THE ROLE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN STRATEGIC SHAPING

by

Andrew F. Hutchinson

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Thesis Co-Advisors: Donald Abenheim
James Wirtz

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The Role of the Army National Guard in Strategic Shaping

Hutchinson, Andrew F.

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

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The thesis provides background on SPP and PfP and discusses assets the National Guard possesses for strategic shaping, including force structure, expertise, and institutional culture. It addresses the effects strategic shaping missions have on the National Guard’s traditional dual missions of providing a disciplined force ready to respond to local and state emergencies and providing properly trained and equipped units for mobilization in response to war and national emergencies.

This thesis also compares and contrasts two similar case studies of strategic shaping: a current study of the SPP Partner Challenge 1999 and the NATO PfP Baltic Challenge 1998 exercises. The case studies illustrate capabilities and benefits of the National Guard in strategic shaping. Finally, the thesis presents recommendations for studying and improving the National Guard’s effectiveness in strategic shaping.

United States Army National Guard, United States National Guard, Strategic Shaping, NATO Partnership for Peace, National Guard State Partnership Program, Bosnia Peacekeeping

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ABSTRACT

This thesis asks whether the Army National Guard is a capable instrument for strategically shaping the post-Cold War environment to meet United States foreign policy objectives. Further, it examines foreign policy and military benefits of Guard participation in strategic shaping missions. It focuses on the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) and the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, although it also refers to National Guard peace operations deployments to Bosnia.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis seeks to determine whether the United States Army National Guard is a capable instrument for strategically shaping the post-Cold War environment to meet United States foreign policy objectives. Further, the work examines the foreign policy and military benefits of Guard participation in strategic shaping missions. It specifically focuses on strategic shaping in the form of the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) and the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, although it also refers to research from National Guard peace operations deployments to Bosnia.

The thesis provides background on SPP and PfP and discusses some of the advantages the National Guard possesses for strategic shaping, such as its force structure, expertise, and institutional culture. It also explores the foreign policy and military benefits of using the National Guard for strategic shaping. It addresses some of the effects strategic shaping missions have on the National Guard’s traditional dual missions of providing a disciplined force ready to respond to local and state emergencies and providing properly trained and equipped units for mobilization in response to war and national emergencies.

This thesis also compares and contrasts two similar case studies of strategic shaping: a current study of the SPP Partner Challenge 1999 exercise and the NATO PfP Baltic Challenge 1998 exercise. The case studies further illustrate the capabilities and benefits of the National Guard’s role in strategic shaping. Finally, the thesis presents several recommendations for studying and improving the National Guard’s effectiveness in strategic shaping.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. diplomatic and military professionals have increasingly stressed the centrality of “strategic shaping” as a military mission. As General George Joulwan, former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR), stated in 1995 during the United States Army troop deployment to Bosnia, “The assumption that the military exists solely to fight the big one means we are strategically irrelevant. ...You are not shaping the environment. You’re sitting there waiting for the big one to start.” (Diamond, 1999) In fact, one of the objectives listed in the 1998 United States National Military Strategy is to shape the international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests by promoting regional stability, reducing threats, preventing conflicts, and deterring aggression and coercion on a day to day basis (A National Strategy for a New Century, 1998, p. 8).

Acting Secretary of the Army Robert Walker’s Appropriation Hearing testimony to Congress in 1998 further clarified the meaning of strategic shaping. Secretary Walker stated to the committee, “Our involvement in bilateral and multinational exercises, exchange programs, information sharing, and other contracts with militaries throughout the Asia-Pacific region are active methods for shaping the strategic environment in ways favorable to America’s interests.” (Walker, 1998, p. 2) In that same testimony, Secretary Walker gave an even more specific example of strategic shaping when he stated:

The National Guard State Partnership Program, which began in December 1992, is another example of Army shaping activities. The program links U.S. states and emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and Latin America through ties between state governor and state National Guard with the ministry of defense and the soldiers of the partner country. Our goal is to demonstrate, through the example of the citizen
soldier, the role of the military in a democratic society. The program seeks to build long-term institutional affiliations and people-to-people relationships while simultaneously assisting in the effort to establish democratic military organizations. (Walker, 1998, p. 2)

In short, strategic shaping is the attempt to influence strategic circumstances in advance, thereby mitigating potential threats to national security. Post-Cold War examples of strategic shaping include peace operations and assistance in nation-building in the Balkans, Haiti, and Somalia; Partnership for Peace (PfP) and State Partnership Program (SPP) interoperability, peacekeeping, and emergency preparedness training exercises in Asia, Europe, and South America; and international disaster relief in Central America and Turkey (Walker, 1998).

A. PURPOSE OF THESIS

This thesis seeks to determine whether the United States Army National Guard is a capable instrument for shaping the post-Cold War environment to meet United States foreign policy objectives. Further, the work examines the foreign policy and military benefits of Guard participation in strategic shaping. The National Guard is capable of conducting strategic shaping because it has the force structure, expertise, and, perhaps most importantly, the appropriate institutional culture to demonstrate civilian control of the military and interoperability of military and civilian institutions. Likewise, Guard participation in strategic shaping fulfills several foreign and domestic policy goals. Providing the National Guard as a role model for military subordination to civil authorities in emerging democracies promotes regional stability. Shaping missions executed by a mixture of National Guard and Active Component (AC) forces also provide nations with an example of a cost-effective credible alternative to standing armies. By
participating in strategic shaping missions, the National Guard remains a relevant, viable citizen-soldier militia, thus fulfilling its function as a positive link in U.S. civil-military relations.

B. IMPORTANCE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN STRATEGIC SHAPING

There are a number of reasons why the strategic shaping role of the National Guard is relevant to current U.S. security interests. Following the end of the Cold War, many former communist and authoritarian governments transitioned to democracy in what has been referred to as the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). As has historically been the case with emerging democracies, some of these countries are experiencing increasing social, political, economic, and civil-military challenges that place fledgling democratic governments in jeopardy. The end of civilian control of the military and the breakdown of emerging democratic governments may result in regional instability, which will negatively affect United States strategic and security interests and civil-military relations in new democracies. (A National Strategy for a New Century, 1998)

In addition, the end of the Cold War led to AC Army force structure reductions from a post-Vietnam high of more than 790,000 soldiers in 1989 down to a level of approximately 480,000 soldiers (Peters, 1998, p.2). Force reduction was the logical result of reduced threats to U.S. national security after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite the reduction of the total number of forces forward deployed, the number of U.S. military commitments and operational deployments has actually increased since the end of the Cold War (“Government Accounting Office Report: Overseas Presence,” 1997). Likewise, American interests abroad as a superpower have not decreased and in many
ways the dissolution of the Soviet Union has resulted in increased regional instability ("Government Accounting Office Report: Overseas Presence," 1997). The combination of reduced force structure and increased deployments and regional instabilities ultimately will have a negative impact on Army readiness. Indeed, testimony by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Congress in 1998 confirmed a possible shortfall in overall U.S. military readiness partly as a result of AC forces devoting a large amount of time and resources to strategic shaping missions ("Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee," 1998).

The United States seems to be presented with a dilemma. It can either continue to deploy AC forces on shaping missions and accept a lower state of military readiness, or it can reduce the number of its strategic commitments. Neither of these options is desirable, given current United States foreign policy goals. An alternative option, analyzed in this thesis, is to train and use the Army National Guard to fulfill a greater share of strategic shaping missions.

National Guard strategic shaping missions also will contribute to the viability of the militia concept within in the United States. The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a debate not only over the necessity of a large peacetime standing army, but also over the relevance of the National Guard's traditional combat and strategic reserve missions (Peters, 1998, p. 5). Nonetheless, the National Guard remains a national strategic reserve and a symbol of American strategic resolve.

The strategic shaping role of the National Guard is relevant domestically as a tool for maintaining and perfecting the militia system as an integral part of positive American civil-military relations. In comparison to many nations throughout history, the United States has been relatively free of civil-military strife. It has experienced no instance of
coup or military takeovers of civilian government. This aspect of U.S. civil-military relations will only be briefly touched upon in this thesis. But if one accepts the premise that a major factor contributing to the relative lack of civil-military contention in the United States is the engrained American cultural belief in the concept of the citizen-soldier, then it is important that this concept survives in the U.S. military.

Similarly, the advent of the modern all-volunteer professional standing military in the United States has increased the political importance of the American militia concept. Since the end of the draft and the advent of the all-volunteer force, the militia or reserve system has become an important institutional link between an American civil society and professional military that is drifting apart (Holsti, 1997). Yet the necessity of this link is difficult for many Americans to understand precisely because the notion of any type of civil-military threat or crisis is alien to them. However, the very fact that American history is comparatively devoid of civil-military discord underscores the relevance of the concepts of the citizen-soldier and the militia system. Indeed, strengthening the militia system in the United States, although difficult to quantify, is perhaps the most important result of National Guard strategic shaping missions.

The question then becomes not whether the United States citizen-soldier militia system is relevant, but how will the United States keep the National Guard relevant and, at the same time, maintain the National Guard as a conventional reserve force? Providing the National Guard with a prominent role in the increasingly important tasks of strategic shaping, a role for which it is uniquely capable, may fulfill both of those goals and at the same time benefit U.S. foreign policy objectives by fostering regional stability.
This thesis focuses on strategic shaping in the form of the National Guard SPP and the NATO PfP programs, although it also refers to research from National Guard peace operations deployments to Bosnia. Chapter Two provides background on SPP and PfP. The thesis uses information from SPP and PfP programs because they have much in common with most strategic shaping missions. Chapter Three discusses some of the unique capabilities the National Guard possesses for conducting strategic shaping. Chapter Four discusses the foreign policy and military benefits of using the National Guard for strategic shaping. It will address some of the effects strategic shaping missions have on the National Guard's traditional dual missions of providing a disciplined force ready to respond to local and state emergencies and providing properly trained and equipped units for mobilization in response to war and national emergencies (Organization of the United States Army, 1994, p. 50).

This thesis also compares and contrasts two cases of strategic shaping in Chapter Five: a current of the SPP Partner Challenge 1999 exercise and the NATO PfP Baltic Challenge 1998 exercise. The case studies will illustrate the capabilities and benefits of the National Guard's role in strategic shaping. Finally, the thesis presents several possible recommendations for studying and improving the National Guard's effectiveness in strategic shaping and in SPP and PfP missions.
II. STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The National Guard has participated in many different types of strategic shaping missions, including international disaster relief and humanitarian construction in Central America, peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and SPP military-to-military exchanges. It has performed these missions shoulder to shoulder with the AC. The SPP and PfP programs are particularly representative of the wide variety of strategic shaping missions. They highlight the unique capabilities that only the National Guard is able to bring to all strategic shaping missions. These SPP and PfP exercises also are ideally suited as training for most other National Guard strategic shaping missions, since they encompass many of the domestic and peace operations tasks required to accomplish shaping missions, but do not require extended deployments.

Other strategic shaping missions, such as National Guard peace operations in Bosnia, demonstrate certain aspects of strategic shaping. International disaster relief, nation building, and humanitarian aid missions are used as examples in this thesis when they overlap other cited strategic shaping missions. They, however, focus only on the component of strategic shaping missions related to National Guard domestic operations.

A. STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

The National Guard SPP directly links citizens from specific American states and partner countries in support of U.S. national interests. Currently, there are 31 voluntary partnerships spread throughout Europe, Central and South America, Asia, and the Pacific. The program’s objectives are to shape the international environment and promote regional stability, demonstrate civilian control of the military and interoperability of
military and civilian institutions, respond to the Theater Commander in Chief’s objectives, and provide a U.S. overseas presence without necessarily maintaining a large forward-deployed military force. The strategies employed to accomplish SPP objectives include using the program as a theater engagement tool through military-to-military exchanges and as a window to cultural, business, educational, and Sister City affiliations beyond purely military relationships. Through the medium of the National Guard, SPP is able to establish broad reaching ties between the partner state and partner country at all levels of society. (Iiams, 1999).

The SPP participates in other U.S. strategic shaping programs, but is not tied to them by statute or line item funding. These programs include the United States European Command’s (EUCOM’s) Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), United States Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM) Joint Military Program and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and In the Spirit Of PfP (ISO PfP). (“State Partnership Program Standard Operating Procedures,” 1999)

B. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

NATO’s PfP program is sponsored through EUCOM and the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). The goal of PfP is to improve interoperability and military cooperation among the signatory nations of NATO’s PfP program through Search and Rescue, Humanitarian Assistance, and Peace Support Operations. The EUCOM and JFCOM commands are the approving authorities for PfP funding. Warsaw Initiative funds cover travel and per diem expenses for the PfP foreign partner country personnel through either EUCOM PfP or JFCOM PfP funding lines. Theater Command funds cover United States personnel on a case by case basis and are approved by Theater
Command through the National Guard Bureau. NATO plans for events and exercises approximately two to three years ahead of time and submits exercise proposals to EUCOM for a decision on support. If EUCOM decides to provide support, the exercises are put into the EUCOM planning cycle and task out to theater components, including the Army National Guard. ("State Partnership Program Standard Operating Procedures," 1999)

Several kinds of exchanges and exercises are associated with SPP and PfP. For example, GUARDEX is a PfP program that includes exchanges in which partner countries integrate personnel into National Guard Annual Training (AT). Currently, GUARDEX is conducted during Continental United States (CONUS) based AT. GUARDEX is not intended to provide formal training of foreign personnel, but is instead intended to train U.S. personnel with the aid of partner soldiers. A GUARDEX exercise must support the PfP objectives of NATO interoperability, peace operations, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance and typically uses Situational Training Exercise (STX) style training activities. Partner Challenge 1999, which is one of the exercises examined in the case study section of this thesis, is an example of a GUARDEX training event. (Iiams, 1999)

Minutemen Fellow Exchange Program events also fall within PfP. These fellowships are provided to individuals, and can include educational exchanges. They are characterized by a two-way flow of information and provide a basis for developing strong, long-term interpersonal relationships. They are divided into National Defense, Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA), and Civilian Skills fellowship categories. (Iiams, 1999)
The National Defense Minutemen Fellowship is designed for United States National Guard and partner country armed forces. It integrates the National Guard’s federal mission of national defense with peacetime engagement and incorporates activities separate and distinct from those occurring under the GUARDEX program (Iiams, 1999). The Training Standards and Objectives Development seminar that took place in Lithuania in October of 1999 is an example of such a National Defense Fellowship event. During that event, two Pennsylvania National Guard officers, one lieutenant colonel and one major, provided 20 Lithuanian officers from the newly formed Lithuanian Armed Forces Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with information on United States training and doctrine that could be used to develop service wide and unit-level training and performance standards. This was one of three similar two-week seminars conducted in 1999. (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999)

The MSCA Minutemen Fellowship is designed for United States National Guard and partner country civilians. It integrates the National Guard’s state and community missions of military support to civilian authorities into peacetime engagement. This fellowship also engages the partner country’s domestic and emergency response agencies. It promotes effective civil-military relations in emerging democracies and improves the effectiveness of the interagency coordination process in crisis situations. (Iiams, 1999)

Finally, the Civilian Skills Minutemen Fellowship is designed for the United States National Guard in a civilian professional capacity and partner country defense forces or government agencies. This fellowship is intended to integrate the civilian professional expertise of Guard soldiers into peacetime engagement. (Iiams, 1999)
These SPP and PfP exchanges are unique to the National Guard and are effective tools for shaping the militaries of emerging democracies. The militaries of emerging democracies often have predominately defensive security and domestic operations missions, such as disaster relief and humanitarian aide, which are suited to a militia force. In contrast, they probably will never conduct worldwide power projection missions like the AC of U.S. Army. Therefore, through SPP and PfP programs, the U.S. National Guard can more effectively shape the militaries of emerging democracies than American AC forces.
III. CAPABILITIES OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN STRATEGIC SHAPING

A. STRUCTURE

Because National Guard force structure contains combat, combat support, and combat service support units, it is suited for all strategic shaping missions. A force that includes not only combat support and combat service force structure, but some combat forces as well, has certain advantages in strategic shaping missions like peace operations. Peace operations in Somalia and the Balkans illustrate that these missions can quickly transition to violence and conflict requiring forces ready for combat.

National Guard force structure basically mirrors the force structure of the Army AC. In addition, more than 54 percent of the United States Army's force structure actually resides in the Army Reserve and National Guard (Reimer, 1999, p. 5). Nearly every type of unit representing combat, combat support, and combat service support elements of the Total Force can be found among the Army National Guard forces of the 54 states and territories. These units include Enhanced Brigade maneuver units; Separate Brigades of aviation, artillery, and engineers; Support Commands and Support Groups that provide logistical support to both Guard and AC forces; and National Guard Divisions, which serve as the nation's strategic reserve. Army National Guard doctrine and Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) for these National Guard units are essentially identical to those of the AC, although not all Guard units have the most modern equipment and weapons systems. Even so, the National Guard force structure as a whole is comprehensive and can accommodate all partnership exchanges
related to conventional military training and operations. ("About the National Guard," 1999)

Although the governors of the states and territories act as the commanders in chief of the National Guard forces within their borders, tactical formations, such as divisions, brigades, and other units tailored for divergent tactical missions, straddle state and territorial boundaries. Therefore, states and territories do not all possess units that can function as independent tactical entities.

The diffusion of tactical units across state boundaries impedes the ability of an individual state to perform certain purely military missions with its assigned force structure and subsequently impedes a state’s ability to perform certain military partnership exercises independently. For example, a small state like Connecticut has a force structure that includes engineer, military police, aviation and support units ("Connecticut Army National Guard Units," 1999). These units may not be well suited to conduct partnership exchange exercises like infantry lanes training exercises. Nevertheless, engineer and military police units are ideally suited for many other military partnership functions, such as peace operations training, domestic support operations, combat service support training, Mission Essential Task List (METL) training development exchanges, and force modernization exchange seminars, since these are military functions that are common to all units.

In addition, SPP military partnership exercises can be organized to overcome the disadvantages of varied state force structures. For instance, nothing in SPP agreements precludes two states with complementary force structures, known as associate partner states, from participating with a single partner country. Kansas is an associate partner
state and, along with California, is partnered with Ukraine ("National Guard Bureau State Partnership Programs," 1999). Likewise, several partner states and partnership countries often conduct exercises with each other. This was the case in 1999 when the Michigan National Guard hosted exercise Partner Challenge 1999. During Partner Challenge 1999, platoons from Michigan, Maryland, and Pennsylvania trained with platoons from their Baltic partner countries of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania (Francisco, 1999). Additionally, SPP can overcome the disadvantages of varied state force structures by participating in and complementing other strategic shaping programs, such as NATO’s PfP exercise Baltic Challenge 1998. During that joint exercise, units participated from Baltic partner countries, the National Guard, the Active Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Airforce, the Coast Guard, and other NATO land, air, and naval forces ("Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise," 1999).

The members of a specific partnership program may initiate a broad spectrum of potential exchange events not only associated with the National Guard’s federal warfighting mission of supporting and augmenting the Total Force, but also related to the National Guard’s state mission of domestic military support to civil authorities. State domestic missions include activation during natural disasters, which is probably the most common reason for state emergency activation, as well community assistance, environmental missions, civil disturbances, and assistance to law enforcement (Domestic Support Operations, 1993).

State National Guard force structure is already prioritized for response to domestic support operations, and is therefore ready-made for partnership exchanges centered on military support to civil authorities. States have prioritized their National Guard force
structure because not all units possess force structure adequate to respond to every imaginable type of domestic support operation. The AC faces the same challenge in responding not only to domestic support operations, but also to strategic shaping missions, such as peace operations. This problem is confronted by military units that are designed and equipped for warfighting missions, and yet are required to participate in non-combat operations. For example, the Pennsylvania National Guard’s 28th Mechanized Infantry Division, which makes up the majority of the force structure of the state, is designed for conventional mechanized warfare. Nevertheless, because it is a relatively self-contained unit, it has an extensive combat support and combat service support structure able to assist civil authorities in a wide variety of missions. ("Pennsylvania National Guard Joint Emergency Operations Plan 95-01,” 1995)

States have also adapted to force structure challenges in domestic support operations through employment of Joint Emergency Operations Plans (JEOPs). States organize their units for domestic support operations under regional task force headquarters. Task force structure is based on geographical location and force structure of subordinate units appropriate for response to domestic operations, not necessarily on normal warfighting force structure and command relationships. ("Pennsylvania National Guard Joint Emergency Operations Plan 95-01,” 1995)

Because emergencies like natural disasters and civil disturbance will not wait for National Guard units to adjust their force structure from tactical military to domestic support configurations, National Guard units down to the company level must periodically develop and refine JEOP battle books. The JEOP task force headquarters requires each of its subordinate units to complete JEOP capability worksheets. The
worksheets list various examples of domestic support operations and further enumerate the tasks necessary to execute these operations. Each unit commander then must evaluate whether his unit can perform those tasks with its force structure. The task force headquarters staff compiles the force structure capabilities of subordinate units into JEOP battle books so they already know which units to assign specific tasks during a given domestic support operation. Therefore, JEOP battle books provide states with a ready-made tool to determine what unit force structure is appropriate for specific strategic shaping operations that are related to military support to civil authority missions. ("Pennsylvania National Guard Joint Emergency Operations Plan 95-01," 1995)

B. SKILLS

The National Guard also possesses unique skills and expertise for conducting strategic shaping missions. It derives this expertise from its ability to perform dual state and federal missions. As is the case with its force structure, National Guard wartime training and doctrinal standards mirror AC standards developed by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). In addition, because of the structure of our federal system of government and the statutory limitations placed upon active duty Army units, specifically the Posse Comitatus Law of 1879, the National Guard routinely conducts domestic support operations at a greater frequency than the AC (Domestic Support Operations, 1993).

A major strength of employing the National Guard in strategic shaping missions lies in its ability to demonstrate its expertise in transitioning back and forth between training for war and conducting domestic support operations. Unlike AC forces, National Guard units are required to train regularly for domestic support operations as a part of...
their METL. Company sized elements within a JEOP task force conduct individual and collective domestic support training tasks and alert exercises, while task force headquarters conduct command post exercises (CPXs) to practice command and control of their subordinate units and liaison with local, state, and federal authorities. State Area Commands (STARC) also conduct statewide comprehensive CPXs that exercise every level involved in domestic support, including liaison with civilian agencies ("Pennsylvania National Guard Joint Emergency Operations Plan 95-01," 1995)

Not only are National Guard commanders required to prepare their soldiers and equipment for domestic support operations, but their units can actually expect to be alerted for state active duty and exercise their training at relatively regular intervals. For example, from 1875 to 1994, Pennsylvania National Guard units have participated in 61 major state duty activations in response to both local and statewide emergencies. Twenty-five of these state activations were for natural disasters, 22 were for civil disturbances, and 13 were for man made environmental disasters, transportation accidents, and community assistance. Forty-five of these state call-ups, over 73%, occurred after 1965. From 1965 to 1994, there was an average of 1.6 activations per year and there were only two years, 1976 and 1980, when the National Guard was not activated in Pennsylvania. These figures seem to point to a trend, at least in Pennsylvania, of increasing reliance by state government on military support to civil authorities. ("Pennsylvania National Guard Joint Emergency Operations Plan 95-01," 1995)

As a result of resource allocation, training time available, and dual mission requirements, National Guard combat training performance may not rise to the same level
of proficiency of the Active Army. The relative inefficiency of reserve forces, in comparison to regular armies, is inherent in all militia systems and, indeed, is related to the issue of democratic inefficiency in general. In democracies, an equitable balance must always be struck between efficiency and the diffusion of power. As envisioned by Alexander Hamilton, this diffusion of power is the practice of using opposite and rival interests, as well as the selfish motives of individuals, “...to ensure that the private interests of every individual are a sentinel over public rights.” (Hamilton, 1961, p. 337) This is precisely why the United States system has both an Active and a Reserve Component, structured in parallel with its federal system of government. In the same vein, the United States possesses a military in some ways constitutionally bifurcated between different branches of government, with the AC more responsive to the executive, while the National Guard is more closely aligned with parochial Congressional interests.

Nevertheless, exposing the inefficiencies of the militia system and democracies in general does not conflict with the objectives of SPP or strategic shaping. If one of the objectives of strategic shaping missions, such as SPP, is to demonstrate all facets of civilian control of the military, then the inadequacies of a militia system also must be brought to light to emerging democracies. To misrepresent the American militia system as a perfectly efficient model is not only disingenuous but also counterproductive to strategic shaping. Emerging democracies benefit from learning of the limits of democracy in the American idiom and then developing a model that fits their own unique circumstances.
C. SHARED VALUES

The institutional culture of the National Guard also contributes to its capability to carry out strategic shaping missions. The National Guard, perhaps to a greater extent than the AC, reflects popular civilian values. Quantifying this capability is difficult. Nevertheless, the National Guard’s citizen-soldier institutional culture helps demonstrate civilian control of the military to emerging democracies, and is perhaps the National Guard’s greatest strength in carrying out strategic shaping missions.

Because of the National Guard’s experience with domestic support operations and the civilian background of its soldiers, the Guard has an institutional culture conducive to the SPP objective of demonstrating civilian control of the military. National Guard units down to the company and platoon level operate from over 2700 community armories across the United States (“About the National Guard,” 1999). They routinely coordinate with and take direction from local, state, and federal civilian officials. Also, National Guard soldiers are involved in community affairs and interact with the citizenry on a daily basis, whether informally during snow emergencies, while assisting in community projects, or even while conducting recruiting drives. Therefore, National Guard soldiers are attuned to the issues affecting the community. A National Guard unit commander really doubles as a soldier and a community servant. Indeed, in some communities, local armories even serve as Election Day polling places (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999). This is a testament to the confidence Americans place in their militia system, whereas many nations committed to democracy are wary of having military forces anywhere near polls during Election Day for fear that a military presence will influence and intimidate voters.
Additionally, for many United States citizens, the National Guard is their only link with the military. In these citizens' eyes, the National Guard is the military. Conversely, National Guard soldiers, as members of the community themselves, must constantly balance their duties as citizen-soldiers with their civilian responsibilities. They are well aware of the challenges unique to a democratic militia system. These citizen-soldiers are capable ambassadors for demonstrating civilian control of the military in strategic shaping missions like SPP because they help ensure the United States democratic system remains in the control of civilian authorities on a day to day basis and are experienced as civil-military ambassadors in their own communities.

Because the National Guard has the force structure, expertise, and institutional culture tailored to respond to both domestic support operations and combat missions, it is more uniquely suited for strategic shaping missions than the AC, which focuses mostly on its high intensity conventional role. Shaping missions require not only interoperability training, but also demonstration of civilian control of the military. As I will discuss in the next chapter, a militia force like the National Guard is a better military model for emerging democracies than professional military forces preparing for the high technology battlefield.
IV. BENEFITS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD’S ROLE IN STRATEGIC SHAPING

A. FOREIGN POLICY BENEFITS

1. Emerging Democracies and Factors Affecting Their Stability

Samuel Huntington, Juan Linz, and other political scientists have commonly referred to the formation of the new democratic regimes in the second half of the twentieth century as the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). Some third wave democracies emerged from former communist countries after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, while others developed from authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Europe during the 1970’s (Huntington, 1991). In any event, these fledgling democracies face considerable challenges during democratic consolidation. Poor economic conditions and dissatisfaction with inefficiencies inherent in democratic government threaten the survival of democracy in these countries. Civil-military tensions also place these new democracies in jeopardy (Huntington, 1991, pp. 231-253). The breakdown of these democracies and resulting regional instability not only threaten America’s immediate interests, but also could prove costly in the long term to United States. Therefore, it is in the United States’ interest to ensure third wave democratic governments survive. (A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1998)

One of the unique benefits of using the National Guard to shape the strategic environment is the influence the National Guard has on civil-military relations in emerging democracies. Specifically, the National Guard serves as a role model to both civilians and the military by demonstrating civilian control of the military. The Guard is uniquely capable for this role because it has broad experience providing military support
to civil authorities and interacting appropriately with government. The National Guard also serves as an example of a citizen-soldier militia’s role as a safeguard against centralization of military power in standing armies.

Of course, exporting American style democracy will not necessarily ensure stability in emerging democracies. There are many different variables that affect successful democratic consolidation. Some of these variables differ not only between the United States and other democracies, but also among emerging democracies themselves. Cultural history, structural nuances in democratic institutions, geography, and demographics are just some of the factors that can have an enormous impact on democratic success.

For example, presidential democracies sometimes fail as a result of immobilism and the unsolvable problems that arise between competing executive and legislative branches of government. Why has this not been the case in the United States? The uniqueness of each country affects these outcomes. In the United States, the executive and legislative branches are sometimes stalemated because of immobilism. Nonetheless, neither the executive nor the legislative branch has ever been able to seize power and nullify the existence of the other. Other factors, including diffusion of political power through federalism, the prestige of the Senate, and the strong institutional power of the Supreme Court, have helped to counterbalance the threat of presidential immobilism in the United States. Such mitigating factors were either not present or not strong in other failed presidential systems like Chile under Allende or Brazil under Gourlart. (Linz, 1978, pp. 72-74)
Factors as simple as the geopolitical position of a country also affect the success of democratic consolidation. The immediacy of an external threat influences the types of military forces a nation develops, which in turn influences a government’s ability to control the military. For example, despite the tradition and institutionalized legitimization of the militia system, the citizen-soldier concept might not have survived in Great Britain and the United States if it were not for favorable geography. England and the United States are both maritime nations that have been relatively free of adjacent external security threats presented by large land armies. Continental powers live with this threat on a daily basis.

Some emerging democracies face overwhelming external threats. For instance, Lithuania is bordered by Byelorussia and Russia. Therefore, the efficiency of its armed forces may be more of an immediate concern to Lithuania than democratic consolidation through diffusion of military power. By contrast, if threatened externally by the former Soviet Union, Lithuania does not alone have the means to maintain its sovereignty. Given its size and strategic resources, Lithuania also could never hope to develop the capability to defend itself. In personnel alone, Lithuania had only 715,825 males fit for military service in 1997, including all of those individuals already employed in the civilian sector, and annually only 26,000 males reach the military age of eighteen. These factors, compounded by economic hardships, may make the combination of Lithuanian NATO membership and a Lithuanian citizen-soldier militia a more realistic and inexpensive alternative to a large professional armed forces. (Republic of Lithuania Background Notes, 1997)

The military structures of third wave democracies also are affected by cultural and
historic factors. To use the same example, Lithuania was essentially an occupied state during the Cold War. Unlike the assimilated East German military or the militaries of other former communist countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lithuania did not inherit an ideologically inspired communist military. Because it has built its new military basically from scratch, Lithuania possesses some flexibility forging a military favorable to democratic ideals. Thus, Lithuania does not have to emphasize military reform to the extent of other former communist countries.

There are many other factors that affect democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, this observation does not diminish the importance of the National Guard as an instrument for shaping civil-military relations in emerging democracies. Lack of military subordination to civilian government is often the proximate cause of democratic breakdown (Huntington, 1991). For instance, the military is often used to remove democratically elected civilian governments, regardless of the deeper reasons for the failure of democracy. Subsequently, strategic shaping is beneficial for shaping or reforming militaries to eliminate, or at least diminish, the immediate threat to democratic stability posed by interventionist militaries. (Interview between J. Giraldo and author, 1999)

Military subordination to civilian government is no guarantee to democratic stability. For instance, immobilism in a presidential democracy could result in an executive dismissing the legislature and restricting civil liberties. In that case, subordination to the commander in chief would contribute to democratic breakdown. In general, however, civilian control of the military is more likely to contribute to democratic stability than undermine it. (Interview between J. Giraldo and author, 1999)
Regardless of the immediate impact that military subordination to civil authority has on democratic stability, effective civil-military relations are desirable for long term democratic consolidation. Positive civil-military relations are not just a means to the end of democratic stability. A country cannot by definition truly be a democracy if its military consistently interferes in political affairs or if its government is not allowed to develop through the consent of the people (Schmitter and Karl, 1993, p. 46). Thus, promotion of effective civil-military relations through strategic shaping contributes not only in the near term to democratic stability, but also in the long term to democratic consolidation.

1. The National Guard's Role in Fostering Democratic Consolidation

One could argue that the AC demonstrates civilian control of the military and promotes military professionalism in emerging democracies as effectively as the National Guard. However, the National Guard is uniquely suited for strategic shaping because of its role as a militia. The United States remains the world's only superpower. Unlike the militaries of most emerging democracies, which focus on defensive security and domestic operations, the AC's strengths are in its power projection capabilities. Therefore, a militia force like the U.S. National Guard is a more appropriate model for shaping emerging democracies than the AC.

The National Guard and the AC in the United States also are in many ways a microcosm of competing state and federal levels of government. One of the basic methods for ensuring democratic consolidation is the diffusion of power throughout the institutions of the state. Consequently, competing interests tend to establish an equilibrium of power, most commonly through checks and balances between different
branches and levels of government. In the same way, the militia concept promotes
democratic consolidation by diffusing power within the military.

But the militia system plays another role in democratic consolidation and in
counterbalancing the power of standing armies. Directly integrating part time citizen-
soldiers in national defense, whether by means of conscription or militia, ensures the
many and varied interests of the population are intermingled in the military. The
overriding single-minded interest of such a citizen-soldier force is the common defense,
not the bureaucratic and institutional interests of standing armies. In essence, this type of
citizen-soldier force "fireproofs" the military in a democracy and contributes to
democratic consolidation. Thomas Jefferson was aware of this aspect of citizen-soldier
armies, especially among the ancients, when he wrote:

The Greeks by their laws, and the Romans by the spirit of their people,
took care to put into the hands of their rulers no such engine of oppression
as a standing army. Their system was to make every man a soldier, and
oblige him to repair to the standard of his country whenever that was
reared. This made them invincible; and the same remedy will make us so.
(Meyer, 1996, p.2)

Although liberal democracy safeguards the liberties of the demos, it does have its
inefficiencies. The tension between liberty and efficiency can have a profound affect on a
state's external security, which is one of the primary responsibilities of any government.
The problem of inefficiency in a militia system is compounded in the modern age by the
highly technical aspects of warfare not present in ancient Rome or colonial America.
Nonetheless, inefficiency is not just a by-product of democracy, but a necessary
component of its very structure and system. Whether built-in inefficiency takes the form
of a bifurcated military, the checks and balances between and within governmental
branches, or a constitutionally mandated balance between majoritarian rule and individual rights, the diffusion of power prevents the tyranny of any one person, body, or majority from trampling liberty.

By contrast, the problem of inefficiencies in a democratic system, especially in the realm of national security, cannot be corrected without damaging at least some of the essence of democracy. If inefficiency prevents the consolidation of power, than efficiency and liberty are to some extent zero sum in nature. Fortunately, these competing interests can be balanced so as not to jeopardize either national security or civil liberties.

For example, the National Guard in the United States is not a universal militia composed of all citizens fit for military duty like the Swiss model. However, it is a militia in the sense that it is made up of ordinary citizens that serve as part time professional soldiers. It is a force that is not part of the regular army, but is subject to call for service in emergency. Thus, the United States has balanced the democratic ideals of a militia concept with the efficiency required of a modern professional army. Each emerging democracy also must determine the proper balance between the competing interests of democratic consolidation and national security, given its own circumstance and situation.

3. National Strategic Benefits

Beyond demonstrating civilian control of the military, there are other strategic benefits to using the National Guard in strategic shaping. Specifically, deploying the National Guard to other regions demonstrates strategic resolve and, through programs like SPP, provides a limited forward-deployed presence. During the Cold War, United
States forces were forward deployed in many areas of the world, thus allowing them to respond quickly to regional threats or crises. The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a reduction of AC forces and substantial withdrawal of forces from areas like Western Europe. Much of that AC forward-deployed presence is now either gone or stretched thin ("Government Accounting Office Report: Overseas Presence," 1997). National Guard strategic shaping programs like SPP give the United States a limited and less expensive forward deployed presence in emerging democracies that may be susceptible to regional instability.

The deployment of National Guard soldiers demonstrates civilian control of the military to emerging democracies, but also demonstrates U.S. strategic resolve, both to the emerging democracy where they are deployed and potential adversaries. Using National Guard citizen-soldiers for strategic shaping missions demonstrates a level of strategic commitment not matched by using AC forces alone, since a nation willing to commit its reserves may be perceived as willing to draw upon the entire population to achieve its strategic objectives. Finally, strategic shaping programs like SPP demonstrate the United States' level of commitment to the security of a partner country without appearing as an occupying force, unlike traditional forward deployed forces.

B. MILITARY BENEFITS

1. Enhanced National Guard Mission Readiness

Although the National Guard's role in strategic shaping benefits United States foreign policy, how will it effect the United States militarily? Will participation in strategic shaping missions like SPP help train the National Guard to perform its traditional dual state and federal missions, or will such missions dilute the National
Guard's limited resources and exacerbate an already high operational tempo? Since the tasks involved in SPP training, exercises, and military exchanges encompass National Guard warfighting, mobilization, and readiness mission essential tasks, as well as domestic support operations tasks, participating in SPP probably would hone the skills of those units involved in strategic shaping. However, more data than is presently available is required to evaluate whether this logic is borne out. Currently, there are no comprehensive studies detailing the effects SPP and PfP have on National Guard readiness. Nonetheless, information does exist on the effects that similar strategic shaping missions in general have on National Guard units. I will use information collected during two peace operation deployments by Pennsylvania National Guard units to illustrate the beneficial effects strategic shaping missions have on military readiness.

Although small-scale unit strategic shaping missions may not have an immediate effect on overall National Guard training readiness, they do provide valuable train-the-trainer skills for the soldiers involved. These skills can then be transferred to other soldiers not deployed on the strategic shaping missions in either the parent unit or adjacent units. For example, when the Pennsylvania National Guard was called upon in 1996 to provide a Fire Support Element (FSE) of approximately fifty soldiers in support of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) Nordic Brigade, the Guard soldiers went through two months of rigorous pre-deployment training and evaluation exercises. The AC Readiness Group (RG) associated with the 28th Division Artillery (the parent unit of the soldiers deployed) conducted the training and evaluation exercises and certified the unit as mission capable. Training focused on individual soldier skills, collective combat tasks, and peace operations. Unit training continued at the unit's home station, Fort
Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; its mobilization site, Fort Dix, New Jersey; its European artillery unit site, Babenhausen, Germany, and in Bosnia itself. (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999)

Because of the nature of the Military Occupational Specialty Qualifications (MOSQs) required for this mission and the force structure of the parent unit, the 28th Division Artillery formed the Nordic Brigade FSE from its entire force structure of approximately 2000 soldiers spread across Pennsylvania. The soldiers of the deployed FSE, designated as Detachment 1, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 28th Division Artillery, had ample opportunity to practice the skills they learned in their home units prior to activation, at pre-deployment training, and during operations in Bosnia. (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999)

After approximately 270 days of deployment, Detachment 1 returned home to the United States and was deactivated. The soldiers returned to their various units throughout the 28th Division Artillery. Subsequently, the 28th Division Artillery had several major opportunities to use the skills the soldiers from Detachment 1 acquired during their deployment. The Division Artillery received modernized land navigation equipment on very short notice in 1998 and was mandated to conduct new equipment training in all its subordinate units. Since the soldiers from Detachment 1 had received formal training on this equipment and were certified as trainers, they were employed as the primary trainers during the new equipment training. This saved time and resources, since trainers did not have to be sent to school to be certified for training on the equipment, and the soldiers trained received the benefit of being taught by soldiers who had actually used the equipment in an operational environment. (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999)
This was just one instance that knowledge and skills acquired by Detachment 1 during the Bosnian strategic shaping mission were transferred to other state units. There are others examples were the training received by Detachment 1 helped improve parent and adjacent unit readiness. In 1997, the 28th Division Artillery was notified that its Target Acquisition Battery F would be activated and deployed to Bosnia. The Fort Indiantown Gap RG Artillery Team and the 28th Division Artillery training staff again used soldiers formerly from Detachment 1 to train Battery F soldiers in pre-deployment tasks at their home station and at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. Similarly, soldiers from Detachment 1 were used as primary trainers for night vision training and certification by Pennsylvania units outside the 28th Division Artillery. The Pennsylvania National Guard infantry units receiving the night vision training were deployed during their 1998 AT as opponent forces in support of AC exercises. Likewise, Detachment 1 veterans were routinely designated in battery training schedules throughout the 28th Division Artillery as primary trainers on numerous tasks during drill weekends and ATs after the Bosnia deployment. (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999)

Strategic shaping missions prepare state units not only for domestic support operations and warfighting, but also for future strategic shaping missions. Strategic shaping missions train units in tasks related to peace operations, humanitarian assistance, and nation building. However, SPP also provides National Guardsmen with the opportunity to acquire new and informal skills not associated with their normal domestic support operations, to include adapting to a new and unfamiliar environment and overcoming language and cultural barriers.
In addition, the training value gained from strategic shaping missions is not limited to the soldiers directly involved in the event. The parent unit gains invaluable experience in the areas of planning, logistics, and mobilization during preparation and execution of the SPP event. This training is applicable to any strategic shaping mission. During the activation of Detachment 1, the 28th Division Artillery Headquarters staff received first hand experience in mobilizing and deploying a unit. Detachment 1 was formed from scratch, trained collectively, and evaluated in approximately two months. Although the deployment was relatively small in scale, it nonetheless exercised every one of the staff skills required to mobilize a much larger force in peacetime or for war. (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999)

Later, when Battery F was mobilized, the 28th Division Artillery Headquarters employed the same staff skills acquired during the Detachment 1 deployment. In fact, approximately the same size unit deployed with less than one quarter of the mobilization staff and support personnel, again in a compressed time frame of two months. The parent unit and its staff essentially were unchanged, with the exception of some personnel turnover, yet the experience of the previous deployment improved mobilization efficiency, not only in the Division Artillery, but in the division and state headquarters as well. (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999)

As a testament to this enhanced efficiency and the proficiency of the Battery F soldiers, many of the Battery F training and administrative requirements normally conducted at unit mobilization sites were completed by the Fort Indiantown Gap RG and the Division Artillery staff at home station. When Battery F arrived at its mobilization station, Fort Benning, Georgia, the soldiers actually were ahead of schedule and had an
extra day to rest (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999). It is important not to minimize the impact of parent unit staff proficiency during strategic shaping deployments, because poor staff training effects overall unit readiness, morale, and retention of the deployed soldiers, no matter how motivated and skilled those soldiers may be.

One must note that Battery F soldiers deployed with only their personal equipment and weapons, not their Firefinder Radars and vehicles. They trained collectively, were evaluated using 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division AC equipment at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and fell in on the previously deployed unit’s equipment in Bosnia. In contrast, unit equipment for Detachment 1, which consisted chiefly of High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and artillery laser range finders, was drawn from FSEs throughout the 28th Division Artillery. This proved a considerable logistical challenge, especially given the deployment’s compressed time schedule. Additional required equipment was loaded onto air load pallets up to the day that Detachment 1 flew to Europe. Therefore, the RG and the parent unit staff had a simpler task before them during the Battery F deployment, in comparison to the Detachment 1 deployment. (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999)

However, leaders generally criticize peace operations like the Detachment 1 mission in Bosnia for detracting from readiness and dulling warfighting ability, which is perceived as the real raison d’être of the Army. This criticism may not be as germane for the National Guard as it is for the AC, since many of the tasks associated with peace operations are related to the National Guard’s dual state and federal missions.
Nevertheless, peace operations by both the National Guard and the AC place a strain on overall readiness, because they divert resources from other missions and training.

In the National Guard, the duration of soldier activation in peace operations, even when congressionally limited to no more than 270 days, may also have an adverse effect on soldier retention. For example, after the redeployment of Battery F to Pennsylvania, the unit’s strength dropped significantly. It is unclear whether the deployment to Bosnia was the proximate cause of the fall in unit strength. Nearly all of the soldiers deployed were retained upon their return to the United States. The majority of the soldiers who left the unit were not deployed because they had MOSQs not required for the operation. The soldiers not deployed to Bosnia from Battery F represented almost one half of the unit personnel strength. Some of the soldiers were scheduled to leave the unit anyway for retirement or other administrative reasons. However, since most of the unit leadership and the full-time unit staff deployed also, many unit recruiting and retention functions at the home station were not given the normal level of attention, despite augmentation by the unit’s higher headquarters. (Interview between J. DeVries and author, 1999)

Comparing peace operations with similar strategic shaping missions, such as SPP and PfP events, may be useful in drawing some conclusions as to how SPP missions effect National Guard unit readiness. There are important distinctions, however, between programs like SPP and peace operations. The level of planning and preparation is more intense in National Guard peace operations than in SPP events, not least because deployment to peace operations requires unit certification by the AC, whereas deployment on SPP events do not (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999). Nevertheless, as I will discuss below in the Partner Challenge exercise case study, SPP
exercises also are planned and prepared for in detail. In addition, at least compared to the Detachment 1 and Battery F deployments, units receive greater preparation and lead-time for SPP exercises like Partner Challenge.

Additionally, most SPP events last no longer than the duration of a normal two-week AT period and include units no larger than platoons or companies (Interview between J. Peiffer and author, 1999). Therefore, SPP events have the unique benefit of preparing National Guard units for other strategic shaping missions, such as peace operations, without adversely affecting unit retention through lengthy and large deployments. In fact, SPP events can have a positive effect on retention, because they communicate a sense of purpose to National Guard Soldiers and instill confidence in them without uprooting them from their family and employment for extended periods of time.

These examples of 28th Division Artillery peace operation deployments illustrate the training benefits of National Guard strategic shaping missions. The Pennsylvania National Guard is, however, not unique. Several different state National Guards have provided FSEs to the Nordic Brigade. Other Target Acquisition Batteries besides Battery F also have fulfilled the target acquisition mission required in Sarajevo. These units also experienced similar training benefits as the Pennsylvanians from strategic shaping missions.

2. **Enhanced National Guard Jointness**

As an added benefit to National Guard military readiness, strategic shaping missions also foster jointness, as evidenced by the *Baltic Challenge 1998* exercise. As stated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine for Joint Operations:
Reserve Component forces provide the Nation with unique and complementary capabilities in time of war or national emergency, or at other such times as the national security requires. JFCs and their subordinates should be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of both Active and Reserve Component forces, blending them in such a manner as to maximize the overall capability of the joint force. (*Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 1995, p. I-6)

In fact, SPP and PfP exercises may be the only opportunity most National Guard units have to participate in joint operations and exercises, other than the interaction that occurs between Army and Air National Guard units. The SPP and PfP joint exercises also provide a chance for National Guard and Active and Reserve Component Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps units to coordinate, plan, and work closely together, thus training as they would actually operate in the post-Cold War international environment. Joint exercises not only enhance multi-service integration and increase National Guard proficiency, but also engender greater understanding and cooperation between the components of the Total Force.

3. **Reduced AC Operational Tempo**

A final important military benefit of using the National Guard for strategic shaping missions is enhancing the AC’s ability to focus on its warfighting mission. Unlike the National Guard, the AC has one predominant mission, which is to respond to external threat. Although strategic shaping is really an early intervention form of responding to external threat, it can detract from combat training and dull the edge of the sword of national defense. Therefore, integrating National Guard forces into strategic shaping missions not only prepares them for their dual state and federal missions, but also lifts some of the burden of strategic shaping missions from the AC.
V. CASE STUDIES

The PfP and SPP exchange events described here further illustrate upon some of the National Guard strategic shaping capabilities and benefits. The SPP training event Partner Challenge 1999 illustrates the National Guard’s strategic shaping capacity, as well as strategic shaping benefits to United States foreign policy and National Guard state and federal mission training. The exercise Baltic Challenge 1998 illustrates National Guard force structure, expertise, and institutional culture capabilities in strategic shaping, as well as benefits to United States foreign policy, National Guard state and federal mission training, and National Guard joint training. In addition, these case studies highlight some of the advantages and disadvantages of different types of exchanges.

A. PARTNER CHALLENGE 1999

Because of a gap between the PfP Baltic Challenge 1998 exercise and the PfP Cooperative Banner 2000 exchange, the state of Michigan offered to host a peace operations training exercise called Partner Challenge 1999 at Camp Grayling, Michigan from 12 to 26 June 1999. Michigan is teamed with Latvia in the SPP. However, the Michigan National Guard planned the training with a regional, rather than national, focus in keeping with other Baltic PfP exchanges. The Michigan planners arrived at this decision in consensus with the other Baltic countries and their partner states, as well as the National Guard Bureau. Therefore, soldiers from the Pennsylvania/Lithuania and Maryland/Estonia SPPs trained together with Michigan and Latvian soldiers during Partner Challenge 1999. One 42-soldier platoon from each of the American partner
states and one 30-soldier platoon from each of the Baltic countries participated in Partner Challenge 1999 (Francisco, 1999).

In comparison to other SPP events, Partner Challenge 1999 was unique in its training concept. Prior to Partner Challenge 1999, National Guard partner states and Baltic countries had participated in large-scale PfP exercises like Baltic Challenge 1998. Such large exercises combine crew drills, situational training exercises (STXs), logistical coordination exercises, and command post exercises (Battle Focused Training, 1990). The goal is to reinforce overall soldier and collective training integration. Partner Challenge 1999 planners decided to narrow its training focus and select what they perceived to be only the most critical METL or collective tasks. Partner Challenge 1999 was therefore developed as a training event versus an exercise. The specific training consisted of combined common task training, competitions, and METL lanes training at the squad and platoon level. The centerpiece of training in Partner Challenge 1999 was its three Lanes Training Exercises (LTXs). An LTX is a training technique for training smaller units on a series of selected soldier, leader, and collective tasks using specific terrain or locations (Battle Focused Training, 1990, p. 4-8). The LTXs in Partner Challenge 1999 were based on the platoon tasks of Tactical Movement, Area Reconnaissance, and Area Security. Each platoon had two days to execute an LTX. The first day allowed the platoon time to train-up and rehearse prior to being evaluated on the second day. The platoons then rotated to the next LTX. (Francisco, 1999)

The LTX tasks selected for Partner Challenge are required in peace operations, but also included tasks that infantry platoons must train on as a part of their collective combat METL. This overlap results from organizing training around battle tasks using

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the seven Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) of Intelligence, Maneuver, Fire Support, Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability, Air Defense, Combat Service Support, and Command and Control (Battle Focused Training, 1990, p. 2-18). Since BOS categories encompass tasks associated with the National Guard’s state, federal, and strategic shaping missions, training value is bound to overlap. Of course, such combat tasks as Raid, Attack, and Ambush were not included in Partner Challenge 1999, but the LTXs selected did contribute not only to strategic shaping, but also to National Guard unit proficiency in its state and federal missions. (Francisco, 1999)

As any Army commander or trainer knows, LTXs are very resource intensive. They require detailed training planning, inter-agency coordination, task identification, terrain preparation, experienced evaluator support, opposition force (OPFOR) assets, extensive logistics support, and ample time to plan, prepare, and execute (Battle Focused Training, 1990). Nevertheless, Partner Challenge 1999 was successfully planned, prepared, and executed in a compressed time frame of 80 days, whereas, by doctrine, resource allocation and planning for a major training event in the National Guard like Partner Challenge 1999 is supposed to require 120 to 180 days lead-time prior to the event (Francisco, 1999). In addition, although LTXs like those in Partner Challenge are resource intensive, the Partner Challenge LTXs absorb fewer resources than a major exercise like Baltic Challenge. (“Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise,” 1999)

Although a multinational training event, Partner Challenge 1999 also did not deviate significantly from normal National Guard training procedures. It was integrated into the National Guard participants’ normal AT schedule. During the Initial Planning
Conference, which occurred in December 1998, United States and Baltic officers identified organizational structure, tasks to be trained, LTX responsibility, and milestones for critical events. Each of the partner state National Guards involved in the exercise volunteered to man, prepare, and execute one LTX. Michigan National Guard soldiers provided logistics support as a part of their normal AT period. The AC Training Support Battalion (TSB) from Fort Stewart, Georgia provided standardized lane training packages to ensure conformity with Training Circular 25-10, *A Leaders Guide To Lanes Training*, Mission Training Programs (MTPs) and United States Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) directives. These are all normal procedures for LTXs. Partner Challenge was unique as a training event only because Baltic soldiers were intimately involved in it planning and execution phases. (Francisco, 1999)

The competition events integrated into *Partner Challenge 1999* were conducted separately from the LTXs. Competition events are prescribed in United States Army training doctrine to stimulate soldier interest and morale, encourage higher levels of performance, and recognize soldiers and units that exceed established standards (*Battle Focused Training*, 1990). The competition events in *Partner Challenge 1999* included a land navigation course, a 4.7-mile road march, rifle qualification, and hand grenade qualification. The United States platoons and the Baltic platoons did not compete against each other. Ostensibly, planners opted for this arrangement so that rivalries would not develop between United States and Baltic soldiers and to level the playing field. In fact, competition between the American platoons became quite intense. However, there was no significant difference in competition scores between countries, except that the American soldiers had an advantage in the rifle qualification, perhaps because of their
greater familiarity with the M16 rifle. The winning Baltic and American platoons were recognized at a post exercise ceremony. Probably the greatest benefit derived from the competition events in Partner Challenge 1999 was that they helped stimulate soldier enthusiasm for the SPP. (Francisco, 1999)

In sum, Partner Challenge 1999 demonstrated that National Guard units have the capability to prepare for both their state domestic support operations mission and federal warfighting mission and simultaneously conduct a strategic shaping mission without substantially impacting normal training. Therefore, one can conclude this training helped maintain National Guard military viability. Partner Challenge 1999 was also beneficial in fostering Baltic-American military ties. Finally, it demonstrated civilian control of the military to Baltic soldiers, albeit indirectly, by bringing them in direct contact with citizen-soldiers and showing them that National Guardsmen are a relatively effective low-cost alternative to active forces. However, a drawback of Partner Challenge 1999 was that it did not allow soldiers from the partner country to observe normal National Guard interaction with civilian authorities.

B. BALTIC CHALLENGE 1998

Baltic Challenge 1998 was one of a number of bilateral and multi-lateral events held annually between individual NATO Nations and their partners that fall within the PfP rubric. However, there was no official NATO involvement in Baltic Challenge 1998 and thus it fell under the heading of an ISO PfP event. The participant nations in Baltic Challenge included Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Norway, Sweden and the United States. The exercise focused on peace support
and humanitarian operations in the host country, Lithuania. It included 5000 military personnel representing all branches of the participant services. Over 2000 ground troops, 2000 sailors with 16 naval vessels, and 24 aircraft trained during the exercise. ("Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise," 1999)

The list of the American forces present at Baltic Challenge 1998 itself illustrates the joint nature of training during the exercise. United States military participants included:

- Five EUCOM staff officers
- 21 Army National Guard staff officers
- Michigan National Guard Infantry Platoon
- Maryland National Guard Infantry Platoon
- Pennsylvania National Guard Combat Engineer Company
- Maryland Air Guard Airlift Detachment
- Forward Support Medical Evacuation Detachment with three Blackhawk helicopters United States Army Europe
- Marine Combat Service Support Detachment
- Marine Medical Shock Trauma Platoon
- Marine Combat Engineer Detachment
- Marine Rifle Company from the Second Marine Corps Expeditionary Force
- Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon
- Navy Inshore Boat Unit
- Navy Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Platoon
• Navy Commander Naval Beach Platoon
• Navy Hospital Ship
• Two Navy Maritime Prepositioning Ships
• Air Force Air Mobility Squadron Detachment
• Air Force Airlift Control Flight Detachment
• Coast Guard Cutter ("Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise," 1999)

These forces all shared various missions in the seventy-eight day seven-phase exercise. The first phase, dubbed operation Baltic Castle, brought together Navy, Marine Corps, National Guard engineers with Lithuanian soldiers to provide engineer and construction support for the overall exercise. The second phase focused on maritime training at sea and interoperability in convoy and escort duties. Phase Three consisted of Baltic Challenge 1998 opening ceremonies. Phase Four included peace operations lane training. Phase Five was devoted to one day of liberty, sports, and cultural exchanges. Phase Six progressed to peace support field training. Finally, closing ceremonies were conducted during the seventh phase. ("Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise," 1999)

The capabilities of the National Guard units involved in this comprehensive exercise were again reflected in Guard force structure, expertise, and institutional culture. As in the Partner Challenge 1999 exercise, National Guard force structure came from various states. The force structure of the units involved was adapted to fit the nature of the exercise. Units represented both combat and combat support branches. While the exercise did not directly involve combat training, combat and peace operations tasks
overlapped as in *Partner Challenge 1999*. Therefore, Maryland and Michigan infantry platoons were flexibly adapted for peace operations training. In addition, the Pennsylvania National Guard Engineer Company possessed ideal force structure for conducting nation building operations, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, as well as peacekeeping operations. (*Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise,* 1999)

The Guard units also demonstrated their expertise in domestic and peace operations during *Baltic Challenge 1998*. The exercise scenario centered on a notional earthquake, which left much of Klaipeda, Lithuania in ruins. Subsequently, large portions of the population were rendered homeless and starving, and gangs of bandits preyed on disaster aid supplies and robbed the citizenry. Engineers from both the National Guard and the Marine Corps constructed command posts and field facilities and renovated medical clinics. Real humanitarian aid also was rendered during the exercise. The engineers repaired education and medical facilities in Klaipeda, including two kindergartens, a high school, an orphanage, a children's medical clinic and hospital, and an adult medical clinic. (*Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise,* 1999)

The foreign policy benefits of the National Guard training in *Baltic Challenge 1998* included increasing regional stability by demonstrating civilian control of the military to the regional defense forces. Using National Guard forces in the exercise also offered Baltic nations a less expensive alternative to regular armed forces by demonstrating the effectiveness of a mixed reserve and active force. Finally, sending National Guard citizen soldiers rather than just AC personnel to *Baltic Challenge 1998* also demonstrated to the Baltic government, civilians, and defense forces (both regulars
and reserves) the depth of commitment the United States has to Baltic regional security and stability. ("Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise," 1999)

**Baltic Challenge 1998** also increased National Guard military viability. Both the deployed units and their parent headquarters gained real-world training on mobilization planning and execution while deploying soldiers to the exercise. In addition, National Guard soldiers trained on tasks that had applications to both their domestic support and combat roles. All National Guard units participated in peace operations lanes training, which included check point and observation tasks, convoy operations, mine awareness, counter sniper techniques, patrolling, combat medical procedures, quick reaction training, and humanitarian relief training. In this respect, **Baltic Challenge 1998** lane training was similar to the **Partner Challenge 1999** LTXs. ("Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise," 1999)

However, skills learned in the lanes training phase of the **Baltic Challenge 1998** were put to the test later in the peace support field training phase. During this scenario-driven four-day period, soldiers and units were evaluated on how well they had learned and applied specific lane training skills and procedures. The planned scenario included role playing by Lithuanian civilians and soldiers, who posed as disaster victims, angry crowds, and profiteers. Participants had to react to a variety of critical tasks and situations. ("Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise," 1999)

This humanitarian relief training phase also tested the jointness and multinational interoperability of the troops. National Guard soldiers trained with American and international service members and civilians. For example, a platoon from the Pennsylvania Army National Guard's 876th Engineers was attached to a company of U.S.
Marines for this phase of the exercise. Ground patrol platoons also contained soldiers from at least four different countries, thus realistically portraying conditions in coalition operations and warfare. The training was conducted within a civilian populated area, adding realism to the scenario and requiring troops to use caution during maneuvers. ("Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise," 1999)

The National Guard units involved not only demonstrated capabilities and benefits in their strategic shaping role in Baltic Challenge 1998, but also met the overall exercise objective, which was to enhance military interoperability in peacekeeping exercises and to foster mutual trust, respect and cooperation among the participants ("Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise," 1999). The Guard units also met their training goals based on the following specifically evaluated exercise objectives:

- Give multinational and joint commanders and staffs practical experience in supporting a multinational peacekeeping training exercise.
- Upgrade operational means and methods of multinational peacekeeping forces, employing different types of equipment, while operating according to a common set of guiding principles.
- Examine and evaluate compatibility of existing organizational structures and technical resources toward conducting combined peacekeeping operations.
- Provide an opportunity for military personnel of all participating countries to exchange basic peacekeeping information. ("Baltic Challenge 1998 Combined Joint Exercise," 1999)
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis has built a foundation for developing the role of the National Guard in strategic shaping. The next step in developing this role would be an in-depth study of National Guard strategic shaping using this thesis as its framework. The following recommendations relate to methods for measuring input and outcome components of strategic shaping missions, further integrating National Guard training for strategic shaping missions, and expanding the civil component of strategic shaping.

A. MEASURE STRATEGIC SHAPING MISSIONS

National Guard force structure, expertise, and institutional culture are inputs into strategic shaping missions. Output benefits of the National Guard’s participation in strategic shaping are more difficult to quantify. This thesis explored both input and output measurements through the use of case studies. In the future, even more comprehensive data could be gathered that measures outputs and benefits of National Guard strategic shaping, such as military performance and readiness, mission cost, and civil-military relations performance during strategic shaping missions.

1. Military Performance and Readiness

Currently, there is a great deal of information available on individual case studies of strategic shaping missions. The case studies in this thesis were very useful for drawing conclusions as to the effects that these missions have on National Guard unit readiness. Comprehensive data on all National Guard units involved in strategic shaping missions also would help develop general principles on the effects strategic shaping missions have on readiness and how effectively units perform these missions. This data could then be
used for operational planning purposes and to develop doctrine for civilian policy-makers and military commanders.

Data on National Guard performance during strategic shaping missions and their impact on unit readiness is available at the unit level. All unit leaders use various types of evaluations and other feedback to assess soldier, leader, and unit proficiency. Thus, data on strategic shaping missions could be gleaned from commanders' personal observations on training and readiness and from assessment and feedback from higher headquarters. Other data could be compiled from Unit Status Reports, External Evaluations, After Action Reviews, Training Assessment Modules, Emergency Deployment and Readiness Exercise reports, Inspector General and Command Readiness Inspections, Army Audit Agency Reports, and maintenance and logistics evaluations.

The effects strategic shaping missions have on National Guard recruiting and retention would also be a critical part of a strategic shaping readiness study. The case study of Battery F cited above illustrates some of the possible negative effects of peacekeeping missions. However, shorter missions like Partner Challenge 1999 and Baltic Challenge 1998 may actually boost unit recruiting and retention. Data gathered on unit recruiting and retention rates before, during, and after participation in strategic shaping missions could clarify which types of shaping missions impact personnel readiness. Questionnaires on soldier motivation for participating in various strategic shaping missions, mission impact on soldier employment and personal life, morale of soldiers deployed and remaining behind, and initial and subsequent soldier and recruit perceptions of missions also would be useful in a readiness study.
A compilation of data from all units deployed on strategic shaping missions would require a considerable investment in time and resources. In addition, gathering accurate statistical data sometimes distracts targeted units from performing their normal duties. Nevertheless, if the statistical data compiled were useful in the planning process of strategic shaping operations and subsequently improved overall unit proficiency, then securing the data would be worth the effort.

2. Cost

Data on the cost of various strategic shaping missions in comparison to similar combat training, domestic support training, and peace operations training could help determine operational requirements for strategic shaping missions. These statistics would have to include costs incurred not only to National Guard units, but to the commands sponsoring the mission as well. Cost comparisons to similar AC missions and training also could establish whether the National Guard is a cost-effective instrument of strategic shaping. Of course, it is difficult to put a price on strategic investment, but a cost study would be useful in setting allocation of resources levels for strategic shaping missions.

3. Civil-Military Relations Performance

Measuring National Guard unit performance in strategic shaping missions is a difficult proposition. This thesis looked at the general benefits of strategic shaping and whether units accomplished specific objectives set forth for the mission. No statistical or comparative study of either Active or Reserve Component forces exists, however, that proves units were successful in shaping the strategic environment to meet United States foreign policy objectives. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a practical method for measuring that type of output.
Of course, the ultimate survival or collapse of an emerging democracy is an indicator of the success of strategic shaping missions. Unfortunately, many variables unrelated to a unit’s performance in demonstrating positive civil-military relations may also affect the stability of an emerging democracy. Nevertheless, certain methods of gathering data exist that may indicate strategic shaping mission accomplishment and establish a link between strategic shaping, positive civil-military relations, and increased professionalism. Polling partner country civilians and soldiers involved in or observing partnership exchanges and other strategic shaping missions, as well as the views of those not involved, could indicate effectiveness. Sampling partner country civilian and soldier attitudes on civil-military relations might also serve as an indicator of mission success, although, again, factors other than strategic shaping could affect these perceptions.

B. FURTHER INTEGRATE GUARD STATE, FEDERAL, AND STRATEGIC SHAPING MISSION TRAINING

Planning and training for strategic shaping missions should be integrated as much as possible into normal unit training development. Presently, there is a tendency for unit commanders and staff to treat SPP and PfP missions as operations separate from normal training. Despite this tendency, state headquarters and unit commanders are adept at maximizing training value and placing training emphasis on overlapping state, federal, and strategic shaping mission tasks because they are faced with competing missions and resource requirements. But, strategic shaping missions should be used as a training tool, rather than perceived as an additional duty. As we have seen in the preceding case studies, many tasks performed during strategic shaping missions are also applicable to normal National Guard state and federal missions. A formal doctrinal mission crosswalk
identifying similar tasks would be useful for commanders to assess the value of strategic shaping training for individual units.

In addition, exercises should be scheduled far enough in advance to give units the ability to integrate strategic shaping missions into unit training plans. Late notice disrupts the intricate and often rigid process of securing training resources and planning training tailored to specific unit needs. Strategic shaping missions become training distracters rather than training multipliers when they are added onto training plans as an afterthought. This is an especially important consideration for National Guard units, which by doctrine require as much as three times the training planning time as AC units (Battle Focused Training, 1990).

C. FURTHER EXPAND THE CIVIL COMPONENT OF STRATEGIC SHAPING

National Guard units should not merely emphasize military training in strategic shaping to the exclusion of civil-military exchanges. Because National Guard unit commanders have only 39 days per year to train for their dual state and federal missions, their focus is inherently on maximizing training. Therefore, in the case studies this thesis reviewed, the emphasis was decidedly on military training. However, SPP and PfP were designed as windows to broader cultural exchanges other than just military-to-military exercises. If a unique benefit of the role of the National Guard in strategic shaping is demonstrating civilian control of the military to emerging democracies, then the civil-military component of strategic shaping should be emphasized significantly. Although significant civil-military interaction does occur in programs like SPP, commanders
should balance between the military-to-military and civil-military components of strategic shaping, not merely focus on its military and training aspects.

**D. FURTHER DEVELOP CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DEMOCRACY, CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS, AND MILITIA SYSTEMS**

A comparative study of correlations between emerging democracies and civil military relations would be useful in further determining the utility of strategic shaping. The study of civil-military relations and emerging democracies is a relatively new area of inquiry. Thus far, political scientists have written on the challenges in establishing democratic institutions and democratic consolidation in general. However, not as much quantitative historical research has been done on how civil-military relations has specifically contributed to the success or failure of emerging democracies. In addition, there exists almost no research on the correlation between militia institutions and civil military relations.

If a quantitative study were to establish when, how, and to what extent civil-military relations impact the success or failure of emerging democracies, then such research could strengthen strategic shaping’s worth as a tool for foreign policy. Likewise, if a separate study could establish how citizen-soldier militias impact civil-military relations, then policy makers might also further prove the efficacy of the National Guard as an instrument of strategic shaping. Shugart and Carey’s comparison of the breakdown of democratic regimes in the twentieth century by regime type might be an appropriate model for these studies (Shugart and Cary, 1992). For instance, for the purpose of determining the utility strategic shaping, the breakdown of democratic regimes would remain the dependent variable, and civil-military relations would replace regime type as
the independent variable. To provide a somewhat simplistic example, if a study concluded emerging democracies do not normally breakdown because of failures in civil-military relations, then strategic shaping through military partnership exchanges might not be worth the strategic investment involved.

Such a comparative study would prove as beneficial as the case study approach used in this thesis. The existing body of work on civil-military relations and emerging democracies mainly employs regional case studies to highlight challenges that specific emerging democracies face during formation and consolidation. Case studies are very useful for this purpose, especially since every region and nation is affected by unique factors. Case studies are also useful in establishing a body of information resources in political science, which can serve as the building blocks for the statistical and comparative methods of studying political models, such as democracies (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691). Since the case study method often looks only at one particular unit, this method of study is useful for predicting the utility of strategic shaping in that specific situation. A single case study, however, cannot be the absolute basis for either proving or disproving strategic generalizations on the benefits of the National Guard as an instrument of strategic shaping.

In contrast, the major weakness of my recommendation to employ the comparative method in a future study of the National Guard as an instrument of strategic shaping is that there are many possible variables that may impact democratic development and consolidation, but few cases and little data available. Almost all social science research involves the problem of too many variables because inherently social variables do not lend themselves to isolation as in a laboratory. The low number of cases

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also makes dealing with the high number of variables problematic because, statistically, the less cases in the sample, the more difficult it is to correlate variables to a certain outcome. (Lijphart, 1971, p. 685)

However, the scientific dimension of comparative politics could be maximized and the many variables and few cases problem could be minimized in a number of ways in a future study of civil-military relations and emerging democracies. One way would be to increase the number of cases of civil-military relations in democracy as much as possible by extending the analysis geographically. Expanding cases of civil-military relations in democracy throughout history, even within the same country, region, or unit would also be helpful, because certain variables in the same unit would have a greater probability of being similar in different times. Unfortunately, a drawback to this method of study is that historical information is in some cases lacking. Nevertheless, the addition of even one case will improve control. Also, combining two or more variables that have similar characteristics could reduce the property space of the analysis. Likewise, a comparative analysis of democracy and civil military relations could focus on cases that are similar in a large number of variables, but dissimilar in the variables that the researcher wishes to relate. (Lijphart, 1971, pp. 685-690)

A strategic study on strategic shaping’s impact on civil-military relations and civil-military relations’ impact on emerging democracies would prove both daunting and possibly politically charged. Nevertheless, it would go far in verifying ideas about civil-military relations, democratic civilian control of the military, fear of standing armies, and the institutionalization of the militia system. It also could point the way to further studies on the measurable utility of using the National Guard in strategic shaping.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Army National Guard is a capable instrument for strategically shaping the post-Cold War environment to meet United States foreign policy objectives. It has the structure, skills, and institutional culture required to accomplish strategic shaping missions, such as partnership programs, peace operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, in conjunction with the AC. Not only does the National Guard possess the force structure to conduct these missions, but it also is uniquely qualified for strategic shaping because of its expertise in transitioning back and forth from warfighting training to domestic support operations. As a result of National Guard experience in domestic support operations and the citizen-soldier status of its members, it has the character necessary to carry out sensitive strategic shaping missions.

In addition, this thesis has underscored the foreign and domestic policy benefits of National Guard participation in strategic shaping. The National Guard contributes to regional stability and democratic consolidation by illustrating effective civilian control of the military, providing an example of the militia concept, and demonstrating United States strategic resolve. Likewise, employing the Guard in strategic shaping missions helps maintain National Guard viability domestically. This contributes to positive civil-military relations in the United States itself, in much the same manner that the National Guard helps strategically shape the international environment. Strategic shaping missions, and specifically partnership programs, are also militarily valuable because they help train the National Guard for its dual state and federal missions. These missions also enhance National Guard joint capabilities and reduce some of the operational burden.
from the AC, thus freeing more active forces to focus on their warfighting capability.

By using available representative case studies, this thesis illustrated specific National Guard capabilities and benefits in strategic shaping. The case studies also highlighted some of the possible challenges associated with using the National Guard for strategic shaping, to include the impact on recruiting and retention and the ability of the National Guard to train to the same standard as the AC for its wartime missions. Nevertheless, this thesis recognizes that, as with all studies that explore new areas, more data could be compiled and analyzed to bring the National Guard’s role in strategic shaping into sharper focus. Therefore, I have made several recommendations related to the further study of this topic. These recommendations included possible methods for measuring unit performance in strategic shaping missions and suggestions for establishing correlations between democracy, civil-military relations, and militia systems.

Nevertheless, it is evident that the post-Cold War international environment is both amorphous and unpredictable. The United States does possess effective instruments to shape this environment and mitigate potential threats to national security interests. In a time of diminishing military resources, the United States must use all of the instruments of strategic shaping at its disposal. Providing the National Guard with a prominent role in the important task of strategic shaping, a role for which it is uniquely capable, will maintain National Guard military viability, keep it relevant, and at the same time benefit United States foreign policy objectives by fostering regional stability.
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