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HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS:

CANADIAN STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC LEVEL DECISION CRITERIA FOR INTERVENTION

BY

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Humanitarian Operations:

Canadian Strategy and Strategic Level Decision Criteria for Intervention

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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This paper treats the terms humanitarian operations and humanitarian intervention synonymously and defines the two as the military response, in either a permissive or non-permissive environment, to a humanitarian crisis.

The paper begins by demonstrating that widespread international support, the UN Charter, global economic interests, and moral/ethical obligations all serve to legitimize the argument for intervention. Using an 'ends-ways-means' framework, it discusses the origins and impact of Canada's foreign policy—defense strategy disconnect as it relates to humanitarian operations and concludes the present foreign policy of active intervention is nearly bankrupt from a military means perspective.

Following a review of policy alternatives, the paper recommends the Canadian government undertake humanitarian operations in accordance with a selective engagement strategy and the following strategic level decision criteria: humanitarian cause, national interests, risk analysis, and the level of international support.
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HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS:
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FOR INTERVENTION

...There are probably fifty wars with accompanying human suffering going on
across the globe today. In the past decade, war has taken the lives of 2 million children.

Every 15 minutes, someone steps on a landmine. This is the world of humanitarian action...¹

Relevant literature offers many slight variations for the terms humanitarian operations and
humanitarian intervention. NATO publications describe humanitarian operations as “those missions
conducted to relieve human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the
area are unable, or possibly unwilling, to provide adequate service support to the population”.² In
Humanitarian Intervention – The United Nations in an Evolving Order, Sean Murphy suggests
humanitarian intervention is “the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international
organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread
deprivations of internationally recognized human rights”.³ For simplicity, this paper treats the terms
synonymously and defines the two as ‘the military response, in either a permissive or non-permissive
environment, to a humanitarian crisis’. A humanitarian crisis, for its part, is characterized by a significant
level of human suffering and may be triggered by any number of events and/or factors. These catalysts
could include ethnic cleansing, as demonstrated by Serbian forces in Kosovo, genocide as conducted by
Hutu elements in Rwanda, or natural disaster, as illustrated by Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua and, more
recently, by the landslides in Venezuela.

While terminology may vary between countries and international organizations, there is almost
universal agreement that humanitarian crises leading to humanitarian intervention will continue to
increase for the foreseeable future. This conclusion is supported by a number of key global indicators
including ongoing intra-state instability, increasing ethnic tension, population pressures, and resource
competition.⁴ The list of current and/or potential ‘international hotspots’ provides additional evidence.
Specifically, there are sizable populations at risk in Afghanistan, Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.⁵

Against this backdrop, the post-Cold War climate of improved international co-operation has
facilitated greater international action. Between 1991 and the end of 1996, 24 new United Nations (UN) -
sponsored peacekeeping missions were established – six more than during the preceding 43 years.⁶ The
so-called ‘Clinton Doctrine’ to “stop anyone who targets innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse
because of their race, ethnic background, or religion”⁷ coupled with the ‘CNN factor’ has further
galvanized the ‘internationalist’ movement.
Canada, from its perspective, has been a proponent of the 'Clinton Doctrine' since long before the term was coined. Indeed, from the Suez, through Cyprus, to the Balkans and Eastern Zaire, Canada has been at the forefront in advocating world action to alleviate humanitarian crises. Furthermore, the current government and, in particular, its Minister of Foreign Affairs - The Honorable Lloyd Axworthy - appears very intent on continuing this trend. Specifically, human security has become a top priority amongst foreign policy objectives and accordingly, nearly 24,000 Canadian soldiers, sailors, and airmen have been committed to operations abroad since 1994. At the same time, however, the Chrétien government has reduced the total number of active duty, reserve, and civilian personnel within the Department of National Defense (DND) from 136,500 to 103,000 and cut the defense budget to the point that it now stands at $10.3 billion - a reduction of 23%. Clearly, military means and foreign policy ends are on diverging paths and consequently, a review of Canada's foreign policy goals and its national military strategy, insofar as they relate to humanitarian operations, is in order.

To this end, this paper will examine and demonstrate the legitimacy of the internationalist's case for intervention. Using an 'ends-ways-means' framework, it will address the apparent foreign policy - defense disconnect regarding humanitarian intervention and will review alternatives. Following this analysis, a national strategy for humanitarian operations that is based upon a policy of selective engagement will be recommended as will the strategic level criteria upon which Canada should base its decisions to intervene.

SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS INTERVENTION

The sovereignty versus intervention debate has troubled the UN since its conception and remains a hotly contested issue. It is fair to report, however, that intervention is generally supported by Western countries seeking to project democratic values and principles abroad and is generally opposed by governments with some cause for concern over their human rights records. Beyond this generalization, a very strong and convincing case can be made for intervention.

The Argument for Sovereignty

Sovereignty refers to "the ability of a country to exercise preeminent control over the people and the policies within its territorial boundaries." The origins of sovereignty and, in turn, the concept of the nation-state have been attributed to the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648. More specifically, the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War in Europe and "legitimized the right of sovereign states to govern their peoples free of outside interference, whether based on political, legal, or religious principles." Sovereignists, therefore, are quick to point out that intervention violates the very premises upon which the great states of Europe were founded.

Non-interventionists will also argue that meddling in intra-state affairs contravenes both the UN Charter and prior rulings from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). With regard to the first claim, the pro-sovereignty side frequently cites the following section of Article 2(7) to the UN Charter:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...\textsuperscript{13}

In a similar vein in 1949, the ICJ "rejected the notion that there exists on the part of states a right of intervention".\textsuperscript{14}

While much of the pro-sovereignty argument rests with the apparent lack of legal basis upon which to base intervention, many countries have been drawn into the sovereignty camp for other reasons. These range from the bias or inconsistency with which intervention appears to occur, an Arab concern in particular,\textsuperscript{15} to the fears of smaller countries that intervention is a concept open to abuse by more powerful neighbors.

In short, non-interventionists believe sovereignty underpins international law, provides order and stability to an otherwise unruly arena of inter-state relations, and most importantly, has withstood the test of time. Consequently, sovereignists oppose any form of intervention, on any grounds, unless specifically requested by the affected government.

The Argument for Intervention

Interventionists suggest sovereignty is more to do with a people than with geographic boundaries or lines on a map. They argue governments are not entitled to the full rights and privileges of a sovereign nation, if they are not legitimized through popular support. This view is supported by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which was signed in 1948 and is now considered to have declaratory status under customary international law. The UDHR affirms "the will of the people shall be the basis for the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and ... free voting procedures".\textsuperscript{16} Other relevant declarations aimed at establishing human rights as legally binding instruments include: the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, and the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.\textsuperscript{17} These conventions clearly call into doubt the basis of the sovereignists' legal argument. Specifically, Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ stipulates that when deciding such disputes as submitted to it, the Court will apply international conventions, international custom, and the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.\textsuperscript{18}

Similarly, the UN Charter is not as clear-cut on the issue of sovereignty as the non-interventionists contend. Article 2(7) of the Charter tempers earlier passages with respect to sovereign jurisdiction by stating the principle of non-intervention shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.\textsuperscript{19} Chapter VII then affirms the UN's intent to promote universal respect for human rights for all and commits all members to joint and separate action for the purposes of achieving
this goal.\textsuperscript{20} By publicly stating that “nothing in the charter precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders”,\textsuperscript{21} the current UN Secretary-General - Mr. Kofi Annan, has signaled a very clear UN stance with respect to the sovereignty – intervention issue. Just as importantly, he has lent credence and impetus to evolving world opinion that is increasingly supportive of the Chapter VII ‘rider’ to Article 2(7). Indeed, in 1991, Security Council Resolution 688, which authorized a US led intervention to protect Kurds in Northern Iraq, was roundly criticized as an unacceptable intrusion into a country’s internal affairs. One year later, similar objections to a more forceful UN role in the Balkans were virtually non-existent.\textsuperscript{22}

This shift in attitude is relevant to the interventionist cause for two reasons. First, widespread support provides legitimacy not only to the intervention in question but also to the concept in general. This, in turn, is important from a legal perspective given the previously mentioned ICJ stipulation regarding international custom. Second, in accordance with the UN Charter, primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the Security Council.\textsuperscript{23} Given strategic forecasts with respect to regional and internal instability,\textsuperscript{24} the future success of the Security Council and hence, the continued relevance of the UN, depends in large measure on worldwide resolve to control unrest with intra-state roots.\textsuperscript{25} This is significant because despite its highly publicized shortcomings, few reasonable governments would wish the UN away. Certainly, it continues to provide a very useful forum for the day-to-day conduct of international affairs and the mediation of international relations.

While there are sufficient legal grounds, increasing support, and practical UN reasons to justify external intervention to relieve humanitarian crises, other considerations are also very compelling. There is, to begin with, the growing belief that those with the power to stop or alleviate human suffering are obliged to do so. The preamble to the UN Charter unquestionably reinforces this view, as does the ‘Clinton Doctrine’. There is also the economic argument. Specifically, with a widely interconnected business world and global trading patterns, the sentiment that governments have the right to intervene as necessary to protect national economic interests is spreading.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Canada’s Position}

Canada is clearly in the interventionist camp and should be - the case for intervention is that much stronger. Intervention, for humanitarian reasons, is not illegal under international law or constrained by the UN Charter. Furthermore, in many instances, it is the only action that is both morally and ethically defensible. In delivering Canada’s opening address to the new session of the UN General Assembly in September 1999, Mr. Axworthy, re-affirmed Canada’s position on the issue. Specifically, he stated that “the sovereignty of states remains a fundamental tenet and key measure of peace and security, however, it is neither absolute nor is it a shield behind which the most egregious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms can be protected”.\textsuperscript{27} As support for views similar to those espoused by Mr. Axworthy (and Mr. Annan) grow, so do calls for greater consistency with respect to the initiation and conduct of humanitarian operations. As a first step to this end, Canada must align foreign
and defense strategies so as to develop a coordinated and sustainable national strategy for humanitarian intervention.

FORMULATING A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

The US Model

The model used to develop the US national strategy for humanitarian operations is detailed at figure 1. Theoretically, all US national strategies are developed using this or a similar framework. The US National Security Strategy (NSS) is the capstone publication and acts as an overarching or umbrella national strategy. Prepared for the President's signature on an annual basis, the NSS articulates both national values and national interests and provides a strategic assessment of global issues, threats and trends. By outlining national objectives and/or providing direction in a number of key policy areas, the NSS endeavors to ensure subordinate (national) strategies are well coordinated and mutually supporting.

In President Clinton's most recent NSS, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law was included amongst the list of American national values. In addition, to assist in the prioritization of demands for US action, national interests were defined and categorized by intensity level as follows:

- Vital – those interests of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of the nation. In addition to the physical security of US territory and that of its allies, US vital interests include its economic well being. The US will do whatever it must, including the unilateral and decisive use of military force, to defend its vital interests;
- Important – those interests that affect the national well being. US resources will advance these interests insofar as the cost and risks are commensurate with the interests at stake; and
- Humanitarian and other – those interests where action is necessary because national values demand it. Examples include the response to natural or manmade disasters or violations of human rights.

The NSS also stipulates that national policies will satisfy one or more of the following national objectives:

- Enhance national security;
- Bolster US economic prosperity; and
- Promote democracy abroad.

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) reinforce the NSS and develop the national strategy for humanitarian operations with greater fidelity. Citing
competing demands and resource constraints, all three Clinton administration documents (NSS, QDR, and NMS) state intervention will occur on a very selective basis and in accordance with the following decision criteria:

- The humanitarian catastrophe is beyond the capability of local/host nation agencies;
- The need for immediate relief is urgent and only the US has the ability to jump-start the longer term response;
- The mission, end-state, and exit strategy are clearly defined and the risk to American lives is minimal;
- Substantial US involvement is confined to the initial period until broader international relief efforts get underway; and finally,
- In all cases, where the commitment of US forces is considered, associated costs and risks must be commensurate with the US interests at stake.30

In short, the formulation of and rationale for the US national strategy governing humanitarian operations is very clear. The US conducts humanitarian intervention when it is in its national interest to do so and following consideration of specific criteria. Humanitarian operations contribute to national objectives (ends) and, assuming its world-class fighting force is employed on a selective basis (i.e. in accordance with decision criteria), the US possesses both the ways and means to implement stated policy.31

The Canadian Process

The Canadian government does not issue a NSS and thus relies on more informal mechanisms to ensure national strategies contribute to national objectives in a coordinated and mutually supporting manner. For example, in 1994, the Ministers of National Defense, Foreign Affairs, and International Trade co-chaired a National Forum on Canada’s International Relations.32 The fruits of these labors were the 1994 Defense White Paper and a 1995 government statement on foreign policy, entitled Canada in the World. These two documents provide the umbrella strategies of their respective departments. Together, they lay the foundation for a number of subordinate strategies including the government’s strategy for humanitarian operations.

Canada in the World lays out three key objectives for the government’s foreign policy: the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of Canadian security, within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture. According to this statement, Canadian values hinge on respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the environment.33 Other than indicating repeatedly that Canadian interests abroad are primarily economic-based, Canada in the World does not discuss national interests as such and certainly not in the manner addressed in the 1998 US NSS. This is unfortunate for as David Haglund notes in a recent Canadian Defense Quarterly article, “however difficult it is to do with it [national interest] as a guide to analyzing and making policy, it is even more difficult to do without it”.34
The 1994 Defense White Paper indicates the fundamental mission of DND and the Canadian Forces (CF) is to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{35} While national interests are again not defined per se, the White Paper does state that Canadians: believe the rule of law must govern inter-state relations, see Canadian security tied to the security of allies, and wish to respond when their efforts can alleviate suffering. In addition, the White Paper assigns three principal roles to the CF: defend Canada, defend North America in co-operation with the US, and contribute to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{36} Although the White Paper does not explicitly link defense roles to key foreign policy objectives as outlined in \textit{Canada in the World}, the connection between military ways and foreign policy ends is fairly obvious in most cases.

It is clear, for example, that humanitarian operations are meant to contribute to international peace and security and, in so doing, further the following foreign policy objectives/ends:

- Promote prosperity and employment – by aiming to prevent and/or contain instability so as to protect links to key trading regions and partners. As 40\% of the Canadian GDP is derived from international trade, the link between the performance of the Canadian economy and a stable and peaceful international environment cannot be understated;\textsuperscript{37}

- Promote global peace – by aiming to prevent intra-state humanitarian crises from spilling across international borders. As noted earlier, the preservation of "international peace and security depends to a large extent upon the ability to control unrest with intra-state roots";\textsuperscript{38} and

- Project Canadian values – by intervening to protect human rights and to foster the concept that governments are only legitimized through popular support.\textsuperscript{39}

The White Paper also lists the range of military ways to achieve stated ends. These include: preventive deployments, no-fly zone and sanction enforcement operations, interposition and observer missions, protection of civilian populations and refugees in 'safe areas', and creation of secure conditions for the delivery of aid.\textsuperscript{40} As the White Paper commits to the retention of a multi-purpose, combat-capable CF and as Canadian soldiers, sailors, and airmen have participated in every type of operation listed above over the past 10 years, the military means to support these ways seem to exist.

What is not is clear, however, in either \textit{Canada in the World} or the White Paper, are the mechanisms or criteria by which Canada determines priorities for the commitment of its military resources in support of foreign policy ends. Unlike the US, Canada does not define national interests or distinguish them by levels of relative importance. The result is the decision to commit to virtually every humanitarian crisis and the inclination to ignore the inconsistency between ends and available means. This clearly indicates a flawed strategy with respect to humanitarian operations despite the rhetoric of key policy documents.
Existing Strategy – Active Interventionism

Both Canada in the World and the White Paper state financial constraints limit Canada’s ability to act abroad to further Canadian objectives and, as a result, Canada must be very selective in the pursuit of its foreign policy goals. The government’s actions, however, do not reflect stated policy as far as humanitarian and peace operations are concerned.

In 1999, CF members participated in over 20 missions throughout the world. In East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, Africa, and throughout the Middle East, the CF played a central role in creating and maintaining the stable, peaceful conditions required for civil institutions to take hold. In Cambodia, Mozambique, and Bosnia, CF specialists assisted the UN and aid agencies on the ground with de-mining efforts as part of the Land Mines Initiative. In Turkey and Honduras, the CF Disaster Assistance Response Team was instrumental in getting timely aid and assistance to the victims of natural disasters. At the moment, there are over 3,000 active duty Canadian soldiers, sailors, and airmen deployed on 22 operations abroad. In fact, Canada is sending more CF personnel more frequently to more operations than at any time since the Korean War. In practice therefore, although claiming to pursue a strategy based on selective engagement, the government is actually committed to a very active and ambitious intervention policy. Unfortunately, the military means to sustain such a strategy do not exist.

The 1994 Federal Budget delivered one of several damaging blows in this regard, by cutting $7 billion from defense over five years. Today, the DND budget hovers around one percent of GDP, ranking Canada 133rd within the world in terms of defense expenditures. In addition, the 1994 White Paper eliminated $15 billion from the capital equipment program over the following 15 years and reduced active and reserve component manning from 74,900 to 60,000 and 29,400 to 23,000 personnel respectively by 1999. The active duty Army, which traditionally bears the brunt of humanitarian operations, now stands at 20,000 soldiers and, of this figure, only 12,000 are field deployable at any given point in time.

The combination of increasing operational activity and declining resources is taking its toll upon military members and upon their families, training, and equipment. For example, some CF medics, military policemen, and combat engineers have completed five six-month operational tours over the past seven years. There are also fewer resources and less time for conventional training and equipment is wearing out at an alarming rate because it is being used far more frequently than anticipated at the time of purchase. In Defense Performance and Outlook 1999, the Chief of the Canadian Defense Staff, General Baril cautions that “the CF cannot do more [operational deployments] when it is already stretched, and we are not making the level of investment necessary for the future. We can continue to do what we are doing for a while, but not indefinitely.” Later, in the same interview, General Baril notes that “if individuals are not at home long enough to upgrade their skills, units will lose their combat edge ... and once that occurs, it takes a long time to get it back”.

8
In short, the government's present policy of active intervention, in practice if not words, is just about bankrupt with respect to the means necessary for its implementation. Furthermore, as the economic rationale for recent budget reductions has not changed significantly, it is very unlikely DND will receive the infusion of funds necessary to correct this ‘ends-ways-means’ imbalance. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the government to consider alternative strategies for humanitarian operations.

Alternatives – Isolationism and Selective Engagement

Although isolationism might seem appealing to Canadians more interested in purely domestic issues than in potential ‘hot-spots’ overseas, it is simply not a realistic or responsible national policy. As stated earlier, the Canadian economy is increasingly interconnected on a global basis and concomitantly, more and more dependent upon global stability. In addition, there are responsibilities and codes of behavior associated with membership in such key international economic and security forums as the G-7, APEC, NATO, and the UN. Specifically, Canada is expected to play a role befitting its stature as middle power and its heritage as an effective international mediator. To act otherwise would risk significant loss of influence on the international stage and would undoubtedly diminish the furtherance of stated national objectives. As the White Paper succinctly notes, and as opinion polls confirm, Canada is internationalist and not isolationist by nature. For these reasons, isolationism is not considered a viable foreign policy option.

While active interventionism and isolation are at opposite ends of the spectrum, selective engagement falls somewhere in the middle ground depending on the degree of selectivity exercised. From the previous discussion it is clear that existing military means can only support the most discriminating of selective engagement policies. While this turns the ‘ends-ways-means’ framework for strategy formulation on its head, it is the current reality. A selective engagement policy is, even by default, the best policy option for Canada as far as humanitarian operations are concerned. Indeed, it acknowledges that global stability and Canadian national objectives are inextricably linked, supports the principle of intervention, but recognizes the constraints on Canada’s ability to respond to every humanitarian crisis. To ensure the strategy is applied in both a selective and consistent manner, a clear set of precise decision criteria is required.

STRATEGIC LEVEL DECISION CRITERIA

In its chapter on international operations, the White Paper states that adherence to the following principles in the purpose, design, and conduct of multi-lateral operations will enhance their prospects for success:

- There must be a clear and enforceable mandate;
- There must be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority;
- The national composition of the force must be appropriate to the mission, and there must be an effective process of consultation among mission partners;
In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there must be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures; and

With the exception of enforcement actions and to defend NATO member states, Canada's participation must be accepted by all parties to the conflict.52

Notwithstanding the general utility of these principles, for the most part, they represent operational and, in some cases, tactical level considerations. They do not address the strategic level criteria the government needs to make tough choices on the level of commitment to and/or between current, future, potential, and non-forecast operations. To correct this deficiency, the following decision criteria are recommended.

Is there sufficient humanitarian cause?

Specifically, as the White Paper already suggests, humanitarian operations should only be undertaken to address genuine threats to international peace and security (as, for example, in the Gulf or the former Yugoslavia) or to stem emerging humanitarian tragedies (such as the situations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo).53

Is action in the National Interest and to what degree?

To answer these questions, the government will need to define Canadian national interests and determine the levels of intensity by which it will view these interests. Although this will require a reversal of the current government's apparent aversion to the use of national interests as a decision making tool, it will provide an effective and consistent framework with which to determine priorities for international commitments in general and for humanitarian operations in particular. To achieve this end, the government need only tailor the national interest matrix, developed by Donald Neuchterlein and illustrated at figure 2, to the Canadian context.54 The national interests depicted above are for illustrative purposes only and could reflect those of any state. The value of the matrix is really derived from the levels of intensity assigned to each interest. While the US NSS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Interest</th>
<th>Intensity of Interest</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Well Being</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Favorable World Order</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion of Values</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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Figure 2
categorized intensity levels as vital, important, and humanitarian, Neuchterlein offers the following categories and definitions:

- Survival – when there is immediate concern for the nation’s survival;
- Vital – when probable serious harm will result to the nation’s well being and there is a requirement for urgent planning;
- Major – when there is potential harm to the nation’s well being or some unfavorable economic, political, or ideological trend. The issue requires serious study; and
- Peripheral – when the well being of the nation is not seriously affected and a ‘wait and see’ approach to the issue is appropriate.55

Once the government establishes Canadian national interests and defines its intensity levels, it can then use the matrix to prioritize competing demands for limited resources. For example, an international crisis in a region of vital importance to Canada’s economic well being should receive a stronger Canadian response than the same crisis in a region with less impact on the same national interest. The matrix can also be used to determine the likely courses of action of the various parties to a particular crisis. Indeed, by occupying Kosovo and commencing a reign of terror, the Serbian leadership was clearly indicating that it viewed its interests in Kosovo at the vital level – presumably for defense-of-homeland reasons – and that nothing short of war was going to deter the pursuit of these interests.

Is the mission worth the risk?

This criteria follows closely from the notion of national interests and their associated intensity levels. Specifically, if a humanitarian crisis is important enough to commit CF resources, it must be important enough to risk the possibility of a long-term, costly engagement that includes the potential for loss of Canadian lives.56 Clearly, the focus of any humanitarian operation should be on foreign policy goals. Focus shifts, however, when the emphasis of politicians is on limiting casualties to zero. For example, Kosovo was supposed to be a war of human values rather than political interests. By ruling out ground forces from the outset, NATO’s leadership signaled Belgrade, and the general public in each member country, that the Kosovar people were not worth risking the life of a single NATO soldier.57

Is there widespread international support for a multi-lateral operation?

This criterion derives from two facts. First, Canada does not possess the military means to undertake complex, multi-dimensional humanitarian operations unilaterally. It is not, however, alone in this regard. Many countries have reduced military expenditures to devote more resources to domestic issues and view multilateral cooperation as a way to pool limited resources to greatest effect.58 Second, significant multi-national participation and/or UN authorization enhances the legitimacy of the intervention both at home and in the international arena.59
CONCLUSION

This paper has made a number of key points and recommendations. It began by examining and demonstrating the legitimacy of the internationalist's case for intervention – a legitimacy based upon growing international support, the unambiguous stance of the UN Secretary-General, global economic interests, and moral/ethical obligations. Using an 'ends-ways-means' framework, it discussed the origins and impact of the foreign policy – defense strategy disconnect as it relates to humanitarian operations and concluded the present foreign policy of active intervention was nearly bankrupt from a 'military means' perspective. Following a review of policy alternatives, it then recommended the government undertake humanitarian operations in accordance with a selective engagement strategy and clearly defined strategic level decision criteria. The criteria themselves were based upon humanitarian cause, national interests, risk analysis, and the level of international support for multilateral operations.

In the argument for strategic level decision criteria, a national interest matrix was described as a critical decision-making tool. At the national level, the matrix would assist the government to determine priorities between competing demands for Canadian action. From a defense perspective, a more selective and consistent strategy would not only help DND to sustain foreign policy initiatives; it would also help the CF to endure as a viable fighting force over the long term.

At the end of the day, failure to adopt a more selective policy for humanitarian intervention by aligning current foreign policy ends with existing military means will only serve to diminish future capabilities. This, in turn, will further constrain future commitments. Ultimately, the commitment – capability gap, if left unchecked, could push Canada off the world stage and into the bleachers where it may be restricted to watching rather than influencing 'the world of humanitarian action'.

Word Count = 5,260
ENDNOTES


4 Global indicators were taken from a slide presented by a speaker participating in the Commandant’s lecture series conducted at the US Army War College during Academic Year 00.

5 Weiss and Collins, 7. The term sizable population at risk refers to more than 1 million inhabitants who are in need of or dependent upon international aid to avoid large-scale malnutrition or death.


11 Ibid., 23.


13 Weiss and Collins, 24.

14 Jarat Chopra, “The Obsolescence of Intervention under International Law,” in *Subduing Sovereignty*, ed. Marianne Heiberg (London: Printer Publishers, 1994), 37. This particular ruling was in response to a minesweeping operation conducted by the Royal Navy in Albanian territorial waters against the clearly expressed wishes of the Albanian government.

15 George Joffe, “Sovereignty and Intervention,” in *Subduing Sovereignty*, ed. Marianne Heiberg (London: Printer Publishers, 1994), 65. Joffe makes the point that while responsible Arab states agreed action was necessary to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, these same states note that similar action has not been taken to force Israel from the Occupied Territories.
16 Ibid., 76.


18 Ibid., 25.

19 Weiss and Collins, 24.

20 Campbell, 13. The relevant passages to Chapter VII are contained in Articles 55 and 56.

21 Barbara Crossette, “UN Chief Wants Faster Action To Halt Civil Wars and Killings,” New York Times, 21 September 1999. Mr. Annan’s statement is a direct quote from his opening address to the 54th Session of the UN General Assembly on 20 September 1999. In the same speech, the Secretary-General warns that countries can no longer expect to hide behind protestations of national sovereignty when they flagrantly violate the rights of citizens.


23 Ibid.


25 Eknes, 114.

26 Joffe, 74.


31 Military strategic concepts or ‘ways’ for achieving strategic ‘ends’ include shows of force, limited strikes, opposed interventions, no-fly zone and sanctions enforcement operations, interposition or observation operations, and disaster relief assistance (amongst other or similar Operations). The military ‘means’ to execute these ‘ways’ requires sizable, capable, full spectrum forces supported by adequate strategic airm- and/or sea-lift resources. The US military has demonstrated these ‘ways and means’ on an ongoing basis since 1991. Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Nicaragua are obvious examples.


36 Collenette, 12 – 38.

37 D. Fraser Holman, “An essay on Canada’s national interests in the 1990s,” Strategic Datalink (Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic Datalink #64, June 1997), 3.

38 Eknes, 114.

39 Joffe, 76.

40 Collenette, 32.


42 Ibid., 10.

43 Jean-Francois Rioux and Robin Hay, Canadian Foreign Policy: From Internationalism to Isolationism (Ottawa, Ontario: The Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, 1997), 22.

44 Holman, 1.

45 Collenette, 41 – 46.

46 Lieutenant-Colonel William Turner, J3 Operations, (Canadian) National Defense Headquarters, telephone interview by author, 9 February 2000. This figure is based on a field army of three brigades (approximately 4,500 all ranks/brigade) and takes into account personnel on career training/educational courses and those personnel precluded from overseas deployment (by Canadian Forces regulation) by virtue of the fact they have completed a six-month operational tour abroad within the previous 12 months.


48 Ibid.


50 Department of National Defense, Defense Performance and Outlook 1999, 8. According to a national survey conducted in the Fall of 1999, 92% of Canadians believe it is important for the CF to be able to protect human rights in fragile democracies.

51 Collenette, 27.

52 Ibid., 29.
53 Ibid., 28.


57 Michael Evans, "Dark Victory," *Proceedings* (Annapolis, Maryland: US Naval Institute, September 1999), 35.

58 Collenette, 27.

59 Eknes, 98.
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