. The expansion varies by command and has usually taken the form of conferences and training exercises.²⁴

LESSONS LEARNED

Case studies show that in each complex contingency operation of the 90’s, the relationship between the military and significant non-military organizations was different due to evolving coordination mechanisms and “facts on the ground.” The extent of these differences makes the development of specific military doctrine at the operational level nearly impossible. That being said, a thorough review of existing literature²⁵ on the NGO/Military relationship does reveal agreement on a number of propositions that are products of lessons learned from previous complex contingencies. These include:

a. Collaboration and coordination between the NGOs and the military must take place to achieve unity of effort.

b. NGOs are frequently on the ground well before the military and will probably remain long after the military is gone.
c. The number of actors and variety of factors involved in a complex contingency make it impossible to develop a comprehensive model that can be applied to the NGO/military relationship.

d. Humanitarian operations are implicitly political and it is the political environment at the highest levels that will help shape the NGO/military relationship.

e. Enlightened self-interest drives the military/NGO relationship. The military has the infrastructure for rapid response, security, logistics management, and transportation while the NGOs bring "humanitarian expertise, a familiarity with the local area, and sustained commitment." By working with the military, the NGOs more effectively attain their goals and, by working with the NGOs, the military stabilizes the disaster more quickly, allowing for an earlier exit of military forces.

f. The efficacy of the Civil-Military Operations Center is key to the relationship during a specific operation.

g. The military cannot solve humanitarian coordination problems on its own. Non-military organizations are the implementers of social and political elements that allow long-term area stabilization which is the key to accelerating military exit. A more complete solution will require the efforts of many actors, including major donor countries and host countries at high political levels.

h. Problems with the NGO/military relationship include: different organizational cultures; NGO concerns about neutrality and impartiality; NGOs limited
ability to plan; ambivalence about information sharing; varying time horizons; military concern about mission creep; and mutual unfamiliarity.  

i. NGOs are not homogenous and each may bring different strengths, agendas and institutional cultures to the table.

US MILITARY TOOL

Joint doctrine guidance on how to achieve interagency coordination and capitalize on NGO resources is appropriately vague. Doctrine provides the commander, in general, with the propositions above and then leaves it to his discretion to determine the appropriate role and method of NGO integration, dependent on the circumstances of the operation.

Traditionally, commanders have depended on Civil Affairs assets to conduct NGO liaison. The mission of Civil Affairs falls within the purview of the Special Operations Command. A review of Special Operations literature shows minimal mention of its civil affairs mission and, when it is mentioned, its focus is on its contributions as a warfighting tool.

The executive agency for civil affairs is the Army Special Operations Command. Ninety-seven percent of civil affairs assets reside in the reserve forces. The advantage of reserve personnel doing civil affairs is that, in general, they are less a product of the military culture and may be able to build bridges with civilians and civilian organizations more easily and quicker than active duty personnel.

The Active Duty component of Civil Affairs is the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) intended to meet initial CA force requirements during contingency operations, setting up for 60-90 days before handing off the mission to the reserve forces. It is
composed of five companies each aligned with a geographic combatant command. Unfortunately, with only 145 total operators, their restricted manpower limits the assistance they can provide for pre-crisis relationship building and operational planning.\textsuperscript{30} According to the current 96\textsuperscript{th} CA Battalion G-3, the battalion has changed drastically with the enhanced credibility brought by the Special Forces. All non-commissioned officers have five to seven years of experience as members of a Special Forces Group prior to arriving, providing them with exceptional levels of warfighting skills and expertise.\textsuperscript{31} Its mission is to "support the commander’s relationship with civilian authorities and populace, promote legitimacy, and enhance military effectiveness" or, as is printed on the cover slide of its command brief, "minimize civilian interference with military operations, operate as a force multiplier."\textsuperscript{32} These mission statements, as well as a review of the draft Army Field Manual 41-10 governing Special Operations, do not emphasize NGO liaison.

There is no doctrinal organization prescribed for Civil Affairs. Civil-military operations planners usually reside as a cell in the CINC’s J-3 staff. Where Civil Affairs resides is dependent on theater. Currently SOCEUR and SOCCENT have executive agency authority for Civil Affairs in their theaters. SOCSOUTH has requested authority and SOCPAC has stated they will not be requesting it.\textsuperscript{33} Discussions with CINC J-5s reveal further evidence of the lack of standardization of civil affairs focus. For instance, CENTCOM relies on liaison with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) representatives as the conduit for relationships with NGOs. Though a civil affairs person was assigned to the staff, he was "gobbled up to demining activities."\textsuperscript{34} At SOUTHCOM, due to the number of humanitarian and disaster relief operations within
the AOR, integration with government agencies and NGOs is expected and "dispersed throughout the command."\textsuperscript{35} The fluidity of these structures is understandable from the military perspective of varying missions and resources however can be confusing for those NGOs who operate worldwide and desire closer, ongoing relationships with the regional U.S. military organization.\textsuperscript{36}

Civil Affairs structural fluidity extends to the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)\textsuperscript{37}, the focus of civil affairs efforts during operations. CMOCs have been in existence for years to help coordinate civil agency efforts to restore order after war however they have evolved through the 90’s to become the focal point of military operations in humanitarian efforts.\textsuperscript{38} They are generally “just in time” organizations that deploy as rapidly as possible to the crisis area and are eventually staffed by reserve forces. Case studies show that the location, composition, lead agency, and effectiveness vary significantly across operations dependent on the nature of the particular crisis.\textsuperscript{39} As can be expected, their power curve to become effective can be long as staffs develop relationships and gain experience and proficiency in the details of the specific crisis.\textsuperscript{40}

**U.S. GOVERNMENT TOOL**

The CMOC’s initial primary source of information for NGO activity is the country team, primarily the USAID representative. USAID is the principle U.S. government agency for dealing with declared natural and manmade disasters worldwide and funnels money and relief commodities to registered NGOs that meet certain accountability criteria. When either the State Department or the Ambassador declares an emergency, USAID responds through their Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) which send Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) to the affected area.
Prior to Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, OFDA had almost no experience working side-by-side with the military in the field. Lessons learned from that operation and Operation Restore Hope in 1992 led to the establishment of a full-time OFDA regional liaison to Asia on the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) staff from 1995-1998. The position was a "trial balloon" based on an Memorandum Of Understanding between OFDA and CINCPAC to improve civil-military coordination. The liaison officer worked primarily with the J-3 staff to address ongoing operations and participate in crisis action and deliberate planning processes. As the position was "out of hide" for OFDA and due to resource restraints, OFDA terminated the MOU and brought the appointee, Mr. Tom Dolan, back to Washington DC to be the Chief of Military Liaison Unit at OFDA headquarters. The unit, established in 1998, has just recently expanded to five people and provides on-call support to regional CINC's. Examples of their deployments include sending a unit member to EUCOM to assist in planning in the weeks leading to the Kosovo operation and, most recently, sending Mr. Dolan himself to Venezuela over Christmas to assist with SOUTHCOM disaster relief efforts.

The OFDA military liaison unit has been in large part a response to a significant reduction in USAID field presence. Due to budget cuts, USAID presence overseas has declined by 35 percent since the end of the Cold War. In addition to expanding OFDA staff, USAID has implemented management initiatives to overcome the challenges of the budget cuts, including a "Strategic Objective Team" concept formally launched in 1995. The concept, driven both by PDD 56 and budget cuts, encourages missions to create teams of USAID mission members, NGO representatives, local government officials and others to identify development objectives and strategies. These teams provide a good
mechanism for interagency coordination however the use of such teams is entirely 
dependent on the priorities of the embassy members and, in many cases, are not being 
pursued.44

USAID representatives, when they are present, can be invaluable to the 
commander. They can identify who is in the area, which organizations are reliable, and 
which are capable of implementing specific elements of a plan. However, their potential 
contributions to the planning process are limited because most USAID field personnel do 
not understand what the military “brings to the table.”45 Additionally, they do not 
maintain general response plans, relying on experience and area expertise in the face of 
crisis. Above and beyond their planning weaknesses, drawbacks to military reliance on 
USAID to provide information on NGOs include: some embassy country teams are fully 
informed of current NGO activities, but many are not, dependent on office priorities; 
frequently the USAID member is aware of U.S. sponsored NGO programs but not 
necessarily of efforts sponsored by other governments; and some NGOs are reluctant to 
be seen allied with embassy efforts. This reluctance is driven because the country team’s 
close relationship with the host nation government could potentially jeopardize the 
NGO’s neutrality so, as a result, often NGOs won’t maintain contact with the embassy 
after they’ve arrived in country.46

US CINCPAC TOOL

The Center of Excellence47 in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance 
(COE-DMHA) was established by congressional mandate in October 1994 as the brain 
child of Dr. Frederick M. Burkle, Jr., Chairman of the Division of Emergency Medicine, 
University of Hawaii Schools of Medicine and Public Health. As a Captain in the U.S.
Naval Reserve, his field experience in Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq and in Somalia convinced him that a neutral organization was required that would allow DOD personnel and representatives from non-military organizations to address the requirements of complex emergencies. He felt a horizontal organization\textsuperscript{48} was needed to act as an intermediary between the military and NGOs who, for institutional reasons and concerns about neutrality, could not work directly with the military. As a result of this concern, COE-DMHA has consciously chosen to maintain a low profile so as not to jeopardize its neutral appearance.\textsuperscript{49}

The original partnership included U.S. Pacific Command, Pacific Regional Medical Command and the University of Hawaii and has since grown to include the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. COE-DMHA is located at Tripler Army Medical Center and is currently being realigned under the U.S. Pacific Command to report directly to DCINCPAC. Though funded by DOD,\textsuperscript{50} its unique partnership with non-military organizations makes it a separate structure so that its staff is not included within CINCPAC staff military billet allowance.

CINCPAC was amenable to the development of COE-DMHA based on experiences in 1992. Faced with the requirements to respond to crises in Bangladesh, the Philippines and those brought by “El Nina,” the staff found itself unequipped to work with NGOs during its humanitarian assistance operations.\textsuperscript{51} The center provided an institutionalized mechanism for NGO liaison.

COE-DMHA now helps develop deliberate and crisis action plans, provides assistance with the theater engagement strategy, advises J-3 on operations, and provides training to staff members. It provides planners with staff members who are familiar with
every aspect of humanitarian assistance and have personal knowledge of patterns of
needs and the assets available to address these needs throughout the CINCPAC area of
operations (AOR). It is COE-DMHA, through CINCPAC J-5, that encouraged the
development of Joint Publication 3-08 and provided editing assistance so a document
could be provided to NGOs, IOs and foreign nations that wanted information on how the
military approached coordination issues.52 Most recently, it contributed significant
information on Indonesia as the staff prepared for Operation INTERSET, the American
support element that deployed to East Timor in September. According to one J-5
planner, COE-DMHA, using its NGO and IO contacts on the ground, provided
information on Indonesia for 12 – 18 months and “…ramped up the last four months
leading to deployment. We would get our briefs from the Intelligence shop and then get
the ‘rest of the story’ from COE.”53

COE-DMHA uses education, training and operational research (primarily
information management systems) in an effort to integrate civil-military assets to
improve responses to international complex humanitarian emergencies. With a staff of
25 civilians and one officer, made up of prior UN, NGO, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, academic and military personnel, it focuses on “…areas exhibiting the
greatest need for a facilitating agent and for which it could make the greatest impact in
improving the relationships between military and civilian agencies. Efforts are directed
to coordinating information on existing hot spots, providing regionally related integrated
education and training and maintaining a repository of shared knowledge.”54

COE-DMHA hosts conferences and provides classes55 that allow military
members to become acquainted with the capabilities of the major NGOs and build
personal relationships with members that they may eventually be working shoulder to shoulder with in a crisis situation. Additionally it provides support to training, games, and exercises conducted by the military by identifying appropriate subject matter experts, assisting in development of scenarios, playing roles, and assessing relief strategies. All unified commands were introduced to the organization at a 1999 conference hosted by CINCPAC and has resulted in EUCOM and SOUTHCOM use of their services. However resource restraints, the language of the Congressional mandate focusing the institution’s effort on the Pacific region, and the fact that the organization is a CINCPAC asset has limited the organization’s support of other unified commands.

THE WRONG ANSWERS

There have been many proposals on how best to address the challenges of inter-agency coordination with NGOs. Some include: establishing a permanent regional CMOC;\textsuperscript{56} developing an intranet CMOC with a CINC staff member tasked to keep it updated;\textsuperscript{57} establishing an Inter-Agency Operations Center;\textsuperscript{58} creating an NGO Liaison Office at DOD and Department of State;\textsuperscript{59} and establishing a Humanitarian Advisor billet on each CINC staff.\textsuperscript{60}

Each of the recommendations has merit, however they all have the same flaw. Each would require new military billets to be established and in today’s environment of shrinking resources,\textsuperscript{61} that is highly unlikely.

The additional argument against many of these proposals is that it is not the military’s job to spearhead interagency coordination or NGO liaison. The job of the U.S. military is to fight and win the nation’s wars. Though today’s environment requires the military to be a “player” in the interagency process, it does not have the resources or the
mandate to take the lead. The military "can do" attitude and desire to fix processes that are broken could open a door in a building that is not constructed for nor has room for the many players that may want to enter. Additionally, due to politics and institutional cultures, some necessary players will not want to walk through the door even if invited.

THE RIGHT ANSWERS

The analysis in this paper suggests the following:

a. DOD should maximize utilization of COE-DRHA training tools and approach an educational institution to encourage the establishment of a sister office to cover support requirements in theaters other than the Pacific. COE-DRHA has proven its efficacy and provides a mechanism to address many of the propositions provided by lessons learned. It is the tool that can be used by CINCs to educate themselves, their staffs, and potential JTF Commanders on NGO resources and operations in a particular region. It provides a focus for those NGOs that desire closer cooperation with the military confused by the "ad hoc" nature of the military Civil Affairs structure. Its non-military staff and structure buffer the inevitable friction between military and NGO cultures and provide a "space" in which both can become familiar with each other and develop unity of effort. It addresses the weaknesses of relying on country teams and USAID representatives for information on NGO operations. It can brief new CMOC members on assets in the area and can facilitate relationship building thereby shortening the time for a CMOC to achieve full efficiency. Additionally, it can brief NGOs on the specifics of a particular CMOC thereby overcoming the confusion created by their fluid structure. Most importantly perhaps, it does the job directed by Joint Pub 3-08 for the
commander without requiring him to use valuable, scarce military resources on a mission
that is not part of the military mandate to “fight and win the nation’s wars.”

b. JTF Commanders need to pay attention to a CMOC staffed by active duty 96th
Battalion personnel and get reserves in as fast as possible. The development of a
“warfighter” perspective by Civil Affairs elements is natural given the proud tradition of
the Special Operations force and may have utility during the initial crisis. However, one
must question whether such “warfighters” will be able to build the relationships
necessary for tactical unity of effort with NGOs when those NGOs are often represented
in the field by “young kids in Birkenstocks and ‘Save the Whale’ t-shirts.” The staffing
of CMOCs with reserve assets allows potential capitalization on the civilian perspective
they may bring to relationships with non-military organizations.

c. Though a Center of Excellence can institutionalize NGO liaison, CINCs and
JTF Commanders will continue to interact with NGOs during exercises, conferences and
operations. Commanders can focus their outreach efforts on “core team” NGOs, maximizing the impact of their limited time to perform such functions.

d. Recognizing that regional stability is dependent on appropriate social and
political strategies, CINCs should discretely encourage through their Political Advisor the
use of the “Strategic Objective Team” concept by local USAID missions, perhaps
offering their Security Assistance Officer (SAO) as a potential member of appropriate
teams. In this forum the SAO can educate team members on military capabilities and
restrictions and, perhaps, if the teams effectively develop and implement correct
strategies, the need of military involvement in complex contingencies will be reduced.

CONCLUSION
It is beyond the capabilities of DOD or any one organization to build synergy in efforts to address complex contingencies around the world, however identifying the need to do so is an important and critical advance made in the past decade. As a result, a variety of tools are evolving that provide the military the means to contribute. Though none of the tools fully address all the challenges involved, it is hoped that this paper has alerted the commander to certain crucial aspects of some of the tools being used and how the military can best address those aspects in the future. Ultimately the choices made in this arena will impact operations well into the coming century.
NOTES

1 "Complex contingencies" is a concept addressed by Presidential Decision Directive – 56 as follows: "In the wake of the Cold War, attention has focused on a rising number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars that pose threats to regional and international peace and may be accompanied by natural or manmade disasters which precipitate massive human suffering. We have learned that effective responses to these situations may require multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security: hence the term complex contingency." (PDD/NSC 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, May 1997, 1).

2 "A few reasons for the increase is decolonization, the end of the Cold War, an increase in ethnic conflicts, clashes within civilizations, the CNN phenomenon, the information revolution, and the rise in the influence of the United Nations." (George F. Oliver, "Who are these guys? Non-governmental organizations in Humanitarian Relief Operations." Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI: 20 May 1996.)


4 Joint Pubs 3-07 and 3-08 contain direct references to NGOs. Joint Pubs 3-07.6, 3-57, and the JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations all discuss NGOs in varying details. See Leonardo V. Flor, "Operations with NGOs: The International Army of the Future," (Unpublished Research Paper, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: May 97), 31-38, for a complete analysis of joint publication references to NGOs.

5 "In peace operations, interagency coordination may be your top priority." (JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, xvi).

6 "In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of NGOs and PVOs must be factored into the commander's assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action." (Ibid., II-18).


8 Lake Doctrine was adopted in March 1996 to replace Weinberger Doctrine. Established seven reasons which may call for the use of force: to defend against direct attack on the U.S., its citizens and allies; to counter aggression.; to defend our key economic interests; to preserve, promote, and defend democracy; to prevent the spread of WMD, terrorism, crime and drug trafficking; to maintain our reliability and enhance our allies confidence in American leadership; and for humanitarian purposes, to combat famine, natural disaster, and abuse of human rights. (John T. Correll, "The Lake Doctrine." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 79, No. 5, May 1996).

9 Small-scale conflicts average 25-35 a year and major humanitarian emergencies caused by natural or technological disasters number 35-60 per year and 15-25 per year, respectively (Frederick M. Burkle "Lessons Learnt and Future Expectations of Complex Emergencies", British Medical Journal, Volume 319, 14 August 1999, 423).

10 William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, April 1997, 8.

12 "The planning process proved very useful, particularly for civilian agencies, even though a final, approved plan was never completed and many functional tasks and timelines for civilian agencies were only partially met or had to be revised." (National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies, *1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power For Peace*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), 74.

13 Bowker, 64.


15 Ibid.

16 "By one estimate, there are over 2m in America alone, most formed in the past 30 years. In Russia, where almost none existed before the fall of communism, there are at least 65,000. Dozens are created daily; in Kenya alone, some 240 NGOs are now created every year." ("Sins of the Secular Missionary", *The Economist*, January 29-February 4, 2000, 25).


18 Joint Pub 3-08, Volume I, II-18.

19 Daniel Byman, Bruce Pirmie, and Cheryl Benard, *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Cooperation with Relief Agencies* (Draft), (Rand, August 1999), 8.

20 Joint Pub 3-08, III-6

21 Dr. Frederick M. Burkle, Jr., Director of the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, telephone interview by author, Newport, RI, 15 January, 2000.

22 Byman, xiii.


24 A review of Joint Lessons Learned System shows a number of routine civil-military exercises including Brave Knight, Brave Response, New Horizon, Emerald Express and a number of Partnership For Peace exercises.

25 These propositions are drawn primarily from Chris Sieple’s 1996 *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Affairs* and an unpublished Rand study commissioned by the U.S. Air Force *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Cooperation with Relief Agencies* (Draft), (Rand, August 1999) however all references listed in my bibliography agree with them.

26 Ibid., 11.

27 Byman, 56.

28 *Special Operations Forces Posture Statement* lists Civil Affairs as one of its principle missions and Humanitarian Assistance as one of its collateral activities. The document discusses SOF missions in detail, however the only mention of NGO liaison is in the SOCEUR chapter which states that personnel have the skills “to successfully interact with U.S. country teams, other government agencies, non-government and
foreign indigenous military organizations." Overall, the document restricts its discussion of civil affairs to "Civil Affairs units are trained to deal with large numbers of civilians and to help provide the infrastructure required to bring governmental services to the population" and a paragraph discussing Civil Affairs, without mention of NGO liaison. In an article on the future of Special Operations, the general’s only reference to civil affairs is SOF mission to contribute to humanitarian relief efforts focus on “war fighter” contributions such as “use of nonlethal weaponry to contain riots; and to employ multi-spectral sensors and imaging systems.”

29 Assets include three reserve CA commands, nine reserve CA brigades and one active and 24 reserve CA battalions.

30 According to a 25 January, 2000 telephone interview by author of Major Bill Butcher, G-3, 96th CA Battalion, the battalion is currently undergoing reorganization with a potential enhancement of 84 positions.

31 The majority of officers have two and a half years of Civil Affairs training and hold master’s degrees in International Relations.

32 96th Battalion Command Power Point Brief, slides 1 and 2, forwarded by J-3, 96th CA Battalion.


34 Anonymous at interviewee’s request, J-5, CENTCOM, telephone interview by author, Newport, RI, 14 January 2000.


36 NGOs are making efforts to improve cooperation between military and non-military actors in complex contingency situations. For instance, CARE, World Vision and Catholic Relief Services have intentionally hired former military officers for senior positions within their organization. The UN also has taken steps to improve interagency coordination by establishing in January 1999 a new Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Its head is simultaneously the Emergency Relief Coordinator heading the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), chartered to coordinate efforts of all members of the UN family of organizations.

37 From FM 41-10 (FD) May 99, H-1: “The CMOC is the primary coordination center established and tailored to assist the unit in anticipating, facilitating and coordinating civil-military functions and activities pertaining to the local civil population, government, and economy in areas where military forces, Government Organizations, international organizations, and NGOs are employed.” Its major activities include “coordinating relief efforts with U.S. and allied commands; coordinating with NGOs, international organizations, Foreign Nationals, and local authorities; providing interface with U.S. government organizations (USIS, USAID, AMEMB); assisting in transition operations; and monitoring the civil-military operations.” “The CMOC can have a variety of names, depending on the level of command or organization that establishes it and in what region of the world it is being established. Some of the more common names include:

   a. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) – CINC
   b. Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) – CINC and DOS
   c. Civil-military Coordination Center (CIMIC Center) – NATO and UN
   d. Civil-military Coordination Center (CMCC) – UN”

38 Oliver, 20.


42 Mr. Tom Dolan, Chief Military Liaison Unit, OFDA Headquarters, telephone interview by author, Newport, RI, 1 February 2000.

43 USAID currently operates in 125 countries with 650 direct hire U.S. staff in 74 countries. The total number of overseas staff is 5,303 including 400 contract personnel.

44 Mr. Oliver Cardunere, Plans and Policy, USAID Headquarters, telephone interview by author, Newport, RI, 26 January, 2000.

45 Ibid.

46 Byman, 63.

47 A Center of Excellence is a concept that has developed over the past 25 years in which representatives from a variety of organizations come together to seek solutions to a problem that no one single organization acting alone can solve. Most centers include an academic affiliation to “facilitate research and scholarly approaches to complex problems.” (COE-DRHA 1998 Annual Report, 2).

48 “Horizontal (also referred to as lateral) organizations have emerged as options to the traditional vertical model where a multifaceted and multi-agency approach is required to solve major problems. This occurs with large workforces who have a variety of skills, technical expertise, and requirements for information sharing; and especially where the decision-making process requires a coordination or collaboration of information not owned by any one individual or organization.” (Frederick M. Burkle and Robin Haydn, “Assisted Management of Large-Scale Disasters by Horizontal Organizations.” Unpublished research paper, COE-DRHA).

49 Dr. Frederick M. Burkle, Jr., Director of the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, telephone interview by author, Newport, RI, 15 January, 2000.

50 Since its establishment, its annual budget has expanded from $1 million in FY95 to $5 million in FY99, provided by Medical Command, US Army using congressionally mandated Defense Health Programs (DHP) funds (COE-DRHA Annual Report, 1998, 31).

51 They are currently involved in developing Joint Publications 3-16, 3-07.6, and 3-07.7, on Multi-National Operations, Foreign Humanitarian and Disaster Relief, and Domestic Humanitarian and Disaster Relief respectively.

52 Mr. Steve Greco, Plans Officer, J-5, CINCPAC, telephone interview by author, Newport, RI, 1 February 2000.

53 Ibid.


55 Since its establishment it has trained over 10,000 people in its two classes: Combined Humanitarian Assistance Response Training (CHART) and Health Emergencies in Large Populations (HELP).


Gibbings, 110.


Byman, 62.

The FY00 Defense Authorization bill has directed DOD to reduce headquarters' staff size by 15 percent by FY02 using FY99 numbers as a baseline. The "shell game" that DOD has used previously to avoid reducing staff size is no longer possible due to DOD Directive 5100.73 of 13 May 99 strictly defining what billets are "headquarters' staff." As a result, 1,300 billets must be cut from a total billet base of 7,100. Though DOD is fighting the cuts based on congressional desire for increased jointness, JCS J-1 staff are not hopeful (Captain Matt Cornell, USAF, J-1 Action Officer, JCS, telephone interview by author, 19 January, 2000). Additionally, as a result of the pending reductions and ongoing problems with recruitment and retention, the services are "extremely reluctant" to establish new billets (CDR Curtis MacKenzie, USNR, Manpower Action Officer, Joint Manpower Division, J-1, JCS, telephone interview by author, 11 January, 2000).

Commanders should keep in mind however that small NGOs can hold disproportionate power in areas of operation due to influential domestic constituencies, connections with local warlords, or specific assets. Personnel from small NGOs may require increased attention from the military if they attempt to cross lines of confrontation or operate in areas of intense conflict. Mishandling a small NGO can have strategic consequences, as the NGO may be able to mobilize internal populations and international media in the area to shape the political environment. A functioning Center of Excellence should be able to advise the Commander when this potential exists so that the Commander can include those NGOs in his outreach efforts.
APPENDIX A
“Core Team” Non-Governmental Organizations

☐ Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)
☐ Africare
☐ American Jewish World Service (AJWS)
☐ American Red Cross (International Services Department)
☐ Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE)
☐ Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
☐ Church World Service (CWS)
☐ International Aid
☐ International Rescue Committee (IRC)
☐ Mercy Corps International (MCI)
☐ Save the Children (U.S. Chapter)
☐ United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)
☐ World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD)
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