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OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS: ISSUES IN SOURCING INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BROOKS B. CHAMBERLIN
United States Army

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Operations in the Balkans: Issues in Sourcing Intelligence Requirements

by

LTC Brooks B. Chamberlin
U.S. Army

COL Thomas Werner
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Brooks B. Chamberlin

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Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo today are supported by highly modified Military Intelligence (MI) units and by significant intelligence augmentation both in the Balkans and in Central Europe. These demands necessitate more individual augmentees from MI than from any other branch. My experience in US Army Europe from 1998-1999 left me with an impression that the Army was struggling to fill these requirements. This study was undertaken to determine if these perceived intelligence personnel challenges had a basis in fact—and, if so, to make recommendations to overcome them.

This study is based on intelligence personnel statistics, policies and trends; MI unit structures; and planned task force rotations as well as anecdotal evidence from MI leaders. It reveals several issues related to current MI requirements and sourcing strategies. Fundamentally, the objectives, policies, and resources (ends, ways, and means) for MI support to Balkans operations are out of balance. Two "train wrecks" loom in the near-term, and other issues must be addressed quickly to avoid mid-term crises.

The two most urgent issues concern declining numbers of deployable counter-intelligence (CI) assets and the lack of adequate MI organizations to support two scheduled National Guard (NG)-led Bosnia rotations. CI personnel shortfalls, declining recruiting and retention, and disproportionate deployment are exhausting our resources. Recently approved force structure changes cannot field new assets in time to redress the problem. Alternative approaches must be implemented to accomplish some CI functions and allow reduction of deployed CI requirements sustainable levels. Second, seven of eight NG divisional MI Battalions are cadre units, yet three NG division headquarters will lead SFOR rotations. Composite MI battalions must be developed, organized, and trained to deploy for two of the three scheduled NG-led SFOR rotations. Scarce MI resources must be identified immediately so that they are not expended before the composite units deploy and so that they can begin training as a team.

Once these two near-term crises are averted, further problems must be addressed to sustain fill of MI requirements over the long run. Some can be solved internally by changes to MI force structure and increased use of contracted specialists. For others, such as the Temporary Change of Station (TCS) process, MI leaders need to force the pace for Army-wide changes. TCS of individuals fosters unpredictability and inefficiency that adversely affect soldiers, their families, sourcing units, and deployed organizations. The Army must stop relying on short-term TCS augmentation and seek solutions consistent with our long-term commitments in the Balkans. MI can not and should not try to fix these problems alone. However, pressing TCS requirements give MI leaders great incentive and a strong voice as advocates for change.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the course of this study, I have encountered, both directly and indirectly, many hard working professionals who are finding innovative solutions to the challenges facing Army intelligence. I am indebted to many of them and to several offices for their assistance in obtaining information cited in this paper or used to develop issues through its appendices.

In particular, MAJ Basile, CPT Brooke, CW2 Hampson, Mr. Harry Gerecke, and Mr. Ben Purcell of USAREUR ODCSINT provided up-to-date information on the many requirements for intelligence augmentation and the current status of contracting linguists and other contracting initiatives. CPT(P) Im and Mr. Ray Hannas at the Total Army Personnel Command assisted me in obtaining snapshots of Army-wide authorizations and the status of our personnel resources. LTC(P) Phelps of the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence provided invaluable data on recruiting and retention trends in intelligence specialties. Ms. Debbie Spunaugle of HQDA, DAMO-FDI provided current Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment for intelligence units as well as information on overall MI organizational structure in both the active and reserve components. Ms. Linda Hein of the U.S. Army Reserve Command added perspectives on policies and issues relating to activation of USAR soldiers as individual augmentees. Finally, many current and former intelligence commanders responded to my request for anecdotes that provided insights into the effects of individual augmentation on sourcing units.

Valuable assistance also came from LTC Ed Fallon and LTC James Harper, who critiqued drafts, and from COL Thomas Werner and Professor Jim Hanlon, who offered critical editorial suggestions regarding clarity and organization.

This study represents the sum of the contributions of these many sources along with other data and relevant documents that I gathered while researching the topic. As well as fulfilling Army War College academic requirements, the study seeks to provide a useful summary of issues and information for senior Army intelligence leaders. It should call attention to challenges looming on the near horizon to our capability to carry out complex, difficult, and lengthy missions in support of our national security strategy.
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OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS: ISSUES IN SOURCING INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Requirements for deployed intelligence units and individual intelligence augmentees for Balkans-related missions are problematic. Military Intelligence (MI) epitomizes Army-wide problems in the areas of intense OPTEMPO, personnel shortfalls, recruiting, and retention. Innovative concepts have somewhat reduced demand for MI soldiers and provided flexibility in filling requirements. However, significant challenges remain in the near- and mid-term.

Foremost among these challenges are two pending "train wrecks." First, current Counter-Intelligence (CI) / tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) requirements are too large for our deployable resources to keep filled. If requirements or policies do not change, a crisis will arrive in the near-term. Second, the Army is deploying National Guard (NG) divisional headquarters to Bosnia to ease the OPTEMPO of active Army forces—but the NG MI force structure is inadequate to support this initiative. Other issues need attention once these two crises are averted. Current processes that deploy individual augmentees create significant problems for our soldiers and their units. MI officers and some enlisted specialties are leaving the Army faster than we can afford, with the deployment tempo and processes apparently contributing to this exodus.

This study examines issues the Army must deal with to source deployed MI requirements. These issues are documented in two categories. First are those related to the numbers of intelligence personnel required for Balkans-related missions and how they deploy. Second are issues with MI units: the tailored MI structures required in Bosnia and Kosovo and deployment schedules. For both categories, each issue is stated, related information is explored, and fixes are recommended.

BACKGROUND

U.S. Army operations in the Balkans began in December 1995 as a short-term deployment to Bosnia within a multi-national peacekeeping force. The asymmetrical threats facing 1st Armored Division (1AD) demanded extraordinary MI efforts. In response, 1AD built a highly modified intelligence structure that disproportionately required certain MI resources. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), also identified requirements for additional intelligence personnel to staff temporary command and control elements, to augment theater-level intelligence centers, and to form joint and combined units for specific Balkans-related missions. The large requirements for extra personnel led USAREUR and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), to develop processes to temporarily source the positions from across the Army.

This 'short-term' operation is now in its fifth year. Its long-term nature is clear. A Task Force (TF) Eagle commander recently said that the mission has no end date and that we will need to "see how long the people of Bosnia want us to be here." Although we cannot withdraw from the unstable situation, we have gradually reduced our forces in Bosnia to one-third their original size. But intelligence requirements have not shrunk proportionally with cuts made to other forces. This continuing demand for extra MI personnel in Bosnia—combined with the addition of new, disproportionate MI requirements in support of Kosovo Force (KFOR)—are stretching MI resources to the breaking point.
The MI issues are rooted in the tailored organizations and unique architectures created for the Balkans. Intelligence requirements are large: the Stabilization Force (SFOR) 7 version of USAREUR’s Deployment Manning Document (DMD) requires more individual augmentees from MI than from any other branch (114 of 408 requirements). Other requirements documents for Balkans missions similarly include many MI positions. Where are these intelligence requirements? Why are they so large?

The SFOR DMD requirements staff temporary elements such as SFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo, the Allied Military Intelligence Battalion (AMIB) in Bosnia, USAREUR’s National Support Element in Hungary and Croatia, and US National Intelligence Cells (NIC) at SFOR and at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Italy. The DMD also includes augmentees at Eagle Focus—an operation supporting SFOR from Germany, and augmentees for expanded Balkans-related operations within the CAOC, EUCOM’s Joint Analysis Center (JAC), and the EUCOM staff in Stuttgart. Other documents list requirements for a NIC at KFOR in Pristina, to augment maneuver Brigade and Battalion S2 staffs in TF Eagle, and to provide non-standard G2 staffs and MI Battalions for both TF Eagle and TF Falcon.

MI requirements are large for many reasons. Deployed divisional MI battalions perform missions very different from the battlefields they were designed for. Some MI capabilities do not fit the Balkans threat environment well, while others are disproportionately needed. Organizations in Europe’s Central Region need help to simultaneously support Balkans operations and accomplish their intelligence responsibilities for the rest of Europe and Africa. EUCOM increased augmentation needs at the JAC as late as October 1999, even as non-intelligence augmentation was being cut. But, above all, it is intelligence support to force protection that demands a robust intelligence architecture. Force protection is the overwhelming priority in the Balkans. Senior leaders have periodically increased MI structure to reduce risk. For example, commanders doubled the size of the TF Eagle Analysis and Control Element during an early SFOR rotation; significantly enlarged the US NIC at SFOR Headquarters in early 1999; and expanded the initial TF Falcon MI Company Team of 44 soldiers to an MI Battalion of 137 military spaces shortly after the Task Force entered Kosovo.

Many organizations have worked to alleviate problems associated with filling the large intelligence requirements in the Balkans. Contractors have been hired to perform selected intelligence tasks; flexibility has been created with Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) that are accepted to fill requirements; requirements in the Central Region have been drastically cut; Reserve Component (RC) individuals and units have deployed.

As of 31 January 2000, 1,012 Serbo-Croatian, Albanian, and Macedonian linguist positions have been contracted. USAREUR has also expanded contracting of hard-to-fill MI requirements to include analysts. Approximately 100 contracted analysts are working Balkans-related tasks at 66th MI Group, TF Eagle, TF Falcon, and SFOR. But reliance on contractors does have drawbacks. It shifts shared military details and security duties to a shrinking deployed military population. It is often costly and relies on a limited hirable population. The proven success of contracting makes it, however, viable and attractive.
TF Eagle has coded 123 positions in its G2 and MI Battalion as specialties 351X, 97X, 9XX, or MOS immaterial. This flexibility allows units to deploy with more of their own soldiers and fewer augmentees. This flexible coding relies heavily on our soldiers' adaptability to get the job done. Long-term relief is also coming. Recently approved changes to MI Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) will eventually align unit structures more closely with current needs.

In spite of these efforts, issues remain. Further, the scope or timing of some issues simply do not match the lanes in the Army road that we are accustomed to. HQDA normally works on long-term issues. Deployed units focus on immediate missions. Resourcing responsibilities are divided between Major Commands (MACOM) who each lack a comprehensive picture. Therefore some issues are kicked around like footballs—being picked up only when a crisis arrives.

ISSUES BASED ON ASSESSMENT OF INDIVIDUAL REQUIREMENTS

The most critical issue with individual MI requirements is that we cannot sustain fill of the currently deployed numbers of CI/tactical HUMINT soldiers. Further, the Temporary Change of Station (TCS) process that sources individual augmentees hurts both soldier morale and unit effectiveness. This impact, combined with the high deployment tempo, drives down retention of MI soldiers.

Consider total MI requirements, both for individual augmentees and to fill tailored units, as compared to US Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) figures for Army-wide MI authorizations and available soldiers as of 1 October 1999. Situations where Balkans requirements matched or exceeded the number of soldiers already unavailable (the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) account) and those where on-hand soldiers are less than 75% of Army-wide authorizations are listed in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS and/or Grade</th>
<th>Balkans Rqmn't</th>
<th>TTHS</th>
<th>AC Auth/On-hand/%</th>
<th>RC Assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35-series Colonel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>140* / 107 / 76%</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Military Intelligence)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35E Major (CI Officer)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78 / 26 / 33%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35F Major (HUMINT Officer)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42 / 8 / 19%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35E Captain (CI Officer)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>138 / 74 / 54%</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35F Captain (HUMINT Officer)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35 / 0 / 0%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350B All-Source Warrant Officer (WO)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>176 / 147 / 83%</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>351B Counter-Intelligence WO</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>357 / 258 / 72%</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>351E Interrogation WO</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>118 / 99 / 83%</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33W EW/Signals System Repairer</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45**</td>
<td>857 / 591 / 69%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97B Counter-Intelligence Agent</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>130**</td>
<td>1257 / 782 / 62%</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes estimated 34-series authorizations. ** Less TTHS related to entry-level training.

TABLE 1. SELECTED BALKANS REQUIREMENTS VERSUS ARMY RESOURCES (Where Balkans Requirements Equal or Exceed TTHS or Where AC Fill is Less Than 75%)
The Balkans requirements cited in Table 1 initially appear to represent a small percentage of the Army's resources. However, available assets are limited by the normal Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move of over one-third of Army soldiers each year and the policy of stabilizing all active component (AC) soldiers for a period equal to their deployment. Units sourcing Balkans requirements often exempt soldiers nearing PCS or end-of-service, further limiting the pool of soldiers eligible to deploy. RC soldiers are restricted in many ways that severely limit their availability.

Three issues with individual MI soldiers emerged from this comparison of requirements and resources, as well as analysis of anecdotes and trends.

EXHAUSTION OF CI/HUMINT RESOURCES

In less than two years, the Army will have insufficient deployable CI/tactical HUMINT soldiers to fill requirements in the Balkans unless current requirements or policies are changed.

Discussion.

Table 1 particularly indicates a shortage of CI and tactical HUMINT soldiers. These specialists are needed to provide intelligence support to force protection throughout the Balkans. The CI (skill 35E) and HUMINT (skill 35F) officers needed for senior management of these operations are in very short supply. Balkans requirements for Warrant Officers (WO) in some specialties represent more than 10% of the active Army's population. Further, serious shortages of both CI WO (specialty 351B) and CI Agents (specialty 97B) mean that units outside the Balkans are already undermanned before they are tasked to provide individual augmentees.

Recruiting and retention trends indicate that the CI shortfalls will not be corrected in the near-term. At 93%, MOS 97B recruiting in fiscal 1999 was above the Army average, yet on a marked downward trend from 1997 (119%) and 1998 (106%) levels. Retention of MOS 97B is below Army average. In August 1999, it stood at 34% for initial term and 60% for mid-term soldiers. This MOS is at 62% strength in spite of at least two consecutive years during which we significantly exceeded recruiting goals.

In Bosnia and in Kosovo, tactical HUMINT soldiers are employed somewhat interchangeably with CI soldiers as members of Force Protection teams. These teams develop and interact with local sources to assemble information regarding threats to our forces and to implementation of agreements. TF Eagle has documented the flexibility to use tactical HUMINT specialties as well as CI soldiers to fill these teams. Tactical HUMINT WO (specialty 351E) and enlisted (MOS 97E) resources are in better shape than their CI counterparts, but a larger percentage of authorizations for these soldiers are in the RC.

Many RC CI/tactical HUMINT soldiers have deployed to the Balkans. Their availability is limited by policies restricting the number and duration of active duty periods. Further, some RC CI soldiers are members of teams that are authorized to deploy and operate only as a team, although current policy only deploys individuals. That disconnect and differences between MTOE CI/tactical HUMINT team structures and the tailored teams in the Balkans prevent use of all assets. Draft material for the 2000 MI Functional Area Assessment (FAA) predicted that RC capabilities to deploy CI/tactical HUMINT soldiers
would be exhausted by March 2002.\textsuperscript{11} This study cannot confirm that forecast. However, it appears plausible in light of quantities of RC resources, currently deployed assets, and the policies affecting their deployment.

The MI FAA recently gained approval to increase authorizations for CI/tactical HUMINT soldiers in divisional MI Battalions and to expand both RC and AC echelon-above-division (EAD) HUMINT assets.\textsuperscript{12} These changes will better balance intelligence disciplines and will align unit structures more with current demand for these skills. However, these changes will only improve MI units' ability to fill Balkans requirements in the long-term. The severe shortfall of specialty 351B and MOS 97B soldiers against current Army-wide authorizations and the recruiting and retention trends cited earlier indicate that it will be a very long time before new authorization levels can be substantially filled.

We have already leveraged flexible MOS coding. We are altering force structure to better meet long-term needs. But we are exhausting both AC and RC resources and must act now. Otherwise tactical commanders will soon have few or no deployable assets available.

**Recommendation.**

Some options offer marginal improvements, but bold action is needed to address the problem's true scope. We must find effective ways to significantly reduce the demand for CI/tactical HUMINT skills.

Contracting some positions and eliminating all duplications of effort could marginally trim requirements and help alleviate the exhaustion of CI/Tactical HUMINT resources. The successes of USAREUR's current contracting initiatives should be evaluated with an eye towards adding selected CI requirements. Operational Control Element and CI analysis positions in TF Eagle and TF Falcon should be assessed to decide if contractor fill is acceptable, and current contract firms should be tasked to determine if they can locate skilled personnel to perform these functions. These management and analysis positions offer more reasonable choices for contracting than teams that work directly with sensitive sources throughout the Balkans. The CI efforts in Bosnia include teams from TF Eagle, the AMIB, and other agencies operating in the same sector. EUCOM identified this potential overlap and considered reinvigorating management processes to prevent redundancy. That effort will ensure we have minimized duplication of effort and may lead to additional small reductions in requirements.

An option that would produce more substantial cuts involves changing doctrine and training to increase employment of non-MI patrols, which are already accompanied by contracted linguists, to work with overt and less sensitive sources, such as local officials. A reduced number of CI teams would then concentrate on the most sensitive sources. This distributed collection would clearly require significant training of maneuver units before deployment, along with changes to collection management and analysis processes. This option could enable full-strength divisional MI units to deploy with little or no augmentation, and allow remaining deployable RC and Corps-level CI/tactical HUMINT assets to be husbanded to meet the higher need for augmentation during RC-led rotations.
IMPACTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEE PROCESS

Current Army-wide processes for tasking and deploying soldiers as individual augmentees directly undermine morale of the deploying soldiers and their families. Further, they unnecessarily detract from mission performance of the soldiers' normal units. Thus the solution has become the problem.

Discussion.

Commanders who have provided individual augmentees cite concerns about the impacts of current TCS and TDY procedures on both the soldier and the unit. First, many cite a triple impact each individual requirement has on sourcing units: One soldier is often attending training and preparing to deploy while another soldier is deployed and third is in a period of post-deployment stabilization. Also, deployment of individuals breaks up teams. These factors reduce the effectiveness of both the deployed soldier and the remainder of the unit as it carries out its missions. Soldiers deploy without the comrades they trust and have trained with. Deployed soldiers restart team-building while performing the new mission. Units aligned with contingency missions elsewhere must constantly reorganize and qualify battle-rostered teams as individuals are pulled out.

Commanders also reported that the TCS process is inefficient and is not linked to PCS processes. Units have identified and sent soldiers to pre-deployment training, only to make last-minute substitutions when those soldiers received reassignment orders just before their scheduled deployment. A related issue is that post-deployment stabilization does not prevent recently returned soldiers from being reassigned to an unaccompanied tour (e.g. Korea) during the stabilization period. Finally, late-breaking changes can be made in requirements and units tasked to provide individual soldiers may submit a reclama. Such situations leave little time to identify and notify an alternate TCS soldier. Short-notice deployments limit training and preparation; they create turbulence and an unpredictable environment. All of this adversely impacts morale. Other soldiers and families in the providing unit are on edge, expecting another tasking at any moment. Lack of predictability and focus on the individual, rather than on a team, undermine morale. The bond between soldiers and their unit is broken when they are singled out to deploy. Spouses also feel isolated if theirs is the only family separated by deployment.

Commanders cite some benefits of TCS and TDY deployments. Some indicated that their soldiers were proud to use their professional skills and training, but such positive reactions are much more common to team deployments than to individual TCS. A consistent recommendation from many of the commanders was to deploy teams rather than individuals.¹³

One effort to reduce the negative effects of individual TCS may provide a model for broader application. USAREUR and HQDA created a habitual association of each TCS Serbo-Croatian linguist requirement with a MACOM. The policy is intended to improve predictability for soldiers and units. It also allows each MACOM some flexibility to rotate or extend soldiers in positions they are sourcing.¹⁴

Deployment of teams instead of individuals is also attractive. Most RC and echelon-above-Corps AC MI units have been structured with derivative Unit Identification Codes to facilitate deployment of teams. However, many teams in the Balkans have tailored structures that do not match MTOE units.
Further, when USAREUR specifically requested team deployments to meet some MI augmentation requirements during Operation Allied Force, HQDA insisted on line-by-line requests for individuals. The TCS and TDY processes add to turbulence and unpredictability in a time of already high OPTEMPO. The focus on individuals is inconsistent with Army values. Change is imperative. **Recommendation.**

The Army needs to institutionalize procedures that ensure predictable deployments for individual soldiers, but shift to team deployments as the preferred means of supporting current and projected missions. The Army should link TCS and PCS by identifying soldiers scheduled to deploy and blocking reassignment until their return and completion of stabilization at home station. Habitual association of a requirement with a sourcing unit could be expanded beyond the current scope of individual linguists. It could include CI/tactical HUMINT teams, analytical sections, and other elements. Soldiers identified to TCS could then talk with soldiers in their unit who have already been deployed to the same position, improving their preparation and reducing personal anxiety. As with the current linguist policy, units could make reasonable adjustments to rotations based on unit and family issues.

Increased deployment of teams instead of individuals would reduce adverse impacts on morale and on mission accomplishment. Familiarity with team procedures, leadership, and teammates not only makes a soldier more productive, it also makes the family at home more confident. Spouses know who is working with and caring for their deployed soldier. They can network with other spouses of the deployed team's soldiers. The bond between the soldier, the soldier's family, and the unit remains strong and supportive. The sourcing unit would not have to reorganize remaining soldiers to accomplish missions. Instead, a deployed element's mission would be reassigned or, if indicated, discontinued.

However, habitual association of requirements with sources and team deployments are really only interim solutions. The Balkans commitments are clearly long-term. The temporary sourcing strategy of TCS, TDY, and individual augmentation should be replaced with a stable, predictable process that can serve for the duration of the mission. Formal manning documents, predictable assignments, and an end to individual taskings would benefit the Army at large and MI in particular. Converting individual requirements to PCS presents two different sets of issues and solutions.

Eagle Focus, HQ EUCOM, the CAOC, and the JAC are all staffed with permanent-party soldiers at locations that can provide normal garrison quality of life. The individual augmentation requirements at these locations could be filled by PCS soldiers assigned as temporary overstrength. Existing command and control structures can manage them without creating additional overhead. Longer assignments would increase skills and knowledge of the mission, and morale would improve as families move and live together. Tracking changes in augmentation requirements and monitoring the temporary overstrength positions would require intense management by the Army's personnel system. Without careful oversight, there is a risk that the temporary additional manpower in EUCOM could inadvertently transition to permanent increases at the expense of other theaters.
Individual augmentees in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Hungary are at forward locations that lack full base support, creating a different challenge. The current senior U.S. commander in Europe and other experts believe that our focus on southeastern Europe will continue over the next ten years. They have identified the need to shift basing of military forces to that area.\textsuperscript{16} Organizations and assignments in the Balkans should reflect this reality. We should follow the post-Korean War and post-World War II models and build formally documented organizations in the Balkans. Soldiers would PCS for 12-month unaccompanied tours similar to most assignments in Korea today. This policy would facilitate predictable assignments, less turbulence, and stable teams.

Solutions involving PCS are not panaceas. Existing shortfalls mean that PCS of soldiers to meet Balkans requirements would reduce the fill across the rest of the Army, whether Army end-strength is increased or not. Combined with Army plans to fill divisional units to 100\%, the implications for EAD units are ominous. At best, PCS solutions would reduce tasking of EAD units for individual augmentees. Units would attain stable, but reduced, Manning levels. However, predictability for soldiers and families would improve significantly.

Intelligence leaders cannot effect such change in a vacuum. They must work in tandem with other senior Army leaders to advocate PCS solutions. MI-unique answers, such as a provisional MI battalion to manage all intelligence augmentees, are inappropriate. A separate MI structure would require more MI assets to staff it and would duplicate existing command structures.

INTELLIGENCE RETENTION

The turbulence and OPTEMPO created by repeated deployment and inefficient TCS processes are contributing to a downturn in retention of MI captains and key enlisted skills.

Discussion.

Recent documents reveal trends that impact on MI resources and emphasize the link between the deployment and morale. This information ranges from officer attrition rates to survey results.

PERSCOM data show that MI captains have voluntarily resigned before consideration for promotion to major at a higher rate than any other branch. MI had the highest attrition rate in 1998 and the second highest in 1999.\textsuperscript{17} In spite of these losses prior to the 1999 promotion board, the remaining MI captains in the primary zone had the lowest selection rate for promotion of 18 branches reported, 10\% below the board's average.\textsuperscript{18} Clearly, the increasing shortfall of both MI captains and majors will complicate fill of deployed requirements.

Recruiting and retention trends for MOS 97B were cited earlier. Their three-year decline is paralleled in other frequently deployed enlisted specialties, such as intelligence analysts, imagery analysts, tactical HUMINT, signals-intelligence analysts, and linguists.\textsuperscript{19}

Three recent surveys of soldiers' attitudes about retention indicate a link between the above trends and deployment tempo. A 1999 Army Research Institute survey showed a sharp decline in officers intending to stay until retirement, paralleled by a more moderate drop for enlisted soldiers. Officers
surveyed in 1999 were twice as likely as those in 1994 to cite the amount of time separated from their families as their motive for leaving—making that motive the most frequent response.\textsuperscript{20} A Government Accounting Office survey found frequency of deployments as second only to pay concerns as the reason given by officers and enlisted soldiers in retention-critical specialties for leaving the military. The survey found that 28% of officers and 23% of enlisted soldiers cited frequency of deployment as their deciding factor for leaving.\textsuperscript{21} Army intelligence officers and enlisted analysts were well represented in this survey. A third survey conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies also concluded that officers are disillusioned with the pressure and pace of deployments.\textsuperscript{22}

Recommendation.

Implementing the changes recommended earlier in this study would provide near-term improvements to alleviate soldiers' concerns. Radical reductions to disproportionate deployment of CI specialties, predictable deployments, and maintaining unit integrity would all directly address much of the underlying discontent.

In the mid- to long-term, those changes need to be complemented with adjustments to MI organizations and with improved recruiting that fills critically short MI specialties. Increased authorizations for CI/tactical HUMINT, such as those changes approved in the MI FAA, will provide a more proportionate pool of resources to meet Balkans-like missions.

ISSUES DERIVED FROM COMPARISON OF INTELLIGENCE UNIT STRUCTURES

Contrasts between the modified MI organizations operating in the Balkans and authorized MI unit structures and their deployment schedules reemphasize and expand the issue identified earlier that disproportionate requirements will soon break the bank of deployable resources. This analysis also raises a critical issue regarding MI units for two scheduled NG-led SFOR rotations. Lastly, it identifies the need for TF Falcon to formally document its MI structure in the near-term.

DISPROPORTIONATE REQUIREMENTS

Large requirements for CI/tactical HUMINT assets cause major shortfalls in deploying units—a problem that is critical in cadre NG MI battalions. Disproportionate demand for MI All-Source technicians (specialty 350B) also challenges deploying units.

Discussion.

The emphasis on CI/tactical HUMINT has been a constant hallmark of both SFOR and KFOR. To meet these needs, deployed task forces have historically leveraged higher echelon MI assets to augment the divisional MI Battalion with CI teams, analysts, and sometimes with long-range surveillance assets. Both team and individual augmentation have been used. Soldiers from III Corps, V Corps, and XVIII Corps have filled out the non-standard TF Eagle MI Battalion, while TF Falcon in Kosovo has been augmented with CI/tactical HUMINT soldiers from XVIII Corps.
There are two justifications for this augmentation: First, augmentation offsets major personnel shortfalls in divisional MI battalions such as those cited both by 1AD in the initial 1995 deployment and by 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) in 1998. Second, augmentation meets requirements that simply exceed divisional assets, even if MI battalions are 100% filled. Specifically, TF Eagle currently requires 15 Force Protection teams, each with one WO, a Non-commissioned Officer (NCO), and two contract linguists. TF Falcon has seven CI teams plus two interrogation teams—each team composed of a WO and three MOS 97B/E soldiers. Both TFs also require multiple CI management and oversight elements. In contrast, a heavy division’s MI MTOE authorizes three CI teams of one WO and three enlisted soldiers each, three interrogation teams with one WO and two enlisted soldiers per team, and a small CI management cell.

Army leadership intends to fill divisional units at 100% of authorizations by early 2001. If this can be carried out, the first need for augmentation will be overcome: deploying units will not start off shorthanded, as 1AD and 1CD were. Then disproportionate requirements will become the sole reason for augmentation. However, 100% fill of divisional units is likely to be accompanied by strong pressure to end TCS augmentation of deploying units. What challenges will then remain for MI?

To answer that question, Balkans MI structures were compared with 100% filled, unaugmented MI Battalions. This comparison identified shortfalls if these units deploy against the current TF Eagle and TF Falcon MI structures. 103rd MI Battalion (Heavy), 110th MI Battalion (Light), 629th MI Battalion (Light)(NG), and 628th MI Battalion (Cadre)(NG) structures were used based on recent or scheduled deployments. Reasonable and sometimes creative substitution was used in comparing organizations to maximize the positions that could be filled. The results of this comparison are summarized in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required at TF</th>
<th>Shortfalls: 103rd MI Bn</th>
<th>Shortfalls: 110th MI Bn</th>
<th>Shortfalls: 629th MI Bn</th>
<th>Shortfalls: 628th MI Bn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>(Heavy Div)</td>
<td>(Light Div)</td>
<td>(NG) (Light Div)</td>
<td>(NG) (Cadre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 (1x MAJ 35D, 1x CPT 35D)</td>
<td>1 (MAJ 35D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16 (3x 350B, 13x 351X)</td>
<td>16 (3x 350B, 13x 351X)</td>
<td>13 (3x 350B, 10x 351X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>15 (1x 74B, 14x 97X)</td>
<td>22 (1x 74B, 1x 92Y, 6x 96B, 1x 96D, 13x 97X)</td>
<td>14 (1x 74B, 1x 96B, 2x 96D, 10x 97X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>256</td>
<td>31 Short</td>
<td>40 Short</td>
<td>28 Short</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2. SHORTFALLS OF 100%- FILLED MTOE VERSUS TF EAGLE MI BN REQUIREMENTS

The disproportionate requirements for CI/tactical HUMINT teams represent the primary shortfall, followed by specialty 350B All-Source technicians. Few other issues exist in the full-strength battalions, but the cadre-strength NG MI battalions clearly face substantial additional problems.

A similar comparison of a heavy division MI battalion MTOE to TF Falcon’s current MI Battalion, using the same substitution rules, reveals similar shortfalls. Each division in Europe is projected to fill two consecutive rotations in Kosovo before handing the mission over to another unit. Therefore, the TF Falcon comparison also considered how many positions could be filled for the second rotation using
soldiers who had not deployed on the first rotation. This capability would have MI soldiers deploy in the same five to six month increments as the rest of the division, rather than nine to twelve month increments. The results are outlined in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required at TF Falcon</th>
<th>Shortfalls: First Rotation</th>
<th>Shortfalls: Second Rotation*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2 (1x 35F LTC, 1x 35F MAJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4 (2x 351B, 2x 351E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>24 (1x25V, 5x 97B, 17x 97E, 1x 98D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>30 Short</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Adds positions a single unit could not fill during back-to-back rotations without deploying the same soldiers for both rotations.

TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF HEAVY DIV MTOE TO TF FALCON MI BN REQUIREMENTS

Tables 2 & 3 clearly indicate that even 100% fill of divisional MI battalions will leave substantial shortfalls. And the Army-wide shortage of specialty 351B and MOS 97B makes 100% fill of divisional MI units highly improbable. Either CI teams will have to deploy for longer or more frequent rotations than other soldiers, or some augmentation must continue. Shortages in CI specialties, coupled with declining recruiting and retention success, also indicate the inadvisability of longer or more frequent rotations.

While augmentation by individuals may soon be ruled out, augmentation by teams might be permitted. Augmentation with teams initially appears desirable in light of MI commanders’ anecdotes cited earlier. However, it is also problematic: very few deployable CI/tactical HUMINT teams will soon remain. Tactical Exploitation Battalions (TEB) are the primary EAD source of CI/tactical HUMINT teams. XVIII Corps has the only fully AC TEB, and several of its teams are already deployed to the Balkans. V Corps’ TEB has been heavily deployed, and its Interrogation Company, an RC unit, has not yet been formed. The TEB of both III Corps’ and I Corps’ MI Brigades are completely RC organizations, although the MI FAA approved recreating some AC elements. Many RC MI soldiers in TEB, linguist, and corps support MI battalions have already been deployed as individual augmentees and policies prevent their use again. As cited earlier, the MI FAA estimated exhaustion of the RC ability to deploy CI/tactical HUMINT assets by March 2002. In the AC, 100% fill of divisional units will come at the expense of EAD MI units that would source any augmentation. In summary, few deployable teams remain.

Disproportionate requirements for All-Source intelligence technicians in TF Eagle are also a potential problem. TF Eagle requires seven, while divisions typically have four authorized. Almost 10% of the Army’s 147 available AC specialty 350B resources are required for Balkans missions.

Recommendation.

This assessment only revalidates earlier recommendations. We must significantly reduce Balkans CI/tactical HUMINT requirements and find doctrinal and training solutions that employ other assets to exploit less-sensitive information sources. The disproportionate CI requirements will soon exceed unit
capabilities even if more successful recruiting and retention reduce the individual shortfalls in the CI field. The MI FAA initiatives are clearly on the right course to increase CI/tactical HUMINT authorizations in the long-term; however a firm doctrinal basis is needed for numbers of teams. With over four years of Balkans experience, we should be able to establish a common measuring stick to determine deployed requirements in terms of numbers of US bases, size of geographic area, or numbers of local population.

Demands for All-Source intelligence technicians can be met by expanding USAREUR's successful contracting of analysts. Contracting fill of selected specialty 350B functions in TF Eagle would enable unaugmented units to deploy successfully.

DIVISIONAL MI BATTALIONS FOR NATIONAL GUARD-LED SFOR ROTATIONS

Organic MI units are completely inadequate to support scheduled NG-led TF Eagle rotations.

Discussion.

The 49th AD, 29th Infantry Division (ID) and the 28th ID will provide the TF Eagle headquarters for SFOR7, SFOR10, and SFOR12 respectively, with mixed active and reserve maneuver elements. A summary of recent and scheduled SFOR rotations is provided in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TE Eagle HQ</th>
<th>Maneuver Units From</th>
<th>MI Battalion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFOR5 Oct 98-Aug 99</td>
<td>1st Cav Div</td>
<td>312th MI Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR6 Aug 99-Mar 00</td>
<td>10th Mtn Div</td>
<td>110th MI Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR7 Mar 00-Oct 00</td>
<td>49th Armored Div (TX NG)</td>
<td>629th MI Bn (MD NG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR8/9 Oct 00-Oct 01</td>
<td>3rd Inf Div</td>
<td>103rd MI Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR10 Oct 01-Apr 02</td>
<td>29th Inf Div (MD NG)</td>
<td>3rd ID, 30th Inf Bde (NG), 45th Inf Bde (NG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR11 Apr 02-Oct 02</td>
<td>101st AA Div</td>
<td>101st AA, 116th AR Bde (NG), 76th Inf Bde (NG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR12 Oct 02-Apr 03</td>
<td>28th Inf Div (PA NG)</td>
<td>3rd ID, 218th Inf Bde (NG), 25th ID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4. STABILIZATION FORCE ROTATION SCHEDULE

Table 4 also identifies the divisional MI battalions that are anticipated to deploy for each rotation. But only one RC divisional MI battalion is authorized at full strength—the 629th MI Battalion, subordinate to the 29th ID. The 629th has deployed with the 49th AD headquarters for SFOR7. The remaining NG divisional MI battalions are in cadre status, with partially manned headquarters companies and no line units. As the time of this study, the Army’s Reserve Command is considering deployment of a non-divisional RC MI battalion for these TF Eagle rotations. However, all potential units are limited by numbers of soldiers they have already deployed as individual augmentees and cannot redeploy.
The substantial shortfalls the cadre units would face in meeting the TF Eagle requirements are summarized in Table 2. The CI/tactical HUMINT shortfalls in these units are even greater than those for unaugmented AC units. That greater need for augmentation will accelerate the forecast exhaustion of the remaining deployable CI/tactical HUMINT assets!

Exacerbating the fact that seven of eight NG divisional MI battalions are cadre units, the NG maneuver brigades scheduled to deploy lack MI companies. The only RC enhanced readiness brigade with any organic MI assets is the 276th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). Efforts to create or expand NG MI units would be a major undertaking in terms of recruiting and training personnel and procuring equipment. That is clearly not a viable option in the limited time before deployment.

**Recommendation.**

To fill TF Eagle during SFOR10 and SFOR12, the Army could create composite MI battalions with a cadre-strength RC divisional MI battalion at the core. AC or RC MI companies organic to an ACR (2nd, 3rd, or 276th) offer one source of units to round up the RC cadre battalions. Both of the RC-led SFOR rotations include maneuver elements from AC divisions, and further augmentation of the composite MI battalion with a Direct Support (DS) MI company from that AC division offers another source. Table 5 provides a summary of the shortfalls that a composite MI battalion formed of these units would have against the current TF Eagle MI Battalion structure, if the sourcing units were at 100% strength.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required at TF Eagle</th>
<th>Shortfall: 628th MI BN NG (Cadre) Alone</th>
<th>Shortfall: 628th MI BN (Cadre) plus ACR MI Company</th>
<th>Shortfall: 628th MI BN plus ACR MI Co and AC DS MI Co (Heavy)</th>
<th>Shortfall: 628th MI BN plus ACR MI Co and AC DS MI Co (Light)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15 (1x MAJ 35D, 6x CPT 35D, 1x LT 25D, 7x LT 35D)</td>
<td>6 (3x CPT 35D, 1x LT 25D, 2x LT 35D)</td>
<td>3 (2x CPT 35D, 1x LT 25D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25 (4x 350B, 20x 351X, 1x 353A)</td>
<td>23 (4x 350B, 19x 351X)</td>
<td>21 (4x 350B, 17x 351X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>148 (34x 96-series, 26x 97X, 32x 99X, 6x 98-series, 50x Support or inmaterial MOS)</td>
<td>34 (4x31U, 1x71L, 1x74B, 4x92Y, 2x96D, 2x96B, 1x99X, 19x97X)</td>
<td>27 (3x31U, 1x71L, 1x74B, 2x92Y, 2x96D, 18x97X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>188 Short</td>
<td>63 Short</td>
<td>51 Short</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5. SHORTFALLS OF COMPOSITE MI BATTALION VERSUS TF EAGLE MI BN REQUIREMENTS**

Table 5 shows that a composite unit could fill up to 80% of the TF Eagle MI Battalion requirements. Consistent with earlier assessments of this study, the greatest challenges are with CI personnel and, to a lesser extent, specialty 350B All-Source technicians. This composite approach can succeed for RC-led rotations if overall CI requirements are reduced as advocated earlier, if sufficient CI/tactical HUMINT assets are earmarked now, and if the units train thoroughly together before deployment. Once CI/tactical HUMINT requirements are reduced, contracted analysts, already pioneered by USAREUR, can resolve the most essential remaining shortfalls.
DOCUMENTATION OF TF FALCON'S MI ORGANIZATION

Formal documentation of the TF Falcon MI structure, including identification of positions that offer flexibility in MOS coding, should be performed as soon as possible to facilitate follow-on deployments.

Discussion.

As described earlier, TF Eagle modified the G2 and MI Battalion DMD using specialty 351X, 97X, 9XX, and MOS-immaterial lines that offer flexibility. This coding enables each deploying unit to fill more requirements and request less augmentation. Only MI leaders who have performed a deployed mission can reasonably identify duties that afford this flexibility. TF Falcon has created a manning document, but copies received to date list only the MOS of the incumbent, not a required specialty. Informal feedback indicates that TF Falcon exploited MOS flexibility in its second rotation as KFOR.

After three years of operations in Bosnia, 1CD reported that confusion still existed in 1998 over some TFE MI authorizations and the responsibility to source them.31 The Army should anticipate the potential for similar problems with TF Falcon when 1AD deploys to replace 1ID later this year.

Recommendation.

TF Falcon should review its MI Battalion structure and formally document specialty 351X, 9XX, 97X and MOS immaterial positions in a manner similar to TF Eagle’s MI Battalion DMD. Documentation of positions that offer manning options will enable future units to prepare for deployment.

CONCLUSIONS

National security strategies are most effective when the means to carry out a given strategy, the ways they are employed, and the strategy’s objectives (ends) are balanced. Sourcing strategies for MI capabilities supporting operations in the Balkans are clearly unbalanced. MI resources (the means) are inadequate. Army-wide policies (the ways) are flawed. In spite of innovative and varied efforts to increase and better use key personnel resources, two potential "train wrecks" loom on the horizon, while other issues bear down in the mid-term.

This study seeks to offer solutions to near- and mid-term problems. Some recommendations may not be particularly palatable to those who focus only on the immediate mission. HQDA staff, responsible for the long-term, will not be inclined to tackle near-term issues. But continuing to provide individual MI augmentees and units in current numbers and under current policies will support today’s deployed commanders at the expense of their successors. If this study’s recommendations are duly considered and appropriately implemented, all commanders deploying to the Balkans can have their most essential intelligence support requirements filled. If ignored, and other reasonable solutions do not emerge, intelligence manning in critical areas will continue its downward spiral and increase risk for future commanders.

Word count: 5946
ENDNOTES


3 Mr. Harry Gerecke <gereckeh@hq.husareur.army.mil>. "SFOR 7 DMD & KFOR documents attached." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 4 November 1999 and Mr. W. Mike Lane <lanewill@hq.1perscom.heidelberg.army.mil>. "RE: DMD Total." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 28 December 99.

4 Mr. W. Mike Lane <lanewill@hq.1perscom.heidelberg.army.mil>. "RE: RE: RE: DMD Total." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 28 December 99.

5 Gerecke.


7 Mr. Ben Purcell, <purcellb@hq.husareur.army.mil>. "RE: Contract Analysts." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 5 December 1999.

8 Mr. Harry Gerecke <gereckeh@hq.husareur.army.mil>. "RE: TFE DMD Attached." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 15 November 1999.

9 LTC W. Howard Phelps <william.phelps@huachuca-emh1.army.mil>. Untitled. Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 10 December 1999.


11 "Military Intelligence Functional Area Assessment," draft briefing slides, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, version 33-2, undated, slide 41.


13 The ideas in this section are synthesized from a series of eight email messages received from MI officers who currently or within the last two years commanded at the COL and LTC level. Their perspectives included command of deployed units, command of units that received individual augmentees, and command of units that provided individual augmentees. They were: COL Harry Bakken <BAKKENH@mail.66mi.darmstadt.army.mil>. "RE: Research Project: MI Manpower in Balkans Ops." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 24 November 1999; COL Kevin R. Cunningham <Kevin.Cunningham@carlisle.army.mil>. "RE: Research Project: MI Manpower in Balkans Ops." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 18 November 1999; LTC Mary J. Hogan <Mary.Hogan@carlisle.army.mil>. "RE: Research Project: MI Manpower in Balkans Ops." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 19 November 1999; LTC(P) Brian J. Keller <Brian.Keller@carlisle.army.mil> "RE: Research Project: MI Manpower in Balkans Ops." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 19 November 1999; COL Patrick Neky <Patrick.Neky@carlisle.army.mil>. "RE: Research Project: MI Manpower in Balkans Ops." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 23 November 1999; LTC James Slavin <James.Slavin@carlisle.army.mil>. "RE: Research Project: MI Manpower in Balkans Ops." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 7 December 1999; LTC Konrad Trautman <Konrad.Trautman@carlisle.army.mil> "RE: Research Project: MI Manpower in Balkans Ops." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 18 November 1999; and LTC Ray Velez, quoted by MAJ James Norwood <norwood@MI513.gordon.army.mil>, "Information On TGS vs. TDY." Electronic mail message to <Brooks.Chamberlin@carlisle.army.mil>, 16 November 1999.

15 This statement is drawn from the personal knowledge of the author based on experiences in USAREUR from June 1998 to July 1999 managing intelligence requirements in the Balkans.


19 Phelps.


22 Rowan Scarborough, “Army Survey Rebuts Pentagon,” Washington Times, 10 January 2000, 1


23 Nash, Chapter VI: Documentation, 1355.


26 The conjectured end of TCS augmentation when divisional units reach 100% fill is based on comments made by a senior Army leader during a Commandant’s Lecture Series program.

27 Ibid.


29 Ibid.


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U.S. Department of the Army. Modified Table of Organization & Equipment 34395AFC24, 103rd Military Intelligence Battalion (Heavy), printed 29 November 1999.


