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JOINT OPERATIONS DURING THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN OF 1863: THE YAZOO PASS EXPEDITION

BY

COLONEL MICHAEL J. DOOLEY
United States Army

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Joint Operations During the Vicksburg Campaign of 1863:
The Yazoo Pass Expedition

by

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Michael J. Dooley

TITLE: Joint Operations in Support of the Vicksburg Campaign-The Yazoo Pass Expedition

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 4 April 2000 PAGES: 76 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This study analyzes Union and Confederate strategic and operational decisions, resources, and actions taken during joint operations conducted during the Vicksburg Campaign of 1863. The primary operation examined, the Yazoo Pass Expedition, was authorized by Major General Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the Department of the Tennessee, and Rear Admiral David D. Porter, commanding the Mississippi Squadron. Grant and Porter hoped to open a line of operations extending from the Mississippi River along the Coldwater, Tallahatchie, Yalobusha, and Yazoo Rivers. This line of operations would be used to establish a lodgement on the Confederate right flank north of Vicksburg in order to outflank Confederate defenders at Vicksburg, Mississippi. The Yazoo Pass Expedition was one of the longest flanking maneuvers attempted during the war. Joint operations were essential to maneuver along an inland water route of over 400 river miles. However, no joint structure or doctrine existed at the time to compel either service to submit to the command of the other. Experience gained from this joint cooperation and the ultimate failure of the expedition helped Grant develop as a strategic and operational commander. Modern joint staff officers can benefit from this experience to improve future operations.
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JOINT OPERATIONS DURING THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN: THE YAZOO PASS EXPEDITION

STRATEGIC SETTING

We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with such blockade we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points...the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan.

Winfield Scott, May 3, 1861

UNION

The blockade of Confederate ports declared by Abraham Lincoln on April 19, 1861, was followed by a proposal by Commanding-General Winfield Scott known as the "Anaconda Plan." The Anaconda Plan called for an encirclement of the Confederacy, to be implemented by a naval blockade of the coastline combined with control of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. In effect, the Anaconda Plan would create a Confederate peninsula, with water on three sides. Union naval forces would control the water and a powerful Army would contain the landward end of the peninsula. The plan, like the South American snake it was named after, was a "strategy of exhaustion."²

By 1862, military and political pressure in the North had resulted in extensive modifications to the strategy. Four key tasks dominated Union strategy. First, control of the Mississippi would split the Confederacy and deprive it of men and materiel from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. Second, an offensive through middle and east Tennessee and along the Chattanooga-Atlanta axis would further divide the Confederate states. This second task would also liberate loyal citizens in east Tennessee, cut the best east-west railroad, disrupt communications, and enable further maneuver toward Mobile or Savannah. Third, military action in Virginia would destroy Confederate forces there, capture the Confederate capital, and secure Washington. Finally, the Union Navy would conduct amphibious assaults and tighten the blockade while these other three tasks were performed.³

Union offensives in Virginia were unsuccessful. The Union Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major General Ambrose Burnside, had been repulsed at Fredericksburg in December 1862. Major General William S. Rosecrans stopped Confederate General Braxton Bragg at Stones River (Murfreesboro) in January 1863 but Rosecrans did not pursue the defeated Confederate force and failed to achieve any strategic advantage.⁴

The Republican Congressional majority had been greatly reduced by the 1862 elections. Insufficient outlets for produce, livestock and commercial goods had resulted in economic stagnation in many states. Voluntary enlistments had significantly declined and the Union was forced to institute the draft as an additional means to raise men for the war effort. All of these factors created a great deal of pressure to begin negotiations with the Confederate government. The Union was war-weary and Lincoln needed a military victory.
CONFEDERATE

Confederate strategists were forced to answer two fundamental questions. The first was the difficult question of how to defend their territory. Every part of their territory was subject to invasion from land or sea, and every state had prominent advocates clamoring for priority. The second question was whether to invade the North or remain on the defensive. With limited resources, Jefferson Davis wavered and failed to make hard choices regarding priorities. Lee argued for an offensive approach and hoped to demoralize the North, sustain his forces on Northern resources, and encourage European intervention. He was convinced of the need to invade the North, but Lee's invasion was repulsed in a bloody tie at Antietam (Sharpsburg) in September 1862.5

Jefferson Davis initially established departmental commands based on geography. He hoped that this system would balance the requirements for both national and local defense. Forces were distributed within each state to meet political and logistical realities and reassure state and local politicians. Centralized control of logistical resources was impractical due to inadequate transportation infrastructure. As a result, each department was required to protect the resources within its geographic region. The departments had complete control of the munitions, factory production, food, and raw materials.6

These departments were consolidated into four major regional commands, as the strategic situation became clearer in 1862-1863. The Trans-Mississippi Department included Confederate territory west of the Mississippi River. The Department of the West included the Mississippi and Tennessee subtheaters. The Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida coordinated the defenses of the southeast. Lee's command comprised forces in Virginia and North Carolina. An active defense could be conducted by interdepartmental troop concentrations, regardless of the departmental boundaries. However, departmental commanders enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, and Davis normally refused to order interdepartmental cooperation. Confederate commanders were often reluctant to give up men or resources and refused to cooperate without orders. The use of the Mississippi River as a boundary greatly hampered efforts to defend the waterway.7
THEATER STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: VICKSBURG

Vicksburg is the key. Here is Red River, which will supply the Confederates with cattle and corn to feed their armies. Here are the Arkansas and White Rivers, which can supply cattle and hogs by the thousand. From Vicksburg these supplies can be distributed by rail all over the Confederacy. Then there is that great depot of supplies on the Yazoo. Let us get Vicksburg and all that key is in our pocket...valuable as New Orleans will be to us, Vicksburg will be more so. We may take all the northern ports of the Confederacy, and they can still defy us from Vicksburg. It means hog and hominy without limit, fresh troops from all the States of the far South, and a cotton country where they can raise the staple without interference.  

Abraham Lincoln

Reverend Newitt Vick, a Methodist minister from North Carolina, founded Vicksburg in 1814. By 1861 Vicksburg was a thriving commercial center and was the largest city in Mississippi. Vicksburg was connected by the Mississippi River and east-west railroads to markets throughout the South. To the west, the Vicksburg, Shreveport, and Texas Railroad (located across the river from Vicksburg) connected the city with Monroe, Louisiana. To the east, the Southern Mississippi Railroad allowed passengers and freight to be shipped through Jackson to markets in Mississippi and Alabama. A railroad junction at Jackson also allowed commodities to be moved north or south via the Mississippi Central Railroad.

Confederate forces quickly moved to reinforce Vicksburg following the surrender of New Orleans. Confederate fortifications on the Yazoo River, approximately fifteen river miles north of Vicksburg, made good use of the high bluffs. The Confederate right flank was anchored at Snyder's Bluff in order to control the mouths of the Yazoo and its tributaries, the Great Sunflower and Little Sunflower Rivers. Heavy guns and a raft barricade in the channel of the Yazoo River protected Haynes' Bluff. Another barricade was formed of sunken vessels and log rafts at Liverpool on the Yazoo River. These barricades trapped several Confederate steamboats and restricted commerce. The gunboat C.S.S. Mobile was under orders to sink any vessel attempting to pass the barricades. By October 1862 the officers and crew formerly assigned to the C.S.S. Arkansas were ordered to Liverpool to assist protecting the barricades and gun batteries. Confederate gun emplacements located at water level and on the bluffs easily commanded the river approaches to Vicksburg and allowed the Confederates to control river traffic to and from the Gulf of Mexico. South of Vicksburg, the bluffs parallel the east bank of the river. Vicksburg defenses were anchored approximately six miles south at Warrenton, and the Confederates had gun emplacements further south on the bluffs at Grand Gulf. Confederate forces in Mississippi felt vulnerable to a land attack by the Union Army since losses at the battles of Shiloh and Corinth had left much of Tennessee in Union hands. The batteries at Vicksburg helped secure the Confederate western flank and facilitated the defense of the Mississippi River, its tributaries, and bayous against a superior Union Navy.
To implement the national strategy, the Union had created a Western Flotilla consisting of gunboats, rams, and mortar rafts. Joint operations were undertaken to seize Confederate strongholds on the Mississippi and its tributaries from both the southern and northern approaches. Operations in 1862 resulted in Union control of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers and the cities of New Orleans and Memphis.

Federal naval forces commanded by Flag Officer David Farragut steamed upriver from New Orleans to Vicksburg on May 18, 1862, but could not elevate their guns sufficiently to have much effect. Farragut had a small army detachment with him, but the city's defenses were already too strong for an infantry assault by a small force and the Federals were forced to withdraw downriver.11

Memphis surrendered to Federal forces after Commodore Charles Davis and his gunboats, combined with a fleet of rams commanded by Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., soundly defeated Confederate naval forces, commanded by Captain James E. Montgomery, CSN, on June 6, 1862.12

Vicksburg was the key to Federal domination of the Mississippi River and Union strategy in the West. Vicksburg's strategic value compelled the Confederates to defend it, and therefore compelled the Union to attack it. In Grant's words, "So long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation of the river was prevented. Hence its importance."13

COMPARISON OF OPPOSING FORCES

Union Forces Opposing Vicksburg

Union Command and Control

Following the surrender of Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862, Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to Major General. Grant rode out a storm of controversy after the bloody battle of Shiloh in April 1862. By July 1862 he commanded the District of West Tennessee. The District of West Tennessee was extended to include the Army of the Mississippi in July 1862. As a result, Grant assumed command of all troops in the armies of the Tennessee and the Mississippi, including the Districts of Mississippi and Cairo. Grant was placed in command of the Department of the Tennessee on October 25, 1862. This department included Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, western Kentucky and Tennessee, and northern Mississippi. Grant reported directly to the general-in-chief, Major General Henry Halleck.14

The Mississippi Squadron was placed under the command of Admiral David Porter on October 9, 1862. Admiral Porter assumed command at Cairo, Illinois on October 15 and reported directly to the Navy Department.15 Porter commanded a fleet of ironclad gunboats, which carried a total of 114 pieces of heavy artillery, including 22 eight-inch, 5 nine-inch, and 1 ten-inch guns. In addition to the ironclads he also commanded a fleet of light draft, or "tinclad", steamboats with light armor to protect them from musket fire.16

Although no joint command and control structure existed to compel unity of command, both services were ordered to cooperate with each other. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles' expectation
was that "...the Mississippi Squadron will cooperate with the army on every occasion in which its cooperation is required and can be extended, and in an emergency...every exertion will be made to meet it." This arrangement worked well for Grant and Porter. The two commanders respected each other and Porter readily implemented the policy of cooperation with the Army. Porter stated in his memoirs: "Though he had no control over me whatever, and I was never tied down by any orders from the Navy Department...I always deferred to his wishes in all matters, and went so far as to give orders to those under my command that they should obey the orders of Generals Grant and Sherman the same as if they came from myself."  

Union Strength, Department of the Tennessee

Grant's department had a total present for duty strength of approximately 103,000 officers and men at the end of January 1863. Of these, a little over half could be employed in the Vicksburg Campaign. Approximately 34,000 men were already dispersed along the Mississippi in the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Army Corps commanded by Major General John A. McClemand and Major General William T. Sherman. Another 18,000 men in Major General James B. McPherson's Seventeenth Army Corps were in the process of being moved down river from Memphis on transports. The remaining forces were required to secure garrisons along the river and to conduct operations in the vicinity of Memphis and Corinth."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commands</th>
<th>Present for Duty</th>
<th>Aggregate Present</th>
<th>Aggregate Present and Absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General headquarters (Young's Point): Staff</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.....</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri Engineer Regiment</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total general headquarters</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirteenth Army Corps (MG John A. McClemand):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General headquarters (Young's Point, LA)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Division (Young's Point)</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>4,079</td>
<td>6,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BG Joseph Osterhaus)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Division (Young's Point) (BG Andrew Smith)</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>4,326</td>
<td>7,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Eastern Arkansas (Helena, AR)</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>12,161</td>
<td>16,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BG Willis Gorman) (includes Twelfth and Thirteenth Divisions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Thirteenth Army</strong></td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>20,629</td>
<td>29,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifteenth Army Corps (near Vicksburg, MS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MG William T. Sherman):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First [Eleventh] Division (BG Frederick Steele)</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>6,165</td>
<td>9,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second [Fifth] Division (BG David Stuart)</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>5,753</td>
<td>7,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Fifteenth Army Corps</strong></td>
<td>609</td>
<td>11,918</td>
<td>17,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixteenth Army Corps: (MG Charles Hamilton during temporary absence of MG Stephen Hurbut)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General headquarters (Memphis, TN)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Division (La Grange, TN)</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>5,856</td>
<td>7,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(COL John McDowell)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Division (Moscow, TN)</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>6,173</td>
<td>7,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BG Jacob Lauman)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Division (Corinth, MS)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3,445</td>
<td>4,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BG John Smith)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of West Tennessee:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BG Charles Hamilton)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbus (Columbus, Ky.)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>5,378</td>
<td>7,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BG Alexander Asboth)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Corinth (Corinth, MS)</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>8,856</td>
<td>11,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BG Grenville Dodge)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Jackson (Jackson, TN)</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>9,030</td>
<td>11,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BG Jeremiah Sullivan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Memphis (Memphis, TN)</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>4,514</td>
<td>7,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BG James Veach)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Division:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grierson's (lst) brigade (La Grange, TN)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1,918</td>
<td>2,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee's (2d) brigade, (Germantown, TN)..</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>2,905</td>
<td>3,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Sixteenth Army Corps</strong></td>
<td>2,517</td>
<td>48,095</td>
<td>62,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventeenth Army Corps: (MG James B. McPherson)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General headquarters (Memphis, TN)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Division (Memphis, Tenn.) (BG John Logan)</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>6,461</td>
<td>7,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Division (Lake Providence, LA)</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>4,939</td>
<td>6,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BG John McArthur)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Division (near Memphis, TN)</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>5,952</td>
<td>7,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BG Isaac Quinby)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Seventeenth Army Corps</strong></td>
<td>929</td>
<td>17,428</td>
<td>21,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand totals Army of the Tennessee</strong></td>
<td>5,174</td>
<td>98,388</td>
<td>132,164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 1 DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, JANUARY 1863**
Confederate Forces Defending Vicksburg

Confederate Command and Control

On October 1, 1862 the Confederacy established a separate military department, which included "the State of Mississippi and that part of Louisiana east of the Mississippi River."²¹ John C. Pemberton's promotion to Lieutenant General was confirmed October 14, and he assumed command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana with headquarters in Jackson, Mississippi. His new responsibilities included command of forces operating in Southwestern Tennessee.²² Confederate Secretary of War George Randolph directed that Pemberton's first priority was defense of the department. Pemberton was to report directly to the War Department.²³

In theory, General Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee provided security for Pemberton's northern and eastern flanks by defending the rest of Tennessee, northern Alabama, and Georgia. To compound Confederate command and control challenges, Bragg was informed on November 19 by the Adjutant General, Samuel Cooper, that Pemberton was now under his command and was to report to him.²⁴ Pemberton now reported to two masters.

In yet another move, General Joseph E. Johnston assumed command of forces in western North Carolina, Tennessee, northern Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and eastern Louisiana on November 24.²⁵ Although he communicated with Johnston, Pemberton continued to report directly to the War Department. Confederate naval forces on the Mississippi and its tributaries were organized into the Naval Forces of the West, commanded by Flag-Officer W.F. Lynch.

Confederate Strength, Department of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana

Pemberton had approximately 54,050 officers and men present for duty during January. Of these, approximately 12,375 were located at Port Hudson, Louisiana. Another 1,400 were located in Columbus, Mississippi, in the eastern part of the state. Approximately 21,000 were located in Vicksburg, and 19,275 were available to defend the Delta along the Tallahatchie and Yazoo Rivers.²⁶
## Confederate Order of Battle, January 31, 1863.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commands</th>
<th>Present for Duty</th>
<th>Aggregate present</th>
<th>Aggregate present and absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana (Jackson, MS) (LTG John C. Pemberton)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First District (Columbus, MS) (BG Daniel Ruggles)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>1,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District (MG Carter L. Stevenson)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevenson’s division (Vicksburg)</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>8,429</td>
<td>10,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith’s division (MG Martin L. Smith)</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>5,824</td>
<td>8,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maury’s division (MG Dabney H. Maury)</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>5,049</td>
<td>7,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Second District</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>19,302</td>
<td>26,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third District (Port Hudson, LA) also known as the District of Louisiana, or Gardner’s Division (MG Franklin Gardner)</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>11,353</td>
<td>15,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth District (Jackson, MS) (BG John Adams)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loring’s division (MG William W. Loring)</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>5,715</td>
<td>7,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowen’s division (BG John S. Bowen) (not included in original report)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4,200(^{28})</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Dorn’s cavalry (MG Earl Van Dorn) (no report received)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>8,773(^{29})</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total, Department of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana</td>
<td>3,157</td>
<td>37,740 (50,713 (including Bowen’s division and Van Dorn’s cavalry)</td>
<td>51,866</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2 DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI AND EASTERN LOUISIANA, JANUARY 1863
Technical Level of Weaponry and Equipment

Union Technology

**FIGURE 2 U.S.S. BARON DE KALB**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel:</th>
<th>Size (Tons)</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Speed</th>
<th>Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S. Baron De Kalb. Ironclad stern wheel gunboat. Launched as the St. Louis on October 12, 1861. Built at Carondelet, MO under War Department contract with James B. Eads of St. Louis, MO. Renamed September 8, 1862 by the Navy Department. Lieutenant-Commander John G. Walker.</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>175' Long 51'2&quot; Wide 6' Draft</td>
<td>9 mph (max)</td>
<td>One X-inch 12,000 lbs. Two VIII-inch 63 cwt. Two IX-in Six 32-pounders, 42 cwt. Two 30 pounder Dahlgren Rifles (configuration as of January 31, 1863)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3 UNION IRONCLAD GUNBOAT TECHNOLOGY**
The Union developed ironclad gunboats to ensure control of the Mississippi River and its tributaries. Although rushed to completion, the ironclads represented the Union's best effort to integrate available technologies in support of joint requirements. ③

The U.S.S. *St. Louis* was launched at Carondelet, Missouri, October 12, 1861. She was the first of seven gunboats built by James B. Eads of St. Louis as part of an August 7, 1861 War Department contract. *St. Louis* was the first Union ironclad vessel, predating the famous *U.S.S. Monitor* by several months. The gunboat was renamed U.S.S. *Baron De Kalb* on September 8, 1862, following transfer of the Western Flotilla to the Navy Department in order to avoid confusion with another commissioned vessel. The *Baron De Kalb* (like her sister boats *Cairo*, *Carondelet*, *Cincinnati*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, and *Pittsburg*) carried thirteen guns capable of firing through three forward ports, eight broadside ports (four on each side), and two stern ports. *Baron De Kalb'*s armament on January 31, 1863, included one X-inch gun and two VIII-inch guns mounted in the bow. Broadside guns included two IX-inch and six 32-pounders. Two 30-pounder Dahlgren rifles were mounted in a stern battery. ④

The forward casemate, steam engines, boilers, and paddle wheels on each vessel were protected by 2 1/2 inches of iron plating backed by 24 inches of oak. Lighter armor was used to protect the pilothouse and main deck outside the casemates. Oak planking protected the rest of the vessel, to include the unarmored flat upper deck. A conical pilothouse was lightly plated. The original design called for approximately 80 tons of armor plating. Modifications to the contract resulted in the use of approximately 120 tons of iron plating in each vessel, causing sluggish performance. The angled armor, designed to deflect enemy shells in a surface battle, provided a perpendicular surface when attacked by elevated batteries. Similarly, the planked upper deck offered little protection from plunging fire. Despite her design shortcomings, *Baron De Kalb* was a powerful vessel. ⑤

Joseph Brown built the U.S.S. *Chillicothe* in Cincinnati, Ohio. Her designer, Samuel Hartt, also included a forward casemate, but here the similarity with *Baron De Kalb* ended. *Chillicothe*’s decks were flat and she had three inches of armor plate backed by white pine planking. She carried two XI-inch rifled guns mounted on pivots. These guns could be swiveled to fire through forward or broadside ports located in casemate “turrets” on each side of the vessel. ⑥

*Chillicothe* was poorly designed and constructed. On seeing her under construction, her first commander, Lieutenant-Commander John G. Walker, reported that *Chillicothe*’s ports had been cut five inches too tall. To fix this deficiency the contractor filled in her gun ports with patches on both the wood backing and the iron plating. During her initial voyage a half-inch seam opened across the deck over the engines. Iron straps were bolted through the deck to strengthen the boat and repair the defect. Walker pronounced her “...a scow, without knees or anything to strengthen her and, I think, very weak. She leaks forward when underway about the plating bolts and her deck leaks very badly.” *Chillicothe*’s wheelhouse was in the gun tower, between the two forward ports, and was in the way of the guns while they were in action. The pilots could only see ahead. To add insult to injury, *Chillicothe* was eight inches too wide to be taken through the Louisville Canal, delaying her delivery downriver until water levels rose. ⑦

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On January 8, 1863, *Chillicothe* sailed from Cairo, Illinois, and joined in the expedition to the White River in Arkansas. *Chillicothe* was employed in the Mississippi River and its tributaries until the end of the war.

The Mississippi Squadron had also inherited another innovation, the mortar raft. In August 1861 General Fremont ordered thirty-eight wooden rafts. Each raft was designed to carry a 13-inch seacoast mortar weighing 17,500 pounds. Mortar rafts were towed behind gunboats or transports and were specifically designed to attack riverside fortifications on the Mississippi River and its tributaries. The 12.8-inch diameter shell fired by this weapon was the largest projectile used by mobile forces, with each shell weighing approximately 208 pounds. Confederate Technology

Confederate "torpedoes", or underwater mines, were produced in various shapes and sizes using a variety of materials. All were designed to encase an explosive charge that could be detonated on contact or on command. Mines were very effective against gunboats and resulted in the sinking of the U.S.S. *Cairo*, an ironclad gunboat produced under the same contract as the U.S.S. *Baron De Kalb*, in the lower Yazoo River on December 12, 1862. The mines used against the *Cairo* were called "Fretwells," after their inventor. Fretwell mines consisted of five-gallon demijohns (bottles encased in wicker), filled with gunpowder, anchored to the river bottom and suspended from a wooden float. These mines were command detonated using a friction primer connected to a trip wire running to a "torpedo [sic] pit" on shore. *Cairo* sank in twelve minutes after two mines shattered her hull. The explosions were powerful enough to lift guns weighing several tons clear of her decks.

Poor waterproofing and faulty detonators caused many failures. Various materials such as kegs or tin sheathing were tried in an effort to protect the powder charges and improve effectiveness. Expedient mines were also constructed using cypress logs 8-12 inches in diameter and three feet long. These were anchored with the top even with the surface of the water and were equipped with a friction primer.

Union forces used soldiers in small boats to locate suspected torpedoes. The soldiers then attempted to destroy the torpedoes with small-arms fire or to pull the torpedoes onto the bank for destruction.

Confederate efforts to build ironclad gunboats at Memphis and in the Yazoo River resulted in construction of the C.S.S. *Arkansas*. *Arkansas* was 165 feet long and 35 feet wide and used railroad iron for protection. *Arkansas* was a very effective vessel, but suffered from engine malfunctions and was destroyed to avoid capture on August 5, 1862.

Two additional vessels were under construction at Yazoo City. One was a ram estimated to be 310 feet long and 60 feet wide. The other was the screw steamboat C.S.S. *Mobile*. *Mobile* was equipped with four guns. The Confederates intended to add an iron plated casemate to *Mobile*, but shortages of materiel and labor slowed vessel construction. Confederate ironclads were not a threat to Grant or Porter
during the winter of 1862-63. However, the Confederates continued to produce gunboats. Grant and Porter hoped to destroy any vessels on the Yazoo River before they could be completed.\textsuperscript{45}

**OPERATIONS AGAINST VICKSBURG-1862**

It is generally regarded as an axiom in war that all great armies moving in an enemy’s country should start from a base of supplies, which should be fortified and guarded, and to which the army is to fall back in case of disaster. The first movement looking to Vicksburg and the force defending it as an objective was begun in November, 1862, and conformed to this axiom. It followed the line of the Mississippi Central Railroad, with Columbus, Kentucky, as a base, and soon after it started, a cooperating column was moved down the Mississippi River on transports, with Memphis as its base. Both these movements failing, the entire Army of the Tennessee was transferred to the neighborhood of Vicksburg, and landed on the opposite or western bank of the river at Milliken’s Bend.\textsuperscript{46}

—Ulysses S. Grant

Following the battle of Corinth, Mississippi on October 3-4, 1862, Major General Ulysses S. Grant suggested to Major General Henry Halleck that it was time to begin a movement against Vicksburg. Grant began to take the initiative with a move toward Oxford, Mississippi on November 2.

On December 4, Halleck approved Grant’s plan for an attack toward Vicksburg. Grant would continue to move south in order to hold the Confederates near Grenada. Major General William T. Sherman would move down the Mississippi with his troops to attack near the mouth of the Yazoo River above Vicksburg and move east to cut the Mississippi Central Railroad.

Grant launched his advance, but on December 20, 1862, Major General Earl Van Dorn’s Confederate cavalry eliminated Grant’s opportunity for an overland campaign toward Vicksburg by capturing his supply depot at Holly Springs. Cooperating with Van Dorn, Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest conducted cavalry raids in Tennessee and Kentucky to cut the Mississippi Central rail and telegraph lines between Jackson, Tennessee and Columbus, Kentucky. With his supplies captured and his lines of communication cut, Grant withdrew beginning December 21 and moved his headquarters to Memphis on January 10.\textsuperscript{47}

The Navy also attempted an assault up the Yazoo River in December, but the heavily defended bluffs, river bottoms, and underwater mines forced a withdrawal following the loss of the U.S.S. Cairo.

With communications severed, Sherman was unaware that Grant was withdrawing. He moved his forces south from Memphis on December 20 and reached the mouth of the Yazoo River on December 26. His movement south was detected and the Confederates reinforced the defenses at Vicksburg. Sherman attempted to assault Vicksburg through the Chickasaw Bayou and failed, withdrawing on December 29. Sherman’s forces returned to Milliken’s Bend, Louisiana on January 2-3, 1863.

Major General McClemand arrived and assumed command of an expedition formed by Sherman and Rear Admiral David D. Porter to move up the Arkansas River with gunboats and transports and attack Confederate forces at Arkansas Post (Fort Hindman). The assault was successful and Arkansas Post surrendered after naval bombardment from the gunboats on January 11.
On January 17, Grant met with McClellan at the mouth of the Arkansas River. On January 20 Grant ordered McClellan's force to return to Milliken's Bend and Young's Point. Grant then returned to Memphis, made arrangements for Major General Stephen A. Hurbut's Sixteenth Corps to secure the territory around Memphis, and moved to Young's Point on January 29. Grant assumed command of the entire force the following day. 48

Grant's forces now consisted of four Army Corps as well as garrisons in key towns and cities. On January 31, 1863, he had forces in Tennessee, Kentucky and along the banks of the Mississippi River from Cairo, Illinois to Milliken's Bend, a river distance of 625 miles.

In November and December, Confederate forces withdrew south in response to Grant's advance along the Mississippi Central Railroad. Pemberton's forces entrenched on the Yalobusha River around Grenada combined with successful cavalry raids to nullify the Union advance. Pemberton was then able to shift forces toward Vicksburg and defeat Sherman's assault on the Chickasaw Bayou December 27-29. Underwater mines and artillery on the bluffs were used to successfully defend against Union gunboat assaults.

**TERRAIN AND WEATHER**

Between Memphis and Vicksburg, the Mississippi River flows through a vast alluvial plain bounded on the east by a line of bluffs. These hills, beginning at the Chickasaw Bluffs near Memphis, curve eastward and again strike the Mississippi at Vicksburg. In the state of Mississippi, this flood plain, bounded on the east by the Yazoo, Tallahatchie, and Coldwater rivers and on the west by the Mississippi, is known as The Delta. Today this area is the most valuable farmland in the Magnolia State. At the time of the Civil War, The Delta, except for the natural levees, was a vast swamp. On these natural levees were found some of the most prosperous Mississippi plantations. The Delta was crisscrossed by numerous watercourses, which afforded ready communications in skiffs between points on the Mississippi and Yazoo rivers. 49

—Edwin C. Bearss

A water route known as the Yazoo Pass had been one of the primary watercourses across the Delta prior to the 1850's. The Yazoo Pass channel connected with the Mississippi River approximately six miles below Helena, Arkansas, near Delta, Mississippi. Two openings led into a single channel, approximately 75 feet wide, which allowed water from the Mississippi River to flow approximately one mile into Moon Lake. Moon Lake was a crescent-shaped, or oxbow, lake approximately 800 to 1000 yards wide and seven to eight miles long. On the east shore of Moon Lake, an outlet channel, approximately 75 to 100 feet wide and 12 miles long connected with the Coldwater River. The Coldwater River flowed into the Tallahatchie River. The Tallahatchie River joined the Yalobusha River approximately 250 miles below Moon Lake to form the Yazoo River. The Yazoo River joins the Mississippi River near Haynes' Bluff, approximately fifteen river miles above Vicksburg. Construction of the Southern Railroad eliminated the need for the Yazoo Pass. The State of Mississippi constructed a levee in the 1850's to block the Yazoo
Pass and protect the rich Delta bottomlands from seasonal flooding. The levee was approximately 100 feet thick and 18 feet high.\textsuperscript{50}

\begin{center}
\textbf{FIGURE 3 YAZOO PASS LEVEE\textsuperscript{51}}
\end{center}

By the winter of 1862-63 the Union Army controlled the high ground from the mouth of the Ohio downriver to Memphis, Tennessee. Grant’s lines of communication extended from Memphis, Tennessee, to the mouth of the Yazoo River north of Vicksburg, a river distance of nearly 400 miles. Union forces occupied the high ground on the west bank of the Mississippi River at Helena, Arkansas. South of Helena, the bottomlands extended approximately 70 miles before they joined another line of bluffs.

Heavy snow, ice, and rain in the Midwest caused the rivers and bayous to rise. The low lands and roads on both sides of the Mississippi River in Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi were under water. Grant’s troops were strung out along the river on any land they could find above water level, usually on the river levees.\textsuperscript{52} Morale was declining, desertions and sickness were increasing, and many soldiers were dying from disease, including pneumonia and smallpox.\textsuperscript{53}

The high ground returned to the east bank of the Mississippi a few miles above Vicksburg at the Walnut Hills, overlooking the flooded land at the mouth of the Yazoo River. The Confederates had reinforced their defenses on the Yazoo River. Large timber rafts, anchored with chain and underwater mines, effectively blocked Federal gunboats on the Yazoo.\textsuperscript{54}
Intelligence

Union Intelligence

The potential of the Yazoo Pass was known to both Union and Confederate forces. Union cavalry, commanded by Brigadier General Cadwallader C. Washburn, crossed the river from Helena, Arkansas and conducted an expedition in the region from November 27-December 4, 1862, to support Grant’s advance. Landing near Delta, Mississippi, his unit conducted reconnaissance along the Coldwater to the Tallahatchie, as far as Oakland and Coffeeville, Mississippi. A Union regiment, supported by artillery was garrisoned south of the Yazoo Pass at Friar’s Point and a Union cavalry force of 2000 men conducted operations between the Mississippi and Tallahatchie rivers during the month of December.

Lieutenant Commander Watson Smith reported to Porter on February 13 that Confederate forces were aware of the projected expedition through Yazoo Pass. “They were fully apprised of the expedition before, or as soon as, the work was commenced. I was told yesterday by an officer that he heard of it in Memphis. They are in force at Grenada, Panola, and along the line of railroad, and are already disputing our advance through the Yazoo Pass.”

Watson Smith received other reports of Confederate vessels, commanded by Lieutenant Isaac Brown, in the Coldwater River but treated them as rumors.

Hurlbut sent additional intelligence reports regarding the principal Confederate fortification on the upper Yazoo River, Fort Pemberton, to Grant’s Assistant Adjutant General, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Rawlins, on April 1, 1863. Hurlbut’s reports were received too late to be of service.

Confederate Intelligence

Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles, then commanding the District of Mississippi, was reminded of the importance of the Yazoo River in an October 9, 1862, message from Flag-Officer W. F. Lynch, then commanding the Naval Forces of the West. Lynch stated “Once within the barrier of the Yazoo, the enemy would control 150 miles of inland navigation, and after destroying a vast amount of public and private property be enabled to strike the Great Northern Railroad at various accessible points.”

Commander Isaac Brown of the Confederate Navy echoed this warning in a November 24, 1862, message to Lieutenant General Pemberton. He reminded Pemberton that “…if the Yazoo Pass remains unobstructed it may at high water afford the enemy a passage for their gun boats into the Coldwater River, thence to this place [Yazoo City]. I am not sure that permanent obstructions can at this time be placed in the pass, but if the trees along its banks were felled from both sides across the channel, which is seldom 100 feet wide, they would offer serious impediments to its navigation.” Brown was an experienced commander and was well familiar with the Yazoo Pass and the river network through the
Delta. While in command of the ironclad C.S.S. Arkansas on June 15, 1862, he had fought his way past the Union flotilla from the mouth of the Yazoo River to Vicksburg. 62

Major General William W. Loring 63 confirmed the presence of Union cavalry near the Yazoo Pass in his December 30 message to Lieutenant General Pemberton. Loring reminded Pemberton that no timber had been felled to block the pass. 64 By the end of January, rising water on the Mississippi compelled Confederate President Jefferson Davis, himself a Mississippian, to ask "Has anything or can anything be done to obstruct the navigation from the Yazoo Pass down?" 65 On January 23 Pemberton ordered Loring to have Major Green L. Blythe, commander of Blythe's Battalion Mississippi State Troops, block the Yazoo Pass. Loring's order stated that Blythe was to use his "whole force, if necessary, to obstruct the Yazoo Pass effectually." He was authorized to impress as many slaves as were required and to "do the work at once." 66

COURSES OF ACTION

The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high water—many of them navigable for steamers. All of them would be, except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length. Marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible; navigating it proved equally impracticable. The strategical way according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis; establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yallabusha [sic], or to Jackson, Mississippi. At this time the North had become very much discouraged. Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure. The elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the prosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and the last dollar. Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater part of the North, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our ranks. It was my judgement at the time that to make a backward movement as long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by many of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as a defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the power to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory. This was in my mind from the moment I took command in person at Young's Point. 67

—Ulysses S. Grant

Grant's challenge was to establish a secure landing on high ground east of the Mississippi while avoiding an apparent retreat. Well-placed Confederate guns made the high ground inaccessible from Haynes' Bluff, near the mouth of the Yazoo, downriver to Warrenton. Winter rains and snowmelt caused the Mississippi bottomlands to flood. A frontal attack, such as that attempted by Sherman on the Chickasaw Bayou, was out of the question. 68 A successful lodgment on the east bank of the Mississippi River was essential to the capture of Vicksburg. This fact, more than any other, linked the movements of the Army and Navy. Porter viewed any naval attempts without army forces to be useless. 69
Determined to find options, Grant allowed an earlier course of action to continue following his arrival at Young's Point. The plan was intended to bypass Vicksburg by allowing the Mississippi River to cut a new channel. In June 1862 Brigadier General Thomas Williams had started a ditch ten to twelve feet wide and one mile long across the long, narrow peninsula just above Vicksburg. The Union hoped that the river would cut a new channel across the peninsula and allow vessels to bypass the city. Sherman's Fifteenth Corps detailed one thousand men to the effort each day since returning from Arkansas Post. The dam at the upper end of the cut eventually collapsed under the pressure of the rising Mississippi. However, the upstream end of the canal was located in an eddy. The ditch simply filled with water and the river failed to cut a new channel. Additionally, the downstream end of the ditch was still upstream from the Confederate forces at Warrenton. Confederate batteries at Warrenton could have been reinforced to maintain control of the river. On February 4 Sherman reported: "This little affair of ours here on Vicksburg Point is labor lost." The project finally abandoned on March 27.

A route through Lake Providence offered a second course of action. This was another attempt at a bypass, this time to the west. Lake Providence, located near the Mississippi River, appeared to offer access to the Mississippi through Bayou Baxter and a series of small streams that fed the Red River. The Red River entered the Mississippi a little above Port Hudson. Major General McPherson's corps was detailed to dig another canal to connect the Mississippi with Lake Providence and to clear a channel through the bayous. This was a much more ambitious project, since the route was nearly 350 miles long by water. McPherson had his troops pull a small towboat into Lake Providence before the canal was completed and discovered that clearing the channel through the bayous would require much longer than anticipated. Soldiers used underwater saws in an attempt to remove cypress stumps, but it was clear that the effort would take too much time.

Although the project was finally cancelled in March, Grant "...let the work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men. Then too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better prospect of success." One of the "other efforts" was the Yazoo Pass Expedition.

THE YAZOO PASS EXPEDITION

Boldness in execution is nearly always necessary, but in planning and fitting out expeditions or detachments great circumspection is a virtue.

—Lieutenant General Winfield Scott

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

A civilian pilot, Mr. J. F. Morton, suggested that the Yazoo Pass route might be practical. Grant and Porter agreed to send a joint expedition through the pass if the levee could be breached.

On January 22, Grant wrote to Major General McClellan: "...On the present rise it is barely possible that Yazoo Pass might be turned to good account in aiding our enterprise..." Porter expressed his concept in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, Senator James W.
Grimes, on January 24. Porter intended to use his naval forces to "...work up the Yazoo and get in there and for an army to come down the Yazoo, cut off supplies, and attack their rear." 77

Grant ordered his topographic engineer, Lieutenant Colonel James H. Wilson to determine the feasibility of re-opening the route and sent a message on January 29 to Brigadier General Willis A. Gorman at Helena directing that Gorman provide troops to assist in breaching the levee. Wilson arrived at Helena from Young's Point on February 1 and coordinated with Gorman. On February 2 Wilson made a reconnaissance and found that the old channel leading up to the levee was unobstructed and that the Mississippi River was eight and one-half feet higher than the old route. 78 Wilson's detail began cutting a breach and emplaced explosive charges in the embankment on February 3. The explosives were detonated the evening of February 3 and water began to wash out the crater. Additional shafts were sunk in the levee and by 11 p.m. a jubilant Wilson reported that "water was pouring through like nothing else I saw except Niagara Falls...the work is a complete success." 79 The breach was 75 yards wide on February 4. There was, if anything, too much water flowing through the break in the levee. Niagara Falls, after all, is not navigable. Neither was the Yazoo Pass on February 4 and the Acting Master of the U.S.S. Forest Rose advised Wilson that it would be several days before the water levels had equalized. 80

Grant's Intent

Grant immediately sent a message to Halleck on February 4 in which he stated "This route, if practicable would enable us to get to the high ground above Haynes' Bluff, and would turn all the enemies' river batteries." 81 Grant reinforced his intent in messages to Halleck and Rear Admiral Porter on February 6. He expressed his desire for the expedition to reach the Yazoo River in order to destroy Confederate gunboats and transports. Additionally, he wanted the expedition to move up the Yalobusha River and destroy the railroad bridges at Grenada. The expedition was to be led by the Navy, while the Army was to provide 600 troops to serve as marines on the gunboats. 82 Grant directed Brigadier General Frederick Steele to provide those 600 Army marines. 83 In his guidance to the commanding officer on February 7, Grant again reiterated that full directions had been given the Navy for the expedition. The infantry would act as marines for the occasion and would be under the immediate command of their own officers, but they were not to "exercise control over the vessel, or dictate when they are to go or what to do. The troops are designed to give protection to the vessels on which they are assigned and to operate on land if the necessity arises." 84 Wilson requested permission to accompany the expedition. 85

Porter's Intent

Porter appointed Lieutenant Commander Watson Smith to lead the expedition. Porter's trust in Smith's abilities was established under fire as Smith commanded the lead vessel of the lead division in Porter's mortar flotilla during the assault on New Orleans in April 1862. Porter appointed Smith commander of the first division of light-draught vessels on January 4, 1863 and Smith served with distinction during the assault on Arkansas Post. 86

Porter provided Smith with detailed guidance in a February 6 message:
Do not enter the Yazoo Cut until the current is quite slack; and some small transport will have to go ahead, and the soldiers will cut away the trees and branches, so as not to endanger the smokestacks of the steamers. 

Proceed carefully, and only in the daytime; 600 or 800 soldiers will be detached to accompany you, and you will take 100 on board of each light-draft. See that the army send a very small steamer, with stores from Helena.

When you get to the Tallahatchie, proceed with all dispatch to ascend it as far as the railroad crossing, and completely destroy the railroad bridge at that point, after which you will, if possible, cut the telegraph wires and proceed down the river to the mouth of the Yalobusha...dash on to Grenada; destroy completely the railroad bridge, and retire at once down the river without any further damage, excepting to destroy means of transportation (which you will do in all cases) and you will destroy all small boats. 

When you get to the Yalobusha, you will proceed with all your force down the Yazoo River and endeavor to get into Sunflower River, where, it is said, all the large steamers are stowed away. These you will not have time to capture; therefore you will destroy them, keeping an account, as near as you can, of the value of the property that falls into your hands.

Obtain all the information you can in relation to ironclads, and destroy them if you can while they are on the stocks.

If this duty is performed as I expect it to be, we will strike a terrible blow at the enemy, who do not anticipate an attack from such a quarter. But you must guard against surprise, and if overwhelmed run your vessels on the bank and set fire to them...By going along only in the daytime, under low steam, you can cruise some time. But after doing the damage I have mentioned in my orders, ascend the river again to the Yazoo Cut-off, and report to me by a dispatch boat.

You will likely find Honey Island fortified. If it has guns on it, and you can take them, destroy them effectually and blow up the fort.

Do not engage batteries with the light vessels. The Chillicothe will do the fighting. Let me hear from you as soon as possible and give me full accounts of what you do.

—David D. Porter

Porter ordered two ironclad gunboats from the First Division of Large Vessels to join the expedition. Lieutenant Commander J.P. Foster, commanding U.S.S. Chillicothe, and Lieutenant Commander John G. Walker, commanding U.S.S. Baron De Kalb, made preparations to join Smith and moved to Helena. Foster had commanded Chillicothe since November 1862 and had participated in operations on the White River. Walker was also an experienced commander and had commanded Baron De Kalb during mine-clearing operations on the lower Yazoo River in December 1862. He had been cited for gallantry in action during the January 1863 assault on Arkansas Post. The Baron De Kalb had been seriously damaged during this assault and had one of her 10-inch guns disabled, a 32-pounder dismounted, and her hull seriously damaged. Two men were killed and 15 were wounded during the engagement.
EXECUTION

Clearing the Yazoo Pass

Natural obstacles, such as fallen timber, low overhanging branches, stumps, and driftwood blocked the old channel and had to be cleared before an expedition could proceed. Union forces were also required to clear trees felled by the Confederates near the Coldwater River. Soldiers from Helena, Arkansas, commanded by Brigadier General C.C. Washburn and supervised by Wilson, entered the Pass February 8 on transports and began clearing the channel between Moon Lake and the Coldwater River. Confederate sympathizers provided a ready source of intelligence to the defenders in Jackson and Vicksburg. Wilson reported to Grant on February 12 "I learned today what I previously suspected, that rebel sympathizers in Helena, through some means or other, obtained information, and communicated to their friends the nature of our Operations at the levee the day we began. At all events, it is certain that while we were engaged in opening the Pass at one end the rebels were closing it at the other." 93

Lieutenant Commander Watson Smith reached Helena, Arkansas on February 13, where he learned that clearing obstructions from the Yazoo Pass would require weeks instead of days. While waiting for the route to be cleared, he obtained additional supplies and ammunition and added the U.S.S. Baron De Kalb and light-draft steamer Marmora to the force. Smith entered Moon Lake on February 20 and anchored to await the clearing of the pass and the arrival of the army component. He commanded a
substantial force, which included the gunboats U.S.S. *Baron De Kalb* and *Chillicothe*, and the tinclads U.S.S. *Forest Rose, Marmora, Rattler, Romeo*, and *Signal*. Smith reminded Porter in a message sent February 13 that he was ill and that the enemy was already aware of the expedition.  

**Porter Restates His Intent**

Porter restated his intent for the expedition to Smith in a February 13 message: "You can then push on down the Yazoo to Grenada, up the Yalobusha, destroy the bridge there, push on then down the Yazoo, capture Yazoo City, allow them twenty minutes to surrender and deliver up all stores and munitions of war, which you will see destroyed. Pass Yazoo with the light-drafts, push on up the Sunflower, destroy all the boats there that you can not bring away, and return to Yazoo City."  

On February 16, Porter again stated his intent to Smith "...I have already written to you not to go up the Tallahatchie, and if there is any danger of the Yalobusha being obstructed with trees, don't go there. The great object is to get to Yazoo City, and below, and up the Sunflower, to destroy the boats."  

**Grant's Intent Changes**

On February 14, Grant relieved Brigadier General Gorman at Helena and replaced him with Brigadier General Benjamin M. Prentiss. After assuming command at Helena, Prentiss reported to Major General McClemand that he had conferred with Generals Gorman, Ross, and Washburn and that they collectively supported an expedition up the Arkansas River instead of an assault on Vicksburg. On February 15, McClemand proposed an Arkansas expedition to clear the west bank of the Mississippi and reminded Grant of the successful attack on Arkansas Post. Grant replied that he could "see but one objection to it. The objection is that all the forces now here to operate with are assigned to looking to the one great object, that of opening the Mississippi, and to take off the number of men suggested would retard progress."  

Grant quickly returned his attention to the Yazoo Pass expedition and expanded his concept for the employment of army forces. He now intended to take a division of troops from the proposed Arkansas expedition, put them on transports, and send them down the nearby Yazoo Pass. In a message to Prentiss dated February 15, Grant stated: "I send with this, steamers to take on board Gen. Ross' Division to be used with the Yazoo Pass expedition...If this expedition should succeed in getting into the Coldwater I want Gen. Ross to take with him all the force he starts from Helena with...the only change I would make in the instructions already given is that as soon as they arrive at the mouth of the Yalobusha they turn up that stream and take Grenada and destroy the railroad bridges there before proceeding further down the river. Let there be no delay in this matter. Time is now growing important."  

Unfortunately, Grant failed to include the Navy in this decision, even though his decision would affect the timing of the expedition. Porter expressed his dissatisfaction to the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, in a report dated March 12: "This was to have been a naval affair altogether, only I borrowed 800 men from General Grant to fill up our crews. At the last moment (and without my knowing it) 6,000 soldiers were ordered to join the expedition. Six days were lost waiting for them...."
softened his comments by stating that the soldiers "...worked like heroes in clearing away the obstructions after they joined. Indeed, I do not know how the expedition could have got through without them."\textsuperscript{100} Porter later included similar comments in his after action report.\textsuperscript{101}

Meanwhile, soldiers continued to remove obstacles from the pass. Many of the trees were cottonwoods and sycamores measuring four feet in diameter and weighing an estimated 35 tons. The best solution was to saw the trees in two and pull them out using a six-inch cable and the combined muscle power of 250-400 men. This duty was made especially difficult by exposure and exhausted the soldiers so that they were replaced several times by fresh troops from Helena.\textsuperscript{102}

On February 16, Washburn suggested that Prentiss send a telegraph to the Associated Press. Washburn’s suggested text read: "The attempt to open the Yazoo Pass is likely to prove an entire failure. After expending great labor to remove the obstructions placed in it by the rebels, it is found impossible to open it except for the very smallest kind of boats. Besides, in the rapid fall of water, it is reported, has caught a number of boats in the Pass, which unless strongly guarded, are liable to be destroyed." Washburn hoped that the dispatch would reach Vicksburg defenders within two days of publication in Union papers.\textsuperscript{103}

On February 16 a roving Confederate cavalry patrol clashed with the working party. Washburn asked Prentiss to send him 200 cavalrmen to protect his workers. The 1\textsuperscript{st} Indiana Cavalry was moved on transports to Dowd’s plantation, on the north side of Moon Lake. They rendezvoused with Washburn’s force at Hunt’s Mill on the night of February 17. On February 19 they skirmished with Confederate cavalry commanded by Capt. A. H. Forrest near the junction of the Yazoo Pass and the Coldwater River, resulting in Confederate losses of six dead, three wounded, and 15 prisoners.\textsuperscript{104}

Washburn’s soldiers removed the last obstruction from the Yazoo Pass by nightfall on February 21.\textsuperscript{105} One regiment of Washburn’s men conducted a reconnaissance through the Yazoo Pass into the Coldwater River, traveling down the Coldwater approximately ten to twelve miles on February 23. On February 24 Lieutenant Colonel Wilson prepared a report for Grant which explained the difficulties encountered in clearing the Yazoo Pass and expressing optimism that the route could be navigated by small steamboats (under 180 feet in length). He reminded Grant that the period during which the route could be used depended on river levels, since vessels needed to cross a bar to enter the Yazoo Pass from the Mississippi River.\textsuperscript{106}

On February 21 Prentiss ordered the Thirteenth Division of the Thirteenth Army Corps to join the expedition.\textsuperscript{107}

Although Ross had assumed command of the Thirteenth Division only two weeks prior to this mission (on February 8 at Helena, Arkansas), he was an experienced commander. Ross had served with distinction during the Mexican War as a lieutenant in the 4\textsuperscript{th} Illinois Volunteers under Edward D. Baker, a friend of Abraham Lincoln. Service as a probate judge, county clerk, local politician, and stockbreeder secured him a Colonelcy in the 17\textsuperscript{th} Illinois on May 25, 1861. Ross served in Missouri and Illinois during

23
the first year of the war and participated in a number of minor engagements. He commanded the 3rd Brigade of McClernand’s Division at Fort Donelson and was promoted to Brigadier General on April 26, 1862. Although Ross was absent during Shiloh, he participated in operations at Corinth and later commanded a division at Bolivar, Tennessee, where his unit protected the Mississippi Central Railroad. In December 1862 Ross commanded the veteran Eighth Division during Grant’s movement south into Mississippi. 108

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Previous Service/Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thirteenth Division, Thirteenth Army Corps</td>
<td>Brigadier General Leonard F. Ross</td>
<td>Minor engagements in Missouri; 3d Brigade, Ft. Donelson. In Dec 1862 Ross commanded a division in Grant’s Central Mississippi campaign. Embarked on steamboat Volunteer with LTC Wilson of Grant’s HQ 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Brigade</td>
<td>Brigadier General Frederick Salomon</td>
<td>Captain at Wilson’s Creek; Colonel in Missouri and Arkansas (9th Wisconsin); Brigadier General commanding Brigade in Kansas (July 1862) 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43rd Indiana Infantry</td>
<td>Major Wesley W. Norris</td>
<td>Unit mustered September 27, 1861. Veteran/experienced. 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th Indiana Infantry</td>
<td>Colonel Thomas Bringhurst</td>
<td>Unit mustered December 11, 1861. Veteran/experienced. 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47th Indiana Infantry</td>
<td>Colonel James R. Slack</td>
<td>Unit mustered November-December 1861. Veteran/experienced. 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Wisconsin Infantry</td>
<td>Colonel James M. Lewis</td>
<td>Unit mustered October 14, 1862. Limited experience. Embarked on steamboat Diana 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Brigade</td>
<td>Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk</td>
<td>COL 33rd MO (Sep 1862); District of Southeast MO; Department of North Missouri Embarked on steamboat Lebanon No. 2 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Iowa Infantry</td>
<td>Colonel Thomas H. Benton, Jr.</td>
<td>Unit mustered December 1, 1862. Limited experience. 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Iowa Infantry</td>
<td>Colonel Samuel A Rice</td>
<td>Unit mustered October 4, 1862. Garrison duty only/inexperienced Embarked on steamboats Lebanon No. 2 and Citizen 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Missouri</td>
<td>Major Thomas H. Penney</td>
<td>Unit organized December 3, 1862. Garrison duty only/inexperienced 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Iowa Battery Light Artillery</td>
<td>Captain Mortimer M. Hayden</td>
<td>Unit mustered September 24, 1861. Veteran/experienced 126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4 UNION ORDER OF BATTLE-YAZOO PASS EXPEDITION

24
Colonel Lewis B. Parsons, Chief Quartermaster of the Western River Transportation Office at St. Louis, supported Grant's forces. Steamboats were chartered and manned by civilian crews. As civilians, the captain, mate and transport crewmembers were not subject to Army orders with regard to the operation of their vessels. They were, however, required under terms of the charter to place their vessels in position to support Army operations.\(^{127}\)

On February 24 Ross embarked the Thirteenth Division on the contract steamers *Cheeseman, Citizen, Diana, Emma, Ida May, John Bell, Lavinia Logan, Lebanon No. 2, Mariner, Moderator, Saint Louis*, and *Volunteer*.\(^{128}\) The division had 178 officers and 3,502 men present for duty.\(^{129}\)

Most of these transports were small, or Ohio River, steamboats displacing approximately 500 tons. Each steamboat was capable of carrying roughly the equivalent of five 10-car freight trains and burned 50-70 bushels of coal per day. Wood could be used instead of coal, but was less efficient.\(^{130}\) Ross reported to Smith that his vessels only had enough coal for ten days, but that he intended to forage for wood.\(^{131}\)

Some of the regiments were able to embark half of each regiment (a regimental "wing") on each vessel and maintained some semblance of unit integrity.\(^{132}\) As an example, the 33rd Iowa Infantry embarked on the steamers *Citizen, and Lebanon No. 2*.\(^{133}\) Similarly, the 36th Iowa Infantry embarked on two vessels, the *Mariner* and the *Lavinia Logan*, with one wing embarked on each vessel.\(^{134}\) One vessel, the *Goody Friend* was designated as a hospital boat and was used to return patients to Helena during the expedition. The division entered Moon Lake, joined the Navy vessels, and waited for the Yazoo Pass to be cleared.\(^{135}\)

Grant directed Ross to take fifteen days rations and 160 rounds of ammunition per man with the expedition.\(^{136}\)

On February 26 Washburn's forces returned upstream to Moon Lake from their obstacle clearance mission and the expedition entered the Yazoo Pass. Lieutenant Commander Watson Smith organized the force with the *Chillicothe* in the lead, followed by the *Baron DeKalb*. He distributed the light-draft gunboats to pull coal barges and provide protection for the troop vessels. One hundred soldiers were on board each light draft to serve as Marines as originally discussed by Grant and Porter.\(^{137}\) The first portion of the route, the actual Yazoo Pass connecting Moon Lake to the Coldwater River, was extremely narrow. Progress was very slow and the vessels were forced to move in column. Swift current forced the vessels to reverse their paddle wheels to avoid being swept downstream into obstacles and other vessels. Soldiers and crews used lines to assist the vessels around turns to avoid collisions with trees and the bank. The column reached the junction with the Coldwater River on February 28, a distance of fourteen miles.\(^{138}\) The light-draft gunboat U.S.S. *Petrel*, commanded by Acting Volunteer Lieutenant George P. Lord, with a 13-inch mortar and ammunition for 75 rounds, and the rams *Lioness* and *Fulton*, joined the expedition at the Coldwater.
Both of the rams, as well as most of the transports, were now in poor condition. Collisions with trees and snags caused smokestacks to be knocked down, paddle wheels to be damaged, and much of their wood trim to be torn. Vessels were repaired using materials brought with the expedition. Cotton and fence rails were also collected and arranged to provide additional protection to the engines, crew and soldiers on board the vessels.

Grant’s Intent Changes Again

Porter sent an encouraging report to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles on March 2 stating that “Our expedition across to the Tallahatchie, through Yazoo Pass, is succeeding, and we have 10 vessels, at last accounts, within a short distance of the Tallahatchie. Officers and men, assisted by the troops, working with a determination that nothing can conquer, and driving the enemy before them. There are but few troops in Vicksburg at this moment, and matters look prosperous.”

On March 5, Grant decided to reinforce the expedition using Major General James B. McPherson’s Seventeenth Army Corps, then located at Lake Providence, Louisiana. Grant intended to establish a lodgment on the east bank of the Yazoo River in order to execute a coordinated attack on Vicksburg with his entire force. The Seventh Division, commanded by Brigadier General Isaac F. Quinby, was to have the lead.

...I want your Corps to get in there as rapidly as possible, and effect a lodgment at Yazoo City, or the most eligible point on Yazoo River from which to operate...Quinby will have general direction in the Pass until you arrive. He may detain Ross' Division, now there, until there are sufficient forces to defend his position...I will give orders to Denver’s Division to...go in by the same route. This will give you five Divisions to operate with, which, with the Gunboats, I hope will enable you to carry out one end of the proposed programme.

—Ulysses S. Grant

Encouraging reports, combined with a lack of confidence in the Lake Providence route, reinforced Grant’s decision to send Quinby’s division. Union gunboats were to fire their guns as a signal when they reached Haynes’ Bluff on the Yazoo River. Porter mistakenly thought that the expedition had reached Haynes’ Bluff on March 6 and notified Grant. Grant sent Halleck the good news on March 7.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Previous Service/Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Division, Seventeenth Army Corps</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Isaac F. Quinby</td>
<td>143 Limited experience (First Manassas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Brigade</td>
<td>Col. John B. Sanborn</td>
<td>144 Experienced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72d Illinois Infantry</td>
<td>Col. Frederick A. Starring</td>
<td>Unit mustered August 1862. MS Central RR 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Indiana Infantry</td>
<td>Maj. Edward J. Wood</td>
<td>Unit mustered February 1862. Iuka, Corinth, MS Central RR 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59th Indiana Infantry</td>
<td>Capt. Thomas A. McNaught</td>
<td>Unit mustered February 1862. Experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Minnesota Infantry</td>
<td>Lieut. Col. John E. Tourtellotte</td>
<td>Unit mustered October 1861. Iuka, Corinth, MS Central RR 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Missouri Cavalry, Co. C</td>
<td>Lieut. Russel W. Maryhugh</td>
<td>Unit mustered September 1861. Experienced. Also under Capt. Samuel P. Tipton in April.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Brigade</td>
<td>Col. Charles L. Matthies</td>
<td>Unit mustered February 1862. Corinth; MS Central RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Iowa Infantry</td>
<td>Col. David B. Hillis</td>
<td>Experienced. Organized Aug 1861. Operations in MO. Battles of Iuka, Corinth; Central MS Campaign 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Missouri Infantry</td>
<td>Lieut. Col. Leonidas Horney</td>
<td>Unit mustered October 1862. Central MS RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Missouri Infantry (Company E)</td>
<td>Lieut. William W. McCammon</td>
<td>Experienced. Organized Oct-Dec 1861. Battles of Iuka, Corinth; Central MS Campaign 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th Ohio Infantry</td>
<td>Lieut. Col. Matthias H. Bartilson</td>
<td>Deployed Feb 1862. Battles: Iuka, Corinth, MS Central RR 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Brigade</td>
<td>Col. George B. Boomer</td>
<td>Unit mustered October 1862. Central MS RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93d Illinois Infantry</td>
<td>Col. Holden Putnam</td>
<td>Unit mustered August 1861. Operations in MO. Iuka and Corinth, MS Central RR 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Iowa Infantry</td>
<td>Lieut. Col. Ezekiel S. Sampson</td>
<td>Unit mustered September 1861. Experienced. Iuka, Corinth, MS Central RR 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Iowa Infantry</td>
<td>Lieut. Col. William E. Small</td>
<td>Experienced. Unit mustered September to December 1861. Operations in MO. Island No. 10, battles of Iuka, Corinth; Central MS Campaign 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Missouri Infantry</td>
<td>Maj. Charles F. Brown</td>
<td>Experienced. Island No. 10, battles of Iuka, Corinth 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>Lieut. Col. Albert M. Powell</td>
<td>Experienced; Island No. 10, battles of Iuka, Corinth 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Missouri Artillery, Battery M.</td>
<td>Lieut. Junius W. MacMurray</td>
<td>Experienced; Island No. 10, battles of Iuka, Corinth 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Ohio Battery</td>
<td>Lieut. Cyrus Sears</td>
<td>Unit mustered March 1862. New Madrid; Is No. 10; Iuka; Corinth; MS Central RR 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Wisconsin Battery</td>
<td>Capt. Henry Dillon</td>
<td>Experienced; battles of Iuka, Corinth; Central MS Campaign 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Wisconsin Battery</td>
<td>Capt. William Zickerick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5 UNION REINFORCEMENTS-YAZOO PASS EXPEDITION
The Seventh Division had 311 officers and 5,539 men present for duty. The division had nearly completed a planned movement downriver from Memphis to Grand Lake. Quinby and his staff demonstrated a great deal of agility and had their troops re-embarked at Grand Lake on March 7. The division arrived at Moon Lake on March 9, having traveled 200 miles upriver. However, when they arrived at Moon Lake there were insufficient small transports to take them into the Pass. Quinby disembarked his troops and went to Helena to request smaller transports.

Grant had requested additional small transports on March 5 to move Quinby’s division into the Pass. Although the Quartermaster sent all available small, shallow draft steamboats as quickly as possible from the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, Quinby was forced to delay his advance. His 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel John Sanborn, entered the Yazoo Pass March 14 embarked on six transports. The lead vessel of Quinby’s force reached the Coldwater after three days. Quinby wrote to McPherson in Helena that flatboats would be much more suited to the task than small steamboats.\[158\]

DEFENDER REACTIONS
Confederate Reaction

Commander Isaac Brown, CSN, notified Lieutenant General Pemberton on February 9 that the enemy had cut the Yazoo Pass levee. Brown urged that two big guns be shipped from Mobile to Grenada to establish a defense at the mouth of the Yalobusha River where enemy gunboats entering from the Tallahatchie River could only attack two abreast. Pemberton replied that the guns would not be sent from Mobile and expressed disbelief that gunboats could get through the Pass.\[159\] He did, however, request a field battery to reinforce the command.

On February 11, Major General W. W. Loring notified Pemberton that he had ordered Major Green L. Blythe to “annoy” the enemy and had ordered General James Z. George’s Mississippi State Troops cavalry forward. Loring asked Pemberton whether forces could be sent from Yazoo City to attack the Federals in the Pass.\[160\] Loring also forwarded a report from Captain J. A. Porter of the Confederate Engineer Corps, which indicated that a Union ram and several transports were in Moon Lake on February 8. Captain Porter requested artillery and cavalry and stated that “opportunities for attack are good” and that the Coldwater River could not be obstructed “without a steamboat and some chains.”\[161\]

On February 17 Commander Brown forwarded a message to Lieutenant General Pemberton from Lieutenant F. E. Shepperd, CSN. Lieutenant Sheppard had been working to obstruct the Yazoo Pass and stated in his February 14 dispatch that “The enemy have driven us off from the works on the Pass, and are coming through. Hasty obstructions with fortifications may save Yazoo City. I have done my best; worked under their noses, till their pickets came in 100 yards of me.” Brown stated that he was fitting out two vessels, the Mary Keene and Star of the West, and needed men to man them. Brown expressed concern that he had little time to prepare and that he could “…give no assurance that we shall be able to stop the enemy, as we cannot tell with what amount or description of force he is coming through. We will do all we can.”\[162\] Pemberton responded by directing that Major General C. L. Stevenson send 200 troops
from Vicksburg to help Commander Brown man the vessels and to send a 32-pounder rifle and a 30-pounder Parrott to Yazoo City to be given to Loring’s command. Pemberton continued to receive warnings of Union movements on subsequent days. Although some of these reports were exaggerated, they served to reinforce previous warnings. Pemberton responded by directing that the troops and guns he had ordered be sent quickly.

Jefferson Davis expressed concern to General Joseph E. Johnston regarding command and control as well as the opening of the Yazoo Pass. On February 19 Davis expressed the opinion that “The rise of the river...has also opened the line of the Yazoo Pass, and, if it has not been sufficiently obstructed, may enable the enemy to come down the Tallahatchie, and get in rear of our position.”

Loring arrived at Greenwood on February 21 and examined the defenses organized by the engineers. He reported to Pemberton that the defenses would be established in the vicinity of Beck’s Ferry, approximately two and one-half miles by land and about four miles by water below Greenwood, Mississippi. Loring reported that the riverbanks were 8 feet above water and the guns would be mounted on earth and cotton bale works. This would provide the Confederates enough elevation to ensure a plunging fire on the Union boats. The Tallahatchie and the Yazoo Rivers were only about 500 yards apart. Works commanding each river were to be connected by lines of rifle pits and entrenchments. The Confederates named these defenses Fort Pemberton. Colonel Thomas N. Waul’s Texas Legion had moved to Greenwood from Snyder’s Bluff during the previous week. Loring approved of Waul’s defensive arrangements and kept Waul in command of the defense force. Loring also ordered Colonel Robert McCulloch of the 2nd Missouri Cavalry to prepare to march toward the Coldwater River if a road could be found through the flooded lowlands. Loring’s defenders initially consisted of approximately 2,000 men.
### ORDER OF BATTLE, GREENWOOD, MISSISSIPPI: February 17-March 16, 1863

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Previous Service/Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding Division</td>
<td>Major General William W. Loring</td>
<td>Experienced veteran. 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waul's Texas Legion</td>
<td>Colonel Thomas N. Waul</td>
<td>171. Arrived Greenwood 14-20 February 172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Texas Infantry</td>
<td>Colonel Ashbel Smith</td>
<td>In charge of the right flank. 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade</td>
<td>Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman</td>
<td>Experienced/veteran leader. 176. In charge of the left flank. 177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Alabama Infantry</td>
<td>Colonel Alpheus Baker</td>
<td>Reorganized as the 54th Alabama on October 9, 1862. 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Kentucky Infantry</td>
<td>Colonel Hylan B. Lyon</td>
<td>Organized in October 1861. Experienced. 179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment, 21st Louisiana Infantry</td>
<td></td>
<td>Experienced/veteran. 180. May have been assigned as heavy artillery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. C. 14th Mississippi Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>Captain Jacob Culbertson</td>
<td>Organized in the spring of 1862. Experienced. 4 guns. 183</td>
</tr>
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**TABLE 6 CONFEDERATE DEFENDERS, GREENWOOD (FORT PEMBERTON), MISSISSIPPI**

On March 11, the fort contained seven guns mounted *en barbette*, behind breastworks constructed of cotton bales covered with earth. The heavy weapons included one banded 32-pounder rifle, one 12-pounder rifle, one 3-inch (18-pounder) Whitworth gun, two 12-pounder rifles on siege carriages, one 3-inch Parrott gun, and one 3.67-inch (20-pounder) Parrott gun (the "Lady Richardson" captured at Corinth). Lighter weapons included one 6-pounder emplaced in the center. One 6-pounder and one 3-inch rifle were emplaced on the left flank. Three cotton-bale and earth magazines were constructed to supply the batteries with ammunition. 186
ARMAMENT OF FORT GREENWOOD.—(Pemberton.)

1 & 4—10 inch Guns (1).
2 8-inch Columbiads, (1) mounted night of 15th.
3 20-pdr. Rifle Parrott, (1).
One battery of field pieces, rifles and smooth-bore, (1 Whitworth 10-pdr.)
Ward's Legion, 2d Texas, 46th Miss., 20th Miss., all we could hear of, not to exceed 3500 men.

ARMAMENT OF ATTACKING FORCE.

Land Battery, 2 20-pdr. Parrots.
1 8-inch Ship howitzer.
DeKalb, 2 9-inch Guns.
Chillicothe, 2 11 " "

NOTE.—The Cotton-bale Battery was a partly sunken Redan, 35 feet long, 8 feet relief, composed of cotton bales, partly covered with earth, two tiers high, six tiers deep, embrasures one foot square, revetted with sheet iron, which blew out soon. Cotton did not burn in any harmful extent; kept wet by pouring water on. The platforms were 9 by 14, one foot below surface, four inches higher on the rear line.

FIGURE 5 GREENWOOD, MISSISSIPPI (FORT PEMBERTON)\textsuperscript{187}
Fort Pemberton was well sited to defend against an approach down the Tallahatchie from the North. No more than two vessels could approach at one time. A land attack would have to cross 600 yards of cleared ground and a bayou. Woods bordering the fields were well within the effective range of the batteries. Loring also intended to obstruct the Tallahatchie River with rafts, if it could be done before the Union forces arrived. C. S. S. *Star of the West* was sunk athwart the channel as an obstacle.\(^{188}\)

Loring ordered that steamboats moving supplies to Grenada and Vicksburg on the Yalobusha and Yazoo Rivers be allowed to continue operations. However, steamboats not required to transport supplies were converted to serve as “cottonclad” troop transports under the command of Captain Isaac N. Brown. The cottonclads would be used to attack and board any Federal boats that might succeed in passing Greenwood.\(^{189}\)

**THE EXPEDITION ADVANCES**

The expedition continued to advance slowly down the Coldwater River and Tallahatchie Rivers. Smith estimated that the expedition was moving at 1 1/2 miles per hour. Nearly every vessel had suffered some damage from overhanging trees since their smokestacks were approximately 200 feet tall.\(^{190}\). Although the gunboats fared somewhat better, even the U.S.S. *Chillicothe* struck a snag and loosened a plank in her hull.

Both Ross and Wilson expressed disgust at the slow progress of the expedition. On March 8, Ross complained to Prentiss that “We have again made a late start this morning, being delayed for the gunboats to complete coaling. The work should have been done by 2 o'clock this morning, and we on our way by 5.30, but it was 7.30 this morning before we started, and then had to leave one of the gunboats to finish her coaling. I am a little, yes, considerably disgusted with these necessary delays.”\(^{191}\). Ross used harsher language in his after action report to Grant dated April 18: “On several occasions the gunboat immediately in my advance stopped and lay to an hour for dinner. In consulting with Lieut. Commander Watson Smith, I urged the necessity of greater rapidity of movement; advised leaving the coal-barges in the rear...and, with the iron-clads and such light transports and light gunboats as could keep up with them, to push forward with the utmost expedition, and gain the mouth of the Tallahatchie, and hold it until the rest of the fleet could join them.”\(^{192}\). Wilson expressed similar frustration with Smith in an after action note to Rawlins dated March 15: “When the iron-clads started into the Pass, I urged with all the force I could the absolute necessity of sending them, the rams, and two mosquitoes forward with all possible dispatch. Both Foster and Walker and General Ross agreed with the plan. Had this been done, they could have reached the mouth of the Tallahatchie in four days.”\(^{193}\)

The expedition encountered the Confederate transport *St. Mary’s* approximately 70 miles above the junction of the Tallahatchie and Yalobusha Rivers on March 9. Commander Brown, CSN, had moved upriver to collect cotton bales for his cottonclads and was forced to speed downriver. In the process the Confederates lost the steamer *Thirty-fifth Parallel* when she ran aground. Brown was forced to set the vessel and her load of approximately 2,500-3,000 bales of cotton on fire.\(^{194}\)
On March 10, the Chillicothe destroyed a bridge and a sawmill on the Tallahatchie River.\textsuperscript{195} As the expedition neared the junctions of the Tallahatchie and Yalobusha Rivers during a hard rainstorm, Smith was informed that the rebels were prepared to defend the area near Greenwood. He also was informed that guns had been mounted, that an obstructing raft had been built and placed in the river, and that the area was strongly garrisoned.\textsuperscript{196}

On March 11, the expedition reached Fort Pemberton. As the Federals approached, Colonel Robert McCulloch’s 2d Missouri Cavalry was ordered to fall back to the south bank of the Yalobusha River.\textsuperscript{197}

Smith continued to move downstream at the head of the column on board the Chillicothe, accompanied by Ross and Lieutenant Colonel Wilson. At approximately 1000 the Confederates opened fire with five guns as the Chillicothe came around a bend in the river approximately 800-900 yards upstream from Fort Pemberton. The Confederate batteries fired 25-30 rounds in thirty minutes and the Chillicothe was struck twice.\textsuperscript{198} The first round struck her port bow above the waterline; the second caused serious damage to the starboard turret casemate. Her iron plating and bolts were loosened and her nine-inch white-pine backing was cracked. Chillicothe fired three rounds using her two 11-inch guns. Watson Smith ordered his vessels to withdraw in order to organize an attack. The Confederates suffered no losses and the Federals had one injured in this opening engagement.\textsuperscript{199}

Ross returned to his transports and ordered his First Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Frederick Salomon, to determine the extent of the Confederate positions. Salomon deployed the 46\textsuperscript{th} and 47\textsuperscript{th} Indiana Infantry. Those two regiments moved forward and approached within three-quarters of a mile of Fort Pemberton. Soldiers from the 46\textsuperscript{th} Indiana observed Colonel Waul’s Texas Legion pickets and forced the Texans to withdraw. Ross’s division disembarked at the Shell Mound plantation, approximately two miles upstream from Fort Pemberton, on the west bank of the Tallahatchie River. The 33\textsuperscript{rd} Iowa Infantry moved upstream on board their transport and fired shots at a squad of rebels.\textsuperscript{200} The remainder of the infantry remained in the vicinity of the Shell Mound plantation during the day and boarded their vessels again that night without being engaged.\textsuperscript{201}

At 1610, the Chillicothe and Baron De Kalb began moving downstream again to attack while the Lioness was held in reserve. At 1615, the Confederate batteries opened fire. After just seven minutes the Chillicothe was forced to withdraw after firing only four rounds. She was preparing to fire a fifth when a Confederate shell entered the open gunport and struck the 11-inch shell as it was being loaded. Both shells exploded. This explosion killed four men and wounded ten men. Two of the Chillicothe’s port covers were blown outward by the explosion. A portion of her pine turret backing was carried away and cotton bales added for protection were set on fire. The 11-inch gun, although struck on the muzzle, was undamaged. Watson Smith ordered a withdrawal.\textsuperscript{202} The Confederates nearly exhausted their rifled 32-pounder ammunition during this engagement, but suffered no casualties.
The river was so narrow that the *Chillicothe* and *Baron De Kalb* were forced to fight side by side. Their inability to maneuver caused them to take a terrible pounding. The light-draft gunboats could not engage the batteries since they were forced to remain upstream behind the ironclads.

During the night of March 11, approximately 1,200 soldiers from the Second Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk dragged 300 cotton bales and one 30-pounder Parrott gun from the *Rattler* and created a land battery. During the night of March 12, a second 30-pounder was added from the *Forest Rose*. This gun position was located approximately 600 yards from Fort Pemberton in the woods near the west bank of the Tallahatchie.\(^{203}\)

March 12 and the morning of March 13 was spent adding cotton to the *Chillicothe* and *Baron De Kalb* to provide additional protection. The *Chillicothe*’s damage was repaired as much as possible under the circumstances. The side port covers were substituted for the forward port covers and replacement gun crews were transferred to the *Chillicothe* from the *Petrel* and *Signal*.\(^{204}\)

The Federals renewed their attack at 1100 on March 13 with the *Chillicothe*, *Baron De Kalb*, mortar raft, and the shore battery. The vessels were secured with lines to keep them from drifting downstream should they become disabled. The Confederates fired rapidly and accurately, severely damaging the *Chillicothe*. The *Chillicothe* remained in place until 1303 firing fifty-four rounds and using up all of her five-second fuses. Thirty-eight shells struck her, ten shots struck within a space of ten feet on the port side of her turret. Seven shots passed through her wheelhouses and the remaining shots struck her bow, the starboard side of her forward turret and on her port quarter and hurricane deck. Her forward and side port covers were carried away on the port side and the cotton bales added for protection were set on fire. *Chillicothe* suffered six more wounded during the engagement.\(^{205}\)

The *Baron De Kalb* held her position until nightfall and was struck six times. One shot penetrated the forward casemate and another entered between two ports, cutting a dozen beams, killing three men, and wounding three more. A second round also disabled her steering gear.\(^{206}\)

The Union shore battery suffered no damage; but both it and the mortar raft were low on ammunition. The mortar raft fired 49 of her 75 available 200-pound shells.\(^{207}\)

The *Chillicothe* and *Baron De Kalb* were ordered to withdraw to fill shells and repair damage.

At the end of the day Wilson reported that "we are not able to perceive any advantage gained....The rebel position is a strong one by virtue of the difficulties of approach, though it is defended by only two guns of any weight, one a powerful 6.4-inch bore."\(^{208}\)

The Confederates suffered 21 casualties during this engagement.\(^{209}\) Most were wounded when an 11-inch shell passed through 16 feet of earth and cotton and blew up the magazine for the Whitworth gun, burning one officer and fifteen men of the Pointe Coupée Artillery. Another soldier was killed when a shell exploded over a battery.\(^{210}\) Confederate batteries were running low on ammunition for the heavy guns on March 13, but they received a shipment at approximately 1900 and the supply crisis passed.\(^{211}\)
Watson Smith and Ross agreed on a plan for renewing the attack. The Navy would close in and attack the fort. If successful in silencing the enemy batteries they would send three of the light-drafts carrying as many of Ross’s troops as possible downstream. Ross was to select a landing site where his men could disembark and assault the fort. During the night of March 15, the expedition landed an 8-inch broadside gun from the Baron De Kalb and placed it in the land battery. At 1130 on March 16, the shore battery opened fire using the 8-inch and two 30-pounder Parrott guns. The Chillicothe moved closer to the fort followed by the Baron De Kalb. At 1243 the Chillicothe and Baron De Kalb were in position. Chillicothe was engaged fifteen minutes and fired seven rounds. She was struck on the port covers by four Confederate rounds after firing her seventh round. The Confederate rounds damaged Chillicothe’s forward port covers so that it was impossible to open them and her commander ordered her to withdraw. Baron De Kalb was also ordered to withdraw.²¹² Chillicothe had suffered one man wounded and one drowned during this engagement. Chillicothe’s losses on March 11, 13, and 16 totaled five killed and 17 wounded.²¹³ Baron De Kalb, which was not engaged at all on March 16, had lost three killed and three wounded on March 13.

Throughout these operations, Smith’s health was failing. He had been ill when he received orders to command the expedition, and his health failed completely during the assaults on Fort Pemberton. On March 17, Smith ordered the flotilla to return upstream and reported himself unfit for duty in a message to Porter. He then departed for Helena on the U.S.S. Rattles. On March 19 the Rattles was fired upon by Confederate forces and lost two men killed. Smith arrived at Helena on March 22.²¹⁴

Lieutenant Commander James P. Foster of the U.S.S. Chillicothe assumed command of the flotilla on March 18. The Chillicothe was badly damaged and low on ammunition, the Baron De Kalb and mortar raft were low on ammunition and all vessels were low on provisions. The flooded terrain did not permit land maneuver and the gunboats had failed in their duels with Fort Pemberton. Foster ordered the flotilla to return to Helena after consulting with Generals Ross, Fisk, and Salomon. The flotilla began to move upstream on March 19.²¹⁵

One officer expressed his disappointment in a diary entry "...a more dissatisfied set of men I never saw...would willingly have stormed the fort rather than left without a more thorough effort to take it...we could have taken it if our leaders would have but gave us the opportunity."²¹⁶

On March 21, the flotilla encountered Brigadier General Quinby’s forces moving downstream to reinforce the expedition. Quinby met with Ross, assumed command of the Army forces, and ordered Ross to accompany him downriver. His intent was to disembark all Army forces near Fort Pemberton and send the transports back to Moon Lake to pick up the remainder of his division. During a separate meeting, he convinced Foster to attempt a supporting attack with the gunboats.²¹⁷

Confederate defenders had been busy during the brief time the expedition had been gone. They had continued to improve Fort Pemberton and had burned the cotton parapet of the Union shore battery position. Most of the trees near the position had been destroyed during earlier engagements and the
position was now exposed to Confederate fire. 218 Approximately six floating mines were emplaced in the Tallahatchie. 219

On March 23, at 1415, the Union forces approached Fort Pemberton during a hard rain. Chillicothe fired three rounds at Fort Pemberton in an effort to draw fire, but the Confederates did not respond. An underwater mine appeared to detonate as the Chillicothe withdrew, but caused no damage. 220 Confederate artillery was fired at Ross's division, mortally wounding a soldier from the 48th Indiana. 221

Supporting Efforts-The Steele's Bayou Expedition

Porter came up with the idea of using a route through Steele's Bayou to make yet another attempt to reach the Yazoo River above Haynes' Bluff. Steele's Bayou could be entered from the lower Yazoo River, a short distance from its junction with the Mississippi River above Vicksburg. A route through Steele's Bayou, Black Bayou, Deer Creek, and Rolling Fork could be followed to reach the Big Sunflower River. The Big Sunflower River rejoined the Yazoo River above Haynes' Bluff. Porter thought that this winding route would allow troops to land approximately ten miles (20 river miles) above Haynes' Bluff and provide Grant another opportunity to turn the Confederate right flank.

The ironclads Louisville, Carondelet, Mound City, and Pittsburg entered Steele's Bayou on March 14, accompanied by four mortar rafts and four tugs. 222 Porter suggested that Grant accompany him on his flagship to examine the route.

Grant had received information from Vicksburg and the Yazoo River that the Yazoo Pass Expedition had reached Greenwood and exchanged shots with Confederate fortifications. He also knew that Greenwood was being reinforced with additional troops and guns. Grant felt that if he could move forces between Greenwood and Vicksburg it would confuse the Confederates and save Ross's force from possible destruction. 223 He boarded Porter's flagship, the Black Hawk, on March 15 and traveled with Porter into Steele's Bayou. Satisfied that the route could be entered, Grant returned to his headquarters on March 16. He ordered Sherman to take his Fifteenth Army Corps "as far as practicable up Steele's Bayou and through Black Bayou to Deer Creek, and...get into the Yazoo River for the purpose of determining the feasibility of getting an army through that route to the east bank of that river [the Yazoo], and at a point at which they can act advantageously against Vicksburg." 224

Unfortunately, Porter and his gunboats did not wait for Sherman's forces to join the expedition. Grant lacked sufficient transports for Sherman's forces and a gap formed between Army and Navy forces as the gunboats continued to move forward. Trees and other natural obstructions in the bayous hampered the movements of the gunboats. The Confederates detected Porter's movement and maneuvered infantry and artillery while Confederate forces felled trees to Porter's front and rear to slow his progress. Sharpshooters fired whenever Union sailors appeared above decks. On March 21, Colonel Giles A. Smith's brigade of the Fifteenth Corps joined Porter's force and provided rear security to keep an escape route open, but by March 22, Porter's force had reached an impasse. The Confederates had
downed numerous trees in front of the expedition and rebel artillery began to move up behind the
gunboats. Sherman's troops linked up with the expedition in time to allow Porter to extract his force and
the expedition returned to its starting point on March 24.

Unaware of these events, Grant remained hopeful that both expeditions would succeed, but he was
having doubts. Grant sent Quinby a message on March 23 in which he reminded Quinby that he expected
him to make an effort to establish a lodgment and informed him of the Steele's Bayou Expedition:

....It is highly desirable that your expedition should clean out the Yazoo River, and, if
possible, effect a lodgment from which we could act against Haynes' Bluff. You will be the
best judge whether this can be done. You will also have to be governed by the disposition
of the navy to co-operate. We cannot order them, but only ask their co-operation. I leave
it to your judgment to say whether the expedition with you should return from Greenwood
or prosecute the attack further....Admiral Porter started about one week ago to try and
reach the Yazoo River, below Yazoo City, with five gunboats....I sent Sherman, with an
army force about equal to yours, to co-operate. If successful, they will come in below the
enemy you are contending against, and between the two forces you would find no further
difficulties before reaching the ground I so much desire. I have not heard from this
expedition [Steele’s Bayou] for several days....P.S. If not sanguine of success, return
immediately with your entire force and fleet.”

—Ulysses S. Grant.

Grant Recalls the Yazoo Pass Expedition

Grant’s intent to send the remainder of McPherson’s Seventeenth Corps into Yazoo Pass would
have included General John E. Smith’s division. Grant changed his mind and sent a message on March
22 to McPherson at Lake Providence in which he stated that “...further force, in by the way of Yazoo
Pass, can be of no service. The party that first went in have so delayed as to give the enemy time to
fortify. I see nothing for it now but to have that force return the way they went in. I will let them try
Greenwood a short time longer, however, and see, too, if Admiral Porter succeeds in reaching the Yazoo
on his present route [via Steele’s Bayou]. In the mean time I want concentrated as near here [Vicksburg]
as possible all the troops now scattered from Young's Point to Helena. You may take immediate steps to
collect your forces. The division of General J.[ohn] E. Smith will belong to your army corps.”

Grant followed this message with a second message sent March 23, confirming his decision. McPherson sent
his own message to Quinby on March 23, and reminded Quinby that he would not receive any more
reinforcements.

Quinby was still attempting to find a way to maneuver and requested a pontoon bridge in his March
25 report to McPherson. He also indicated that Foster intended to withdraw on April 1, unless he received
orders from Porter to stay. In Quinby’s words: “It is one of the great evils of our service that the land and
naval forces are left, in a great measure, independent of each other. The best concerted plans are liable
to fail from this cause.”
Grant formally cancelled the Yazoo Pass Expedition in a March 28 message to Brigadier General Prentiss at Helena "The troops that have gone down the Yazoo Pass are now ordered back..."229 Prentiss continued to send supplies and ammunition to the flotilla. The steamers Charles Bowen and Dacotah carried 20,000 rations, four 30-pounder Parrott guns and ammunition. The gunboat U.S.S. Marmora returned to Helena, picked up a coal barge and towed the barge from the city back to the flotilla.230

Bad weather continued to plague the expedition and Quinby was prevented from emplacing a battery of four 10-pounder Parrott guns on March 27 because of flooding caused by heavy rain.231 A severe thunderstorm passed through the area on March 28. The 47th Indiana Infantry lost four men killed and two wounded to falling trees.232

Union delays, combined with the failure of the Steele's Bayou Expedition, gave the Confederates time to reinforce Fort Pemberton. Forces from the Deer Creek, Haynes' Bluff, and Yazoo City areas began arriving at Fort Pemberton on March 25, including Brigadier General John C. Moore's brigade from Yazoo City.

On March 28 the Third Mississippi and a light artillery battery were sent up the Yazoo River on board the cotton clad Magenta. They reached Camp Loring, located four miles southwest of Greenwood on the Heard Plantation, on April 1.

On March 29, Brigadier General Winfield S. Featherston began to move his brigade from Deer Creek to reinforce Loring.233

On April 1, Major General Dabney H. Maury arrived at Greenwood and was assigned to command the Confederate left. Maury later described the miserable conditions: "The rivers were out of their banks, the lowlands were under water, skiffs were moored to doors of the farm-houses, and buffalo gnats swarmed over the horses and cattle. I lost twenty-four mules one night from their poisonous bites. I could scarce find dry land enough on which to form a line of battle, and smokes were made all along the line so that horses might stand in them and in some measure be protected from the gnats."234

Loring's command exceeded 7,000 men by April 1. The Confederates now outnumbered the Federals. Patrols were sent out to attack Union pioneers working to improve gun batteries.235 Confederate batteries shelled the Union positions on the night of April 1 and continued the shelling on subsequent days with little effect.236 The Confederates did not attempt any maneuver and on April 3, their numerical superiority was neutralized by the arrival of the remainder of Quinby's division.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Previous Service/Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Brigade</td>
<td>Brigadier General Lloyd Tligman</td>
<td>Already at Fort Pemberton with brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Mississippi Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Colonel Arthur E. Reynolds</td>
<td>Organized September 10, 1861. Veteran/experienced. Arrived March 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Brigade</td>
<td>Brigadier General Winfield S. Featherston</td>
<td>Organized in 1861. Experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Mississippi Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Hugh J. Reid</td>
<td>Organized in mid-1861. Veteran/experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Mississippi (Hurst's-Drakes) Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Colonel David W. Hurst</td>
<td>Organized in early 1862. Experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Mississippi Sharpshooter Battalion</td>
<td>Major William A. Rayburn</td>
<td>Organized in May 1862. Limited experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. C. 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Mississippi Light Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>Captain Lauterdale A. Collier</td>
<td>Organized in early 1862. Experienced. 4 guns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore's Brigade (also known as Moore's Command)</td>
<td>Brigadier General John C. Moore</td>
<td>Experienced. Moore's Brigade moved to Greenwood from Yazoo City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Alabama Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Colonel James F. Dowdell</td>
<td>Unit mustered May 13, 1862. Veteran/experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Alabama Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Colonel John W. Portis</td>
<td>Mustered in May 1862. Experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Mississippi Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Colonel William T. S. Barry</td>
<td>Organized in the spring of 1862. Experienced/veteran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Mississippi Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Colonel W. Bruce Colber</td>
<td>Organized in mid-1862. Experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bledsoe's Missouri Artillery Battery</td>
<td>Captain Hiram M. Bledsoe</td>
<td>Mustered in April 1861. Veteran/experienced. 4 guns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units Not Brigaded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Mississippi Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Colonel Orlando S. Holland</td>
<td>Organized in mid-1862. Experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Tennessee Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>Colonel John G. Stocks</td>
<td>Formed in April 1862. Experienced. Company B served as Loring's personal escort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. A. 22&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Louisiana Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Lieutenant J. E. Lambert</td>
<td>Limited experience. May have been assigned as heavy artillery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Detachment</td>
<td>Lieutenant F. E. Shepperd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Missouri Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>Colonel Robert McCulloch</td>
<td>Formed in August 1862. Experienced/veteran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Arkansas Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>Colonel William F. Slemens</td>
<td>also known as 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Cavalry Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Brigade, Mississippi State Troops</td>
<td>Brigadier General James Z. George</td>
<td>Experienced leader.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7 CONFEDERATE REINFORCEMENTS-FORT PEMBERTON
On April 4, the Confederate reinforcements began fortifying their positions into what became known as Fort Loring on the extreme left of the Confederate line of defense.\textsuperscript{259}

After conducting reconnaissance for twelve days and lacking small boats or pontoons to bypass Fort Pemberton, Quinby agreed that further attempts to take the position were futile. Even Wilson agreed that it was time to depart. This decision was reinforced when Confederate generals Maury and Tilghman found a way to attack the Federal headquarters. Maury stated in his memoirs that Tilghman "proposed that we should try and break up the enemy's headquarters about a mile away from our front. Tilghman had been a civil engineer, and he had a county map showing the position of the farm-house [sic] where Quinby had his headquarters. He [Tilghman] trained his guns by the compass, while I sent in a body of sharpshooters through the woods on the enemy's right. We opened at the signal, and broke up the whole establishment, which retreated hastily for the Mississippi by way of the Yazoo [Pass]."\textsuperscript{260}

The expedition departed on April 5, and the entire force cleared the Yazoo Pass on April 8.

A soldier from the 33\textsuperscript{rd} Missouri expressed his disappointment by saying "I think we could have taken the fort any day we were there if our Gens. had have made the attempt....none of us had the remotest idea of abandoning operations in front of the rebel fort and returning to Helena."\textsuperscript{261}

An officer from the 72\textsuperscript{nd} Illinois expressed a different view: "We are all sadly disappointed at not having a chance to take Fort Pemberton, but our generals are much more sensible than we are. They know that we can't take the fort, as it is impossible to bring a sufficient number of troops to operate at once as the fort is almost entirely surrounded by water...Lieutenant Colonel Wilson of General Grant's staff is here and sees for himself the impossibility of success and the utter uselessness of shedding blood where it would avail nothing."\textsuperscript{262}

OUTCOMES

This enterprise promised most fairly, but for some cause our troops and boats delayed so as to give the enemy time to fortify. My last information from this command was to the 17th. They were at Greenwood, on the Yazoo, a fortified place, and had abandoned all idea of getting past until they could receive additional ordnance stores. By a prompt movement Yazoo City could have been captured without opposition.\textsuperscript{263}

—Ulysses S. Grant

The Yazoo Pass Expedition provides a historical example of joint operations under difficult circumstances. Shortcomings in command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, and operational support contributed to its failure.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

Political and military pressures required Grant and Porter to seize the initiative. The Yazoo Pass appeared to offer an option for maneuver, and the expedition was ordered. Grant originally provided troops to support Porter's expedition in an effort to destroy Confederate gunboats and transports on the
Yazoo River and destroy the railroad bridges on the Yalobusha River at Grenada. When Grant saw the potential for the expedition to establish a lodgment on the Yazoo River, he reinforced the expedition with Ross's division. When Porter mistakenly informed Grant that the expedition had reached the Yazoo River, Grant quickly decided to reinforce success and ordered McPherson's Corps to expand the lodgment.

However, movement execution was much slower than predicted and the expedition had not yet reached the Yazoo River. Clearing the Yazoo Pass of the combination of Confederate and natural obstacles required much more time than anticipated. Additional time was lost waiting for Washburn's units to return upriver as they conducted reconnaissance following their obstacle clearance mission.

Winter storms and heavy rains created high water conditions on the Mississippi and made the Yazoo Pass route feasible. However, flooded terrain in the Delta contributed to a lack of Union mobility at Fort Pemberton. Weather conditions had little apparent impact on Confederate operations.

A major factor was the caution exercised by Lieutenant Commander Watson Smith. Porter's order directed him to "not enter the Yazoo Cut until the current is quite slack...Proceed carefully, and only in the daytime...guard against surprise...if overwhelmed run your vessels on the bank and set fire to them." Smith executed Porter's instructions to the letter. Smith's caution, combined with the use of steamboats that were too large for the narrow, twisting route, slowed the movement through the Yazoo Pass to a crawl. Although the gunboats could have gone ahead, he kept pace with the slowest vessel. The flotilla moved only during daylight and made multiple stops, to include stops for lunch. The slow Union advance allowed the Confederates time to select and improve their defensive positions at Greenwood.

Fortifications at Fort Pemberton were well placed and constructed. Fort Pemberton was surrounded by water on three sides and the Union could not maneuver their numerically superior infantry. Similarly, the narrow confines of the Tallahatchie River did not allow the Union gunboats to maneuver. The gunboats could bring only five weapons to bear (two on Chillicothe and three on Baron De Kalb) as they could only approach head on. Sites for Union land batteries were limited by flooded terrain and wooded approaches. These factors gave a decided advantage to the defenders.

No preparations were made during the initial decision process to consider the effect of flooded terrain on ground maneuver. Although each transport carried a small skiff, the expedition lacked sufficient small boats or bridging materials to support operations.

The heavy Confederate artillery at Fort Pemberton also neutralized the Union gunboat technology. Porter directed Smith to engage Confederate batteries with the Chillicothe, expecting her three-inch armor and 11-inch guns to be much more capable than they really were. Unfortunately, the Chillicothe was poorly built. Nine inches of white pine backing had been used for her armor instead of thick oak. This comparatively weak armor, combined with the construction defects patched by her contractor, could not withstand the pounding of the Confederate rounds. The outcome of the entire expedition might have been different if the gunboat had been able to withstand the Confederate fire and destroy the Confederate batteries. Baron De Kalb fared somewhat better, but her thinner armor was still no match for heavy guns.
Although Confederate mines failed to sink or damage any Union vessels, the apparent detonation of one mine must have had a psychological impact on the force. The knowledge that Confederate mines had sunk the U.S.S. Cairo in December would have reinforced the naval commander’s reluctance to maneuver closer to Fort Pemberton.

INTELLIGENCE

Confederate intelligence sources and scouts quickly detected the movement of the expedition and the progress being made to clear obstacles in the Yazoo Pass. The Confederates had anticipated movement down the Yazoo Pass and were observing the route. Union activity was difficult to hide. Many of the steamboats were three stories tall and produced a great deal of smoke when underway. Confederate intelligence was collected from a variety of sources and reported the number, type and location of Union vessels. Union efforts to clear the Yazoo Pass and Steele’s Bayou routes were reported almost immediately. Union forces made little use of intelligence. Little effort was made to scout ahead of the main body and both Grant and the expedition chain of command tended to discount reports of enemy forces and defensive plans. Grant and Porter appear to have naively assumed that their plan would take the enemy by surprise.

There is no evidence to suggest that the Union made any effort to implement a deception plan, information campaign or to preserve operational security. Although Washburn suggested a somewhat belated information campaign to General Prentiss on February 16 any attempt at an information campaign at this stage would have had limited effect.267

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Grant and Porter achieved unity of command with Grant assuming the role of Joint Task Force commander. Naval policy required Porter to cooperate with the Army and Porter ensured that the Mississippi Squadron complied with that intent.

The Yazoo Pass Expedition was organized without an overall commander. Grant and Porter relied completely on the policy of cooperation between the services. However, even they failed to keep each other informed. When the Yazoo Pass route appeared to meet his need to establish a foothold on the high ground near Haynes’ Bluff, Grant quickly moved to send his army. Unfortunately, he did not coordinate with Porter and confusion ensued with regard to intent. The Mississippi Squadron after action report blamed the change in plans for the expedition's failures.268

In keeping with established policies, both Grant and Porter designated commanders for the Army and Navy components of the expedition. Tactical unity of effort was not achieved. In Quinby’s words:“It is one of the great evils of our service that the land and naval forces are left, in a great measure, independent of each other. The best concerted plans are liable to fail from this cause.”269

Grant and Porter did not have a clear picture of the expedition’s progress. Multiple chains of command, combined with poor communications, meant that their reports were delayed by several days.
Porter received reports from Watson Smith. Porter was located near the mouth of the Yazoo and on his own expedition during this time and messages between the two commanders were delayed approximately eight days.

Grant received reports from Ross through Prentiss at Helena and messages were delayed approximately three to seven days. Wilson sent his own reports to Rawlins or Grant at Young's Point, but his messages were also sent through Helena. When Quinby assumed command of the Army forces, he reported to McPherson at Lake Providence, with a time delay of approximately seven days.

The Confederate forces established unity of command and shorter lines of communication. Since there was no telegraph office in Greenwood, Loring ordered Waul to establish a line of couriers to the nearest telegraph office at Vaiden, on the Central Railroad, in order to communicate with Pemberton.270

**OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND LOGISTICS**

Grant assumed that sufficient transports would be immediately available for this maneuver. Most were in use on other rivers and delays were encountered as the quartermaster attempted to obtain additional vessels to support the change in plans.

Grant did not coordinate with supporting commands and agencies early in the planning process. Although attempts were made to react to his requirements, there were not enough small vessels available in time to meet his requirements.

Logistical concepts were not adapted to changing conditions. The Union battlefield distribution system relied on rapid delivery of forces and sustainment using transports. It was effective and efficient while forces remained on the Mississippi River. The system collapsed when the expedition reached Fort Pemberton and the nearest supply point was 200 miles and several days away. The expedition was not prepared for a siege or an extended operation. Union ammunition and ration supplies were inadequate.

Gunboats and the mortar raft carried their normal basic load of ammunition. The *U.S.S. Chillicothe* was originally provided with 100 XI-inch shells, and 10 barrels of powder. With both guns in use, *Chillicothe* carried ammunition for less than three hours of continuous engagement.271

The mortar rafts normally carried 75 rounds for their 13-inch mortars. The mortar raft had fired 49 of its 75 rounds, or sixty-five percent of its ammunition by March 13th.272

Ironically, Confederate ammunition supplies were also nearly exhausted during the Union assaults on Fort Pemberton. However, Loring’s forces were able to use their interior lines of communication to redistribute ammunition. Quantities of ammunition were never high at Fort Pemberton and on March 25 the magazines at Fort Pemberton contained only 90 rounds for the 32-pounder rifle, 140 rounds for 8-inch guns, 90 rounds for the three 12-pounder rifles, and 60 rounds for Parrott guns.273

The daily march ration for Union troops was one pound of hardtack, ¼ pound of salt pork or ¼ pound of fresh meat, coffee, sugar, and salt. Naval forces used similar rations and vessels were able to draw rations at Army commissaries through cooperative agreements.274 Rations were normally issued for four days at a time when units were not moving.275 Grant directed units accompanying the Yazoo Pass
Expedition to take fifteen days rations. By March 2, Army units were down to six days rations and had sent to Helena for additional rations. Both Army and Navy forces supplemented their rations by foraging for beef and pork. Cattle and hogs were shot, butchered, and distributed to the transports by regimental foraging parties. By March 3, Watson Smith reported that the army elements were down to five days' on hand. The flotilla was not much better off. No vessel had more than a month's supply of food. The Chillicothe was down to seven days, the Lioness thirteen, and the Fulton seven. Smith projected that he could maintain his naval force for 22 days to one month. 20,000 additional rations were shipped on the transport Dacotah.

Cooking the rations while underway was another matter. Officers dined in the boat's cabin, but this was a luxury not afforded the average soldier. Soldiers on the transports made coffee using hot water from the steam engines. Meat was fried in the boiler fires or on sticks over the steam escape pipes.

By February 1863 the Confederate forces were experiencing shortages of many ration items and even the Army of Northern Virginia was critically short of rations. Pemberton's forces experienced shortages, but were comparatively well provisioned, with the exception of meat. The previous December one soldier had complained that "our rations come rather short and expect they will get shorter before a great while...we can make out to eat it [pork] by shutting our eyes and holding our noses..." Beef was the most difficult ration item to procure. Pork and lard were used as substitutes and quality was a continuous problem. Salt beef rations were calculated at 1 lb. per daily ration while pork rations were calculated at ½ lb. per daily ration. On March 1, 1863, the post commissary and depot at Vicksburg had a combined total of 4,875 pork rations, 3,060 salt beef rations and 1,000 head of cattle to support approximately 21,000 troops. The situation had improved by May and an inspector found that Vicksburg had a total of 379,000 pounds, or 758,000 pork rations available for issue. Rations were shipped to Vicksburg from Jackson, Meridian, and Snyder's Bluff. Rations were also stored at Bovina, Edwards, Bolton, and Yazoo City.

SIGNIFICANCE

Politically, the Yazoo Pass Expedition was seen as one more failure for the administration. Many sought Grant's removal. Abraham Lincoln responded to Grant's critics by saying "I rather like the man. I think I will try him a little longer."

The economic impact of the Yazoo Pass Expedition was significant. Thousands of acres of crops were flooded by the breach in the levee, thus reducing the harvest in one of the most productive regions of the country. Union forces confiscated and destroyed other staples, such as cotton. Mississippi Squadron vessels returned with 558 bales on their decks and Union reports indicate that approximately 4,000 to 5,000 bales of cotton were captured or destroyed, or a retail loss of approximately $1.2 million to $1.5 million dollars.
The Yazoo Pass Expedition did not have an immediate military impact on the outcome of the war. Neither side accomplished strategic objectives. However, the expedition forced Pemberton to react to Grant's maneuver and kept Confederate forces occupied near Fort Pemberton for nearly two weeks after the expedition departed. Grant used this time to explore other options and develop his campaign plan for a final drive against Vicksburg.

Grant's decision to cancel the Yazoo Pass expedition was sound. Available information indicated that the expedition had been stopped at Fort Pemberton. Efforts to conduct a supporting attack through Steele's Bayou, Black Bayou, Deer Creek, and Rolling Fork failed. Water levels on the rivers were dropping and the Yazoo Pass would be unusable in a few weeks. Lower water levels would also provide the Confederates with opportunities to interdict the return route. Other courses of action, such as the efforts to bypass Vicksburg using canals, were not feasible. Grant needed to concentrate all of his forces, as well as Porter's gunboats, near Milliken's Bend to set the conditions for his next move.

The Yazoo Pass Expedition, combined with other efforts, resulted in Confederate indecision. Pemberton was kept guessing as to what Grant's next move would be. The Confederates continued to disperse their forces in case the route would be tried again. Colonel Waul and his Texas Legion remained at Fort Pemberton. Waul supervised improvements and recommended to Pemberton on April 27 that the fortifications remain in place until mid-May. He justified this action by explaining that falling river levels, combined with Union troop dispositions, would make another attack down the Tallahatchie unlikely after another two weeks.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

The Yazoo Pass Expedition provides many lessons learned with implications for current and future operations.

Unity of command must be achieved to ensure success. Grant and Porter achieved unity of effort through consensus, mutual respect, and a determination to cooperate. However, Grant failed to include the Navy in his changes of intent, thus causing command confusion. Tactical unity of effort was marginal. Ross was unable to influence Watson Smith to any appreciable degree. Tactical commanders lacked the authority to compel joint action. Effective communication with strategic leaders is an essential component of Theater command. Pemberton failed to keep Jefferson Davis informed, and Jefferson Davis was forced to demand status several times during the Vicksburg campaign.

Planners must ensure that intelligence is not overlooked in the zeal to accomplish the mission. Commanders at all echelons, to include Grant and Watson Smith, discounted intelligence reports regarding enemy knowledge of the mission and preparations for defense. Pemberton discounted initial reports of the Union advance.

Leaders should not be afraid to cancel operations when the risks outweigh the rewards. Ross and Quinby recognized the danger posed to their forces by open terrain, water obstacles, and an entrenched enemy. Their risk assessment, combined with their inability to maneuver around these defenses, resulted in their separate decisions to avoid combat.
Operational security and deception campaigns must be integrated into the campaign plan. Both forces failed to disguise their activities. Similarly, neither force conducted information or psychological operations.

Planners must consider the effects of weather and military activity on the terrain. Grant and his subordinate commanders failed to consider the impact of local flooding. As a result, the maneuver force was not provided with sufficient engineering assets (pontoon bridges or assault boats) to cross the flooded terrain.

New weapon systems do not guarantee mission success. U.S.S. Chillicothe’s construction defects, combined with a determined enemy, resulted in needless casualties when the pine backing of her armor gave way under the impact of Confederate artillery shells.

Similarly, this expensive weapon system was effectively neutralized by inexpensive Confederate technology. The Confederate employment of mines almost resulted in the loss of the Chillicothe and contributed to the retreat of Union vessels from the final engagement at Fort Pemberton.

Battlefield distribution concepts must be adjusted to meet changing conditions. Battlefield distribution failed during the Yazoo Pass Expedition. Grant’s forces relied on a few depots along the Main Supply Route (the Mississippi River). Large steamboats were used to rapidly distribute units, medical support, ammunition, rations, and fuel. The system was efficient and effective as long as units were located along the Main Supply Route. Route restrictions, combined with a shortage of transportation assets capable of supporting the maneuver force, caused the system to fail. Sustainment quantities were insufficient for a protracted operation. Fuel, ammunition and ration quantities specified for the expedition would have been sufficient for an unopposed movement. The expedition lacked sufficient resources to conduct a siege. Planners failed to anticipate and adjust the standard ammunition loads carried to support key weapon systems (gunboats and mortar raft).

The Yazoo Pass Expedition provides a historical example of joint operations. Experience gained from this operation helped develop Grant as a strategic and operational commander. Joint staff officers should consider the strategic and operational lessons learned from the Yazoo Pass Expedition to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past and facilitate future operations.

WORD COUNT=19,586
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid., 163.

4 Ibid., 190.

5 Ibid., 163-64.

6 Ibid., 164.

7 Ibid., 165.


14 O.R., XVII, pt. 2, 278.


16 Arnold, 32.


18 Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War, 143.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., XV, 820.

23 Ibid., 717.

24 Ibid., 752.

25 Ibid., 757-58.

26 Ibid., XXIV, pt. 3, 611.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., XVII, pt. 2, 845. Bowen's division was not listed in the official strength report. Division strength was provided by MG Sterling Price to MG William W. Loring in a message dated January 19, 1863. The figure of 4,200 cited probably represents the number of enlisted men present for duty and has been included in this table as an approximation of Bowen's unit strength. Bowen's division was in Pemberton's department on the Big Black River in January 1863.

29 Ibid., 844-45. An inspection report dated January 18, 1863 states that Van Dorn had 8,773 troops (of which 7,455 were to be transferred to Tennessee). This probably represents the number of enlisted men present for duty and has been included in this table as an approximation of Van Dorn's unit strength.

30 Photograph of U.S.S. Baron De Kalb (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives, date unknown).


32 Ibid., 56

33 John D. Milligan, Gunboats Down the Mississippi (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1965), 19-30.

34 O.R.N., I, p. 42.

35 Milligan, 14-15.


37 Ibid., 23, p. 448. See also Ibid., 24, p. 92.

38 Milligan, 17.


40 Isaac Brown, "Confederate Torpedoes in the Yazoo," in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol III (New York: T. Yoseloff, 1956), 580. The Baron De Kalb was also sunk by mines near Yazoo City in July 1863.

41 O.R.N., 23, p. 549.


45 O.R., XXIV, pt. 3, 38. See also O.R.N., 24, p. 244.


48 Ibid., 230.


50 Ibid., 482.

51 O.R., XXIV, pt. 1, 372.


54 O.R., XXIV, pt. 3, 10.


56 O.R.N., 24, p. 252.

57 Ibid., 24, p. 257.

58 Ezra J. Warner, *Generals in Blue* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 391-92. John Aaron Rawlins was city attorney in Galena, Illinois in 1857. Grant asked Rawlins to be his aide-de-camp and Rawlins was commissioned a Captain on August 30, 1861. Rawlins later became Grant's assistant adjutant general. Rawlins was known as Grant's "alter ego." Grant referred to Rawlins as "the most nearly indispensible" man around him. Rawlins was promoted to brigadier general and was brevetted to Major General in both the volunteer and regular armies. Grant made Rawlins his Secretary of War in March 1869. Rawlins died of tuberculosis in September 1869 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.


60 O.R.N., 23, p. 707.

61 O.R., LII, pt. 2, 393.
62 Nash, 144-48.


64 O.R., XVII, pt. 2, 812.

65 Ibid., XXIV, pt. 3. 608

66 Ibid., 598.


68 Ibid., 232.

69 O.R.N., 23, p. 408.

70 O.R., XXIV, pt. 3, 32.

71 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 237.

72 Ibid., 234.

73 O.R., II, 641.


75 Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War, 139.

76 O.R., XXIV, pt. 3, 6.

77 O.R.N., 24, p. 195.

78 O.R., XXIV, pt. 1, 372

79 Ibid., 373.

80 Ibid., 375.

81 Ibid., 14.

82 Ibid., 17

83 Ibid., XXIV, pt. 3, 37.

84 Ibid., 38.
Ibid., XXIV, pt. 1, 375.

O.R.N., 24, p. 163.

Ibid., 244.

Ibid., 251.

Ibid., 23, p. 474.

Ibid., 24, p. 118.

Ibid., 23, pp. 569, 577.


Ibid., 376.


Ibid., 254.

Ibid., 244.


Ibid., 57.

Ibid., 56.

O.R.N., 24, p. 265.


Ibid., 402. The author could find no evidence that this message was ever sent to the Associated Press. In any event, Confederate scouts could have verified the information proposed in Washburn's message.

Ibid., 360-61.

Ibid., 376.

Ibid., 377-78.

Ibid., XXIV, pt. 3, 62

Warner, Generals in Blue, 411-12.
109 Ibid.

110 Warner, Generals in Blue, 417-18. Salomon fought at Wilson's Creek in Sigel's Brigade. He was appointed Colonel of the 9th Wisconsin on November 26, 1861 and commanded a brigade in Kansas during 1862.

111 Frederick H. Dyer, A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion (Dayton, OH: The National Historical Society, 1979), 1136. The 43d Indiana participated in a number of engagements prior to the expedition including the siege of New Madrid (March 5-14, 1862), the siege and capture of Island No. 10 (March 15-April 10, 1862); the expedition to and operations against Fort Pillow (April 13-June 5, 1862); the White River expedition (June 10-July 14, 1862), and an expedition to Arkansas Post (November 16-21, 1862).

112 Dyer, 1136. The 46th Indiana participated in a number of engagements prior to the expedition including the siege of New Madrid (March 5-14, 1862), the siege and capture of Island No. 10 (March 15-April 10, 1862); the expedition to and operations against Fort Pillow (April 13-June 5, 1862); the White River expedition (June 10-July 14, 1862), and an expedition to Arkansas Post (November 16-21, 1862).

113 Dyer, 1137. The 47th Indiana participated in a number of engagements prior to the expedition including the siege of New Madrid (March 5-14, 1862); the siege and capture of Island No. 10 (March 15-April 8, 1862); the expedition to and operations against Fort Pillow (April 13-17 and May 19-23, 1862) and an expedition to Arkansas Post (November 16-21, 1862).

114 Dyer, 1685. The 28th Wisconsin participated in two expeditions prior to embarking with the Yazoo Pass Expedition. These included the expedition to Hickman, KY (December 25-26, 1862) and the White River Expedition (January 5-7, 1863).

115 Thomas Stevens, unpublished personal diary entry for February 24, 1863, U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

116 Warner, Generals in Blue, 154. Fisk was an avowed abolitionist and was appointed assistant commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau for Kentucky and Tennessee after the war. He founded Fisk University in Nashville. President Grant appointed Fisk to the board of Indian Commissioners. Fisk ran for governor of New Jersey in 1886 and for President of the United States in 1888. Died July 9, 1890.

117 Dyer 1177. The 29th Iowa participated in the White River Expedition (January 11-26, 1863).

118 Dyer 1179.


120 Benjamin F. Pearson, "Benjamin F. Pearson's War Diary," Annals of Iowa XV, no. 2 (1925): 120. Lieutenant Colonel Francis Marion Drake was also present on the expedition with the 36th Iowa. Drake was promoted to colonel in 1864 and was breveted to brigadier general in 1865. He was elected Governor of Iowa and served from 1896-1898. Drake founded Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa.

121 Dyer 1179-80.

122 Pearson, 111.
Dyer 1335. The 33rd Missouri participated in operation in Missouri from September 22-December 19, 1862 and in an expedition to Devall's Bluff, Arkansas (January 16-20, 1863).

Henry S. Carroll to his mother, March 10, 1863, Henry Carroll Papers, Harrisburg Civil War Roundtable Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle, PA.

Dyer, 1336.

Dyer, 1164. The 3rd Iowa Battery Light Artillery ("Dubuque Battery") participated in many small engagements in Missouri and Arkansas during 1862 and fought in the Battle of Pea Ridge (March 6-8, 1862).

O.R.N., 24, p. 97.

O.R., XXIV, pt. 1, 396.

Ibid., XXIV, pt. 3, 74 and 163. Strength figures reported the Thirteenth Division during February and March 1863 are identical.


Pearson, 111.

Sperry, 15.

Pearson, 111.

Ibid., 120.

O.R., XXIV, pt. 3, 37. See also O.R.N., 24, 259.

O.R.N., 24, p. 244.

Ibid., 246.

Ibid., 448.

O.R., XXIV, pt. 3. 86-87.


Ibid., XXIV, pt. 1, 19-20.

Warner, *Generals in Blue*, 387. Quinby graduated sixth in the West Point class of 1843. Quinby raised the "Rochester Regiment" (mustered into service as the 13th New York). He served as Colonel of the 13th New York (Sherman's Brigade) during First Manassas. Quinby resigned after his unit was swept
from the field. In March 1862 Quinby accepted a commission as brigadier general of volunteers and was
given command of the 7th Division, Army of the Tennessee, in September.

144 Warner, Generals in Blue, 419. Sanborn entered the war as Colonel of the 4th Minnesota. He led
one of Rosecrans' brigades at the battle of Iuka in September 1862. Sanborn commanded the 4th
Minnesota at the battle of Corinth in October 1862.

145 Dyer, 1077.

146 Ibid., 1137.

147 Ibid., 1297-98.

148 Ibid., 1172.

149 Ibid., 1327.

150 Ibid., 1332.

151 Ibid., 1533,34.

152 Ibid., 1166.

153 Ibid., 1169.

154 Ibid., 1332.

155 Ibid., 1316.

156 Ibid., 1491.

157 Ibid., 1673.


159 O.R.N., 24, p. 294.

160 O.R., XXIV, pt. 3, 623

161 Ibid., 623.

162 Ibid., 630.

163 Ibid., 629.

164 Ibid., 633.

165 Ibid., XXIII, pt. 2, 641.
166 Ibid., XXIV, pt. 3, 638-39.


170 Warner, Generals in Gray, 193-94.

171 Ibid., 328-29.

172 Hewett, 76-112.

173 Stewart Sifakis, Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Mississippi (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1995), 106-107. The 20th Mississippi was organized in the spring of 1861 and was mustered into service in June 1861. The unit surrendered at Fort Donelson February 16, 1862 and was paroled in mid-September 1862.


175 Ibid., 416-417.

176 Warner, Generals in Gray, 306. Tilghman entered the Confederate Army from Kentucky in 1861. Commanded Fort Henry and surrendered to Grant after sending most of his troops to Fort Donelson. Promoted to brigadier general October 18, 1861. Exchanged in the fall of 1862. Assumed command of the 1st Division of the I Corps of Van Dorn's (later Pemberton's) army just after Corinth and was in the rear guard during the retreat from Holly Springs to Grenada, Mississippi.

177 O.R., XXIV, pt. 1, 417.


179 Stewart Sifakis, Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, the Confederate Units and the Indian Units (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1995), 43. The 8th Kentucky surrendered at Fort Donelson on February 16, 1862. The unit was exchanged at Vicksburg on September 13, 1862.

180 Stewart Sifakis, Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Louisiana (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1995), 108-109. The Louisiana 21st (Smith's-Higgins'-Patton's) Infantry Regiment (also known as the 22nd Infantry Regiment) was organized as the 22nd Infantry Regiment in New Orleans on March 28, 1862. The unit was redesignated as the 21st Infantry Regiment in January 1863 following several reorganizations. Battle experience included New Orleans (April 18-25, 1862), the Vicksburg bombardments (May 18-July 27 1862), the Chickasaw Bayou defense (December 27-29, 1862), and Snyder's Mill (December 27, 1862). This unit generally served as heavy artillery.
Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Mississippi*, 111. The 23d Mississippi Infantry surrendered at Fort Donelson on February 16, 1862. The unit served in Mississippi following its exchange in late 1862.

Hewett, 678.

Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Mississippi*, 17-18. Mississippi 14th Light Artillery Battalion, Company C was organized in the spring of 1862 and served in Mississippi.

Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Louisiana*, 29-31. The Louisiana Point Coupée Artillery Battalion, Company A was formed in August 1861. It was armed with one 10-lb. Parrott, two 12-lb. Howitzers, and three 6-lb. Smoothbores on April 6, 1862. Battle experience included Belmont (November 7, 1861), Island No. 10 (April 6-7, 1862), Coffeeville (December 5, 1862), and the Yazoo Pass (February 16-19, 1863). Only one section was present at Fort Pemberton.

Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Louisiana*, 31-32. The Louisiana Point Coupée Artillery Battalion, Company B was formed in early 1862. Battle experience included Island No. 10 (April 6-7, 1862), Coffeeville (December 5, 1862), and the Yazoo Pass (February 16-19, 1863).


Ibid., 389.

O.R.N., 24, p. 296. The batteries in Charleston harbor fired upon the *Star of the West* in January 1861 as she attempted to reinforce Fort Sumter: the first hostile artillery fire of the Civil War. Louisiana seized the *Star of the West* in New Orleans when the state seceded. The *Star of the West* was moved, along with many other vessels, to the Yazoo when Farragut advanced on New Orleans in the spring of 1862.

O.R.N., 24, p. 296.

Ibid., 262.


Ibid., 399.

Ibid., 380.

O.R.N., 24, pp. 246, 284, 299, 541, 693. This represented a monetary loss of approximately $750,000 to $900,000 since cotton was valued at $300 per bale.

Ibid., 24, p. 267.

Ibid., 246.

O.R., XXIV, pt. 3, 663.

Ibid., XXIV, pt. 1, 412.

200 Sperry, 19-20.


203 Henry S. Carroll to his mother, March 13, 1863. See also O.R.N., 24, 247.

204 O.R.N., 24, p. 274.

205 Ibid., 274, 276.

206 Ibid., 273-75.

207 Ibid., 274.

208 O.R., XXIV, pt. 1, 379.

209 Ibid., 416.


212 Ibid., XXIV, pt. 1, 382-3.


214 Ibid., 287, 515

215 Ibid., 281, 284, 288.

216 Pearson, 119.


218 Henry S. Carroll to his mother, March 29, 1863.


220 Ibid., XXIV, pt. 1, 417. See also O.R.N., 24, p. 283.

221 Pearson, 120.

222 O.R.N., 24, p. 474. Louisville, Carondelet, Mound City, and Pittsburg were all sister vessels to the Baron De Kalb and were produced under the same contract by James Eads of St. Louis.
223 Ibid., 480.

224 Ibid., 481.


226 Ibid., 127. See also O.R.N., 24, p. 480.

227 Ibid., 134.

228 Ibid., XXIV, pt. 1, 408.

229 Ibid., XXIV, pt. 3, 151.


231 O.R., XXIV, pt. 1, 409.

232 Pearson, 121.


234 Dabney Herndon Maury, Recollections of a Virginian in the Mexican, Indian, and Civil Wars (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1897), 177-178.

235 Raab, 97.

236 Pearson, 122.

237 Sifakis, Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Mississippi, 114-15. The 26th Mississippi Infantry surrendered at Fort Donelson on February 16, 1862. The unit served in Mississippi following its exchange in late 1862.

238 Warner, Generals in Gray, 86. Featherston served with the 17th Mississippi Infantry in the Army of Northern Virginia during 1862.

239 Sifakis, Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Mississippi, 74-76. The Mississippi 3rd Infantry Regiment was organized in 1861. The unit fought in the battles of Biloxi and Christian Pass in April 1862 and in the Chickasaw Bayou against Sherman in December 1862.

240 Ibid., 109-110. The Mississippi 22nd Infantry Regiment was organized in mid-1861 and fought at Shiloh (April 6-7, 1862). The unit was at Vicksburg during the bombardments of May-July of 1862 and fought at Baton Rouge in August 1862. Skirmishes at Rolling Fork (March 20, 1863) and Fore's Plantation (March 25, 1863) preceded its arrival at Fort Pemberton.

241 Ibid., 119-20. The Mississippi 31st Infantry Regiment was organized by increasing the 5th Infantry Battalion to regimental size in early 1862. The unit was at Vicksburg during the bombardments of May-July of 1862 and fought at Baton Rouge on August 5, 1862. A skirmish at Fore's Plantation on March 25, 1863 preceded its arrival at Fort Pemberton.
242 Hewett, 13.

243 Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Mississippi*, 121-23. The Mississippi 33rd (Hurst's-Drakes) Infantry Regiment was formed in early 1862. The unit served in northern Mississippi and fought at Corinth October 3-4, 1862.

244 Ibid., 67-68. The Mississippi 1st Infantry Battalion, Sharpshooters (also known as the 10th Sharpshooters Battalion) was organized in May, 1862. The unit served in Loring’s Division from January-April, 1863.

245 Ibid., 7-8. Mississippi 1st Light Artillery Regiment, Company C was organized in early 1862. The unit was at Vicksburg during the bombardments of May-July of 1862 and fought at Chickasaw Bayou December 27-29, 1862. The company fought against Admiral Porter’s Steele’s Bayou expedition March 14-27 and at Rolling Fork March 20, 1863 before its arrival at Fort Pemberton.

246 Warner, *Generals in Gray*, 219. Moore graduated from West Point in 1849 and saw action against the Seminoles in Florida. After garrison duty in Santa Fe and Baton Rouge Moore resigned his commission in 1855. Moore organized the 2d Texas Infantry in 1861 and was elected Colonel. Commanded 2d Texas at the battle of Shiloh and was commended for gallantry. Promoted to Brigadier General on May 26, 1862. Moore took part in the attack on Corinth.

247 Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Alabama*, 106-107. The 37th Alabama fought at the battles of Iuka (September 19, 1862), Corinth (October 3-4, 1862), and Chickasaw Bayou (December 27-29, 1862) prior to their defense against the Yazoo Pass Expedition.

248 Ibid., 112-13. The Alabama 42nd Infantry Regiment was mustered into Confederate service at Columbus, MS on May 16, 1862. Battle experience included Corinth (October 3-4, 1862).

249 Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Mississippi*, 124-25. The Mississippi 35th Infantry Regiment was organized in the spring of 1862. The unit served in northern Mississippi and was usually associated with Maury’s Division. Battle experience included Corinth (October 3-4, 1862) and Chickasaw Bayou (December 27-29, 1862).

250 Ibid., 131-32. The Mississippi 40th Infantry Regiment was organized in mid-1862. Battle experience included Iuka (September 19, 1862) and Corinth (October 3-4, 1862).

251 Stewart Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, the Confederate Units and the Indian Units*, 70-71. The Missouri 1st (Bledsoe’s) Artillery Battery was mustered into Confederate service on April 21, 1861. Battles included Wilson’s Creek (August 10, 1861), Pea Ridge (March 7-8, 1862), the Corinth Campaign (April-June 1862), and Corinth (October 3-4, 1862).

252 Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Mississippi*, 127-28. The Mississippi 37th Infantry Regiment was organized in mid-1862. Battle experience included the Corinth Campaign (April-June 1862), Farmington (May 1862), Iuka (September 19, 1862), and Corinth (October 3-4, 1862).

253 Stewart Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Tennessee* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1992), 51-53. The Tennessee 7th Cavalry Regiment (also known as the Tennessee 1st (Jackson’s) Cavalry Regiment) was formed following the addition of five companies to the 6th Cavalry Battalion in April 1862. Company B served as escort to Major General William W. Loring from the fall of 1862 until early 1864. The unit was assigned to Moore’s Brigade, Loring’s Division in April 1863. Battle experience included Union City (April 1, 1862), Lafayette Station, TN (June 25 and 29, 1862), an expedition from Holly Springs to Bolivar and Jackson, TN (July 25-August 1, 1862), and Corinth (October 3-4, 1862).
Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Tennessee*, 27-28. The Tennessee Memphis Light Artillery Battery was organized in Memphis in July 1861. On May 9, 1862 the battery was equipped with three 6-lb. Rifles and one 12-lb. James Rifle. Battle experience included the Corinth Campaign (April-June 1862), Farmington (one section) (May 9, 1862), and Corinth (October 3-4, 1862).

Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Louisiana*, 109-110. The Louisiana 22nd (Theard's-Herrick's) Infantry Regiment (also known as the 23rd Infantry Regiment) was organized as the 23rd Infantry Regiment and was mustered into Confederate service in March 1862. The designation was changed to 22nd (Theard's-Herrick's) Infantry Regiment in early 1863 following several reorganizations. This regiment generally served as heavy artillery and battle experience included New Orleans (April 18-25, 1862) and the Vicksburg bombardments (May 18-July 27, 1862).

Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, the Confederate Units and the Indian Units*, 90-91. The Missouri 2nd Cavalry Regiment was formed in August 1862, following the reorganization of the 4th Cavalry Battalion into a regiment. Battle experience included Iuka (September 19, 1862), Corinth (October 3-4, 1862), Coffeenville (December 5, 1862), Holly Springs (December 20, 1862), and a skirmish in the vicinity of the Yazoo Pass (February 16-19, 1863).

O.R., XXIV, pt. III, 622 and Sifakis, *Compendium of the Confederate Armies: Mississippi*, 31-32. The Mississippi 1st Cavalry Battalion, State Troops was organized for six months in early 1863 and served in the 5th Military District, Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana from February-April 1863.

Bruce S. Allardice, *More Generals in Gray* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 99-100. George enlisted as a private in the 1st Mississippi for the Mexican War and saw action at the Battle of Monterrey. He returned to Mississippi, became a lawyer and was elected to the Mississippi Secession Convention. George served as a junior officer in the 20th Mississippi during the Virginia campaigns of 1861. He was imprisoned for seven months following the 20th Mississippi's surrender at Fort Donelson on February 16, 1862 and was appointed brigadier general of state troops following his exchange. George was in poor health and his health did not recover until after Vicksburg. He later served as colonel of the 19th and 5th Mississippi Cavalry regiments and was captured a second time on November 3, 1863. George was a prisoner for the remainder of the war. His distinguished career after the war included an appointment as chief justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1879 and election to the U.S. Senate in 1880, 1886, and 1892.


Maury, 177-78.

Henry S. Carroll to his mother, March 29, 1863.


O.R., XV, 300.

O.R.N., 24, p. 244.


O.R.N., 24, p. 244.
269 O.R., XXIV, pt. 1, 408.
270 Ibid., XXIV, pt. 3, 639.
272 Ibid., 24, p. 274.


277 O.R.N., 24, p. 262.
278 Pearson, 15. See also O.R.N., 24, p. 263.
279 O.R.N., 24, p. 263.
280 Ibid., 24, p. 514.
281 Sperry, 15-16.
282 O.R., XXIII, pt. 2, 626.
283 John M. Smith (33rd Mississippi Infantry) to Mrs. Teresa A. Smith, December 20, 1862. U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle, PA.
285 Ibid., XXIV, pt. 3, 867.
286 Catherine Merrill, The Soldier of Indiana in the War for the Union (Indianapolis: Merrill and Co., 1866-69), 293-94.
287 O.R.N. 24, pp. 284, 543-44.
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