COMBATING TERRORISM

Comments on Bill
H.R. 4210 to Manage
Selected Counterterrorist
Programs

Statement for the Record of Norman J. Rabkin, Director
National Security Preparedness Issues
National Security and International Affairs Division
Madam Chairman:

We are pleased to submit this statement for the record to comment on a bill introduced before this subcommittee at your April 6, 2000 hearing—the Terrorism Preparedness Act of 2000 (H.R. 4210). The bill creates a new Office of Terrorism Preparedness to coordinate and make more effective federal efforts to assist state and local emergency and response personnel in preparation for domestic terrorist attacks.

Summary

Overall, we believe that H.R. 4210 would address some of the problems of fragmentation and duplication that we and others have found in programs to combat terrorism. Specifically, the bill would create a new Office of Terrorism Preparedness to centralize leadership and coordination of federal programs to help state and local governments prepare for terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. However, the duties of the new office, as currently described in the bill, may overlap with some functions of the recently created National Domestic Preparedness Office. Our work on the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), on which the Office of Terrorism Preparedness is patterned, suggests that success in achieving the bill’s goals depends on the Office head’s ability to build consensus among the involved agencies. In addition, the new office may take some time to accomplish its objectives as laid out in the bill. The limited scope of the new statutory office would not address some of the larger problems with fragmented leadership and coordination in federal programs to combat terrorism.

H.R. 4210 Would Address Some Fragmentation Issues

H.R. 4210 would address some of the fragmentation problems that we and others have found in providing assistance to state and local governments to prepare for terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Our past work has concluded that the multiplicity of federal assistance programs requires focus and attention to minimize redundancy of efforts and eliminate confusion at the state and local level. The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction—also known as the Gilmore Panel—recently testified about similar problems before your subcommittee.

To eliminate these types of problems, the bill would create a new Office of Terrorism Preparedness within the Executive Office of the President. The new Office would have, among others, the following specific duties.
- Establish, coordinate and oversee policies, objectives and priorities of the Federal government for enhancing the capabilities of state and local emergency preparedness and response personnel.

- Publish a Domestic Terrorism Preparedness Plan and an annual strategy for carrying out the plan.

- Review terrorist attack preparedness programs of state and local governments, and establish voluntary minimum standards for such programs.

As currently proposed in the bill, the Office may overlap with some functions to be performed by the existing National Domestic Preparedness Office. The Attorney General established this office within the Department of Justice to be responsible for interagency leadership and coordination of federal efforts to provide assistance for state and local governments to prepare for terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. As an example of potential duplication, the National Domestic Preparedness Office recently issued a "blueprint" for federal assistance, which is analogous to the new Office of Terrorism Preparedness function to prepare a national plan and strategy.

In addition, the bill would limit the scope of the new Office of Terrorism Preparedness to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. According to intelligence and law enforcement officials, terrorists are least likely to use these types of weapons. The Subcommittee may want to consider authorizing the Office of Terrorism Preparedness to assist state and local governments to prepare for both weapons of mass destruction and the more likely threat of conventional explosives.

Lessons to Be Learned From ONDCP

The proposed Office of Terrorism Preparedness is patterned after ONDCP. The ONDCP was created by Congress in 1988 to better plan the national drug control effort and assist Congress in overseeing the effort. ONDCP is the President's primary policy office for drug issues and has three Major responsibilities.

- Develop a national drug control strategy with short and long term objectives and annually revise and issue a new strategy.

- Develop an annual consolidated drug control budget providing funding estimates for implementing the strategy.

- Oversee and coordinate implementation of the strategy by the various federal agencies.
We believe that many of the experiences of ONDCP may be useful for the Subcommittee in refining this bill and, if enacted, overseeing the operations of the Office of Terrorism Preparedness. We have issued several reports on ONDCP’s efforts to develop and implement a national strategy and to assess the adequacy of federal budgets and programs to carry out that strategy. There are several important lessons to be learned.

- Fragmentation had hampered federal efforts to control drugs, therefore strong central leadership was needed to overcome longstanding problems with agencies not sharing information and not coordinating programs.

- As established in the Executive Office of the President, ONDCP was positioned to rise above the particular interests of any one federal agency.

- Getting consensus among federal agencies with diverse missions, for whom drug control was a minor role, was difficult and time-consuming.

- After its creation, it took ONDCP almost ten years (from 1988 to 1997) to develop the current national strategy.


- Despite these problems, we supported the reauthorization of the ONDCP due to the continuing need for a central agency to provide leadership, planning, and coordination for the nation’s drug control efforts.

Although there are some similarities, the ONDCP’s broad scope of activities sets it apart from the proposed Office of Terrorism Preparedness. ONDCP is responsible for overseeing and coordinating the drug control efforts for over 50 agencies and programs, with an annual budget of almost $20 billion. The ONDCP is involved in the entire range of drug control efforts—both supply reduction (interdiction, international, and law enforcement efforts) and demand reduction (education and treatment efforts). There is no equivalent of the ONDCP for the broader management of counterterrorism programs.
H.R. 4210 Would Not Address LargerFragmentation ofFederal Counterterrorism Programs

H.R. 4210 would not resolve some of the overall fragmentation problems in federal programs to combat terrorism. In May 1998, the President appointed a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism within the National Security Council, who is tasked to oversee a broad variety of relevant policies and programs related to counterterrorism, produce an annual Security Preparedness Report, provide advice regarding budgets for counterterrorism programs and coordinate guidelines for managing crises. Despite the creation of this position, overall federal efforts remain fragmented because key interagency management functions are conducted by different departments and agencies. We believe that this is one cause for the following problems in federal efforts to combat terrorism that we have reported.

- There is a lack of linkage between the terrorist threat, a national strategy, and agency resources.

- Federal efforts to combat terrorism have been based on worst case scenarios which are out of balance with the threat.

- Without coordination, agencies could develop their own programs in isolation, creating the potential for gaps and/or duplication.

- Federal agencies have not completed interagency guidance and resolved some command and control issues.

- Efforts to develop a national strategy continue, but to date they have not included a clear desired outcome to be achieved.

- Efforts to track federal spending across agencies have started, but they have only begun efforts to prioritize programs.

Because the proposed Office of Terrorism Preparedness is limited to the function of providing assistance to state and local governments, it will not address these larger issues of fragmentation in interagency leadership and management. As stated earlier, there is no equivalent of the ONDCP for the broader management of counterterrorism programs. As shown in Table 1, ONDCP centralizes key interagency management functions for drug control that are not centralized for combating terrorism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Counterdrug</th>
<th>Counterterrorism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Act as Top Official Accountable To President</td>
<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>National Security Council (National Coordinator For Security, Infrastructure Protection And Counterterrorism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act as Top Official Accountable to Congress</td>
<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>Numerous officials (including the Attorney General, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop a National Interagency Strategy</td>
<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>Attorney General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set Priorities within National Strategy</td>
<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget in theory, but actually done by individual agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and Monitor International Programs</td>
<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>Secretary of State (via Coordinator for Counterterrorism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Liaison and Assistance to State and Local Governments</td>
<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>Department of Justice (National Domestic Preparedness Office) and Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor Budgets Across Federal Agencies</td>
<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and Monitor Overall Performance Measures</td>
<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>No agency assigned to do this overall task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Research and Development</td>
<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>National Security Council (via the Technical Support Working Group)</td>
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Source: GAO analysis of counterdrug and counterterrorist programs.

This concludes our statement for the record. If you have any questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-5104. Stephen L. Caldwell and Raymond Wyrsch made key contributions to this statement.
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DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan Does Not Identify Potential Excesses or Support Planned Procurements
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### Abbreviations

- **BAT/ATACMS**: Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition/Army Tactical Missile System
- **DOD**: Department of Defense
- **JSOW**: Joint Stand-Off Weapon
- **MLRS**: Multiple Launch Rocket System
- **MPIM**: Multipurpose Individual Munition
- **RADAM**: Remote Area Denial Artillery Munition
- **SADARM**: Sense and Destroy Armor Munition
- **SFW**: Sensor Fuzed Weapon
- **WAM**: Wide Area Munition
B-282444

May 5, 2000

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In its report on the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill, the House Committee on Appropriations expressed concern that the military services are continuing to develop and procure an increasing number of tank-killing weapons at a time when potential adversaries have smaller armored forces. The Committee also questioned whether current antiaarmor acquisition plans are appropriate and directed the Secretary of Defense to develop an Antiaarmor Munitions Master Plan. According to the report, the plan should identify the projected armored threat and the projected quantity of all antiaarmor weapons, whether fielded or in development, with the purpose of identifying and eliminating excess antiaarmor capability. The Department of Defense (DOD) was directed to submit the plan with its fiscal year 2000 budget submission.

Before the Master Plan was issued, we reported that DOD’s inventory of antiaarmor weapons had remained at 1990 Cold War levels (in terms of overall quantities and types), while the number of armored targets under current planning scenarios had dropped to less than 20 percent of the number considered in 1990.1 Previously, guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense establishing the most demanding level of threat U.S. forces must be prepared to counter and setting forth the war-fighting strategy had been based on a large-scale Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat involving thousands of armored vehicles; but the guidance is now based on a much smaller armored threat from two regional conflicts occurring simultaneously.2


2The Defense Intelligence Agency identifies the number and types of enemy armored targets in each scenario that each service needs to destroy. The commanders in chief allocate responsibility for the targets among the military services. On the basis of these allocations, the services determine their antiaarmor weapon requirements.
Since 1990, DOD has invested billions of dollars to further increase its antiarmor weapon capabilities. According to the President's fiscal year 2000 budget submission, DOD expects to spend about $17.9 billion developing and producing additional antiarmor weapons from fiscal year 2000 until all the programs are completed.

The plan\(^3\) was sent to Congress on August 25, 1999, several months after the fiscal year 2000 budget submission. At your request, we reviewed DOD's Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan to determine whether it provided the data and analyses necessary to (1) identify excess antiarmor weapons currently in the inventory or under development and (2) support current acquisition plans.

Results in Brief

DOD's Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not identify any excess antiarmor weapons or provide the data and analyses needed to identify such excesses. Instead of identifying the types and quantities of antiarmor weapons needed to meet requirements under current planning scenarios, the plan only described the types of antiarmor weapons in the inventory and under development and identified the number and types of armored systems possessed by nine countries it considered potentially hostile to the United States. The total capabilities and quantities of the armored systems possessed by these countries substantially exceeds those in the current two-regional conflict threat scenario. The plan acknowledged that the tank threat from the countries identified in that scenario is low, but the plan did not identify potential excesses in antiarmor weapons resulting from major reductions in the armor threat since 1990. Further, the modeling practices the services used to identify individual antiarmor weapons quantity requirements routinely generated excessive requirements. Specifically, we found that (1) the Air Force added more targets to the model than it is responsible for, (2) the services added large quantities of weapons to their models to allow for uncertainties, (3) the services projected the use of sophisticated and expensive antiarmor guided weapons against unarmored targets, and (4) the Marine Corps and the Army did not always accept their model's results and used manual calculations to support higher antiarmor weapon requirements.

\(^3\)The plan was classified as secret.
The plan provided little data and analyses to support the services' plans to spend about $17.9 billion on 15 antiarmor weapon acquisition programs. In support of acquiring the new systems, the plan described various types of improvements and technological advances in the designs of armored systems and noted the potential proliferation of armored systems with these advanced designs. The plan also described the capabilities of individual antiarmor weapons that were being acquired by the services and noted that the new weapons would provide improved lethality and effectiveness. However, the plan also indicated that the existing antiarmor weapon inventory is more than adequate to defeat the threat as defined in the Secretary of Defense's planning guidance. Further, the plan did not assess the effects of combined joint service capabilities and changes in war-fighting strategies on the requirements for these weapons. For example, under the 1990 Cold War threat scenario, the Army was expected to play the dominant role in halting a massive Soviet/Warsaw Pact armored invasion, but under current war-fighting plans, the Air Force is to have the largest (and still growing) share of armored targets. Nevertheless, the Army's planned procurement costs for antiarmor weapons from fiscal year 2000 to completion account for about 80 percent ($14 billion) of DOD's total procurement budget for antiarmor weapons. An assessment of the joint antiarmor capabilities of the services and changes in war-fighting requirements could identify opportunities to significantly reduce requirements for certain antiarmor weapons currently being acquired.

We are issuing a matter for congressional consideration either (1) to restrict funding for antiarmor weapons until the Secretary of Defense provides Congress with the antiarmor weapon analysis directed in the conference report on the fiscal year 2000 appropriations bill or (2) to establish an annual funding cap on the procurement of antiarmor weapons and require that DOD establish priorities among the multitude of antiarmor weapons now available or being developed.
Background

DOD currently has a large inventory of 40 different types of antiairorn weapons capable of destroying tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery. These weapons include various types of ground- and air-fired guided missiles, tank rounds, rockets, and mines. DOD is currently funding the production of 15 new antiairorn weapon systems.4

DOD issued its first Antiairorn Master Plan in 1985 and updated it annually until 1990. The 1990 Antiairorn Master Plan still reflected the Cold War threat and focused on the antiairorn weapons that would be needed to prevail in a Central European conflict. The plan was not updated until 1999. In the October 1999 conference report on the fiscal year 2000 Defense appropriation bill,5 the congressional conferees noted that the 1999 Master Plan lacked the analyses needed to support the services' claimed antiairorn weapons requirements. In their report, the conferees directed the Secretary of Defense to provide another antiairorn weapon analysis with the fiscal year 2001 budget request. Although the budget has been submitted, the Secretary has not yet provided the analysis as directed.

Master Plan Did Not Provide Data and Analyses Needed to Identify Excess Weapons

The 1999 Antiairorn Munitions Master Plan did not identify any excess antiairorn weapons or provide the data and analyses needed to identify any such excesses. Key to identifying any excess antiairorn weapons is an assessment of the types and quantities of antiairorn weapons needed to defeat the threat outlined in the planning scenarios.6 Although such data is available, the plan only described various types of antiairorn weapons in the inventory or under development and identified the number and types of armored systems possessed by nine countries it considered potentially hostile to the United States—including some countries of the former Soviet Union. The total capabilities and quantities of the armored systems possessed by these countries substantially exceeded those in current threat scenarios. According to DOD officials, no attempt was made to determine whether the weapon systems presented in the Master Plan were justified on

4The Antiairorn Master Plan shows 19 systems under procurement. One of them, however, is for a modification, and three others are for practice rounds. Procurements of combat weapons thus total 15.


6According to DOD Instruction 3000.4, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall develop policy guidance on munition requirements in the Defense planning guidance.
the basis of the threat depicted in the Secretary of Defense's planning guidance.

Plan Did Not Identify Potential Excesses Resulting From Reduced Threat

The plan did not assess the impact of reductions in the threat scenarios on antiarmor weapons requirements. As we previously reported, the number of potential enemy armored targets outlined in the planning guidance has decreased considerably since 1990. During the Cold War, the services considered the greatest threat to be a massive land attack spearheaded by thousands of armored vehicles in Central Europe. Today's conditions, however, are significantly different, and military planners consider smaller regional conflicts as the basis for developing war-fighting plans and requirements. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency's latest biannual Ihr-year threat report, issued in 1997, the number of armored targets that the United States is likely to face is less than 20 percent, the number considered in 1990.

Iraq and North Korea are currently the most likely opponents the United States would face in a regional conflict scenario. The armored systems possessed by these two countries were included in the Master Plan but accounted for a small percentage of the total number it identified. In addition, the plan concluded that the armored systems that would be used by the two countries under the two-conflict scenario are low technology threats. Our review of the Secretary of Defense's planning guidance shows that the two countries are unlikely to acquire significant improvements in their armored capabilities in the foreseeable future. Intelligence officials believe the likelihood that either country will obtain such technologies in significant quantities is extremely low. Figure 1 shows a comparison of tank technology levels of the two countries in 1999 and projected in 2004. It shows that high technology tanks are expected to increase from 1 percent of the total in 1997 to 9 percent in 2004, with low technology tanks still accounting for 64 percent of the total in 2004.

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8The next report is scheduled to be released later this year.

9Russia and the Ukraine, both of the former Soviet Union, account for over half of the systems identified in the plan.
According to intelligence officials, the proliferation of high technology systems is not materializing as quickly as originally estimated, and the two countries are economically disadvantaged. Further, an arms embargo and sanctions by the United Nations limit one country from procuring additional weapons.

Quantity Requirements for Antiarmor Weapons May Be Significantly Overstated

Each of the military services determines the type and quantities of antiarmor weapons it needs on the basis of target allocations provided by the commanders in chief. On the basis of the number and types of armored targets they are assigned, the services determine the types and quantities of antiarmor weapons they need to (1) defeat the assigned targets, (2) equip forces not assigned to the two-theater conflict, (3) ensure that forces assigned to the conflict have a ready supply of weapons left over after the conflict ends, and (4) conduct training. The services use war-fighting simulation models that determine the number of weapon systems needed to defeat the threat. Each service is responsible for designing its own threat models and determining its underlying assumptions.
Our review of how the services determine their antiarmor weapon requirements found several modeling practices that routinely generated excessive requirements. Specifically, we found the following:

- The Air Force added more targets to the model than were assigned. For example, it increased the number of allocated targets by 13 to 21 percent—depending on the type of target—for additional flexibility.
- The services added large quantities of weapons to their models to allow for uncertainties. For example, according to Army data, an average of only 3 percent of its direct fire antiarmor weapons would be used against assigned targets, with the remaining 97 percent required to compensate for uncertainty factors such as missing targets and shooting at wrong targets.
- The services projected the use of sophisticated and expensive antiarmor guided weapons against unarmored targets. For example, two of the Air Force's newer and more advanced antiarmor weapons (the Joint Stand-Off Weapon BLU-108 variant and the Sensor Fuzed Weapon) are expected to be used against unarmored targets over 60 percent of the time.
- In some cases, the Marine Corps and the Army did not accept their models' results and used manual calculations to support higher requirements. For example, the Marine Corps increased its requirements for the Predator short-range assault weapon by 289 percent over the model's calculation.

The services' antiarmor weapon requirements' modeling practices are discussed in more detail in appendix I.

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**Plan Provided Limited Support for New Antiarmor Weapon Acquisitions**

The Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not provide the data and analyses necessary to support DOD's current acquisition plans. The military services currently have 15 different types of antiarmor weapons under development or in production. According to the President's fiscal year 2000 budget submission, DOD plans to spend a total of over $24 billion procuring these weapon systems, of which $17.9 billion will be used from fiscal year 2000 through program completion. Of the $17.9 billion, $8.3 billion will be spent in fiscal years 2000-05 and $9.5 billion in fiscal year 2006 and beyond. Appendix II shows planned costs and procurement quantities of each

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\(^{10}\)DOD classifies the costs of the systems contained in the Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan. We used unclassified fiscal year 2000 budget submission documentation to determine costs.
weapon system based on the fiscal year 2000 budget request. Appendix III shows funding by fiscal year from 2000 through 2005 and to completion.

As support for acquiring the new systems, the plan described various types of improvements and technological advances in armored system designs and noted the potential proliferation of armored systems with these advanced designs. The plan also described the capabilities of individual antiair weapons being acquired by the services and noted that the new weapons would provide improved lethality and effectiveness. The plan indicated that the existing inventory of antiair weapons is more than adequate to defeat the threat as defined in the scenario. The plan stated that "by preparing for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Warsaw Pact conflict involving massive Soviet armed forces, the United States would certainly be prepared for conventional regional conflicts." Further, the plan did not assess the effects that combined joint service antiair capabilities and changes in war-fighting strategies could have on requirements for new systems.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Master Plan Did Not Assess Potential Excesses Resulting From Joint Service Capabilities</th>
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<tr>
<td>The plan did not assess the impact of joint service antiair capabilities on acquisition requirements. Such an assessment could identify unnecessary overlap and duplication among the services' antiair capabilities. Instead, the plan simply incorporated the services' antiair inventory data and procurement plans without assessing them on a joint basis. While each antiair weapon acquisition program described in the plan has gone through the requirement determination and acquisition approval process in each service and in DOD, we previously reported that these processes have not been effective in preventing overlap and duplication in weapon capabilities and requirements.</td>
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In our prior work, we found that the services conduct extensive analyses to justify major acquisitions but that these analyses can be narrowly focused and do not fully consider alternatives. For example, when the Navy carried out its analyses to justify the development of an antiair variant of the Joint Standoff Weapon, it did not fully consider available alternatives such as the Air Force's Sensor Fuzed Weapon with Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser, which uses the same submunition, carries more submunitions, and is cheaper than the proposed variant. However, the Joint Standoff

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Weapon was chosen as the more cost-effective weapon. A subsequent Air Force analysis showed that the Sensor Fuzed Weapon would be more cost-effective and potentially more suitable.

DOD has a structure and process to review requirements from a joint perspective, but they are not effective. Operational requirements for new weapons are reviewed by all the services, the Defense Acquisition Board, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to help define and validate system requirements, examine trade-offs, and explore alternatives. In 1998, however, we reported that officials in both the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense view their roles as members of these organizations in determining weapon requirements as only advisory.\textsuperscript{12} We concluded that DOD’s lack of an effective process to assess joint mission capabilities and requirements adequately makes the Department unable to determine the need for and priority of planned antiarmor investments.

In addition to not assessing joint service capabilities, the plan did not take into account allied forces and their contribution to antiarmor capability. DOD expects its allies to be responsible for 29 percent of the anticipated threat in the two-conflict scenario.

Plan Did Not Identify Potential Weapon Excesses From Changes in Warfighting Plans

Under the 1990 Cold War threat scenario, the Army was expected to play the dominant role in halting a massive Soviet/Warsaw Pact armored invasion. However, current war-fighting plans, based on the threat, call for the Air Force to have the largest (and still growing) share of armored targets. Nevertheless, the Army’s planned procurement costs for antiarmor weapons from fiscal year 2000 to completion account for about 80 percent ($14 billion) of DOD’s total procurement budget for antiarmor weapons.

Depending on how they plan to conduct the war, the commanders in chief allocate the number of targets contained in the planning scenarios among individual services. According to these plans, the Air Force has the highest percentage of total mobile armored targets, and its share of these targets has increased from 20 to 29 percent. The Navy’s share has increased from 6 to 9 percent; the Marine Corps’ target share has remained constant at about 12 percent. The Army’s share has remained the same at about 21 percent.

The U.S. allies' share has decreased from 40 to 29 percent. Figure 2 shows the percentage of all mobile armored targets in two hypothetical major conflicts for the Army and the Air Force in 1997 and 1998.

Figure 2: Percentage of Mobile Armored Targets Allocated to the Army and the Air Force, 1997-98

The antiarmor weapon quantity requirements described in the Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan also do not reflect changes in the Army's warfighting strategy. After submitting the Master Plan, the Army Chief of Staff announced plans to develop a lighter and more mobile force in response to concerns about the difficulties and limitations of transporting and supporting the large and heavy M1A1 tank and other armored systems. To respond more quickly to contingencies, and to become more mobile and more rapidly deployable, the Army has begun transitioning to a lighter, smaller, more fuel-efficient and reliable force. Although the transition will take a number of years, it will significantly impact the Army's antiarmor weapon requirements. However, the Master Plan shows substantial investments in heavy armored capabilities such as the improved 120-millimeter tank rounds.
Congress Found Master Plan Inadequate

In its October 1999 conference report on the fiscal year 2000 defense appropriation bill, the conferees stated that the 1999 Master Plan did not show any evidence of future prospects for reducing the number of antiarmor programs and little evidence of rigorous critique of claimed requirements. The congressional conferees directed the Secretary of Defense to provide, with his fiscal year 2001 budget request, an evaluation of (1) the joint effectiveness of existing antiarmor weapons in addressing the threat described in defense planning guidance and (2) the ability of planned antiarmor weapons to fill the shortfalls in capabilities described in threat scenarios. DOD has submitted its fiscal year 2001 budget, but the Secretary has not yet provided the analysis directed by the conference report.

Conclusions

The Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not provide the data and analyses needed to identify any excesses in antiarmor weapons or to support current antiarmor weapon acquisition plans. Specifically, the plan did not address the joint effectiveness of existing antiarmor weapons in addressing the threat described in the Secretary of Defense’s guidance or the way planned antiarmor weapons are expected to fill any shortfalls in capabilities described in threat scenarios. Although the congressional conferees directed the Secretary to provide such data and analyses with the submission of the fiscal year 2001 defense budget request, the Secretary has not yet done so. As a result, congressional decisionmakers have limited ability to assess the services’ plans to spend about $17.9 billion to develop and produce antiarmor weapons from fiscal year 2000 to program completion.

Matter for Congressional Consideration

Should Congress not receive the data and analyses directed by the conference report on the fiscal year 2000 Defense appropriation bill, it should consider restricting fiscal year 2001 funding for antiarmor weapons until such information is provided. Alternatively, Congress may wish to impose an annual funding cap on the procurement of antiarmor weapons to permit some modernization but requiring DOD to establish priorities and choose among the multitude of antiarmor options now available or being developed.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD stated that we had identified several areas where the munitions requirement process could be improved and noted that a working group had been tasked to review the existing process and recommend changes. DOD also offered several explanations of why additional antiarmor weapons beyond those needed to kill expected targets may be justified. They stated that the requirements process also permits the services to base their requirements on the amount of munitions needed to fully arm a given force structure. Further, they stated that, while the services plan to fight in fully joint operations, each service equips and trains its forces to ensure that it retains strategic and tactical flexibility. Finally, DOD stated that its update of the Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan would address these issues more fully. If DOD's working group addresses the problems that we identified with the requirements process, we believe that will be a step in the right direction.

Nevertheless, DOD was directed to identify and eliminate excess antiarmor capability. However, the August 1999 Plan was found to be inadequate to support the services' claimed antiarmor requirements. Subsequently, DOD was directed to submit additional data and analyses of its antiarmor weapons and capabilities with its fiscal year 2001 budget. However, it did not do so. Accordingly, we continue to believe that Congress should consider restricting DOD's funding for antiarmor weapons until such information is provided.

DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV.

Scope and Methodology

To determine whether DOD's Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan provided the data and analyses necessary to identify excess antiarmor weapon capability, we evaluated the plan's results and discussed the plan with representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology, Washington, D.C.; the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.; and the Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia. We compared the plan's threat with the Secretary of Defense's guidance, the out-year threat report, and the phased threat distribution. We discussed the information with representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland, and the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Crystal City, Virginia. We also analyzed DOD's process for developing the requirement quantities depicted in the Master Plan. We analyzed the services' munitions requirement models that generated the different quantities of antiarmor...
weapons needed to defeat the current threat as defined in the Defense Intelligence Agency's out-year threat report. We discussed the requirement data and our analyses with representatives from the Center for Army Analysis, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; the Air Force Director for Operational Requirements, Arlington, Virginia; the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Assessment Division, Washington, D.C.; and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.

To determine whether the Master Plan provided the necessary data and analyses necessary to support DOD's current acquisition plans, we compared the weapon systems contained in the plan with DOD's current acquisition plans. We reviewed the fiscal year 2000 budget submission, the commanders in chief's target allocations, changes in war-fighting strategies, and our prior reports.

We conducted our review from May 1999 through January 2000 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested congressional committees and parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or William Graveline at (256) 650-1400 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Wiggins
Associate Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues
The services are responsible for destroying the number of targets assigned to them by the commanders in chief. The services use war-fighting simulation models to determine the number of weapon systems needed to defeat the threat. Our review of these models found several practices that routinely generate excess requirements.

The commanders in chief's target allocations include an optional flexibility factor to either increase or decrease the service's share of allotted targets. The Air Force used this factor to increase the number of allocated armored targets in its model by 13 to 21 percent (the percentage varied according to the target type). The Navy and the Army did not use this factor in their models, and the Marine Corps said it was unable to determine whether the factor had been included because only the results of the model are available, not the input data. Representatives of the commanders in chief stated that they believe using the flexibility factor results in overstated requirements and that a flexibility factor is not needed because their office goes through a very rigorous process in developing initial target allocations. They recommended that the flexibility factor be eliminated in the next target allocation. A new target allocation process is being developed, but it is unknown at this time whether the flexibility factor will be included.

All the services incorporated large uncertainty factors into their models, increasing the numbers of needed combat weapons well beyond those needed to destroy allocated targets. Uncertainty factors include logistical delays or losses, poor weather, and wrong targets. According to Army data, an average of only 3 percent of its combat requirement would be used to destroy assigned targets; additional weapons needed to compensate for uncertainty factors account for the remaining 97 percent. Table 1 shows the percentage of Army direct fire antiarmor weapons used against allocated targets. For example, only 1.1 percent of the Army's Javelin system combat requirement is used for weapons needed to destroy assigned targets.
In the Air Force, weapons expected to be used against assigned targets accounted for an average of 60 percent of the combat usage requirement. The remaining 40 percent is attributed to uncertainties. The Marine Corps was unable to provide us with percentage figures. The Navy uses three classified uncertainty factors similar to those of the other services. Some of these factors, such as poor weather, are already taken into account by the commanders in chief. When they develop initial target allocations, the commanders in chief allocate more targets than the number available in the theaters to compensate for some of these uncertainties.

The Navy/Marine Corps Air, and the Air Force also use a significant portion of some expensive antiaircraft weapons against unarmored targets. This practice also increases requirements. In its models, for example, the Navy/Marine Corps Air uses about 80 percent of its TOW and Hellfire missiles against unarmored and lower-value targets such as trucks. It could instead use its less expensive saboted light armor penetrator, high explosive antiaircraft munition, or other weapons and save the more expensive and more capable weapons for more heavily armored targets. Similarly, two of the Air Force's newer and more advanced antiaircraft weapons (the Joint Stand-Off Weapon BLU-108 variant and the Sensor Fuzed Weapon) are expected to be used against unarmored targets over 60 percent of the time. All four weapons were designed and justified primarily as tank-killing weapons. Table 2 shows the percentage of combat requirements for Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps Air antiaircraft weapons to be used against armored and other targets.

---

Table 1: Army Direct Fire Antiaircraft Weapons Used Against Targets, as a Percentage of Combat Requirement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Weapons fired against targets as a percentage of combat requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Javelin</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperhead</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M919 25-mm gun round</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW Missile</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120-mm tank rounds</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75-in. Hydra rockets</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellfire</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longbow</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix I
Antiarmor Requirements Modeling Practices

### Table 2: Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps Air Antiarmor Weapon Usage Against Target Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Percent used against tanks</th>
<th>Percent used against armored combat vehicles</th>
<th>Percent used against artillery</th>
<th>Percent used against other targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-87</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-103</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensor Fused Weapon</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOW (BLU-108)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maverick G</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maverick K</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maverick H</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maverick D</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy/Marine Corps Air</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR Maverick</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellfire</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laser Maverick</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockeye</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOW (BLU-108)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Army and the Navy/Marine Corps Air also allowed their models to destroy more targets than allocated, again increasing weapon usage. According to the most recent analyses available, the Army and the Navy/Marine Corps Air destroyed 17 percent and 21 percent more tanks, respectively, than they were assigned, inflating their weapon requirements.

Finally, in some cases, the Marine Corps Ground and the Army did not accept the number of weapon systems recommended by their models for combat usage. In their latest requirements report, they instead favored using a higher estimate obtained by a manual calculation. They told us that the numbers provided by the models had been too low and that manual calculations had been necessary. The Marine Corps Ground compared the results of the model with a manual calculation of the number of munitions each weapon can hold and selected the higher number. Table 3 shows the increases in some Marine Corps Ground weapon requirements because of these higher manual calculations.
The Army disregarded its modeled results when calculating one of its antiarmor weapon requirements. According to Army officials, the Army did not use the model's results if weapon usage results were so low that other formulas based on usage could not be calculated. This was the case, they said, for the Javelin antiarmor weapon. According to the Army's May 1999 requirement update, only 180 Javelins were expected to be fired at targets in the model. This low usage was insufficient to calculate the remaining portion of the combat requirement using the model formula. Consequently, the Army used a manual calculation to finalize the combat requirement. Using the manual calculation, the number of Javelins needed for combat was determined at 16,848.
# Quantity and Cost of Antiarmor Systems Under Development and Procurement

(then-year dollars in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Quantity to be procured</th>
<th>Total cost</th>
<th>Cost through fiscal year 1999</th>
<th>Cost, fiscal year 2000 to completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition/Army Tactical Missile System (BAT/ATACMS)</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>19,554</td>
<td>$4,264</td>
<td>$149</td>
<td>$4,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M26 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>12,378</td>
<td>3,485</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>3,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) BLU-108</td>
<td>Navy/ Air Force</td>
<td>5,955</td>
<td>2,369</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javelin</td>
<td>Army/Marine Corps</td>
<td>26,956</td>
<td>3,324</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td>1,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense and Destroy Armor Munition (SADARM)</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>2,057</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>1,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide Area Munition (WAM)</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>33,991</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longbow Hellfire</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>12,905</td>
<td>2,092</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>1,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW)</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>4,237</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predator</td>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>18,190</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank round M829A2/E3</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>242,000</td>
<td>1,694</td>
<td>1,438</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Area Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM)</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>428,000</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1919 25-mm gun round</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,791,000</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multipurpose Individual Munition (MPIM)</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>3,521</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcano</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>184,000</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M830A1 tank round</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$24,467</strong></td>
<td><strong>$6,590</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$17,877</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Projected Antiarmor Weapon Production Funding, Fiscal Year 2000 to Completion

(then-year dollars in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006 to completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAT/ATACMS</td>
<td>$226</td>
<td>$228</td>
<td>$264</td>
<td>$374</td>
<td>$340</td>
<td>$372</td>
<td>$2,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M26 MLRS Rocket</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>3,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOW BLU 108</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javelin</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADARM</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAM</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1,398</td>
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<tr>
<td>Longbow Hellfire</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFW</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Predator</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>301</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank round M829A2/M829E3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADAM</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M919 25-mm gun round</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M80 series</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcano</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M830A1 tank round</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$1,252</td>
<td>$1,511</td>
<td>$1,549</td>
<td>$1,674</td>
<td>$1,176</td>
<td>$1,187</td>
<td>$9,528</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mr. James F. Wiggins  
Associate Director  
Defense Acquisition Issues  
National Security and International Affairs Division  
U.S. General Accounting Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548  

Dear Mr. Wiggins:


In 1999, the House Committee on Appropriations questioned whether current antiarmor acquisition plans were appropriate, and directed the Secretary of Defense to develop an Antiarmor Weapons Master Plan. This plan was sent to Congress on August 23, 1999. The GAO review found the submitted plan was inadequate to support the Department's acquisitions plans, and noted that it did not address the joint effectiveness of existing antiarmor munitions against the threat.

The current acquisition plans of DoD have all been supported by the use of the Capabilities Based Munitions Requirements (CBMR) process, which incorporates Service, OSD, and Joint Staff review. The GAO report has identified several areas where the CBMR process could be improved; a working group led by the Joint Staff has been tasked to review the existing process and to recommend changes. The CBMR process addresses several areas which are key to understanding the Department's antiarmor weapons acquisition goals. These include the need to minimize friendly force casualties by reducing exposure to counterfires, through features such as lower signatures, longer ranges, and higher lethality (which generates fewer repeated attacks). Other key issues include shelf-life expiration and reliability concerns, training requirements, logistical requirements, and safety concerns.

Relative to the Matter for Congressional Consideration, the essence of the GAO's concern is their perception that the munitions requirements process is flawed. The imposition of an annual funding cap on the procurement of antiarmor weapons has no bearing on the way the requirements for these weapons are established. The CBMR process allows military planners to base munitions requirements on the following concepts:

- A given force structure, armed to its designed military capability.
• The estimated quantity of munitions to defeat a specified threat with that force structure.

These concepts are consistent with the national military strategy of flexible and selective engagement to protect U.S. interests throughout the world. This clearly allows the Commanders-in-Chief and the Services to base their requirements upon both the number of targets that need to be destroyed and the amount of munitions needed to fully arm a given force structure. It is not just one or the other, but rather the combination of both.

The GAO report correctly identified that in our analysis relatively few munitions (compared to those planned for procurement) may be used. However, since we cannot predict which platforms will experience the immediacy of tactical need, the CBMR process explicitly acknowledges as legitimate the need to ensure that each platform has a basic load of ammunition.

The services do intend and plan to fight in fully joint operations. However, occasionally intervening circumstances such as weather, rules of engagement, terrain obstructions, or collateral damage considerations preclude the routine substitution of one form of joint firepower for another. In order to field a robust force fully capable to support operations across the operational spectrum, each service equips and trains its forces to ensure that it retains strategic and tactical flexibility.

Our planned submission of an update to the Antiarmor Weapons Master Plan will address all these issues more fully.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report.

George R. Schaefer
Director
Strategic and Tactical Systems
Appendix IV
Comments From the Department of Defense

- The estimated quantity of munitions to defeat a specified threat with that force structure.
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Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report.

George R. Schneider
Director
Strategic and Tactical Systems
Beverly Breen, Laura Durland, William Gillies, Bobby Hall, and Roy Karadbil made key contributions to this report.
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