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NATION ASSISTANCE SHAPING NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY WITH A COLD WAR POLICY

BY

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Nation Assistance Shaping National Security and Military Strategies for the 21st Century With a Cold War Policy

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

10 April 2000
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ABSTRACT

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Nation assistance has evolved into a vital tool for shaping the international security environment. It is a network of programs comprising security assistance, foreign internal defense, and humanitarian and civic assistance. Nation assistance programs play a major role in the U.S. engagement strategy to defend and protect U.S. national interests in an asymmetrical and multi-polar world. The definition, scope, and role of nation assistance have changed with the world that confronts the U.S. Its beginnings were the programs to rebuild a shattered Europe and Japan at the end of World War II. During the Cold War, it was a major part of anti-Communist containment tactics. After the fall of Vietnam it became quasi dormant until the collapse of the bipolar world in the early 1990's. The new and broadened scope of nation assistance is currently found in the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the visions from successive Chiefs of Staff of the Army. It is integrated into the fundamental strategic approach of “shape, respond and prepare now” executed by the U.S. armed forces. Funding for nation assistance has to rely on the resources from the American people and their congressional representatives. It may be easier to get funding to feed starving millions than to provide sustainment funding for them now that Americans are no longer concerned about poor, less developed countries converting to communism. DoD has institutionalized nation assistance programs in its strategies and planning processes, and has given the geographic combatant commanders ownership and a stake in nation assistance’s results to meet the new century’s challenges.
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NATION ASSISTANCE SHAPING NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY WITH A COLD WAR POLICY

The U.S. military provides the dynamism and teeth behind U.S. national power and foreign policy. Once reserved nearly exclusively for times of war, more and more of late the U.S. government has relied on the military, sometimes with the United Nations, to back up foreign policy in non-belligerent operations.¹ The military places these operations along a continuum from peace to war that it calls the Military Spectrum of Conflict.² On the ‘peace side’ of the intersection between peace and war is nation assistance. (See Figure 1)

It routinely involves all the U.S. armed forces, and the U.S. Army, America’s primary land power arm, to execute the bulk of this foreign policy component. Policy makers feel that Army involvement in these programs and assistance efforts “offers the highest level of U.S. commitment to allies, partners, and friends.”³ Nation assistance is extended in an effort to promote long-term regional stability, especially in conflict-prone areas of the world. Not only is America served by nation assistance; it has been used to return health and self-sufficiency, life and hope to wrecked nations and peoples.⁴ This study examines the genesis of nation assistance, its cold war development, and how it has been reshaped to fit the needs of US foreign policy in the new world order. Nation assistance has evolved into a vital tool for shaping the international security environment; the U.S. military has long been actively engaged in nation assistance and has integrated it into its plans to meet the new century’s challenges.

DEFINING NATION ASSISTANCE

Nation assistance is a rubric of programs,⁵ the major components of which are security assistance (SA), foreign internal defense (FID) and humanitarian and civic assistance (H&CA).⁶ Security Assistance comprises military-to-military cooperation and materiel, doctrinal and training assistance. Foreign Internal Defense is assistance given to other countries to help them act against insurgencies and maintain internal order. It includes military help along with political, economic, and informational support. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance comprises other activities in which, while getting valuable training, US
personnel help host nations improve their quality of life, respond to natural disasters, or provide emergency relief to their people. (See Figure 2)

Nation assistance is a major part of U.S. engagement strategy to defend and protect our national interests. The U.S. armed forces advance national security by "shaping" the international environment; "responding" to a full spectrum of crises in which nation assistance plays a role; and "preparing now" for an uncertain future with near term commitments that will influence the future global security challenges.8

Current operations doctrine (contained in Joint Publication 1-02, the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Terminology Master Database9) establishes nation assistance as one of the Operations Other Than War (OOTW).10 Nation assistance is described as a composite of programs from both the Departments of State and Defense. Department of State has responsibility for the majority of nation assistance programs; Defense has responsibility for "other Title 10 (DoD) programs." DoD programs are codified under Title 10, Section 401, which primarily refers to H&CA programs of nation assistance and assigns DoD responsibility for the following operations:

- Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations (Sec 401);
- Transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries (Sec 402);
- Foreign disaster assistance (Sec 404); and
- Use of DoD funds for U.S. share of costs of UN peacekeeping activities: limitation; prohibition on the use of funds by DoD to the UN for costs associated with UN peacekeeping activities and any arrearage to the UN (Sec. 405). These sections define the subordinate activities and operations, requirements, and constraints, which scope and limit the use of the military in the execution of a nation assistance program.11

Title 10 requires that H&CA activities to be reimbursable, be limited in scope and duration, and be part of an organized program of unit training (unlike the other parts of nation assistance).

Time changes everything; concepts and ideas are not immune. The world changes, strategy evolves, and tactics adapt with it. The definition and range of "nation assistance" have changed with the
world that confronts the U.S. As will be seen, it began as a civic action program designed to assist under-developed, "third-world" nations, yet became one of the primary tools in the fight against communism during the era of superpower confrontation and competition. From helping to contain communism, nation assistance has evolved to incorporate coordinated, cooperative, and participatory assistance to nations in need under any number of conditions from peacetime to war. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the perception that nation assistance was inherently linked to fighting communism no longer exists. In a world where instability generated by ethnic conflict, refugee flows, and mass genocide is a threat as real as missile emplacements, over the last century, nation assistance has become a flexible curative applied across the entire operational spectrum.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Nation assistance has changed hand-in-hand with America's changing perception of its interests and of the threats to its interests, and has evolved as America's response to those threats has evolved. Nation assistance has been an element of policy since the U.S. forces helped rebuild the Axis powers after World War II. That rebuilding was done in the context of occupation; today's policies have evolved in a more antagonistic international structure during the Cold War struggle to contain communist expansion. In the early 1960's Congress passed legislation for what it called "civic activities" to help create in developing nations strong and stable institutions in the U.S. mold. To improve the quality of everyday life for people in the poorest countries, military personnel and equipment were sent to support civil engineering projects, deliver medical services, and help build schools and other facilities.¹² Beginning with the Humphrey Amendment in 1961, such activities became an integral part of the U.S. foreign assistance effort.¹³ That year, Congress codified the International Development Act (IDA) that not only allowed but also actively encouraged the U.S. military to help the social and economic development of friendly developing nations.¹⁴ These congressional mandates rapidly expanded the military's involvement in U.S. foreign assistance efforts. National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 119, (18 December 1961) provided interagency guidelines for the program.¹⁵

The following year, another memorandum (NSAM 182, 24 August 1962),¹⁶ continued to emphasize the need for U.S. programs to assist developing nations to build viable institutions and assigned responsibilities to various agencies for accomplishing such assistance.¹⁷ The Kennedy Administration developed these action memoranda and the concepts therein to give itself a 'schools and roads' carrot to go with the 'bombs and guns' stick in discouraging peoples from sympathy to the communist insurgencies it saw brewing on every continent. Civic action, more and more often called nation-building,¹⁸ came to be an integral part of U.S. counterinsurgency policy and containment strategy. Interestingly enough, both Marxism-Leninism and American foreign policy paralleled each other philosophically in their attempts to buy the loyalty of the starving uncommitted with scant regard to the mesh of either communism or capitalism with indigenous cultures. Nation-building became one of the standard strategies to hinder communism's advance and to mitigate conflict; it attempted to pro-actively
remove the motivation for poorer countries to turn to Moscow or Beijing for guidance and leadership. Likewise, by implicitly linking economic prosperity with pluralistic democracy, friendly national leaders were willing to attempt democracy. Nation-building was seen as a way to spread the very best of American political and economic theory and practice to the unenlightened world believed to be looking to Washington for leadership. In providing this leadership U.S. prestige as a superpower would be enhanced, the U.S. sphere of influence widened, and U.S. world-views confirmed.

Nation-building as a term and as a concept fell out of fashion in policy circles and the media after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The loss of one of the premier examples of U.S. help and assistance, the 'poster child' of containment and nation-building, revealed the limits of the U.S. ability to shape other peoples and cultures into its own image. Nation-building seemed to sum up all that was overreaching, over-confident, and over-stretched in the containment doctrine. During the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. involvement overseas from El Salvador to Angola to the Middle East generated far more domestic controversy, debate, and a sense of limits, than was the case in the optimistic and anti-Communist 1960s. The link, at times explicit, between nation-building and support of anti-Communism in assisted nations became progressively more tenuous; as this link declined in importance to the nation, so too did Congressional willingness to use military force for nation-building aims. Over this period, Congressional review became more stringent; there were no more Gulf of Tonkin resolutions, and goals were more down-to-earth than building whole nations. It was not until after the U.S.-led Operation "Just Cause" and the collapse of the bipolar world in the early 1990s that the nation-building concept reemerged, with the new label "nation assistance."¹⁹

A TOOL FOR THE NEW ASYMMETRICAL WORLD²⁰

Nation assistance in the new, asymmetrical and multi-polar world has become a fundamental pillar of American foreign policy and a means by which the military employs the strategy of engagement. More fundamentally than ever before, nation assistance contours the military's roles and mission as a national power instrumentality. General Gordon R. Sullivan, the first post-cold-war Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), foresaw the opportunity for the Army to articulate a vision and follow through with a strategy that would transform the Army of the future. This would be in conjunction with the evolving joint military missions supporting the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS). General Sullivan's vision of "Service to Nation" was the basis of the Army's efforts to adapt to the new global conditions, paving the way for the development of new capabilities within the armed forces, especially the Army, to support the engagement strategy. The success of the Army in adapting to the new era would be vital in light of recent presidents' increasing reliance on the military, especially the Army, to accomplish nation assistance programs and activities in response to disasters, suffering, and regional stability abroad.
General Sullivan’s “Army After Next” thinking\textsuperscript{21} saw nation assistance playing a significant part in the Army’s future and in supporting the President’s evolving NSS. As General Sullivan wrote in his 1996 book, \textit{Hope is Not a Method}:

the Army would both perform that dirty work of fighting the future’s ambiguous little wars and assist when called upon in the aftermath of a disaster...The Army had done similar things throughout its history...remembering the Marshall Plan in Europe and the rebuilding of Japan in particular, but during the era of containment, the fear of the breach of the Fulda Gap became almost all-consuming, and commanders and troops had become unfamiliar with those past operations, at least as anything other than a distraction from deterring communist aggression.\textsuperscript{22}

The current CSA is General Eric K. Shinseki. His recent strategic vision statement, “The Army Vision: Soldiers On Point for the Nation...Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War,”\textsuperscript{23} embraces a full spectrum of operations to describe the Army’s mission through a joint, unified, regional approach in support of the NSS and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reexamination of the Defense Department’s assumptions, programs, and operations. The vision states “The Army—[will have] strategic dominance across the entire spectrum of operations...The land forces [will be] in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from...[nation assistance] to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars....”\textsuperscript{24}

Both General Sullivan and General Shinseki saw their visions having to “be accomplished in a world where threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where the conflict is inherent yet unpredictable, and where the U.S. capability to defend and promote our national interests would be subject to tight materiel and personnel resource constraints and restraints.”\textsuperscript{25} In short, the military would operate in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment.\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, during the last decade there has been a three-fold increase in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) with nation assistance receiving its share of funding and attention. Nation assistance has become an even greater part of the daily DoD business than it was during the cold war. It is no longer a distraction from the primary purpose of the Army, it is part of that purpose.

Nation assistance is included in the overall guidance the U.S. armed forces receive. Nation assistance was addressed by several of its components and activities in the recent May 1997 QDR report and implied in the President’s subsequent October 1998 NSS. The QDR recommended changes in Defense guidance; the subsequent NSS accepted and addressed many of the QDR recommendations. One significant change was in executing that guidance which would come in the form of a plan, the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP).

The QDR recommended that in order to support the national security strategy “the U.S. military and the Department of Defense must be able to help shape the international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests, respond to the full spectrum of crises when directed, and prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future.”\textsuperscript{27} The QDR also states that to meet the strategic goals “the Department [DoD] [will employ] a wide variety of means including: forces deployed for exercises,
combined training, or military-to-military interactions; and programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and international arms cooperation. These means listed above are many of the basic programs that make-up nation assistance.

Since the promulgation of the NSS, NMS and QDR, the National Command Authority (NCA) has directed through the NSS that the regional combatant Commanders In Chiefs (CINCs) implement the administration’s integrated strategic approach of “shape, respond, and prepare now.” The primary objective of this integrated approach is to reduce the need “to respond to future crises.” Nation assistance is a major part of the strategy to “shape” the global security environment; to create, foster, and sustain a stable, prosperous, and democratic community and world of nations among whom conflicts are resolved by democratic and diplomatic means, not by war. “The TEP process, approved by the President in 1997, ensures that military engagement activities are prioritized within and across theaters, and balanced against available resources…to ensure the readiness of [the] Armed Forces to carry out crisis response and warfighting missions…as well as sustain an appropriate level engagement activities over the long term.”

Nation assistance supports the “response” element; it provides the framework for US assistance to countries and regions experiencing crises that, if ignored, could create, directly or indirectly, international conflict. It also demonstrates U.S. resolve and reaffirms the U.S. role as a global leader.

Nation assistance is also the underpinning of “prepare now;” it requires near term commitment to shape and respond while transforming U.S. combat capabilities and support structures allowing for continuous engagement of the U.S. military and foreign policy bodies in at-risk nations and regions to effectively shape and respond for future challenges.

The NSS is the President’s planning guidance to the defense community. The NSS pursues a forward-looking national security strategy and sets forth three core objectives – enhance America’s security, bolster America’s economic prosperity, and promote democracy and human rights abroad. In board terms, nation assistance programs are one of the means that supports the three objectives. This is accomplished through activities such as military activities to reduce or deter the diverse threats we face today; have the ability to maintain an unrivaled military, provide for freedom of navigation and energy security, and promote the principle of civilian control of the military, respectively. It also implies that nation assistance satisfies the third national interest that employs U.S. military forces, their unique capabilities and resources to support humanitarian and other interests. Yet, the military’s use will be achieved within a selective, restrictive, and cooperative approach designed to give the affected country the opportunity to restore its own basic services.

The Chairman’s NMS provides broad guidance by allowing “peacetime military engagement to encompass all military activities involving other nations to shape the security environment in peacetime.” Nation assistance activities continuously reinforce the integrated approaches of “shaping, responding, and preparing now” from the NSS, thus promoting trust and confidence and increased security of our
allies, partners, and friends.\textsuperscript{41} The 1997 NMS, which is based on the NSS and the recommendations in the 1997 QDR, broadly and implicitly addresses the importance of nation assistance. The Chairman states:

the armed forces will help shape the international environment in appropriate ways to bring about a more peaceful and stable world. Our purpose is to deter and defeat threats...while fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous wars...and respond to a wide variety of other potential crises.\textsuperscript{42}

Although the Chairman does not specifically say nation assistance in the above passage, the context implies the Military Spectrum of Conflict and all its operations. Nation assistance is the median -- the intersection -- between these two spectrums of peace and combat. Nation assistance helps to shape the international security environment in appropriate ways by responding to a wide variety of crises thus retaining and reassuring global stability.

\textbf{LIMITING FACTORS TO NATION ASSISTANCE}

The US military does not act alone when setting the objectives and methods of nation assistance. There is heavy Department of State involvement, particularly in the formulation of programs and goals with regard to specific countries. Reports from U.S. embassies around the world can influence Congress' allocation of funding for nation assistance.\textsuperscript{43} It is possible that the best course of action from a military viewpoint will not coincide with what the State Department thinks. When this occurs, the consequences might be slight or severe. People from outside the DoD can have unrealistic views of what can and can not be accomplished by the military and may direct the squandering of resources on goals that cannot be effectively and efficiently achieved.

Political factors are also at work as limiting factors in nation assistance. Congress is more apt of late to call for US soldiers to come to the aid of other nations in assistance programs and efforts, possibly because with fewer veterans in its ranks, it has a shallower understanding of what military intervention means and when to properly authorize its employment.\textsuperscript{44} The involvement of the armed forces in more than a hundred different countries, sending tens of thousands of soldiers abroad in foreign operations, exercises, activities, and events, the bulk of which are nation assistance, is clear testimony to this increased appetite for helping the starving, disaster stricken, under-developed, as well as for promoting regional stability. What is not as clear is whether or not there is a popular and Congressional will to provide, on a long-term basis, the fiscal resources needed to sustain this high level of effort without robbing the accounts needed to pay for the military's more fundamental, if less newsworthy, mission of "fighting and winning the nation's wars." The public seems not to care about nation assistance once the starving and distressed faces are off the television screens; keeping up the funding for meaningful continuing programs, the kind of programs which will have lasting positive impact on target peoples, may very well be very difficult in the future, even if some nation assistance programs (foreign military sales, financing and training) have budgets which generate little controversy or public opposition.\textsuperscript{45}
SHAPING A RESPONSE TO THE NEW CENTURY'S CHALLENGES

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, set up by Congress to study the future security environment in the world, views the U.S. military as the world's principal power for the next 25 years. The Commission assumes that this force will remain ready and instantly available to respond to a variety of crises. Moreover, the Commission assumes that much of the world will experience economic growth. Despite this growth, disparities in income will increase and widespread poverty will persist. Regional wars and ethnic conflicts will continue, and conflicts and crises of lesser intensity will occur sporadically and randomly around the world. Based on this, the military can expect more and more to be involved in fending off war by stabilizing the international security environment through nation assistance programs. This will present significant challenges for the military in succeeding in its future NSS role.

To help itself meet these challenges, the military created a new and ambitious planning initiative which addresses the activities supporting the 'shape the security environment' goal in a deliberate and formal way. This initiative, in modifying the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan's guidance (part of the Joint Strategic Planning System), tasks the geographic combatant commands to develop and implement regional theater engagement plans (TEPs), a planning document. The TEP requires significant participation and ownership on the part of regional combatant commanders. Their peacetime engagement activities are now explicitly tied to the NSS/NMS goals and objectives. According to the authors Jordan, Lovelace, and Young from the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, who are conducting a study on "Shaping" the World Through "Engagement" state "DoD...expects this increased participation by the CINCs in the planning process will result in greater resource efficiencies, more strategic relevance, and increased fidelity in those activities that the armed forces have carried out for years," and will continue to carry on into the new millennium. Complimenting and completing the TEP are the command strategy document reflecting the CINC's vision and intent, and the Theater Engagement Database, which contains budgetary and programmatic data to help keep the command focused on the execution of the plan and provide a yardstick to measure the effectiveness of its work. Together, these documents make visible the framework to pursue effectively and influentially achieve the NSS/NMS goals and objectives.

Nation assistance is part of the military's role in shaping the international security environment. The newly released NSS for a New Century December 1999, continues to institutionalize this role, and nation assistance's place in it. It points to the military's part in responding to the full spectrum of potential threats in close coordination with our diplomatic, economic, domestic, intelligence and informational counterparts. "The military's crucial role in shaping the international security environment engages in ways...such as defense cooperation, security assistance, and training and exercises with allies and friends, [while] our Armed Forces help to deter aggression and coercion, build coalitions, promote regional stability and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies." The NSS asserts that "we [the U.S.] cannot lead abroad unless we devote the necessary resources to military, diplomatic, intelligence and other efforts to meet this strategy." Conversely, the President recognizes there are
limits to U.S. involvement. Decisions to commit are weighted against the need to sustain our engagement over the long term. The focus is on threats and opportunities that are most relevant to our interest and to apply our resources where we can make the greatest difference. The "ways and means" by which the military achieves its future role in shaping the global security environment is through judiciously selected and deliberately planned nation assistance programs, operations, activities and events in all the geographic combatant commands. The great variance in countries and missions, from disaster to training forces in the ways of democracy, in which nation assistance will be carried out presents tremendous challenges that will require great flexibility in devising strategies, and in how the military operates from region to region, crisis to crisis, and program to program.

Both the civilian and military leaders risk overextending the military when they continue the current trend of increasing military involvement in nation assistance. The risk is that the military's ability to perform its primary mission to "fight and win the nation's wars" will be degraded by the emphasis on nation assistance. CAPT Arthur H. Barber III in his Parameter article, "Engagement through Deployment: Shaping America's Future Military," presents an opinion and assumption that is still a very relevant argument and active debate today. "The risks and pain to giving up conventional combat force structure today are real and immediate. The risks of reducing capability to conduct nation assistance and short-changing modernization are long-term." These concerns continue the debate of balancing the current requirements to meet future capabilities required in meeting the military's primary role of "fighting and winning the nation's wars" in future conflicts. An additional influence on that balance is the future risk of a major theater war or two sequential major regional conflicts. Although the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century foresees only a minimal possibility of such a war or multiple major conflicts within the next 20-25 years, the nation must budget for it and the military must plan and train to fight it. While doing this, however, it continues to perform a variety of nation assistance activities worldwide. Nation assistance by reducing the seeds of conflict reduces the possibility of a future major war; the U.S. is better served spending its resources to help developing nations than continuing to build combat structure. As more nations institute democratic governments and as major corporations expand the global economy, they will be less inclined to engage in war. Thus the money spent on nation assistance will reduce the need for the U.S. to maintain such a significant combat arms capability advantage over other nations. The TEP initiative, which makes very explicit the CINCs' nation assistance programs and their costs, provides a means to ensure that sufficient resources are provided and spent. A corollary benefit of nation assistance is that more power, prestige and influence will be accorded to the United States as it assumes a more benevolent and cooperative role with nations worldwide.

It is essential that the U.S. military balance its missions and continue to develop and sustain the necessary warfighting and MOOTW training, education, and readiness required to successively execute not just the traditional mission to "fight and win the nation's wars," but all the other operations that decrease the risk of a future war. It is incumbent on the U.S. armed forces through the CINCs to continue to improve and develop more efficient and creative methods for theater engagement planning and
support to nation assistance. Increased participation on the part of the assisted nation will imbue nation assistance with host nation commitment and ownership while judiciously using America’s armed forces to assist those nations and maintain global stability and international security.

CONCLUSION

Nation assistance has evolved from an anti-Communist tactic during the Cold War, to a complex tool and strategy for creating a stable and safe international security environment in today’s asymmetrical world. The use of the U.S. military in nation assistance has continuously and significantly contributed to U.S. national security and stability in shaping the international security environment. The military remains an active and potent element of national power, and its continued decisive, deliberate, synchronized, and tailored planning and participation in nation assistance benefits not only the U.S., but also the assisted nations. As Generals Sullivan’s and Shinseki’s vision statements express, the United States will continue to find its military at the forefront of many nation assistance activities. The military and Congress will struggle to balance today’s requirements to “fight and win the nation’s wars” against the demands of resourcing nation assistance as the U.S. armed forces continue to bear the burden of service to the nation. Ultimately, Congress will need to garner support from the American people for the armed forces to be adequately resourced for its involvement in nation assistance. These dilemmas are not new and their resolutions in future events will continue to determine the U.S. posture as an effective and influential global leader in the beginning decades of the 21st Century.

Total word count: 4613
ENDNOTES

1 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 16 June 1995), III-1. The types of operations the military participates in other than war are: Arms Control; Combating Terrorism; DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations; Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime intercept Operations; Enforcing Exclusion Zones; Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight; Humanitarian Assistance; Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA); Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency; Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); Peace Operations (PO); Protection of Shipping; Recovery Operations; Show of Force Operations; Strikes and Raids; and Support to Insurgency.

2 Hereafter, U.S. Armed Forces will be used interchangeably between “military” and “armed forces.” U.S. is understood in this paper and will routinely not proceed military or armed forces.


5 Nation assistance rubric is composed of programs, operations, activities, conferences and events.

6 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publication 3-07, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 16 June 1995), III-9 and 10. Security Assistance (SA) is a group of programs by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services. SA programs include Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing Program, International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), Economic Support Fund, and commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is the total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. Its focus is assisting host nation (HN) personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. It supports HN internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. FID may address other threats to a HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. FID may include training, materiel, advice or other assistance in direct support and combat operations as authorized by the NCA. JP 3-07.1 covers FID doctrine. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (H&CA) is provided under Title 10 US Code Section 401. It is in conjunction with military operations and exercises. Its use must fulfill unit-training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefits to the local populace. H&CA differs from Humanitarian Assistance (HA) in that HA operations are for emergency relief and H&CA are planned activities. HA is a separate operational type of MOOTW. H&CA programs relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. H&CA is limited in scope and duration. Assistance is to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing HA.

7 U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms – Joint Terminology Master Database, Joint Publication (JPub) 1-02, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 29 June 1999), 303-4, as amended 29 June 1999, defines nation assistance as: Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other U.S. Code
Title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations.


10 U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Publication 3-07, III-1. The original term and concept for MOOTW was identified as LIC, Low Intensity Conflict.

11 Armed Forces, United States Code, Title 10, Chapter 20, Humanitarian and Other Assistance, secs 401-404 (1999), 114. The Secretary of Defense prescribes that the Secretary of a military department may carry out H&CA activities in conjunction with authorized military operations of the armed forces in a country if the Secretary concerned determines: (1) that the activities will promote security interests of both the US and the country in which the activities are carried out; and (2) that activities identify specific operational readiness skills for members of the armed forces who participate. Such activities shall complement but not duplicate any other form of social or economic assistance provided by any other department or agency of the US and shall serve the basic economic and social needs of the people of the country concerned. Constraints cited are no direct or indirect assistance provided to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity and render no assistance by any member of the armed forces for detecting, lifting, or destroying landmines. The “humanitarian and civic assistance” in Sec 401 means any of the following: (1) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country. (2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems. (3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities. (4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. (5) Detection and clearance of landmines, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of landmines. Section 402, Transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries, DOD may transport to any country, without charge and on a space available basis, supplies which have been furnished by a non-governmental source and intended for humanitarian assistance. The use of this section requires: that the transportation is consistent with US foreign policy; that there is a legitimate need for such supplies; that the supplies are suitable, and in usable condition, for humanitarian purposes; that adequate distribution arrangements are coordinated at the destination country; and in fact the supplies will be used for the intended purpose. Under Section 404, the President may direct the Secretary of Defense to provide disaster assistance outside the US to respond to manmade or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of lives. Assistance may include transportation, supplies, services, and equipment. Congress will be notified of the assistance provided, and proposed to be provided, plus any of the following information available at the time of notification: the disaster assistance required; the threat to human lives presented by the disaster; military personnel and material resources involved or expected to be involved; and disaster assistance being provided or expected to be provided by other nations or public or private relief organizations. This assistance is appropriated under the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs of DOD. Under 405, Use of DOD funds for US share of costs of UN peacekeeping activities: limitations; is a prohibition on the use of funds by DOD directly or indirectly to the UN for costs associated with UN peacekeeping activity and any US arrangements to the UN. In the 1994 Edition Chapter 20, is divided into two subchapters: Humanitarian and Other Assistance, secs 401-404 and Civil-Military Cooperation, sec 410. Sec 401-404 addressed Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations (Sec 401); Transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries (Sec 402); International peacekeeping activities (Sec 403); and Foreign disaster assistance (Sec 404). International peacekeeping activities (Sec 403) was later repealed by P.L. 104-106 and the subchapter II, Civil-Military Cooperation (Sec 410), also repealed by this same P.L. Peacekeeping activities reappear in a November 1999 amendment to the UN Participation Act.
[UNPA] of 1945 [22 USC 287 et seq] (known as the "Biden amendment") which placed additional emphasis on financial reimbursement for US participation in and support of UN Peacekeeping Operations [PKOs], E. Sweigard, CDR, “Information Paper, Subject: Amendment to the United Nations Participation Act,” (Washington, D.C.: J5/Global, 1999, photocopied), 1. Requirements to Obtain Reimbursement – Directs POTUS to “obtain a timely fashion” UN commitment to reimburse the US whenever USG furnishes assistance: (1) To the UN when the assistance is designed to facilitate or assist in carrying out an assessed PKO; (2) For any UN PKO authorized under Ch VI or VII of the UN Charter and paid for by PK or regular budget assessment of the UN members; (3) To any country participating in an operation authorized under Ch VI or VII of the UN Charter and paid for by PK assessments when assistance is designed to facilitate participation of that country in the operation. Exceptions- (1) Goods and services provided to US Armed Forces; (2) Assistance having a value of less than $3M per FY per operation; (3) Assistance furnished before the date of enactment of this section; (4) Salaries/expenses of CIVPOL, other civilian and military monitors where UN policy is to require payment by contributing members for similar assistance to UN PKOs; (5) Any commitment made before enactment of this section; (6) Whenever POTUS determines that deployment of US military forces is important to the security interests of the US. POTUS must notify Congress in above case and Congress can overrule within 15 days of notification.


14 Alfred J. Kraemer, Promoting Civic Action in Less Developed Nations: A Conceptualization of the U.S. Military Mission Role (Washington D.C.: George Washington University, 1968), 3 and 6, TR68-10. Public Law 87-195 codifying IDA. Kinds of activities covered under civic actions refer to almost any action by the military involving the use of noncombat skills for the benefit of the civilian population, such as: construction or repair of such things as roads, bridges, dams and canals, schools, religious buildings, and other public facilities; disaster and refugee relief (distributing food and clothing, providing temporary shelter); provision of electrical power; digging of wells; distribution of books, educational supplies and educational materials glorifying the central government; provision of musical entertainment (military band); transporting seriously sick people to a hospital; medical assistance; crop dusting; or spontaneous acts of help, charity, friendliness during operations or field exercises (such as handing out treats for children or providing first aid); vocational training of recruits prior to discharge; or conducting literacy classes for civilians.

15 U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Military Operations, Directorate of International and Civil Affairs, Nation Building Contributions of the Army (NABUCA), IV-6. Definition: “The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)” US began formal support by using indigenous armed forces in countries in crisis as well as countries in need of economic and social development. This was the first time civic action was permitted to become a “major function” of selected units in order to receive US assistance. Most US Country Teams and Unified Commands received a joint message with the NSAM guidance as well as funding instructions. The Military Assistance Program (MAP) would provide equipment and training for military units, while the Agency for International Development (Department of State, AID) [authority Foreign Assistance Act 1961, Public Law 480] would fund local civilian labor and the materials consumed in specific projects.

16 McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor. “National Security Action Memorandum No. 182, Subject: Counterinsurgency Doctrine.” Memorandum for the Secretaries of State, and Defense, et. al.,


18 Both academic and political literatures use at least two spellings for nation building. One term uses a hyphen between the two words to make it a compound word and the other use is a two-word combination where nation is the adjective of building.


20 In a Letter of Instruction to the Chiefs of Mission, dated 16 September 1994, President Clinton acknowledged that "with the end of the Cold War, we are entering an era so new that it has yet to acquire a name." Department of National Security and Strategy (DNSS), US Army War College, The Interagency Process From Peace to War Readings: Volume III Part B The Major Actors, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 5 April 1999), 464.


22 Ibid., 74.


24 Ibid.


26 Ibid.


28 Ibid.


31 Cohen, QDR, 9-10.


33 Cohen, QDR, 11-13.
34 Ibid., 14.
35 Clinton, NSS 1999, 5.
36 Ibid., 22.
37 Ibid., 26.
40 Shalikashvili, NMS, 6-7.
41 Ibid., 13.
42 Ibid., i.
43 Henk, 26. “If, for instance, the local ambassador has more than normal clout and interest in these military programs, he/she often can exert enough pressure significantly increase the funding allocation. Likewise, those embassies with resident military staff are more likely to take full advantage of funding available in the security assistance system,” endnote, 67.
46 Ibid., 122.
47 Ibid., 123.
49 Ibid., 5-5 to 5-21.
50 Clinton, NSS 1999, 11.
53 Clinton, NSS 1999, 11.
54 Ibid., 11.
55 Ibid., 3.

56 Ibid.

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