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RELATING TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM
(REVISED EDITION)

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UNITED STATES SENATE

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PREFACE

This compilation is an updated version of a January 14, 1965, committee print. It contains material deemed useful in any discussion of the situation in southeast Asia. The material has been collected with the assistance of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, the Department of State, and the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

J. W. Fulbright,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
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A. SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1954-1965

Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, and the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations

1948

June 5.—Bao Dai, French High Commissioner Emile Bollert, and Gen. Nguyen Van Xuan sign the Baie d’Along Agreement to establish State of Vietnam with Bao Dai as chief of state within the French Union.

1949

March 8.—The Elysee Agreement, in the form of an exchange of letters between Bao Dai and President Auriol of France, outlines the general principles affecting French-Vietnam relations.

June 14.—An exchange of letters between Bao Dai and French High Commissioner Leon Pignon puts into effect the Elysee Agreement. United States sends message of welcome to Bao Dai.

July 1.—Bao Dai decrees formally establishes State of Vietnam and provide a basis for its organization on a constitutional framework.

1950

February 7.—Great Britain and the United States extend de jure welcomes to Vietnam.

February 19.—U.S. consulate general in Saigon is raised to Legation and Minister accredited to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.


1951

September 7.—United States signs agreement with Vietnam for direct economic assistance.

September 8.—Delegates from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos participate in the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty at San Francisco.

1952

July.—U.S. Legation in Saigon is raised to Embassy status. U.S. Ambassador presents credentials to Bao Dai. Vietnamese Embassy is established in Washington, D.C.

October 12.—The 200th U.S. ship carrying military aid arrives in Saigon.

1 This chronology has been compiled primarily on the basis of "Deadline Data on Work Affairs," Deadline Data, Inc., New York, and Memorandum RFE-14, Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Jan. 10, 1962.
1954

May 8—July 21.—Geneva Conference on Indochina. The delegates are from Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. (joint chairmen), France, the United States, Communist China, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and the Vietminh regime. Agreements are signed on July 20 and 21 and the main provisions concerning Vietnam are that (1) Vietnam is to be partitioned along the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam, (2) regulations are imposed on foreign military bases and personnel and on increased armaments, (3) countrywide elections, leading to the reunification of North and South Vietnam, are to be held by July 20, 1956, and (4) an International Control Commission (ICC) is to be established to supervise the implementation of the agreements. The United States and Vietnam are not signatories to the agreements. The United States issues a unilateral declaration stating that it (1) “will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb” the Geneva agreements, (2) “would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security,” and (3) “shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the U.N. to insure that they are conducted fairly.”

July 7.—Head of State and former Emperor Bao Dai appoints Ngo Dinh Diem Premier of Vietnam.

August.—Flow of almost 1 million refugees from North to South Vietnam begins.

October 11.—The Communist Vietminh regime formally takes over control of Hanoi and North Vietnam.

October 24.—President Eisenhower sends a letter to Premier Diem of South Vietnam stating that American assistance will be given hereafter not through the French authorities, but directly to the Government of South Vietnam. The letter also states that the U.S. Government “expects this aid will be met by * * * undertaking needed reforms.”

December 29.—Conference of France and the Associated States (Cambodia, etc.) terminates the economic and customs union between the Associated States.

1955

January 1.—United States promises to render direct assistance to Vietnam, on the basis of the existing pentalateral agreement of December 1950, for support of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

February 5.—Premier Diem decrees the first of a series of laws initiating important and extensive land reform program.

February 12.—The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) takes over the training of the South Vietnamese Army, following the relinquishing of command authority by the French.

March 2.—Cambodia’s King Sihanouk abdicates in favor of his father Prince Norodom Suramarit after criticism by the International Supervisory Commission of his proposed electoral reforms.

March 7.—United States and South Vietnam sign agreement which supplements existing economic cooperation agreement of September 1951.

March 29.—Armed revolt is precipitated in Saigon by the Binh Xuyen political-bandit group, spreading ultimately into large-scale dissidence in the southern provinces with the participation of elements of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects.

April 17.—South Vietnamese Government appeals to the U.N. against the North Vietnamese Communists, who, in violation of the Geneva agreements, prevent northerners from migrating to South Vietnam.

April 23.—Chou En-lai and the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister gives assurances of “noninterference” to ex-King Sihanouk of Cambodia.

May 10.—Premier Diem forms a new Cabinet composed largely of his own followers.

May 10.—United States signs agreement with Cambodia for direct military aid to replace the aid formerly given through the French Government.

July.—Communists initiate first overt propaganda move in South Vietnam by distributing literature signed by North Vietnam’s “National United Front.”

July 1.—France formally relinquishes command authority over the Vietnamese Navy.

July 7.—French formally transfer Nha Prang Airbase to Vietnamese control.

July 20.—Talaks were scheduled to begin (according to Geneva agreement) for the preparation of all-Vietnam elections to be held on July 20, 1956, to reunite the country. The Government of South Vietnam rejects the North Vietnamese Government’s invitation to discuss the elections, on the grounds that in North Vietnam the people would not be able to express their will freely and that falsified votes in North Vietnam could overrule the votes in South Vietnam.

August 16.—Last French High Commissioner in Vietnam departs.

September 25.—Cambodia leaves the French Union. Cambodia declared an “independent and sovereign state” by the Cambodian National Assembly.

October.—Binh Xuyen is defeated as an organized armed insurgent force.

October 23.—A national referendum deposes Bao Dai, former Emperor and since March 7, 1949, head of State of Vietnam. Ninety-eight percent of the votes express preference for Premier Diem.

October 26.—A Republic is proclaimed by Ngo Dinh Diem who becomes the first President of South Vietnam.

October 31.—President Diem issues his first order to the Vietnamese Armed Forces as their supreme commander.

December 12.—U.S. consulate in Hanoi is closed.
January.—South Vietnamese Army units occupy Tay Ninh, principal Cao Dai political center, leading to breakup of the organized Cao Dai armed insurgency. Agreement with Cao Dai leaders on February 28 legalizes Cao Dai religious practices and forbids its political activities as a religious sect.

February 12.—Tran Van Soai, leader of an important Hoa Hao faction, surrenders. Ba Cut, another principal Hoa Hao leader, is captured on April 13, leading to breakup of organized Hoa Hao armed insurgency.

February 18.—Sihanouk on a visit to Peiping declares that Cambodia renounces SEATO protection.

March 4.—General elections for South Vietnam's first National Constituent Assembly, which is to have 123 members, results in the victory of the National Revolutionary Movement and other political parties supporting President Diem.

March 31.—Souvanna Phouma becomes Prime Minister of Laos.

April 6.—Vietnam Government announces it will continue to cooperate with the ICC and reiterates its position of supporting Vietnam-wide elections at such time as conditions in Communist North Vietnam permit genuinely free voting.

May 9.—Communist China signs a 2-year economic and technical aid agreement with Cambodia.

May 17.—Soviet Union announces the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cambodia.

July 4.—Constituent Assembly in Vietnam approves unanimously a draft constitution providing for a strong executive with safeguards for individual citizens. The President, whose term of office is to be 5 years, has veto power over all legislation of the unicameral parliament and may rule by decree when the National Assembly (elected for 4 years) is not in session.

July 6.—U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon visits Vietnam, hands to President Diem of South Vietnam a letter in which President Eisenhower declares he is looking forward to many years of partnership between the two countries. As guest speaker before the Constituent Assembly, Nixon declares that "the militant march of communism has been halted."

July 30.—Vietnamese liaison mission to the ICC is established preparatory to the transfer of functions from the French liaison mission.

August 5.—Accord reached between Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong for establishment of a coalition government.

September 19.—French Air Force officially transfers the Touraine Airbase to Vietnamese control.

October 26.—South Vietnam's first constitution is promulgated and the National Constituent Assembly is officially transferred into a National Assembly.
January 3.—International Control Commission reports that between December 1955 and August 1956 neither North Vietnam nor South Vietnam have been fulfilling their obligations under the 1954 armistice agreement.

May 5-19.—President Diem visits the United States. He addresses on May 9 a joint session of Congress. In a joint communiqué (issued May 11), President Eisenhower and President Diem declare that both countries will work toward a “peaceful unification” of Vietnam. The United States will continue helping South Vietnam to stand firm against communism.

June.—French naval and air force training mission withdrawn.

July 29.—United States establishes consulate in Hue.

October 22.—Bombing of U.S. MAAG and USIS installations in Saigon; U.S. personnel injured.

November 19.—Two Pathet Lao leaders receive Cabinet portfolios to form government of national union.

1958

January 4.—Large Communist guerrilla band attacks plantation north of Saigon, reflecting steady increase in Communist armed activity in South Vietnam since mid-1957.

May 17.—North Vietnamese liaison mission to the ICC withdrawn from Saigon.

June 25.—Cambodian royal proclamation, alleging that South Vietnamese troops have “invaded” and occupied several Cambodian border villages; accuses South Vietnam of 19 cases of violation of Cambodian territory since January 1957. Allegation is repudiated by the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam.

July 18.—Cambodia recognizes Communist China.

September 10.—France and South Vietnam sign agreement under which France provides aid for the Vietnam Government’s agrarian reform program—1,490 million francs.

November 19.—Cambodia signs trade and payments agreement with North Vietnam.

1959

May 13.—Japan signs a World War II reparations and loan agreement with South Vietnam.

June.—Pathet Lao resumes attack in northern provinces of Laos.

July 8.—Communist guerrillas attack Vietnamese military base at Bien Hoa, killing and wounding several U.S. MAAG personnel.

July 10.—In Belgian Communist publication Red Flag, Ho Chi Minh, head of the North Vietnamese Communist regime, states “we are building socialism in Vietnam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution.”

July 31.—Lao Government announces renewed Pathet-Lao attacks on Government forces.
August 30.—Second national elections give the National Revolutionary Movement and other pro-Government political parties overwhelming majority in the National Assembly in South Vietnam.

October 30.—Spokesman of the Vietnamese Army discloses that a campaign against Communist guerrillas in the country's southernmost region, the Camau Peninsula, resulted in heavy guerrilla losses.

November 14.—French Minister of Finance and Vietnamese Vice President initial (in Saigon) agreements for the settlement of financial claims between the two countries and for a French loan of 7 billion (old) francs (about $14 million) and a credit of 11 billion (old) francs (about $22 million) for the purchase by South Vietnam of capital equipment.

December 31.—General Nosavan takes over control of Lao Government.

1960

April 17.—North Vietnam protests to the chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference (Britain and the U.S.S.R.) against a "formidable" increase of personnel in the American Military Assistance and Advisory Group in South Vietnam; and accuses the United States of turning South Vietnam into "a U.S. military base for the preparation of a new war."

April 30.—An opposition group of 18, calling themselves the Committee for Progress and Liberty, send letter to President Diem demanding drastic economic, administrative, and military reforms.

May 3—Cambodian armed forces repulsed South Vietnamese troops who had crossed into Cambodia.

May 5.—United States announces that at the request of the Government of South Vietnam, the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group will be increased by the end of the year from 327 to 685 members.

June-October.—Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam increase.

June 1-2.—U.S. top-level policy conference on southeast Asia (in Hawaii).

June 13.—Prince Sihanouk becomes Chief of State of Cambodia.

July 2.—Prince Sihanouk declares that if the United States does not "radically revise" its military aid policy, he will ask the Soviet bloc for aircraft and arms.

July 20.—Vietnamese National Assembly delegation leaves Saigon for 6-week visit to the United States.

August 9.—Kong Le takes over Vientiane in coup.

August 15.—Prince Souvanna Phouma becomes Premier of Laos again.

September 29.—Sihanouk urges the East and West power blocs to turn Cambodia and Laos into a guaranteed neutralized buffer zone as means of bringing peace to southeast Asia.

October 26.—President Eisenhower assures President Ngo Dinh Diem, in a letter of good wishes on South Vietnam's fifth anniversary, that "for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead."
November 10—South Vietnam Government sends letter to the ICC charging that Communist attacks in the Kontum-Pleiku area in October (1) involved regular army forces from Communist North Vietnam through Laos, (2) constituted open aggression which was well prepared, commanded by high-ranking officers, and conducted by regular forces trained in North Vietnam, and (3) employed weapons made in North Vietnam and other Communist countries.

November 11.—Military coup attempt against President Diem's regime. Paratroop battalions led by Col. Nguyen Van Thi and Lt. Col. Vuong Van Dong besiege the presidential palace. An order of the day issued by Colonel Thi declares that struggle against the Communists will be intensified, that President Diem is guilty of autocratic rule and nepotism and has "shown himself incapable of saving the country from communism and protecting national unity."

November 12.—Loyalist troops enter the capital and subdue the rebels. According to press reports from Saigon, an estimated 200 soldiers and civilians were killed during the fighting.

November 13.—U.S. State Department expresses satisfaction at the failure of the coup against President Diem and also hopes that "his powers will be established on a wider basis with rapid implementation of radical reforms and energetic action against corruption-suspected elements."

November 16.—Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's brother and political adviser, announces that President Diem plans to appoint a new Government and introduce a far-reaching reform program based on reports of the Ford Foundation and of a French study group.

December 16.—Phoumi Nosavan retakes Vientiane.

1961

January 4.—Prince Boun Oum installed as Premier of Laos.

January 29.—Radio Hanoi praises establishment of the "National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV)," allegedly founded in December 1960. On January 30, Radio Hanoi, quoting the press organ of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam, states that the "sacred historical task" of the NFLSV is "to overthrow the U.S.-Diem clique" and "to liberate the south."

February 6.—President Diem announces (at the first press conference held by him in 5 years) his administrative reform program.

February 7.—President Diem announces he will be a candidate for re-election in the presidential elections to be held on April 9.

March 6.—Pathet-Lao forces begin advance toward Luang Prabang and Vientiane.

March 10.—The Communist-led newly formed National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam announces that a guerrilla offensive against the Government will be started to prevent the holding of the April 9 elections. The "National Front" also declares that it will fight with every means the "dictatorial regime set up by the Americans," that it stands for the "peaceful reunification of the country."
March 27.—Cambodian and South Vietnamese representatives reach agreement in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on settling the Cambodian refugee problem which has recently strained relations between the two countries. Large numbers of Cambodians settled in Vietnam crossed into Cambodia during the past weeks complaining that both Communist guerrillas and Government forces have committed atrocities against them.


April 4.—President Diem appeals to the ICC to make an “immediate and energetic investigation” of growing Communist terrorism and subversion throughout South Vietnam.

April 9.—President Diem and Vice President Tho are elected by an overwhelming majority in Vietnam’s presidential elections.

April 28.—Prince Souvanna Phouma, in Moscow, signs joint communique calling for neutralizing of Laos.

May 2.—North Vietnam calls for a cease-fire in Laos.

May 5.—President Kennedy declares at a press conference that consideration is being given to the use of U.S. forces, if necessary, to help South Vietnam resist Communist pressures. He declares that this will be one of the subjects discussed during the forthcoming visit of Vice President Johnson in South Vietnam.

May 12.—International Control Commission reports a de facto cease-fire has been brought about in Laos.

May 16.—Fourteen-nation conference on Laos convened in Geneva.

June 4.—President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, in Vienna, reaffirm their support of a neutral and independent Laotian Government and of international agreements to assure Lao neutrality.

June 12.—Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and North Vietnamese Premier Phan Van-dong (in Peiping on a visit) accuse the United States of aggression and intervention in South Vietnam.

June 21.—Three Lao princes meet at Zurich and agree to form coalition government.

August 2.—President Kennedy declares that the United States will do all it can to save South Vietnam from communism.

September 1-4.—Series of attacks by 1,000 Communist guerrillas in Kontum Province. Army Command communique states that during the month of August there were 41 engagements between Government forces and Communist rebels in South Vietnam.

September 17.—British advisory mission on administrative and policy matters, headed by R. G. K. Thompson (former Permanent Defense Secretary in Malaya), leaves for South Vietnam.

September 18.—Communist forces estimated at 1,500 men attack and seize the capital of Phuoc Thanh Province, only 60 miles from Saigon.

September 25.—President Kennedy, addressing the U.N. General Assembly in New York, declares that a threat to peace is “the smouldering coals of war in southeast Asia.”
October 1.—Military experts of SEATO meet in Bangkok, Thailand, to consider the increasing Communist menace to South Vietnam. Adm. Harry D. Felt, U.S. Navy commander in chief in the Pacific, declares that there is no immediate prospect of using U.S. troops to stop the Communist advance in southeast Asia, but he indicates that among the plans evolved for “every eventuality” some do call for the use of American troops.

October 2.—President Diem declares at the opening of the National Assembly’s budgetary session: “It is no longer a guerrilla war waged by an enemy who attacks us with regular units fully and heavily equipped and who seeks a strategic decision in southeast Asia in conformity with the orders of the Communist international.” The President also says that the U.S. committee headed by Dr. Eugene Staley recommended an increase in aid both for military measures and for economic and social development.

October 8.—The three Laotian princes—neutralist Souvanna Phouma, pro-Western Boun Oum, and pro-Communist Souphanouvong—agree on Souvanna Phouma as head of coalition government. Agreement subsequently breaks down in dispute over distribution of Cabinet posts.

October 11.—President Kennedy announces (at his new conference) that he is sending Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, his military adviser, to South Vietnam to investigate there the military situation and to report on it to him personally.

October 18.—State of emergency is proclaimed in South Vietnam by President Diem. On the same day the President also begins a series of consultations with Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.

November 16.—Following closely the recommendations in General Taylor’s report, President Kennedy (with the approval of the National Security Council) decides to bolster South Vietnam’s military strength, but not to commit U.S. combat forces at this time.

December 8.—U.S. State Department publishes “white paper” that South Vietnam is threatened by “clear and present danger” of Communist conquest.

December 14.—U.S. President Kennedy pledges increased aid to South Vietnam.

1962

February.—United States withholds cash grant aid from Lao Government “pending further progress toward formation of a government of national union.”

January 4.—A joint United States-South Vietnamese communiqué announces “broad economic and social program [to raise living standards], * * * Measures to strengthen South Vietnam’s defense in the military field are being taken simultaneously.”

February 7.—Two U.S. Army air support companies totaling 300 men arrive in Saigon, increasing (according to the New York Times) the total of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam to 4,000.

February 24.—In a Peiping Radio broadcast, Communist China declares her security seriously threatened by an “undeclared war” being waged by the United States in South Vietnam. The broadcast demands the withdrawal of U.S. personnel and equipment.

February 27.—Two fighter planes, piloted by members of the South Vietnam Air Force, bomb and strafe Presidential palace in Saigon for 25 minutes. President Diem and his staff not injured.


March 22.—“Operation Sunrise,” a comprehensive plan to eliminate the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam, begins with a mopping-up operation of rebels in Binh Duong Province.

April 20.—National Assembly pledges full support to President Diem’s plan to establish thousands of “strategic hamlets” in the Communist-infested Mekong Delta during the current year.

May 6–27.—Communist forces in Laos gain control of large territories; about 2,000 Lao Royal Army troops with their commander flee into Thailand crossing the Mekong River.

May 15.—President Kennedy announces that at the request of the Thai Government and “because of recent attacks in Laos by Communist forces and the subsequent movement of Communist military units toward the border of Thailand,” he has ordered U.S. military forces to Thailand.

May 25.—President Diem promulgates the protection of morality law, which prohibits all dancing and beauty contests, and makes prostitution and “unnatural methods” of birth control illegal.

June 2.—Canadian and Indian members of the ICC find North Vietnam guilty of subversion and covert aggression against South Vietnam. The Polish delegation to the Commission rejects the charge.

June 12.—Three Lao factions sign an agreement for the establishment of a neutralist regime under Souvanna Phouma with Cabinet posts to be divided between the three factions.

June 26.—South Vietnam’s National Assembly votes to extend its term of office by 1 year, to August 1963. The explanation given is that it is impossible to hold elections now, because it would tie down troops needed against the Communist guerrillas.

July 6.—U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara declares that, while a final victory over the Communists in South Vietnam is years away, he is encouraged by the increased effectiveness of U.S. aid to the South Vietnamese forces.

July 23.—Declaration and protocol on the neutrality of Laos is signed by 14-nation conference at Geneva.

July 30.—United States completes the withdrawal of the 5,000 Marines sent to Thailand.

August 20.—Sihanouk asks President Kennedy for an international conference to guarantee Cambodia’s neutrality—threatens to ask for Chinese Communist protection in the absence of guarantees.
September 12.—General Taylor, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, visits the central highland of South Vietnam where mountain peasants (montagnards) are being trained by the U.S. special forces for war against the Vietcong Communist guerrillas.

October 26.—National Assembly extends by 1 year President Diem’s emergency powers to rule by decree.

November 8.—South Vietnam withdraws its Ambassador to Laos as a result of Laos’ establishment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.

December 6.—South Vietnamese Government protests to the ICO against the introduction of Chinese-made weapons and ammunition. A large cache was discovered by a patrol in the central highlands.

December 8.—Government in Saigon announces that 4,077 strategic hamlets have been completed (of a total of 11,182 to be built) and that 39 percent of South Vietnam’s population is now living in these communities.

1963

January 9-11.—Adm. Harry D. Felt, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, confers with Gen. Paul D. Harkins and declares, before his departure, that the Vietcong guerrillas face “inevitable” defeat, and he says: “I am confident the Vietnamese are going to win the war.”

March—June.—Pathet-Lao launch attack on Kong Le’s forces.

March 8.—U.S. military sources report that the Vietnamese Navy has taken over patrol of South Vietnam’s coast from the U.S. 7th Fleet.

April 8-10.—SEATO Ministerial Council meeting in Paris (to discuss the Communist threat to southeast Asia) issues communique on April 10 expressing “concern over the continuing and widening threats to the security” of the treaty area; takes note of the “considerable progress” made in South Vietnam in the fight against Communist subversion and rebellion; emphasizes that effective measures to “prevent and counter subversion continues to be a major task facing the member countries”; and notes the improvements in the “plans for defensive action, in the light of changing and anticipated situations.”

April 10.—SEATO Ministerial Council meeting in Paris calls on the parties to the 14-nation Geneva Conference “to assure the maintenance of peace, neutrality, and national unity” in Laos.

April 14.—U.S. Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman (in a television interview) says that President Kennedy has decided that the United States must not become involved in the continuing conflict in Laos. He says that there are no plans to commit U.S. troops, and military supplies will only be sent if requested by the Laotian Government.

April 17.—President Diem proclaims an “open arms” campaign to induce Vietcong guerrillas to give up their weapons and return to the side of South Vietnam.
April 22.—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk calls the situation in South Vietnam “difficult and dangerous,” and says that the United States “cannot promise or expect a quick victory” and that its role is “limited and supporting.”

May 8.—Riot erupts in northern city of Hue, former imperial capital, 400 miles north of Saigon. Involves Buddhist celebration of the anniversary of Buddha’s birth and the flying of flags on the special day—12 persons are killed, including some children. Buddhist leaders charge that Government troops fired into the crowd, while Government officials say that Communists were responsible for the explosion.

June 3.—Buddhist demonstrations break out in Hue. Martial law is swiftly imposed.

June 7.—President Diem (in a broadcast) appeals for calm and makes a partial concession to Buddhist demands that the Government accept responsibility for the incidents in Hue.

June 11.—Buddhist monk (Thich Quang Duc) commits suicide by burning himself to death with gasoline in front of the Cambodian legation. Further aggravates religious crisis involving South Vietnamese Buddhists.

June 15.—Tentative agreement is reached between Buddhist leaders and representatives of President Diem to end alleged religious discrimination and meet Buddhist demands.

June 16.—Government troops use tanks, tear gas, clubs, firearms, and barbed wire to suppress riots in Saigon which follow an agreement between Buddhist leaders and the Government.

June 27.—President Kennedy announces (in Ireland while on a European tour) the appointment of Henry Cabot Lodge as the next American Ambassador to South Vietnam, effective September 1963, to succeed Frederick Nolting.

July 11.—U.S. Ambassador Nolting returns to South Vietnam after consultations in Washington and issues a statement assuring continued U.S. support to President Diem and warning that “unity of purpose and purpose in action” must not be weakened by “internal dissension.”

July 17.—Armed policemen use clubs against 1,000 Buddhists protesting religious discrimination in front of a pagoda in Saigon. On the same day, President Kennedy says (at his news conference) that the religious crisis in South Vietnam is interfering with the war effort against the Vietcong guerrillas and expresses hope that President Diem and Buddhist leaders will “reach an agreement on the civil disturbances and also in respect for the rights of others.”

August 21.—Martial law is proclaimed throughout South Vietnam by President Diem after hundreds of armed police and government troops raided the main Buddhist Xa Loi pagoda in Saigon.

August 22.—Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau (a Buddhist) submits his resignation to President Diem. Also on the same day, South Vietnam’s Ambassador to the United States Tran Van Chuong (father of Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu) resigns. Both resign in disapproval of Government policies toward Buddhists. Department of State issues statement deploiring action against Buddhist pagodas.
August 26.—U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge presents his credentials to President Diem.

August 27.—Cambodia breaks off diplomatic relations with South Vietnam.

August 29.—French President de Gaulle issues policy statement on South Vietnam. He declares that France is able “to appreciate the role this people would be capable of playing in the current situation of Asia for its own progress and for the benefit of international understanding once it was able to exercise its activity in independence from foreign influence, in internal peace and unity, and in concord with its neighbors. Today, more than ever, this is what France wishes for all of Vietnam.”

August 30.—French Ambassador to the United States Herve Alphand declares, after meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, that General de Gaulle’s statement is part of a long-range French political solution which would reunify North and South Vietnam in “independence and neutrality” and that his declaration is not meant as a slap at the United States.

September 4.—Times of Vietnam charges that U.S. Central Intelligence Agency agents had planned a coup d’etat for August 28 to overthrow President Diem. On the same day, U.S. President Kennedy declares (in a television interview with CBS Correspondent Walter Cronkite) that the United States is prepared to continue to assist South Vietnam “but I don’t think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months, the Government has gotten out of touch with the people.”

September 5.—President Diem declares (in a press interview) that “the Government considers this [Buddhist] affair closed.” He denies reports that his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu has taken control of the Government. On the same day, Ngo Dinh Nhu says (in a press interview): “I have never controlled the Government.”

September 8.—David Bell, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, warns (in a television interview) that the U.S. Congress may cut back aid to South Vietnam unless the Diem government changes its policies. Cambodia receives from Soviet Union three MIG–17 jet fighters and other military equipment.

September 9.—President Kennedy (in a televised interview) says that he doesn’t think “it would be helpful at this time” to reduce U.S. aid to South Vietnam, because that might bring about a collapse similar to that of the Chiang Kai-shek government in China after World War II. On the same day, U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge confers with President Diem.

September 14.—Presidential decree announces end of martial law in Vietnam on September 16.

September 21.—President Kennedy orders Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to go to South Vietnam to review the military efforts against the Communist Vietcong. McNamara and Taylor in South Vietnam from September 24 to October 1.
1963—Continued

September 27.—Elections are held for the 123-member National Assembly. All candidates were approved in advance by the Government; many were unopposed, including President Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his wife, Mme. Nhu.

October 2.—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, report to President Kennedy and the National Security Council on their mission to South Vietnam. The statement says that the United States will continue its "policy of working with the people and Government of South Vietnam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Vietcong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central object of our policy in South Vietnam."

October 7.—Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of President Diem, arrives in New York to begin a 3-week unofficial visit to the United States.

October 8.—U.N. General Assembly agrees to send a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam to investigate charges of Government oppression of Buddhists. The Diem government on October 4 had invited the U.N. to send such a mission.

October 24.—U.N. fact-finding mission on the Buddhist situation in South Vietnam arrives in Saigon, and on the next day confers with President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.

October 27.—Buddhist monk burns himself to death in Saigon—the seventh such suicide since June 11.

November 1.—Military coup (organized by the key generals of the armed forces) against the Diem regime. Rebels lay siege to the presidential palace in Saigon which is captured by the following morning. President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu escape from the palace, but a few hours later are taken by the rebels, and while being transported in an armored carrier to rebel headquarters they are assassinated. A proclamation broadcast by the leaders of the coup (a council of generals, headed by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh) declares that they have "no political ambitions" and that the fight against the Communists must be carried on to a successful conclusion.

November 2.—Military leaders in South Vietnam set up a provisional Government headed by former Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho (a Buddhist) as Premier. The Constitution is suspended and the National Assembly dissolved. Buddhists, students, and other political prisoners arrested by the former regime are released.

November 4.—Premier Nguyen Ngoc Tho of South Vietnam announces formation of a mixed military-civilian Cabinet which has been approved by the military leaders. United States recognizes the new provisional Government of South Vietnam. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk rejects, during a press conference, French President de Gaulle's proposals for a neutral, independent Vietnam, stating that the result would be a Communist Vietnam.

November 9.—United States announces resumption of its commodity-import aid to South Vietnam, suspended in August.
November 14.—President Kennedy, in his news conference, states his confidence in General Harkins and denies reports that Harkins "lost his usefulness in Vietnam because of his identification with the Diem regime."

November 15.—U.S. military spokesman in Saigon reports that 1,000 U.S. servicemen will be withdrawn from South Vietnam, beginning December 3.

November 19.—Sihanouk declares end to all U.S. military and economic aid to Cambodia, charging that the CIA is trying to oust him from power.


November 22.—President John F. Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas, Tex. His successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, affirms on November 24 the U.S. intention to continue its military and economic support of South Vietnam's struggle against the Communist Vietcong.

December 12.—Sihanouk announces the recall of the Cambodian Ambassador to the United States and the entire staff.

December 14.—U.S. military spokesman in Saigon reports on stepped up guerrilla attacks on hamlets, outposts, and patrols in November, estimating Government casualties at 2,800 and Vietcong losses at 2,900. He also reports that enough weapons were captured by the Vietcong to arm five 300-man battalions.

December 19-20.—U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara and Director of CIA, John A. McCone in Saigon to evaluate the new Government's war efforts against the Vietcong.

January 2.—Secretary Rusk announces in news conference that "A Vietnamese Army group seized in the delta area of Vietnam some 300,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, weapons like mortars, recoilless ammunition, made in China" and that almost certainly Hanoi was primarily responsible for their infiltration into South Vietnam.


January 10.—Sihanouk postpones the departure date for U.S. aid personnel, who had been told to leave Laos by January 15.

January 11.—Sihanouk says he is willing to accept U.S. aid if it is offered "without conditions."

January 27.—U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara in a speech before the House Armed Services Committee states that the situation in South Vietnam "continues grave," but that "the survival of an independent Government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of southeast Asia and to the free world that I can conceive of no alternative other than to take all necessary measures with our capability to prevent a Communist victory." France establishes diplomatic relations with Communist China.

February 4-6.—Vietcong launches offensive in Tay Ninh province and the Mekong Delta; in ensuing fighting hundreds of Government troops are reported dead.

February 7.—When asked at a press conference about certain neutralization proposals regarding South Vietnam, Secretary Rusk reiterates U.S. policy that, “If the agreements which have already been reached and which have been signed by those in the north would be fulfilled, there could be peace in southeast Asia.”


February 19.—Sihanouk proposes that a four-nation agreement be signed by the United States, Thailand, South Vietnam, and Cambodia to “recognize” Cambodia’s neutrality and territorial integrity.

March 7.—General Khanh announces a 1-year reform program to rebuild South Vietnam’s political and administrative structure and raise standard of living.

March 8-13.—McNamara and Taylor in Saigon.

March 22.—Vietnam Military Council gives unanimous vote of confidence to Premier Khanh.

April 13-15.—SEATO Ministerial Council communique declares the defeat of Vietcong is “essential” to the security of southeast Asia and SEATO to fulfill its treaty obligations.

April 19.—Military coup (by rightwing generals) against the government of Souvanna Phouma in Laos. United States, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and France protest the coup as a violation of the Geneva accords.

April 23.—Legitimate government of Souvanna Phouma restored in Laos.

April 25.—General Westmoreland to replace General Harkins in Saigon.

May 1.—Souvanna Phouma announces merger of rightwing and neutralist forces in Laos.

May 2.—Explosion in Saigon Harbor sinks U.S. aircraft transport ship.

May 12.—Secretary Rusk asks NATO members to give greater support to South Vietnam.

May 12-13.—Secretary McNamara and General Taylor make fifth on-the-spot review of South Vietnam.

May 17.—Cambodia calls for urgent meeting of U.N. Security Council to consider the “repeated acts of aggression” by United States-South Vietnamese forces.

May 17.—Pathet Lao forces begin overrunning neutralist forces in the Plain of Jars.

May 20.—France proposes reconvening of 14 nation conference on Laos in Geneva. This proposal is rejected by the United States and United Kingdom and endorsed by the Soviet Union, Poland, Cambodia, India, and Communist China.
May 21.—United States initiates reconnaissance flight over Laos.
May 22.—Secretary Rusk stating the choices in Vietnam, says: “A third choice would be to expand the war. This can be the result if the Communists persist in their course of aggression.”
May 25.—U.N. Security Council considers establishment of a commission of experts “to help define and mark the border line between South Vietnam and Cambodia.”
May 27.—United States announces that several T-28 fighter-bombers have been sent to Laos.
June 6—7.—Two U.S. reconnaissance planes are shot down by Pathet Lao ground fire from the Plain of Jars.
June 12.—President de Gaulle calls for an end to all foreign intervention in South Vietnam.
June 23.—President Johnson announces appointment of General Taylor to be U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and Alexis Johnson as Deputy Ambassador.
August 2.—U.S.S. Maddox is attacked in international waters off the coast of North Vietnam by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.
August 4.—Destroyer O. Turner Joy and destroyer Maddox are attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats.
August 4.—President Johnson orders U.S. “air action” against “gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam.”
August 5.—President Johnson’s message to Congress; joint resolution is introduced “To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.”
August 5.—United States sends reinforcements to Tonkin Bay area.
August 6.—Cambodia charges “Americans in uniform joined South Vietnamese in firing into Cambodia.”
August 7.—U.S. Congress approves southeast Asia resolution (Senate vote, 88-2; House vote, 416-0). General Khanh declares state of emergency in Vietnam.
August 17.—President Johnson signs southeast Asia resolution into law (Public Law 88-408).
August 18.—General Khanh elected Vietnamese President by Military Revolutionary Council, ousts Duong Van Minh as chief of state and installs new constitution.
August 26.—General Khanh promises liberalization of regime after repeated protests by Vietnamese.
August 27.—New Vietnam Constitution is withdrawn; Revolutionary Council disbands; General Khanh, Duong Van Minh, and Tran Thien Khiem are named provisional leaders.
August 29.—Nguyen Xuan Oanh is named acting premier of Vietnam to head caretaker government for 2 months. He states General Khanh has suffered mental and physical breakdown.
September 3.—General Khanh resumes premiership; Taylor sees him “rested and recovered”; dissolves triumvirate and restores Duong Van Minh to position of chief of State. Cambodia charges South Vietnam launched “major attack” near Koh Rokar, penetrating into Cambodia territory.
September 13.—Bloodless coup by Brig. Gen. Lam Van Phat against General Khanh in Saigon.
September 13.—Forces loyal to General Khanh regain control of Vietnam government.
1964—Continued

September 15.—Cambodia indefinitely postpones presentation of credentials by U.S. Ambassador-designate Kidder.

September 16.—Laotian talks in Paris end because of deadlock.

September 18.—U.S. Defense Department reports U.S. destroyers in Tonkin Gulf fire on and presumably hit four or five hostile targets.

September 19.—Vietnam Government makes sweeping changes in military command following abortive coup of September 13.

September 26.—Vietnam High National Council formally inaugurated and is charged with preparing a new constitution.

October 2.—Sihanouk, at Communist China's 15th anniversary celebration, says China will grant Cambodia military and economic assistance.

October 20.—Revolutionary Council presents new Vietnam constitution.

October 21.—United States charges Cambodian troops crossed South Vietnam border and seized a U.S. officer.

October 24.—USAF C-123 loaded with ammunition shot down by Cambodia.


October 26.—Vietnam Revolutionary Council elects Phan Khac Suu chief of state.

October 27.—Cambodia claims it shot down U.S. C-123. United States admits plane over Cambodian territory due to "mapreading error."

November 1.—Tran Van Huong named Premier of Vietnam.

November 2.—Russia delivers new arms shipment to Cambodia to replace American equipment.

December 4.—South Vietnam military leaders announce support of Premier Tran Van Huong's government.

December 8-17.—Ambassador Bonsai meets with Cambodian Delegate Son Sann in New Delhi in an attempt to clear away misunderstandings.

December 20.—Military stage purge; dissolve civilian High National Council (provisional legislature). United States opposes power takeover of military and dissolution of civilian parliament.

December 21.—General Khanh supports power of military versus U.S. appeals; declares Vietnam forces would not fight "to carry out the policy of any foreign country."

December 24.—Terrorist bombing in Saigon kills 2 Americans and wounds 52 Americans and 13 Vietnamese.

1965

January 8.—South Korea sends 2,000 military advisers to South Vietnam.

January 13.—Defense Department confirms that two U.S. planes were shot down over Laos.

January 27.—Premier Huong ousted. General Khanh asked to solve the political crisis.
January 28.—General Khanh nominates Nguyen Xuan Oanh as acting Premier.

February 6.—Russian Premier Kosygin arrives in Hanoi.

February 7.—President Shastri of India proposes a meeting between Russian and American leaders to solve problems of southeast Asia.


February 8.—Premier Kosygin announces Soviet willingness to aid North Vietnam if she is invaded.

February 10.—Vietcong blow up U.S. military billet at coastal city of Quinhon, killing 23 soldiers.

February 11.—Secretary General U Thant calls for international negotiations on Vietnam inside or outside of the U.N.

February 15.—Chinese Communists threaten to enter the war if American troops enter North Vietnam.

February 16.—South Vietnamese Armed Forces Council announces that Phan Huy Quat has been named new premier.

February 18.—South Vietnam Army and Marine units stage bloodless coup in Saigon and oust General Khanh.

February 21.—Khanh regains temporary control of the Government.

February 21.—Armed forces council demands resignation of General Khanh.

February 21.—Khanh bows to council demands for resignation.

February 24.—Premier Phan Huy Quat announces South Vietnam's determination to end the war with honor.

February 25.—North Vietnamese officials state negotiations would be considered if American troops were withdrawn.

February 7.—State Department issues white paper detailing charges of aggression on the part of North Vietnam.

March 1.—President Quat rules out peace until the North Vietnamese stop their infiltration into South Vietnam.

March 6.—Two U.S. Marine battalions sent to South Vietnam for limited duty.

March 8.—Secretary General U Thant proposes that the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, Communist China, and North and South Vietnam participate in a preliminary conference.

March 9.—United States rejects U Thant's offer until North Vietnam stops its aggression against South Vietnam.

March 22.—United States discloses that it has provided the South Vietnamese Army with certain types of nonlethal gases.

March 23.—Russian Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev hints of Russian participation in the war.
March 25.—In a public statement President Johnson held out to North Vietnam the prospect of economic aid if peace is secured.

March 29.—Bomb explodes outside U.S. Embassy in Saigon, causing heavy damage and casualties.

April 1.—Seventeen nonaligned nations meeting in Belgrade appeal for immediate negotiations.

April 2.—United States announces intention of sending several thousand more troops to South Vietnam.

April 7.—President Johnson, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University stresses our willingness to negotiate, and suggests a $1 billion aid program for southeast Asia.

April 8.—U.S.S.R. proposes international conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality.

April 8.—Peiping announces that U.S. peace offer is a trick.

April 11.—North Vietnam officials denounce President Johnson's offer to negotiate.

April 12.—Gordon Walker is unsuccessful in British attempts to meet with officials in Hanoi and Peiping over southeast Asia.

April 14.—The United States urges Hanoi to consider the plea of 17 nonaligned nations for peace talks.

April 23.—Secretary Rusk requests Cambodian parley.

May 3.—Cambodia breaks diplomatic relations with the United States.

May 4.—President Johnson requests $700 million supplemental appropriation for Department of Defense for Vietnam effort.

May 5.—House of Representatives approves President's request for additional $700 million in defense funds by vote of 408 to 7.

May 5.—SEATO condemns Communist aggression in Vietnam war.

May 6.—Senate passes $700 million supplemental appropriation bill by vote of 88 to 3.

May 6.—Two U.S. Marine battalions sent to Vietnam; first combat units to be deployed to South Vietnam.

May 12.—Red Chinese Chief of Staff calls for preparation for atomic war. President Johnson declares that Peiping prevents Hanoi from agreeing to talks.

May 13.—United States halts bombing missions on North Vietnam.

May 19.—United States resumes air attacks on North Vietnamese targets.

May 25.—Soviets announce construction of antiaircraft missile sites are underway around the capital of North Vietnam.

June 1.—President asks Congress to authorize $89 million for expanded program of economic and social development in southeast Asia.

June 7.—U.S. military authorities disclose that number of American military personnel in South Vietnam has passed 50,000 mark. (Army, 21,500; Marine Corps, 16,500; Air Force, 9,500; and Navy, 3,500).

June 7.—By vote of 42 to 26 Senate adopts amendment adding $89 million to foreign aid bill in accordance with President's request of June 1.

(See E, p. 233, from chronology, June 8–16, 1965.)
B. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS ON UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS

(On March 8, 1949, France signed an agreement with the state of Vietnam under Bao Dai, agreeing to recognize the independence of Vietnam. Similar agreements were later signed with Cambodia and Laos.)

1. UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF VIET-NAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA: Statement by the Department of State, February 7, 1950.

The Government of the United States has accorded diplomatic recognition to the Governments of the State of Viet Nam, the Kingdom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia. The President, therefore, has instructed the American consul general at Saigon to inform the heads of Government of the State of Viet Nam, the Kingdom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia that we extend diplomatic recognition to their Governments and look forward to an exchange of diplomatic representatives between the United States and these countries.

Our diplomatic recognition of these Governments is based on the formal establishment of the State of Viet Nam, the Kingdom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia as independent states within the French Union; this recognition is consistent with our fundamental policy of giving support to the peaceful and democratic evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government and independence.

In June of last year, this Government expressed its gratification at the signing of the France-Viet Namese agreements of March 8, which provided the basis for the evolution of Viet Namese independence within the French Union. These agreements, together with similar accords between France and the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, have now been ratified by the French National Assembly and signed by the President of the French Republic. This ratification has established the independence of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia as associated states within the French Union.

It is anticipated that the full implementation of these basic agreements and of supplementary accords which have been negotiated and are awaiting ratification will promote political stability and the growth of effective democratic institutions in Indochina. This Government is considering what steps it may take at this time to further these objectives and to assure, in collaboration with other like-minded nations, that this development shall not be hindered by internal dissenion fostered from abroad.

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1 The matter printed in italics is a staff note on the documents and not part of the official text.
The status of the American consulate general in Saigon will be raised to that of a legation, and the Minister who will be accredited to all three states will be appointed by the President.

(Hostilities between the French and Viet Minh Forces began late in 1946 and gradually worsened until the Geneva Agreements of 1954. This statement marks the beginning of U.S. military and economic assistance to the Associated States and France to restore stability in the area. Formal agreements were signed later.)

2. EXTENSION OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID: Statement by the Secretary of State, May 8, 1950

The French Foreign Minister and I had just had an exchange of views on the situation in Indochina and are in general agreement both as to the urgency of the situation in that area and as to the necessity for remedial action. We have noted the fact that the problem of meeting the threat to the security of Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos which now enjoy independence within the French Union is primarily the responsibility of France and the Governments and peoples of Indochina. The United States recognizes that the solution of the Indochina problem depends both upon the restoration of security and upon the development of genuine nationalism and that United States assistance can and should contribute to these major objectives.

The United States Government, convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development.

3. ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM: Note From the American Chargé d'Affaires at Saigon to the Chiefs of State of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, May 24, 1950

I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States has decided to initiate a program of economic aid to the States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. My Government has reached this decision in order to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to restore stability and pursue their peaceful and democratic development.

With these purposes in mind, the United States Government is establishing, with headquarters in Saigon and associated with the United States Legation, a special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. This mission will have the responsibility of working with the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and

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1 Issued at Paris, where the Secretary of State was attending a Western Foreign Ministers meeting; Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1950, p. S21.
2 Department of State Bulletin, June 12, 1950, pp. 977–978. David Bruce, the American Ambassador at Paris, simultaneously delivered an identical note to the President of the French Union.
with the French High Commissioner in developing and carrying out a coordinated program of economic aid designed to assist the three countries in restoring their normal economic life. The members of the American economic mission will, at all times, be subject to the authority of the Government of the United States and will not become a part of the administrations of the Associated States.

The Government of the United States recognizes that this American assistance will be complementary to the effort made by the three Associated States and France, without any intention of substitution. American aid is designed to reinforce the joint effort of France and the Governments and peoples of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, on whom rests the primary responsibility for the restoration of security and stability.

United States economic aid will be granted in accordance with separate bilateral agreements between each of the Associated States and the United States of America. The approval of these agreements will be subject to legal conventions existing between the Associated States and France. Initial economic aid operations, however, may begin prior to the conclusion of these agreements.

The United States Government is of the opinion that it would be desirable for the three governments and the French High Commissioner to reach agreement among themselves for the coordination of those matters relating to the aid program that are of common interest. The American economic mission will maintain contact with the three Associated States, with the French High Commissioner in Indochina and, if desired, with any body which may be set up by the Associated States and France in connection with the aid program.

Mr. Robert Blum has been appointed Chief of the United States special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

Identical letters are being addressed today to the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the President of the French Union.

4. THE MILITARY AID PROGRAM: Statement by the Departments of State and Defense, September 23, 1951

Discussions which have been going on for the past week between General of the Army, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, French High Commissioner in Indochina, and Commander in Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina, and officials of the Departments of Defense and State were concluded September 22 in an atmosphere of cordiality and unity of purpose.

The participants were in complete agreement that the successful defense of Indochina is of great importance to the defense of all Southeast Asia. United States officials stated that General de Lattre's presentation of the situation in that area had been invaluable to them and had demonstrated that United States and French policies in the Associated States were not at variance.

In the course of the discussions with the Department of Defense, the military-aid program for Indochina was reexamined, with the

1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 8, 1951, p. 570.
result that considerable improvement will be made in the rate of
deliveries of many items of equipment. General de Lattre has been
advised that the question of additional aid for the French and Viet-
namese forces in Indochina in the fiscal year 1952 program is under
study by the United States Government.

5. THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA: Communiqué Regarding
   Discussions Between Representatives of the United States,
   France, Viet-Nam, and Cambodia, June 18, 1952

   Mr. Jean Letourneau, Minister in the French Cabinet for the
   Associated States in Indochina, has just concluded a series of conver-
sations with U.S. Government officials from the Department of State,
   Department of Defense, the Office of Director for Mutual Security,
   the Mutual Security Agency, and Department of the Treasury. The
   Ambassadors of Cambodia and Viet-Nam have also participated in
   these talks.

   The principle which governed this frank and detailed exchange of
   views and information was the common recognition that the struggle
   in which the forces of the French Union and the Associated States are
   engaged against the forces of Communist aggression in Indochina is
   an integral part of the world-wide resistance by the Free Nations to
   Communist attempts at conquest and subversion. There was unani-
   mous satisfaction over the vigorous and successful course of military
   operations, in spite of the continuous comfort and aid received by the
   Communist forces of the Viet-Minh from Communist China. The
   excellent performance of the Associated States' forces in battle was
   found to be a source of particular encouragement. Special tribute
   was paid to the 52,000 officers and men of the French Union and
   Associated States' armies who have been lost in this six years' struggle
   for freedom in Southeast Asia and to the 75,000 other casualties.

   In this common struggle, however, history, strategic factors, as
   well as local and general resources require that the free countries
   concerned each assume primary responsibility for resistance in the
   specific areas where Communism has resorted to force of arms. Thus
   the United States assumes a large share of the burden in Korea while
   France has the primary role in Indochina. The partners, however,
   recognize the obligation to help each other in their areas of primary
   responsibility to the extent of their capabilities and within the limita-
   tions imposed by their global obligations as well as by the require-
   ments in their own areas of special responsibility. It was agreed
   that success in this continuing struggle would entail an increase in
   the common effort and that the United States for its part will, there-
   fore, within the limitations set by Congress, take steps to expand its
   aid to the French Union. It was further agreed that this increased
   assistance over and above present U.S. aid for Indochina, which now
   approximates one third of the total cost of Indochina operations,
   would be especially devoted to assisting France in the building of the
   national armies of the Associated States.

   1 Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1952, p. 1010.
Mr. Letourneau reviewed the facts which amply demonstrate the determination of the Associated States to pursue with increased energy the strengthening of their authority and integrity both against internal subversion and against external aggression.

In this connection Mr. Letourneau reminded the participants that the accords of 1949, which established the independence within the French Union of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, have been liberally interpreted and supplemented by other agreements, thus consolidating this independence. Mr. Letourneau pointed out that the governments of the Associated States now exercise full authority except that a strictly limited number of services related to the necessities of the war now in progress remain temporarily in French hands. In the course of the examination of the Far Eastern economic and trade situation, it was noted that the Governments of the Associated States are free to negotiate trade treaties and agreements of all kinds with their neighbors subject only to whatever special arrangements may be agreed between members of the French Union.

It was noted that these states have been recognized by thirty-three foreign governments.

The conversations reaffirmed the common determination of the participants to prosecute the defense of Indochina and their confidence in a free, peaceful and prosperous future for Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.

Mr. Letourneau was received by the President, Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Foster, as Acting Secretary of Defense. Mr. John Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, acted as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation participating in the conversations.

6. SUPPORT BY NATO OF THE FRENCH UNION DEFENSE EFFORTS IN INDOCHINA: Resolution Adopted by the North Atlantic Council, December 17, 1952

The North Atlantic Council

Recognizes that resistance to direct or indirect aggression in any part of the world is an essential contribution to the common security of the free world;

Having Been Informed at its meeting in Paris on the 16th December of the latest developments in the military and political situation in Indochina;

Expresses its wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long continued struggle by the French forces and the armies of the Associated States against Communist aggression; and

Acknowledges that the resistance of the free nations in South-East Asia as in Korea is in fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community;

And therefore agrees that the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indochina deserves continuing support from the NATO governments.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 4.
7. ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES AID FOR FRANCE AND INDOCHINA: Joint Franco-American Communiqué, September 30, 1953

The forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina have for 8 years been engaged in a bitter struggle to prevent the engulfment of Southeast Asia by the forces of international communism. The heroic efforts and sacrifices of these French Union allies in assuring the liberty of the new and independent states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam has earned the admiration and support of the free world. In recognition of the French Union effort the United States Government has in the past furnished aid of various kinds to the Governments of France and the Associated States to assist in bringing the long struggle to an early and victorious conclusion.

The French Government is firmly resolved to carry out in full its declaration of July 3, 1953, by which is announced its intention of perfecting the independence of the three Associated States in Indochina, through negotiations with the Associated States.

The Governments of France and the United States have now agreed that, in support of plans of the French Government for the intensified prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh, the United States will make available to the French Government prior to December 31, 1954 additional financial resources not to exceed $385 million. This aid is in addition to funds already earmarked by the United States for aid to France and the Associated States.

The French Government is determined to make every effort to break up and destroy the regular enemy forces in Indochina. Toward this end the government intends to carry through, in close cooperation with the Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese Governments, the plans for increasing the Associated States forces while increasing temporarily French forces to levels considered necessary to assure the success of existing military plans. The additional United States aid is designed to help make it possible to achieve these objectives with maximum speed and effectiveness.

The increased French effort in Indochina will not entail any basic or permanent alteration of the French Government's plans and programs for its Nato forces.

(On May 7, 1954, Dien Bien Phu fell to Viet Minh Forces after a long siege. This development led France to submit armistice proposals to the Geneva Conference convened the previous month to discuss Korea and “peace in Indochina.” This statement sets forth the United States position on the Geneva negotiations.)

8. THE THREAT OF DIRECT CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA: Address by the Secretary of State, June 11, 1954 (Excerpt)

At the moment, Indochina is the area where international communism most vigorously seeks expansion under the leadership of Ho

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\(^1\) Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 12, 1953, pp. 486-487.
Chi-Minh. Last year President Eisenhower, in his great “Chance for Peace” address, said that “aggression in Korea and Southeast Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action.” But the French were then opposed to what they called “internationalizing” the war. They preferred to treat it as a civil war of rebellion. However, on July 3, 1953, the French Government made a public declaration of independence for the three Associated States, and in September it adopted the so-called Navarre plan, which contemplated a rapid buildup of national native forces. The United States then agreed to underwrite the costs of this plan.

But last winter the fighting was intensified and the long strain began to tell in terms of the attitude of the French people toward a war then in its eighth year. Last March, after the siege of Dien-Bien-Phu had begun, I renewed President Eisenhower’s proposal that we seek conditions which would permit a united defense for the area. I went to Europe on this mission, and it seemed that there was agreement on our proposal. But when we moved to translate that proposal into reality, some of the parties held back because they had concluded that any steps to create a united defense should await the results of the Geneva Conference.

Meanwhile, the burdens of a collective defense in Indochina have mounted. The Communists have practiced dilatory negotiating at Geneva, while intensifying their fighting in Indochina. The French and national forces feel the strain of mounting enemy power on their front and of political uncertainty at their rear. I told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week that the situation is grave but by no means hopeless. The future depends largely on decisions awaited at Paris, London, and Geneva.

The situation in Indochina is not that of open military aggression by the Chinese Communist regime. Thus, in Indochina, the problem is one of restoring tranquillity in an area where disturbances are fomented from Communist China, but where there is no open invasion by Communist China. This task of pacification, in our opinion, cannot be successfully met merely by unilateral armed intervention. Some other conditions need to be established. Throughout these Indochina developments, the United States has held to a stable and consistent course and has made clear the conditions which, in its opinion, might justify intervention. These conditions were and are (1) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of the area; and (5) assurance that France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won.

Only if these conditions were realized could the President and the Congress be justified in asking the American people to make the sacrifices incident to committing our Nation, with others, to using force to help to restore peace in the area.

Another problem might, however, arise. If the Chinese Communist regime were to show in Indochina or elsewhere that it is determined to pursue the path of overt military aggression, then the situation would be different and another issue would emerge. That contingency has already been referred to publicly by the President and myself. The President, in his April 16, 1953, address, and I myself, in an ad-
dress of September 2, 1953, made clear that the United States would take a grave view of any future overt military Chinese Communist aggression in relation to the Pacific or Southeast Asia area. Such an aggression would threaten island and peninsular positions which secure the United States and its allies.

If such overt military aggression occurred, that would be a deliberate threat to the United States itself. The United States would of course invoke the processes of the United Nations and consult with its allies. But we could not escape ultimate responsibility for decisions closely touching our own security and self-defense.

There are some, particularly abroad, who seem to assume that the attitude of the United States flows from a desire for a general war with Communist China. That is clearly false. If we had wanted such a war, it could easily have been based on the presence of Chinese aggressors in Korea. But last July, in spite of difficulties which at times seemed insuperable, we concluded a Korean armistice with Communist China. How could it be more surely demonstrated that we have both the will to make peace and the competence to make peace?

Your Government wants peace, and the American people want peace. But should there ever be openly launched an attack that the American people would clearly recognize as a threat to our own security, then the right of self-preservation would demand that we—regardless of any other country—meet the issue squarely.

It is the task of statesmanship to seek peace and deter war, while at the same time preserving vital national interests. Under present conditions that dual result is not easy to achieve, and it cannot be achieved at all unless your Government is backed by a people who are willing, if need be, to sacrifice to preserve their vital interests.

At the Geneva Conference I said: "Peace is always easy to achieve—by surrender." Your Government does not propose to buy peace at that price. We do not believe that the American people want peace at that price. So long as that is our national will, and so long as that will be backed by a capacity for effective action, our Nation can face the future with that calm confidence which is the due of those who, in a troubled world, hold fast that which is good.

The Geneva Agreements theoretically ended the war between French Union forces and the Vietminh in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. These states were to become fully independent countries, with the last-named partitioned near the 17th parallel into two states pending reunification through "free elections" to be held by July 20, 1956. The United States and Vietnam are not signatories to these agreements.)

9. AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM, July 20, 1954

CHAPTER I—PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

Article 1
A provisional military demarcation line shall be fixed, on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their

1 IC/42/Rev. 2, 20 July 1954.
withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south.

The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as shown on the map attached (omitted).

It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than 5 kms. from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities.

Article 2

The period within which the movement of all the forces of either party into its regrouping zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be completed shall not exceed three hundred (300) days from the date of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 3

When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control.

Article 4

The provisional military demarcation line between the two final regrouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a line perpendicular to the general line of the coast.

All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union, and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

Article 5

To avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities, all military forces, supplies and equipment shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 6

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

Article 7

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Joint Commission.

Article 8

Civil administration and relief in the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief of the two parties in their respective zones. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of
civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed at any one time a figure to be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission or by the Joint Commission. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be determined by the Joint Commission. No one else shall carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

Article 9

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as limiting the complete freedom of movement, into, out of or within the demilitarized zone, of the Joint Commission, its joint groups, the International Commission to be set up as indicated below, its inspection teams and any other persons, supplies or equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint Commission. Freedom of movement shall be permitted across the territory under the military control of either side over any road or waterway which has to be taken between points within the demilitarized zone when such points are not connected by roads or waterways lying completely within the demilitarized zone.

CHAPTER II—PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE GOVERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT

Article 10

The Commanders of the Forces on each side, on the one side the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union forces in Indo-China and on the other side the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet-Nam, shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.

Article 11

In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout all parts of Viet-Nam, in all areas of hostilities and for all the forces of the two parties.

Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the cease-fire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the different sectors of the country as follows:

- Northern Viet-Nam at 8:00 a.m. (local time) on 27 July 1954
- Central Viet-Nam at 8:00 a.m. (local time) on 1 August 1954
- Southern Viet-Nam at 8:00 a.m. (local time) on 11 August 1954

It is agreed that Pekin mean time shall be taken as local time.

From such time as the cease-fire becomes effective in Northern Viet-Nam, both parties undertake not to engage in any large-scale offensive action in any part of the Indo-Chinese theatre of operations and not to commit the air forces based on Northern Viet-Nam outside that sector. The two parties also undertake to inform each other of their plans for movement from one regrouping zone to another within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.
Article 12

All the operations and movements entailed in the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:

(a) Within a certain number of days after the cease-fire Agreement shall have become effective, the number to be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines (including river- and sea-mines), booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substances placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there. All demolitions, mine fields, wire entanglements and other hazards to the free movement of the personnel of the Joint Commission and its joint groups, known to be present after the withdrawal of the military forces, shall be reported to the Joint Commission by the Commanders of the opposing forces;

(b) From the time of the cease-fire until regrouping is completed on either side of the demarcation line:

(1) The forces of either party shall be provisionally withdrawn from the provisional assembly areas assigned to the other party.

(2) When one party's forces withdraw by a route (road, rail, waterway, sea route) which passes through the territory of the other party (see Article 24), the latter party's forces must provisionally withdraw three kilometres on each side of such route, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movements of the civil population.

Article 13

From the time of the cease-fire until the completion of the movements from one regrouping zone into the other, civil and military transport aircraft shall follow air-corridors between the provisional assembly areas assigned to the French Union forces north of the demarcation line on the one hand and the Laotian frontier and the regrouping zone assigned to the French Union forces on the other hand.

The position of the air-corridors, their width, the safety route for single-engined military aircraft transferred to the south and the search and rescue procedure for aircraft in distress shall be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission.

Article 14

Political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones, on either side of the provisional military demarcation line:

(a) Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet-Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement;

(b) Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by the regrouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on,
such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it.

Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is no break in the transfer of responsibilities. For this purpose, adequate notices shall be given by the withdrawing party to the other party, which shall make the necessary arrangements, in particular by sending administrative and police detachments to prepare for the assumption of administrative responsibility. The length of such notice shall be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission. The transfer shall be effected in successive stages for the various territorial sectors.

The transfer of the civil administration of Hanoi and Haiphong to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam shall be completed within the respective time-limits laid down in Article 15 for military movements.

(c) Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties.

(d) From the date of entry into force of the present agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.

**Article 15**

The disengagement of the combatants, and the withdrawals and transfers of military forces, equipment and supplies shall take place in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, equipment and supplies of the two parties shall be completed within three hundred (300) days, as laid down in Article 2 of the present Agreement;

(b) Within either territory successive withdrawals shall be made by sectors, portions of sectors or provinces. Transfers from one regrouping zone to another shall be made in successive monthly installments proportionate to the number of troops to be transferred;

(c) The two parties shall undertake to carry out all troop withdrawals and transfers in accordance with the aims of the present Agreement, shall permit no hostile act and shall take no step whatsoever which might hamper such withdrawals and transfers. They shall assist one another as far as this is possible;

(d) The two parties shall permit no destruction or sabotage of any public property and no injury to the life and property of the civil population. They shall permit no interference in local civil administration;

(e) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall ensure that steps are taken to safeguard the forces in the course of withdrawal and transfer;

(f) The Trung Gia Military Commission, and later the Joint Commission, shall determine by common agreement the exact
procedure for the disengagement of the combatants and for troop withdrawals and transfers, on the basis of the principles mentioned above and within the framework laid down below:

1. The disengagement of the combatants, including the concentration of the armed forces of all kinds and also each party's movements into the provisional assembly areas assigned to it and the other party's provisional withdrawal from it, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective.

The general delineation of the provisional assembly areas is set out in the maps annexed to the present Agreement.

In order to avoid any incidents, no troops shall be stationed less than 1,500 metres from the lines delimiting the provisional assembly areas.

During the period until the transfers are concluded, all the coastal islands west of the following lines shall be included in the Haiphong perimeter:
- meridian of the southern point of Kebao Island
- northern coast of the Ile Rousse (excluding the island), extended as far as the meridian of Campha-Mines
- meridian of Champha-Mines.

2. The withdrawals and transfers shall be effected in the following order and within the following periods (from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces of the French Union</th>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hanoi perimeter</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiduong perimeter</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiphong perimeter</td>
<td>300</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ham Tan and Xuyenmee provisional assembly area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Viet-Nam provisional assembly area—first installment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaine des Jones provisional assembly area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point Camau provisional assembly area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Viet-Nam Provisional assembly area—last installment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER III—BAN ON INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMS AND MUNITIONS, MILITARY BASES

Article 16

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited.

It is understood, however, that the rotation of units and groups of personnel, the arrival in Viet-Nam of individual personnel on a temporary duty basis and the return to Viet-Nam of individual personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam shall be permitted under the conditions laid down below:

(a) Rotation of units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel shall not be permitted for French

1 Not reprinted here.
Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

However, under the heading of individual personnel not more than fifty (50) men, including officers, shall during any one month be permitted to enter that part of the country north of the provisional military demarcation line on a temporary duty basis or to return there after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam.

(b) "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or groups of personnel by other units of the same echelon or by personnel who are arriving in Viet-Nam territory to do their overseas service there;

(c) The units rotated shall never be larger than a battalion—or the corresponding echelon for air and naval forces;

(d) Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis, provided, however, that in any one quarter neither party shall introduce more than fifteen thousand five hundred (15,500) members of its armed forces into Viet-Nam under the rotation policy.

(e) Rotation units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel, and the individual personnel mentioned in this Article, shall enter and leave Viet-Nam only through the entry points enumerated in Article 20 below:

(f) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam. Reports on the arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam shall be submitted daily to the Joint Commission and the International Commission.

All the above-mentioned notifications and reports shall indicate the places and dates of arrival or departure and the number of persons arriving or departing.

(g) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of individual personnel as authorized above, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

Article 17

(a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armoured vehicles, is prohibited.

(b) It is understood, however, that war material, arms and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics. Such replacements of war material, arms and munitions shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north
of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

Naval craft may perform transport operations between the regrouping zones.

(c) The war material, arms and munitions for replacement purposes provided for in paragraph (b) of this Article, shall be introduced into Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below. War material, arms and munitions to be replaced shall be shipped from Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below;

(d) Apart from the replacements permitted within the limits laid down in paragraph (b) of this Article, the introduction of war material, arms and munitions of all types in the form of unassembled parts for subsequent assembly is prohibited;

(e) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures which may take place of war material, arms and munitions of all types.

In order to justify the requests for the introduction into Viet-Nam of arms, munitions and other war material (as defined in paragraph (a) of this Article) for replacement purposes, a report concerning each incoming shipment shall be submitted to the Joint Commission and the International Commission. Such reports shall indicate the use made of the items so replaced.

(f) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the replacements permitted in the circumstances laid down in this Article, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

Article 18

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory.

Article 19

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

Article 20

The points of entry into Viet-Nam for rotation personnel and replacements of material are fixed as follows:

—Zones to the north of the provisional military demarcation line: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen;

—Zone to the south of the provisional military demarcation line: Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tanchau.
CHAPTER IV—PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES

Article 21
The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Viet-Nam, French and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Viet-Nam during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Viet-Nam shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective in each theatre.

(b) The term “civilian internees” is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All prisoners of war and civilian internees held by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to their country of origin, place of habitual residence or the zone of their choice.

CHAPTER V—MISCELLANEOUS

Article 22
The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

Article 23
In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the Forces of either party shall, within a specific period after the entry into force of the Armistice Agreement, permit the graves service personnel of the other party to enter the part of Viet-Nam territory under their military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war. The Joint Commission shall determine the procedures and the time limit for the performance of this task. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall communicate to each other all information in their possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

Article 24
The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the demilitarized zone and the territory under the military control of the other party, and shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in Viet-Nam.

For the purposes of the present Article, the word “territory” includes territorial waters and air space.
Article 25
The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint groups and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

Article 26
The costs involved in the operations of the Joint Commission and joint groups and of the International Commission and its Inspection Teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

Article 27
The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for ensuring and observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all elements and military personnel under their command.

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be studied by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

CHAPTER VI—JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIET-NAM

28. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

29. An International Commission shall ensure the control and supervision of this execution.

30. In order to facilitate, under the conditions shown below, the execution of provisions concerning joint actions by the two parties, a Joint Commission shall be set up in Viet-Nam.

31. The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commanders of the two parties.

32. The Presidents of the delegations to the Joint Commission shall hold the rank of General.

The Joint Commission shall set up joint groups the number of which shall be determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of officers from both parties. Their location on the demarcation line between the re-grouping zones shall be determined by the parties whilst taking into account the powers of the Joint Commission.

33. The Joint Commission shall ensure the execution of the following provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

(a) A simultaneous and general cease-fire in Viet-Nam for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

(b) A re-groupment of the armed forces of the two parties.

(c) Observance of the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and of the demilitarized sectors.
Within the limits of its competence it shall help the parties to execute the said provisions, shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these provisions, and shall endeavor to solve such disputed questions as may arise between the parties in the course of executing these provisions.

34. An International Commission shall be set up for the control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the Representative of India.

35. The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States. The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen, Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tranchau. These points of location may, at a later date, be altered at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, or of the International Commission itself, by agreement between the International Commission and the command of the party concerned. The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers of Viet-Nam, the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for holding enquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams etc.). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require. Beyond the zones of action as defined above, the mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out other movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement.

36. The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the tasks of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in particular:

(a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties, effected within the framework of the re-groupment plan.

(b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the re-grouping areas, and also the demilitarized zones.

(c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well as along all frontiers of Viet-Nam the execution of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions and war material.
37. The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

38. The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, their investigation and their observations, furthermore they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the Commission.

39. If any one inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

40. When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

41. The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 42. If the votes are divided the chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may formulate recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, in order to ensure a more effective execution of that agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

42. When dealing with questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely:

(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan;

(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regrouping zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other party;

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

43. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommendation of the International Commission, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 42, it shall submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

44. The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it should be able to fulfill the tasks provided for in article 36.
45. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos. The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.

46. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam may, after consultation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

47. All the provisions of the present Agreement, save the second sub-paragraph of Article 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.

Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th of July 1954 in French and in Viet-Namese, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Army of Viet-Nam

TA-QUANG BUC,

Vice-Minister of National Defence of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM

I. DELINEATION OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

(Article 1 of the Agreement; Reference Map: Indo-China 1/100,000)

(a) The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as follows, reading from east to west:

the mouth of the Song Ben Hat (Cua Tung River) and the course of that river (known as the Rao Thanh in the mountains) to the village of Bo Ho Su, then the parallel of Bo Ho Su to the Laos-Viet-Nam frontier.

(b) The demilitarized zone shall be delimited by Trung Gia Military Commission in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam.

II. GENERAL DELINEATION OF THE PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY AREAS

(Article 15 of the Agreement; Reference Maps: Indo-China 1/400,000)

(a) NORTH VIET-NAM

Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the French Union forces

1. The perimeter of Hanoi is delimited by the arc of a circle with a radius of 15 kilometres, having as its centre the right bank abutment of
Doumer Bridge and running westwards from the Red River to the Rapids Canal in the northeast.

In this particular case no forces of the French Union shall be stationed less than 2 kilometres from this perimeter, on the inside thereof.

2. The perimeter of Haiphong shall be delimited by the Song-Van-Uc as far as Kim Thanh and a line running from the Song-Van-Uc three kilometres northeast of Kim Thanh to cut Road No. 18 two kilometres east of Mao-Khé. Thence a line running three kilometres north of Road 18 to Cho-Troi and a straight line from Cho-Troi to the Mong-Duong ferry.

3. A corridor contained between:
   In the south, the Red River from Thanh-Tri to Bang-Nho, thence a line joining the latter point to Do-My (South-west of Kesat), Gia-Loc and Tien Kieu;
   In the north, a line running the Rapids Canal at a distance of 1,500 metres to the north of the Canal, passing three kilometres north of Pha-Lai and Seven Pagodas and thence parallel to Road No. 18 to its point of intersection with the perimeter of Haiphong.

Note: Throughout the period of evacuation of the perimeter of Hanoi, the river forces of the French Union shall enjoy complete freedom of movement on the Song-Van-Uc. And the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam shall withdraw three kilometres south of the south bank of the Song-Van-Uc.

Boundary between the perimeter of Hanoi and the perimeter of Hai-duong

A straight line running from the Rapids Canal three kilometres west of Chi-ne and ending at Do-My (eight kilometres south-west of Kesat).

(b) CENTRAL VIET-NAM

Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the forces of the Viet-Nam People's Army south of the Col des Nuages parallel

The perimeter of the Central Viet-Nam area shall consist of the administrative boundaries of the provinces of Quang-Ngai and Binh-Dinh as they were defined before the hostilities.

(c) SOUTH VIET-NAM

Three provisional assembly areas shall be provided for the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

The boundaries of these areas are as follows:

1. Xuyen-Moc, Ham-Tan Area
   Western boundary: The course of the Song-Ray extended northwards as far as Road No. 1 to a point thereon eight kilometres east of the intersection of Road No. 1 and Road No. 3.
   Northern boundary: Road No. 1 from the above-mentioned intersection to the intersection with Route Communale No. 9 situated 27 kilometres west-south-west of Phanthiet and from that intersection a straight line to Kim Thanh on the coast.
2. Plain des Jones Area

Northern boundary: The Viet-Nam-Cambodia frontier.

Western boundary: A straight line from Tong-Binh to Binh-Thanh.

Southern boundary: Course of the Fleuve Antérieur (Mekong) to ten kilometres south-east of Cao Lanh. From that point, a straight line as far as Ap-My-Dien, and from Ap-My-Dien a line parallel to and three kilometers east and then south of the Tong Doc-Loc Canal, this line reaches My-Hanh-Dong and thence Hung-Thanh-My.

Eastern boundary: A straight line from Hung-Thanh-My running northwards to the Cambodian frontier south of Doi-bao-Voi.

3. Point Camau Area

Northern boundary: The Song-Cai-lon from its mouth to its junction with the Rach-Nuoc-Trong, thence the Rach-Nuoc-Trong to the bend five kilometers north-east of Ap-Xeo-La. Thereafter a line to the Ngan-Dua Canal and following that Canal as far as Vinh-Hung. Finally, from Vinh-Hung a north-south line to the sea.

10. AGREEMENT OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN CAMBODIA, JULY 20, 1954

CHAPTER I—PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING EXECUTION OF THE CEASE-FIRE

Article 1

As from twenty-third July 1954 at 0800 hours (Pekin mean time) complete cessation of all hostilities throughout Cambodia shall be ordered and enforced by the Commanders of the Armed Forces of the two parties for all troops and personnel of the land, naval and air forces under their control.

Article 2

In conformity with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, there shall be a simultaneous cessation of hostilities throughout Cambodia, in all the combat areas and for all the forces of the two parties.

To obviate any mistake or misunderstanding and to ensure that both the ending of hostilities and all other operations arising from cessation of hostilities are in fact simultaneous,

(a) due allowance being made for the time actually required for transmission of the cease-fire order down to the lowest échelons of the combatant forces of both sides, the two parties are agreed that the complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the territory of Cambodia shall become effective at 8 hours (local time) on 7 August 1954. It is agreed that Pekin mean time shall be taken as local time.

Article 3

(b) Each side shall comply strictly with the time-table jointly agreed upon between the parties for the execution of all operations connected with the cessation of hostilities.

Article 3

All operations and movements connected with the execution of the cessation of hostilities must be carried out in a safe and orderly fashion.

(a) Within a number of days to be determined by the Commanders of both sides, after the cease-fire has been achieved, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines, booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous devices placed by it. Should it be impossible to complete removal and neutralization before departure, the party concerned will mark the spot by placing visible signs. Sites thus cleared of mines and any other obstacles to the free movement of the personnel of the International Commission and the Joint Commission shall be notified to the latter by local military Commanders.

(b) Any incidents that may arise between the forces of the two sides and may result from mistakes or misunderstandings shall be settled on the spot so as to restrict their scope.

(c) During the days immediately preceding the cease-fire each party undertakes not to engage in any large-scale operation between the time when the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities is signed at Geneva and the time when the cease-fire comes into effect.
action likely to create difficulties for such withdrawals. They shall assist one another as far as possible.

4. While the withdrawals are proceeding, the two parties shall not permit any destruction or sabotage of public property or any attack on the life or property of the civilian population. They shall not permit any interference with the local civil administration.

5. The Joint Commission and the International Supervisory Commission shall supervise the execution of measures to ensure the safety of the forces during withdrawal.

6. The Joint Commission in Cambodia shall determine the detailed procedures for the withdrawals of the forces on the basis of the above-mentioned principles.

CHAPTER III—OTHER QUESTIONS

A. THE KHMER ARMED FORCES, NATIVES OF CAMBODIA

Article 5

The two parties shall undertake that within thirty days after the cease-fire order has been proclaimed, the Khmer Resistance Forces shall be demobilized on the spot; simultaneously, the troops of the Royal Khmer Army shall abstain from taking any hostile action against the Khmer Resistance Forces.

Article 6

The situation of these nationals shall be decided in the light of the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at the Geneva Conference, reading as follows:

"The Royal Government of Cambodia,

In the desire to ensure harmony and agreement among the peoples of the Kingdom,

Declares itself resolved to take the necessary measures to integrate all citizens, without discrimination, into the national community and to guarantee them the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms for which the Constitution of the Kingdom provides;

Affirms that all Cambodian citizens may freely participate as electors or candidates in general elections by secret ballot."

No reprisals shall be taken against the said nationals or their families, each national being entitled to the enjoyment, without any discrimination as compared with other nationals, of all constitutional guarantees concerning the protection of person and property and democratic freedoms.

Applicants therefor may be accepted for service in the Regular Army or local police formations if they satisfy the conditions required for current recruitment of the Army and Police Corps.

The same procedure shall apply to those persons who have returned to civilian life and who may apply for civilian employment on the same terms as other nationals.
B. BAN ON THE INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMAMENTS AND MUNITIONS, MILITARY BASES

Article 7

In accordance with the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at 2400 hours on 20 July 1954 at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers:

"The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other States, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

"During the period which will elapse between the date of the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and that of the final settlement of political problems in this country, the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of the territory."

C. CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND PRISONERS OF WAR—BURIAL

Article 8

The liberation and repatriation of all civilian internees and prisoners of war detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of whatever nationality, captured since the beginning of hostilities in Cambodia during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Cambodia shall be liberated after the entry into force of the present Armistice agreement.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason or kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All foreign prisoners of war captured by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to the destination of their choice.

Article 9

After the entry into force of the present Agreement, if the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Cambodian commander shall, within a specified period, authorize the exhumation and removal of the bodies of deceased military personnel of the other party, including the bodies of prisoners of war or personnel deceased and buried on Cambodian territory.
The Joint Commission shall fix the procedures by which this task is to be carried out and the time limit within which it must be completed.

CHAPTER IV—JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN CAMBODIA

Article 10
Responsibility for the execution of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

Article 11
An International Commission shall be responsible for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative of India. Its headquarters shall be at Phnom Penh.

Article 12
The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States.

The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Phnom Penh, Kompong Cham, Kratie, Svay Rieng, Kampot. These points of location may be altered at a later date by agreement between the Government of Cambodia and the International Commission.

The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering on the land and sea frontiers of Cambodia. The mobile teams shall have the right to move freely within the limits of their zones of action, and they shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfillment of their tasks (provision of personnel, access to documents needed for supervision, summoning of witnesses needed for enquiries, security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require.

Outside the zones of action defined above, the mobile teams may, with the agreement of the Cambodian command, move about as required by the tasks assigned to them under the present Agreement.

Article 13
The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the execution by the parties of the provisions of the present Agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the functions of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and shall in particular:

(a) control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and see that frontiers are respected;
(b) control the release of prisoners of war, and civilian internees;
(c) supervise, at ports and airfields and along all the frontiers of Cambodia, the application of the Cambodian declaration concerning the introduction into Cambodia of military personnel and war materials on grounds of foreign assistance.

Article 14
A Joint Commission shall be set up to facilitate the implementation of the clauses relating to the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The Joint Commission may form joint groups the number of which shall be decided by mutual agreement between the parties.

The Joint Commission shall facilitate the implementation of the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to the simultaneous and general cease-fire in Cambodia for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

It shall assist the parties in the implementation of the said clauses; it shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the implementation of the said clauses; it shall endeavor to settle any disputes between the parties arising out of the implementation of these clauses. The Joint Commission may send joint groups to follow the forces in their movements; such groups shall be disbanded once the withdrawal plans have been carried out.

Article 15
The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of the parties concerned.

Article 16
The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above and as soon as possible, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Joint Commission or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

Article 17
The inspection teams shall transmit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, investigations and observations; furthermore, they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the findings of each member shall be transmitted to the Commission.

Article 18
If an inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or threat of a serious violation, the International Commission shall be informed; the Commission shall examine the reports and findings of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures to be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.
Article 19
When the Joint Commission is unable to reach agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

Article 20
The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by a majority vote, subject to the provisions of article 21. If the votes are equally divided, the Chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said Agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

Article 21
On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular,

(a) refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan,

(b) violation or threats of violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces,

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

Article 22
If one of the parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 21, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference of all cases in which its work is being hindered.

Article 23
The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it may be able to perform the tasks prescribed in article 13.

Article 24
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia shall act in close cooperation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of those three Commissions shall be responsible for coordinating their work and for relations between them.

Article 25
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia may, after consultation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and in Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Viet-Nam and in Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.
Article 26
The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

Article 27
The present Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall apply to all the armed forces of either party.

Article 28
The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of their functions.

Article 29
The Joint Commission, composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of the two parties, shall assist the parties in the implementation of all the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, ensure liaison between the two parties, draw up plans for the implementation of the Agreement, and endeavour to settle any dispute arising out of the implementation of the said clauses and plans.

Article 30
The costs involved in the operation of the Joint Commission shall be shared equally between the two parties.

Article 31
The signatories of the present Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all personnel under their command.

Article 32
The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary be examined by the Commands of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

Article 33
All the provisions of the present Agreement shall enter into force at 00 hours (Geneva time) on 23 July 1954.

Done at Geneva on 20 July 1954.

For the Commander-in-Chief of the Units of the Khmer Resistance Forces and for the Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnamese Military Units
(signed) Ta-Quang-Buu

Vice-Minister of National Defence of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam
11. AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN LAOS, JULY 20, 1954

CHAPTER I—CEASE-FIRE AND EVACUATION OF FOREIGN ARMED FORCES AND FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL

Article 1

The Commanders of the armed forces of the parties in Laos shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Laos by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.

Article 2

In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout the territory of Laos in all combat areas and for all forces of the two parties.

In order to prevent any mistake or misunderstanding and to ensure that both the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and movements of the opposing forces are in fact simultaneous.

(a) Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the territory of Laos shall become effective at 8 hours (local time) on 6 August 1954. It is agreed that Pekin meantime shall be taken as local time.

(b) The Joint Commission for Laos shall draw up a schedule for the other operations resulting from the cessation of hostilities.

Note: The cease-fire shall become effective 15 days after the entry into force of the present Agreement.

Article 3

All operations and movements entailed by the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:

(a) Within a number of days to be determined on the spot by the Joint Commission in Laos each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines, booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substance placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there.

(b) As regards the security of troops on the move following the lines of communication in accordance with the schedule previously drawn up by the Joint Armistice Commission in Laos, and the safety of the assembly areas, detailed measures shall be adopted in each case by the Joint Armistice Commission in Laos. In particular, while the forces of one party are withdrawing by a line of communication passing through the territory of the other party (road or waterways) the forces of the latter party shall provisionally withdraw two kilometres on either side of such line of communication, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movement of the civil population.

1 IC/51, Rev. 1, 20 July 1954, Original: French.
Article 4
The withdrawals and transfers of military forces, supplies and equipment shall be effected in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, supplies and equipment of the two parties shall be completed within a period of 120 days from the day on which the Armistice Agreement enters into force. The two parties undertake to communicate their transfer plans to each other, for information, within 25 days of the entry into force of the present Agreement.

(b) The withdrawals of the Viet-Namese People’s Volunteers from Laos to Viet-Nam shall be effected by provinces. The position of those volunteers who were settled in Laos before the hostilities shall form the subject of a special convention.

(c) The routes for the withdrawal of the forces of the French Union and Viet-Namese People’s Volunteers in Laos from Laotian territory shall be fixed on the spot by the Joint Commission.

(d) The two parties shall guarantee that the withdrawals and transfers of all forces will be effected in accordance with the purposes of this Agreement, and that they will not permit any hostile action or take action of any kind whatever which might hinder such withdrawals or transfers. The parties shall assist each other as far as possible.

(e) While the withdrawals and transfers of the forces are proceeding, the two parties shall not permit any destruction or sabotage of any public property or any attack on the life or property of the local civilian population. They shall not permit any interference with the local civil administration.

(f) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall supervise the implementation of measures to ensure the safety of the forces during withdrawal and transfer.

(g) The Joint Commission in Laos shall determine the detailed procedures for the withdrawals and transfers of the forces in accordance with the above-mentioned principles.

Article 5
During the days immediately preceding the cease-fire each party undertakes not to engage in any large-scale operation between the time when the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities is signed at Geneva and the time when the cease-fire comes into effect.

CHAPTER II—PROHIBITION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMAMENTS AND MUNITIONS

Article 6
With effect from the proclamation of the cease-fire the introduction into Laos of any reinforcements of troops or military personnel from outside Laotian territory is prohibited.

Nevertheless, the French High Command may leave a specified number of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army in the territory of Laos; the strength of such personnel shall not exceed one thousand five hundred (1,500) officers and non-commissioned officers.
Article 7
Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement, the establish-
ment of new military bases is prohibited throughout the territory of
Laos.

Article 8
The High Command of the French forces shall maintain in the ter-
ritory of Laos the personnel required for the maintenance of two
French military establishments, the first at Seno and the second in
the Mekong valley, either in the province of Vientiane or downstream
from Vientiane.
The effective maintained in these military establishments shall not
exceed a total of three thousand five hundred (3,500) men.

Article 9
Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement and in accord-
ance with the declaration made at the Geneva Conference by the Royal
Government of Laos on 20 July 1954, the introduction into Laos of
armaments, munitions and military equipment of all kinds is pro-
hibited, with the exception of a specified quantity of armaments in
categories specified as necessary for the defence of Laos.

Article 10
The new armaments and military personnel permitted to enter Laos
in accordance with the terms of Article 9 above shall enter Laos at the
following points only: Luang-Prabang, Xieng-Khouang, Vientiane,
Seno, Paksé, Savannakhet and Tchépône.

CHAPTER III—DISENGAGEMENT OF THE FORCES—ASSEMBLY AREAS—
CONCENTRATION AREAS

Article 11
The disengagement of the armed forces of both sides, including con-
centration of the armed forces, movements to rejoin the provisional
assembly areas allotted to one party and provisional withdrawal move-
ments by the other party, shall be completed within a period not ex-
ceeding fifteen (15) days after the cease fire.

Article 12
The Joint Commission in Laos shall fix the site and boundaries:
—of the five (5) provisional assembly areas for the reception of
the Vietnamese People's Volunteer Forces,
—of the five (5) provisional assembly areas for the reception
of the French forces in Laos,
—of the twelve (12) provisional assembly areas, one to each
province, for the reception of the fighting units of "Pathet Lao".
—The forces of the Laotian National Army shall remain in situ
during the entire duration of the operations of disengagement and
transfer of foreign forces and fighting units of "Pathet Lao".

Article 13
The foreign Forces shall be transferred outside Laotian territory
as follows:
(1) French Forces: The French forces will be moved out of
Laos by road (along routes laid down by the Joint Commission
in Laos) and also by air and inland waterway;
Vietnamese People’s Volunteer forces: These forces will be moved out of Laos by land, along routes and in accordance with a schedule to be determined by the Joint Commission in Laos in accordance with principle of simultaneous withdrawal of foreign forces.

Article 14

Pending a political settlement, the fighting units of “Pathet Lao”, concentrated in the provisional assembly areas, shall move into the Provinces of Phongsaly and Sam-Neua, except for any military personnel who wish to be demobilised where they are. They will be free to move between these two Provinces in a corridor along the frontier between Laos and Viet-Nam bounded on the south by the Line SOP KIN, NA MI-SOP SANG, MUONG SON.

Concentration shall be completed within one-hundred-and-twenty (120) days from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement.

Article 15

Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations for their activities during the hostilities and also undertakes to guarantee their democratic freedoms.

CHAPTER IV—Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees

Article 16

The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Laotian and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Laos, during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Laos, shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire comes into effect.

(b) The term “civilian internees” is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed strife between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason or kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All foreign prisoners of war captured by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to the destination of their choice.

CHAPTER V—Miscellaneous

Article 17

The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

Article 18

In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the forces of either
party shall, within a specified period after the entry into force of the present Agreement, permit the graves service of the other party to enter that part of Laotian territory under his military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war.

The Joint Commission shall fix the procedures by which this task is carried out and the time limits within which it must be completed. The Commanders of the forces of each party shall communicate to the other all information in his possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

**Article 19**

The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the territory under the military control of the other party, and engage in no hostile act against the other party.

For the purpose of the present article the word “territory” includes territorial waters and air space.

**Article 20**

The Commander of the forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint organs and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

**Article 21**

The costs involved in the operation of the Joint Commission and its joint groups and of the International Commission and its inspection teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

**Article 22**

The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all military personnel under their command.

**Article 23**

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be examined by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

**Chapter VI—Joint Commission and International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos**

**Article 24**

Responsibility for the execution of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

**Article 25**

An International Commission shall be entrusted with control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the Agreement on
the cessation of hostilities in Laos. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative of India. Its headquarters shall be at Vientiane.

Article 26
The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States.

The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Pakse, Seno, Tchepone, Vientiane, Xieng-Khouang, Phongsaly, Sophao (province of Samneua). These points of location may, at a later date, be altered by agreement between the Government of Laos and the International Commission.

The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be regions bordering the land frontiers of Laos. Within the limits of their zones of action, they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provisions of personnel, access to documents needed for supervision, summoning of witnesses needed for holding enquiries, the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams etc...). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require.

Outside the zones of action defined above, the mobile teams may, with the agreement of the Command of the party concerned, move about as required by the tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

Article 27
The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the execution by the parties of the provisions of the present Agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the functions of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and shall in particular:

(a) Control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and see that frontiers are respected;
(b) Control the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees;
(c) Supervise, at ports and airfields and along all the frontiers of Laos, the implementation of the provisions regulating the introduction into Laos of military personnel and war materials;
(d) Supervise the implementation of the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to rotation of personnel and to supplies for French Union security forces maintained in Laos.

Article 28
A Joint Commission shall be set up to facilitate the implementation of the clauses relating to the withdrawal of foreign forces.
The Joint Commission shall form joint groups, the number of which shall be decided by mutual agreement between the parties.
The Joint Commission shall facilitate the implementation of the clauses of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to the simultaneous and general cease-fire in Laos for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties. It shall assist the parties in the implementation of the said clauses; it shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the implementation of the said clauses; it shall endeavour to settle any disputes between the parties arising out of the implementation of these clauses. The joint groups shall follow the forces in their movements and shall be disbanded once the withdrawal plans have been carried out.

Article 29

The Joint Commission and the joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the commands of the parties concerned.

Article 30

The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible, either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

Article 31

The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, investigation and observations; furthermore, they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the findings of each member shall be transmitted to the Commission.

Article 32

If an inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation, the International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall examine the reports and findings of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

Article 33

When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

Article 34

The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 35. If the votes are equally divided, the chairman's vote shall be decisive.
The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said Agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

**Article 35**

On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular,

(a) refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan;

(b) violation or threat of violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces,

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

**Article 36**

If one of the parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 35, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference of all cases in which its work is being hindered.

**Article 37**

The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it may be able to fulfill the tasks prescribed in article 27.

**Article 38**

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and Cambodia.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.

**Article 39**

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos may, after consultation with the International Commissions in Cambodia and Viet-Nam, having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Viet-Nam, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be reduced unanimously. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

**Chapter VII**

**Article 40**

All the provisions of the present Agreement, save paragraph (a) of Article 2, shall enter into force at 24 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.

**Article 41**

Done in Geneva (Switzerland) on 20 July 1954, at 24 hours, in the French language.
12. FINAL DECLARATION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE,
JULY 21, 1954

Final declaration, dated July 21, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on
the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the represent-
atives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People’s Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the
United States of America took part.

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in
Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control
and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agree-
ments.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities
in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its con-
viction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declar-
ation and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit
Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part, in full
independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Govern-
ments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures
permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community,
in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in
conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take
place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions
of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the
cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into
Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all
kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the
declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their
resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in
personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective
defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined
by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the
cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base
under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regroup-
ing zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that
the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military
alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in
the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of
the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the
effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if
this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alli-
ance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on
the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the
sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity
of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference
in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on
any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory
Commission in order to study such measures as may prove
necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities
in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected.

13. THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS IN INDOCHINA:
Statement by the President, July 21, 1954

I am glad, of course, that agreement has been reached at Geneva
to stop the bloodshed in Indochina.

The United States has not been a belligerent in the war. The pri-
mary responsibility for the settlement in Indochina rested with those
nations which participated in the fighting. Our role at Geneva has
been at all times to try to be helpful where desired and to aid France
and Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to obtain a just and honorable
settlement which will take into account the needs of the interested
people. Accordingly, the United States has not itself been party to
or bound by the decisions taken by the Conference, but it is our
hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with
the rights and the needs of the countries concerned. The agreement
contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on
how they work in practice.

The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect
that it is not prepared to join in the Conference declaration, but, as
loyal members of the United Nations, we also say that, in compliance
with the obligations and principles contained in article 2 of the United
Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the
settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression
would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.

As evidence of our resolve to assist Cambodia and Laos to play
their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful com-
community of free nations, we are requesting the agreement of the Gov-
ernments of Cambodia and Laos to our appointment of an Ambassador
or Minister to be resident at their respective capitals (Phnom Penh
and Vientiane). We already have a Chief of Mission at Saigon, the
capital of Viet-Nam, and this Embassy will, of course, be maintained.

The United States is actively pursuing discussions with other free
nations with a view to the rapid organization of a collective defense in
Southeast Asia in order to prevent further direct or indirect Com-
munist aggression in that general area.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 188.
14. STATEMENT BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE 1
AT THE CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION OF THE
GENEVA CONFERENCE, JULY 21, 1954 2

As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a
declaration by the Conference such as is submitted. However, the
United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these
matters:

Declaration

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its
efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles
and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements con-
cluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between (a) the Franco-
Laotian Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-
Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the Command of the
Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command
and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and of para-
graphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva
Conference on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid
agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or
the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the
Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members
to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation
of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously
threatening international peace and security.

In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free
elections in Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear its posi-
tion which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on
June 29, 1954, as follows:

In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek
to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure
that they are conducted fairly.

With respect to the statement made by the representative of the
State of Viet-Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional position
that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it
will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing
in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any de-
parture from this traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos
and Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty,
in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of
that area to determine their own future.

1 Walter Bedell Smith.
15. SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY AND PROTOCOL THERETO, SEPTEMBER 8, 1954

Text of Treaty

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.
ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagements in conflict with this Treaty.
ARTICLE VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE VIII

As used in this Treaty, the “treaty area” is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.
Understanding of the United States of America

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

For Australia:
R. G. Casey

For France:
G. La Chambre

For New Zealand:
Clifton Webb

For Pakistan:
Signed for transmission to my Government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan.
Zafrulla Khan

For the Republic of the Philippines:
Carlos P. Garcia  
Francisco A. Delgado  
Tomas L. Cabili  
Lorenzo M. Tañada  
Cornelio T. Villareal

For the Kingdom of Thailand:
Wan Waithayakon Kommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Reading

For the United States of America:
John Foster Dulles  
H. Alexander Smith  
Michael J. Mansfield

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty concluded and signed in the English language at Manila, on September 8, 1954, the signed original of which is deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

In testimony whereof, I, Raul S. Manglapus, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Department of Foreign Affairs to be affixed at the City of Manila, this 14th day of October, 1954.

[Seal]
Raul S. Manglapus
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty

DESIGNATION OF STATES AND TERRITORY AS TO WHICH PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IV AND ARTICLE III ARE TO BE APPLICABLE

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

(With the Geneva accords, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia became fully independent states. Accordingly this communiqué announced agreement by France and United States to channel U.S. assistance directly to these countries.)

16. DIRECT AID TO THE ASSOCIATED STATES: Communiqué Regarding Franco-American Conversations, September 29, 1954 ¹

Representatives of the two Governments have had very frank and useful talks which have shown the community of their views, and are in full agreement on the objectives to be attained.

The conclusion of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in Manila on September 8, 1954, has provided a firmer basis than heretofoe to assist the free nations of Asia in developing and maintaining their independence and security. The representatives of France and the United States wish to reaffirm the support of their Governments for the principles of self-government, independence, justice and liberty proclaimed by the Pacific Charter in Manila on September 8, 1954.

The representatives of France and the United States reaffirm the intention of their governments to support the complete independence of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam. Both France and the United States will continue to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam in their efforts to safeguard their freedom and independence and to advance the welfare of their peoples. In this spirit France and the United States are assisting the Government of Viet-Nam in the resettlement of the Vietnamese who have of their own free will moved to free Viet-Nam and who already number some 300,000.

In order to contribute to the security of the area pending the further development of national forces for this purpose, the representatives

¹Issued at Washington: Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 534. The United States was represented by Acting Secretary Smith and France by Guy LaChambre, Minister of State for Relations with the Three Associated States, and Edgar Faure, Finance Minister.
of France indicated that France is prepared to retain forces of its Expeditionary Corps, in agreement with the government concerned, within the limits permitted under the Geneva agreements and to an extent to be determined. The United States will consider the question of financial assistance for the Expeditionary Corps in these circumstances in addition to support for the forces of each of the three Associated States. These questions vitally affect each of the three Associated States and are being fully discussed with them.

The channel for French and United States economic aid, budgetary support, and other assistance to each of the Associated States will be direct to that state. The United States representatives will begin discussions soon with the respective governments of the Associated States regarding direct aid. The methods for efficient coordination of French and United States aid programs to each of the three Associated States are under consideration and will be developed in discussions with each of these states.

After the bilateral talks, the chiefs of diplomatic missions in Washington of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam were invited to a final meeting to have an exchange of views and information on these matters. The representatives of all five countries are in complete agreement on the objectives of peace and freedom to be achieved in Indochina.

17. AID TO THE STATE OF VIET-NAM: Message From the President of the United States to the President of the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam, October 23, 1954

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.

We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The

Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

18. MISSION OF THE SPECIAL UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE IN VIET-NAM: Statement Issued by the White House, November 3, 1954

The President on November 3 designated Gen. J. Lawton Collins as Special United States Representative in Viet-Nam with the personal rank of Ambassador, to undertake a diplomatic mission of limited duration. He will coordinate the operations of all U.S. agencies in that country.

General Collins will proceed immediately to Saigon, where he will confer with Ambassador Donald R. Heath prior to the latter's already scheduled return to the United States for reassignment following 4½ years of distinguished service in Indochina. For the duration of this assignment General Collins will relinquish his other duties, including that of U.S. representative on the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Since the conclusion of hostilities in Indochina, the U.S. Government has been particularly concerned over developments in Viet-Nam, a country ravaged by 8 years of war, artificially divided into armistice zones, and confronted by dangerous forces threatening its independence and security.

The U.S. Government is fully aware of the immense tasks facing the Government of Viet-Nam in its effort to achieve solidarity, internal security, and economic rehabilitation. The United States has already played an important role in the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Communist rule in North Viet-Nam.

Moreover, as the President told Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem in his letter of October 23d, U.S. representatives in Viet-Nam have been instructed to consider with the Vietnamese authorities how a program of American aid given directly to Viet-Nam can best assist that country. General Collins will explore this matter with Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem and his Government in order to help them resolve their present critical problems and to supplement measures adopted by the Vietnamese themselves.

In executing his temporary mission, General Collins will maintain close liaison with the French Commissioner General, Gen. Paul Ely, for the purpose of exchanging views on how best, under existing circumstances, the freedom and welfare of Viet-Nam can be safeguarded.

1 Gen. J. Lawton Collins
19. DIRECT AID TO VIET-NAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS:
Statement by the Department of State, December 31, 1954

Arrangements have been completed so that on January 1, 1955, the United States can begin supplying financial aid directly to the Governments of Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos for the purpose of strengthening their defense against the threat of Communist subversion and aggression. This direct aid reaffirms the independent status these Governments now possess, and is in addition to the economic aid that has been given directly to these three states by the United States since 1950. The aid will be given pursuant to section 121 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, which provides for "the furnishing, as far as possible, of direct assistance to the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam . . . " The provision of U.S. aid directly to these Governments was confirmed by the communiqué issued at Washington on September 29 of this year, following talks between representatives of the United States, France, and the Chiefs of Mission of the three Associated States and by letters from President Eisenhower to the King of Cambodia and to President Diem of Viet-Nam.

(A national referendum on October 23, 1955 deposed Bao Dai, former Emperor and since March 7, 1949, head of state of Vietnam, who had lived mostly abroad. On October 26, Diem became first President of South Vietnam and proclaimed a Republic.)

20. RECOGNITION OF THE NEW CHIEF OF STATE OF VIET-NAM: Statement by the Department of State, October 26, 1955

On October 26, the Government of Viet-Nam sent the following communication to the American Embassy at Saigon:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the United States Embassy that by referendum October 23 the Vietnamese people have pronounced themselves in favor of the deposition of Bao Dai and have recognized President Diem as Chief of State. It is hoped that the Government of the United States will continue as in the past to entertain diplomatic relations with the new Government of the State of Viet-Nam."

U.S. Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt, under instructions, has replied as follows:

"The Government of the United States looks forward to maintaining with the new Government of Viet-Nam the same cordial and friendly relations which have in the past so happily existed between the two governments."

The United States affirms its intention to maintain friendly relations with the Government of Viet-Nam. We are glad to see the evolution of orderly and effective democratic processes in an area of Southeast Asia which has been and continues to be threatened by Communist efforts to impose totalitarian control.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 7, 1955, p. 760.
21. UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO VIET-NAM: Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Washington, June 1, 1956

This past March, I had the pleasure of accompanying the Secretary of State on his visit to Saigon where we conversed with President Diem on the present and future problems of Viet-Nam. I was struck, as so many other recent observers have been, at the progress Free Viet-Nam has made in a few short months toward stability, security, and strength. President Diem seemed to reflect this progress in his own person. On the occasion of our earlier visit some 15 months ago, he seemed tense and gravely concerned about the problems facing Viet-Nam. This time he was reposed, poised, and appeared confident of the future of his country.

Among the factors that explain the remarkable rise of Free Viet-Nam from the shambles created by 8 years of murderous civil and international war, the division of the country at Geneva and the continuing menace of predatory communism, there is in the first place the dedication, courage, and resourcefulness of President Diem himself. In him, his country has found a truly worthy leader whose integrity and devotion to his country's welfare have become generally recognized among his people. Asia has given us in President Diem another great figure, and the entire free world has become the richer for his example of determination and moral fortitude. There is no more dramatic example of this fortitude than President Diem's decisions during the tense and vital days of the battle against the parasitic politico-religious sects in the city of Saigon in the spring of 1955. These decisions were to resist the multiple pressures to compromise that were building up around him, and to struggle to the victorious end for the sake of a just cause. The free world owes him a debt of gratitude for his determined stand at that fateful hour.

Consider Viet-Nam at three stages in its recent history:

First, in mid-1954, partitioned by fiat of the great powers against the will of the Vietnamese people, devoid of governmental machinery or military strength, drifting without leadership and without hope in the backwash of the defeat administered by the combined weight of Communist-impressed infantry and of Chinese and Russian arms.

Secondly, in early 1955, faced with the military and subversive threat of the Communists north of the 17th parallel, confronted with internal strife, its government challenged by the armed, self-seeking politico-religious sects, its army barely reformed and of uncertain loyalty, assailed from within by the most difficult problems, including that of having to absorb the sudden influx of three-quarters of a million refugees who would rather leave their ancestral lands and homes than suffer life under Communist tyranny:

1Department of State press release No. 289, May 31, 1956 (also printed in the Department of State Bulletin, June 11, 1956, pp. 972-974). This address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robertson, was delivered before the American Friends of Viet-Nam, meeting at the Willard Hotel in Washington.
And finally Viet-Nam today, in mid-1956, progressing rapidly to the establishment of democratic institutions by elective processes, its people resuming peaceful pursuits, its army growing in effectiveness, sense of mission, and morale, the puppet Vietnamese politicians discredited, the refugees well on the way to permanent resettlement, the countryside generally orderly and calm, the predatory sects eliminated and their venal leaders exiled or destroyed.

Perhaps no more eloquent testimony to the new state of affairs in Viet-Nam could be cited than the voice of the people themselves as expressed in their free election of last March. At that time the last possible question as to the feeling of the people was erased by an overwhelming majority for President Diem's leadership. The fact that the Viet Minh was unable to carry out its open threats to sabotage these elections is impressive evidence of the stability and prestige of the government.

The United States is proud to be on the side of the effort of the Vietnamese people under President Diem to establish freedom, peace, and the good life. The United States wishes to continue to assist and to be a loyal and trusted friend of Viet-Nam.

Our policies in Viet-Nam may be simply stated as follows:
To support a friendly non-Communist government in Viet-Nam and to help it diminish and eventually eradicate Communist subversion and influence.
To help the Government of Viet-Nam establish the forces necessary for internal security.
To encourage support for Free Viet-Nam by the non-Communist world.
To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a country and people ravaged by 8 ruinous years of civil and international war.

Our efforts are directed first of all toward helping to sustain the internal security forces consisting of a regular army of about 150,000 men, a mobile civil guard of some 45,000, and local defense units which are being formed to give protection against subversion on the village level. We are providing budgetary support and equipment for these forces and have a mission assisting the training of the army. We are also helping to organize, train, and equip the Vietnamese police force. The refugees who have fled to South Viet-Nam to escape the Viet Minh are being resettled on productive lands with the assistance of funds made available by our aid program. In various ways our aid program also provides assistance to the Vietnamese Government designed to strengthen the economy and provide a better future for the common people of the country. The Vietnamese are increasingly giving attention to the basic development of the Vietnamese economy and to projects that may contribute directly to that goal. We give our aid and counsel to this program only as freely invited.

I do not wish to minimize the magnitude of the task that still remains and of the problems that still confront this staunch and valiant member of the free world fighting for its independence on the threshold of the Communist heartland of Asia.

The Communist conspiracy continues to threaten Free Viet-Nam. With monstrous effrontery, the Communist conspirators at Hanoi accuse Free Viet-Nam and its friends of violating the armistice pro-
visions which the Vietnamese and their friends, including ourselves, have scrupulously respected despite the fact that neither the Vietnamese nor ourselves signed the Geneva Accords while they, the Communists who have solemnly undertaken to be bound by these provisions, have violated them in the most blatant fashion.

The facts are that while on the one hand the military potential of Free Viet-Nam has been drastically reduced by the withdrawal of nearly 200,000 members of the French Expeditionary Corps and by the reduction of the Vietnamese Army by more than 50,000 from the time of the armistice to the present as well as by the outshipment from Viet-Nam since the cessation of hostilities of over $200 million worth of war equipment, we have on the other hand reports of steady constant growth of the warmaking potential of the Communists north of the 17th parallel.

Our reports reveal that in complete disregard of its obligations, the Viet Minh have imported voluminous quantities of arms across the Sino-Viet Minh border and have imported a constant stream of Chinese Communist military personnel to work on railroads, to rebuild roads, to establish airports, and to work on other projects contributing to the growth of the military potential of the zone under Communist occupation.

As so eloquently stated by the British Government in a diplomatic note released to the press and sent to Moscow in April of this year, and I quote:

The Viet Minh army has been so greatly strengthened by the embodiment and re-equipment of irregular forces that instead of the 7 Viet Minh divisions in existence in July 1954 there are now no less than 20. This striking contrast between massive military expansion in the North and the withdrawal and reduction of military forces in the South speaks for itself.

By lies, propaganda, force, and deceit, the Communists in Hanoi would undermine Free Viet-Nam, whose fall they have been unable to secure by their maneuverings on the diplomatic front. These people, whose crimes against suffering humanity are so vividly described in the book by Lt. Dooley who addressed you this morning, have sold their country to Peiping. They have shamelessly followed all the devious zigzags of the Communist-bloc line so that their alliance with Communist China and the Soviet Union is firmly consolidated. These are the people who are now inviting President Diem to join them in a coalition government to be set up through so-called “free elections.”

President Diem and the Government of Free Viet-Nam reaffirmed on April 6 of this year and on other occasions their desire to seek the reunification of Viet-Nam by peaceful means. In this goal, we support them fully. We hope and pray that the partition of Viet-Nam, imposed against the will of the Vietnamese people, will speedily come to an end. For our part we believe in free elections, and we support President Diem fully in his position that if elections are to be held, there first must be conditions which preclude intimidation or coercion of the electorate. Unless such conditions exist there can be no free choice.

May those leaders of the north in whom the spirit of true patriotism still survives realize the futility of the Communist efforts to subvert Free Viet-Nam by force or guile. May they force the abandonment
of these efforts and bring about the peaceful demobilization of the large standing armies of the Viet Minh. May they, above all, return to the just cause of all those who want to reunify their country in peace and independence and for the good of all the people of Viet-Nam.

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(Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem visited Washington, D.C., from May 8 to 11, at which time this communiqué was issued. Viet Cong activity then was still at minor level.)

22. VIETNAMESE-UNITED STATES RELATIONS: Joint Statement Issued at Washington by the President of the United States and the President of Viet-Nam, May 11, 1957

His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and President Eisenhower have held discussions during President Ngo Dinh Diem’s state visit as the guest of President Eisenhower during May 8–10.

Their discussions have been supplemented by meetings between President Ngo Dinh Diem and his advisers and Secretary of State Dulles and other American officials. These meetings afforded the occasion for reaffirming close mutual friendship and support between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States. The two Presidents exchanged views on the promotion of peace and stability and the development and consolidation of freedom in Viet-Nam and in the Far East as a whole.

President Eisenhower complimented President Ngo Dinh Diem on the remarkable achievements of the Republic of Viet-Nam under the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem since he took office in July 1954. It was noted that in less than three years a chaotic situation resulting from years of war had been changed into one of progress and stability.

Nearly one million refugees who had fled from Communist tyranny in North Viet-Nam had been cared for and resettled in Free Viet-Nam. Internal security had been effectively established.

A constitution had been promulgated and a national assembly elected.

Plans for agrarian reform have been launched, and a constructive program developed to meet long-range economic and social problems to promote higher living standards for the Vietnamese people.

President Ngo Dinh Diem reviewed with President Eisenhower the efforts and means of the Vietnamese Government to promote political stability and economic welfare in the Republic of Vietnam. President Eisenhower assured President Ngo Dinh Diem of the willingness of the United States to continue to offer effective assistance within the constitutional processes of the United States to meet these objectives.

President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem looked forward to an end of the unhappy division of the Vietnamese people and

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confirmed the determination of the two Governments to work together to seek suitable means to bring about the peaceful unification of Vietnam in freedom in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. It was noted with pleasure that the General Assembly of the United Nations by a large majority had found the Republic of Vietnam qualified for membership in the United Nations, which has been prevented by Soviet opposition.

President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem noted in contrast the large buildup of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Vietnam during the past 2½ years, the harsh suppression of the revolts of the people of North Vietnam in seeking liberty, and their increasing hardships. While noting the apparent diminution during the last 3 years of Communist-inspired hostilities in southeast Asia except in the Kingdom of Laos, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem expressed concern over continuing Communist subversive capabilities in this area and elsewhere. In particular, they agreed that the continued military buildup of the Chinese Communists, their refusal to renounce the use of force, and their unwillingness to subscribe to standards of conduct of civilized nations constitute a continuing threat to the safety of all free nations in Asia. To counter this threat, President Ngo Dinh Diem indicated his strong desire and his efforts to seek closer cooperation with the free countries of Asia.

Noting that the Republic of Vietnam is covered by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Vietnam would be considered as endangering peace and stability. The just settlement of problems of the area by peaceful and legitimate means within the framework of the United Nations Charter will continue to be the mutual concern of both Governments. Finally, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem expressed the desire and determination of the two Governments to cooperate closely together for freedom and independence in the world.

(Viet Cong activity began to increase by late 1967, obviously at the direction of North Vietnam, and reached serious proportions by 1959.)

23. THE IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE SECURITY AND PROGRESS OF VIET-NAM: Address by the President (Eisenhower), Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, April 4, 1959 (Excerpt)1

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Let us consider briefly the country of Viet-Nam and the importance to us of the security and progress of that country. It is located, as you know, in the southeastern corner of Asia, exactly halfway round the world from Gettysburg College.

Viet-Nam is a country divided into two parts, like Korea and Germany. The southern half, with its 12 million people, is free but poor. It is an underdeveloped country; its economy is weak, average individual income being less than $200 a year. The northern half has been turned over to communism. A line of demarcation running along the 17th parallel separates the two. To the north of this line stand several Communist divisions. These facts pose to south Viet-Nam two great tasks: self-defense and economic growth.

Understandably the people of Viet-Nam want to make their country a thriving, self-sufficient member of the family of nations. This means economic expansion.

For Viet-Nam's economic growth, the acquisition of capital is vitally necessary. Now, the nation could create the capital needed for growth by stealing from the already meager rice bowls of its people and regimenting them into work battalions. This enslavement is the commune system, adopted by the new overlords of Red China. It would mean, of course, the loss of freedom within the country without any hostile outside action whatsoever.

Another way for Viet-Nam to get the necessary capital is through private investments from the outside and through governmental loans and, where necessary, grants from other and more fortunately situated nations.

In either of these ways the economic problem of Viet-Nam could be solved. But only the second way can preserve freedom.

And there is still the other of Viet-Nam's great problems—how to support the military forces it needs without crushing its economy.

Because of the proximity of large Communist military formations in the north, Free Viet-Nam must maintain substantial numbers of men under arms. Moreover, while the Government has shown real progress in cleaning out Communist guerrillas, those remaining continue to be a disruptive influence in the nation's life.

Unassisted, Viet-Nam cannot at this time produce and support the military formations essential to it or, equally important, the morale—the hope, the confidence, the pride—necessary to meet the dual threat of aggression from without and subversion within its borders.

Still another fact! Strategically south Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of south Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

Viet-Nam must have a reasonable degree of safety now—both for her people and for her property. Because of these facts, military as well as economic help is currently needed in Viet-Nam.

We reach the inescapable conclusion that our own national interests demand some help from us in sustaining in Viet-Nam the morale, the economic progress, and the military strength necessary to its continued existence in freedom.
(In 1960 The Communist Party of North Vietnam openly avowed its purpose to liberate the south from the “rule of U.S. imperialists and their henchmen.” This statement summarizes Communist activity in South Vietnam and announced increased U.S. military assistance.)

24. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE, MAY 4, 1961
(Excerpt)\(^1\)

I thought that it might be useful if I were to make some comments on the background of the situation in Viet-Nam—that is, not back-ground comments but comments on the background.

Since late in 1959 organized Communist activity in the form of guerrilla raids against army and security units of the Government of Viet-Nam, terrorist acts against local officials and civilians, and other subversive activities in the Republic of Viet-Nam have increased to levels unprecedented since the Geneva agreements of 1954. During this period the organized armed strength of the Viet Cong, the Communist apparatus operating in the Republic of Viet-Nam, has grown from about 3,000 to over 12,000 personnel. This armed strength has been supplemented by an increase in the numbers of political and propaganda agents in the area.

During 1960 alone, Communist armed units and terrorists assassinated or kidnapped over 3,000 local officials, military personnel, and civilians. Their activities took the form of armed attacks against isolated garrisons, attacks on newly established townships, ambushes on roads and canals, destruction of bridges, and well-planned sabotage against public works and communication lines. Because of Communist guerrilla activity 200 elementary schools had to be closed at various times, affecting over 25,000 students and 800 teachers.

This upsurge of Communist guerrilla activity apparently stemmed from a decision made in May 1959 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam which called for the reunification of Viet-Nam by all “appropriate means.” In July of the same year the Central Committee was reorganized and charged with intelligence duties and the “liberation” of south Viet-Nam. In retrospect this decision to step up guerrilla activity was made to reverse the remarkable success which the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam under President Ngo Dinh Diem had achieved in consolidating its political position and in attaining significant economic recovery in the 5 years between 1954 and 1959.

Remarkably coincidental with the renewed Communist activity in Laos, the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam at its Third Congress on September 10, 1960, adopted a resolution which declared that the Vietnamese revolution has as a major strategic task the liberation of the south from the “rule of U.S. imperialists and their henchmen.” This resolution called for the direct overthrow of the government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The most recent gains by the Pathet Lao in the southern part of Laos have given added seriousness to the security situation in Viet-Nam. Communist control over Lao territory bordering Viet-Nam south of the 17th parallel makes more secure one of the three principal

routes by which north Vietnamese armed units have been able to infiltrate the Republic of Viet-Nam. The other two routes are, as is well known, directly across the 17th parallel and by sea along the coastline of the Republic of Viet-Nam. In addition to the obvious fact that the strength of the Pathet Lao has been tremendously increased by the importation of light and heavy arms from the outside, we have no reason to doubt that the north Vietnamese armed units not operating in Laos have been similarly reequipped and strengthened from the same outside source.

The increased Communist activity in the Republic of Viet-Nam and countermeasures to meet this threat have been matters of urgent and recent discussion, both by the officials of Viet-Nam and the United States. In connection with these the President has authorized an increase in the amount of military assistance, and a number of other measures have been determined upon. Furthermore the United States has undertaken training and advisory measures which are designed to strengthen both materially and militarily the ability of the Viet-Nam armed forces to overcome this increased Communist threat. A part of the effort, of course, must include in a situation of this sort a vigorous civil program as well in the economic and social field. As you may recall, the members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization expressed their concern about the situation in Viet-Nam in our recent conference in Bangkok, and it is perfectly apparent that we must all give very serious attention to developments in that country.

Now, I think I will be able to take a few questions.

Q. In your remarks on south Viet-Nam are you, in fact, suggesting that, as the war in Laos draws to a close, the Communists are simply opening up a new theater in southeast Asia?

A. I don't believe this is a shift from one theater to another. I think both of these countries have been under pressure from the Communists from the north, and the pressures in Laos have served to increase the pressures somewhat in Viet-Nam. The most active part of Communist efforts in Viet-Nam is occurring not in the north actually but in the south, the far south, in the Saigon area. But a considerable number of the personnel and also some of the supplies undoubtedly have been coming in from the north by infiltration—some of it through Laos.

(In view of the worsening situation in South Vietnam, President Kennedy announced on May 5, 1961 that Vice President Johnson would discuss with President Ngo Dinh Diem measures to help the country resist Communist pressures. The joint communiqué set forth the outcome of these discussions.)

25. JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT SAIGON BY THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRESIDENT OF VIET-NAM, MAY 13, 1961

Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President of the United States, has just completed a visit to the Republic of Viet-Nam, on behalf of President Kennedy and on invitation of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

1 Department of State Bulletin, June 19, 1961, pp. 956-957.
The enthusiastic welcome he received in Viet-Nam reflected a deep sense of common cause in the fight for freedom in Southeast Asia and around the world.

This recognition of mutual objectives resulted in concrete understandings between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States.

It is clear to the Government and the people of Viet-Nam and to the United States that the independence and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam are being brutally and systematically violated by Communist agents and forces from the north.

It is also clear to both Governments that action must be strengthened and accelerated to protect the legitimate rights and aspirations of the people of free Viet-Nam to choose their own way of life.

The two Governments agreed that this is the basic principle upon which their understandings rest.

The United States, for its part, is conscious of the determination, energy and sacrifices which the Vietnamese people, under the dedicated leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, have brought to the defense of freedom in their land.

The United States is also conscious of its responsibility and duty, in its own self-interest as well as in the interest of other free peoples, to assist a brave country in the defense of its liberties against unprovoked subversion and Communist terror. It has no other motive than the defense of freedom.

The United States recognizes that the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Ngo Dinh Diem, who was recently reelected to office by an overwhelming majority of his countrymen despite bitter Communist opposition, is in the vanguard of those leaders who stand for freedom on the periphery of the Communist empire in Asia.

Free Viet-Nam cannot alone withstand the pressure which this Communist empire is exerting against it. Under these circumstances—the need of free Viet-Nam for increased and accelerated emergency assistance and the will and determination of the United States to provide such assistance to those willing to fight for their liberties—it is natural that a large measure of agreement on the means to accomplish the joint purpose was found in high-level conversations between the two Governments.

Both Governments recognize that under the circumstances of guerilla warfare now existing in free Viet-Nam, it is necessary to give high priority to the restoration of a sense of security to the people of free Viet-Nam. This priority, however, in no way diminishes the necessity, in policies and programs of both Governments, to pursue vigorously appropriate measures in other fields to achieve a prosperous and happy society.

The following measures, agreed in principle and subject to prompt finalization and implementation, represent an increase and acceleration of United States assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam. These may be followed by more far-reaching measures if the situation, in the opinion of both Governments, warrants.

First, it was agreed by the two Governments to extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid and to infuse into their joint actions a high sense of urgency and dedication.

Second, it was agreed that regular armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam should be increased, and that the United States would extend
its military assistance programs to include support for an additional number of regular Vietnamese armed forces.

Third, it was agreed that the United States would provide military assistance program support for the entire Vietnamese civil guard force.

Fourth, it was agreed that the two Governments should collaborate in the use of military specialists to assist and work with Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public works activities in the villages of free Viet-Nam.

Fifth, it was agreed that the assistance of other free governments to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in its trouble against Communist guerrilla forces would be welcome.

Sixth, it was agreed that, to achieve the best possible use of available resources, the Vietnamese and the United States, in prosecution of their joint effort against Communist attacks in Viet-Nam, a group of highly qualified economic and fiscal experts would meet in Viet-Nam to work out a financial plan on which joint efforts should be based.

Seventh, it was agreed that the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam would discuss new economic and social measures to be undertaken in rural areas, to accompany the anti-guerrilla effort, in order that the people of Viet-Nam should benefit promptly from the restoration of law and order in their villages and provinces.

Eighth, it was agreed that, in addition to measures to deal with the immediate Viet-Nam guerrilla problem, the two Governments would work together toward a longer range economic development program, including further progress in the fields of agriculture, health, education, fisheries, highways, public administration, and industrial development.

These longer range plans and programs would be developed in detail after further consideration and discussion.

Their goal would be a Viet-Nam capable of a self-sustained economic growth.

President Ngo Dinh Diem and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, on behalf of President Kennedy, established a sense of mutual confidence and respect which both believe essential to fulfillment of their objectives.

(In October 1961 President Kennedy sent General Maxwell D. Taylor to Vietnam for consultations and recommendations, which resulted in the decision to bolster military strength of South Vietnam.)

26. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 17, 1961 (Excerpt)1

Insofar as Viet-Nam, one of our other principal points of concern involved, I should like to just make a few comments on that. The determined and ruthless campaign of propaganda, infiltration, and subversion by the Communist regime in north Viet-Nam to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam and subjugate its peoples is a threat to the peace. The independence and territorial integrity of that free country is of major and serious concern not only to the people of Viet-Nam and their immediate neighbors but also to all other free nations.

The accelerated assault in carrying out the orders of the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam to “liberate” the south—overthrow the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam— is of particular concern to the United States. As President Kennedy assured President Diem last October 24th, the United States is determined to help Viet-Nam preserve its independence, protect its people against the Communist assassins, and build a better growth.

In that same letter the President noted that we would be consulting with the Vietnamese Government about what additional measures we might take to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam in its struggle against the Communist aggressors. These consultations to coordinate our activities with those of the Vietnamese Government, to find the most effective means of sustaining the social and economic progress of the people of Viet-Nam and of protecting their liberty, are now under way in Saigon.

In the meantime there has been an acceleration of deliveries under our mutual defense assistance program. It can be expected that in order to help the Government of Viet-Nam meet increased Communist attacks some changes in the type of equipment delivered and in the nature of our training under the military advisory and training program will be required. Perhaps you would appreciate that there are reasons why I cannot go into detail about some of these matters at this time.

Now, I shall try to answer your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to Viet-Nam and the acceleration and the possible changes in our aid there, and so forth, are we asking or receiving any assurances from President Diem as to the steps that he is willing to take to make the effort against the Communists there more efficient?

A. These are questions which are being discussed with him at the present time, and, of course, in a nation of 14 million people, with a substantial army and military establishment there, there is a major job to be done by the peoples and the Government of the country concerned. But the precise relationship between their effort and our effort is now being discussed with them, and I would not—indeed I do not—have at the moment reports on those discussions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what can be done about the increasing use of Laos as a Communist base in violation of the Soviet pledges that this would be made a neutral area?

A. This is one of the subjects which have been discussed at Geneva, and certainly if there is to be any substance whatever in the notion of a neutral and independent Laos, then any arrangements for Laos must insure that Laos not itself be used as a route of penetration and infiltration and subversion against south Viet-Nam. This is, in fact, only one of three of the principal routes for the supply of agents, cadres, and arms from the north into south Viet-Nam. The other is across the 17th parallel. Part of it is in difficult and mountainous country where that kind of traffic can occur and can be dealt with only with the most strenuous measures. The third route is by sea. As you know, there are very large numbers of coastal junks and small
vessels plying along there, and we have very specific information that some of this traffic has been utilized for the kind of penetration to which we are now objecting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when Prime Minister Nehru was here, he said that the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam had been ineffective because of the impediments placed in its way by the south Vietnamese Government. We had been under the impression that it was ineffective because of the impediments placed in its way by the north Vietnamese government. That has been repeated 2 days ago in statements from New Delhi. Can you straighten us out, please?

A. During a period when people in south Viet-Nam found themselves under pressure and did not feel that they were getting adequate assistance from the ICC, irritations did develop, and I think that it would be only fair to say that the ICC has not had, in some problems of detailed arrangements, facilities, and support, all of the cooperation which it needs, and that situation has now been, I think, largely rectified. But the first task, as we see it, of the ICC is to take up in the most serious terms the letter which was recently filed with the ICC by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam charging large-scale infiltration and subversion by illegal intrusion from the north. These intrusions are not something that are done just secretly. They are a part of the proclaimed policy of the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam. They have spoken about them openly and quite publicly for several months. We believe that these charges are sound, that they are well supported in fact, and that they deserve the immediate and full investigation and report to the world by the ICC.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you stated that what is being done in Viet-Nam is in our view a threat to the peace. Is what we are doing to aid the Government of south Viet-Nam being done within the limitations, and will continue to be, if so, of the Geneva Accords, or are we moving toward denouncing those accords as a breach of the peace under the terms of General Walter Bedell Smith's statement at the time of the 1954 agreements?

A. Well, at this stage, the primary question about the Geneva Accords is not how those accords relate to, say, our military assistance program to south Viet-Nam. They relate to the specific, persistent, substantial, and openly proclaimed violations of those accords by the north Vietnamese.

Now the status of those accords will be determined more by the attitude of the north, which has been, is, and so far as we know continues to be ready to disregard them in their own attacks against the south Vietnamese. The first question is, what does the north do about those accords?

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the complaints laid before the ICC, I think more than 700 specific charges and letters and complaints have been laid before the ICC by south Viet-Nam over the years. During the conversations here with the Prime Minister of India, did we get any kind of assurances that, now that south Viet-Nam apparently is willing to cooperate with the ICC, it will in fact act vigorously to put the Commission into operation there?

A. I would not wish to attribute this specifically to a conversation with Prime Minister Nehru, but we have indications that the ICC does expect to take up these questions, and I believe a new chairman has
been appointed. I think there is some real prospect that they will go 
vigorously into these questions that have been raised.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have referred to this situation in south Viet-
Nam as a threat to the peace. What are the prospects of taking this 
to the United Nations?

A. I think there is a possibility that this question will come to the 
United Nations at some stage. I think at the present time we believe 
that the consultations with other governments in which we are now 
engaged and our consultations with the Government of south Viet-
Nam would be the most immediate steps to be taken up.

(At this news conference Secretary of State Rusk announced the 
release of a State Department report "A Threat to the Peace," which 
stated that South Vietnam was threatened by "clear and present 
danger" of Communist conquest.)

27. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE, 
DECEMBER 8, 1961 (Excerpts)¹

The last time we met, I discussed with you the ruthless campaign 
by which the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam has been trying 
to conquer South Viet-Nam. I said then that this campaign posed 
a threat to the independence and territorial integrity of a free coun-
try and its people and was a serious threat to the peace. I want to 
underline that earlier statement.

We are releasing today a report on what is happening in Viet-Nam. 
It documents the elaborate program of subversion, terror, and armed 
infiltration carried out under the direction of the authorities in Hanoi.

It points out—with extensive documentation for the world to see—
the methods by which North Viet-Nam has introduced its espionage 
agents, military personnel, weapons, and supplies into the south in 
recent years. This report shows that this already considerable effort 
by North Viet-Nam has been accelerated sharply in recent months. 
Kidnappings, assassinations of public officials, and other forms of 
terrorism have increased. The number and size of armed engagements 
have grown. The pace of infiltration from the north, across 
the demilitarized zone, through Laos, and by sea, has been stepped 
up. These documents show clearly that the North Vietnamese Com-
munists have repeatedly violated the Geneva Accords. I believe that 
this report makes it clear that South Viet-Nam needs additional help 
in defending itself.

The Government of South Viet-Nam realizes this and has welcomed 
support from the non-Communist world. The United States is now 
taking steps to help South Viet-Nam develop the military, economic, 
and social strength needed to preserve its national integrity. It is 
our hope that other nations will join us in providing assistance to 
South Viet-Nam until such time as the Communists have halted their 
acts of violence and terror.

*   *   *   *   *

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to your opening statement on Viet-
Nam, your statement, like the report which is being issued today, gives
no guidelines at all as to what help the United States would like to see
other nations provide or the mechanism by which they might provide
it. Can you be more specific in what you have in mind?

A. Well, I think there are a number of ways in which other nations
can help. There is first, of course, the sense of political support for
the Government of Viet-Nam as it meets this serious threat from the
north. Then there are many tasks which are present in South Viet-
Nam on which assistance is needed. They are economic assistance,
technical assistance, administrative help, and measures of the sort
which we have in mind to improve the effectiveness of the South Viet-
namese armed forces. Improvements in their mobility, their com-
communications, and their equipment, and things of that sort.

I would think that the mechanisms are those which are already
established in South Viet-Nam, and I know that the South Vietnamese
Government has had discussions and is having discussions with others
on this particular point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that same connection, how do you regard the
statements of Communist China that they will not remain indifferent to
United States assistance to South Viet Nam? Do you feel that this
might lead to an escalation of war preparations?

A. Well, I think, as our report brings out, the Communist powers
themselves have not been indifferent to South Viet-Nam for the last
several years. One of the problems is that they have not used their
influence to insist upon full compliance on the part of the other side
with the Geneva Accords. I don't myself believe that those expres-
sions from Peiping can be treated as a shield behind which North
Viet-Nam takes over South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said quite pointedly that North Viet-Nam had
violated the Geneva Accord. While we are not a signatory of the
accord, we did have an arrangement with the ICC and South Viet-Nam
about the number of military personnel we would have in South Viet-
Nam. We have also observed the kind of material we sent in there.
Do we now feel bound by these prior arrangements?

A. I think that puts the question the wrong way around. There
is no question that the North Vietnamese have been systematically
violating the 1954 Geneva Accords. Indeed, the title of the report
which we are issuing to the public today, A Threat to the Peace, is
taken from Under Secretary Bedell Smith's statement at the time of
the Geneva Accords as to our attitude toward that situation.

Now, actions are being taken by the other side to breach these ac-
cords. It is not a violation of an agreement of this sort to take steps
to protect oneself against the other party's breach, even though in the
absence of such a breach those steps might not be considered normal.

If the North Vietnamese bring themselves into full compliance with
the Geneva Accord, there will be no problem on the part of South
Viet-Nam or any one supporting South Viet-Nam.
(In this exchange of messages, President Kennedy pledged increased assistance to Vietnam's defense effort.)


President Kennedy to President Diem

DECEMBER 14, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your recent letter in which you described so cogently the dangerous condition caused by North Viet-Nam’s efforts to take over your country. The situation in your embattled country is well known to me and to the American people. We have been deeply disturbed by the assault on your country. Our indignation has mounted as the deliberate savagery of the Communist program of assassination, kidnapping and wanton violence became clear.

Your letter underlines what our own information has convincingly shown—that the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They have thus violated the provisions of the Geneva Accords designed to ensure peace in Viet-Nam and to which they bound themselves in 1954.

At that time, the United States, although not a party to the Accords, declared that it “would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.” We continue to maintain that view.

In accordance with that declaration, and in response to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort as well as help relieve the destruction of the floods which you describe. I have already given the orders to get these programs underway.

The United States, like the Republic of Viet-Nam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary. We shall seek to persuade the Communists to give up their attempts of force and subversion. In any case, we are confident that the Vietnamese people will preserve their independence and gain the peace and prosperity for which they have sought so hard and so long.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

President Diem to President Kennedy

DECEMBER 7, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since its birth, more than six years ago, the Republic of Viet-Nam has enjoyed the close friendship and cooperation of the United States of America.

Like the United States, the Republic of Viet-Nam has always been devoted to the preservation of peace. My people know only too well the sorrows of war. We have honored the 1954 Geneva Agreements even though they resulted in the partition of our country and the enslavement of more than half of our people by Communist tyranny. We have never considered the reunification of our nation by force. On the contrary, we have publicly pledged that we will not violate the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone set up by the agreements. We have always been prepared and have on many occasions stated our willingness to reunify Viet-Nam on the basis of democratic and truly free elections.

The record of the Communist authorities in the northern part of our country is quite otherwise. They not only consented to the division of Viet-Nam, but were eager for it. They pledged themselves to observe the Geneva Agreements and during the seven years since have never ceased to violate them. They call for free elections but are ignorant of the very meaning of the words. They talk of “peaceful reunification” and wage war against us.

From the beginning, the Communists resorted to terror in their efforts to subvert our people, destroy our government, and impose a Communist regime upon us. They have attacked defenseless teachers, closed schools, killed members of our anti-malarial program and looted hospitals. This is coldly calculated to destroy our government’s humanitarian efforts to serve our people.

We have long sought to check the Communist attack from the North on our people by appeals to the International Control Commission. Over the years, we have repeatedly published to the world the evidence of the Communist plot to overthrow our government and seize control of all of Viet-Nam by illegal intrusions from outside our country. The evidence has mounted until now it is hardly necessary to rehearse it. Most recently, the kidnapping and brutal murder of our Chief Liaison Officer to the International Control Commission, Colonel Noang Thuy Nam, compelled us to speak out once more. In our October 24, 1961, letter to the ICC, we called attention again to the publicly stated determination of the Communist authorities in Hanoi to “liberate the South” by the overthrow of my government and the imposition of a Communist regime on our people. We cited the proof of massive infiltration of Communist agents and military elements into our country. We outlined the Communist strategy, which is simply the ruthless use of terror against the whole population, women and children included.

In the course of the last few months, the Communist assault on our people has achieved high ferocity. In October they caused more than 1,800 incidents of violence and more than 2,000 casualties. They have struck occasionally in battalion strength, and they are continually augmenting their forces by infiltration from the North. The level of their attacks is already such that our forces are stretched to the utmost. We are forced to defend every village, every hamlet, indeed every home against a foe whose tactic is always to strike at the defenseless.

A disastrous flood was recently added to the misfortunes of the Vietnamese people. The greater part of three provinces was inundated, with a great loss of property. We are now engaged in a nationwide effort to reconstruct and rehabilitate this area. The Communists are, of course, making this task doubly difficult, for they have seized upon the disruption of normal administration and communications as an opportunity to sow more destruction in the stricken area.

In short, the Vietnamese nation now faces what is perhaps the gravest crisis in its long history. For more than 2,000 years my people have lived and built, fought and died in this land. We have not always been free. Indeed, much of our history and many of its proudest moments have arisen from conquest by foreign powers and our struggle against great odds to regain or defend our precious independence. But it is not only our freedom which is at stake today, it is our national identity. For, if we lose this war, our people will be swallowed by the Communist Bloc, all our proud heritage will be blotted out by the “Socialist society” and Viet-Nam will leave the pages of history. We will lose our national soul.

Mr. President, my people and I are mindful of the great assistance which the United States has given us. Your help has not been lightly received, for the Vietnamese are proud people, and we are determined to do our part in the defense of the free world. It is clear to all of us that the defeat of the Viet Cong demands the total mobilization of our government and our people, and you may be sure that we will devote all of our resources of money, minds, and men to this great task.

But Viet-Nam is not a great power and the forces of International Communism now arrayed against us are more than we can meet with the resources at hand.
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM

We must have further assistance from the United States if we are to win the war now being waged against us.

We can certainly assure mankind that our action is purely defensive. Much as we regret the subjugation of more than half of our people in North Viet-Nam, we have no intention, and indeed no means, to free them by use of force.

I have said that Viet-Nam is at war. War means many things, but most of all it means the death of brave people for a cause they believe in. Viet-Nam has suffered many wars, and through the centuries we have always had patriots and heroes who were willing to shed their blood for Viet-Nam. We will keep faith with them.

When Communism has long ebbed away into the past, my people will still be here, a free united nation growing from the deep roots of our Vietnamese heritage. They will remember your help in our time of need. This struggle will then be a part of our common history. And your help, your friendship, and the strong bonds between our two peoples will be a part of Viet-Nam, then as now.

Ngo Dinh Diem

THE PRESIDENT
The White House
Washington, D.C.

(This communique focused on new joint efforts to accelerate and broaden assistance to the countryside and to support a comprehensive and coordinated counterinsurgency program.)

29. JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES AND VIET-NAM ON THE EXPANSION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, JANUARY 4, 1962

The Government of Viet-Nam and the United States Government announce a broad economic and social program aimed at providing every Vietnamese with the means for improving his standard of living. This program represents an intensification and expansion of efforts already made for the same purpose during the past few years.

Social facilities in the fields of education and health will be established throughout the country. Roads, communications and agricultural facilities will be developed to bring increasing prosperity to the people.

Measures to strengthen South Viet-Nam’s defense in the military field are being taken simultaneously pursuant to the recent exchange of letters between President Kennedy and President Diem.

All of these steps—economic, social, military—demonstrate the desire of both the United States and Vietnamese Governments to do their utmost to improve the protection and prosperity of the Vietnamese in the face of Communist guerrilla aggression and depredations directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi.

The Vietnamese and American Governments have worked out a comprehensive program as a follow-up to the study made by a joint group of experts under the leadership of Professor Vu Quoc Thuc of Viet-Nam and Dr. A. Eugene Staley of the United States, as well as later studies. Some measures have already been started. Others are in the advanced planning stage and will soon be underway.

The United States Government is furnishing additional aid to assist the Government of Viet-Nam is maintaining a level of essential imports which the Government of Viet-Nam could not otherwise finance. Pri-

ority will be given to imports required to meet the needs of the people, including the means of developing industries of Viet-Nam, and luxury goods will be excluded in accordance with current conditions of austerity. The Vietnamese Government, as recently announced, has taken steps to increase greatly the piaster resources available to it for financing the piaster costs of security, economic and social programs.

With this combination of dollars and piasters, the Government of Viet-Nam, with United States material and advisory support, will carry out the following programs at village and hamlet levels and in cities:

1. Training facilities for village officials will be set up to improve administration where government has the closest contact with the people.

2. The rural health program will be further developed. Maternity clinics have already been established in over half of the districts and first aid stations in about two-thirds of the villages. The objective is to extend this program to achieve 100 percent coverage. A nationwide program of inoculations against diphtheria, tetanus and whooping cough will be started. These programs will be concentrated in the near future in areas relatively free of Viet Cong domination and will be extended to other areas as Viet Cong are suppressed.

3. The education program will also be expanded. Public-primary schools have increased from 1,191 in 1954 to 4,668 in 1961. Over the same period the number of students has grown from 330,000 to 1,100,000. The goal is to extend primary schools to every village in the country. As with rural health facilities, the immediate aim is to expedite the extension of primary schools to all those villages in areas relatively free of Viet Cong and to extend them to villages in other areas as Communist guerrillas are eliminated.

4. Village communications are being developed, both to enable receipt of radio programs broadcast over the National Radio System (now nearing completion), and to provide the means for village communication with district headquarters. Such a communication system will make it possible to make emergency calls of any nature—for example, for emergency medical assistance.

5. New roads are being built to link rural communities with main highways and, in turn, with provincial and national centers. This program, already underway in many areas, will make it easier to ferret out Viet Cong guerrillas at the same time it lays potential for improving the lot of loyal citizens.

6. Adequate funds will be available to support and expand the agricultural credit system. It has already functioned successfully in many parts of the country, and as security is restored an increasing number of farmers will be able to borrow money cheaply in order to increase their production and income.

7. The program to control pests and insects, especially in central Viet-Nam where they have ravaged rice crops for the past two years, is ready to be launched on an extensive scale. It should materially improve the livelihood of peasants in the areas affected.

8. Special efforts will also be taken to enable the montagnard population in the High Plateau to share progress in this region with their Vietnamese compatriots. Resettlement will be accelerated where necessary to remove the population from Viet Cong pressures. Increased
resources available to the Government of Viet-Nam will assist in the construction of resettlement villages and will permit helping inhabitants where necessary until they become self-supporting. Many of the Land Development Centers created during the past few years are now flourishing areas producing new crops like kenaf and ramie, and people living in them enjoy a bigger income than before. Similar prospects exist for new resettlement centers for montagnards, to which village improvements in health, education and communications will be extended.

9. Special efforts will be directed at reconstruction in flood-stricken regions in the Mekong Delta. These will include regroupment of people into new villages to which health, education and communications benefits will be extended. Road and canal construction will also be involved.

10. Extensive programs of public works will be undertaken to help relieve unemployment.

11. Industrial development which has been marked in the past two years will continue. In the field of cotton textiles, for example, a further investment of $6 million will go far toward making Viet-Nam nearly self-sufficient in cotton cloth. At the same time it will provide living for thousands of workers.

Increased United States assistance for both immediate economic and social measures and longer range development reflects the confidence of the United States Government in the future of free Viet-Nam. Both the Vietnamese and United States Governments also welcome the support and assistance of other Governments in carrying forward these programs for insuring the freedom of Viet-Nam and increasing the prosperity of the Vietnamese people.

30. SECRETARY RUSK’S NEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH 1, 1962 (Excerpts)

I would like to open today with a statement on Viet-Nam. We have noted recent comments from Peiping, Moscow, and Hanoi about the nature and purposes of American aid to Viet-Nam. I should like, therefore, to make a brief comment on that situation.

These comments from Communist capitals wholly neglect the fact that the Republic of Viet-Nam is under attack of Communist guerrillas who are directed, trained, supplied, and reinforced by North Viet-Nam—all in gross violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords. Irrefutable evidence of this illegal and aggressive activity has been made public; I can add that what is known publicly is strongly and conclusively reinforced by intelligence information.

United States military and economic assistance and technical advice are being extended to the Republic of Viet-Nam at its request to assist the Vietnamese people to maintain their independence against this aggression. There have been other examples, in almost every continent, of this type of aggression.

The United States is assisting with training, logistics, transportation, and advisory personnel to enable the Government of Viet-Nam
to deal with this conspiratorial effort to take over that country by violent means. We have no combat units in that country, and we have no desire for bases or other United States military advantages. All we want is that the Vietnamese be free to determine their own future.

In reference to the demand by the Communists that the cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference and other countries concerned consult regarding Viet-Nam, the United States is always prepared to talk about situations which represent a threat to the peace, but what must be talked about is the root of the trouble; in this case it is the Communist aggression against Viet-Nam in disregard of the Geneva Accords.

The President made it clear last December in responding to the Vietnamese request for assistance that

... our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence.

If the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary.

There is no threat to the peace of Southeast Asia from the south or from across the Pacific Ocean; the threat comes only from the north, from those who have declared their intention to force the rest of the world into their pattern—despite the fact that no people has yet chosen that pattern in a genuinely free election. There can be peace overnight in Viet-Nam if those responsible for the aggression wish peace. The situation is just as simple as that.

* * * * * * * * *

Q. Mr. Secretary, in reference to your opening statement on Viet-Nam, were you anticipating that there might at some stage be major-power talks on the situation in Viet-Nam?

A. I don't know today what might be in the future on the matter of talks. What I wanted to point out was that the issue there is extremely simple. There is no problem in South Viet-Nam if the other side would stay its hand, would leave Viet-Nam alone, would stop this infiltration of cadres and supplies and direction and control from the north. Then the problem of peace in Viet-Nam could be settled very quickly indeed. I don't at the moment envisage any particular form of discussion on that matter, but that is the issue and it could be settled very simply.

* * * * * * * * *

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement you said the United States was always willing to talk about the Vietnamese situation. What sort of talks do you think would be most fruitful? For example, would a second round of the 1954 Geneva talks do any good with the United States?

A. I do not have in mind any specific form of talk. The message that we want to get across to the other side in the face of these comments and declarations that they have made through various channels is that there is no problem about peace in Viet-Nam if they will simply decide to leave it alone. It is just as simple as that. We have no ambitions of a national sort ourselves. We can think of a great many other things to do with our resources or our manpower than the task we have undertaken to assist the Government of South Viet-Nam in that
situation. We have seen this story before in other parts of the world since 1945. Peace could be immediate if this aggressive effort would be suspended, if it were called off, if it were canceled, and it is just as simple as that. There are various ways, including this press conference today, in which we hope to make that clear to the other side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, back on the subject of Viet-Nam. You have said that the United States is willing to talk, but you say you think that talks are not required in order to bring peace to the area. As a practical matter, do you think it would be possible to get the Communists to cease and desist aiding the North Vietnamese without having some sort of negotiations?

A. This is not something on which the other side is unaware of our view. No, I would think that the subject of discussion would be relatively simple, and I wouldn't now want to predict exactly how discussions, if any occur, might go on. This matter did come up in the Geneva conference on Laos, where references were made to Viet-Nam and to the Geneva Accords.

I don't want to pursue this question of exactly how any talks might occur among governments. Obviously there are talks, because the authorities in Peiping and other capitals have addressed communications, for example, to the cochairmen through public channels, and there are the ICC [International Control Commission] activities, which are intergovernmental discussions. But I don't at the moment foresee any specific form or method of discussion.

(On June 2, 1962, the Canadian and Indian members of the International Control Commission found North Vietnam guilty of subversion and covert aggression.)


The report just issued by the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam demonstrates that the Communist North Vietnamese are engaged in a campaign of aggression and subversion aimed at the violent overthrow of the Government of South Viet-Nam. It indicates clearly that the hostilities in Viet-Nam, which in the first 5 months of this year alone resulted in the death of more than 9,000 people, are planned, caused, and led by the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam. These are the conclusions of the Commission's Legal Committee:

* * * there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. * * * there is evidence to show that the PAVN [People's Army of Viet-Nam] has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South.

The Commission accepted these conclusions of the Legal Committee that there was sufficient evidence to show "beyond reasonable doubt" that the authorities in Communist North Viet-Nam committed these violations. The Commission also cited the Republic of Viet-Nam for its activities in importing military equipment and personnel above the limits imposed by the 1954 Geneva Accords. The report clearly demonstrates, however, that these actions were taken by South Viet-Nam as part of its effort to defend itself against aggression and subversion from the North. In December of last year President Diem requested increased military assistance from the United States. We have responded to this request.

President Diem and President Kennedy have both stated that they look forward to the discontinuance of the present level of military assistance when the Communist North Vietnamese halt their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam. The report of the International Control Commission takes note of this position. The United States welcomes the Commission's report and recommends it for world attention. We hope that the Commission will continue its efforts to restore peace in Viet-Nam.

(The 1954 Geneva Accords provided for the withdrawal of Vietnamese Communist forces from Laos and for the reintegration of the Pathet Lao into the national community. However, it was not until 3 years later that the Pathet Lao, having achieved important concessions from the Royal Lao government agreed to the reunification and ostensibly to the dissolution of Pathet Lao forces. In 1959, the Pathet Lao reverted to the use of force and by spring of 1961 won a series of military victories and were in a position to take over the country. In 1961 a de facto cease fire was achieved under the government of Prince Boun Oum and the Geneva Conference to settle the Lao question convened, which finally resulted in agreement in 1962, by which a coalition government would be established, all foreign troops and military personnel withdrawn, and the use of Lao territory for "interference in the internal affairs of other countries" was prohibited.)

32. DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS,
JULY 23, 1962

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, whose representatives took part in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-62;

Welcoming the presentation of the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, and taking note of this statement, which is, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of
Laos, incorporated in the present Declaration as an integral part there-
of, and the text of which is as follows:

THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF LAOS,

Being resolved to follow the path of peace and neutrality in conformity with
the interests and aspirations of the Laotian people, as well as the principles of
the Joint Communiqué of Zurich dated June 22, 1961, and of the Geneva Agree-
ments of 1954 in order to build a peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic,
united and prosperous Laos,

Solemnly declares that:

(1) It will resolutely apply the five principles of peaceful co-existence in
foreign relations, and will develop friendly relations and establish diplomatic
relations with all countries, the neighboring countries first and foremost, on
the basis of equality and of respect for the independence and sovereignty of Laos;

(2) It is the will of the Laotian people to protect and ensure respect for the
sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos;

(3) It will not resort to the use or threat of force in any way which might
impair the peace of other countries, and will not interfere in the internal affairs
of other countries;

(4) It will not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, whether
military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the Kingdom
of Laos; it will not allow the establishment of any foreign military base on
Laotian territory, nor allow any country to use Laotian territory for military
purposes, or for the purposes of interference in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries, nor recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including
SEATO.

(5) It will not allow any foreign interference in the internal affairs of the
Kingdom of Laos in any form whatsoever;

(6) Subject to the provisions of Article 5 of the Protocol, it will require the
withdrawal from Laos of all foreign troops and military personnel, and will
not allow any foreign troops or military personnel to be introduced into Laos;

(7) It will accept direct and unconditional aid from all countries that wish
to help the Kingdom of Laos build up an independent and autonomous national
economy on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of Laos;

(8) It will respect the treaties and agreements signed in conformity with the
interests of the Laotian people and of the policy of peace and neutrality of the
Kingdom, in particular the Geneva Agreements of 1962, and will abrogate all
treaties and agreements which are contrary to those principles.

This statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos shall be pro-
mulgated constitutionally and shall have the force of law.

The Kingdom of Laos appeals to all the States participating in the Interna-
tional Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, and to all other
States, to recognise the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and terri-
torial integrity of Laos, to conform to these principles in all respects, and to
refrain from any action inconsistent therewith.

Confirming the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos and non-interference in its internal affairs which are embodied in the Geneva
Agreements of 1954;

Emphasising the principle of respect for the neutrality of the King-
dom of Laos;

Agreeing that the above-mentioned principles constitute a basis
for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question:

Profoundly convinced that the independence and neutrality of the
Kingdom of Laos will assist the peaceful democratic development of
the Kingdom of Laos and the achievement of national accord and
unity in that country, as well as the strengthening of peace and security
in South-East Asia;

1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with the will of the Government
and people of the Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the statement of
neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, that they
recognise and will respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos.

2. Undertake, in particular, that
(a) they will not commit or participate in any way in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos;
(b) they will not resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos;
(c) they will refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos;
(d) they will not attach conditions of a political nature to any assistance which they may offer or which the Kingdom of Laos may seek;
(e) they will not bring the Kingdom of Laos in any way into any military alliance or any other agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with her neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to enter into any such alliance or to conclude any such agreement;
(f) they will respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO;
(g) they will not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the introduction of any foreign troops or military personnel;
(h) they will not establish nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the establishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any foreign military base, foreign strong point or other foreign military installation of any kind;
(i) they will not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries;
(j) they will not use the territory of any country, including their own for interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos.

3. Appeal to all other States to recognise, respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence and neutrality, and also the unity and territorial integrity, of the Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any action inconsistent with these principles or with other provisions of the present Declaration.

4. Undertake, in the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to ensure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present Declaration.

5. The present Declaration shall enter into force on signature and together with the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, shall be regarded as constituting an international agreement. The present Declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union.
of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all the other States of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Declaration.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

PROTOCOL TO THE DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Kingdom of Laos, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

Having regard to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos of July 23, 1962;

Have agreed as follows:

**Article 1**

For the purposes of this Protocol

(a) the term “foreign military personnel” shall include members of foreign military missions, foreign military advisers, experts, instructors, consultants, technicians, observers and any other foreign military persons, including those serving in any armed forces in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials;

(b) the term “the Commission” shall mean the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos set up by virtue of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and composed of the representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with the representative of India as Chairman;

(c) the term “the Co-Chairmen” shall mean the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962, and their successors in the offices of Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively;

(d) the term “the members of the Conference” shall mean the Governments of countries which took part in the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962.

**Article 2**

All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall be withdrawn from Laos in the shortest time possible and in any case the withdrawal shall be completed not later than thirty days after the Commission has notified the Royal Government of Laos that in accordance with Articles 8 and 10 of this Protocol its inspection teams are present at all points of withdrawal from Laos. These points shall be determined by the
Royal Government of Laos in accordance with Article 3 within thirty days after the entry into force of this Protocol. The inspection teams shall be present at these points and the Commission shall notify the Royal Government of Laos thereof within fifteen days after the points have been determined.

**Article 3**

The withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall take place only along such routes and through such points as shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission. The Commission shall be notified in advance of the point and time of all such withdrawals.

**Article 4**

The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited.

**Article 5**

Note is taken that the French and Laotian Governments will conclude as soon as possible an arrangement to transfer the French military installations in Laos to the Royal Government of Laos.

If the Laotian Government considers it necessary, the French Government may as an exception leave in Laos for a limited period of time a precisely limited number of French military instructors for the purpose of training the armed forces of Laos.

The French and Laotian Governments shall inform the members of the Conference, through the Co-Chairmen, of their agreement on the question of the transfer of the French military installations in Laos and of the employment of French military instructors by the Laotian Government.

**Article 6**

The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defence of Laos, is prohibited.

**Article 7**

All foreign military persons and civilians captured or interned during the course of hostilities in Laos shall be released within thirty days after the entry into force of this Protocol and handed over by the Royal Government of Laos to the representatives of the Governments of the countries of which they are nationals in order that they may proceed to the destination of their choice.

**Article 8**

The Co-Chairmen shall periodically receive reports from the Commission. In addition the Commission shall immediately report to the Co-Chairmen any violations or threats of violations of this Protocol,
all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Protocol, and also any other important information which may assist the Co-Chairmen in carrying out their functions. The Commission may at any time seek help from the Co-Chairmen in the performance of its duties, and the Co-Chairmen may at any time make recommendations to the Commission exercising general guidance.

The Co-Chairmen shall circulate the reports and any other important information from the Commission to the members of the Conference.

The Co-Chairmen shall exercise supervision over the observance of this Protocol and the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.

The Co-Chairmen shall keep the members of the Conference constantly informed and when appropriate will consult with them.

ARTICLE 9

The Commission shall, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, supervise and control the cease-fire in Laos.

The Commission shall exercise these functions in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and within the framework of the Cease-Fire Agreement or cease-fire arrangements made by the three political forces in Laos, or the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that responsibility for the execution of the cease-fire shall rest with the three parties concerned and with the Royal Government of Laos after its formation.

ARTICLE 10

The Commission shall supervise and control the withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel. Inspection teams sent by the Commission for these purposes shall be present for the period of the withdrawal at all points of withdrawal from Laos determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission in accordance with Article 3 of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 11

The Commission shall investigate cases where there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation of the provisions of Article 4 of this Protocol has occurred.

It is understood that in the exercise of this function the Commission is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. It shall carry out its investigations in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and shall immediately inform the Co-Chairmen of any violations or threats of violations of Article 4, and also of all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Article in accordance with Article 8.

ARTICLE 12

The Commission shall assist the Royal Government of Laos in cases where the Royal Government of Laos considers that a violation of Article 6 of this Protocol may have taken place. This assistance will be rendered at the request of the Royal Government of Laos and in full co-operation with it.
 Article 13

The Commission shall exercise its functions under this Protocol in close co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that the Royal Government of Laos at all levels will render the Commission all possible assistance in the performance by the Commission of these functions and also will take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the Commission and its inspection teams during their activities in Laos.

 Article 14

The Commission functions as a single organ of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962. The members of the Commission will work harmoniously and in cooperation with each other with the aim of solving all questions within the terms of reference of the Commission.

Decisions of the Commission on questions relating to violations of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of this Protocol or of the cease-fire referred to in Article 9, conclusions on major questions sent to the Co-Chairmen and all recommendations by the Commission shall be adopted unanimously. On other questions, including procedural questions, and also questions relating to the initiation and carrying out of investigations (Article 15), decisions of the Commission shall be adopted by majority vote.

 Article 15

In the exercise of its specific functions which are laid down in the relevant articles of this Protocol the Commission shall conduct investigations (directly or by sending inspection teams), when there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation has occurred. These investigations shall be carried out at the request of the Royal Government of Laos or on the initiative of the Commission, which is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos.

In the latter case decisions on initiating and carrying out such investigations shall be taken in the Commission by majority vote.

The Commission shall submit agreed reports on investigations in which differences which may emerge between members of the Commission on particular questions may be expressed.

The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission resulting from investigations shall be adopted unanimously.

 Article 16

For the exercise of its functions the Commission shall, as necessary, set up inspection teams, on which the three member-States of the Commission shall be equally represented. Each member-State of the Commission shall ensure the presence of its own representatives both on the Commission and on the inspection teams, and shall promptly replace them in the event of their being unable to perform their duties.

It is understood that the dispatch of inspection teams to carry out various specific tasks takes place with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. The points to which the Commission and its inspection teams go for the purposes of investigation and their length
of stay at those points shall be determined in relation to the requirements of the particular investigation.

**Article 17**

The Commission shall have at its disposal the means of communication and transport required for the performance of its duties. These as a rule will be provided to the Commission by the Royal Government of Laos for payment on mutually acceptable terms, and those which the Royal Government of Laos cannot provide will be acquired by the Commission from other sources. It is understood that the means of communication and transport will be under the administrative control of the Commission.

**Article 18**

The costs of the operations of the Commission shall be borne by the members of the Conference in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

(a) The Governments of Canada, India and Poland shall pay the personal salaries and allowances of their nationals who are members of their delegations to the Commission and its subsidiary organs.

(b) The primary responsibility for the provision of accommodation for the Commission and its subsidiary organs shall rest with the Royal Government of Laos, which shall also provide such other local services as may be appropriate. The Commission shall charge to the Fund referred to in sub-paragraph (c) below any local expenses not borne by the Royal Government of Laos.

(c) All other capital or running expenses incurred by the Commission in the exercise of its functions shall be met from a Fund to which all the members of the Conference shall contribute in the following proportions:

- The Government of the People’s Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America shall contribute 17.6 per cent each.
- The Governments of Burma, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Laos, the Republic of Viet Nam and Thailand shall contribute 1.5 per cent each.
- The Governments of Canada, India and Poland as members of the Commission shall contribute 1 per cent each.

**Article 19**

The Co-Chairmen shall at any time, if the Royal Government of Laos so requests, and in any case not later than three years after the entry into force of this Protocol, present a report with appropriate recommendations on the question of the termination of the Commission to the members of the Conference for their consideration. Before making such a report the Co-Chairmen shall hold consultations with the Royal Government of Laos and the Commission.
ARTICLE 20

This Protocol shall enter into force on signature.
It shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all other States and to all other States of the world.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July one thousand and ninety-six in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

(In May 1963 Buddhist riots in Huế set off disputes between the Vietnamese Government and the Buddhists. In August, martial law was proclaimed after increasing demonstrations, including immolations. Against this background, President Kennedy made the following statements.)

33. PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S TV INTERVIEWS, SEPTEMBER 2, AND 9, 1963 (Excerpts)¹

(a) CBS Interview, September 2

* * * * * * *

Mr. Cronkite. Mr. President, the only hot war we've got running at the moment is of course the one in Viet-Nam, and we have our difficulties here, quite obviously.

President Kennedy. I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Viet-Nam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people.

The repressions against the Buddhists, we felt, were very unwise. Now all we can do is to make it very clear that we don't think this is the way to win. It is my hope that this will become increasingly obvious to the Government, that they will take steps to try to bring back popular support for this very essential struggle.

Mr. Cronkite. Do you think this Government has time to regain the support of the people?

President Kennedy. I do. With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel, I think it can. If it doesn't make those changes, I would think that the chances of winning it would not be very good.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 30, 1963, pp. 498-500
Mr. Cronkite. Hasn't every indication from Saigon been that President Diem has no intention of changing his pattern?

President Kennedy. If he does not change it, of course, that is his decision. He has been there 10 years, and, as I say, he has carried this burden when he has been counted out on a number of occasions.

Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that; but in the final analysis it is the people and the Government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear. But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away.

We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.

(b) NBC Interview, September 9

Mr. Huntley. Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that our Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it difficult to alter or shift that policy?

The President. Yes, that is true. I think in the case of South Viet-Nam we have been dealing with a Government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better. Since June, however—the difficulties with the Buddhists—we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn't been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may spread. So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the Government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the Government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time, and we must be patient, we must persist.

Mr. Huntley. Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?

The President. I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost—a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that.

Mr. Brinkley. Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called "domino theory," that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?
The President. No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it.

Mr. Brinkley. In the last 48 hours there have been a great many conflicting reports from there about what the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] was up to. Can you give us any enlightenment on it?

The President. No.

Mr. Huntley. Does the CIA tend to make its own policy? That seems to be the debate here.

The President. No, that is the frequent charge, but that isn't so. Mr. [John A.] McCone, head of the CIA, sits in the National Security Council. We have had a number of meetings in the past few days about events in South Viet-Nam. Mr. McCone participated in every one, and the CIA coordinates its efforts with the State Department and the Defense Department.

Mr. Brinkley. With so much of our prestige, money, so on, committed in South Viet-Nam, why can't we exercise a little more influence there, Mr. President?

The President. We have some influence. We have some influence and we are attempting to carry it out. I think we don't—we can't expect these countries to do everything the way we want to do them. They have their own interest, their own personalities, their own tradition. We can't make everyone in our image, and there are a good many people who don't want to go in our image. In addition, we have ancient struggles between countries. In the case of India and Pakistan, we would like to have them settle Kashmir. That is our view of the best way to defend the subcontinent against communism. But that struggle between India and Pakistan is more important to a good many people in that area than the struggle against the Communists. We would like to have Cambodia, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but there are ancient differences there. We can't make the world over, but we can influence the world. The fact of the matter is that with the assistance of the United States and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], Southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has been maintained independent against a powerful force, the Chinese Communists. What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.
(As dissension between the Buddhists and the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem increased, the U.S. reexamined its policy toward South Viet-Nam, as noted in the following three statements.)

34. U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM: WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, OCTOBER 2, 1963

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor reported to the President this morning and to the National Security Council this afternoon. Their report included a number of classified findings and recommendations which will be the subject of further review and action. Their basic presentation was endorsed by all members of the Security Council and the following statement of United States policy was approved by the President on the basis of recommendations received from them and from Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge.

1. The security of South Viet-Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet-Nam.

2. The military program in South Viet-Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.

3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdrawn.

4. The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet-Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.

5. It remains the policy of the United States, in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society.

35. THE NEXT STEPS TOWARD PEACE: Statement by Mc-
George Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, September
30, 1963 (Excerpts)¹

The difficult situation in the troubled country of South Viet-Nam
is one which I have even less desire to discuss, in substantive terms,
than the other questions I have taken as examples. The important
mission of Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General
[Maxwell D.] Taylor is only just ending, and it would be wholly in-
appropriate for me to comment on the course of action which may be
chosen in the light of this mission and of the continuing consider-
ation which is going forward in Saigon under the leadership of Ambassador
[Henry Cabot] Lodge, and also in Washington.

Yet it is not wrong, I think, to suggest that in this case again there
are two propositions, both of them true, and two kinds of error which
can result from an unwillingness to accept them both. And again both
propositions have been stated clearly by the President. The first is
that the object of American policy in this part of the world is to assist
in a most difficult and important struggle against Communist subver-
sion—military, paramilitary, and political. The commitment of the
United States to the independence of South Viet-Nam goes back many
years. This commitment was intensified and reinforced 2 years ago,
and since then a major cooperative effort has been carried forward
with increasing energy—and at least until recently with increasing suc-
cess—by Americans working closely with the people and Government
of South Viet-Nam. It is the policy of the United States to sustain
that effort.

Yet it would be folly for the United States to neglect, or to regard
with indifference, political developments of recent months which raise
questions about the ability of the Government and people of South
Viet-Nam to support each other effectively in their contest with com-
munism. The President has made it clear that the United States
is not indifferent to these events and regards them with great concern.
It is and must be the policy of the United States Government to make
clear its interest in whatever improvements it judges to be necessary,
always of course with a proper regard for responsibilities which rest
in the first instance upon the people of South Viet-Nam.

It is no secret that observers of the scene in South Viet-Nam have
often differed sharply in their interpretation of events. From these
differences there have come divergent recommendations for policy.
There is nothing discreditable in the existence of such differences.
In a situation in which easy solutions do not exist and in which com-
mitments of purpose and hope are high, it is only natural that there
should be a tendency in each observer to emphasize the part of the
truth to which he is nearest. If a particular antisuressive effort
is going well, the man who is working on that effort is bound to see
that part of reality as very large. If in the cities there is repression
and alienation of public support, men living in those cities, with
responsibilities more civil than military, will feel a special and intense

concern. Where danger comes is not in these equally right perceptions of important phenomena but in the human tendency, here as in each of my preceding examples, to suppose that one's own reality is the only reality, so that the observation of the other man is somehow misleading.

The requirement upon statesmanship, once again, is to seek ways of meeting both the need for effective prosecution of the struggle and the need for a workable relation between the people and government of a friendly country. No one can say that this task is easy. No one can even say it is certainly possible. But what can be said, and what the President has said already, is that the United States will not shrink from this responsibility or attempt to make it easier than it is by pretending that only one part of it is important.

36. U.S. REVISES AID TO VIET-NAM'S SPECIAL FORCES:
Statement by the Department of State, October 22, 1963

The U.S. Government has informed the Government of Viet-Nam that U.S. support will no longer be provided to those elements of the special forces which are not committed to field operations or engaged in related training programs. This action is in line with President Kennedy's statement on September 12 that "What helps to win the war we support. What interferes with the war effort we oppose."

(On November 1, a military coup by virtually the entire Vietnamese leadership against the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem took place and President Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were assassinated. A provisional government was set up which was recognized by the United States on November 7. The following day, Secretary of State Rusk met with the press.)

37. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 8, 1963 (Excerpts)

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your appraisal of the situation now in Viet-Nam, since we have recognized it, and what do you see ahead in the future as to the impact on U.S. policy in Southeast Asia?

A. Well, I think the great question which has been in front of us all along has been how to get on with the main job of assuring that South Viet-Nam is secure and able to work out its own future under its own leadership and without any interference from the outside.

Now, we were very much concerned when in 1959 the Viet Cong, with public support from Hanoi, moved to interfere in South Viet-Nam and indeed threatened to take it over, and there has been steady growth in assistance and help by the United States and others to South Viet-Nam in that struggle.
We were also concerned in May and June and July of this year when developments in South Viet-Nam indicated that there was a growing gap between the government and the people of that country, and there was some danger that the solidarity of the country itself in meeting this threat would be undermined by differences within the country.

Now it is our hope that the political and the military leadership that has now formed a new government there in Viet-Nam will be able to rally the country, consolidate the effort, get on with the job, so that that country can be independent and free and secure.

As far as the United States is concerned, we do not have and have never had any special United States interest in terms of military bases or anything of that sort. Our primary concern with Viet-Nam is that it be secure and independent, as it is entitled to be, and we are hopeful now that there will be a consolidation of effort and that the central problem there will be dealt with with expedition, and we will do what we can to assist, and we have every reason to believe that the present leadership will do everything they can on their own side.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, your remarks on neutralization in Viet-Nam may be subject to misinterpretation. Just to sum it up here: You reject neutralization as a solution to the problem in Viet-Nam?

A. Well, I don't know—my point is I don't know what Hanoi talks about when they talk about neutralization. South Viet-Nam was not allied with anyone; it was not a military base for anyone. It was subjected to attack from the outside through penetration, infiltration, arms supplies, subversive activities, matters of that sort.

There can be peace in Southeast Asia if others would leave South Viet-Nam and Laos alone and let the peoples of those countries work out their own future.

My point is I don't know what they mean by neutralization, except that I suspect that it means that they are trying to find some formula by which they can bring South Viet-Nam within the Communist world.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, in South Viet-Nam, do you think that the new regime can prosecute the war more effectively than Diem did? If so, why?

A. I think, actually, the principal problem that developed with respect to the previous regime was the alienation of apparently very large sections of the population. We believe that the present regime has moved promptly to consolidate public effort, that they will be able to resolve some of the internal difficulties that grew up, and that there will be a possibility that the people of that country will move in greater unity on behalf of the total effort.

We are encouraged about the possibilities. But there is a good deal of unfinished business and some real problems ahead. But the reception, the support of the people themselves, will be vital in this type of guerrilla warfare. The attitude of the peoples becomes absolutely crucial. As I think it was Mao Tse-tung said, “If guerrillas are operating within a friendly population, every bush is an ally.” Well, in the last period we feel that as far as the villages are concerned and the countryside is concerned, they become more and more the
ally of the effort to eradicate the Viet Cong aggression. And we believe this will get an impetus from recent events and they can go ahead now with more confidence.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have twice referred to Hanoi's idea of neutralization in Viet-Nam. What is your understanding of the French point of view and their mention of a truce?

A. I think that was perhaps a comment from a very long-range point of view. It had very little to do with what happens tomorrow or the next day, perhaps commenting on the basis of what was anticipated at the time of the 1954 Geneva Accords. But we see no—we see no development specifically along that line from Paris or any ideas about any particular moves that ought to be taken at this time.

(On November 22, 1963 President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. In December President Lyndon B. Johnson sent Defense Secretary McNamara and CIA Director John A. McCone to Saigon to evaluate the new Government's war effort. This New Year's greeting from President Johnson pledged the energetic support of the United States.)

38. MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO GEN. DUONG VAN MINH, CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, December 31, 1963

DEAR GENERAL MINH. As we enter the New Year of 1964, I want to wish you, your Revolutionary Government, and your people full success in the long and arduous war which you are waging so vaniously and bravely against the Viet Cong forces directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi. Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara have told me about the serious situation which confronts you and of the plans which you are developing to enable your armed forces and your people to redress this situation.

This new year provides a fitting opportunity for me to pledge on behalf of the American Government and people a renewed partnership with your government and people in your brave struggle for freedom. The United States will continue to furnish you and your people with the fullest measure of support in this bitter fight. We shall maintain in Viet-Nam American personnel and material as needed to assist you in achieving victory.

Our aims are, I know, identical with yours: to enable your government to protect its people from the acts of terror perpetrated by Communist insurgents from the north. As the forces of your government become increasingly capable of dealing with this aggression, American military personnel in South Viet-Nam can be progressively withdrawn.

The United States Government shares the view of your government that "neutralization" of South Viet-Nam is unacceptable. As long

1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 27, 1964, pp. 121-122.
as the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam persists in its aggressive policy, neutralization of South Viet-Nam would only be another name for a Communist takeover. Peace will return to your country just as soon as the authorities in Hanoi cease and desist from their terrorist aggression.

Thus, your government and mine are in complete agreement on the political aspects of your war against the forces of enslavement, brutality, and material misery. Within this framework of political agreement we can confidently continue and improve our cooperation.

I am pleased to learn from Secretary McNamara about the vigorous operations which you are planning to bring security and an improved standard of living to your people.

I wish to congratulate you particularly on your work for the unity of all your people, including the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, against the Viet Cong. I know from my own experience in Viet-Nam how warmly the Vietnamese people respond to a direct human approach and how they have hungered for this in their leaders. So again I pledge the energetic support of my country to your government and your people.

We will do our full part to ensure that under your leadership your people may win a victory—a victory for freedom and justice and human welfare in Viet-Nam.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

39. SECRETARY RUSK’S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 7, 1964 (Excerpt)¹

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go to the other side of the world—
A. Right.
Q. Viet-Nam—
A. Right.
Q. The President suggested last week that there might be circumstances under which the United States would approve of the neutralization of both North and South Viet-Nam. He did not at that time spell this out. Could you tell us what is the policy of the United States in that respect?
A. Well, let’s start from the most elementary aspects of that problem. When the Geneva Conference on Laos convened in 1961-1962, I made a statement at that time that the only problem of peace in Southeast Asia arose from the north; that there was no threat to the peace of Southeast Asia from the south or from across the Pacific; that if those in the north would leave their neighbors alone, there could be peace; if the agreements which have already been reached and which have been signed by those in the north would be fulfilled, there could be peace in Southeast Asia.

Now, we know that the other side has no present intention of talking about the neutralization of North Korea—of North Viet-Nam. Were they to make any such proposal, that at least would inject something new into the situation. But what we can’t accept is the idea that, while they disregard their solemn commitments and move to under-

mine the Geneva accords of 1954, as well as of 1962, somehow we neutralize South Viet-Nam—meaning presumably by that withdrawing American forces and pulling out support so that South Viet-Nam would be even more exposed to the kinds of penetration which have been aimed at Southeast Asia from the north for these past few years. That is simply a device for the communization of all of Southeast Asia, and that we cannot accept. So I think we ought to go back to the basic point—that existing agreements ought to be observed, and if they would be observed, then the way is open for peace in Southeast Asia.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, what do you regard as being the consequences then of the proposals set forth by President de Gaulle? Are they severely damaging or not?

A. Well, there is some uncertainty about just what those proposals are, because there have been some statements made but no detailed proposals of which I am aware.

It was indicated at one point some months ago that the reference to a neutralized Southeast Asia was intended to be a reference to a very long-term solution, that it did not have operational impact upon the immediate situation because of the attitude of the Communist world, and I don't know of any other proposals or any more precise proposals that have been made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, has there been any talk, specifically, of a treaty for the neutralization of Southeast Asia? There has been talk about the neutralization of Cambodia, in which a certain number of nations would participate to guarantee it. But is that what De Gaulle has in mind?

A. I don't know what they might have in mind in Paris. My own thought on that would be that if these existing agreements were to be lived up to, if they were to be performed, this question wouldn't even arise, because these states of Southeast Asia would then be independent, secure, and free to pursue their own policy.

And there would be no problem of disengagement from an alliance on the part of, say, a country like Laos or Cambodia or South Viet-Nam, who are not allies and who would have to themselves invoke the protocol of SEATO before SEATO would become applicable. So that what they need is a chance to pursue their own policy as independent countries. And that is what they do not have so long as they are under this pressure from the north.

Q. Mr. Secretary, just to set the record straight, sir?

A. Yes?

Q. When you use the term "north," are you speaking of the government in Hanoi, the government in Peiping, the government in Moscow, or?

A. I'm thinking of all three of them. But in what relative weights, I could not—I would not want to be mathematical. Certainly Hanoi and Peiping are fully behind these aggressive pressures that are going on in Southeast Asia. We would be glad to see the Soviet Union more active in itself, throwing its full weight behind the performance on the existing accords. But I think all of them carry heavy responsibility in this regard.
On January 30, 1964, a military coup by Gen. Nguyen Khanh ousted the government of Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh. After a visit by Defense Secretary McNamara and General Taylor to Saigon in March and by Secretary of State Rusk in April, the following four statements were made.

40. TV INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MARCH 15, 1964 (Excerpt)²

Mr. Brinkley. You have had reports in the last day or two from the Ambassador to France [Charles E. Bohlen] and from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Can you tell us anything of what he reported to you from Viet-Nam?

The President. Yes, he made a very lengthy report and I think a responsible and constructive one. We are going to consider it in the Security Council further the early part of the week. We have problems in Viet-Nam, as we have had for 10 years. Secretary McNamara has been out there—this is his fourth trip. We are very anxious to do what we can to help those people preserve their own freedom. We cherish ours, and we would like to see them preserve theirs. We have furnished them with counsel and advice, and men and materiel, to help them in their attempts to defend themselves. If people quit attacking them, we'd have no problem, but for 10 years this problem has been going on.

I was reading a letter only today that General Eisenhower wrote the late President Diem 10 years ago, and it is a letter that I could have well written to President Khanh and sent out by Mr. McNamara.

Now, we have had that problem for a long time. We are going to have it for some time in the future, we can see, but we are patient people, and we love freedom, and we want to help others preserve it, and we are going to try to evolve the most effective and efficient plans we can to continue to help them.

Mr. Sevareid. Mr. Kennedy said, on the subject of Viet-Nam, I think, that he did believe in the "falling domino" theory, that if Viet-Nam were lost that other countries in the area would soon be lost.

The President. I think it would be a very dangerous thing, and I share President Kennedy's view, and I think the whole of Southeast Asia would be involved and that would involve hundreds of millions of people, and I think it's—it cannot be ignored, we must do everything that we can, we must be responsible, we must stay there and help them, and that is what we are going to do.

41. UNITED STATES TO INCREASE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO VIET-NAM: Statement by the White House, March 17, 1964 ²

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor, following their initial oral report of Friday, today reported fully to President Johnson and the members of the National Security Council. The report covered the situation in South Viet-Nam, the measures being taken by General...
Khanh and his government, and the need for United States assistance to supplement and support these measures. There was also discussion of the continuing support and direction of the Viet Cong insurgency from North Viet-Nam.

At the close of the meeting the President accepted the report and its principal recommendations, which had the support of the National Security Council and Ambassador Lodge.

Comparing the situation to last October, when Secretary McNamara and General Taylor last reported fully on it, there have unquestionably been setbacks. The Viet Cong have taken maximum advantage of two changes of government, and of more longstanding difficulties, including a serious weakness and overextension which had developed in the basically sound hamlet program. The supply of arms and cadres from the north has continued; careful and sophisticated control of Viet Cong operations has been apparent; and evidence that such control is centered in Hanoi is clear and unmistakable.

To meet the situation, General Khanh and his government are acting vigorously and effectively. They have produced a sound central plan for the prosecution of the war, recognizing to a far greater degree than before the crucial role of economic and social, as well as military, action to insure that areas cleared of the Viet Cong survive and prosper in freedom.

To carry out this plan, General Khanh requires the full enlistment of the people of South Viet-Nam, partly to augment the strength of his antiguerrilla forces, but particularly to provide the administrators, health workers, teachers, and others who must follow up in cleared areas. To meet this need, and to provide a more equitable and common basis of service, General Khanh has informed us that he proposes in the near future to put into effect a National Mobilization Plan that will provide conditions and terms of service in appropriate jobs for all able bodied South Vietnamese between certain ages.

In addition, steps are required to bring up to required levels the pay and status of the paramilitary forces and to create a highly trained guerrilla force that can beat the Viet Cong on its own ground.

Finally, limited but significant additional equipment is proposed for the air forces, the river navy, and the mobile forces.

In short, where the South Vietnamese Government now has the power to clear any part of its territory, General Khanh's new program is designed to clear and to hold, step by step and province by province.

This program will involve substantial increases in cost to the South Vietnamese economy, which in turn depends heavily on United States economic aid. Additional, though less substantial, military assistance funds are also needed, and increased United States training activity both on the civil and military side. The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Viet-Nam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their overall conclusion that with continued vigorous leadership from General Khanh and his government, and the carrying out of these steps, the situation can be significantly improved in the coming months.
I turn now to a consideration of United States objectives in South Viet-Nam. The United States has no designs whatever on the resources or territory of the area. Our national interests do not require that South Viet-Nam serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western alliance. Our concern is threefold.

First, and most important, is the simple fact that South Viet-Nam, a member of the free-world family, is striving to preserve its independence from Communist attack. The Vietnamese have asked our help. We have given it. We shall continue to give it.

We do so in their interest; and we do so in our own clear self-interest. For basic to the principles of freedom and self-determination which have sustained our country for almost two centuries is the right of peoples everywhere to live and develop in peace. Our own security is strengthened by the determination of others to remain free, and by our commitment to assist them. We will not let this member of our family down, regardless of its distance from our shores.

The ultimate goal of the United States in Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, is to help maintain free and independent nations which can develop politically, economically, and socially and which can be responsible members of the world community. In this region and elsewhere many peoples share our sense of the value of such freedom and independence. They have taken the risks and made the sacrifices linked to the commitment to membership in the family of the free world. They have done this in the belief that we would back up our pledges to help defend them. It is not right or even expedient—nor is it in our nature—to abandon them when the going is difficult.

Second, Southeast Asia has great strategic significance in the forward defense of the United States. Its location across east-west air and sea lanes flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side and Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines on the other and dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In Communist hands this area would pose a most serious threat to the security of the United States and to the family of free-world nations to which we belong. To defend Southeast Asia, we must meet the challenge in South Viet-Nam.

And third, South Viet-Nam is a test case for the new Communist strategy. Let me examine for a moment the nature of this strategy.

Just as the Kennedy administration was coming into office in January 1961, Chairman Khrushchev made one of the most important speeches on Communist strategy of recent decades. In his report on a party conference entitled “For New Victories of the World Communist Movement,” Khrushchev stated: “In modern conditions, the following categories of wars should be distinguished: world wars, local wars, liberation wars and popular uprisings.” He ruled out what he called “world wars” and “local wars” as being too dangerous for profitable indulgence in a world of nuclear weapons. But with regard to what he called “liberation wars,” he referred specifically to Viet-Nam. He said, “It is a sacred war. We recognize such wars.”

1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 15, 1964, pp. 564-570.
I have pointed out on other occasions the enormous strategic nuclear power which the United States has developed to cope with the first of Mr. Khrushchev's types of wars: deterrence of deliberate, calculated nuclear attack seems as assured as it can be. With respect to our general-purpose forces designed especially for local wars, within the past 3 years we have increase the number of our combat-ready Army divisions by about 45 percent, tactical air squadrons by 30 percent, airlift capabilities by 75 percent, with a 100-percent increase in ship construction and conversion. In conjunction with the forces of our allies our global posture for deterrence and defense is still not all that it should be, but it is good.

President Kennedy and President Johnson have recognized, however, that our forces for the first two types of wars might not be applicable or effective against what the Communists call "wars of liberation," or what is properly called covert aggression or insurgency. We have therefore undertaken and continue to press a variety of programs to develop skilled specialists, equipment, and techniques to enable us to help our allies counter the threat of insurgency.

Communist interest in insurgency techniques did not begin with Khrushchev, nor for that matter with Stalin. Lenin's works are full of tactical instructions, which were adapted very successfully by Mao Tse-tung, whose many writings on guerrilla warfare have become classic references. Indeed, Mao claims to be the true heir of Lenin's original preceptions for the worldwide victory of communism. The North Vietnamese have taken a leaf or two from Mao's book—as well as Moscow's—and added some of their own.

Thus today in Viet-Nam we are not dealing with factional disputes or the remnants of a colonial struggle against the French but rather with a major test case of communism's new strategy. That strategy has so far been pursued in Cuba, may be beginning in Africa, and failed in Malaya and the Philippines only because of a long and arduous struggle by the people of these countries with assistance provided by the British and the United States.

In Southeast Asia the Communists have taken full advantage of geography—the proximity to the Communist base of operations and the rugged, remote, and heavily foliated character of the border regions. They have utilized the diverse ethnic, religious, and tribal groupings and exploited factionalism and legitimate aspirations wherever possible. And, as I said earlier, they have resorted to sabotage, terrorism, and assassination on an unprecedented scale.

Who is the responsible party—the prime aggressor? First and foremost, without doubt, the prime aggressor is North Viet-Nam, whose leadership has explicitly undertaken to destroy the independence of the South. To be sure, Hanoi is encouraged on its aggressive course by Communist China. But Peiping's interest is hardly the same as that of Hanoi.

For Hanoi, the immediate objective is limited: conquest of the South and national unification, perhaps coupled with control of Laos. For Peiping, however, Hanoi's victory would be only a first step toward eventual Chinese hegemony over the two Viet-Nams and Southeast Asia and toward exploitation of the new strategy in other parts of the world.
Communist China's interests are clear: It has publicly castigated Moscow for betraying the revolutionary cause whenever the Soviets have sounded a cautionary note. It has characterized the United States as a paper tiger and has insisted that the revolutionary struggle for "liberation and unification" of Viet-Nam could be conducted without risks by, in effect, crawling under the nuclear and the conventional defense of the free world. Peiping thus appears to feel that it has a large stake in demonstrating the new strategy, using Viet-Nam as a test case. Success in Viet-Nam would be regarded by Peiping as vindication for China's views in the worldwide ideological struggle.

Taking into account the relationship of Viet-Nam to Indochina—and of both to Southeast Asia, the Far East, and the free world as a whole—five U.S. Presidents have acted to preserve free-world strategic interests in the area. President Roosevelt opposed Japanese penetration in Indochina; President Truman resisted Communist aggression in Korea; President Eisenhower backed Diem's efforts to save South Viet-Nam and undertook to defend Taiwan; President Kennedy stepped up our counter-insurgency effort in Viet-Nam; and President Johnson, in addition to reaffirming last week that the United States will furnish assistance and support to South Viet-Nam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control, has approved the program that I shall describe in a few minutes.

The U.S. role in South Viet-Nam, then, is: first, to answer the call of the South Vietnamese, a member nation of our free-world family, to help them save their country for themselves; second, to help prevent the strategic danger which would exist if communism absorbed Southeast Asia's people and resources; and third, to prove in the Vietnamese test case that the free world can cope with Communist "wars of liberation" as we have coped successfully with Communist aggression at other levels.

I referred earlier to the progress in South Viet-Nam during 1954–1959. In our concern over the seriousness of the Viet Cong insurgency, we sometimes overlook the fact that a favorable comparison still exists between progress in the South—notwithstanding nearly 15 years of bitter warfare—and the relative stagnation in North Viet-Nam.

The so-called "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam," with a greater population that the South and only a marginally smaller area, appears to be beset by a variety of weaknesses, the most prominent of which is its agricultural failure. Mismangement, some poor weather, and a lack of fertilizers and insecticides have led to a serious rice shortage. The 1963 per capita output of rice was about 20 percent lower than 1960. Before the June 1964 harvests, living standards will probably decline further in the cities, and critical food shortages may appear in some of the villages. Furthermore, prospects for the June rice crops are not bright.

The internal transportation system remains primitive, and Hanoi has not met the quotas established for heavy industry. As for the people, they appear to be generally apathetic to what the party considers the needs of the state, and the peasantry has shown considerable ingenuity in frustrating the policies of the Government.
In contrast, in the Republic of Viet-Nam, despite Communist attempts to control or inhibit every aspect of the domestic economy, output continued to rise. In 1963 South Viet-Nam was once more able to export some 300,000 tons of rice. Add to this the pre-1960 record: up to 1960, significant production increases in rice, rubber, sugar, textiles, and electric power, a 20-percent rise in per capita income, threefold expansion of schools, and restoration of the transportation system. One cannot but conclude that, given stability and lack of subversive disruption, South Viet-Nam would dramatically outstrip its northern neighbor and could become a peaceful and prosperous contributor to the well-being of the Far East as a whole.

But, as we have seen, the Communists—because South Viet-Nam is not theirs—are out to deny any such bright prospects.

In the years immediately following the signing of the 1954 Geneva accords, the Communists in North Viet-Nam gave first priority to building armed forces far larger than those of any other Southeast Asian country. They did this to establish iron control over their own population and to insure a secure base for subversion in South Viet-Nam and Laos. In South Viet-Nam, instead of withdrawing fully, the Communists maintained a holding guerrilla operation, and they left behind cadres of men and large caches of weapons for later use.

Beginning in 1959, as we have seen, the Communists realized that they were losing the game and intensified their subversive attack. In June 1962 a special report on Viet-Nam was issued by the International Control Commission, a unit created by the Geneva conference and composed of a Canadian, and Indian, and a Pole. Though it received little publicity at the time, this report presented evidence of Hanoi's subversive activities in South Viet-Nam and specifically found Hanoi guilty of violating the Geneva accords.

Since then, the illegal campaign of terror, violence, and subversion conducted by the Viet Cong and directed and supported from the north has greatly expanded. Military men, specialists, and secret agents continue to infiltrate into South Viet-Nam both directly from the north and through Laos and Cambodia. The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, particularly those of large caliber, has increased. These include Chinese 76 mm. recoilless rifles and heavy machineguns. Tons of explosive-producing chemicals smuggled in for use by the Viet Cong have been intercepted along with many munitions manufactured in Red China and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in the Communist bloc. In December 1963 a Government force attacked a Viet Cong stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province and seized a large cache of equipment, some of which was of Chinese Communist manufacture. The Chinese equipment included a 90 mm. rocket launcher, 60 mm. mortars, carbines, TNT, and hundreds of thousands of rounds of various kinds of ammunition. Some of the ammunition was manufactured as recently as 1962.

When President Diem appealed to President Kennedy at the end of 1961, the South Vietnamese were quite plainly losing their fight against the Communists, and we promptly agreed to increase our assistance.

Fourteen months later, in early 1963, President Kennedy was able to report to the nation that "The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in South Viet-Nam." It was evident that the Government
had seized the initiative in most areas from the insurgents. But this progress was interrupted in 1963 by the political crises arising from troubles between the Government and the Buddhists, students, and other non-Communist oppositionists. President Diem lost the confidence and loyalty of his people; there were accusations of maladministration and injustice. There were two changes of government within 3 months. The fabric of government was torn. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets virtually disappeared. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1 of last year, 35 were replaced. Nine provinces had three chiefs in 3 months; one province had four. Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major military commands changed hands twice. The confidence of the peasants was inevitably shaken by the disruptions in leadership and the loss of physical security. Army and paramilitary desertion rates increased, and the morale of the hamlet militia—the "Minutemen"—fell. In many areas power vacuums developed causing confusion among the people and a rising rate of rural disorders.

The Viet Cong fully exploited the resultant organizational turmoil and regained the initiative in the struggle. For example, in the second week following the November coup, Viet Cong incidents more than tripled from 316, peaking at 1,021 per week, while Government casualties rose from 367 to 928. Many overextended hamlets have been overrun or severely damaged. The January change in government produced a similar reaction.

In short, the situation in South Viet-Nam has unquestionably worsened, at least since last fall.

The picture is admittedly not an easy one to evaluate and, given the kind of terrain and the kind of war, information is not always available or reliable. The areas under Communist control vary from daytime to nighttime, from one week to another, according to seasonal and weather factors. And, of course, in various areas the degree and importance of control differ. Although we estimate that in South Viet-Nam's 14 million population there are only 20,000 to 25,000 "hard core" Viet Cong guerrillas, they have been able to recruit from among the South Vietnamese an irregular force of from 60,000 to 80,000—mainly by coercion and "bandwagon" effect, but also by promising material and political rewards. The loyalties of the hard core have been cemented by years of fighting, first against the Japanese, then against the French, and, since 1954, against the fledgling government of South Viet-Nam. The young men joining them have been attracted by the excitement of the guerrilla life and then held by bonds of loyalty to their new comrades-in-arms, in a nation where loyalty is only beginning to extend beyond the family or the clan. These loyalties are reinforced both by systematic indoctrination and by the example of what happens to informers and deserters.

Clearly, the disciplined leadership, direction, and support from North Viet-Nam is a critical factor in the strength of the Viet Cong movement. But the large indigenous support that the Viet Cong receives means that solutions must be as political and economic as military. Indeed, there can be no such thing as a purely "military" solution to the war in South Viet-Nam.
The people of South Viet-Nam prefer independence and freedom. But they will not exercise their choice for freedom and commit themselves to it in the face of the high personal risk of Communist retaliation—a kidnapped son, a burned home, a ravaged crop—unless they can have confidence in the ultimate outcome. Much therefore depends on the new government under General Khanh, for which we have high hopes.

Today the government of General Khanh is vigorously rebuilding the machinery of administration and reshaping plans to carry the war to the Viet Cong. He is an able and energetic leader. He has demonstrated his grasp of the basic elements—political, economic, and psychological, as well as military—required to defeat the Viet Cong. He is planning a program of economic and social advances for the welfare of his people. He has brought into support of the Government representatives of key groups previously excluded. He and his colleagues have developed plans for systematic liberation of areas now submissive to Viet Cong duress and for mobilization of all available Vietnamese resources in the defense of the homeland.

At the same time, General Khanh has understood the need to improve South Viet-Nam's relations with its neighbors, Cambodia and Laos; he has taken steps toward conciliation, and he has been quick and forthright in expressing his Government's regret over the recent Vietnamese violation of Cambodia's borders. In short, he has demonstrated the energy, comprehension, and decision required by the difficult circumstances that he faces.

Before describing the means by which we hope to assist the South Vietnamese to succeed in their undertaking, let me point out the options that President Johnson had before him when he received General Taylor's and my report last week.

Some critics of our present policy have suggested one option—that we simply withdraw. This the United States totally rejects for reasons I have stated.

Other critics have called for a second and similar option—a "neutralization" of Viet-Nam. This, however, is the game of "what's mine is mine, and what's yours is negotiable." No one seriously believes the Communists would agree to neutralization of North Viet-Nam. And, so far as South Viet-Nam is concerned, we have learned from the past that the Communists rarely honor the kind of treaty that runs counter to their compulsion to expand.

Under the shadow of Communist power, neutralization would in reality be an interim device to permit Communist consolidation and eventual takeover. When General Taylor and I were in Hue, at the north end of South Viet-Nam, 2 weeks ago, several Vietnamese students carried posters which showed their recognition of the reality of neutralization. The signs read: "Neutralize today, communize tomorrow."

Neutralization of South Viet-Nam, which is today under unprovoked surversive attack, would not be in any sense an achievement of the objectives I have outlined. As we tried to convey in Laos, we have no objection in principle to neutrality in the sense of nonalignment. But even there we are learning lessons. Communist abuse of the Geneva accords, by treating the Laos corridor as a sanctuary for infiltration, constantly threatens the precarious neutrality. "Neutralization of
South Viet-Nam”—an ambiguous phrase at best—was therefore rejected.

The third option before the President was initiation of military actions outside South Viet-Nam, particularly against North Viet-Nam, in order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in South Viet-Nam. This course of action—its implications and ways of carrying it out—has been carefully studied.

Whatever ultimate course of action may be forced upon us by the other side, it is clear that actions under this option would be only a supplement to, not a substitute for, progress within South Viet-Nam’s own borders.

The fourth course of action was to concentrate on helping the South Vietnamese win the battle in their own country. This, all agree, is essential no matter what else is done.

The President therefore approved the 12 recommendations that General Taylor and I made relating to this option.

We have reaffirmed U.S. support for South Viet-Nam’s Government and pledged economic assistance and military training and logistical support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

We will support the Government of South Viet-Nam in carrying out its anti-insurgency plan. Under that plan, Prime Minister Khanh intends to implement a national mobilization program to mobilize all national resources in the struggle. This means improving the quality of the strategic hamlets, building them systematically outward from secure areas, and correcting previous overextension. The security forces of Viet-Nam will be increased by at least 50,000 men. They will be consolidated, and their effectiveness and conditions of service will be improved. They will press the campaign with increased intensity. We will provide required additional materiel. This will include strengthening of the Vietnamese Air Force with better aircraft and improving the mobility of the ground forces.

A broad national program is to be carried out, giving top priority to rural needs. The program includes land reform, loans to tenant farmers, health and welfare measures, economic development, and improved status for ethnic minorities and paramilitary troops.

A Civil Administrative Corps will be established to bring better public services to the people. This will include teachers, health technicians. The initial goal during 1964 will be at least 7,500 additional persons; ultimately there will be at least 40,000 men for more than 8,000 hamlets, in 2,500 villages and 43 provinces.

Farm productivity will be increased through doubled use of fertilizers to provide immediate and direct benefits to peasants in secure areas and to increase both their earnings and the nation’s export earnings.

We have learned that in Viet-Nam political and economic progress are the *sine qua non* of military success and that military security is equally a prerequisite of internal progress. Our future joint efforts with the Vietnamese are going to apply these lessons.

To conclude: Let me reiterate that our goal is peace and stability, both in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. But we have learned that “peace at any price” is not practical in the long run and that the cost of defending freedom must be borne if we are to have it all.
The road ahead in Viet-Nam is going to be long, difficult, and frustrating. It will take work, courage, imagination, and—perhaps more than anything else—patience to bear the burden of what President Kennedy called a “long twilight struggle.” In Viet-Nam, it has not been finished in the first hundred days of President Johnson’s administration, and it may not be finished in the first 1,000 days; but, in cooperation with General Khanh’s government, we have made a beginning. When the day comes that we can safely withdraw, we expect to leave an independent and stable South Viet-Nam, rich with resources and bright with prospects for contributing to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia and of the world.

43. ADDRESS BY SECRETARY RUSK, APRIL 25, 1964
(Excerpt)

If the Communists were to succeed in their assault on South Viet-Nam, the consequences to us, and to the free world as a whole, would be very serious. The rest of Southeast Asia would be in jeopardy, and saving it would be more costly, in blood and treasure, than defeating the aggression in South Viet-Nam. And the loss of Southeast Asia as a whole to the Communists would bring about a major shift in the balance of power. The South Asian subcontinent would be flanked, and Australia would be directly threatened. Such an immense victory for the Communists might well undermine the will of free peoples on other continents to defend themselves.

These very briefly, are the reasons why President Eisenhower decided to assist the Republic of South Viet-Nam; why, when the Communists stepped up their assault, President Kennedy decided to increase our assistance; and why President Johnson has increased it further and has promised that we will continue to help the Republic of Viet-Nam until this aggression against it is defeated.

At the meeting in Manila last week, the eight SEATO members considered all aspects of the attack on South Viet-Nam. None suggested that the free nations should turn their back and walk—or run—away from this aggression. France was already committed to what it calls a “political solution”—that is, to some form of so-called “neutralization.” But it did not submit any specific proposal along that line. The consensus of the other members was that so-called “neutralization” of South Viet-Nam would be only a device for turning it over to the Communists.

Indeed, seven of the eight members of SEATO had little difficulty in arriving at some clear-cut pronouncements concerning the assault on the Republic of Viet-Nam.

They agreed that it is an “aggression” and that it is “directed, supplied and supported by the Communist regime in North Vietnam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962.”

They agreed that “the defeat of the Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of South-East Asia” and that “it will also be convincing proof that Communist expansion by such tactics will not be permitted.”

They also agreed that “the members of SEATO should remain prepared, if necessary, to take further concrete steps within their respective capabilities of fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty.”

It should be noted that the seven members who agreed on these and related declarations are the regional members—Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand—and the two others which maintain military forces in the area: Great Britain and the United States.

The communique adopted at Manila was by far the strongest ever issued by a SEATO Council. It demonstrated that SEATO is far from moribund. It is a warning which Hanoi and Peiping would do well to heed.

In Viet-Nam, I talked at length with General [Nguyen] Khanh and his colleagues, as well as with Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge, General [Paul D.] Harkins, and other members of our American team. These talks reinforced my confidence in the will and the ability of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to lead the people of that country to victory and a better life.

Our policy is to assist the Government and people of South Viet-Nam in achieving those objectives. As President Johnson said in New York Monday:

The statement of the SEATO allies that Communist defeat is “essential” is a reality. To fail to respond * * * would reflect on our honor as a nation, would undermine worldwide confidence in our courage, would convince every nation in South Asia that it must now bow to Communist terms to survive. * * * So let no one doubt that we are in this battle as long as South Viet-Nam wants our support and needs our assistance to protect its freedom.

Our appraisal of the morale and capabilities of the Government and people of South Viet-Nam is not exclusively American. Seven members of SEATO—all of whom have representatives in South Viet-Nam—joined in saying:

The Government and people of the Republic of Vietnam have given eloquent testimony to their determination to fight for their country.

The SEATO Council also expressed its confidence in the “program of political and administrative reform, military action, pacification, and economic and social development recently instituted by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. * * *” That favorable judgment was further reinforced in my own mind by what I saw and heard in Viet-Nam. General Khanh has both vigor and breadth of view. He believes that defeating the Communists requires a combination of military, political, economic, and social programs. His objective is not only to root out the Communists but to improve the living standards of the Vietnamese people.

Actually, between the end of the Indochinese war in 1954 and 1959, South Viet-Nam made great economic and social progress. Its achievements left the vaunted Communist paradise in North Viet-Nam far behind. Almost certainly that is why Hanoi reactivated the assault on South Viet-Nam in 1959.
The Communist campaign has, of course, held back South Vietnam's overall economic development. But I saw at firsthand that progress continues even in the midst of war. I visited a modern synthetic textile plant and a modern papermaking plant near Saigon. About 200 miles northeast of Saigon I visited a "New Life" hamlet. This is in a relatively secure province—and one which General Khanh described as a "pilot province," an example of what can and will be done elsewhere as the Communists are rooted out. I visited also a large dam and hydroelectric installation built by the Japanese as part of their reparations agreement. This installation will also provide water for irrigation.

I believe that economic and social development should be accelerated in the relatively secure areas of the country. I discussed with General Khanh and his colleagues various ways in which our aid program might be improved and in which other free nations might provide useful assistance, both military and civilian. There is need for more people of several professions and vocations—not least, for more physicians. I believe that several free nations are prepared to send more help, both in people and in critical material.

The Viet Cong have scored some gains in the last few months. They took advantage of two successive coups and the resultant turnovers in South Vietnamese administrative personnel to increase their efforts. They recaptured some of the more exposed strategic hamlets. They have managed to launch a few rather large-scale attacks, although they continue to rely chiefly on assassinations and small assaults.

General Khanh's objective is not only to "clear" but to "hold." With American assistance, he is moving ahead with training and equipping of local self-defense forces for villages and hamlets in the less exposed areas, thus releasing regular troops for offensive actions against the Viet Cong. He is increasing his security forces by some 50,000 men. I believe that his efforts are beginning to show results.

We can all take deep pride in the performance of the American military men who are training and supporting the South Vietnamese. We should take pride also in our civilian officials and their families, who work amid danger.

The Vietnamese people are energetic, intelligent, and quick to learn. They have a great economic potential. When they have won the peace and security which they are fighting for, and so fully deserve, they can become, I believe, one of the most prosperous people in that part of the world.

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(After another visit by Secretary McNamara and Gen. Taylor to Saigon in May, the President made the following statement.)

44. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, JUNE 2, 1964
(Excerpt)\(^1\)

It may be helpful to outline four basic themes that govern our policy in Southeast Asia.

First, America keeps her word.

\(^1\) Department of State Bulletin, June 22, 1964, p. 953.
Second, the issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole. Third, our purpose is peace. Fourth, this is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. On the point that America keeps her word, we are steadfast in a policy which has been followed for 10 years in three administrations. That was begun by General Eisenhower, in a letter of October 25, 1954, * * * to President [Ngo Dinh] Diem: 1

* * * * * * * * *

Now, that was a good letter then and it is a good letter now, and we feel the same way. Like a number of other nations, we are bound by solemn commitments to help defend this area against Communist encroachment. We will keep this commitment. In the case of Vietnam, our commitment today is just the same as the commitment made by President Eisenhower to President Diem in 1954—a commitment to help these people help themselves.

We are concerned for a whole great geographic area, not simply for specific complex problems in specific countries. We have one single, central purpose in all that we do in Southeast Asia, and that is to help build a stable peace. It is others and not we who have brought terror to small countries and peaceful peasants. It is others, not we, who have preached and practiced the use of force to establish dictatorial control over their neighbors. It is others, not we, who have refused to honor international agreements that aim at reasonable settlement of deep-seated differences. The United States cannot fail to do its full share to meet the challenge which is posed by those who disturb the peace of Southeast Asia, but the purpose of America will not change. We stand for peace.

* * * * * * * * *

(The next six documents deal with the situation created by the North Vietnamese attacks on the U.S.S. Maddox and U.S.S. C. Turner Joy on August 2 and 4. This action resulted in U.S. air action against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam and President Johnson's request for Congressional action on a joint resolution "to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia").

45. ADDRESS TO THE NATION BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AUGUST 4, 1964 (Excerpt) 2

My Fellow Americans: As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply.

The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. The destroyers and supporting aircraft acted at

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1 Text omitted.
once on the orders I gave after the initial act of aggression. We believe at least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U.S. losses.

The performance of commanders and crews in this engagement is in the highest tradition of the United States Navy. But repeated acts of violence against the Armed Forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam which have been used in these hostile operations.

In the larger sense this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in Southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Viet-Nam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America.

The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the Government of South Viet-Nam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war.

I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries and, indeed, to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations. Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States, and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.

46. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, AUGUST 5, 1964

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia. These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They

1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1964, pp. 261-263.
were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on armed forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.
I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past—to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the Southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward—and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved.

The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.


I have asked for this urgent meeting to bring to the attention of the Security Council acts of deliberate aggression by the Hanoi regime against naval units of the United States.

Naval vessels of my Government, on routine operations in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, have been subjected to deliberate and repeated armed attacks. We therefore have found it necessary to take defensive measures.

The major facts about these incidents were announced last night by the President of the United States and communicated to other governments at the same time I was instructed to request this meeting. I shall recount these facts for you, Mr. President, in chronological order so that all the members may have all the information available to my Government.

At 8:08 a.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 2, 1964, the United States destroyer Maddox was on routine patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, proceeding in a southeasterly direction away from the coast about 30 miles at sea from the mainland of North Vietnam. The Maddox was approached by three high-speed North Viet-

1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1964, pp. 272-274.
namese torpedo boats in attack formation. When it was evident that these torpedo boats intended to take offensive action, the Maddox, in accordance with naval practice, fired three warning shots across the bows of the approaching vessels. At approximately the same time, the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga, which was also in international waters and had been alerted to the impending attack, sent out four aircraft to provide cover for the Maddox, the pilots being under orders not to fire unless they or the Maddox were fired upon first.

Two of the attacking craft fired torpedoes, which the Maddox evaded by changing course. All three attacking vessels directed machinegun fire at the Maddox. One of the attacking vessels approached for close attack and was struck by fire from the Maddox. After the attack was broken off, the Maddox continued on a southerly course in international waters.

Now, Mr. President, clearly this was a deliberate armed attack against a naval unit of the United States Government on patrol in the high seas—almost 30 miles off the mainland. Nevertheless, my Government did its utmost to minimize the explosive potential of this flagrant attack in the hopes that this might be an isolated or uncalculated action. There was local defensive fire. The United States was not drawn into hasty response.

On August 3 the United States took steps to convey to the Hanoi regime a note calling attention to this aggression, stating that United States ships would continue to operate freely on the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law, and warning the authorities in Hanoi of the “grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces.” This notification was in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva accords.

Our hopes that this was an isolated incident did not last long. At 2:35 p.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 4, when it was nighttime in the Gulf of Tonkin, the destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy were again subjected to an armed attack by an undetermined number of motor torpedo boats of the North Vietnamese navy. This time the American vessels were 65 miles from shore, twice as far out on the high seas as on the occasion of the previous attack. This time numerous torpedoes were fired. That attack lasted for over 2 hours.

There no longer could be any shadow of doubt that this was a planned, deliberate military aggression against vessels lawfully present in international waters. One could only conclude that this was the work of authorities dedicated to the use of force to achieve their objectives, regardless of the consequences.

My Government therefore determined to take positive but limited and relevant measures to secure its naval units against further aggression. Last night aerial strikes were thus carried out against North Vietnamese torpedo boats and their support facilities. This action was limited in scale, its only targets being the weapons and facilities against which we had been forced to defend ourselves. Our fervent hope is that the point has now been made that acts of armed aggression are not to be tolerated in the Gulf of Tonkin any more than they are to be tolerated anywhere else.
I want to emphasize that the action we have taken is a limited and measured response, fitted precisely to the attack that produced it, and that the deployments of additional U.S. forces to Southeast Asia are designed solely to deter further aggression. This is a single action designed to make unmistakably clear that the United States cannot be diverted by military attack from its obligations to help its friends establish and protect their independence. Our naval units are continuing their routine patrolling on the high seas with orders to protect themselves with all appropriate means against any further aggression. As President Johnson said last night, "We still seek no wider war."

Mr. President, let me repeat that the United States vessels were in international waters when they were attacked.

Let me repeat that freedom of the seas is guaranteed under long-accepted international law applying to all nations alike.

Let me repeat that these vessels took no belligerent actions of any kind until they were subject to armed attack.

And let me say once more that the action they took in self-defense is the right of all nations and is fully within the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The acts of aggression by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin make no sense whatsoever standing alone. They defy rational explanation except as part of a larger pattern with a larger purpose. As isolated events, the kidnapping of village officials in the Republic of South Viet-Nam makes no sense either. Neither does the burning of a schoolhouse—or the sabotage of an irrigation project—or the murder of a medical worker—or the random bomb thrown into a crowd of innocent people sitting in a cafe.

All these wanton acts of violence and destruction fit into the larger pattern of what has been going on in Southeast Asia for the past decade and a half. So does the arming of terrorist gangs in South Viet-Nam by the regimes in Hanoi and Peiping. So does the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against the legitimate government of that nation. So does the fighting in Laos—and all the acts of subversion—and all the propaganda—and the sabotage of the international machinery established to keep the peace by the Geneva agreements—and the deliberate, systematic, and flagrant violations of those agreements by two regimes which signed them and which by all tenets of decency, law, and civilized practice are bound by their provisions.

The attempt to sink United States destroyers in international waters is much more spectacular than the attempt to murder the mayor of a village in his bed at night. But they are both part of the pattern, and the pattern is designed to subjugate the people of Southeast Asia to an empire ruled by means of force of arms, of rule by terror, of expansion by violence.

Mr. President, it is only in this larger view that we can discuss intelligently the matter that we have brought to this Council.

In his statement last night, President Johnson concluded by emphasizing that the mission of the United States is peace. Under the explicit instructions of President Johnson, I want to repeat that
assurance in the Security Council this afternoon: Our mission is peace.

We hoped that the peace settlement in 1954 would lead to peace in Viet-Nam. We hoped that that settlement, and the supplementary Geneva accords of 1962, would lead to peace in Laos. Communist governments have tried aggression before—and have failed. Each time the lesson has had to be learned anew.

We are dealing here with a regime that has not yet learned the lesson that aggression does not pay, cannot be sustained, and will always be thrown back by people who believe, as we do, that people want freedom and independence, not subjection and the role of satellite in a modern empire.

In Southeast Asia we want nothing more, and nothing less, than the assured and guaranteed independence of the peoples of the area. We are in Southeast Asia to help our friends preserve their own opportunity to be free of imported terror, alien assassination, managed by the North Viet-Nam Communists based in Hanoi and backed by the Chinese Communists from Peiping.

Two months ago, when we were discussing in this Council the problems created on the Cambodia-South Viet-Nam frontier by the Communist Viet Cong, I defined our peace aims in Southeast Asia. I repeat them today:

There is a very easy way to restore order in Southeast Asia. There is a very simple, safe way to bring about the end of United States military aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Let all foreign troops withdraw from Laos. Let all states in that area make and abide by the simple decision to leave their neighbors alone. Stop the secret subversion of other people’s independence. Stop the clandestine and illegal transit of national frontiers. Stop the export of revolution and the doctrine of violence. Stop the violations of the political agreements reached at Geneva for the future of Southeast Asia.

The people of Laos want to be left alone.
The people of Viet-Nam want to be left alone.
The people of Cambodia want to be left alone.

When their neighbors decide to leave them alone—as they must—there will be no fighting in Southeast Asia and no need for American advisers to leave their homes to help these people resist aggression. Any time that decision can be put in enforceable terms, my Government will be only too happy to put down the burden that we have been sharing with those determined to preserve their independence. Until such assurances are forthcoming, we shall stand for the independence of free peoples in Southeast Asia as we have elsewhere.

That is what I said to this Council in May. That is what I repeat to this Council in August.

When the political settlements freely negotiated at the conference tables in Geneva are enforced, the independence of Southeast Asia will be guaranteed. When the peace agreements reached long ago are made effective, peace will return to Southeast Asia and military power can be withdrawn.
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM

48. SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION 1

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

## 49. COMPARISON OF RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN VARIOUS AREAS

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<th>Southeast Asia</th>
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<td>Whereas naval units of the Communist regimes in Viet-Nam, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked U.S. naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of Southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area but desires only that they should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it.</td>
<td>Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers &quot;to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety&quot;; and Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1847 the parties agreed that &quot;an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations&quot;; and Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1963 declared &quot;The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from continental Communist powers, including the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union&quot;; and Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence; Now, therefore, be it.</td>
<td>Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores; Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and Whereas the President of the United States on Jan. 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against territories therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty. Therefore be it.</td>
<td>Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the Congress of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be and he hereby is au...</td>
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### 49. Comparison of Resolutions Relating to the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Various Areas—Continued

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<th>Southeast Asia</th>
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<th>Middle East</th>
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<td><strong>the President, as Commander-In-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Sec. 2.</strong> The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. In consonance with the Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any party or member state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall be reported to the Congress, except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses.</td>
<td><strong>(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of armed, the Marxian-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere; (b) to prevent in China the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and (c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Sec. 2.</strong> The President is authorized to undertake in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to its national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism. President, that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses.</td>
<td><strong>thoroughly to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in securing the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Sec. 2.</strong> The President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall be reported to the Congress.</td>
<td><strong>and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Sec. 2.</strong> This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses.</td>
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In Viet-Nam, too, we work for world order.
For 10 years, through the Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy administration, and this administration, we have had one consistent aim—observance of the 1954 agreements which guaranteed the independence of South Viet-Nam.
That independence has been the consistent target of aggression and terror. For 10 years our response to these attacks has followed a consistent pattern:
First, that the South Vietnamese have the basic responsibility for the defense of their own freedom.
Second, we would engage our strength and our resources to whatever extent needed to help others repel aggression.
Now, there are those who would have us depart from these tested principles. They have a variety of viewpoints. All of them, I am sure, you have heard in your local community.
Some say that we should withdraw from South Viet-Nam, that we have lost almost 200 lives there in the last 4 years, and we should come home. But the United States cannot and must not and will not turn aside and allow the freedom of a brave people to be handed over to Communist tyranny. This alternative is strategically unwise, we think, and it is morally unthinkable.
Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf much of Asia and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world. Moreover, such action would offer no solution at all to the real problem of Viet-Nam. America can and America will meet any wider challenge from others, but our aim in Viet-Nam, as in the rest of the world, is to help restore the peace and to reestablish a decent order.
The course that we have chosen will require wisdom and endurance. But let no one doubt for a moment that we have the resources and the will to follow this course as long as it may take. No one should think for a moment that we will be worn down, nor will we be driven out, and we will not be provoked into rashness; but we will continue to meet aggression with firmness and unprovoked attack with measured reply.
That is the meaning of the prompt reaction of our destroyers to unprovoked attack. That is the meaning of the positive reply of our aircraft to a repetition of that attack. That is the meaning of the resolution passed by your Congress with 502 votes in favor and only 2 opposed. That is the meaning of the national unity that we have shown to all the world last week.
There is another consideration. Wherever the forces of freedom are engaged, no one who commands the power of nuclear weapons can escape his responsibility for the life of our people and the life of your children.
It has never been the policy of any American to sympathetically or systematically place in hazard the life of this nation by threatening
nuclear war. No American President has ever pursued so irresponsible a course. Our firmness at moments of crisis has always been matched by restraint—our determination by care. It was so under President Truman at Berlin, under President Eisenhower in the Formosa Straits, under President Kennedy in the Cuba missile crisis—and I pledge you that it will be so long as I am your President.

In Viet-Nam, in Cyprus, and in every continent, in a hundred different ways, America's efforts are directed toward world order. Only when all nations are willing to accept peaceful procedures as alternative to forceful settlement will the peace of our world be secure.

(After several weeks of rapid political developments in South Viet-nam, during which General Khanh briefly relinquished the premiership, the Secretary of State was questioned at a press conference.)

51. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 14, 1964 (Excerpt)

Q. Mr. Secretary, what in your judgment is the impact of the uprising in Viet-Nam yesterday on the future prospects for getting on with the war?

A. Well, we hope very much that the events of the last 2 days will underline the importance of the projected plan which the triumvirate announced 10 days ago to constitute a council, broadly representative of the major elements in the population, whose task it will be in the weeks immediately ahead to devise a constitution for the country which will make it possible for all elements in the country to be represented, and to bring more civilians into the government to take on those tasks that are essentially civilian in character and permit the military leaders to concentrate more and more of their attention on the war against the Viet Cong.

We know this has been in their minds—in the minds of the military leaders for some time. And the machinery which was established under the leadership of the Acting Chief of State, General [Duong Van] Minh, seemed to us to be a way to move on that purpose with dispatch.

We do believe that it was important and gratifying that these recent incidents did not lead to armed conflict and to violence among elements of the armed forces, and we hope that these incidents will have a stabilizing effect and that people, having now seen this prospect of violence which was avoided, will now recognize the importance of getting on with it through consultation and movement toward a stable and more permanent constitutional system.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do we have a good, intelligible analysis of what the elements in the unrest are in Saigon today?

A. Well, if you are referring to the events of these past 2 days, I think that it is fair to say that basically this came from the disgruntlement of certain officers in connection with their removal from command and their removal from office. We did not have any reason to suppose that the troops and the junior officers of the elements that were moved into Saigon from nearby areas had a political program in mind or that they were particularly aware of what was going on.

But the officers who were primarily involved were officers who had been sacked by the Government in the course of the last week or so. And obviously they were not very happy about the situation.

We do, however, again come back to the point that relatively small elements of the armed forces were involved, perhaps 8 to 10 battalions, and that it was apparent that the armed forces were not prepared to follow them in a deeper, divisive, and violent disagreement within the armed forces. We found considerable encouragement in that.

Now, it is going to take some time to build the permanent kind of stable and constitutional government that they are looking for out there. I think that those of us who are concerned about this on a day-to-day matter—day-to-day basis—ought to pause and recall that for almost 25 years South Viet-Nam has been involved in violence and disorder and the highest of tensions: the period of Japanese occupation, the war against the French occupation, the division of the country between North and South, and the consolidation of the North as a Communist country, the tragic events that set group against group in the closing weeks of President Diem's regime, and the changes that have occurred since. These have created residues of problems, and it is not easy to set aside all that is past in order to get together on the important requirements of the future.

So this is understandable, even though we, and I think the present leaders, are impatient to get all of that behind us and build the kind of government that can move the country on to the kind of future that is waiting for it, if it can have some peace internationally and some unity and confidence in the country domestically.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the past, in connection with similar incidents in Laos, perhaps even other countries, you yourself and other members of the administration have remarked pointedly that the United States cannot salvage a situation where there is no will and no evidence on the scene that the people themselves are willing to help themselves. Have you begun to talk in these terms to the people in Saigon?

A. Well, I think the important point which we have made in conversations and discussions is that we understand that there are reasons for some of these differences in the country. But these are differences which are of secondary importance compared to—with the overriding necessity of saving the country, establishing its security, maintaining its independence. And therefore we would hope that these lesser differences would be put on ice, that a moratorium would be declared on them, until the main job of building a secure and independent country has been accomplished. And we have tried to make that clear. And I think that we have made some headway on that point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, both General [Maxwell D.] Taylor and former Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge have said that if South Viet-Nam could establish the stable constitutional government you mentioned, the war against the Communists would be over. On that basis, then, would you say that the primary problem in South Viet-Nam is political and governmental, rather than an actual military operation against the Communists?

A. Well, I think you would have to interpret their remarks against the background of the broader view of what they themselves have of a situation. I think it isn't literally true that the moment a stable government is formed that the problem of the Viet Cong would dis-
appear. But what is true is that we are not aware of any important
group in South Viet-Nam other than the Viet Cong itself that looks to
Hanoi for an answer.

These officers who led these battalions into Saigon Sunday [September 13] declared their determination to win the war against the Communists. But what is needed is the sort of structure which has been steadily building in the provinces for the past several months, the sort of structure which provides the administrative skeleton of the country which insures that public services are operating efficiently,
that the police are where they should be to provide the elements of
security so that those who cooperate with the Government need not
fear unduly the attempts of the Viet Cong to break up that system.

Now, there has been considerable headway in the provinces in this
matter in the past several months and these events in Saigon have not
brought about dislocation and changes in the provinces of the sort
that cuts across the effort of the Government. But thus far there has
not been the complete unity and the stability of the Government at
the very top in Saigon among the top several dozen leaders with the
full understanding of the people of Saigon. This problem is heavily
concentrated in Saigon itself. And we hope now that these leaders
will see the dangers of incidents such as that which has just occurred
and will put lesser problems behind them and move toward the unity
which is so urgently required.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel perhaps that we Americans, and the
rest of the world as well, have overestimated American power to in-
fluence this situation?

A. Well, I think there may be some Americans who expect miracles
from the United States in these far-off and distant places. Let me
remind you once again that there are a billion and a half people in
Asia, half of them in the Communist world, half of them in the free
world. We are not going to find answers for a billion and a half
people by simply saying to them, “Now, just move over and we Amer-
icans will settle these things for you.” That is not the way it’s going
to happen.

We can help those Asians who are determined to be free to develop
the strength and the structure of the organization and the economic
base, develop their public services, so that they have the strength and
the capacity to meet their problems themselves. And this is what
we have been trying to do for the past 10 years in South Viet-Nam.

After the dividing of the country, President Eisenhower determined
to provide very substantial assistance to South Viet-Nam. I point
out to you that in the years 1956 to 1959 some very important progress
was made economically and from the point of view of administration,
and they were well on their way toward peace and toward prosperity.
But then the North decided that this was perhaps getting too much
for them and they decided in 1959 to renew their attempts to under-
mine and take over South Viet-Nam, and they publicly proclaimed
that in 1960.

So these pressures from the outside have to be met, have to be
resisted. But these are matters which Asians themselves must have
a full part in as their own problem. We can help and assist. And we
can also be sure that these do not become matters of all-out, wholesale
invasions with organized armed forces and things of that sort, that
these people have a chance to—these 14 million people in South Viet-
Nam—have a chance to resolve their problems themselves.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the organized Buddhists are being spoken of as having a major veto power in any future Vietnamese stability: (1) Do you think this is true; and (2), what do you think their objectives are, what are they seeking?

A. Well, I would not want to offer a generalization about 80 percent of the population of South Viet-Nam.

There, of course, have been some problems in the past, as you know, some of them originating out of religious differences. Some of them perhaps have been stimulated during President Diem's regime. Some of them are more political in character, but political points of view which represent elements that have one particular religious belief rather than another. And I would not want to call that necessarily a religious difference.

But, with 80 percent of the population Buddhist, it is very important that the Buddhist element, just as with the Catholic element, find a basis on which they work together to build and support a government which can build their country's security and independence.

(The following two statements were made after further govern-
mental changes in Saigon, as a result of which Pham Khao Huu was selected chief of state and Tran Van Huong named Premier of South Vietnam.)

52. PRESIDENT JOHNSON REAFFIRMS THE BASIC POL-
ICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN VIET-NAM, DECEM-
BER 1, 1964

The President today reviewed the situation in South Viet-Nam with Ambassador [Maxwell D.] Taylor, and with the Secretaries of State [Dean Rusk] and Defense [Robert S. McNamara], the Director of Central Intelligence [John A. McCone], and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Gen. Earle G. Wheeler].

Ambassador Taylor reported that the political situation in Saigon was still difficult but that the new government under Prime Minister [Tran Van] Huong was making a determined effort to strengthen national unity, to maintain law and order, and to press forward with the security program, involving a combination of political, economic, and military actions to defeat the Viet Cong insurgency. The Ambas-
sador also reported that, although the security problems have increased over the past few months in the northern provinces of South Viet-
Nam, with uneven progress elsewhere, the strength of the armed forces of the government was being increased by improved recruiting and conscription and by the nearly 100-percent increase in the combat strength of the Vietnamese Air Force. Also, the government forces continue to inflict heavy losses on the Viet Cong.

On the economic front, Ambassador Taylor noted that agricultural output was continuing to increase, with U.S. assistance in fertilizers and pesticides playing an important role. He also noted that the

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prices of goods and the value of the piaster have remained remarkably stable. On the other hand, the Ambassador reported that increased interdiction of the communication routes by the Viet Cong is interfering to some extent with commerce within the country, and the recent typhoons and floods in central Viet-Nam have destroyed a large percentage of the crops and livestock in that region. The Vietnamese Government, with U.S. assistance, has moved promptly to organize a program which is bringing relief and rehabilitation to the stricken areas.

The President instructed Ambassador Taylor to consult urgently with the South Vietnamese Government as to measures that should be taken to improve the situation in all its aspects.

The President reaffirmed the basic U.S. policy of providing all possible and useful assistance to the South Vietnamese people and government in their struggle to defeat the externally supported insurgency and aggression being conducted against them. It was noted that this policy accords with the terms of the congressional joint resolution of August 10, 1964, which remains in full force and effect.

The meeting reviewed the accumulating evidence of continuing and increased North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong and of North Vietnamese forces in, and passing through, the territory of Laos in violation of the Geneva accords of 1962.

53. COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES AND VIET-NAM REGARDING MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN VIET-NAM, DECEMBER 11, 1964

The Government of Viet-Nam has just completed a series of discussions with the United States mission with regard to measures which should be taken to improve the situation in South Viet-Nam in all its aspects.

The U.S. Government has offered additional military and economic assistance to improve the execution of the Government's programs and to restrain the mounting infiltration of men and equipment by the Hanoi regime in support of the Viet Cong.

The Government of Viet-Nam has accepted this offer of support, which includes provision for increased numbers of military, paramilitary and police forces, the strengthening of the air defense of South Viet-Nam, and further economic assistance for a variety of forms of industrial, urban and rural development.

For its part, the Government of Viet-Nam is reviewing ways of increasing the scope and effectiveness of its programs related to the development of security and local government in the rural areas.

Together the Government of Viet-Nam and the U.S. mission are making joint plans to achieve greater effectiveness against the infiltration threat.

In the course of the discussions, the U.S. representatives expressed full support for the duly constituted government of Prime Minister [Tran Van] Huong.

When my old friend Senator [Stuart] Symington relayed your invitation to come here, I was delighted to accept. I shall make only one partisan statement tonight and that is to say how fortunate you in Missouri are in your distinguished senior Senator. For the rest, I would like to speak on the topic you have chosen—"American Policy in South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia"—totally without regard to partisanship. That topic and the issues it raises concern all of us, as Americans.

I shall talk, if I may, to three related sets of questions:

1. How did we come to be in South Viet-Nam? How does what we are doing there relate to our wider purposes in the world, to our specific purposes in Asia, and, in a word, to our national interests?
2. What has been the course of events in Viet-Nam that has brought us to the present situation?
3. What are the key problems, and what can we do to help in solving them and in achieving our objectives?

The first question requires a look at history.

Even when the Far East was much more distant than it is today, we Americans had deep concern for developments there. Americans pioneered in trade and missionary effort with China and in opening up Japan to Western influence. In 1898 we became in a sense a colonial power in the Philippines but began almost at once to prepare the way for independence and self-government there—an independence promised by Act of Congress in 1936 and achieved on schedule in 1946. By the 1930’s, we had wide interests of many types in the Far East, though only few direct contacts in Southeast Asia apart from the individual Americans who had served over decades as political advisers to the independent Kingdom of Thailand.

Events then took a more ominous turn. We became aware that the ambitions of Japanese military leaders to dominate all of Asia were a threat not only to the specific interests of ourselves and other Western nations but to the peace of the whole area and indeed of the world. China, in which we had taken a lead in dismantling the 19th-century system of foreign special privileges, was progressively threatened and large parts overrun. We ourselves were finally attacked at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. We responded to aggression by conducting with our allies a major Pacific war that cost the United States alone 272,700 casualties and over a hundred billion dollars.

In the end Japanese militarism was defeated and the way apparently cleared for an Asia of free and independent national states that would be progressively freed of colonialism, that need threaten neither each other nor neighboring states, and that could tackle in their own way the eternal problems of building political and economic structures that would satisfy the aspiration of their peoples.

That kind of Far East was a pretty good definition of our national interests then. It is equally valid today. We cared about the Far

East, and we care today, because we know that what happens there—among peoples numbering 33 percent of the world's population, with great talent, past historic greatness, and capacity—is bound to make a crucial difference whether there will be the kind of world in which the common ideals of freedom can spread, nations live and work together without strife, and, most basic of all, we ourselves, in the long run, survive as the kind of nation we are determined to be. Our basic stake in the Far East is our stake in a peaceful and secure world, as distinct from a violent and chaotic one. But there were three great flaws in the 1945 picture after the defeat of Japan.

1. In China a civil war had been raging since the 1920's, between the Government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist movement. After a brief and edgy truce during the war against Japan, the civil war was resumed in circumstances where the Government had been gravely weakened. We assisted that Government in every way possible. Mistakes may have been made, but in the last analysis mainland China could not have been saved from communism without the commitment of major United States ground and air forces to a second war on the Asian mainland. Faced with a concurrent threat from Soviet Russia against Europe and the Near East, we did not make—and perhaps could not then have made—that commitment. And there came to power on the mainland, in the fall of 1949, a Communist regime filled with hatred of the West, with the vision of a potential dominant role for China, but imbued above all with a primitive Communist ideology in its most virulent and expansionist form.

2. In Korea a divided country stood uneasily, half free and half Communist. With our military might sharply reduced after the war, as part of what may have been an inevitable slackening of effort, we withdrew our forces and reduced our economic aid before there was in existence a strong South Korea defensive capacity. With Soviet backing, North Korea attacked across the 38th parallel in June 1950. With the Soviets then absent from the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. was able to condemn the aggression and to mount a U.N. effort to assist South Korea. The United States played by far the greatest outside role in a conflict that brought 157,530 United States casualties, cost us at least $18 billion in direct expenses, and in the end—after Communist China had also intervened—restored an independent South Korea, although it left a unified and free Korea to be worked out in the future.

In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected three elements:

— a recognition that aggression of any sort must be met early and head-on or it will have to be met later and in tougher circumstances. We had relearned the lessons of the 1930's—Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia.

— a recognition that a defense line in Asia, stated in terms of an island perimeter, did not adequately define our vital interests, that those vital interests could be affected by action on the mainland of Asia.

—an understanding that, for the future, a power vacuum was an invitation to aggression, that there must be local political, economic, and military strength in being to make aggression unprofitable, but also that there must be a demonstrated willingness
of major external power both to assist and to intervene if required.

3. In Southeast Asia, finally, there was a third major flaw: the difficulty of liquidating colonial regimes and replacing them by new and stable independent governments. The Philippines became independent and with our help overcame the ravages of war and the Communist Huk rebellion. The British, who had likewise prepared India and Burma and made them independent, were in the process of doing the same in Malaya, even as they joined with the Malayans in beating back a 13-year Communist subversive effort. Indonesia was less well prepared; it gained its independence too, with our support, but with scars that have continued to affect the otherwise natural and healthy development of Indonesian nationalism.

French Indochina was the toughest case. The French had thought in terms of a slow evolution to an eventual status within some French union of states—a concept too leisurely to fit the postwar mood of Asia. And militant Vietnamese nationalism had fallen to the leadership of dedicated Communists.

We all know the result. Even with substantial help from us, France was unable to defeat the Communist-led nationalist movement. Despite last-minute promises of independence, the struggle inevitably appeared as an attempt to preserve a colonial position. By 1954, it could only have been won, again, by a major United States military commitment—and perhaps not even then. The result was the settlement at Geneva. The accords reached there were almost certainly the best achievable, but they left a situation with many seeds of future trouble. Briefly:

1. North Viet-Nam was militantly Communist and had developed during the war against the French an army well equipped and highly skilled in both conventional and subversive warfare. From the start, North Viet-Nam planned and expected to take over the south and in due course Laos and Cambodia, thinking that this would probably happen by sheer decay under pressure but prepared to resort to other means if needed.

2. South Viet-Nam had no effective or popular leadership to start with, was demoralized and unprepared for self-government, and had only the remnants of the Vietnamese military forces who had fought with the French. Under the accords, external military help was limited to a few hundred advisers. Apart from its natural self-sufficiency in food, South Viet-Nam had few assets that appeared to match those of the north in the struggle that was sure to come.

3. Cambodia was more hopeful in some respects, more remote from North Viet-Nam, with a leader in Prince Sihanouk, a strong historical tradition, and the freedom to accept external assistance as she saw fit. From the start Sihanouk insisted, with our full and continuing support, on a status of neutrality.

4. Laos, however, was less unified and was left under the accords with a built-in and legalized Communist presence, a disrupted and weak economy, and no military forces of significance.

Such was the situation President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles faced in 1954. Two things were clear: that in the absence of external help communism was virtually certain to take over the successor states
of Indochina and to move to the borders of Thailand and perhaps beyond, and that with France no longer ready to act, at least in South Viet-Nam, no power other than the United States could move in to help fill the vacuum. Their decision, expressed in a series of actions starting in late 1954, was to move in to help these countries. Besides South Viet-Nam and more modest efforts in Laos and Cambodia, substantial assistance was begun to Thailand.

The appropriations for these actions were voted by successive Congresses, and in 1954 the Senate likewise ratified the Southeast Asia Treaty, to which Thailand and the Philippines adhered along with the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan. Although not signers of the treaty, South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia could call on the SEATO members for help against aggression.

So a commitment was made, with the support of both political parties, that has guided our policy in Southeast Asia for a decade now. It was not a commitment that envisaged a United States position of power in Southeast Asia or United States military bases there. We threatened no one. Nor was it a commitment that substituted United States responsibility for the basic responsibility of the nations themselves for their own defense, political stability, and economic progress. It was a commitment to do what we could to help these nations attain and maintain the independence and security to which they were entitled—both for their own sake and because we recognized that, like South Korea, Southeast Asia was a key area of the mainland of Asia. If it fell to Communist control, this would enormously add to the momentum and power of the expansionist Communist regimes in Communist China and North Viet-Nam and thus to the threat to the whole free world position in the Pacific.

I have come at a statement of our policy in the Far East by the route of history, for policy is the fruit of history and experience, seldom of some abstract design from a drawing board. In essence, our policy derives from (1) the fact of the Communist nations of Asia and their policies; (2) the lessons of the thirties and of Korea; (3) the logical extension of that fact and these lessons to what has happened in Southeast Asia.

It is possible to define our total policy in Asia, as it has existed at least since 1954, in quite simple terms.

1. Our objectives are those of the free nations of the area—that they should develop as they see fit, in peace and without outside interference. We would hope that this development will be in the direction of increasingly democratic institutions and that there will be continued and expanded ties of partnership and contact with ourselves and with the other nations of the free world. Yet we know that Asia will develop as the leaders and peoples of Asia wish it to develop, and we would not have it otherwise.

2. Asia confronts two central problems: the threat of Communist nations whose objective is domination and enslavement, and enormous economic and political problems that would exist in any case. If these two problems cannot be solved over time, the Asia of the future will be the breeding ground of ever more direct threats to our national interest and could be the source of a third world war.
3. To deal with these central problems, the free nations of the area need the help of the United States and of our major allies. Outnumbered in population and in military forces by the Communist nations as they are—by nearly two to one if you leave out India—the free nations of Asia cannot do the job alone. We cannot do it for them, but we have the resources and the military power to play a crucial role.

4. The peace and security of East and Southeast Asia are indivisible. If the Communist powers succeed in aggression, they will be encouraged, free nations discouraged, and the inevitable process of evolution toward moderation within the Communist countries themselves postponed or perhaps prevented altogether. We have seen the dynamics of Hitlerite Germany and militarist Japan checked and defeated and the West Germany and Japan of today emerge as respected major nations of the world. Thanks to NATO, our handling of the Cuban crisis, and other actions, something like the same process may be underway with Soviet Russia today. Such a process of moderation will come eventually for the Communist nations of Asia if they are checked. It cannot come if they are not, and any loss of free nations makes the future task that much, and perhaps immensely, more difficult.

So much, then, for how we came to become involved in South Vietnam and how that involvement relates to our wider policies and purposes. In simple terms, a victory for the Communists in South Vietnam would inevitably make the neighboring states more susceptible to Communist pressure and more vulnerable to intensified subversion supported by military pressures. Aggression by “wars of national liberation” would gain enhanced prestige and power of intimidation throughout the world, and many threatened nations might well become less hopeful, less resilient, and their will to resist undermined. These are big stakes indeed.

Let us now wind the reel back to South Vietnam in 1954 and trace the course of events to the present.

From 1954 to 1959 great progress was made. In Ngo Dinh Diem a staunchly nationalist and anti-Communist leader was found. Against all odds, including the opposition in 1954–55 of old-line military leaders and religious groups, he took hold. Under his rule the nationalist feeling of the newly formed country—which does differ to a significant degree from the north—was aroused, and it soon became and has remained clear that, whatever the extent of their attachment to particular governments in their own country, the great mass of the people of South Vietnam do not wish to be ruled by communism or from Hanoi.

On the economic and social front education was vastly expanded, major land reforms were carried out, and the economy grew at a rapid rate, far outstripping what was happening under the Communist yoke in the north. Instead of decaying and dropping by default into communism, South Vietnam was in a fair way toward becoming really able to stand on its own feet.

In all this the United States played a major helping role. On the military side we helped to create a fairly decent army almost from scratch, with a normal Military Assistance Advisory Group of a few hundred men. That army was never big enough to threaten the north,
nor was it meant to be; it may well have been too much oriented to conventional warfare and not to the handling of a sophisticated guerrilla aggression.

Then, beginning roughly in 1959, two trends got underway that are still today at the heart of the problem.

First, the Diem government, instead of steadily broadcasting its base and training key groups for responsibility, began to narrow it. More and more the regime became personal in character. Opposition parties, which had previously been active in relatively free elections, were driven underground, and there began a process of repression which, while never drastic by the standards we should apply to governments in new nations, much less by those of Communist countries, nevertheless alienated increasing numbers of the all-too-small pool of trained men capable of helping to govern effectively.

Second, Hanoi went on the march. Seeing itself thwarted in both South Viet-Nam and Laos, Hanoi began to send trained guerrillas into the south and increasing cadres to assist the Communist Pathet Lao forces in Laos. In South Viet-Nam there had been from the start thousands of agents and many pockets of Communist influence left behind in the division of Viet-Nam, and as early as 1957 a campaign of assassination of local officials had begun that tallies on the map almost exactly with the areas under strongest Communist control today. In 1959 such activity was stepped up, guerrilla units formed, and the real campaign got underway.

That campaign is sometimes referred to as a civil war. But let us not delude ourselves. Discontent there may have been—and local recruiting by the Viet Cong, largely through intimidation. But the whole campaign would never have been possible without the direction, personnel, key materiel, and total support coming from Hanoi and without, too, the strong moral support, and key materiel when needed, provided by Peiping and, up to 1962 at least, by the Soviet Union. Thousands of highly trained men coming from the north, along with the crucial items of equipment and munitions—these have been from the start the mainspring of the Viet Cong insurgency. This has been all along a Communist subversive aggression, in total violation of the Geneva accords as well as general principles of international behavior.

Indeed the true nature of the struggle has been publicly stated many times by Hanoi itself, beginning with a 1960 Communist Party conference in North Viet-Nam which declared the policy of, as they put it, “liberating” the south.

By early 1961, South Viet-Nam was clearly in difficulty. President Johnson, then Vice President, visited the country in the spring, and we stepped up our military supplies and tried to turn our training emphasis increasingly to the guerrilla front. Then, in the fall of 1961, a series of key assassinations and raids on Government centers brought South Vietnamese morale to a critical point. Something more was needed. President Kennedy considered and rejected the sending of United States combat units to fight the Viet Cong. Instead, he responded to the request of the South Vietnamese Government for American military advisers with Vietnamese units and for Americans to furnish helicopter and air transport lift, combat air training, communications, and, in short, every possible form of assistance short of combat units.
But the military effort was and is only one aspect of the struggle. The economic front was equally important, and a smaller but extraordinarily dedicated group of civilian Americans went into the dangerous countryside, unarmed and often unescorted, to help in the creation of the fortified hamlets that soon became, and remain, a key feature of strategy, and to bring to the villages the schools, fertilizer, wells, pigs, and other improvements that meant so much and would serve to show the Government’s concern for its people.

The basic strategy adopted in early 1962 was sound and was, indeed, in key respects the same as the strategy that prevailed against communism in Malaya, Greece, and the Philippines. It is a strategy that takes patience and local leadership and that takes learning and experience as well. The Vietnamese and we are still learning and changing today and will go on doing so.

Under the advisory concept, the American strength in South Vietnam rose to 12,000 by mid-1962 (eventually to the present 23,000), and with our help the South Vietnamese began to reverse the slow tide of growing Communist gains. By the spring of 1963, things seemed to be on the upswing, not only in the judgment of senior Americans but in that of experienced observers from third countries.

Yet the unhappy tendencies of the Diem government had persisted, despite all the quiet advice we could give in favor of reforms. The stubbornness and inflexibility which had been his great assets in the early days after 1954 had now become serious drawbacks. The Buddhist uprisings of the spring of 1963 brought the political situation to the forefront again. Now, Buddhism as a religion is not nearly as dominant in South Vietnam as it is elsewhere in Southeast Asia—Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. The adherents of Buddhism may not be even a majority of South Vietnamese, and there are significant Catholic and other groups as well as large numbers of adherents to older religious beliefs. Nonetheless, Buddhists are the most numerous faith, they are entitled to fair treatment, and they had some case against the Diem government for personal discrimination, though little, according to the findings of a United Nations Commission, for true religious persecution. But these grievances might have been met without serious trouble if they had not been fanned by a small group of leaders who were and are, in fact, politically motivated.

Unfortunately the Diem government refused to compromise or to redress the areas of legitimate grievance and in August sent the army into the pagodas of Saigon and other cities, following up with a drastic campaign of suppression against students and a wide circle of political opponents. As a result, by late September—when I personally accompanied Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara to Saigon—it was clear that Diem and his brother Nhu had aroused wide popular opposition and, perhaps most crucial, had alienated almost to the breaking point the key trained elements within the Government structure itself, both civilian and military.

Although Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge continued to urge reforms that might still have saved the government, Diem did not respond, and on November 1, 1963, he was overthrown, he and Nhu—most unfortunately—killed, and a new military government installed by force.
No one could then tell whether the new government would be better. Clearly, it had to be military in the first instance, and the first military group, under General [Duong Van] Minh, had considerable popular backing. Yet it was ineffective and tended to throw out the baby with the bath, replacing so many military and provincial officials that the way was open for major Viet Cong gains. Then, in January, General [Nguyen] Khanh took control in a bloodless coup. He showed ability on the military and economic front, but he, in turn, decided to turn over the government to civilian leaders to be selected by consultation among representatives of the key groups—the Buddhists, the Catholics, the military, labor, the religious sects, the various areas including the considerable body of refugees from the north, past political groupings, and so on.

The result was the present government under Prime Minister [Tran Van] Huong, a man of determination and character, dedicated to fairness to all groups. He is wrestling today essentially with the same kind of problems that Diem faced and overcame in 1954, but in the far more difficult internal security crisis brought on by the Viet Cong aggression, which has been slowly extending the areas of Communist control in the countryside and the pace of guerrilla and terrorist activity, even to Saigon itself.

So the political situation today is critical, and its resolution is central to turning the war around and restoring an independent and secure South Viet-Nam. That task must essentially be done by the Vietnamese people, under Vietnamese civilian and military leaders, all under a government that unites the divergent political-interest groups and that gives orders that can be carried out.

I have dwelt at such length on the political history because it is this aspect that is today in the headlines, as it is the greatest concern of our representatives in Saigon and of the Vietnamese leaders themselves, who must find the answer.

And may I pause here, apropos of the headlines, to say that I think the American people are getting the facts. We in Government follow closely what is said in the newspapers and magazines and on TV; part of our job is to see that these media are properly informed and given access to everything except for those few details that are necessarily matters of security in what is, after all, a war situation. I think we are doing our job and that the media are doing theirs. The picture that you, as thoughtful citizens, get is in fact the picture that we have on all essential points. If that picture is complex or not entirely clear, believe me our picture is the same, for that is the nature of the situation.

The real point of the political history in South Viet-Nam is that it should cause us no amazement and no despair. Was it not 7 years between the end of the American Revolution and the making of a lasting Constitution, even for a new nation which had united to fight a war and had centuries of British evolution toward democratic self-government behind it? And how many new nations in the world today have found lasting stability in a decade, especially where there had been little preparation under colonialism, where the national historic tradition was remote, and, above all, where a violent aggressor was striking constantly at the very fabric of government? Take, if you will, one fact alone—that in the first 8 months of 1964 the Viet
Cong assassinated more than 400 local officials and kidnapped another 700—and try in your mind to project what an equivalent amount of gangsterism would do to government performance in this country and then to project that effect, in turn, onto the situation in a country such as South Viet-Nam.

So this is a tough war, and the Vietnamese are a tough people to have stood up under it and to be holding their heads above water after 20 years of violence and uncertainty.

How should we now, then, approach this situation, as Americans?

Above all, we must stand firm and be patient. We never thought in 1961, or in 1954, that the task would be easy. North Viet-Nam had certain advantages:

—Experience and sophistication in every aspect of subversion and political warfare.
—Dedicated and fanatic agents who for the most part came from the south to fight the French and then returned to areas they knew well.
—An open corridor through Laos to keep up the supply of guerrillas and supplies. In the past year, such infiltration has markedly increased and has included for the first time significant numbers of indigenous North Vietnamese trained in North Viet-Nam in regular military units.
—A numerical ratio of guerrilla forces to Government forces that is well below the ratios of 10 to 1 that have been found necessary for success in past guerrilla wars. There are today in South Viet-Nam perhaps 35,000 hard-core Viet Cong fighters and another 60,000 to 80,000 local Viet Cong forces, against roughly 400,000 military and paramilitary forces for the Government, or a ratio of about 4 to 1.
—The internal political divisions and, above all, the inexperience in government of the South itself.

Yet the balance sheet is by no means all one-sided.

—Our advisory effort, on all fronts, has done great things and, in the wide personal relationships involved, must stand almost unique in the history of relations between an Asian nation under fire and an outside Western nations. Although there are from time to time signs of anti-American feeling, working relationships at all levels remain close and friendly.
—With our help, the Government has been able to maintain economic stability and to move to help areas secured from the Viet Cong.
—Our military efforts and our equipment, supplied to the Vietnamese, have largely offset the unfavorable numerical ratio favoring the Viet Cong.
—The Vietnamese military forces continue to fight well. Our own military men consider most of them as tough and brave as any in the world. Through there have been military reverses, there have also been significant victories—which sometimes do not make headlines. On the military front, the Viet Cong is not capable of anything like a Dien Bien Phu.
—Above all, the Vietnamese people are not voting with their feet or their hearts for communism.
As to our basic policy, the alternatives to our present course might be, on the one hand, to withdraw or to negotiate on some basis such as what is called "neutralization," or, on the other hand, for the Vietnamese and ourselves to enlarge the war, bringing pressure to persuade Hanoi, by force, that the game they are playing is not worth it.

It is also suggested that the United Nations might be of help. There may emerge possibilities for a U.N. role, but it is not clear that the U.N., which has been unable to carry through commitments such as the Congo, would be able to act effectively to deal with this far more difficult situation in its present form. And this has been the public judgment of the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. U Thant.

As to the basic alternatives, so long as South Viet-Nam is ready to carry on the fight, withdrawal is unthinkable. A negotiation that produced a return to the essentials of the 1954 accords and thus an independent and secure South Viet-Nam would of course be an answer, indeed the answer. But negotiation would hardly be promising that admitted communism to South Viet-Nam, that did not get Hanoi out, or that exposed South Viet-Nam and perhaps other countries of the area to renewed Communist aggression at will, with only nebulous or remote guarantees.

As for enlarging our own actions, we cannot speak surely about the future, for the aggressors themselves share the responsibility for such eventualities. We have shown in the Gulf of Tonkin that we can act, and North Viet-Nam knows it and knows its own weaknesses. But we seek no wider war, and we must not suppose that there are quick or easy answers in this direction.

The root of the problem, to repeat, is in South Viet-Nam. We must persist in our efforts there, with patience rather than petulance, coolness rather than recklessness, and with a continuing ability to separate the real from the merely wished-for.

As a great power, we are now and will continue to find ourselves in situations where we simply do not have easy choices, where there simply are not immediate or ideal solutions available. We cannot then allow ourselves to yield to frustration but must stick to the job, doing all we can and doing it better.

The national interests that have brought us into the Viet-Nam struggle are valid, and they do not become less so just because the going gets rough and the end is not yet in sight. President Johnson said in his state of the Union message:

"Our goal is peace in Southeast Asia. That will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace.

What is at stake is the cause of freedom, and in that cause America will never be found wanting."

55. JOINT U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE RETALIATORY ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM: White House Statement, February 7, 1965*

On February 7, U.S. and South Vietnamese air elements were directed to launch retaliatory attacks against barracks and staging areas in the southern area of North Viet-Nam which intelligence has shown

to be actively used by Hanoi for training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Viet-Nam.

Results of the attack and further operational details will be announced as soon as they are reported from the field.

Today's action by the U.S. and South Vietnamese Governments was in response to provocations ordered and directed by the Hanoi regime.

Commencing at 2 a.m. on February 7th, Saigon time (1 p.m. yesterday, eastern standard time, two South Vietnamese airfields, two U.S. barracks areas, several villages, and one town in South Viet-Nam were subjected to deliberate surprise attacks. Substantial casualties resulted.

Our intelligence has indicated, and this action confirms, that Hanoi has ordered a more aggressive course of action against both South Vietnamese and American installations.

Moreover, these attacks were only made possible by the continuing infiltration of personnel and equipment from North Viet-Nam. This infiltration markedly increased during 1964 and continues to increase.

To meet these attacks the Government of South Viet-Nam and the U.S. Government agreed to appropriate reprisal action against North Vietnamese targets. The President's approval of this action was given after the action was discussed with and recommended by the National Security Council last night [February 6].

Today's joint response was carefully limited to military areas which are supplying men and arms for attacks in South Viet-Nam. As in the case of the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin last August, the response is appropriate and fitting.

As the U.S. Government has frequently stated, we seek no wider war. Whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors. The key to the situation remains the cessation of infiltration from North Viet-Nam and the clear indication by the Hanoi regime that it is prepared to cease aggression against its neighbors.

56. WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN DEPENDENTS: Statement by President Johnson, February 1, 1965

Following meetings with the National Security Council, I have directed the orderly withdrawal of American dependents from South Viet-Nam.

It has become clear that Hanoi has undertaken a more aggressive course of action against both South Vietnamese and American installations, and against Americans who are in South Viet-Nam assisting the people of that country to defend their freedom. We have no choice now but to clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued determination to back South Viet-Nam in its fight to maintain its independence.

In addition to this action, I have ordered the deployment to South Viet-Nam of a Hawk air defense battalion. Other reinforcements, in units and individuals, may follow.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 22, 1965, p. 239.
57. SERIOUS VIETCONG ATTACKS: Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, February 7, 1965

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. In describing certain of the events which have taken place in South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam during the past 24 hours, I'll refer to this map which stands in front of us. On it we have shown the relative positions of China, Laos, North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Thailand, and the South China Sea.

Approximately 24 hours ago, at 2 a.m. Sunday morning, February 7, Saigon time, the Viet-Nam Communist guerrillas carried out three attacks, one against installations in the Pleiku area, which is in the central part of South Viet-Nam, a second at Tuy Hoa, with an airstrip adjacent to it, an area near the coast, and a third against Viet-Nam villages near Nha Trang.

The first attack in the Pleiku area was carried out by a company of Viet Cong using 81-mm. mortars, the mortar fire was directed against the United States military compound at the Second Corps Headquarters of the South Vietnamese military forces, and simultaneously elements of the same company attacked the airstrip at Camp Holloway, at which were located United States helicopter forces on the outskirts of Pleiku.

This latter attack on the airstrip was accompanied by a ground probe during which small-arms fire was used, rifle grenades, demolition charges, and recoilless rifles. Following completion of the attacks a Viet Cong four-tube, 81-mm. mortar position was located outside the perimeter defense of the airstrip. Nearby were containers for 61 mortar rounds. The United States casualties in the Pleiku area were 7 killed, 109 wounded, and, of the 109, 76 of the wounded required evacuation.

In addition 5 United States helicopters were destroyed, 9 to 11 damaged, and 6 United States fixed-wing aircraft were damaged.

The second attack at Tuy Hoa was directed against Vietnamese villages in the area and against the storage tanks for aviation gas for the Vietnamese Air Force stationed at the Chop Chi Airfield. Again, 81-mm. fire was used, the storage tanks of aviation gas were set on fire. There were no United States casualties in that area.

The third attack, as I mentioned earlier, was against a village or series of villages about 15 miles northeast of Nha Trang. The reports of operations in this area are fragmentary, and I can't give you the results other than to say that we believe that there were no United States casualties there. Immediately following, the United States representatives in Saigon met with representatives of the South Vietnamese Government. They jointly agreed that joint retaliatory action was required. The President's approval of this action was given after the action was discussed with and recommended by the National Security Council at a meeting held between 7:45 p.m. and 9 p.m. last night.

As a result of this action, elements of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces were directed to launch joint retaliatory attacks against barracks and staging areas in the southern portion of North Viet-Nam.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 22, 1965, p. 239.
On this map you see Hanoi, the capital of North Viet-Nam, Saigon, the capital of South Viet-Nam, the line of demarcation between the two countries at the 17th parallel. The targets agreed upon for the joint retaliatory attacks were barracks areas and staging areas in the southern portion of North Viet-Nam. As I say, elements of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces were directed to launch joint retaliatory attacks against those targets. These are the areas which Hanoi has used as bases for the infiltration of men and equipment out of the southern portion of North Viet-Nam across the border into Laos, down the corridor through Laos, and into South Viet-Nam. The infiltration routes are picturized on the map. One comes into the Pleiku area in the central part of Viet-Nam, and others come further south.

U.S. aircraft took off from three U.S. carriers that were steaming in the South China Sea. These carriers were steaming south of the 17th parallel, which is the line of demarcation between North and South Viet-nam, about 100 miles off the coast of South Viet-nam. The three carriers were the U.S.S. Ranger, U.S.S. Hancock, and U.S.S. Coral Sea.

Of the aircraft which took off from the carriers, 49 struck the Dong Hoi barracks and staging area in the southern part of North Viet-Nam. Certain other U.S. aircraft and certain South Vietnamese aircraft aborted because of adverse weather conditions and did not proceed to their target areas. Photo reconnaissance of the results of the strike is not yet available, but the combat crews upon their return to the carriers reported seeing heavy fires, heavy smoke, and substantial damage to military targets in the target area. One U.S. aircraft, an A-4 from the carrier Coral Sea, was lost. The pilot was seen to eject into the sea. Air-sea rescue operations are underway. All other aircraft returned safely to their bases.

58. COMPLAINT TO UNITED NATIONS: U.S. Letter to President of Security Council, February 7, 1965

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to inform you of the following acts which have further disturbed the peace in Viet-Nam.

In the early morning of February 7th, Vietnamese time, Viet Cong forces carried out coordinated attacks on South Vietnamese air bases in Pleiku and Tuy Hoa, on two barracks installations in the Pleiku area, and on a number of villages in the area of Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. Numerous casualties were inflicted, and at least one village was burned.

These attacks by the Viet Cong, which operates under the military orders of North Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi, were a concerted and politically timed effort to sharpen and intensify the aggression at a moment designed for broader effect in the field of international politics, and to test the will of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States to resist that aggression.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Government of the United States immediately consulted and agreed that it was necessary to take prompt defensive action. Accordingly, on the afternoon of February 7th, Vietnamese time, United States and South Vietnamese air elements were directed to take joint action against certain military facilities in the southern area of North Viet-Nam. An attack was carried through against Dong Hoi, which is a military installation and one of the major staging areas for the infiltration of armed cadres of North Vietnamese troops into South Viet-Nam in violation of international law and of the Geneva Accords of 1954.

The Viet Cong attacks of February 7th related directly to the central problem in Viet-Nam. That central problem is not one of a struggle by one element of the population in South Viet-Nam against the Government. There is, rather, a pattern of military operations directed, staffed, and supplied in crucial respects from outside the country. Up to 94,000 armed and trained soldiers have infiltrated into South Viet-Nam from the north since 1959. In addition, key items of equipment, such as mortars of the type employed in the attacks of February 7th, have come from North Viet-Nam. During 1964, the infiltration of men and equipment has increased sharply, and virtually all of those now coming in are natives of North Viet-Nam.

Infiltration in such numbers can hardly be labeled "indirect aggression"—though that form of aggression is illegal too. What we are witnessing in Viet-Nam today is a sustained attack for more than six years across a frontier set by international agreement.

Members of the Security Council will recall that we discussed in the Council, in August 1964, aggression by the Hanoi regime against naval units of the United States in the Gulf of Tonkin. At that time we described these attacks as part of a pattern which includes the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against the legitimate government of South Viet-Nam, the arming of terrorist gangs in South Viet-Nam, the assassination of local officials as an instrument of policy, the continued fighting in Laos in violation of the Geneva agreements,—a pattern, in short, of deliberate systematic and flagrant violations of international agreements by the regime in Hanoi which signed them and which by all tenets of decency, law, and civilized practice, is bound by their provisions.

The Republic of Viet-Nam, and at its request the Government of the United States and other governments, are resisting this systematic and continuing aggression. Since reinforcement of the Viet Cong by infiltrators from North Viet-Nam is essential to this continuing aggression, counter-measures to arrest such reinforcement from the outside are a justified measure of self-defense.

Mr. President, my Government is reporting the measures which we have taken in accordance with our public commitment to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam against aggression from the North.

We deeply regret that the Hanoi regime, in its statement of August 8, 1964, which was circulated in Security Council Document S/5888, explicitly denied the right of the Security Council to examine this problem. The disrespect of the Hanoi regime for the United Nations adds to the concern which any United Nations member state must feel about Hanoi’s violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
Nevertheless I would remind you, and through you other members of the Security Council and of the United Nations, that our mission in Southeast Asia is peace and that our purpose is to ensure respect for the peace settlement to which all concerned are committed.

We therefore reserve the right to bring this matter to the Security Council if the situation warrants it.

In a statement issued this morning on behalf of President Johnson, the United States Government once again emphasized that "we seek no wider war. Whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors. The key to the situation remains the cessation of infiltration from North Viet-Nam and the clear indication by the Hanoi regime that it is prepared to cease aggression against its neighbors."

Our objective is a peaceful settlement. This would require both the self-restraint of the regime to the north and the presence of effective international peacekeeping machinery to make sure that promises are kept.

This is our purpose. But we will not permit the situation to be changed by terror and violence and this is the meaning of our action this weekend.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

59. JOINT U.S.-SOUTH VIET-NAM STATEMENT ON ATTACKS ON NORTH VIET-NAM, SAIGON, FEBRUARY 11, 1965

Since February 8, there have been continued acts of aggression by the Communist Viet Cong under the direction and with the support of the Hanoi regime against the Vietnamese people and installations in South Viet-Nam and against their American advisers. For example, these aggressive acts have included the following:

- The mining of 13 bridges and 7 separate acts of sabotage against the railroads resulting in death and injury to 18 Vietnamese civilians and 2 escort soldiers in addition to the material damage;
- Attacks on hamlets and convoys resulting in death or injury to many Vietnamese civilians and the kidnaping of others in addition to substantial military casualties;
- The vicious attack and related actions involving the American enlisted men's quarters at Qui Nhon by Viet Cong terrorist demolition teams resulting in 12 known Vietnamese and American dead, and including more than 40 others wounded and missing. Many of the latter must be supposed dead.

In response to these continued attacks by the Communists, South Vietnamese and American air elements today carried out air operations against selected military installations in the southern part of North Viet-Nam which have been used by the Hanoi regime for training and support of the Viet Cong personnel carrying out these acts.


On February 11, U.S. air elements joined with the South Vietnamese Air Force in attacks against military facilities in North Viet-Nam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Viet-Nam.

These actions by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments were in response to further direct provocations by the Hanoi regime.

Since February 8, a large number of South Vietnamese and U.S. personnel have been killed in an increased number of Viet Cong ambushes and attacks. A district town in Phuoc Long Province has been overrun, resulting in further Vietnamese and U.S. casualties. In Qui Nhon, Viet Cong terrorists in attack on an American military billet murdered Americans and Vietnamese. In addition, there have been a number of mining and other attacks on the railway in South Viet-Nam as well as assassinations and ambushes involving South Vietnamese civil and military officials.

The United States Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Viet-Nam on this continuation of aggressions and outrages. While maintaining their desire to avoid spreading the conflict, the two Governments felt impelled to take the action described above.


At the request of the Government of Viet-Nam, U.S. Air Force F-100 and B-57 aircraft from Bien Hoa and Da Nang participated in a combined airstrike west of An Khe in Binh Dinh Province on the afternoon of February 24. This strike was launched in order to assist in an attack against large Viet Cong forces in the mountain pass between An Khe and Pleiku and to assist in the extrication of an isolated unit under heavy attack.

U.S. jet aircraft have participated in similar combined operations on a number of occasions during the past week. Use of American aircraft stationed in Viet-Nam to reinforce the capability of the Vietnamese Air Force is in keeping with the announced U.S. policy of providing maximum assistance to the Government of South Viet-Nam in its effort to repel the Communist aggression directed and supported by the Hanoi regime.

62. SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Secretary Rusk’s News Conference of February 25, 1965

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I should like to take a few moments of your time to try to draw together in the simplest and most fundamental way our attitude toward the situation in Southeast Asia.
Some of the things which I shall say will repeat what has been said before, but memories here and abroad seem to be sometimes short. And it is important to repeat and draw together those matters which are at the center of the problem, because there is a great deal else which is peripheral and transitory.

1. The nations of Southeast Asia have a right to live in peace, free from aggression directed against them from outside their borders. Now, this is not an empty theory; it is a point of vital importance to the safety and, indeed, the very existence of more than a hundred smaller nations all over the world.

2. North Viet-Nam, in callous disregard of the agreements of 1954 and 1962, and of international law, has directed and supplied the essential military personnel and arms for a systematic campaign of terror and guerrilla action aimed at the overthrow of the Government of South Viet-Nam and at the imposition by force of a Communist regime. The evidence of North Viet-Nam’s direct responsibility for this aggression has been repeatedly presented by the Government of Viet-Nam, the United States Government, and the International Control Commission. A full and up-to-date summary of the evidence establishing this responsibility will be available to you within a very few days. It is now being processed for publication.

3. The attitude of the United States toward threats to the peace in Southeast Asia has been made clear many times and in the most serious and formal ways:
   (a) by the ratification of the Manila Pact in February 1955, which includes South Viet-Nam as a protocol state; (This treaty was approved by the Senate by a vote of 82 to 1.)
   (b) by a decision of President Eisenhower in 1954 to extend aid to South Vietnam, who said in a letter to the President of South Viet-Nam:

   The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

   and he went on to say that

   The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means.

   and then again (c) by the joint resolution of the Congress of the United States, passed in August 1964 by a combined vote of 502 to 2, which stated, among other things:

   That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

   and that

   The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

   and that

   * * * the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
and then you should remind yourselves of the statement made by President Johnson on the occasion of signing that joint resolution:

To any armed attack upon our forces, we shall reply.
To any in Southeast Asia who ask our help in defending their freedom, we shall give it.

In that region, there is nothing we covet, nothing we seek—no territory, no military position, no political ambition. Our one desire—our one determination—is that the people of Southeast Asia be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way.

4. Now, it has been stated over and over again that the key to peace in Southeast Asia is the readiness of all those in that area to live at peace and to leave their neighbors alone. Now, there is no mystery about that formulation; those who are not leaving their neighbors alone know exactly what it means. It is an obligation under the 1954 agreements, under the 1962 accords on Laos, and under general international law. The illegal infiltration of military personnel and arms cannot be described as “leaving your neighbor alone.”

5. There have been negotiated settlements in Southeast Asia, the most recent one as late as 1962. Those several agreements were intended to establish peace in that area; compliance with them by all concerned can achieve that result.

6. Now, since the Geneva conference of 1962, the United States has been in active and continuous consultation with other governments about the danger created by aggression in Southeast Asia. It has been discussed in the United Nations, in the SEATO and NATO Councils, and on innumerable occasions directly with other governments through diplomatic channels. We have had direct discussions with almost every signatory of the agreements of 1954 and 1962. What is still missing is any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing and what it knows it is doing against its neighbors. The absence of this crucial element affects the current discussion of “negotiation.” Political channels have been and are open, and a considerable number of governments are actively interested in keeping them open to explore the possibilities of a peaceful solution. But a negotiation aimed at the acceptance or the confirmation of aggression is not possible. And a negotiation which simply ends in bitterness and hostility merely adds to the danger.

7. Let me remind you that on February 17 the President said, and I am quoting:

As I have said so many, many times, and other Presidents ahead of me have said, our purpose, our objective there is clear. That purpose and that objective is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country.

We have no ambition there for ourselves. We seek no dominion. We seek no conquest. We seek no wider war. But we must all understand that we will persist in the defense of freedom and our continuing actions will be those which are justified and those that are made necessary by the continuing aggression of others. These actions [he added] will be measured and fitting and adequate. Our stamina and the stamina of the American people is equal to the task.

Let me conclude by reaffirming, still once more, that the central object of American policy and action in peace in Southeast Asia and the safety of the independent states in that region. Many of the peoples of that area have been subjected to 25 years of turmoil and violence; they are entitled to peace. We ourselves much prefer to use our resources as a part of an international effort to assist the economic and
social development of the peoples of that area than to have them
diverted into the harsh necessities of resisting aggression.

I am ready for your questions, gentlemen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the association of the United States Gov-
ernment with the activities of these nations you referred to which are
trying to keep open the channels of diplomacy?

A. Well, we are ourselves in regular contact with many govern-
ments in all parts of the world, through diplomatic means. We have
not seen any basis on which we can ask anyone else to speak for us, and
we do not know of anyone else who is purporting to speak for us.

But let me come back again with great emphasis—because I do think
that it is central to this question of negotiation. And that is that the
missing piece—the missing piece is any indication that Hanoi is pre-
pared to stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors.

Now, in many of these postwar negotiations in the last 20 years, as
you know, the negotiations have been frequently and most often pre-
ceded by some indication that those negotiations might have some
chance of success. Now, that is the missing piece here—that is the
missing piece.

The object is the safety and security of these smaller countries of
Southeast Asia. In that issue all of the smaller countries of the world
have a vital stake. It is at the heart of the very structure of inter-
national life, of the international state system. And it is the missing
element, the unreadiness of Hanoi to stop doing what it is doing—
that is the problem in this thing called negotiation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you give that message to Hanoi by way of the
Chinese Communists in the Warsaw meeting the other day?

A. We had a talk—I think it was yesterday. That talk revealed
nothing new in the known positions of the two sides. That talk did
not supply the missing piece that I am talking about. There was no
indication in that talk that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what they
are doing.

Q. Well, did you use that channel to get this word directly to them?

A. Our policy, along the lines that I have summarized here, was
made clear there; it is made clear repetitively with governments all
over the world, time and time again, and this was done yesterday.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is speculation here that the United States
is now in the process of expanding its military role in Viet-Nam in
hopes that this might convince the Hanoi government to provide this
missing link.

A. I wouldn't speculate on that from that point of view. I would
urge you to look at what I have said in my opening statement. Look
at all of it—look at all of it taken together. That is the policy—that
is the policy. How you feel you must act at a particular time and
under particular circumstances under that policy and within that
policy—for example, within the joint resolution of the Congress—
depends upon circumstances from time to time. But the policy is to
act to support the independence and safety of these countries of South-
east Asia. That is the policy.

And I would urge you to give serious consideration to all of the
elements that I have indicated in my opening statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Secretary-General U Thant, in New York yester-
day, in urging the beginning of some kind of informal discussions to
restore peace in Viet-Nam, said, "I am sure that the great American people, if they only know the true facts and the background to the developments in South Viet-Nam, will agree with me that further bloodshed is unnecessary." Now, are you hiding any true facts from the American people?

A. Well, I don't want to comment on that particular statement in any personal sense. I believe that there has been some clarification of that statement since then. But, as I have said to you gentlemen before, I don't know of any situation anywhere in the world on which the American people have been better informed, in more detail, on a current basis, both by officials and by the intensive effort of a vigorous and free press, that is the case with respect to South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, perhaps, sir, then you could clarify this point. There has been a noticeable, considerable difference of emphasis in the statements of the general objectives of United States policy in these terms. There have been times when the United States policy has been said to be to defend the freedom of the people of Viet-Nam. There have been other times when the policy of the United States has been said to be to resist the expansion of Chinese Communist aggression. Could you clarify that?

A. I think those two mean exactly the same thing. The expansion of Communist aggression involves the attempt to take over South Viet-Nam. I think that is looking at the same coin from both its sides.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Secretary-General said he had made a proposal to the United States. The White House said no such proposal has been presented to the President. Do you know of any such proposal?

A. Well, we have talked over the past 2 years informally and on a number of occasions with the Secretary-General, who carries a very heavy responsibility in his role at the United Nations, as well as with many governments in various parts of the world. Now, during that 2-year period, various suggestions have been discussed—sometimes by us, sometimes by others. But the proposals that I know about thus far have been procedural in nature. The missing piece continues to be the absence of any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors.

Now, these suggestions and procedural questions have been discussed, many of them publicly. This question of calling a conference, under what circumstances—these are procedural matters. What we are interested in, what is needed to restore peace to Southeast Asia, is substance, content, an indication that peace is possible in terms of the appetites and the attitudes of the other side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you evaluate the situation, the political situation in South Viet-Nam, in the light of the recent changes of government and whether or not you feel that an effective government is now possible there, and is that one of the missing pieces?

A. Well, we have been very deeply concerned, as you know, for some time about the question of the essential unity and solidarity of the Government in Saigon. Confusion on that matter—or the absence of unity—ramifies in a variety of directions and, of course, makes it that much more difficult for them and for us to act effectively to insure the independence and the safety of South Viet-Nam. And undoubtedly disunity and confusion in Saigon increases the expecta-
tion of the other side that, if they persist, they have a chance of success.
So we attach the highest possible priority to unity and solidarity among the South Vietnamese leaders and its Government.
I can express my belief, as well as my hope, that at least some of these problems of disunity have been resolved.
The recent so-called coup that involved—what—something like three battalions again, similar to the one of last September, did not interfere with the operation of the civilian government, or did not create a situation of bloodshed within the country.
But we are moving with hope and expectation and in the closest working relationship with the present Government in that country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your statement seems to suggest that only Hanoi’s aggression gives any body and major danger to what some have also described as the coincident civil war in South Viet-Nam. Did you mean to suggest, sir, that if you obtain evidence that Hanoi stops doing what it is doing, the United States aid and assistance to the South Vietnamese Government would no longer be necessary to handle the local problem?

A. Well, let’s be a little careful about this word “indigenous element.” There are those who use that term, particularly in the Communist world, because the North Vietnamese are Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese are Vietnamese and they would like to have everyone believe that that is what is meant by letting the Vietnamese settle their own problems. But an attack by North Viet-Nam on South Viet-Nam by military personnel and arms is aggression contrary to established agreements. Without the control of these operations from the North, without the manpower, the trained manpower sent from the North into the South, without the supply of arms and other key items of equipment from North to South, the indigenous aspect of this problem, the genuinely indigenous aspect of this problem, would be quite a different matter. It was this external aspect of the matter which explains the presence of the American military personnel in that area, the rapid increase in American personnel since 1961. It was the escalation of that infiltration. So I think we need to separate very carefully that part which is local, that part which is external; and the external part of it is the crucial aspect in terms of the pacification of the country and in terms of the establishment of peace in Southeast Asia.

Q. You mean then, also, sir, the withdrawal of such manpower as may have infiltrated as being part of stopping, doing—

A. Well, that is what they are doing; that is what they must stop.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect more active and perhaps collective support from other parties than Asians to the American effort in South Viet-Nam, and could you describe whether they have given any formal pledges?

A. Well, we have been discussing with other governments, as you know, for some time now, increased assistance to South Viet-Nam, political, through personnel, economic, in other ways. We have been encouraged in some cases to see that that increased assistance is forthcoming. We know that there are other governments that are considering now whether they might not be able to do more than they have been doing, not just those in Asia. We would welcome additional
support, and we think it is very important, both as an encouragement
and practical support for South Viet-Nam and also as an indication
to the other side of the international objection as to what the other
side is trying to do here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in order to interpret your statement correctly,
could you tell us whether or not you mean to suggest that it would be
a precondition of any negotiation or conference that there must be
an actual cessation of this penetration, or merely an indication of that?

A. No. I think that it is well for us and for everyone to concen-
trate on the meat of the matter. The meat of the matter is that Hanoi
is sending these people and these arms into South Viet-Nam contrary
to every agreement and contrary to international law. Now, if that
problem is grappled with, then we can get into details. We can con-
sider whether the meat involves a little salt and pepper and a dash of
garlic, but here is the meat of the matter, and I think we ought to
keep our eyes on that. That is the central, all-important element in
this situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what kind of legal basis did the United States
have to bomb the targets of North Viet-Nam?

A. Self-defense of South Viet-Nam and the commitments of the
United States with respect to the security and the self-defense of
South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if we could turn from Viet-Nam briefly, I won-
der if we could go to the Middle East. I wonder, sir, what was the
reason for our approval of the shipments of tanks to Israel? And,
secondly, now that the German shipments have ceased, what plans
does the United States have to see that Israel gets the remaining part
of the arms shipment?

A. On the first part of your question, we have been interested in
some sort of reasonable balance in the armed forces in that area. As
you know, Western Europe has been the primary supplier of arms to
Israel. We ourselves have tried not to be active in the Near East in
the arms field, although we have taken some steps in that regard be-
cause for some years we have been trying to find some way in which
to put some ceilings on this neighborhood arms race in the Near East.
We have been working with the governments concerned to find out
whether it is possible that this arms race might somehow be turned
downward.

The second part of your question I am not able to get into—about
the future.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in response to an earlier question you equated
Chinese Communist expansionism with the guerrilla war in South Viet-
Nam, but I don't believe you mentioned Peiping or Communist China
in your opening statement. I wonder whether you could tell us what
you believe the role of Red China and its guilt in this particular opera-
tion is?

A. Well, I think in my earlier statement I intended to comment
on—

Q. You emphasized Hanoi.

A. I intended to comment in answer to an earlier question on Com-
munist aggression and not specifically, necessarily Peiping or the
Chinese Communist aggression at the same time. However, I think
the role of Peiping here is pretty clear. They have gone to consider-
able lengths to make it public themselves. They have announced the doctrine of a militant world revolution, which they not only have adhered to in theory but have backed up in practice on more than one occasion. They have supported that doctrine with a harshness which has created very serious problems even within the Communist world, quite apart from problems with the free world.

Now we know that they have been giving encouragement, that they have been sending arms to North Viet-Nam, that many of these arms that we capture in South Viet-Nam are of Chinese origin, Chinese manufacture, and they have thrown their military and undoubtedly their economic weight behind what Hanoi is doing, and I would suspect that they have a very strong influence indeed in Hanoi's attitude in this present situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned Hanoi and Peiping—what about the shipment of Russian supplies to North Viet-Nam?

A. We haven't precise information on that, but I think in the case of the Soviet Union, judging from their public as well as private statements over the last 2 years or so, I think they have all along taken about the same view of South Viet-Nam as have other members of the Communist world. They have had a somewhat different view on Laos where they had a very specific and clear commitment on Laos, but I think they have been less active in this present situation than these other two capitals by a very considerable

Q. Mr. Secretary, could we return, sir, to what you restated several times as a critical point? Could you clarify for us in a diplomatic sense what it is that the United States would regard as evidence that Hanoi is stopping doing what it is doing? How could this be converted into a diplomatic, negotiable situation?

A. I don't think that it requires me at this time to try to spell that out in detail. We would find out very shortly on the ground, as well as through any diplomatic channel, whether there has been any change in the position in that respect. But I don't think it is appropriate for me to talk about complex sets of preconditions on their side or on our side or problems of that sort, because we still have this missing piece, which is the dominant element in the problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, for a number of years—excuse me, Mr. Secretary.

A. Yes.

Q. I want to turn to an internal problem in the State Department. Mr. John Reilly, who took part in some unauthorized wiretaps in the Otpekka case here several years ago, gave some untruthful testimony under oath before a committee of Congress on this, and now he has been hired by the FCC. I wonder if you could tell us if it is true that the State Department made no unfavorable comment in his personnel file on either the unauthorized wiretaps or the untruthful testimony under oath on a material matter?

A. I don't know what comments were made in his personnel file. I simply am uninformed on that point.

Q. Well, do you condone the unauthorized wiretaps, or have you looked into this at all?

A. As you know, sir, I have looked into this in great detail, but I am not going to get into this with you today.

Q. Well, Mr. Secretary, just a moment—

Q. I don't want to deal with the Otpekka case.
A. Yes?

Q. Mr. Secretary, were we satisfied that all supplies and infiltration from the North had been stopped, would the United States be content to solve the indigenous aspects, the civil war aspects, by free elections under international supervision in South Viet-Nam?

A. Well, let's get to the first step first, and then if we get to that step, then we will have the luxury of indulging in the consideration of the second step.

Q. What are our policies with regard to the indigenous aspects of a civil war? Could you enlighten us on this?

A. Well, I think that the indigenous aspects of it could be brought to a conclusion very quickly and that the South Vietnamese people could turn back to the problem of building their country and improving their constitutional system, elevating the economic standards of the country and get on with the modernization of the country which has been their purpose from the beginning.

Q. But only by military force, Mr. Secretary?

A. I am not commenting on that. I think the pacification of the country would be easy if the external aggression were stopped.

Q. Mr. Secretary, for years now we have been talking about the war in South Viet-Nam as a guerrilla war. And yet today twice you spoke about the armed attack and aggression from one nation upon another. I wonder, sir, if this is, in substance, changing the context of our understanding of the war in Viet-Nam?

A. No. I think all along we have put the finger on this question of the infiltration of the personnel and of the arms from outside as the key to the problem, and if those are aggressive acts, that is aggression from the North, and that is the thing which is at the heart of the problem, I wouldn't characterize it as a different thing.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Sure.

Q. I did want to clear up two things here. You said you had looked into this matter, and I wondered, did you know there were unauthorized wiretaps and did you know there was untruthful testimony under oath? Those seem to be the pertinent points.

A. Well, I am aware of the circumstances involving both those points, but I won't make a characterization of either one of them at this point.

Q. Do you think it's all right? Did you approve it?

A. No, I am not making any comment about what I did or did not approve of about either one of those points.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in past press conferences I believe you have reiterated the theme that the war—and so has Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara—that the war has to be won in the South. Why now is all this talk about Hanoi and infiltration from the North? This is a relatively new theme, at least as far as the emphasis is concerned. Are you still of the mind that the war has to be won on the ground in the South?

A. Well, that part of it, of course, is extremely important and is crucial to the entire effort. But again let me go back to my opening statement, taken altogether. Because the aggression, these aggressive acts from the North have been—as we have made clear recently—have been increased both with respect to manpower and with respect
Q. Mr. Secretary?
A. Yes, sir?

Q. When we were involved in the Korean war, Chiang Kai-shek's offer of troops to participate was rejected. Now, as I understand it, South Koreans are being introduced into Viet-Nam. Can you tell us wherein the situations differ?
A. Well, the South Korean personnel that are going into South Viet-Nam are not going there for combat purposes. They will be primarily engaged, I understand, on engineering tasks here and there. They will have with them certain local guards in connection with those particular tasks. They were requested by the South Vietnamese Government. They have a limited mission. I think that explains that particular point.

The other question 15 years ago had many more complications in it.

Q. Are the South Koreans able to defend themselves if attacked?
A. The South Koreans and the United States are able to defend South Korea if attacked, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, without commenting on specific future operations, you did imply in one of your earlier answers that the concept of self-defense and United States security commitments would, in your view, give us the right to continue attacks.
A. I think the question was the legal basis for the action that had been taken in that regard.

Q. Well, that implied the broad concept of self-defense would permit—
A. That's correct.

Q. ——would permit further attacks without necessarily—
A. I was commenting on the legal basis, yes.

Q. Under that concept, Mr. Secretary, has the United States, by allowing American combat flights in South Viet-Nam, modified its previous position on the role of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam?
A. Well, again, the policy remains the same. Look at the congressional resolution passed by a margin of 502 to 2. Now, the use of a particular weapon may change from time to time, or a type of aircraft, but the policy is the same. When the circumstances or changed circumstances require changed actions, those actions will be taken. But that does not mean an underlying change of policy. I have tried to put together in my opening statement the elementary and basic policy within which we are operating.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to the negotiations, is it a fair summary of what you have been saying today that the United States is not prepared for any kind of negotiation on the war in South Viet-Nam with the governments of Hanoi and Peiping unless and until what you call this missing piece is provided?
A. Well, I would think that that would be the essential point in discovering whether what is broadly called the political process—whether it's diplomatic contacts or whatever—can help bring this question to a peaceful solution. I think that is crucial to it. There is no political gimmick by which you can bar the other side from...
continuing aggression if they are determined to do so. That has to be met on the ground, factually, directly. There is no political wizardry which will change that until that will is changed, until the decision is changed on the other side.

Q. A related question, Mr. Secretary—

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your thinking on the present reception being accorded to Mr. Ulbricht of East Germany by Egypt?

A. Well, we consider the Federal Republic of Germany the spokesman for the German people on international affairs. We have not looked with favor upon any treatment of East Germany or its officials that would seem to undergird or underpin the division of the German people or enhance the position of the regime in East Germany.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Laos is also a part of this aggression from North Viet-Nam. The policy statements that you have been making today apply equally to Laos, do they, or just for Viet-Nam?

A. Yes. For brevity's sake I did not include Laos in detail, but the the same situation obtains there. In the case of Laos, we have an agreement as recent as 1962. I don't know of any single day since the signing of those agreements in which North Viet-Nam has been in compliance with them. Now, compliance with those agreements would make a big contribution to the peace of Southeast Asia. That is what they were for. Their entire purpose was to decide that everyone would leave the Laotians alone and let them run their own affairs. That is what it was all about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems that the congressional opinion that has been expressed over the last couple of weeks has not focused so much on goals of policy, which you have outlined, but the ability of the United States to realize them in Southeast Asia. Can you say why you think the new level of action which the U.S. has moved up to in Southeast Asia will realize these goals any more than the policy of simply fighting the war out in the South that we were following before?

A. Well, I think I would go back to the President's statement on February 17th and to the underlying policy of the congressional resolution itself. What is required is required. The commitment there is very clear with respect to this aggression and our commitment to the security of these countries of Southeast Asia.

No, I don't think one could look into the future and get a specific answer to your question as to how they will eventually develop. The other side is very much involved in writing that scenario. I think the policy and the determination and the attitude are clear.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the British and the Russian Governments, as cochairmen of the Geneva conference, decided to convene it, in the absence of the missing piece, would the United States be prepared to attend this conference?

A. Well, I think they would be in consultation with the members of the conference before they convened it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is implied on the subject of negotiations that what you're saying is that the minimum on our side would be a status quo ante. That is, at the beginning of the guerrilla war, that South Viet-Nam would remain with its territorial integrity and independence.
A. Well, the heart of the problem is an assault upon the safety and
the territorial integrity and independence of South Viet-Nam. If
that is relieved and removed, then things can begin to move. That is
the heart of the problem. That is why we have forces out there.
They could come home tomorrow if that problem had not been
created by aggression. They never would have been there in the first
place. That is the central heart, the essence of the situation, and that
is the problem that has to be dealt with.

Q. Thank you, sir.

63. AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH: State Department
Report, February 27, 1965

INTRODUCTION

South Viet-Nam is fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of
terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by
the Communist regime in Hanoi. This flagrant aggression has been
going on for years, but recently the pace has quickened and the threat
has now become acute.

The war in Viet-Nam is a new kind of war, a fact as yet poorly un-
derstood in most parts of the world. Much of the confusion that prev-
vails in the thinking of many people, and even many governments,
seems from this basic misunderstanding. For in Viet-Nam a totally
new brand of aggression has been loosed against an independent people
who want to make their own way in peace and freedom.

Viet-Nam is not another Greece, where indigenous guerrilla forces
used friendly neighboring territory as a sanctuary.

Viet-Nam is not another Malaya, where Communist guerrillas were,
for the most part, physically distinguishable from the peaceful major-
ity they sought to control.

Viet-Nam is not another Philippines, where Communist guerrillas
were physically separated from the source of their moral and physical
support.

Above all, the war in Viet-Nam is not a spontaneous and local rebel-
lion against the established government.

There are elements in the Communist program of conquest directed
against South Viet-Nam common to each of the previous areas of
aggression and subversion. But there is one fundamental difference.
In Viet-Nam a Communist government has set out deliberately to con-
quer a sovereign people in a neighboring state. And to achieve its
end, it has used every resource of its own government to carry out its
carefully planned program of concealed aggression. North Viet-
Nam's commitment to seize control of the South is no less total than was
the commitment of the regime in North Korea in 1950. But knowing
the consequences of the latter's undisguised attack, the planners in
Hanoi have tried desperately to conceal their hand. They have failed
and their aggression is as real as that of an invading army.

This report is a summary of the massive evidence of North Vietna-
inese aggression obtained by the Government of South Viet-Nam.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 22, 1965, pp. 404-425. (Appendixes, pictures, and
maps omitted.)
This evidence has been jointly analyzed by South Vietnamese and American experts.

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Viet-Nam were trained in the North and ordered into the South by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Viet Cong (VC), the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political organizers, and propagandists have come from the North and operate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into the South is directed by the Military High Command in Hanoi. (See section I.)

The evidence shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Viet Cong have been sent into South Viet-Nam from Hanoi. In recent months new types of weapons have been introduced in the VC army, for which all ammunition must come from outside sources. Communist China and other Communist states have been the prime suppliers of these weapons and ammunition, and they have been channeled primarily through North Viet-Nam. (See section II.)

The directing force behind the effort to conquer South Viet-Nam is the Communist Party in the North, the Lao Dong (Workers) Party. As in every Communist state, the party is an integral part of the regime itself. North Vietnamese officials have expressed their firm determination to absorb South Viet-Nam into the Communist world. (See section III.)

Through its Central Committee, which controls the government of the North, the Lao Dong Party directs the total political and military effort of the Viet Cong. The Military High Command in the North trains the military men and sends them into South Viet-Nam. The Central Research Agency, North Viet-Nam's central intelligence organization, directs the elaborate espionage and subversion effort. The extensive political-military organization in the North which directs the Viet Cong war effort is described in section IV.

Under Hanoi's overall direction the Communists have established an extensive machine for carrying on the war within South Viet-Nam. The focal point is the Central Office for South Viet-Nam with its political and military subsections and other specialized agencies. A subordinate part of this Central Office is the Liberation Front for South Viet-Nam. The front was formed at Hanoi's order in 1960. Its principal function is to influence opinion abroad and to create the false impression that the aggression in South Viet-Nam is an indigenous rebellion against the established government. (See section IV.)

For more than 10 years the people and the Government of South Viet-Nam, exercising the inherent right of self-defense, have fought back against these efforts to extend Communist power south across the 17th parallel. The United States has responded to the appeals of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam for help in this defense of the freedom and independence of its land and its people.

In 1961 the Department of State issued a report called A Threat to the Peace. It described North Viet-Nam's program to seize South Viet-Nam. The evidence in that report had been presented by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the International Control Commission (I.C.C.). A special report by the I.C.C. in June 1962 upheld the validity of that evidence. The Commission held that there
was "sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that North Viet-Nam had sent arms and men into South Viet-Nam to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the legal Government there. The I.C.C. found the authorities in Hanoi in specific violation of four provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954.

Since then, new and even more impressive evidence of Hanoi's aggression has accumulated. The Government of the United States believes that evidence should be presented to its own citizens and to the world. It is important for free men to know what has been happening in Viet-Nam, and how, and why. That is the purpose of this report.

I. HANOI SUPPLIES THE KEY PERSONNEL FOR THE ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET-NAM

The hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Viet-Nam are men trained in North Viet-Nam. They are ordered into the South and remain under the military discipline of the Military High Command in Hanoi. Special training camps operated by the North Vietnamese army give political and military training to the infiltrators. Increasingly the forces sent into the South are native North Vietnamese who have never seen South Viet-Nam. A special infiltration unit, the 70th Transportation Group, is responsible for moving men from North Viet-Nam into the South via infiltration trails through Laos. Another special unit, the maritime infiltration group, sends weapons and supplies and agents by sea into the South.

The infiltration rate has been increasing. From 1959 to 1960, when Hanoi was establishing its infiltration pipeline, at least 1,800 men, and possibly 2,700 more, moved into South Viet-Nam from the North. The flow increased to a minimum of 3,700 in 1961 and at least 5,400 in 1962. There was a modest decrease in 1963 to 4,200 confirmed infiltrators, though later evidence is likely to raise this figure.

For 1964 the evidence is still incomplete. However, it already shows that a minimum of 4,400 infiltrators entered the South, and it is estimated more than 3,000 others were sent in.

There is usually a time lag between the entry of infiltrating troops and the discovery of clear evidence they have entered. This fact, plus collateral evidence of increased use of the infiltration routes, suggests strongly that 1964 was probably the year of greatest infiltration so far.

Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 VC officers, soldiers, and technicians are known to have entered South Viet-Nam under orders from Hanoi. Additional information indicates that an estimated 17,000 more infiltrators were dispatched to the South by the regime in Hanoi during the past 6 years. It can reasonably be assumed that still other infiltration groups have entered the South for which there is no evidence yet available.

To some the level of infiltration from the North may seem modest in comparison with the total size of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam. But one-for-one calculations are totally misleading in the kind of warfare going on in Viet-Nam. First, a high proportion of infiltrators from the North are well-trained officers, cadres, and specialists. Second, it has long been realized that in guerrilla combat
the burdens of defense are vastly heavier than those of attack. In Malaya, the Philippines, and elsewhere a ratio of at least 10-to-1 in favor of the forces of order was required to meet successfully the threat of the guerrillas' hit-and-run tactics.

In the calculus of guerrilla warfare the scale of North Vietnamese infiltration into the South takes on a very different meaning. For the infiltration of 5,000 guerrilla fighters in a given year is the equivalent of marching perhaps 50,000 regular troops across the border, in terms of the burden placed on the defenders.

Above all, the number of proved and probable infiltrators from the North should be seen in relation to the size of the VC forces. It is now estimated that the Viet Cong number approximately 35,000 so-called hard-core forces, and another 60,000-80,000 local forces. It is thus apparent that infiltrators from the North—allowing for casualties—make up the majority of the so-called hard-core Viet Cong. Personnel from the North, in short, are now and have always been the backbone of the entire VC operation.

It is true that many of the lower level elements of the VC forces are recruited within South Viet-Nam. However, the thousands of reported cases of VC kidnapings and terrorism make it abundantly clear that threats and other pressures by the Viet Cong play a major part in such recruitment.

A. THE INFILTRATION PROCESS

The infiltration routes supply hard-core units with most of their officers and noncommissioned personnel. This source helps fill the gaps left by battle casualties, illness, and defection and insures continued control by Hanoi. Also, as the nature of the conflict has changed, North Viet-Nam has supplied the Viet Cong with technical specialists via the infiltration routes. These have included men trained in armor and ordnance, antiaircraft, and communications as well as medical corpsmen and transport experts.

There is no single infiltration route from the North to South Viet-Nam. But by far the biggest percentage of infiltrators follow the same general course. The principal training center for North Vietnamese army men assigned to join the Viet Cong has been at Xuan Mai near Hanoi. Recently captured Viet Cong have also reported an infiltration training camp at Thanh Hoa. After completion of their training course—which involves political and propaganda work as well as military subjects—infiltrating units are moved to Vinh on the east coast. Many have made stopovers at a staging area in Dong Hoi where additional training is conducted. From there they go by truck to the Laos border.

Then, usually after several days' rest, infiltrators move southward through Laos. Generally, they move along the Laos-South Viet-Nam border. Responsibility for infiltration from North Viet-Nam through Laos belongs to the 76th Transportation Group of the North Vietnamese army. After a time the infiltration groups turn eastward entering South Viet-Nam in Quang Nam, Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Kontum, or another of the border provinces.

The Communists have established regular lanes for infiltration with way-stations established about 1 day's march apart. The way-stations
are equipped to quarter and feed the Viet Cong passing through. Infiltrators who suffer from malaria or other illnesses stay at the stations until they recover sufficiently to join another passing group moving south.

The map on page 409 shows the infiltration route from North Viet-Nam to the South followed by VC Sgt. Huynh Van Tay and a group of North Vietnamese army officers and men in September 1963. Tay was captured during an engagement in Chuong Thien Province in April 1964.

Local guides lead the infiltration groups along the secret trails. Generally they direct the infiltrators from halfway between two stations, through their own base station, and on halfway to the next supply base. Thus the guides are kept in ignorance of all but their own way-stations. Only group leaders are permitted to talk with the guides in order to preserve maximum security. The men are discouraged from asking where they are or where they are going.

The same system of trails and guides used along the Lao infiltration routes is used within South Viet-Nam itself. Viet Cong infiltrators may report directly to a reassignment center in the highlands as soon as they enter South Viet-Nam. But in the past year or more some groups have moved down trails in South Viet-Nam to provinces along the Cambodian border and near Saigon before receiving their unit assignment. Within South Viet-Nam infiltration and supplies are handled by VC units such as the Nam Son Transportation Group.

At the Laos border crossing point infiltrators are reequipped. Their North Vietnamese army uniforms must be turned in. They must give up all personal papers, letters, notebooks, and photographs that might be incriminating. Document control over the infiltrators has been tightened considerably over the past 2 years. A number of Vietnamese infiltrators have told of being fitted out with Lao “neutralist” uniforms for their passage through Laos.

Infiltration groups are usually issued a set of black civilian pajama-like clothes, two unmarked uniforms, rubber sandals, a sweater, a hammock, mosquito netting, and waterproof sheeting. They carry a 3-5 day supply of food. A packet of medicines and bandages is usually provided.

The size of infiltration groups varies widely. Prisoners have mentioned units as small as 5 men and as large as 500. Generally the groups number 40-50. When they arrive in South Viet-Nam these groups are usually split up and assigned to various VC units as replacements, although some have remained intact.

**MILITARY PERSONNEL**

The following are individual case histories of North Vietnamese soldiers sent by the Hanoi regime into South Viet-Nam. They are only an illustrative group. They show that the leadership and specialized personnel for the guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam consists in large part of members of the North Viet-Nam armed forces, trained in the North and subject to the command and discipline of Hanoi.

1. **Tran Quoc Dan**

   Dan was a VC major, commander of the 60th Battalion (sometimes known as the 34th Group of the Thon-Kim Battalion). Disillusioned
with fighting his own countrymen and with communism and the lies of the Hanoi regime, he surrendered to the authorities in South Vietnam on February 11, 1963.

At the age of 15 he joined the revolutionary army (Viet Minh) and fought against the French forces until 1954 when the Geneva accords ended the Indochina War. As a regular in the Viet Minh forces, he was moved to North Vietnam. He became an officer in the so-called People’s Army.

In March 1962 Major Dan received orders to prepare to move to South Vietnam. He had been exposed to massive propaganda in the North which told of the destitution of the peasants in the South and said that the Americans had taken over the French role of colonialists. He said later that an important reason for his decision to surrender was that he discovered these propaganda themes were lies. He found the peasants more prosperous than the people in the North. And he recognized quickly that he was not fighting the Americans but his own people.

With the 600 men of his unit, Major Dan left Hanoi on March 23, 1962. They traveled through the Laos corridor. His group joined up with the Viet Cong First Regiment in central Vietnam.

The 35-year-old major took part in 45 actions and was wounded once in an unsuccessful VC attack on an outpost. As time passed he became increasingly discouraged by his experience as a VC troop commander. Most of all, he said, he was tired of killing other Vietnamese. After several months of soul-searching he decided to surrender to the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam. He has volunteered to do “anything to serve the national cause” of South Vietnam.

2. Vo Thoi

Sergeant Vo Thoi (Communist Party alias Vo Bien) was an assistant squad leader in the VC Tay Son 22d Battalion. On the night of October 7, 1963, his unit attacked An Tuong village in Binh Dinh Province. After overrunning the village, Vo’s company was assigned to set up an ambush against Republic of Vietnam troops rushing to defend the village. In the ensuing fight Vo was seriously wounded. He was picked up by local farmers and turned over to the authorities. Vo’s life and experiences were similar to those of thousands of Viet Cong. Born in Quang Ngai Province in 1932, he went through 5 years of school and then worked on his parents’ small farm. During the war against the French he joined the Viet Minh forces. When the fighting ended, he was transferred to North Vietnam with his unit, the 210th Regiment. He remained in the North Vietnamese army until 1960 when he was sent to work on a state farm in Nghe An Province. Vo said 3,000 men and women worked on the farm, of whom 400 were soldiers. In September 1962 Vo was told he must join the newly activated 22d Battalion. All the members of the battalion came from provinces in South Vietnam, from Quang Tri to Phu Yen. But it was not an ordinary battalion; two-thirds of its members were cadre with ranks up to senior captain.

The group was put through an advanced training course that lasted 6 months. The training program included combat tactics for units from squad to company and the techniques of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla fighting. There were heavy doses of political indoctrination.
On March 5, 1963, the 22d Battalion received orders to move south. They were transported in trucks from Nghe An Province to Dong Hoi in Quang Binh, just north of the 17th parallel. From there the unit was moved westward to the Lao border. Then the more than 300 men began walking to the south following mountain trails in Laos and the Viet-Nam border area. They marched by day, rested at night. Every fifth day they stopped at a way-station for a full day's rest. One company dropped off at Thua Thien Province. Vo and the remainder of the group marched on to Pleiku Province. Two fully armed companies from a neighboring province were assigned to the battalion. The assignment given to the battalion was to harass strategic hamlets in the Hoai An district of Binh Dinh, to round up cattle and rice, to kill or kidnap cadre of the Government forces, and to recruit local youth for service with Viet Cong.

Nguyen Thao

Nguyen Thao was a VC weapons technician. A native of Khanh Hoa Province in South Viet-Nam, he joined the Viet Minh in 1960. He worked at a secret arsenal manufacturing weapons for use by the guerrilla forces. He went to North Viet-Nam after the Geneva accords were signed in 1954. In North Viet-Nam he attended a technical school specializing in arms manufacture. He received special training in foreign small arms and artillery.

At the end of 1962 he was ordered to Ha Dong to attend a special course of political training in preparation for infiltrating into South Viet-Nam. On completion of the training course he was assigned to a group of 14 men who would move to the south together. Nguyen Thao said the group was composed of 4 armament specialists, 2 chemical engineers, and 8 middle-level technical cadre.

They left Ha Dong in March 1963, crossed into Laos, and reached their destination in the northern part of South Viet-Nam in May. Nguyen Thao went to work at a secret VC arsenal near the Quang Ngai border. Fifty men, some local workers, manned the arsenal weapons section. The group manufactured mines and grenades for the VC units in the area and repaired weapons.

Nguyen Thao said he soon realized from talking with the local workers at the arsenal that most of what he had heard in the North about conditions in South Viet-Nam was wrong. He said the Communists had deceived him. Two months after his arrival at the arsenal he decided to defect. He asked permission to rejoin his family and to work in a national defense factory and continue his studies.

Nguyen Viet Le

This VC soldier was born in Quang Nam Province in South Viet-Nam. He served with the 305th Division of the Viet Minh and moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. In April 1961 Nguyen Viet Le and his unit, the 50th Battalion, moved into Laos. He said the unit remained in Laos for 2 months, during which it fought in four battles alongside the Pathet Lao. During these engagements one of the battalion's four companies was badly mauled and had to be returned to North Viet-Nam.

The other three companies were assigned to South Viet-Nam. They arrived in Quang Ngai Province in the summer of 1961. For a month they rested and waited for orders. They took part in a major action.
against an outpost of the Government of South Viet-Nam in September. Nguyen Viet Le was captured during a battle in Quang Ngai Province in April 1962.

5. Nguyen Truc

Corp. Nguyen Truc was born in 1933, the son of a farmer in Phu Yen Province in South Viet-Nam. From 1949 to 1954 he served as a courier and then as a guerrilla fighter with the Viet Minh. In early 1955 he boarded a Soviet ship and moved with his unit, the 40th Battalion, to North Viet-Nam. He remained in the army, but in 1959, bothered by illness, he went to work on a state farm.

In August 1962 Nguyen Truc was notified that he was back in the army and that he was being sent to South Viet-Nam. He reported to the Xuan Mai training center and underwent 6 months of military and political reeducation. His unit was the newly activated 22d Battalion. The training course was completed in February 1963, but departure for South Viet-Nam was delayed until April.

For infiltration purposes the battalion was divided into two groups. On April 27, Nguyen Truc and his group boarded trucks at Xuan Mai. They went first to Vinh, then on to Dong Hoi, and finally to the Laos-North Viet-Nam border. There they doffed their North Vietnamese army uniforms and put on black peasants clothing. The march to the south began, sometimes in Lao territory, sometimes in Viet-Nam. They passed through Thua Thien Province, then Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Nagi, and finally to their destination, Pleiku. Each day they had a new guide, generally one of the mountain people of the area.

Nguyen Truc said that he and most of the troops who were sent north after the Indochina War wanted to return to their homes and rejoin their families. In August 1963 Nguyen Truc was sent out on a foraging expedition to find food for his unit. He took the opportunity to defect to Government forces at An Tuc in Binh Dinh Province.

6. Nguyen Cam

Cam is the son of a farmer in Quang Tin Province. Born in 1929, he joined the Viet Minh youth group in his home village in 1946. In one year he became a guerrilla fighter. In 1954, as the Indochina War was drawing to a close, he was serving with the Viet Minh 20th Battalion. In May 1955 he went to North Viet-Nam with his unit.

Ill health caused his transfer to an agricultural camp in 1958. By 1960 he was back in uniform, serving in the 210th Regiment. In May of that year he was assigned to a small group that was to set up a metallurgical workshop. Early in 1961 he was sent to a metallurgical class in Nghe An Province. They were taught a simple form of cast-iron production, simple blast furnace construction, and similar skills. Their instructor was an engineer from the Hanoi Industrial Department.

Their special course completed, Cam and his group of 35 men prepared to go to South Viet-Nam. They went by truck from their training center at Nghe An to the Lao border. After 19 days marching through Laos, they arrived in the vicinity of Tchepone. There they waited for 3 days until food supplies could be airdropped by a North Vietnamese plane. Nineteen days of walking took them to the Laos-South Viet-Nam border.
Delayed on route by illness, Cam finally reached his destination in November 1961. It was a secret VC iron foundry in Kontrum Province. Several iron ore deposits were nearby, and the hill people had long used the iron to make knives and simple tools. Cam’s job was building kilns to smelt the ore. The Viet-Cong hoped to use the iron for mines and grenades.

On August 4, 1963, Sergeant Cam went to a nearby village to buy salt for his group. On his return he found his comrades had gone to one of their cultivated fields to gather corn, and he joined them. The group was interrupted at their work by a Vietnamese Ranger company. After a brief fight Cam was taken prisoner.

7. **Nguyen Hong Thai**

Thai, 32 years old, was born and grew up in Quang Ngai Province in South Viet-Nam. After service with the Viet Minh he was moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. After 3 years of military service he was assigned to a military farm. In December 1961 he was recalled to his former unit, the 306th Division, and went to the special training camp at Xuan Mai in preparation for fighting with the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam.

Training began in January 1962 and lasted for 4 months. The training group, designated the 32d Battalion, was composed of 650 men who came from various branches of the North Vietnamese army—engineers, artillery, airborne, transport, marines, and some factory workers and students. Three-fourths of the training was military (guerrilla tactics, ambushes, sabotage, etc.) and one-fourth was political. In the latter, heavy emphasis was laid on the necessity for armed seizure of power in the South.

Group 32 was divided into sections and began infiltrating to the south on July 14, 1962. It moved in three groups. Thai said it took his group more than 55 days to travel from North Viet-Nam through Laos to Quang Ngai Province in the south. He reported that all the communications and liaison stations on the route to South Viet-Nam are now operated by the army of North Viet-Nam. Soon after his arrival in South Viet-Nam, Thai was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. He was made a platoon leader in the 20th Viet Cong Highland Battalion. In February 1963 the unit moved from Quang Nam to Kontum Province.

Combat conditions and the rigors of guerrilla life began to depress Thai. He said he wanted only to rejoin his family and live in peace. In September he asked and received permission to visit his family in Quang Ngai. When he got home, he surrendered to a South Vietnamese Army post.

8. **Dao Kien Lap**

Lap is a civilian radio technician. He has been a member of the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam since 1955. In February 1963 he was selected for assignment to South Viet-Nam where he was to work with the Liberation Front. He infiltrated into South Viet-Nam with a group of about 70 civilian specialists. They included doctors, pharmacists, union organizers, radio specialists, propagandists, and youth organizers. One of the infiltrators in Dao’s group was a man named Binh, publisher of the newspaper Labor of the Lao Dong Party. Another was a member of the city soviet of Hanoi.
The specialists in Dao's group received 3 months of basic military training at Son Tay, and then departed for the South in mid-June. Their orders were to report to the Central Office of the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam where they would be assigned according to their individual specialties. Dao and Binh were to help run a radio station of the Liberation Front.

They traveled through Laos and along the Viet-Nam border. They had to stop for several weeks in Quang Nam Province to recuperate from their travels. On October 1 they were directed by guides to a VC station in Ban Me Thuot.

Dao said he had by then decided to defect to the Government authorities in the South. He set off with one companion, but they were separated as they crossed a swiftly flowing river. Dao gave himself up at a Government post in Ban Me Thuot on October 13, 1963.

9. Tran Ngoc Linh

Linh was a Viet Cong senior sergeant, leader of a reconnaissance platoon. He is the son of a middle-class farm family in Tay Ninh Province. He served with the Viet Minh against the French and moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. He served the next 7 years in the North Vietnamese army. In September 1962 Linh was assigned to the Xuan Mai training center at Ha Dong to prepare for duty in South Viet-Nam. His group was given a 4-month refresher course in infantry tactics with emphasis on guerrilla fighting. Then he received 6 months of special training in the use of machineguns against aircraft. Antiaircraft training has become an increasingly important part of the preparation of North Vietnamese troops assigned to the Viet Cong.

Linh and about 120 others made up the 406th Infiltration Group commanded by Senior Captain Nguyen Van Do. They were divided into four platoons. During the final 2 weeks of preparation each number of the group was issued new equipment—black, pajama-like uniform, a khaki uniform, a hammock, mosquito netting, rubber sandals, and other supplies, including two packets of medicine.

In the early morning hours of July 4, 1963, his group started its journey from the Xuan Mai training center outside Hanoi. The convoy of six Molotov trucks moved south along Highway 21 to Nghe An Province and then on to Quang Biuh. On July 7 they arrived at the final processing station near the Laos-North Viet-Nam border. There they turned in their North Vietnamese army uniforms as well as all personal papers and anything else that might identify them as coming from the North. But their departure for the South was delayed for several weeks. In August they set off through Laos.

Twice along the way Linh had to stop at liaison stations because of illness. When the infiltrators recovered from their illnesses, they were formed into special groups to continue their penetration into South Viet-Nam. Linh reported being delayed once for 8 days, and the second time for 10 days.

Finally, in the first week of November 1963, Linh was sufficiently recovered to begin the final leg of his journey to a VC center where he was to be assigned to a combat unit. He and three other who had been similarly delayed by attacks of malaria and other sickness made up a group. They moved through the jungles of Quang Duc Province near the Cambodian border. On the morning of November 9 they crossed
the Srepok River. There they ran into a unit of the South Vietnamese Army. One of the infiltrators was killed, Linh was taken prisoner, and the other two Viet Cong escaped.

These are typical Viet Cong. There are many other officers like Tran Quoc Dan, technicians like Nguyen Thao, and simple soldiers like Nguyen Truc. They were born in South Viet-Nam, fought against the French, and then went north and served in the army of North Viet-Nam. They were ordered by the Communist rulers in Hanoi to reenter South Viet-Nam. Violating the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, they used the territory of neighboring Laos to infiltrate into the South. They are the means by which Communist North Viet-Nam is carrying out its program of conquest in South Viet-Nam.

C. INFILTRATION OF NATIVE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The Communist authorities in Hanoi are now assigning native North Vietnamese in increasing numbers to join the VC forces in South Viet-Nam. Heretofore, those in charge of the infiltration effort have sought to fill their quotas with soldiers and others born in the South. The 90,000 troops that moved from South Viet-Nam to the North when the Geneva accords ended the Indochina War have provided an invaluable reservoir for this purpose. Now, apparently, that source is running dry. The casualty rate has been high, and obviously many of those who were in fighting trim 10 years ago are no longer up to the rigors of guerrilla war.

In any case, reports of infiltration by native North Vietnamese in significant numbers have been received in Saigon for several months. It is estimated that as many as 75 percent of the more than 4,400 Viet Cong who are known to have entered the South in the first 8 months of 1964 were natives of North Viet-Nam.

Vo Thanh Vinh was born in Nghe An Province in North Viet-Nam in 1936. He was captured by South Vietnamese forces on May 5, 1964. He described himself as a military security officer. He infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in April 1964 with a group of 34 police and security officers from the North.

Another native North Vietnamese captured in the South was VC Private First Class Vo Quyen. His home was in Nam Dinh Province. He was captured by South Vietnamese forces on May 5, 1964. He described himself as a military security officer. He infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in April 1964 with a group of 34 police and security officers from the North.

Le Pham Hung, also a private first class, was captured on July 7 in Thua Thien Province. He is a native of Nam Dinh in North Viet-Nam. Drafted for military service in May 1963, he was in the 324th Division. His group, consisting solely of 90 North Vietnamese draftees, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in May 1964. He reported that another company of North Vietnamese entered the South at the same time as his unit.
A former member of the 90th VC Battalion reported that his unit had been reinforced by native North Vietnamese troops earlier this year. Le Thua Phuong, an information cadre and a native of Quang Ngai Province in the South, surrendered to Government forces on April 23, 1964. He said that the 90th Battalion had received 80 North Vietnamese replacements in February.

A medical technician named Hoang Thung was captured in Thua Thien Province on July 4, 1964. He said he had infiltrated into the South in late 1963 with a group of 200 Viet Cong, the majority of whom were ethnic northerners, 120 of them draftees.

These reports destroy one more fiction which the authorities in Hanoi have sought so long to promote—that the fighting in the South was a matter for the South Vietnamese. They underline Hanoi's determination to press its campaign of conquest with every available resource.

D. INFILTRATION OF VIET CONG AGENTS

No effort to subvert another nation as elaborate as that being conducted by the Ho Chi Minh regime against South Viet-Nam can succeed without an intelligence-gathering organization. Recognizing this, the authorities in Hanoi have developed an extensive espionage effort. An essential part of that effort is the regular assignment of secret agents from the North to South Viet-Nam.

The heart of the VC intelligence organization is the Central Research Agency in Hanoi (see section IV, C). Communist agents are regularly dispatched from North Viet-Nam, sometimes for brief assignments but often for long periods. Many of these agents move into South Viet-Nam along the infiltration trails through Laos; others are carried by boats along the coasts and landed at prearranged sites. A special maritime infiltration group has been developed in North Viet-Nam, with its operations centered in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces just north of the 17th parallel.

1. Maritime Infiltration

The following case illustrates the methods of maritime infiltration of secret agents used by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam:

In July 1962 a North Vietnamese intelligence agent named Nguyen Viet Duong began training to infiltrate South Viet-Nam. A native southerner, he had fought against the French and had gone to North Viet-Nam after the war ended. Selected for intelligence work, he was assigned to the Central Research Agency in 1959.

After a period of intensive instruction in radio transmission, coding and decoding, and other skills of the intelligence trade, he was given false identity papers and other supplies and was transported to the South. His principal task was to set up a cell of agents to collect military information. He flew from Hanoi to Dong Hoi, and from there the maritime infiltration group took him by boat to South Viet-Nam. That was in August 1962.

In January 1963 Duong reported to Hanoi that he had run into difficulties. His money and papers had been lost, and he had been forced to take refuge with VC contacts in another province. Another agent was selected to go to South Viet-Nam. One of his assignments was to contact Duong, find out details of what happened to him, and help Duong reestablish himself as a VC agent. The man selected for
the task was Senior Captain Tran Van Tan of the Central Research Agency.

Tan had already been picked to go to the South to establish a clandestine VC communications center. Making contact with Duong was one of his secondary assignments. After intensive preparations Tan was ready to move to South Viet-Nam in March. He was transferred to an embarkation base of the maritime infiltration group just north of the 17th parallel.

He was joined by three other VC agents and the captain and three crewmen of the boat that would take them south. All were given false identity papers to conform to their false names. They also were provided with fishermen's permits, South Vietnamese voting cards, and draft cards or military discharge papers. The boat captain received a boat registration book, crew lists, and several South Vietnamese permits to conduct business.

The agents and boatmen were given cover stories to tell if captured. Each man had to memorize not only the details of his own story but the names and some details about each of the others. The agents had to become familiar with simple boat procedures so they could pass as legitimate fishermen.

The expedition left the embarkation port on April 4. In addition to the four agents the boat carried six carefully sealed boxes containing a generator, several radios, some weapons, and a large supply of South Vietnamese currency. They also carried some chemicals and materials for making false identification papers. Their destination was a landing site on the coast of Phuoc Tuy Province.

Soon after leaving North Viet-Nam the VC boat encountered high winds and rough seas. On April 7 the storm became violent. The boat tossed and threatened to capsize. Strong northeasterly winds forced it ever closer to shore. Finally the boat captain, Nguyen Xit, ordered that the six boxes be thrown overboard. This was done, and the boat then was beached. The eight men decided to split up into pairs and try to make contact with VC forces. They buried their false papers and set out. Six of the eight were captured almost immediately by authorities in Thua Thien Province, and the other two were taken several days later.

2. Student Propaganda Agents

The student population of South Viet-Nam is an important target group for VC propagandists. These agents seek to win adherents for the Communist cause among young workers, students in high schools and universities, and the younger officers and enlisted men in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Typical of the agents sent into South Viet-Nam for this purpose is Nguyen Van Vy, a 19-year-old VC propagandist. He is a native of the Vinh Linh District in North Viet-Nam, just north of the demilitarized zone. He was a member of a Communist Party youth group in his native village. He was recruited for propaganda work in the South in the fall of 1962. He was one of 40 young persons enrolled in a special political training course given by the Communist Party in his district.

The first phase of the training consisted of political indoctrination covering such subjects as the advance of communism, the North Vietnamese plan for winning control of the country, the responsibility
of youth in furthering this plan, the war in the South, and the need for propaganda supporting the Liberation Front.

Those who successfully completed the first phase were selected for the second level of training, the so-called technical training phase. In this the trainees were given their mission in the South. Vy was told he should infiltrate into South Viet-Nam and there surrender to the authorities, describing himself as a defector who was "tired of the miserable life in the North." He was to say he wanted to complete his schooling, which was impossible in the North. He was told to ask to live with relatives in the South so he could go to school. Once his story was accepted and he was enrolled in a school, he was to begin his work of propagandizing other students. He was to wait for 3 or 4 months, however, until he was no longer the subject of local suspicion.

He was assigned to work under an older agent to whom he had to report regularly.

A third member of the team was a younger man who was to assist Vy. The three were to infiltrate into South Viet-Nam separately and to meet there at a rendezvous point.

At first Vy was to do no more than to observe his fellow students carefully, collecting biographical data on them and studying their personalities, capabilities, and aspirations. He was then to select those he thought might be most influenced by Communist propaganda and try to make friends with them.

Once he had selected targets, he was to begin to influence them favorably toward the North and to implant Communist propaganda. He was responsible then for bringing into his organization those he had influenced effectively. These individuals were to be given their own propaganda assignments to work on other students.

Students who wanted to evade military service in the Government forces were considered prime targets. Where possible, Vy was to help them get to North Vietnam. He was also told to make contact with any students who had been picked up by the authorities for suspected Communist activities. These, too, were to be helped to escape to North Vietnam. Any useful information concerning developments in the South or military activities were to be reported through his superior, Nguyen Van Phong.

In case he became suspect, he was either to make his own way back to North Vietnam or to go into the jungle and try to contact a VC unit.

Vy entered South Vietnam on January 2, 1963, by swimming across the Ben Hai River. He encountered an elderly farmer who led him to the local authorities in Hai Gu. There he told his story but was not believed. He then admitted his true mission.

3. Other Agents

The Communist authorities in North Vietnam send their agents into South Vietnam by a wide variety of means. A few like Nguyen Van Vy cross the demilitarized zone, more infiltrate by sea, and still more along the infiltration routes through Laos. But there are other methods for entering South Vietnam. VC espionage agent Tran Van Bui attempted one such method.

Bui was a graduate of the espionage training school in Haiphong, North Vietnam. He completed a special 6-month course in July 1962. The training included political indoctrination, but most of the time
was spent on such things as use of weapons, preparing booby traps, and methods of sabotage. He was also given instruction in methods for enlisting help from hoodlums, draft dodgers, and VC sympathizers. Once in South Vietnam, he was to organize a small unit for sabotage and the collection of information. On specific assignment by his superiors he was to be ready to sabotage ships in Saigon harbor and to blow up gasoline and oil storage points and Vietnamese Army installations. He was told to be prepared to assassinate Vietnamese officials and American personnel.

In September 1962 Bui was given his mission assignment. He was to hide aboard a foreign ship. When discovered, he was to claim to be a refugee who wanted to "escape" to South Vietnam. He was given an automatic pistol with silencer, some explosive devices, and a small knife that could inject poison into the body of a victim.

Bui stole aboard a foreign ship in Haiphong harbor. After 3 days at sea—when he was sure the ship would not turn around—Bui surrendered to the ship's captain. When the ship arrived in Bangkok, Bui was turned over to the Thai authorities. They in turn released him to the South Vietnamese as he had requested. But in Saigon his true mission was disclosed and he made a full confession.

II. HANOI SUPPLIES WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND OTHER WAR MATERIEL TO ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH

When Hanoi launched the VC campaign of terror, violence, and subversion in earnest in 1959, the Communist forces relied mainly on stocks of weapons and ammunition left over from the war against the French. Supplies sent in from North Viet-Nam came largely from the same source. As the military campaign progressed, the Viet Cong depended heavily on weapons captured from the Armed Forces in South Viet-Nam. This remains an important source of weapons and ammunition for the Viet Cong. But as the pace of the war has quickened, requirements for up-to-date arms and special types of weapons have risen to a point where the Viet Cong cannot rely on captured stocks. Hanoi has undertaken a program to reequip its forces in the South with Communist-produced weapons.

Large and increasing quantities of military supplies are entering South Viet-Nam from outside the country. The principal supply point is North Viet-Nam, which provides a convenient channel for materiel that originates in Communist China and other Communist countries.

An increasing number of weapons from external Communist sources have been seized in the South. These include such weapons as 57-mm. and 75-mm. recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machineguns, rocket launchers, large mortars, and antitank mines.

A new group of Chinese Communist-manufactured weapons has recently appeared in VC hands. These include the 7.62 semiautomatic carbine, 7.62 light machinegun, and the 7.62 assault rifle. These weapons and ammunition for them, manufactured in Communist China in 1962, were first captured in December 1964 in Chuong Thien Province. Similar weapons have since been seized in each of the four Corps areas of South Viet-Nam. Also captured have been Chinese Commu-
nist antitank grenade launchers and ammunition made in China in 1963.

One captured Viet Cong told his captors that his entire company had been supplied recently with modern Chinese weapons. The reequipping of VC units with a type of weapons that require ammunition and parts from outside South Viet-Nam indicates the growing confidence of the authorities in Hanoi in the effectiveness of their supply lines into the South.

Incontrovertible evidence of Hanoi's elaborate program to supply its forces in the South with weapons, ammunition, and other supplies has accumulated over the years. Dramatic new proof was exposed just as this report was being completed.

On February 16, 1965, an American helicopter pilot flying along the South Vietnamese coast sighted a suspicious vessel. It was a cargo ship of an estimated 100-ton capacity, carefully camouflaged and moored just offshore along the coast of Phu Yen Province. Fighter planes that approached the vessel met machinegun fire from guns on the deck of the ship and from the shore as well. A Vietnamese Air Force strike was launched against the vessel, and Vietnamese Government troops moved into the area. They seized the ship after a bitter fight with the Viet Cong.

The ship, which had been sunk in shallow water, had discharged a huge cargo of arms, ammunition, and other supplies. Documents found on the ship and on the bodies of several Viet Cong aboard identified the vessel as having come from North Viet-Nam. A newspaper in the cabin was from Haiphong and was dated January 23, 1965. The supplies delivered by the ship—thousands of weapons and more than a million rounds of ammunition—were almost all of Communist origin, largely from Communist China and Czechoslovakia, as well as North Viet-Nam. At least 100 tons of military supplies were discovered near the ship.

A preliminary survey of the cache near the sunken vessel from Hanoi listed the following supplies and weapons:

- approximately 1 million rounds of small-arms ammunition;
- more than 1,000 stick grenades;
- 500 pounds of TNT in prepared charges;
- 2,000 rounds of 82-mm. mortar ammunition;
- 500 antitank grenades;
- 500 rounds of 57-mm. recoilless rifle ammunition;
- more than 1,000 rounds of 75-mm. recoilless rifle ammunition;
- one 57-mm. recoilless rifle;
- 2 heavy machineguns;
- 2,000 7.92 Mauser rifles;
- more than 100 7.62 carbines;
- 1,000 submachineguns;
- 15 light machineguns;
- 500 rifles;
- 500 pounds of medical supplies (with labels from North Viet-Nam, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union, and other sources).

The ship was fairly new and had been made in Communist China. Documents aboard the ship included three North Vietnamese nautical charts (one of the Haiphong area and one of Hong Gay, both in North
Vietnam, and one of the Tra Vinh area of South Viet-Nam. The military health records of North Vietnamese soldiers were found. One man had a political history sheet showing he was a member of the 338th Division of the North Vietnamese army.

Also aboard the North Vietnamese ship were: an instruction book for a Chinese Communist navigational device; postcards and letters to addresses in North Viet-Nam; snapshots, including one of a group of men in North Vietnamese army uniforms under a flag of the Hanoi government.

Members of the I.C.C. and representatives of the free press visited the sunken North Vietnamese ship and viewed its cargo. The incident itself underlined in the most dramatic form that Hanoi is behind the continuing campaign of aggression aimed at conquering South Viet-Nam. It made unmistakably clear that what is happening in South Viet-Nam is not an internal affair but part of a large scale carefully directed and supported program of armed attack on a sovereign state and a free people.

There have been previous seizures of large stocks of ammunition and weapons and other military supplies that could only have come from Communist sources outside South Viet-Nam. In December 1963 a Republic of Viet-Nam force attacked a VC stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province southwest of Saigon. A large cache of VC equipment was seized. Included in the captured stocks were the following weapons and ammunition, all of Chinese Communist manufacture:

- One 99-mm. rocket launcher;
- 2 carbines (type 53);
- 120 rounds of 75-mm. recoilless rifle ammunition;
- 120 detonating fuzes for recoilless rifle ammunition;
- 14,000 rounds of 7.62 (type P) ammunition;
- 160,000 rounds of 7.62 carbine ammunition;
- 150 fuzes for mortar shells;
- 100,000 rounds of 7.92 Mauser-type ammunition;
- 110 lbs. (approximate) of TNT;
- Two 60-mm. mortars.

These weapons and ammunition are the same as those used in the North Vietnamese army. Some of the 7.62-mm. ammunition was manufactured as recently as 1962.

Materiel is sent into South Viet-Nam from the North by a variety of methods—overland, by river and canal, and by sea. In one instance, Vietnamese troops discovered a cache in which the 75-mm. ammunition alone weighed approximately 1 1/2 tons. It has been estimated that it would require more than 150 porters to carry this quantity of ammunition over rough terrain. However, a few sampans, each manned by a few men, could transport it with little difficulty. It is worth noting, in this connection, that the delta where the cache of materiel was seized has 460 miles of seacoast as well as 2,500 miles of canals navigable by large water craft and another 2,200 miles of canals over which sampans can move easily. Much of the transport of large stocks of ammunition is undoubtedly waterborne for at least much of its travel into South Viet-Nam.

Large quantities of chemical components for explosives have been sent into South Viet-Nam for the Viet Cong. During 1963 there
were at least 15 incidents in which boats, junks, or sampans were seized with explosives aboard. More than 20 tons of potassium chlorate or nitrate were captured. All these cases were in the delta area, and the majority were on or near the Mekong River. Red phosphorus made in Communist China has been among the chemicals captured from the Viet Cong.

The Communists have shown extreme sensitivity to exposure of the fact that war materiel is going to the Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam, Communist China, and other Communist countries. A secret document captured from a VC agent last year reflected this sensitivity. The document was sent from VC military headquarters in Bien Hoa Province to subordinate units. It ordered them to "pay special attention to the removal of all the markings and letters on weapons of all types currently employed by units and agencies and manufactured by friendly East European democratic countries or by China." It said incriminating marking should be chiseled off "so that the enemy cannot use it as a propaganda theme every time he captures these weapons."

III. NORTH VIET-NAM: BASE FOR CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH

The Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960 set forth two tasks for its members: "to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam" and "to liberate South Viet-Nam."

The resolutions of the congress described the effort to destroy the legal Government in South Viet-Nam as follows: "The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses."

At the September meeting the Communist leaders in the North called for formation of "a broad national united front." Three months later Hanoi announced creation of the Front for Liberation of the South. This is the organization that Communist propaganda now credits with guiding the forces of subversion in the South; it is pictured as an organization established and run by the people in the South themselves. At the 1960 Lao Dong Party Congress the tone was different. Then, even before the front existed, the Communist leaders were issuing orders for the group that was being organized behind the scenes in Hanoi. "This front must rally * * *"; "The aims of its struggle are * * *"; "The front must carry out * * *"—this is the way Hanoi and the Communist Party addressed the "Liberation Front" even before its founding.

The Liberation Front is Hanoi's creation; it is neither independent nor southern, and what it seeks is not liberation but subjugation of the South.

In his address to the Third Lao Dong Party Congress, party and government leader Ho Chi Minh spoke of the necessity "to step up the socialist revolution in the North and, at the same time, to step up the national democratic people's revolution in the South."

The year before, writing for Red Flag, the Communist Party newspaper of Belgium, Ho had said much the same thing:

"We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution."
In the same vein, the commander-in-chief of the North Vietnamese armed forces, Vo Nguyen Giap, spoke at the 1960 party congress of the need to “step up the national democratic people’s revolution in the South.” Earlier in the year, writing for the Communist Party journal Hoc Tap in Hanoi, General Giap described the North as “the revolutionary base for the whole country.”

Le Duan, a member of the politburo and first secretary of the Lao Dong Party, was even more explicit when he talked at the party congress about the struggle in the South and the party’s role. After noting the difficulties involved in overthrowing the existing order in South Viet-Nam, Le Duan said:

Hence the southern people’s revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organisation and education of the people of the South.

Another high official of the Hanoi regime, Truong Chinh, writing in the party organ Hoc Tap in April 1961, expressed confidence in the success of the struggle to remove the legal Government in South Viet-Nam because: “North Viet-Nam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong base for the struggle for national reunification.”

He outlined the steps by which the Communists expect to achieve control over all Viet-Nam as follows: The “Liberation Front” would destroy the present Government in the South; a “Coalition Government” would be established; this government would agree with the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi regarding national reunification “under one form or another.” It takes little imagination to understand the form that is intended.

“Thus,” wrote Truong Chinh, “though South Viet-Nam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means, the party policy of achieving peaceful national reunification is still correct.”

The official government radio in Hanoi is used both overtly and covertly to support the Viet Cong effort in South Viet-Nam. Captured agents have testified that the broadcasts are used sometimes to send instructions in veiled code to Viet Cong representatives in the South.

Hoc Tap stated frankly in March 1963: “They [the authorities in South Viet-Nam] are well aware that North Viet-Nam is the firm base for the southern revolution and the point on which it leans, and that our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution.”

In April 1964 the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party issued a directive to all party echelons. It stated: “When the forces of the enemy and the plots of the enemy are considered, it is realized that the cadres, party members, and people in North Viet-Nam must increase their sense of responsibility in regard to the South Viet-Nam revolution by giving positive and practical support to South Viet-Nam in every field.”
Nguyen Chi Thanh, writing in a Hanoi newspaper in May 1963, underlined the importance of the role of the North Vietnamese army in Hanoi’s plans to unify Viet-Nam under Communist rule:

“Our party set forth two strategic tasks to be carried out at the same time: to transform and build socialism in the North and to struggle to unify the country. **Our army is an instrument of the class struggle in carrying out these two strategic tasks.**”

IV. ORGANIZATION, DIRECTION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL OF THE ATTACK ON SOUTH VIET-NAM ARE CENTERED IN HANOI

The VC military and political apparatus in South Viet-Nam is an extension of an elaborate military and political structure in North Viet-Nam which directs and supplies it with the tools for conquest. The Ho Chi Minh regime has shown that it is ready to allocate every resource that can be spared—whether it be personnel, funds, or equipment—to the cause of overthrowing the legitimate Government of South Viet-Nam and of bringing all Viet-Nam under Communist rule.

A. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Political direction and control of the Viet Cong is supplied by the Lao Dong Party, i.e., the Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh. Party agents are responsible for indoctrination, recruitment, political training, propaganda, anti-Government demonstrations, and other activities of a political nature. The considerable intelligence-gathering facilities of the party are also at the disposal of the Viet Cong.

Overall direction of the VC movement is the responsibility of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. Within the Central Committee a special Reunification Department has been established. This has replaced the “Committee for Supervision of the South” mentioned in intelligence reports 2 years ago. It lays down broad strategy for the movement to conquer South Viet-Nam.

Until March 1962 there were two principal administrative divisions in the VC structure in the South. One was the Interzone of South-Central Viet-Nam (sometimes called Interzone 5); the other was the Nambo Region. In a 1962 reorganization these were merged into one, called the Central Office for South Viet-Nam. The Central Committee, through its Reunification Department, issues directives to the Central Office, which translates them into specific orders for the appropriate subordinate command.

Under the Central Office are six regional units, V through IX plus the special zone of Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh. A regional committee responsible to the Central Office directs VC activities in each region. Each regional committee has specialized units responsible for liaison, propaganda, training, personnel, subversive activities, espionage, military bases, and the like.

Below each regional committee are similarly structured units at the province and district levels. At the base of the Communist pyramid are the individual party cells, which may be organized on a geographic base or within social or occupational groups. The elaborateness of the party unit and the extent to which it operates openly or underground is determined mainly by the extent of VC control over the area concerned.
1. The "Liberation Front"

The National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam is the screen behind which the Communists carry out their program of conquest. It is the creature of the Communist Government in Hanoi. As noted above the Communist Party in the North demanded establishment of such a "front" three months before its formation was actually announced in December 1960. It was designed to create the illusion that the Viet Cong campaign of subversion was truly indigenous to South Viet-Nam rather than an externally directed Communist plan.

The front has won support primarily from the Communist world. Its radio faithfully repeats the propaganda themes of Hanoi and Peiping. When its representatives travel abroad, they do so with North Vietnamese passports and sponsorship. The front's program copies that of the Lao Dong Party in North Viet-Nam.

In late 1961, in still another effort to conceal the extent of Communist domination of the front, the Communists announced formation of a new Marxist political unit, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). This mechanism provided a way to explain the Communist presence in the front while at the same time making it appear that the Communist voice was only one of several affiliated organizations in the front. The PRP itself claimed direct descent from the original Indochinese Communist Party and from the North Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi.

B. MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Military affairs of the Viet Cong are the responsibility of the High Command of the People's Army of North Viet-Nam and the Ministry of Defense, under close supervision from the Lao Dong Party. These responsibilities include operational plans, assignments of individuals and regular units, training programs, infiltration of military personnel and supplies, military communications, tactical intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six military regions are the same as those of the VC political organization.

The military structure of the Viet Cong is an integral part of the political machinery that controls every facet of VC activity in South Viet-Nam under Hanoi's overall direction. Each political headquarters from the Central Office down to the village has a military component which controls day-to-day military operations. Similarly, each military headquarters has a political element, an individual or a small staff. This meshing of political and military activity is designed to insure the closest cooperation in support of the total Communist mission. It also gives assurance of political control over the military.

Associated with the Central Office, believed to be located in Tay Ninh Province, is a military headquarters. Through this headquarters, as well as through other channels, Hanoi maintains direct contact with its principal military units in the South.

In addition to its supervision of the general military effort of the VC, the military section of the Central Office is believed to have direct command of two regimental headquarters and a number of security companies.
The hard core of the VC military organization is the full-time regular unit usually based on a province or region. These are well-trained and highly disciplined guerrilla fighters. They follow a rigid training schedule that is roughly two-thirds military one-third political in content. This compares with the 50-50 proportion for district units and the 70 percent political and 30 percent military content of the village guerrilla's training.

The size of the Vietcong regular forces has grown steadily in recent years. For example, the Vietcong have five regimental headquarters compared with two in 1961. And the main VC force is composed of 50 battalions, 50 percent more than before. There are an estimated 139 VC companies. Hard-core VC strength now is estimated at about 35,000 where it was less than 20,000 in 1961.

The main force battalions are well armed with a variety of effective weapons including 75-mm. recoilless rifles and 81-82-mm. mortars. The companies and smaller units are equally well equipped and have 57-mm. recoilless rifles and 60-mm. mortars in their inventory. It is estimated that the Vietcong have at least 130 81-mm. mortars and 300 66-mm. mortars. There is no precise estimate for the number of recoilless rifles in their hands, but it is believed that most main force units are equipped with them. In at least one recent action the Vietcong employed a 75-mm. pack howitzer. This mobile weapon, which has a range of 8,500 yards, will increase the Vietcong capabilities to launch long-range attacks against many stationary targets in the country.

Supporting the main force units of the Vietcong are an estimated 60,000-80,000 part-time guerrillas. They are generally organized at the district level where there are likely to be several companies of 50 or more men each. These troops receive only half pay, which means they must work at least part of the time to eke out a living.

Below the irregular guerrilla forces of the district are the part-time, village-based guerrillas. They are available for assignment by higher headquarters and are used for harassment and sabotage. They are expected to warn nearby VC units of the approach of any force of the legal government. They provide a pool for recruitment into the VC district forces.

The record shows that many of the village guerrillas are dragooned into service with the Viet Cong. Some are kidnaped; others are threatened; still others join to prevent their families from being harmed. Once in the Viet Cong net, many are reluctant to leave for fear of punishment by the authorities or reprisal by the Communists.

Lam Van Chuoi is a typical example. He was a member of the Village Civil Defense force in his home village in Kien Giang Province. In March 1960, he was kidnaped by the Viet Cong and kept a prisoner in the highlands for one month. There he was subjected to intense propaganda and indoctrination. He was returned to his village but kept under close observation and steady pressure. Finally, he was convinced he must join the VC. Later, he was transferred to a Communist military unit in another province. After learning of the Government's "Open Arms" program, he decided to defect from the VC. In May 1964, he walked into a Government outpost and asked for protection.
Money to pay the regular VC units comes from a variety of sources. Funds are sent from Hanoi. "Taxes" are extorted from the local population. Landowners and plantation operators often must pay a tribute to the VC as the price for not having their lands devastated. Similarly, transportation companies have been forced to pay the VC or face the threat of having their buses or boats sabotaged. Officials and wealthy people have been kidnaped for ransom. The VC have often stopped buses and taken the money and valuables of all on board.

For the most part, the VC have concentrated their attention on individuals, isolated or poorly defended outposts, and small centers of population. They have mercilessly killed or kidnaped thousands of village chiefs and other local officials. But over the past year the VC have moved into larger unit operations. Their ability to operate on a battalion level or larger has substantially increased.

C. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

A key element in the Viet Cong effort is an elaborate organization in Hanoi called the Central Research Agency (C.R.A.) (Cua Nghien-Cuu Trung-Uong). Though it handles Hanoi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus of its operation is on South Vietnam. This agency is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities of both the Lao Dong Party and the North Vietnamese armed forces for information, personnel, and facilities.

The C.R.A. reportedly operates under the close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi government reportedly sit on its directing committee, including Premier Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

Considerable information on the organization of the C.R.A. has become available from captured Viet Cong agents and from the work of intelligence agents of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Much of this information cannot be made public for security reasons, but it is possible to describe the C.R.A. organization and its operations in broad outline.

The headquarters of the C.R.A. in Hanoi is divided into six main sections, not including a special code unit. The six sections are responsible for administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research, and training. Each section has units to handle the specialized activities of its particular area of responsibility. The research section, for example, has subsections that handle political, economic, and military affairs respectively.

C.R.A. headquarters directs a number of special centers for overseas operations. One such center maintains intelligence channels to overseas areas. It operates through special units at Haiphong and at Hongay.

A second special center is responsible for VC intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demarcation line," the border with South Viet-Nam. This unit, based in Vinh Linh in southeast North Viet-Nam, is responsible for sending agents and supplies to the South by sea. It also cooperates with the North Vietnamese army in planning and carrying out infil-
The C.R.A. maintains intelligence bases in Laos and other countries.

Inside South Viet-Nam the Viet Cong have a large intelligence network. Some of its units are responsible for receiving and sending on agents arriving from the North. They feed and give instructions to groups infiltrating into South Viet-Nam. They take delivery of equipment and supplies received from the North and relay them to Viet Cong units in the South.

Many Viet Cong agents have been captured in Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by the C.R.A. to penetrate all Republic of Viet-Nam Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other specialized organizations. Party and military intelligence units and agents work closely with the C.R.A.

Each of the main centers operating under C.R.A. headquarters has its own sections and units designed to carry out its main functions. The center at Vinh Linh, responsible for the main infiltration effort of the Viet Cong, has separate sections for radio communications, coding, documentation and training, and liaison. It also has specialized units for infiltration through the mountains, infiltration by sea, and "illegal action" in the mountain area.

The C.R.A. maintains a large and expanding radio communications network. Agents also are used to carry messages, usually in secret writing or memorized.

Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelligence operation in support of the Viet Cong is one of the most extensive of its kind in the world.

V. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HANOI'S CAMPAIGN OF AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET-NAM

While negotiating an end to the Indochina War at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were making plans to take over all former French territory in Southeast Asia. When Viet-Nam was partitioned, thousands of carefully selected party members were ordered to remain in place in the South and keep their secret apparatus intact to help promote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were stored away for future use. Guerrilla fighters rejoined their families to await the party's call. Others withdrew to remote jungle and mountain hideouts. The majority—an estimated 90,000—were moved to North Viet-Nam.

Hanoi's original calculation was that all of Viet-Nam would fall under its control without resort to force. For this purpose, Communist cadres were ordered to penetrate official and unofficial agencies, to propagandize and sow confusion, and generally to use all means short of open violence to aggravate war-torn conditions and to weaken South Viet-Nam's Government and social fabric.

South Viet-Nam's refusal to fall in with Hanoi's scheme for peaceful takeover came as a heavy blow to the Communists. Meantime, the Government had stepped up efforts to blunt Viet Cong subversion and to expose Communist agents. Morale in the Communist organization in the South dropped sharply. Defections were numerous.

Among South Viet-Namese, hope rose that their nation could have a peaceful and independent future, free of Communist domination.
The country went to work. The years after 1955 were a period of steady progress and growing prosperity.

Food production levels of the prewar years were reached and surpassed. While per capita food output was dropping 10 percent in the North from 1956 to 1960, it rose 20 percent in the South. By 1963, it had risen 30 percent—despite the disruption in the countryside caused by intensified Viet Cong military attacks and terrorism. The authorities in the North admitted openly to continuing annual failures to achieve food production goals.

Production of textiles increased in the South more than 20 percent in one year (1958). In the same year, South Viet-Nam's sugar crop increased more than 100 percent. Despite North Viet-Nam's vastly larger industrial complex, South Viet-Nam's per capita gross national product in 1960 was estimated at $110 a person while it was only $70 in the North.

More than 900,000 refugees who had fled from Communist rule in the North were successfully settled in South Viet-Nam. An agrarian reform program was instituted. The elementary school population nearly quadrupled between 1956 and 1960. And so it went—a record of steady improvement in the lives of the people. It was intolerable for the rulers in Hanoi; under peaceful conditions, the South was outstripping the North. They were losing the battle of peaceful competition and decided to use violence and terror to gain their ends.

After 1956 Hanoi rebuilt, reorganized, and expanded its covert political and military machinery in the South. Defectors were replaced by trained personnel from party ranks in the North. Military units and political cells were enlarged and were given new leaders, equipment, and intensified training. Recruitment was pushed. In short, Hanoi and its forces in the South prepared to take by force and violence what they had failed to achieve by other means.

By 1958 the use of terror by the Viet Cong increased appreciably. It was used both to win prestige and to back up demands for support from the people, support that political and propaganda appeals had failed to produce. It was also designed to embarrass the Government in Saigon and raise doubts about its ability to maintain internal order and to assure the personal security of its people. From 1959 through 1961, the pace of Viet Cong terrorism and armed attacks accelerated substantially.

The situation at the end of 1961 was so grave that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam asked the United States for increased military assistance. That request was met. Meantime, the program of strategic hamlets, designed to improve the peasant's livelihood and give him some protection against Viet Cong harassment and pressure, was pushed energetically.

But the Viet Cong did not stand still. To meet the changing situation, they tightened their organization and adopted new tactics, with increasing emphasis on terrorism, sabotage, and armed attacks by small groups. They also introduced from the North technicians in fields such as armor and antiaircraft. Heavier weapons were sent in to the regular guerrilla forces.

The military and insurgency situation was complicated by a quite separate internal political struggle in South Viet-Nam, which led in November 1963 to the removal of the Diem government and its replace-
ment with a new one. Effective power was placed in the hands of a Military Revolutionary Council. There have been a number of changes in the leadership and composition of the Government in Saigon in the ensuing period.

These internal developments and distractions gave the Viet Cong an invaluable opportunity, and they took advantage of it. Viet Cong agents did what they could to encourage disaffection and to exploit demonstrations in Saigon and elsewhere. In the countryside the Communists consolidated their hold over some areas and enlarged their military and political apparatus by increased infiltration. Increasingly they struck at remote outposts and the most vulnerable of the new strategic hamlets and expanded their campaign of aggressive attacks, sabotage, and terror.

Any official, worker, or establishment that represents a service to the people by the Government in Saigon is fair game for the Viet Cong. Schools have been among their favorite targets. Through harassment, the murder of teachers, and sabotage of buildings, the Viet Cong succeeded in closing hundreds of schools and interrupting the education of tens of thousands of youngsters.

Hospitals and medical clinics have often been attacked as part of the anti-Government campaign and also because such attacks provide the Viet Cong with needed medical supplies. The Communists have encouraged people in rural areas to oppose the Government's antimalaria teams, and some of the workers have been killed. Village and town offices, police stations, and agricultural research stations are high on the list of preferred targets for the Viet Cong.

In 1964, 436 South Vietnamese hamlet chiefs and other Government officials were killed outright by the Viet Cong and 1,131 were kidnapped. More than 1,750 civilians were killed in bombings and other acts of sabotage. And at least 8,400 civilians were kidnapped by the Viet Cong.

Today the war in Viet-Nam has reached new levels of intensity. The elaborate effort by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam to conquer the South has grown, not diminished. Military men, technicians, political organizers, propagandists, and secret agents have been infiltrating into the Republic of Viet-Nam from the North in growing numbers. The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, particularly those of large caliber, has increased. Communications links with Hanoi are extensive. Despite the heavy casualties of 3 years of fighting, the hard-core VC force is considerably larger now than it was at the end of 1961.

The Government in Saigon has undertaken vigorous action to meet the new threat. The United States and other free countries have increased their assistance to the Vietnamese Government and people. Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Viet-Nam in 1964, and he promised the Vietnamese: "We shall remain at your side until the aggression from the North has been defeated, until it has been completely rooted out and this land enjoys the peace which it deserves."

President Johnson has repeatedly stressed that the United States' goal is to see peace secured in Southeast Asia. But he has noted that "that will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace."

Though it has been apparent for years that the regime in Hanoi was conducting a campaign of conquest against South Viet-Nam, the Government in Saigon and the Government of the United States both
hoped that the danger could be met within South Viet-Nam itself. The hope that any widening of the conflict might be avoided was stated frequently.

The leaders in Hanoi chose to respond with greater violence. They apparently interpreted restraint as indicating lack of will. Their efforts were pressed with greater vigor and armed attacks and incidents of terror multiplied.

Clearly the restraint of the past was not providing adequately for the defense of South Viet-Nam against Hanoi’s open aggression. It was mutually agreed between the Governments of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States that further means for providing for South Viet-Nam’s defense were required. Therefore, airstrikes have been made against some of the military assembly points and supply bases from which North Viet-Nam is conducting its aggression against the South. These strikes constitute a limited response fitted to the aggression that produced them.

Until the regime in Hanoi decides to halt its intervention in the South, or until effective steps are taken to maintain peace and security in the area, the Governments of South Viet-Nam and the United States will continue necessary measures of defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Viet-Nam.

VI. Conclusion

The evidence presented in this report could be multiplied many times with similar examples of the drive of the Hanoi regime to extend its rule over South Viet-Nam.

The record is conclusive. It establishes beyond question that North Viet-Nam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South. It shows that North Viet-Nam has intensified its efforts in the years since it was condemned by the International Control Commission. It proves that Hanoi continues to press its systematic program of armed aggression into South Viet-Nam. This aggression violates the United Nations Charter. It is directly contrary to the Geneva accords of 1954 and of 1962 to which North Viet-Nam is a party. It shatters the peace of Southeast Asia. It is a fundamental threat to the freedom and security of South Viet-Nam.

The people of South Viet-Nam have chosen to resist this threat. At their request, the United States has taken its place beside them in their defensive struggle.

The United States seeks no territory, no military bases, no favored position. But we have learned the meaning of aggression elsewhere in the postwar world, and we have met it.

If peace can be restored in South Viet-Nam, the United States will be ready at once to reduce its military involvement. But it will not abandon friends who want to remain free. It will do what must be done to help them. The choice now between peace and continued and increasingly destructive conflict is one for the authorities in Hanoi to make.
EXCELLENCY: For the information of the Members of the Security Council, I am transmitting a special report entitled *Aggression From the North, the Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam*, which my Government is making public today. It presents evidence from which the following conclusions are inescapable:

First, the subjugation by force of the Republic of Viet-Nam by the regime in northern Viet-Nam is the formal, official policy of that regime; this has been stated and confirmed publicly over the past five years.

Second, the war in Viet-Nam is directed by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party (Communist) which controls the government in northern Viet-Nam.

Third, the so-called People's Revolutionary Party in the Republic of Viet-Nam is an integral part of the Lao Dong Party in North Viet-Nam.

Fourth, the so-called liberation front for South Viet-Nam is a subordinate unit of the Central Office for South Viet-Nam, an integral part of the governmental machinery in Hanoi.

Fifth, the key leadership of the Viet-Cong—officers, specialists, technicians, intelligence agents, political organizers and propagandists—has been trained, equipped and supplied in the north and sent into the Republic of Viet-Nam under Hanoi's military orders.

Sixth, most of the weapons, including new types recently introduced, and most of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Viet-Cong, have been sent from North to South Viet-Nam.

Seventh, the scale of infiltration of men and arms, including regular units of the armed forces of North Viet-Nam, has increased appreciably in recent months.

Eighth, this entire pattern of activity by the regime in Hanoi is in violation of general principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and is in direct violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954. Such a pattern of violation of the treaty obligations undertaken at Geneva was confirmed by a special report of the International Control Commission in 1962 and it has been greatly intensified since then.

These facts about the situation in Viet-Nam make it unmistakably clear that the character of that conflict is an aggressive war of conquest waged against a neighbor—and make nonsense of the cynical allegation that this is simply an indigenous insurrection.

I request that you circulate copies of the Report, together with copies of this letter, to the Delegations of all Member States as a Security Council document.

In making this information available to the Security Council, my Government wishes to say once more that peace can be restored quickly to Viet-Nam by a prompt and assured cessation of aggression by Hanoi.

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against the Republic of Viet-Nam. In that event, my Government—as it has said many times before—would be happy to withdraw its military forces from the Republic of Viet-Nam and turn promptly to an international effort to assist the economic and social development of Southeast Asia.

In the meantime, my Government awaits the first indication of any intent by the government in Hanoi to return to the ways of peace and peaceful resolution of this international conflict.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

65. COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST ARMED AGGRESSION: Department Statement, March 4, 1965

The fact that military hostilities have been taking place in Southeast Asia does not bring about the existence of a state of war, which is a legal characterization of a situation rather than a factual description. What we have in Viet-Nam is armed aggression from the North against the Republic of Viet-Nam. Pursuant to a South Vietnamese request and consultations between our two Governments, South Viet-Nam and the United States are engaged in collective defense against that armed aggression. The inherent right of individual and collective self-defense is recognized in article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

If the question is intended to raise the issue of legal authority to conduct the actions which have been taken, there can be no doubt that these actions fall within the constitutional powers of the President and within the congressional resolution of August 1964.

66. LEGAL BASIS FOR UNITED STATES ACTIONS AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM: Department of State Memorandum, March 8, 1965

I—THE ISSUE

This memorandum considers the question whether United States-South Vietnamese actions against military targets in North Viet-nam are justified in international law, particularly in light of the United Nations Charter and the 1954 Geneva Accords on Viet-Nam. It concludes that these actions are fully justified.

II—THE FACTS

On February 27, the Department of State issued "Aggression From the North," a report of North Viet-Nam's campaign to conquer South Viet-Nam. That Report establishes beyond question that North Viet-Nam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South.

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Viet-Nam were trained in the North and ordered into
the South by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Viet Cong, the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political organizers, and propagandists have come from the North and operate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into the South is directed by the Military High Command in Hanoi. It shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Viet-Cong have been sent into South Viet-Nam from the North. The evidence plainly indicates that under Hanoi's overall direction the Communists have established an extensive machine, both political and military, for carrying on the war against South Viet-Nam.

The history of Hanoi's campaign to conquer South Viet-Nam is a long one. It was documented earlier in a report entitled "A Threat to the Peace" issued by the Department of State in December 1961. In a special report of June 1962, the International Control Commission in Viet-Nam concluded that there was "sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that North Viet-Nam was sending arms and men into South Viet-Nam to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the legal government there, in violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

To meet the threat created by these violations of the Geneva Accords, and by North Viet-Nam's aggressive intervention contrary to general international law, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam requested United States assistance. We had been providing Viet-Nam since 1950-51 with both economic and military aid. This assistance was continued after the conclusion of the 1954 Geneva Accords, within the limitations prescribed by those agreements. It had become apparent, however, by 1961 that this limited assistance was not sufficient to meet the growing Communist threat. Consequently, in 1961, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam requested additional aid from the United States. The United States responded with increased supplies and with larger numbers of training and advisory personnel to assist the Vietnamese forces in prosecuting the war against the Viet Cong. This response was proportioned with the design of sustaining Viet-Nam in its defense against aggression without extending the conflict beyond the borders of the country.

The Communists, however, increased their intervention without regard to obligations under international law and international agreements by which they were bound. They stepped up the assistance from the North and increased the use of neighboring Laos as an infiltration route, in violation of the freshly concluded 1962 Geneva Agreement for the Settlement of the Laotian Question.

In more recent months North Viet-Nam has sharply increased the infiltration of men and equipment into the South, and virtually all personnel now coming in are natives of North Viet-Nam. Dramatically illustrative of Hanoi's role is the discovery along the South Vietnamese coast on February 16, 1965 of a huge cargo of arms, ammunition and other supplies, delivered by ship from North Viet-Nam. Major attacks by organized units are being launched against government forces. The North Vietnamese have even attacked United States vessels in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Thus, what began as covert and indirect aggression has become open armed aggression. This aggression has been carried out across the
internationally agreed demarcation line of 1954 between North and South Viet-Nam, and across international frontiers between Viet-Nam and Laos.

III. INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE UN CHARTER

As has been seen, North Viet-Nam is engaged in a continuing armed aggression against South Viet-Nam in violation of international agreements and international law.

This being the case, what are the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States entitled to do under international law by way of response?

Under international law, the victim of armed aggression is obviously permitted to defend itself and to organize a collective self-defense effort in which others who are willing may join. This right is recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Article 51 states that—

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by the members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such actions as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

As has been shown above, the whole course of conduct of North Viet-Nam, particularly as it has evolved in recent months, adds up to open armed attack within the meaning of Article 51. Indeed it is more than a single armed attack; it is a continuing program of armed aggression carried on across international frontiers and established demarcation lines. In these circumstances, South Viet-Nam has requested and received assistance from the United States and other nations in a collective defense effort.

Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter is also relevant to the Viet-Nam situation. Article 2, paragraph 4, provides that—

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

In the first place, it is plain that the use of force against territorial integrity and political independence has been initiated by North Viet-Nam and not by anyone else. Secondly, paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter does not place an absolute prohibition on the use of force. It permits the use of force in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Moreover, the Charter itself specifically provides for the use of force in certain circumstances—action through the United Nations itself, action through regional arrangements, and action in self-defense. The actions of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam, being defensive in character and designed to resist armed aggression, are wholly consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter and specifically with Article 2, paragraph 4.

It was as a measure of self-defense under Article 51 that the United States responded in August 1964 to the North Vietnamese attack on
our vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin. Those measures were immediately reported to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51. The Security Council did not see fit to take any action to maintain or restore international peace and security in the area. Indeed, North Viet-Nam refused to participate in the deliberations of the Security Council and explicitly denied the right of the Council to examine this question.

The attacks against South Viet-Nam have mounted in intensity since August. In these circumstances, it has been mutually agreed between the Government of South Viet-Nam and the United States Government that further means of providing for the collective defense of South Viet-Nam are required. Prompt defensive action has been decided upon, and airstrikes have been made against military installations and facilities in North Viet-Nam which support the aggression against the South. The actions taken constitute a limited and measured response, fitted to the situation that called for it. Again, these measures have been reported to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. As yet, the Council has taken no action to maintain an effective peace in the area. Until the regime in Hanoi decides to cease its aggressive intervention in South Viet-Nam, or until effective steps are taken to maintain international peace and security in the area, the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam have every right to continue their individual and collective self-defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Viet-Nam.

IV—The Geneva Accords

It has been demonstrated that the North Vietnamese have repeatedly violated the 1954 Geneva Accords in a most serious and flagrant manner. In so doing, of course, North Viet-Nam is ignoring an international Agreement which it signed and by which it is bound. In addition, by the continued presence in neighboring Laos of North Vietnamese forces and their use of Laotian territory for infiltration into South Viet-Nam, North Viet-Nam is violating solemn commitments which it undertook in the 1962 Geneva Agreements to refrain from such activities.

In these circumstances, international law recognizes the principle that a material breach of a treaty by one party entitles other parties at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding or related provision until the other party is prepared to observe its obligations.

The actions of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States are fully consistent with this principle. North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva Agreements have created an immediate danger to the continued independence and integrity of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The response of South Viet-Nam and the United States is designed to meet this threat created by North Viet-Nam’s disregard of the Accords. The extensive North Vietnamese violations certainly justify South Viet-Nam at least to withhold compliance with those provisions of the Accords which limit its ability to protect its very existence. Both South Viet-Nam and the United States have made clear that the actions which they have taken will no longer be necessary if North Viet-Nam would comply with the Accords.
1. It is important for us all to keep a cool and clear view of the situation in Viet-Nam.

2. The central cause of the danger there is aggression by Communists against a brave and independent people. There are other difficulties in Viet-Nam, of course, but if that aggression is stopped, the people and Government of South Viet-Nam will be free to settle their own future, and the need for supporting American military action there will end.

3. The people who are suffering from this Communist aggression are Vietnamese. This is no struggle of white men against Asians. It is aggression by Communist totalitarians against their independent neighbors. The main burden of resistance has fallen on the people and soldiers of South Viet-Nam. We Americans have lost hundreds of our own men there, and we mourn them. But the free Vietnamese have lost tens of thousands, and the aggressors and their dupes have lost still more. These are the cruel costs of the conspiracy directed from the North. This is what has to be stopped.

4. The United States still seeks no wider war. We threaten no regime and covet no territory. We have worked and will continue to work for a reduction of tensions on the great stage of the world. But the aggression from the North must be stopped. That is the road to peace in Southeast Asia.

5. The United States looks forward to the day when the people and governments of all Southeast Asia may be free from terror, subversion, and assassination—when they will need not military support and assistance against aggression but only economic and social cooperation for progress in peace. Even now, in Viet-Nam and elsewhere, there are major programs of development which have the cooperation and support of the United States. Wider and bolder programs can be expected in the future from Asian leaders and Asian councils—and in such programs we would want to help. This is the proper business of our future cooperation.

6. The United States will never be second in seeking a settlement in Viet-Nam that is based on an end of Communist aggression. As I have said in every part of the Union, I am ready to go anywhere at any time and meet with anyone whenever there is promise of progress toward an honorable peace. We have said many times—to all who are interested in our principles for honorable negotiation—that we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954—a reliable arrangement to guarantee the independence and security of all in Southeast Asia. At present the Communist aggressors have given no sign of any willingness to move in this direction, but as they recognize the costs of their present course, and their own true interest in peace, there may come a change—if we all remain united.

Meanwhile, as I said last year and again last week, "It is and it will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance to support South Viet-Nam for as long as is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control." The military actions of the United States will be such, and only such, as serve that purpose—at
Some of you have asked me for some comment as to the policy aspects of the use in Viet-Nam of gases of the tear-gas family, back in December and January. And I am very glad to respond to those questions.

The shadow of gas warfare has been raised in connection with these incidents. That is not involved. We are not embarking upon gas warfare in Viet-Nam. There has been no policy decision to engage in gas warfare in Viet-Nam. We are not talking about agents or weapons that are associated with gas warfare in the military arsenals of many countries. We are not talking about gas that is prohibited by the Geneva convention of 1925 or any other understandings about the use of gas.

Now, we can understand the concern around the world and in this country about the specter of gas warfare. These memories go back to World War I, when tens of thousands were killed or maimed by what might be called “military gases.”

This is not involved here. We are talking about a gas which has been commonly adopted by the police forces of the world as riot-control agents—gases that are available commercially and have been used on many occasions, some in this country, and on many occasions in other countries.

Now, why is tear gas a part of the equipment of police forces? It is because police forces would like to be able to use the minimum force that is required for the maintenance of law and order. It is a minimum instrument. And my information is that certain situations arose in South Viet-Nam where this problem presented itself.

On one occasion, for example, the Viet Cong had seized a village, was holding the villagers in hostage, and was firing through these villagers at mixed crowds outside the village. The decision was made to employ tear gas to try to deal with that situation as a riot-control type of problem in order to avoid the problem of whether to use artillery or aerial bombs that would inflict great damage upon innocent people.

There is no question here about gas warfare and gas in contravention of established conventions.

Now, it may be that there was a failure in full explanation, in briefing or in reporting, from Saigon on this matter. The initial reports tended to stimulate problems which were not present; for example, the use of the word “experimentation” suggested that something new and esoteric and weird might be involved here. This is not the case:

What has been involved has been well-known, traditional agents, in the hands of police forces in many parts of the world. And under the circumstances in which this gas was used in Viet-Nam, the desire was to use the minimum force required to deal with the situation to avoid death or injury to innocent people.

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1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1965, pp 528-532.
Now, that is at the heart of the policy question. We are not engaged in gas warfare. It is against our policy to do so, as it is against the policies of most other governments that I know about.

But we are reminded, when something of this sort comes up, of the nature of the war in South Viet-Nam. It isn't a comfortable and easy war. It isn't a war that is going to be decided by troops on parade with blank cartridges. It is a mean, dirty struggle carried out without regard to ordinary norms of conduct by the Viet Cong.

Those who are concerned about tear gas I would hope would be concerned about the fact that during 1964 over 400 civilian officials were killed and over a thousand were kidnaped in South Viet-Nam—village chiefs, schoolteachers, public-health officers. Among other civilians, 1,300 were killed, over 8,000 were kidnaped, and entire villages have been burned to the ground, and families of those who were in the armed forces were kidnaped and held as hostages.

There is nothing more urgent, from the point of view of the United States, than that peace be restored to that country as quickly as possible. And peace can be restored if Hanoi would stop infiltrating militarily trained personnel into South Viet-Nam, stop the sending of arms into South Viet-Nam, and stop directing these operations aimed at taking over South Viet-Nam against the wishes of the people of that country.

Now, these are the essential policy aspects of the problem. We do not expect that gas will be used in ordinary military operations. Police-type weapons were used in riot control in South Viet-Nam—as in many other countries over the past 20 years—and in situations analogous to riot control, where the Viet Cong, for example, was using civilians as screens for their own operations.

But this does not represent a new departure of policy, the introduction of new weapons, the introduction of any new approach to the very difficult problems in that country.

69. PATTERN FOR PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Address by President Johnson, Johns Hopkins University, April 17, 1965

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some two dozen countries having an interest in Southeast Asia. We are joining those 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight, which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world.

I have come here to review once again with my own people the views of the American Government.

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is a principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam.

Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is burst-

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1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 28, 1965, pp. 606-610.
ing with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Viet-
Nam's steaming soil.

Why must we take this painful road? Why must this nation
hazard its ease, its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so
far away?

We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where
every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will
our own freedom be finally secure.

This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet
the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason
and the waste of war, the works of peace. We wish that this were not
so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we
wish.

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place.

The first reality is that North Viet-Nam has attacked the independ-
ent nation of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest. Of course,
some of the people of South Viet-Nam are participating in attack on
their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and
arms, flow in a constant stream from North to South.

This support is the heartbeat of the war.

And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the
targets of assassination and kidnaping. Women and children are
strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government.
And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale
raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is
the new face of an old enemy.

Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening
shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by
Peiping. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet,
which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United
Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the
forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam
is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-
Nam?

We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every
American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-
Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus,
over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-
Nam defend its independence.

And I intend to keep that promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation
to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an un-
forgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe,
from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests in part
on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave
Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in
the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's
word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even
wider war.
We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must stay in Southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: “Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further.”

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile—that China’s power is such that it is bound to dominate all Southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

We do this in order to slow down aggression. We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.

And we do this to convince the leaders of North Viet-Nam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fact:

We will not be defeated.

We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery—the will to endure as well as the will to resist.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: armed hostility is futile—our resources are equal to any challenge—because we fight for values and we fight for principle, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending.

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement. Such peace demands an independent South Viet-Nam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.
These are the essentials of any final settlement.
We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.
There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.
We have stated this position over and over again 50 times and more to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready with this purpose for unconditional discussions.
And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die in battle—Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Viet-Nam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.
But we will use it.
This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony. For what do the people of North Viet-Nam want? They want what their neighbors also desire—food for their hunger, health for their bodies, a chance to learn, progress for their country, and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle.
These countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrest existence from the soil. They are often wracked by diseases, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40.
Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. It also requires the works of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works, and now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.
The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Viet-Nam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible.
The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area, and as far back in 1961 I conferred with our authorities in Viet-Nam in connection with their work there. And I would hope tonight that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.
For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress.
The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done. The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA. The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care. Schools can be established to train people in the skills needed to manage the process of development. And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn and rice and cotton.

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding patriotic, and distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World Bank.

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, and elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change—as we see in our own country—does not always come without conflict.

We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful, or because we have made some mistakes, or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions.

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power, and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.

For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.

For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so.

For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.

The ordinary men and women of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam, of China and India, of Russia and America, are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed.

Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge—always before denied—to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.
I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.

A dam built across a great river is impressive. In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchen warmed, and the home heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA. Electrification of the countryside—yes, that, too, is impressive.

A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive. The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive. These—not mighty arms—are the achievements which the American nation believes to be impressive. And if we are steadfast, the time may come when all other nations will also find it so.

Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?

Ask yourselves that question in your homes—and in this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, all done all we can do? Have we done enough?

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: “I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live.”

This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill, or aid, hate or understand. We can do all these things on a scale that has never been dreamed of before.

Well, we will choose life. And so doing, we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.

70. U.S. REPLY TO 17-NATION APPEAL ON VIET-NAM, APRIL 8, 1965

We welcome the concern and interest of the governments participating in the Declaration of March 15; just as we welcome any initiative aimed at bringing peace to any part of the world. The Declaration is a constructive contribution to the effort for peace.

We fully agree with the general principles expressed in that Declaration. The fulfillment of those principles, which are an essential part of American policy everywhere, is the purpose of our presence in Vietnam.

The Declaration reaffirms the right of all people to self-determination. And so do we. We seek self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.

The Declaration reaffirms the belief that recourse to force is contrary to the rights of the people of Vietnam to peace, freedom and independence. And so do we. We seek to bring peace and help restore those rights.

The signatory nations point out that they are "deeply concerned" at the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam. And so are we. We should end the war by ensuring the independence of South Vietnam.

The basic cause of the conflict in Vietnam is the attack by North Vietnam on the independent nation of South Vietnam. The object of that attack is total conquest.

The regime in North Vietnam has sent trained military personnel and weapons of war on an increasing scale into South Vietnam. It has directed and supported a mounting campaign of terror, assassination, and military action against the Government and people of the Republic of South Vietnam.

The Government of South Vietnam has requested the help of the United States in its defense against attack. In fulfillment of our long-standing commitments we have given such help. We will continue as long as we are needed, and until the aggression is halted. In these actions we seek only the security and peace of South Vietnam, and we threaten no regime.

The war against South Vietnam is a war of great brutality. Simple farmers are the target of assassination and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to the government. Small and helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large scale raids are conducted on towns; and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

We hope that the anger of people in every country will extend to those who commit these daily acts of violence in the South. We hope that the sympathy and compassion of every land will be held out to these victims of unprovoked attack. These are men and women, and even children, who die because they are attacked—not because they are attackers.

Peace in Southeast Asia demands an independent South Vietnam—security guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of an final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned, in large groups or in small ones, in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.
We have stated this position over and over again, to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready—with this purpose—for unconditional discussions.

We believe that peace can be achieved in Southeast Asia the moment that aggression from North Vietnam is eliminated. That aggression has many elements. It has meant the training and infiltration of agents and armed forces—the procurement and supply of munitions—the bombing of compounds by night and Embassies by day—murdering secretaries and soldiers alike—in short, a whole campaign of terror and military action that is externally supported and directed. When these things stop and the obstacles to security and stability are removed, the need for American supporting military action will also come to an end.

And when conditions have been created in which the people of South Vietnam can determine their own future free from external interference, the United States will be ready and eager to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam. At the same time, it should become possible to work out the future relationships between North and South Vietnam on the basis of mutual respect and determination to resolve their problems by peaceful means.

Because the aggressor has made great efforts to hide his actions, it will also be important to have new ways and means of assurance that aggression has in fact been stopped. The problems of such control and assurance are not easy. But these difficulties are not at the center of the problem. The center of the problem is in the realities of behavior. Those realities are known and felt in South Vietnam. They are known and understood by those who are responsible for them. It is by their ending in fact that the actions of the United States Government will be governed.

We also hope that the nations of the world can join in helping the countries of Southeast Asia in their own effort to improve the life of their people.

We have offered our help for a large-scale program of economic development embracing all of Southeast Asia. We hope that other industrialized nations will join.

We are glad of this Declaration. We believe that the nations which signed it are motivated by a deep and sincere purpose of peace. That is our purpose too. We hope it is shared by all others who are affected by this Declaration.

17-NATION APPEAL

THE APPEAL OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF SEVENTEEN NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES CONCERNING CRISIS IN VIETNAM

Pursuant to the final Declaration of the Declaration of the Conference of Heads of States or Governments of Non-aligned Countries held in Cairo in October 1964,

we, the undersigned Heads of state or government, have noted with great concern the aggravation of existing tensions and conflicts in South-East Asia and in certain regions of Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, arising from oppression and foreign intervention, and regret the present deadlock in
Southeast Asia and Vietnam

We solemnly reaffirm the right of peoples to self-determination and the principle that all states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; we reaffirm our dedication to the principle of the inviolability of, and respect for, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states; we express our conviction that recourse to force and pressure in various forms is contrary to the rights of the people of Vietnam to peace, freedom, and independence and can only lead to the aggravation of the conflict in that area and to its transformation into a more generalized war with catastrophic consequences.

We are deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam and are convinced that it is the consequence of foreign intervention in various forms, including military intervention, which impedes the implementation of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam.

We are firmly convinced that, irrespective of possible differences in appraising various elements in the existing situation in Vietnam, the only way leading to the termination of the conflict consists in seeking a peaceful solution through negotiations. We therefore make an urgent appeal to the parties concerned to start such negotiations, as soon as possible, without posing any preconditions, so that a political solution to the problem of Vietnam may be found in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people and in the spirit of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam and of the Declaration of the Conference of Non-aligned Countries held in Cairo.

We invite the governments of all countries interested in maintenance of world peace to associate themselves, as soon as possible, with this appeal.

March 15, 1965

MOHAMMAD YOUSUF, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Afghanistan

AHMED BEN BELLA, President of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria

ARCHBISHOP MAKARIDOS, President of the Republic of Cyprus

DUDLEY SENANAYAKE, Prime Minister of Ceylon

HALF SELASIE I, Emperor of Ethiopia

DR. KWAME NKRUMAH, President of the Republic of Ghana

SEKOI TAOUME, President of the Republic of Guinea

LAL BAIJADUR SHAHRI, Prime Minister of India

MARSHAL ABDUL SALAM MOHAMED AREF, President of the Republic of Iraq

JOJO KENYATTA, President of the Republic of Kenya

MAHENDRA BIR BIKRAM, SHAH DEVA, King of Nepal

GENERAL MOHAMAD AMIN EL-HAFEZ, President of the Syrian Arab Republic

HASSIB BOUGOUTRA, President of Tunisia

GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, President of the United Arab Republic

JOSTIP BROZ TITO, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

KENNETH KAUNDA, President of Zambia

MILTON OBOTE, Prime Minister of Uganda

71. Defining Scope of the War: Address by Secretary Rusk, April 23, 1965 (Excerpt)

What is a "war of national liberation"? It is, in essence, any war which furtheres the Communist world revolution—what, in broader terms, the Communists have long referred to as a "just" war. The term "war of national liberation" is used not only to denote armed insurrection by people still under colonial rule—there are not many of those left outside the Communist world. It is used to denote any effort led by Communists to overthrow by force any non-Communist government.

Thus the war in South Viet-Nam is called a "war of national liberation." And those who would overthrow various other non-Communist governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin American are called the "forces of national liberation."

Nobody in his right mind would deny that Venezuela is not only a truly independent nation but that it has a government chosen in a free election. But the leaders of the Communist insurgency in Venezuela are described as leaders of a fight for "national liberation"—not only by themselves and by Castro and the Chinese Communists but by the Soviet Communists.

A recent editorial in Pravda spoke of the "peoples of Latin America . . . marching firmly along the path of struggle for their national independence" and said, "... the upsurge of the national liberation movement in Latin American countries has been to a great extent a result of the activities of Communist parties." It added:

The Soviet people have regarded and still regard it as their sacred duty to give support to the peoples fighting for their independence. True to their international duty the Soviet people have been and will remain on the side of the Latin American patriots.

In Communist doctrine and practice, a non-Communist government may be labeled and denounced as "colonialist," "reactionary," or a "puppet," and any state so labeled by the Communists automatically becomes fair game—while Communist intervention by force in non-Communist states is justified as "self-defense" or part of the "struggle against colonial domination." "Self-determination" seems to mean that any Communist nation can determine by itself that any non-Communist state is a victim of colonialist domination and therefore a justifiable target for a "war of liberation."

As the risks of overt aggression, whether nuclear or with conventional forces, have become increasingly evident, the Communists have put increasing stress on the "war of national liberation." The Chinese Communists have been more militant in language and behavior than the Soviet Communists. But the Soviet Communist leadership also has consistently proclaimed its commitment in principle to support wars of national liberation. This commitment was reaffirmed as recently as Monday of this week by Mr. Kosygin [Aleksai N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers].

International law does not restrict international revolution within a state or revolution against colonial authority. But international law does restrict what third powers may lawfully do in support of insurrection. It is these restrictions which are challenged by the doctrine, and violated by the practice, of "wars of liberation."

It is plain that acceptance of the doctrine of "wars of liberation" would amount to scuttling the modern international law of peace which the charter prescribes. And acceptance of the practice of "wars of liberation," as defined by the Communists, would mean the breakdown of peace itself.

Viet-Nam presents a clear current case of the lawful versus the unlawful use of force. I would agree with General Giap [Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnamese Commander in Chief] and other Communists that it is a test case for "wars of national liberation." We intend to meet that test.
Were the insurgency in South Viet-Nam truly indigenous and self-sustained, international law would not be involved. But the fact is that it receives vital external support—in organization and direction, in training, in men, in weapons and other supplies. That external support is unlawful for a double reason. First, it contravenes general international law, which the United Nations Charter here expresses. Second, it contravenes particular international law: the 1954 Geneva accords on Viet-Nam and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.

In resisting the aggression against it, the Republic of Viet-Nam is exercising its right of self-defense. It called upon us and other states for assistance. And in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense under the United Nations Charter, we and other nations are providing such assistance.

The American policy of assisting South Viet-Nam to maintain its freedom was inaugurated under President Eisenhower and continued under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Our assistance has been increased because the aggression from the North has been augmented. Our assistance now encompasses the bombing of North Viet-Nam. The bombing is designed to interdict, as far as possible, and to inhibit, as far as may be necessary, continued aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

When that aggression ceases, collective measures in defense against it will cease. As President Johnson has declared:

"... if that aggression is stopped, the people and Government of South Viet-Nam will be free to settle their own future, and the need for supporting American military action there will end."

The fact that the demarcation line between North and South Viet-Nam was intended to be temporary does not make the assault on South Viet-Nam any less of an aggression. The demarcation lines between North and South Korea and between East and West Germany are temporary. But that did not make the North Korean invasion of South Korea a permissible use of force.

Let's not forget the salient features of the 1962 agreements on Laos. Laos was to be independent and neutral. All foreign troops, regular or irregular, and other military personnel were to be withdrawn within 75 days, except a limited number of French instructors as requested by the Lao Government. No arms were to be introduced into Laos except at the request of that Government. The signatories agreed to refrain "from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs" of Laos. They promised also not to use Lao territory to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries—a stipulation that plainly prohibited the passage of arms and men from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam by way of Laos. An International Control Commission of three was to assure compliance with the agreements.

What happened? The non-Communist elements complied. The Communists did not. At no time since that agreement was signed have either the Pathet Lao or the North Viet-Nam authorities complied with it. The North Vietnamese left several thousand troops there—the backbone of almost every Pathet Lao battalion. Use of the corridor through Laos to South Viet-Nam continued. And the Communists barred the areas under their control both to the Government of Laos and the International Control Commission.
To revert to Viet-Nam: I continue to hear and see nonsense about the nature of the struggle there. I sometimes wonder at the gullibility of educated men and the stubborn disregard of plain facts by men who are supposed to be helping our young to learn—especially to learn how to think.

Hanoi has never made a secret of its designs. It publicly proclaimed in 1960 a renewal of the assault on South Viet-Nam. Quite obviously its hopes of taking over South Viet-Nam from within had withered to close to zero—and the remarkable economic and social progress of South Viet-Nam contrasted, most disagreeably for the North Vietnamese Communists, with their own miserable economic performance.

The facts about the external involvement have been documented in white papers and other publications of the Department of State. The International Control Commission has held that there is evidence “beyond reasonable doubt” of North Vietnamese intervention.

There is no evidence that the Viet Cong has any significant popular following in South Viet-Nam. It relies heavily on terror. Most of its reinforcements in recent months have been North Vietnamese from the North Vietnamese Army.

Let us be clear about what is involved today in Southeast Asia. We are not involved with empty phrases or conceptions which ride upon the clouds. We are talking about the vital national interests of the United States in the peace of the Pacific. We are talking about the appetite for aggression—an appetite which grows upon feeding and which is proclaimed to be insatiable. We are talking about the safety of nations with whom we are allied—and the integrity of the American commitment to join in meeting attack.

It is true that we also believe that every small state has a right to be unmolested by its neighbors even though it is within reach of a great power. It is true that we are committed to general principles of law and procedure which reject the idea that men and arms can be sent freely across frontiers to absorb a neighbor. But underlying the general principles is the harsh reality that our own security is threatened by those who would embark upon a course of aggression whose announced ultimate purpose is our own destruction.

Once again we hear expressed the views which cost the men of my generation a terrible price in World War II. We are told that Southeast Asia is far away—but so were Manchuria and Ethiopia. We are told that, if we insist that someone stop shooting, that is asking them for unconditional surrender. We are told that perhaps the aggressor will be content with just one more bite. We are told that, if we prove faithless on one commitment, perhaps others would believe us about other commitments in other places. We are told that, if we stop resisting, perhaps the other side will have a change of heart. We are asked to stop hitting bridges and radar sites and ammunition depots without requiring that the other side stop its slaughter of thousands of civilians and its bombings of schools and hotels and hospitals and railways and buses.

Surely we have learned over the past three decades that the acceptance of aggression leads only to a sure catastrophe. Surely we have learned that the aggressor must face the consequences of his action and be saved from the frightful miscalculation that brings all to ruin.
It is the purpose of law to guide men away from such events, to establish rules of conduct which are deeply rooted in the reality of experience.

72. SOURCE OF VIET CONG STRENGTH: Mr. McNamara's News Conference, April 26, 1965

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I should like to report to you briefly this morning upon our latest estimates of the strength of the Communist forces in South Viet-Nam, of the support which they are receiving from North Viet-Nam, and of certain of the actions which we are taking to reduce that level of support.

The clandestine infiltration of personnel and materiel from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam continues to play a vital role in providing the Communist Viet Cong with the leadership, with the technical competence, with the weapons, and with the ammunition which they need to carry on their insurgency directed against the established Government in South Viet-Nam.

Recent evidence both from captured prisoners and from captured documents has increased our estimates of the number of infiltrators to a total of 39,000. Reports to date confirm the infiltration of between 5,000 and 8,000 men in 1964 alone.

In view of the normal timelag between the actual active infiltration and our confirmation of it, I think it is probable that we are in excess of 10,000 men infiltrated from the North into the South during the past year.

Furthermore, recent captures indicate that approximately 75 percent of these men sent from the North to the South were born in North Viet-Nam. It is clear that the Communists are determined to keep up this level of support despite the drying up of the supply of former Southerners, men born in South Viet-Nam, ordered north by the Viet Minh at the time of the 1954 Geneva accords. Many of the recent captives are young draftees called into infiltration units that marched south through Laos in units 500 to 600 strong.

I think you are familiar with the general routes of infiltration. On this map we have shown North Viet-Nam, Laos, South Viet-Nam. This is the South China Sea, Hainan Islands of the Communist Chinese, Thailand, the 17th parallel, which divides North and South Viet-Nam.

The infiltration routes proceed down the rail and highway lines north and south, they cross the east-to-west laterals into Laos, proceed down through Laos and into South Viet-Nam.

With the changing course, changing nature, particularly the intensification of infiltration both of arms and personnel into South Viet-Nam, the course of aggression pursued by the government of North Viet-Nam has grown progressively more flagrant and more unconstrained.

The latest step has been the cover infiltration of a regular combat unit of the North Vietnamese Army into South Viet-Nam. Evidence accumulated within the last month now confirms the presence in northwest Kontum Province—that is in the central highland area of South

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Viet-Nam, around Pleiku and north of Pleiku—recent evidence which we have received confirms the presence in that northwest Kontum Province of the 2d Battalion of the 326th Division of the regular North Vietnamese Army. It is important to recognize, I think, that the great bulk of the weapons which the Viet Cong are using and with which they are supplied come from external sources.

Since 1960 the Viet Cong have captured approximately 39,000 weapons from troops of the South Vietnamese Government. During that same period of time the Viet Cong lost to those Government troops about 25,000 of their weapons, and therefore the Viet Cong had a net gain of about 14,000 weapons during this 5-year period. Thus they gained only 10 to 15 percent of their overall weapons requirements. The remainder of the weapons, those for their 38,000 to 46,000 regular troops and for their 100,000 irregulars, have come from external sources.

Moreover it appears that the Viet Cong main force units, their regular units, are being entirely reequipped and entirely retrained with the newest Chinese Communist family of weapons. For example, 101 weapons were captured recently—3 weeks ago on the days of April 5 and 6—from elements of the Viet Cong regiment in Chuong Thien Province. That regiment was operating far to the south in the Camau Peninsula. The weapons which are captured are believed to be representative of the weapons mix of Viet Cong main force units. They included 1 U.S. M-1 rifle, 4 U.S. carbines, an East German machinegun, Czechoslovakian assault rifles, and the remainder were Chinese Communist weapons, including 72 modern rifles, 11 assault rifles, 4 machineguns, 2 60-millimeter mortars, 3 rocket launchers, and a 75-millimeter recoilless rifle.

I have here one of the new family of Communist Chinese weapons. This is a light machinegun of their 7.62 class; ammunition for this can only be supplied from Chinese sources. This gun bears the Chinese arsenal mark and has obviously been manufactured in that country, supplied by China to North Viet-Nam, infiltrated by North Viet-Nam into the South.

In this particular instance—I am referring to that of April 5 and 6—over 90 percent of the small arms and 100 percent of the larger pieces were of Communist bloc origin, mainly Chinese.

Prisoners captured in that battle stated that they and their units had been quiet in the past 2 months because they had withdrawn to the U Minh Forest, which is on the most southerly coast of South Viet-Nam, where they had received and been trained and reequipped with the new family period of Chinese Communist weapons.

The ammunition supply for these weapons, of course, will have to come from Communist China via North Viet-Nam.

Now, the current South Vietnamese Air Force and U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force strikes against North Viet-Nam have been designed to impede this infiltration of men and materiel, an infiltration which makes the difference between a situation which is manageable and one which is not manageable internally by the Government of South Viet-Nam.

The airstrikes have been carefully limited to military targets, primarily to infiltration targets, to transit points, to barracks, to supply depots, to ammunition depots, to routes of communication, all feeding
the infiltration lines from North Viet-Nam into Laos and then into South Viet-Nam.

More recently there have been added to this target system railroads, highways, and bridges which are the foundation of the infiltration routes. The strikes against the bridges have been particularly successful. During the last 3 weeks, between April 3 and April 26, Vietnamese and U.S. aircraft struck a total of 27 rail and highway bridges along key lines of communication in North Viet-Nam.

The primary emphasis has been placed upon the routes south of 20 degrees north. 20 degrees north runs through this area. Hanoi is at about the 21st parallel. Thanh Hoa is at the 20th. Our strikes are concentrated on the lines of communication running south and east and west, south of 20 degrees.

Twenty-four of the bridges have been destroyed, or they have been so badly damaged as to be rendered incapable of supporting traffic. The basic objective of the strikes has been to inhibit, to reduce, to deflect, the movement southward of men and materiel. We have sought to deny them the use of their primary lines of communication and to force dependence on an inadequate secondary road system and inadequate means of support.

The strikes have been designed to increase the dependence on an already overburdened road transport system by denying the use of the rail lines in the South. In summary, our objectives have been to force them off the rails onto the highways and off the highways onto their feet.

A total of 10 highway bridges have been struck. Ten have been destroyed along the key north-south coastal highway. You can see that on this map. This is a map of North Viet-Nam. This is the key north-south route running from Hanoi down to the demarcation line, with its laterals going east and west to the passes that run into Laos: this line, Route 7, running into Laos over the Barthelemy Pass and onto the Plaine des Jarres; this route, number 8, running into Laos over the Nape Keo Neva Pass and then south into Viet-Nam; this route, number 12, running over to the Mu Gia Mugin Pass, then south into Viet-Nam. The strikes have been designed to interrupt this north-south route and the east-to-west route.

As I say, a total of 10 of the highway bridges have been struck and destroyed along that north-south route. In addition, two railway and two combination railway and highway bridges, which are the foundation of that route, which lie between Thanh Hoa, being here, and Vinh here, have been struck, one of them here, and one here.

This has effectively interdicted and destroyed the capability to move by rail south of Thanh Hoa.

Destruction of these railroad bridges will result in increased dependence on the highway system, and destruction of the highway bridges will complicate the movement of the vehicle convoys southward.

Nine bridges have been struck and destroyed on the routes leading into Laos, primarily on these two routes which, as I said, feed the north-south traffic through Laos and into South Viet-Nam.

U.S. strikes against these bridges in North Viet-Nam have been extremely accurate, and they have been very effective. Spans and piers have been dropped and destroyed. You can see that on some of these typical pictures. This is the railroad bridge at Dong Phong Thuong.
You can see the span lying in the river. Now, this is a major highway bridge over a deep river at Phuong Can. This span has been completely destroyed. The river is so deep it has sunk into the river, and you can't see it on the picture. This is the Tom Da railroad and highway bridge located here. You can see the span completely destroyed. Next is a very important Thanh Yen highway bridge on a major route into the Dong Hoi area.

This Dong Hoi is a location of barracks and depots and ammunition dumps from which men and equipment are infiltrated into the South. This is the Sang Ko Chai highway bridge, a very high bridge over the deep gorge. You can see the span completely dropped. We have noticed with our reconnaissance aircraft large convoys of trucks traveling this route. You can imagine the difficulty they will have in spanning that point, and so on with the others.

Supplementing the bridge strikes, armed reconnaissance is being conducted along truck convoy routes against maritime traffic and rolling stock on the rail lines.

These carefully controlled rail strikes will continue as necessary to impede the infiltration and to persuade the North Vietnamese leadership that their aggression against the South will not succeed.

I will be very happy to take your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, over the weekend in Washington some confusion has been created by remarks of high officials on the eventuality of the use of the nuclear weapons in Viet-Nam. Could you clarify the position of your Government?

A. Yes, it is perfectly apparent. There is no military requirement for the use of nuclear weapons in the current situation, and no useful purpose can be served by speculation on remote contingencies.

Q. Why was it done then, Mr. Secretary?

A. I don't know that it was done. I am simply responding to the gentleman's question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do the North Vietnamese get around these bridges, or aren't they?

A. They will get around them to the extent they can by building ferries in the area, but I think you can see from some of these pictures this is going to be quite a task and will take a considerable period of time. Secondly, they will get around them by diverting traffic from the main routes to secondary routes, which increases the time and labor required in supplying the infiltration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what efforts are made to avoid hitting civilians in our airstrikes?

A. Each target is chosen after a very careful review of all reconnaissance photographs. We have carried out very complete reconnaissance of this entire area. Each target is chosen after careful review of reconnaissance photographs to insure that it is isolated and separate and apart from urban population or civilian population areas. To the best of our knowledge there have been few, if any, civilian casualties associated with our strikes to date.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a number of statements over the weekend by Secretary Rusk that—and the President is having a news conference tomorrow, and you are having one today. Does this indicate we are reaching somewhat of a showdown or turning point?
A. No, it does not. I am responding to your oft-repeated request for a news conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say you have successfully isolated the battlefield, and if you have, would that preclude the movement of large forces from the North?

A. No, I would not say we have isolated the battlefield. I hope I have not given you that impression. We have impeded the progress of men and material from North Viet-Nam through Laos and into South Viet-Nam. We have not stopped it, and we surely have not isolated the battlefield.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in what way were the Viet Cong, which are operating in South Viet-Nam, affected by the airstrikes against North Viet-Nam?

A. In two respects. First, as I say, we have slowed down the movement of men and materiel, and this has adversely affected the Viet Cong, although I don't wish to overemphasize the degree to which it has affected them so far.

Secondly, the airstrikes against North Viet-Nam and also the increased tempo of airstrikes by the Vietnamese Air Force and the U.S. Air Force in South Viet-Nam have significantly and adversely affected the morale of the Viet Cong troops in the South. We know this from our interrogation of Viet Cong captured within the last 4 to 8 weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what the size is of the North Vietnamese battalion now operating in the South and what is the significance of the fact that a regular unit is operating?

A. I can't be too specific or accurate in estimating the size of that battalion. I guess it is on the order of 400 to 500 men. As to its significance, I think it is primarily significant in indicating that the North Vietnamese have used up or dried up the source of individual fillers who could be recruited, trained, and sent back to fight in South Viet-Nam and that they are now having to call upon the regular units of their forces for that purpose. This is understandable.

I believe I am correct in saying that in the past 41/2 years the Viet Cong, the Communists, have lost 89,000 men killed in South Viet-Nam. Now, not all of these men have been infiltrated from the North, but an important number have been. With that, plus the expansion of the Viet Cong forces in the South, you can see the heavy drain upon the filler resources in the North and the reason why they have to go turn to their regular military units to continue the supply of men over these infiltration routes; the supply is absolutely essential to them if they are to offset the continuing casualties.

I mentioned before that these casualty rates are high, both those suffered by the Viet Cong and those suffered by the South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese are suffering casualties at rates higher than we have ever experienced in our history. I think this is an indication of their will to fight and defend their own country and Government.

Q. Secretary McNamara, there have been reports of additional deployment of combat units and planned combat units to South Viet-Nam—U.S. combat units—can you tell us if these combat units are going out there and secondly why? Is there a serious threat of attack to a major U.S. base in that area?
A. We will never comment upon future movements of U.S. combat forces; so I cannot answer Mr. Norman's question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your figures here of the Viet Cong main force of 38,000 to 46,000 are somewhere between 4,000 and 10,000 larger than the estimates of a month ago. Does that indicate—estimates given us—does that indicate that the infiltration has been continuing during the airstrikes?

A. No, that by itself does not indicate it, although I believe it has. Our information on infiltration in terms of specific numbers of men or specific numbers and types of weapons lags the actual event by several weeks. So that I can't give you any specific figures on the volume of infiltration that has occurred during the airstrikes. The figures are higher, however, than those received by you a few weeks or months ago because of continuing indication from captured Viet Cong and continuing evidence from captured documents that our original estimates were low and that the volume of infiltration in 1963 and '64 was higher than we had previously estimated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what has been done to stop infiltration by sea?

A. It seems probable that as the Viet Cong depend more and more upon North Viet-Nam for their ammunition and, as I suggested, this particular weapon, which is a 7.62 light machinegun, and the associated rifles and other weapons of that family, will depend exclusively upon Communist sources for supply.

As that supply requirement increases in terms of pounds and tons, no doubt they are seeking to supplement their land routes by sea routes. We have had some indication of that. You may recall that within the past 2 months a coastal vessel was captured and sunk at Vung Ro Bay. That single vessel had on it 4,000 weapons. There have been two or three other indications recently of fairly substantial efforts to infiltrate arms by sea.

Therefore, we have joined with the South Vietnamese in expanding the sea patrol, which already includes 400 or 500 junks, and to which we have added U.S. naval vessels and U.S. naval aircraft to detect and allow the South Vietnamese to inspect and, where necessary, destroy men and equipment being infiltrated from the North.

Q. Sir, you say the Northerners are now hard pressed to supply Southerners to the battle in the South and they are forced to resort to using a regular battalion of armed forces. Do you anticipate the appearance of other regular units from the North in the South and if so what does it—

A. I can't answer your question because I can't project the actions of the North Vietnamese government. I anticipate they will continue to endeavor to offset their losses in the South.

There is only one way for them to do this effectively, and that is to continue to infiltrate men and equipment over these lines of infiltration through Laos or along the seacoast. It is to impede that, to deter it, that we are carrying on the airstrikes and enlarging the sea patrol.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your words here today about nuclear weapons mean that if we saw a military requirement for use of small nuclear weapons that we would not use it, and if we saw a reason to bomb some other big cities in enemy territory that we would not?

A. I don't wish to add to the statement I already made on that subject.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any way in which the infiltration could be significantly cut down at the 17th parallel and at the access routes into South Viet-Nam from Laos?

A. It seems unlikely that the infiltration is actually crossing the parallel in any substantial volume. It goes around the parallel either through Laos or by the sea route. I think it will be possible to interdict infiltration by sea by putting in effect a sea patrol across the parallel and extending it into the international waterways, and this we are doing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a personal question. As the fighting has increased in Viet-Nam, more and more of the U.S. critics of the administration's policy have been referring to this as "McNamara's war." What is your reaction? Does this annoy you?

A. It does not annoy me because I think it is a war that is being fought to preserve the freedom of a very brave people, an independent nation. It is a war which is being fought to counter the strategy of the Communists, a strategy which Premier Khrushchev laid out very clearly in that very famous speech which he made on January 6, 1961. You may recall that at that time he divided all wars into three categories. He spoke of world wars, meaning nuclear wars; he spoke of local wars, by which he meant large-scale conventional wars; and then he spoke of what he called "wars of liberation."

He ruled out world wars as being too dangerous to the existence of the Communist states. He ruled out local wars because he said they could very easily escalate into nuclear wars which would lead to the ultimate destruction of the Communist states. But he strongly endorsed "wars of liberation" and made it perfectly clear that it would be through application of that strategy that the Communists would seek to subvert independent nations throughout the world, seek to extend their domination, their political domination, of other nations.

It is very clear that that is the Communist Chinese strategy in Southeast Asia. It is a strategy I feel we should oppose, and, while it is not my war, I don't object to my name being associated with it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a question a little removed from Viet-Nam. I would like to know why the election results of our Armed Forces and other absentee balloting have not been revealed. I understand the survey is completed, the release is made, and I believe it is in Mr. Sylvester's [Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs] office.

A. I am very sorry, I don't know the answer. I will endeavor to find it out. I myself have been very anxious, as has my wife, who has been associated with the League of Women Voters, to extend the privilege of voting to the Armed Forces. If we have not done it effectively, I will take action to correct it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what new equipment will be bought to carry out the increased action in South Viet-Nam—equipment and weapons?

A. We don't have plans to increase procurement above the previously established levels. As you know, we have vastly increased the stocks...
of tactical aircraft during the past 4 or 5 years. I think we have already taken delivery on some 8,500 tactical aircraft during the past 4 years.

We have increased the number of squadrons and the number of tactical aircraft, for example, tactical fighter aircraft, in the Air Force units by about 30 to 40 percent during that period.

The losses at the present time in Southeast Asia are really quite low in relation to our aircraft procurement schedule. We have no immediate plans for increasing that. Similarly we have over the past 4 years greatly increased our inventories of conventional munitions, bombs, ammunition of all kinds, and they appear adequate at the present time. If at any point either our aircraft inventory or our ammunition stock appears to need replenishment, we will of course initiate procurement immediately.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what political or psychological effect does the bombing seem to be having on the Hanoi regime?

A. It is very difficult for me to give you an accurate answer or definitive answer because I don't have access to the thoughts of that regime. But I can see some evidence that it is affecting them. There is clear evidence from the interrogation of Communist prisoners in South Viet-Nam that it is adversely affecting the morale of the Communists in South Viet-Nam. There is clear evidence, I think, from these pictures that it is affecting the ability of the North Vietnamese to continue to supply the Viet Cong forces in the South. There is clear evidence from other pictures and reconnaissance that we have that they are being forced to divert their limited resources to a greater degree to the aggression they are carrying on in the South. Beyond that I really can't say.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us about the Russian Sams?

Q. Mr. Secretary, the infiltration of that North Vietnamese battalion—does that suggest to you that the Viet Cong may be trying to move into the third stage of insurgency?

A. No, it does not suggest that to me. They have had battalions operating in the South heretofore. They have simply been organized from individuals sent as individuals into the South. The difference here is not in the form of operation in the South. As I say, they have operated in battalion-size units heretofore. The difference is that they recruited men from a battalion, organized it as a battalion, sent it down as a battalion into the South. I think it has more bearing on their manpower problems than it does on their operational tactics.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the event there is no radical change in the complex of the war, such as Russia or China entering it in a major way, what is your best estimate of how long a war we are in for before the tide turns?

A. I can't predict the future. I think we have all recognized for a long period of time that this will be a long and difficult road. Beyond that I can't say.

Q. You pointed out the manpower problems of the Viet Cong. How do you assess the reports from Moscow and Peiping that they may send volunteers there to help with this recruiting problem?

A. I really can't assess it, Jack. I don't know what action they will take. I think it will be very difficult for them to recruit men, train them in guerrilla tactics, which are a unique form of combat opera-
tions, and infiltrate them through these very long and difficult routes of communication.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there were reports of Soviet surface-to-air missiles in the Hanoi area. Could you tell us something about that. Are there more than one site? Also any Chinese Communist troop movements?

A. No, I can't comment upon any surface-to-air missile sites in North Viet-Nam. To the best of my knowledge there are no operational sites at the present time, but I think we should assume that there will be and plan accordingly, and we are so planning.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports out of Honolulu, from intelligence sources made public yesterday, I believe, that the Communists are planning to make Da Nang into another Dien Bien Phu. Is there any evidence of a large troop buildup in that area?

A. There are indications that in the highland areas to the west of Da Nang—this is Da Nang on the coast—that in the highland areas west of Da Nang there have been substantial buildups of Viet Cong forces during the last 12 months. What plans they have for the use of those forces, I can't say; I don't know. We have a very large base at Da Nang.

We have an important airbase at Phu Bai, between Hue and Da Nang. It is to protect the substantial quantities of U.S. equipment and the substantial number of U.S. forces at these bases that we have recently introduced into that area certain Marine battalions. There are four there at the present time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as the destructiveness of the airstrikes increases, isn't there some likelihood that the political or deterrent effect that you might expect from them will be less in that the North will have less to lose?

A. They obviously will have less to lose when they have lost some 23 bridges, but I doubt very much that the effect will be less. The infiltration continues, as I suggested, along these routes. Our airstrikes are now concentrating on armed reconnaissance, flying over the routes, attacking military trucks and military convoys.

I do not anticipate that the effect of those strikes will be less in the future than it has been to date.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider it possible for the Communist side to bottle up Americans somewhere like Da Nang and turn it into a Dien Bien Phu? Is it possible for us to get into that kind of a fix?

A. The war in South Viet-Nam is a war that must be fought primarily by the South Vietnamese. It is a guerrilla war. They are the major elements of the antiguerrilla forces. We must depend upon them for that antiguerrilla combat. They are fighting for the preservation of their own Government, their own nation. So I think the answer to your question is no.

Q. Mr. Secretary, aren't we endangering the American forces in South Viet-Nam by letting Soviet bloc ships and Russian ships daily land arms at Hai Fong without doing anything about it?

A. The arms we are talking about are Chinese arms that are coming in from China to the best of our knowledge.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you at all discouraged by the results so far of the controlled escalation tactics?
A. I think the effects are quite clear, the physical effects are clear, and the obvious effects on the rate of infiltration and the increased effort that these strikes are causing the North Vietnamese are much to our advantage.

Q. How much is our effort currently costing us in South Viet-Nam?

A. It is extremely difficult to estimate the cost of this operation, simply because we are dealing with costs that are difficult to allocate. How would you allocate the Pentagon, for example, between all of our other operations, worldwide and those in South Viet-Nam? But making the best allocation we can, it is something on this order:

Economic aid is probably running $300 million a year. I will check the accuracy of this for you a little later. P.L. 480 contributions—these are contributions of food and agriculture products—probably running on the order of $70 million a year. It seems likely that the military assistance program for South Viet-Nam for fiscal 1965, our current fiscal year, will approximate $330 million. And very, very roughly, I would estimate the cost of the U.S. forces operating in the waters of South Viet-Nam and in the air and the cost of our advisory and logistical support, is running on the order of $800 million a year. So that we have a cost approximating a billion and a half dollars at the present time.

I think that is all, gentlemen. Thank you very much.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

73. REVIEW OF SITUATION IN VIET-NAM: Statement by the President, April 27, 1965

We are engaged in a crucial struggle in Viet-Nam.

Some may consider it a small war. But to the men who give their lives, it is the last war. And the stakes are huge.

Independent South Viet-Nam has been attacked by North Viet-Nam. The object of that attack is conquest.

Defeat in South Viet-Nam would be to deliver a friendly nation to terror and repression. It would encourage and spur on those who seek to conquer all free nations within their reach. Our own welfare and our own freedom would be in danger.

This is the clearest lesson of our time. From Munich until today we have learned that to yield to aggression brings only greater threats—and more destructive war. To stand firm is the only guarantee of lasting peace.

At every step of the way we have used our great power with the utmost restraint. We have made every effort to find a peaceful solution. We have done this in the face of the most outrageous and brutal provocation against Vietnamese and Americans alike.

Through the first 7 months of 1964, both Vietnamese and Americans were the targets of constant acts of terror. Bombs exploded in helpless villages, in downtown movie theaters, even at a sports field. Soldiers and civilians, men and women, were murdered and crippled.

Yet we took no action against the source of this brutality—North Viet-Nam.

When our destroyers were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin, we replied with a single raid. The punishment was limited to the dead.

For the next 6 months we took no action against North Viet-Nam. We warned of danger; we hoped for caution in others.

The answer was attack, and explosions, and indiscriminate murder. It soon became clear that our restraint was viewed as weakness. Our desire to limit conflict was viewed as a prelude to surrender. We could no longer stand by while attack mounted, and while the bases of the attackers were immune from reply.

And so we began to strike back.

But we have not changed our essential purpose. That purpose is peaceful settlement. That purpose is to resist aggression. That purpose is to avoid wider war.

I say again that I will talk to any government, anywhere, and without any conditions; if any doubt our sincerity, let them test it.

Each time we have met with silence, slander, or the sound of guns. But just as we will not flag in battle, we will not weary in the search for peace.

I reaffirm my offer of unconditional discussions. We will discuss any subject, and any point of view, with any government concerned.

This offer may be rejected, as it has been in the past. But it will remain open, waiting for the day when it becomes clear to all that armed attack will not yield domination over others. And I will continue along the course we have set: firmness with moderation, readiness for peace with refusal to retreat.

For this is the same battle which we have fought for a generation. Wherever we have stood firm, aggression has been halted, peace restored, and liberty maintained.

This was true under President Truman, President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy. And it will be true again in Southeast Asia.

74. ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS TO MEET MOUNTING MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN VIETNAM: Message From the President of the United States, May 4, 1965

To the Congress of the United States:

I ask the Congress to appropriate at the earliest possible moment an additional $700 million to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam.

This is not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our effort to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand united before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Vietnam shall be preserved and Communist attack will not succeed.

In fiscal year 1965 we will spend about $1.5 billion to fulfill our commitments in southeast Asia. However, the pace of our activity is steadily rising. In December 1961, we had 3,164 men in South Viet-

1 H. Doc. 157, 89th Cong., 1st sess.
n. By the end of last week the number of our Armed Forces there had increased to over 35,000. At the request of the Government of South Vietnam in March, we sent Marines to secure the key Damang/Phu Bai area; 2 days ago, we sent the 173d Airborne Brigade to the important Bien Hoa/Vung Tau area. More than 400 Americans have given their lives in Vietnam.

In the past 2 years, our helicopter activity in South Vietnam has tripled—from 30,000 flying hours in the first quarter of 1963 to 90,000 flying hours in the first quarter of this year.

In February we flew 160 strike sorties against military targets in North Vietnam. In April, we flew over 1,500 strike sorties against such targets.

Prior to mid-February we flew no strike sorties inside South Vietnam. In March and April, we flew more than 3,200 sorties against military targets in hostile areas inside the country.

Just 2 days ago, we dispatched Gen. C. L. Milburn, Jr., Deputy Surgeon General of the Army, to assist U.S. representatives in Vietnam in formulating an expanded program of medical assistance for the people of South Vietnam. We are contemplating the expansion of existing programs under which mobile medical teams travel throughout the countryside providing on-the-spot medical facilities, treatment, and training in rural areas.

The additional funds I am requesting are needed to continue to provide our forces with the best and most modern supplies and equipment. They are needed to keep an abundant inventory of ammunition and other expendables. They are needed to build facilities to house and protect our men and supplies.

The entire $700 million is for this fiscal year.

The Secretary of Defense will today support this request before the appropriate congressional committees.

Nor can I guarantee this will be the last request. If our need expands I will turn again to the Congress. For we will do whatever must be done to insure the safety of South Vietnam from aggression. This is the firm and irrevocable commitment of our people and Nation.

I have reviewed the situation in Vietnam many times with the Congress, the American people and the world. South Vietnam has been attacked by North Vietnam. It has asked our help. We are giving that help because our commitments, our principles, and our national interest demand it.

This is not the same kind of aggression with which the world has been long familiar. Instead of the sweep of invading armies, there is the steady, deadly stream of men and supplies. Instead of open battle between major opposing forces, there is murder in the night, assassination, and terror. Instead of dramatic confrontation and sharp division between nationals of different lands, some citizens of South Vietnam have been recruited in the effort to conquer their own country.

All of this shrouds battle in confusion. But this is the face of war in the 1960's. This is the "war of liberation." Kept from direct attack by American power, unable to win a free election in any country, those who seek to expand communism by force now use subversion and terror. In this effort they often enlist nationals of the countries they wish to conquer. But it is not civil war. It is sustained by power and resources from without. The very object of this tactic is
to create the appearance of an internal revolt and to mask aggression. In this way, they hope to avoid confrontation with American resolution.

But we will not be fooled or deceived, in Vietnam or any place in the world where we have a commitment. This kind of war is war against the independence of nations. And we will meet it, as we have met other shifting dangers for more than a generation.

Our commitment to South Vietnam is nourished by a quarter century of history. It rests on solemn treaties, the demands of principle, and the necessities of American security.

A quarter century ago it became apparent that the United States stood between those who wished to dominate an entire continent and the peoples they sought to conquer.

It was our determined purpose to help protect the independence of the Asian peoples.

The consequence of our determination was a vast war which took the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans. Surely this generation will not lightly yield to new aggressors what the last generation paid for in blood and towering sacrifice.

When the war was over, we supported the effort of Asian peoples to win their freedom from colonial rule. In the Philippines, Korea, Indonesia, and elsewhere we were on the side of national independence. For this was also consistent with our belief in the right of all people to shape their own destinies.

That principle soon received another test in the fire of war. And we fought in Korea, so that South Korea might remain free.

Now, in Vietnam, we pursue the same principle which has infused American action in the Far East for a quarter of a century.

There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The answer is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our power is essential, in the final test, if the nations of Asia are to be secure from expanding communism. Thus, when India was attacked, it looked to us for help, and we gave it gladly. We believe that Asia should be directed by Asians. But that means each Asian people must have the right to find its own way, not that one group or nation should overrun all the others.

Make no mistake about it. The aim in Vietnam is not simply the conquest of the South, tragic as that would be. It is to show that American commitment is worthless. Once that is done, the gates are down and the road is open to expansion and endless conquest. That is why Communist China opposes discussions, even though such discussions are clearly in the interest of North Vietnam.

Moreover, we are directly committed to the defense of South Vietnam. In 1954 we signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That treaty committed us to act to meet aggression against South Vietnam. The U.S. Senate ratified that treaty and that obligation by a vote of 82 to 1.

Less than a year ago the Congress, by an almost unanimous vote, said that the United States was ready to take all necessary steps to meet its obligations under that treaty.

That resolution of the Congress expressed support for the policies of the administration to help the people of South Vietnam against attack—a policy established by two previous Presidents.
Thus we cannot, and will not, withdraw or be defeated. The stakes are too high, the commitment too deep, the lessons of history too plain.

At every turning point in the last 30 years, there have been those who opposed a firm stand against aggression. They have always been wrong. And when we heeded their cries, when we gave in, the consequence has been more bloodshed and wider war.

We will not repeat that mistake. Nor will we heed those who urge us to use our great power in a reckless or casual manner. We have no desire to expand the conflict. We will do what must be done. And we will do only what must be done.

For, in the long run, there can be no military solution to the problems of Vietnam. We must find the path to peaceful settlement. Time and time again we have worked to open that path. We are still ready to talk, without conditions, to any government. We will go anywhere, discuss any subject, listen to any point of view in the interests of a peaceful solution.

I also deeply regret the necessity of bombing North Vietnam. But we began those bombings only when patience had been transformed from a virtue into a blunder—the mistaken judgment of the attackers. Time and time again men, women, and children—Americans and Vietnamese—were bombed in their villages and homes while we did not reply.

There was the November 1 attack on the Bien Hoa airfield. There was the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon. There was the February 7 attack on the Pleiku base. In these attacks 15 Americans were killed and 245 were injured. And they are only a few examples of a steady campaign of terror and attack.

We then decided we could no longer stand by and see men and women murdered and crippled while the bases of the aggressors were immune from reply.

But we have no desire to destroy human life. Our attacks have all been aimed at strictly military targets—not hotels and movie theaters and embassy buildings.

We destroy bridges, so it is harder to convey the instruments of war from north to south. We destroy radar stations to keep our planes from being shot down. We destroy military depots for the infiltration of men and arms to the south. We patrol routes of communications to halt the invaders. We destroy ammunition dumps to prevent the use of explosives against our men and our allies.

Who among us can feel confident that we should allow our soldiers to be killed, while the aggressor sits smiling and secure in his sanctuary, protected by a border which he has violated a thousand times. I do not believe that is the view of the American people or of the Congress.

However, the bombing is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to bring us closer to the day of peace. And whenever it will serve the interests of peace to do so, we will end it.

And let us also remember, when we began the bombings there was little talk of negotiations. There were few worldwide cries for peace. Some who now speak most loudly were quietly content to permit Americans and Vietnamese to die and suffer at the hands of terror without protest. Our firmness may well have already brought us closer to peace.

Our conclusions are plain.
We will not surrender.
We do not wish to enlarge the conflict.
We desire peaceful settlement and talks.
And the aggression continues.
Therefore I see no choice but to continue the course we are on, filled as it is with peril and uncertainty.
I believe the American people support that course. They have learned the great lesson of this generation: Wherever we have stood firm aggression has been halted, peace restored, and liberty maintained.
This was true in Iran, in Greece and Turkey, and in Korea.
It was true in the Formosa Strait and in Lebanon.
It was true at the Cuban missile crisis.
It will be true again in southeast Asia.
Our people do not flinch from sacrifice or risk when the cause of freedom demands it. And they have the deep, abiding, true instinct of the American people: When our Nation is challenged it must respond. When freedom is in danger we must stand up to that danger. When we are attacked we must fight.
I know the Congress shares these beliefs of the people they represent.
I do not ask complete approval for every phase and action of your Government. I do ask for prompt support of our basic course: Resistance to aggression, moderation in the use of power, and a constant search for peace. Nothing will do more to strengthen your country in the world than the proof of national unity which an overwhelming vote for this appropriation will clearly show. To deny and delay this means to deny and delay the fullest support of the American people and the American Congress to those brave men who are risking their lives for freedom in Vietnam.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.


75. SPEECH BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON CONCERNING ECONOMIC AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM, MAY 13, 1965

Good morning ladies and gentlemen, and my friends of the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists. I am very happy that you requested through the press office this opportunity for us to meet together, because after looking at some of the cartoons you have drawn, I thought I’d invite you over to see me in person. After all, I had nothing to lose.
I know that I am talking to the most influential journalists in America. Reporters may write and politicians may talk but what you draw remains in the public memory long after these other words are forgotten. That is why, after I learned that you would be here and we would meet together that I put together some notes to discuss with you while you were in Washington, a very little-known side of our activity in one of the most vital places in the world—South Vietnam.
The war in Vietnam has many faces.

There is the face of armed conflict—of terror and gunfire—of bomb-heavy planes and campaign-weary soldiers. In this conflict our only object is to prove that force will meet force—that armed conquest is futile, and that aggression is not only wrong, but it just will not work.

And the Communists in Vietnam are slowly beginning to realize what they once scorned to believe; that we combine unlimited patience with unlimited resources in pursuit of an unwavering purpose.

We will not abandon our commitment to South Vietnam.

The second face of war in Vietnam is the quest for a political solution—the face of diplomacy and politics—of the ambitions and the interests of other nations. We know, as our adversaries should also know, that there is no purely military solution in sight for either side. We are ready for unconditional discussions. Most of the non-Communist nations of the world favor such unconditional discussions. And it would clearly be in the interest of North Vietnam to now come to the conference table. For them the continuation of war, without talks, means only damage without conquest. Communist China apparently desires the war to continue whatever the cost to their allies. Their target is not merely South Vietnam, it is Asia. Their objective is not the fulfillment of Vietnamese nationalism. It is to erode and to discredit America’s ability to help prevent Chinese domination over all of Asia.

In this domination they shall never succeed.

And I am continuing and I am increasing the search for every possible path to peace.

The third face of war in Vietnam is, at once, the most tragic and most hopeful. It is the face of human need. It is the untended sick, the hungry family and the illiterate child. It is men and women, many without shelter, with rags for clothing, struggling for survival in a very rich and a very fertile land.

It is the most important battle of all in which we are engaged.

It is not enough to just fight against something. People must fight for something, and the people of South Vietnam must know that after the long, brutal journey through the dark tunnel of conflict there breaks the light of a happier day. And only if this is so, can they be expected to sustain the enduring will for continued strife. Only in this way can longrun stability and peace come to their land.

And there is another, more profound reason. In Vietnam communism seeks to really impose its will by force of arms. But we would be deeply mistaken to think that this was the only weapon. Here, as other places in the world, they speak to restless people—people rising to shatter the old ways which have imprisoned hope—people fiercely and justly reaching for the material fruits from the tree of modern knowledge.

It is this desire, and not simply just for conquest, which moves many of the individual fighting men that we must now, sadly, call the enemy.

It is, therefore, our task to show that freedom from the control of other nations offers the surest road to progress, that history and experience testify to this truth. But it is not enough to call upon reason or point to examples. We must show it through action and
we must show it through accomplishment, and even were there no
war—either hot or cold—we would always be active in humanity's
search for progress. This task is commanded to us by the moral values
of our civilization, and it rests on the inescapable nature of the world
that we have now entered. For in that world, as long as we can
foresee, every threat to man's welfare will be a threat to the welfare
of our own people. Those who live in the emerging community of
nations will ignore the perils of their neighbors at the risk of their
own prospects.

This is true not only for Vietnam but for every part of the develop-
ing world. This is why, on your behalf, I recently proposed a massive,
cooperative development effort for all of southeast Asia. I named the
respected leader, Eugene Black, as my personal representative to in-
augurate our participation in these programs.

Since that time rapid progress has been made, I am glad to report.
Mr. Black has met with the top officials of the United Nations on
several occasions. He has talked to other interested parties. He has
found increasing enthusiasm. The United Nations is already setting
up new mechanisms to help carry forward the work of development.

In addition, the United States is now prepared to participate in,
and to support, an Asian Development Bank, to carry out and help
finance the economic progress in that area of the world, and the de-
velopment that we desire to see in that area of the world.

So this morning I call on every other industrialized nation, includ-
ing the Soviet Union, to help create a better life for all of the people
of southeast Asia.

Surely, surely, the works of peace can bring men together in a com-
mon effort to abandon forever the works of war.

But, as South Vietnam is the central place of conflict, it is also a
principal focus of our work to increase the well-being of people.
It is in that effort in South Vietnam which I think we are too little
informed and which I want to relate to you this morning.

We began in 1954 when Vietnam became independent, before the war
between the North and the South. Since that time we have spent
more than $2 billion in economic help for the 16 million people of
South Vietnam. And despite the ravages of war we have made steady
continuing gains. We have concentrated on food, and health, and edu-
cation, and housing, and industry.

Like most developing countries, South Vietnam's economy rests on
agriculture. Unlike many, it has large uncrowded areas of very rich,
and very fertile land. Because of this, it is one of the great rice bowls
of the entire world. With our help, since 1954, South Vietnam has
already doubled its rice production, providing food for the people, as
well as providing a vital export for that nation.

We have put our American farm know-how to work on other crops.
This year, for instance, several hundred million cuttings of a new
variety of sweet potato, that promises a sixfold increase in yield, will
be distributed to these Vietnamese farmers. Corn output should rise
from 25,000 tons in 1962 to 100,000 tons by 1966. Pig production has
more than doubled since 1955. Many animal diseases have been elimi-
nated entirely.

Disease and epidemic brood over every Vietnamese village. In a
country of more than 16 million people with a life expectancy of only
35 years, there are only 200 civilian doctors. If the Vietnamese had doctors in the same ratio as the United States has doctors, they would have not the 200 that they do have but they would have more than 5,000 doctors.

We have helped vaccinate, already, over 7 million people against cholera, and millions more against other diseases. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese can now receive treatment in the more than 12,000 hamlet health stations that America has built and has stocked. New clinics and surgical suites are scattered throughout that entire country; and the medical school that we are now helping to build will graduate as many doctors in a single year as now serve the entire population of South Vietnam.

Education is the keystone of future development in Vietnam. It takes a trained people to man the factories, to conduct the administration, and to form the human foundation for an advancing nation. More than a quarter million young Vietnamese can now learn in more than 4,000 classrooms that America has helped to build in the last 2 years; and 2,000 more schools are going to be built by us in the next 12 months. The number of students in vocational schools has gone up four times. Enrollment was 300,000 in 1955, when we first entered there and started helping with our program. Today it is more than 1,500,000. The 8 million textbooks that we have supplied to Vietnamese children will rise to more than 15 million by 1967.

Agriculture is the foundation. Health, education and housing are the urgent human needs. But industrial development is the great pathway to their future.

When Vietnam was divided, most of the industry was in the north. The south was barren of manufacturing and the foundations for industry. Today, more than 700 new or rehabilitated factories—textile mills and cement plants, electronics and plastics—are changing the entire face of that nation. New roads and communications, railroad equipment and electric generators, are a spreading base on which this new industry can, and is, growing.

All this progress goes on, and it is going to continue to go on, under circumstances of staggering adversity.

Communist terrorists have made aid programs that we administer a very special target of their attack. They fear them. They know they must fear them because agricultural stations are being destroyed and medical centers are being burned. More than 100 Vietnamese malaria fighters are dead. Our own AID officials have been wounded and kidnapped. These are not just the accidents of war. They are a part of a deliberate campaign, in the words of the Communists, "to cut the fingers off the hands of the Government."

We intend to continue, and we intend to increase our help to Vietnam.

Nor can anyone doubt the determination of the South Vietnamese themselves. They have lost more than 12,000 of their men since I became your President a little over a year ago.

But progress does not come from investment alone, or plans on a desk, or even the directives and the orders that we approve here in Washington. It takes men. Men must take the seed to the farmer. Men must teach the use of fertilizer. Men must help in harvest. Men must build the schools, and men must instruct the students. Men must
carry medicine into the jungle and treat the sick, and shelter the home-
less. And men—brave, tireless, filled with love for their fellows—are
doing this today. They are doing it through the long, hot, danger-
filled Vietnamese days and the sultry nights.

The fullest glory must go, also, to those South Vietnamese that are
laboring and dying for their own people and their own nation. In
hospitals and schools, along the rice fields and the roads, they continue
to labor, never knowing when death or terror may strike.

How incredible it is that there are a few who still say that the
South Vietnamese do not want to continue the struggle. They are
sacrificing and they are dying by the thousands. Their patient valor
in the heavy presence of personal, physical danger should be a helpful
lesson to those of us who, here in America, only have to read about it,
or hear about it on the television or radio.

We have our own heroes who labor at the works of peace in the midst
of war. They toil unarmed and out of uniform. They know the
humanity of their concern does not exempt them from the horrors of
conflict, yet they go on from day to day. They bring food to the hun-
gry over there. They supply the sick with necessary medicine. They
help the farmer with his crops, families to find clean water, villages
to receive the healing miracles of electricity. These are Americans
who have joined our AID program, and we welcome others to their
ranks.

For most Americans this is an easy war. Men fight and men suffer
and men die, as they always do in war. But the lives of most of us, at
least those of us in this room and those listening to me this morning,
are untroubled. Prosperity rises, abundance increases, the nation
flourishes.

I will report to the Cabinet when I leave this room that we are
in the 51st month of continued prosperity, the longest peacetime pros-
perity for America since our country was founded. Yet our entire
future is at stake.

What a difference it would make if we could only call upon a small
fraction of our unmatched private resources—businesses and unions,
aricultural groups and builders—if we could call them to the task of
peaceful progress in Vietnam. With such a spirit of patriotic sacrifice
we might well strike an irresistible blow for freedom there and for
freedom throughout the world.

I, therefore, hope that every person within the sound of my voice
in this country this morning will look for ways—and those citizens of
other nations who believe in humanity as we do, I hope that they will
find ways to help progress in South Vietnam.

This, then, is the third face of our struggle in Vietnam. It was
there—the illiterate, the hungry, the sick—before this war began. It
will be there when peace comes to us—and so will we. Not with sol-
diers and planes, not with bombs and bullets, but with all the won-
drous weapons of peace in the 20th century.

And then, perhaps, together, all of the people of the world can share
that gracious task with all the people of Vietnam, north and south
alike.

Thank you for coming this morning. Good morning.
To the Congress of the United States:

The American people want their government to be not only strong but compassionate. They know that a society is secure only where social justice is secure for all its citizens. When there is turmoil anywhere in our own country, our instinct is to inquire if there is injustice. That instinct is sound. And these principles of compassion and justice do not stop at the water's edge. We do not have one policy for our own people and another for our friends abroad.

A vast revolution is sweeping the southern half of this globe. We do not intend that the Communists shall become the beneficiaries of this revolt against injustice and privation. We intend to lead vigorously in that struggle. We will continue to back that intention with practical and concrete help.

In southeast Asia today, we are offering our hand and our abundance to those who seek to build a brighter future. The effort to create more progressive societies cannot wait for an ideal moment. It cannot wait until peace has been finally secured. We must move ahead now.

I know of no more urgent task ahead. It requires more of us, more of other prosperous nations, and more of the people of southeast Asia.

For our part, I propose that we expand our own economic assistance to the people of South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos.

I propose we start now to make available our share of the money needed to harness the resources of the entire southeast Asia region for the benefit of all its people. This must be an international venture. That is why I have asked Mr. Eugene Black to consult with the United Nations Secretary General and the leaders of the poor and advanced nations. Our role will be vital, but we hope that all other industrialized nations, including the Soviet Union, will participate.

To support our own effort, I ask the Congress to authorize and appropriate for fiscal year 1966 an additional $89 million for the Agency for International Development for expanded programs of economic and social development in southeast Asia.

This money will serve many purposes:

1. Approximately $19 million will provide the first installment of our contribution to the accelerated development of the Mekong River Basin. This is an important part of the general program of regional development which I outlined at Johns Hopkins University on April 7. This money will enable us to meet a request for half the cost of building the Nam Ngum Dam, which the international Mekong Committee has marked “Top Priority” if the Mekong River is to be put to work for the people of the region. This will be the first Mekong power project to serve two countries, promising power to small industry and lights for thousands of homes in northeast Thailand and Laos. The funds will provide also for—

   powerlines across the Mekong, linking Laos and Thailand;
   extensive studies of further hydroelectric, irrigation, and flood control projects on the Mekong main stream and its tributaries;
   expansion of distribution lines in Laos.

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1 H. Doc. 196, 89th Cong., 1st sess.
2. **Five million dollars** will be used to support electrification cooperatives near three provincial towns—Long Xuyen, Dalat, and Nha Thang—in South Vietnam. Co-ops which have been so important to the lives of our rural people, will bring the benefits of low-priced electricity to more than 200,000 Vietnamese. We hope this pattern can be duplicated in towns and villages throughout the region. I will ask that we provide further support if the pattern meets the success we believe possible.

3. **Seven million dollars** will help provide improved medical and surgical services, especially in the more remote areas of Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. South Vietnam is tragically short of doctors; some 200 civilian physicians must care for a population of 15 million. In Laos the system of AID-supported village clinics and rural hospitals now reaches more than a million people. But that is not enough. We propose to extend the program in Laos, assist the Thailand Government to expand its public health services to thousands of rural villages, and to organize additional medical and surgical teams for sick and injured civilians in South Vietnam.

Better health is the first fruit of modern science. For the people of these countries it has far too long been an empty promise. I hope that when peace comes our medical assistance can be expanded and made available to the sick and wounded of the area without regard to political commitment.

4. **Approximately $6 million** will be used to train people for the construction of roads, dams, and other small-scale village projects in Thailand and Laos. In many parts of Asia the chance of the villager for markets, education, and access to public services depends on his getting a road. A nearby water well dramatically lightens the burdens of the farmer's wife. With these tools and skills local people can build their own schools and clinics—blessings only dreamed of before.

5. **Approximately $45 million** will be used to finance increasing imports of iron and steel, cement, chemicals and pesticides, drugs, trucks, and other essential goods necessary for a growing civilian economy. This money will allow factories not only to continue but, through investment, to expand production of both capital and consumer goods. It will provide materials for urgently needed low-cost housing. And it will maintain production incentives and avoid inflation. It is not easy for a small country, with a low income, to fight a war on its own soil and at the same time persist in the business of nation-building. The additional import support which I propose will help Vietnam to persevere in this difficult task.

6. **An additional $7 million** will supplement the present program of agricultural development and support additional government services in all three countries, and will help in the planning of further industrial expansion in the secure areas of Vietnam.

* * * * *

Much of the additional assistance I request is for Vietnam. This is not a poor and unfavored land. There is water and rich soil and ample natural resources. The people are patient, hard-working, the custodians of a proud and ancient civilization. They have been oppressed not by nature but by man. The failures of man can be redeemed. That is the purpose of the aid for which I now ask additional authorization.
We are defending the right of the people of South Vietnam to decide their own destiny. Where this right is attacked by force, we have no alternative but to reply with strength. But military action is not a final solution in this area; it is only a partial means to a much larger goal. Freedom and progress will be possible in Vietnam only as the people are assured that history is on their side—that it will give them a chance to make a living in peace, to educate their children, to escape the ravages of disease, and above all, to be free of the oppressors who for so long have fed on their labors.

Our effort on behalf of the people of southeast Asia should unite, not divide, the people of that region. Our policy is not to spread conflict but to heal conflict.

I ask the Congress, as part of our continuing affirmation of America's faith in the cause of man, to respond promptly and fully to this request.

77. WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT RELATIVE TO MISSION OF U.S. GROUND UNITS IN VIETNAM

There has been no change in the mission of U.S. ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this regard to General Westmoreland recently or at any other time. The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations like the air base at Danang. They have the associated mission of active patrolling and securing action in and near the areas thus safeguarded. If help is requested by appropriate Vietnamese commanders, General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack when other effective reserves are not available and when, in his judgment, the general military situation urgently requires it. If General Westmoreland did not have this discretionary authority, a situation could easily arise in which heavy loss of life might occur and great advantage might be won by the Vietcong because of delays in communications.

This discretionary authority does not change the primary mission of U.S. troops in South Vietnam which has been approved by the President on the advice and recommendation of responsible authorities. However, I would emphasize any such change of primary mission would obviously be a matter for decision in Washington.
## C. U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM

**U.S. Fiscal Year - Millions of Dollars**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>276.4</td>
<td>275.4</td>
<td>276.6</td>
<td>279.9</td>
<td>285.4</td>
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### Table I - Expenditure by Program

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D. NUMBER OF CASUALTIES INCURRED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

A. CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM ACTIONS BY HOSTILE FORCES

[Cumulative from Jan. 1, 1961, through June 5, 1965]

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total deaths</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>398</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Wounded in action</td>
<td>1,916</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>2,352</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Missing in action</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Detained</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
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B. CASUALTIES NOT THE RESULT OF ACTIONS BY HOSTILE FORCES

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<tr>
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<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Dead</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>190</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Missing</td>
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1 Source: Department of Defense.

June 8—State Department spokesman says that U.S. military command in South Vietnam has been authorized to send American troops into combat alongside Vietnamese forces if such "combat support" is requested by South Vietnam.

June 9—White House issues statement that "There has been no change in the mission of U.S. ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks."

June 12—Spokesman announced that Premier Quat had decided to hand back the reins of government to the military following Chief of State Suu's refusal to approve proposed cabinet changes.

June 16—Secretary McNamara announces new troop movements to Vietnam which will bring total there to over 70,000.