The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

AC/RC SEAMLESS INTEGRATION TURMOIL-TRANSITION-TEAMWORK

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TERRY M. HASTON
United States Army National Guard

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2000

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
AC/RC Seamless Integration
Turmoil-Transition-Teamwork

By

Lieutenant Colonel Terry M. Haston
United States Army National Guard

COL William A. Belich
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Terry M. Haston

TITLE: AC/RC Integration, Turmoil-Transition-Teamwork

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 10 April 2000    PAGES: 28    CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

As the United States enters the twenty-first century, the National Security Strategy depends more on the Reserve Components than it ever has in the past. Friction between the Active Army and Reserve Components, particularly the Army National Guard, has reached its peak and is now showing evidence of healing. However, the process is far from being released from intensive care and becoming the cohesive team that the nation will need in the future. Combat readiness of both Army and Army National Guard units has been the theme of countless debates and professional opinions. How to measure that readiness draws further discussion and criticism from military professionals and elected officials alike. Readiness, force structure, allocation of resources and their equitable balance between the Active and Reserve components are critical elements in meeting guidance of the Army’s Chief of Staff in becoming “The Army”. However, the most difficult bridge to cross is the one that spans the cultural gap between these organizations and their leadership.

This paper will examine the cultural division and its perceived causes as it relates to the four major measured areas of readiness. The focused areas will be those used in the current Army readiness reporting as in accordance with Army Regulations 220-1. It will also consider current missions and operational tempo rates assigned to both the Active and Reserve components and explore possible reassignments of these missions and roles.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. 111
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................. v
SEAMLESS INTEGRATION ......................................................................................... 1
WHERE WE HAVE BEEN ............................................................................................ 1
NEW DIRECTIONS ...................................................................................................... 4
FORCE STRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL ................................................................. 5
SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT ....................................................................................... 8
TRAINING .................................................................................................................... 9
MISSIONS .................................................................................................................. 12
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 15
ENDNOTES ............................................................................................................... 17
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 21
SEAMLESS INTEGRATION
Turmoil-Transition-Teamwork

WHERE WE HAVE BEEN

Seamless integration is a phrase coined by the former Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer, in his attempt to start the melding process in recovery of institutional wounds inflicted during Desert Shield/Desert Storm between the Active and Reserve components. These wounds were the result of decisions made by Army leadership not to activate National Guard Combat Brigades with their associated Round-Out Divisions during deployment. This was only another incident between the Active and the Reserve Components that eroded the gap and further widened the crevice between our nation's professional military and its citizen soldiers.

Throughout the history of the United States armed forces, there have been internal conflicts between the professional active Army and the State Militia. The basis for this conflict has never been definitively established, but nevertheless existed either overtly or surreptitiously. The founding fathers of this country embedded into the constitution the framework for a standing militia to be established for the general defense as it’s eloquently phrased in Article I:

"The Congress shall have the power...To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."\(^1\)

Interpretations of these laws, throughout the years, have taken on several meanings by the leadership in camps of both the Active Military and the National Guard. Critical decisions, which changed the direction of history, were made reflecting the strife inlaid between these organizations because each thought it was the sole proprietor of national security. Evidence of these decisions is clearly noted by history.

After the war of 1812 and prior to the war with Mexico the Militia was primarily relegated to a law enforcement asset for states' governors. The professional Army held the opinion that the Militia was ill disciplined and equipped.\(^2\) These tensions were carried over to the Civil War when officers of Militia units in both the North and South were replaced by regular Army Officers when called into service. Although most units served well, the effects of this action again caused tensions to increase. After the War Between the States ended, the Militia once again was tasked with law enforcement support missions. Reconstruction was a time of healing for a war-torn nation, and in the Southern Militia units were not allowed to reform for fear of re-ignition of old convictions. Former Militia officers, who had found new professions and received regular Army commissions during the war, were reduced to ranks far inferior to their wartime status.\(^3\) This action again struck at the roots of nation. When units were allowed to reform, the name "National Guard" was adopted rather than the former title of "Militia ".

\(^1\) Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution.


\(^3\) "The Civil War," by Bruce Catton, pp. 222-223.
Between the end of the Civil War and World War I, several instances occurred which demonstrated the wall of misunderstanding was growing taller between the two organizations.

The Assistant Secretary of War, Henry Breckinridge, told the National Guard Association members “You will either come into the continental Army or you will get out. The National Guard will no longer have any federal sanction. States which want to maintain their own guard will have that privilege“.

President Woodrow Wilson called the entire National Guard into active service during World War I, recognizing their importance; however, this was not the view held by the Army’s leadership. General Peyton March demanded that all Guardsmen remove state patches from their uniforms. He removed all but one of the National Guard general officers in command and replaced them with active duty generals. Some years later General Pershing stated that the Army had never given the National Guard their support.

As World War II broke out, the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, convinced Congress to activate the National Guard. The equipment assigned to the National Guard was what he wanted rather than the soldiers themselves, he later admitted. These acts did not go unnoticed by the citizen soldiers and the effects ran deep within their leadership, further raising suspicions.

During the Korean War citizen soldiers were again mobilized to support the national defense. However, as before, Guardsmen were mobilized and deployed as individuals, not as units. This decision again tore at the foundation of the National Guard and the grass roots support it provided to the nation’s defense. The breaking up of units was a means to dilute the infrastructure of the guard and ensure that regular army leadership was in place to use effectively the newly acquired resources.

The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 exempted members of the National Guard from being drafted into the active armed forces. The significance of this law and the negative connotation that it would eventually imply would not be realized until ten years later. President Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to mobilize the National Guard during the escalation of the Vietnam War fostered the belief that the National Guard was filled with only those people who wanted to avoid being drafted. During this period the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff encouraged the President to mobilize 200,000 reservists, but he elected to fill manpower requirements through implementation of the draft. This perception of the National Guard infested the nation and credibility further declined in the eyes of the public and leadership of the Army.

General Creighton Abrams took command of all forces in Vietnam from General William C. Westmoreland and again asked for citizen soldiers to be integrated into the fighting forces in Southeast Asia. His belief was that if a war is important enough to commit United States soldiers, it’s important enough to include the citizen soldiers. This was the first indication from the National Command Authority that they were actually listening.

On 11 April 1968 the President ordered 24,500 National Guardsmen and Reservists to active duty. Most units were support type units that served primarily within the United States; however, eight Army National Guard units actually deployed to Vietnam. The only ground-maneuver unit to actually fight in
combat was Company D (Ranger), 151 Infantry. Over 2,000 Guardsmen whose units were not called volunteered for duty. Over half were officers and twenty-three of these soldiers were killed in action. In total, more than 9,000 Guardsmen served in Vietnam. 8

After the United States removed its forces from Vietnam, the military was at an all time low in both strength and morale. The same situation affected the National Guard. With the end of the draft and national disdain for the military in general, leadership immediately saw that actions must be taken to begin the rebuilding process. The “Total Force” concept was developed by then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. He stated:

“Emphasis will be given to concurrent consideration of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve Forces.” 9

The “Total Force” policy was set in place and it seemed that animosity between the Active Forces and the National Guard was beginning to ease. The “CAPSTONE” program was implemented, aligning Active Component forces with Reserve Component Forces. This program matched Reserve units with a “Wartime” chain of command Active unit, and its command structures, with which they would serve in the event of mobilization. It also provided a means of “training oversight” for units to insure that the Active Component Combat Arms Commander knew the status of his “third” brigade, and it provided the Reserve Component Combat Arms Commander a resource for training guidance and expertise. 10

National crisis arose in Grenada and Panama during the 1980s and selected individuals were activated to perform special duties, mostly composed of Air National Guardsmen and Army Reservists. These situations did not warrant a Presidential Selected Call-up of the Army National Guard and were successfully prosecuted by Active Component units.

Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990 tested the “Total Force” policy for the first time since its implementation, and proved to be a limited success at best. As the potential for hostilities escalated, President Bush made a critical decision and ordered a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up of 200,000 Reservists under 673(b) of Title 10 USC that allowed Reserve soldiers to remain on active duty for 180 days. The first Reserve Components activated in this process were soldiers and individual units possessing skills that assisted active component units in their urgency to get to Southwest Asia. The first Active Component unit scheduled to depart was the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), stationed at FT Stewart, Georgia. The 24th Infantry was the heavy Division of the XVIII Airborne Corps, the Army’s premiere Rapid Deployment force. The “Round Out” Brigade for the 24th was the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Georgia Army National Guard. As the situation escalated in Southwest Asia, the leaders of the Army National Guard anticipated the inevitable notification that the 48th Brigade was to accompany its affiliated Division to war. The call never came. Instead, the Army Leadership elected to deploy the 197th Infantry Brigade stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia. The 197th Infantry Brigade was not an actual combat brigade. It was an organization whose members served as the instructors and support
staff for the United States Army Infantry School. They were hastily organized and equipped with older vehicles for combat operations, yet they were selected to complete the 24th Infantry Division. 11

The Army's leadership stood firm by their decision not to recommend mobilization of National Guard Combat "Round Out" Brigades, referencing the 180-day active duty time restriction for all Guardsmen activated. Their reasoning was that Guardsmen could not complete required post-mobilization training in sufficient time to be integrated effectively into theater. 12 After reconsideration of the potentially long term political ramifications and effects of negative publicity, the 48th Infantry Brigade from Georgia, 155th Armor Brigade from Mississippi and the 256th Infantry Brigade from Louisiana were mobilized. These decisions were not made without stipulations. The requirements for the selected Brigades to be deployed to theater constituted their "certification" that they were combat-ready. The "certification" process took place at a major training center and was evaluated by an active component cadre. The purpose of the evaluation was to ensure correction of any lack of combat skills prior to deployment. The 48th Brigade was required to train at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California longer than any unit heretofore. After one month at their mobilization station at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and two months at the National Training Center, the 48th Brigade was certified to go to war. The certification came on 28 February 1991, the same day that the cease-fire was signed in Iraq. Therefore, they never deployed into the theater of operation.13

These examples represent only a few instances where the Active Army and the Army National Guard have sparred over the right to be the caretaker of National Security. Be it unjustified on any account, suspicious feelings and animosity still exist on both sides of the services. The last major conflict fought between the two services culminated in 1996 during the quadrennial review mandated by Congress. Both services viciously defended their positions and patriotism during these meetings in hopes of convincing the committee that reductions in resources and manpower should be borne by the other service. 14 As in any relationship between like characters, things are often said and done in anger that have long lasting effects and make the recovery process more difficult. Currently the reconciliation process still has its high and low points, but the important thing is that it is still moving forward.

NEW DIRECTIONS

As we begin a new millenium, missions generated in order to reach our national security objectives increase and become more complex. These missions tend to lean away from conventional combat and move toward peace making, peace enforcement and "peace-keeping" operations. Significantly impacting the Army's ability to accomplish these missions is the reduction in end-strength and budget restrictions. Based upon these facts, the Leadership of the Army has begun to depend more and more upon the Reserve Component to fill in the gaps that have been left by a smaller active force. The Army's Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, has focused his efforts on ensuring that the force recognizes these gaps and takes action to fill spaces as reflected in his vision statement. He states the objectives for achieving these goals as follows:
Increasing strategic responsiveness.

Developing a clear long-term strategy to improve operation jointness and to implement the goals of Joint Vision 2010.

Developing leaders for joint warfighting as well as change.

Completing the full integration of the Active and Reserve Components.

Manning our warfighting units.

Providing for the well being of soldiers, civilians, and family members.\textsuperscript{15}

The Chief of Staff further indicates his position on "seamless integration" by describing his views of the total force concept. He states:

"We are THE Army—totally integrated into a oneness of purpose—no longer the Total Army, no longer the One Army. We are The Army, and we will march into the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century as The Army. We acknowledge the components and their varying organizational strengths. We will work to structure the Army accordingly."\textsuperscript{16}

In the Army's posture statement, General Shinseki states that in reaching the "one team, one fight, one future concept," that a clear vision, which recognizes that our Reserve Components are the strongest link to the American people, must be taken. He further states that our seamless integrated forces provide the vision for the future, for total Army integration that is based on a resolution that readiness is non-negotiable. Imbedded in the posture statement is the message that total Army integration is not about how Reserve components units can supplement or replace Active units, but rather about how it is a process of combining the three components to create the force our nation needs.

The Chief, National Guard Bureau, LTG Russell C. Davis, has also adopted this philosophy as evident during a speech, June 15, 1999, presented to the Adjutants General Association of the United States in Indianapolis, Indiana. His comments stated:

"Do what is best for the Army team. One team, one fight, and one future are not just a slogan. It is a guiding principle. Integration is a worthwhile goal that requires our best efforts in both the active and the reserve components."\textsuperscript{17}

The setting for the new azimuth, in which both the Active Army and the Army National Guard have been established, has detours along the way that still must be navigated. The leadership has made their intentions clear and now it is up to the force to execute the mission of seamless integration. The ends, ways, and means of accomplishing this task are not going to be simple, as there are two hundred years of precedence to overcome. The approach taken must be carefully charted and consideration of all parties must be made.

FORCE STRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL

The type of units that each force maintains has been a point of contention since the 1950s. The proper balance between combat, combat support and combat service support units, and to which service
component they are assigned has changed frequently. These changes have precipitated significant readiness issues for both the Active and Reserve components to the point where missions could not be accomplished with forces available.

The Army has proposed relieving its shortage of personnel, especially in the support arena, by converting combat units in the National Guard to assume these missions. Specifically, the Army plans to turn twelve National Guard Combat Brigades into support units, thus creating 42,700 additional support troops and eliminating all but 15,700 of the estimated shortfall. That transition would take approximately ten years and cost three billion dollars, according to initial estimates. By converting some combat units to support units that are currently not aligned with a wartime headquarters, the Army intends to correct two problems. The first is filling an identified need in support forces and the second is eliminating redundant combat forces. It also executes recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions made in 1995 and the Quadrennial Defense Review in 1996 in which both recommend a total reduction in all forces. 18

The Army's plan does not address many of the issues that have been raised about the current force structure in both the Active and Reserve components. The Army would still face many of the same problems in carrying out small peacekeeping operations and or prosecuting two nearly simultaneous major theaters of war (MTW) that it does today. The majority of the support forces would still remain in the Reserve components.

The ground truth is that the United States Army, "The Army", cannot fulfill our National Security Strategy should force structure be further reduced; specifically, if two simultaneous MTWs occur. Swinging the pendulum between the Active and Reserve forces as to who should maintain combat forces does nothing but reduce overall readiness. Reducing combat forces in the Army National Guard will not eliminate the problem of fulfilling mission requirements. Further reduction in the active Army's combat roles will only exacerbate the problem.

Basic trust by the Active Component toward the Reserve Component must be the foundation to correct this problem, and readiness is the key issue. Readiness can be attained only when units know what missions to train for, and are provided the resources to do so. Each time force structure changes overall readiness is reduced. Seamless integration can be attained only when all entities know what is expected.

The greatest challenge facing both forces is manning the established force structure. Recruiting and Retention have been established as priorities for both Active and Reserve Components. Programs to retain soldiers have been the focal point as it costs considerably more to recruit and train a soldier than it does to retain a soldier who has already mastered their specialty. Pay raises and benefits have been increased to provide incentives; however, competing in the current thriving economy has made it difficult.

Army National Guard soldiers face the challenge of balancing their military responsibilities with the demands of their civilian employers. As referenced earlier, mission requirements have placed a greater demand on Reserve Component soldiers in filling the gaps that Active Units cannot. This can be
attributed to reduction in forces, misalignment of force structure and operational tempo. Operational tempo cannot be changed as it is influenced by an ever-changing world situation. Reduction in forces cannot be changed unless our elected officials redirect the National budget and change the current National Defense Strategy. However, alignment of force structure to meet mission requirements is directly influenced by the leadership of the military.

National Guard soldiers whose units mission profile transitions frequently often are required to train for another military occupational specialty (MOS). This requires additional education that often takes the soldier away from his civilian employer and reduces the unit's overall readiness. This is especially true if the entire unit transitions. These changes do not take into consideration the loss of experience that the leadership structure loses when units reorganize. Active Component units normally do not face this situation as the military personnel system facilitates the rotation of qualified personnel to backfill losses. Instability within the Reserve Component force structure is a significant challenge that can be prevented. To develop and maintain a seamless force, this must be corrected. Mission assignment and force alignment is the solution.

Frequent deployments are beginning to have a negative impact on some Army National Guard units. A recent New York Times article reported that there are some indications that increased use of Army National Guard and Reserves has begun to hurt recruiting and retention. Soldiers leaving active duty have shown a declining propensity to join a National Guard or Reserve Unit after they end their Active obligation because of the frequency of deployments.19

Whatever is causing recruiting and retention problems, quality soldiers must be retained to maintain the strength and readiness of our units and to ensure that we build a seamless force. The Active Component and the Reserve Component must develop ways and means to stop competing for the same personnel resources. Competition for raw material, the non-prior-service soldier, is and should be fair game for both recruiters; but proselytizing soldiers from one component to the other is not productive and only builds more barriers. Active duty recruiters approaching National Guard Soldiers and offering them benefits that are not available to the Guard Recruiters completely unbalances the system and causes both forces to eventually expend additional resources. With the exception of overseas enlistment bonuses, National Guard recruiters should have the same resources to offer enlistees as their Active duty counterparts. The same applies for education tuition assistance. Currently, a new enlistee in the Army National Guard who signs a contract for six years may be entitled to education benefits totaling $9,036.00.20 The same enlistment for four years on Active duty can receive up to $50,000.

As recently as 1999, National Guard soldiers were offered attractive incentives to leave the National Guard and join the Active Army. As an example, an E-6 (Staff Sergeant), 19K (M1 Tank Commander) is offered an enlistment bonus of $6000.00 to join, plus $6000.00 if he can depart within ten days after his enlistment confirmation. This is a total of $12,000.00 to transfer from the National Guard to the Active Army, keeping previous rank and military occupational specialty (MOS). The National Guard does not have benefits such as these to obtain new recruits, or to entice soldiers in the Active Army to
come into the National Guard. To obtain a seamless-integrated and balanced force, benefits and enlistment criteria must be standardized for both components.

One of criticisms that the Army National Guard has received justifiably over the years is the accusation of fostering a "good old boy" system within its officer and senior enlisted ranks. Working very hard to overcome this shadow, in 1992 the Army National Guard implemented the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA). This act ensured that Army National Guard Officers have to meet standards similar to their Active counterparts in military and civilian education, and professional efficiency. A similar program has been instituted for enlisted personnel. These programs have made significant changes in the professionalism of the Army National Guard leadership, but with these requirements come challenges and costs. Equal educational opportunities must be made available to National Guard soldiers at Active Army schools and academies in greater numbers than are currently available. As over fifty percent of our Armed forces are in the Reserve Component, one would think that availability of educational opportunities should reflect more of a balance. This imbalance is being accounted for through unit and Reserve Component run academies. To obtain a seamless-integrated force, professional military education must be made more available to the Reserve Component soldier.

One of the last and probably most important issues regarding force structure and personnel is having sufficient resources to provide full-time manning at Reserve Component units. During FY 98 the Army National Guard was authorized to have over 45,000 full time personnel to organize, recruit, administer, train and maintain its equipment and units. Full time support requirements are established by detailed analysis of unit workloads and grades are determined by classification studies. Congress authorizes resources for full time support, which is then allocated to the states by National Guard Bureau in accordance with deployment criteria of various support packages. Despite increasing mission requirements and operational tempo, Active Guard Reserve (AGR) ranks are being reduced, as are military technician positions. During a speech given by LTG Russell Davis, Chief of National Guard Bureau, to the Adjutants Generals' Association on 15 June 1999, he stated that units that have less than 75 percent of their required level of full time manning were severely curtailed in their ability to meet mission requirements. Currently the Army National Guard is manned at 53.5% of it's AGR requirements, and authorizations will allow only 55% for Force Support Package 1 and 2 units as well as Enhanced Brigades. Units that deploy later are authorized 50%. These authorizations lower unit readiness and severely impact the ability to prepare for wartime missions. To obtain a seamless-integrated force full-time manning authorizations must be increased and resourced.

**SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT**

Force modernization is essential in the equation of seamless integration. Modern weapons, aircraft, communication devices and other equipment are necessary to make the Army National Guard a deployable asset and a dependable deterrent in application of the National defense strategy. The goal of the Army National Guard's modernization strategy is to equip the force to be relevant, compatible and
interoperable. Modernization has improved significantly over the past 10 years. The Active Component has done an admirable job in their total-package fielding program by including Army National Guard units in their fielding strategy; however, units are still woefully short critical equipment. The Active Component plan, as detailed in the TY-99 posture statement, indicates that the Army will continue to modernize the Reserve Component along a timeline ensuring that first-to-fight units receive modernized equipment first and that the Total Army remains interoperable. Also stated is that the Reserve Component received or will receive $21.5 billion of new and cascaded equipment. What is not made clear in the plan is that the Army National Guard must lobby Congress for additional resources to insure it has sufficient equipment to maintain readiness. This is accomplished through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA). These supplemental resources assist in acquiring urgently needed equipment for the modernization of high priority units. During FY 98 the National Guard received $70 million in funding from NGREA. These funds purchased critical items such as night vision goggles, tactical wheeled vehicles and training simulation devices. All are critical in maintaining readiness. The FY99 defense appropriation only provided $20 million in these funds.

The Active Component, under the watchful eye of Congress, has been equitable in its allocation of the Defense Budget. But issues still remain unresolved. Most recently, the aging fleet of AH-1 (Cobra) and UH-1 (Huey) helicopters has been grounded due to faulty engine components. These components cannot be replaced, as there is no longer a demand for manufacturing and parts are not available. The Active Component no longer maintains these aircraft in their inventory. There is no planned interim fix. The schedule for aircraft modernization is far behind and did not take into consideration the unexpected equipment failure. Readiness levels of units that have these aircraft will plummet and reduce the Army National Guard's overall readiness.

Unless equipment is modernized equitable across the force, this situation will continue to occur not only with helicopters but also with all other systems. The most prevalent shortcoming is in communications equipment. Seamless integration cannot occur when units cannot tactically talk to each other. The first-to-fight units have been fielded or are receiving the SINCGARS radios; however, they are receiving cascaded equipment that cannot transmit and receive digitally. Where does this leave the Army National Guard units on the FORCE XXI digital battlefield? To obtain seamless integration, equipment must be modernized equitably across the force in accordance with mission requirements.

TRAINING

Within "The Army", training is the most complicated objective to conquer. What type of training is required, how much time and resources should be focused on training, and what standards should be attained; these questions have come in two forms in the past. One standard for the Active Component and another one for the Reserve Component was the norm until the 1980s. Wisely, this has changed to "one size fits all" for both components regarding doctrine and standards. If units are to fight side by side and depend on the other for survival, expectations of capabilities must be the same. However, a
difference still remains in the amount of time and resources available to Reserve Component units to meet the prescribed standards.

A common misperception still remains about the training readiness of the Reserve Component and continues to have significant impact upon its consideration as a full partner in the "The Army" team. Upon receiving the call to mobilize, Reservists are not fully mission qualified and are not supposed to be. This expectation of full readiness is probably the widest gap between the two cultures.

Reserve Component units traditionally have thirty-nine days annually to train. In that period they must accomplish training standards to a level as prescribed by FORSCOM/NGB 350-2. With the exception of Combat Service Support Units, no Reserve Component Unit should be expected to accomplish all of its Mission Essential Task List (METL) prior to mobilization. For this reason, a post mobilization-training plan for each unit is established based upon the expected training requirements after mobilization. During the normal training year, focus is placed on pre-mobilization tasks. These are tasks that require basic skills and are imperative to mission accomplishment. It also forms the basic foundation on which all other training is based. This includes basic soldier skills, combat survival tasks and focuses collective training at the platoon and company level. Pre-mobilization tasks are also selected based upon available training resources. Pre-mobilization training resources are limited and careful selection must be made concerning what tasks will be trained. Those tasks not trained during pre-mobilization are deferred to the post-mobilization training plan. Advance schedules and resource requirements are considered carefully and updated constantly pending mobilization. LTG (Ret.) Arthur S. Collins, Jr., in his book Common Sense Training, eloquently stated the reality of training within the Reserve Component when he said:

"For a variety of reasons, all subject to challenge and emotional debate, Reserve Component Training suffers from the Army's failure to make a realistic assessment of what can be expected from the Reserve Components in an emergency, and from the Reserve Component's promise of more than they can deliver. The reasons for the unrealistic assessment are complex; they relate to the history, political, constitutional, and budgetary circumstances of a society, which has an aversion to military service and gives primacy to individual freedom. Given the increasing importance of the Reserve Components and the resources now being invested in them, we have a need for more realistic appraisals of what can be expected of these forces in a national emergency." 27

As earlier stated, Reserve Component units are provided resources to train thirty-nine days annually. This number is only a base line, as most Combat Arms units in the Reserve Component spend a minimum of forty-five days training, with leadership training as much a seventy days annually. 28 These additional days are necessary for critical personnel to meet established standards. Unfortunately, a significant portion of this additional training is not resourced.

Seamless-integration in training between the Active and the Reserve Components has been strengthened in the past five years by the inclusion of a Combat Training Center rotational cycle allocated annually for one of the Army National Guards Enhanced Brigades at each facility. A heavy Enhanced Brigade goes to the National Training Center at FT Irwin, CA and a light Enhanced Brigade goes to the
Joint Readiness Training Center at FT Polk, LA. These rotations have provided credence to the "one team" concept, although the results have not yet validated the training strategy. With the current rotational cycle, an Enhanced Brigade will be allowed to train at one of these premier facilities once every eight years. This is not sufficient to keep these "first to fight" units at the required training level necessary to meet future missions. Additional resources are provided to Reserve Component rotational units beginning two years prior to its scheduled Combat Training Center date. With costs of seven million dollars for a Heavy Brigade to go to the NTC, not including train-up, the National Guard Bureau simply cannot afford to increase rotations. This means that each rotation is a totally new experience for each unit and its leadership, as personnel have completely turned over since the last rotation. As an example, a lieutenant could conduct a rotation as a platoon leader, then return as a senior staff officer or possibly a Battalion Commander. This training gap does not do justice to the units or the soldiers.

During the last Heavy Brigade Rotation at the National Training Center, USA Today reporter Steven Komarow, and the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, observed the 155th Separate Armor Brigade, Mississippi Army National Guard. After a battle that took place where the opposing forces soundly defeated the Mississippi Brigade, Komarow made the following observations:

"Watching from atop a nearby hill is Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army's new Chief of Staff. He's not surprised by the outcome. The Guard is expected to fall against a full-time force that thrashes many regular Army units. In the past, Army chiefs have patted the Guard on the back for its efforts and walked away. But, Shinseki doesn't have that luxury. The Army has shrunk from 777,000 soldiers 10 years ago to about 480,000 today. That means the odds are growing that the Guard will be called on for front-line combat. And in the real world, the Mississippi Guard would not get a second chance".29

It is evident by the results of Combat Training Center rotations that more training resources, including time, are necessary. This means more frequent rotations at these premier training centers. Current mobilization plans take into consideration National Guard combat units rotating through a major Power Projection Platform (PPP) to receive a "CTC"-like experience after mobilization. However, the "PPP" is not currently manned, nor does it have instrumentation to support the training intensity required during a mobilization, to support two major theaters of war (MTW).30 More time training is more time that Guardsmen spend away from their employers and families. To assist in maintaining the tactical edge and reduce time away from employers, the Army National Guard has adapted fully and integrated the use of simulators in its training program. These devices allow skills to be developed in a virtual environment, thus accelerating the transition to live training. Problems include the cost of fielding these devices in sufficient quantities and the inclusion of virtual training as an acceptable training alternative to meet required standards. As OPTEMPO resources decrease, these devices will prove to be invaluable and must be considered by all as an acceptable training alternative.31

Methodology as outlined in FORSCOM/NGB 350-2 and US Code Title 11 fully implements the integration of Active Component Soldiers in high priority Reserve Component units through Regional Training Support Brigades. This concept is not new, as the "Advisors" have been around in one capacity or another for several years. Now they are fully integrated down to the Troop, Company and Battery level
as a training resource. The experience they bring to units is excellent and cannot be replicated by any virtual or constructive training device. However, as in any teambuilding relationship, personality conflicts arise, normally due to cultural differences. For both components to exploit the others qualities, each must work diligently to focus on the same objective. This objective must be genuinely agreed upon by all team members and not patronized simply by personal agendas and short-term goals. To these ends, the integration of components at this level can be the greatest asset in bridging the cultural gap.

To obtain seamless integration in training, steps must be taken to level the playing field. Resources and opportunities must be afforded to units that are expected to meet the challenges of “first to fight”. These opportunities must be in the form of OPTEMPO resources coordinated with training events, along with realistic expectations of results. Expectation of results by no means implicates the reduction of standards. It simply questions realistically how high the bar should be set by both components, given the resources and conditions available. The Department of the Army along with the National Guard Bureau must truthfully examine desired expectations and work jointly to insure that conditions for success are established.

MISSIONS

The United States Army today is smaller than it has been in the past twenty-five years. Its also has more diverse mission requirements necessitating flexibility in its posture. One of the first things that the Army Chief of Staff established upon his confirmation was to ensure that the Army's ten Divisions and three Armored Cavalry Regiments were manned at 100% strength. This is a lofty goal considering that the Army did not meet its recruiting and retention marks for the past two years.

Declining recruiting and retention numbers in both the Active and Reserve Components have been directly related to the intensity, requirements and frequency of worldwide missions constituted by our National Security Strategy. Most of these duties have been peacekeeping, peace making or peace-enforcement missions. Simultaneously, Active Army units have maintained their intensive training schedule focusing on their Mission Essential Task List, geared toward conducting two Major Theaters of War (MTW). This operational tempo is taking its toll on leaders and soldiers alike.

During a recent lecture at the US Army War College, a Senior Army Officer indicated that the intensity of cyclic training requirements, to include semi-annual gunnery and CTC rotations, along with peacekeeping mission deployments, keeps soldiers away from their families over two hundred and fifty days per year. He indicated that this intensity was beginning to have negative effects. The same effects are occurring within the Reserve Components.

In the late 1980s Reservists spent less than 1 million days on active duty supporting military operations. During FY-99 they spent nearly 13 million. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen said in an interview, “We simply could not undertake a sustained operation anywhere in the world without the Guard and Reserve.” DOD has held true to these remarks as units from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have supported, in some capacity, every mission that the Army has undertaken. The
provision has arisen from the types of units being ordered to active service. Those units have not been high priority units, but rather units at the lower end of the resource and requirements list; units that the Army does not have force structure for, but needs frequently. As the Reserve Component does not have sufficient force structure for these types of units either, the ones that exist are participating in multiple deployments. Personnel turnover rates in these units are high. What can be done to balance this situation with current force structure and resources so the Army Chief of Staff's new guidance may be met in support of our National Security Strategy? How can seamless integration between components be implemented to help resolve the dilemma?

These issues of resources, force structure, training, personnel, equipment and seamless integration of components are directly influenced by only one thing. Mission! Unless we are to remain stagnant in our current situation, mission re-assignment must be made across the force to better make use of our available forces. Several mission requirements must be met before considering any mission re-assignment. First, the current National Defense Strategy requires that our forces be able to fight and win in two Major Theaters of War (MTW) simultaneously. It also requires that Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), as decided by our National Leadership, also be carried out. If all three requirements occurred at the same time, "The Army" would not currently be able to support them.

During the 1999 Association of the US Army annual meeting, the Army Chief of Staff, General Shinseki, outlined his approach to the future. To accomplish the National Defense Strategy, he indicated that all of the Army's 10 Divisions and 3 Armored Cavalry Regiments would be manned at 100% strength by 1 January 2001, seek to replace the entire fleet of tracked vehicles with wheeled vehicles, erase the distinction between light and heavy forces with an "objective force", and be able to deploy this force (brigade size) in 96 hours, with the remainder of the Division deployed in 24 hours. These goals are to be accomplished with assistance and cooperation of the Reserve Component; however, mission assignment does not change.

Without changing responsibilities and missions of both components, no progress can be made. The following recommendations for changes would assist in meeting the requirements of the National Defense Strategy and directives from Army Chief of Staff. First, the Active Component must be allowed to change it's METL. Its primary METL must include peacekeeping type missions and training associated with those related tasks. This would reduce greatly the requirements for biennial CTC rotations and semi-annual gunnery. It would reduce the frequency in which soldiers are deployed, thus increasing retention within high probability units. Experience and expertise would be gained by retaining veteran soldiers, reducing the cost of training new inductees more frequently. This does not mean that Active Component units would not train on MTW tasks; crossover missions are applicable to both scenarios, thus requiring a balanced METL. For identified units, those tasks specifically related to MTW operations would be trained less frequently than those related to peacekeeping operations. This mission change would also precipitate equipment modernization as directed by the CSA. Wheeled vehicles are more adept to peacekeeping missions than tracked vehicles. They are also lighter and more rapidly deployable. This
deployable. This transition also supports the deployment timetable goals established by General Shinseki. It would be necessary for the Active Component to examine its force structure for support units. With a quicker, lighter force, some combat elements may be restructured to support elements within their original organic unit.

Currently no new main battle tank is designed to take the place of the M1 Abrams series. As the Active Component converts at least nine Brigades from tracked combat vehicles to wheeled vehicles, the tracks should be cascaded to the Reserve Components. As General Donn A. Starry stated, "Changing force requirements by the Active Army have historically resulted in reorganization of National Guard units—to the end that they are forever unready." Nothing could be truer than that statement, but now is the time for changes if they are to be made.

The "threat", as once depicted by the Soviet Army, is replicated less now than it was ten years ago; however, heavy armor formations as presented by Iraq's Republican Guard still exist in the Middle East. A wheeled army cannot effectively defeat such a force. Each major conflict that the United States has been involved in over the last twenty years has set the conditions of the battlefield with a dominating air campaign. These campaigns have shaped the theater of operations and allowed time for political negotiations to transpire before the employment of ground forces. Historically, this time frame has lasted up to 150 days, time sufficient for heavy reserve forces to mobilize, complete post-mobilization training and deploy into theater in support of an Active, "Objective Force" which has been rapidly deployed. In "tightening up" the active component, the Army National Guard should become heavier to provide the balance of power necessary to accomplish the National Defense Strategy. This heavier force would be less costly to maintain, as it would train less frequently than Active Heavy Forces do now. Training facilities and devices would be available more frequently to Reserve Component units, as Active units would have a different immediate training focus. This would reduce competition for resources and provide for more focused, better-trained units in both Components. This would also provide realistic missions for Army National Guard Divisions as they are currently organized.

In December 1997, the Congressional Budget Office published a study that examined almost these same issues regarding the Army's ability to fight two nearly simultaneous MTWs. The study considered the fact that the Cold War focus had shifted from deterring or defeating the Soviet Union, to a more global mission of fighting smaller conflicts against less formidable foes. It also considered an Active Army that is now 30% smaller than it was ten years ago. All the assumptions were based upon requirements as defined by the commission on roles and missions. Each alternative considered cutting forces in order to save money or reducing missions in order to retain forces. By re-assigning missions, as outlined above, both forces could retain the ability to conduct these missions at a reduced cost. Seamless Integration can be attained by assigning specific missions, providing resources to train for those missions and, finally, by each component's willingness to place selfish agendas and egos aside for the betterment of our nation.
CONCLUSION

Not one member of either the Active or Reserve Components can honestly say that they have never held some type of animosity toward the other service. Mistrust and suspicion have been embedded in our cultures for so long that many of our junior leaders simply believe that it is designed to be this way. The leadership of both components has a difficult task to integrate the forces, but it can be done. As the CSA said,

"Integration of the Army components is, at its heart, about achieving the bedrock of the Total Army idea—a quality force. Total Army integration is not about how Reserve component units can supplement or replace Active units—it is a process of combining the three components to create the force our Nation needs—it is all about quality—ensuring we have the best mix of forces available to get the job done."\(^{37}\)

Major General William Navas, former director of the Army National Guard, indicated in recent writings that changing the "Five Rs" would be necessary for both organizations to be successful. Those Rs include Rules, Roles, Relationships, Responsibilities and expected Results. He continues by stating,

"The interaction among three individuals on positions who are charged with making this delicate enterprise work are the secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff and the National Guard Bureau Chief. They must base their decisions on our founding fathers intentions, the Constitution and the challenges and opportunities of the present. This relationship is the crucial element to honest, effective and enduring integration."\(^{38}\)

Now is the time to make the necessary changes between components as the Army begins a new direction. Balance the missions between the two components. Allow the Active Army to focus on current missions at hand: peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping. Rapid response would be their watchword, meeting the CSA’s guidance. Focus the National Guard combat units on mobilization toward a heavy MTW, with the expectation and requirement of getting into theater within 90 days. Both components must be resourced accordingly.

Placing both components’ egos aside can bridge the cultural gap. We have conquered turmoil; we are in transition and teamwork is only a step away.

Word Count = 7784
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid. 74


5 Ibid. 81.


7 Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime”, Parameters, VOL XXI, (Summer 91): 46


11 Ibid. 95.


13 Ibid. 108.


16 Ibid. 2.


21 Jacobs, 76-79


25 “Equipping the Guard”, 3

26 FORSCOM/NGB 350-2, Reserve Component Training (FT McPherson, GA, U.S. Army/U.S. Forces Command, 1999), 17


28 Thomas A Lippiat, et al., Post-mobilization Training Resource Requirements: Army National Guard Heavy Enhanced Brigades (Santa Monica, CA, Rand, 1996), Summary xvii

29 Steven Komarow, “Readiness of the National Guard In Doubt”, USA Today, 13 September 1999.

30 Steve Rader et al., Going to War: Mobilizing and Deploying the Army National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades (Washington DC.: Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), Contract: GS23F-8006H, 1999), 25-35


32 The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant’s Lecture Series.

33 Steven Lee Myers, 2


36 Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, 47

38 William A. Navas Jr, "The "Five Rs" of Army Integration and the Crucial Element," *National Guard*, June 1999, 38
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Davis, Russell C., LTG, Chief of National Guard Bureau, "Opening Remarks at the Adjutant Generals Association Conference., Indianapolis, IN, 15 June 1999.

Doubler, Michael D., LTC. "Guard Century; Turbulence and Transition". *National Guard December 1999.*


Komarow, Steven. “Readiness of the National Guard in Doubt.” *USA Today*, 13 September 1999, sec 1A, p. 3.


