The report contains information on the Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.

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17a. Descriptors

USSR
Military Organizations
Military Facilities
Military Personnel

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms

20000503 061

17c. COSATI Field/Group 15C

18. Availability Statement
Unlimited Availability
Sold by NTIS
Springfield, Virginia 22151

19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED

20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED

21. No. of Pages 142

22. Price $4.07
TRAINING METHODS IN AVIATION INTERCEPTOR UNITS CRITICIZED

In an Air Defense Interceptor Regiment

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 78 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col G. Molchan: "Unused Reserves"]

[Text] The flying weather was very bad. But, the fighter interceptors of the regiment were Lt Col V. Bukreyev who was serving as acting commander flew that day. First class pilots, real masters of their business carried out the missions. There many such area warriors in the regiment. Their contribution to the overall success of the collective in the socialist competition was significant. When the day flights ended, I found out that all the missions in the air had been carried out by the pilots with good and excellent evaluations.

But, I repeat, in the main it was masters of combat employment who participated in these flights. That day, the young pilots were at the airfield but they did not fly. Ahead of them is a great deal of work in order to learn to so successfully fly missions in such bad weather. It causes one to think: How attentively did they listen to those who flew during that shift, if they organized an exchange of knowhow there? But, the young pilots until the end of the flying remained somewhat aloof from what their senior comrades were doing in the air. True, in the squadron where Capt A. Toltinov is the political worker, a combat leaflet was published. But, the leaflet only reflected the flying missions and cited the names of those who were competing. But, as to how these missions are being carried out, what results the competition participants are achieving, who is ahead and who is behind—not a word.
The question arises: Could it be that here there are no laggards for whom the leading knowhow would be useful, those who require practical assistance in the struggle for better indicators? Especially in the first squadron. There was a time when this subunit [podrazdeleniye] was first not only as far as numerical designator is concerned. It lost its rank of excellent due to discipline violations. Potential accident causes exist here.

Of course, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of the dissemination of leading knowhow based on a few flights. All the more so since the basic measures for dissemination of this knowhow are conducted during the period of the ground training, during lessons and drills. However, as it turned out, the exchange of knowhow had not been any better organized these days.

What are the reasons for the deficiencies in generalization and dissemination of the knowhow of the best aviators? Maj V. Lysachev, commander of the first squadron, cites the fact that the commanders of the flights and the group chiefs are very busy. Lysachev recently took over the squadron. Squadron personnel had made the pledge to regain the rank of excellent subunit. It goes without saying that the young squadron commander has many concerns. But, the collective will not achieve the assigned goal if, due to business chores, it overlooks the important questions of organizing competition. Introduction of leading knowhow is the direct responsibility of all leaders. The Letter of the CC CPSU, USSR Soviet Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and CC Komsomol underscores: "It is necessary to elevate the publicity of the competition, to surround the leaders and the innovators with glory and respect, to widely disseminate and introduce their knowhow and achievements."

Commanders, political workers, party, and Komsomol organizations in the unit [chast'] have at their disposal the most varied technical means of agitation and propaganda, but they are not being used for the purposes of the further development of competition. I find out from a talk with Sr Lt A. Letenko, the chief of the unit club, that during the past training year and the beginning of this training year, not a single measure concerning the exchange of knowhow, not a single radio program devoted to competition leaders, was organized here.

But, the arsenal of the forms and methods of cultural and educational work to provide aid to commanders in illustrating competition progress is used in a goal-oriented manner in the officers' club in the military garrison. The workers in this
center of culture participated in the formulation of visual agitation in the duty flight shack. Portraits of the best aviators hang in the club foyer. Maj S. Smolev, the man behind this touch, demonstrated materials which generalized the flying knowhow of officer V. Balashov, one of the best aviators in the regiment.

However, more detailed and specific indicators of the achievements of the military aviators in socialist competition must be reflected directly within the regiment, in its Lenin rooms, in the political department and the staff, in the squadron staffs. But, even in the best Lenin room (the third squadron) the portraits of the leaders are hung with such laconic inscriptions, for example, "Capt Markin." Little can be gained from such an inscription.

And here is a display dedicated to the best efficiency experts. It is located in the regimental staff. Judging from the date inscribed on the latest of these pennants hanging on the wall, "1974," it is not difficult to guess when this display was updated the last time. One of the unsigned portraits depicts Sr Lt of Technical Services Yu. Boykov who transferred to another unit a long time ago. The display was set up seven years ago when the skilled members of the regiment took first place within the national air defense troops suggestion awards program.

But, could it be that all the efficiency experts in the unit have been transferred? Warrant Officer I. Rodionov himself put in more than 10 valuable suggestions last year. There are many people with excellent ideas in the TEC [technical maintenance unit] and in the squadrons. However, the results of the efficiency expert's second year is not clearly reflected anywhere.

Schools of leading knowhow are being created in the units for the study and widespread introduction into practice of new drills, forms, and methods of work by the victors of the competitions by specialties. I had an opportunity to familiarize myself with the work of one of these schools in the neighboring regiment where Maj A. Krayev is the political worker. Under the guidance of Engr-Maj V. Voronin, a member of the party committee, the lessons conducted here are interesting with practical demonstration of leading methods. The best pilots, engineers, and technicians who are well known in the regiment for their sniper strikes on the targets, for high culture in the maintenance of the missile equipped aircraft and for leading methodology in the training of young specialists give speeches.
For example, communist Capt N. Naruzhnyy, commander of an excellent crew, related leading knowhow to the students at the school, how the crew that he leads achieves accuracy in firing against maneuvering targets, how it analyzes the material from the flight recorders. The quality of each flight is discussed in the squadron. By doing so it achieves full visibility, publicity, and comparability of the results achieved. Through such analysis, maximum objectivity is achieved in evaluations and the position in the competition, which is assigned to each crew in accordance with the marks received, is more accurately determined.

The young commanders achieve in the school of leading knowhow not only the secret of methodological mastery but also the art of organizing competition within the crew, flight, and group. There is no doubt that this is useful.

This then is an example of the well thought out work on the propaganda of leading knowhow. The example is worthy of imitation, especially in the unit which was discussed above.

In an Interceptor Squadron

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 78 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt L. Bokhan, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Counting On a Weak 'Enemy'"]

[Text] A tactical flying exercise was undersay. The fighters from the squadron commanded by Maj A. Mikhaylov, one after another rose into the air to meet the "enemy." Taking off now was the flight commanded by Capt Yu. Ovchinnikov. Carrying out the vector commands, lead accurately took the flight to the assigned region. The sky was clear, cloudless, which also facilitated the visual search for the aerial targets.

The "enemy" fighters appeared unexpectedly. They were the first to detect the aircraft of the opposing sides. But, they were unable to put this to use. And, they themselves came under attack.

On the ground Capt Ovchinnikov reported that the flight had accomplished the assigned mission. And, the attack by the pilots (and this was confirmed by the photography) was successful. But, as the senior chief who was present during the flights pointed out, it was too much cut and dried, and the pilots operated in a trite manner.
Being blunt, the combat could not be called useful. This is what happened. In the process of a maneuver, Sr Lt V. Tkachenko's wingman was unable to maintain his position in the formation. Thus, they did not succeed in carrying out the aerial combat that had been thought through earlier. The pair received the command to return to the airfield. But, even in such a difficult situation there was the chance to achieve success. Orienting lead in the situation, he could have made a more effective maneuver, which would have allowed him to reestablish the combat formation and occupy a tactically advantageous position for a decisive attack.

To be fair to the pilots in the squadron we are discussing, it should be stated that all of them are first class specialists and experienced aerial warriors. During combat training, they have often demonstrated outstanding tactical and firing mastery, independence in the selection of maneuvers and means of attacking targets.

How then does one explain the low level of effectiveness of some of the flights during the exercise that was conducted? One reason is that, during the preparation for and during the progress of the exercise, let downs and simplifications were permitted. Main attention was concentrated on the timeliness of take off and arrival of the fighters on the attack line, on management of the air combat. It goes without saying that this is also important. But, along with this, one must be also concerned about creating a useful tactical situation and route, to envision measures which ensure overcoming "enemy" PVO [air defense] facilities.

And, what was observed during the preparations for the flights? The commander assigned the combat training mission to the pilots on the opposing sides in the same classroom. Here, they examined in detail the concept of each of the sides and stipulated the operations of the aviators at all stages of the aerial combat. This was done to ensure flight safety. Undoubtedly, one must concern oneself about safety measures. However, one must not forget about improving the tactical training of the aviators, creation of conditions which will facilitate their forming such qualities as independence, initiative, and combat activeness.

The squadron commander later explained that the main mission of these exercises was working out the elements of group aerial combat and therefore insufficient attention was placed on tactics. Well, there you have it—combat and without tactics. How can one be divorced from the other?
Undoubtedly those who support the work of the flying crews must also acquire combat skills during an exercise. However, the necessary intensity was not noted in the operations of the aviation specialists either. Having gotten the aircraft airborne, they took a smoke break. No one gave them unexpected inputs, no one attempted to check their skill in operating in a situation close to actual combat. When the command came to decontaminate the equipment, several of the specialists simply did not know the first thing to do. And, it is no accident that Sr Lt of Tech Svcs N. Volynskiy, deputy squadron commander, for a long time was unable to pinpoint those who had excelled at the exercise. Competition for overfulfillment of the norms in preparing aircraft for flight and raising the quality of equipment maintenance was not organized as it should have been.

Also coming to mind is another tactical flying exercise which was held by the very same squadron. On that occasion, a certain amount of artistry was demonstrated in the creation of conditions that approximated combat to the maximum. The aircraft who were acting as simulated targets and the interceptors took off from different airfields. Compressed suspenses in preparing the aircraft for flight were called for. The aerial situation often changed and the crews were retargeted to the accomplishment of unexpected missions which required from the pilots the ability to operate with initiative and to their maximum limits.

And, you should have seen the satisfaction on the faces of the aviators when they returned to the airfield. For example, when Capt M. Kukushkin during one flight succeeded in intercepting two low altitude targets, this success was discussed with interest by the pilots of the entire squadron. And, the ground-based specialists were not bored as they waited for the aircraft. They accomplished missions involving restoration of aircraft with simulated damage, repulsed attacks by airborne landing forces, and eliminated the after-effects of an "enemy" raid on the airfield.

The good knowhow accumulated in the organization of exercises, unfortunately, was not used in full measure in the squadron. Nor was the guidance of the socialist competition on a high level. They did not avoid formalism in this important matter. The aviators did not make pledges for the tactical flying exercise and, naturally, the results were not summed up. Not a single "flash" leaflet which would have discussed the outstanding pilots, technicians, and mechanics, appeared at the airfield the entire day. But, in this as well as in
the other squadrons of the regiment, there are many specialists whose work knowhow deserves the broadest publicity and popularization.

During the exercise critique, shortcomings were analyzed and ways to eliminate them were pointed out. It will be useful if a detailed discussion on raising the quality of aerial training also takes place in the party organization. The Letter of the CC CPSU, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and CC Komsomol concerning the unfolding of socialist competition in 1978 emphasizes the responsibility of every Soviet person to conduct an active struggle to raise the quality and effectiveness of work and to achieve the best results with the least expenditures. This requirement is fully applicable to military specialists as well.

A tactical flying exercise is a school of combat mastery. It is tied in with large expenditures of money, forces, and people's energy. And, it is very important that all the capabilities for a further improvement in the quality of aviator's aerial training be fully used during combat employment flights.

7869
CSO: 1801
SCHOOL ADMISSION ANNOUNCEMENTS

KGB, MVD, Engineer, and Musician Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Mar 78 p 4

[Unattributed]

[Text] Higher Border Schools of the KGB [Committee for State Security] attached to the USSR Council of Ministers

Moskovskoye vysshee pogranichnoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishchye imeni Mossoveta [Moscow Higher Border Command Red Banner School imeni Mossovet (129328, Moscow, I-328);

Vyssheye pogranichnoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishchye imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskogo [Higher Border Command Red Banner School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy] (480075, Alma-Ata, 75);


The schools train officers for the Border Troops of the KGB attached to the USSR Council of Ministers. The course of training is four years. Those who complete the schools are awarded the military rank of lieutenant and issued an All-Union level diploma with the award of the classification:

--in the higher border command schools--"combined-arms officer with higher general education";

--in the higher military-political school--"officer-political worker with higher general education."
The military schools accept first term servicemen as well as civilian youths who possess a completed secondary education and who are physically fit for training in military educational institutions.

The entrants' age—from 17 to 21 years—dates from 1 September of the year of entry.

The political school accepts CPSU members and candidate members and Komsomol members based on recommendation by political organs or Komsomol raykom (gorkom), who have demonstrated the inclination toward political work. Servicemen who desire to enter the school submit a report no later than 15 March through the chain of command to the unit [chast'] commander, while civilian youths submit an application to the personnel department of the committee for State Security attached to the Council of Ministers of the corresponding republic or to the Committee for State Security directorates within krays and oblasts. Applications are accepted until 30 April.

Entrance examinations are held at the secondary school level: for the command schools in Russian language and literature (written), mathematics (written and oral), physics (oral); for the military-political school in USSR history, geography, and mathematics (oral) and Russian language and literature (written).

Examinations begin on 1 July for servicemen and on 10 July for civilian youths.

Higher Schools of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]

Vyssheye politcheskoye uchilishche MVD SSSR [Higher Political School of the USSR MVD] (198075, Leningrad, L-75);

Novosibirskskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche MVD SSSR [Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School of the USSR MVD] (630114, Novosibirsk, 114);

Ordzhonikidzevskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni S. M. Kirova MVD SSSR [Ordzhonikidze Higher Military Command Red Banner School imeni S. M. Kirov of the USSR MVD] (362005, Ordzhonikidze, 5);

Saratovskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskogo MVD SSSR [Saratov Higher Military Command School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy of the USSR MVD] (410023, Saratov, 23);
Khar'kovskoye vyssheye voyennoye uchilishche tyla MVD SSSR [Khar'kov Higher Military School of Rear Services of the USSR MVD] (310005, Khar'kov, 5).

The schools train officers for the internal troops of USSR MVD.

The age of the entrants, necessary documents, the manner in which they are filled out, and periods for submission are determined by the rules governing acceptance to military educational institutions.

The Higher Political School of the USSR MVD accepts CPSU members and candidate members as well as Komsomol members who have demonstrated the inclination towards political work.

Warrant officers [praporshchik] are accepted in all military educational institutions of the USSR MVD (except the Novosibirsk and Saratov schools) if they have at least two years of practical experience:

--to the Ordzhonikidze Higher Military Command School--in the capacity of a platoon commander and company first sergeant;

--to the Higher Political School--in vacant political officer responsibilities:

--to the Khar'kov Higher Military School of Rear Services--as a company first sergeant, as well as a specialist in the intendence, automobile, and artillery-technical services.

The course of training is four years and is three years for warrant officers in the Ordzhonikidze Higher Military Command School.

Entrance examinations are given at the secondary school program level:

In the Higher Political School: in Russian language and literature (written), mathematics, USSR history, and geography (oral); in the Novosibirsk, Ordzhonikidze, and Saratov Higher Military Command Schools, as well as in the Khar'kov Higher Military Rear Services School: in Russian language and literature (written), mathematics (oral and written), and physics (oral). Instead of the examination in mathematics (written), entrants in the intendence specialty at the Khar'kov Military Rear Services School take an examination in chemistry (oral).
Entrance examinations for servicemen begin on 10 June and begin on 10 July for civilian youths.

Those who complete the schools are awarded the officer rank of lieutenant and issued an All-Union level diploma with the award of the classification:

--in the Higher Political School--"officer with higher political education";

--in the Novosibirsk, Ordzhonikidze, and Saratov Higher Military Command Schools--"motorized infantry officer with higher education";

--in the Khar'kov Higher Military Rear Services School--"officer of the automobile service, engineer-mechanic" (the automobile technical specialty); "officer of the artillery-technical service, engineer-mechanic" (the weapons-technical specialty); "officer of the provisions and equipment supply service, engineer-economist" (the intendence specialty).

Voyennyy inzhenernyy Krasnoznamennyy institut imeni A. F. Mozhayskogo [Military Engineering Red Banner Institute imeni A. F. Mozhayskiy]

First term and career servicemen and civilian youths are accepted. Entrants' age as well as the required entry documents and periods for the applications are determined by the rules for entry into military educational institutions.

The institute trains military engineers for the USSR Armed Forces. Those who complete the institute are awarded the military rank of engineer-lieutenant and, depending upon the specialty they have chosen, are granted an All-Union level diploma with the award of the qualification of military engineer-mechanic, military engineer-electrician, military engineer-hydrometeorologist, military engineer-builder, military engineer-mathematician, military engineer in radio technical specialties, and military engineer in electronics and radio electronics.

Entrance examinations are given in mathematics (written and oral), physics (oral), and Russian language and literature (written).

The course of training is five years.

Detailed information can be obtained at military commissariates and at unit staffs.
The institute address is 197082, Leningrad, P-82, Zhdanovskaya Ulitsa, 13.

Voyenno-dirizherskiy fakul'tet pri Moskovskoygosudarstvennoy ordena Lenina konservatorii imeni P. I. Chaykovskogo
[Bandmaster Faculty attached to the Moscow State Order of Lenin Conservatory imeni P. I. Chaykovskiy]

The faculty trains officer-bandmasters with a higher military-musical education. The course of training is five years.

The faculty accepts: warrant officers [praporshchik i nichman] and career servicemen through age 25; first term servicemen and civilian youths through age 23 based on 1 September 1978.

Those entering the faculty must have a secondary musical education and be able to play an orchestra instrument.

Entrance examinations are conducted at the secondary school level in Russian language and literature (written), USSR history (oral), and mathematics; directing, wind orchestra instrument (practical), solfeggio and harmony (oral and written) at the level of a musical school program.

Entrance examinations begin on 17 July 1978.

Detailed information can be obtained at military commissariats and unit staffs. The faculty's address is 119021, Moscow, G-21, Komsomol'skiy Prospekt, 22.

Physical Culture School

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Mar 78 p 4

[Unattributed]

[Text] Voyennyy dvazhdy Krasnoznamennyy institut fizicheskoy kul'tury [Higher Twice Red Banner Institute of Physical Culture] announces admission to the first course.

The course of training at the institute is four years. The graduates are issued an All-Union level diploma of a higher military-special education in physical culture and sport.

The institute accepts for residence instruction warrant officers [praporshchik (michman)], first-term and career servicemen, and civilian youth with a completed secondary education who possess a sports rating of at least second class (for civilian youths—at least a first
youth class) in one type of sport, meet the health requirements for study in the institute, and who have successfully passed competitive examinations. The age of the entrants, the required entry documents, and periods for their submission are determined by the rules of acceptance to a military educational institution.

Warrant officers and first-term and career servicemen who have the rank of "USSR Master of Sport," "USSR Master of Sport International Class," or "Distinguished USSR Master of Sport" are accepted to the institute through age 27.

Officers under 30 who possess the rank "USSR Master of Sport," "USSR Master of Sport International Class," and "Distinguished USSR Master of Sport" in olympic types of sports are accepted to the group which prepares trainers of the highest classification.

The non-resident department accepts officers and warrant officers who are serving as chiefs (teachers) of physical training and sport, trainers in sport clubs, and sports instructors at age: senior officers--up to 40 years, junior officers--through age 35, and warrant officers who have served in the rank of warrant officer at least three years--until age 27.

Competitive entrance examinations are conducted in Russian language and literature (written), biology (oral), chemistry (oral), physical culture and sport (practical accomplishment of drills in gymnastics, light athletics, swimming, as well as examination of the level of technical preparedness in the selected type of sport).

Entrance examinations for civilian youths, first-term and career servicemen, and warrant officers start on 15 July through 5 August and from 5 through 15 August for officers.

Detailed information concerning entrance rules can be obtained at military commissariats or unit staffs.

The institute's address: 194044, Leningrad, K-44, Prospekt Karla Markska, 63.

Naval School

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 78 p 4

[Unattributed]
Lomonosovskoye morekhodnoye uchilishche VMF [Lomonosov Navigation School of the Navy] announces admission to the first course.

The school trains specialists with a secondary special education for work in command positions aboard support ships of the Navy.

Admission is based on secondary education in the specialties: technician-ship operator, technician-ship mechanic, radio technician, as well as on the basis of an eighth grade education in specialties: technician-ship operator with the right to operate ship board engines.

The course of training at the secondary education level is three years and four months, on the eighth grade level is four years and four months.

The school accepts youths 17 and older (at the eighth level--from age 15) who are physically fit for service in the Navy.

Persons who have at least two years of practical work experience, as well as servicemen who have been released from active military service into the reserve (within two years of their release) are accepted non-competitively upon receipt of positive evaluations on the entrance examinations.

Entrance examinations are conducted from 1 through 10 August in Russian language and literature--essay (for those with the eighth grade background--dictation) and in mathematics (oral).

Out of town candidates are provided housing cost free during the period of the examinations.

Graduates are given an All-Union level diploma of secondary technical education.

Detailed rules for entry to the school are available upon request. The address of the school: 188510, Leningradskaya Oblast, Lomonosov, Ulitsa Krasnega Flota, Building 18/48.

Military Institute

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Mar 78 p 4

[Unattributed]

The translation, military-juridical and military-political faculties are admitting students.

The institute is accepting civilian youths, first-term and career servicemen, as well as warrant officers [praporshchik i michman] who possess a secondary education and who are physically fit for training in a military educational institution. The age of the entrants as well as the documents required for entry and periods for their submission are determined by the rules for admission to military educational institutions. Applications must indicate the name of the faculty selected.

Entrants take competitive entrance examinations for all faculties at the secondary school program level in Russian language and literature (written and oral), foreign language (oral) and USSR history (oral). Examinations will be held from 15 July through 5 August.

The course of training is five years.

Graduates are awarded the military rank of lieutenant and given an All-Union level diploma with the award of the corresponding qualification.

Address: 109033, Moscow, Zh-33, Volochayevskaya Ulitsa, Building 3.

Air Defense Radio-Technical School

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 78 p 4

[Unattributed]


Officers up to age 35 who possess a higher military or higher military-special education or at least two years of practical work experience in officer positions after completion of the VUZ and who have demonstrated the capability for pedagogical and scientific research work are accepted for graduate work.

Applications for graduate work are submitted through the chain of command until 1 March 1978 with a copy sent directly to the chief of the school with an indication of the selected specialty (faculty), the foreign language studied, and duty address.
Entrance examinations will be held at the level of the school program for the special discipline, CPSU history, and one foreign language from 1 through 30 June 1978.

Individuals who have completely or partially passed candidate examinations with the approval of the acceptance commission can be released from taking the corresponding entrance examinations and exercise preferential rights upon registration. Here, the candidate examination in the special discipline must have been taken at the school.

Apply to this address: 252064, Kiev-64.

Air Defense Command Academy

Moscow KRASNYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Feb 78 p 4

[Unattributed]

[Excerpts] Voyennaya komandnaya akademiya protivovozdushnoy oborony imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza G. K. Zhukova [Military Command Academy of Air Defense imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov] announces admission to resident graduate work, including both in the specific specialty and specialties announced by the directive.

Accepted for graduate work are officers up to age 38 who have a higher education, at least two years of practical experience in officer responsibilities after completion of the VUZ, and who have demonstrated the ability to handle pedagogical and scientific research work.

Applications for graduate training are submitted through the chain of command with a copy directly to the chief of the academy indicating the selected specialty, the foreign language studied, and service address.

Exams will be held from 1 through 30 June 1978 in CPSU history and the foreign language at the level of the VUZ and, in the special discipline, at the level of the corresponding academy faculties.

Address inquiries to: Kalinin-22, Ulitsa Zhigareva 50. Telephone: 3-70-01, additional numbers 3-02, 3-43, 4-90.
Higher Naval School

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 78 p 4

[Excerpts] Vyssheye voyenno-morskoye uchilishche imeni M. V. Frunze [Higher Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze] announces admission to resident graduate work.

Accepted for graduate work are naval officers through age 35 who have a higher education, at least two years of practical experience in officer responsibilities after completion of the VUZ, and who have demonstrated the ability to handle pedagogical and scientific research work.

Commanders of units and institutions along with their comments and the documents, as well as the applicants' personnel files and medical records, are sent to the chief of the school prior to 1 May 1978. Competitive entrance examinations will be held from 1 June through 30 August 1978 at the level of extant school programs in the special discipline, CPSU history, and one foreign language.

The specialties in which the selection for graduate work is being made will be refined in personal correspondence.

Direct inquiries to 199162, Leningrad, V-162, VVMU imeni M. V. Frunze.

7869
CSO: 1801
SUPPLY ECONOMY IN AIR DEFENSE UNITS DESCRIBED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 21 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Engr-Col V. Zheltov: "They Achieved Success. But At What Cost?"]

[Text] My job often takes me to units [chast'] and sub-units [podrazdeleniye] to analyze questions concerning the organization of the training process and competition and concerning operation and care of weapons and combat equipment. Here are some of the ideas and conclusions that I have formed.

We were once working in a surface-to-air missile battalion commanded by Lt Col M. Konovalov. At first glance, the picture here was fine: the subunit year after year achieved good results in the accomplishment of the training plan and of socialist pledges. Lt Col Konovalov with pride named the best specialists and their achievements in combat work.

But, during an inspection it turned out that the expenditure of the service life of the radio electronic gear here was not monitored last year. Why was that? The battalion commander cited local conditions, specific difficulties, and so on. "If we sometimes permitted some deviations from the norms of service life expenditure," he said, "then naturally it was in the interests of raising the qualification of the operators and the coordination of the command post crew."

Is Lt Col Konovalov correct? No. Unmonitored expenditure of service life is the consequence of ineffective use of the equipment during training sessions and the fact that servicing was not sufficiently careful. They do not approach such questions in a serious manner in the subunit. "The
main thing," several of the officers here stated, "are high indicators in training and at what price they are achieved is not all that important."

PVO [Air Defense] troops are involved with the maintenance and operation of complex and expensive combat equipment and the expenditure of resources. The requirements of the 25th CPSU Congress and the words of the appeal from the Letter of the CC CPSU, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and CC Komsomol—to economize in all areas, in the large items and the small, to reduce production costs, and to completely eliminate instances of waste and extravagance—fully apply to them. Analysis shows that it is possible to achieve high indicators in combat training of specialists with much less expenditures of effort, time, and money with a significant savings in the service life of combat equipment.

The experience of leading military collectives also confirms this. For example, in the subunits commanded by officers L. Korol'kov, M. Dranikov, and V. Sikerzhitskiy, a significant savings in equipment operating life has been achieved in recent years. Moreover, along with this is a high level of specialist training, excellent crew coordination, and the continual combat readiness of the subunits.

What guarantees such success? It is primarily careful organization of the training process and effective utilization of every lesson hour. Here they have elaborated a methodology for the lessons and drills conducted with the combat equipment which clearly points out exactly which equipment is required for the accomplishment of specific training tasks and in what sequence simulators and other technical training means is to be used. Here they are continually improving the organization of servicing work, they are introducing the most effective drills for elimination of deficiencies, and they rule out instances in which the equipment is unnecessarily used. The knowhow of these subunits has been generalized and is now being adopted.

Engineers from senior staffs can make a significant contribution to the struggle for economic use of the service life of combat equipment and weapons. For example, Engineer-Lt Col B. Lemster was the initiator of a new system for planning adjustment and servicing of the equipment in units and subunits. It is based upon the scale-critical path method and it permits taking into account all types and the amount of equipment in subunits, determining the
most rational sequence of work accomplishment, ensuring that specialists have the required instruments and tools, and monitoring the quality of how the inspections are performed.

The example of the unit where Engineer-Lt Col V. Vinogradov is the deputy commander for weapons can serve to illustrate the viability of such a planning system. Here they are creating integrated groups which monitor the organization of servicing. In addition to engineers from the unit weapons service, they include the most experienced specialists in the subunit as well as the repairmen. The integrated group ensures careful accomplishment of the work called for by the schedule and assists in the timely repair of deficiencies as well as the generalization and propagandizing of the know-how of the best specialists.

In addition, the officers from the unit weapons service hold a daily meeting and analysis of the information concerning the condition of the equipment in the subunits and failures which have occurred. Based on these data, qualified substantiated decisions are made and a great deal of servicing work is accomplished in order to improve the quality of the maintenance and operation of the weapons and combat equipment.

Introduction of the system developed by Engineer-Lt Col Lemster requires a high degree of special training on the part of engineers and technicians. With this in mind, training meetings are held with them. A meeting held recently was highly valued by the specialists, for example. Lessons, a seminar, demonstration, and servicing enriched the meeting participants with valuable, useful knowhow.

There is yet another way to ensure preservation of the service life of combat equipment and economic expenditure of resources. We are talking about improving training facilities. For example, in the subunits commanded by officers M. Mel'nichenko and V. Prilipko, a fine training base has been created through their own efforts. Classrooms equipped with items that are no longer serviceable but are usable for training purposes have been set up for specialists of all types. The missilemen acquire knowledge and practical skills without working on serviceable combat equipment here. Thus, a significant savings in the service life of the combat equipment is achieved.
If we carefully look to see how better and more effectively to organize combat training, to look for what is required on the part of every commander, political worker, engineer, and technician, then we most certainly will find new reserves for improving combat readiness and the preservation of the service life of combat equipment and of resources.
EXCESSES OF SPARE PARTS AND ACCESSORIES CRITICIZED

Moscow KRAZNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by V. Trokhov, worker in a repair enterprise: "A Mountain of Spare Parts." Passages enclosed in slant lines printed in bold face]

[Text] In his speech at our Party meeting, the chief accountant began (how many years in a row is this now?) mentioned the leftovers that exceed the norms. They are the sore point of a cost-accounting enterprise. We are involved in the capital repair of military communications equipment. One would wonder where we would get leftovers? It seems that everything that we get must be used for the equipment. However, is everything we are receiving useful for our purposes?

Take, for example, any listing of the parts contained in repair set No 1. Of the 61 items, there are only 4 which need to be increased in the number that are supplied. Of the remaining 57 spare part items, many should be reduced in number and some are not even needed at all. This picture is characteristic for any other of the sets of ZIP (spare parts, tools, and accessories).

I begrudge extra work and wasted funds. I have spoken about this many times with members of commissions who have come to visit us. The people have agreed with me but everything remains the same. And, of our suppliers, we have been unable to find a single enterprise which will respond to our requests. If only just one of them would attempt to change the composition of the ZIP at his enterprise. For what? It involves "volume" and, behind the "volume" are the bonuses.
They tell us that if we don't want to accept the repair part sets, then we will get the ZIP in scattered fashion. That's what they did last year. But, this year the cartons of spare part sets sent down to us from above are arriving. Soon the warehouses will begin to get the overflow from the shops. The mountain of above-norm reserves will get even bigger. How many more times does the chief accountant have to sound the alarm?

From the Editorial Board

Our correspondent visited the repair enterprise where comrade Trokhov works. The facts contained in his letter were confirmed. The enterprise annually sends the higher organ requests to change the composition of the ZIP, however, the ZIP are either not corrected in any way by the supplying plants year after year or the corrections made are insignificant.

The chief engineer at the enterprise, Engr-Maj Zh. Buryak who thinks that worker Trokhov should not have turned with his appeal to the newspaper, adopted a strange position in his discussion with our correspondent. Meanwhile, it was clear to everyone that the problem posed in the reader's letter is a very important one and it concerns, by the way, not only a single repair organ, not only communications equipment. Corrections in the repair ZIP is an important state matter. Great reserves for savings exist here.

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CSO:  1801
I wanted to visit the lessons in a battalion which had successfully completed the past training year and which is accumulating achievements during winter training. The regimental staff designated the First Motorized Infantry Battalion commanded by Gds Capt I. Agbalov. I joined the lessons in the excellent subunit [podrazdeleniye] with the hope of seeing careful organization of the training process, the fervent zeal of competition, and the struggle for effective use of every training minute.

The battalion chief of staff recommended that I visit the First Motorized Infantry Company. The location of the lesson was the tactical range and we traveled there with Gds Lt Yu. Kondaurov, the deputy company commander for political affairs. However, the subunit did not turn out to be at the tactical range. The battalion chief of staff commented on this fact in the following way:

"It means that they selected another spot. You can work on tactics any place you so desire."

Speaking bluntly, this is a doubtful conclusion. Why select "another spot" if you have a specially equipped area: with a designated "enemy," and targets set up. Moreover, it is strange to hear this from an officer whose duty it was to monitor the unswerving adherence to the lesson schedule. By the way, as it later turned out, the company was not occupied with tactics in any other place.

Four hours of tactical training had been planned for this day for the Second Motorized Infantry Company as well.
But, the lessons did not take place here either. Gds Lt. S. Chirkov, acting company commander, explained this by saying that some of the troops were on fatigue duty. The remaining operator-gunners had been sent to the firing range and the driver-mechanics on the combat infantry vehicles [BMP] had been sent to the motor pool. An analogous picture was seen in the Third Motorized Infantry Company.

What caused the incongruity between the plans and actual events? Gds Capt I. Agibalov said that the main reason was the necessity for the fatigue duties. But actually, some of the battalion troops were separated from the subunit by order of the higher staff. At the same time, quite a few soldiers and sergeants were working in the battalion area.

This turned out not to be a unique situation. Having learned from the schedule that a day later there would be field firing in the battalion, I went to the firing range. Located here was the motorized infantry company commanded by Gds Sr Lt A. Kilunin. The firing, as they say, was not waging—the company was doing a drill. Moreover, the troops were listless and operated without enthusiasm.

Gds Sr Lt Kilunin explained this by saying "the target field has been set up for field firing at platoon level but, our plan calls for individual firing." But, as it turned out later, this was not the reason. The company did not fire because the motorized infantrymen did not receive ammunition. The chief of the warehouse was nowhere to be found.

Several days later, I again visited the company commanded by Gds Sr Lt A. Kilunin. The motorized infantrymen accomplished combat firing in platoons. Such firing is the concluding stage of platoon training and the examination of its combat coordination. Here a great deal depends on the ability of the lesson director to create a useful tactical background, to place the trainees in conditions which are very close to the situation in actual combat. Unfortunately, this did not happen and mostly because the time that it took for the targets to pop up was inordinate. The operator at the control panel was not operating with a stopwatch but was doing it by eyeballing. Neither the platoon commander Gds Lt A. Terent'yev or the company commander "noticed this" somehow. The armored targets during the lesson were denoted by frames made of rods. It was practically impossible to determine whether such a "target" took a hit. One could only be amazed at how the commander was able to make the conclusion that "a majority of the platoons received a good evaluation."
Nor was a spirit of competition felt during the lesson. The following system has, for a long time, been a part of the training practice of the personnel: Prior to firing, the platoons make specific socialist pledges. They are reflected in visual agitation. This was not done in the company. The mobile Lenin room also was not deployed. A critique of the operations and a summing up of the results of pledge accomplishment by the platoons were not held.

The main reason for these deficiencies can primarily be seen in the fact that several officers in the battalion set about accomplishment of their service obligations without the requisite responsibility. This is the only thing that can explain, for example, the fact that Gds Sr Lt A. Kilunin takes the subunit out to the firing range when it hasn't received its ammunition, that the Third Motorized Infantry Company wasted two hours of planned lessons on the preparations for firing, that the commander of the battalion and the staff poorly monitored the progress of the training.

One would think that there is no requirement to point out that those who attended the lessons discussed above, for example the battalion commander, could have avoided many of the shortcomings. However, Gds Capt I. Agibalov for some reason felt it necessary to check on the state of things in the barracks. But, truly, it is difficult to agree that monitoring the clean up of the barracks is more important than organization of field firing. Or, that a battalion commander would think that an excellent subunit can operate on its own.

When I raised this point, Gds Capt Agibalov frankly stated:

"Well, to be honest with you, we are not excellent soldiers. We were more surprised than anyone when the battalion rated us as excellent."

At first, I felt that the battalion commander had said this in the heat of the moment. But, political worker Gds Capt L. Shkad', acting deputy regimental commander for political affairs, also affirmed:

"Yes, at the regiment the battalion was not rated as excellent but the higher headquarters designated it as such."

At the unit [chast'] staff, I was shown a document which reflects the summing up of the combat and political training for the last training year. The document states that the First Motorized Infantry Battalion was not only not excellent but it was at the back of the pack among the regimental subunits. I looked at a summary document at the formation [soyedineniye]
staff. Amazingly it was written there that the battalion commanded by Gds Capt I. Agibalov, based on the results of the socialist competition, achieved outstanding results.

One must propose that the corresponding responsible persons establish how this came to be entered in the document. It is only left to me to say that a non-objective, inflated evaluation brought nothing but harm to the battalion. Who is to say that, in the festive situation of receiving congratulations and undeserved valuable presents, several battalion officers didn't come up with the idea that high indicators in training come by themselves, that it is possible not to have to fight for them.

Quite a long period of time passed after these initial meetings. Not long ago, I again visited the unit. "Organization of the training process has been set straight in the battalion," they assured me at the staff, "Control over lesson progress has been strengthened and the party committee has strictly pointed out to the battalion commander the necessity to be more responsible in the organization of training." But, along with Gds Maj A. Rabchenyuk, secretary of the party committee, we headed for the battalion and it soon turned out that far from everything has been done so far in order to ensure high quality and the effectiveness of each lesson. Lack of organization continues to occur. Thus, for example, the company which, according to the words of the battalion commander should be involved in physical training, in actual fact was involved in cleaning its gasmasks.

When deficiencies are repeated, when organizational gaps turn out basically to be the system, then, you will agree, there is a cause for alarm. And, it is not a matter only of the actual harm which it brings to the combat training of the subunit. There is also the moral factor. Moreover, it is known how errors of this type disenchant people. In the Letter of the CC CPSU, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and CC Komsomol concerning the unfolding of competition in 1978 underscores that organization and discipline are vital factors in the struggle for the successful accomplishment of socialist pledges. In the instance described, we are involved with an underevaluation of just these very factors.

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CS0: 1801
FIRING TRAINING IN A MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 78 p 1

[Article by Capt A. Bezyukevich, motorized infantry battalion commander, Red Banner Far East Military District: "The Effect of Competition"]

[Text] The battalion was tasked to execute drills involving training firing from infantry combat vehicles [BMP]. Understanding that the smooth rhythm of the exercises is guaranteed ahead of time, we in the staff, it seemed to us, thought through all the details. The companies held party and Komsomol meetings where they discussed measures to increase the vitality of socialist competition.

We presumed that the struggle for first place would unfold between the companies commanded by Sr Lts S. Ignatenko and V. Vodolatskiy. The former had pledged by the end of the year to become excellent and the latter was zeroed in on a good evaluation. But, it would be possible evidently, given proper organization, to achieve even more. That is why everyone believed that during the firing these two companies would come out ahead of the competing subunits [podrazdeleniye]. The officers were the first to fire. And, as long as they were firing, everything went well. The results were stable. The socialist competition gained strength and heated up.

When it came time for the young troops and the driver-mechanics to show their skill in firing, the results fell. The people recognized their responsibility and tried. But, as sometimes happens, the harder they tried, the worse they fired. There were many two's. The company commanded by St Lt S. Ignatenko only achieved 69 percent successful completion of the lesson among the total number of shooters. The results for the group of young soldiers headed by Lt S. Podymako were even worse.
What were they to do? What should they do overall in order to do away with such bad luck? In any event, there certainly can be no hanging of heads and sitting on hands. The officers profoundly analyzed the reasons for the breakdown in this lesson. It turned out that the people did not possess firm skills in the use of the sight. They were unable to fire the stipulated number of rounds at the "enemy" tanks and his infantry in the established norm time. They fussed about and lost time. Several young soldiers, according to observations by Lt S. Podymako, tightened up in anticipation of the shock and jerked the trigger. And, this is direct evidence of a poor level of training.

They decided to place greater attention on working out these problems at subsequent exercises and set up better training facilities in the battalion. We have an equipped firing and engineer range, a company strong point, and a lesson area. Simulators set up in the firing area make it possible with a great deal of effectiveness and quality to conduct electronic firing and tank firing drills. With the aid of special sight mockups created by efficiency experts, we have the capability to carry out the detection and selection of the target, determine its range, and lay the gun and machine gun.

Separating the personnel into competing pairs, we organized the lessons in various sectors of the training area. One of the two troops in this instance is obliged to be the victor. And, the individual who loses desires to overtake his comrade.

After three days of training, Lt S. Podymako again "fired" the young soldiers. This time they fired without any two's. But, they could do better! The company commander noted that the motorized infantry excellently destroyed close-in targets but missed the long-range targets. It turned out that the soldiers introduced too much of a correction when taking into account such factors as the wind, movement of the vehicle, and movement of the target. The officer introduced corrections into the methodology of training and the results in firing against long-range targets improved significantly.

We summed up daily with a short generalization of leading knowhow and analysis of shortcomings. And, it became clear each day that moving ahead in the competition is the company led by Sr Lt V. Vodolatskiy. This in the main is thanks to the fact that the sergeants here more actively and vitally participate in conducting the drills and the lessons with their subordinates using the method of competition. All of this, of course, stemmed from the officers, from their skillful organizational and indoctrinational work with the
sergeants. We emphasized this at a meeting of the battalion officers and required on the part of Sr Lt S. Ignatenko an improvement in his work with young commanders.

The facets of the characters of the officers, sergeants, and soldiers came to light in a new way during the competition. I accumulated many observations in the psychological plane. It turned out, for example, that communists S. Ignatenko and V. Vodolatskiy have more and better self-esteem. In the sense that they do not like to lose in competition, they do not wish to give up first place without a stubborn and honorable struggle. If they point out that the rival is moving forward, the question of why is immediately posed. What is his reason for superiority, why has this been achieved? And, they carefully study leading knowhow, adopt it, put it into practice, and then, with new energy, continue the competition for the right to be first.

Speaking of increasing the viability of competition, I cannot but point out that important, in my view, factor of the personal example of officers. In our outfit they fire and they drive the BMP best and are in the forefront of their subordinates. This is how it is done. Three individuals with equal responsibilities are placed in three vehicles. When the command is given, they move out rapidly forward. You have to see how their commanders during these minutes "feel" for their soldiers. They take pride in their successes and go through the failures, if they occur, as if they were their own failures. And when it is up to the soldiers themselves, they strive not to let their commanders down.

In recent weeks, the incandescence of the competition between the subunits has noticeably increased. The spark of competition both between the sergeants and between the officers flamed up brightly. Platoon commander Lt V. Krutskikh chose as his rival the best gunner and methodologist in the battalion, Lt. V. Grokhovskiy. Capable, knowledgeable, he led his subordinates from one success to another. But initially, Grokhovskiy did not take his new rival seriously. How is he going to keep up with me! But, Lt Krutskikh motivated himself and so motivated his platoon that he was able to overtake the leader. Grokhovskiy's subordinates had to give up the "to the best platoon" banner to their rivals. Right behind V. Krutskikh came Lt. V. D'yachenko into the competition. By the way, both are from the motorized infantry company which now ranks with the best subunits in the battalion.
But, who knows, it may turn out that there soon may be a change in the competition leader. Regardless of how that turns out, everyone wins from the competition which we strive to set up at all lessons. The combat readiness of the battalion increases and combat training is strengthened. The people will grow, both from a professional and from a moral standpoint.

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CSO: 1801
An order which appointed a commission for the acceptance of a 100-meter firing range in the city of Zelenograd was issued on 24 February 1976 by the Moscow City DOSAAF Committee [MGK DOSAAF]. V. Vakhonin, deputy committee chairman for material-technical supply and construction, was designated as Chairman Plenipotentiary. It was natural to assume that, since there is a commission and there is an installation to be turned over, that there will be an acceptance document. However, we did not succeed in finding such a document in the records of the MGK DOSAAF Capital Construction Department. But, among the papers, we did come across a notification about the transfer of a completed and operationally ready small arms range by the Construction Administration of the City of Zelenograd to the Moscow City DOSAAF Committee.

The transfer of the firing range, as stated in the document, occurred on the basis of a receipt dated... dated--it is unknown since the date has not been filled in. The notification was dated 21 July 1977. This means that, between February 1976 and July 1977, the receipt of the firing range for operation took place. But when, specifically?

The search for the firing range receipt took place in the Construction Administration of the City of Zelenograd. It turned out that the firing range was receipted for not in February 1976, but in February 1977. Signing as commission chairman was F. Mshevelidze, the chairman of the Capital Construction Department of the MGK DOSAAF.
With his own signature, he verified that the installation was ready for operation. But nonetheless, as of March 1978, that is a little more than a year later, not a single shot had been heard at the firing range. This is because, as is stated in the letter to the editorial board from I. Bashkirov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, the firing range was accepted before it was completed and it cannot be used for firing.

The builders who erected the installation pledged, as it was explained to me, to finish up the uncompleted work in the shortest period of time. But no sooner had the ink dried on the document than they forgot about this. Regardless of how often this was brought up to them by Hero of the Soviet Union Col (Res) M. Kibkalov, chairman of the Zelenograd Rayon DOSAAF Committee, all he got was more promises. In this connection, one must quote Article Six of the decision by the Zelenograd ispolkom dated 14 December 1977. It states: "Request that the chief of Zelenogradstroy administration comrade Zh. F. Volkov provide assistance to the RK DOSAAF in completion of the construction work on the 100-meter firing range for use with combat weapons." However, two months later, the firing range remains unusable.

Does this mean that the "accepted" firing range actually does not exist? This depends on how you look at the question. The accounting department provided a certificate stating that the workers assigned to the firing range in which, as you will recall not a single shot has been fired, has already been paid more than 5,500 rubles. It should be said in fairness that they are not sitting around with nothing to do but are occupied with completely different work.

It is not only the 5,500 rubles that the MGK DOSAAF paid for construction of the firing range or the signature of comrade Mshevelidze. You must add to this sum the expenditures for rental of buses which the workers from the military commissariat transport draftees to other firing ranges many kilometers away.

And it is not about funds that we are talking. There has been a serious amount of harm done to the training of youths for service in the armed forces. This harm cannot be measured in rubles and kopecks.
The commanders and political workers of our radiotechnical unit [chast'] studied with interest the article by Gds Maj V. Vityazev. It poses an important question, contains interesting knowhow, and causes one to do some thinking.

Many commanders and political workers in our unit are organizing indoctrinational work in a businesslike manner and are achieving the goal that all the troops in the collectives accomplish socialist pledges in competition. Even now, it is possible to name several crews and subunits [podrazdeleniye] in which there are no laggars. There is
the crew headed by WO I. Sokolov, a master of combat qualification. For several years in a row he is maintaining the title of excellent. As a rule, all the troops in his crew are released into the reserve as otlichniks and first class specialists. Communist WO Sokolov, knowlegable about combat equipment, a skillful methodologist, an indoctrinator, is a good example for his subordinates in service. He works with each troop individually and assists them in becoming otlichniks and acquiring high moral-combat qualities. Unfortunately, the work with people is not carried on with such perseverance in such a goal-oriented manner in all crews and subunits. Certain officers, warrant officers, and sergeants put it this way. One or two laggards is not the end of the world if most of the soldiers and sergeants are industrious and example troops, they do not determine the face of the collective. It goes without saying that we are attempting to show the falsity of this approach, to teach young commanders how to organize competition and individual work with people, in particular with those who are lagging behind.

We also encountered other shortcomings. Several commanders, party, and Komsomol activists narrowly and unilaterally comprehend the essence of the slogan "not a single lagger among us!" Not long ago, Maj V. Silant'yev, a worker from the unit political department, visited the company commanded by Capt V. Moskvitin. Conversing with Lt G. Kudryatsev, the political worker determined that there are two laggards--Pvts N. Koptsov and V. Sukhotskiy--in the crew that he commands. How is work conducted with them? Lt Kudryatsev animatedly explained that they help Koptsov in technical training and Sukhotskiy in special training. Otlichniks have become the sponsors for these two soldiers for this purpose.

This is fine, of course. But individual indoctrinational work with these soldiers has not been considered at all even though they also demonstrated shortcomings in their conduct. Analysis of the situation in this and in other crews affirmed the fact the laggars are only being assisted in the solution of training problems, in the main in technical and special training. But other questions concerning raising their political consciousness and indoctrinating them in a spirit of high discipline, attracting them to the active social life of the collective has fallen out of the purview of the commanders, party and Komsomol activists.
It goes without saying that the officer from the political department did a great deal on the spot to assist in elimination of the shortcomings brought to light. In the summary report of the CC CPSU to the 25th CPSU Congress, comrade L. I. Brezhnev, evaluating the initiative of enterprises that issued the slogan "not a single lagger among us!" emphasized that this initiative is not simply a production slogan but it is also a moral norm. Universal dissemination of this slogan and its introduction into practice can provide the country with important results. The appeal "not a single lagger among us!" stated in the letter of the CC CPSU, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and CC Komsomol was a combat slogan of collective labor and the sign of our times. The unit commander, the officers of the political department, and the staff strive to profoundly explain to the personnel "on the spot" these vital political documents, to teach all officers, warrant officers, and sergeants the art of indoctrinational work with people in the organization of competition.

We place primary attention on the generalization and dissemination of the knowhow of the best collectives where there has for a long time now been no laggers. Among them is the company which is commanded by SrLt V. Izhikov. It is characteristic that this subunit as early as the middle of last year was numbered among the stable "middlemen." And it was basically just several people who hindered the collective from moving forward who brought to naught the efforts of their comrades, who pulled the company backwards. Among them were Pvt V. Glebskiy and Pvt N. Gubarenkov. The commander, party and Komsomol activists stepped up the individual work with them and over time achieved a breakthrough in the relationships of these troops towards training and service. You now would not recognize Glebskiy and Gubarenkov. Both of them are high class-rated specialists, example troops, both are participating actively in the social work of the subunit. Using the knowhow of SrLt Izhikov, we teach all company commanders how they should work with laggers.

Tried and true forms of competition can do a lot here. Recently we began to place more attention on the competition for the title of best combat crew. What does that do for us? During the competition, there was an increase in the responsibility on the part of each troop for the overall success and for the labor of his comrades. This rallies the collective and pulls the laggers up to the level of the leaders.
In our view, a mutual exchange of knowhow between competing companies is of great utility.

Effectiveness in bringing the patriotic initiative to fruition greatly depends on the friendly coordinated efforts of commanders, political workers, party, and Komsomol organizations, on just how skillfully they use leading knowhow and how they place unused reserves into action. The unit staff and political department closely monitors the progress of such work, generalize its results, and widely publicize it. We have compiled lists of the laggers that presently exist in a number of subunits. As the competition results are summed up, the unit commander is obliged to analyze the work with them in the collectives, note shifts to the plus side, and strictly criticize those who are marking time and who are satisfied with the level that has been reached.

Life convinces us that the patriotic movement with the slogan "not a single lagger among us!" is an important reserve for a further increase in the combat readiness of subunits.

7869
CSO: 1801
Participation in the movement for the leading formation [soyedineniye] has made a noticeable imprint on the working style of the staff officers of our division and impells them to more profoundly immerse themselves in the organization of socialist competition. During the present training year, as is known, its scales have increased. It now also includes competition between units [chast']. The division staff is fulfilling the function of organizing and monitoring the progress of the regimental competition.

Take the tank regiment which is commanded by Gds Lt Col V. Mizun and another tank regiment with which it is competing. When both units provided us in the division staff with information concerning the progress in fulfillment of the socialist pledges for the past month, the indicators were approximately equal. But we all the same, not vacillating, stated that first place goes to the regiment commanded by Gds Lt Col Mizun at this stage of the competition.

What criteria guided our comrades in making this decision? The division staff officers, continually visiting the units and subunits [podrazdeleniye], noted that this regiment strived to conduct every lesson and especially the exercise in a situation that approximated combat to the maximum. Quality of tactical training here is always in the center of attention. At a recent tactical exercise, division staff officers noted, for example, the outstanding operations of the tank battalion commanded by Gds Maj Lasevich and the tank company commanded by Gds Sr Lt M. Bogatyrev. By the way, these subunits in this regiment are among the best in the division.
Things on the whole went well in the neighboring tank regiment. But here one often encountered instances where lessons were conducted under simplified conditions and where formalism was permitted in the organization of socialist competition. All of this shifted the weights in favor of the subordinates of Gds Lt Col Mizun when the determination of the victor in the next stage of the unit competition was made. The quality of combat and political training is the main criterion which forms the basis for monitoring progress of competition between units and when summing up.

Monitoring competition progress, our officers recently visited one of the units at a tactical drill lesson conducted with his subordinates by battalion commander Gds Capt Yu. Gromov. A number of shortcomings came to light here. One would wish for better logistical support to the lesson.

On this day, other staff officers visited the firing range where firing was being conducted by the battalion commanded by Gds Maj V. Starovoytov from the unit which was competing with the regiment where Gds Yu. Gromov serves. The firing began exactly at the appointed time and a sequence of carrying out each drill was strictly adhered to. The lessons at the training locations were well organized. In a word, that day the work quality of both the commander and his subordinates was a great deal higher than in the battalion commanded by Gds Capt Gromov. When we at the division staff began to compile the progress and results of the socialist competition in these two units, we took into consideration the observations made that training day, of course.

We see the organizing role of the staff in socialist competition to be that of the active champion of introducing leading knowhow. Among the officers who fruitfully work in this direction one could name comrades M. Yeremeyev, I. Bol'dyusov, and N. Rachinskiy. Their merits are that many officers from the competing units utilize the knowhow in conducting lessons using the competition method. This approach was elaborated in the regiment where one of its authors serves, this being Gds Capt V. Mokrous, commander of a leading tank battalion.

How did it all turn out in the end? First of all, the knowhow of comrade Mokrous was adopted by the officers of this regiment. Then, it was adopted also by the commanders of the
regiment that was competing with them. Moreover, something new was introduced into the competition methodology. It acquired a great deal of vitality in the summing up of the competition between these two units.

A monthly summing up at a meeting of all officers of the division, in our view, greatly facilitates increasing the vitality of competition between units. At this meeting, the formation commander speaks and analyzes the progress in accomplishment of pledges and the use of the indoctrinational capabilities of competition. They critically analyze shortcomings in combat training, generalize the knowhow of the best units, and sum up competition results between the regiments at the given stage. Then, all of this is reflected in an order disseminated throughout the division.

The letter of the CC CPSU, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and CC Komsomol concerning the unfolding of competition in 1978 emphasizes that, under the conditions of the high elevation of socialist competition, the responsibility of workers at all levels of administration and all leaders is growing even more. This situation fully applies to us, the officers of the staff and the political department.

I would like at this time to emphasize the role of the party organization of the staff and the bureau which is headed by Cds Maj N. Lyakin. Party activists strive to achieve a situation whereby primarily the staff officers themselves actively struggle for the accomplishment of their own personal pledges. At the same time, the party organization continually monitors how the staff communists assists the command element in improving the organization of competition between the regiments of the division, how they struggle for raising the quality of the training progress in units and subunits. Our comrades discuss these questions at the meeting of the bureau. Recently, for example, communist A. Vorob'evyev, N. Mitsevich and N. Sheremet, made a report. This approach undoubtedly raises the sense of responsibility on the part of the staff officers for their participation in the work and compels them to work with initiative.

The Kantemirovka tankers are steadfastly struggling for the right to call themselves the leading formation. Having accepted with great enthusiasm the greeting of the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Council
of Ministers to the troops of the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, they are striving to respond to it with a further growth in the combat readiness of their division and with an increase in the quality and effectiveness of military labor. Our duty is to so organize combat training and socialist competition that the patriotic desires of the troops find specific embodiment in the further growth of combat readiness and strengthening of organization and discipline.

7869
CSO: 1801
INDOCTRINATION METHODS IN AIR FORCE UNIT DESCRIBED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 1 Apr 78 p 2


[Text] Lecture propaganda occupies an important place in ideological work with personnel of air units (chast') and large units (soyedineniye). Not only has active lecture work by our authorized propagandists become a sign of the times, but also the broad participation of command, political, flight and engineer-technical cadres in propaganda of Marxism-Leninism, of materials of the 25th CPSU Congress, of the new Soviet Constitution, of current problems of scientific communism elaborated in works by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and of documents devoted to the 60th Anniversary of the Great October and the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. Propagandists from among scientists, specialists of the national economy and veterans of the party, war and labor speak regularly to the soldiers. It was with a sense of rightful pride that all of us perceived the high praise given in the CPSU CC Decree "On the Status and Measures for Improvement of Lecture Propaganda" to the noble labor of those who bear political and scientific knowledge into the masses, facilitating the great cause of communist indoctrination of Soviet citizens.

In giving the report "The Great October and the Progress of Mankind," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "One of the primary tasks is to instill in people a striving for high social goals, ideological conviction and a genuinely imaginative attitude toward labor. A very important front in the struggle for communism passes by here, and the course of economic development and the country's sociopolitical development will depend more and more on our victories on this front." The party teaches ideological cadres to see this "front of struggle" in their lecture work. This thought can also be traced through the new party document—the Central Committee decree on lecture propaganda. The decree has been studied in our units with all ideological activists and it has been discussed at party meetings. Political organs and party organizations are working out specific steps to further improve the organization and content of lecture propaganda and to increase its indoctrinational effect.

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Of course, success is ensured primarily by careful selection of propagandists. It is important that they be people with a good ideological-theoretical and military training and high moral-political qualities who have attained high indicators in combat training and service. But it would be incorrect to limit ourselves merely to this aspect of organizational work. The CPSU CC decree directs us toward a constant concern for propagandists and for giving them scientific-methodological assistance.

We naturally base ourselves on foremost experience in developing a particular matter. The political department of aviation of the Odessa Military District headed by Maj Gen Avn V. Kuznetsov, for example, displays businesslike concern for increasing the ideological-political level and improving the methods expertise of lecturers and propagandists. Col V. Mal'dov, Col V. Shatov, Col N. Shevchenko and other officers of the political department constantly brief the lecturers and propagandists personally on the spot, assist them in selecting the necessary reference material and conduct objective individual work. This approach leads to a situation where lecture work in district aviation units is conducted meaningfully and in close connection with party decisions, the life of the country and flight training missions.

Talks given to soldiers by commanders, chiefs of staffs and services and masters of flight training play a large role in political and military indoctrination. Agitation-propaganda groups of district air units devote much attention not only to political problems, but also to matters of military-technical propaganda, especially the study of aviation technology and methods of its combat employment. For example, officers V. Shkanakin, V. Kopanev, A. Bochkovskiy and others gave a series of lectures on problems of struggling for high quality in flying work and the features of moral-psychological preparation of young pilots. The word of experienced propagandists finds a fervent response in students. This has a positive effect on their day to day military work.

There has been a significant improvement of late in the work of collectives of nonregular propagandists in a number of air units of the Moscow, Transbaykal and North Caucasus military districts, in units of Long Range and Military Transport Aviation and in the Air Academy imeni Yu. A. Gagarin.

Many political organs are constantly engaged in an analysis of questions asked by students of the lecturers and briefers. This allows tying in lecture propaganda more closely with life and with the needs of personnel. More and more attention is being given in our units to the relationships between lecture propaganda and other forms of ideological indoctrination work. Propagandists not only give lectures and briefings, but they also are initiators in giving Lenin Lessons, sociopolitical readings, theoretical conferences and interviews. In the units where Sr Lt V. Gritsenko is a propagandist the talks by many members of the agitation-propaganda group are accompanied by a showing of topical films and newsreels such as "Night Over China," "Caution! Maoism!," "Criminal Course of Zionism" and "Always Be on Guard!" Such experience must unquestionably be disseminated.
We cannot fail to mention nonregular lecture groups. Such a group, set up under the political department of aviation of the North Caucasus Military District, is oriented primarily on an officer audience and considers its primary mission to be in-depth propaganda of current problems of CPSU theory and policy and the foundations of Soviet military science, and exposure of false bourgeois ideological concepts. Considering the complex nature of the subject matter, special concern is shown here for the ideological-theoretical and methodological training of lecturers. Individual briefing of lecturers and a critique and discussion of the talks they prepare have become firmly entrenched in the group's working practice. Each new step in increasing the quality and effectiveness of lecture propaganda is the result of a heightened level of party exactingness toward its organization.

The air force political organs which are headed by comrades N. Malinovskiy, A. Singayevskiy, V. Kuzovov and A. Lunichev constantly hear accounts by ideological workers on the status of lecture propaganda and on measures for increasing the ideological-theoretical knowledge and professional expertise of propaganda cadres. A system is taking shape for training propagandists for practical work among the troops on the basis of individual plans for increasing their professional expertise.

The new party document on lecture propaganda insistently demands that every talk to an audience be distinguished by high effectiveness and that it exert its beneficial influence on further development of socialist competition and on the personnel's struggle for increasing the effectiveness and quality of the entire training and indoctrination process. Especially important in this regard is the role of the personal example of communist leaders, chiefs of political organs, officers of political departments, and authorized lecturers and propagandists. Enjoying great authority among personnel are presentations by the chief of the political department of the Kurgan Higher Military-Political Air School, Col A. Borisov, by officers V. Makeyev, N. Pogonin, N. Laptev, A. Krivtsov, A. Man'ko, L. Dzhulay, S. Yegupov and many others. Their competency, well-reasoned presentations, party fervency, class approach to an assessment of social phenomena and the ability to pass on to listeners the entire force of their communist conviction are the main "secrets" of their profound effect on people.

Lecture propaganda, however, still does not fully meet modern party requirements everywhere, and all of us, guided by ideas of the CPSU CC decree, have a great deal of work to do. We must improve planning. Omissions in this area, as practice has shown, inevitably lead to a limitation of the subject matter of lecture propaganda and to a narrowing of its sphere of effect on personnel. In visiting the troops, one becomes convinced that lectures and briefings are insufficient in places on matters of political vigilance, indoctrination of soldiers in a spirit of hatred for forces of reaction and aggression, and on problems of morality and legal propaganda. For example, such shortcomings were inherent in the work of the agitation-propaganda group in which Maj I. Panchenko is a member. We also have facts where all lecture propaganda is farmed out to just one authorized propagandist. He draws up plans, elaborates the topic matter of presentations and often prepares rescuing "texts" for others.
The CPSU CC Decree "On the Status and Measures for Improving Lecture Propaganda" advances important tasks for party organizations. It is our duty to justify the party's high trust by increasing the level of work so that the fervent word of the propagandist generates a response in soldiers' hearts, leads them on to new successes in combat training and multiplies their contribution toward increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

6904
CSO: 1801
Maj K. Rossiyskiy arrived in our district after completing the Frunze Military Academy, taking the position of deputy regimental commander. The opinion exists that a person will not reveal himself especially in this position: It is allegedly "unobtrusive." In my view, judgments as to visible and unobtrusive positions are pointless. Everything depends on the activeness and job qualities of the officer who occupies a particular post. And Maj Rossiyskiy's service can serve as a persuasive example in this regard. In literally just a month this quiet, modest, steadfast officer made himself the subject of conversation. Everyone—supervisors and subordinates alike—saw behind his laconism and coolness the ability to allocate his personal working time in a military manner, economically and rationally, and to make the most of others' time to the same extent.

Behind his calm, precise instructions they could see his firmness of character, his conviction as to the substantiation of a decision which had been made and his desire to implement it to completion. The deputy commander's day to day activities showed that from the first days of his service in the regiment the academy graduate displayed official zeal. These are the very words which can be used to express the officer's attitude toward military and party obligation and the degree of his industriousness, persistence and tenacity.

One has to agree that it is not very often that we use the word "zeal." We usually hear "conscientiousness," "striving" or "diligence." But some comrades take "zeal" as something episodic and temporary, as a desire to draw attention to oneself. Is it necessary to explain that the meaning of this capacious word is different?

"Zeal" is broader than the concept of "diligence." In my view, diligence does not touch on such aspects as a person's initiative, his creative pioneering, or a spirit of innovation in his official work. But the
situation most often requires officers to have initiative, boldness and a readiness to assume complete responsibility for an independent decision. Maj Rossiyskiy manifested the ability to combine execution with initiative and inquisitiveness.

As a rule, the Soviet officer, party member and Komsomol member takes part in the work of elective party or Komsomol organs or carries out their individual assignments. In this regard we cannot fail to state that the person to which words of official zeal can be applied usually also is foremost in social matters. While giving a great deal, he enriches himself a great deal. Qualities acquired in social work also expand his capabilities as a commander and an indoctrinator. This is why I see in official zeal an entire complex of moral-job qualities: party spirit, competency, a deep understanding of obligation, execution, initiative, selflessness in labor and an inner need to place social matters above personal affairs.

In reflecting on the official zeal of an officer or a director, I wish to recall the words of V. I. Lenin: "In order to manage, one must be competent; one must know all conditions of production fully and precisely; one must know the technology of this production at its contemporary level." This thought of Lenin's becomes more and more current as years go by. The 25th CPSU Congress gave a great deal of attention to matters of competency of the contemporary director and the need for an organic combination of competency with party spirit, discipline, initiative and a creative approach to matters. Under conditions of great and complex changes caused by the revolution in military affairs, we need especially profound knowledge and firm skills. And they come only thanks to persistent labor and dedication to duty and service. One only has to relax for a time and be satisfied with what has been achieved, and with the present tempos of development of military affairs it is very difficult or even impossible to make up for what has been lost.

A commander's official zeal also has a great indoctrinational significance. It is correctly said: as is the commander, so are the subordinates. Nothing has such an influence on shaping of a young officer's personality or on his attitude toward service as the example of a commander. And one can only envy the lieutenant who after school comes under the wing of an industrious, erudite commander and skilled organizer. Next to him he quickly gathers force and develops.

Young graduates of military schools most often are encountered with just such commanders, but it sometimes happens otherwise. Over my long army service I have had occasion more than once to encounter rather complex situations. For example, say a regiment is commanded by an officer generally thought to be very capable. There is no limit to his industriousness. When the commander is present the regiment lives as a faultlessly adjusted mechanism. But let the commander go on leave or, even worse, leave for a new duty assignment, and many elements of this mechanism begin to operate intermittently.
There is nothing mysterious here. The officer simply belonged to that category of commanders—assiduous, energetic, exacting commanders of initiative—who at the same time do not dare rely on subordinates or trust in their independence, sometimes even in minor matters. The consequence of this mistrust is substitution for deputies or even subunit commanders. One sees many external attributes of official zeal in the work of such a commander: he spends his days and nights in the regiment, as they say, and essentially carries the entire "load." But one only has to take a closer look at things and one will see immediately that this is a warped "zeal." "Unobtrusive" deputies really do appear next to such a commander. The process of development of other officers who are constantly coddled also is delayed. In short, we should not praise a commander for zeal, basing this on superficial observations, without delving into the essence of the matter and without assessing completely the effectiveness of his training and indoctrination work. Analysis and insight are required here.

I wish to return again to the thought that, along with unconditional fulfillment of any instruction, official zeal means broad initiative and a commander's ability to assume responsibility for a decision made on his own. In one exercise two motorized rifle battalions received a mission to make an assault crossing of a large river with a swift current. It was a difficult and important mission and its accomplishment involved risk and danger. Without awaiting further clarification, one of the battalion commanders, Capt M. Levoshenya, immediately began preparing personnel and equipment for the assault crossing, reconnoitering routes of forward movement and the banks, and so on. The other battalion commander, Capt V. Getsayev, naturally also realized what he had to do, but he dawdled. Hoping for assistance from above, he took his battalion to the water's edge unprepared to perform the mission in a tactical, technical or psychological sense. During this time the battalion commanded by Capt Levoshenya was already crossing the obstacle.

This incident leads one to reflect. Two officers occupying identical positions and having approximately equal experience conducted themselves differently in a similar situation. One did everything the situation required while the other clearly was not up to it. Why? Different characters? A different degree of responsibility? I believe there is more to it than this. The battalion headed by Capt Getsayev was not in good repute in the unit. The regimental command element was constantly helping the commander in everything. Having become accustomed to "nannies," the young battalion commander was considerably slower than his coworker, Capt Levoshenya, in acquiring the qualities a commander needs: resolve and initiative. Without them, what official zeal is there to speak of?

As with all other participants of the Great Patriotic War, I often have occasion to answer the question: What is needed for victory in battle? When we speak about bravery, tactical expertise or military cunning, this is perceived as proper by young officers, but some of them do not find a
fitting place for official zeal in this set. They believe that this is allegedly not for war, that this is a peacetime category. But war primarily is labor, labor of the highest intensity. We not only need constant readiness for an exploit and heroism for victory, but sometimes also the very laborious, routine work which we do not include in heroics.

In meeting young officers and commanders of platoons, companies, batteries, battalions and artillery battalions—the sons of those with whom one has fought the foe in the same formation—one automatically experiences a feeling of pride. You see that they have an inherent enthusiasm in service based on awareness and an understanding of the duty of a defender of the socialist motherland and on allegiance to the cause of the Communist Party. This relates the younger generation of soldiers with the frontlinesmen who passed on grand combat traditions to them as a heritage.

For example, I will mention Sr Lt Anatoliy Churilov. With his exceptional industriousness, initiative and discipline, he won firm authority in the unit. He is a young company commander and party member who works actively in the Komsomol and was elected delegate to the 18th Komsomol Congress. Churilov is greatly obligated for his command development to the regimental officer collective and to the atmosphere of high exactingness, mutual assistance and concern created within it. This fact once again emphasizes how important it is that relationships within a military collective, especially among commanders and subordinates, be warm and comradely and that an officer carry out his duties with spiritual enthusiasm.

We cannot forget about another aspect of the matter as well. A majority of the officers have a family. All of them need time for rest, for visiting cultural-enlightenment establishments and for reading. But unfortunately some commanders assume that regulation order in the subunit can be assured only if officers are in the barracks from reveille to retreat. And they are there, realizing in the depths of their souls that their presence in the company is far from always occasioned by official necessity. In the final account, all this dampens the people's ardor. In order to attain a fighting mood and creative attitude toward service in subordinates, a commander is obligated to consider officers' personal interests and help them actively in arranging everyday life and leisure.

The attitude toward official duty is one of the most important job qualities of a person. It must receive an objective evaluation in officer performance appraisals and must be considered in determining prospects for their service. The work of preparing for performance appraisals—both organizational as well as indoctrinational work—has been going on for a long while in the units of our district. We see as one of the chief goals of indoctrinational work the officers' ideological conditioning and an increase in their sense of responsibility.
Winter combat training is coming to an end. District personnel are laboring with full output in the jubilee year of the Armed Forces. Behind the results of the first months of training we see the selflessness, military inspiration and official zeal of every Far East Military District soldier, based on dedication to his socialist motherland and on an understanding of his personal responsibility for defense of its borders and for strengthening the combat might of the Armed Forces.

6904
CSO: 1801
COMPLAINT BY WARRANT OFFICER ABOUT USE OF PRIVATE CAR

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 2 Apr 78 p 2

[Letter by WO V. Guzchenko and comment by Lt Col V. Parfenov, Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent: "On the Track of a Letter: In the Role of "Gofer"]

[Text] Dear Editors!

I am in the position of practical training instructor of driver-electricians in a platoon of a signal company at the Khar'kov Higher Military Pilots' School imeni Twice Hero Soviet Union S. I. Gritsevts. But I have almost no occasion to perform my official duties. The fact is that I have a personal vehicle and they immediately made me a cabby-gofer, if one can express it thus. I rushed through nearby villages and purchased products, primarily for my immediate supervisor, Lt Col V. Tsyganenko. I often drive with a group of soldiers from the platoon to enterprises of the city of Khar'kov, where we work for deficit construction materials. And so it turns out that I am too busy to train subordinates and they have no time to learn.

This role does not satisfy me, but I soon fell into disgrace for my protests. I am turning to you with a request to look into my matter.

WO V. Guzchenko

On arriving at the place, I learned that V. Guzchenko was no longer at the school. The warrant officer had been released to the reserve. I had the thought that perhaps his letter to the newspaper was the angry slam of the door on leaving. Company commander Capt I. Kolupayev seemingly confirmed this surmise: "Of course it's nonsense," he responded concerning the letter's contents.

But it became clear from talks with other comrades that I should not be hasty in taking such conclusions for the truth. The school's signal officer, Lt Col V. Tsyganenko, also at first declared quite categorically that he had given the warrant officer no assignments to purchase products for himself.
"Although there were instances," said Viktor Filippovich after a minute's reflection, "when he brought some things to me. But this was exclusively on his own initiative."

It turns out that the warrant officer had a very sufficient amount of his own desire and initiative not to hold classes with the soldiers but to drive out to the sovkhozes and enterprises during his official time. Then why had he complained that these trips kept him from working with his subordinates? Capt A. Kazannik, commander of the platoon in which the warrant officer served, said just that:

"Guzchenko took no part in training the soldiers. He was eternally carrying out some kind of special assignments."

The most extensive "special assignments" were trips for the purpose of procuring deficit construction materials. Once one of the members of an authoritative commission suggested that it would be well to face the facades of some of the buildings at the school with ceramic tile. The suggestion was taken as a guide for action, but tile does not lie around underfoot. True, there was a plant in the city which supplied this product, but the school was not listed among its customers. Then the school's command element studied the plant's needs and established without difficulty that the enterprise required manpower. The order followed: assign soldiers from the platoons to work in the plant for the purpose of acquiring necessary materials. And so, abandoning their lesson plans and trainers, the future driver-electricians and radio operators began to master work which was remote from their military specialty. True, not everyone did it at once, but according to a schedule established here. Today one platoon works, while another follows the schedule. Tomorrow they change places. But in the combat training records it was tidily noted that personnel of both platoons were engaged in training.

There were not enough class leaders: they were wholly absorbed in the interests of production. I accidentally dropped in on one of the classrooms and saw the following picture: Pvt A. Tikhonov was conducting political studies under the topic "Socialist Competition and Its Role in Increasing Unit Combat Readiness." He was copying in his notebook the lesson plan of the group leader, platoon commander Capt I. Baryshev, and was simultaneously dictating aloud for the others to copy. Eleven persons were absent from the class. "They are engaged in economic work on Capt Baryshev's order," was the explanation given to me.

With such a state of affairs the practical training instructor really does lack time, and he has no one to work with anyway. And if, like WO Guzchenko, he also is the owner of high-speed transport, then does he have time for classes? For this is an entire treasure for those who love to "get something out of something."
The position of officers of the school's political department and staff is the cause of surprise. They know full well about the abnormal situation with combat training in the signal company, but they disregard it here. The desire to give the school compound an exemplary appearance and create beauty and comfort within it is natural and understandable, but this of course must not be done to the detriment of the quality of soldiers' training. This detriment makes itself known. Future driver-electricians and radio operators do not receive sufficient knowledge and skills in their speciality. For example, Pvt S. Kaziyev has been in classes for practical driving of a vehicle only twice during his more than two-month stay in the company. And some of his comrades have only been there once.

Aren't they paying a rather high price here for the notorious "deficit"?
INNOVATION AND IMPROVEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 78 p 2

[Article by Engr-Maj Gen Safronov, Chief of Inventions Department of USSR Ministry of Defense, delegate to 5th VOIR [All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers] Congress: "Forum of Innovators"]

[Text] Today the work of the 5th Congress of the All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers (VOIR) begins in the Great Kremlin Palace. Representatives of the Army and Navy are taking part in its work. In the little over five years which have passed since the 4th Congress, noteworthy events have occurred in the life of the multimillion member army of VOIR and all the country's inventors and rationalizers.

A particularly important event was the adoption of the new USSR Constitution, which legislatively guarantees freedom of technical creativeness of USSR citizens and which emphasizes that the state creates necessary conditions for broad unfolding of invention and rationalization work, supports voluntary societies and organizes the adoption of inventions and rationalization suggestions in the national economy and other spheres of life.

The creators of technical progress greeted with enormous enthusiasm in February 1975 the warm welcome by the General Secretary of our party, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, addressed to inventors and rationalizers of the Soviet Union.

Responding to the party's steadfast concern for development of technical creativeness, the country's innovators have achieved significant successes in recent years. Now the VOIR brings together 86,000 primary organizations. An economic effect amounting to 19.6 billion rubles was obtained from the use of 18.5 million rationalization suggestions and 195,000 inventions in the national economy in the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Technical creativeness assumed an even greater scope in the first years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan.
VOIR organizations display great activeness in the Armed Forces. They have been set up in many units (chast'), in a majority of higher military educational institutions, in repair enterprises, construction organizations, scientific research and other establishments and operate in close coordination with inventions commissions.

The councils of these organizations conduct much indoctrinational work among their members, carry out various activities to propagandize technical creativeness, assist the command element to monitor the progress of adoption of inventions and rationalization suggestions into troop practice, and facilitate the development of collective creativeness, a higher quality in filling out invention applications and the study of patent information.

For example, the VOIR council of the Air Engineering Academy imeni Professor N. Ye. Zhukovskiy works actively. The academy organization numbers hundreds of members—servicemen, workers and employees of the Soviet Army. In 1977, with the active assistance of the VOIR council, a competitive review was held of invention and rationalization work among the youth, it marked the beginning of a permanent contest for best training subunit in invention and rationalization, and many other very effective activities were conducted.

Much success in invention work has been achieved in the Military Engineer Institute imeni A. F. Mozhayskiy and in many other Army and Navy collectives.

Continuous ties are maintained between the USSR Ministry of Defense Inventions Department and the VOIR Central Council. This permitted identification of many suggestions by military innovators which are of great interest for the national economy.

Participation by collectives of scientific research establishments, military educational institutions, enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the All-Union Public Review of Use of Inventions and Rationalization Suggestions has become an important phase in this work. Hundreds of thousands of technical innovations were elaborated, over 9,400 of which were performed at the invention level.

Now there is a review going on under the motto "For Effectiveness and Quality" for use of scientific-technological achievements exhibited in the USSR VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy] in units, aboard ships, in military educational institutions and at repair enterprises, as well as use of inventions and rationalization proposals by Army and Navy innovators. This review was announced by editors of the journal TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE and by the USSR Ministry of Defense Inventions Department jointly with the VOIR Central Council and directors of USSR VDNKh.

The work and decisions of the 5th All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers Congress will have a good influence on further development of inventions and rationalization in the country and the Soviet Armed Forces.
VEHICLE SPOT CHECK CHIEF COMPLAINS ABOUT RETALIATIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 78 p 2


[Text] The conversation with officers and warrant officers of the Poltava Higher Surface to Air Missile Command School imeni Arm Gen N. F. Vatutin who entered the room assigned me for work began almost identically.

"Again this Marusich. If you only knew how many people were engaged in looking into his complaints and how much paper has been used up on this matter! But he still is in no way satisfied."

It would appear that the people could be understood in a purely human manner. As a matter of fact, people already had come from Kiev and from Moscow. They had studied matters and chatted with commanders, political officers and officers of services. But the indefatigable warrant officer continued to knock at the doors of various echelons.

The essence of his letters basically reduced to the fact that the school was violating rules for operating motor transport and transporting personnel. As chief of the technical control point, almost daily he was forced to detain vehicles as they were leaving the motor pool. Either servicing had not been performed to the full extent or documents were incorrectly filled out.

The warrant officer knew the paragraphs of appropriate orders and instructions by heart and would seek to see that each of them was carried out to the letter. He believed sacredly that this would place a reliable barrier in the path of accidents and extraordinary occurrences. And the school commander had praised him more than once for "faultfinding" and had set him as an example for others.

The general would praise him, but some officers, especially from among those who were immediately responsible for the status and operation of motor transport, were obviously not happy with the punctuality of the KTP [technical control point] chief. "A vehicle again left on a trip late because of Marusich," they would complain. And there was no way they wanted to understand
that they could not blame, let us say, the OTK [technical control department] controller of a plant shop for the fact that he would reject defective products.

Around two years ago Marusich turned to the newspaper of the Kiev Military District, LENINSKOE ZNAMYA, for help. Soon a critical article appeared in it by Lt Col I. Botov, who, after visiting the school became convinced that there were substantial shortcomings in the organization of the motor pool service.

Perhaps, as Maj A. Sandin, chief of the school's motor transport service, asserts, the newspaper worker exaggerated somewhat in order to make the material more vivid and convincing? In no way! This is shown by the answer sent to the editors. It stated, in particular, that Maj A. Sandin, Maj V. Durnev and Sr Lt N. Zyablov had been punished for omissions in service and that the command element had planned steps aimed at eliminating the shortcomings which had been revealed.

Yes, steps had been outlined. But did the situation in the sub-unit or the attitude of some officials on performance of official duties change? It is unfortunately impossible to give an affirmative answer to these questions.

It would appear that it was not by chance that a half year later Maj Sandin was subjected to criticism at a meeting of the party organization of the school's technical unit. Speaking to the party members, deputy chief of the political department Col P. Nikolenko stated frankly that everything actually remained as before in the vehicle motor pool. Several months later a question was raised at the party meeting about the external appearance and discipline of personnel.

But WO Marusich continued to detain motor vehicles which had been readied for departure in an unsatisfactory manner. Hot words arose more and more often at the gates of the KTP. This frequently occurred in the presence of cadets, which hardly led to a correct indoctrination of future officers or the instilling of proper respect in them for demands of regulations, orders and manuals.

The situation grew more heated. This was aided to some extent by WO Marusich himself, who, judging from everything, decided that the interests of the motor transport service were dear to him alone. In some cases he began to conduct himself in an ill-conceived, tactless manner. But there was another reason: those in the school's motor transport service began to think not so much about bringing proper order to the motor pool as about "taming" the indefatigable KTP chief.

Not wishing to retreat, he again submitted a complaint in November of last year. This time the assignment to look into it was given to Lt Col V. Kasperchik, who arrived at the school from Kiev with appropriate authority. Just how did the officer accomplish the mission assigned him?
The final report he drew up abounds in obvious contradictions and "rubbery" wording. It follows from the document, for example, that equipment servicing is conducted with low quality and that some motor pool duty officers perform their duties imprecisely. But the conclusion is: "The school's motor pool service is organized properly."

It was stated in the complaint that there were cases of violation of rules for transporting personnel. "There possibly were instances," registers Lt Col Kasperchik. There is further mention of coarseness shown toward the KTP chief. And again: "This possibly took place." Must it be shown that the primary duty of one investigating a complaint is to establish the truth. But he did not do this. It is not precluded that this was the very reason that further events continued to develop in far from the best manner.

Books disappeared mysteriously from the room of the KTP chief—books in which he had registered the reasons that vehicles had been detained over a long period of time.

And soon an order appeared by which WO Marusich was transferred to the position of training support battalion vehicle technician.

"For the benefit of the service," as the motor transport officers explained to me.

They obviously managed to convince the school commander of this as well. He signed the order.

Well, from a legal point of view, WO Marusich's transfer cannot give rise to any objection. Moreover, he was appointed with an advancement. But besides the legal aspect, there also exists the moral aspect.

For long years WO Marusich had performed the duties of KTP chief skillfully and conscientiously. Not once had the question of his transfer come up until he had written to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. After this he was told to sign that he was familiar with the order. Sign, period. They didn't even consider it necessary to first have a talk with the person.

WO Marusich's advancement in position does not make him happy. There is a bitter feeling in his heart. But things do not just concern personal offense.

Serious damage has been done to all indoctrination work with personnel, including with future officers. Many cadets perform duty at the motor pool and all events were taking place before their eyes. It is not completely out of the question that some of them were beginning to weigh in their minds: "Is it worth it to act according to the regulation? For all I know, you will also get a lot of unpleasantness."
But military school must be an example for future officers of everything concerning exactingness, regulation order and mutual relationships in the military collective.

And it would appear that the time has come to ask Maj Sandin and other motor transport officers why, for example, there still is no plan for vehicle technical servicing in their motor pool by the beginning of the month and why the shortcomings mentioned two years ago are being repeated to this day.

This will without question be of benefit to the service, as will an increase in exactingness on the part of the command element and of the principle of party organizations in everything concerning the training and indoctrination of future officers and maintaining an atmosphere of high exactingness and strict observance of the demands of our regulations in the school in every sector and in every matter.

This conclusion clearly suggests itself.

6904
CSO: 1801
Enthused by the warm send off by relatives and close friends, Lt Nicoliay Zarechnev, graduate of the Orenburg Higher SAM Command School, lithely hopped on the step of the railcar on Express Train No. 586 and, before he even got inside the door, fell into the strong embrace of a sympathetic, erect brown-haired man dressed in a sports suit.

"I am happy to greet you, young lieutenant!" smiling warmly said the brown-haired man, and he introduced himself: "Maj Mikhail Nazarovitch Litvinov."

Touched by the attention given him by his senior officer, the lieutenant briefly but fully and forthrightly introduced himself. He ended his report with the words: "I am en route to my duty station."

"That is fine," his new acquaintance said approvingly and, changing over to the personal form of address, added "What a shame. They have placed me in with a pensioner. I can't drink, I can't have a heart-to-heart talk!"

They succeeded in rapidly eliminating the problem. Ten minutes later, they were seated in a separate compartment and animatedly sharing their impressions. The brown-haired gentleman in the sports suit raised a number of warm toasts.
"Our replacements are worthy ones," he said as he slapped the lieutenant on the shoulders. "True, we have, as they say, powder in the magazines. I, my friend, am a deputy commander. What is the main element in our work? A business-like and goal-oriented approach. It's for these very qualities that they are sending me on an independent assignment. I will get my orders in a couple of days. Until then. . ."

Unfolding before the lieutenant was an engaging picture of his personal growth.

"I will bring you over to my outfit," asserted the brown-haired gentleman. "We really need specialists now! We have a great deal of equipment, devices, and electronic gear."

Lt Zarechnev had pleasant dreams that night. He was prepared to immediately transfer to work for this major and to embark upon any job with him. And in the morning he departed the train. At the next stop after he woke up. True, alone. In order to report to the militia organs about the mysterious disappearance of his brown-haired neighbor as well as of his entire uniform, 50 rubles of his personal funds, and several documents, including the certificates from school which attested to the fact that he, Lt Zarechnev, had resided previously in the barracks and there was no housing set aside for him.

The contents of this certificate certainly greatly touched Litvinov, the man who had taken it. In point of fact, there was no housing set aside for him either, other than the depressing surroundings in one of the cells of the UVD [Directorate of Internal Affairs] of the Kemerovskiy oblispolkom from which he had escaped.

However, we will leave the unfortunate lieutenant the chance, after wiping away his sad male tears, to himself take up things with the personnel directorate of the Transcaucasus Military District and will turn now to the activities of the criminal Litvinov.

He loved to travel since he encountered cordiality and hospitality everywhere he went. Thus, in Perm', they offered him an excellent overcoat in the garrison military hotel and, in the presence of the charming customer, they sewed on major's shoulderboards. In Novosibirsk, representing himself as Zarechnev, he dined in the restaurant amongst
some officers wearing technical emblems on their lapels. In Ural'sk, he drank in friendship with a particular major. There were similar such encounters in Vladimir and in Moscow.

It was there in Moscow that he arrived from another wonderful trip along with WO E. Saakyan who was returning from TDY [temporary duty] and who was wearing his personal weapon. In order not to break up this sudden friendship, they booked a double room in the Mostransagentstvo Hotel. They invited in some friendly ladies and everything was fine. Until that fateful morning when WO Saakyan noticed that his pistol was missing and so was the irresistible "major" Litvinov-Zarechnov.

And now we sum up this sad tale. Young Lt N. Zarechnnev received quite a "jolt." WO E. Saakyan was kicked out of the Soviet Army. The criminal Litvinov was captured and rendered harmless. During the investigation he told everything. He was unable to remember the names of all of the daydreamers with whom he drank and caroused. It is a sad thing that among them were also military personnel for whom vigilance, as is known, is the fundamental quality.

7869
CSO: 1801
TRAINING OF MISSILEMEN DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 78 p 2

[Article by Gds Engr-Lt Col N. Tkachenko and Gds Maj N. Sarychev: "At a Level Higher"

[Text] After a tactical lesson once, the unit [chast'] commander gathered us, the staff officers and subunit [podrazdeleniye] commanders, in order for us to analyze the lesson results immediately. It was an intense lesson and the missileers were called upon to operate in the most complex and unexpected situations. Their knowledge, training, and psychological tempering were subjected to comprehensive examination. The results gave us cause to think: all crews operated under identical conditions but they accomplished the mission in different ways. Special attention was drawn to the fact that even those subunits which according to their main combat training indicators did not differ one from the other did not get identical results.

Why was this?

I will point out that those in the unit staff knew the reasons. It was, however, important that those who participated in the combat that had just been completed understand these reasons too. For this purpose, the unit commander primarily analyzed how the two leading subunits accomplished the combat training missions.

Crews in the subunit commanded by Capt S. Terent'yev in the first stage of the lesson operated successfully. But, the density of the raid grew, their returns from the ECM sparkled on the screen, and the inputs began to be introduced more often. Gaps were noticed in the rhythm of the combat work and the precision in reporting the coordinates broke down. In the final analysis, the operator crew coped with the assigned mission in a manner weaker than normal.
The missileers of the crew led by officer G. Gavrilov operated under the exact same conditions. But, they handled the increased load confidently without a single error. Moreover, one sensed in the coordinated work that was noted for its initiative and mutual understanding that they could have stood even greater stress. Where do they get this additional drive? Moreover, the second group had almost exactly the same number of high class-rated specialists. It is a case where all of the operators in their second year of service are capable of replacing the guidance officer and, in turn, he can replace the launch control officer. Assimilation of service responsibilities at a higher level is that very reserve of stability which brought the missileers through the difficult test.

It is now difficult to remember when the first operators who were able to take on the responsibilities of the guidance officer first appeared in our subunits. Initially, you could count them on one hand. Their success was considered to be exceptional and far from accessible to everyone.

A great deal changed with time. First, the general educational level of the youths who now enter the army has risen noticeably. Second, our commanders, engineers, and technicians have improved their knowledge and methodological mastery. Finally, third, training facilities have expanded and been enriched.

Undoubtedly all of this impacts favorably on the training of young missileers. Training periods are being reduced and quality is improving. One can encounter specialists working at a level higher than their assigned responsibility in any subunit now. More and more of them are found each year.

It is not difficult to imagine the great reserve that this creates for the further improvement of subunit combat readiness. Take, for example, the operator crew. Here, all specialists in combat accomplish a single mission, their responsibilities are mutually linked and mutually dependant, they are directed to a single goal. And, when they are trained in working at a level higher than their assigned responsibility, where better can they achieve that coordination in operations which, as is known, is a vital factor in crew readiness to accomplish a combat mission under any conditions. In other words, in the given instance, not only every specialist but the crew as a whole due to their "reserve of stability" stands a head higher.
It seems necessary to emphasize the following as well. Assimilation of functional responsibilities at a level higher than the assigned task is envisioned in the missileers' socialist pledges. And, leading commanders not only encourage this desire but in fact assist their subordinates in carrying out what they intend. But, this also happens. The most experienced soldiers and sergeants pledge to train themselves in the work at the level of the officer (and they have all reasons for doing so) but the commander, not knowing the actual capabilities of his subordinates, holds them back, impedes their initiative. Other instances occur. The young specialist has not quite succeeded in fully assimilating his functional responsibilities and he is already pushed to "raise himself to a little bit higher level." He makes the pledge and is unable to fulfill it. As a result, the very idea of struggling for higher mastery is discredited.

These problems are solved seriously and in a business-like manner in the subunit which is temporarily headed by officer G. Gavrilov. Here they carefully evaluate the capabilities of each specialist and take a reasoned approach to the elaboration of socialist pledges. And, they reinforce the accomplishment of what is intended by a methodologically skillful organization of lessons and drills. Here is how they organize operator drills covering tracking missions.

The main task for lesson directors is the consistency and high quality of mission accomplishment. Therefore, they do not immediately begin such drills. First of all, the young soldiers forming the crews undergo preliminary training: they study the relief of the surrounding terrain and the special features in the accomplishment of the combat mission at a given position and assimilate the optimum modes of equipment functioning.

The second stage of the training involves working out the coordination between elements: The launch officer—guidance officer—operators. A strict sequence is followed here. The crew is initially placed in a simple air situation. Then, as the skills of the specialists improve, the situation is gradually made more complex. At the same time, the amount of information and the number of inputs grow.

Having achieved high quality accomplishment of all elements, the officers gradually begin to increase the speed and to polish the operation as a whole. Given such an approach,
the crew in rapid order increases its mastery to such a level that, under the most complex conditions, it demonstrates faultless coordination. Gains are also made as far as time is concerned and this provides the capability for training the specialists at a level higher than their assigned responsibility.

In our unit there are many subunits in which these capabilities are widely used. We could name many experienced methodologists who are bringing their subordinates up to speed in very short periods of time. Among them are Gds Capt A. Babich and Gds Capt S. Konoplev, Gds Sr Lt V. Nikonov, Gds WO [praporshchik] V. Blokhin and others. In the crews that they lead and in the subunits most of the soldiers in their second year of service are capable of operating equipment at an officer's level.

Unrecognizable changes have also occurred in this sense in the subunit commanded by Gds Capt Terent'yev. The situation changed after he began to use the knowhow of leading subunits in his work in training specialists. The subunit once participated in a long exercise. Staff officers, convinced that all specialists in complex situations cope in an excellent manner with their responsibilities, decided to test them to their breaking point. The first input that was made put the launch officer out of action. He was replaced by Lt V. Borshchenko, the guidance officer, and his place at the controls was taken by Gds Pvt B. Lazuka, an operator. The precise rhythm of the combat barely changed.

Then the staff officers, even though this was not included in the examination program, made other inputs one after another. As a result, all of the officers were "put out of action" at their battle stations. Only soldiers and sergeants remained at the controls. But, they did not panic. Gds Pvt Lazuka fulfilled the responsibilities of the launch officer.

Thus, the foundation of the stable growth of knowledge and skills on the part of the specialists and their assimilation of responsibilities at a level higher than their assigned tasks is the creative approach of commanders, political workers, and staff officers to the organization of combat training and socialist competition. We are organizing our efforts taking this into consideration.

7869
CSO: 1801
Political Indoctrination in Motorized Infantry Regiment Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Apr 78 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col A. Pimenov: "Almost Everyone Was Involved..."]

[Text] Discussing the agitational-propaganda group, the regimental propaganda officer Sr Lt Ye. Dotsenko named with pride the following figures: Over the last three months, approximately 50 lectures, reports, and other mass-scale political measures were conducted.

"On the average there is a report or a lecture every day," summed up the officer.

The figures are impressive. And the feelings of an officer participating directly in this work is fully understandable. Actually, a great deal is being done. Communists leaders began to appear before the troops more often. The members of the agitational-propaganda group worked up more lectures. The number of their speeches during Lenin lessons, thematic evenings, and so on increased. In a word, quantitative indicators which we discussed in detail with our comrades from the unit [chast'] are impressive.

What interested me was how broadly do these measures encompass the personnel?

I attempted to find the answer to that question along with the deputy regimental commander for political affairs, the party committee secretary, and the propaganda officer. We were not overly successful. For example, we were unable
to determine what percent of the personnel heard a particular lecture. It was no easier to find out which subunits attended the measures that were conducted on the regimental scale. For the sake of fairness, it should be stated that Major P. Naumenko, the secretary of the party committee, evaluated the work of the agitational-propaganda group. The analysis contained several comments: "the troops of these subunits [podrazdeleniye] attended this particular lesson." But two or three comments do not provide a clear overall picture.

"We are attempting to cover the majority of the troops," the conversants said.

"Majority." The word itself indicates approximation. But, can such a criterion be satisfactory if in reality you are concerned about the viability of agitational-propaganda work? Orienting oneself simply on the "majority" does not give a specific impression concerning one of the indicators of its impact on people.

The CC CPSU decree "On the State of and Measures to Improve Lecture Propaganda" emphasizes that it must be systematically weighed in all collectives. How systematically is it being conducted in the companies of this regiment and in the entire regimental collective as a whole?

I selectively conversed with several soldiers and sergeants in the 8th Motorized Infantry Company. Here are several of the answers. Pvt Irbatyr Kubekov, secretary of the company Komsomol organization (he has served in the company since June of last year and was elected secretary in September):

"I have not had the opportunity to attend lectures, reports, and other regimental measures, except movies. No one from the regimental directorate spoke in the company since I have been in the company. I only listen to lectures at a seminar of Komsomol secretaries."

Komsomol member Sgt Aleksandr Kulikov, commander of an infantry combat vehicle, for the last three months attended two lectures. One was devoted to the theme "Soviet law concerning responsibility for military crimes" given by the garrison legal officer and the second covered driving rules given by an officer from the transportation service.

"Other measures may have been conducted, but I did not attend, therefore I don't know," said Sgt Kulikov.
Sgt Sergey Arkhipov, deputy platoon commander, only remembered an appearance by the TsDSA [Central Club of the Soviet Army] agitational brigade. He had not heard the regimental propaganda officers in the past three months.

Of course, my conversations with the troops cannot be called a reflection of the entire picture. Moreover, because people can simply forget things. Yes, they can forget things but, as has already been stated, approximately 50 measures were conducted in the regiment. The people I talked with did not mention a single one of them. Could it be that they have all simply forgotten? This does give some food for thought. Later, when we discussed these facts with the political workers, Capt A. Stoyan concluded "We come to the conclusion that we must visit the companies more often."

As is known, this conclusion was made a long time ago. It would be incorrect to assert that the communists in the regimental party organization do not know that the regiment must be the center of ideological-indoctrinational work. However, they still rely on the "majority." And this comes through not only in lecture propaganda but in the other forms of ideological-political indoctrination of the troops as well. I visited political lessons in two motorized infantry companies. Lt A. Knyagnitskiy gave a lesson in one of the companies. Three groups were combined into one and only 40 percent of the students were present at the lecture. Why was this? One was sick and three were on detail. Pvt A. Ostashko, Pvt N. Shkelev, and Pvt A. Tatarintsev were on TDY according to the roster, but in reality, were in the unit club. Also "on TDY" was Pvt A. Valeyev, who at the time was asleep in the company storeroom.

An analogous picture was found in the other company--three groups had also been combined into one here. Sr Lt N. Zakharov guided the lesson. It turned out, in particular, that Pvts T. Arsibayev and V. Terekhov often missed the lessons and were absent this time too. And, this did not alarm anyone. Apparently because the "majority" of students attend the lessons or, as they say in the unit, "almost everyone is involved."

Or here is another example. A political briefing for warrant officers [praporshchik] was held the same day that I arrived at the unit. An officer from the political department
sent specially to the unit to monitor the briefing quoted that approximately 30 percent of those who were supposed to be at the political briefing were there. Where were the remaining individuals? The unit propaganda officer took two hours to try to clear this up. However, he was unsuccessful in explaining each absence to the representative of the political department.

What does this tell us? Primarily that there is not real concern for the full inclusion of the troops in indoctrinational measures. And, on that occasion, no one would have begun to look into the reasons for the absence of many warrant officers at the political briefing if the worker from the political organ had not requested that this be done.

Afghanistan-propaganda work, as is known, is one of the forms of the link of leaders with the masses, the active influence of communists on all members of the collective. Based on real contact with people, it provides the opportunity to study the moods, learn the needs, and react to their needs in a timely manner. The facts that I encountered in the regiment show that contentment with such an incipient criterion as "majority" and remaining remote from the company often deprives communist leaders and the party committee of required information concerning the needs of the troops and how things are in the collectives.

Moreover, such a strange approach to indoctrinational work causes instances when not only the remote servicemen but even entire troop collectives slip from the mind of the propaganda officers. This is what occurred here. A group of soldiers from the combat engineer subunit appealed to me by stating "Help us get to visit the unit museum. They say that the museum is very good but we are not allowed to visit."

The museum at the regiment is in fact a good one. As was explained to me by the unit political workers, the museum is a real center of indoctrination of the troops in the combat traditions, that all of the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers in the unit visit it. Then suddenly, such an unexpected request.

One would think first off that the soldiers who approached me were a rare exception, people who accidentally fell outside of that "majority." I went to the subunit and posed the question: "Who has not yet visited the museum?" Jr Sgt
P. Baranovskiy, Pvt V. Nikitin, Pvt T. Berdashvili, Pvt A. Kostenko, and other participants in the conversation to a man announced that they had never been.

"You must understand, this is a shame," said Pvt V. Nikitin. "I get out of the service this spring and I have not even been to my own museum."

Sr Lt S. Bannikov confirmed that the subunit had not been to the museum, nor had he himself. They do not let individuals go to the museum and the regiment plans group visits but the regiment to this time for some reason had not planned such an excursion.

"There is some sort of misunderstanding," commented Capt A. Stoyan, deputy regimental commander for political affairs. "All of the subunits have visited the museum."

Meanwhile, this "misunderstanding" is not a rarity but the result of the absence of specificity when analyzing the ideological-indoctrinational work in the regiment.

As they say, everyone respects statistics but no one wants to be the statistician. And statistics, as it turned out, makes it possible to respond specifically to the question: Do our indoctrinational measures widely involve the personnel?
Spring... This is the time when thousands of youths think about selecting their life's vocation: What should I be? Many dream about adopting the complex and honorable profession of defender of the socialist fatherland, to become an officer. But, what type of officer exactly: combined-arms commander or political worker, a pilot or a tanker, a missileer or a sailor?

These questions are contained in many of the letters which the editorial board receives from soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers, and students in secondary and vocational educational schools. Readers are interested in the special features of particular military specialties and in the training and life of a cadet. Responding to the requests of our readers, today we begin publication of materials under the rubric "We Discuss Military Schools." Maj Gen Ye. Leonov familiarizes our readers with the school which trains combined-arms officers for the Ground Forces.
Someone who visits Blagoveshchensk for the first time will remember our remarkable city which has been built at the juncture of two rivers—the Amur and the Zeya. A memorial complex erected in honor of the troops from the Amur who fell in battle for the honor, freedom, and independence of our socialist fatherland, stands on one of its squares—Victory Square. Annually first-year students from our school take the military oath here and make a solemn pledge to the party and the people.

Directly following this is intense training. In classrooms and in laboratories, doing field lessons, the cadets assimilate the complex science of being victorious. Commanders, political workers, teachers, and instructors pass on their rich knowhow to them. Among them are colonels I. Rodin, V. Kharchenko, Yu. Eydel', and A. Kamenev, Lt Cols M. Mishin and G. Kosov, and many others.

A combined-arms commander... This is an ideologically tempered comprehensively trained officer. Today he must know and be able to do a great deal. Often youths who enter our school are amazed by the fact that, from the very first day of training, along with the expected lessons on tactics, firing, and driving, a significant portion of their time must be spent on the study of social sciences, higher mathematics, theoretical mechanics, the resistance of materials, and other subjects which are taught in civilian VUZ's. Why is this necessary? For general erudition?

No, we are not just discussing erudition in this instance. The graduate of the combined-arms school along with a military specialty receives a higher education and the diploma of an engineer in maintenance of tracked and wheeled vehicles. Only comprehensive knowledge allows an officer to skillfully, with the greatest effectiveness, employ modern complicated weapons in combat and to correctly train and indoctrinate subordinates.

The training of future officers in the school is also set up taking these high demands into consideration. And, of course, the greatest attention is devoted to field training, to lessons on the terrain, during which theoretical knowledge is converted to practical skills. Amongst the volcanoes and narrow taiga valleys the cadets are taught to control subunits [podrazdeleniye], to drive combat vehicles, and to fire from the assigned weapon. All of this is done in a situation which approximates combat to the maximum.
Electronic and radio equipment today assists in creating such a situation. Combat training missions, as a rule, are worked out in a complex manner. This to a significant degree raises training effectiveness.

It is not only in the field that modern training facilities have been created. The training wings of the schools have classrooms for programmed instruction, that contain computers, automated simulators, course preparation, lecture halls, and various offices and laboratories which have been equipped with training facilities. With their aid it is possible to set up and rapidly change the complex tactical situation on miniature training grounds, explain how vehicle assemblies and mechanisms operate, use equipment with which the students can themselves test their knowledge, and many other things.

A great deal of attention is devoted in the school to the formation and development of one of the basic qualities of a commander—the ability to indoctrinate subordinates. Therefore, along with military and special lessons, each cadet during his training takes a course in party-political work and in the basics of military pedagogy and psychology. Great significance is attached to indoctrinating cadets with high internal culture.

The school also has a rich library of over 100,000 books. The cadets have available to them a large club in which debates are held, as are meetings with individuals from the field of literature and art and evenings of rest along with the students and working youths of the city. Amateur artistic hobby groups, people's creativity hobby groups, and sports sections are in operation. In a word, each cadet will find something to his liking to fill his free time.

We are also proud of the school's museum. It contains many exhibits which discuss the participation of graduates in the Great Patriotic War, about the life and activities of the reknowned Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovskiy, for whom the Far East Combined-Arms School is named.

The displays also present materials which show how our graduates are now serving in the troop units. Most of them have been included in the intense rhythm of officers' service and are rapidly winning authority in the eyes of subordinates.

Those who are now attending the school strive to multiply its great traditions. Youths who come to us from the far corners of the country from the very first day steadfastly assimilate
the knowledge and skills which are required by a combined-arms officer. Cadet V. Shvydkiy, a native of the Far East, is the Frunze grant holder and Sgt V. Nepochatov, who came to us from the Moscow area, won the Leninist Komsomol grant. For them, just as for the other students, the school has become their home. They are doing everything to hold high the honor of a cadet of the Far East Combined-Arms School.

Another training day has ended. By the way, in accordance with the lesson plan, several subunits will continue during the night: it is a regular trip into the field.

And those who are not participating in the night lessons on the terrain are arranging an evening walk, as envisioned by the daily agenda. The ageless tune resounds over the military garrison:

"...On the high banks of the Amur, the sentries of the motherland stand."

This is a song about those who defended the socialist fatherland during the Civil and the Great Patriotic War. It is also about the heirs of glory of older generations who are being trained to take their place among the officer corps.

Kalinin Military Artillery Academy

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 20 Apr 78 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Arty P. Slipchenko, chief of the Military Artillery Academy imeni M. I. Kalinin: "In Close Contact with the Troops"]

[Text] The officer corps of the USSR Armed Forces is annually augmented by graduates from military educational institutions, including graduates of our school—the Military Artillery Academy imeni M. I. Kalinin. As a rule, they are assigned to responsible jobs. Naturally, we are pleased when we learn that our graduates are fulfilling the high trust with honor.

Approximately five years ago future Capt V. Sukhoruchenko completed the academy. For successes in training and indoctrinating subordinates and for continually raising his personal professional mastery, the officer was twice promoted ahead of his contemporaries. We also received fine feedback about another of our graduates—Lt Col A. Lobachev, who actively and steadfastly introduces automated control systems.

One could give many similar examples. They are sufficient to allow one to convincingly say that, within the walls of the academy, students are receiving profound knowledge and firm
practical skills. However, this does not give us the right to be complacent about what has been achieved. Military affairs continue to develop without let-up. Consequently, the work of our faculties must be restructured as required. One cannot fall behind. That which satisfies us yesterday is unavoidably obsolete today.

Where are the hidden reserves for further improvement in the training-indoctrinational process? Primarily, in our view, in strengthening and expanding ties with the troops. Only there can the ideas given birth to in classrooms and laboratories be tested. Only in the process of practical work in troop units can we understand to infinity which are the strong points and which are the weak points in the academy's graduate, what else must be done to improve the quality of his training.

It is this very close tie with the troop units that has allowed us to establish in a timely manner that certain graduates have insufficiently developed practical skills for controlling sub-units [podrazdeleniy] under the conditions of modern combat. What is the reason for this? It would seem, just as envisioned by the program, that group lessons, drills, command and staff, and tactical exercises are being conducted with the students. But, why do they sometimes not provide the desired results?

Analysis showed that far from all the students during these lessons and drills succeeded in operating in certain "jobs." And, if they succeeded in doing so, it was only once or twice during the training which, it goes without saying, is insufficient to acquire firm practical skills.

Then the question was posed as to broader participation of academy personnel in the exercises which are conducted in troop units. We met this question head on. Our students now have the opportunity to function in the role of commander or deputy commander and as chief of staff and to realistically guide personnel in the accomplishment of combat training missions, including field firing. Along with unit [chast'] officers, the students participate in the elaboration of exercise plans and in summing up results. All of this undoubtedly facilitates the development of command skills.

The supervisory and teaching staff of the academy is actively participating in these exercises. The utility is obvious: leading scientifically substantiated methods of training artillery-men are more rapidly being introduced into the troop units and we comprehensively familiarize ourselves with the activities of our students under conditions which approximate combat to the maximum, and we make our conclusions.

For example, at one of the exercises, Col I. Lyubimov, candidate of military sciences, docent, and senior instructor, served as an
umpire in a regiment. Evaluating in particular the actions of academy graduates, the teacher pointed out to them certain miscalculations and mistakes but, at the same time, also made conclusions for the faculty.

Col Yu. Sotskov visited a troop unit and provided great assistance to the officers of one of the staffs in improving the organization of the combat employment of artillery. At the same time, he noted that certain academy graduates did not fully possess methodological skills.

The material accumulated on such trips is systematized, generalized, analyzed, and presented for discussion at meetings of the faculty and at departmental gatherings. Here they note certain concrete measures intended to eliminate the shortcomings that were noted in the training-indoctrinational process. Sometimes these measures are of a partial nature. And sometimes more cardinal decisions are proposed. Thanks to this our graduates now leave the academy armed not only with new ideas and knowledge which reflect the modern level of development of military science, but also practical skills which will allow them to carry on the struggle for the introduction of these ideas and knowledge into practice.

Close contact with troop units allows our scientists to address in a timely manner those questions which at the given moment are most bothersome to commanders and staffs. It is these very problems in an overwhelming majority of instances which become the themes for scientific research and dissertations.

At exercise Berezina, let's say, artillery subunits work out integrated fire support missions for the troops under various combat conditions. A representative from our academy was there on the spot—Maj Gen Arty V. Piratov, candidate of military sciences and chief of one of our leading faculties. Rich knowhow and continual contact with troop units permitted him to provide valuable recommendations and to prepare a scientific work which had great significance for the practical activities of artillery units.

This is far from an isolated example of close cooperation with troop units. Scientific research is carried out in the faculties on a number of vital problems linked with the further improvement of combat readiness and with the more effective employment of modern weapons and the methodology of training artillerymen. Taking part in these elaborations are Cols Yu. Kotov and I. Sholokhov, Engr-Lt Col A. Novaselov, and Lt Col A. Guk.
Organizing lessons with the students and carrying on scientific research, we never forget that our graduates along with high professional training must possess the firm skills of an officer-indoctrinator. This means that during the time of training in the academy students must assimilate Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology, the practice of party-political work, acquisition of profound knowledge in the field of military pedagogy and psychology, as well as comprehension and adoption of the leading knowhow accumulated in units and formations [soyedineniye].

Again, the crux of this work for us was contact with troop units. Based on the initiative of the political and the training departments, as well as the social sciences faculty, a special form was developed which was to be filled out at our request by the direct chiefs of our graduates and by unit political workers. The responses to the questions posed made it possible to determine with sufficient accuracy whether our former students approached solution of problems involving indoctrination of personnel in a sufficiently qualified and skillful manner.

Based on the resultant data, a long-range plan was elaborated. In accordance with this plan, great attention is devoted to the development and strengthening of the skills that students possess in the field of indoctrinational work from the very first day that the students arrive at the academy. Taken into consideration here was the fact that after graduation they would be tasked to carry on indoctrinational work not in the platoon or in the battery, but at scales determined by higher responsibilities.

This plan envisions work with the students during their non-training time. They participate in the preparation of lectures, social-political themes, and give lectures both to servicemen and to the workers of the city of Leningrad. Meetings with specialists-psychologists, scientists, and lawyers are regularly organized. During their probationary period, the students are given assignments directed towards acquisition of skills in indoctrinational work with personnel.

A great deal has been done in the academy to further improve the training-indoctrinational process and to raise the effectiveness of scientific research. But we must go further and achieve more.

The report by comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress underscored: "The modern leader must organically combine within himself a party attitude with profound competence, discipline with initiative and a creative approach to business." These words place great demands on us. For we are training officer-leaders for the USSR Armed Forces. They must possess all of these qualities.
The road makes a sharp turn and immediately against the background of the forest the enormous light-colored buildings of the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined-Arms School imeni 60th Anniversary of Great October come into view. Officers-political workers are trained here for the USSR Armed Forces. What are the special features of their military profession? What demands are made upon them?

"A real political officer in the army," writes comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his memoirs "Malaya zemlya," is a person around whom people gather, he knows for sure their mood, needs, hopes, dreams, he leads them to self-sacrifice, to a feat." It is these very political officers that we nurture in our school.

To lead people is a sacred responsibility, the ultimate duty of the political worker. In order to successfully carry out this task, he must possess the most profound ideological conviction, comprehensive knowledge, and the skill from class positions to examine and solve any problems. The political worker must posses the ability to pass his conviction on to subordinates and to ignite an unquenchable flame in their hearts.

From this stems the basic task facing the students: during the time that they remain at the school they must arm themselves with knowledge and assimilate the forms and methods of ideological influence on personnel. To achieve this one primarily must assimilate Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy, scientific communism, and profoundly and comprehensively study the history of the CPSU, the decisions of Congresses, CC Plenums and other party documents.

Materials and documents linked with the trip by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet comrade L. I. Brezhnev to Siberia and the Far East occupy a large place in all training-indoctrinal work with cadets. Lectures have been prepared and seminars and meetings held to discuss these questions.

Let's look in one of the auditoriums. The students are attentively listening to the lecture given by Col Yu. Popov. Short, laconic notes appear in the notebooks. But the lecture, just as in all
higher educational institutions, only gives an orientation and illuminates key questions. Ahead is work during self-study hours. A profound concept is found here. One must not only acquire a certain store of knowledge in the school, but also the ability to supplement this independently.

Knowledge is necessary not just in and of itself. One must learn how to employ it in practice. These skills are imparted to the students by one of the leading faculties in the school—the faculty of party-political work. How do they prepare and conduct talks with soldiers and sergeants? What should a subunit [podrazdeleniye] party and Komsomol organization zero in on in this or that situation? How is it most advisable to denote the victors in socialist competition? Experienced teachers pass on to the students how to do this and many other things.

Of course, we are primarily talking about the acquisition of practical skills in the conduct of political work under field conditions. Therefore, faculty teachers, most often Cols V. Smirnov and L. Kumin, travel with the students to tactical lessons. When summing up results, they also always evaluate the activities of the students from the point of view of active, continual, and viable political support to the battle.

A visible place in the training process is devoted to field tactical lessons with the cadets of a military-political school. And, this is understandable. The professional competence of a political worker is determined not only by knowledge in the social sciences, but also by his military training.

In our training center, the future officers-political workers learn to fire from all types of small arms, as well as from tanks and combat infantry vehicles. Cadets acquire practical skills in driving vehicles, tanks, and armoured personnel carriers.

Formation of the qualities required by the future officer-political worker also continues during non-training time. Cadets prepare lectures and reports and present them at the school, to the troops of the garrison, and to school children and the workers of Novosibirsk and of the oblast. Our students also actively participate in the conduct of thematic evenings and debates. All of this not only enriches knowledge and expands outlook but also allows them to acquire practical knowhow in lecture propaganda and organization of mass cultural measures with personnel.
The cadets make trips to locations of revolutionary, combat, and labor glory and often visit the largest construction sites of the Tenth Five-Year Plan. Firm friendship links us, for example, with the builders of the Sayano-Shushenskoye GES. All of this facilitates the indoctrination of future political workers in the glorious traditions of our party and people.

Even firmer contacts have been established by us with the collective in the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Territorially we are located side by side. And, the scientists continually visit the cadets, give lectures, and participate in conferences held at the school.

Our graduates--lieutenants with a higher military-political education--go out annually to the troop units. Awaiting them is difficult but very interesting responsible work and service. They are the heirs of the commissars who always were in the front line and who led the armed defenders of the Country of Soviets.

7869
CSO: 1801
OFFICER USES INFLUENCE FOR SON IN SERVICE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 78 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col A. Sorokin: "The Child Comes for a Visit"]

[Text] In his letter to the editorial board, WO [praporshchik] A. Ivanov mentioned the undisciplined Pvt Yuriy Kolesnikov, who works in the TECh [technical maintenance unit], who has received more than one reprimand and who in a space of a year and a half succeeded in making a trip home more than ten times, how Kolesnikov's father, a staff officer at the military district headquarters, comes to pick up his son in his own Zhiguli and who is not at all interested in Yuriy's service and discipline. "What is going on?" asks comrade Ivanov. "Help me sort out this mysterious phenonomen."

The editorial board assigned me to visit the garrison where Pvt Yu. Kolesnikov serves. The soldier had been sent TDY from the aviation regiment to the airfield technical support battalion to pull detail until the end of his service (his period of service expires in May of this year). He has a very bold attitude and is satisfied with everything.

The only ones dissatisfied are the chiefs. With his attitude towards service. WO I. Mamayke put it this way when discussing the soldier:
"As long as you are watching him—he's doing something. You turn away—he drops what he is doing. He just returned from detention: "he was arrested for being drunk." At his previous assignment at the TEC the reports were identical: lazy and lacking in will. True, there were occasions when he amazed everyone with his unique "inventiveness." Thus, he was once arrested with a full teapot which held an alcoholic beverage rather than hot tea. Wine. He showed no vitality during training. He continually was a lagger in competition. Due to poor training and a lack of discipline this specialist was not allowed to work on a missile-equipped aircraft. However, on days off and holidays he was permitted to go home. Maj Yu. Kuz'michev, unit [chast'] chief of staff, waved his hands: "But what can we do if they call from our headquarters?"

We encountered Maj I. Kolesnikov at the higher headquarters—the military district staff. Ivan Ivanovich is in a good mood about the successes of his son... He confirms that the young man went home, but not anywhere as often as the regimental statistics indicated. It was only seven times, not eleven times. And, only legally—with leave papers.

"And I know this exactly," says Ivan Ivanovich. "I myself marked down the 'arrival-departure.'"

When difficulties with the departure of his son arose, Ivan Ivanovich was forced to turn to the organization of calls "from above," about which they speak in a low voice in the unit. Who was it that complained? Maj I. Kolesnikov has firm ties with the communications people. How can one not assist a comrade from higher headquarters! And, Lt Col V. Markelov from the military district aviation staff and Lt Col V. Balayev from the formation [soyedineniye] staff called down to the unit with a firm request to release Pvt Yu Kolesnikov for a trip home. These requests for some reason were immediately accepted in the regiment as a direct order.

Incidentally, the inventive father did not overlook a single principle of pressure. He also employed the coaxing method. The availability of local transport allowed him to "toss" certain short materials to the unit. Finally, for example, he gave the aviators a roll of Whatman paper, 60 sheets of large format paper, as a gift. He obtained it and delivered it with an expensive gesture of generosity. Moreover, this roll cost him nothing if you don't take into account that the Whatman paper was to have gone to another unit, to the cartography unit.
Presents, calls, the position of a military district staff officer—all of this ensured that the aviators would be obliging. They welcomed Kolesnikov Sr with pleasure and with a readiness to release Kolesnikov Jr. Everyone saw this but no one tried to stop such a violation of regulations. And, only after communist WO A. Ivanov announced that he had written a letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA did the TEC political officer finally send a report about these violations up the chain of command to the formation political department chief. But, nothing has resulted from such measures.

Incidentally, not even the most viable measures can correct everything involved in this instance. Definite moral harm in the eyes of the personnel has been inflicted on the reputation of the military district staff officer and on the authority of the commander's incentive. But the greatest harm was inflicted upon the individual for whom, it would seem, everything had been done. This is Pvt Yuriy Kolesnikov. His development did not occur. His entire period of service was insufficient to allow him to assimilate a military specialty and become a real soldier. The importunate tutelage of his parents and, to be blunt, his officer father's irresponsible attitude toward indoctrinating his son in a sense of high responsibility for honorable accomplishment of his duty to society served as a barrier to this.

7869
CSO: 1801
SOCIALIST COMPETITION BETWEEN REGIMENTS IN GSFG TRIED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 28 Apr 78 p 2

[Articles by various authors: "Two Regiments are Competing"]

Two regiments are competing. . . .
A great deal lies behind these words. These are new broader horizons of competition, new reserves for increasing its viability.

At the request of Col V. Nagornyy, our correspondent, the commanders of the two competing regiments discuss the first lessons of the competition between the units (chast') stemming from the results of the winter training.

We are Teaching Each Other

Gds Maj N. Abanin, commander of the Guards Tank Novgorod-Berlin Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and of the Red Star Regiment: "Having initiated the competition with another tank regiment, we decided to adopt everything that is best that we possess. Our competitors strived to do the same. And now we note with satisfaction that the command element, party, and Komsomol organizations of the regiments were mutually enriched with knowhow and we exchanged a great amount of useful experience with each other.

"I recall the first meeting between the representatives of the regiments. It was both businesslike and inspiring. Gds Lt Col Boris Akimovich Maksimishin, regimental commander,
led the delegation of guests. He also was the first to speak. Gds Lt Col Maksimishin discussed the combat path of the unit and the pledges made by the tankers. We in turn exchanged plans. The frank businesslike discussion served to bring the collectives together. "You should have seen the inquisitiveness with which the guests familiarized themselves with the life of our collective. Judging from everything, the commander set the tone when he ordered his accompanying deputies, subunit [podrazdeleniye] commanders, political workers, and the specialists from the various services to 'go at it full bore'. And, as is understandable, we wanted to put our best foot forward: moreover, last year the regiment won the title of excellent. In the motor pool, in the training classes, in the barracks—lively discussions were underway with the guests.

"We then visited our comrades in competition. And, I must say, there was much to learn there. In particular, how they organized the training of the specialists to fire the main gun of the tank. Our attention was primarily attracted to the firing range which had the latest word in equipment. The number of training positions and how they were equipped with various training devices made it possible to simultaneously train the personnel of an entire company.

"Naturally, we in a healthy way were envious of our neighbors. Unfortunately, objective reasons did not permit us to equip our firing range in a similar manner. But, we did not want to give up first place. The decision was made to achieve an improvement in the firing mastery of the troops through an intensification of training, improvement of training methodology, and additional lessons with the simulators and in firing hobby group. Seeing the specific goal, the people set to work with enthusiasm. And, we now can confidently say that we adopted the correct course. Based upon the results of the winter period of firing training, the regiment received a high evaluation. Naturally, this is pleasant.

"But, unfortunately, not everything is going as we would like it to go. We recently met with Gds Lt Col Maksimishin and noted with concern that both we and they have subunits which have not accomplished the pledges made.

"We attempted to determine the reasons and find ways of eliminating the deficiencies. I think that the joint search for new reserves for improving combat readiness will assist us in the summer training period to avoid similar shortcomings."
Not Only on Inspection Day...

Guards Lt Col B. Maksimishin, commander of the Guards Tank Berdichev Order of Lenin Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy, and of the Red Star Orders of the MNR [Mongolian Peoples' Republic] Sukhe-Bator and Combat Red Banner imeni Sukhe-Bator: "Competition between regiments has become a notable phenomenon in our life. It permitted us as if observing from the sideline to look at our work and to learn to more self-critically evaluate it. Why? Because, we began on a daily basis to compare our results with the indicators of another collective analogous in size. Moreover, we previously did this only when summing up the results of the training period and, in daily life, knew little about each other. That which had been achieved was looked upon by the personnel as the peak of perfection. That is how it was with us, in particular, with firing training, when certain commanders considered their subordinates as inimitable masters. And suddenly everyone learned that their neighbors at a given stage had done even better.

"When the decision was made to compete with the Novgorod-Berlin regiment, we knew that it carries the title of excellent and that it would be difficult to defeat them. However, we are all happy to have the chance to get to know the leaders better. Lessons for the record during which we held drills on firing from the main gun were held at the same firing range. The moving-target tank gunnery ranges were side by side. You should have seen the amount of attention that our crews paid to the actions of their neighbors. They noted every single result, observed how their neighbors organized the drills for the accomplishment of the lessons, were not ashamed to monitor the knowhow of those who had already been awarded an excellent evaluation. Unfortunately, we did not exceed in achieving an overall excellent evaluation for firing. But undoubtedly, the firing mastery of the crews noticeably increased. Is this not confirmation of the effectiveness of competition between regiments?

"During the competition we were convinced that the results, as a rule, were higher where the contacts between the competitors were closer. For example, the closest contacts exist in our regiments between the officers and the battalions which are commanded by Gds Capt N. Yegoryshev and Gds Lt Col V. Vasil'yev. And, this played no small role in the fact that the subunits indicated were the victors in the competition in our units."
"Unfortunately, no matter how you look at it, we still do not have a precise plan. We are carefully monitoring mutual activities only on inspection days. This interest wanes during daily training. As a result, we end up with our own types of ebbs and flows in the competition. One would think that, to avoid this seasonality, it would help to have competitions for the title of best specialist, demonstration lessons for officers and warrant officers [praporshchik], and other joint measures. In a word, there are still great reserves for increasing the viability of competition between units. One of our joint tasks during the summer training period is to find these reserves and put them to the service of combat readiness."

Lt Gen P. Shkidchenko, Deputy Commander in Chief for Combat Training, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany at the request of the editorial board shares his thoughts concerning the questions raised by the commanders of the competing units: "Competition between units is a new phenomenon. Naturally, there are special features to be found in how it is organized. One of these special features—the requirement for close and continual contact between the competing collectives—has been quite fully covered by the regimental commanders. The concern on the part of the unit commanders is understandable: to maintain continual businesslike contact with a competitor which sometimes is located quite a ways away is really difficult. And, it seems to me that not everything is dependent on the unit commanders. Competition between regiments requires closer attention on the part of the command element of formations [soyedineniy], staffs, and political organs. The viability of competition between regiments is an important prerequisite for success in the movement for the leading formation, for the best group of forces."

"In addition, a meeting of the group military council noted that competition between regiments still is not being properly organized everywhere. Knowhow of leading formations is still being introduced still without the requisite steadfastness. And, such knowhow does exist, for example, in the Guards Tank Ural'sk-L'vov Order of the October Revolution Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Volunteer Division imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy. Questions concerning the competition between regiments here were examined during meetings of the party and Komsomol aktiv and at service gatherings. Regularly, at least once per month, results are summed up. And, as pointed out in the Letter of the CC CPSU, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and CC Komsomol concerning the unfolding of socialist competition in 1978, publicity is a vital component of competition."
"Now is the time to carefully analyze the results of winter training and to generalize the accumulated knowhow. We are planning a gathering of the best regiments for this purpose. An attentive approach to the organization of competition between units will facilitate making it an even more active form of the struggle for the leading formation, for the best group of forces, for a further raising of combat readiness."

7869
CSO: 1801
PROBLEMS WITH SOCIALIST COMPETITION TRAINING OF CADETS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Troyan, cadet division commander, and Lt Col V. Bondarev, senior instructor: "A Creative Quest is Required"]

[Text] A survey concerning one of the graduates of our Odessa Higher Artillery Command School imeni M. V. Frunze states: "Lt I. Mayorov skillfully organizes socialist competition." We also have analogous information concerning Lts A. Mishin, M. Timofeyev, G. Obukhovskiy, and others. Unfortunately, not all of our graduates possess the requisite skills in this sphere. Why?

It would seem that the cadets participate in competition and see how the commander guides it. And, they accumulate knowhow. But, is the organization of competition at the school always a real school for them?

Having critically analyzed the situation that has developed, we in the school came to the following conclusion: It is often repeated in the lecture halls that socialist competition is an integral part of training and indoctrination, but at lessons and drills, this theoretical thesis is not always reinforced by practical deeds.

We now require that cadets who have been designated as lesson directors in order to acquire methodological skills include in their training plan a special section which describes organization of the training.
It soon came to light that the cadets coped relatively easily at drills where norms are worked out. But, difficulties arise at field lessons when not all of the trainees' activities are evaluated using time indicators. Here the teachers spoke their authoritative word. Working out certain themes with the cadets, they clearly demonstrated how the factor of competition should be employed.

The commanders of the cadet subunits [podrazdelenye] are not remaining on the sidelines. For example, battery commander Sr Lt V. Laryushkin designates from among the cadets commanders of Platoons and crews during the tactical exercise and tasks them to carefully think through questions involving the organization of competition at various stages of the exercise. And, during the exercise, the officer gives the cadets specific advice and recommendations on the employment of the competition factor when working out missions, when ensuring that the competition is publicized, when comparing results, and so on. Capt V. Trush, Sr Lt V. Pizintsali, and others take an identical approach.

However, as experience showed, one must not limit oneself to these measures when inculcating cadets in the skills of organizing socialist competition. In order to create situations similar to those which a graduate will encounter in the troop units, we strive to more often involve the cadets in the conduct of lessons with the soldiers and sergeants of the service subunits. Opportunities are created during such lessons for a unique supplemental probationary period.

But, of course, the main thing is the probationary period in the troop unit. It plays an enormous role in the training of the cadets for future service as an officer. Here, in our view, not everything is favorable.

The major deficiency is the fact that the cadets are not given the opportunity to demonstrate independence very often in troop units. Why not, for instance, trust the cadet with summing up the results of competition in a platoon? It goes without saying that both prompting and monitoring will be required. But, one must remember the following as well: You can never teach a person to swim if you don't allow him to go into the water.

Meetings with commanders and political workers from troop units and with former graduates that are regularly held at the school provide invaluable assistance to the cadets in the acquisition of skills in organizing competition. They assure knowhow and provide examples from actual practice.
Efforts directed toward inculcating the students with firm skills in organizing competition never stop at the school. However, not all reserves are being put to use. A further creative quest is required. The winter training period which was a serious test for our graduates from last year is coming to a close in the troop units. Analyzing their knowhow, their successes, and their oversights, we receive useful inputs for our work with the cadets.

The ability to employ the invigorating force of socialist competition in full measure in the interests of the matter at hand cannot be tested in any exam which our graduates take.

But, life itself forces them to pass this examination immediately upon their arrival in the troop units. And, our task is to prepare the young officers for this examination to the best of our ability.

7869
CSO: 1801
FIRE TRAINING FOR COMBAT INFANTRY VEHICLE CREW

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 78 signed to press
20 Feb '78 pp 12-13

Article by Sergeant V. Nesterov, leader of an "excellent"-rated squad, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "On Target With the First Round"

One indicator of a high degree of fire training is the ability of personnel to destroy a target with the first launch, or round, at maximum ranges of fire. Precisely this kind of success has been achieved by the motorized infantry squad commanded by Sergeant V. Nesterov.

As they publish his article, the editors invite warrant officers, sergeants, and first sergeants to exchange experience in instructing subordinates in accurate firing with any type of weapon.

When I took command of the squad I had to suffer not a few disappointing failures. For example, machine gunner Private A. Shafarenko would break off his firing at moving targets; machine gunner Private S. Muratov performed his target reconnaissance very slowly and at night calculated distances inaccurately; while, as a result of his slowness, grenade launcher operator V. Gavril'kov was unable to destroy his target during the short time the area was illuminated. There was, indeed, plenty to think about. Upon the advice of the platoon commander, I made myself detailed notes in a notebook of even the slightest deficiencies in my subordinates' fire training and on this basis began to work with each soldier individually.

The main thing I tried to get from those I was instructing was rapid and accurate performance, that is, those military qualities
without which one cannot imagine oneself a gunner. But how does one go about teaching, let us say, a gunner to execute all fire missions flawlessly and with lightning-like rapidity? The main thing I emphasized was rifle training.

Now I noticed one peculiar thing. After several sessions on the firing range, Private Shafarenko learned to execute his fire missions rapidly, to make proper fire adjustments, and to give accurate target designations. But one had only to put him in an infantry combat vehicle with a running engine, and it was as if there were another soldier in his place. The same problems that he had, as they say, been doing at the blackboard since summer, he now did two, and even three, times slower; and he made not a few mistakes in target reconnaissance at the training range. I shared my observation with the platoon commander, and he advised giving the gun operator more training time in a "hot" vehicle, arranging vehicle field exercises for this purpose. This method did indeed pay off. Private Shafarenko made no more errors in his calculations and learned to act quickly under any conditions.

We began to look for ways and means to increase further the rate of operational performance under combat conditions. I will dwell on one instructive point. Gunners well know how important it is in combat, upon detection of one target or another, to determine its range quickly; to calculate accurate initial settings; and to destroy the target with the first round. Having spotted the target, the gunner calculates its range using the mil formula, and on that bases the sight setting. The calculation is sufficiently rapid and accurate. But as experience has shown, this calculation may be simplified considerably and time may be saved, things which we practice in our daily military training. In order the better to master and remember the order of calculation, we have devised the rhymed lines of the simple rule: "Decimeters by mils divided, the range setting ready provided."

In order to check this, we will perform the calculations for the same fire mission using both methods.

Let us assume that we are firing a BMP infantry combat vehicle (ICV) gun at a tank. $size = 3.5$ meters
$elevation\ angle = 0-05$
$range = ?$

The range will be equal to

$$range = \frac{size \times 1000}{elevation\ angle} = \frac{3.5 \times 1000}{5} = \frac{3500}{5} = 700 \text{ meters}$$

On the basis of the range obtained we determine the sight setting. It will be equal to BR-7.
We will solve the same problem using the other method. Thus, "Decimeters by mils divided, the range setting ready provided."

\[
3.5 \text{ miles} = 35 \text{ decimeters} : 5 \text{ thousand} = 7 \text{ (range setting BR-7)}
\]

One operation, and the answer is ready! We need not go into how much this method simplifies and expedites the work of an ICV crew.

Also with one operation, only with the opposite solution, it is easy to find the size of the target on the basis of the known distance (corresponding to the sight setting).

For example:

\[
\text{range} = 1000 \text{ (range setting 10)} \quad \text{elevation angle} = 0.02 \\
\text{size} = 10 \times 2 = 20 \text{ decimeters} = 2 \text{ meters}
\]

Again, one operation.

Is this calculation at variance with the conventional procedure for solving problems involved in the execution of fire missions? No, it is not. As can be seen from the examples, it is actually based entirely on the mil formula.

A no less important condition for rapid combat operational performance, and, in the final analysis, for accuracy of fire, is the gunner's ability to make proper allowance for wind corrections. There are a great number of wind directions. We represent them graphically like this (see Fig. 1).

This diagram is easy to remember. Operating according to his knowledge of the ballistic missile correction table, a gunner has no trouble quickly and accurately calculating the initial settings required for an accurate first round. It is necessary to perform as many operations as possible per unit of time. This means that in an attack, let us say, on an enemy defensive position heavily saturated with antitank weapons, an expert gunner may destroy no small number of dangerous targets within a short period of time. In an effort to cut down on time, and drawing on my own experience, I have taught my gun operator to proceed in the following manner. Before giving the driver-mechanic "Short halt!", he should lay the gun for deflection and hold it in this position until the vehicle comes to a complete halt, after which there is only to lay for elevation. But at this point we came up against an unexpected fact.

"When the ICV comes to a complete halt," the gunner complained, "it makes a slight, but sharp turn to the right and my preliminary laying for deflection is no longer worth a whit."

We began to discuss the problem with the entire crew. The suggestion that the driver-mechanic was pulling on the steering

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control when he finished braking proved not to be the case. The cause of the difficulty was something else entirely—the steering devices were not well adjusted, and it was also found that there was unequal tension in the track assemblies. This, as it turns out, is an example of how firing can be affected by the technical condition of the vehicle! In our work there really are no trivial matters. We drew the appropriate practical conclusions from this fact, which had an immediate effect on the crew's next fire training exercise.

It was not for nothing that I devoted a lot of attention to my gun operator, since he is the main person involved in firing and should receive comprehensive training.
It was also necessary to do considerable work with grenade launcher operator Private Gavril'kov and machine gunner Private Muratov. They both had difficulty orienting themselves at night and would make a large number of errors in determining distances.

I began to work with these soldiers on the basis of a definite plan. The most difficult thing of all was to eliminate the visual effect of the proximity of local objects. The night obscures distances. To fail to take this into consideration is to doom oneself to failure in firing.

That is why I have tried above all to develop in my subordinates the power of visual estimation, to teach them initially to determine with accuracy the distance to clearly visible reference points or local objects, and then to those which are very difficult to distinguish under conditions of limited visibility. The training was much more effective when those under instruction would determine distances employing the method of comparing them with previously known distances. It was more difficult to build up speed in those operations. Of assistance in this regard has been the good equipment and facilities on the firing range, which has a good training target layout for night fire exercises. By turning on tumbler switches I showed the trainees a target now in one place, now in another, varying the range and method of detecting the target—by illumination of the terrain sector and by the flashes from the rounds fired by the target itself.

Competition during exercises was highly effective in this regard. Soldiers competed not only in the speed with which they met one military standard or another, but also in the quality of their performance. At the end of training the squad champion in one category or another was announced along with his record score; this generated in all the rest the keen desire to improve their own scores and surpass the champion. The heat of competition increased as a result of this. But then without a high level of competitive spirit it would be impossible to achieve success. How do I maintain it?

Publicity, comparability of results, and exchange of experience—these are the basic principles of competition to which I adhere in all exercises and training. I will give the following example. During one infantry training exercise conducted in protective gear and involving the use of smoke screening, Private Muratov exceeded by 30 percent the military standard for disassembling and assembling his automatic weapon. I announced this great achievement to the entire squad. But no matter how hard the others tried to break the record set by their comrade-in-arms, their efforts were to no avail. For the most part, they were able to exceed the norm by only 5 percent. Comparison of
the figures 5 and 30 percent was thought to reveal some secret. I suggested to Private Muratov that he share his experience in the rapid assembly and disassembly of an automatic weapon under conditions of poor visibility. The explanation, as it turned out, proved to be quite simple: the soldier had developed a good sensitivity to the feel of all the parts of his weapon and could even assemble and disassemble it blindfolded without any effort. This immediately caught everyone's interest. They began to try to meet the military standard by feel—blindfolded. Once, twice, three times, and everybody had mastered the secret of this rapid performance, from which, of course, the combat effectiveness of the squad as a whole also benefited.

The speed with which military tasks were performed gradually increased from exercise to exercise, along with the complexity of the training itself. Trainees began to develop solid skills and true proficiency. For rapid target detection from the beginning of the period in which the terrain was illuminated, they have been raising their heads slightly off the butt in order to increase their field of vision. Having detected the target, let us say, the machine gunner quickly lines up the front sight with it, not worrying at first about the rear sight notch; he then lowers his head to the butt in the usual manner, quickly lines up the front sight with the rear sight notch and simultaneously pulls the trigger. As a rule, fire adjustments have been made on the basis of tracer trails. In time, Privates Gavril'kov and Muratov began confidently to perform all their planned night firing exercises.

During all instruction and training, in addition to instruction in weapons operational techniques, I develop in my subordinates a sense of great responsibility for their own fire training.

Squad personnel turned in satisfactory results in one of the test exercises involving the performance of a complex firing exercise. All motorized infantrymen without exception delivered fire at a rapid rate; destroyed their targets with the first rounds or with the first bursts of automatic weapon and machine gun fire; and received excellent ratings, successfully fulfilling thereby their socialist obligations in fire training.

A challenging test for us, a test of our maturity in combat, was the past tactical field fire exercise. Our subunit podrazdeleniye attacked a well prepared "enemy" position. The engagement took place in the depth of the defense. Success in this effort was decided by the ability quickly and flexibly to maneuver the squad's fire and to destroy targets with accuracy. When the situation permitted, our company attacked in ICV's advancing behind the tanks.
Well knowing that fire from moving vehicles exerts a powerful effect on morale, especially on that of enemy antitank weapon crews in exposed positions, depriving them of the possibility of delivering accurate, well-aimed fire and thereby reducing the destruction of ICV's, we tried to detect our targets in a timely manner and open fire on them without delay.

The tactical situation became more complicated when the ICV crossed the stream Tikhiy (see Fig. 2). The platoon's attacking tanks delivered concentrated fire on an emplaced "enemy" tank. One of them was "disabled."

"PTURS /antitank guided missile/, emplaced tank near the broken tree directly ahead, 1800. From a short halt, fire!" I commanded the gunner over the TPU /intertank communication system/.

There immediately followed target designations for three more targets: a vehicle-mounted recoilless gun, a light machine gun near a stump, and a small group of infantry on the south slope of a height. Oval. I order the machine gunner to deliver fire from the right side on the vehicle-mounted recoilless weapon, one of the automatic riflemen to fire on the light machine gun, and all remaining riflemen on the left side to deliver fire on the group of infantry. There began the crackle of automatic
weapon and machine gun bursts. At the appointed time there was a brief interruption of the firing while Private Shafarenko launched an antitank missile at the emplaced armored target. Within a calculated number of seconds the squad had destroyed four important targets, in addition to which we provided assistance to the tankers with whom we were cooperating.

One can truly say that there are no limits to the increase possible in the mastery of combat skills. We will continue to increase our knowledge, improve our skills, persistently search for reserves for growth in military ability, and strive to greet the coming glorious holiday, Victory Day, with new successes in socialist competition.

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U.S. MOTORIZED INFANTRY PLATOON COMBAT OPERATIONS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 78 signed to press
20 Feb 78 pp 38-39

Article based on material from the foreign press by Colonel
N. Nikitin: "The Motorized Infantry Platoon in Combat"

Text Acting in accordance with the requirements of their
strategy of the "realistic deterrent", and abiding by the social
injunction of reactionary imperialist circles, the generals in
the Pentagon are maintaining their ground forces at a high level
of combat readiness and devoting a great amount of attention to
further increasing the military resources of infantry and motor-
ized infantry units (chast') and subunits (podrazdeleniye). The
improvement being made in their organizational structure, as well
as in their combat utilization, is proceeding mainly by means of
increasing their fire and striking power and their mobility.

The motorized infantry platoon is the smallest tactical subunit
comprising an organizational part of the motorized infantry com-
pany. It consists of a command and control group, three motor-
ized infantry squads, and a weapons squad.

The command and control group consists of the platoon commander,
the assistant platoon commander, and a radio-telephone operator.
They are armed with M16 rifles.

The motorized infantry squad has a squad leader and two fire
groups, A and B. One fire group consists of four men (the group
leader, a grenade launcher operator, an automatic weapon opera-
tor, and a rifleman). The other group has five men (the group
leader, a grenade launcher operator, an automatic weapon opera-
tor, and two riflemen). The squad also has an APC (armored
personnel carrier) driver. The weapons squad is composed of
the leader, two machine gun operators, two assistant machine
gun operators, two gunners, and two ammunition carriers.
A motorized infantry platoon numbers 47 men, 36 5.56-mm M16 rifles, 8 11.43-mm Colt pistols, 2 90-mm antitank grenade launchers, 2 7.62-mm general purpose machine guns, 4 M113 APC's, 4 12.7-mm heavy machine guns, and a radio unit.

The platoon's weapons and military equipment possess the following specifications.

5.56-mm M16A1 rifle: weight - 2.86 kg; sighting distance - 500 m; rate of fire - 700-900 rounds/min; magazine capacity - 20 and 30 rounds.

90-mm antitank grenade launcher: weight - 16 kg; sighting distance - 450 m; rate of fire - 3-4 rounds/min. This weapon may be fired from a bipod or from the shoulder.

7.62-mm M60 general purpose machine gun: weight - 10.4 kg (19 with stand); sighting distance - 1100 m; rate of fire - 600 rounds/min; belt capacity - 100 rounds.

M113 APC: swimming fighting weight - 10 t; capacity, including crew - 13 men; maximum speed - on land 64 km/h, in water 6.4 km/h; cruising range on land - 320 km; in armament the vehicle is equipped with a 12.7-mm antiaircraft machine gun. The APC is air-transportable and air-droppable.

The combat role of the motorized infantry platoon is to execute combat missions by means of fire, maneuver, and hand-to-hand fighting, both as an element of a company and independently. In the latter case, the platoon operates in conjunction with the execution of security or reconnaissance missions or as an airborne force as an element of a helicopter assault operation. In some cases the platoon may be attached to tank subunits.

In offensive operations the motorized infantry platoon may operate as an element of a company in the first or second echelon (reserve) (see Fig. 1). The platoon front line of attack may extend up to 300 m. The platoon is assigned an assault objective at a depth of up to 1500 m. It moves up to the initial line, or assault line in armored personnel carriers and then dismounts near the assault line. The APC's are then concealed or they support the attack with machine gun fire.

The assault line is drawn as close as possible to the enemy and, depending on the nature of the terrain, may be 100-150 m from the forward line.

The attack is launched when the supporting fire weapons transfer their fire to the enemy depth. Depending on its place in the company battle formation, its assigned mission, and the nature
of the terrain, the platoon may advance in battle formations in a line, by column, in arrowhead or reversed arrowhead formations, or echeloned to the right or left.

In attacking an enemy defensive position which is well prepared, saturated with antitank weapons, and insufficiently neutralized by fire, the motorized infantry operates on foot ahead of the tanks, destroying enemy personnel, and protecting the tanks against tank destroyers and antitank weapons fire. The tanks in turn operate against tanks and enemy weapons and APC's, supporting thereby the advance of the infantry and motorized infantry. APC's usually follow at some distance behind the tanks in readiness to pick up the motorized infantry forces for the purpose of exploiting the attack.
A motorized infantry platoon operates offensively in armored personnel carriers and has great maneuverability and mobility. This supports the offensive at the same speed as the tank sub-units. However, the motorized infantry platoon is vulnerable to antitank weapons fire and its operations depend to a great degree on terrain conditions. It dismounts in case of strong resistance, as well as when conducting offensive operations in wooded and populated areas, and in places impassable for the APC.

Upon detecting an enemy withdrawal, the platoon commander organizes pursuit.

In defense, the motorized infantry platoon is set the task of delivering destructive fire upon the enemy right up to the approach to the forward line, preventing a breakthrough into the depth, destroying the attacking forces with fire and counterattacks together with other subunits of the company in case of penetration, and reestablishing the occupied position.

For defensive operations the platoon prepares the zone of defense in which the strong point is established. It is believed that a platoon is able to hold a strong point along a front of up to 400 m and to a depth of 200 m (see Fig. 2). The intervals between strong points of the platoons of a company may extend to 200 m.

A platoon's battle formation is most often based on a line of squads, although, as the Americans believe, this should not prevent taking full advantage of terrain conditions and the potential of its organic weapons. Depending on conditions, the battle formation may be: A - all squads in a line (in this case, when the platoon is part of the company perimeter); battle formation B - two squads forward and the third in the rear of the zone. It may be defended by a front line to the rear or a front line forward in order to provide covering fire for the flanks of the squads ahead of it.

The platoon's defensive fire system is organized so as to insure the destruction of the enemy by machine gun fire on the long-range approaches, an increasing intensity of fire as the enemy nears the forward edge of the battle area, the laying of barrage fire along the line in immediate proximity to the forward edge, destruction by fire of penetrating enemy forces, and the launching of a counterattack. Squads are assigned overlapping sectors of fire and a line along which to lay down barrage fire. The nearest artillery and mortar barrage fire line is drawn as close as possible to the forward edge of the battle area and should not be more than 200 m from it.

The platoon weapons squad is assigned positions within the platoon strong point, thereby insuring the most effective utilization of the means of fire. When machine guns and antitank rifles
are attached to motorized infantry squads they are placed in the main squad positions so as to provide flanking and oblique fire.

The platoon strong point may also include fire positions for "TOW" PTUWS /antitank guided missile/ launchers. In addition, it may have two or three tanks from a tank platoon attached to the company.

Covering shelters are dug for the motorized infantry platoon's APC's in the depth of the platoon defense zone. APC's are employed to provide machine gun fire support for squad-level engagements and cover for flanks and the boundary areas between units. M60 general-purpose machine guns transported on motorized infantry squad APC's are employed in squad positions.

The engineering operations involved in establishing the platoon defense zone include: preparation of main and reserve positions for the motorized infantry squads and organic and attached weapons, setting up the platoon commander's command and observation post, clearing fields of fire, and placing obstacles ahead of the forward edge and on the flanks of the strong point.

Emplacements for organic and attached weapons are usually most highly developed at the main positions, where within 5-6 hours of the beginning of operations are constructed trench shelters or dugout shelters to provide cover for personnel and weapons and storage for ammunition. If there is time, these entrenchments are connected by communications trenches with the infantry squad positions.

The platoon commander's command and observation post is set up as a half-covered trench with dugout or trench shelters for two to three men.

Special attention is given to concealing platoon positions from ground and air observation.

If time permits, improvements are made in the engineer equipment of the platoon defense zone. Reserve, secondary, and decoy trenches are dug; main and alternate positions are connected with communications trenches; a communications trench is dug to the rear; and antitank and antipersonnel obstacles are reinforced.

The company's second echelon (reserve) platoon defense zone is set up basically the same way as that of the defense zone of the platoon in the first echelon.

A motorized infantry platoon engagement is initiated with the approach of the enemy to within the effective firing range of the organic and attached weapons. Upon the enemy's approach to
within range of rifle and machine gun fire the platoons opens fire with all available weapons. At this point, machine gun and automatic rifle crews and riflemen deliver their fire on the enemy infantry and attempt to cut it off from the tanks. Crews of PTURS and antitank rifles and guns deliver fire on the enemy tanks.

If the enemy succeeds in penetrating the platoon's defense zone, the platoon tries to destroy him with fire, bayonets, and grenades. Flanking fire is directed on enemy forces who have penetrated the defense zone of a neighboring platoon in an effort to prevent an expansion of the penetration into the flank of the platoon's defenses. If the enemy creates the threat of encirclement, the platoon takes up defensive positions around the perimeter, utilizing for this purpose its reserve and alternate positions.

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SOCIALIST COMPETITION: SIGNIFICANCE, METHODS OF IMPROVING IT

[Article by Col Yu. Mel'nikov, candidate of philosophical science, docent: "Socialist Competition--A Lever of Progress, A School of Indoctrination"]

[Excerpts] Socialist competition has taken up a firm place in the life of our society. The great cause of communist construction and the formation of the new man are being completed with its assistance. As far as the armed forces are concerned, competition facilitates the increase in combat readiness of units [chast'] and subunits [podrazdeleniye], and the formation on the part of servicemen of high political and moral-combat qualities. The party looks upon socialist competition as a powerful lever of social and economic progress, as a school of political, labor, and moral indoctrination of the workers. "We are all pleased," said comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the summary report of the CC CPSU to the 25th CPSU Congress, "about the Leninist ideas socialist competition have set in motion. We are proud of the fact that communists are in the forefront of the competition. Competition exerts a profound influence on economic practice, on the social-political life of the country, and on the moral atmosphere. Our overall military slogan is to comprehensively develop and further socialist competition in the movement for a communist attitude towards labor." ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials from the 25th CPSU Congress], pp 76-77)

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* This article is recommended for use in Marxist-Leninist training groups studying the theme "The 25th CPSU Congress on socialist competition, its influence on economic and social-political life of the country. Ways to improve the effectiveness of socialist competition in the army and the navy."
As a social phenomenon, competition is inherent in any socioeconomic formation. The joint actions of people are the objective foundation of its growth and development. Karl Marx noted, that in a majority of production operations, the social contact gives rise to competition and to a unique stimulation of the vital energy which increases the individual productivity of specific individuals (see Karl Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol 23, p 337).

In a more general form, competition is a contest, a rivalry based on the desire of a person to show his worth, to achieve the best results in this or that sphere of activity. The social nature and the content of competition in specific-historical forms, are stipulated in the final analysis of the means of production, by the nature of social relationships. Thus material productive activities of people based on individual property, on the relationship of superiority and subordination, give rise to a more distorted form of competition--market rivalry.

The character and the content of competition, its forms and principles change fundamentally in a socialist society. F. Engels farsightedly predicted that, in a structure worthy of humanity, the market rivalry of individuals amongst themselves, the rivalry of capital with capital, labor with labor and so on is replaced by competition based upon human nature (see Karl Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol 1, p. 562).

Socialist property radically changes the nature of labor which becomes directly social, free, and creative. In the process of such labor, the collectivist nature of man is more fully brought to life, conditions are created whereby people, who are competing, can achieve the best results in their activities. It was socialism, wrote V. I. Lenin which was the first to create the capability to employ competition really on a wide basis, actually on a mass scale, to pull in an actual majority of the workers "into the arena of such work where they can show their worth, unfold their capabilities, and discover the talents which the people possess--the untapped source which capitalism also downplayed, supressed, and strangled by the thousands and the millions" (Complete Works, Vol 35, p. 195).

V. I. Lenin placed exceptional significance on the socialist competition of the workers. In his work "Kak organizovat' sorevnovaniye?"written two months after the victory in the October Revolution, and in other works, he revealed the sources and the basic traits of socialist competition and its principal difference from capitalist market rivalry,
expressed the fundamental thoughts on its essence and content, showed the significance of competition in socialist and communist construction, formulated the most important principles of its organization, and noted the perspectives for its development.

Socialist competition is characterized by the following basic traits.

First, it is a natural manifestation of the social activeness of the masses, as a real means of bringing to light and mobilizing the creative forces and energies of the members of the society to accomplish the entire complex of economic, sociopolitical, moral aesthetic, military, and other tasks of socialist and communist construction.

Second, socialist competition retains the character of a labor contest, a rivalry, being a mutually advantageous struggle. The essence of competition, notes comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is a factual labor consciousness, a factual labor rivalry, that is, the factors upon which V. I. Lenin places special significance" ("Leninskим kursom" [Following Lenin's Path], Vol 4, p 39). It is this very consciousness, the healthy labor rivalry, the desire to show one's worth, not to lag behind the others, to become a leader and thereby provide the greatest assistance to the overall cause—this is what primarily sets those competing apart from the people who are simply carrying out their labor in service obligations.

Third, harmoniously combined in socialist competition are personal and social interests. In opposition to capitalist market rivalry within the framework of which there is a struggle of personal interests, the struggle for the sake of personal gains by any means, socialist competition is a contest of members of socialist collectives who are laboring not only for themselves, but also for their collective, for their society. Therefore, during the competition, the entire society and each of its members wins. The dialectic unity of competition and mutual assistance, comradely rivalry and creative cooperation are sources of the inexhaustible and mighty transformational force of socialist competition.

Fourth, socialist competition, being an objective phenomenon, develops and functions under the influence of a subjective factor—the creative organizational activities of people. The organization of competition, V. I. Lenin pointed out, must occupy the leading place among the tasks of Soviet power and he emphasized the importance of the ability "to call forth both competition and the independence of the
masses" (Collective Works, Vol 52, p 39). Competition guidance is based upon the skillful use of the Leninist organizational principles: publicity, comparability of results, the capability for the practical reiteration of leading knowhow, and the use of material and moral incentives.

Fifth, socialist competition carries a mass character, it encompasses millions of laborers in the city and in the countryside, the troops of the army and the navy, and penetrates into all spheres of their life's activities. It mobilizes the Soviet people to increase labor productivity and the effectiveness of social production and, along with this, indoctrinates them in our glorious revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions.

The essence of competition therefore is the realization of the personality, of the collective of all our great creative potentialities under the conditions of the competition, and of the labor rivalry during comradely cooperation and mutual assistance for the overall goal of all of those competing and is, in the final analysis, the growth of social well being, fortifying the power of the motherland and the acceleration of the movement of the country to communism.

* * *

As a form of expression of the social activeness of the masses, and the desire with maximum effort to labor for the growth of the fatherland, competition develops in all spheres of the society's life. It smoothly and consciously is used by the party for the accomplishment of the tasks of communist construction. It makes it possible to consider socialist competition as the objective law in the development of our society.

It is just as objective in the Soviet Armed Forces. The Red Army, noted M. V. Frunze, is "an accurate picture, and accurate key with our worker and peasant country, and, as long as throughout the country we see strengthening of the material position of the working masses, as long as we see a fortification of the spirit of activeness and initiative, then this is reflected also in the Red Army" (Selected Works, Voyenizdat, 1965, p 330).

Socialist competition in the Soviet Army and Navy as its nature and basic traits does not differ from competition amongst the workers of our country. As concerns the specific content and the forms of its manifestations, the methods of
organization and the goals of competition, then naturally, under the conditions of the army and the navy, it has its own special features which are determined by the specifics of military activities and by the purpose of the armed forces.

Being an objective phenomenon, and the basic law in the development of a socialist army, competition is primarily a special, specific form of contact between people in the process of joint military labor based upon the desire of each soldier to show his worth, to achieve the best results and to surpass the achievements of others. This link is realized by conscious, creative activities of the personnel on the corresponding guidance of commanders, political organs, and staffs. Competition, as it was stated at the All-Army Meeting of otlichniks of combat and military training (1975), is one of the manifestations of the high consciousness of Soviet fighting men, their understanding of the importance of true accomplishment of their military duty, and the personal responsibility for high combat readiness of their subunits and units.

Further, inasmuch as military affairs and comprehensive preparation for possible combat operations to defend the socialist fatherland form the goal and the content of the activities of every serviceman, then competition in the army and the navy bears a "military tinge," and manifests itself as a military-combat competition. Its essence consists in calling upon every soldier to exhibit enthusiasm, initiative, and the desire to himself excel and to aid his comrades in accomplishment of the tasks linked with assimilation of weapons and combat equipment, the strengthening of discipline in organization, and so on. Socialist competition, points out Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, is a powerful factor in the further increase in the combat readiness of troops and naval forces. It facilitates the development of mass scale creativity, initiative and the steadfastness of the troops and the achievement of established goals. The desire during socialist competition, speaking in Leninist terms, is to achieve more without fail, to be true masters of military affairs amidst the troops, and to assimilate in an excellent manner the weapons and combat equipment entrusted to them. Military and political training and socialist competition are indivisible, and a breakdown in competition has a direct impact on the quality of training.

The key to the content of socialist competition in the army and the navy is increasing the effectiveness of the process of training and indoctrination of the troops, high quality
accomplishment of military training plans, the achievement of excellent indicators primarily in the basic elements of combat and political training, a further decrease in the time required to bring subunits, units and ships into combat readiness, excellent assimilation of weapons and combat equipment, and assimilation of the most effective methods of their combat employment. Competition in inseparable from raising the political and social level of personnel, it includes the struggle for honor, worth, faultless conduct, a model internal form and the military bearing of the troops, and their observance of the norms of communist morality and military ethics. It is also directed towards improving the living conditions of the personnel, economic expenditure of resources, and maintenance of military installations, barracks, motor pools and so on in model condition.

Socialist competition in the construction units, railroad troops, and of the USSR Ministry of Defense production enterprises has a great deal in common with competition in the national economy. Vitally employed here is the struggle of collectives for the honorary right to be designated as brigades and enterprises of communist labor.

Competition in military educational institutions is mainly directed towards improvement in the training process, more complete utilization of troop knowhow, towards improving the scientific-pedagogical level of the teachers and the quality of individual training of students and cadets, and the maintenance of high military discipline and strict compliance with regulations.

In its direction, socialist competition in the army and the navy fulfills two main functions: in a professional-technological and a socioindoctrinal function. The former includes the increase in the combat readiness of the units and subunits by improving military mastery, knowledge, skills, and the ability of the servicemen, the scientific organization of military labor, improving the technology of military activities based upon comradely competition on the part of the troops and all spheres of combat training. This function of competition has acquired a special influence. In the final analysis, the combat capabilities and combat readiness of the armed forces depends on how well the troops of the army and the navy assimilate equipment and weapons.

The socioindoctrinal function of socialist competition solves the problem of improving the collectivistic relationships between servicemen by strengthening their cooperation
and mutual assistance. During the competition, such high moral qualities as communist ideals and principles, discipline, military honor, and the moral responsibility for the overall cause are taught. Competition forms, amongst the troops, the habit of carrying out their responsibilities, giving their all, and raises their activeness in all spheres of military activities.

The collective nature of weapons and combat equipment has not diminished but rather the role of each individual person has grown and the mutual interdependability of the troops in the process of accomplishing combat missions has intensified. In the final analysis, the progress and the outcome of war depends on this individual, on his spiritual and physical qualities. In order to reliably operate military equipment and weapons and to skillfully employ them in a complex combat situation, the Soviet soldier must not only have excellent military knowledge and habits but also high moral qualities and physical tempering. It is not accidental that the USSR Minister of Defense and Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy place attention on the requirement to more fully utilize competition for the formation amongst the Soviet troops of high moral-political and combat qualities, strengthening discipline and strengthening organization.

Thus, both the functions of socialist competition—professional-technological and socioindoctrinal—are mutually interconnected, their mutual permeation has become more organic by virtue of the further development and improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The contemporary stage of competition in the army and navy is characterized by a number of special features which reflect this basic content. Among these we could note the complex nature of competition, its direct link to the scientific-technical revolution, its mass nature, and its richness and variety of forms.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, in his speech entitled "Sixty years on Guard of the Conquests of Great October" noted the growing role of socialist competition in the struggle for improving combat readiness of units, and ships and for the improvement in the effectiveness and quality of the training-indoctrinal process. The forms of competition are changing but its essence remains unchanged, this reflected in the words of comrade L. I. Brezhnev: "Work better today than yesterday, tomorrow—better than today. And, better—this means emphasis
on quality, on effectiveness." Soviet troops formally follow these instructions. They have fulfilled the socialist pledges made in honor of the jubilees of Great October and the USSR Armed Forces.

As a direct continuation and further development of the jubilee Great October competition, during this training year competition in the army and navy is being conducted with the slogan "Reliably defend the socialist fatherland, be in continual combat readiness, steadfastly assimilate weapons and equipment, improve combat mastery," to make the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces a year of shock labor. The letter from the CC CPSU, the USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and CC Komsomol "On the Unfolding of Socialist Competition for Fulfillment and Overfulfillment of the 1978 Plan and Intensification of the Struggle for the Improvement of Effectiveness in Production and Work Quality" was warmly received by the Soviet troops. They accepted it as a document of enormous inspirational and mobilizational force possessing important political and practical significance for the further development of socialist competition in the armed forces.

The scale and effectiveness of competition to a decisive measure are determined by the level of the organizational work done by commanders, political organs, staffs, and party organizations. It is not accidental that the ability to organize competition, to use its mighty force in the interests of the overall elevation of the combat readiness is looked upon in the army and the navy as evidence of the maturity of our military cadres. This skill presupposes first off the ability to provide for the full bringing to fruition of the Leninist principles of competition: publicity, comparability of results, the capability for the practical reiteration of leading knowhow, and the employment of moral and material incentives.

Inasmuch as socialist competition has become an integral part of the entire combat and political training process closely linked with all aspects of military service, one needs to add that it retains a complex, all-encompassing character. This means that, when it is being organized, one needs to strive to join together the training of the troops with the formation among them of high moral-combat qualities. The thoughtful compilation of socialist pledges, and checking on progress of their accomplishment, the regular summing up, this is the key to the unswerving improvement in the effectiveness of competition. The main criterion for competition effectiveness is the actual level of combat readiness achieved by units and subunits.
Real competition, the healthy rivalry of troops and troop collectives is achieved by the integrated use of all systems of the organizing principles of competition. Only a realistic struggle tempers an individual's will, develops steadfastness in the movement towards the desired goal, and does not permit one to be satisfied with that which has been achieved. Moreover, as the experience of leading units and ships shows, the development of healthy rivalry makes it possible to not only determine the real contribution of each individual to the common cause, to raise the effectiveness of military labor, but also to steadfastly rebuff formalism, bureaucracy, and precentomania. Great results are gained from such forms of competition based on missions and norms, contests for the best specialist, the best combat crew, section, crew, company, or battery, and for the best training facility, barracks, and military installation.

In order to raise the effectiveness of the competition, its organizers and leaders must strive to see that pledges are intense and substantiated, that is, they must take into consideration the real capabilities of the collectives. We learned long ago that if pledges are reduced this holds back the creative activities of those competing, it hinders the employment of extent reserves, and contradicts the very idea of competition—to move forward without fail, to achieve more without fail; on the other hand, unrealistic inflated pledges, as a rule, stifle the troops interest in the competition and undermine their belief in their own beliefs.

It is very important to elevate the role of military collectives in the organization competition. It is in the company, the battery, in those subunits on an equal level with them—in the basic cells of the army and navy—in the process of joint military labor to strengthen and develop combat competition to more fully bring to light the capabilities of each individual and to form high moral qualities. The more coordinated the collective is, the healthier the social attitude is within it, the cleaner the moral atmosphere, the higher the activeness and responsibility of the people will be, and the quality of combat and political training will be higher too. Article 8 of the USSR Constitution which states that labor collectives develop socialist competition, easier dissemination of leading work methods, certification of labor discipline, the indoctrination of its members in a spirit of communist morality, and the concern for raising the political consciousness, culture, and professional qualifications, relates directly to military collectives.

Party organizations and their military assistant—the army Komsomol—is the stable cementing force of military collectives.
Communist and Komsomol members are the enormous force and reliable bulwark of commanders in accomplishment of tasks involving raising the combat readiness of subunits, units, and ships, and strengthening discipline and organization. An overwhelming majority of them are otlichniks and leaders in combat and military training. Being the pathfinders of patriotic initiatives, they support the high incandescence of competition and assist their coworkers in their military growth.

Competition is an important sector of party political work, especially as regards the propaganda of leading knowhow of masters of military affairs, and excellent subunits and units, and the mobilization of troops for its assimilation and further development. The party and the government stress the requirement to increase the publicity of competition, and to surround the leaders and innovators with glory and respect, and widely disseminate and introduce their knowhow and achievements. The successes on the part of the leaders give birth amongst the people to conviction in their own strengths and elicit the desire to repeat and surpass these successes. We are speaking, it goes without saying, about real achievements. That is why we must universally improve the party demandingness and principled nature in the objective evaluation of the results of people's activities, the results of socialist competition, especially when determining training otlichniks, excellent subunits, units, and ships.

Finally, an increase in the effectiveness of competition is directly linked with the skillful employment of a variety of forms of incentives for troop activeness and the indoctrination of the personnel with pride in the successes of their subunit, unit, ship, and formation. If the military labor of a military man, his successes in competition, are evaluated based on these, then things turn out better for him. A friendly word of approval, the award of a banner or a certificate to the victor, a meaningful chat with an agitator, propagandist, a remark in the wall newspaper, or a mention over the local radio station about the valuable knowhow of a leader—all of this inspires and uplifts people. The correct utilization and employment of the moral incentives of competition form a very great force which impells people to show initiative and creativity, elicit the desire to serve the homeland giving their all, and calls upon them to join the struggle for best results.

* * *

Thus, socialist competition is one of the main moving forces in the development of the Soviet society and an important
factor in raising the combat readiness of the troops and labor forces. To comprehensively develop and improve competition and to increase its effectiveness is one of the important conditions for the successful accomplishment of the tasks laid down by the 25th CPSU Congress to the Soviet people and its armed forces. Its a matter of honor for the defenders of the motherland to mark the year of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces with shock military labor and a further increase in military readiness of ships and units.

Seminar Lesson Recommendations

The theme "the 25th CPSU Congress, its influence on economic and the social political life of the country. Ways to improve the effectiveness of socialist competition in the army and the navy" is very vital. Its study will permit the seminar participants to profoundly explain the role and significance of socialist competition in the life of our society and armed forces, to evaluate the contribution of the 25th Party Congress to the development of the theory and practice of competition, to expand their thoughts on the content, functions of competition, principles of its organization and methods of guiding it.

In his introductory words, the leader emphasizes that, at all stages of socialist and communist construction, competition was and remains a powerful means for the development of creative initiative and the activeness of the masses, an effective method of elevating the productive forces, improvement in productive relationships, indoctrination of the workers, and strengthening the defensive capabilities of the nation. A further development of competition and improvement of its organizations is an important condition for bringing fruition the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the tasks of the Tenth Five-Year Plan. Knowledge of the essence, content, and mechanisms of competition will assist military cadres in raising its effectiveness in units and subunits so as to comprehensively increase combat readiness. The following main questions are recommended for discussion at the lesson: 1. The social nature and essence of socialist competition 2. 25th CPSU Congress on the growing role of socialist competition in the solution of economic, socio-political, and indoctrinational tasks of communist construction. 3. The special features, content, and functions of socialist competition in the Soviet Armed Forces. Conditions and ways for raising its effectiveness.

The following is recommended as a theme in essaying: "Leninist principles for organizing socialist competition and their
further development in the materials of the 25th CPSU Congress and other party documents." The essay must reflect the activities of commanders, political workers, and party organizations in bringing to life the Leninist principles of organization of competition and the realization of instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy on further improvement in the guidance of socialist competition in the army and navy and the improvement in its effectiveness.

As the first question is examined, attention should be concentrated on explanation of the essence and social nature of competition. As the basic foundations of scientific communism convincingly pointed out, competition is the social relationship of a contest, a rivalry between people which is inherent in any collective work and which is based upon the desire on the part of each individual to achieve the best possible results. Arising initially in the sphere of material production, competition is also found in other spheres of social life.

Inasmuch as social relationships of people manifest themselves in the form of superiority and subordination or in the form of cooperation and mutual assistance, then there are two basic types of competition in existence—antagonistic (market rivalry) and non-antagonistic (socialist competition).

Socialist competition is a qualitatively new type of competition. It objectively arises in the process of the joint activities of people free from exploitation, linked with the relationships of comradely cooperation and mutual assistance. Only socialism, V. I. Lenin emphasized, destroying the slavery of the masses, first opens the path for the competition really on a mass scale (see Complete Works, Vol 36, p 190). This Leninist thought is contained also in the CPSU Program: "The recognition by the workers that they are working not for exploiters but for themselves, for their society, gives both to labor enthusiasm, innovations, creative initiative, and mass scale socialist competition." V. I. Lenin saw in competition that mighty force which would be able to solve all the basic questions of communist construction. And actually, practical realization of the capabilities of competition permits the Communist Party, and the Soviet state to find more effective ways to elevate productive forces into improved social relationships and the indoctrination of the new man.

Thus, socialist competition is a mighty movement of the workers masses, a manifestation of initiative and independence,
an important means for raising labor productivity, a factor in creation of the new discipline and the organization of labor for the sake of the glory of communism.

During discussion of the second question, it is important to first of all emphasize the economic function of competition. Facilitating an increase in labor productivity, and the development of productive forces, competition accelerates the growth of social wealth, and aids in the achievement of the basic goal of socialist production—more complete satisfaction of the demands of the Soviet people. Other mutually connected functions of competition should then be examined—social, political and indoctrinational. Competition in our country is the most effective method of improving social relationships and enlisting the masses in the management of production, and their communist indoctrination.

Bringing to light the most important features of competition under contemporary conditions, it is important to underscore that it is now indivisible from the scientific-technical revolution and more and more directed toward the solutions of the problems of effectiveness and quality, and achievement of the best economic results. The main point is to consistently develop the democratic foundations of competition as the creative cause of the workers themselves, to decisively irradicate from it the elements of formalism and bureaucratic perversions, to elevate the role of labor collectives, to steadfastly accomplish the Leninist principles for the organization of competition, and to correctly use the system of moral and material incentives of its participants. The seminar should look in depth at the letter from the CPSU CC, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU, and CC Komsomol, to show its significance for the further development of competition and the improvement of the creative activeness of the masses.

The third point in the seminar lesson places the attention of the students on the specifics of socialist competition in the army and navy to explain its contents, function, and basic traits in its contemporary stage of development and the conditions and ways for improving the effectiveness of competition for the interests of strengthening the military might and combat readiness of the armed forces.

The Soviet Army and Navy is an indivisible portion of our people, living the same life with them. Therefore, the competition of the servicemen develops in the main in accordance with the same laws as are found in the country overall. However, it also has its own special features, its own directions, which are stipulated by the specifics of
military activities. Socialist competition under the conditions of the armed forces is primarily a military-combat competition which expresses itself in the friendly contests, and the comrade rivalry of the troops in military collectives. Stimulating the social activeness of those competing, it has as its goal the comprehensive improvement of combat readiness, the combat capabilities of units and subunits, high quality accomplishment of the missions assigned and the communist indoctrination of the troops. Stemming from the instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and the further improvement in the guidance of socialist competition and improving its effectiveness, it is necessary to examine the characteristic traits of the contemporary stage of competition in the army and navy. It is important to underscore here that competition has now become an immutable component of combat and political training. It has a mass nature, it develops under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution, and influences all aspects of life and activities of the troops and naval forces, and is all the more closely tied in with the missions of maintaining constant combat readiness. Moreover, the role of competition as a school of political, labor, and moral indoctrination of servicemen is broad.

Competition in the army and navy at the present time is characterized by a richness in the variety of its forms, and the mass scale patriotic initiative of the troops. It is necessary to profoundly and comprehensively bring to light those of its forms such as competition on the missions and norms, competition for the title of best in the combat specialty, the best on individual elements of combat training, and so on. One of the new trends in the struggle for training effectiveness and quality for high combat readiness is the patriotic movement for the leading formation in the military district, in the fleet, and in the service of the armed forces which began at the initiative of the troops of the M. I. Kalinin Guards Motorized Rifle Taman' Division.

Characterizing the traits and special features of the contemporary stage of competition, it is necessary to talk in detail about how it is employed in a particular subunit, unit, aboard ship, to evaluate the leading knowhow of members of the units, and to make suggestions on elimination of extant deficiencies in the organization of the competition. Proper attention should be paid to the analysis of the conditions for raising the effectiveness of the competition, to point out the role in this matter played by commanders, political organs, staffs, party, and Komsomol organizations.
It is important to underscore here that the success of the competition primarily depends on the correct implementation of the Leninist principles of its organization, the development of a spirit of real competition, and the friendly rivalry of the troops. The main criterion for effectiveness of the competition is the actual level of combat readiness achieved by units, subunits, and ships.

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WARRANT OFFICER TRAINING IN THE ODESSA MILITARY DISTRICT

Following Lenin's course, the communist party at all stages of construction of the armed forces demonstrated and is demonstrating continual and unremitting concern about command cadres. A brilliant example of such concern is the creation in 1972 in the army and the navy of the warrant officers' institute [praporshchik i michman], a new detachment of professional commanders that is a close adjunct to the officers corps. The founding of this institute was brought about in the interests of the combat readiness of the armed forces, by the requirements for their contemporary condition and for their long term development.

The requirements placed by the party and the government on the new detachment of command cadres were clearly formulated at the All-Union Warrant Officers Conference held in Moscow in January of 1973. These demands first of all are to be unremittingly dedicated to the Communist Party, to their motherland and to the people, to profoundly recognize their military duty and civil responsibility, to irreconcilably relate to their class enemies, and to be always ready to perform a feat in the name of the defense of socialism's conquests. The very status of warrant officers as the direct indoctrinators of the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers obliges them to be the bearers of high ideological conviction and political consciousness and the perpetrators of the glorious revolutionary and combat traditions of the older generations of Soviet people. Secondly, to comprehensively skilled specialists, true masters of their affairs. And, this is only possible under
the conditions of the continual steadfast improvement in their professional knowledge and expansion of their political outlook. Third, always and in all ways be the model of military efficiency and discipline. And not only in themselves but to also indoctrinate their subordinates in such a spirit. Fourth, to possess high commanders qualities, organizational capabilities, the ability to confidently lead their subordinates in any situation, to organize viable socialist competition, and to correctly accomplish the tasks involving the training and indoctrination of personnel. In a word, to be demanding chiefs and experienced pedagogues.

Six years have passed since the warrant officers' institute was initiated. This, of course, is not a long period of time. But, it is a sufficient amount of time for us to rightfully state that warrant officers have proved themselves. They are accomplishing with honor and merit the tasks levied upon them and they carefully preserve and increase the remarkable combat traditions of the army and navy.

A great deal of positive knowhow in the training and indoctrination of warrant officers has been accumulated in the troop units of our district. Now, when an inspector asks the unit [chast'] who is the best shot, who best of all operates the combat vehicle, who is prepared without delay to accomplish the most responsible tasks, you often hear the answer—the warrant officer. No, this is not rhetoric for the sake of prestige. This is in fact the reality. Warrant officers have occupied their proper place in the troop collectives. The majority of them have become the reliable assistants of officers, they have taken on the common concerns with the officers, new traits have been developed in their characters, and a real pedagogical manner has become noticeable in their activities. Many of them confidently command platoons, skillfully lead technical services. In a word, they are successfully coping with all responsibilities. And, as they say, there is honor in labor. Just recently, Warrant Officers P. Andrukh, F. Babichenko, P. Malyshev, Yu. Marchenko, I. Safoyno, N. Shevtsov, and many others have been awarded the medal "For Excellence in Military Service" 2nd class and other governmental awards. A measure of glory accompanies Warrant Officer I. Guznyak, a brave combat engineer who, in peacetime has been awarded the Order of the Red Star and the medal "For Courage." He is a deputy to one of the raysovet in the city of Kishinev. Warrant Officers I. Drezd, N. Shvernenko, and other participants in the All-Union Warrant Officers Conference are models of comradely labor.

An important place in the training process with the troops is occupied by their political, tactical, firing, and technical
training. The knowhow from leading units affirms that political training of warrant officers is most effective where regular planning lessons of the type used for the Marxist-Leninist training of the officer staff are conducted, and where the specific job, the general educational level, the vital and practical knowhow, and other special features of this command cadre are more fully taken into consideration when the training groups are put together.

Political training, goal-oriented, ideological-indoctrinational work with warrant officers facilitate increasing their political consciousness, social activeness, and sense of personal responsibility for carrying out their service responsibilities and their military duty.

It is known that only those commanders who are distinguished by their ideological conviction, professional mastery, and excellent combat training are able to provide good training for soldiers and sergeants and skillfully able to pass on their knowledge and knowhow. Under the conditions of modern combat, every warrant officer must be capable where necessary to replace an officer, to take upon himself the execution of the officer's responsibilities. From this stems the task to train warrant officers with maximum effectiveness in combat work, in particular, those who occupy command jobs and who possess leading combat specialties.

The warrant officers'school plays a large role in this. The district military council and political directorate have done and are doing everything possible to man this school with the best pedagogical cadres and to equip them with the most modern forms of equipment and weapons, and the latest training instruments and visual aids. Future cadets from the ranks of the soldiers, sergeants and petty officers, who have expressed the wish to dedicate themselves to military service, as a rule, undergo careful selection and examination in units and subunits [podrazdeleniye]. Only those who are faultlessly disciplined, who have a good general education, and a special training background, and who have demonstrated volitional qualities are recommended for the warrant officers'school.

The training program in the warrant officers'school is designed to arm the cadets in the shortest possible time with the required knowledge and practical skills. I would be less than frank from the outset if I didn't say, like in any new matter, many difficulties have been encountered. But, this is understandable, the field of responsibilities of the modern commander is very broad, and they cannot be encompassed by a single training program. What is required is to search, to experiment, to test in
practice the rationality and the viability of different forms of training-indoctrinational work, and to gradually develop the most efficacious variant of training process.

One can now definitely state that the warrant officers' school collective is on the proper course. Its graduates receive a good ideological tempering, and enter the troop units sufficiently armed with various special knowledge and with the basic commanders' methodological and pedagogical skills. Great merit in this regard falls to the chief of the school, Lt Col T. Tikhonov, Deputy Commander for Political Affairs, Maj Yu. Bryksin, other officers and the party organization headed by Capt A. Morozov. Fruitfully functioning in the school is the methodological-training council which is occupied with searching for ways to further improve training effectiveness, with the analysis, generalization, and dissemination of the leading knowhow of the best methodologists, studying the critiques received from the troop units concerning the quality of service on the part of graduates and elaborating based on these critiques of methodological recommendations. Leninist readings, methodological and theoretical conferences, and scientific-practical seminars are regularly conducted with the students. A specific ritual for the graduation of the cadets has been worked out for the cadets. As a rule, members of the military council award the warrant officer shoulder boards to the graduates. This lends a great deal of weight to the festive ritual and attunes the people to the businesslike approach.

However, we would be less than truthful if we were to assert that all the problems in the warrant officers' school have been solved. Inasmuch as there are no limits to the improvements capable in any cause, this is all the more true when dealing with the training and indoctrination of commanders. Thus, in the troop units, far from all commanders, political party workers, and Komsomol organizations the requisite stress is put on the selection of candidates to be to be cadets from amongst the first term soldiers and sergeants. As a result, a portion of those sent to attend the school come via the military commissariats.

These are people who have served their mandatory term of service but whose military knowledge is at a lower level than that of individuals who enter the school directly from troop units. All of this must be taken into account when organizing their training in the warrant officers' school and then when they arrive in the unit to serve. Efforts are required on the part of commanders prior to warrant officers drawn from amongst the draft eligible becoming qualified specialists and skilled indoctrinators of subordinates.
Further, when determining the future warrant officer's training profile, the special training and army knowhow that they acquired during their first term of service, as well as their natural inclinations and personal interests are not always strictly taken into consideration. For example, at present only 15 percent of those individuals entering Komsomol workers training groups are former activists. The remainder of the contingent does not have any practical experience in social work. They have to start from scratch. But, Komsomol and party activities is a profession. It is not picked up over night. Such people have to be found. Yes, and the same is true in regard to other training profiles.

Not all cadets at the present time have the opportunity to have, albeit, short lived, a probationary period in troop units. Practice shows that the familiarization with their future work is better left to be handled in the training process, by means of expanding the radius of their activities at lessons, drills, and in self-training sessions. The probationary period is a unique stimulus and a creative impulse.

While we are on the subject of the training program at the warrant officers' school, I would like to also express this opinion. As each year passes, the demands made upon the level of military, political, and special training for warrant officers continue to increase inasmuch as their service activities are linked with the operation of complex military equipment, command and control equipment, and so on. Therefore, I think that, for the purpose of raising warrant officer training quality and providing them stable methodological skills in several complex specialties, it would be wise to employ several other measures. Life itself dictates this necessity.

There are also other shortcomings in the work of the warrant officers school. They still are not finding out the reason for the breakdowns in service of the young commanders with whom they come in contact in the troop units. The crux of the matter is that some senior chiefs are inclined to look upon the school's graduates as trained commanders or specialists and subsequently do not or pay little attention to painstaking indoctrination work; they don't organize systematic lessons. It never occurs to such chiefs that training never did nor will it ever end, that training, especially the training of a military man, cannot stand gaps. This all the more important for young commanders. Warrant officers receive in school in essence only initial training, only the rudiments of a commander's knowledge. Their further training, the establishment of a commander's authority occurs directly in formations [soyedineniye], units and subunits.
It is a bitter thing to have to realize, but, in several units, there are still instances of warrant officers being released into the reserves for unseemly conduct or due to their insufficient military and technical training. And, this occurs in those very areas where warrant officers are left to their own devices, where the requisite attention is not paid to questions involving their training and indoctrination. Many in the district surely remember the sad history involving Warrant officer V. Yefimchenko. He was a model soldier during his first term of service. After he was released as a good specialist, he was sent to the warrant officer's school. But, a year and a half after he completed the school he appeared before a comradely court of warrant officer honor. The decision of the court was very strict. He was petitioned to be released into the reserve for discrediting the rank of serviceman.

We will not make excuses for Yefimchenko. He got out of line and said goodbye to his dream due to his own guilt. We have no pity for those who violate discipline. But, was the unattractive end to this story proper? Probably not, if he had been assigned a wise tutor, if planned training had been organized with the warrant officers, if their ideological-political indoctrination had been set up. In this connection, it should be said that Officer V. Fadeyev, a subunit commander, also paid little attention to warrant officers. And, he paid for it. The communications platoon commanded by Warrant Officer A. Starchenko received an unsatisfactory evaluation at a final examination.

It goes without saying that similar situations are the exception. But, since they still are encountered, the district military council, commanders and political organs in units and formations are taking measures to ensure that the proper training-indoctrinational work is undertaken with warrant officers. Lectures and reports in which the key problems of training the new, the youngest detachment, of command cadres are brought to light are regularly held during meetings and conferences with various categories of leaders. District staff officers systematically visit subunits and units and on the spot directly in the most diligent manner check all "modules" of the system of working with warrant officers that have been established and which have proved themselves in practice. A 100 percent involvement by warrant officers in the various forms of training is being achieved. We always remind every-worker being sent out to a unit of Lenin's instructions that one must diligently examine work and get down to the essence of the matter. And, we unfailingly are interested upon their return whether or not they look in depth into the situation, whether they studied things locally, carefully, and whether
they assisted in solving problems. If they did not, this means that they did not fulfill the main tasks that is required of them.

Questions concerning the training and indoctrination of warrant officers are annually discussed at the meetings of the district military council. Its decisions facilitate improving the activities of commanders and political workers. All of these questions are continually within the purview of the political directorate. It analyzes the state of political training, ideological-indoctrinal and organizational party work with warrant officers, it determines and accomplishes the specific measures for further improving its quality and effectiveness. Just recently, it heard a report by political workers comrades V. Gordeyev and V. Chernykh concerning work with warrant officers. Thorough, logical discussion of such reports find their logical manifestation in the development of topical course outlines which contain specific recommendations for commanders, political workers, party, and Komsomol activists. Last year alone the political directorate sent five such topical course outlines to troop units.

Careful attention is placed in the district on the study of the processes and phenomena emerging amongst this category of command cadres in the sphere of their service and domestic life. A great deal is also being done to develop their social-political activeness, and ensuring the advanced guard role of the young communist warrant officers in combat and political training. The continual, goal-oriented work of the military council, the political directorate and the staff of the district undoubtedly are impacting favorably on the state of affairs in troop units. The responsibility on the part of commanders and political workers for the training and indoctrination of warrant officers has noticeably increased, and they have begun to more strongly, and the main thing, more subjectively solve these problems, to more deeply involve party and Komsomol organizations in them. This most visibly manifests itself in the military collectives where officer-communists V. Papusha, V. Kopanev, and others serve. These collectives successfully completed last year's jubilee training year, and completely fulfilled their socialist pledges in honor of the glorious 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. Warrant officers made a worthy contribution to this success. It has now become fact that the work with this particular category of servicemen is now at the requisite level. On this plane, one can look at the knowhow accumulated in the tank regiment headed by Lt Col A. Latushkin. Serving here are warrant officers of various ages, various specialties, with a different general educational background, which is always taken into consideration for the purposes of
a strictly differentiated approach to work with this category of commanders. Thus, at the unit level, seminars and lectures for all warrant officers are conducted. They work toward the organization of competition, the methodology for conducting lessons and indoctrination work, are familiarized with the basics of military pedagogy and psychology, and, on a weekly basis, information concerning orders, directives, and other regulations are brought to their attention. Then, already in the subunits, warrant officers are studying in the commanders training program. And finally, the third type of training—accomplishment of individual tasks which involve the study of equipment and improving the sphere special knowledge.

The political training for the warrant officers has been set up in a thoughtful manner. The most experienced propagandists are called upon to conduct the political lessons with them. Some warrant officers study at the university of Marxism-Leninism, others improve their general educational level in evening secondary school.

Speaking in 1976 at a reception in the Kremlin in honor of the graduates of the military academies, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU and USSR Minister of Defense, underscored that there is a great gap between lessons and skill. To assist young commanders, to more rapidly surmount this particular gap and to bring to a minimum the unavoidable delays and barriers in their labor is the duty of experienced officers and veterans of the army and navy. This in full measure also relates to work with warrant officers. Communist Lt Col N. Skorobogat'ko, Maj A. Seryy, Capt V. Lobanets, and others have taken up sponsorship for warrant officers and provide them with multifaceted assistance.

Warrant Officer A. Pasechnik after completion of the school was assigned as a technician in a tank company. But, his knowledge was insufficient, he got confused when conducting servicing days, and his spirits sagged. Communist D. Repetskiy came to the aid of the young Komsomol member. The officer assisted him in sorting out not only the fine points of technical details but also the mutual relationships with subordinates, the "secrets" of the methodology. The experienced comrade suggested to him that servicing the equipment, and taking care of it was not a mechanical process. It was necessary also to use the work in the parking area so that the soldiers would better learn the vehicle and would learn to love the equipment. To achieve this, each procedure on the part of the leader had to be selected with care and each of his demonstrations had to be a model. And, Warrant Officer Pasechnik tried with all his might. With the aid of the officer, he acquired the knowledge and the skill.
The company received an excellent evaluation on the final examination. A great deal of the merit here falls to young Warrant Officer Pasechnik.

Also worthy of praise were the activities of the party committee in the regiment which was directed to improve the professional training of the warrant officers and to provide the advice given to warrant officers more activeness and to provide them with the skills of the propagandists and agitators, to attract them to party and Komsomol work. The results of such goal-oriented activities are at hand. Many warrant officers are an example in training, service and discipline, give lectures and reports, conduct conversations, and actively participate in the organization of various measures of an indoctrinational nature in the subunits.

A great deal of positive things in working with warrant officers have resulted as well in other units in the district. Such a form of improving military, political and technical knowledge as training and taking examinations in secondary military schools without regularly attending the classes is being introduced on a wider scale. Recently, former Warrant Officers N. Sologubov, N. Alavitskiy, J. Bilyy, A. Zubritskiy, M. Forostyanyy, and B. Belgunin became lieutenants. All of them successfully continue to serve as well in their new capacity.

However, in our opinion, this form of training requires the broadest explanation for correct understanding on the part of commanders, political workers, and warrant officers.

In actuality, many warrant officers occupy such command and technical positions which, due to their complexity and responsibility, in essence do not differ from those that junior officers fill. They are given a responsibility of managing complex combat equipment, the training and indoctrination of subordinates, which affirms the growing role and significance of the military cadres at this level. How skillfully the warrant officer copes with the service responsibilities is wholly dependent on the level of his theoretical training and his work knowhow.

One viable form of improving military education accessible to warrant officers is the independent study of disciplines envisioned in the program of a secondary military educational institution, passing of examinations without regularly attending classes, and thus the obtaining of a secondary military special education. There is no doubt that, having received such an
education, a warrant officer can more successfully continue to serve in the responsible positions of warrant officer or even those of junior officers.

The fact that a warrant officer who has received a secondary military special education can be awarded an officer's rank also is an important incentive for passing of examinations without regularly attending classes. In those units and subunits where commanders and political workers convincingly and correctly explain this particular program amongst the warrant officers and who select from among those worthy for taking these exams without regularly attending class, who create the necessary conditions and monitor their training, those are areas where warrant officers are being carefully trained and where they are successfully passing the examinations without regularly attending classes, and where the warrant officers are setting a good example in service.

It seems to us that the opportunity to receive a secondary military special education should be available not just to a few warrant officers, as this opinion is held in several units, but to many warrant officers, and primarily those who are occupying command and technical positions.

The number of career service soldiers possessing a higher or secondary special education, a related army profession, and who have served in the cadres at least a year who are being called for military service in the grade of warrant officer is growing. But, this problem has yet to be solved fully. The fact of the matter is that in quite a number of units, work involving the selection of warrant officers begins just prior to the troops being released into the reserve. But, it is advisable to begin this from their very first steps of service. In other words, we must not select them, but train them, rationally and comprehensively. Party and Komsomol organizations have been called upon to play a leading role in this matter. Yes, and warrant officers themselves should not stay on the sidelines.

The role of the comradely courts of warrant officer and career servicemen's honor has notably increased. They now are occupying themselves more with preventive work, and have become a viable means for legal propaganda, and the indoctrination of the troops in a spirit of the requirements of a communist morality, strict and accurate adherence to the law, to the military oath, the military regulations, to actively cooperate in prevention of violations of the law and to create in the collectives a situation of irreconcilability to those who create disorder. The courts headed by communist G. Alavidze, G. Goroshchuk, and a number of others possess these qualities.
The "warrant officer days" have become more interesting. If before they were conducted at the troop unit level, as time goes on their scale has expanded to the garrison level. The themes covered is also being varied. In the Odessa Garrison, for example, for a little over two years now, more than 68 various themes have been covered during the "warrant officer days." However, there is no value in simply enumerating the number of themes covered during the "warrant officer days." If one takes upon the elaboration of one, but a cardinal, question, the gains will be greater. Warrant officers get the opportunity to more deeply examine the problem, look at it in depth, and study how it is solved in practice by neighboring units.

We do not always call upon the warrant officers for a frank chat about how they structure their lives off the job, do they visit theaters, what are they reading. But, let's say, the every-day readers checkout card in a library, like a seismograph, registers the shifts in the spiritual makeup of the individual, and they reveal the world of his interests.

According to the extant statute, individuals obligated to military service can be called upon to serve as warrant officers if they are less than 35 years old. We think that we should include those younger individuals obliged to military service in the ranks of the warrant officers so that they will be able to devote more time to military service. Then, greater perspectives in service and the opportunity to gain professional training opens up before them.

Finally, concerning the initial period of warrant service. As is known, at present individuals can serve in the capacity of warrant officer not only for five years, but also for a longer period. However, several chiefs limit themselves to the procedure of the minimal, five years. They do not take an active part in convincing selected candidates to join the ranks of the warrant officers for a longer period. It seems to us that the procedure for service in the capacity of warrant officer for a period of more than five years would facilitate greater stabilization and the strengthening of this category of command cadre in the armed forces and it would create more confidence on the part of the warrant officers themselves in military service as a profession.

So then, many problems remain on the agenda. And, they await our solution. We must further elevate the role and the authority of warrant officers.

It seems it was just recently that the term "warrant officer," which designates a new military rank, just entered
the military lexicon. Interest immediately increased concerning those who would be joined into a single detachment and attention was attracted to the unfamiliar shoulder boards. One recalls that the question that was put forth by one of the skeptics. Are they capable, the warrant officers, through their conduct and service to prove out the trust placed in them? In their very first years of service they demonstrated that they are capable! Then, we now proudly affirm that the army and navy has received worthy reinforcement in the form of warrant officers. During these years into the ranks of the warrant officers have come thousands of those who, following the call of their heart, decided to dedicate their fate to the army and the navy, to give all their effort and capability to the sacred duty of the armed defense of the beloved motherland. In their fervent hearts, just as in the hearts of all of the armed defenders of the socialist fatherland, are deeply stirred the words written in our Fundamental Law—the Soviet Constitution: "The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people is to reliably defend the socialist fatherland and to be in constant combat readiness which guarantees the immediate rebuff to any aggressor." Seasoned in comradely labor and perceiving the difficult soldierly trails to combat improvement, warrant officers are honorably and selflessly fulfilling their high constitutional duty.

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