HOW CAN USAR RECRUITING IMPROVE?

BY

COLONEL YOU-YING W. WHIPPLE
United States Army Reserve

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

HOW CAN USAR RECRUITING IMPROVE?

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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USAREC, which recruits for both the Regular Army and the Army Reserve, has missed the USAR recruiting objectives for the last five consecutive years (FY 1995-1999). Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 directs the Secretary of the Army to conduct such a review, to include examining a possible course of corrective action, whether the responsibility for Army Reserve recruiting should be placed under the control of the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR). This Strategic Research Project reviewed the United States Army Reserve (USAR) recruiting performance by the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) by analyzing the Reserve unit locations, recruiter surveys, and recruiter write-rates. Looking at the military eligible population of potential growth in this country, the author evaluates the locations of Army Reserve centers and Army National Guard armories. Using the Department of Defense recruiter surveys, the author ascertains recruiter performances and perspectives on issues related to recruiting. Finally, comparison of performances by Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard recruiters are analyzed.
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To my husband, Dr. Andrew P. Whipple, and our children, Joan, Kyle, Beth, and Daniel, I want to extend my thanks and love for supporting me throughout my military career, home and abroad. I dedicate this paper to my parents, Tze Seng and Chuan Wang, and my in-laws, Quentin and the late Joan Whipple.

I want to express special thanks and appreciation to Dr. Douglas V. Johnson, whose patience, guidance, encouragement, and friendship greatly assisted in the completion of this project.

I also want to thank BG Billy Cooper, Deputy Commanding General of USAREC, USAREC staff members, especially CPT(P) Thomas Liuzzo, OCAR staff, especially MAJ Anthony Kanellis, and OSD staff members, especially Ms Andrea Zucker.
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HOW CAN US AR RECRUITING IMPROVE?

Our nation requires military personnel in both the Regular Army and the Army Reserve components to maintain a force structure to continue our global engagement and military supremacy. Without a robust force, the military cannot continue to perform the ever-increasing number of missions that come our way. These have included the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) including, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and Support and Sustainment Operations (SASO). "Since the end of the Cold War, the number of enlisted entrants into the military has declined significantly, reflecting the need for a smaller force in the post-drawdown military. Across the Department of Defense (DOD), the total accession requirements declined by 33 percent between 1989 and 1998. Despite this dramatic drop, the armed services are still finding it difficult to meet their enlisted recruiting goals. For example, the Army had to reduce its annual recruiting mission when it became clear that the original mission was unattainable given its resources. In fiscal year (FY) 98, the number of Army accessions fell short of the Army's annual requirement by over 1 percent, while Navy fell short by over 12 percent."\(^1\) It is clear that the level of manning impacts military readiness. It is likewise clear that the reserve forces are of vital importance to military readiness, and it is clear that present manning levels of authorized forces are adversely affecting the military's ability to perform its many missions. Recruiting and retention are the points of control of military personnel levels and thus must be considered in any assessment of readiness and strength. Since the reserve military force and its personnel differ in important ways from the active duty military structure and environment, a consideration of reserve recruiting as distinct from active duty recruiting is reasonable.

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) recruiting performance by the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). USAREC, which recruits for both the Regular Army (RA) and the Army Reserve (AR), missed its Army Reserve Fiscal Year 1999 objectives by more than 10,500 soldiers (non-prior service, NPS). This marks the fifth year in a row that USAREC has missed the Army Reserve recruiting goal. \(^2\) The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 directs the Secretary of the Army to conduct a review of the Army's system of recruiting for the Army Reserve to include examining, as a possible course of corrective action, whether the responsibility for Army Reserve recruiting should be placed under the control of the Army Reserve Command. \(^3\)

There are multiple aspects that affect recruiting performance. This paper compares the Regular Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard (ARNG) by analyzing some of the factors impacting each, including the unit locations, the recruiter surveys, and the write-rates with the goal of identifying changes in recruiting policy that should improve USAR recruiting. Divided into six sections, this paper covers the background information, unit locations, survey results, write rates, summary-conclusions, and recommendations. The background information covers the historic events that evolved and brought Army Reserve recruiting under USAREC's control. The Reserve unit location section details
the results of the USAR 1999 National Market Analysis, which assessed the military available population
to support future USAR force structure. Next, the Department of Defense recruiter survey results are
discussed to ascertain field recruiter performances and perspectives. The third aspect of recruiting that is
discussed in this paper is the recruiter write rates, which measure recruiters' productivity. Then the
summary and conclusion section provides an outcome of this paper, and the recommendation section
offers some suggestions on how to improve USAR recruiting.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Why have Army Reserve recruiting problems come to the forefront of current military issues? Why has recruiting become such a problem that Congress is now involved? This recruiting problem is not
limited to the Army Reserve but also to the Regular Army as well as other services and components
except the Army National Guard and the Marine Corps. How can a nation maintain its military power
without maintaining its authorized force levels? Due to our national interests and our national values, the
United States must maintain a sufficient military force, enough to continue its military supremacy and
global presence. Lacking these authorized levels, the United States will be unable to continue the
increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of MOOTW, PKO, and SASO missions without seriously
degrading morale and readiness. At present USAREC must focus on the challenges of manning the
Regular Army and the Army Reserve forces at authorized end-strength levels.

When USAREC misses the Army Reserve recruiting goals, it is perceived by the Army Reserve
that USAREC is being preferential toward recruiting for the Regular Army mission over the Army Reserve
mission. The belief by the USAR is that only after a potential recruit rejects the Regular Army will
enlistment in the Army Reserve be offered. Whether this is or is not the reality, it is perceived to be the
case by several Regular Army and Army Reserve recruiters. In contrast, the Army National Guard does
its own recruiting with each state controlling its own National Guard recruiting program. Therefore, the
Army National Guard does not depend on USAREC to meet its recruiting goals.

That successful Army Reserve recruiting is important to the Army as a whole is readily evident
from the past decade. Normally, the reserve forces provide the backup for the Regular Army. "The 'Total
Force' Policy instituted in 1973 clearly specified that reserve forces would be 'the initial and primary
augmentation of active forces and military response would involve the integrated use of all forces
available including active, reserve, civilian, and allied.' Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the
first time reserve forces were mobilized in 40 years, and it was also the first major event since the All-
Volunteer Force (AVF) was started in 1973. Reservists have participated in almost every major military
operation since, including those in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and most recently East Timor. Presuming that the force structure in the armed forces has stabilized (no decrease in authorized strength
since 1997) and the increase in the number of deployments continues, the use of reserve forces will only
continue to expand in the foreseeable future. Due to the OPTEMPO of the Regular Army in the last
decade, the reserve forces are now being called more and more frequently to support the increasing
number of military missions. Therefore, it is imperative that both the regular and reserve components of
the armed forces remain fully manned, in case of major theaters of war (MTWs) or of several concurrent
lesser demands. During our present tenuous world situation with numerous terrorist threats,
unpredictable rogue leaders, and continuous warring factions, our nation cannot afford to let its guard
down.

In response to the possible repercussions of recruiting malaise within the Army Reserve, the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representative authorized in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, a review of the possibility of the Chief of the Army Reserves (CAR)
controlling Army Reserve recruiting. The creation of an USAR recruiting command, separate from
USAREC, is proposed as a means to the end in solving the Army Reserve recruiting dilemma.

How was the mission for Army Reserve recruiting assigned to the US Army Recruiting
Command? According to an information paper dated 9 August 1999, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel (ADCSPER) in 1975 established the One Army Recruiting Task Force to explore ways to
improve recruiting in the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. This study was to evaluate the
feasibility of total or partial integration of recruiting programs. Prior to 1974 unit commanders were
responsibility for recruiting and retention. Until 30 June 1974, the Personnel Division of Office of the
Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR) was responsible for the management of the recruiting and retention
effort. Then beginning 1 July 1974, this responsibility was transferred to FORSCOM along with OCAR’s
recruiting and retention positions. “In August 1978, the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army (VCSA)
decided to make USAR recruiting a USAREC responsibility. The transition from FORSCOM (Forces
Command) to USAREC began on 1 October 1978 and was completed in May 1979.”

Prior to the transition (FY76-FY78) the USAR mission accomplishment ran 82.2% to 92.5%. Immediately after the
transition (FY80-FY83) the goal reached between 110.5% to 112.0%. The trend above 100% prevailed
until FY85. From 1986 to 1999, USAREC achieved its USAR mission only five times (1986, 1990, 1992,
1993, and 1994). In the last five years (1995-1999) USAREC’s USAR mission accomplishment has
steadily declined, arriving at the lowest percentage ever in FY99, 76.9% with a shortfall of 10,500
soldiers. (Figure 1)

USAREC, on the other hand, feels the Army Reserve recruiting targets that it has been given for
the last three years FY97-99 were inflated and unrealistic. As seen in Figure 1, FY97 mission was
40,000 and actual goal reached was 39,353. FY98 mission was 40,600 and actual goal reached was
37,050. FY99 mission was 40,600 and actual goal reached was 35,035. Since USAREC has not been
able to meet those goals, the consequences to Army Reserve manning and readiness for the following
years compound year upon year.
USAREC Performance of USAR Mission FY83-99

FIGURE 1 - USAREC PERFORMANCE OF USAR RECRUITING MISSION FY83-99

One factor that affects the effectiveness of recruiting is the state of the economy. When the economy is up, recruiting is more difficult than when the economy is down. The military must compete for the eligible youth against a combination of lucrative job markets and increasing college attendance. However, “although college attendance has increased, the number of college graduates has not increased – so there is a large number of people out there with some college experience who might be interested in the military.” These students who do not complete their college should be an untapped source for recruiters. Another factor adversely affecting recruiting is that some civilian companies have provided or offered educational benefits similar to the Army’s. These include scholarships, educational loans, loan repayments, and tuition assistance (as a part of their incentive programs to join their organizations). As a result, no longer are the military services’ educational bonuses and incentives unique and attractive. Further, the American culture does not encourage the American youth to serve its country by way of military service. These factors have compounded recruiting problems generally.

In order to compete against a robust economy, civilian educational benefits, and the American culture, the Army Reserves, along with the other services and components, in the last few years have increased entry bonuses and incentives. Aside from the Marine Corps and the Army National Guard, all services and components are having a difficult time in achieving their recruiting missions. In order to
compete for the same market, all services and components have focused on monetary compensation, increasing their bonuses and incentives to attract eligible youth into their services or components.21 “Many state National Guard programs offer college tuition assistance packages. In fact, 14 states offer 100% college tuition programs (for state universities), while 32 state Guard programs provide partial college assistance.22 All services and components are reviewing their bonus and incentive programs to evaluate and to improve the effectiveness of these programs. Since the effectiveness of monetary inducements in enhancing recruiting into the Army Reserves has not significantly increased, perhaps there are other avenues unique to the Army Reserves that can be tapped to increase recruitment success. In spite of all the offers in bonuses and incentives offered to join the Army Reserve and the increase in the Army Reserve recruiter numbers, the mismatch of the Army Reserve units’ location with the geographical potential growth of eligible youth must be addressed.23 24

RESERVE UNIT LOCATIONS

In addition to the above factors of robust economy, civilian educational benefits, and the American culture, the locations of Army Reserve units do not match the locations of potential population growth. Unlike active duty personnel, Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers are constrained by the nature and location of their civilian jobs. They normally cannot move around the country and be stationed overseas according to the needs of the military. Being citizen-soldiers, their civilian jobs are their soldiers’ main livelihood. These soldiers hold two jobs; for them the Army Reserve or Army National Guard is only a part-time job. Newly enlisted Army Reserve or Guard soldiers are usually recruited for the nearest Reserve unit or Guard armory within a 50-mile radius of their homes.25 In order to find a unit that has the military occupation specialty (MOS) position, the Army Regulations states that a new recruit may not be assigned to a unit farther than 50 miles from his or her residence. However, the soldier may voluntarily waive the 50-mile restriction.26

The geographical location of Army Reserve centers can be a significant and unique factor in the success of Army Reserve recruiting. The Army Reserve soldiers are not paid for travel or lodging when they perform regular weekend drills. When a Reservist attends weekend drills, he only receives drill pay but is reimbursed for neither travel nor lodging. As the numbers of Reserve units and centers have decreased, the distance a Reservist has to travel to attend drills has increased. Therefore, now more than ever Reserve centers should be placed in areas closer to where the recruits are already located, so that travel and lodging expenses will not negate drill earnings.27 Another possibility is to provide the Reservist outside the 50-mile restriction with per diem to cover travel and lodging expenses for the drill weekend. Recruiters for the Army Reserves need to be aware of the nature of Army Reserve duties so as to direct their recruits to appropriate units which are located proximal to the recruits’ homes or places of civilian employment. Due to the number of Army National Guard units, this 50-mile radius constraint is not as crucial for the Army National Guard. Neither are Regular Army recruits restricted by this 50-mile constraint, once accessed into the Regular Army. They leave home and go wherever their assignments
take them. These geographical complications unique to the Reserves may further detract from recruiting success into the Reserves by USAREC personnel.

USAREC provides command and control and administrative support and training, but most Active Guard Reserve (AGR) recruiters do USAR recruiting. According to the USAR 1999 National Market Analysis (NMA), the Army Reserve has 808 Reserve centers (Figure 2 - Current USAR centers) and the Army National Guard has 2,460 armories (Figure 3 - Current ARNG armories). The Army National Guard has more than three times as many armories as the Army Reserve has centers. Because of this fact, Guard armories are not determinants for Army National Guard recruits as they are for Army Reserve recruits.

Each Reserve center houses at least one unit; most centers have several Army Reserve units. Most of the USAR centers or units are located in the eastern half of the United States, with a heavy concentration of units in the northeast and Midwest. Figure 4 shows the current average USAR fill rates, which describe the percentage of slots a unit is filled. USAR units with less than 70% of the fill rates are located mostly in the Midwest. These numbers indicate that the Army Reserve units may be located in the wrong places for recruiting purposes.

Figure 3 shows the current ARNG armory locations; usually each armory houses several units, which is the same as for the Army Reserve. Again, the concentration of these armories is in the eastern half of the United States. Figure 5 shows the current average ARNG fill rates, which are in the range of 80-90%. Almost all the armories are so filled, except within a few states such as Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico. If location is a primary predictor of recruiting success, most Army National Guard units appear to be properly located.

The 1999 National Marketing Analysis (NMA) provided a macro-level assessment of the military available population to support future USAR force structure. It focused on the eligible population of 17-29 year old males and females within the continental United States. It considered the four-year projected population growth and migration patterns of the military available youth. The 1999 NMA based its average gains and losses experienced by USAR units within a given geographical area during the last four fiscal years (FY95 through FY98) for its four-year (FY99-FY02) projections of future USAR force structure. The 1999 NMA was intended to develop courses of action in unit station planning; in other words, where future Army Reserve units should be located. Its purpose was to provide the Army Reserve strength management office with tools to facilitate USAR unit planning. It also was to identify areas with and without sufficient markets to support the current Army Reserve force structure.

This analysis assumed that present market and demographic trends would continue over the next several years and that both end strength and readiness objectives would provide proper alignment of USAR units. An area identified "as oversaturated or as having potential for additional USAR structure should not be considered as having the same potential for other reserve component units (e.g. Army and Air National Guard, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserves)." Over-saturated areas are defined as "areas where units currently exist that are having difficulty achieving even 70% fill and are projected to
FIGURE 2 - CURRENT USAR CENTER LOCATIONS
All maps from 1999 USAR National Market Analysis, PA&E, USAREC, 15 May 1999

FIGURE 3 - CURRENT ARNG ARMORY LOCATIONS
FIGURE 4 - CURRENT AVERAGE USAR FILL RATES

FIGURE 5 - CURRENT AVERAGE ARNG FILL RATES
FIGURE 6 - OVER-SATURATED MARKET AREAS

FIGURE 7 - PROJECTED MILITARY AVAILABLE POPULATION GROWTH
continue having difficulty (or are areas where current units may not be having difficulty now but are projected to begin having difficulty). Figure 6 shows that much of the over-saturated market areas are in the northeastern and mid-western parts of the United States. Within these over-saturated market areas recruiters have been unable to fill the vacant positions in existing USAR units. The obvious question would be, "from where would the eligible youth come to fill the already-existing vacancies or what can be done to enhance availability?" These northeastern and mid-western states are predicted to continue the shortage of enlisted personnel through the end of FY02, if current authorizations remain the same. Of the 27 market areas (Figure 6 - Over-saturated Market Areas) identified as significantly over-saturated, most of these areas are in the northern and mid-western states, i.e. Illinois, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Indiana, New York, and Massachusetts. At the same time, most of the USAR units are located in these over-saturated areas. Therefore, these areas should have been recommended as candidates for force structure reductions. Serious considerations for unit relocations or additions must be given to the southern and western states.

Based on the 1999 NMA, the national population that would be available for the military service (17-29 year old males and females) is projected for a 4.46% increase during the next four years, 1999-2002. Figure 7 shows the projected military available population growth. These projected growth regions indicate areas of military growth will be mainly in the southern and western states.

There are 182 market areas that have been identified in Figure 8 as having potential to support additional enlisted authorizations at the existing reserve center locations as seen in Figure 8 (Potential Growth – Existing Locations). These areas in the southeastern states should be considered as relocation sites for units currently in the over-saturated market areas as well as sites for new force structure. Forty-one market areas shown in Figure 9 (Potential Growth – New Locations) have been identified as potentially capable of supporting additional enlisted authorizations at new reserve center locations. These areas are mainly in the southern and western part of the United States.

Another problem associated with Reserve unit locations is that in 1994 the Army Reserve component shifted its profile from combat arms, combat support, and combat service support to only the combat support and combat service support units. The Army National Guard retained combat arms units in exchange for relinquishing combat support and combat service support units. Because of the Army Reserve component profile shift, it is even more difficult to access potential entrants within a fifty-mile radius, in order to match the military occupation specialty (MOS) with local units. Unless these Army Reserve units are already in areas of potential youth population growth, recruiting into combat support and combat service support units will be hard to improve.

These conclusions regarding Reserve unit locations are further enhanced by the 1999 USAR National Market Analysis (NMA). The 1999 NMA provided an assessment of the military available population (17-29 year old males and females within the continental United States) to support USAR force structure. The USAR force development needs a predictable tool to identify the plan for future USAR units, to identify areas capable of supporting the current USAR force structure, and to identify
FIGURE 8 - POTENTIAL GROWTH (EXISTING LOCATIONS)

FIGURE 9 - POTENTIAL GROWTH (NEW LOCATIONS)
areas with sufficient future market potential authorization both existing locations and new locations. The results of this analysis are that some of the northern and mid-western states such as Illinois, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Indiana, New York, and Massachusetts, lack the potential for growth. The northeastern United States and the mid-western United States are having a very difficult time recruiting for the Army Reserve. On the other hand, the southeastern and southwestern states do not encounter much of a recruiting problem. The propensity of available population to join the military is very high in the southern part of the United States. The problem may not be USAREC but locations of USAR units. These findings support increasing the number of Reserve units in these parts of the country.

To summarize, the locations of reserve units are critical to Army Reserve recruiting. The Army Reserve should consider the relocation of units from over-saturated markets into areas of potential growth. However, secondary and tertiary effects of unit relocation must be seriously considered. Some of these effects are political implications and influences, relocation costs, and command and control. Nonetheless relocation of Reserve units may be one component of a multi-partite solution to the Army Reserve recruiting dilemma.

RECRUITER SURVEY RESULTS

In order to ascertain recruiter performances and perspectives, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducts surveys every two years on issues related to recruiter selection and training, organizational leadership, recruiter support, and quality of life. According to the results of the 1998 DOD Recruiter Survey, even though recruiters receive monthly bonuses for duty as a recruiter, many recruiters question whether this factor impacts their recruiting success. The surveys asked about factors such as goal achievement, job demands, annual leave, recruiting improprieties, supervisory support, team work, job satisfaction, military life, and remaining in recruiting. If the circumstances and their underlying factors that negatively impact recruiter success can be identified, their resolution may well be a part of solving the recruitment problem.

The Regular Army sampled 1887 Army recruiters with 992 responses usable for analysis (53%). Usable responses were those who responded and who were only production recruiters. Production recruiters are considered ones that had mission goals and at least one year of recruiting experience. The Army Reserve had a sample of 762 with 337 responses usable for analysis (44%) and the Army National Guard had a sample of 1063 soldiers with 598 responses usable for analysis (56%). (See Table 1) These recruiter survey results were significant in indicating that the ability to achieve recruiting goals is down, that job demands are up, that taking annual leave has increased so that leave losses decreased, that recruiting improprieties are up, and that supervisors are slightly more helpful in 1998 than 1996.

In the area of goal achievement, the survey indicates that both Regular Army (49% in 1994 to 17% in 1998) and Army Reserve (64% in 1994 to 37% in 1998) recruiters feel that their goals are more difficult to reach than are those of the Army National Guard recruiters (62%). A majority of the Army
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**TABLE 1 – COMPOSITE RA, AR, AND ARNG RECRUITER SURVEY RESULTS**

National Guard recruiters (62-64%) feel their goals were achievable and only 25% of Army National Guard recruiters feel their goals were unachievable. The changes in the recruiter survey results of team work, job satisfaction, military life, and remaining in recruiting are not significant.

Recruiter attitudes and perceptions, as expected, have great impact on how they perform their mission of recruiting new soldiers. Job demands are up across the Total Army. This feeling is not specific to recruiters. With the increase in the operation tempo, all services and components feel similar pressure. These increases in job demand began with the drawdown of the military and when services were asked to do more with less. Even though the number of personnel has decreased, OPTEMPO has
not decreased accordingly, but has increased. Recruiters as well as the rest of the armed service personnel feel that their job demands have gone up, working up to 60 or more hours per week.

As for annual leave, there is a significant increase; 65-78% of all three component recruiters has been taking their annual leave rather than losing it. This indicates that supervisors are taking care of their subordinate recruiters. Only 2% of the Regular Army and Army Reserve recruiters have lost over 11 days of annual leave, but 17% of Army National Guard recruiters have lost over 11 days of annual leave (1998).

Recruiting improprieties as observed by fellow recruiters have increased from 1994 to 1998 in all three components, 18% and 19% in 1994 to 32% and 31% in 1998 for the Regular Army and Army Reserve recruiters respectively and 16% in 1994 to 26% in 1998 for the Army National Guard recruiters.

Supervisory support has remained about the same for all three components from 1994 to 1998, 38-44% of the Regular Army and Army Reserve recruiters and 46% to 53% for the Army National Guard. These recruiters feel they received good support from their supervisors.

All three component recruiters (ranging from 39% to 44% in 1994 to 1998 surveys) feel that they worked with their superiors as a team. According to these recruiters, management support has basically remained the same. Half of the recruiters reported their immediate supervisor stood up for them and coached them if needed.

In the area of job satisfaction, recruiters for the Army National Guard are most satisfied among the three components (67%). Only one-third (32%) of the Army Reserve recruiters and an even smaller proportion (25%) of the Regular Army recruiters are satisfied with their recruiting jobs. Most of the recruiters of all three components (84-86%) are satisfied with military life. As for their military careers, more than twice the number of Army National Guard recruiters (58%) will remain in recruiting than will the Regular Army (25%) and Army Reserve (22%) recruiters. It appears that Army National Guard recruiters find their recruiting jobs satisfying even though they work over 60+ hours per week. They also feel (62%) are able to make their recruiting goals. In light of the survey results, USAREC should evaluate its mission objectives for both Regular Army and Army Reserve recruiters, should ascertain the reasons for positive Army National Guard recruiter feedback, and should emulate some of these Army National Guard recruiter practices. (Figure 10, 11, and 12)

Satisfaction with military life has declined from 1994 to 1998 recruiter surveys. The Regular Army recruiters (94% in 1994 to 86% in 1998) said they were satisfied with military life. The Army Reserve recruiters (90% in 1994 to 84% in 1998) indicated they were satisfied with military life. The Army National Guard recruiters (86% in 1994 to 84% in 1998, least decline) felt they were satisfied with military life; they were least satisfied with military life of the three components.

As for remaining in recruiting, about 25% of the Regular Army recruiters would choose if given the choice; this has remained the same as in 1994. The decline in Army Reserve recruiters desire to remain in recruiting (34% in 1994 to 22% in 1998) is significant. The Army National Guard recruiters wishing to remain in recruiting also declined (63% in 1994 to 58% in 1998).
FIGURE 10 - 1994 DOD RECRUITER SURVEYS - ARMY

FIGURE 11 - 1996 DOD RECRUITER SURVEYS - ARMY
In summary, the Department of Defense conducts recruiter surveys for all services and components every two years to evaluate recruiter perspectives. Since the recruiters are the only ones who are surveyed, it is not possible to compare recruiters with any other specialty, only among themselves. Focusing on the Army and its components, the most significant negative result among these recruiters from 1994 to 1998 is the decrease in the perception that goals can be achieved by only 17% of the Regular Army recruiters. Only 17% Regular Army recruiters felt their goals were achievable and only 37% Army Reserve recruiters felt their goals were achievable. And the most significant (65-78% of all three component recruiters) is that annual leave is being taken rather than lost.\(^{45}\) One of the explanations for the negative result could be that at the present time all military recruiting community is very competitive among each other as well as among the civilian sector. A possible explanation for the positive result is that recruiter supervisors were supportive and made an effort to ensure the recruiters took their leaves.

**WRITE-RATES**

The success of a recruiter in his or her job is reflected in the write rates, which measure productivity. Write-rate is defined as the number of contacts per month divided by the number of contacts signed or accessed per month per recruiter.\(^{46}\) There are three types of write rates, gross write rates, net write rates, and mission write rates. Gross write rate is the number of contracts that one recruiter writes in one recruiting month or the total number of contracts per unit (i.e. company or battalion) divided by the number of recruiters in that unit in one month. Net write rate is the same as gross write rate except Delayed Entry Program (DEP) losses are removed from the total contracts written in that recruiting month.
Mission write rate is the number of contracts a recruiter or unit must write in a given month to ensure that mission is accomplished. When write rates are used net write rates are the figures used.

The net write rate for Army Reserve recruiting for planning purposes requires a 2.78 monthly write rate. This translates into 33 contracts per year, based on 100% achievement. However, for planning purposes, 95% achievement is used which, translates into a write rate of 2.64 as the planning factor.\(^{47}\) Write rates express the productivity that is expected of the recruiter.

It normally takes a recruiter approximately 140 contacts to eventually have 1 accession into the Army Reserve. The recruiter first contacts the interested prospect, then arranges 22 appointments, conducts 14 appointments, makes numerous follow-up visits, answers questions, assists with filling out the entry packet and in obtaining numerous required documents. Out of 140 contacts, 3.4 prospects will take the required entry tests, 1.7 will qualify, 1.2 will sign a contract, and finally 1 will be successfully accessed.\(^{48}\) Write rates are seasonally affected with first (October to December) and fourth (July to September) quarters typically having the highest figures.\(^{49}\)

Since the need for new recruits fluctuates each year depending on the force structure and vacancies, each recruiter is tasked to make a certain number of contracts per year based on numerous factors. Some of these factors include the USAREC mission, the write rate, the recruiting station location, the number of recruiters at each station, the density of the available population, and the population propensity to join the Army Reserve versus other services or components. From 1990 to 1999 the write rates for the Army Reserve have dropped from 3.24 to 2.38. (Figure 13 - USAR Historical Write Rates). This 26.5% decrease in recruiter productivity is another means of evaluating recruiter effectiveness and may suggest other means of enhancing Army Reserve recruiting efforts.

Comparing the write rates of the Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard (Figure 14), the Army Reserve recruiters appear to have the highest write rates. However, this may not be the case. The reason for this relatively high write rate is that not only do the Army Reserve recruiters recruit for the Army Reserve mission, but the Regular Army recruiters also recruit for the Army Reserve. For various reasons, some recruiting stations do not have full-time Active Guard Reserve (AGR) recruiters. Without AGR recruiters at the recruiting station, the Regular Army recruiters must then recruit for both the Army Reserves as well as for the Regular Army. Army Reserve recruiters, in contrast, per current law (Title 10, U.S. Code 12310), cannot recruit for the Regular Army mission. It is not possible from the present data to compare the write rates of Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard recruiters separately, and USAREC needs to develop a method of measuring effectiveness of all recruiters.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has provided background information on the history of how USAREC assumed the recruiting mission for the Army Reserve in 1978. In the beginning USAREC did very well recruiting for the Army Reserve. However, in the last five years, USAREC has failed to reach the goals for Army Reserve recruiting. The Army National Guard recruits its own personnel within each state. Each state has its own state recruiting program, bonuses, and incentives. The success of the Army National Guard needs to be reviewed for possible insights to improve USAR recruiting.

The influence of Reserve unit locations and the mismatch of geographical growth potential with Reserve units were examined. The units in already over-saturated areas (such as northeastern and midwestern states) have been unable to reach their authorized strength. The potential growth areas are in the southern and western states. This mismatch needs to be addressed in future Reserve unit stationing plans.

Recruiter survey results were discussed in detail. In order to ascertain recruiter performances and perspectives, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducts surveys every two years or so since 1989 on issues related to recruiters, such as goal achievement, job demands, annual leave, recruiting improprieties, supervisory support, team work, job satisfaction, military life, and remaining in recruiting. Comparisons were made between the Regular Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard recruiters. The most significant negative result among these recruiters from each other and from 1994 to 1998 is the decrease in goal achievement by the Regular Army (17% felt goals were achievable) and Army Reserve (37% felt goals were achievable) recruiters. One of the explanations for the negative results could be that all military recruiting community is very competitive at the present time among each other as well as among the civilian sector. Another area measured is job demands; recruiters feel job demands have risen. More are spending over 60 hours per week in their jobs. On the other hand, the most significant positive result is that annual leave is being taken rather than being lost. Annual leave loss of eleven days or more is negligible for Regular Army and Army Reserve recruiters. However, the Army National Guard recruiters have lost the most of their annual leaves. A possible explanation for the positive result is that supervisors made an effort to ensure their recruiters took their annual leaves. As for recruiting improprieties observed by fellow recruiters, the significant increase should a concern for recruiting leadership. In supervisor support and team work, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard recruiters are seeing an increase but the Regular Army recruiters are experiencing a decrease. Regarding job satisfaction, Regular Army and Army Reserve recruiters indicate a significant decrease, but the Army National Guard recruiters a slight increase. As for military life, the Regular Army and Army National Guard recruiters feel a decline in the quality of military life while the Army National Guard recruiters' feelings are unchanged. A possible explanation for this could be the ARNG recruiters do not move every 3 years or so as do RA and AR recruiters. And, regarding remaining in recruiting, AR recruiters have the most significant decline while the RA and ARNG recruiters remained basically unchanged.
Finally, recruiting write rates, which define recruiting productivity, are defined and explained. Write rate is the number of contacts per month divided by the number of contacts per actual contracts signed or accessed per month per recruiter. Several factors that affect or influence write rates were discussed. Comparing the write rates of the Regular Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard, the Army Reserve recruiters appear to have the highest write rates. However, this is not actually the case because Regular Army recruiters recruit for not only the Regular Army but also for the Army Reserve. When recruiting stations do not have Army Reserve (AGR) recruiters, the Regular Army recruiters must then recruit for both. Therefore, it is not possible presently to compare the write rates of Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard recruiters.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the area of Reserve unit locations, the mismatch of Reserve unit locations with projected military available population growth must be resolved or be further analyzed. Since Army Reserve recruiters can only require their applicants to commute to a unit within a fifty-mile radius of their residence unless a waiver is signed, Reserve unit locations are crucial. More studies are needed to seriously assess the secondary and tertiary effects of relocation Army Reserve units from the military over-saturation region to future potential growth regions. Political impact and influences may be key factors in Reserve unit relocations. Relocation of Reserve units from over-saturated regions to areas of potential growth may be a partial solution to the Army Reserve recruiting dilemma.

Another recommendation before relocating Reserve units would be to conduct studies that project the demographics of future military available population growth to ten to twenty years, instead of just four to five years.

To alleviate the soldier’s expenses for weekend drills at Reserve centers beyond fifty-mile limit, reimbursement for lodging and travel could also be a partial solution.

Since Military Occupation Specialties in the Army Reserve have shifted, the locations of Reserve units requiring combat support and combat service support specialties must be considered.

As for recruiter surveys, since the recruiters are the only ones who are surveyed, it is not possible to compare recruiters with other specialties, only among themselves. However, these survey results will be helpful in long term analysis of successful recruiters. A recommendation is that these surveys continue to be conducted every two years for all of Department of Defense recruiters. Factors affecting recruiter job satisfaction need to be addressed and possible solutions developed. Recruiting impropriety issues are serious and should be resolved with military leadership emphasis and support.

Write rates should be clearly defined and should be the same for all services and components for comparison purposes. Since Regular Army and Army Reserve recruiters recruit for the Army Reserve, the write rate for the Army Reserve is always higher and is not a good indicator of Army Reserve recruiting productivity. A recommendation is for a truer measurement of recruiting productivity to be formulated.
This paper covered only three aspects of Army Reserve recruiting. Due to the plethora of factors that affect Army Reserve recruiting and Army Reserve uniqueness, more studies and assessment need to be performed to formulate an improved recruiting strategy. A strategic look at solving or alleviating the Army Reserve recruiting dilemma will require careful considerations into secondary and tertiary effects of that plan. As the U.S. Army War College teaches, all strategic plans must pass the test for strategy, to ascertain whether they are suitable, feasible, and acceptable before implementation.

Word Count = 6875
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