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16. Abstracts

The report contains information on the Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.

17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors

USSR
Military Organizations
Military Facilities
Military Personnel

17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms

17c. COSATI Field/Group 15C
## TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

### No. 1360

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GENERAL MAYOROV ON ARMED FORCES CAPABILITIES

Riga KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVI in Russian No 2, Feb 78 signed to press
24 Jan 78 pp 23-31

[Article by General of the Army A. Mayorov, commander of the Baltic Military
District: "Offspring of Great October"]

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union is consistently and unflinchingly pursuing a
peaceloving foreign policy. L. I. Brezhnev said in the report devoted to
the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution: "Soviet
power was born under the sign of the Leninist Decree on Peace and since that
time the entire foreign policy of our country has been permeated with a love
of peace. Objective historical conditions dictated its specific content:
the policy of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social
systems."

During recent years, thanks to the change in the correlation of forces in
the world and primarily to the growth in the power and authority of the Soviet
Union and all the socialist commonwealth and thanks to the successes of the
international worker's movement and the forces of national liberation, a
change from "cold war" to a relaxation of international tension has managed
to be achieved. This is a good sign which testifies that a certain part of
the ruling circles in capitalist states understand the new realities.

At the same time one cannot fail to see the difficulties and obstacles on
the path to consolidating detente. Although imperialism's capabilities
for aggressive actions have been reduced, its nature remains as before.
Recently, the reactionary circles of the leading capitalist powers have
become considerably more active. In a number of capitalist countries
frantic anti-Soviet and anticommunist propaganda is being spread. Every
possible falsehood about the so-called "Soviet and communist threat" is
being disseminated, attempts to slander detente and to twist its
meaning are being launched, and military preparations are being feverishly
developed.
Today's Chinese leadership is acting together with the most reactionary and aggressive circles of the West. Despite the interests of its own people it is feverishly carrying out the militarization of the country and stubbornly sticks to its policy of an openly anti-Soviet line, and encourages the kindling of military conflicts.

Thus, the situation in the world remains complicated and contradictory despite positive changes. Due to the continuing arms race and the existence of military danger the Soviet state has been forced to strengthen its defensive capabilities in every way possible. This is an objective necessity. It says in the Constitution of the USSR: "The duty of the armed forces of the USSR to the people is to provide a reliable defense of the socialist motherland and to be in constant combat readiness, guaranteeing that any aggressor is instantly repulsed."

True to Leninist teachings, our party is solving the complex problems of strengthening the country's defensive capabilities in accordance with the distinctive features of each stage of social development and the international situation. In doing this, it proceeds with due regard to the economic, scientific, moral, political and military potential of the country. It is also important to emphasize that the strengthening of the Soviet State's defensive capabilities is inseparable from increasing the defensive might of the entire socialist commonwealth.

Under modern conditions the party while carrying out its economic strategy—the highest goal of which has been and remains a steady rise in the people's material and cultural standard of living (this is its core which permeates the 10th Five-Year Plan and the long term plan) -- is promoting, as was pointed out during the 25th CPSU Congress, the further build-up of the country's economic power, the expansion and basic renewal of production funds, and the assurance of a steady and balanced growth in heavy industry—the basis of the economy. The solution of this task also ensures an increase in the country's defensive potential.

At the present time the industrial might of the Soviet Union has attained a high level: It is almost 18 times higher than that which served as the basis for achieving victory in the Great Patriotic War. A successful implementation of the target of the 10th Five-Year Plan and of the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress will ensure a further rise in the economy of the USSR and will serve as a weighty contribution to strengthening the might of the entire socialist commonwealth.

V. I. Lenin taught that the victory of socialism and communism is possible only on a firm scientific foundation and by the comprehensive use of the achievements of modern science and technology. The scientific potential also serves as an important component of the country's defensive might. The introduction of scientific and technological achievements has caused a revolution in military affairs and has had a definite effect on the armament
and organizational structure of the army and navy, on methods for conducting military operations and on methods for training and indoctrinating personnel. All this ensures maintaining the country's defensive capabilities and the armed forces' combat might at the required level.

In modern combat the role of the moral and political potential has grown many times. A future war, if it should come, will inevitably be transformed into a clash between two world systems. An uncompromising nature will be peculiar to it. It is also necessary to consider the basic and qualitative changes in military affairs which have been primarily caused by the appearance of nuclear missile weapons and by the accelerated growth in the technical equipment of the armed forces. All this places increased requirements on army and navy personnel.

The objective basis for the high moral spirit of the Soviet people and its army is our social and state system and the just goals of defending the great accomplishments of socialism. Such determinant features of our social development as the progressive growth of the economy, the constant increase in the prosperity and cultural level of the workers, the further rapprochement of all classes and social strata of the population, the ever deepening process of internationalizing all aspects of the life of the peoples of the USSR, and the formation of a new historical community of people—the Soviet people, have a favorable effect on the moral and political condition of the army and navy.

Military potential properly comes forth as a leading element in the country's defensive capabilities. Under this it is customary to understand the capability of a state to maintain and improve its armed forces, to increase their combat power, to fill their ranks with trained personnel, to provide modern equipment and all types of supplies under peacetime conditions and during war.

The Soviet armed forces are the main strength of the military might of the socialist state.

Under the conditions of a developed socialist society, real opportunities are being created for a further comprehensive improvement in all the component elements of the armed forces.

Weapons and combat equipment are being constantly developed and improved based on the society's powerful material technical base and the use of all the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution. At the present time the most modern systems for waging war have been created and are in the armament of the armed forces.

The large-scale social, political and cultural transformations in the country's life, which are connected with strengthening mature and developed socialism, have led to an increase in the quality of army and navy personnel. The growth
of the political consciousness of Soviet people is demonstrated in the increase of the servicemen's creative activity and in their exemplary performance of military duty. The increase in the ranks of party and Komsomol organizations in the armed forces testifies to this. Communist and Komsomol members today compose about 90 percent of the personnel.

Army and navy command personnel are noted for political maturity and high level of training. About 50 percent of the officers have a higher military and special military education. Engineers and technicians occupy up to 45 percent of the officer positions.

The equipping of the army and navy with the latest weapons which place high demands on personnel also caused changes in the organizational structure and in the alignment of the branches of the armed forces and services. Now, the Strategic Rocket Forces are the basis of their combat power. All the other branches of the armed forces—the Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Forces, and Naval Forces—are being improved and strengthened together with them.

Military theory—one of the most important factors in the army's and navy's combat power—has been further developed. Under the leadership of the Communist Party a military doctrine has been worked out which reveals the essence and nature of modern wars and which gives a scientific basis to ways to construct the military and prepare the country and the armed forces to repulse an aggressor. Soviet military science by taking into consideration the effect of the scientific and technological revolution on military affairs is working on and developing important problems in strategy, operational art and tactics.

The present day period—a period of mature and developed socialism—is characterized by a further increase in the role of the party in society and by strengthening its theoretical, political and organizational activity.

The growth of the role of the CPSU in society on the whole signifies the strengthening of its role and importance in the leadership of the Soviet armed forces. This leadership has been and remains the decisive source of the power and invincibility of the Soviet armed forces.

The activity of the Communist Party in the leadership of the armed forces is exceptionally multifaceted. Essentially, there are no questions in the area of military affairs which the CC CPSU, the Politburo of the CC CPSU and the general secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Marshal of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev, are not constantly engaged in. The fighting men of the Soviet army and navy say with pride that the defensive capability of the USSR and the power of the armed forces are inseparably linked with the activity of the party and with the name of an outstanding party, state and military figure, comrade L. I. Brezhnev. Soviet fighting men value the party's attention and concern and respond to them with infinite devotion and selfless military labor.
Created as a weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat, our heroic armed forces are now standing guard over the first general socialist state in the world which is building communism. This fills the activity of Soviet fighting men with even deeper meaning.

Our socialist reality and the active ideological work of the party are the basis for forming in Soviet fighting men a communist moral fibre, political awareness, a high level of responsibility for strengthening the country's security, and a striving to persistently improve their combat skill and to increase unit and subunit combat readiness.

The peoples of our country live as a single friendly family and are erecting the edifice of communism. An integral part of them are the USSR armed forces which are strong and invincible because of the monolithic solidarity of Soviet society and the friendship and brotherhood of the Soviet peoples. Our army and navy are an outstanding school for internationalism, a school for instilling a sense of brotherhood, solidarity and mutual respect for all nations and nationalities in our motherland. Each unit and subunit is a multinational military family in which the unbreakable friendship of Soviet peoples, which is one of the characteristic features of the Soviet way of life, is graphically displayed.

The international nature and essence of our armed forces during the present stage of their development is also clearly demonstrated in the military alliance of the armies of the Warsaw Treaty countries and in their joint performance of tasks in defending the achievements of socialism.

The Leninist ideas on the thoroughly popular nature of the armed forces of a socialist state and the unity of the army and people have found a worthy reflection in the fundamental law of our country. The inclusion of a special chapter, "Defense of the Socialist Motherland", in it contributes to further strengthening the solidarity of the army and people, to strengthening the military and patriotic indoctrination of Soviet citizens--especially the youth, and to improving their preparation to defend the socialist motherland.

Quite a bit is being done in the Latvian SSR in the area of the military and patriotic indoctrination of workers. Questions on preparing youth for service in the armed forces are regularly discussed at plenums and sessions of party committee bureaus, meetings of the party aktiv, and sessions of local councils of peoples' deputies. A harmonious system for the military and patriotic indoctrination of the population has taken shape in the republic. Lectures, reports, discussions, meetings with war and labor veterans and excellent soldiers and sailors in combat and political training, evenings devoted to military glory, month-long campaigns of mass defense work, and trips to sites of our people's revolutionary, military and work fame are regularly conducted at enterprises, kolkhoz, sovkhoz, establishments and training institutes. DOSAAF organizations are making a weighty contribution to the preparation of the younger generation for the army and navy.
The forces of the Red Banner Baltic Military District are protecting the peaceful and creative work of our people along with all the men in the Soviet army and navy. Within them are famous large units and units who have been singled out with honorary titles and decorations for the courage and valor displayed in the struggle against the motherland's enemies. Among them are the Guards Motorized Rifle Proletarskaya, Moskovsko-Minskaya, Red Banner (twice), Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Division in whose ranks 15 Heroes of the Soviet Union grew up during the war years; the Fighter Aviation Orshanskiy Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Regiment imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy--one of the oldest in the Soviet armed forces; a regiment bearing the name of Hero of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Matrosov; the subunit in which Yuriy Smirnov fought and performed his immortal feat.

The Baltic fighting men respond to the continual concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet people for the armed defenders of the motherland by further increasing activity in work and training, with new successes in combat and political training, by performing the socialist obligations assumed, and with outstanding patriotic initiatives.


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CSO: 1801
'KRASNAYA ZVEZDA' EDITORIAL STAFF WORK DESCRIBED

Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 2, Feb 78 signed to press 19 Jan 78 pp 8-11

Article by Capt 1st Rank (Res) Mikhail Novikov, former editorial staff member of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Assignment to 'KRASNAYA ZVEZDA'"

Khoroshevskoye Shosse, 38

Khoroshevka is a fine word. Cheerful. But it has a nostalgic ring to it for me. I used to come here day after day for 10 years, to this five-story grey-brick building which has the representations of four orders and the letters forming the words: "EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE 'KRASNAYA ZVEZDA' NEWSPAPER" over the entrance. I would come directly from the airport after having breathed in the mists of the Far East or being roasted by the Mediterranean sun. And I would have the feeling of returning home, to my own moorage.

But now I am going to Khoroshevskoye shosse on an "assignment"—four stations on the metro and one stop on the trolley bus from the center. I am going in order to write about the editorial staff where I spent a good half of my working life (before Khoroshevka it was ulitsa Chekhov—the former editorial office address). And although I have been coming here only as a guest for five years now, it is really hard for me to refer to the staff at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA as "they" and not "we." It is also hard to write about them, while remaining impartial.

Mikhail Borisovich Novikov was born in 1924. He graduated from a higher naval academy. He has been with the press since 1947. He worked at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for almost 20 years as an editor of a section and member of the editorial board. He is a Union of Journalists of the USSR prize laureate. He is now chief of the editorial staff of artistic scientific literature at the "Znaniye" izdatel'stvo and a Captain 1st Rank in the Reserve.
The Collective

Nikolay Ivanovich raised his eyes from the desk. "Hello, hello, sit down please. Right now I'm just about to sign identification cards. One comrade has been promoted to colonel and another to lieutenant colonel."

"Who are they?"

"Oh, you don't know them. They haven't been with us that long." And then he named them. Indeed, I didn't know them.

This is a feature peculiar only to military editorial staffs: officer ranks. Editors of sections, assistant editors, almost all special correspondents, consultants, observers and literary associates wear them. And they do not simply "wear" them in accordance with a statute of the newspaper and position held, but in reality, by their entire way of life they confirm their right to belong to the officer corps.

However, military ranks are far from being a direct equivalent to the journalistic talent and productivity expressed in the lines. Therefore, it is hard for me to refrain from writing about other titles which better correspond to the substance of the work of newspapermen.

On the editorial staff now are 96 members of the Union of Journalists and 3 members of the Union of Writers, 6 honored workers of culture of RSFSR, 3 who have become laureates of the Union of Journalists of the USSR prize and 3 who have received the prize of the Moscow Journalistic Organization.

Among those who were developed in the collective, found what suited them and went into literature are such writers as Gennadiy Semenikhin, Nikolay Gorbachev, Vladimir Zhukov, Vasily Sokolov, Nikolay Boranenkov....

Well, a military promotion is a more than pleasant event for a journalist too.

Nikolay Ivanovich Makeyev carefully and with obvious satisfaction traced out his signature on the certificates.

Well, now two more officers will receive new shoulderboards in a meeting from the hands of a man who for them, just as for most of the staff at Krasnaya Zvezda, has always been the chief editor and general. Behind his back he is not only called "the chief" as on other editorial staffs, but even more often thus: "The general said....," "The general decided...." And although there are now three generals at Krasnaya Zvezda, "the general" in this case means precisely Lieutenant General Makeyev without any additional explanation needed.

Twenty-two years at the helm of the editorial ship is a whole epoch in the life of the newspaper. Krasnaya Zvezda has become what it is today just under him. And quite a few changes to it had to be undergone.
In the war years when the firing line of the fronts passed through every heart, ZVEZDOCHKA was one of the most read newspapers. With the Victory, people became interested in other concerns and goals. And the newspaper, where dry articles on proven military training methods, indoctrination in military traditions and the eternal everyday service problems predominated, truly interested only those who still had ties to army life.

And even this interest was not unshakable. The abbreviation NTR [scientific and technical revolution] had not yet received general recognition and the words "revolution in military affairs" had not yet been uttered, but the processes behind these concepts had already begun to gather their terrific speeds. The equipment entering the inventory was not simply improved in principles—the basis of it was changed: electronics, missiles, nuclear munitions, and the atomic reactor. Newton's physics yielded to Einstein's. And the cadres changed in accordance with this. While a secondary education was more than enough before, a higher and secondary one now became the minimum for a junior officer.

A qualitative change in the readers. This alone required a most earnest reorganization of the bureaucratic newspaper. But General Makeyev and the staff were faced with an even more complex task: make the newspaper general in its essence and not narrow. That, shouldering the patriotic indoctrination of tomorrow's warriors and satisfaction of their spontaneous thirst for romance of the feat, the military education of all interested in party policy on development of defense, and information for veterans: look, how your practice is growing in new ground.

The general led his newspaper on this difficult assault which required years of consistent and systematic work. How he directed the party organization in this process and skillfully relied on it and how he got each member of the collective to become an active confederate in it is a special and long story which I will not go into here. Better I try to mention some of the human traits, or rather streaks even, of Makeyev the leader.

The chief is a strong-willed and firm person. It was useless to argue with him when principles were involved. But how yielding he became when discussing questions of creativity! He knew how to conclude the most heated dispute with a conciliatory: "Well, you are probably right" or "Well, I don't know, I won't insist, let's talk about it some more."

Many of us knew Nikolay Ivanovich when he was still a colonel and an editor of a section. And everyone knew that he became a journalist long ago, even prior to his military service. Consequently, any associate could ask the chief, "Nikolay Ivanovich, please look over my article. I don't know whether I have something or not or if it is worth standing up for." No one was ever refused.

At the same time, the chief did not acknowledge work for others and trained us to be responsible for our own work from "a" to "z." I remember how time
and again he said on the telephone to high ranking people, "You resolve this with Novikov. He's responsible for the Navy here." It is not enough to say that this was complimentary for me. This committed me!

It happened that we quarreled with our chief and received reprimands from him and grumbled in the corners—work is work. But all the good that association with him gave us was immeasurably greater.

We moved to Khoroshevka into a new group of enterprises in 62. That year, the newspaper's circulation crossed over the cherished figure with six zeroes for the first time, having doubled compared to the recent past. And this despite the large reduction of the Armed Forces in the past—by 1.2 million. An indisputable fact was shown: the civilian reader had been drawn to the ZVEZDOCHKA. But the military had not drifted away from it either.

How then were the hearts of the subscribers won?

The newspaper was the first to tell the general reader about atomic weapons and their destructive properties and military application. The newspaper was the first to tell about strategic anti-aircraft missiles and about the people wielding them. The newspaper was the first to widely tell about the atomic Navy and its sailors. Not to mention that the newspaper was the first to elucidate the service of radar operators, and the first to write about supersonic jet aircraft and flights into the stratosphere, about new tanks and other "conventional" weaponry.

The propagandistic and military articles have become more replete and ponderable, the life of the party organizations has been illustrated in a more varied manner, reportage on cruises, flights and exercises has begun to appear more often, and articles on the themes of pedagogy and psychology, notes of the military publicist, and international and technical military reviews have been strengthened in the pages. The rubric-call, "Let's write a book on the heroes and feats!" was started. And such a book has been written. Not one, but a full seven books gathered from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA feature stories were published by Voyenizdat under the title of "Heroes and Feats."

The circulation soon doubled again. Then it reached 2.7 million, the current level.

In the 1965 Ukaze on the Order of Lenin award to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA—the third award in succession—the services of the newspaper were defined thus: "For great and fruitful work in rearing military personnel and Soviet youth in the heroic traditions of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces and in mobilizing the warriors to master new combat equipment and raise the combat readiness of the forces...."

Soviet youth was mentioned in the Ukaze for good reason. Sociological research has shown that pupils and military instructors of the schools, former servicemen and students, PTU [vocational and technical school] students
and master-tutors are subscribing to the newspaper in addition to the military who need to read it in the interests of the service. And besides that, miners and kolkhoz farmers, workers and teachers, reserve officers and parents of soldiers....

Nine years later, the fourth order--of the October Revolution--appeared on the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA banner (the editorial staff has its own banner): "For great service in communist rearing of warriors and in mobilizing them to successful accomplishment of the missions of strengthening the combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces...."

...At 1030 as we were finishing our conversation, Aleksey Krysov, the chief secretary, came into the office with the duty brigade. The proof sheets were laid on the desk in front of the chief and the report on tomorrow's issue was made. Content, geography, representation of the different branches of arms. Nikolay Ivanovich interrupted from time to time, thought awhile, then asked him to continue.

The work on the issue was controlled--always the same and always a new one.

Rubrics

The issue was going smoothly, not requiring any intervention by the chief secretary. And Krysov became absorbed in the work on the plans. There are several of them: the semiannual and the subject. All this must be brought together, compared and coordinated. The strategic task is to determine for an extended period what main directions will be reflected in the pages and how to coordinate the efforts of the sections on the main questions.

I sat down at the long table used for meetings and leafed through the albums with the best articles noted by the editorial board pasted in them. A generalized portrait of the newspaper written by the strokes of all forms of inputs and genres emerged. There are the pages on the theme: "Let's Discuss the New Draft USSR Constitution." There are the prompt reportages with the stereotype rubric, "Exercise 'Dvina'." There are the "old familiar," the rubrics that won a place in the sun back during my days on the editorial staff: "Experience of Those Moving Ahead," "Commander and Modern Combat," "Ideological Work: Experience, Problems, Judgments," "Military Character," "Necessary for the Ocean," "At the Compass Points of the Mediterranean," "From the Life of Young Officers...."

We always had many rubrics. Some died quietly or were abolished and others sprang up in place of them, announcing new theme directions. And they at once began going through the great trial for survival: will they suit the reader's taste, will they be acceptable to the permanent correspondents as a baton, will they not turn out to be one-day-moths? Some have not only survived, but have even become real traditions....

Aleksey Krysov gets up from behind the desk, comes toward me, and looks over my shoulder.
"This rubric, you notice, 'New Weapons and Tactics,' is going well. Especially with the section of the ground forces."

"It was going well for them even in my time."

"You're right, it's an old one. And here's a brand-new one: 'Cities, People, Feats.' We're putting out articles under this one on the cities which have been awarded orders. On the whole, famous places on the map of the war. Here is both the heroic spirit of the struggle and the patriotic education of today."

"And this one?"

"Military Dynasties in the Service of the Motherland? It's also a new one. We started it with 'The Chapayev Brothers.'"

"Do you conduct competition as before?"

"It has changed a little. Now there is not one leader for the entire army and navy, but five--each branch of the Armed Services has its own. Thus it is easier to take into consideration the specifics of all the branches of arms. And they make pledges for a longer period than before. Here, you see the banner headline, 'Year of the 60th Anniversary of the Armed Forces--Year of Shock Military Labor?' This is the motto for '78. It will be promoted by last year's initiators. They have remained the leaders. And we are continuing to run still another initiative, general for all--the movement for the leading large unit."

Aleksey returned to his desk. But I stopped to glance at the article, "There, in the Ocean," under the rubric, "With the Initiators of Competition." I was very interested in the by-line: Captains 1st Rank M. Korenevskiy and G. Savichev. Old friends with whom I spent many years working hand in hand. Special correspondents whose advancement is largely associated with the theme of the atomic navy. They came to it by different paths, just as different as their journalist biographies are different. And indeed, it is worth saying a few words about these paths.

In May of '45, when Mikhail Korenevskiy, the Komsomol organizer of a combat engineer battalion, was taking part in the capture of Berlin, cadet Gennadiy Savichev was taking exams for the first year of the higher naval academy. A year later, Korenevskiy was transferred to political work with the navy and found himself an associate at the large-circulation newspaper of the Baltic submariners. And later, the following steps up the professional ladder: a fleet newspaper, the editorial faculty of the academy, the central newspaper of the Navy. And finally, Krasnaya Zvezda, as a special correspondent. In '62, when the first opportunity arose to tell about the people from nuclear-powered vessels, there was know question about who would get the honored assignment: naturally, Korenevskiy, the naval special correspondent.
At that time, Savichev, after working through posts of an artillery officer on the battleship "Sevastopol" and on cruisers, was serving as an executive officer on a flag ship. But he did not just serve; he finished the script writer's course of the VGIK [All-Union State Institute of Cinematography] by correspondence and published stories and feature stories in the press.

Some time passed and special correspondent Korenevskiy sailed to the North Pole under the ice in a nuclear submarine. And executive officer Savichev was hired from the ship as a senior associate at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. And some more time passed. The editorial staff was allocated a space on one of the nuclear submarines preparing for a round-the-world underwater cruise. This trip called for good health. And Savichev came out on top. His feature stories on the trip, which were later compiled into a book, "Around the Earth Under Water," confirmed that nature had not only provided the new KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writer with excellent health: his work was marked by a high journalistic prize.

Twelve years have passed since then. And now the two special correspondents, whose names are well known to the newspaper's readers, are writing about how things are going on the nuclear missile submarine captained by Captain 1st Rank A. Kazakov. This ship's crew is the initiator of socialist competition in the Navy....

I leaf through the album and scan the headlines. They can also tell you something about the current make-up of the Armed Forces. "Bridge Goes Under Water." This is no allegory, nor journalistic play-up for effect. We are actually talking about the engineer's laying a crossing under the surface of a water barrier. "Amphibians Attack." This is about tanks, about combat vehicles that can go into the sea and after passing through the water move again onto the shore. "Explosion at Dawn" under the rubric of "Romance of Military Service." Well here the cliche reveals the theme: the parachutists-assault forces. Sort of nothing special, as many times as this has been written about. I scan the reportage "obliquely"...and begin to reread carefully.

These assault forces, it turns out, did not jump with conventional parachutes, but with "experimental gliding" ones having high horizontal maneuvering speed. Moreover, the author himself, Captain Yu. Soldatenko, correspondent for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, also jumped with them.

"Aleksey, what section is Soldatenko in?" I asked Krysov.

"He's in information. Why?"

"He jumped with the assault forces?"

"That's right. He's a dynamic fellow. Look for his story about a special trip. It's interesting...."
We quickly find the needed issue. On page four, "Unscheduled Flight."
A dramatic situation: four soldiers suffered burns. They had to be taken
immediately to Leningrad, to the burn clinic at the Military Medical Academy.
An AN-26 was sent for them. This was not an ordinary plane; it had an
operating and resuscitative center and a hospital ward. Yuri Soldatenko
flew along and wrote about the struggle in the air to save the life of the
seriously burned people by medical science and technology.

Five years ago I had read about the "flying laboratories"—aircraft that
search for submarines, but this was the first time I heard about the "flying
hospital." Well, such is the age of the NTR. They say its rates dictate
to industry a change in equipment and output every eight to nine years.
And after all, the Armed Forces do not exist in a vacuum....

Closing the last album, I thought about how my life at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA had
constantly been in contact with something new which had appeared for the
first time. Just being accustomed to the process of continual renewal and
the everyday editorial flow took the edge off the capability of being sur-
prised.

...The office door flew open and people flocked in for a planning session.
The time was approaching 1400.

Ascent

In the room where I worked for 10 years and where only a desk and a lamp of
the public furniture had been replaced, Ivan Panov complained about his
fate to me: "The korset' [correspondent's network] of material has piled
up, the secretariat demands: 'Let's have it, let's have it,' and there's
just the two of us, Cherkashin and me. Tkachev is up north and Serezha
Bystrov is at the academy."

I had wanted most of all to transfer the reins of the section to Panov, and
I did so with a clear conscience. And things were going fine with him.
The adversities were sort of passing things.

"You yourself remember," Ivan continued, "what a sweet life you had with
Krysov when Baronov and I were taking examinations and there were just the
two of you."

It's true; it was like that: Ivan Panov and Oleg Baronov studied by corres-
pondence at the academy imeni Lenin for two years. Three leaves for
semester examinations and one for the state examinations.

"Well," I agreed, "we groaned, but dragged along. After all, you needed
the degree. It's indispensable."

But did Serezha really need a second degree? After all, he graduated from
the L'vov Academy.
"Serezha is a fine fellow," Panov changes tone, "he's looking ahead. Of course, the department of journalism at the L'vov Military Political Academy gives a higher education. But the naval education there—you yourself know. A little higher level is needed for the ZVEZDA. One can, of course, pull oneself up to it on one's own, but it's surer with the academy.

The intercity line started ringing. Vladivostok was calling Panov....

I remembered how Nikolay Ivanovich Makeyev liked to repeat at the short meetings: "There are now over 400 basic military specialties in the armed forces of the developed countries. This alone should define the scope of your military erudition."

I don't know, there may be over 500 of these specialties now. The point is not and it makes no difference that it is not possible to come to know the particulars of the specialties of several hundreds of men. But to know within the limits of one's branch of the Armed Services how these specialties are interrelated and connected, what role they play in the use of weapons, how they are correlated with execution of tactical missions and missions of control, and what impressions they make on relations of people—this is what a military journalist has to know.

One may find himself on a nuclear submarine or in a missile battalion for the first time in his life and ably write about everything that is seen, with a "fresh eye." But if you are a professional, and if you go there a second or a third time? Then superficial impressions are not enough and one has to write about the heart of the matter and about problems. And if you don't have the initial theoretical training and the established concepts, you will waste lots of time on study and you won't be protected from naive judgments and elementary blunders....

As far as I know the editorial collective, they have always been learning here. Well, first, as prescribed for all military people—at seminars on Marxist-Leninist training and at command activities—with periodic trips to ranges, academies and training centers. And second....

 Practically all officers on the staff now have a higher education. The majority of those over 40 graduated from the editorial department of the VFA [Military Political Academy] imeni V. I. Lenin. Those younger—from the higher Military Political School. There are people with with engineering and with other degrees. The editor of the ground forces section, Gennadiy Kashuba, graduated from the pedagogical department of the academy last year in addition to the school. Aleksey Kulakov, editor of the missile and air defense forces section, added to his military education another way.

When Kulakov, permanent correspondent in a group of forces, was assigned as an editor of a section and member of the editorial board, he knew everything about aviation that a military journalist needs to know and even more. He flew as a radio gunner on a ground attack plane in the war, and later graduated from the Aviation Military Political School and the VFA, and
worked in an air defense district. But he, in his own judgment, did not know enough about missiles, much less the strategic type. And then Kulakov made a request to one of the military academies to audit a missile course and work in the study rooms and simulators.

He had to get assimilated in his new post and still find time for regular studies. But does Aleksey really complain today about that difficult time? He not only supervises the section with confidence, but even frequently writes himself. He writes both about airmen and missilemen—vividly and with profound penetration into the work and nature of people.

And really quite an unusual school was chosen by Nikolay Cherkashin for himself. I remember how he was inducted into the Army and at the recommendation of a "Komsomol member" selected to spend two years as a lieutenant at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Department of philosophy at MGU [Moscow State University] and a fine pen with experience on a central youth newspaper—that is what Nikolay had to his credit. But his liability was a complete lack of knowledge of military life. To begin with, he was assigned to the literature and art section. Here he was noted for his feature stories on people with unusual fortunes. There was much debate about these stories. That is why they also were remembered.

Cherkashin decided to remain permanently and became a special correspondent. And then one fine day he came to the chief's office and self-critically asked, "Is this normal? Here I am working as a special correspondent on the newspaper published in the capital, the military newspaper, but I haven't served one day in the troops and don't know military life from the inside."

"It's not normal," the general agreed. "How about some on-the-job training in a tank battalion?"

"I would like to be a political officer on a submarine," Cherkashin answered and laid the handsome certificate of an underwater aqua-lung swimmer on the chief's desk. His deliberate course made an impression.

"But will they take you?" Nikolay Ivanovich asked with doubt, glancing at the special correspondent's multidioptric glasses.

"Well, I put out some feelers and didn't encounter any objections...."

The sly Kolya had already made arrangements for everything.

Nikolay Cherkashin served two years as an executive officer on a submarine. He passed, naturally, all the prescribed tests: on the layout of the ship, on damage control, etc., etc. He submerged on an autonomous cruise about which he wrote very adequately. He returned to the editorial staff with a combat order and the rank of captain-lieutenant.

That is how the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA staff learns—not by order, not for the sake of a degree and a notorious "float," and not for the sake of wealth.
and advantages. However, there is an advantage. One. Speaking in inspirational language, the ascent to the heights of knowledge increases the usefulness of a person in his favorite work. And along with each person moving up, the newspaper also makes an ascent to fresh advances. That is why there is always an abundance of students studying by correspondence on the staff. One studies at an academy, another at a university, a third at a literary institute. The tasks of the studies are varied, but the goal is the same.

...Fanov finished his telephone conversation and began folding up the printed pages—the time was close to 1600 and the start of the editorial board meeting.

The first issue of the newspaper is out at 1730. And the staff "Volga" is already hurrying to the airport and hauling the round cases with the matrices for delivery to six points. The pages will be transmitted to another 24 cities in the country by facsimile. Yet another issue will be added to those 16,500 issues of Krasnaya Zvezda that have been published since its inception. These issues have been awaited, as they are awaited even now, in the companies and batteries, on the ships and airfields, in the garrisons and remote radar sites, in rural homes and urban apartments. Maybe it is said unnecessarily rhetorically, but it is precisely the consciousness of this truth that fills the labor of the editorial collective and of all those whose efforts go to publishing the party organ of the Armed Services with exalted substance....

I went out the doorway into the darkness of the early winter evening and walked toward Khoroshevka where engines were growling and brakes screeching. I glanced back. I could not help glancing back. The lights were on behind almost all the windows in the dark facade of the long five-story building. The neon letters, "Krasnaya Zvezda," crowned the roof.

I carried a familiar burden of tiredness with me, just as in those years when I left here every day. And I had the feeling as though I had grown five years younger....

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8545
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NAVAL TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Aboard a Missile-Carrying Submarine

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 78 signed to press 20 Feb 78 p 9

[Article by WO V. Babich: Lesson in the Ocean]

[Text] Warrant Officer (Michman) Kravchenko had heard it said once that an important attribute of a man is that he know his shortcomings. The michman retained that saying in his memory and often cited it to people who strove to justify their mistakes. There was a time when the michman himself had the habit of expressing his own personal views concerning every poor evaluation. That is until a certain incident occurred at sea.

At first, the incident didn't seem to merit Kravchenko's serious attention. His subordinates had failed to fulfill a part of the training schedule. But it was only a training assignment. And who was really at fault, the michman wondered. "It was just a matter of unfortunate circumstances."

The unfortunate circumstances began with a hitch in plans before the training assignment began. The missile-carrying submarine had assumed an attack course in the direction of the estimated point of a salvo. With only a few cable lengths remaining, one of the indicators of the readiness of the equipment would not light up.

The control center queried about the trouble. But Michman Kravchenko could not come up with an immediate answer. He himself was crawling around the equipment to check out the system. He spotted the trouble: the regulator for a filler pump was evidently out of normal alignment. How could that have happened? The michman had, in fact, inspected the equipment before the training session began. But there was no time available to investigate. After switching the machinery on full power, Kravchenko returned to the console, calculating in his mind how much
time had been lost. The possibility of fulfilling the sched-
ule was still a real one; that is, assuming that everything
would go flawlessly from then on. Only now it was Senior
Seaman Smirnov's turn to fail. He was late in carrying out a
procedure. Since the delay seemed minimal, in principal, it
shouldn't have affected the outcome of the work. But the fact
of the matter is that on this occasion the missilemen failed
to meet the schedule.

When the detachment leader subsequently investigated the causes
of the problem, the explanation was given that the slide valve
of the pump had been stripped. Senior Seaman Smirnov had
failed to notice this. He had bumped into the slide valve while
he was rushing to his battle station after the alarm had sound-
ed. In the heat of the moment, he had failed to see what had
been bruised. Smirnov then performed absent-mindedly during
the training session and, consequently, was late in carrying out a
procedure. He himself talked frankly about this during
the critique of the training. However, what the michman be-
lieved at first to be an iron-clad justification, in no way
dampened the severity of the captain's appraisal.

From the tenor of the captain's words during the critique, it
became clear that the guilty person was none other than Mich-
man Kravchenko. "You feel that the breakdown is in the per-
formance of your subordinates," the captain said. "But the
breakdown is on your conscience, because you did not help the
seamen soon enough."

The detachment leader was offended at first and felt that the
rebuke from the captain was unfair. After all, wasn't Krav-
chenko an expert, and hadn't he personally performed his own
work beyond reproach? Nevertheless, after thinking over what
had happened, it became clearer to the michman that he would
have been a hypocrite if he had continued to claim that the failure
was merely the result of coincidence. The captain's evalua-
tion had been an objective one. Even before he had adminis-
tered it, he had advised the michman about shortcomings, the
tolerations of arbitrariness, and a slackening of efforts.
Kravchenko hadn't paid proper attention to this advice, so the
result took the form of a bitter lesson at sea. Now when he
recalls that memorable training session, the michman is obliged
to admit that never, neither before nor particularly after that
incident, had he or would he permit himself to check out the
equipment in such a superficial manner. Granted, there hadn't
been any reason to be uncertain or alarmed: the parameters of
all systems had seemed normal. The equipment hadn't broken
down; but this could have happened, and steps should have been
taken against this eventuality. It boils down to the fact that in his role as a specialist he had not displayed a proper level of exactingness, principle, or responsibility.

The michman increased the amount of demands on his subordinates. They began to perform more efficiently and rapidly. The norms were surpassed confidently and steadily. But Kravchenko still felt that all of their resources were far from being applied. The seamen didn't display any spark or a spirit of competition in their work.

The deputy commander for political affairs suggested that the michman attempt to organize a competition based on tasks and norms. He also suggested an optimum way of organizing such a competition. The michman followed his advice. Now on the evening before training, Kravchenko discussed with each of the subordinates what results needed to be achieved in order to complete the assigned duties. The training now was carried out more purposefully, in a livelier fashion, and with greater interest. It became easier to compare the achievements of the seamen by taking into account not only the performance indicators, but also the attitude of the men toward their military duties, which aided in the drawing up of more objective conclusions on the successes of the submarine men in the Socialist competition.

The efforts of the detachment leader and the zeal of the seamen paid off. The crew caught up and the skills of all of the men improved. Even Senior Seaman Smirnov made the michman happy by mastering the norm of advanced specialization, while not experiencing a single disruption at work. For this performance he was recently honored.

"Fire!"

The "goods," in the jargon of the missilemen, were fired in a normal way. When the results were tallied, Michman Nikolay Kravchenko accepted the congratulations of his comrades with satisfaction.

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Surface Vessel Missile-Crew Training

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 78 signed to press 20 Feb 78 p 11

[Article by WO A. Tambovtsev: The Development of an Operator]

[Text] Missilemen A. Trofimov and N. Amonenko, subordinates of Warrant Officer (Michman) V. Abramkin, had studied the assignment: "The Search, Detection, and Identification of Aerial Targets Under Clear Conditions and Under Interference."
After they completed their lessons, they answered all of the test questions of their supervisor accurately and in a workmanlike manner, leaving no doubt that the study goals had been achieved. However, the mastering of practical operational procedures did not come easy to the seamen. They were obliged to repeat the procedures over and over again.

During search and tracking operations, operations detachment leader Michman Abramkin demands efficient coordination from his subordinates. After informing them how to do it in theory, he ordered Seaman Trofimov to man the scope at an operating position. The michman then set up the parameters of a simulated target on the trainer, and switched on the motor. Trofimov carefully monitored the situation on the scope of the plan-position indicator. At first no signal was visible on this scope or on the one at which Seaman Amonenko was seated. But after a moment or two, Trofimov noticed the illuminating beam of a radial scan of an oblong blip. The operators grabbed for the tuning dials. They determinedly tuned the signal into the gate. But the target was not locked-on for tracking.

"Stop the search!" "Seaman Amonenko, turn off the set!" Abramkin ordered. "And now let's examine our mistakes." The operations supervisor meticulously analyzed the omissions of his subordinates. After intercepting the signal, Trofimov, for some unexplained reason, failed to make his report in the proper format: "Contact, bearing, range." But adherence to the report format is very important. When he is manning the main control position, the captain of the submarine obviously needs to receive information on the air situation immediately. Otherwise, the submarine would be unable to occupy an advantageous position in time, and the crew could not ready the weapons and equipment to launch an attack on the "enemy."

The michman turned to Trofimov: "Please tell me why the target was not tracked?"

"The automatic control of the indicator was in error," the sailor said half-convincingly.

"Oh no comrade Trofimov, it was not the automatic control. It was you who was working in an uncoordinated way and allowing jerks to occur while you rotated the tuner. And that is why the signal was racing to the left and right of the sight. But when you are trying to make a precise matchup of the signals with the sight or with the gate, you should always rotate the elevation drive, the bearing, and the range smoothly. And do not use the handle, but the shaft of the tuner. I'll show you."
The michman turned on the set, set up target data on the trainer, and began a search. A faint pulse flickered in the right sector of the scope. Using the handle of the tuner, Abramkin hurried to transfer the sight to the right in the direction of the signal. He ordered Trofimov, who was operating next to him, to do the same thing. When the signal was only millimeters away, Trofimov's hands (on command) deserted to the shaft of the tuning controls. The target was in the gate.

"Rotate slowly. Like so," the precise voice of the michman could be heard.

Abramkin and Trofimov pressed buttons simultaneously. The target was being tracked.

This operating procedure was repeated many times, but the michman noted still other flaws. Diverting from the situation on the circular scan scope, Trofimov was looking at the handle of the tuner when he was supposed to be operating. Amonenko, for his part, was staring at the readings on the indicator scale. This divided their attention and blunted their reactions. After leading his subordinates to the point of doing things automatically, the operations supervisor shifted to the next segment of the training assignment.

In the opinion of Senior Lieutenant A. Podubnyy, the head of the gunnery department, Michman Abramkin is an experienced methodologist and instructor. Without cutting any corners, Abramkin prepares his subordinates for difficult tests, while following the well-known principles: "From the particular to the general," "Do as I do," and so forth. When he is training operators, he demonstrates excellent leadership qualities and a fine understanding of the missileman rating. Abramkin is a leader in the Socialist competition. He greeted the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution and the new Constitution of the USSR by being an exceptional missileman. He has also mastered the rating of hydrophone operator. But the object of his primary concern is the training of his subordinates so that they are prepared for the demands of modern warfare.

The training of the operators continued. The michman complicated the air situation by increasing the number of targets and accelerating their speed to that of existing types of aircraft. The operators were forced to work under great pressure in order to search, detect, and classify, and track the air targets during a single rotation of the antenna. Nevertheless, they are still error prone.
Trofimov was unable initially to remember the position of the targets, and often reported the bearing and range for the wrong target. It is well known that when there is only one signal on the plan-position indicator screen it is easy for an operator to classify the parameters. But when there are two or three? Trofimov then became confused and began to transmit data on a target which had been fixed initially by sight. To avoid confusion, the michman set up the following procedure: report on target data beginning from top to bottom and to the right of the screen, based on the direction of the rotation of the beam scan. Naturally, as is required in such situations, the operator initially transmitted data on antiaircraft targets situated nearer to the center of the scope, which precluded a low-flying "enemy" from passing through.

The seamen operated more and more confidently as each day passed. However, a few small problems still prevented them from being trained to operate under interference and on low-flying targets.

"You are doing well," the michman said to his subordinates. "But why do you look at the tuning controls and the mode and range scale buttons during the search? This interferes with the effective monitoring of the screen. Seaman Amonenko, in which direction should the tuning control be rotated for a reduction in range?"

"To the left."

"Correct. But why during searches do you look at the control and the card with the scales?"

After reflecting a bit on the observations of the detachment leader, the seamen began to operate correctly, without looking away from the cathode ray scope.

Thus, Abramkin painstakingly and persistently instructed his subordinates, preparing them for the most difficult procedure: the detection and classification of targets under conditions of interference. He explained in detail the characteristics of radar deception. Next he assigned a search covering a maximum range, and set up a high speed target on the trainer. Trofimov and Amonenko began the search, quickly intercepted a target, and put it on tracking. No sooner had they done this than the section leader unexpectedly complicated the situation. The seamen took a bearing on a new signal and immediately decided to track it.

"As you were! I have to praise you both for the quickness of your reactions. But your actions are uncertain." The seamen
listened to the quiet voice of the young supervisor. "Why did you select the second signal for tracking?"

"What do you mean why?" Trofimov was surprised. "Wasn't it separated from the first one? And it was closer to the center of the scope. This indicated that this particular 'missile' posed the greatest threat to the ship."

"Correct thinking," the michman commented. "But in reality, the second signal was not separated from the first, but was alongside of it. If you hadn't been hurrying so, Seaman Trofimov, you would have noticed that the second signal, on the second or third cycle of the beam scan, didn't move toward the center of the scope but to the side. Besides, the signal's outline, luminance, and shape changed radically. Such combinations are observed during firing exercises; moreover, they are not excluded from battles."

Abramkin concluded that the misses by the operators occurred because they had been trained inadequately.

Almost without a letup, the michman taught the sailors the art of searching for targets, including low-flying ones. The lessons went on for days and weeks. The intensive work produced the desired results. The operators began to operate the sets expertly and achieved a level of full interchangeability at their battle stations.

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7198
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DEVELOPMENT OF SUPREME LEADERSHIP ENTITIES FOR CONDUCT OF WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 78 signed to press 31 Mar 78 pp 16-26

[Article by Maj Gen G. Mikhaylovskiy and Col I. Vyrodov, docent, candidate of historical sciences: "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period: Supreme Organs for Conduct of War"]

[Text] War is a many-sided process carried on by two or more participants. It is the most acute and specific form in which class struggle is manifested and it is the product of social antagonism. Warring sides seek to achieve their goals and use forces and capabilities to achieve victory under their plan. Therefore each participant (a coalition, a state, a class or a nation) conducts its own war, and in this regard we can speak of the direction of war.

Armed forces are used as the chief and decisive means for achieving political goals in war, along with the economic, diplomatic, ideological and other forms of struggle used in the course of war. Historical experience shows that all states had in common a striving to attain a uniformity of direction of all forms of struggle in a war. This striving assumed various appearances in different socio-economic formations and was determined by many factors of a political, economic and military nature. The basic trend, however, always was a unification of the political and military leadership, which included political and strategic entities as the most important elements, with the former playing the dominant role. Their structure, purpose and nature of activity was subject to constant change depending on the class structure of society, the level of development of productive forces, the domestic and international situation, the state of military affairs and, finally, the nature and goals of war.

Such entities appeared for the first time in states of the slaveowning society—Ancient Greece (6th-4th centuries B.C.) and Ancient Rome (3rd century B.C. to 2nd century A.D.). Strategic leadership entities (the gerousia in Sparta, a college of strategists in Athens and so on) were created along with political entities (a citizen assembly in Sparta, the "council of 500" in Athens and so on). The councils of Roman military leaders were the first collegial control entities created only for wartime.
The monarchical institutions in whose hands all military and political power was concentrated in the state continued to strengthen in the era of feudalism. The church had a great influence on state policy. The district councils, dumas, synods and other deliberative entities functioning under the monarchs were the supreme organs of political leadership of the war. Strategic leadership was exercised by councils under the monarchs or by designated commanders in chief. The primary issues of war were decided by the Eastern Slavs in the 6th-8th centuries by people's assemblies and strategic leadership entities--leaders' councils, councils of independent princes and so on.2

The departmental system arose in the state of Muscovy in the 14th-15th centuries. The departments decided fundamental issues of preparing and waging war. This system received particularly great development under Ivan IV. In the era of Peter I's rule, the Governing Senate (1711) played the part of supreme political entity and the Military College (1718) played the part of supreme strategic entity.3

Military ministries and their general staffs became the supreme strategic leadership entities until the end of the 19th century (during the period of premonopoly capitalism). Some deliberative entities also existed: state councils and military councils; however, they did not play a decisive role in direction of a war.

The service of general staffs originated in the 16th-17th centuries and the position of general-quartermaster was instituted approximately in the 18th century in armies of the largest states of Western Europe. A general staff was formed in 1785 in Prussia, in the 1870's in Austro-Hungary, and in 1792 in France (Main Staff).

Peter I introduced the position of general-quartermaster for the first time in Russia in 1701. In 1711 the quartermaster staff was established, which in 1763 was transformed into the General Staff.4

The role of general staffs rose considerably in the middle of the 19th century in connection with the development of means of conducting war and the growth of mass armies. The Prussian General Staff played an especially large part in the country's political life. In the latter half of the 19th century it became the primary organizer for predatory wars and the chief conductor of a policy of expansion and aggression by the German bourgeoisie. The Austro-Hungarian General Staff had considerable influence on all aspects of the life of the state. The general staffs of France and Great Britain performed narrower missions limited to troop training and the planning of military operations.

In the era of imperialism many wars were waged by coalitions of states. The supreme political entities here were conferences and consultations of heads of states which were part of the coalition. Military operations in the theaters usually were directed by commanders in chief of coalition forces with an apparatus which included representatives of bloc participants.
as advisers. The structure of these entities still was imperfect in all states, however, and did not always take account of the altered nature of wars, which became a test of the economic, moral-political and military capabilities of states. The mobilization of all forces and resources of the participating countries was required to conduct them. The complexity of problems being accomplished in such wars led to a significant increase in the scope of political, economic and military tasks.

By virtue of the capitalistic contradictions among bourgeois states, the military coalitions of these states usually were unstable. Noting the substance of these alliances, V. I. Lenin wrote: "Is it 'conceivable' to assume . . . that such alliances were nontransient? Or that they precluded friction, conflicts and struggle in each and every possible form?" He emphasized that it was impossible to "give any answer except a negative one" to this question.

The increased scope of military operations made it necessary to create intermediate troop leadership echelons. This was done in Russia on the eve of World War I, when front headquarters were formed along with the supreme commander and his staff. The General Headquarters—the supreme entity for direction of combat activities of the armed forces—was created in Russia at the beginning of World War I. A war ministry carried out military organizational development and the training and supply of troops. The general staff—the primary working entity of the supreme high command—planned the preparation and conduct of the war. Immediate control of troops of the army in the field was exercised through the supreme commander, the front and army commanders in chief and unit (soyedinenyiye) commanders.

The supreme military and political power in Germany during World War I belonged to the Kaiser. He directed the armed forces through a war ministry and a Great General Staff directly subordinate to the Kaiser. Strategic leadership was exercised according to the scheme of supreme high command-army (without a front echelon). Strategic leadership of the armed forces in France was exercised by the President through a war ministry and a main staff. The headquarters of groups of field armies which were created were seen as an intermediate echelon. A National Defense Council was formalized by law, but actually it played no role in resolving military matters.

Thus during the years of World War I the warring states had supreme political and strategic leadership entities for conduct of war, the activities of which were directed by the head of state. Prior to and at the beginning of the war, some countries set up supreme strategic entities for direction of naval warfare. The naval ministry became such an entity in Russia, and it included the Admiralty, the Main Naval Staff and a number of headquarters. An Admiralty functioned in Great Britain headed by the secretary of the navy (Lord of the Admiralty). Direction of the naval forces in France was exercised by a naval ministry through the naval general staff. In Germany such direction belonged undividedly to the Kaiser and was exercised through the naval ministry, the Kaiser's naval cabinet and a naval staff (naval general staff).
World War I put forth very acutely the problem of controlling the economy in the interests of attaining war goals. Supreme entities began to appear in the warring countries for resolution of this problem. In Russia this was expressed in creation of conferences on transport, fuel and food; in France and Great Britain by creation of a ministry of war supply; and in Germany by creation of a military-industrial committee.  

With regard to permanent supreme entities for direction of military operations of coalition armies, not one of the warring sides succeeded in creating them, since contradictions arose among participants of the coalitions who were striving to accomplish their missions at their partners' expense. For example, France and Great Britain wanted to place the main burden of waging war on Russia, while Germany wished to place it on Austro-Hungary. The United States adopted a waiting position. Coordination of the efforts of coalition participants was accomplished at episodic conferences, consultations and meetings of heads of states, as well as through diplomatic channels. It was only at the Rappalo Conference (November 1917) that the Entente (without Russia) set up a Supreme War Council to coordinate military operations in the West European Theater of Military Operations. This council included the heads of governments and representatives of general staffs of Great Britain, France, the United States and Italy. A supreme commander of armed forces of the Entente in Europe was designated in March 1918. These solutions were somewhat late and played a certain part only in the concluding phase of World War I.  

The most characteristic trend in military-political leadership was noted in the interwar period—a further centralization of power in the hands of chiefs of state and a weakening of the influence of legislative organs on resolution of military matters.  

This was manifested most fully in Germany, where after fascism seized power Hitler was granted extraordinary powers, including in the military-political field. At the beginning of 1939 an imperial defense council headed by the Reichskanzler (Hitler) was set up for the purpose of greatest centralization of political and military leadership. Direction of war preparations and, with the beginning of World War II, direction of military operations was exercised through it. The council included prominent figures of the fascist party, ministers and heads of all primary civilian departments and commanders in chief of branches of the armed forces. Imperial ministries (foreign affairs, propaganda, armament and economics), the imperial association of German industry and so on had greatest importance in preparation for war. A council of ministers for defense headed by Goering existed along with the imperial defense council. It included general commissioners for administrative control and for economics, a chief of staff of the supreme high command, chief of the chancery and so on. The council was given responsibility for coordinating matters of administrative control and the country's economy with matters of strategic military planning. A general council of the German economy had been set up by 1933. It was the supreme economic entity in the first years of fascist dictatorship. The supreme
high command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) with a staff was the supreme strategic leadership entity. The OKW staff was the working entity of the supreme high command and performed functions of general war planning and strategic leadership of the armed forces.

During World War II, especially after the attack by fascist Germany against the USSR, the structure, functions and relationships among Germany's supreme leadership entities for conduct of war underwent changes. The staff of the supreme high command was given only functions of an organizational and administrative nature: organization and build-up of troops, logistical support to the armed forces, creation of operational-strategic reserves, and maintaining contacts with supreme military entities of Germany's allies.

All matters of strategic planning and direction of military operations were concentrated in the staff for operational control of the armed forces, which formally was part of the staff of the supreme high command but was in fact directly subordinate to Hitler. High commands with staffs (OKH [Army High Command], OKL [Air Force High Command], OKM [High Command of the Navy]) were at the head of branches of the armed forces (ground forces, air force and navy). This system of supreme leadership entities for conduct of war functioned throughout the war with minor changes. The presence of numerous independent higher military control entities often led to a lack of coordination in their work and rivalry among them. In addition, the very system for direction of the armed forces of fascist Germany was based on the reactionary and adventuristic policy of the Hitlerite leadership. It gave full play to voluntaristic decisions and arbitrariness in military matters. Germany's defeat in the war graphically showed the fallaciousness of the system of supreme leadership entities which had been set up and their inability to direct the war as a whole (sketch 1).

As Japan unleashed war in the Far East in the thirties, the Emperor was the supreme commander of its armed forces. An imperial headquarters was established in 1937 and the general staffs of the army and navy became its working entities. The chiefs of these staffs were directly subordinate to the Emperor. There was a council for governmental liaison with the headquarters which functioned to coordinate matters of strategic leadership with organs of state authority, but it possessed no juridical rights. No special changes took place in the overall system of Japan's military leadership during World War II. In 1944 the council was redesignated the supreme council for conduct of the war without an expansion in its powers. The overall system of Japan's military-strategic leadership on the whole had a monarchical-bourgeois character and reflected the interests of militaristic circles both in domestic and foreign politics.

Questions of overall leadership in the bloc of fascist states were not resolved. Hitler attempted to subordinate the activities of his European allies fully to his own ends and did not permit creation of supreme coalition entities of military-political leadership. Troops of Germany's satellites were completely subordinate to the fascist German command in the TVD [theater of military operations]. With regard to Japan, the most
Sketch 1. Strategic leadership of Germany's armed forces during World War II

Important problems of interstate cooperation with fascist Germany were resolved chiefly through diplomatic channels, while military matters were resolved through military attaches—assistants to the ambassadors on military matters. In April 1942 a conference of the representatives of Germany, Italy and Japan was held in Munich, at which the decision was made to set up a composite staff group under the high command of the Wehrmacht to coordinate common actions.12

The supreme leadership entities for conduct of war in capitalist states fighting against fascist Germany had their own features. Military-political power in Great Britain nominally belonged to the King, but all basic issues of conduct of the war were resolved by a war cabinet chaired by the prime minister, who was in fact the supreme commander of armed forces during the war. Various committees (military, war production, civil defense and so on) were the strategic leadership working entities. Most important of the military committees were the following: chiefs of staff, defense, chiefs of rear services, logistical support planning, intelligence and so on. A special place was occupied by the chiefs of staff committee, which was the primary entity for strategic leadership of the armed forces. It included the chief of the imperial general staff (chairman), chief of staff for joint operations, chief of staff of the ministry of defense, chief of the naval staff and chief of the air staff.
Supreme military-political power in the United States belonged to the President, who during the war headed the supreme high command. Just as in Great Britain, the chiefs of staff committee was the strategic leadership working entity. It included the chief of staff under the president (chairman), Army chief of staff, Navy chief of staff and CIC of the Air Force. There was a board for emergency measures under the president, which took up matters of regulating the war economy and distributing military orders. War and naval departments also functioned. Many military-political matters were resolved by the state department headed by the secretary of state. Questions of coalition strategy by the United States and Great Britain were coordinated at conferences of the chiefs of state. The Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, subordinate to the U.S. President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, was a permanent working entity for strategic leadership of the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain in World War II. Its primary task was to elaborate strategic plans and direct armed struggle in all TVD's where American and British troops were located. Direction of operations in the Pacific was made the responsibility of the American chiefs of staff committee, while in Southeast Asia and the Near East it was the responsibility of the British chiefs of staff committee. Each TVD had allied high command entities, while in Europe there was a supreme high command. Sluggishness was noticed in the work of coalition entities. Their actions were not always sufficiently coordinated. Frictions often arose, chiefly due to domestic and foreign policy contradictions.

Overall matters for conduct of the war by states of the anti-Hitler coalition were decided at conferences of the heads of state of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, with the participation of military representatives, as well as by correspondence between chiefs of state and governments, by personal meetings of state and military figures, and through diplomatic channels. No permanent working entity was created within the framework of the anti-Hitler coalition. The course of the Great Patriotic War had a deciding effect on coordination of plans of its participants. The political and strategic leadership of the USSR, which bore the main burden of war, also was of great importance.

After the end of World War II substantial changes occurred in the organizational structure of supreme entities of military leadership of the capitalist countries, but the general principles of this system were retained.

In the United States, Congress discusses many military-political matters. The President exercises overall leadership of the armed forces through the Defense Department headed by a civilian secretary appointed for four years, and through the National Security Council. As in the war years, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, under which there is a joint staff, is the primary working entity for supreme strategic leadership. Direction of warfare in the TVD's is exercised by CIC's with their own staffs. Thus, during the war in Vietnam there were the positions of the CIC of U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific and CIC of troops in South Vietnam.
In Great Britain matters of military policy are decided by the heads of the ruling party. The Defence Committee, headed by the Prime Minister, includes ministers of defence, foreign affairs, economics and so on. Immediate leadership of the armed forces is exercised by the defence ministry, which was repeatedly reorganized in 1964 and in the period 1967-1969. The primary working entities of the defence ministry at the present time are the defence council, chiefs of staff committee, defence staff and departments of branches of the armed forces. The defence chief of staff is chairman of the chiefs of staff committee. Staffs of branches of the armed forces (the general staff in the army) are subordinate to the defence staff for operational matters. There are committees of defence councils of the Army, Navy and Air Force which exercise leadership of the corresponding branches of the armed forces.14

In the FRG the supreme strategic leadership entity in peacetime is the Ministry of Defense, under which there is a supreme military council (consultative entity) and a main staff of the armed forces (primary working entity). The Inspector General of the Bundeswehr plays a large part in directing preparations of the armed forces in peacetime.

The military-industrial complex—an aggressive alliance of the largest military monopolies of the militaristic leaders and their henchmen in the state apparatus—exercises a deciding influence on the military economy and the armed forces in imperialistic states.

International imperialism has created a number of military-political alliances ( blocs) in the postwar period, aimed against the socialist community and the national liberation movement. The most important of them is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The supreme political entity of this alliance is a council. Taking part in its work are the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, finances and economics, and, at the most important sessions, the heads of governments of states belonging to NATO. A permanent council functions between sessions, which are held twice a year. Its working entity is an international secretariat operating under the direction of a general secretary. A military planning committee exercises functions of a supreme military-strategic entity of NATO. It examines matters of organizational development and employment of the joint armed forces, determines the portion of military participation by each alliance member and approves its strategic concepts. The Military Committee is the supreme military executive entity of NATO. It is directly involved in elaborating the alliance's strategic plans and it determines the primary directions for organizational development of the joint armed forces. The primary working entities of the Military Committee are a permanent military committee and an international joint staff. There is also a nuclear defense committee under NATO which functions as a consultative organ. The working entity of this committee is a nuclear planning group which considers questions of planning the use of nuclear weapons by joint armed forces of the alliance. Within the system of supreme strategic leadership organs of NATO there are also regional commands in Europe, the Atlantic, the English Channel and a U.S. regional strategic group in Canada. The European regional
command has three TVD's subordinate to it: Northern Europe, Central Europe and Southern Europe. It is presumed that if a coalition war breaks out in Europe, direction of armed warfare will be exercised by the NATO supreme command. The position of supreme commander of the NATO joint armed forces in Europe was established in 1950, and it is held only by American generals. 15

Direction of military operations of coalition forces in local wars of the postwar period has been carried out in different ways. For example, in Korea (1950–1953) all military formations of Great Britain, Australia, Belgium and other states were operationally subordinate to the American command. During the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956, operational plans were developed jointly, but direction of military operations was exercised by the national commands.

The question of supreme military leadership entities of the socialist state was thoroughly elaborated by Lenin on the basis of his teaching on the defense of the socialist homeland. Lenin stated that achievement of victory in war requires the mobilization of all the country's forces and centralization of leadership to make use of all material, spiritual and military capabilities of the socialist state. 16

During the Civil War the supreme state and military entity was the Workers' and Peasants' Defense Council set up in November 1918 under the chairmanship of Lenin. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR) was the supreme strategic leadership entity. Its chairman was simultaneously People's Commissar for Army and Navy Affairs. Leadership of the army in the field was exercised by the RVSR through the Supreme Commander and his working entity—the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] Field Staff. The RVSR resolved all general and rear services matters regarding the country's defense, activation of new formations, bringing troops up to strength, troop stationing and combat training of troops through the All-Russian Main Staff.

The work of the supreme military-strategic entities was carried on under the direction of the party CC. The CPSU's leadership in all stages of development of the Soviet state was the primary basis for Soviet military organizational development. At the end of the Civil War the Workers' and Peasants' Defense Council was converted into the Labor and Defense Council.

The following changes took place in the overall structure of Soviet military control in the thirties. In 1934 the USSR RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] was abolished and the People's Commissariat for Army and Navy Affairs was redesignated the People's Commissariat for Defense (NKO). A single entity—the USSR Defense Committee—was formed in 1937 to unify leadership of defense of the Soviet state. The People's Commissariat of the Navy was created in December 1937 by decision of the party and the government. This structure of military control existed briefly, however, and at the very beginning of the war it underwent substantial change.
During the Great Patriotic War, a decision of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] CC Politburo of 30 June 1941 set up an extraordinary entity, the State Defense Committee (GKO), under the chairmanship of the Party CC General Secretary, I. V. Stalin (see sketch). All state and military power was concentrated in the GKO, and it brought together the political and economic leadership in the country. All fundamental issues decided in the GKO were reviewed by the CC Politburo. L. I. Brezhnev remarked that "the Central Committee was the staff from which supreme political and strategic leadership of military operations was exercised."\(^{18}\)

The General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was the supreme strategic leadership entity. Its primary working entity was the General Staff. Centralization of military control also was achieved by the fact that the Chairman of the GKO was simultaneously the Supreme Commander and the People's Commissar of Defense and headed the General Headquarters of the VGK [Supreme High Command].\(^{19}\) High commands of sectors were created at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and the High Command in the Far East was set up in 1945. The front was the supreme operational formation (ob'yedineniye) throughout the war.
The system of supreme leadership entities in the Great Patriotic War years was distinguished by flexibility, stability and efficiency. It ensured the mobilization and rational use of all the country's forces and resources throughout the struggle with the aggressor. The unity of political and military leadership worked out by Lenin and developed by the CPSU under new historical conditions was one of the important factors for victory in the Great Patriotic War.

After the war there was a reorganization of supreme military leadership entities in conformity with the peacetime conditions. In accordance with the USSR Constitution adopted on 7 October 1977, questions of war and peace, defense of sovereignty, protection of state borders and territory of the USSR, organization of defense, and leadership of the USSR Armed Forces are handled by the USSR Supreme Soviet (Article 73, paragraph 8). The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet forms the USSR Defense Council and approves its composition (Article 121, paragraph 14). The USSR Council of Ministers exercises overall control of organizational development of the USSR Armed Forces and determines the annual contingent of citizens subject to call-up for active military service (Article 131, paragraph 5).

The USSR Ministry of Defense exercises immediate leadership of the Armed Forces (except for border guard and internal troops). It includes the Armed Forces General Staff, a number of main and central directorates, directorates of commanders in chief of branches of the armed forces, civil defense establishments and so on. The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, operating with the rights of a department of the CPSU CC, exercises leadership of party-political work in the Armed Forces. The border guard and internal troops are controlled by the Committee of State Security of the USSR Council of Ministers and by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs respectively. Military councils are set up in branches of the Armed Forces, military districts, groups of forces, armies, fleets, flotillas and air defense districts. They are given the right of examining and deciding all important issues involving the life and work of the corresponding branch of the Armed Forces, military district, fleet and so on.

A system of supreme military control entities formed in the fraternal socialist countries at the end of the forties and the beginning of the fifties. Overall leadership of defense in those countries is exercised by supreme entities of state power. The supreme strategic leadership entities are ministries of defense (ministries of national defense) with their working entities, the general (main) staffs.

A defensive alliance of European socialist countries—the Warsaw Pact Organization—was created in May 1955 in the interests of defense of the achievements of socialism, strengthening the defenses of the socialist community and maintaining universal peace. The Political Consultative Committee (PKK) is its supreme political entity. Joint Armed Forces have
been set up headed by a commander in chief. The Committee of Ministers of Defense of Warsaw Pact Countries and the Joint Command with a working entity—the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces—are the primary executive entities of the PKK.

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Supreme leadership entities for conduct of war originated in the overall system of state control entities, and they developed and improved in unity with them.

An attempt to unify political and military leadership, with a dominant role played by the former, was the basic trend in development of supreme leadership organs for conduct of war. The role of political leadership entities for conduct of war continually grows under present-day conditions. Organizational development of supreme leadership entities for conduct of war takes place on a classic basis and their activities bear a party character. Centralization, which is achieved in various ways, is one of the important directions in development of supreme leadership entities for conduct of war. One of the ways is by creating extraordinary entities for wartime during peacetime.

Military committees (supreme military councils) and general headquarters of the VGK occupied a central place in the system of strategic leadership of armed struggle. Their primary working entities were the general staffs (chiefs of staff committees), the role of which constantly increases in accomplishment of strategic planning, in the organization of military operations and in controlling the operations. Along with national entities, coalition entities for conduct of the war are receiving considerable development.

Typical of the activities of supreme entities for conduct of war under present-day conditions is an increase in personal responsibility of political and military leaders of states. At the same time the increase in the role of popular masses in wars exercises a direct effect on their work. Broad layers of the populace in capitalist countries hinder the ruling circles, and consequently the military-political leadership entities, in conducting antipopular military policy. The popular masses in socialist countries support the policy of Marxist-Leninist parties and governments in every way, including in the field of military organizational development and strengthening of the defenses of their own states and countries of the entire socialist community. The monolithic unity of toiling masses and armed forces of the socialist community facilitates the purposeful work of supreme military-political entities in preparing to repulse the attack of any aggressor.
FOOTNOTES


5. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Completed Collected Works], XXVII, 417.

6. Ibid.


15. Lenin, XLI, 117-121; XLV, 383.

18. PRAVDA, 9 May 1975.


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MARSHAL BUDENNYY'S RELIEF FROM COMMAND ASSIGNMENT DESCRIBED

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[Article by Col Gen (Ret) A. Pokrovskiy: "Memoirs: On the Southwest Sector (July-September 1941)"

[Text] In connection with the expansion of the general front of struggle with the fascist German troops, rapid changes in the situation, disruptions in communications with the fronts and disruption of coordination among them at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the need arose to bring the operational-strategic leadership nearer to the troops by organizing intermediate control entities of the General Headquarters [GHQ] of the Supreme High Command.

The State Defense Committee decreed for this purpose on 10 July 1941 to set up three main command elements: a northwestern, a western and a southwestern.

Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budennyy was designated commander in chief [CIC] of the Southwest Sector (napravleniye).

The sector included the following: Southwest Front (CIC Col Gen M. P. Kirponos), Southern Front (CIC Arm Gen I. V. Tyulenev) and Black Sea Fleet (CIC Vice Adm F. S. Oktyabr'skiy).

Marshal Budennyy's operational-strategic activities began from the first days of the war. He was given responsibility for direction of the group of forces of the GHQ Reserve. After the group was inactivated he became deputy CIC of the Western Front and later commanded 21st Army for several days. Marshal Budennyy received the State Defense Committee decree about his new assignment at the army command post in Gomel'. He drove off without delay to the headquarters of Southwest Front, which was located northeast of Kiev in Brovary.
Budenny began studying the situation immediately on his arrival at Brovary. He listened to the reports of the Front CIC and his chief of staff, Lt Gen M. A. Purkayev, with great agitation. One sensed that the Marshal was taking the failures of the forces of this formation (ob'edineniy) to heart.

The situation was complicated. The engagement on the border and subsequent combat actions ended unfavorably for the Southwest Front. The enemy succeeded in seizing a significant portion of the territory of the Right-Bank Ukraine. His advance units ( chast') had arrived at the Irpen River, i.e., to the immediate approaches to Kiev.

While the 5th Army was in a relatively stable position on the right wing of the front, the situation was serious in the zones of action of the 6th and 12th armies. The enemy's move to Berdichev and his constant attacks against Fastov and Kazatin created the danger that these armies would be encircled from the northeast (see sketch).

Based on the situation at hand, Budenny demanded that the CIC and military council of the front reinforce Kiev's defenses with all available forces and means and activate the defensive operations by armies, especially the 5th and 26th armies, to close the gap between them. He demanded that all forces step up combat actions at night.

As the Marshal's adjutant, I attended all his meetings with the front leaders and took down the instructions he gave them along with everything needed for subsequent formalization of the report to the GHQ or the General Staff.

We arrived in Poltava on the early morning of 13 July. According to instructions of the General Staff, the headquarters of the commander in chief was to be located here, and generals, officers, signal subunits (podrazdeleniy) and support subunits were being sent here to man it. The headquarters actually deployed several kilometers from Poltava in a small rest home near the village of Gorbanivki.

Gen A. I. Shtromberg headed the operations department of the staff being created. The following persons were assigned as chiefs of other departments: Col N. G. Gryaznov—intelligence; Gen V. V. Tsyganov—rear services; Col V. V. Vlasov—military transportation; Gen N. A. Borzov—communications. Gen F. Ya. Falaleev was given direction of aviation, Gen V. S. Tamruchi was placed in charge of tank troops, Gen B. I. Sheremetov, headed the artillery, Gen G. G. Nevskiy was placed in charge of engineer troops, and Gen A. I. Burnazyan was in charge of the medical service. A political department was set up under the high command, and it was headed by Gen I. M. Grishayev.

These generals and officers, along with all personnel on the staff, were distinguished by a high degree of military and special training and discipline, and they had a deep realization of their responsibility for assigned missions. The control apparatus immediately began active work.
Defensive actions of Southwest Sector forces in 1941

Key:
1. Conventional symbols
2. Troop situation as of
3. Southwest Front
4. Southern Front
5. Southwest Sector
6. Bryansk Front
7. ...Tank Group
8. ...Army
9. ...Army (Res)
10. Primorskaya Army
11. Army reserve as of
12. Black Sea
13. Odessa
14. Kherson
15. Nikolayev
16. Kakhovka
17. Dnepr
18. Ingulets
19. Ingul
20. Yuzhnyy Bug
21. Nikopol'
22. Melitopol'
23. Zaporozh'ye
24. Dnepropetrovsk
25. Krasnograd
26. Perevolochnaya
27. Poltava
28. Znamenka
29. Kremenchug
30. Lokhvitsa

[Key continued on next page]
[Key continued from previous page]


At the same time as the situation was studied at the fronts, they had to prepare materials for the CIC to make a decision and for reports and messages to the GHQ and the General Staff.

It should be noted that Marshal Budenny greatly helped in smoothing out the staff's work. He would patiently seek precision and speed in the work and would react relatively calmly to mistakes and imperfections.

I personally did not have to reflect on my place in the staff system. The serious situation at the fronts required me immediately to begin shaping the entire apparatus of the CIC and organizing its work without awaiting special instructions from Budenny. By coincidence, then, I had occasion to become chief of staff of the Southwest Sector and to hold this position until this entity ceased to exist. A decree of the State Defense Committee of 5 August instituted a sector military council made up of S. M. Budenny, N. S. Khrushchev and A. P. Pokrovskiy.

On 28 August the CIC and member of the military council made up a sector order appointing me to the position of chief of staff. This decision considerably increased my responsibility for the work of the staff.

The Marshal did not intend to delay at his headquarters. He decided to set off for the Southern Front so as to look into the situation and the decisions made on the spot. By this time the situation in the south had worsened considerably, especially on the right wing of the front. Under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the battle-weakened 18th Army was forced to withdraw, exposing the flank and rear of 12th Army of the Southwest Front. The 9th Army, which was defending the approaches to Odessa, also was withdrawing.

The front directorate, being assigned hurriedly from the Moscow Military District, arrived in the Ukraine only on 24 June. Running ahead, I wish to note that three front chiefs of staff had been replaced before the end of August. Gen A. I. Antonov, who before this had held the position of chief of staff of the Kiev Military District, was appointed as new chief.
The CIC's trip to the Southern Front was not destined to be carried out, however. He again left for the Southwest Front on 15 July on instructions from the GHQ. The Supreme High Command was greatly disturbed by the worsening of the situation at Kiev and in the zones of the 6th and 12th armies.

Particularly intensive work began for the sector CIC and his apparatus in the middle of July. The fierce combat operations along the thousand-kilometer front were highly dynamic, and a crisis situation was appearing more and more often in different sectors. Greatly weakened in previous battle, troops of the fronts continued to offer heroic resistance to the enemy. By 15 July up to 30 percent of the rifle divisions in the Southwest Front had no more than 1,500 personnel, another 30 percent had 3,000-4,000 each, and some of them had been deprived of artillery. A majority of the tank units (soyedineniye) were without tanks. Troops had to defend broad zones. The few aircraft of the fronts could not give them noticeable support. The 4th Long Range Bomber Corps commanded by Col V. A. Sudets, an energetic and strong-willed commander, gave our troops a great deal of assistance by attacks against enemy groupings.

While the defenses south of Kiev managed to be reinforced with several arriving divisions brought together under the control of the 26th Army, things stood poorly with reinforcement of the defenses of the 6th and 12th armies. In spite of the complicated situation of the Southern Front, Budenny ordered two divisions shifted urgently from it to assist these armies, but this was insufficient to change the situation.

The fascist German troops continued to expand the breach in the sector Berdichev, Belaya Tserkov', enveloping the right flank of the 6th army. An enemy breakthrough simultaneously appeared at the boundary of the Southwest and Southern fronts. This created the threat of encirclement of the 12th and 18th armies. To prevent this, the CIC requested authorization from the GHQ to withdraw the 6th and 12th armies to the line Belaya Tserkov', Gaysin, and to withdraw the 18th army to the line Trestynets, Kamenka, Authorization was received and the withdrawal was accomplished, but the enemy soon created an even more dangerous situation. The Marshal again was forced to seek authorization from the GHQ to withdraw them to the line Zvenigorodka, Roshkovo. A positive answer was received this time as well.

As in previous instances, the CIC demanded that the withdrawing armies conduct counterattacks and counterblows against the enveloping enemy groupings to support the withdrawal.

Under enemy pressure, the withdrawal of the 6th and 12th armies had to be planned in the zone of action of Southern Front, which led to their being greatly separated from the main body of the Southwest Front, and to an interruption of communications and logistical support. Considering these circumstances, these armies were resubordinated to the CIC of Southern Front as of 2000 hours on 25 July. To aid in coordination, they were brought together under the direction of Maj Gen P. G. Ponedelin, CIC of the 12th Army.
In a directive dated 28 July, the GHQ of the Supreme High Command demanded that the enemy's advance be disrupted and the enemy prevented from moving to the Dnepr between Kiev and Cherkassy. The Southern Front was instructed to consolidate on the line Shpola, Ternovka, Balta, Rybnitsa. While the instruction on preventing the enemy's move to the Dnepr between Kiev and Cherkassy was received for execution, with regard to the Southern Front the CIC was forced to request authorization from the GHQ, because of conditions of the situation at hand, for withdrawal of the front's right wing to successive lines so as to occupy a line along the Sinyukha River, Pervomaysk, Troitskoye and Grigoriopol' by 4 August. This was the last attempt to prevent the enemy's encirclement of the 6th and 12th armies by a withdrawal.

In spite of expectations, the command element of Southern Front did not succeed in adjusting the control of Gen Ponedelin's group. The CIC's instructions as to its logistical support were not carried out. It was apparent from messages from military councils of the 6th and 12th armies that the troops remained without ammunition or fuel.

On 1 August the enemy completed the encirclement of these armies. Their situation proved to be genuinely serious. In addition to the lack of ammunition and fuel, a majority of divisions of the 5th army had only 1400-1800 men each. Mechanized corps had a few tanks each.

Gen B. I. Arushanyan, former chief of staff of 12th Army, recalls: "On the night of 31 July/1 August troops of Ponedelin's group left Uman' on orders from the front CIC and withdrew to the line of the Sinyukha River. Operation instructions came by radio on the morning of 1 August to hold this line firmly. On 4 August orders came to the group by radio from the CIC of Southern Front, I. V. Tyulenev: 'Arrange a break-out from encirclement with your own resources.' We then decided to make a breakthrough in a southern direction with a subsequent turn to the east. Due to the lack of ammunition we broke through at night without artillery preparation. A portion of the forces moved out of encirclement, but the enemy closed the breach which had formed with heavy counterblows. . . . We decided to try again to break out of encirclement with the remaining forces, this time in a northerly direction with a subsequent turn to the east. In case the organized breakthrough failed, we would destroy heavy equipment and vehicles and make our way to friendly lines in small groups. On 6 August our covering group continued to hold the positions and to infiltrate through the front line with the onset of darkness."\(^1\)

Realizing how difficult it was to break out of encirclement without outside help, Budenny ordered the CIC of Southwest Front to prepare and conduct a counterblow by forces of the 26th army from an area northwest of Cherkessy in the direction of Zvenigorodka. Unfortunately, this counterblow could be begun only on 7 August. In spite of this, it still played a positive role: It helped troops of the 6th and 12th armies to break out of encirclement in small groups. It should be noted that a portion of the detachments which

\(^1\) VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1973, p 65.
did not succeed in breaking out of encirclement continued to offer the enemy resistance until 13 August, preferring death to disgraceful imprisonment.

With the loss of the 6th and 12th armies, the situation in the Southern Front abruptly worsened. The enemy's 1st Tank Group and 17th Army rushed into the rear of the remaining front troops. Operations of the German 11th Army and the Romanian 3rd and 4th armies simultaneously were stepped up. There arose the threat of Odessa's loss. At first only three divisions could be assigned for its defense. They were the basis for the formation of the Primorskaya Army on 15 July under the command of Lt Gen G. P. Safronov.

Soon the 18th and 9th armies also were in the enemy ring, and it was only by 16 August that we could ensure their breakout from encirclement and withdrawal to the left bank of the Dnepr, where they took up defenses from Nikopol' to Kherson. The Primorskaya Army was cut off from troops of Southern Front.

With the enemy's move to the immediate approaches to major installations on the Dnepr and especially with the loss of the 6th and 12th armies, the need for reserves grew extremely acute. During the routine situation report on 5 August, CIC Budennyy made it known to the Chief of the General Staff that there were no friendly forces in a sector extending 160 km from Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy to Pervomaysk and that the enemy had taken Kirovograd.

At the end of July the GHQ informed the CIC that 19 rifle and 5 cavalry divisions being activated in the Khar'kov and Odessa military districts were being placed at his disposal. The readiness times for the divisions stretched out for almost a month. Eight rifle and two cavalry divisions were assigned to the Southwest Front, nine rifle and three cavalry divisions were assigned to the Southern Front, and two rifle divisions, three air regiments and two tank brigades were assigned to the CIC's reserve.

The arriving troops were poorly outfitted with artillery, small arms, communications facilities, and engineer and quartermaster property. The CIC and his staff took steps to make up for what they lacked from local resources. Marshal Budennyy turned to oblast party and soviet organs on this matter. They had an excellent understanding of the situation and needs of the troops being activated and began a great deal of work to support them, achieving good results. Work began simultaneously to activate people's home guard units. One of them, the Kremenchug Home Guard Division, took part in fighting for its city. It was manned with workers and employees of Kremenchug and had a high party and Komsomol stratum. After taking up defenses on 5 August, the home guard personnel displayed selfless courage and bravery in fighting to repulse enemy attacks and prevented him from taking the city and the crossing over the Dnepr from the move.2

Thanks to the work of the military council of the Southwest Sector as well as that of local party and soviet organs, they successfully accelerated the activation of reserve units and at the beginning of August began creating two armies, one for each front.

Meanwhile, the situation had shaped up in such a way that the left bank of the Dnepr from Cherkassy to Dnepropetrovsk was exposed for almost 300 km. It urgently had to be closed up to prevent the enemy's unhindered invasion of the Left-Bank Ukraine. The defense of this sector to Kremenchug was assigned to the new 38th Army under the command of Lt Gen D. I. Ryabyshev. Another army, under the command of Gen N. Ye. Chibisov and with the designation of Reserve, became part of the Southern Front. It was to take up defenses on the line Kremenchug, Ingulets River, Krivoy Rog and support the withdrawal of the 18th and 9th armies beyond the Dnepr. Thus the fascist German command, being forced to draw the 1st Tank Group back and send it against the Reserve Army, weakened the thrust of its own forces. The reduction of enemy pressure on the 18th and 9th armies allowed them to break out of encirclement, albeit with enormous difficulty and heavy losses.

Direction of the defense of Odessa became greatly complicated. In consideration of this, the Primorskaya Army was placed in subordination to the CIC of the Black Sea Fleet on 19 August.

A directive of the Supreme High Command was received that same day. It was the first document in one and one-half months, during the entire existence of the sector high command, which provided a description of the operational-strategic situation in the Ukraine and gave suppositions as to the sectors of probable enemy operations. It required the east bank of the Dnepr from Loyev to Perevolochnaya to be defended by forces of the Southwest Front, Kiev to be held no matter what, and the axes toward Chernigov, Konotop and Khar'kov to be simultaneously covered. The front composition was set as follows: 29 rifle, 5 motorized, 3 tank and 1 cavalry division. Eight rifle divisions were placed in reserve.

The Southern Front was ordered to take up a defense of the bank from Perevolochny to Kherson. The front was to have 20 rifle, 1 tank and 1 cavalry division and 5 rifle divisions in reserve. In addition, the GHQ demanded that four rifle and three cavalry divisions be placed in the CIC's reserve.

The GHQ's order to defend the left bank of the Dnepr fully coincided with the opinion of the sector military council, but the requirement for assigning 20 divisions in reserve gave rise to doubt. The troops of both fronts had suffered significant losses in previous fighting and required replacements. The Southwest Front was to defend an 800 km zone with 34 rifle and motorized divisions. This meant over 20 km per division. With the assignment of eight divisions to the front reserve, their zones increased to 33 km. The Southern Front with its 20 rifle divisions was defending a zone extending for 500 km. Each division had 25 km, but with the assignment of nine rifle divisions to the reserve, the existing defense of the Dnepr bank could be completely disrupted.
Even before receipt of the GHQ directive, the front commanders in chief, with an excellent realization of the significance of the reserves in the defense, would strive to create them to at least a minimum extent, but each time the units which had just been taken out of battle again would be committed to close the breaches which had formed.

That was the case in the given instance. In carrying out the directive which had been received, all attempts by the front to place the indicated number of divisions in reserve failed. This was because the situation grew more acute with each passing day, and forces and weapons became fewer and fewer.

By the middle of August the high command staff had accumulated information as to the unfavorable position of adjacent troops on the Gomel'-Chernigov Sector. The need arose to revise missions of the right-flank 5th Army and the 27th Separate Rifle Corps of the Southwest Front. Troops of the 5th Army, which had been moved forward far to the west, were deprived of previous advantages and were in danger. Considering this, Marshal Budenny requested the GHQ on 16 August to authorize withdrawal of the 5th Army and 27th Rifle Corps to the east bank of the Dnepr and to regroup a portion of the forces in the Chernigov Sector. The request was approved and troops began to withdraw beyond the Dnepr on the night of 19/20 August.

The advance of 5th Army to the Chernigov Sector took place in a difficult situation. It coincided with the attack by the fascist German 2nd Army against the flank of the Southwest Front. Fierce fighting broke out on the Desna and in the vicinity of Chernigov. Superiority was on the enemy's side. In spite of this, troops of the 5th army command by Gen M. I. Potapov offered heroic resistance to the enemy. The situation grew extremely complex on the right wing of the Southwest Front with the appearance of units of the enemy's 2nd Tank Group in the Konotop Sector. The 40th Army commanded by Maj Gen K. P. Podlas was created in an urgent manner. Withdrawing troops of the Central Front began to appear to the left of the army as it was deploying. This hindered control and disrupted the already poor stability of the small 40th Army. The CIC reported the situation to the GHQ on 25 August and requested the troops be subordinated to withdrawing the 3rd and 21st armies of the Southwest Front. This request was approved only on 6 September. The 21st Army, which included troops of the 3rd Army was resubordinated to the CIC of the Southwest Front.

The situation of troops of the Southwest Sector became more and more critical at the end of August. A menacing situation arose not only on the right wing, but also at the boundary of the fronts. Troops of the Southern Front strained their utmost in repulsing the enemy's offensive at Dnepropetrovsk and Kakhovka. The enemy's pressure at these points created a real threat to the Crimea, and thus to Sevastopol'.

All command echelons, political organs, party organizations and staffs sought the slightest opportunities to delay the enemy and inflict maximum losses on him. On 31 August the Hitlerites made an assault crossing of the Dnepr southeast of Kremenchug. Marshal Budenny attached special
significance to these events. He personally drove out to 38th Army, where he
determined there was an absence of proper direction of troop actions on the
part of the army command. Soon a group of command personnel headed by the
deputy chief of staff of the front, Gen I. Kh. Bagramyan, was sent to the army
at his request. The Marshal simultaneously decided to reinforce it with the
5th Cavalry Corps and the 34th Cavalry Division, and with two tank brigades
and one tank division from his own reserve. These units along with four
rifle divisions of the army made up a group for the counterblow. As it was
being formed, however, the enemy managed to expand his base of operations
considerably and deploy the main body of the 17th Army and 1st Tank Group there.
When the shock grouping of the 38th Army moved into the attack, it encountered
heavy fire in combination with counterattacks by tanks and infantry and air
strikes. The enemy's 1st Tank Group moved into the attack to the north,
toward the 2nd Tank Group, on 12 September. Their advance units linked up
on 15 September in the vicinity of Lokhvits. The enemy simultaneously was
developing the attack in the direction of Poltava and against the flank
and rear of the Southern Front.

The situation of the Southern Front was complicated by the fact that the
enemy had succeeded in taking the bridge across the Dnepr at Dnepropetrovsk
without special effort and creating bases of operations here and at Kakhovka.
After the CIC's trip to clarify circumstances of the loss of Dnepropetrovsk
and after a report to the GHQ, Lt Gen D. I. Ryabyshev assumed command of
Southern Front and Maj Gen R. Ya. Malinovskiy took command of the Reserve
Army. Soon the 6th and 12th armies were set up on its base, and command
of them was given to generals R. Ya. Malinovskiy and I. V. Galanin.

By September the fascist German command had fully deployed four German field
armies (2nd, 6th, 11th, 17th), two tank groups (1st and 2nd), two Romanian
armies (3rd and 4th), a Hungarian corps, a Slovakian corps and an Italian
corps against troops of the Southwest Sector. This grouping was supported
by aviation. By the end of the first ten-day period of September, an
extremely dangerous situation had taken shape in the Southwest Front which
required an immediate cardinal decision: either continue to defend Kiev
and territory adjacent to the left bank of the Dnepr and subject troops to
every encirclement, or attempt to avoid encirclement by a rapid withdrawal
and take up defenses on a favorable line. It was apparent from all previous
instructions of the Supreme High Command that it adhered to the tactics
of rigid, stubborn resistance on the positions occupied, sometimes without
consideration of the capabilities of friendly and enemy troops.

The CIC of the Southwest Sector realized the need for a stubborn defense
and persistently sought to achieve this to the last. When possibilities
of resistance had been exhausted, however, and the situation at hand
threatened destruction of the troops, he requested authorization from the
GHQ to withdraw to new lines. It was Budennyy's chief desire to preserve
his troops and inflict as heavy losses as possible on the enemy.
The CIC was aroused even more than usual during the period from 8 through 10 September, especially after conversations on the morning of 10 September with the chief of the General Staff. Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov passed on instructions of the GHQ to send the 2nd Cavalry Corps from the reserve to the Bryansk Front to close the breach in the vicinity of Konotop, Novgorod-Severskiy. Budenny answered that the corps was needed on the Dnepropetrovsk-Kharkov Axis, where only the 273rd Rifle Division was in a 60-km sector. He then reported that if the corps were moved to the area indicated there was no need to subordinate it to General Yeremenko, since the same thing might happen to it as with the 21st Army. In response, Marshal Shaposhnikov reaffirmed the GHQ instructions on moving the cavalry corps. The situation became so acute, however, that these instructions could not be carried out.

It should be mentioned here in passing that when the GHQ made the decision to disband the headquarters of all corps, Budenny immediately submitted a petition to retain them in the cavalry. He twice received a refusal, but again stood his ground. The Marshal attempted to prove that elimination of the corps' headquarters would lead to dissipation of the cavalry and it would be converted from an operational to a tactical resource. Finally Budenny's petition was approved, and the cavalry corps fought until the end of the Great Patriotic War.

On the morning of 10 September the military council of Southwest Front requested the GHQ to authorize taking troops from the Kiev Fortified Area and sanction the withdrawal of front troops to prepared rear positions along the Psel River in connection with the enemy's breakthrough in the vicinity of Romny, Gayvoron and due to a lack of reserves. Soon the Chief of the General Staff called Gen M. P. Kirponos to a direct line and gave him the GHQ's negative response. He also passed on instructions to continue to fight at the previous positions.

As soon as the content of the front's petition and the GHQ answer to it became known, the CIC immediately sent a message to the GHQ in which he reported that the enemy's plan was fully apparent at that time for enveloping and encircling the Southwest Front from the directions of Novgorod-Severskiy and Kremenchug. It was necessary to set up a strong group of forces to counter this plan. The Southwest Front was in no condition to do this. If the GHQ of the Supreme High Command in turn did not have the capability to concentrate such a group at the moment, then withdrawal was quite urgent for the Southwest Front. Delay could involve loss of troops and of enormous quantity of equipment. If the matter of the withdrawal could not be revised, the CIC requested that troops and combat equipment at least be moved out of the Kiev Fortified Area. These forces and resources would undoubtedly aid the Southwest Front in countering the enemy encirclement.

The message signed by Budenny, Khrushchev and me was sent at 0815 hours on 11 September. There was no answer to it either on that day or the following day. As it became known, the Supreme Commander gave instructions
to Gen M. P. Kirponos over the direct
line on the evening of 11 September
to regroup the forces immediately and, in coordination with the Bryansk
Front, to attack the enemy's Konotop Group, organize a defensive line along
the Psel River or somewhere along this line, set out five or six divisions,
and only after this begin an evacuation of Kiev. In addition, cease to
look for positions for a withdrawal, and seek ways to resist. Then Stalin
demanded that Kiev not be abandoned and bridges not be blown.

On 13 September Marshal of the Soviet Union Semen Konstantinovich Timoshenko
arrived at the headquarters of the Southwest Sector. After greeting those
present, both marshals left for a separate room. They returned in about two
hours, and Budenny announced that he was leaving for Moscow and that Marshal
Timoshenko had been designated commander in chief of the Southwest Sector.

Thus my military service was interrupted under the immediate leadership of
a remarkable person and a courageous, steadfast military leader in general.
The conduct of operations with a withdrawal of troops always was considered
a difficult matter in military art. This difficult lot fell to Marshal
S. M. Budenny. In each of these and other similar operations, the enemy
achieved success at the cost of heavy losses, his forces were exhausted
and the tempo of advance was reduced. At the same time the Soviet Armed
Forces gradually built up resistance and dealt increasingly telling blows
against the enemy.

April 25th will mark the 95th anniversary of the birth of Semen Mikhaylovich
Budenny. He did not have occasion to take part in direction of the
victorious operations of 1943 and the subsequent war years, but this cannot
belittle the great significance of his contribution toward achievement of
our victory over the fascist German armed forces, or of his work to set
up and strengthen Soviet power and the Armed Forces. The Communist Party
and Soviet government highly esteemed the services of Marshal Budenny to
the Motherland by three times awarding him the title Hero of the Soviet
Union and decorating him with many orders and medals.

On the evening of 13 September, after talks with the military council of
the Southwest Front, the new CIC reported to Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov
that the front had been given orders in conformity with instructions of
the GHQ, and he added that the situation was worsening. On 16 September,
convinced that the demands of the GHQ could not be carried out, he issued
a verbal order for front troops to break out of the encirclement. This
order was delivered by Gen I. Kh. Bagramyan by aircraft on the following
day. Gen Kirponos requested the GHQ of the VGK [Supreme High Command] to
confirm the order of the CIC. On 18 September the GHQ authorized him to
leave the Kiev Fortified Area and send the 37th Army across to the left
bank of the Dnepr. Suffering heavy losses, the surrounded front troops
made their way through the solid enemy ring in separate detachments and
groups. The front command and many thousands of commanders and soldiers
died the death of the brave in battle against the fascist German invaders.
The presence of the staff of the sector CIC in the vicinity of Poltava became dangerous. The vicinity of Khar'kov was planned as the new location. The General Staff authorized them to begin rebasing on the morning of 19 September, with the arrival of combat action directly to Poltava. The enemy took the city by the evening of that day.

The high command of the Southwest Sector was abolished on 26 September. Marshal Timoshenko was assigned CIC of the Southwest Front, N. S. Khrushchev was assigned member of the military council, and I was assigned as chief of staff of this front.

The GHQ subsequently employed an entity such as the sector high command in 1942 in the Moscow and North Caucasus sectors. This entity was instituted for the last time to control fronts in defeat of the Kwantung Army of militaristic Japan in 1945.

As our command element gained combat experience and as the fascist German forces became exhausted and then lost the strategic initiative, direction of the fronts by the GHQ became considerably easier and it began to control each of them directly. The most authoritative representatives of the GHQ of the Supreme High Command, accompanied by groups of specialists from branches of the Armed Forces and the combat arms, were sent out to coordinate the actions of fronts.

Finally, one can draw the conclusion that where a war is being waged over vast expanses, the need arises to bring the strategic leadership nearer to the troops, for which various supplementary control organs can be employed. Their organizational forms must be determined depending on the situation.

Thus, during the period from July through September, troops of the Southwest Sector conducted fierce defensive actions against superior enemy forces. The GHQ of the VGE, the sector high command, and the command elements of fronts and armies did all they could to conduct an active defense with fewest losses to friendly forces by wearing out enemy units at each defensive line.

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HISTORY OF LOCAL ORGANS OF MILITARY CONTROL TRACED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 78 signed to press 31 Mar 78 pp 120-122

[Article by A. Markin: "You Ask—We Answer: From Military Councils to Military Commissariats"]

[Text] "In April 1978 local organs of military control will celebrate their 60th anniversary and in this regard military commissariat workers should find great interest in materials telling about the work" and "subsequent development of local organs of military control during this period." (From letters to the editors of Col B. T. Kryukov, Military Commissar of Khmel'nitskaya Oblast, and Maj L. V. Zhdanov, Deputy Chief of Political Department of Lipetskaya Oblast Military Commissariat.)

One of the most important features of the creation of Armed Forces of the Soviet state was the fact that, as V. I. Lenin remarked, they were built "in the inseparable proximity, in the inseparable togetherness one could say, of the Soviets with the Army." It is therefore natural that the first organs of local military control arose as part of the Soviets. It was on 12 (25) January 1918 that the People's Commissar for Military Affairs instructed all local Soviets and soldiers' committees to set up military departments immediately, to organize a network of recruiting stations and to open registration of volunteers for the ranks of the Red Army. At the end of the month the All-Russian Board for Activation of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] published draft instructions to the Soviets on creation of a Red Army which examined in detail the purpose and structure of military departments. Such departments were set up in February-April 1918 in a majority of the guberniya and uyezd Soviets and began recruitment of volunteers for the RKKA.

Volunteer formations could not, however, solve the problem of defeating the interventionists and the internal counterrevolution. On 29 May 1918 the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] adopted a decision on conversion to universal military obligation. The military councils of
the Soviets were small and did not have trained specialists. They were incapable of ensuring the formation of a massive regular army. To accomplish this complex mission it was required to create a uniform centralized system of special local military control organs encompassing not only guberniya and uyezd centers, but volosts as well.

On 8 April 1918 the Council of People's Commissars under the chairmanship of V. I. Lenin passed a decree instituting volost, uyezd, guberniya and district commissariats for military affairs, and the VTsIK approved this decree on 22 April. The document stated that military commissariats were being created "to implement measures of accounting for the populace fit for military service, for its call-up, for forming a military force of the Russian Soviet Republic, for training each and every worker and peasants not exploiting another's labor in military affairs, for controlling all troops intended for serving local needs, and for satisfying physical demands of military supply." The decree determined specific duties of military commissariats and established a strict subordination: volost military commissariats to the uyezd military commissariat; uyezd military commissariats to the guberniya military commissariat; guberniya military commissariats to the district military commissariat; and district military commissariats to the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. All mobilization data passed to the military commissariats from registration departments of uyezd Soviets (former uyezd directorates of military commanders), as did all functions of military control on the corresponding territory. They were set up by the Soviets and operated under the direction of local party and soviet organs.

Inasmuch as creation of military commissariats dragged on in some guberniyas, the local Soviets were sent instructions of the VTsIK and the Council of People's Commissaria signed by Ya. M. Sverdlov and V. I. Lenin on 18 May 1918, which once again substantiated the need to set up military commissariats and ordered accomplishment of this task in a week's time. By the end of 1918 there were 7 district, 39 guberniya, 385 uyezd and around 7,000 volost military commissariats on the territory of the Soviet Republic.

The timeliness of measures taken by the party and government to set up military commissariats was noted in March 1918 at the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress: "The transition from voluntariness to obligation became possible at the moment when the chief masses of the old army had been reabsorbed in the cities and villages and local military control organs had been created successfully in outlying areas: organs for registration, activation and supply (volost, uyezd, guberniya and district commissariats)."

The RKP(b) CC and local party organs did a great deal to staff the military commissariats with workers dedicated to the cause of the party and Soviet power. For example, the following were commissars of military districts: Moscow—Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy, one of the organizers of military and combat work of the Bolsheviks and a party member since 1898; Petrograd—B. P. Pozern, a party member since 1902 and an active participant in three
revolutions; Yaroslavl'--M. V. Frunze, a true Leninite (from August through December 1918). Of the 4,562 volost military commissariats on which there were survey data in the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, 24 percent were members of the RKP(b) and 26.2 percent were sympathizers. 8

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of military commissariats in creating a Red Army first of a million men, then of three million and finally of five million during the years of the Civil War. They played an enormous part in organizing the registration of draft contingents, in preparing military-trained reserves and in providing personnel to units in the field. Lenin said that "creation of a military and state apparatus which was capable of victoriously withstanding the test of 1917-1921 was a great undertaking." 9

After the Civil War the party and the Soviet government continued to show concern for the might of our Armed Forces. Lenin said that "having begun our peaceful construction, we are bending all efforts to continue it without let-up. At the same time, comrades, be on guard and safeguard the defenses of our country and our Red Army like the apple of your eye." 10

The tasks of the RKKA and tasks of local military control organs changed under peacetime conditions. The Armed Forces were cut back to 600,000 persons and in 1923 began a transition to a territorial militia system of organization. In conformity with the Decree of the TsIK [Central Executive Committee] and SNK [Council of People's Commissars] of the USSR dated 9 January 1925, the guberniya military commissariats were converted into territorial directorates of recruiting districts (corps, division and so on), connected organizationally with troop units (soyedineniye). The volost and uyezd military commissariats were preserved as a registration-mobilization apparatus.

Aggravation of the international situation in the thirties made it necessary for new changes in Soviet military organizational development. The Communist Party and Soviet government took energetic steps to gradually convert the army to a cadre basis. By 1937 the strength of the Red Army reached 1.1 million persons and 77 percent of all rifle divisions had become regular. Local military control organs also were subjected to a fundamental realignment. A decree of the USSR SNK dated 7 July 1938 created independent military commissariats in autonomous republics, krays, oblasts and cities, while the network of rayon military commissariats was increased by more than threefold. 11 The reorganized military commissariats did an enormous amount of work in conformity with provisions of the USSR Constitution of 1936 and the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation dated 1 September 1939, which secured a cadre system of building the army and the principle of universal military obligation of Soviet citizens.

Military commissariats accomplished complex and important missions of staffing new units with command cadres and military schools with cadets. In addition to this they gave a great deal of assistance to schools, tekhnikums and universities in conducting initial military and predraft preparation of pupils and students. They devoted much attention jointly with the
Osoaviakhim [Society for Assistance to the Defense and Aviation-Chemical Industry] defense society to preparing the youth for service in the Army and to training pilots, parachutists, snipers and so on in their specialties. No little credit goes to local military control organs for the fact that on the eve of the Great Patriotic War the Red Army became a completely regular army numbering over five million persons.\(^{12}\)

The military commissariats stood a difficult test in the war years, especially in the first period. They had to conduct mass mobilization in compressed periods of time and simultaneously take draft contingents into the depths of the country out of the areas adjacent to the front, help form the people's home guard, create paramilitary fighting battalions and other combat formations, and arrange to carry out the decision of the GKO [State Defense Committee] dated 17 September 1941 on military training of male citizens in the ages from 16 to 50 years and training of specialists for the troops with resources of civilian departments. An important direction in the work of military commissariats was pension support to families of service personnel, provision of various material assistance and getting jobs for war invalids and the wounded.

Immediately after liberation of areas temporarily occupied by the enemy, the military commissariats would restore local military control and assist soviet organs in arranging peacetime living.\(^{13}\) By providing personnel to the front, military commissariats assisted in the victorious conclusion of the war.

The basic avenues of work of the military commissariats in the postwar period were registration and call-up of citizens into the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces, mass defense and patriotic work, and preparation of the youth for service in the Army and Navy. The ever-increasing demands on combat and mobilization readiness of troops and on their training under conditions of the revolution in military affairs, as well as the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation of 1967, introduced substantial changes to the content of the work of military commissariats, especially in the area of bringing troops up to required strength. Registration for the draft began to be preceded by a series of measures for preparing the youth for military service in order to introduce young soldiers rapidly into formation.

The new USSR Constitution places great responsibility on military commissariats. Article 31 in particular states: "Defense of the socialist Homeland is among the most important functions of the state and is a matter of all the people."\(^{14}\) It substantiates the institution of universal military obligation. Many departments, universities, schools and social organizations take part in preparing the youth for service in the Armed Forces. This work is directed by the Communist Party, and military commissariats bear immediate responsibility for conducting the necessary activities.
Military commissariats have covered a grand path in their 60 years of existence. They now represent a harmonious system of local organs of military control performing complex and important missions of ensuring the defensive capability of our Motherland.

FOOTNOTES

* The editors continue to answer questions on military history topics of interest to a wide range of readers under this rubric.

1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXVIII, 50.

2. For more detail see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1966, p 107.


5. For more details see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1968, pp 104-105.

6. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the CC], II, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 62.


8. Lenin, XLIV, 106.

9. Lenin, XLIV, 300.


12. For more detail see S. Shtemenko, "Local Organs of Military Control," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Apr 1968.


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Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 78 signed to press 31 Mar 78 pp 125-128

[Article: "At Readers' Conferences]

[Text] Attending a readers' conference of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL held on 29 December 1977 in the Red Banner Northern Fleet were commanders of units (soyedineniye), ships, combat units (chast') and subunits (podrazdeleniye), staff officers, officers of the political organ, and party and Komsomol activists. Opening the conference, Rear Adm G. V. Yegorov emphasized the role of military-historical science in further increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Capt 1st Rank V. P. Vorob'yev, editor for history of naval art, gave a briefing entitled "On the Work of the Editors and Editorial Board of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Fulfilling Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, Explaining the New USSR Constitution and Propagandizing Combat Traditions." The presentations provided a positive assessment of the journal. There also were critical remarks and wishes expressed. Capt 1st Rank N. M. Kharitonov suggested the more frequent inclusion of scientific reports and historical sketches on the history of the Northern Fleet and its postwar development, on exploits of Northern Fleet navymen in the war years and on the history of military pedagogics.

Capt 1st Rank V. N. Tsirul'nikov expressed the wish for more items on the Navy in the section entitled "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period."

Capt 2nd Rank V. V. Bazhenov considers it a shortcoming that the journal has little material on the Northern Fleet and some sections such as "Scientific Reports" and "Expertise and Heroism" have almost none.

Capt 1st Rank I. Ya. Khrizman expressed a number of wishes aimed at eliminating shortcomings in the journal's work and at increasing its ideological and scientific level. He said in particular that it should print material more frequently on the development of tactics of naval arms, especially submarines, and including the Northern Fleet, which has rich combat experience. In Khrizman's opinion, the experience of the
submariners must be covered more deeply in all sections of the journal, especially in "Expertise and Heroism," and the work of force staffs should be shown.

Khrizman's wishes and critical remarks were supported and elaborated on by Capt 2nd Rank N. P. Gerasimenko. He said that he recalled in particular an article about combat actions of the S-13 submarine of the KBF [Red Banner Baltic Fleet], published several years ago. He expressed the desire that such material appear in the pages of the journal concerning the combat actions of submarines of the Northern Fleet as well. He remarked that there would be great interest in such articles about the experience of combat training of the fleet in the postwar period, on work of the staffs, on ocean deployments and on the history of development of international maritime law.

Capt-Lt P. A. Chmel' expressed the desire that more articles be published about local wars and that there be a generalization of their experience, reasons for their outbreak and course of combat actions.

Lt F. A. Shpitser requested the editors and editorial board to write about fulfillment of the Tenth Five-Year Plan and about its role in increasing the defensive might of the Motherland; and to provide diagrams and tables on the country's economy, on new construction sites and on the geography of the distribution of industry. He also requested that the journal regularly contain articles which would expose the bourgeois falsifiers of history and that materials on the need for high political vigilance be printed regularly, and not just from time to time.

Capt 1st Rank K. L. Oleynik spoke about the need to study military history from the standpoint of its great role in understanding the present and foreseeing the future. We should continue to cover the experience of interaction of naval arms, especially submarines, and tell about their combat employment and accomplishment of diversified missions.

Capt 1st Rank A. Lysenko, Red Banner Northern Fleet

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A readers' conference of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL took place on 21 December 1977 in the Leningrad District Officers' Club imeni S. M. Kirov. It was opened by Col L. N. Boytsov, chief of the political department of the staff and directorate of the district. Col L. P. Kozlov gave a briefing on the work of the journal's editors and editorial board in the jubilee year, the year of the 60th Anniversary of the Great October. Taking part in the conference were officers of the district staff and directorate, of military educational institutions and of military museums, as well as members of the Military Science Society.
All speakers remarked that the journal was performing a great deal of necessary work. Material contained in No. 10 and 11 for 1977 devoted to the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution was especially well regarded by the readers. Meanwhile, they expressed a number of suggestions and wishes aimed at further improving the journal’s work.

For example, Col N. D. Korostelev, Col Justice L. P. Khamov and Col (Ret) G. F. Gashev remarked that the editors still were publishing few articles about operations in the Northwest TVD [Theater of Military Operations], and that there were unique features here in the operations of each branch of the Armed Forces. Col (Ret) P. I. Petrov, secretary of the VNO [Military Science Society] of the LODO [Leningrad District Officers’ Club] imeni S. M. Kirov, told about plans for the VNO’s work in military historical topics and expressed the desire that the journal devote more space to operations of the first period of the war which still were poorly covered; that it tell more about the combat deeds of scouts, particularly the work of front and army reconnaissance subunits; and that it cover matters of the conduct of contemporary local wars more frequently and in more detail.

Maj D. V. Gavrilyuk spoke about the need for constant criticism of bourgeois falsifiers of history. Some of them, stressed the speaker, go to such lengths as attempting to prove that there was no military intervention by countries of the Entente in Russia during the years of the Civil War. He further remarked that it would be well if the editors sought an opportunity to publish articles timed for specific dates, with a lead time of at least a month. Then this material could be used with great success by instructors and propagandists in practical work.

D. V. Gavrilyuk noted that we have to popularize the journal more among the troops. Young officers still know little about its direction and purposes. Therefore, in addition to conducting readers' conferences and other work, the editors should set up an authors' aktiv of young officers and scholars.

Col I. G. Inozemtsev suggested holding discussions in the pages of the journal on the most current topics and bringing in officers from the troops more widely to take part in them. He simultaneously recommended that there be a regular publication of information about new books published in various journals, about texts on military history and on defense of candidates' and doctoral dissertations.

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The VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL readers' conference at the General Staff Military Academy imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov on 27 February 1978 was very interesting.
The conference was opened by Lt Gen I. P. Semenov, chief of the Academy's political department.


Col V. G. Klevtsov, an instructor of the academy and a candidate of historical sciences, took the platform. He remarked that the journal was popular among the faculty and students of the Academy. At the same time, he expressed a number of wishes to the collective of editors and the editorial board. For example, to provide more materials revealing the strategy in the Civil and Great Patriotic wars; to reflect more deeply the development of Soviet military history in postwar years; to speak out more sharply against some commanders and political officers who underestimate the experience of past wars; and to popularize more widely prominent Soviet military historians and theorists.

Col N. N. Ivanov emphasized in his talk that the VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL is one of the important military publications which covers current problems. Of interest and use from this standpoint is material under the rubrics: "The CPSU as the Organizer of Organizational Development of Soviet Armed Forces," "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period" and so on. The speaker advised providing more material on the interaction of combat arms and branches under various conditions of combat operations.

Col Yu. D. Matviyets believes that it is necessary to provide fuller coverage of the combat experience accumulated during years of the Great Patriotic War, and the work of commanders at all levels in the imaginative elaboration and implementation of decisions.

Candidate of Historical Sciences Lt Col K. Narulin noted the diversity and depth of solution of problems by the journal. He expressed the desire to the editorial collective to devote more space to articles propagandizing the combat experience of army and division levels, to covering military-technical superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War, to an analysis of local wars and to criticism of the bourgeois falsifiers of military history.

Lt Gen G. F. Samoylovich is, in his words, a long-time reader of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL. He advised bringing in participants of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars more widely for appearances in the journal, telling about little-known events of the war and providing a critical assessment of various publications on military history.
Lt Gen I. P. Semenov, chief of the Academy's political department, summarized the results of the readers' conference. After noting the positive points in the journal's work and the high ideological direction of materials, especially in No 10 and 11 for 1977, as well as No 2 for 1978, he expressed the desire for broader coverage of the work of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy in the war years and clearer demonstration of party-political work, especially in the first period of the Great Patriotic War, the combat cooperation of Soviet and fraternal armies in the struggle against fascism, and problems of moral-psychological preparation.

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There was a verbal edition of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL at the Moscow City Teachers' Club during celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. Class leaders and military instructors of schools and veterans of public education came to the meeting with editorial workers and editorial board members.

Lt Col A. I. Sidorov, responsible secretary of the editorial office, told those present about the topical matter of the journal and the most interesting and instructive materials. He shared plans for the editors' work for 1978.

Teachers listened with unceased interest to the talk by Lt Gen (Ret) F. Ye. Bokov, former member of the military council of 5th Shock Army. Fedor Yefimovich shared his recollections of the last days of the Great Patriotic War and told about the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers in the assault on the capital of the fascist Reich—Berlin.

Adm (Ret) S. Ye. Zakharov, member of the editorial board of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, remarked in his presentation on the role of navymen in the Great Patriotic War. They fought selflessly not only at sea, but also on the land. Their exploits in the Battle of Moscow and in the defense of Leningrad, in the Battle of Stalingrad and at Malaya Zemlya, and in the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol' and the Soviet Arctic have become legendary.

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The editors and the editorial board of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL thank all those who spoke at readers' conferences for their wishes and critical remarks. All of them are being studied and considered carefully in our work.

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COMMENTS ON NATO COMBAT AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS

Moscow KRYL'YA RODINY in Russian No 4, Apr 78 signed to press 13 Mar 78 p 33

[Article from foreign press materials by Engr-Lt Col L. Nechayuk: "In the Arsenals of Imperialism: Fighters for NATO"]

[Text] In building up arms, the reactionary forces of countries of the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance are blocking a further relaxation in international tensions. Referring to the notorious "Soviet threat," the military bosses of NATO are demanding an increase in the numbers and effectiveness of combat capabilities. Statements by western specialists emphasize in particular that winning air superiority is a necessary condition for ground forces or naval forces to achieve success in combat operations involving both conventional and nuclear weapons. Provoking fear of the "growing military might of Warsaw Pact countries" in the people, the heralds of a new war are advocating a strengthening of NATO tactical aviation for "destroying mobile enemy armored targets." These views have a deciding influence on the present development of foreign fighter aviation.

As aircraft are improved and outfitted with complex, effective equipment and weaponry, combat capabilities of fighters have risen substantially. Meanwhile, a revision of views on the purpose of fighters has occurred abroad in recent years, which of course has been reflected in the approach taken to their design and outfitting. For example, at the beginning of the sixties, fighter-bombers which had been manufactured previously began to be adapted for performing a wider range of missions. To illustrate, American F-100 and F-105 aircraft also were used to win air superiority, for close air support, and interdiction of an area of combat operations when the United States participated in local wars. Such half-measures made little sense. Fighters therefore appeared in the inventory which already had been planned as multipurpose. A typical example is the F-104 PHANTOM, which came into the U.S. Air Force inventory in 1961.
Further development of the idea of universalization of fighters rested on use of the latest scientific and technical achievements in aircraft construction, the most important of which were the variable geometry wing and the bypass turbojet engines with afterburner. These were the technical innovations which were the basis for creation of the F-111 multipurpose fighter-bomber in the United States. It was given supersonic speed not only at high altitudes, but also at very low altitudes (around 60 m) with use of an automatic terrain-following system. Another feature of the aircraft was the increased ferry range. This was considered necessary for swift movement of the aircraft to various parts of the globe in case of U.S. participation in military conflicts and local wars.

As American specialists now admit, however, there was far from complete realization of the idea of a general-purpose fighter in the F-111 design. The combination of long ferry range, the capability of carrying an increased payload (over 18 tons) and the capability of operating from dirt strips around 900 m long caused the aircraft to be too heavy. As a result, a number of the F-111's technical specifications did not correspond to the demands of the time. Instead of the over 1,700 aircraft planned for construction, a little over 500 were ordered and even fewer were actually constructed.

The failure with the F-111 undoubtedly dealt a sensitive blow to the idea of a universal, multipurpose fighter. Moreover, the experience of combat operations in Southeast Asia and the Near East led foreign aircraft specialists to the conclusion that they now could not get by without specialized aircraft designed for effective performance of some one tactical mission. As they assume, special value is acquired by the capability of intensive maneuvering with minimum turning radii, while maximum flight speed and service ceiling of the aircraft go into the background. For example, such views were seen in creation of the F-15 and F-16 fighters in the United States, which were intended chiefly for winning air superiority. Suffice it to say that that rate-of-climb and minimum turning radius of the F-15, for example, is twice better than that of the F-4 PHANTOM fighter. At the same time, their speed and altitude characteristics are almost identical.

By the way, rejection of the idea of a multipurpose fighter and the transition to specialized aircraft also was reflected in the struggle between aircraft construction firms of the United States and Western Europe for the so-called "contract of the century." We are speaking of the delivery of fighters to Belgium, Norway, Holland and Denmark to replace obsolete aircraft of American manufacture. As it is generally known, the American F-16 fighter came out the winner in this skirmish. It crowded out the French F-1 MIRAGE and the Swedish VIGGEN-37E. There is no doubt that such an outcome of the continuous rivalry between the American and West European aviation concerns was determined chiefly by political and not military-technical reasons. When things smack of solid profit, the foreign entrepreneurs go all-out and set in motion the entire might of the military and political dictate which the United States enjoys in NATO. That is what happened this time as well.
Just what is the F-16 fighter? It is a single-place, single-engine aircraft designed basically to win air superiority, but it can be used also to support ground forces. It has been designed to provide high maneuverability in aerial combat at altitudes from 3,000 to 12,000 m and at flight speeds of Mach 0.8-1.6. A number of aerodynamic innovations have been employed in the design for this purpose. An integral scheme of smooth wing and fuselage connection; leading edges in the form of a forward-jutting wing root with a high sweep angle; leading-edge slats and combined flap-ailerons along the entire sweep of the wing. Meanwhile, foreign military specialists note that the F-16 essentially is a simplified version of the F-15 with reduced radius of action and limited suitability for bad-weather flying. It can serve only as a supplement to other specialized aircraft of the eighties.

In an attempt to weaken the dominant position in military aviation of its transoceanic partner in NATO, the countries of Western Europe—England, the FRG and Italy—began developing their own fighter-bomber at the beginning of the seventies, which now has been designated the TORNADO. Each of the countries participating in its creation has such different views on this aircraft that it has resulted in a very broad range of missions being imposed on it.

Judge for yourselves. England, for example, is planning to use the TORNADO aircraft to replace the VULCAN bombers, CANBERRA reconnaissance aircraft as well as the LIGHTNING interceptors. The FRG and Italy intend to use the TORNADO to replace obsolete American aircraft as an air superiority fighter and for operations against ground targets. As a result, as the West German newspaper SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG wrote with reference to the statement by Gen F. (Oblezer), the result has been "the most complicated aircraft one can imagine." In other words, the TORNADO is the West European version of a multipurpose aircraft.

It is a heavy (maximum takeoff weight is 22.7 tons) supersonic fighter with variable geometry wing. In operating against ground targets it can lift up to 5,500 kg of payload. According to design calculations, the onboard equipment will permit using the TORNADO in bad weather. For example, it was emphasized that the instrument landing system provides for landing with the lower edge of overcast at 30 m and horizontal visibility of around 400 m.

It would appear that the appearance of the TORNADO fighter bespeaks a return to the idea of a multipurpose aircraft in Western Europe. This is not so, however. Specialization still is the predominant trend in West European military aircraft construction. For example, the JAGUAR tactical aircraft of joint development has come into the inventory of the British and French air forces. It is fitted with a sophisticated navigation and weapons control system which, as asserted, provides high accuracy in aircraft navigation and approach to target. With a maximum takeoff weight of 14.5 tons, the JAGUAR is capable of carrying up to 4,500 kg of payload. Its tactical radius is 575 km, while its short takeoff and landing run permits operation from field airstrips.
The ALPHA JET has been developed jointly in the FRG and France, and they intend to accept it into their air force inventory. It is a comparatively light aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of around 7 tons and payload of 2,200 kg. It also is intended for use from field airstrips. The HARRIER VTOL aircraft, which has been in inventory since 1969, is intended along with these aircraft to perform close air support missions in England. As the foreign press has noted more than once, however, it has serious shortcomings: poor maneuverability, short radius of action, and complicated technical maintenance.

Characteristic evidence of a narrowing of the range of missions being imposed on fighter-bombers was the return of ground assault aircraft to construction and acceptance at the beginning of the seventies. Such aircraft have a subsonic or transonic speed and small service ceiling and can wage only defensive battles against fighters. They are well adapted, however, for strikes against ground targets. The American A-10A ground assault aircraft is the most modern of them. The A-10A's maximum takeoff weight is over 21 tons, and it has a payload up to 7,250 kg. The aircraft is relatively simple in design and outfitting and can operate from unimproved airfields.

In continuing military preparations, the militaristic circles of the United States and their allies in the aggressive NATO bloc are steadfastly striving to build up the combat might of the Air Force. They are attempting to use any methods and means to prevent a strengthening of political detente and to prevent it from being supplemented by a military detente. Whipping up tensions and fanning the arms race, which brings superprofits to the ringleaders of the military-industrial complexes, are the objectives and the essence of those efforts which are being put forth by NATO's leaders in the face of the peace-loving aspirations of mankind.

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LEGAL BASIS FOR MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND SERVICE DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 78 signed to press 21 Mar 78 pp 9-16

[Article by Col Gen of Justice A. Gornyy, chief military prosecutor: "The Legal Basis for Life in the Armed Forces"]

[Text] Just as all Soviet people, the men of the Armed Forces received with ardent approval the new Constitution of the USSR—the basic law of the Soviet public socialist state. They see in this document of tremendous political and legal—state significance the brilliant expression of their interests, aspirations, and hopes, the firm guarantee of their rights, and an urgent program for their practical activity.

Soviet socialist law plays an active role in all fields of state and public life. In the interests of the workers and in conformance with party policy, it consolidates, regulates, and protects socialist public relations, establishes and guarantees the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens, and contributes to the development of socialist democracy and the strengthening of discipline, the communist upbringing of people, and the solution of other tasks in the building of communism.

The constitution which is now functioning has a creative role which is especially great. It forms a firm legal foundation for a society of mature socialism and the public state which corresponds to it. The basic law legally secures the building of a developed socialist society in our country and the conversion of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a public state which expresses the will and interests of the workers, peasants, and intellectuals, and the workers of all nations and nationalities in the USSR. "In creating the new constitution," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev notes in the article, "A Historic Position on the Path to Communism," "we proceeded from the fact that it will become an important means for the further development and deepening of socialist democracy and a mighty implement for the building of communism."

The constitution expresses Leninist ideas and party policy in the area of defense of the socialist fatherland and military organizational development with maximum clarity.
In accordance with Leninist teaching, the basic law proclaims that the defense of the socialist fatherland belongs among the most important state functions and is a matter for the entire people. The constitution allotsthe decisive role in the accomplishment of this task to our glorious Armed Forces. The basic law points out that they were created for the defense of socialist achievements, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the USSR and must always be ready for the immediate rebuffing of any aggressor. The Soviet servicemen realize that with contemporary means of armed conflict and under conditions where the scientific-technical revolution in military affairs is developing, the invincible defense of the country can be ensured and their duty to the people can be accomplished successfully only as a result of maintaining the troops' combat readiness at the level required by the basic law of the Soviet state.

Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee CPSU and Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov points out: "The high level of combat readiness of the Armed Forces is the result of the servicemen's military labor in peacetime.... Combat readiness encompasses all aspects of life and activity in the Armed Forces and reflects their attained level of combat and operational training, the coordinated activity of the units and large units, the ideological-political indoctrination of the personnel, and their moral-psychological and physical tempering. The increasing of combat readiness is the permanent task of all servicemen." The role of one-man commanders in the accomplishment of this task is especially great and important. They, as defined by the military regulations, bear personal responsibility to the Communist Party and the Soviet government for the constant combat and mobilization readiness of the units, ships, and subunits entrusted to them and they are required to adopt all measures to increase it.

The Soviet Armed Forces are structured and function on political, economic, and social principles which are common for our entire society and state. The entire 60-year experience in the development and combat activity of our Armed Forces confirms convincingly the correctness of the Leninist conclusion that the creation of the Red Army could lead to successful results only because it was accomplished in a spirit of general Soviet construction.

The basic socio-economic, political, and legal principles of a developed socialist society and public state which are confirmed in the new constitution of the USSR are also firm principles for the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces at the contemporary stage. This is the guarantee of their combat might.

The Armed Forces of the USSR are a part of our society, of our people. They are structured on socialist public relations, imbued with the socio-political and ideological unity of the personnel, serve the people and are accountable to them, and accomplish their state will and their duty to them.

Our army is an army of the fraternal collaboration of all classes and social groups of Soviet society, of the friendship of workers of all nations and nationalities of the country, an army of the entire people. It is intended
for the accomplishment of a lofty and noble mission—the defense of the revolutionary achievements and peaceful labor of the Soviet people; it lives one life with them and with the same interests. It is an army of high organization, moral fiber, and the consciousness of the servicemen who are patriots and internationalists. The Soviet people love their army, are proud of it, are constantly concerned about it, and are providing it with everything necessary for the accomplishment of the missions facing it. The monolithic unity of the army and the people is one of the main sources of the Soviet Armed Forces' strength.

The Soviet constitution defines the legal status of the Soviet citizen, expands and guarantees the rights and freedoms of the citizens, confirms the principle of their equality before the law, and establishes the unity of their rights and responsibilities. The Soviet servicemen are Soviet citizens who enjoy full and equal rights and are accomplishing the duty of the motherland's armed defenders. This is one of the factors which ensure the indestructible unity of the army and the people.

The Soviet constitution proclaims that the Communist Party is the leading and directing force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system and state and public organizations. The leadership of the Armed Forces by the CPSU is the guarantee for ensuring their proper combat readiness. Questions of strengthening the defensive capability of the country and increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces are constantly at the center of attention of the Central Committee CPSU, its Politburo, and the general secretary of the Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, and chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev. The combining of these posts in the person of the outstanding party, state, and military leader, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, strengthens the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In accordance with the principles of Soviet democracy the Supreme Soviet, as the highest organ of state authority, is competent to decide all questions which are referred by the constitution to the jurisdiction of the USSR. And according to Article 73 of the Soviet constitution, the questions of peace and war, the protection of sovereignty, the guarding of the state borders and the territory of the USSR, the organization of the defense, and the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces are within the jurisdiction of the USSR. The Supreme Soviet USSR passes laws on military organizational development. Such a law is, for example, the law of the USSR, "On the universal military obligation."

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR which, within the limits envisaged by the constitution, accomplishes the functions of highest organ of Soviet state authority in the period between sessions, is also competent to resolve important military questions. For example, it forms the Military Council of the USSR and approves its composition, appoints and replaces the high command of the Soviet Armed Forces, establishes military ranks, and so forth (Article 121 of the constitution). It also issues ukases and decrees in regard to questions within its jurisdiction. Thus, ukases of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet USSR approved the military oath and the general military regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces, giving them the force of law and the basic legal norms for the life of the military organism.

In accordance with the constitution, the Council of Ministers USSR accomplishes overall direction of the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and determines the annual contingent of citizens subject to call-up for active military service. Decrees on these and other questions of military organizational development form an important component part of the legislation which regulates the life and combat activity of our Armed Forces.

Based on the provisions of Article 135 of the Soviet constitution which determine the competence of ministries and state committees of the USSR, the conclusion should be drawn that the Ministry of Defense USSR is assigned the direction of all organs of military control subordinate to it and responsibility for the state and development of this sphere of its activity. Within the limits of his competence, the Soviet Minister of Defense issues orders and other legal acts and organizes and checks their implementation on the basis of and in executing the laws of the USSR, other decisions of the Supreme Soviet USSR and its Presidium, and decrees and instructions of the Council of Ministers USSR which are mandatory for all organs of military control subordinate to him.

In their totality the provisions of the Soviet constitution, the laws of the USSR, the ukases of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, and decrees of the Council of Ministers USSR on military questions, the military oath, the military regulations, orders, and other legal acts form a well developed system of legal norms which regulate the organizational development, life, and activity of the Armed Forces.

The organs of Soviet military control are structured and function on principles of strict centralization and unity of command which have been confirmed in military legislation. This is caused by the specific nature of the Armed Forces and the necessity to ensure unity of will and action by all personnel, a high state of military discipline, combat efficiency, and the combat readiness of the troops. At the same time, those requirements of the principle of democratic centralism which are confirmed in the constitution are also extended to the Armed Forces in full measure: the obligatory nature of decisions by higher organs for lower ones, the combination of unity of command with initiative and creative activity locally, and its combination with the responsibility of each state organ and official for the assigned matter.

The most important organizational principle of the Soviet Armed Forces is unity of command. At the same time, unity of command in them is combined with a collective quality and the collegium of the Ministry of Defense and military councils are functioning. As indicated in the decree of the Central Committee CPSU and the Council of Ministers USSR of 17 April 1978, military councils have the rights of consideration and solution of all most important
questions concerning the life and activity of the Armed Forces and are responsible to the Central Committee CPSU, the government, and the Ministry of Defense for the condition and combat readiness of the troops.

Soviet unity of command is accomplished on a party basis. The commander (chief) is required to implement firmly and consistently the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government, rely on the party organization in all his activity, and utilize in every way the mobilizing force and influence of the party and Komsomol organizations to improve discipline and the combat readiness of the troops entrusted to him. The commander-communist directs the activity of the party organization. The most varied problems in service activity of communists and Komsomols are discussed at party and Komsomol meetings and with their most active members. An important role is also played by service conferences of command and leadership personnel, meetings of personnel, comradely courts, and other organs of the military public. All these forms of collective activity and the broad participation of servicemen and their collectives in the life of the Armed Forces help the one-man commanders in the selection of the most expedient decisions and ways for their practical implementation.

V. I. Lenin taught us to observe the laws and instructions of Soviet authority in a sacred manner and to see to their execution by everyone. He stressed "the execution of all laws concerning the Red Army and all orders and the maintenance of discipline in it in every possible way through conscience rather than through fear..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 39, p 152).

In accordance with Lenin's behests, the constitution establishes that the Soviet state and all its organs function on the basis of socialist legality and that state and public organizations, officials, and citizens are required to observe the constitution and Soviet laws. These provisions also pertain in full measure to the organs of military control, all commanders and chiefs, and all servicemen regardless of their service status and military rank.

The laws of the Soviet state express the will of the people and party policy in the field of the motherland's defense and ensuring the combat might of her Armed Forces. Confirming and regulating military service relations in accordance with this, the laws and military regulations introduce stability, firmness, and specific definiteness in them and direct the activity of the Armed Forces' personnel toward the attainment of a common single goal. They thereby regulate the life and activity of the military organism.

To function on the basis of socialist legality is, first of all, the steadfast execution of the Armed Forces' constitutional duty to the Soviet people. This also means the constant comparison and conformity of one's behavior with the constitution, Soviet laws, and military regulations, the strict observance and precise execution of all their requirements, the conscientious enjoyment of one's rights, and the performance of one's service duties as well as respect for the law and the legal interests and obligations of other persons. Violation of these rights is punishable by law.
The principle of legality obliges the organs of military management and one-man commanders to issue orders and other acts only on the basis of and in execution of laws and military regulations, in complete and exact conformance with them, and to execute one-man command and disciplinary authority on the basis of and within the framework of legal norms and within the limits of their authority.

Socialist legality is inseparably connected with military discipline. Legality is an important means for maintaining firm military law and order and increasing the personal responsibility of the men. The higher the level of legality, the better its state with the troops, the clearer the execution, and the higher the organization and combat readiness of the troop units, ships, and large units.

Experience proven by history and by daily troop practice confirms the high level of effectiveness of the principles for the organizational development, life, and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces which are confirmed in the Soviet constitution and developed in Soviet laws, governmental decrees, military regulations, and other acts of military legislation which, in their aggregate, form the legal basis for the functioning of our state's military organization.

Further strengthening of the legal basis for state and public life is considered in the Soviet constitution as a component part of the development of socialist democracy, the improvement of the Soviet state system, and the development of Soviet society's entire political system. At the same time, the ensuring of socialist legality and law and order in every way in the Armed Forces serves to improve the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the troops.

In this work, special attention should be devoted to seeing that each article and each provision of the new Soviet constitution is considered in full measure in the daily activity of all organs of military management, all responsible officials, and all Soviet servicemen. "We did not create the constitution for decoration," stressed Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his concluding remarks at the special Seventh Session of the Supreme Soviet USSR. "It must be implemented and will be implemented in all its parts."

The efforts of commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations, organs of military justice, and military collectives are being directed toward the accomplishment of this task. Commanders and political officers, communists and Komsomols serve as a personal example of the strict observance and precise execution of the requirements of the constitution, laws, and regulations. Relying on party and Komsomol organizations, the one-man commanders and political organs are mobilizing the personnel for the implementation of the constitutional requirement--to maintain the constant combat readiness of the troops--and for improving organization, discipline, and military law and order. They are indoctrinating the men in a spirit of high political consciousness and vigilance, the sanctity and inviolability of the laws, the
military oath, and the military regulations, and irreconcilability toward bourgeois ideology and manifestations of a petty bourgeois ideology.

In accordance with the principles of socialist democracy, the constitution establishes that the citizens of the USSR are equal before the law regardless of origin, social and property status, race and nationality, education, and other circumstances and that equality of rights is ensured in all fields of economic, political, social, and cultural life. It grants the citizens broad rights and guarantees the opportunity for their actual implementation.

The Soviet servicemen are also equal before the law. They, just as all Soviet citizens, possess the full and complete socio-economic, political, and personal rights and freedoms proclaimed and guaranteed by the constitution of the USSR and Soviet laws. No one can prevent the servicemen from enjoying the rights granted to him, just as his enjoyment of his rights and freedoms must not harm the interests of society and the state or the rights of other citizens.

In our society—a society of developed socialism, genuine democracy, and a high level of organization, moral fiber, and consciousness of the workers—the organic combination of actual rights and freedoms of the citizens with their obligations and responsibility to the state is ensured. On the strength of this principle, the constitution proclaims that the implementation of the rights and freedoms is inseparable from the citizens' performance of their duties. Along with the rights, it defines the basis obligations of the Soviet citizens and imposes lofty requirements on them.

Servicemen and reservists who are called to assemblies not only enjoy full and complete rights, but they also bear all the obligations of citizens which are envisioned by the constitution. Furthermore, they are endowed with rights and bear responsibilities which follow from the conditions of military service. Just as all Soviet citizens, the servicemen of the Armed Forces are obliged to observe the constitution and Soviet laws, respect the rules of socialist society, bear the lofty title of citizen of the USSR with dignity, guard the interests of the Soviet state, and contribute to the strengthening of its might and authority.

The new constitution, just as formerly, proclaims the defense of the socialist fatherland as the sacred duty of each citizen of the USSR, and military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces as an honorable obligation of the citizens. The Soviet servicemen always perform this first duty with honor and dignity and prove by deed their boundless devotion to the motherland, the party, and the people and their loyalty to the military oath. Moved by patriotic feelings, they are constantly improving their combat skill, persistently mastering complex military equipment, are closing their ranks ever more closely, and are improving organization and discipline, attaining clarity and coordination in actions and best indices in combat and political training.

The basic law imposes on the Soviet citizens, including the servicemen, the obligation to protect and strengthen socialist property, struggle against
embezzlement and waste of state and public property, respect the rights and legal interests of others, be uncompromising toward antisocial deeds, and assist in the protection of public order in every way.

Each serviceman's conscientious accomplishment of all duties envisaged by the constitution, Soviet laws, and military regulations is one of the main ways to strengthen socialist legality and military law and order and to increase even further the organization, discipline, and combat readiness of the troops.

Respect for the personality and protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens which are recorded in the constitution are the duty of all state organs, public organizations, and responsible officials. The same duty is assigned to the organs of military administration, commanders and other responsible officials, and public organizations of the Armed Forces. Commanders and political officers are constantly concerned that all servicemen have the actual opportunity to enjoy their rights and accomplish their citizen's and military duty conscientiously. They see strictly that the servicemen do not accomplish any actions or deeds which harm the interests of society and the state or the rights of fellow servicemen and other citizens. Such phenomena as abasement of the personality, honor, and dignity of the serviceman and any other violations of the rules of military comradeship are absolutely foreign to the socialist nature of our army. Cases of this type must be prevented in time and decisively stopped, regardless of who committed them. This is an important part of the work to rally the military collectives and strengthen discipline in them.

The organs of military justice are making a certain contribution to the ensuring of legality, firm military order, and the legal indoctrination of the Armed Forces personnel.

In accordance with the constitution and the statute on the military prosecutor's office which was approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, the highest supervision of the precise and uniform execution of the laws in the Soviet Armed Forces is assigned to the Prosecutor-General of the USSR and the Chief Military Prosecutor and lower military prosecutors subordinate to him.

In close coordination with the command, political organs, and the military community the military prosecutors are directing all their efforts toward the steadfast accomplishment of the requirements of the Soviet constitution, Soviet laws, and military regulations among the troops and are striving to assist in every way in the raising of military discipline and combat readiness.

They see as their party and service duty the accomplishment of highest supervision over the precise and uniform execution of the laws by the military organs of command, responsible officials, and servicemen with even greater activity and devotion to principle, the conduct of a struggle against violators of the law, the reliable protection of the rights and legal interests of servicemen and other Soviet citizens, troop units, and institutions, and
the timely adoption of measures provided by law for the elimination of any violations, from wherever they may originate, and the institution of legal proceedings against the guilty.

All activity of the organs of the military prosecutor's office to include the application of measures of state compulsion and the force of law is acquiring an ever more clearly expressed preventive-indoctrinational nature. They are adopting active measures to disclose and eliminate the reasons and the conditions for the emergence of violations of the law and to indoctrinate the servicemen in a spirit of precise and steadfast implementation of the Soviet constitution, Soviet laws, the military oath, military regulations, and orders of commanders and chiefs.

In our Armed Forces, which are organized on socialist socio-political and legal principles, there are all actual conditions and opportunities to constantly ensure actual legality and firm military order in each troop unit, on each ship, and in each subunit, institution, and organ of military command. This is evidenced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the servicemen are performing their service irreproachably and that no violations of the law or incidents have been noted for a long time in many units and large units while their number is being reduced annually in others.

But such opportunities are still not completely utilized everywhere. And as a result, violations of discipline and military order appear. One of the ways to correct this situation, as was stressed with new force in the decisions of the December (1977) Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU, is to improve the organization, order, and discipline in all spheres of life and constantly to improve the quality and effectiveness of the work by all organs and responsible officials.

Special attention should be devoted to the prevention and timely stopping of violations of the law. Here, all efforts should be directed toward the complete elimination of cases of deviation from the rules for the performance of military duty, guard, garrison and interior service, from mutual relations in the troop collective as called for by the regulations, and from the rules for the care of socialist property, and cases of amoral behavior must be decisively rooted out.

The experience of many units and large units where exemplary order is the constant norm in their lives and activity shows that this has become possible as a result of an integrated approach to the formulation of preventive and indoctrinational work and the unified and well coordinated actions of commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations, and the organs of military justice. Skillful organizers of legal propaganda are directing it into a single channel of ideological work and the communist indoctrination of the servicemen. They are concerned about increasing the skill of the agitators and propagandists and raising the ideological and methodological level of lectures, reports, talks, conferences, and other indoctrinational measures. They skillfully tie constitutional provisions with the norms of
other Soviet laws, requirements of the military oath and military regulations, with the life of the troops, and with the practical tasks being accomplished in the units and subunits. They are varying the forms of oral and printed legal propaganda with consideration of the different groups of servicemen. Here, special attention is devoted to explaining the rights and obligations of the Soviet servicemen and the principle of the organic combination of rights with duties and the responsibility of the citizens to the state and society. The personal responsibility of the servicemen for the defense of the socialist fatherland is stressed as is their service duty—to display a high level of vigilance everywhere and in everything.

Being guided by the decree of the Central Committee CPSU, "On the status and measures to improve lecture propaganda," it is necessary to raise the organizational level of propaganda work and its purposefulness everywhere and to eliminate shortcomings in good time and completely.

The creative use of leading experience should serve the further increase in the effectiveness of measures being conducted in the Armed Forces. It is very important to adopt the most effective forms and measures of propaganda and, on this basis, to raise the level of legal indoctrination of the men and to mold in them an active life's position, a high state of discipline and vigilance, and the habit of strict observance of legal and moral norms.

The interests of the matter require that propaganda on the constitution of the USSR, laws, and military regulations be closely connected in literally each unit and on every ship with daily practical activity of commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations for the further strengthening of discipline and law and order, for improving the work of all responsible officials, and for increasing the effectiveness and quality of military labor, organization, and personal responsibility of each service-
man for the performance of his duty. This is the indispensable condition for the further strengthening of the legal basis of life in the Armed Forces and for maintaining their combat readiness at the level required by the basic law of the Soviet socialist public state.

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USE OF MORAL INCENTIVES FOR IMPROVING SOCIALIST COMPETITION DISCUSSED

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[Article by Lt Gen M. Popkov, member of Military Council, chief of Political Directorate, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Moral Incentives for Competition"]

[Text] Strained combat training is under way in the district's units and subunits. The troop personnel, just as all Soviet servicemen, are striving to accomplish the missions assigned by the Minister of Defense USSR to the armed defenders of our motherland with high quality. This is being furthered by the socialist competition which has been widely initiated in the units and subunits. It is having a profound influence on the training and indoctrination process, the socio-political life of the troop collectives, and on the moral atmosphere in them. The mobilizing role of the competition was stressed with new force in the Letter of the Central Committee CPSU, the Council of Ministers USSR, the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, and the Komsomol Central Committee to party, Soviet, administrative, trade union, and Komsomol organizations and to the workers of the Soviet Union, "On the initiation of socialist competition for the accomplishment and overaccomplishment of the plan for the year 1978 and intensification of the struggle to increase the effectiveness of production and the quality of work."

The letter caused an ardent response in the hearts of millions of Soviet people. It was also greeted with inspiration by our servicemen. The ideas and provisions of this important document have tremendous significance for the further strengthening of the competition's effectiveness, it being a powerful lever to increase the creative activity and initiative of the Soviet Armed Forces' personnel.

This year, the socialist competition in our district was enriched with new experience and valuable patriotic initiatives. As is known, it is taking place under the slogan, "Defend the socialist fatherland dependably, be in constant combat readiness, master weapons and equipment persistently, and improve combat skill."

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In the district, the first to respond ardently to the call of the Carpathian motorized riflemen to make the year of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces a year of soldierly shock labor were the men of the Guards Motorized Rifle Rezhitskaya Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Division imeni Hero of the Soviet Union Major General I. V. Panfilov. The Panfilovites again headed the struggle for the title of leading large unit. Realistically substantiated socialist obligations have been assumed and are being accomplished successfully in the units and subunits of this legendary division. Commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations, and all Soviet servicemen consider their achievements as a step for a further increase in combat readiness, outstanding knowledge of weapons and equipment, their skillful mastery, and ensuring the strict observance of the requirements of discipline, the regulations, and the norms of communist morals.

Combat training and competition are inseparable. Competition stimulates the search for the new in the training process, instills the striving always to be ahead in the servicemen, helps to make the most complete use of the capabilities of equipment and weapons and exceed combat-training norms, and further the effective employment of armament. At the same time, competition rallies the military collectives and helps commanders and political officers to mold in the personnel communist conviction, lofty moral-political and combat qualities, and a conscientious attitude toward the performance of their honorable duty to the motherland.

It is completely clear that much here also depends on how the practice of moral incentive is organized in various troop collectives. It is one thing when a person feels that his work and training are of interest, his diligence is noted, his successes are mentioned, and his initiative finds active support of the commanders, political officers, and the army community. This gives him new strength and inspires him. It is quite another thing when the competition is organized formally on lessons in the field, on the range, on the firing range, or on the tank driving grounds, when the efforts of the servicemen are not noted, and moral incentives are employed from case to case, in an ordinary manner, and for the sake of form.

This year commanders, political organs, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations of our units and subunits have intensified their attention to questions of moral incentive and are being strictly guided by party instructions and the corresponding requirements of the Minister of Defense USSR and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces. They regularly organize conferences, seminars, and lessons with the officers, warrant officers [praporshchik], and sergeants, teach them how to make an objective evaluation and note the soldierly labor of the men, and analyze the practice of employing incentives.

Commanders and chiefs have available a harmonious system of means for encouragement. They are granted great rights by the Disciplinary Regulation of the Soviet Armed Forces: the announcement of thanks to the serviceman, awarding him certificates or the badge of the expert, cancelling disciplinary punishment previously imposed on him, and other rewards.
The honoring of the best specialists and entire troop subunits has become widely employed among the troops. The leading troop collectives of the district are awarded Memorial Banners of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets and Councils of Ministers of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Tadzhikistan—the republics on whose territory the troops of the district are based. Battalions and companies which are winners of the socialist competition are awarded challenge Red Banners, prizes, and certificates. Platoons, sections, squads, and crews are awarded challenge pennants. Subunits and regiments which have earned the title of outstanding are entered in the historical service lists of the large units.

We provide special rewards for officers, warrant officers, and extended-service men whose subordinate troop units and subunits are continuously outstanding for at least two years. For example, they may be recommended for the awarding of government awards, early promotion to the next military ranks, or enjoy an advantage when entering higher military-educational institutions and when advancing in service in the established order.

Awards instituted by the Komsomol Central Committee also have an indoctrinal effect on the men. They are awarded annually to the best of the best Komsomols. They are the Komsomol Badge of Honor, the badge "Military Valor," and others. The right guides of the army formation are entered in the Book of Honor of the Komsomol Central Committee. The awarding of the challenge Red Banner of the Central Committee of the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League to the best Komsomol organization is becoming a significant event in the life of the district's Komsomol.

In many units, it has become the rule, when summing up the results of combat training and competition for the month, to photograph the victors of the competition together with famous workers of the oblast and the republic, with veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and to award them photographs with the signatures of distinguished people. Here, commanders and political officers try to see that the incentive has a purposeful character and assists in the concentration of the servicemen's efforts on the main directions in the struggle for combat readiness, the skillful mastery of combat equipment and weapons, and the further strengthening of military discipline.

Special attention of command-political personnel is concentrated on the moral incentive of the men who have distinguished themselves on tactical exercises, in flights, on live firings and launchings, and in the accomplishment of exercises in driving combat vehicles. We publicize in every way the achievements of the experts and the successes of the leading collectives. In the jubilee year, for example, we widely propagandized the experience of the leading officers who were decorated with orders and medals for soldierly labor—the commander of a combat engineer platoon, Senior Lieutenant V. Fishchuk, a battery commander, Senior Lieutenant N. Botov, a company commander, Senior Lieutenant A. Abramov, a chief of staff of a motorized rifle battalion, Captain S. Nasrullayev, and a commander of a tank battalion, Captain A. Korkishko. We tell about them and other competition winners regularly at
officers' calls, methodological conferences, seminars, assemblies, lessons, and talks. The achievements of the experts are also popularized in leaflets, posters, and radio broadcasts.

I will refer to the experience of the N-th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment. This unit is rich in combat traditions. Here, moral incentives which increase the activity of the men in combat training and in mastering combat equipment and weapons are skillfully used to mobilize the personnel for the accomplishment of lofty socialist obligations. Colorfully prepared greetings with a portrait of one of the Heroes of the Soviet Union who was trained in the unit alongside a photograph of the serviceman who has distinguished himself and with warm words of thanks are awarded to the men directly in the field, on the firing range, and on the tank driving grounds. The men accept with excitement from the hands of the commanders the pennants, prizes, and ribbons of honor which mark the successes of the soldiers and sergeants, sections, crews, and platoons in the accomplishment of training—combat missions on tactical exercises, firings, driving sessions, when servicing equipment, and so forth. The men consider it a great personal honor to shoot or drive combat vehicles for frontline fighters Heroes of the Soviet Union S. Rassokha and A. Dyatlov. The winners of the competition receive the right to sign the report to veterans of the unit, participants in the Great Patriotic War. Such forms of moral incentive are skillfully linked with the unit's combat traditions.

The "Call-over with a day at the front" which is conducted in the regiment has a positive influence on the quality of field lessons. In the course of live firings and tactical exercises the commanders and political officers bring to the attention of the servicemen a description of events from the unit's history which occurred at the front 35 years ago. Then the men assume personal obligations for the period of the exercise or accomplishment of the firings and assure their commanders that they will spare no energy and strength to be worthy of the glory of their fellow-soldier heroes.

The visits to lessons by veterans of the unit also have a tremendous emotional impact on the servicemen. This year, one of the 28 Panfilov Guardsmen, Hero of the Soviet Union I. Shadrin, former political instructor A. Dubinin, and other veterans were present on the firing training grounds, on the range, and on the firing range of the unit. Recently, the men warmly received the children of Major General I. V. Panfilov—the daughters Valentina, Yevgeniya, Galina, and Mayya, and his son, Vladilen, a lieutenant colonel. On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces, guests of the personnel were the daughter of political instructor V. Klochkov, El'vira, and a former commissar of the regiment, Colonel (retired) A. Mukhamed'yarov.

The guardsmen are also inspired by letters to their parents, to the enterprises, or to the schools. The letters tell about the achievements of the men in training and in service. It is mandatory that the letters be read before a formation of all subunit personnel. Radio broadcasts devoted to the winners of the competition and stories about them in operational news sheets and wall newspapers leave a good trace in the men's consciousness.
There are many examples of a creative approach to moral incentive whose forms are continuously enriched and are becoming considerably broader among the troops of the district. Thus, the honoring of the leaders of socialist competition enjoys great popularity in the unit clubs and Officers' Houses. At soirees which are often called "From all our hearts," young officers meet with their mentors—teachers of the military schools, with writers and composers, and with their comrades in the competition. Parents and representatives of the shops and brigades where the servicemen worked prior to entering the army also arrive for the soirees honoring the soldiers and sergeants. The right guides are saluted by veterans of the party and the Armed Forces, heroes of labor, and pioneers.

These measures are thoroughly prepared under the direct supervision of commanders, political organs, and party organizations. The committees and bureaus of the Komsomol display activity and businesslike initiative here, too. The honoring takes place, as a rule, with great emotional enthusiasm and leaves a profound impression.

The honoring of entire subunits has also become traditional. One such measure was devoted to the outstanding reconnaissance subunit commanded by Captain Yu. Andreyev. Photo newspapers on the life of the leading subunit, poster leaflets, and bulletins about the best people were hung in a festively adorned room. The unit commander, staff officers, and men with whom the scouts competed spoke to those who were assembled and workers and kolkhoz workers from neighboring enterprises and kolkhozes also spoke. The soldier's chorus sang the servicemen's requests which resounded in the hall. The experts of combat and political training were awarded valuable gifts and souvenirs to the applause of the audience.

The honoring of the men inspired the scouts and all personnel of the regiment to new soldierly deeds. On days of winter training, the subunit is marching confidently in the leading ranks of the competitors. Missions in combat and political training are accomplished with great enthusiasm, effectively, and in a quality manner here and the combat skill of the men is being improved from day to day.

It goes without saying that such occasions of honor are used, as a rule, in those cases where discussion concerns the rewarding of the servicemen for a large contribution to the success of a small unit or unit in socialist competition. In speaking of this, it is necessary to stress that when employing measures of moral incentive commanders and political officers should not lose a sense of proportion. Extremes are impermissible here: on the one hand, a lowering of the grade for a high result attained by the competitors, and on the other—the extremely generous rewarding of a serviceman for insignificant success. Now, when the party demands that we concentrate our efforts on raising the quality and effectiveness of work, accuracy and objectivity are especially important in evaluating the labor of each serviceman and each troop collective. Underestimating the diligence of a serviceman, just as exaggerating the evaluation of efforts for the attainment of certain results, has a negative effect on the quality and effectiveness of combat training.
Commanders and political officers are striving to employ varied forms of moral incentive constantly, skillfully, and in strict conformance with the volume of work accomplished by one or another person. Those who scatter rewards as if from the horn of plenty proceed absolutely incorrectly. Such a method is of no value. On the contrary, it develops among subordinates a light approach to the accomplishment of tasks, conceit, and complacency. In those collectives where unremitting attention is devoted to the organization of competition and where a spirit of creativity and mutual exactingness reigns, an atmosphere for the continuous exchange of experience has been created and, as a rule, such errors have been eliminated.

A certain moral atmosphere and public opinion which would contribute to the broad publicity of how to study, work, and serve should be created in each troop collective in the course of training and competition. The contribution of each member of the collective to the common success must receive an objective evaluation. It is very important that the servicemen who participate in the competition are always confident. Their diligence in service, exemplary behavior, initiative, and creative approach to the accomplishment of tasks must be noted by the commander and party and Komsomol organizations and approved by their fellow servicemen. At the same time, it is necessary to instill in the servicemen the firm conviction that violators of military discipline will not avoid responsibility. Such a healthy moral atmosphere bears a powerful stimulating motivation for each serviceman and forces him to compete with the best specialists, struggle for first place in the competition, and be a model in observing military order.

It can be said with confidence that today the creative activity of the serviceman is truly becoming one of the chief criteria according to which he is evaluated by his brother-soldiers and comrades in arms. The serviceman who has mastered armament and equipment in an excellent manner as well as his combat specialty and who participates actively in community life and in propagandizing knowledge and leading experience always enjoyed and enjoys respect in the military collective.

As always, the communists are marching in the vanguard of the competition. Many of their undertakings have been widely seized upon among the troops. For example, communists of the outstanding battery commanded by Captain V. Gavv stepped forth as the initiators of the movement for the outstanding accomplishment of firings while those of the motorized rifle company imeni Hero of the Soviet Union political instructor V. Klokho stepped forth with the initiative, "We will continue and multiply the traditions of our fathers." The movement for the right to win the prize imeni the Hero of the Soviet Union—an alumnus of the unit—was also greeted with ardent support of the men in the district. These patriotic initiatives embody the living tie of the heroic history of the Soviet Armed Forces and the combat traditions of the units and subunits with today’s practice, with the successful accomplishment of tasks in combat and political training, and with a further increase in the vigilance and combat readiness of the district's troops.
The majority of CPSU members and candidate members are examples in training and service. The party organizations are constantly concerned about this. Party meetings on the personal contribution of each communist to raising the level of combat readiness, the quality of combat training, and the effectiveness of socialist competition which are conducted in the units have shown up in a good light.

The positive experience of reports by communists concerning their accomplishment of the duties set forth in the CPSU regulations has been accumulated by many party organizations. During such reports, the discussion turns not only on the exemplary nature of the CPSU member in the accomplishment of the obligations which he has assumed, but also on how he helps his service comrades, displays initiative, and how uncompromising his attitude toward shortcomings is.

Replacements come to the troop collectives twice a year. Instilling in the young servicemen noble inducements for soldierly labor, a sense of responsibility, pride in their specialty and their unit, and a high state of discipline and vigilance is a subject of primary concern for commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations.

The indoctrinational effect of the ceremonial presentation of weapons and combat equipment is great. It has become a firm part of the practice in the majority of troop collectives. This ceremony takes place as a great and exciting event. Commanders tell about the remarkable qualities of Soviet weapons and equipment, about those who master them skillfully, about ways to master firing, driving, working procedures on radios, and so forth. Masters of military affairs speak to the young soldiers and provide a practical demonstration of how weapons and equipment operate faultlessly. Taking the weapons in their own hands, the newcomers give their word to their comrades that they will study them to perfection, take care of them carefully, and master them skillfully.

It is especially important in the competition that the serviceman's success, just as his omissions in service, finds a response on the part of his commander and fellow servicemen. It is appropriate to stress here that stimulation can be expressed both in the form of a moral reward as well as in moral condemnation. Both have a strong indoctrinating influence on the servicemen.

In life, it often happens that some commander or political officer finds dozens of objective reasons which allegedly interfere in obtaining ponderable results in combat training and in competition. But if you look, the roots of low effectiveness in combat training and competition go down into elementary disorganization and the absence of proper order in the company and battalion. The leaders prepared for lessons improperly, permitted simplifications and indulgences in working out exercises and the accomplishment of combat-training missions, did not conduct drills and tactical and marching drill exercises in the proper manner, and were unable to prepare the training-material base. So efficiency was also reduced and conditions for the
accomplishment of socialist obligations were made difficult. It can definitely be stated that the attainment of successes in competition is possible only if constant concern is displayed for each lesson, for each person, and for seeing that the words of the competitors are embodied in deeds without fail.

The commanders and political officers of our district are striving to consider the conditions which influence the effectiveness of the moral incentives which they employ and to know their subordinates, their needs, requirements, and attitudes well. These goals are served, in particular, by correspondence with the men's parents and by the collection and study of material in the course of individual work. The communists and Komsomol activists render great assistance to the commanders and political organs in this matter.

The influence of a reward or critical evaluation has the greatest effect if these incentives are applied to a person in time. Among the district's troops it has become a rule to declare thanks, as they say, while hot on the scent, to prepare bulletins of leading experience without delay, to release radio reports on the right guides, and to award pennants to the winners. We conduct regular summing up of the competition's results and each man is immediately rendered his due for his work.

True, at times "troubles" occur. Let us say, an order declares leave for a soldier but there is a delay in giving the soldier the documents. It is clear that the man's attitude will be spoiled and, as a result, the reward loses its meaning. Or it also happens that a man is awarded the badge, "Expert of the Soviet Army," but there is no haste in giving him the decoration. We examine each specific case of blunders of this type and they receive a fundamental evaluation in the political sections, party committees, and party bureaus. Errors in employing measures of moral incentive for the men are now encountered more and more rarely.

Problems in the correct use of means for moral reward are discussed regularly at assemblies, seminars, and at lessons in the commander's training system.

The district's political directorate constantly rivets the attention of commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations on improving practice in the use of moral incentives and increasing their effectiveness. In this regard, they strive to see that the entire variety of rewards are employed primarily in the subunit. This is important because only in this way can the greatest influence on the personnel be attained. Meanwhile, moral incentives are not always skillfully used in the company or battery. The district's political directorate sees that the most varied rewards are employed widely, creatively, and effectively in the companies and batteries and that the subunit commanders have the necessary conditions and opportunities for this. Much attention was devoted to moral incentive in recommendations on how to convert the company into a center for the training and indoctrination of the personnel which were worked out recently by the district's political directorate. Officers from the political directorate teach the commanders and political officers directly on the spot, especially those at the company level, how to make skillful use of incentives which have proven themselves.
The leading experience in moral incentive is widely generalized in the dist-
trict. Recently, for example, the report of the chief of the political sec-
tion of the Guards Motorized Rifle Rezhitskaya Order of Lenin, Red Banner,
Order of Suvorov Division iimeni Hero of the Soviet Union Major General I. V.
Panfilov was discussed in the political directorate. The report was sub-
mitted by Guards Colonel V. Polevik on the course of the competition in light
of the requirements of the Letter from the Central Committee CPSU, the Council
of Ministers USSR, the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, and the Komsomol
Central Committee and the requirements of the Minister of Defense USSR and the
chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces. Along with
other questions, the practice of using moral incentives was also examined in
a detailed conversation.

Of course, the district's political directorate does not overlook shortcomings
in the work of commanders, political organs, or party and Komsomol organiza-
tions on this important work sector. We have not yet overcome crash programs
in this important matter. It happens that moral incentives are widely used on
the eve of some holiday or after the completion of a training period or
training year but they are forgotten in daily life. We encounter instances
where a serviceman or an entire subunit is excessively praised. Sometimes
praise is even given from inertia, for past services, losing sight of the fact
that the serviceman or subunit worsened their indices. It is a rare occurrence
where, for example, the rank of expert or outstanding subunit is officially
lifted from someone or a subunit. But you see, this is a strong means for
influencing the servicemen. Junior commanders are extremely timid in employ-
ing the rights granted to them for rewarding subordinates. This has a nega-
tive influence on the authority of the noncommissioned officers, on the one
hand and, on the other, narrows the field of employment of moral incentives.
The district political directorate sees that moral incentives have in fact
become incentives for creativity and initiative in each unit and subunit.

At the present stage of the competition, the men of the district have taken
especially close to their hearts the instruction of the General Secretary of
the Central Committee CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet USSR, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev: "Work better today than yesterday, and
tomorrow better than today," and they consider it their duty to redouble
their efforts in combat training and service. Commanders of the district's
units and subunits are trying to maintain this atmosphere in each subunit so
that each training day is completed with an outstanding result and the lesson
proceeds with high effectiveness. For the attainment of this goal, many of
them analyze indices in the training of each squad, crew, and section and the
level of training of each specialist attentively and daily. In the course of
this analysis they determine the cost for attaining various results and, in
summing up the results, they propagate in every way and reward those who
managed to work out one or another training-combat mission better or exceed
the norms under more difficult conditions.

We are concerned that each commander increases his role in the effective use
of moral incentives. And this consists of noting the diligence of the men
in time, evaluating it objectively, determining the most expedient form of
reward, making his experience the property of all, and not leaving those who have a listless attitude toward the matter of training and service without exerting influence on them. The attention of the officer-educators is focused on employing moral incentives consistently and on seeing that the senior commander usually employs his rights only when lower commanders have exhausted their capabilities. It is important to attach special significance to each case where moral incentive measures are employed and to make this act an exciting and joyous event not only for the one being rewarded, but also for all members of the collective. It is important to see that it causes pride for their comrade in everyone and the desire to be his equal, take the leader as an example, and repeat his experience.

We are trying to create at atmosphere where the fellow-servicemen of the experts have the opportunity to compare their personal successes with the highest indices attained by the leaders and where the moral incentives become a unique generator of effectiveness in socialist competition and an effective means for developing creative initiative of people. The Military Council and political directorate of the district are constantly directing commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations toward this.

Today, each day in the troops is saturated to the limit with stepped-up work on accomplishing the tasks of combat and political training and lofty socialist obligations. The district's troop personnel, just as all the motherland's defenders, inspired by the warm words of greeting from the party's Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, and the Council of Ministers USSR to the men of the Soviet Armed Forces in connection with their 60th anniversary, are continuing persistent mastery of the science of winning which was forged in battles. Commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations are striving to maintain a spirit of healthy competition between the men and of mutual assistance so as to please the motherland with worthy soldierly deeds in the current training year.

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RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY REGULATIONS AND DISCIPLINE EMPHASIZED

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[Article by Maj Gen V. Luzherenko, candidate of Historical Sciences and associate professor: "Regulations and Military Discipline"]

[Text] To students and assistants of political studies groups leaders

This article is recommended for use in preparing for political studies on the theme "The 25th CPSU Congress on the observance of Soviet laws, increase of responsibility and discipline, and the regulations of the USSR armed forces--a summary of the principles of life and military activity of the forces."

One of the most important conditions which contribute to carrying out the grandiose plans of the party for our country's economic and social development is the observance of socialist legality. Socialist legality ensures the further development of the state which scored the victory of socialism, strengthens public discipline and furthers the building of a communist society.

V. I. Lenin attached great significance to socialist legality. He demanded that the laws and directives of the Soviet Government be sacredly observed and their fulfillment seen to by everyone, emphasizing that "the least infringement, the least violation of soviet order is a chink which the workers' enemies will exploit...."

Measured by the growth of the tasks of communist development in quantity and complexity, the requirements of the Soviet people for organization and social order are constantly increasing. The 25th Congress of the CPSU gave much attention to the problems of strengthening Soviet law and order, socialist legality and discipline, and to improving the legal education of the workers as an integral part of communist development.
The adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR, the Fundamental Law of the land, was a notable contribution to the matter of communist development. The strict fulfillment by everyone—without exception—of the provisions of the Constitution is a reliable guarantee of socialist legality and law and order in the country.

Just what do the concepts of "law and order" and "socialist legality" mean? "Law and order" is conceived as a defined system in social relations, based on the strict observance of Soviet laws. "Socialist legality" is the strict, steadfast observance by all organs of the Soviet State, institutions, organizations, officials, and citizens of Soviet laws and other legal acts promulgated on them.

Soviet military discipline is one of the forms of socialist state discipline. The party always has and does treat conscientious military discipline as one of the basic Leninist principles of military development. High discipline ensures the organization and coordination of service personnel's actions and the exact and purposeful military order which makes it possible to maintain subunits [podrazdeleniya], units [chasti], and ships in constant combat readiness.

Military regulations play an important role in strengthening military discipline; achieving unity, precision, and teamwork of a military organism; and in the high combat readiness of the armed services. Created on the basis of a single socialist legality of the Soviet State, they hold within them the entire 60 years' experience of development of the Soviet armed forces and the training and education of personnel. They reflect the nature of our army as the army of a country of developing socialism and are an embodiment of the modern requirements of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government.

The essence of military discipline is formulated quite clearly in the Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR: "...the strict and exact observance by all military personnel of the order and rules established by Soviet laws and military regulations." The responsibilities of military personnel in maintaining military discipline are specifically and precisely defined in this regulation.

The awareness by each service member of his military duty and personal responsibility for the defense of his Homeland, the USSR, is basic military discipline. This awareness will help the defender of the Homeland to carry out exactly the demands of the military oath, military regulations, and the commands and orders of commanders. In them are expressed the will of the people and the will of the Communist Party.

Military discipline obliges service personnel to endure all the burdens and hardships of military service and not to spare his own blood or very life in carrying out his military duty. Soviet troops have acted just that way defending the freedom and independence of their socialist Fatherland, and while fulfilling their international duty in many complicated situations in peacetime.
A disciplined troop will constantly keep in mind the maintaining of military and state secrecy. Divulgence of secrets may damage the country's defense capabilities. It is therefore very important not to tolerate official conversations on the street, in public places, or in personal correspondence.

The requirements of the Disciplinary Regulations which pertain to the obligations of military personnel in strengthening military discipline are closely interwoven with the requirements of the Interior Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Set forth in them are the general duties of military personnel and relations between them, rules for internal order in a regiment and its subunits, duties of a regiment's major officials and the personnel of its subunits.

"A military serviceman", it is stated in the Interior Service Regulation, "...should sacredly and inviolably observe Soviet Laws and the military oath; be disciplined, honest, truthful, brave, and not spare his efforts or very life in fulfilling military duty; unquestioningly obey commanders (chiefs) and protect them in battle; and guard dearly the battle colors of his unit".

Statutes pertaining to the chain of command in the armed forces occupy an important place in regulations. The right of chiefs to give orders and to verify their execution has an important significance for maintaining firm military discipline as does the duty of subordinates to unquestioningly obey chiefs and carry out the requirements of seniors.

Observance of the procedure for performing internal service and of the duties of persons on daily detail which calls for the maintenance of internal order, protection of weapons, military and other materiel, munitions and a unit's buildings and stores--which are established by the Interior Service Regulation--have no less significance for strengthening military discipline. The precise, exact, and irreproachable fulfillment by a detail of its duties not only provides order, but also is conducive to strengthening discipline and raising the combat readiness of subunits.

On board ships, internal services, the responsibilities of officials, and the rules for performing detail duty are additionally regulated by Navy Regulations of the Military Fleet.

One of the indispensable qualities which characterize a disciplined troop is the strict fulfillment by him of the requirements of the Regulations of Garrison and Guard Duties of the Armed Forces of the USSR, in which the organization and order for performing garrison and guard duties are laid out, and the rights and responsibilities of garrison officials and other military personnel who bear these duties are defined.

The importance of observing the provisions of this regulation by all military personnel is explained first of all by the fact that performance of guard duty is a combat assignment: in guarding, a soldier is bound not only to guard, but also defend his post.
Drill training of personnel is carried out in accordance with the Drill Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Also stated in them are the duties of military personnel in formation, the procedure for executing drill movements, and saluting.

Fulfilling the requirements of this regulation is an important condition for strengthening military discipline.

There are no insignificant details or optional provisions in regulations. Only the strict and exact fulfillment of all their requirements characterize a disciplined troop and is conducive to a soldier or sailor acquiring the full amount of knowledge, skills, and ability necessary for him to firmly bear all the burdens and hardships of military service, the difficulties of combat conditions, and to act bravely and with confidence in all the conditions of army life.

However carefully and minutely regulations have been worked out though, they are not able to contain instructions and recommendations for all the instances of life. Moreover, the very concept of military discipline in our time is filled with new substance and is growing ever larger and multifaceted, being enriched by provisions and rules of behavior which control the life and activity of troops in modern situations. Such concepts as discipline of time, discipline of collective responsibility for carrying out combat assignments, and discipline of competent operation of equipment and weapons have come into practice in the army and navy life. The role has increased for such moral and resolute qualities of the fighting man as honesty and truthfulness, selflessness and courage, and a consciousness of his civil and military duty.

Today it is extremely important to follow unswervingly not only the letter, but also the spirit of regulations. For this, it is necessary to cultivate in oneself such a quality as self-discipline which should become an inherent trait of a Soviet soldier’s character.

Just what is self-discipline? It is self-criticism; the capacity to avoid a wrong deed; the ability to control one’s nature; a deeply developed sense of personal responsibility for an assigned activity; self-control in behavior on duty and in everyday life; and observance of the principles of socialist society.

Soviet troops have time and again demonstrated high conscientiousness and discipline in carrying out their official duty in the course of performing military duty while rendering help to the workers in carrying out national economic tasks and overcoming the after-effects of natural calamities on military drill days.

Personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy live a full-blooded life. Strenuous combat training goes on in units, aboard ships, and in subunits. Troops persistently improve combat skill and vigilantly bear duty in exercises, on naval cruises, on board flights, on military alert, and in situations which
approximate actual combat. They understand well that their labor is a labor for the good of the Homeland and in the name of the triumph of communism. They have accepted with all their heart the words of the new Constitution of the USSR regarding the need to reliably defend the socialist Fatherland and to be in a constant readiness which guarantees an immediate repulse to any aggressor.

Inspired by the paternal salute of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers, the troops of the Soviet Armed Forces have assured the Communist Party and the Soviet Government that they--together in the future with troops of the fraternal countries of socialism--will vigilantly guard our peoples' historic achievements; devote all their efforts to raising the effectiveness and quality of military and political training; persistently master modern weapons and new military technology; and tirelessly increase their vigilance.

The further strengthening of military discipline, increase of organization and unity of military personnel, and strict fulfillment by every troop, of the requirements of the statutes which have become established as moral standards in our society, will undoubtedly favorably affect successes in military and political training, and the resolution of the responsible task set before the Soviet Armed Forces by the 25th CPSU Congress: to be the guard of the Soviet people's peaceful work and the stronghold of universal peace.

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