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THE "TYRANNY OF MEANS": INTEGRATING THE WEINBERGER-POWELL AND ABRAMS DOCTRINES

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRISTOPHER R. PAPARONE
United States Army

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by

LTC Christopher R. Paparone
U.S. Army

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Esq.
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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ABSTRACT

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The author hypothesizes that many observers have erroneously accepted the "way the world is" in terms of U.S. military involvement. The author argues that U.S. propensity for foreign adventures resides mainly from the policy-making level — the President and his administration. Strategic problems, such as the "corrosive effects of military operations other than war," "smaller scale contingency snowball," and "living a lie" stem from the current policy. The U.S. military is losing focus on its traditional primary mission — to fight and win the nation's wars. Few seem to ponder a future where policy and U.S. propensity for interventionism may be considerably different under a new administration. Senior military leaders must be prepared to advise on alternative national policies and strategies. The author offers alternatives for combining policy and strategy from the successful post-Cold War Bush Administration and the Cold War Eisenhower Administration and integrating the Weinberger-Powell and Abrams doctrines into a hybrid policy based strategy. Finally, he recommends a resulting force structure.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** .................................................................................................................. iii

**INTEGRATING THE WEINBERGER-POWELL AND ABRAMS DOCTRINES** ...................... 1

**THE TYRANNY OF MEANS AND THE "DOABILITY DOCTRINE"** .......................... 1

**CORROSIVE EFFECTS OF MOOTW** ........................................................................ 3

**THE SSC SNOWBALL** .............................................................................................. 5

**LIVING A LIE** .......................................................................................................... 6

**BETWEEN GLOBALISM AND ISOLATIONISM** ......................................................... 7

**WEINBERGER-POWELL DOCTRINE** ................................................................. 9

**INTEGRATING THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE** ............................................................ 11

**A RESULTING PRINCIPLED FORCE STRUCTURE** .............................................. 16

**CONCLUSION** ....................................................................................................... 17

**ENDNOTES** ............................................................................................................ 19

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ..................................................................................................... 25
THE "TYRANNY OF MEANS": INTEGRATING THE WEINBERGER-POWELL AND ABRAMS DOCTRINES

The love of their country is with them only a mode of flattering its master; as soon as they think that master can no longer hear, they speak of everything with a frankness which is the more startling because those who listen to it become responsible.

Marquis De Custine

Some military observers have suggested that U.S. strategic problems stem from U.S. refusal to accept the way the world is. They postulate that we will be inexorably involved in numerous policing actions because of the post-Cold War reality and because the United States is responsible, as the world's only remaining superpower. A common recommendation is that military training, equipment, and organization should be developed around this "reality"; hence, around military operations other than war (MOOTW) instead of warfighting.¹ This paper presents an opposing view. The root of our strategic problem stems not from external conditions, but from a flawed globalistic policy based on an international social agenda instead of compelling vital national interests. The current policy creates blurred vision across a wide array of transitory threats, fed by a tempting, over-structured, active component force -- the tyranny of means. This author argues that the United States is suffering from the symptoms of strategic over-stretch as a result of the corrosive effects of MOOTW and the Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC) snowball. A more moderate national security policy and strategy, suggested by the author, is arguably more principled and acceptable -- New Look Cooperative Engagement. This proposed hybrid-policy-based strategy is based on President Bush's Cooperative Engagement and President Eisenhower's successful New Look, with a supporting military strategy enhanced by a return to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and prudent application of the Abrams Doctrine. The author concludes that senior military leaders have a moral and legal obligation to not deviate from the core purpose of the U.S. military: to fight and win our nation's wars.

THE TYRANNY OF MEANS AND THE "DOABILITY DOCTRINE"

Policy, like strategy, is said to be the art of the possible. John Lewis Gaddis, in his book Strategies of Containment, concluded that the tyranny of means was a key factor in determining post-World War II shifts between symmetrical (a military counter-force, -response to crises) and asymmetrical (using unalike ways and means) strategies. Having overabundant military means available, according to Gaddis, has often been the "decisive determinant" of whether the United States chooses an uneconomical symmetrical response strategy over a less expensive asymmetrical response strategy. He writes this conclusion on the "New Frontier" policy and Flexible Response strategy of the '60s:

It is ironic that this should have occurred under the administrations [Kennedy and Johnson] that prided themselves on their ability to match ends in the most appropriate manner; one cannot help but conclude that the very abundance of means which seemed to be available during those years contributed to the problem. The bracing discipline of
stringency, after all, provides more powerful incentives than even the most sophisticated management techniques.²

This realization should be alarming to Americans because it forces the question, what came first, the policy or the strategic means? Indeed, the tyranny of means postulated by Gaddis might produce a crisis-du-jour national security policy. This may explain the root of U.S. strategic problems in the Kennedy-Johnson Bay of Pigs and Vietnam conflicts and similar Clinton encounters in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and now in East Timor, Indonesia. The tyranny of means explanation is that the United States became involved because it was possible, and not because policy was carefully formulated around vital interests.

Globalism is defined as, "A United States (U.S.) foreign policy of active involvement, both politically and militarily, in all parts of the world; the polar opposite of isolationism."³ In his National Security Strategy (NSS), President Clinton calls for "promotion of democracy abroad" and links that growth to both a healthy global economy and international stability. His policy, often referred to as the "Clinton Doctrine," is clearly based in globalism -- to lead the world in: "peace, prosperity, and the universal values of democracy and freedom...for the benefit of our own people and people around the world."⁴ In execution of this globalistic policy, President Clinton has demonstrated a proclivity to commit U.S. forces symmetrically in a "crisis response" mode. By the President's definition, these military responses are not necessarily linked to vital interests, but because of our global leadership responsibility, may be linked to important, or humanitarian and other interests; hence, one could label his an expansionist international social agenda. To wit, the direct result of his global engagement policy is the U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) -- calling for response to all manner of crises, covering a "full range of military operations." The NMS requires U.S. forces to be ready to respond frequently to multiple SSCs, while maintaining readiness to fight and win two, nearly simultaneous major theater wars (dual-MTWs).⁵

I postulate that the military and the administration have the same desire for means; albeit, differing priorities or ideas on strategic ways. One can sense this dichotomy in the text of the President's NSS and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's (CJCS) NMS. Not surprisingly, in his 1998 NSS the President omits any reference to "winning the nation's wars" as the principal role of the military.⁶ The President leaves fighting and winning major theater wars as the "ultimate test" of the military after global shaping, deterring, and other forms of engagement have failed. On the other hand, the Chairman states up front in his NMS that the core purpose of the Armed Forces is "to deter and defeat threats...fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous wars remains the foremost task."⁷ Again, this suggests why the President's ends and ways differ from those of the Chairman. Perhaps because the differing ends still justify means acceptable to both parties, the Chairman has not raised an issue with the basic policy. Or, as this paper would suggest, the means are justifying the ends. A senior military leadership moral problem stems from the ends-means disconnect in the way forces are committed. Jeffery Record summarized his assessment of this moral dilemma in his article "The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning." He states, "Repetition of politically sterile military interventions not only suggests such
interventions are motivated more by desire to be seen to be doing something rather than concern that 'something' actual makes a lasting difference. If true, this would indicate a social agenda at work versus a more thoughtful foreign policy in the traditional sense of national security.

With the possible exception of the General Maxwell Taylor's Flexible Response military strategy adopted by the '60s era Kennedy and Johnson administrations, never has the use of U.S. conventional military forces to respond to international crises been as closely tied to a U.S. national grand strategy as it is today. By "responding to a full range of military operations," the engagement policy has, in effect, expanded (or likely corroded) the role of the military beyond that which it has been trained, organized, and equipped. Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, once confirmed this redefinition of military roles in the execution of engagement policy by asking General Colin Powell, "What's the point in having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" Because Clinton's engagement policy infrequently uses the criterion of vital interest to distinguish cause for intervention, the potential use of the military, under Ms. Albright's implied expanded role (her "doability doctrine"), is virtually unlimited. Her question seems to have been driven by having surplus forces available -- the tyranny of means -- without a clear understanding of the corrosive effects of MOOTW on the warfighting capability of military forces.

CORROSIVE EFFECTS OF MOOTW

General Johnson, Chief of Staff of the Army early in the Vietnam conflict, stated the Army had reached a point "with its many missions scattered throughout the world...it could not be stretched much further." But it did get stretched, and overstretched it was -- at tremendous risk from potential threats posed by the Soviet-Warsaw Pact countries to vital national security. The problem with the current engagement policy is this same danger of strategic overstretch. Andrew J. Bacevich stated this cogent conclusion, insinuating defense establishment duplicity in his scathing review of U.S. engagement policy:

...Pentagon planners do not stay up nights worrying that globalization will put the Department of Defense out of business. On the contrary, they understand that pressing for an open world and enforcing its rules will generate a plethora of new military requirements... Unmoved by visions of self-regulating peace and prosperity, the defense establishment seeks to stifle opposition to the American version of globalization by institutionalizing U.S. military supremacy... Americans will wake not to utopia, but to an unruly world in which the United States has assumed vast burdens not easily shed... America will have become Rome.

The Clinton Doctrine is not good for America if one believes only vital interests should govern whether to commit forces. There are equally compelling arguments below the policy level. A recent Wall Street Journal column summed up the argument quite well, "We only (seem to) intervene when there are no vital national security interests... particularly if a domestic special-interest group supports it and the risk of casualties is low." The column's highlight is that there is a cost to building a foreign policy on hopes of beneficence rather than on rock-solid shared interests. The authors also argue that the danger of this policy is the fading perception among real or potential adversaries that we have clearly defined our vital interests and that we are willing and able to defend them with military forces. They articulate that the
corrosive effects of MOOTW could be substantial especially if the U.S. military continues its transformation from an institution focussed on killing people and destroying things toward an agency mainly for peacekeeping and policing. Finally, this column makes the logical point that in the long run our friends and allies may become unsure whether our security umbrella is still reliable.\textsuperscript{12}

The corrosive effects of MOOTW also are impacting levels beneath policy and strategy. According to General John N. Abrams, commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, "warfighting doctrine will recognize more complex missions, which can shift from peacekeeping or deterrence to full combat rapidly...ensuring a full spectrum capable Army for the future." Although General Abrams also emphasized that the Army needs to "improve our crisis response," he added that the Army must also "preserve our warfighting capability."\textsuperscript{13} In effect this shifting of doctrine is a dilution of the core competency of the Army, making peace operations and other forms of MOOTW equally important. Doctrine, especially new doctrine, drives policies, training schedules, and even materiel acquisition decisions. If the Army is not cautious, these decisions may have equal weight toward the lower end of the spectrum.

The corrosive effects of MOOTW are also found at the individual and unit individual levels. Journalist Dana Priest writes, "This is not the life Lambert or others expected when they signed up, ready to do battle and trained in armor, infantry and artillery tactics. In Kosovo, where President Clinton will visit troops today, the soldiers have had to learn to be surrogate mayors, school principals, police chiefs, social workers and even corporate chief executive officers as they try to forge lasting peace in a land divided by centuries of hate."\textsuperscript{14} The Army party line is that, although combat skills may deteriorate, leadership skills are honed. Yet in many cases those same junior leaders did not join the Army to conduct peace, but to wage war. The attrition rate for captains is at 12% -- relatively high. While some of this is due to the enticing growth of the U.S. economy, some is also because the missions are not what they expected or were trained for.\textsuperscript{15} The second and third order effects of MOOTW are real. The likelihood of the U.S. military becoming constabulary forces must be addressed.

The author of this paper served two tours in Bosnia, commanding a combat service support unit. Upon return from Bosnia, he directed his staff to report on what percent of the collective tasks listed in the battalion's mission training plan (MTP) were not trained while in Bosnia. The MTP is a doctrinal list of all the tasks the unit is designed to accomplish in combat. He also directed his staff to estimate how many of these same tasks were not trained on a recent deployment to the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC) in Hohenfels, Germany -- under a high intensity combat scenario. Thirty percent of the tasks were not trained in Bosnia compared to fifteen percent not trained at CMTTC. Most of the differential was attributed to combat survival tasks such as support while maneuvering, night operations, nuclear, chemical, biological defense and operational security, such as camouflage, concealment, light, and noise discipline. This inability to train in such critical tasks makes the training differential more profound than the quantitative difference suggests. His colleagues in the combat arms thought the differential would be even greater for the combat units because their coordinated maneuver collective skills were so perishable
and not required in Bosnia. Thus, in this case, the corrosive effects of MOOTW were ultimately a threat to warfighting capabilities.

Furthermore, these effects snowball (or intensify), as larger military formations are committed to MOOTW or smaller scale contingencies (SSCs). Senator Hutchinson (Republican - Texas) articulates a sense of the same reasoning from a strategic perspective:

It takes nine months to restore a peacekeeping unit to peak combat readiness.... By failing to keep our armed forces combat ready, we invite other nations to take advantage... As a superpower, the United States must draw distinctions between the essential and the important. Otherwise, we could dissipate our resources and be unable to handle either. To maximize our strength, we should focus our efforts where they can be best applied. \(^{16}\)

THE SSC SNOWBALL

SSCs are defined by the CJCS as: "a regional crisis based on a less compelling national interest or threat than those involved in a major theater war." \(^{17}\) The key issue with the military leadership has to be the availability of forces if they are to fight and win the nation's MTWs when committed to long-term SSCs. There is an obvious SSC snowball effect from seemingly endless peace operations, small wars, and other "aggressive engagement activities" the President has directed. For example, by summer 1999, the U.S. Army has rotated five division headquarters and multiple battalions (a division minus) through Bosnia since U.S. ground forces entered in December 1995. At any point in time, a division (minus) is either training for the mission, engaged in the mission, or is recovering from the mission in Bosnia. The same may hold true for forces committed to Kosovo. A disturbing Washington Post article leaked reports of large-scale unreadiness in the two divisions committed to Bosnia and Kosovo -- the 10th Mountain and the 1st Mechanized Infantry Divisions. \(^{18}\) Their unreadiness stems from the inability of these forces to redeploy to major theaters of war when a vital interest is threatened.

These divisional forces committed to the Balkans do not include the significant pool of Army corps and echelon above corps (EAC) elements committed to supporting these operations over long lines of communications back to Germany and the United States. So, out of the U.S. Army active force of ten divisions and multiple corps and EAC units, only about two thirds are actually available on short notice to fight in major theater wars. For example, if the 2d Infantry Division stationed in Korea is subtracted as a "stay-put" force, this leaves six U.S. Army active divisions ready to deploy for a short notice war -- compared to seven the United States employed in the Gulf War.

Even if the administration accepts substantial risk in U.S. Army Balkans commitments, the Air Force SSC snowball grew also in response to the recent NATO-Serbia conflict over Kosovo. The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ryan, has compared the Kosovo air campaign to the level of effort that was required in Desert Storm. \(^{19}\) He added, "consistent with our defense strategy, U.S. forces could not have continued the intense campaign in Kosovo and, at the same time, been prepared to fight and win two major theater wars." \(^{20}\)
To his credit, President Clinton recognizes the SSC Snowball issue in his NSS:

...our military must be able to transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of
global engagement—from substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well
as multiple concurrent smaller scale contingencies. Withdrawing from such operations
would pose significant political and operational challenges.\(^\text{21}\)

But, senior military leaders have answered the SSC Snowball issue in a weakly formulated concept of
operation found in the NMS.

More than likely, we would have to disengage from activities and operations not deemed
vital in order to better posture our forces to deter or defeat aggression in a second major
theater war...Responding to multiple concurrent contingencies requires careful
consideration to ensure our forces are not dissipated and therefore either unable, or
perceived as unable, to respond to more critical threats.\(^\text{22}\)

It seems these statements are vested more in a hope rather than a valid assumption, because it is
doubtful a significant force can redeploy in time for decisive action in a major theater war. In a recent
interview, the Chief of Staff of the Army stated, "In a two-war scenario, the peacekeeping forces in
Kosovo and Bosnia could not quickly extract themselves and their equipment, return to their home bases,
retrain and then ship off to a major war in the allotted time."\(^\text{23}\) Hope is not a method — this is the crux of
the moral dilemma of our military leaders. "Engagement that squanders American power and treasure on
peacekeeping...or engagement that concentrates our finite resources on potential warfighting in vital
areas..." is like living a lie.\(^\text{24}\)

LIVING A LIE

What makes living a lie an even more complex moral dilemma is the unsavory truth that the
Department of Defense (DoD) continues to spend tax dollars on readiness to fight in the very unlikely
scenario of dual-MTWs. This dual-MTW rationale is a basis to fund a large standing military motivated
perhaps out of institutional self-preservation — couched in the veil of bipartisan acceptability. The
undesirable outcome of the Republican-controlled congressional support of the politically correct dual-
MTW strategy is to sustain the administration's adventurous agenda. Even Secretary of Defense
Cohen's appointed National Defense Panel (NDP), chartered to review the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), expressed serious doubts about the dual-MTW scenario in its preliminary discussions.
One member said, "...it is unlikely that the U.S. will face more than one large-scale regional conflict,
roughly on the scale of the Persian Gulf War at any one time over the next five to ten years."\(^\text{25}\) This
argument was translated into a similar statement in the NDP final report: "The Panel views the two-
military-theater-of-war construct as a force-sizing function and not a strategy. We are concerned that this
construct may have become a force-protection mechanism — a means of justifying the current force
structure—especially for those searching for the certainties of the Cold War era."\(^\text{26}\)
The NDP report falls short in not recommending changes to policy that should drive a new strategy and offers no recourse to the stated lack of a military strategy. The NDP only alluded to a policy and strategy mismatch when the panel concluded, "our current course is unlikely to produce the military capabilities necessary to meet the range of challenges we foresee in 2010-2020." The panel also lightly stepped on policy issues in the area of national interests; in fact, they avoided the term and used "national security imperatives" instead. The NDP's seemingly ill-conceived and rather ambiguous recommended policy imperatives were stated as:

- National Survival,
- Global and Economic Stability, and
- Domestic Security.

Compare this version to the much more useful list discussed in the early NDP meetings:

1. Protecting America's territory, borders and airspace;
2. Protecting Americans against threats to their lives and well-being;
3. Preventing a major power threat to Europe, East Asia, or the Persian Gulf;
4. Preventing the hostile interference by outside powers in the Western Hemisphere;
5. Access to international trade and investments;
6. Freedom of the seas; and,
7. Access to resources.

Legally, the military is not supposed to live a lie. Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 153, states that the CJCS is charged to advise the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on matters of "planning, advice, [and] policy formulation." A quote from the CJCS Joint Strategic Planning System best expresses the right thing to do: "Disconnects between strategy ends and means must be presented to the NCA and brought into balance so that the military's ability to fight and win our nation's wars is not compromised." The military has both a moral and legal responsibility to recommend policy and strategy alternatives.

BETWEEN GLOBALISM AND ISOLATIONISM

That presentation should include an alternative to the clear and present dangers of the Clinton social agenda-driven engagement policy. The alternative does not have to be an unrealistic, "polar-opposite" isolationist policy as claimed by many contemporary reporters and opinion columnists. Ironically, the President's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, called for a more realistic policy than the President's: "The U.S. doesn't have the capability or the consensus, or the responsibility, to come to the aid of every people in trouble." The President's former Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta, concurs. He was critical of Mr. Clinton's recent speech, when the President stated that genocide anywhere is a national interest. Mr. Panetta said, "...there's no 'meat on the bones' of this doctrine...the Kosovos of the world are probably the kind of challenges we're going to have to face over and over again." In other words, how do you determine which ones rate intervention?"
Close to what Mr. Berger and Mr. Panetta propose, the Bush Administration seemed to have the more correct policy at the end of the Cold War. Bush's more thoughtful policy was named collective engagement, which reserved the right of the United States to take unilateral action, and for the most part engage in international efforts in association with the other major players. This policy enabled the United States to take part in both coalition and allied operations, and recognized U.S. vital interests would have to be at stake for large-scale and long-term military commitments. While not an isolationist policy by any measure, collective engagement certainly recognized the limitations of U.S. strategic means. The policy calls for burden sharing with our friends and allies. The nuclear protective umbrella for the U.S. homeland defense and the defense of our allies would also be of critical importance under this policy. Perhaps most importantly, from the moral domain, the policy also is more consistent with just war theory. It portrays a strategic defense vice the strategic offense that defines the expansionistic nature of Clinton's form of globalism. For the twenty-first century, the Bush policy needs a "new look," in a national security strategy (NSS) which will implement it. Bush's policy was not a completely new idea.

Although he agreed with a continued containment policy, President Eisenhower rejected the 1950s limited war strategy that got the United States involved in the Korean War. The Eisenhower Administration's new look containment strategy was characterized by "equating security with the defense of permanent interests rather than the repulsion of transitory threats. It implied the existence of interests distinct from threats." This was a very different strategy from Kennedy's Flexible Response and the Clinton NSS symmetrical approaches which focus on transitory threats. The Eisenhower strategy was characterized by asymmetry that "combined the certainty of a response with uncertainty as to its nature,\" The strategy had five main, asymmetrical strategic elements: (1) Overseas bases with the valued support of allies—who are provided nuclear protection through the threat of "massive retaliation" by the U.S.; (2) Reliance on manpower reserves and tremendous economic resources of the industrialized nations; (3) Psychological warfare (what would be referred to today as information warfare); (4) A heavy investment in covert operations; and, (5) A strong commitment to negotiation as an instrument of policy. It is important to note that during Eisenhower's two terms in office, he ordered only one intervention (not including three U.S. noncombatant evacuation operations) that involved U.S. Marines who assisted the government of Lebanon in a small-scale, short-term operation in 1958.

This did not make "Ike" an isolationist, but in retrospect perhaps the most shrewd and calculating containment strategist of the Cold War. Eisenhower loathed the idea of a powerful "military industrial complex," because he feared preoccupation with the process of developing means would overtake the purpose of defense. "He did not, in his words, want "to turn the United States into an armed camp to police the world." History demonstrates he was correct, and he summed up what he considered his proudest achievement to a reporter years later. "The United States never lost a soldier or a foot of ground in my administration, we kept the peace. People asked how it happened -by God, it didn't just
happen, I'll tell you that."\(^2\) Now that we know the Soviet threat was not as pervasive as perceived, perhaps the Cold War would have ended sooner if we had stayed the Eisenhower course.\(^3\)

**WEINBERGER-POWELL DOCTRINE**

To get to a corresponding state of "vital military readiness" under a *New Look Collective Engagement* policy based strategy, adventuristic employments under a globalistic policy must cease. In a return to a more conservative policy, conventional force structure and readiness would be based primarily on vital wartime requirements and asymmetrical U.S. capabilities that would keep our enemies deterred or at least strategically off-guard. Performance of clear military tasks will be accomplished to proper standards necessary to fight and win when conventional force is necessary. Readiness would be based on vital interests, answering the question "ready for what?" more clearly. This would likely mean a need to return to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine that the Bush Administration employed under the *New Look Cooperative Engagement* policy based strategy. The United States could return to committing combat forces only under criteria similar to these:

1. Only as a matter of vital interest;
2. With wholehearted intention of winning;
3. Under clearly defined political objectives;
4. With continual reassessments;
5. With reasonable assurance of support of Congress and the American people;
6. As a last resort.\(^4\)

Six years later, General Powell, when CJCS, tempered Weinberger's criteria. He added the importance of some ambiguity, because we may not want to give away our intentions to potential enemies. The President might refrain from publicly expressing what U.S. vital interests are, for example. Powell also recommended maintaining asymmetrical response capabilities, but almost always responding with overwhelming force when force is employed. He also stressed the importance of using all instruments of national power before, during, and after commitment of forces. He recommended risk assessment and management throughout the decision-making process.\(^5\) What is now termed the hybrid "Weinberger-Powell" doctrine fits right in with the proposed *New Look Cooperative Engagement* policy based strategy. These are the tested principles for executing the proposed policy.

At least one observer has argued that Clinton actually embraced the Wienberger-Powell doctrine with the 1994 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." The author, Kenneth J. Campbell, claims PDD 25 is a direct evolution of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine.\(^6\) But upon close examination, the document is very limited in that it discusses U.S. decision criteria for participation in primarily United Nations (UN) peace operations and not across the full spectrum of operations. The purpose of PDD 25 seemed to be more focused on reforming the UN and placating Congress after the Somalia debacle vice setting strict standards for the United States. What may be the most remarkable counter-argument to Campbell's is that the United States did not follow the criteria when deciding to send troops to Bosnia -- one of the criteria of PDD 25 is,
"The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation."47 After several extensions, the United States is still in Bosnia five years later, and is planning to remain indefinitely -- a clear violation of this criterion.48

There are those who argue that the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine is inappropriate for another reason. Cori Dauber makes a case for the fallibility of the doctrine -- thinking the military uses it as an escape mechanism from conducting humanitarian intervention:

This is most clearly seen whenever the question of humanitarian military action is raised. When should the United States intervene in another nation's affairs, under what circumstances, what conditions...the military incentive is straightforward. If they can prevent interventions that do not meet their criteria, they can retain the support and respect of the public.... The doctrine sets the bar so high that it will be almost impossible to argue effectively in favor of humanitarian intervention. The vagueness of "public support" means there are no predetermined standards for determining when the Weinberger criterion has been met.49

What Dauber fails to understand in this case is that the doctrine is not "their" criteria (i.e. the military's). The doctrine was developed for the civilian National Command Authority (NCA) as a tool to determine the risks associated with this profound course of action -- to place the precious sons and daughters of America in harms way. This decision should not be made on the "technicality" of the doctrine, but on the assessed risk to the time-tested Clausewitzian-based, Trinitarian balance among the Army, the government, and the citizens. Dauber's main thrust is to portray the military as an institution immersed solely in self-protection and analogous to other government institutions or commercial business. Dauber missed the concept of the moral domain in an ethical decision-making process of civilian leadership.

To make the new look collective engagement policy based strategy more realistic in a more volatile world, other military interventions (such as humanitarian aid, noncombatant evacuations, Grenada/Panama "Monroe Doctrine"-type issues) could be decided with additional risk-management and assessment protocols in place. Within the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, a risk management model could be advocated to assist the President if contemplating an exception to the "vital interest" criterion. Here is a proposed model based on a common risk management process used by business and the military:

STEP 1. IDENTIFY HAZARDS. Identify the potential hazards to forces by examining the major military tasks to accomplish. Focus on the essential military tasks only. Make sure non-military tasks are assigned to the best governmental, non-governmental agency, or coalition partner or ally. Eliminate military tasks that have unacceptable hazards -- negotiated between civil-military leaders. The resulting list will contribute to knowing when the military mission is complete (assist in developing an exit strategy). Consider contingency changes in the policy based strategy (policy and strategy branches and sequels) to insure against the unknown or poor assumptions.

STEP 2. ASSESS HAZARDS TO DETERMINE RISKS. Analyze each remaining hazard and assess the severity of its effect on the overall accomplishment of the mission. Consider the impact of these hazards on the will of the American people, the Congress, and the morale of military personnel. Determine whether it is politically acceptable -- determined by the President and his political advisors -- to call up reserve component
(RC) forces. If the cost is too high in terms of duration or the magnitude of the military intervention, consider not committing forces at all.

STEP 3. DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS. Develop control measures to treat the dangers. These should include consideration of rules of engagement, reporting requirements, cross-border operations, zones of separation, and other restraints. These become the essence of civil control over military operations.

STEP 4. IMPLEMENT CONTROLS. Decide on what control measures to implement based on their potential to reduce risk while not causing unacceptable risk to mission accomplishment. This step addresses the freedom of action afforded to the combatant commander. If the restraints are unacceptable based on military feedback, advice, and opinion, consider not committing forces at all.

STEP 5. SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE. Monitor mission execution and enforce control measures. Continually assess, modify, and adjust control measures to meet the changing conditions. If conditions change significantly, return to STEP 1. Capture and disseminate policy and strategy lessons learned from mishaps and near mishaps for future use.50

A new look collective engagement policy based strategy implemented with the Weinberger-Powell doctrine is a superior alternative to Clinton adventurist policies and a weak stab at creating “reform” in multilateral peace operations.

The moral and legal duty of our senior military leaders, then, should be to advise and provide opinion to the NCS and the Congress as follows:

- Understand that changing the military culture from the core of warfighting to that of peacekeeping and policing may have a corrosive effect on the defense of our vital interests;
- Recognize the infeasibility of rapid disengagement from SSCs because of the SSC Snowball effect;
- Evaluate the dual-MTW strategy as a force sizing criteria and assure the U.S. is not living a lie as if the dual-MTW concept were part of the national military strategy;
- Endorse a New Look Collective Engagement policy and security strategy, similar to that described above, with the carefully applied principles of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine.

But still missing is a long-term solution, preferable made into law that would inexorably ensure future adventurist foreign policies would be made more expensive in terms of domestic political support. The answer may be found in the Abrams Doctrine.

INTEGRATING THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff challenged President Johnson in 1967 to mobilize the reserves, he refused — probably the key decision of the entire Vietnam conflict.51 In the words of the authors of the Pentagon Papers, mobilization of the reserves was a "political sound barrier" which remained unbroken during the war. Most historians agree that this domestic constraint virtually dictated American war policy...President Johnson viewed reserve mobilization as the "threshold" beyond which the nation would
understand itself to be on a "war footing." Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams subsequently recognized this "threshold" as a key to ensuring support of the American people would be behind the military effort.

History demonstrates that a disciplined strategic military leader can influence crisis response strategies that their civilian masters may be tempted to employ. To counter the adventuristic implementation of the '60s Flexible Response strategy, General Creighton Abrams rearranged force structure in the '70s to increase the domestic political cost for the Commander in Chief to commit forces for other than truly vital interests. General Abrams is reported by his biographer to have said, "They're not taking us to war again without the reserves." The rationale seemed to stem from his experiences during Vietnam, when the Johnson Administration purposefully avoided calling up the reserves.  

It is important to take pause here to point out that there were other significant strategic issues that drove Abrams's decision-making process on the active-reserve mix. The Vietnam War was all but over, and the American people were tired of war and looking for a traditional American post-war draw down. The Cold War was going strong, with a credible Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat looming in Europe. There was intense debate over the "tooth-to-tail" ratio of combat forces to combat support and combat service support and the need for a strong deterrence. Lieutenant General Depuy, General Abrams's subordinate, took note that even with a large scale reserve, "without mobilization, the Army should be able to deploy either a heavy corps of three divisions and support, or a light corps of three divisions and support, and maintain it in combat for 90 days."  

Abrams also had developed a requirement to reach sixteen active divisions with a personnel cap that would support only thirteen. That personnel cap was not only driven by congressional limp support, but also by the estimates on what he could recruit in the new voluntary Army -- VOLAR -- because compulsory draft had recently ended. One may speculate here that Abrams had seen the effects of the draft on popular support from hometowns across America and must have known that with the VOLAR, the political connection would be lost or had to be replaced. Abrams's philosophical "doctrine" on the active-reserve mix was that if we go to war, then the NCA should be forced to call up a significant portion of the reserves. Abrams developed a force structure premise, placing critical forces in the reserve component. This was called the Total Force Concept and later, in 1973, made policy by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger.  

In his seminal book on the decision process for foreign military interventions, Veztberg highlights the importance of determining the sufficiency of military capability to sustain the intervention and all other commitments. He writes:

The scarcity of regular troops may constrain both the ability to get involved in large scale overt military intervention and, once involved, to escalate the intervention. An intervention that requires mobilization of reservists raises the risk of unwelcome social events -- first among them, the arousal of public sensitivity to the problem. Public scrutiny of the policy may become a direct constraint on the decisionmaker's flexibility and freedom to escalate, and it may have further indirect effects due to increased importance of domestic legitimacy for intervention.
Some would take issue with the viability of this doctrine. One observer, for example, recommends abandonment of the dual-MTW as "no longer an intellectually viable construct." He takes an opposing view on building "MOOTW Forces" into U.S. force structure and recommends leading the U.S. force structuring away from the Abrams Doctrine:

...the U.S. military's professional agenda for the foreseeable future will be dominated by small wars and military operations other than war [MOOTW]...[and that the U.S.] pays insufficient attention to MOOTW as a strategy. Most of these missions require either little in the way of conventional military power or the employment of substantial conventional force in non-traditional ways. Many elevate the value of combat support and combat service support above combat itself, which in turn elevates the relative importance of the Reserve vis-a-vis Active Components...The transfer of MOOTW-critical Reserve Components [e.g. civil affairs and psychological operations units] to permanent active service would probably enhance active force MOOTW effectiveness...\^58

The commentator goes on to say the Total Force Policy of the 70s has had no discernable impact on restraining presidential commitments to SSCs, probably because most SSCs to date have been popular or cheap or too small. He sees the likelihood of the MTW scenario as miniscule. His conclusion would be just the opposite from Abrams's — that the United States should place required RC units (such as psychological operations and civil affairs units) more in the active component (AC) to meet the demands of SSCs.\^59 This is similar to what General Shinseki, the current Chief of Staff of the Army, has proposed in the report: "The Fort Lewis Brigades units are to serve as the contingency force for operations below the threshold of full-scale war, including peacekeeping."\^60 One U.S. Army reserve officer agreed with Record's and General Shinseki's conclusion that the AC forces need more MOOTW capability: "The question is how do find the appropriate mix (of active component/reserve component--AC/RC) and the structure of the RC to support those missions without decimating support for the [RC]. We are beating a small group of RC units to death in rotations. I think we should, first, admit it if that's the mission of the future and then restructure the AC to bear the 'active missions'."\^61 His view certainly would ease the pain felt in the RC by reversing the Abrams Doctrine.

This argument is one that would probably better support the Clinton policy of engagement than would the Abrams Doctrine. The Clinton policy would probably receive more political support from Congress and the American people by using only AC forces in MOOTW and keep the RC available only for vital national interests. The AC forces, after all, are full-time volunteers and deployment is just another job site. The Abrams Doctrine reflects the military's desire to restrict forces available for rapid response to what the President decides. It is a persuasive argument to note that our country's system of government is founded on civilian control of the military. If the President decides to send forces to conduct MOOTW, the military is obligated to structure itself accordingly, to meet the mission set directed by the Commander in Chief. Has not the U.S. military, particularly the Army, failed to do so since the end of the Cold War? The Abrams Doctrine is an attempt to limit the utility of the Armed Forces. In the strongest form of this argument, is this tantamount to mutiny?

13
No, because the Abrams Doctrine was implemented as an addendum to an existing insurance policy. The RC has historically been the national repository of forces, accessible in the event of war. In the wake of the Vietnam debacle, the "Total Army" concept was vigorously supported by our civilian leaders of the time. The concept envisioned only one Army, not artificially separated by full- or part-time duties. This concept is receiving even greater civilian support today, expressed in the Department of the Army Vision: "We will develop leaders at all levels and in all components [emphasis added] who can prosecute war decisively and who can negotiate and leverage effectively in those missions requiring engagement skills." Throughout the Army Vision statement, the term "The Army" is emphasized to recognize that the increased melding of the RC and AC now warrants removing the word "Total" from the concept. Secretary of Defense William Cohen recently published a policy "to eliminate 'all residual barriers - structural and cultural' to effective integration of the reserve and active components...." Clearly civilian leadership, at least in the DoD, is behind the one Army and one military concept. Perhaps they recognize that to split the military along ideology associated with foreign intervention is more politically unsavory than to make the difference clear. Would not a reverse of the "One Army" policy make the AC seemingly more of a mercenary force while the RC was the only true measure of national will?

The very pain that the RC experiences during these long term SSCs is really part of the cure proposed by the Abrams Doctrine. Reservists and guardsman who make up a viable political constituency translate that pain into political action. These observers think the pain is not large enough to make any difference, but the jury is still out -- especially in the wake of the Air Force reservists and guardsman who were called up during the Kosovo air campaign. A greater political impact also remains to be seen when the U.S. portion of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia is next filled by:

- SFOR 7, 49th Armored Division, Texas National Guard;
- SFOR 8, brigades from the North Carolina and Oklahoma National Guard;
- SFOR 9, brigade from the Georgia National Guard;
- SFOR 10, 29th Infantry Division (Light), Virginia National Guard;
- SFOR 11, brigades from the Idaho and Indiana National Guard; and,
- SFOR 12, by the 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Pennsylvania National Guard.

The pain of calling up the reserves is the cost of ensuring the popular support from the American people -- pulling the deep roots of hometown America. Stephen M. Duncan, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs makes a strong statement. "The involuntary activation of citizen warriors...for activities that do not involve important American security interests, that have no urgency, and that in many cases have limited training value is an ironic perversion [of the Abrams Doctrine]." Duncan concludes the costs of continually activating the reserves for MOOTW missions will be a deterioration of the reserve components to the point our ability to protect truly vital interests will be adversely affected. Another opinion comes from a present day National Guardsman who supports the Abrams Doctrine:

I would argue that it is even more valid today for a number of compelling reasons. The concept of a "just-war" has been largely compromised due to political scandal,
disillusionment in the nation's government, media access to the war as it transpires, and the complication of world environment and associated foreign policy issues. With this in mind, national support becomes a much more difficult asset to gain and maintain. The Guard represents the communities from which it is formed and thus represents the American public in a much more intimate way than any other component can. Further, the Governors who command each state Guard during peacetime can muster considerable support (or criticism) when considering activating "their" armies. Any consideration for activation of the Guard has been met with a closer scrutiny of the tolerance of families and employers that will support this. In this day and age of very close attention by the media, and in turn the public, to any military action, many politicians see Guard involvement as an integral part of gaining grass roots support.58

The jury is still out for another reason. The DoD has found creative workarounds to prevent large-scale reserve call-ups that would otherwise be necessary. Since the Clinton Administration took office, massive use of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) has been employed and provided large-scale goods and services to operating forces. As a logistician, it is this author's estimate that the equivalent of five to eight battalions of construction engineers, logistics, signal, and other support units would have been necessary to support operations in Bosnia had it not been for the heavy use of Brown and Root Services Corporation (BRSC). BRSC was initially contracted under LOGCAP and has cost the government over one billion dollars in Bosnia alone.69 This is not to suggest this is a cheaper alternative to military force structure (beyond the scope of this paper) but to suggest a more politically acceptable alternative to using force. Congress should monitor the use of LOGCAP as a means to circumvent the need to call up the reserves; otherwise, the President could commit AC forces to long term and potentially unpopular operations without testing the support of the American people.

Military historians have studied how means can constrain strategy.70 One of the great lessons from World War II that highlights this concept was best expressed in a post-war study:

The...ability of a nation to wage modern war lies fundamentally in its resources of [its access to] raw materials, industrial capacity, transport, scientific knowledge, and manpower. These are only potentials. For combat, they must be translated into fully equipped and trained forces at strategic points...[These factors] influenced, and in many cases dictated, consideration of strategy, whether the grand strategy of the United Nations or the strategy of a single campaign.71

The corresponding concept-- an abundance of means -- may be equally as pervasive. Thus, the tyranny of means is a sword that cuts both ways. The art of force management is the careful balancing between having too much available and having too little -- to avoid the tyranny of means. With the authority to organize, train, and equip forces, service secretaries and chiefs should consider the Abrams Doctrine as a suitable method to counterbalance adventuristic policies in the decades ahead, no matter what political party is in office. If senior military leaders do not, Congress should direct the active-reserve force structure mix to further and inexorably link the use of force to the will of the American people. A logical step for the Congress, then, may be to extend the Abrams Doctrine into law to further buttress Clausewitz's Trinitarian balance. What should the force look like under a new look collective engagement policy based strategy, governed by the Abrams Doctrine?
A RESULTING PRINCIPLED FORCE STRUCTURE

A former congressional staff member, James L. George, presents a provocative argument that the need for large standing forces maintained at high states of readiness, has been recently overstated, and may always have been -- even during the Cold War. He refutes the "No more Task Force Smiths" and the "Hollow Force" arguments quite well. He first attacks the Task Force Smith rationale:

While there is no question that the Task Force Smith episode was not the Army's finest hour, there were many factors leading to its so-called rout. Readiness per se was really only one--and not even the most important [among ten listed]...Task Force Smith was routed on July 5th, [1950] but only a month later -- on August 4th -- the Pusan perimeter was established...By early November some American forces had reached the Yalu River. 72

He also disparages the "Hollow Force" myth:

"Hollow Force" is one of those terms that everyone uses but few have really defined...definitive story has yet to be written...much evidence is anecdotal...[but] would seem many observers would agree that the factors behind the Hollow Force involved much more than just [readiness]...While the 1970s were not the best of times, they were certainly not the worst of times either...[George goes on to list: major weapons system acquisitions, such as the F14, F15, and F16; better leadership that invoked a revolution in attitude and training; and the beginning of systematic drug testing and enforcement].73

George recommends placing more of our military in the reserves by drastically furthering the tiered-readiness approach begun by General Abrams. This approach is capabilities-based and assumes, as some observers have, that no real threat to U.S. vital interests can be projected through 2015. He proposes force structure amounting to:

- Six, well-resourced Army divisions as a capable decisive force, with strategic power projection enablers [place remainder in the Reserve component];
- A status quo Naval force [Navy and Marines] as the initial deterrent and response force; and,
- An Air Force principally placed in the reserve components, because their readiness is the easiest to maintain [evidenced by recent operations and the Air Force successful employment of Reserves].74
- [The author of this paper would add more resources to the special operating forces to promote asymmetrical responses to deter or confront would-be opponents].

George's approach largely ignores the policy debate on the current administration's propensity for multiple military interventions. He also does not address issues associated with current operations tempo and personnel. But, under his plan, the United States would have no choice but to make the active force smaller, and consequently, when taken in concert with the Abrams Doctrine, would have the effect of constraining the expansionistic "global leadership" of the Clinton Administration. An added benefit would be to take the savings from the active force structure and place it in research and development, information warfare, and covert operations -- asymmetrical responses similar to Eisenhower's New Look.

In taking George's idea even further, readiness must be redefined and focussed on a "troop-to-task" (capabilities-based) total force structure. Critical tasks would be derived from regional,
asymmetrical strategies, implemented in synergistic "strategic cocktails" with interagency-coordinated economic, political, informational, and military means. The assumption of no foreseeable large threats to U.S. vital interests could be hedged with continued expeditionary naval capability, backed by a tiered-decisive Army force -- a smaller active and a larger reserve force, and a primarily reserve Air Force structure. Finally, the Army needs to implement quickly the new Chief of Staff, General Shinseki's, vision for a lighter, more mobile Army.\textsuperscript{75}

CONCLUSION

Structuring much of the force in the RC can ensure that a small, high-tech, highly trained and mobile, warrior-spirited, and highly resourced active force is inseparably tied to equally well-resourced citizen soldiers. The citizen soldier is the strongest measure of linkage in Clausewitz's remarkable trinity, because it overlaps two of the three necessities: the "commander and his army" and the "people."\textsuperscript{76} General Westmoreland, the U.S. Commander in Vietnam, is quoted as saying the reserve is "a highly-visible manifestation of the nation's resolve."\textsuperscript{77} His statement was profoundly correct as proven by his futile attempt to win the Vietnam War without the mobilization of the reserves. This is not to suggest mobilizing the reserves wins wars, but would signify the magnitude and duration of national determination to win. Where he failed was to tender his resignation when not provided the forces and national resolve he said he needed. Years after Vietnam, after General Johnson had stepped down as Chief of Staff of the Army, he "told Bruce Palmer that his greatest regret that he had not resigned in protest over the President's failure to mobilize [the reserves]."\textsuperscript{78} In the year 2010, will our senior military leaders have similar regrets for not forcing the same issue or for not developing principled advice and opinion on policy and strategy?

Senior military leaders have a moral and legal obligation to advise and express opinions on the basic policy that has placed the U.S. military in a risk position of global overstretch. \textit{The tyranny of means} is corroding the core warfighting purpose of the military and has, in a vicious circle, created a snowball that is gaining perhaps unrecoverable momentum. Senior military leaders should prepare now to give the best possible advice to the upcoming new administration on the merits of returning to a more principled \textit{New Look Cooperative Engagement} policy based strategy. The Joint Chiefs must convince Congress and the next President to place more of our forces in the reserve to help prevent future globalistic adventures in the next century and preserve the warfighting culture of the U.S. military. The QDR is a good place to start this process.

John Hillen in his remarkable essay on military culture said it best. "Certain constants must always apply lest the U.S. military culture: (1) no longer effectively provide for the common defense; (2) lose its institutional soul, properly rooted in warfighting; or, (3) accommodate demands for social change at the expense of the military's functional or legal imperative."\textsuperscript{79} Hillen goes on to say, "the path of least resistance for the military, is just to abandon many tenets of its traditional culture and surrender...the result that social imperatives are imposed at the expense of functional imperatives, introducing a possibly
calamitous confusion between means and ends. 30 Clearly Hillen underwrites the principle of the tyranny of means.

POST SCRIPT

Interestingly, the President seems to have reversed this dichotomy (at least in writing) in the more recent December 1999 version of his NSS. In it, he more clearly states “the primary mission of our Armed Forces is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are threatened.” 31 This latest rendition also reduces emphasis on military engagement activities. Perhaps this is a sign of a turn in policy, but one not yet implemented. The dominant and probably lasting U.S. role in Kosovo peace enforcement operations clearly reflects the 1998 version. Perhaps with the presidential election year and with recent, stronger advice from the CJCS, this may be a real policy shift.

Word Count: 9,461
ENDNOTES


6Clinton, p. 22.

7Shalikashvili, cover memorandum used as a preface to the NMS.


13"Warfighting Doctrine Will Shift Dramatically," AUSA News, Vol. 23, No. 2., December 1999, p. 2. Interestingly, General John Abrams is the son of General Creighton Abrams. Ironically, his father was also father of the Abrams Doctrine discussed later in the article.


15The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant’s Lecture Series.

17. U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Strategic Planning System. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01A (Washington, D.C.: 1 September 1999), Enclosure D, paragraph 3.b. (1).


22. Shalikashvili, p. 15.


27. Ibid., p. 21.


29. Holmes, p. 3-4.


33 Davis, p. A12.

34 Francine Kiefer, "Clinton 'Doctrine:' Is it Substance or Spin?" Boston Christian Science Monitor, p. 2.

35 Shafritz et al., p. 154.


37 Ibid., p. 151.

38 Ibid., pp. 152-161.


43 See John Lewis Gaddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 244-48, for an excellent accounting from both superpowers strategies during the Eisenhower and Krushchev years. For example, Eisenhower's asymmetrical impetus to develop the U-2 system and support for future satellite reconnaissance capability confounded the Soviets. Krushchev "must have realized from the day the first U-2 flew over the Soviet Union how difficult it was going to be to sustain strategic claims based on so little substance."

44 Shafritz et al., 716.


50 This model is a hybrid between the Army model ingrained in most soldiers' memories (the Army 5-step risk management model) and a similar one presented in a comprehensive handbook: Leverett, E.J., Jr., Risk Management (Department of Risk Management and Insurance, University of Georgia: Athens, Georgia, 1989), 2-1 to 2-3. The author also quotes Mehr and Hodges, perhaps equally applicable to risk management in foreign policy, "(1) Don't risk more than you can afford; (2) Don't risk a lot for a little; and, (3) Consider the odds," on page 2-1." The Army comprehensive doctrine on Risk Management is published in Field Manual 100-14, Risk Management, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 23 April 1998.

51 Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and the Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," p. 39


53 Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's, 1998), pp. 363-364. I asked Dr. Sorley in an electronic mail letter to comment on that research. Here is his reply (cited with his permission):

—Original Message——

From: Lewis Sorley To: Paparone Date: Wednesday, October 27, 1999 2:14 PM Subject: Re: Creighton Abrams and the Total Force Policy Dear Chris: 1. It is clear to me that General Abrams had two objectives in so structuring the force. As General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr. often heard Abrams say, "They're not talking us to war without the reserves again." One aim was to provide a means of realizing a sixteen-division force within a restricted end strength. The other was to ensure the public support that comes from having the reserve component called to active duty, support that had been forfeited by LBJ's persistent refusal to call the reserves during the Vietnam War. 2. You are right that the primary documentation for this comes from interviews rather than documents. But the witnesses are authoritative. They include both General Kerwin and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. See in addition to "Thunderbolt" my essay "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime" in "Parameters" (Summer 1991). 3. You might also find some substantiation in Major Creighton Abrams's [son of General Abrams] study of the sixteen-division force. It is cited on p. 403 of the "Bibliography" in "Thunderbolt." Best wishes, Dr. Lewis Sorley


56 James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense Memorandum, subject:: Readiness of the Selected Reserve, 23 August 1973. The Secretary wrote: "Total Force is no longer a 'concept.' It is now the Total Force Policy which integrated the Active, Guard, and Reserve into a homogenous whole."


58 Record, 9-21.

59 Ibid., p. 21.


61 The electronic mail was from a source (U.S. Army Reserve Officer) to remain anonymous at the officer's request.


64. Vinch, p. 2.

65. This is a slightly modified and noteworthy quote from Edwin J. Philbin, "Guard Ready to Serve," USA Today, 15 December 1997, p. 22A. Philbin is a retired Major General and former assistant secretary of Defense under President Ronald Reagan -- now executive director of the National Guard Association of the United States.


67. Ibid., p. 223.

68. The electronic mail was from a source (U.S. Army National Guard Officer) to remain anonymous at the officer's request.

69. Electronic mail from Alan I. Moses, Chief, Civilian Augmentation Program Management Program Manager, Sustainment Contract HQ USAREUR, ODCSLOG, Plans & Operations Division Operations Branch, Sustainment Section DSN 370-6609 / 6767 (fax ext. 3158) Commercial +49 (0)6221 57 + ext. Cell Phone: +49 (0)173 230 1367. Message text as follows:

---Original Message---
From: Moses, Alan <mosesa@hc.husareur.army.mil>
To: 'Paparone' <paparone@pa.net>
Date: Tuesday, November 02, 1999 3:13 AM
Subject: RE: How much has BRSC cost so far?
Here is the through end of FY 99 + $1,032M or 1 billion 32 million.
Alan


73. Ibid., 9-12.

74. Ibid., 17-18.


77 Brower, p. 40.


80 Ibid., p. 21.

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Kiefer, Francine, "Clinton 'Doctrine:' Is it Substance or Spin?," Boston Christian Science Monitor, p. 2.


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Schlesinger, James, Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 23 August 1973, subject: Readiness of the Selected Reserve.


SPEECHES

THESIS


UNPUBLISHED NOTES

Depuy, William E., LTG, notes taken at the Army Commanders' Conference, 1972, obtained from the Military History Institute archives 15 September 1999.