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LESSONS FROM THE EAST: NOTHING NEW THAT'S NOT IN THE BOOKS

BY

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Lessons From the East: Nothing New That's Not in the Books

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ABSTRACT

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Early this century the United States Army began to implement a long overdue and much needed reform program. This program began to form in the 1870s after Brevet Major General Emory Upton published the results of his military observer mission to the armies of Asia and Europe. In the conclusion to his report, he recommended changing the military policy of the United States and his suggestions later formed the basis for Secretary of War Elihu Root's reform program, some 20 years after he published his report.

Nearly 30 years after Upton's observer mission, the U.S. Army sent several officers to observe both the Russian and Japanese armies during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05. This paper will explore what these officers learned; the mechanisms the Army used to share their ideas; and whether the Army, as an institution, learned from the experiences of the observers. To determine this, the paper will examine the professional journals, Army War College lectures, and the subsequent careers of two of these officers.
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PREFACE

When the Russo-Japanese War began on February 8, 1904, the United States was one of several nations to send military observers and attaches to Manchuria to witness the first major war of the 20th Century. War correspondents from magazines and newspapers also flocked to the front. These observers, military and civilian alike, sent back commentaries on the battles as well as reports on the new weapons and technology used by both sides, new tactics, and even descriptions of such seemingly minor details as entrenching tools, bayonets, saddles, pontoons, and the kit for an infantryman.

U.S. Army officers used these reports as a basis for articles in professional military publications, such as the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, Journal of the United States Artillery, The Cavalry Journal, and the Infantry Journal. Additionally, the Russo-Japanese War was the first major conflict as the U.S. Army War College began instruction. Therefore, the war should have provided many useful and current examples for lectures and student research. Needless to say, an "information explosion" surrounded this war.

The quantity and quality of sources was so great that research for and scope of this paper required limits. Therefore, this paper concentrates only on the reporting of the U.S. military observers sent to observe the Japanese. This was done because research determined, other than the official reports of the military observers, the professional journals and the academic instruction at the Army War College used more examples from the Japanese side of the war than from the Russian. Lectures at the War College were repeated from year to year, so it was not necessary to review all of them. Finally, the author sampled articles from the Journal of the Military Service Institution for the views and discussions the journal presented represented all of the branches of the Army. For the most part, the material used during research dates from 1906 to 1910.

I would like to thank LTC Edwin M. Perry, Director of the Military History Institute (MHI), for his assistance and encouragement during this project. His knowledge of military history, particularly of the American Army, helped me to focus on this particular project early on. Dr. Brian Linn, the Harold K. Johnson Visiting Professor of Military History, opened my eyes to the wealth of material in the professional journals. Special thanks go to Drs. David Keogh and Richard Sommers, of the MHI Archives, for their assistance in retrieving material in the early years of the Army War College. And finally, appreciation goes to the staff of the MHI library, especially Louise Arnold-Friend and Richard L. Baker, who helped guide me through the stacks and kept me from getting lost.
LESSONS FROM THE EAST: NOTHING NEW THAT'S NOT IN THE BOOKS

Victory in the Spanish-American War left the U.S. Army in quite a predicament. The small Regular Army no longer had to worry about taming the West but now had overseas possessions, particularly in the Philippines, to protect and subdue. As the volunteer regiments were demobilized, the Army's new duties demanded that it expand beyond its pre-war manning levels. However, expanding the Army would not be so easy for both the Army and the War Department had not performed well during the war. The absence of planning and preparation, the lack of coordination and cooperation among the various Army bureaus, and the red tape had become a public scandal.

This "splendid little war" had changed the strategic equation for the United States and its armed forces and the war had served as a coming out party. The U.S. no longer was a back stage extra, but had stepped out onto the world stage. The country had expanded beyond its continental borders. The Army and Navy would have to station forces in these new possessions if they were to protect them.

The Pacific and Atlantic Oceans no longer was a barrier to invasion from a first-class power for technology also worked to change the strategic equation. Developments in transportation and communications had made the world smaller, making the oceans even less of a protective barrier. Ships were bigger and faster and the telephone and telegraph made communications easier and quicker. Our first line of defense would have to be a powerful Navy backed up by a larger, more efficient Army.

New weapons also had brought new challenges to the military art. Small arms were more accurate, could fire more rapidly, and used smokeless powder. The development of machineguns as well as the quick-firing artillery, firing indirectly on a target at greater distances, added even more firepower to both the offense and the defense. These weapons spread the infantry across ever-wider frontages and coupled with mobilization of large armies of conscripts, the battlefield expanded.

These developments demanded that the U.S. Army reexamine how it would wage war. From the organization of the War Department to the equipment of the soldier, the old Army was inadequate to protect the continental United States let alone the new possessions. The Army needed to change to meet the challenges of the new century.

Despite the obvious need, change was slow. Many reforms of the early 1900s had been recommended 20 years earlier when Brevet Major General Emory Upton had published, in 1878, his report The Armies of Asia and Europe. Many of his recommendations also appeared in his unfinished 1881-manuscript The Military Policy of the United States. When Elihu Root became Secretary of War on 1 August 1899, he used Upton's manuscript, his knowledge of current business practices, the report of the Dodge Commission, and other sources as the basis for the reform the War Department and the Army. This reform plan was outlined in his first Annual Reports of the War Department in 1899. While Congress did not pass the law to implement Root's recommendations until 1903, in the interim, it did authorize the Army to expand to some 100,000 officers and men with an appropriate staff.

Root's reforms included replacing the Commanding General of the Army with a Chief of Staff who would not have command authority; establishing a General Staff to assist the Chief of Staff make
recommendations to the Secretary of War; and creating an Army War College to train officers for duty as staff officers and for higher command. The War College also was to assist the General Staff develop war plans. While these and other changes were being implemented, or becoming mired in the red tape of the Army's bureaus, the Army debated how it should be organized and equipped.

The Russo-Japanese War was the first major conflict of the 20th Century and the first to occur after the Army began its reform efforts. At this time, very few active-duty U.S. Army officers had ever commanded more than a regiment in combat or peacetime. However, though this lacked higher military education and many had just served in a frontier army, U.S. officers had a high degree of "professionalism, intellectual vitality, and knowledge of modern military science." The Russo-Japanese War offered an opportunity for the Army to learn first-hand what modern war had become and makes changes to meet the challenges of the new century.

Did the U.S. Army learn from its observers in Manchuria? Unfortunately no; the Army as a whole missed a golden opportunity and, as an institution, did not learn from the Japanese campaigns in Manchuria. Individual officers learned some lessons but mostly these officers were the observers themselves. Academic instruction at the military schools, such as the Army War College, and the writings of officers in the professional military journals did pass on lessons from the Japanese campaign in Manchuria. However, the Army did not make any major changes based on these lessons. Only after the U.S. entered World War I, did the Army and War Department finally change, such as selecting and producing a machine gun that soldiers needed to fight a modern war.

U.S. MILITARY OBSERVERS TO THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND WHAT THEY LEARNED

More so than any previous war, the outbreak of this war, late on 8 February 1904, created intense international military, naval, and diplomatic interest. The U.S. was to dispatch 12 official military observers to the Imperial Japanese forces, nine from the Army (one was unofficial) and three from the Navy. Of the eight official observers, five produced reports. Four of these reports the Second (Military Information) Division of the General Staff published in 1906 and 1907. These four officers included Captain Peyton C. March, General Staff; Major Joseph E. Kuhn, Corps of Engineers; Captain J.F. Morrison, 20th Infantry; and Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. McClernand, First cavalry. The fifth, written by Captain John J. Pershing, Cavalry and General Staff, Military Attaché, Tokyo, was never published. These nine officers studied aspects of the War from March 1904 to September 1905 when military operations ended. In addition to the five volumes of the observer reports, the Second Division published a four-volume history of the Russo-Japanese War and a much shorter Epitome on the Russo-Japanese War (1907).

Since there had not been a recent great war that involved large numbers of troops, the armies of the world, especially the European armies, were starved for professional information. The American Army was no different. Its military observers reported on everything they saw. Most of the published official reports included a general narrative describing the battles and movements of the Japanese Imperial Army. But these reports also described details such as field hospitals, the post office,
entrenching tools, rifles, machine guns, knapsack, mess tins, food and cooking arrangements, pack saddles, clothing, tenting, and more. In addition, to descriptions the observers included measurements, drawings, and photographs. Pershing's unpublished report also includes the memos he wrote that listed the questions that he wanted responses from various entities in the Japanese Army. These included subjects such as the functions of the Gendarmerie and the administration of military justice, field hospitals and medical tools, instruments, and materials, the telegraph department, the engineering department, and others.10

Of all the observations, most interesting was the statement from Captain J.F. Morrison, who was with the Second Japanese Army from early August to the end of October 1904. "The Japanese in their army have shown us little that is not in the books, little that can be truly called original. The organization of the infantry is taken from the German and French; their medical corps is from the German. Their tactics can be found in books open to us all."11 Major Joseph E. Kuhn believed that since this was the first great war since 1877, "one might reasonably expect some startling and original methods."12 But the opposite was true. This "war was conducted by both sides along strictly orthodox lines."13 So far as he could tell, "the recognized rules and principles for conducting warfare underwent no serious modification in their application."14 Captain Peyton C. March, stated that the Japanese "method was not distinguishable from the method in any marked degree. They took advantage of cover, with plenty of intervals between files, and used individual fire."15

"One of the most striking lessons of the Japanese war is the return of the use of the bayonet and sword upon the battlefield. This is greatly increased by the constant use of the night attack by both sides."16 Peyton March made this statement in his sixth report. In his third report he stated that "The night attack...all lead to the thought that the progress and development in killing capacity of the modern rapid-fire field gun and rifle have forced the attack, if it desires to live at all, to return to the old methods of a century ago when the individual man and his bayonet was the winning factor in the hand-to-hand combats of those days."17 The bayonet and sword held a particular fascination for most of the U.S. observers. Only Major Kuhn seemed not to have given these edged weapons much attention. Pershing wrote a three-page memorandum on the use of the bayonet in both the Philippines and in the Manchurian campaign and the faults of the American bayonet.18 However, as indicated in Captain March's statements above, usually the bayonet and the sword were mentioned in conjunction with the tactics of the night attack.

Firepower had made the defense stronger and frontal attacks less feasible unless "made by good troops, well handled, and supported by adequate artillery fire."19 Captain Morrison made virtually the same statement in his report. "This campaign has proven that a frontal attack against an entrenched [sic] position can be successfully made. But it seems equally proven that the attack must be made by not only brave but thoroughly trained soldiers."20 "As was to be expected from the destructiveness of modern firearms, great use was made of night attacks and maneuvers."21 Night attacks became the tactics du jour to defeat the greater power of an entrenched, well-armed, defense.
Machine guns and rapid-fire artillery also added to the power of the defense and further encouraged the use of night attacks. Captain March stated as much. Major Kuhn carried his conclusions a step further. As the only U.S. observer to be in Manchuria for nearly the entire war, he observed that "Machine guns, used sparingly at first, rapidly demonstrated their value and were employed in increasing numbers in the later stages of the war." He then continued, "It seems certain that this weapon will play an important part in the future, and the equipment and tactics of machine guns should receive serious and prompt consideration for our army." The machine gun had made an impression on these officers. When used in conjunction with entrenchments and well-placed artillery, the defense was virtually impregnable.

"The cavalry was not used in action." Captain March devoted one paragraph to the Japanese cavalry. He devoted 13 paragraphs to the bayonet and sword. Pershing indicates that the cavalry was used "to protect the rear of the Division and to keep connection with the Yalu (5th) Army." Captain Morrison said the Japanese needed better horses for their cavalry. In his general observations, Major Kuhn states, "the Russian cavalry missed some great opportunities to inflict great damage on the Japanese, but it "simply accomplished nothing at all." He never mentions the Japanese cavalry.

Lieutenant Colonel McClelland took a different approach from the other observers when he wrote his report. He followed the example of Emory Upton when that officer wrote his observations of the armies of Asia and Europe in 1878. Upton wrote a very detailed report on several Asian and European armies then he devoted some 100 pages to changes that needed to be made in the American Army if the U.S. was to become a realistic force in a war with a first-class power. McClelland provided his readers with a detailed, well-organized, report on the Japanese army. This report covered such subjects as the use of railroads, the Japanese supply system, ranks, recruitment, conscription, schools, annual training and maneuvers, arsenals, the industrial base, promotions, retirement, and discipline. In his conclusion, instead of summarizing what he had written, he launched into an outline for change in the American Army. These included a promotion system, combining the Quartermaster and Subsistence departments, creating a transport department, consolidating the many smaller Army posts into a few large posts, creating a reserve officer corps as well as an enlisted reserve, reorganization of the field artillery, and the need for greater preparedness, which he believed was a "national duty."

Like McClelland, all of the U.S. observers were looking for ideas to help bring the U.S. Army up to the standards of the Twentieth Century. Each approached this goal in a different manner, and each provided their fellow officers with a considerable amount of information to consider. What did the Army do with this information? How was this information evaluated and what changes did the Army make?

THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: THE LECTURE COURSE

The Army War College was established to provide advanced instruction for selected officers of the Army and the Militia of the United States to prepare them for command and high-level staff duty. Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss, the President of the Army War College when its course of instruction began on November 1, 1904, believed that an officer attending the College should already "have
learned...all that he needs to know of the theory of the art of war."30 Now he should be ready to "learn things by doing things." Little purely academic instruction, such as the lectures, occurred and those that did were frequently held on Saturday mornings.31 With Bliss' philosophy, the College would "take up the solutions to practical problems."32 The Russo-Japanese War started nine months, February 1904, before the beginning of the first academic year at the College. Because of this coincidence, one would expect the war to support discussions for several years, however, the topics of lectures does not support that expectation.33

In academic year 1906-1907, no lectures directly discussed the Russo-Japanese War. In fact, only two lectures discussed specific battles--Shiloh and Antietam.34 The other lectures varied in content; from discussions of new technology, such as wireless telegraphy or military aeronautics, to results of conferences, to tactical employment of units, to a more general discussion of modern warfare. The Russo-Japanese War was discussed only to illustrate points in the presentations.

The lecture course of academic year 1907-1908 was a little different than the previous years. The lectures were organized and delivered so as to build on the previous lectures. The overall theme was "The Evolution of Modern War"35 and is the first year that the Russo-Japanese War figures prominently in the lecture course. Over a three-week period Major Eben Swift, General Staff, presented a three-part lecture entitled "The Influence of Peace Training in War as Shown in the Manchurian Campaign of 1904." Although these lectures do not exist in the MHI archives, they appear to have the same theme as lectures Major Swift gave on March 436 and April 4, 1910.37 In lectures on the battles of Liao-yang and the Sha River, Major Swift attempts to show how the Japanese trained of regular troops and the reserves that provided the nation with a mass army capable of mobilizing and successfully waging war on short notice. These lectures illustrate a point the Army continues to press throughout this early period of the 20th Century—preparedness. The observers for the U.S. learned that the Japanese had been preparing for this war for some ten years.38 In the lecture on the Battle of Liao-yang, Swift makes the point that the Japanese Imperial Army had 146,000 men in peacetime and three months after mobilization for the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had 480,000 trained men ready for war and deploying to the theater.39 These three lectures in early 1908 are preceded by six other lectures discussing the influences of ruse and stratagem, drill and discipline, terrain (as used by Napoleon and Lee), fortification, and the peacetime training in the Franco-Prussian War. The final six lectures discuss the functions and operations of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineer troops, as deduced from recent wars and in the writings of the best military authorities.40 Several of these lectures are repeated in subsequent, generally alternating, academic years.

The lecture course for academic year 1908-1909 is the first year we see lectures that develop a theoretical plan on how to organize and mobilize an army to fight a first-class power. These two lectures, one on the Engineer Corps by Major J.E. Kuhn—the longest serving military observer—and the other on the Signal Corps by Major C. McK. Saltzman, outline how to organize, equip, and train the regular engineer and signal elements of the army as well as how to call up National Guard troops. Major Kuhn
recognizes that "our political system will ever forbid...thorough preparation for war possible only through
large standing armies." But, he continues the Army should plan in advance, in detail, everything
related to organization and equipment. "The problem then is not one of numbers, but of organization,
equipment, and training, in the quickest and most effective manner." Major Kuhn recommends an
organization to provide engineer troops for 20 divisions. Major Saltzman organizes the signal troops for
an army of at 450,000 troops. He also introduces an aeronautical company for each field army. Both
of these plans draw on the Russo-Japanese War to illustrate their points.

The lecture entitled "The Infantry Attack" in December 1908 draws heavily from the reports of the
military observers. In this 34-page lecture, Captain Frank S. Cocheu discusses the infantry attack by day
and by night. For his illustration of the day attack, he uses German tactics for his example. For night
attacks, he uses Japanese tactics as illustrated in the battle narratives of the Manchurian Campaign from
the official reports of Captain March, Major Morrison, and Major Kuhn. Of the 20 pages he uses to
describe the night attack tactics, some ten of them are direct quotes from the official reports. This is the
only instance where a lecture credited the work of the military observers, except, of course, for the
lectures presented by the observers themselves.

One of the College's major responsibilities, part of its learning by doing, during its early years was
the drafting of war plans by the student officers. Specific areas of the world were designated by a color.
Japan was orange; the U.S. was blue. The first Orange/Blue was drawn up during academic year 1906-
1907 as Problem No. 12 when Japan was rattling its sabers over segregation of Asians in the schools in
California. The Japanese victory in the war marked the first time an Asian power had defeated a
European power. Although there is no reference to War in the plan, the fact that the plan had been
drafted indicates that the Army and War Department had learned from the observers to respect the power
projection capabilities of the Japanese Imperial Army and plan on how to counter a future threat.

THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNALS: HOW IDEAS WERE SHARED

During the years after the Russo-Japanese War, the principal means of sharing ideas, experiences, and observations was through the professional military journals, which included The Cavalry
Institution of the United States. The Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States
(JMSI) served as the primary source for material for this paper because for the period 1905 to 1908, its
articles, unlike the other branch-specific publications, represented all branches of the Army.

Between 1905 and 1908 there were only 27 articles on the Manchurian Campaign in the JMSI.
Eighteen were categorized as "Original Papers" and nine appeared in the section "Translations and
Reprints." Eleven of the 18 "Original Papers" articles were parts of three multi-part articles—a five-part
article entitled "Field and Siege Operations in the Far East", a four-part article on "Cavalry Operations in
the Russo-Japanese War", and a two-part article "In Manchuria: The Battle of the Shakhe (Sha) River".
Five more articles discussed cavalry operations; three discussed machineguns, the Japanese rifle, and
the new Russian knapsack; only one talked about supply of ammunition to the Russian infantry and
artillery; two were on training; four were general discussions of the war; and one was a book review. Only one was by an American military observer—Colonel Valery Havard, Assistant Surgeon General—with the Russian Army.

J.F.C. Fuller noted that artillery and field fortifications were two key characteristics of the war, not bayonets and bullets.⁴⁹ Of the 27 articles, none discuss these two issues. However, nine articles, one third of the total, discussed cavalry which more than one observer noted accomplished nothing. These articles were trying to define a role for the cavalry branch in modern warfare at a time when that branch's role was diminishing and was vulnerable to the new firepower weapons, the machinegun and rapid-fire artillery.

One of the articles, “Use of Cavalry in Warfare Under Existing Conditions”, by Colonel Charles A.P. Hatfield, 13th Cavalry, U.S. Army, state that only by the study of campaigns from all periods of history can we determine the proper use of cavalry in war.⁵⁰ Then he makes three statements that sums up the plight of the cavalry. First, the improvement of firearms has had the “greatest effect on the progress of the cavalry.” Second, “No other arm has been subject to so many theories.” And last, “It is not a new thing for it to be a favorite topic.”⁵¹ After considerable discussion of the use of cavalry in the American Civil War, he spends just two short paragraphs on cavalry in the Manchurian campaign. Essentially, the Russians are incapable of developing the employment of cavalry and the Japanese fall far short of the mark as well. However, in its training of the cavalry for dismounted work, the troops must not lose confidence in the importance of shock. For “it must not be forgotten that in its mounted action with the saber it still has great possibilities in war.”⁵² The strategic employment of cavalry is where this arm will find its greatest possibilities. Screening, reconnaissance, attacking an enemy's communications, and, of course, the pursuit of a defeated enemy is where cavalry will make its greatest impact.⁵³ This summation is typical of most of the articles on cavalry. For an arm that accomplished nothing of value, quite a bit of space has been spent to justify its existence. Rather than focusing the Army on its needs to modernize, journal articles such as this one attempt to fit the war's experience within the existing force structure.

Colonel William R. Livermore's (U.S.A., Corps of Engineers) five-part article entitled “Field and Siege Operations in the Far East” is published in five consecutive issues of JMSI from May/June 1905 to January/February 1906 is the only comprehensive description of the operations in the Russo-Japanese War. He includes numerous maps to accompany his battle descriptions. Until the Second Division of the General Staff publishes the Epitome of the Russo-Japanese War in 1907, Colonel Livermore's articles are the best summary of the war available. His articles are more, however, than a summation of the fighting. Colonel Livermore analyzes and tries to draw some lessons from this war. In the very first article he ends it with a general lesson on military preparation. At the end of his fifth article he states, “The experience of the last war must be applied to the conduct of the next war.”⁵⁴ He concludes that this “war has shown the necessity for carrying the instruction of armies to a higher point than it can be carried on the parade ground.”⁵⁵ By far this is the most instructional series of articles on understanding the war and some of the lessons that could have been learned from it.
THE OBSERVERS AND THEIR EXPERIENCES: INVALUABLE! PERSHING AND MARCH

Although is no direct evidence exists that any of the officers who served as observers of the Japanese Imperial Army in Manchuria benefited from their service in Manchuria, this experience certainly did not hurt the careers of six of the officers; they became at least a brigadier general. Captain March retired as a lieutenant general, but later was promoted to full general. Pershing retired as General of the Armies, having been promoted to that rank during WWI. Colonel Crowder, Major Kuhn, and Captain Morrison all became major generals, and Lieutenant Colonel McClelland retired as a brigadier general. All six of these officers later served in some fashion during WWII, as did many of the other foreign observers from the European armies.56

“Clearly he was there in Manchuria as a faithful industrious reporter, a gatherer of information which would be of basic professional value in knowledge of the contact of troops with modern arms,”57 stated Frederick Palmer, a war correspondent that became a lifelong friend of Pershing. In his biography of Pershing, he claims the General said his experience in Manchuria was “Invaluable.”58 However, because he never published his report, Pershing’s experience directly benefited only himself. Pershing also wrote a very detailed monograph on his observations of the Japanese Army after the war while he was the Military Attaché in Tokyo, but this report was never published either!

No one of course, including Pershing, can see what the future will be perfectly. But Pershing did seem to have developed a concept of future war from his experiences in Manchuria. What he saw in Manchuria warned him that modern conflicts would require huge armies, and therefore officers needed to start thinking beyond the regiment and start thinking in terms of brigades, divisions, armies, and theatres of war.59

Frank E. Vandiver, in his biography of Pershing, states that Pershing went to Manchuria an accomplished small unit leader but returned skilled in the management of mass.60 Whether or not this was true at the time, Pershing does appear to be thinking in terms of something more than the regiment, the largest permanent peacetime units in the Army after his Manchurian service.61 When he took command at Fort McKinley in the Philippines, he trained the two infantry and one cavalry regiments stationed there as a single experimental brigade, not as three separate regiments.62

Pershing’s believed strongly in training in peacetime to be ready for war and his Manchurian experience reinforced this philosophy. The Japanese Army was well trained and disciplined because of their peacetime training, and not because of preparations after the war had begun. Training made men soldiers.63 “Lack of preparedness beforehand cannot be remedied by the publication of long letters of instruction, nor by any other means, within a reasonable time, after war begins.”64 Troops should be physically fit and well trained in the basic army skills in peacetime. After he took command of Fort McKinley in January 1907, he developed a training program for the brigade that was condensed into a 20-page pamphlet. The proof of his program showed in the maneuvers, parades, artillery range, long marches, and the athletic fields. He emphasized firing practice and would emphasize this again years
later when, as commander of the American Expeditionary Force in France, he issued a general training
directive in mid-July 1917. Pershing learned one other lesson in Manchuria that also was reinforced when he returned to
Japan in late 1907 to observe Japanese military maneuvers. He respected the Japanese as soldiers, but
also believed that their ambitions would extend to the Philippines. Pershing, as a result of his
experiences, had made the transition from a tactical leader to a strategic one.

Peyton March also benefited greatly from his experience in Manchuria, and like Pershing, made the
transition from tactical leader to strategic. Unlike Pershing, his reports were published and he had more
of an immediate impact on the Army as a whole. After returning to the United States he was assigned to
the War Department. In Manchuria the effectiveness of the Japanese General Staff system, which was
modeled after the German system, had made a lasting impression on him. Dismayed by what he saw in
the American system, he advocated a reorganization of the General Staff. But the powerful bureau chiefs
and their friends on Capitol Hill frustrated his efforts. He then became a member of several committees,
including Bayonet and Sword, Entrenching Tools, and the Reorganization of the Artillery. In all of these
efforts, he referred to his experience in Manchuria and when the General Staff devised an artillery
organization, March devised the field artillery organization.

In 1907, Major March transferred to the field artillery and joined the 6th Field Artillery (Horse)
Regiment at Fort Riley as commander of the first battalion. In 1908 the Army staged eight maneuvers
with combined regular and National Guard units. March again drew upon his Russ-Japanese War
experience when he was placed in charge of preparing an instructional program for artillery maneuvers.
This program emphasized night attacks and the increased effectiveness of modern weapons, particularly
the machinegun.

Peyton March also came away from Manchuria with a healthy respect for the Japanese Imperial
Army as well as a better understanding of modern war and its requirements. At the Battles of Liao-yang,
Shaho and other fights, March saw a well trained, disciplined army defeat an adversary in large-scale
warfare. In a lecture at the new U.S. Army War College, which Pershing had left early to become military
attaché to Japan, March summed up his strategic view of what the Russo-Japanese War would mean for
the United States, "[if] Japan wins this war, nothing less than predominance in the Pacific will satisfy her.
The slightest study of the strategic weakness of our situation in the Philippines should show us that
possibly the time may come when we shall have to play a hand ourselves."

CONCLUSION

In the early part of the 20th Century the U.S. Army was evolving from a small wars/police force
army to a major land power. It was just beginning to come to grips with larger organizations, new
technology, planning ahead for war mobilization, and new tactical and strategic principles. Reports such
as those of the military observers did not become tools for improving tactical doctrine until the WWII era.
Until then they were used more for personal enlightenment and group instruction at the military schools,
such as the General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and the U.S. Army War College at
Washington Barracks, than as a direct tool for improving tactical doctrine.\textsuperscript{72} The military observers came back with many ideas and observations that could have been used to help develop and prepare the U.S. Army for future warfare long before the typical American rush to organize for war in 1917.

However, the observers to Manchuria's ideas did not have much of an impact on the Army as a whole because there was no central clearing house that could systematically analyze and distill those lessons in the way the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) does today. In the early 1900's, the General Staff was the closest organization to perform functions similar to TRADOC, such as to develop basic doctrine and adjust it as needed. But the General Staff had limited resources, and so limited its effort to publishing the Field Service Regulations, the first of which appeared in 1905.\textsuperscript{73} In that year the regiment was still the largest permanent peacetime unit in the Army.\textsuperscript{74} Only by 1910 had the division had become the "great administrative and tactical unit and forms the basis for army organization."\textsuperscript{75}

Rather than focusing the Army on its need to modernize, articles in the professional military journals attempted to fit the war's experience within the existing force structure. Individual officers used the military observers' reports primarily as references to illustrate points in their journal articles, War College lectures, and individual research projects.

The observers themselves do seem to have learned from their experiences. Pershing and March in particular incorporated their experiences into the way they organized and trained their commands throughout the remainder of their careers. Major Kuhn especially noted the importance of machineguns, but little was done with this information—when the U.S. entered the war in Europe in 1917 the Army still had not purchased and deployed a machinegun in large numbers.

Today, the U.S. Army finds itself in a very similar situation. The Cold War is over and the Army finds that its services are in ever increasing demand around the world. While the demand for the Army's services are increasing, the new Joint Vision 2010 emphasizes that the Army must achieve dominance across the "full range of military operations," in all regions of the world. In the early 20th Century, the Army's mission had expanded from being more of a police force in the western United States to a protector of the empire. Now, as we enter the 21st Century, the Army finds its role changing again from the bulwark against communism to the world's fire brigade. Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, and the Sinai are just some of the examples of current demands on the Army. Kosovo, in particular, showed the world that the U.S. Army has a problem. It has global responsibilities but cannot deploy rapidly enough to make a difference. It is too heavy.

Warfare is changing and the Army needs to change with it. However, much like the Army after 1905, we are still trying to fit the current force structure into the new way of warfare. The US observers in 1904 and 1905 continued to emphasize that more and more accurate firepower was now the major factor driving changes in tactics and strategy. They also stated that cavalry had not made an effective contribution to the war effort in Manchuria. Yet, a sample of articles from the Journal of the Military Institution of the United States showed that discussions centered on justifying current force structures in
the new way warfare. Discussions of future warfare today continue to make the same mistake. The Army is trying to keep its heavy, European Plains, stand up to the Russians, force structure to fight small wars. The Army needs to be lighter and more mobile if it will be dominant across the full spectrum of war in the future; much like it was against the Indians in the Old West.
ENDNOTES


2 Emory Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe: Embracing Official Reports on the Armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and England (New York: Greenwood Press, 1878).

3 President William McKinley appointed Major General (of Volunteers) Grenville M. Dodge to investigate the source of the problems in the Spanish-American War. Hewes, 6.


6 In 1905, and continuing for several years after, the regiment is the largest permanent unit of the Regular Army in time of peace. Temporary or provisional brigades and divisions were created only for instruction at field exercises and maneuvers. The War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Second Division, General Staff Document No. 241, Field Service Regulations, United States Army (New York: Army and Navy Journal, 1905), 9.


9 For a complete list of the U.S. Military Observers with the Imperial Japanese Army, see the Appendix in Greenwood, 30-31.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

Ibid., 53.

Ibid., 43.


Ibid., 230.

Ibid.


Pershing R-J Report, 2.


Ahern, Chronicle, 18.

Ibid.

Pappas, 41.

Ahern, 19.

The lists of lectures referred to here are for the academic years 1906-1907, 1907-1908, 1908-1909, and 1909-1910. These are located in the U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The lists for the academic years 1904-1905 and 1905-1906 do not appear to exist.

List of Lectures, Army War College, Course 1906-1907, 6.

List of Lectures Delivered Before the Army War College, Course 1907-1908, 272-273.


38 Swift, "Liaoyang," 1.

39 Ibid.

40 List of Lectures, 1907-1908, 272-273.

41 Major Joseph E. Kuhn, Partial List of Lectures Delivered Before the Army War College, Course 1908-1909, "Plan Which Would Be Put into Operation by the Engineer Corps in Case of War with a First-class Power, for Furnishing Our Field Army with Appropriate Engineer Services," January 21, 1909, 93.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 94.


47 Army War College, "Problem No. 12, United States—Japan," 1907.


49 Ibid., 57.


51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., 351.

53 Ibid., 351-352.


56 Greenwood, 31-35.


58 Ibid., 62.


60 Ibid., 378-379.


62 Vandiver, 417.

63 Ibid., 378.


66 Smythe, 137-138.

67 Coffman, 31.

68 Ibid., 32.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., 34.

71 Ibid., 32.

72 Vetock, 30.

73 Ibid.

74 *Field Service Regulations 1905*, 9.

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