The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S., Japanese, or ROK governments, or their respective defense agencies, those of co-sponsoring bodies, or those of all the workshop participants. This report is intended to advance the understanding of naval cooperation, rather than to suggest policy.

Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) was founded in 1979 as an organization affiliated with the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) to provide the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) with policy alternatives. Following a steady expansion of the capacity and scope of its contributions to national defense policy, the institute separated from the ADD and became an autonomous, non-profit research organization, fully sponsored by the government, in March 1987. The institute is devoted to research on the strategic environment, security policy, national defense strategy, force development, defense economy, weapon system acquisition policy, defense automation, and arms control. KIDA's involvement in this workshop was under the auspices of the Force Development Directorate of KIDA. The project director for the workshop was Captain Kye-Ryong Rhoe, a senior fellow at KIDA.

The Okazaki Institute

The Okazaki Institute is a Tokyo-based independent, private, and non-profit research institute dedicated to regional and national security analysis, policy planning, area studies, and the survey of modern diplomatic history. The institute was founded in 1992 as an independent think-tank working to find alternatives to Cold War patterns of thought. Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki, Japan's former ambassador to Thailand and to Saudi Arabia, is the Institute’s president. The project director for the workshop was retired Rear Admiral Sumihiko Kawamura, formerly of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, a senior resident of the Institute. Professor Hideshi Takesada of the National Institute for Defense Studies was the workshop co-chairman.

The Center for Naval Analyses

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) is a private, non-profit, federally funded research and development center that conducts independent analyses for the U.S. Department of the Navy. CNA performs policy analysis; analyzes military operations and exercises; assesses technology requirements; investigates work force, business management, and infrastructure issues; and assists in developing strategies and long-range plans. The Center for Naval Analyses is a component of The CNA Corporation, which provides similar analyses for other parts of the U.S. government as well as for selected foreign governments. CNA's participation in this workshop was supported by the Regional Issues Team, directed by Peter Swartz; the team is a component of the Policy Analysis Division. The project director for the conference was Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld, a senior analyst at CNA.
Trilateral Naval Cooperation:
Korea-US-Japan
Workshop III

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Introduction and summary

The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and the Okazaki Institute held a workshop at KIDA headquarters in Seoul, Korea, from 7 to 8 October 1999. The three parties exchanged papers and held discussions to determine what practical steps would be required for U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral naval cooperation. The workshop was the third of its kind, building on two previous workshops that resulted in agreement that the three navies could—and should—conduct trilateral humanitarian assistance operations. Participants at this year’s workshop set out to answer the following questions: What tasks or operations could the three navies plan for? What would we need to consider when planning to exercise those operations? What preparatory steps are necessary to arrange for combined planning? What information and advice is there to draw on for humanitarian and disaster assistance planning within each country, inside and outside the naval services?

Participants presented 12 papers (four from each institute) on those topics. The presentations were followed by commentary and candid discussion. This workshop report summarizes these proceedings, including similarities and differences of outlook among participants. The report presents workshop discussion by theme, which may not necessarily reflect the chronological order of topics as scheduled for the workshop discussion. Actual discussion reflected the overlap of and relationship between many of the issues covered at the workshop. In this report, the authors have tried to capture that overlap while presenting participants’ views under topic headings. Appendix A contains the opening remarks by ROK Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Lee Soo-Young. Appendices B through D list participants and observers from each country.

Assumptions from previous workshops

The workshop was predicated on a number of assumptions flowing from the previous two trilateral workshops. Remarks by this year’s participants reflected these assumptions, which included the following:

- The U.S. should act as the facilitator for U.S.-Japan-Korea naval cooperation.
- Trilateral cooperation should start with planning, rather than proceeding immediately to operations.
• Trilateral naval cooperation should be humanitarian in nature, at least initially. Potential trilateral humanitarian missions could include maritime relief, maritime refugee rescue, transport support, and medical support.

• Trilateral planning and operations should be low-key and non-threatening.

• Operations should be open-ended to include other countries in the future (e.g., China, Russia).

Themes and conclusions

Discussion centered around a number of themes and general consensus emerged on the following issues:

**China**: To avoid potentially negative Chinese reactions, trilateral naval cooperation (TNC) should neither exclude nor ignore China. Trilateral operations and exercises should be transparent and open-ended to facilitate multinational cooperation in the future. There was less consensus on when to include China, and others. To assure that China would not regard trilateral cooperation—regardless of mission—as implicit, if not explicit, containment, the U.S., Japan, and the ROK should make a concerted effort to demonstrate the humanitarian nature of the operations and the true objective of TNC: to strengthen relations and cooperation between the ROK and Japan. Russia was mentioned in similar terms, but far less often.

**Missions**: Participants agreed that TNC should start with humanitarian assistance operations (HAO)\(^1\) because they are the only multilateral missions that are currently politically palatable in Japan and would be more acceptable to China than other types of operations. Beyond agreement on the desirability of starting with HAO, participants disagreed somewhat on what operations would be appropriate for TNC. Korean and Japanese participants, in particular, wanted to ensure that starting with humanitarian cooperation would not preclude more robust cooperation in the future.

\(^1\) Participants agreed to scrap the term that was fleshed out last year as “projecting assistance,” or PA. Instead, participants agreed that the more commonly understood term “humanitarian assistance operations” (HAO) was a suitable description for the kinds of activities that they were considering for trilateral naval cooperation.
The discussions included:

- **Constabulary operations**: Some Korean and Japanese participants suggested that the three navies should consider trilateral constabulary missions (e.g., counterdrug operations, anti-smuggling). This led to a discussion of procedural and political constraints on deploying the JMSDF rather than the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA). American participants pointed to U.S. laws that differentiate between Navy and Coast Guard operations and argued that the ultimate goal of TNC was to enhance trilateral Navy cooperation. They argued that TNC, therefore, should be limited to Navy conduct of military humanitarian operations.

- **Submarine rescue operations**: A Korean participant suggested submarine salvage rescue. After initial concerns among Japanese participants that such operations extend beyond the range of humanitarian operations, participants learned that the three navies are already planning multilateral humanitarian submarine salvage operations.

- **Response to “manmade disasters”**: A Japanese participant distinguished between “manmade” disasters and natural disasters and argued that TNC should exclude any operations in response to manmade disasters (e.g., refugee rescue operations in response to a situation on the Korean peninsula). He argued that these operations are especially off limits when they “lack the consent of the affected country’s government, or in absence of any ruling entity in that country.” Other participants disagreed, arguing that TNC on the high seas would preclude approval of the source country (e.g., the DPRK).

**Geography**: Participants generally agreed that trilateral exercises should occur primarily in Northeast Asian waters so that the location and the forces involved would be those that would actually participate in TNC operations (i.e., Seventh Fleet). All agreed that the exercise location should avoid contentious areas, such as those near disputed territorial claims. Participants did note that the transit of JMSDF ships to Turkey indicates that previous Japanese policy restrictions may have been eased with respect to operating distance from Japan.2

**Starting simple**: Trilateral naval cooperation should start out simple. This concept included the idea that the operations should be of a type familiar to all three navies and, at least initially, U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral cooperation should be strictly navy-to-navy, rather than joint.

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2 In October 1999, three JMSDF ships (JDS Osumi, an MCM, and an AOE) deployed to Turkey to provide temporary housing to earthquake victims.
**U.S. lead:** The U.S. should take the lead, at least initially, in both planning and commanding operations. Participants generally favored a lead nation command structure, with the lead nation rotating among the three countries.

**Planning:** Participants identified Korean and Japanese public opposition to cooperation as a potential obstacle to implementing USN-JMSDF-ROKN cooperation. They agreed, therefore, that TNC will require political-level approval and guidance, in addition to operational-level approval and guidance.

**Open-ended operations:** Trilateral naval cooperation should be open-ended so that other countries (namely China and Russia) could join. This would include designing the exercises and operations in such a way that would facilitate multilateral operations. There was less consensus on when the three navies should invite other navies to join. An American participant argued that bringing them in too soon would complicate and even "doom" the initiative. Japanese participants agreed. Some Korean participants, on the other hand, were eager to include China early.

**USN experience:** Participants agreed that the three navies should apply lessons learned from the USN's extensive experience with humanitarian operations. Participants were also in favor of using USN doctrine and ROE, as modified for each country's concerns, as a base from which to build trilateral doctrine and ROE.

**RIMPAC as a model:** A Japanese participant suggested, and many participants agreed, that RIMPAC could serve as an example for planning operations that would ultimately become multinational.
Which operations are appropriate for TNC?

Many participants used the conceptual framework established at the 1998 workshop to shape their discussions regarding appropriate types of trilateral naval cooperation for the U.S., Japan, and Korea (see “Assumptions” above). While agreeing on the desirability and feasibility of pursuing maritime relief, maritime refugee rescue, transport support, and medical support, there was less consensus on other mission areas.

Humanitarian assistance

An American participant noted that he had helped to define “projecting assistance” at the 1998 workshop to encompass “maritime relief,” “maritime refugee rescue,” “transport support,” and “medical support.” However, he argued that it is probably better to use the more commonly understood term “humanitarian operations” to describe such activities. In his vision, TNC humanitarian operations would be “organized, as opposed to ad hoc, operations by naval ships to render assistance to peoples or nations in need of help.” Participants agreed that “humanitarian assistance operations” was an appropriate description for missions they were considering for trilateral naval cooperation.

Based on USN experience, the American participant identified two types of naval humanitarian operations: (1) those ordered in the wake of an unexpected natural disaster, and (2) those scheduled as routine or preplanned activities. For humanitarian operations in response to natural disasters, “operations are normally organized and dispatched hastily, within days of the event.” One such operation was USS Independence’s role in evacuating people and equipment in the wake of Mt. Pinatubo’s eruption in the Philippines in 1992. The second kind of naval HO, preplanned activities, can be described as “civic action,” such as well-digging.

He also described the nature of naval responses to humanitarian operations:

- HAO involve an emergency on land that is responded to by naval vessels, often warships, from the sea.
- HAO are conducted during peacetime and can be undertaken only with the express permission of the nation that has experienced the emergency
(because approaching land to provide assistance involves entering the territorial waters of another nation).

- Naval forces have the advantage of being self-sufficient and being able to access offshore remote or destroyed areas that are inaccessible by road or air (except helicopters), though ships are of only limited value to emergencies far inland.

- Personnel of the assisting vessel will often have responsibility for performing the humanitarian assistance, though—given enough advance warning—the ship could have detachments of specialists, such as medical, water purification, and road building personnel.

- HAO are not the primary missions of the ships that respond (except for designated hospital ships).

Finally, he noted that the workshop coincided with the transit of three JMSDF ships to Turkey, including JDS Osumi, for disaster relief operations in the wake of the October 1999 earthquake. In thinking of feasible TNC, he remarked that operations in Turkey were much more distant than anything he had envisioned. In contrast, he noted that other participants at last year's workshop had felt that TNC humanitarian assistance should, in general, be limited to a Korean contingency. He added that participants have to reach a conceptual agreement on what TNC would entail, be it strictly humanitarian assistance or a broader framework—perhaps including anti-submarine warfare (ASW). He was in favor of a broad conception of TNC, but cautioned that it would be too big a pill to swallow all at once. He argued that TNC would fail if the three navies tried to do too much too soon. He suggested that humanitarian operations are a useful beginning because they are the most politically acceptable among domestic constituencies in the U.S., Japan, and Korea, and abroad in China and Russia.

A Korean participant suggested that the first exercise/training should be a simple humanitarian assistance mission that would be acceptable among the three navies and would not provoke misunderstanding by neighboring countries. He recommended that the first exercise be a large-scale refugee rescue at sea, including maritime SAR. Lastly, he recommended that the second phase of training involve submarine crew rescue and mine-clearing exercises. In his view, maritime humanitarian relief operations include massive refugee rescue scenarios, and military SAR exercises include submarine crew rescue.

Another Korean participant suggested that maritime disaster relief, maritime refugee rescue, maritime transport support, and medical support to
shore are transnational issues that are appropriate for TNC in a Korean contingency. He added that—in addition to the four humanitarian assistance missions agreed upon last year—TNC could potentially cover a wide range of operations, including: water space management in case of high-intensity conflict on the Korean peninsula; interdiction of illegal trade, piracy, and migration at sea; maritime environmental monitoring; and information sharing. He went further to argue that non-HA operations are critical TNC missions because without them, “trilateral naval cooperation may be hamstrung, especially once a Korean contingency starts.” He argued that the DPRK is likely to be the source of security problems in the future and that TNC in a Korean contingency would be an essential solution for Northeast Asia (NEA) regional stability. [Potential TNC in a Korean contingency is discussed in more detail later in this report under the heading “Humanitarian TNC in a Korean Contingency?”]

A Japanese participant distinguished between maritime refugee rescue in response to “manmade” disasters and maritime refugee rescue in response to natural disasters. He argued that TNC—even under UN “auspices”—should exclude refugee rescue operations because: (1) history shows that most large refugee outflows to the sea are manmade; and (2) refugee rescue operations may not necessarily have “the consent of the affected country’s government.” If not, or in the absence of any ruling entity in that country, “the risk of hostilities placing projection assistance forces in danger is very high.” He argued that the three navies would need to find a framework other than humanitarian assistance to do such military operations trilaterally.

The same participant further argued that TNC should not entail “restoration support activities [i.e., preliminary medical treatments, supply of food and water, and the construction of shelters] that usually follow the initial, more urgent tasks.” There are other organizations responsible for such activities, he said.

Another Japanese participant defined humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations as responses to natural or manmade disasters, limited in scope and duration, and supplementary or complementary to the host nation’s efforts.

Another Japanese participant stated that medical and transport support will likely be two of the highest priority operations in response to natural disasters.

An American observer agreed with participants that humanitarian, non-threatening exercises are the right place to start, as these are operations
that the navies will actually have to accomplish in the real world. He added that cooperating on that level would enable the three countries to expand TNC in the future to include some of the types of operations that a Korean participant had proposed [see the section below on scenarios—environmental protection, counter-terrorism at sea, counter-drug operations at sea, sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection, MIOs, NEOs, and minesweeping operations].

A Korean participant noted that implementing TNC will enhance trilateral capabilities in command and control interoperability, sea transportation, logistic support, and surveillance and reconnaissance. He argued that, given these enhanced capabilities, TNC “has to” develop further, or there would be adverse effects on regional stability. He argued that “active crisis management” will emerge as the 21st century’s major challenge and explained that TNC will require pre-planning, strong political leadership, and sustained attention in order to overcome potential obstacles to implementation of TNC.

Another Korean observer was hopeful about TNC, but suggested that today’s topic was too narrow. He argued that the boundaries of humanitarian operations are difficult to define—especially on the sea—and are, therefore, not an appropriate way to characterize potential TNC operations. For example, he noted differences in view among participants regarding what they considered humanitarian operations. In his opinion, HAO included maritime support and maritime refugee rescue, but not maritime pollution. Instead of characterizing potential TNC operations as “humanitarian,” he suggested that the three navies consider types of cooperation on a case-by-case basis, starting with low-key, non-threatening operations.

A Japanese observer rejected the idea that the military should not be prepared to conduct MOOTW because such missions are only “spillover” duties for the military. Instead, he argued that the military’s function includes protecting security interests through deterrence and “compellence” and through the conduct of humanitarian operations. He argued that TNC is significant both for its humanitarian purposes and for its contributions towards promoting strategic stability. An American participant agreed that forces need to be prepared in peacetime for combat, which is why they’re useful for humanitarian operations or MOOTW. But, he added, if the forces are prepared only for MOOTW, they can’t do combat well.

The Japanese observer also argued that the ROKN-JMSDF SAREXs should evolve into more advanced operations, such as disaster relief on shore. He
argued that ROKN-JMSDF exercises are “expected” to develop into trilateral, and even multilateral, exercises. He added that these enhanced SAREXs would enable each navy to pursue advanced tactics and technology.

A Japanese participant reminded the others that an American participant at the 1998 workshop had suggested that the three navies should focus on operations with shorter duration than most UN operations of this decade.

Submarine rescue

A Korean participant argued that TNC should include salvage operations because of their non-threatening nature and because all three countries have salvage capabilities. He noted that the USN has excellent deepwater salvage capabilities and the ROKN has done many salvage operations. He also argued that SAR encompassed submarine salvage operations.

An American participant agreed with a Korean participant’s earlier suggestion to include submarine SAR in TNC. He noted that China and Russia have large submarine forces, as do the U.S., Japan, and Korea, so submarine SAR could be a unifying theme for the region.

A Japanese participant disagreed, saying that neither the JMSDF nor the ROKN has sufficient assets or an appropriate command structure to conduct salvage operations. Therefore, he argued, we should plan to do only trilateral humanitarian assistance operations (not to include submarine salvage). He noted that the several natural disasters in Asia this decade underline the need for TNC to prepare to cope with these unexpected disasters.

A Japanese participant argued that salvage operations go beyond humanitarian operations. He noted that the very conservative Japanese interpretation of HAO could be “rescue or relief directed toward non-military personnel in distress.” He added that the three navies may be able to conduct submarine rescue in the future, but initially they should start with simple humanitarian operations. Referring to potential restrictions on deployment of the JMSDF, he added that MOFA controls JMSDF participation, by law.

An American participant noted that planning for multilateral submarine rescue operations has already begun. He added that, apparently, the forum for discussing these operations has already been set up as a multilateral one and the USN, JMSDF, ROKN, and other navies have joined in this discussion at the operational level.
In response to a Japanese participant’s comments about submarine rescue operations, a Korean participant said that every navy should maintain a high level of readiness in peacetime to be prepared for wartime. Trilateral naval cooperation is about naval, not civilian, operations. Our common workshop goal is low-key humanitarian operations. He explained that he suggested submarine rescue because all three navies have submarines and salvage capabilities. He argued that the Japanese participant’s doubts about technical proficiency for submarine salvage were resolved by this workshop’s identification of existing cooperation.

The Japanese participant responded that he thought this workshop was about trilateral naval cooperation in the area of humanitarian operations. He also noted that an American participant had mentioned that cooperation on submarine rescue is being pursued in another forum and asked why it should have to be addressed at this workshop.

The American participant responded that he wasn’t sure that submarine rescue was, indeed, being discussed in “another forum,” meaning a really different context, because those discussions include the USN, ROKN, and JMSDF (as well as the Singaporean and Australian navies). In those talks, they call submarine rescue “humanitarian assistance,” and all the discussions are unclassified.

Constabulary missions

In addition to humanitarian relief and search-and-rescue operations, a Korean participant argued that countering drug production and drug trafficking and anti-smuggling operations are possible areas of “non-war” naval cooperation. A Japanese participant had trouble with these suggested operations. He argued that the purpose of the workshop is to promote trilateral naval cooperation, not some broader form of trilateral maritime contribution.

Another Japanese participant identified three types of military applications of naval power: military, constabulary, and benign. Constabulary missions, he said, include ocean peacekeeping (OPK), and benign missions include humanitarian assistance. He argued that we should initially limit TNC to HA; in the future, we should expand TNC to include military and/or constabulary cooperation.

An American responded that the USN doesn’t do constabulary missions; the USCG does. When USCG detachments do counterdrug operations from
USN ships, the Navy ships take down the Navy flag and fly the USCG flag. He explained that there is a strict firewall between USN operations and USCG law enforcement, and this division of responsibility has been around since the 19th century. Therefore, he argued, if TNC were to include constabulary operations (meaning law enforcement), the USN might not be able to participate. He recommended that TNC should start with what we know the three navies can do.

The Japanese participant replied that he was aware that the USN doesn’t do constabulary operations, and that constabulary operations weren’t part of this workshop. But, he argued, the current threat environment on the high seas blurs the distinction between constabulary and non-constabulary operations. He noted that the American participant had stated that the USN and USCG command structures are separate. But, he argued, the recent USN-USCG National Fleet agreement demonstrates that constabulary operations should be a more important naval mission than they are now.

The American participant replied that the firewall between the USN and the USCG exists because of U.S. law, not a USN-USCG agreement. He stressed that this law has been around since the Civil War. Another American participant argued that the purpose of the National Fleet is to take advantage of capabilities unique to the USN and the USCG without affecting the fine line between USN and USCG legal responsibilities. He added that humanitarian operations can’t be categorized as either constabulary or military, because they involve civilians.

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3 This same participant has developed a concept called “Ocean Peacekeeping,” which is essentially, a multinational constabulary force that would operate on the high seas and in territorial waters enforcing commonly agreed-upon Law of the Sea (LOS) requirements. He discussed the concept at length in his paper but did not elaborate in his workshop comments. Nevertheless, an American participant described a Japanese participant’s OPK concept as interesting, but said that before OPK could be seriously considered it requires some analytical support: (1) What is the scope of the problem? He questioned whether the massive forces that the Japanese participant had identified were commensurate to the size of the problem. In other words, what is the problem and where is the threat? (2) References to operations of the Law of the Sea should be made clear. The paper assumes that the LOS supports constabulary functions by navies, but it was not clear to the American whether this is now the case.

4 The National Fleet is a concept that was signed into existence by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard in September 1998. According to the Memorandum of Agreement, the National Fleet “synchronizes planning, training and procurement” between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard.

5 The one exception, as dictated by international law, is that ships at sea are obligated to conduct anti-piracy operations, if the need arises.
A Korean participant noted that, after the Cold War, most navies' roles and missions switched to non-military, constabulary functions, beyond the familiar navy roles of presence, power projection, and sea control.

A Japanese participant noted that, since the end of the Cold War, the JMSDF has accepted new roles, including diplomatic functions, public welfare functions (i.e., disaster relief and environmental protection), and constabulary functions (i.e., anti-piracy and anti-smuggling). The JMSDF is developing both hardware and software to support these capabilities. He added that the Japan Defense Agency has adopted a number of policies that promote efforts to engage other Asian nations. Another Japanese participant listed the humanitarian assistance operations in which the JMSDF has participated in the past.6

A Japanese participant added that the three navies should also consider maritime pollution prevention as another area for trilateral naval cooperation.

Another Japanese participant suggested that planning for maritime constabulary tasks should take into consideration that neither Japan nor Korea has yet done any of the ones mentioned. He recommended a Track II dialogue to pursue the possibility of constabulary cooperation.

### Joint operations

Participants also discussed the possibility of other services joining trilateral cooperation, including the three countries' coast guards.

An American participant asked whether TNC would evolve into joint operations. He noted that joint management (e.g., CINCPAC) could help facilitate political management in the U.S., but it might be problematic for the ROKN and the JMSDF. He recommended that the three parties explore each country's inhibitions regarding whether other services could eventually participate. He argued that trilateral naval cooperation is the easiest place to start.

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6 January 1995: JMSDF ships transported water and food supplies and provided rooms on ships for Kobe earthquake victims. October 1999: JMSDF ships deployed to Turkey to provide temporary housing. The detachment to Turkey includes JDS Osumi, an MCM, and an AOE. At the time of the workshop, these three ships were transiting the Strait of Malacca and due to arrive on October 19.
A Japanese participant suggested that the three countries consider separately how they would interact with non-naval governmental agencies, such as the army, air force, coast guard, and NGOs within each country. He suggested that the level of cooperation with these agencies would depend on the nature of the humanitarian operation. Another Japanese participant offered an example of possible involvement of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) in case of a Korean contingency: he suggested that the JGSDF might send some forces to the Korean peninsula to participate in humanitarian operations, including non-combatant evacuation operations, because the distance between the ROK and Kyushu is only 180 kilometers, which is within range of JGSDF helicopters.

Another Japanese participant commented on the relationship between the JMSDF and the JMSDF. He noted that two North Korean spy ships intruded in Japan’s waters on March 23, 1999. The JMSA and JMSDF cooperated in pursuit of those ships, but the North Korean ships got away and returned to North Korea. He further noted that the JMSA and JMSDF will have a joint exercise at sea in October 1999. He said that some Diet members criticize JMSA-JMSDF cooperation because they don’t like the expanded role of the JMSDF. Instead, they want to enhance the role of the JMSA. He argued that recent articles in the “liberal press” indicate that the government of Japan (GOJ) could deploy the JMSA, rather than the JMSDF, to operate trilaterally with the ROKN and USN. An American participant replied that, in that case, the USCG would insist on playing, too. He argued that, for the U.S., this is not such an impossible thing to do. For example, when the USN doesn’t have enough ships for some appropriate missions, USCG cutters substitute.

Another Japanese participant said that Japan only sent the JMSA—vice the JMSDF—to Bangladesh after the cyclone in 1991 because Japan was busy passing a law (the 1992 International Disaster Relief Law) to allow its MCMs to participate in the Gulf. He noted that another Japanese participant said that the GOJ is now ready to send the JMSDF for disaster relief operations, but Japan has yet to consider TNC for relief of non-manmade, natural disasters.

He agreed with another Japanese participant’s remarks that under current Japanese law, the JMSDF isn’t the only force option for conducting humanitarian assistance. He noted that the JASDF, the JGSDF, the JMSA, and other organizations could also do HA. He argued that the force assignment heavily depends on MOFA. In Japan, MOFA may assign the JMSA, instead of the JMSDF, to do HA missions abroad. He noted that this process is very
different from how the USN deploys. Therefore, he argued, maybe TNC exercises and planning should include the JMSA. An American participant replied that, while he appreciated the fact that MOFA could assign the JMSA rather than the JMSDF, the purpose of TNC is to have trilateral navy participation. If the JMSDF can’t participate, he argued, then the TNC exercise simply won’t happen.

Another Japanese participant noted that the JMSA and the JMSDF share responsibility for SAR and, therefore, SAR is not a de facto JMSDF mission. Nonetheless, SAR is politically acceptable because it is humanitarian in nature, it is easy to conduct, and it requires only limited hardware and software interoperability. Therefore, he felt that JMSDF participation in TNC SAR was politically and technically possible.

A Korean participant remarked that the responsibilities of the Korean Maritime Police (KMP) are comparable to those of the JMSDF for civilian, vice military, operations. The KMP mission is to patrol the Korean coast using hundreds of craft and patrol boats, protect the ROK from outside infiltration, monitor fishing boats, and conduct anti-smuggling and anti-piracy operations. In wartime, the ROKN can control all maritime resources under government authority—including the KMP. In peacetime, the ROKN can only control the KMP in limited ways. In case of a rescue emergency, the ROKN can direct the KMP to do humanitarian relief operations.

Another Korean participant argued that only the KMP—not the military maritime service (the ROKN)—would cooperate with the JMSA.
Humanitarian TNC in a Korean contingency?

Workshop discussion frequently returned to the question of whether the three navies should and could cooperate in the case of a Korean contingency—and if so, how.

Survivability of the DPRK

An American participant remarked on how popular perceptions of the DPRK regime’s survival have changed and how those changed perceptions have affected the content and direction of the workshop. He noted that an original concept flowing from an earlier workshop had been to prepare for refugee assistance operations in response to a DPRK collapse, but now participants recognize that the U.S., Japan, and Korea are pursuing “two-Korea” policies. Many more people now believe that although the DPRK could still collapse, it will probably be with us “for a very long time.”

Given this assumption, the participant argued that it would be a mistake to postpone trilateral naval cooperation until after reunification. Instead, he suggested that TNC can be an “element of quiet diplomacy, a small but significant step that can contribute to the broader military rapprochement” already taking place between Korea and Japan. In fact, he argued, TNC must start before a DPRK collapse (or some other pre-reunification event) in order to allow time for experimentation and development of trilateral cooperation into something that will actually be useful.

A Japanese participant asserted that there has been a change in the conventional mindset so that people now no longer think that the collapse of North Korea is inevitable. He noted that in 1994 the U.S. agreed to provide North Korea with two nuclear reactors—a project that was scheduled to continue for ten years. He argued that this timeline shows that the U.S. government actually thought that North Korea would survive for at least ten years. Therefore, he argued, there is actually continuity among U.S. government policymakers regarding their thoughts on the DPRK’s future.

The American participant responded that it might seem like a contradiction that the U.S. committed to a ten-year policy in 1994 when we thought North Korea was on the verge of collapse, but Congress easily passed that policy because it figured the U.S. wouldn’t actually have to pay out much money to North Korea because North Korea would soon collapse. So, he
argued, there actually has been a shift in U.S. government policymakers' views on the survivability of the DPRK regime.

The Japanese participant remarked that the passage of time will reflect the content of the workshop discussions—as we can see that the passage of time has seen a change of atmosphere in our three countries since the trilateral workshop series began two years ago. He added that the age of multilateral security cooperation in Asia is emerging. He also noted that several incidents over the past years (including the DPRK spy ship intrusion into Japanese waters, the submarine intrusion into ROK territorial waters in December 1998, and the associated gunfire exchange between the ROK and DPRK navies) demonstrated how Kim Jong-il and North Korean hostile actions contributed to the development of this workshop.

Manmade vs. natural disasters

Moving past the issue of whether or not thinking has changed regarding the DPRK's survival, participants debated whether TNC should be associated with a Korean contingency and, if so, how. A Japanese participant argued that it's unlikely that the DPRK would welcome Japan's help in the case of a Korean contingency, and, therefore, "it is difficult to imagine that there will be a role for" trilateral humanitarian assistance forces, "even with a UN mandate." He argued that the government of Japan's current interpretation of the Japanese constitution makes it unlikely that—barring permission of the host nation—the JMSDF would be able to participate in humanitarian operations related to a manmade contingency on the Korean peninsula. He added that, although he believed TNC would be absolutely necessary in a Korean contingency, it would be difficult for Japan to extend assistance to the ROK. He argued that it is therefore difficult to expect TNC to evolve beyond non-threatening cooperation. Instead, the three navies should handle these situations within the current bilateral frameworks between the USN and ROKN and between the USN and the JMSDF.

An American participant said it was important to resolve the issue of whether cooperation should be limited to non-manmade disasters or whether it could also include operations in response to manmade emergencies. He noted that the Japanese participant's definition of acceptable trilateral humanitarian assistance cooperation depends on the invitation of the DPRK, which would be particularly unlikely for Japan. Yet, as a Korean participant had pointed out, there was a wide range of potential Korean scenarios in
which the three navies could provide various forms of trilateral naval assistance.

A Japanese participant pointed out that Japan's 1992 Disaster Relief Law authorizes dispatch of SDF overseas for disaster relief operations regardless of UN activities. However, the law does not address SDF dispatch in the case of "manmade" disasters. He explained that the Diet could approve such operations, but "in the absence of legal and political backing, the most feasible preparations for exercise planning should be directed toward non-manmade disasters with no political sensitivity and complexity."

An American participant agreed that perhaps TNC should initially focus on natural, rather than manmade, disasters, saying that the three navies should "start small."

What TNC operations would a Korean contingency entail?

A Japanese participant thought that TNC in a Korean contingency could include refugee rescue operations and NEOs. (He mentioned that JASDF aircraft were dispatched to Thailand for a NEO in 1997, thus implying that the JMSDF could feasibly deploy for NEOs.) A Korean participant agreed, saying that TNC might be the best and only option for projecting assistance in a Korean situation. He added a famous quote from Oliver Cromwell, "A man of war is the best ambassador."

Another Korean participant thought that TNC could involve massive refugee rescue operations at sea, for example, in the case of a DPRK collapse. He added that we could also expect a breakdown of command and control in the case of a DPRK collapse. In that case, TNC could include transport and supply of food, etc. He suggested that the three navies consider how to divide labor among themselves.

The same Korean participant added that he believed trilateral naval NEOs would be justified in a Korean contingency because: (1) there are many U.S. and Japanese nationals in the ROK; and (2) evacuating foreign nationals would prevent the DPRK from using captured foreign non-Combatants as a human shield. He added that TNC NEOs would require considerable coordination, including escort of transportation ships and logistics. He therefore recommended NEOs as a subject of discussion at the planning level and at this kind of workshop in the future.
An American participant agreed that TNC could include NEOs. He wondered, however, whether the JMSDF would be able to play a role in a DPRK NEO, given the questions raised by several Japanese participants earlier.

A Korean participant discussed what he called a “future-oriented and forward-looking” vision for TNC. He suggested four possible scenarios for a Korean contingency and corresponding “feasible” TNC:

1. In what he called the “best case” scenario, NK stabilizes and receives official recognition from the U.S. and Japan, causing countries to lift their embargoes, thus facilitating investment in NK. Eventually, NK recovers economically, primarily because of Western aid. As a result, NK is willing to support TNC. In such a scenario, NK would be most concerned with preparing for unpredictable natural disasters. In the case of a natural disaster, NK would probably require external humanitarian assistance (NK particularly lacks naval humanitarian assistance resources). In this case, TNC could involve non-military HOs, such as environmental protection and disaster relief, either at sea or ashore.

2. In the second scenario, the U.S. and Japan officially recognize NK, but the domestic situation deteriorates. NK experiences a military coup, food shortages, civil riots, a mass exodus of refugees on boats, and a refugee crisis on the Chinese and Russian borders. To cope, the NK government asks for international humanitarian assistance “because as long as NK can establish a full-fledged diplomatic relationship with the United States and Japan, she would not conduct military actions against the ROK.” In this scenario, TNC should focus on HA, but also address constabulary tasks if the situation requires—for example, counter-terrorism at sea, counter-drug operations at sea, and interdiction of illegal trade and migration at sea. NK may be willing to coordinate with TNC.

3. In the third scenario, NK recovers economically by playing the nuclear and missile cards with the U.S., Japan, and the ROK. NK does not, however, receive international recognition. In such a case, the NK government might launch intermittent local maritime conflicts against the ROK by dispatching submarines or midget-submarines carrying special operations forces. These actions could cause a Freedom of Navigation (FON) crisis (e.g., if NK unilaterally claims a sea boundary) and threaten SLOCs that affect oil flow and trade to the region, Europe, and North America. In this scenario, TNC’s major tasks could include SLOC protection, SAR, and MIOS based on a UN resolution.

4. The fourth scenario sees the DPRK’s domestic situation and international relations deteriorate further. NK pursues isolationist policies and could launch small- or large-scale war. In response to the NK attack, TNC should
include NEOs, MIOs based on UN resolutions, maritime traffic coordination, and minesweeping operations.

A Japanese participant responded that Scenario 1 is feasible, especially in light of the Perry Report. In his opinion, North Korea will survive into the 21st century. He noted that TNC has been threat-driven until now, and the DPRK’s continuing survival will enhance that cooperation. Regarding Scenario 2, he noted that the Korean participant had posulated that a Korean contingency could include refugee SAR operations. The Japanese participant argued that, although Japan does have an International Disaster Relief Law and has participated in bilateral SAREXs with Russia and the ROK, multilateral cooperation for disaster relief beyond Japan’s shores is a “gray zone” in domestic politics.

Regarding the Korean participant’s Scenario 3, the Japanese participant argued that Japan’s response would be easy if its SLOCs were attacked: Japan would defend her SLOCs. However, if a Japanese SLOC were not directly attacked (e.g., if there were an incident while sweeping mines on the high seas), there would be a great deal of internal debate about what Japan’s reaction should be. The Korean participant responded that the JMSDF won’t be able to participate if it doesn’t understand the threat to Japan from North Korean naval activities. He argued that the JMSDF should participate in SLOC defense because it has sufficient forces to do so.

The Japanese participant replied that international water is still a “gray area” for JMSDF deployment. Another Japanese participant agreed that, in a Korean contingency, Japan may not be able to join trilateral naval operations as long as Japanese SLOCs are not directly attacked. Nonetheless, he argued that Japan could sweep floating mines—and, in fact, has already done so (in the Persian Gulf)—because there are no constitutional constraints on such operations. In this regard, he noted his disagreement with the other Japanese participant who had argued that minesweeping operations were a “gray area.”

In response to the first two scenarios, an American participant asked other participants whether they felt a North Korean invitation would be mandatory for humanitarian operations at sea rather than on sovereign Korean territory. The Korean participant who developed the scenarios replied that TNC should have the following guidelines: start from small-scale exercises close to shore—not on the open seas—with appropriate scenarios, sharing information. With those guidelines, he argued, TNC will be possible, including in a Korean contingency. A Japanese observer agreed, adding that
trilateral cooperation would be particularly useful in case of a Korean contingency.

Another Japanese participant argued that North Korea is more complicated than the four scenarios that the Korean participant had postulated. He added that the three nations also need to prepare for other scenarios based on the complexity and artfulness in DPRK diplomacy. He offered the following anecdote as an example of the complexity in relations with North Korea: The DPRK promised not to launch a Taepodong missile as long as U.S.-DPRK talks are ongoing, but William Perry said that the final goal of the U.S. is to make the DPRK comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Therefore, he argued, the U.S. is not going to object if the DPRK continues deployment of the Nodong. As a result, the DPRK will deploy more Nodongs and produce more Scud missiles, despite the development of U.S.-DPRK talks.

A Korean participant argued that we can’t disregard a North Korean collapse; instead, we should prepare now for how we would respond. And, if cooperation is successful, we could expand TNC humanitarian assistance to East Asia as a whole.

A Japanese participant remarked that his appreciation for the North Korean threat had grown due to his involvement in the Korea-Japan Shuttle. He said that he now more fully appreciates what the strategic implications of a peninsular contingency would be for Japan.

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7 The Korea-Japan Shuttle is a program sponsored by the Okazaki Institute and the New Asia Research Institute. As of October 1999, the parties had met more than ten times to discuss Korea-Japan security relations.
Things to consider during the planning process

Participants discussed a number of factors the three navies will need to consider when planning trilateral naval cooperation, from attaining necessary political support to building common doctrine and ROE.

Participants from all three countries stressed the need for thorough planning at an early stage. An American participant compared planning for trilateral naval cooperation to a “big elephant” that, because of its size, needs to be eaten one bite at a time. Throughout the workshop, participants returned to this analogy, emphasizing the complexity of planning for TNC and the need to proceed thoroughly and deliberately.

Another American participant suggested that the keys to planning were simplicity and a clearly defined objective. A Korean participant agreed, adding that planning should be low-key and non-threatening.

As for factors to consider during the planning process, the American participant identified two U.S. examples: determining how the exercise should be paid for and determining how assets would be scheduled. He noted that USN forces are currently spread very thin, so advance planning is necessary—the earlier the better—to ensure sufficient assets. He added a third consideration for participating U.S. forces: getting command sponsorship.

A Korean participant argued that there was considerable distance between the desired reality and the feasibility of multinational naval operations. Impediments to TNC include insufficient assets, constitutional constraints, interoperability gaps, and the absence of common policy, especially in the case of the Korean peninsula. He argued that such differences made planning for trilateral naval cooperation difficult.

The planning process itself

A number of participants offered different visions of how to implement TNC planning.

A Japanese participant recommended that, in facilitating TNC, the three navies need to hold:

- Regular planning conferences for establishing “mutually agreed upon” doctrine, standard operating procedures (SOPs), definitions for the operations, etc.
• Regular combined exercises, including wargaming, to improve proficiency.

A Korean participant recommended a four-phase approach for TNC planning:
• Phase I: Hold workshop to identify anticipated problems and preparations.
• Phase II: ROK-U.S.-Japan planning staffs determine TNC missions, operating area, available assets, organization, and training scenario, and review ROE.
• Phase III: Execute wargame or CPX, preferably on the lead nation flagship.
• Phase IVa: Complete final coordination for exercise.
• Phase IVb: Conduct exercise.

An American participant liked the Korean participant’s suggested planning process.

Another American participant offered the diagram in figure 1 (see page 23) to illustrate his suggested process.

A Korean participant argued that the TNC planning staff should be multinational with equal representation, to include decision-making. The lead nation should call an Initial Planning Conference (IPC), after which the staffs would report the plans to their respective naval leaders. The lead nation should also call a Mid-Planning Conference in order to draw up a final plan.

Another Korean participant suggested that, to make participation effective, the three navies should hold periodic working groups to discuss political-military issues, the budget, and other planning concerns.

A Japanese participant suggested that the U.S. should act as leader and broker in organizing trilateral naval cooperation. An American participant replied that those roles (leader and broker) are neither easy to combine nor necessarily mutually inclusive.

Planning framework

A Korean participant argued that, while the three countries share the same objectives, their humanitarian objectives may differ and their navies differ
operationally (in size and use). Because of differences in the navies' capabilities and applications, the three countries should negotiate—before planning for TNC begins—an agreement that identifies the scope, objectives, authority, and guidelines for trilateral naval cooperation. He noted that each country will need some adjustments to its objectives, authority, and guidelines to plan those operations.

An American participant disagreed about the need for preliminary high-level agreements for implementing TNC. The three navies can already cooperate (i.e., SAR, transport support, medical support, and some refugee assistance) under current policy-level guidance. He added that China would be less sensitive to low-level political understanding than to high-level policy
agreements which would presumably get public attention. He suggested, instead, that the three navies establish a cooperative framework based on memorandums of understanding (MOUs).

A Japanese participant also suggested that all three navies should develop a trilateral Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), like the one between the U.S. and Japan. A Korean participant replied that the three navies don’t need an ACSA to do what an ACSA would allow. The Japanese participant replied that he had suggested an ACSA just as an example of the most advanced framework for enabling more flexible cooperation and interoperability, but he agreed that an ACSA may not be necessary for trilateral naval humanitarian assistance operations. Nonetheless, he argued that an ACSA would be ideal.

Another Japanese participant suggested that, even though Japan is currently legally allowed to do TNC, the three parties should still think about implementing a new ACSA between Japan and Korea. He argued that Japanese politicians are no longer afraid to discuss Korea-related issues, so there probably wouldn’t be any obstacles in the Diet to passing a Korea-Japan ACSA. He noted that the ACSA between the U.S. and Japan, enacted in 1993, was upgraded by the Diet in 1999.

Another Japanese participant suggested that a common “standing exercise” operational plan (OPLAN) would make coordination among the three navies and NGOs easier. Such an OPLAN should include a force list, a deployment plan, coordination procedures, a communication plan, a list of bases and facilities to be used, a transportation plan, and an ACSA. He also recommended that the three navies apply the U.S. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

He identified three possible types of exercise OPLANS and their associated command structures: (1) joint operation/common OPLAN/single commander; (2) coordinated operation/common OPLAN/national commander; and (3) individual operation/individual OPLANS/national commander. A Korean participant was skeptical about developing a common OPLAN, saying the process would be more time consuming than it’s worth. He was also concerned that a common OPLAN could include scenarios that would limit the plan’s utility. Nonetheless, the three navies could try to develop a common OPLAN. An American participant was also concerned that a common OPLAN could limit options if the scenarios were too specific, but he felt such a plan was worth consideration.
Another American participant agreed that operational planning can and should be done for TNC humanitarian assistance operations. He also suggested that planning should probably be open for transparency's sake. A third American participant strongly endorsed the Japanese participant's suggestion to develop a standing OPLAN.

ROE // Doctrine

Referring to a point made in *Doctrine for Joint Operations*¹, a Korean participant noted that building common ROE could be difficult because of differences in individual national policies and operational employment concepts. Instead, he suggested that each navy maximize the transparency of its ROEs in fora such as staff talks, wargames, and joint training. He recommended that each national component commander seek the authority to release relevant ROE, especially self-defense ROE (which he called the most contentious in multinational operations), to the other navies. Finally, during the planning phase, the navies should identify differences in their respective ROE.

An American participant suggested using the EXTAC 1000 series of U.S. multinational Experimental Tactics (EXTAC) manuals. He noted that these manuals cover areas of interest discussed at the workshop, including: maneuvering/tactical procedures; helicopter operations from ships other than CVs; rear area support; voice procedures; messages; NEOs; humanitarian assistance missions; maritime interdiction force operations; international control of shipping; and meteorological support. He also suggested using unclassified, peacetime U.S. standing rules as a starting point for trilateral naval cooperation ROE, noting that ROE should be addressed early in the planning process because they are time-consuming. He remarked, however, that Japan and the ROK would have to accommodate the fact that U.S. ROE reflect a policy of "hostile intent," which justifies action in the name of self-defense of U.S. forces.

A Japanese participant agreed that unclassified U.S. doctrine and ROE would be good baselines from which to build. He also supported the idea to increase ROE transparency among the three navies. A Korean participant also agreed that standing U.S. ROEs would be a good starting point. He added,

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¹ Joint Pub 3-0, 1 February 1995, p.VI-3.
however, that the Koreans don't have the EXTAC manuals and should get this doctrine as soon as possible to prepare for further operations. Another Korean participant thought that the EXTAC 1000 series was distributed only to NATO countries and wondered whether it could be distributed to the ROKN and JMSDF. The American participant pointed out that U.S. Naval Warfare Doctrine Command’s website\(^9\) states that the EXTAC 1000 manuals were created “to allow NATO maritime forces to conduct exercises and operations with non-NATO maritime forces.” The website further states, “Originally designed to support NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program, they have since been made available to support maritime exercises and operations involving other non-NATO nations.”

An American participant reminded others that the U.S., Japan, and Korea should be sensitive about the ROE of other countries. He noted that sometimes a ship depends upon an allied or cooperating ship for its own defense.

Operational- and political-level guidance

An American participant identified two requirements for implementing TNC: (1) political-level support and guidance, and (2) operational-level planning and exercises. He argued that fleet-level officers are motivated by a different set of concerns than political leaders. Operational-level decisions include making hard allocation and funding choices, while remaining responsive to political concerns (such as China’s reaction). Therefore, he suggested that building cooperation requires both “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches. He offered table 1 (see page 27) to illustrate various types of coordination required at different levels to facilitate trilateral humanitarian assistance.

Because of the coordination required at levels above and below, he recommended that the three navies build a framework for cooperation based on Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs). He explained that MOUs spell out operational procedures, and that MOUs and exercise scenarios could be managed at Type Command (TYCOM) levels.

\(^9\) The website is at www.nwdc.navy.mil/navigation1/doctrine8.htm. [Note that the web address spelling of “navigation” is incorrect.] The website also states, “This Series of documents although unclassified is currently not available for general distribution to the public. Non-NATO nations seeking access to these documents must do so through a NATO member nation” — in this case presumably the U.S.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognizant authority</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Types of coordination needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Command Authorities/</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Establish guidance and limits for cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense /</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate political approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Defense Agency /</td>
<td></td>
<td>Authorize response in a crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Defense/</td>
<td></td>
<td>Set policy initiatives or approve tri-lateral agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministries of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN/JMSDF/ROKN Staff level</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Host staff talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate political approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate issues with domestic agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Determine priorities for humanitarian assistance cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT /</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Coordinate schedules of major ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSEVENTHFLT /</td>
<td></td>
<td>Develop engagement plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSDFLT /</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate funding for humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCROKFLT Fleet level</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approve operational MOUs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support joint engagement and planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type Commanders</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Coordinate asset allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Identify operational requirements and develop MOUs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Host information exchanges and exercise symposia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Propose and develop specific exercise plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit level</td>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Identify interoperability requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carry out port visits and participate in exchanges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
He also argued that many operational problems can be addressed through bilateral structures. To illustrate, he submitted table 2 (see page 29) showing exercise scenarios and assets that could be considered for TNC today and summarizing some of the operational issues that would come up in those exercises.

A Japanese participant remarked that it would be very hard to add items to the American participant’s list, though some items could be removed with prioritization.

The American participant continued, saying that the best approach to TNC is two-pronged:

1. Define and achieve the necessary level of political agreement (e.g., navy-to-navy or higher).

2. At the operational level, operators need to coordinate with their counterparts in each other’s navies.

A Japanese participant noted a discrepancy between the American participant’s emphasis on the need for political and navy-to-navy coordination, and a Japanese participant’s view that TNC should be as low-key as possible. The American participant replied that he discussed primarily operational issues because he thought all of the participants were well aware of political issues but need to think more about operational-level questions.

Coordinating with NGOs

A Korean participant remarked that the three navies will need to consider cooperating with NGOs if it turns out that trilateral humanitarian assistance operations become associated with military contingencies.

An American participant described how this coordination could work, drawing on U.S. experience in coordinating with NGOs in operations ashore. He reasoned that the USN, JMSDF, and ROKN would be much more likely to cooperate with NGOs on land than at sea. He noted, however, that operations on shore may be limited because, for example, very few personnel who come from the sea stay ashore at night. This was the case during humanitarian assistance operations in Bangladesh in 1991 because the forces didn’t want their visible presence to suggest pressure on the local government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Example scenarios</th>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Planning levels</th>
<th>Some key issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maritime rescue</td>
<td>Merchant ship in distress</td>
<td>Helos, DDs, P-3Cs, light amphibious ships</td>
<td>Surface Type Commanders</td>
<td>Air coordination, takeoff and recovery, surface coordination, domestic agency coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submarine rescue</td>
<td>Submarines, tenders, DSRVs</td>
<td>Submarine Type Commanders</td>
<td>DSRV procedures, interoperability, waterspace management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SAR for non-combatant</td>
<td>P-3Cs, helos, DDs</td>
<td>Air Type Commanders</td>
<td>Air coordination, surface coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee rescue</td>
<td>Refugee pick-up in water between Japan and Korea and transport to Japan or Korea</td>
<td>Helos, amphibious ships, LCACs, LPDs, medical units embarked</td>
<td>Fleet-level coordination with Type Commanders, shore sites, domestic agencies</td>
<td>Political situation management, security, holding areas, repatriatization procedures, medical asset allocation, domestic agency coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical support /</td>
<td>Earthquake, hurricane, or other natural disaster requiring access by sea</td>
<td>Helos, amphibious ships, LCACs, LPDs, medical units embarked</td>
<td>Fleet-level coordination with Type Commanders, domestic agencies</td>
<td>Embarking medical personnel and supplies, ship-to-shore coordination, geographic assignment of assets, logistical supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Trilateral Naval Cooperation

In describing the U.S. system, he explained that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) decides whether or not to ask DOD for help. Within USAID, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) leads the overseas effort. OFDA, in that capacity, dispatches Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs), which are authorized to spend U.S. money on the spot in support of assistance. He noted that DARTs have been involved in every U.S. assistance operation since at least the early 1990s. Red Cross/Red Crescent societies, which have standing similar to that of a sovereign nation, are also frequent participants. There is also a wide variety of UN agencies (e.g., CARE, OXFAM) that do relatively little advance planning for particular situations and can therefore be challenging for the U.S. military to work with. On the other hand, he argued that these organizations can also be very good sources of information on the ground; therefore, he said, it is important for the armed forces involved to include them in their planning.

The American participant identified three broad types of military disaster relief:

1. Fast relief, when the military is the only organization that can get food and water to the affected populations. In such a case, the military provides transport support to organizations and assistance to relief workers.


3. Logistical support, including moving relief supplies, HRO personnel, or even victims.

He emphasized that, in the conduct of humanitarian assistance operations, the military should view itself as supporting NGOs. The sooner NGOs no longer need the military, the sooner the military can go home. On that note, he argued that it is important for the military to resist bringing in materials on which residents could become dependent. He added, however, that it may be difficult to determine what to introduce and what not to introduce until arriving on scene.

The American participant also described the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and the Civil-Military Operations Cell (CMOC)—two structures with which forces are likely to become involved during humanitarian assistance operations. The HOC coordinates the overall relief strategy and requests military support. The CMOC is where the military estimates what kinds of help relief workers need. Its staff includes civilians, medical experts, and engineers. He noted that, given its situation-dependent structure, the CMOC can be established almost anywhere (e.g., on a command vessel, such as USS Coronado).
A Japanese participant remarked that planning should draw on the growing body of U.S. literature about U.S. military relief operations. He remarked that it is also important to think about UN involvement (e.g., CMOC, HOC).

An American participant agreed that militaries should be aware of their support role in HAOs and should, in light of that recognition, keep their operations proportional. USN experience shows that as missions change and the situation evolves, the original mission can tend to develop into something broader than initially envisioned, a situation the U.S. military refers to as "mission creep." He cautioned that the three navies need to ensure that they can manage potential mission creep.

An American participant suggested that, when planning, the three navies apply lessons learned from historical experience, especially USN operations with NATO, UNITAS, and RIMPAC countries; Russia-U.S. bilateral operations; and operations with the USCG. He argued that the Kosovo experience demonstrated how the need for other services and assets from non-allied nations can complicate operations. A Korean participant agreed that the three navies can learn from USN cooperative experience within other structures, such as NATO and UNITAS.

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\footnotesize{UNITAS means "united" in Spanish. UNITAS is an annual USN deployment and multilateral exercise series with Latin American navies around the waters of South America.}

\footnotesize{“Rim of the Pacific” (RIMPAC) is a multilateral, biannual, naval exercise conducted among the USN and some Asian navies. The exercise is conducted under the coordination of Commander, U.S. Third Fleet. Forces from the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps also participate.}
What the operations should look like

Command structure

A Korean participant said that the following factors should be kept in mind when comparing types of command structures for TNC: the three countries’ coalition systems, political realities, a potentially negative Chinese reaction, and the ROK’s and Japan’s ability to lead the operation. He recommended that TNC should use a lead nation command structure, with a rotating lead nation. He argued that rotating the lead command could help alleviate Chinese concerns about U.S. domination of military operations. On the other hand, the U.S. should lead the first planning process because the U.S. has planned and conducted many humanitarian operations in the past. He added that Japan should be the lead nation the following year, followed by Korea—reflecting the three navies’ sizes and experience with humanitarian operations.

An American participant agreed that we have to consider the three navies’ capabilities and assign priorities accordingly. He also agreed that a rotational command structure is worth investigating. Another Korean participant argued that an appropriate command structure and chain of command must consider the huge quantitative and qualitative gaps between the three navies.

A Japanese participant also agreed that the U.S. should take the initiative in planning. Japan-Korea relations, he said, have not yet matured enough to run cooperation. He noted that the JMSDF always asks the U.S. to take the initiative in planning, and argued that Japan should be more flexible on this point in the future. Another Japanese participant argued that the U.S. should lead the planning process, or at least lead Japan, because the JMSDF is less experienced in maritime cooperation.

A Korean participant noted that RIMPAC uses an integrated command structure, while the 1999 ROKN-JMSDF SAREX employed a parallel command structure. For U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral naval cooperation, he recom-

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12 Like other participants who addressed command structure issues, the Korean participant used the conceptual framework of command structure options as defined and discussed in Guidelines for the World's Maritime Forces in Conducting Multinational Operations (Michael Johnson, CNA Research Memorandum 95-119, March 1996).
mended a lead nation command structure, led by the United States. He also suggested that the lead nation could rotate. He suggested that, as lead nation and as the navy with the most experience in humanitarian relief operations (and the “most appropriate operational equipment”), the USN should provide a flagship. That flagship should host a multinational cooperation center. An American participant agreed that a rotating lead command would suit TNC.

A Japanese participant was in favor of a parallel command structure.

An American participant recommended that the three navies conduct exercises to practice and sort out the command relationships and other issues. He thought this process would take about 18 months.

An American participant recommended that TNC employ the lead nation command structure, which is much simpler for controlling the operation. (See figure 2.) He recommended that leadership could rotate among the U.S., Japan, and Korea, but that the U.S. should start the process. An inte-

**Figure 2.**
grated command structure, he said, might also work for TNC. As for doctrine, the U.S. has Joint Pubs 3-0 and 5-0 and other published multinational doctrine. Korean and Japanese doctrine, he said, is evolving; he hoped that ROKN and JMSDF doctrine would become more transparent.

As an example for the JMSDF, USN, and ROKN to follow, a Korean participant pointed to the NATO maritime process—whose members have operated together for more than 50 years with common operational procedures, communications links, and command structure. He added that the three navies should borrow ideas from Europe, which has a good organization to deal with humanitarian operations, especially SAR. He described NATO’s SAR structure, in which operations are controlled by a Rescue Coordination Control Station (RCCS). He added that each country has its own organization for supporting SAR and suggested that the three navies establish a Search and Rescue Operation Coordination Center (SAROCC) in Northeast Asia, similar to the RCCS in Europe, with admiral and action officer participation. The three parties should invite China and Russia to participate, especially because those countries have similar naval resources. He noted that the ROK Minister of National Defense had visited China on August 25 and expressed his desire for better ROK-China military cooperation, through such measures as joint SAREXs and port visits. As for Russia, the two ministers of national defense agreed at the Fifth Korean-Russia MND Conference to conduct another joint SAREX next year. In that light, the ROKN-JMSDF SAREX in August 1999 was another step towards multilateral cooperation. All of these developments suggest that TNC is timely.

An American participant remarked that the Korean participant’s idea about a SAR center (like NATO’s) seemed to suggest a regional command and control center. He agreed that this idea deserved consideration.

A Korean participant noted that command and control (C2) planning will be very important for the first exercise because the three navies have never actually exercised trilaterally with each other. He suggested that multinational staff C2 efforts should emphasize achieving unity toward common objectives. He added, however, that coordination and cooperation—rather than command and control—will be the key high-level functions. Finally, he noted that compromise and consensus are important aspects of multinational decision-making.
RIMPAC

A Japanese participant suggested that TNC should build off of the common RIMPAC experience. For example, as in RIMPAC, the U.S. should take the initiative in clarifying standard operating procedures (SOPs). Japan and Korea can then plan based on those U.S. standards and U.S.-designed SOPs, as modified by Japanese and Korean legal and political constraints. The participant identified the following requirements for SOP development: (1) SOP development should include simulations that address functional and regional divisions of labor; (2) SOPs should provide general and specific guidelines for joint operations at sea; and (3) SOPs should be reviewed and updated at least annually.

An American participant noted that the term “RIMPAC” has some Cold War connotations. He worried that adding TNC exercises on to RIMPAC could suggest guilt by association in dealing with China and Russia. If the three navies use RIMPAC, he said, they should be careful about how they associate TNC with it. The Japanese participant replied that the three navies could use RIMPAC’s architecture as a model, but perhaps change the name. He added that RIMPAC is useful as a building tool for two reasons: (1) it employs a command structure with a U.S. lead; and (2) it is multilateral, which makes it a good example to follow when the three navies want to invite China and Russia. Two Korean participants agreed that RIMPAC would be a useful model for planning TNC.

A Korean participant noted that RIMPAC is biennial. He suggested that the three navies could incorporate trilateral humanitarian assistance exercises into RIMPAC rather than conduct them separately. An American participant discouraged this idea, noting that USN Third Fleet already has a great deal of planning to do for the already complex RIMPAC, so it would be unfair to add the responsibility of planning TNC. On the other hand, taking advantage of RIMPAC to do something off-line could be good.

A Japanese participant suggested that TNC could build off of RIMPAC operations one year, operate independently the following year, then again operate with RIMPAC, and so on.
Force structure

A Korean participant noted that the U.S., Japan, and ROK are not part of a common alliance system, a factor that could affect what an appropriate TNC force structure would look like. They will need to consider their respective alliance systems, national sovereignty, and cultural and legal limitations in selecting an appropriate force structure. He argued that, of the three types of multinational force structures—ad hoc, on-call, and standing—TNC should use ad hoc forces.

A Japanese participant recommended creating both a trilateral humanitarian assistance “ready force” and a trilateral humanitarian assistance coordination center. He described this ready force as a trilateral naval “Task Group,” consisting of ships with aircraft, landing ships, and supply ships. He reiterated that the JMSDF has earmarked two landing ships (LSTs) and an AOE for unexpected disaster situations (based on the International Disaster Relief Law). A Korean participant argued that a prepositioned (e.g., Okinawa, as suggested) trilateral ready force would be inappropriate. Instead, he argued that the three navies could create rapidly deployable forces. He also suggested that the three navies could have separate humanitarian assistance offices.

An American participant preferred on-call forces to standing forces because of the comparatively greater cost of maintaining standing forces.

Another American participant argued that a standing office, or staff, and a standing force are things to think about down the road, but that it would be premature to spend time thinking about them now. He argued that the USN, especially, has enough tasks to keep it busy and already has unfilled staff billets. U.S. operational commanders would therefore be reluctant to become involved in any kind of standing force if it appeared to limit the flexibility of Seventh Fleet to respond to its other responsibilities.

Responding to these comments, the Japanese participant replied that he understood the objections to his proposal for a ready force, but he reminded participants that humanitarian assistance requirements could arise unexpectedly and, in such emergencies, it was important to be prepared.

Participants then discussed which assets from each navy would participate in trilateral naval operations. A Japanese participant agreed with an American participant’s 1998 workshop paper, which stated that amphibious ships are the most appropriate for humanitarian TNC. He added that all three
navies are well equipped with such assets. In addition to the LST *Osumi*, which was commissioned in 1998, he noted that the JMSDF is also scheduled to commission two more LSTs by 2003, and a 13,500-ton AOE has been included in the JFY 2000 budget.

The Japanese participant also noted that Japan has three ships (two Miura-class LSTs and one Towada-class AOE) earmarked and on-call on a permanent basis to respond to “unexpected disasters.” In addition, the JASDF has six C-130 aircraft assigned to carry an on-call ground rescue team consisting of 13 medical doctors and other rescue operations troops. Japan also has one UH-1 and three CH-47s earmarked to respond to emergencies. He noted that Japan also has a large P-3C fleet that could quickly deploy if so assigned. He added that JASDF and JGSDF activities are limited to the ground, so maritime cooperation should be limited to navies. An American participant argued that these JMSDF earmarked forces indicate that the JMSDF is prepared to participate in trilateral humanitarian assistance operations.

A Korean participant suggested the following ROKN assets for suggested TNC missions:

- For massive refugee rescue relief: P-3Cs, rescue helicopters, surface ships such as submarine rescue ships (ARSs) and LST(H)s, combat ships and aircraft for patrolling, and salvage groups.
- For submarine crew rescue operations: submarines and submarine rescue ships (ARSs).
- For ship rescue: tug ships and fire-fighting ships. Korean Maritime Police fire-fighting ships could also participate, as appropriate.

He also noted that NGOs and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) could also assist in refugee rescue operations, especially to provide transport support (e.g., civilian ships) and medical support (e.g., civilian doctors).

An American participant added that amphibious ships should be the ships of choice because of their abilities to carry helicopters and LCACs (landing craft, air cushions), to move many people and large amounts of supplies from ship to shore, and to perform emergency medical operations. He added that a hospital ship, which is somewhat less threatening, could also prove useful and would promote a benign view of TNC operations. In the USN inventory, he specified LHAs (landing helicopter, amphibious), LPDs (landing platform docks), LSDs (landing ship docks), Aegis cruisers, Perry-class frigates, and Spruance-class destroyers. He argued that Arleigh Burke-class destroyers would not be as appropriate because they lack helicopter well
decks. Aegis cruisers, on the other hand, as the potential ships of choice for ballistic missile defense (BMD), could irritate neighboring countries. Finally, USN LCACs had proven especially useful in areas of heavy damage during recent disaster relief operations in Turkey.

The same American participant identified ROKN assets that have aviation and large-lift capabilities: “Alligator”-class LSTs; Un-bong LSTs; KDX\textsuperscript{13} surface combatants with helicopter capabilities; and shore-based aircraft, such as P-3Cs. He noted that P-3s are particularly attractive because they are common to the USN, JMSDF, and ROKN, and would be especially useful for surveillance.

The American participant suggested the following JMSDF assets: Osumi-class LSTs, Miura-class LSTs, Kongo-class and other helicopter-capable destroyers, Towada-class replenishment ships, and shore-based aircraft. He noted that the LSTs would be useful because they can carry large amounts of cargo and move close to shore. He added that the JMSDF US-1 has some unique capabilities that would be useful.

A Korean participant, who focused on trilateral naval cooperation in SAR operations, suggested the following supporting resources: aircraft (e.g., P-3s), ships, submarines, communications systems, technology, and C4I. He added that the Japan Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA) and the Korean Maritime Police (KMP) have similar resources.

The same Korean participant who had previously argued in favor of trilateral submarine salvage rescue operations, identified ROKN and KMP assets that could support salvage efforts. For example, he identified submarine rescue ships (ASRs), salvage and rescue ships (ATSs), and salvage ships (ARSSs). He explained that the ASR has a Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) which can dive up to 300 meters, and the ATS DSRV can dive up to 100 meters. For Japanese support for salvage operations, he identified the JMSDF’s ARS, which has a DSRV that can search up to 300 meters deep, and the Daigoku, which can search up to 1,000 meters deep. He concluded that all three navies have DSRVs and either Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) or unmanned vessels. He recommended establishing U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea memoranda of agreement (MOAs) for rescuing submarine crews. He argued that, separately, all three navies have highly capable submarine crew rescue capabilities, but combining efforts would provide synergy and minimize the loss of lives.

\textsuperscript{13} The KDX is the ROK’s indigenously produced destroyer.
Location

A Korean participant suggested that the three navies should train in an area where a real crisis could occur, though they should be careful to avoid unnecessarily invoking suspicion or misunderstanding by China or the DPRK. To meet these criteria, he suggested that the operating area should be where civil transits are minimal and where ROKN-USN-JMSDF combatants could easily travel. Based on those criteria, he recommended an area southeast of Cheju island and west of Japan. (See map below.)

An American participant also recommended that the three navies should avoid contentious areas that involve territorial claims. If that proves too hard, he suggested Hawaii and the U.S. west coast as fallback locations. He noted, however, that the long transit from Asia to Hawaii or the U.S. west
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cost would be expensive for Japan and Korea, making political approval harder to obtain in those countries.

A Japanese participant agreed with the Korean participant's proposed area of operations, though he argued that a trip to Hawaii or the west coast of the U.S. would provide a strong incentive and reward for the JMSDF and ROKN crews. An American participant said that he agreed that Korean and Japanese sailors would look forward to going to Hawaii or the west coast of the U.S., but he doubted that the Commander of Seventh Fleet (who commands USN forces based in Japan) would send his ships on an expensive (due to fuel and transit costs) eight-day transit to Hawaii instead of on a half-day transit within the region for an operation that could be conducted in-area. He endorsed the Korean participant's proposed area of operations.

In response to the American participant's remarks about the cost of transiting to waters around the U.S., the Japanese participant argued that the cost might be worth the reward and incentive that those locations would provide the crew, which doesn't get to go many places very often. He also suggested Iwo Jima as a candidate location, though he noted that the area is busy because of USMC amphibious exercises and night landing exercises there. An American participant said that the Iwo Jima suggestion might be a good compromise between using a contentious area around Japan or Korea, and traveling the long distance to Hawaii. Another American participant agreed that Iwo Jima was worth considering because it would be a good place to practice the shore aspect of humanitarian operations.

Another Japanese participant agreed that exercises in Hawaii or on the U.S. west coast would be a good incentive for Korean and Japanese forces. He added that operations in those locations would also get lots of press coverage, which would be a good thing. An American participant commented that it would be good to publicize the exercise no matter where it is held, in order to minimize any negative public reaction in Korea or Japan.

A Korean participant agreed that TNC operations should avoid operating in areas in NEA where there are contentious, unresolved territorial issues. He recommended the West Sea area of the Korean peninsula or the area around Cheju Island.

Another American participant agreed that a local (NEA) location would be better for the U.S. because of the Navy's command structure. He reasoned that the U.S. would likely take the lead in organizing the exercise, and in that case, Seventh Fleet would be a more appropriate commander than Third
Fleet. Seventh Fleet works with the ROKN and JMSDF on a daily basis. Furthermore, after the exercise, the navies will want to be prepared to do real operations; if exercises were to be held around the U.S., the navies would not exercise with the Seventh Fleet ships with whom they would actually eventually operate. By operating in Hawaii, he argued, we would just postpone the issue of addressing geography.

Another American participant agreed that moving the exercise to Third Fleet would complicate matters.

A Japanese participant wondered whether the three navies could invite China and Russia to exercise in this region. He wondered whether it would be possible to hold a four-navy exercise there. He also suggested that the DPRK would not oppose a four-navy exercise if either China or Russia were to join the U.S., the ROK, and Japan in the naval exercise.

A Korean participant suggested that the issue of location could be resolved at staff talks if participants at the workshop could not arrive at a consensus.

Communications

A Korean participant suggested that the three navies should review communications procedures they already use in their bilateral exercises and RIMPAC, to identify appropriate methods for TNC communications. He suggested using Alliance Communications Signal (ACS) for general code words and signal messages. He noted that other major naval communications pathways include voice communications, signal messages, visual signals, and liaison personnel.

The same Korean participant noted the utility of liaison personnel in compensating for and overcoming technical barriers in multilateral cooperation. He added that liaison personnel can also foster mutual understanding of missions and tactics, transfer of vital information, mutual trust, and teamwork. He recommended that the three navies exchange liaison personnel as early as possible to ensure unity of effort and to improve mutual understanding. He also recommended that the navies consider communications security issues, such as code words and encryption devices. He suggested studying those used in RIMPAC.

A Japanese participant also recommended that the ROKN and JMSDF consider dispatching liaison officers during the operations to help with trans-
lations and communications. He recommended that English be the official language.

A Korean participant inquired about a possible USN MOOTW C4I system and suggested sharing it with the ROKN and JMSDF to facilitate interoperability. An American participant clarified that the USN does not have a MOOTW-specific C4I system. Rather, the USN adapts its C4I system to suit whatever operation it is conducting. A Japanese participant noted that sharing USN C4I systems is desirable, but depends on a U.S. decision. An American observer explained that there is a bilateral Communications Security (COMSEC) MOU between the government of Japan and the U.S. government. That MOU does not permit the U.S. to provide cryptological materials that would allow a third party to join in communications. (He noted that this is currently a problem at RIMPAC when the United States wants to include Japan.) Now that the Guidelines legislation has been passed, there is a move to re-negotiate the MOU, but that's a national—vice navy—decision. An American participant argued that that is a practical problem that could be resolved. Another American participant agreed that the three navies could expect to resolve such problems, since these issues were addressed satisfactorily in the 1990s in Europe with non-NATO nations.

A Korean participant suggested using the Internet and commercial telephone systems. A Japanese participant said that he had heard that wireless technology is more workable than the Internet for multilateral operations. An American participant replied that the Internet is of limited utility because—although U.S. ships use the Internet—U.S. aircraft don't fly with Internet assets on board. Another American participant added that communications at sea are complex because they depend on satellites. This satellite technology requires appropriate equipment on the ships, so communications are not as simple as just taking a PC on the ship and plugging it in. Cellular phones, therefore, make more sense. A third American participant noted that using the Internet is feasible but very expensive because of the need to increase bandwidth. He suggested that using commercial communications, on the other hand, is an excellent idea and said that, in fact, the USN routinely uses commercial communications.
Obstacles to implementing TNC

Throughout the workshop, participants noted a number of potential obstacles to realizing trilateral naval cooperation. In addition to a potentially negative Chinese reaction [discussed in the next section], participants cited potentially negative Korean and Japanese public opinion and legal constraints.

On the other hand, a number of participants noted the record of Japan-ROK military exchanges, including mutual port visits, high-level exchanges of defense officials, SAREX ’99, and student exchanges. Many argued that these exchanges have opened the door to more cooperation. A Japanese participant argued that the exchanges have also been confidence-building measures. An American participant remarked that there had been more ROKN-JMSDF cooperation than he had been aware of. Nevertheless, participants still recognized the potential roadblocks to implementing TNC, as discussed below.

China

As in previous years, the China issue punctuated most discussion, regardless of subject. Discussion regarding China focused on how to avoid negative Chinese reactions to USN-JMSDF-ROKN cooperation. This topic is covered in detail in the section titled “Including China and Other Fourth Parties.”

Justifications to domestic audiences

A Korean participant argued that, in order to implement TNC, the United States, Japan, and the ROK will need to achieve domestic public support for the operations. Therefore, Korean and Japanese military leaders should work to persuade their governments and publics to support TNC as a stability-builder for the countries and the region. He added that the United States should play an active part in this process in Japan and Korea.

An American participant disagreed with this recommendation to launch a campaign in Japan and Korea to gain public support for TNC. Instead, he recommended downplaying the national security aspects of TNC.
Another American participant said that one way to achieve public support is by assuring an acceptable common purpose. The difficult part in realizing trilateral naval cooperation is actually implementing the concept. He identified a number of policy implications to consider when planning for TNC:

- Actual TNC will entail “real-world” events, not exercises. The pace of events, therefore, cannot be dictated or precisely anticipated.

- The operations will involve fourth parties, unless the affected country is the U.S., Japan, or the ROK. If assistance is rendered to a fourth country, the three navies will have to get diplomatic clearances to enter the territorial waters of that country.

- Presenting TNC as preparation for a possible DPRK collapse would likely cause an “angry outburst from Pyongyang.”

- Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington have to decide they want to do the operations planned for; otherwise, the three navies won’t be able to proceed. Also, the three countries will have to justify TNC carefully as contributing to each government’s policy objectives—rather than just as a method for improving trilateral operations and naval capabilities—so as to avoid negative reactions from East Asian countries who could interpret TNC negatively.

He added that the three countries need to agree on the following operational concepts before starting TNC:

- TNC is not intended to be another form of military presence.

- TNC would probably not be conducted in response to war.

- TNC is not a military “crisis response.”

- TNC is not intended as a first step to erode Japan’s peace constitution.

- TNC is not intended to affect the status of conflicting territorial sea claims (e.g., the Dok-do or Takeshima dispute) in case a humanitarian emergency arises in the vicinity of these islets. TNC would not reinforce, diminish, or otherwise imply a judgment on the validity of either nation’s claim.

He continued to explain that, based on the assumptions listed above (especially that TNC will entail “real-world” operations, rather than schedule-dictated exercises), the three countries will have to answer the following question: Why should the three navies do this? The answer: To bring Korea and Japan closer together, something that benefits all three countries.
He concluded that the ultimate purpose of TNC—while not belittling the good that it will provide to people in distress—is to facilitate “a genuine strategic relationship” between Korea and Japan. He argued that because the ultimate objective is political, vice military, TNC will require the political blessing of Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. For TNC to be realized, the three governments must support the view that closer relations between Korea and Japan are desirable. He added that current relations (or a lack thereof) between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) demonstrate that when political relations go bad, the first victim is usually military relations. He reiterated that political approval is a prerequisite for TNC, which we wouldn’t be talking about if not for good political relations. Furthermore, TNC would inflict costs—both fiscal and opportunity costs—on all three navies. Lastly, he noted that the USN has done humanitarian operations for years, as have, to a lesser extent, the ROKN and JMSDF. What is unique about USN-JMSDF-ROKN cooperation in humanitarian operations is the trilateral aspect.

A Korean participant remarked that using TNC for political purposes, such as containing North Korea, is a bit extreme. We should have a different purpose for our cooperation.

Another Korean participant said this discussion highlighted the importance of developing a more particular justification for TNC.

Legal constraints

A Japanese participant noted that legal considerations are especially constraining on Japan. He said that Japan’s International Cooperation Law permits dispatch of Self-Defense Forces overseas for PKO only. He anticipated no obstacles to JMSDF participation in transport support and medical support operations. He argued that JMSDF participation in maritime relief and maritime refugee rescue, on the other hand, could be problematic given Japan’s legal framework, which he described as a matter of interpretation.

He further explained that, after the end of the Cold War, Japan developed the 1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). The NDPO states that while defense of Japan is still the primary role of the Self-Defense Forces, the SDF also have new roles. These new roles include responding to various situations, such as large-scale disasters, and contributing to a more stable security environment.
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An American participant argued that the three countries should do trilateral NEO, MIO, and PKO, while a Japanese participant argued that legal constraints would prevent Japan from participating in those types of operations if they were in areas of conflict. He added that disaster relief overseas is a permissible JMSDF operation, but he disagreed with another Japanese participant’s interpretation that the Japanese International Cooperation Law permits the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces overseas for PKO as well as for humanitarian operations in areas of conflict.14

Another Japanese participant cited the Japanese Disaster Relief Law, enacted in 1992, as providing authorization to prepare for major disasters overseas.

A Korean participant remarked that, in the past, legal constraints have prevented the JMSDF from participating in combined exercises with anyone other than the USN, though JMSDF and ROKN participation in RIMPAC has provided indirect cooperation. He suggested that the first-ever JMSDF-ROKN SAREX, held in August 1999, cleared the last obstacle for TNC.

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14 Actually, the JSDF are precluded from participating in PKO in areas of conflict by Japan’s International PKO Law, which lists five prerequisites for JSDF PKO deployment, including a cease-fire.
Including China and other fourth parties

Most, if not all, participants expressed concern at some point during the workshop about the potential for China to react negatively to trilateral naval cooperation. Participants thought that an unhappy China could: (1) dampen Japanese and Korean political and public support for combined operations, and (2) respond with an action that might threaten the security of Northeast Asia. Participants agreed that transparency in TNC planning and operating was critical to avoiding, or at least mitigating, a negative Chinese reaction. They also agreed that TNC should be left open-ended to enable China and other parties to be invited at an undetermined point in the future.

China

An American participant argued that any effort to implement bilateral or multilateral activities in Asia must consider the reaction of China, which could regard TNC as a form of containment. This is true even for relatively benign trilateral humanitarian operations. He suggested that if China or Russia were to object to TNC, we should—eventually—invite observers. Bringing in the Chinese or Russians from the outset, he argued, would probably unnecessarily complicate and might even “doom” the initiative. In his view, the Chinese and Russians probably would not attend if invited, but we should invite them anyway to demonstrate good will.

The American participant added that the three navies must also consider the reaction of other Asian countries (besides China) to U.S.-Japan-Korea naval cooperation. Nevertheless, cooperating in the name of humanitarian assistance could help assuage any concerns because the three navies would be “doing good.”

A Korean participant agreed that the three parties should invite China and recommended that the U.S., Japan, and the ROK should take the following measures in order to prevent a negative Chinese reaction:

- Tell China that the region should be prepared to respond to natural disasters and that the logical choice for such humanitarian assistance operations would be USN-JMSDF-ROKN cooperation because it has already “materialized.”
• Regularly include TNC as an agenda item in diplomatic dealings with the Chinese to make them accept naval cooperation as a "fait accompli."

• Support each other's efforts to expand bilateral military cooperation with China.

• Extend invitations for observing and joining the operations to all countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

A Japanese participant noted that national representatives from each country had said that it is important to consider both the domestic political environment in each country and the reactions of other countries to TNC, but only the Koreans had discussed China's reaction in detail. The Japanese and American participants had only touched on it. He argued that this difference demonstrated how Koreans—especially naval officers—particularly fear a strong reaction from China.

The Korean participant denied the Japanese participant's assertion that, as an active-duty ROKN officer, he fears China more than Japanese or Americans might. He said his point had been that, having initiated TNC and wanting to move forward, the three navies should avoid stimulating a negative Chinese reaction from this point forward. Another Korean participant replied that Koreans are not especially worried about China's reaction to TNC as long as TNC is transparent, is limited to humanitarian assistance, and includes an invitation for China to join. In his opinion, there is great opportunity for positive cooperation between Korea, Japan, and China.

An American participant noted that he had not talked at length about China's reaction because he chose to focus on operational, vice political, considerations.

A Japanese participant remarked that negative feelings towards China have been growing in Japan because of China's atomic bomb tests and China's actions towards Taiwan in 1996.

Another Japanese participant noted that China's reaction had received a lot of attention at the workshop and wondered why. He categorized China's objections to initiatives taken by other countries into the five following areas:

1. Any U.S. security initiative in Asia
2. Any initiative that relates to Taiwan and a BMD program, especially when the program is said to extend to Taiwan
3. Any initiative that suggests an increase in Japan's international military role and corresponding military capability

4. Any initiative that involves the DPRK factor, such as TNC in the Sea of Japan

5. Any initiative that fails to take the PLA Navy into consideration.

He argued that the U.S., Japan, and Korea don't need to pay attention to China's concerns if they're caused by factors 1, 3, 4, or 5. The only relevant factor when planning TNC is #2 (such as with BMD). In other words, the only legitimate Chinese interest is the Taiwan question. He therefore recommended that the three navies not refer to Taiwan when discussing TNC.

Another Japanese participant argued that the U.S., Japan, and Korea can ignore China's opposition as long as TNC is strictly humanitarian. He argued that we shouldn't overemphasize the importance of China's objections.

An American participant argued that, even though China has no reason to be concerned about TNC, there are two reasons why we should be able to understand a potentially negative Chinese reaction:

1. It can be difficult to tell what we're doing out at sea—especially if the operations later involve land. China could misinterpret our activities.

2. China would be concerned—and perhaps rightly so—that our three navies would be improving their interoperability.

Keeping TNC inclusive

A Japanese participant noted that Southeast Asian nations conduct multilateral seminars and minesweeping exercises. Northeast Asian nations, however, have conducted only bilateral, never multilateral, exercises so far. He suggested that the ROK, Japan, and the U.S. can help NEA shift to combined operations through TNC. He argued that multilateral operations without China, however, are less significant in terms of building confidence in the region. He noted that China currently does not participate in combined operations, but one option might be to invite China as an observer. He argued that trilateral cooperation could be regarded, or at least publicized, regionally as a confidence-building measure. Therefore, he argued that we should invite China as an observer—not as a participant—to show the good intent of TNC. He added that Japan, the U.S., the ROK, China,
and Russia could do a joint SAREX in the future, based on TNC. Therefore, TNC could become important for ensuring regional stability, including transparency.

Another Japanese participant agreed that the three navies should invite China as an observer. He also strongly recommended that the U.S. join the next ROK-Japan SAREX.

An American participant agreed that the three navies should invite Chinese observers. Engaging China will help ease Chinese concern. He added that the three navies should design the operations so that any other nation could easily join.

A Korean participant suggested that the three navies could—after wargaming—conduct a real exercise at sea. At that time, the navies could invite Russia and China as observers. Later, maybe after three years, the navies could invite China and Russia to join in the exercises.

A Japanese participant argued that the three navies should consider notifying China and Russia of their combined exercises, or invite them as observers. He added that TNC should be open-ended, vice self-contained, for China's and Russia's eventual inclusion. He reiterated his view that the RIMPAC framework was the most feasible in this regard.

A Korean participant believed that China will accept TNC as long as the three navies keep it transparent, limited, and open-ended to China. China would then recognize that TNC wouldn't be getting in her way and that she could actually use that kind of humanitarian assistance in case of an earthquake or other disaster. Furthermore, China would recognize that TNC is not directed at Taiwan.

Another Korean participant explained that, in addition to the ROKN-JMSDF SAREX, the ROK government would like to invite the Russian and Chinese navies to participate in SAREXs bilaterally in the future. He noted that the Russian and Chinese navies have similar resources to those of the ROKN. In fact, the Russian and ROK MNDs agreed on September 2 that the Russian and ROK navies will conduct a SAREX next year (2000). On August 25, the ROK Minister of National Defense visited China and proposed that the ROK and PRC develop deeper military cooperation, including port visits and information sharing for a SAREX. He ended his discussion with an endorsement of the idea to invite Russia and China to join naval cooperation operations.
A Japanese participant asked whether the ROK would want to invite Russia and China in the same year. The Korean participant said that he was not sure whether the schedule is fixed. He explained that the ROKN has only proposed the bilateral SAREX with China for some time in the future.

Another Japanese participant stated that the three parties should invite China to this workshop series. He noted that his mind has changed since last year, when he didn't think they should. He said that Perry's efforts and trilateral mechanisms resulted in the U.S., Japan, and Korea having shared goals and visions. Therefore, he continued, trilateral policy coordination among the countries was now better than before. He said that this more solid de facto alliance had made him believe that the three countries would be able to address the issue of inviting China to join TNC. He said he hoped for frank discussions.
**Trilateral Naval Cooperation**

**Why TNC?**

This section describes participants' views about why the USN, ROKN, and JMSDF should pursue trilateral naval cooperation. Many participants described their support for TNC in terms of how they envision the future security framework of the Asia-Pacific region.

A Korean participant premised the need for TNC on the “valuable geo-strategic, economic, ecological, and physical features” of the waters surrounding the Korean peninsula. He argued that the military advantage of TNC is the combined capability of three separate navies that complement each other operationally. He argued that naval cooperation encompasses more than just exercises; it also includes navy-to-navy staff talks, information sharing, and technology transfers.

He described countries in the Asia-Pacific region as moving towards multinational rather than unilateral military operations, often with “non-traditional partners in ad hoc coalitions that have been assembled to deal with a specific maritime situation in which the participants share a common maritime interest.” He added that countries in the region are now also more likely to do humanitarian assistance operations with non-traditional partners.

Another Korean participant described the security situation in Northeast Asia as unpredictable and transitional. He argued that naval cooperation could play a leading role in contributing to regional peace and security. More specifically, he argued that U.S.-Japan-Korea naval cooperation is an important step towards broader security cooperation with China, Russia, and North Korea.

An American participant agreed that TNC has higher policy goals, is a stepping stone to include China and Russia, and appeals to the governments of the three countries.

A Japanese observer argued that TNC will be critical for building confidence and stability in the region. He mentioned the importance of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Asia and noted that they serve to promote mutual understanding and reassurance. Another Japanese participant countered that the purpose of TNC is to promote a more stable security environment through operations rather than through CBMs.
A Korean participant identified three benefits of naval cooperation in NEA: (1) it helps to build confidence and trust; (2) it contributes to stability; and (3) cooperative structures can maintain communications in case there is heightened tension. He said that a constant in Asia is its ties to the seas: 80 percent of Asia’s population lives within 500 miles of the ocean and 74 percent of Asian oil arrives by sea. He noted the emergence of multilateralism (i.e., CSCAP, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), RIMPAC exercises, four-party talks in Korea, and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)) and argued that we should organize multilateral humanitarian relief operations in Asia. A Japanese participant argued that the four-party talks on Korea are irrelevant to the discussion of TNC because the prerequisite for naval cooperation is transparency. He added that the four-party talks only serve to discuss specific issues that are exclusive to the four parties, rather than including others, such as Russia. The Korean participant replied that he had mentioned four-party talks only as an example of the trend in the Asian security environment towards multilateralism.
Ideas for the next workshop

A notional framework for a fourth U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Naval Cooperation Workshop emerged from discussion: the workshop could consist of one or more simulations of trilateral naval humanitarian operations. (One suggested possibility for a relatively easy simulation was to add the USN to the bilateral ROKN-JMSDF SAREX.) A simulation could be the best way to identify specific problems, and to suggest solutions for planners. The simulation could be local (focusing on NEA) and designed in an open-ended way in order to enable inclusion of other countries in the future. The simulations would be difficult to conduct effectively without the participation of active duty naval officers from all three countries. Working through the simulations thoroughly, participants could identify issues that need further discussion. Those issues could be discussed the following day by the officers and policy experts. The resulting workshop report, to be submitted to the ROKN, JMSDF, and USN, could highlight the operational and political problems that TNC would entail.
Appendix A

Opening remarks by Admiral Lee Soo-Young, ROKN CNO

Following a welcome by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jang Chang-Kyu (the President of KIDA), ADM Lee Soo-Young, the ROK Chief of Naval Operations, presented the following remarks:

Mr. Chang-Kyu Jang, President of KIDA, all the parties concerned to the Trilateral Naval Workshop, and distinguished guests: It is my great honor to deliver an address today at the 3rd U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Naval Workshop, co-hosted by the Center for Naval Analyses, the Okazaki Institute, and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

First of all I would like to thank all the participants for sparing your precious time for the workshop today.

Ladies and gentlemen:

The age of land-based civilization, as you all know, is giving way to the newly rising age of maritime civilization these days, and many scholars of future studies refer to the sea’s natural resources as the sole alternative to the running-dry shore resources. What I want to tell you is that the incoming 21st century will be a maritime era during which people have to depend on the sea for a significant portion of their lives.

As globalization makes more and more progress in the new era, it is obvious that the sea, which has been an object of vague dream to date, would become a catalyst for promoting exchange and cooperation among nations.

Nevertheless, the blue water of Northeast Asia these days is suffering from many destabilizing and peace-threatening factors, such as territorial disputes, conflicting views over maritime jurisdiction, piracy, illegal immigration, and maritime pollution.

As for the Korean peninsula, North Korea still sticks to its greed of communizing the entire peninsula by force under the cause of “a great and powerful state,” attempting to make the Northern Limit Line void, and maintaining threat to the region by its missile projects; we cannot perceive the slightest sign of reconciliation on the Korean peninsula.
In this regard, exchange and cooperation based on mutual understanding among all the parties concerned are most essential to settlements of unstable maritime security issues in Northeast Asia. Especially, close politico-military cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and Korea is wanted more than ever before since we do not have a multilateral security cooperative regime in this region.

When you take a look at navies of the U.S., Japan, and Korea, I am sure you will find various naval activities conducted based on ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan bilateral alliances. As for the ROK-Japan relationship, it has gradually developed; the first Search and Rescue Exercise between the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Korean Navy, held last August, indicates the development.

I am well aware of the fact that the Trilateral Naval Workshop served as a catalyst for furthering cooperation among the three navies. I hope our latest workshop, through exchange of sincere opinions based on mutual understanding, will reach tangible measures to further develop the naval cooperation, which would in turn contribute to the peace and stability in the region.

Moreover, I sincerely hope that the workshop will do much for the co-prosperity and peace in the region by conducting a leading role in the establishment of a Northeast Asia multilateral security cooperative regime in the 21st century.

Finally, I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the President of KIDA and all the people concerned, for their utmost efforts in preparing and arranging the workshop. I wish fair wind and following seas for the entire workshop program. Thank you.
Appendix B
Korean participants and guests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Paper presented or role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPT Kye-Ryong Rhoe, ROKN (Ret.)</td>
<td>Co-chairman, “Considerations in Planning ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Naval Training and Exercises”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)</td>
<td>“Supporting Resources of Trilateral Naval Cooperation for Humanitarian Relief at Sea”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT Yong-Hyun Jung, ROKN ROKN Headquarters</td>
<td>Discussant and rapporteur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Changsu Kim KIDA</td>
<td>Rapporteur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jae-wook Lee KIDA</td>
<td>“Tasks and Operations of Japan-Korea-United States Trilateral Naval Cooperation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR Sukjoon Yoon, ROKN ROK Naval Academy</td>
<td>“Trilateral Naval Cooperation between the ROK, U.S., and Japan: Preparations for Humanitarian Assistance Operations”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR Young-sik Yoon, ROKN ROKN Headquarters</td>
<td>Discussant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR Ho-Seop Jung, ROKN ROKN Headquarters</td>
<td>Discussant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Hyun-ki Kim Korea Institute for Maritime Studies (KIMS)</td>
<td>Discussant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR Sung-hwan Wie, ROKN ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Discussant</td>
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## Appendix C

Japanese participants and guests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Paper presented or role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Hideshi Takesada</td>
<td>Co-chairman and rapporteur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADM Sumihiko Kawamura, JMSDF(Ret.)</td>
<td>“Project Assistance: Operations to Plan For”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kawamura Institute</td>
<td>Discussant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Akira Ogawa, Jr.</td>
<td>“Trilateral Naval Operations: Planning for Assistance Projection from the Sea”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Okazaki Institute</td>
<td>Rapporteur, “Trilateral Humanitarian Assistance from the Sea: Preparations for Planning”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT Kazumine Akimoto, JMSDF</td>
<td>Rapporteur, “Projecting Assistance: Considerations from concepts of CBMs and MOOTW”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Hiroyasu Akutsu</td>
<td>Discusant and rapporteur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian National University; Yoido Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR Naoto Yagi, JMSDF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Toshihiko Okoshi</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Okazaki Institute</td>
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### Appendix D

**U.S. participants and guests**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Paper presented or role</th>
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</table>
| Mr. Thomas J. Hirschfeld  
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) | Co-chairman |
| Mr. Stephen J. Guerra  
CNA | “Preparations for Humanitarian  
Operations: Complementing and  
Supporting Humanitarian Relief  
Organizations” |
| Dr. Barry L. Howell  
CNA | “Preparatory Steps for Trilateral  
Exercises and Maritime Operations” |
| RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN (Ret.)  
CNA | “Planning Considerations for  
Trilateral Humanitarian Operations” |
| CDR James M. Warren, USN (Ret.)  
CNA | “A Framework for Trilateral Exercises:  
Operations Other than War” |
| Ms. Susan C. McArver  
CNA | Rapporteur |
| RADM William D. Sullivan, USN  
Commander, Naval Forces Korea  
(CNFK) | Observer |
| LCDR Mark Andreas, USN  
7th Fleet, N56, NEA Pol-Mil Officer | Observer |
| CAPT William E. Christman, USN  
CNEJ, N3/S | Observer |
| CAPT Don Cook, USN  
CNFK, Operations Department Head | Observer |
| LCDR Steve Marker, USN  
American Embassy, Seoul,  
Naval Attaché | Observer |
| Dr. Pete Ogden  
Commander, Patrol and  
Reconnaissance Wing 1 (CPRW-1),  
CNA Field Representative | Observer |
| CDR (Sel.) Clem Tanaka, USN  
CPRW-1, N3 Exercise Officer | Observer |
| CDR Kevin F. Trail, USN  
CNFK, Plans Department Head | Observer |
| LCDR Takashi Yamamoto, USN  
7th Fleet, N57, Japan Pol-Mil  
Affairs Officer | Observer |
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>Salvage ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASR</td>
<td>Submarine rescue ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td>Salvage and rescue ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic missile defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence-building measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>Center for Naval Analyses</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSRV</td>
<td>Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle</td>
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<td>FON</td>
<td>Freedom of Navigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JASDF</td>
<td>Japan Air Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JGSDF</td>
<td>Japan Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMSA</td>
<td>Japanese Maritime Safety Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMSDF</td>
<td>Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>U.S. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>KIDA</td>
<td>Korean Institute for Defense Analyses</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCAC</td>
<td>Landing craft, air cushion</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHA</td>
<td>Landing helicopter, amphibious</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>Landing platform dock</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>Landing ship, dock</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing ship, tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOS</td>
<td>Law of the Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing ship, tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCM</td>
<td>Mine countermeasures</td>
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<td>MIO</td>
<td>Maritime intercept operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military operations other than war</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTRC</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>Northeast Asia</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-combatant evacuation operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIMPAC</td>
<td>Rim of the Pacific combined exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKN</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROV</td>
<td>Remotely operated vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea lines of communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBMD</td>
<td>Theater Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAS</td>
<td>Means &quot;united&quot; in Spanish; UNITAS is an annual USN deployment and multilateral exercise series with South American navies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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