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DEPLOYMENT PROCESS IMPROVEMENT
BY PEACETIME FUNCTIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
OF ARMY RESERVE TRANSPORTATION UNITS

BY

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DEPLOYMENT PROCESS IMPROVEMENT BY PEACETIME FUNCTIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ARMY RESERVE TRANSPORTATION UNITS

by

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ABSTRACT

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The deployment timelines proposed by the new Army vision require economies to be realized from improvement of the deployment process. To optimize the process, deployment planners must reduce slack time. This is especially true for those early parts of the process heavily dependent upon the Army Reserve. One substantial contributor to slack time has been the reliance on post-mobilization training for Army Reserve units. While there may be training time available to those units required later in the warfight, that is not true for those units directly responsible for the deployment process. Many of those units are Army Reserve transportation units operating both from the customer unit origin and at the joint force commander’s required destination. The Army Reserve, for the most part, has been tied to geographically determined command and control relationships rather than the functional alignment that most active component units use. Functional command and control for transportation units would allow more intelligent management, result in better operational training, and provide the technical competence necessary for USAR transportation units to meet mission requirements and reduce the need for post-mobilization training.
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DEPLOYMENT PROCESS IMPROVEMENT BY PEACETIME FUNCTIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ARMY RESERVE TRANSPORTATION UNITS

The Army Reserve is The Army’s support force.

— Major General Thomas J. Plewes

With the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) performing more of the missions of the Army than ever before, it is increasingly important that they be ready. General Shelton has said “(w)e must direct our energy and effort to achieve a totally integrated, joint Total Force structure, trained and tested under one standard, sooner, rather than later.”¹ It is time for the USAR to relook the way it prepares units that may have to support contingencies across the full spectrum of operations. “The Army Reserve is no longer a force in reserve, it is a force constantly in use because it is constantly in demand.”² This is especially true of Army Reserve transportation units that are crucial to the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) effort of the force projection Army. “Key enablers for this Power Projection strategy are the power projection units and platforms of the Army Reserve.”³ Without them early on to conduct linkup with the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) strategic transportation system and provide the theater support infrastructure of the theater port opening package, the warfighter will find it difficult to meet the increased strategic responsiveness timelines General Shinseki has set in the Army vision (see Table 1).⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Unit</th>
<th>Old Timeline (days)</th>
<th>New Timeline (days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigade combat team</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five divisions</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1 - DEPLOYMENT TIMELINE REQUIREMENTS

While efforts are underway to design a force that is physically more deployable in size and weight while retaining lethality, the U.S. Army must also look for ways to realize economies from process improvement, such as a reduction in time in any of the deployment phases. These new timeline requirements force review of the entire deployment process from installation, or home station for the Army Reserve, until handoff to the joint force commander. To optimize the process, deployment planners must reduce slack time that exists in any of the deployment phases. This is especially true for those early parts of the process heavily dependent upon the Army Reserve. One substantial contributor to slack time has been the reliance on post-mobilization training for Army Reserve units. While this training time may be available to those units required later in the warfight, that is not true for those units directly responsible for the deployment process. Many of those units are Army Reserve transportation units operating both from the customer unit origin and at the joint force commander’s required destination.
The Army Reserve, for the most part, has tied command and control (C2) relationships to geographically determined boundaries rather than the functional alignment that most active component units have. Proximity was the driving force for determination of this C2 structure. For example, in the southeast U.S. 81st Regional Support Command (RSC) area of responsibility, the 356th Quartermaster Battalion, a subordinate unit of the 375th Transportation Group, was responsible for the 386th and 647th Transportation Companies (Medium Truck). In this same eight-state area, the 812th Transportation Battalion, one of the highest priority units in the Army Reserve targeted for early deployment, is subordinate to the 171st Area Support Group. The 375th Transportation Group, itself the highest priority transportation group in the USAR, is in Mobile, Alabama, less than 500 miles from the 143rd Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) in Orlando, Florida but is subordinate to the 81st RSC, a peacetime, TDA organization. These examples demonstrate that transportation units may not have always had the best technical leadership that they could have had if chains of command aligned transportation units functionally. The competence necessary for USAR transportation units to meet mission requirements depends upon functional management. This causes the need to look for change from historic geographic command and control associations to functionally aligned ones. Functionally aligned C2 relationships would improve unit operational readiness, thus reduce the need for post-mobilization training.

Today’s Army Reserve is more relevant to the Army and the National Military Strategy (NMS) than any time in its history. The nation has called upon and deployed the USAR as many times in the past ten years as it was in the first eighty years of its existence. “Since a large portion of the Army’s Combat Service Support (CSS) units are in the reserve components, the preparedness of those units and the time necessary to mobilize and deploy them will be significant planning factors.” As the Army transitions to a global, distribution based, seamless logistics system, a trained and ready Reserve force is vital to meeting the challenges of the National Military Strategy, ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping to combat.

**JOINT VISION 2010 AND FOCUSED LOGISTICS**

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team.

— General John M. Shalikashvili

The transition from a Cold War bipolar to a new multi-polar strategic environment required evolution in the way that the modern military would meet this challenging and uncertain future. Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) defines the transformation of the Armed Forces through technological innovation and information superiority achieving full spectrum dominance – the ability to dominate an adversary across the full range of military operations. Using the four operational concepts of Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics, the military will develop joint warfighting capabilities to meet 21st century security challenges.
Each of the other three concepts relies on Focused Logistics "to project power with the most capable forces, at the decisive time and place."6

Focused Logistics will be the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations. Active and reserve combat service support capabilities, prepared for complete integration into joint operations, will provide logistic support and sustainment as long as necessary.7

Thus, the goal of Focused Logistics is "full spectrum supportability, supporting the warfighter from a source of supply to a point of need whether that be a foxhole, cockpit, deck plate, or base,"8 by "instilling 'confidence' in the warfighter that critical supplies will be in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity."9 "Rapid transportation and time-definite delivery will supplant large inventories."10 Thus, "transportation is a critical asset in any operation requiring the movement of military forces."11

ARMY ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Successful force projection requires tailorable, flexible logistics.

— Field Manual 100-5

The Army must satisfy its Title 10, US Code, responsibilities of providing training, administrative, and logistical support for its Army Service Component (ASC) to joint force commanders. The recent reorganization of echelons above corps (EAC) support organizations into the theater support command (TSC) provides centralized control of the Army support functions through unity of effort.12 These organizations, whether in part or whole, are all found in the Army Reserve.

The shift to a logistics based force began during the late 1950s, when the Army Reserve became increasingly combat support (CS) and CSS oriented.13 This definition of CSS includes combat health support, personnel and finance support, supply, maintenance, transportation, and field services.14 While shedding most of its combat arms units during the 1990's, the Army Reserve's core competencies became CS and CSS, especially EAC logistics. Today, the Army Reserve vision is to be "(t)he essential provider for training and support operations, engaged worldwide with ready units and soldiers."15

As we change from a supply to a distribution-based sustainment system, theater support systems must be far more responsive, reliable, and accessible. To support EAC modernization efforts, the Transportation Corps is "transition(ing) to an integrated global distribution system capable of efficient operations in peace and war,"16 including initiatives integrating the active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) into multi-component units, combining mode and movement control operations starting at the battalion level, and converting to a standardized truck company design. Complicating execution of the EAC theater transportation system are requirements to support other services during deployment, sustainment, and redeployment. These include the Army executive agent responsibilities for joint support and JRSOI. These are fundamental changes to current transportation unit operations and require close
supervision by organizations familiar the technical aspects of the transitions. These initiatives, along with the reduced post-mobilization training times required of these force projection enablers, drive the need for change in the USAR C2 structure.

THEATER LOGISTICS SUPPORT

The TSC, working as an ASC theater-level organization, will always operate as part of a joint, and often, multinational force. The theater combatant commanders assign logistics responsibilities to forces of all Services in accordance with executive agent responsibilities and cross-service agreements. These assignments are based upon the common-user and most-capable-service concepts. They eliminate duplication and improve efficiency. Because the Army provides the bulk of common-user CSS in the communications zone (the area from the corps rear boundary to the Continental United States (CONUS) base), the combatant commander may build the logistics command structure around an Army TSC.\textsuperscript{17}

The TSC provides it transportation services support through the Army TRANSCOM.

The ASC provides much of the logistics support to the other services through the Wartime Executive Agency Requirements (WEAR). These permanent support responsibilities are designated in a variety of Department of Defense (DoD) directives and joint publications. They include most of the theater EAC ground transportation services at the transportation battalion level (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wartime Executive Agency Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common User Land Transportation In-theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation of Common User Ocean Terminals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermodal Container Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotive Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Manager for Military Traffic Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{TABLE 2 - WEAR TRANSPORTATION RESPONSIBILITIES}\textsuperscript{18}

JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

"Joint Reception Staging Onward movement and Integration (JRSOI) is the critical link between deployment and employment of the joint forces. It is the responsibility of the supported combatant commander\textsuperscript{19} to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of meeting the operational requirements.

The reliance on forward basing and prepositioned equipment during the Cold War era masked the importance of this process. During the large-scale deployment of the Operation Desert Shield forces, the Army discovered its weaknesses in JRSOI. Today, JRSOI is the final phase of deployment. EAC transportation units are responsible for the reception operations at the airports and seaports of disembarkation and movement to the theater destinations. "The time between the initial arrival of the deploying unit and its operational employment is potentially the period of its greatest vulnerability.\textsuperscript{20} The
transportation group provides the theater commander with the JRSOI capability throughout the theater of operations.\textsuperscript{21}

**ARMY ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT**

The bi-annual Total Army Analysis (TAA) process determines the force structure required to support the combat forces outlined in the NMS. It also determines which component of the Army resources those forces with units. The distribution of transportation units during the last TAA, TAA-07, placed over seventy percent of the Transportation Corps in the RC, either USAR or Army National Guard (ARNG)\textsuperscript{22}. The USAR is the dominant source for transportation units with over fifty percent of the Army totals (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Unit</th>
<th>% of Army Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transportation commands</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation groups</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor battalions</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminal battalions</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway units</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3 - USAR TRANSPORTATION UNITS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ARMY\textsuperscript{23}**

Of those EAC transportation units critical to the JRSOI phase of the deployment process, the Army Reserve provides seventy percent of battalion and above C2 capability for transportation mode operations (see Table 4). These units must be ready to meet their mission requirements the day after they are called and know what to do when they get to wherever they are needed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Unit</th>
<th>USAR Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transportation command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation movement control agency</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation groups</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminal battalions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor battalions</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement control battalions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4 - USAR EAC TRANSPORTATION COMMAND AND CONTROL UNITS\textsuperscript{24}**

**THE DEPLOYMENT PROCESS AND ARMY TRANSPORTATION**

The deployment process begins with a decision requiring force projection and ends with a force ready to conduct operations in a theater of operations. It consists of four phases with three major movement segments. The movement segments are from the point of origin to the port of embarkation
(POE), between the ports of embarkation and debarkation, and from the port of debarkation (POD) to the destination. Table 5 illustrates the deployment phases with their corresponding movement segments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployment Phase</th>
<th>Movement Segment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predeployment activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement to and activities at POE</td>
<td>Origin to POE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement to POD</td>
<td>POE to POD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JROSI</td>
<td>POD to destination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5 - DEPLOYMENT PHASES AND MOVEMENT SEGMENTS**

The Services, the supporting combatant command and the supported combatant command all share responsibility for deployment operations. As stakeholders in the system, they must strike a balance between operational effectiveness and deployment efficiency, the optimal and economical use of deployment resources. Army transportation units play critical roles supporting the three stakeholders of the deployment process as enablers in preparation for movement, POE operations, and JROSI. Army Reserve transportation units are tied to the deployment process at both the point of origin to POE and the destination segments with links through the TSC to the strategic mobility system.

Army transportation deployment support and transportation terminal units are TDA organizations that support the first two deployment phases. They are subordinate to the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) under C2 of the USTRANSCOM who is the DOD-designated single worldwide manager for common-user POE and POD. These are among the first units needed for any force deploying as part of a MTW or contingency operation and are 100 percent in the USAR. Deployment support units prepare individuals, unit, and materiel for deployment by assisting the supporting commanders prepare personnel and equipment for movement through the transportation system. Transportation terminal units assist MTMC with the operation of CONUS ports.

Army transportation groups, employing various types of transportation battalions, conduct the modal and intermodal transportation operations, which include air, sea, waterway, highway, and rail, for JROSI and theater sustainment. They receive handoff of personnel and materiel at the air and seaports from the operators of the strategic mobility system. They conduct harbor and terminal operations, instream off-load operations, logistics over the shore (LOTS) operations, airfield operations, rail operations, and surface transportation operations. One transportation group is in the AC while the other four are in the USAR (see Table 6). The transportation higher headquarters organization responsible for their wartime employment is the Army TRANSCOM.

The heart of theater transportation operations is at the transportation group level. The group establishes the customer support system that links the movement control, or tasker, with the transportation mode operator, or mover. They operate cargo transfer operations and trailer transfer points. While the transportation battalions conduct current operations, the transportation groups plan for
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transportation Groups</th>
<th>Higher Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Transportation Group (AC)</td>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Transportation Group (USAR)</td>
<td>143rd TRANSCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300th Transportation Group (USAR)</td>
<td>310th TAACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336th Transportation Group (USAR)</td>
<td>88th RSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>375th Transportation Group (USAR)</td>
<td>81st RSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 6 - ARMY TRANSPORTATION GROUPS**

Future operations providing the joint commander with alternatives for force support. The complexity of these type operations requires technical oversight during training. While the 143rd TRANSCOM provides this supervision during annual training, it has little input during the rest of the training year.

**THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS IN TRANSITION**

The requirement for more rapid transportation is driving Army Transportation Corps change as it transitions to incorporate new doctrinal ways of doing business. Some of this change includes formation of multi-component units, integration of AC and RC watercraft oversight, merging of movement control and mode operations in the multi-capable transportation battalion, reorganizing movement control and trailer transfer detachments, consolidation of terminal service and cargo transfer functions and standardizing truck company design. These are major changes for USAR transportation units requiring reorganization, individual and collective retraining and unit restationing.

The Army has formed multi-component units to further integrate the AC and RC. These units, either in the AC or RC depending to which component the preponderance of the unit belongs, contain both AC and RC soldiers and equipment. The Army has targeted several AC and USAR transportation units for this conversion beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2001 (see Table 7). "Great strides are being made to expand the multi-component nature of transportation units with the integration of Reserve platoons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40th Transportation CO (MT)</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Fort Lewis, WA</td>
<td>FY 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360th Transportation CO (MT)</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Fort Carson, CO</td>
<td>FY 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>416th Transportation CO (POL)</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Hunter Army Airfield, GA</td>
<td>FY 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd TMCA</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Mobile, AL</td>
<td>FY 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Transportation BN</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Fort Eustis, VA</td>
<td>FY 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97th Transportation CO (HB)</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Fort Eustis, VA</td>
<td>FY 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143rd TRANSCOM</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Orlando, FL</td>
<td>FY 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>332nd Transportation BN (Term)</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Tampa, FL</td>
<td>FY 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>824th Transportation CO (HB)</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Tampa, FL</td>
<td>FY 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 7 - MULTI-COMPONENT TRANSPORTATION UNITS**
in AC truck companies and the assignment of a Reserve battalion commander to an AC unit and an AC commander to a Reserve battalion.28

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY RESERVE

The Army Reserve established U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) in Atlanta in 1991 and recently reorganized its command and control structure to bring it in line with the new end strength, to enhance its ability to train and mobilize Army Reserve units and to reflect its expertise in combat support and combat service support functions. The new structure consists of eleven Regional Support Commands (RSC), three Regional Support Groups (RSG) and 37 specialized commands. The RSCs command, control, and support units based on geographical boundaries. The others command, control and support units in specific functions, such as medical, logistics, engineer and training.29

The USARC, a major subordinate command of U.S. Army Forces Command, commands, controls, and supports all Army Reserve troop units in the continental United States with the exception of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units (see figure 1). The USARC also ensures the readiness of its forces and prepares the nearly 1,700 units under its command to mobilize and deploy to a wartime theater of operation. The USARC's command and control structure is designed to focus on training; readiness; supporting mobilization; and providing military support to other federal agencies. Eleven Regional Support Commands (RSCs) located throughout the United States provide resource, logistics

FIGURE 1 – REGIONAL SUPPORT COMMANDS
and personnel management services to all Army Reserve units within their region. A network of seven institutional training and five exercise divisions allows the USARC to train new soldiers during mobilization and provide valuable peacetime training for Active and Reserve soldiers. The USARC also supervises specific troop units such as transportation, military police and signal commands through a system of 25 General Officer Commands (GOCOM).

ARMY RESERVE TRANSPORTATION UNITS

The 143rd TRANSCOM, a USAR GOCOM located in Orlando, Florida, is the Army's senior transportation unit, either AC or RC. In its wartime role, it provides C2 to subordinate transportation groups. The 143rd TRANSCOM has peacetime C2 of 52 various types of transportation units. This includes the transportation movement control agency, one transportation group, one movement control battalion, and one terminal battalion. The 32d Transportation Group is the only one of the four USAR transportation groups subordinate to the 143rd TRANSCOM in peacetime. The other three USAR transportation groups' C2 is based upon geographical location.

In the wartime Major Theater War (MTW) scenarios, the 143rd TRANSCOM would either supervise through the TSC or command as a theater transportation command any of the USAR EAC transportation units listed in Table 4. This would be in addition to the units of 7th Transportation Group, the AC transportation group located at Fort Eustis, Virginia.

The balance of the transportation units are subordinate to the command and control structure established by each RSC, most often based upon geography. While each RSC attempts to design a structure that maximizes training and support relationships based on each unit's needs, the geographic distribution of transportation units capable of command and control is not equal. Thus, transportation units may not always have a functional transportation organization to rely upon.

Army Reserve transportation units are unique in that not only do they need to be individually ready for deployment, but they also enable the deployment process at the power projection platforms, ports, and during JRSOI. Their ability to mobilize rapidly, deploy and conduct operations directly affects the force projection process, not just for the Army, but the other Services as well.

The need to look at the USAR C2 structure is a combination of many factors, some already described above. They include the reduction in deployment timelines, the increased complexity of supporting today's force, and basic changes in the way the Transportation Corps conducts operations. Added to the mix is a need to foster mentoring relationships between officer and enlisted soldiers to maximize job performance and satisfaction. Finally, a new C2 architecture could have a positive effect on unit personnel readiness by improving transportation career training and job progression.

DEVELOPING FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

While the Army Reserve has long recognized the value of functional relationships, it has established few functional C2 arrangements. The geographic organization of the USAR was designed during a time when Cold War mobilization allowed extensive post mobilization training times and when
peacetime lines of communication relied upon the mail, telephone, and direct visits. Today’s requirements for USAR transportation units to join the power projection platforms to the inter-theater lift and to provide the theater connection to the strategic mobility systems enabling rapid deployment and JRSOI call for units to be immediately available and ready. This is especially true for those units designated as the earliest to deploy.

The Army Reserve first implemented functional transportation C2 by placing transportation deployment support and transportation terminal units under MTMC. While these units remain within the USARC C2 system, they have functional training and support relationships with the MTMC to ensure unit readiness and mission tasking. This C2 association allows MTMC to design alternative methods to resolve the difficulties of unit access before reserve mobilization, quickly integrate technical and doctrinal change, and assess readiness capabilities.

The USARC initiated command wide functional transportation coordination with USARC Operations Order 95-1 effective fiscal year 1996. This document designated the 143rd TRANSCOM and the 3rd TMCA as the USARC action agents for nationwide USAR movement support and movement control respectively. It recognized that “USAR transportation assets were not maximized due to piece meal allocation and/or lack of nationwide movements integration.” The intent of this assignment was “to enhance collective training, individual training and readiness of USAR transportation units by providing realistic technical training.” It considered this mission as “an excellent training opportunity for USAR staffs to gain and demonstrate staff proficiency.” As a follow on to this directive, the 143rd TRANSCOM has developed memorandums of agreement with the various RSCs to adopt guidelines for functional alignment of transportation units, enhance training relationships, and provide training, readiness and operational oversight to the transportation units within the RSC.

The USARC Commander established the Transportation Training Advisory Board (TTAB) in February 1999 to create functional transportation training management and coordinate resolution of training issues. The Commander of the 143rd TRANSCOM chairs the TTAB, which includes the Commander of 3rd TMCA, the commanders of the five transportation groups and representatives from the Office of the Chief, Transportation (OCOT), MTMC, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), USARC, and RSCs. The board, having met in August 1999 and March 2000, will work to solve training readiness issues and recommend solutions to the various commands and organizations.

A NEED FOR FUNCTIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

Maintaining and improving unit readiness is the foundation of the USARC C2 administrative design. The role of this design is to establish relationships that accomplish two major objectives: provide peacetime support and prepare for wartime operational capabilities. While peacetime support is the most obviously visible result of the organizational design, the efforts must focus on preparation for the wartime mission. This is true especially to meet the timelines of the early deploying force. The management of Army Reserve units should not merely optimize peacetime support, but maximize those operational
capabilities required during wartime. If we train as we fight, and all activities are training, then the role of functionally aligned C2 is as important in peacetime as wartime.

The USARC measures the effectiveness of this management arrangement through evaluation of three major resource areas: training, personnel, and equipment. Reorganization of the transportation unit chain of command would benefit unit readiness variably in each of these areas. A regional, geographic approach would be the best for many BASOPS support functions in facilities and equipment management, and the functional approach would be the best to maximize operational training capabilities. Personnel management would be split between the two. Administrative actions such as pay and promotions are BASOPS responsibilities while assignments and training fall under the functional organizations. Thus, the functional commanders would manage those areas directly effecting unit capabilities and the geographic commander would be responsible for BASOPS support functions. This would focus each organization, whether functional or geographic, much the same way as the supported and supporting roles of the AC CINCs.

CONCLUSION

Changes in the role of the military following the close of the Cold War force reduced deployment timelines to increase strategic responsiveness and support the NMS. The new timeline to place a corps-sized force early in a theater of operations is less than half of the old. Army transportation units provide the key enablers in the strategic deployment process at both the CONUS and reception ends. While efforts are underway to design a force that is physically more deployable in size and weight while retaining lethality, the Army must also look for ways to improve time efficiencies to maximize process improvement, as well.

The Army Reserve, as a major force provider to the strategic deployment process, must undergo change to aid in the effort to reduce the time that it takes for deployment of forces. In the past, a major portion of time has been devoted to post-mobilization training. This may still be relevant to those units that come late in the warfight, but for units the Army relies upon early, especially transportation units, there is no time for post-mobilization training. These units must be immediately available, ready, and trained. The USAR must organize its management structures in a manner that maximizes these units' capabilities so that they are ready for employment with little or no post-mobilization training required. This reduction in the post-mobilization training time will contribute significantly to deployment process improvement.

Three quarters of the Army Reserve transportation groups are not aligned under a transportation headquarters, including the first USAR group slated for the warfight. Less than thirty percent of the terminal and motor battalions' parent peacetime organizations are transportation. Only one of the four highest priority battalions are subordinate to a transportation group in peacetime. Most of this is based upon proximity. While proximity simplifies C2 for both functionally and geographically prioritized alignments, it may do so at the expense of functional competence. There is no time in today's
deployment timelines for additional training following mobilization for those high priority units slated early in the deployment process.

Army Reserve transportation units require a peacetime C2 structure that optimizes both the support and operational roles that a headquarters fills. This would be a blend of the purely geographic and functional approaches. Today’s regional, geographic approach would be better for many BASOPS support functions such as facilities, equipment, and personnel administration but not for preparing units for their operational, wartime missions. There, a C2 approach that relies on training and mentoring by functional experts would better maximize operational capabilities. Ready and trained personnel who are experts in using the equipment that they will fight with are the key to ready units. Thus, a new design could split personnel management between geographic and functional support. Functional commanders would influence career progression through assignments while geographic commanders would provide more centralized administrative support.

The Army Reserve followed the lead of the Army as it changed to meet the demands of the Cold War. It demonstrated its professionalism as a significant force provider for Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It restructured during the nineties to focus on its core CS/CSS competencies, meet the new force structure constraints and reduce administrative overhead. It must now look to continued relevancy by remain creating C2 relationships in key functional areas that reduce strategic deployment timelines. One way that the Army Reserve can do this is by realigning transportation unit administrative relationships based upon geographic support roles and functional operational C2. This would result in better peacetime preparation to fill wartime force provider responsibilities.

WORD COUNT = 4747
ENDNOTES


7 Ibid.


9 Ibid.

10 Ibid, 1.


20 Ibid.


26 Ibid., I-11,l-12.

27 Ibid., I-14.


30 "OPORD #95-01," Headquarters, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Atlanta, Georgia, 1.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 2.


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