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PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

ROK PROFESSOR ANALYZES DPRK POLITICAL SYSTEM

Seoul VANTAGE POINT in English Vol 1, No 5, Sep 78 pp 1-11

[Abridgment of article by Han Pae-ho, professor of Korean University: "North Korean Political System"]

[Text]

North Korea is known to be the most closed and totalitarian of all Communist countries. It is different from the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states, which have contacts with Western nations, and even from China, which has now come to negotiate with the United States for diplomatic normalization.

In this regard, it is hard to grasp the situation in north Korea realistically and objectively. For north Korea watchers, the only available data are those official materials released by the Communist authorities mostly to serve their propaganda purposes. Herein lies one reason why a truly systematic and comprehensive study of the north Korean Communist system is well-nigh impossible.

When trying to understand the characteristics of the north Korean system despite these limitations, it is necessary to note the following points. First, the north Korean Communist system did not result from a long, drawn-out Communist revolution as in China but was in fact an "occupation regime" imposed by the Russian military government during its occupation of the territory at the end of World War II. As a consequence, the current slogans, "independence" and "subjectivity," chanted by the Kim Il-sung regime reflect the sensitive relationship between north Korea and Russia and, therefore, Kim Il-sung's so-called "Juche (independence) Thought" should also be understood in this context.¹

Second, before the formation of the Communist system in north Korea, the country was under Japanese colonial rule which, in turn, was preceded by 500 years of absolute monarchy. A scholar² once described the Japanese colonial system as "colonial totalitarianism" and it was well recognized that Japan enforced an unprecedentedly suppressive colonial rule on Korea. Just the same as their southern compatriots, the north Korean residents had been
placed under severe control and repression by the colonial government. As they came under the Russian military government, they were again subjected to control and oppression as rigorous as those under Japanese rule in contrast to the southern society which was exposed to Western democracy by the U.S. military government. The Communist rulers in north Korea could make the most of the people's blind submission to power taught by the Japanese colonialists.

Third, the north Korean regime has a militant nature; it attempted to achieve the "national unification" by occupying south Korea by force and has since remained isolated in international society, stigmatized as an aggressor. The situation has changed somewhat since the early 1970s, but north Korea still maintains extreme antagonism and tension in its relations with south Korea. This is related to the fact that the system in the north has constantly been influenced by military factors and that the military still plays a major role in maintaining the Communist regime.

The person who made north Korea what it is today is Kim Il-sung, a totalitarian dictator. As the personality and power of dictator Stalin played a decisive role in shaping the Soviet Union after Lenin, so Kim Il-sung's personality decided the course of the north Korean Communist system as seen in the following paragraphs.

I. Components of the North Korean System

As a political unit, north Korea has the environment of the Soviet Union, China and south Korea, and contains the ruling group as the "actor" and the people as the "social force."

The environment constantly offers "inputs" to the north Korean system. Everything that happens in international society, between Russia and China and inside south Korea becomes an input as far as it is related to north Korea. And things that happen inside north Korea also have effects on its system and they can be called "within-puts."

The "actors" in north Korea have to make policy decisions based on their own perception and judgment of the situation and the political course they thus choose influences north Korea's social, economic and political situations. This is the political process in north Korea. Most important in analyzing north Korea's external relations, is to examine the country's environment objectively and analyze its political leaders' perception of this environment. Accurate explanation or understanding of north Korea's external activities can be made only through observing the interactions between the environment and its perception by the north Korean leadership.

a) Political Culture

The actors managing the north Korean system have a political orientation which combines political faith, sense of values and social attitude. It is more adequate to call this political orientation a political culture as it is demonstrated in the entire political system.

In his observation of the characteristics of north Korean political culture, Prof. Kim Il-pyong said that the Kim Il-sung system achieved a cultural and ideological transformation through a disintegration of
the traditional attitude, sense of values and faith. According to Prof. Kim, the Kim Il-sung system first transformed the consciousness of the masses under the slogan of "national construction" in the first stage from the 1945 Liberation from Japanese colonial rule to the 1953 Korean armistice. In the second stage from 1954 to 1958, the Kim system pursued a kind of cultural revolution in an attempt to bring to success the first five-year economic development plan, under which collective farms and Socialist industries were constructed. From 1959 to 1970, cultural and ideological revolutions were carried on by means of Socialist education.4

To make a new political system take root, political culture has to be so transformed as to back it up. In other words, an identical sense of values, attitude and faith should be shared by the ruler and the ruled. This is a question common to all newly born states, and it has particular importance in Communist states where ideology is the main tool of ruling. In the course of Communist revolution, the greatest obstacle are the non-Communist traditional factors, the way of thinking of the masses and their basic structure of consciousness. Without transforming these factors in such a way as to fit the Communist system, stabilization of the political system is hard to achieve. The so-called Socialist education is the means to attain this transformation. Socialist education is more effective when imposed on the younger generation before they absorb any non-Communist factors. However, the north Korean leaders are not content with subjecting only the younger generation to Socialist education but are bent on fundamentally changing the behavior and way of thinking of the older generation also.

For this purpose, they created "Kim Il-sung Thought," which is also called "Juche (independence) Thought" or "Yuil (monolithic) Thought." The Juche Thought, which was officially introduced in 1956, was in short a means with which to indoctrinate the north Korean people by removing the Confucian tradition and establishing a Socialist culture. At the same time, the north Korean rulers publicize Kim Il-sung Thought as a creative, original idea on the same level as the thoughts of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung.

There are no data to judge how successful these efforts of the north Korean leaders have been but it is not difficult to imagine that the political orientation of the north Korean people must now be fundamentally different from the traditional pattern.

Because of this Juche Thought, which has been observed as the only orthodox ideology for a long time, the present north Korean system should now be maintained by a simple and rigid political culture. This can be compared with the "Juja-hak (Neo-Confucianism) Theory" of the Yi Dynasty period, which, as the only orthodox ideology, was employed in justifying the political system of the monarchy. In fact, one significant contribution of Juche Thought was the binding of the party, government and the people in one monolithic ideology, denying any other ideology as heresy.

Therefore, the political culture in north Korea is a strictly uniform culture using ideology as a means to
idolize Kim Il-sung and bend the people to his personality at the same
time. It certainly is an extreme case of totalitarian communism, portraying
“individuals buried in the whole” and “the whole as an extension of
the individual.” In this sense, Kim Il-sung can be evaluated as “more
Stalinistic than Stalin himself.” Even Stalin could not have dreamed of
establishing such a complete totalitarian dictatorship as Kim Il-
sung’s.

b) Chief and Elite

The north Korean regime officially
calls Kim Il-sung “our great chief.”
This means the supreme leader. By
all standards, Kim’s position has an
absolute authority rather than relative
one. This is clearly seen in the rela-
tions between Kim and the ruling
elite in north Korea. Under the 1972
constitution, Kim Il-sung became
president. Before that there was no
clear indication of the head of state,
and the chairman of the presidium
of the Supreme People’s Assembly
acted as the head of state following
the Russian example. The new con-
stitution defined the president as the
head of state and Kim Il-sung
concurrently holds the chairmanship
of the Central People’s Committee.
The Central People’s Committee is
the supreme ruling body under the
constitution and exercises control
over the Supreme People’s Assembly.
Kim Il-sung’s absolute authority had
already been firmly established in
north Korea even before the 1972
constitution and the new charter only
confirmed it.

The relations between Kim Il-sung
and the political elite group below
him deserve close observation. Ac-
cording to Lee Chong-sik, a group of
15 is positioned closest to Kim.
This group makes up the Political
Committee of the Party and includes
the premier and deputy premiers of
the cabinet. Some of them also con-
trol the military as vice chairmen of
the National Defense Committee.
In this way, a small number of Kim’s
confidants form the nucleus of the
north Korean political structure,
sharing the most important positions
among themselves and also competing
for loyalty to Kim Il-sung. Moreover,
most members of this group have
maintained personal relations with
Kim since the days of Japanese
colonial rule.

The relationship between Kim and
the ruling elite group is very asym-
metrical. As in other Communist
systems, the north Korean ruling
group has the shape of a pyramid
with the Central Committee forming
the base and the members of the
Political Committee and other stand-
ing committees making up the next
higher part. Above them are the
group of 10-odd top leaders, over
which Kim reigns as the “supreme
leader.” The top group is subject
to Kim’s absolute authority which
has no parallel in the present Russian
ruling hierarchy or even in the past
Chinese system under Mao Tse-tung.
Some may believe that Mao exercised
as absolute an authority as Kim’s,
but in fact Mao’s power was con-
siderably moderated by his old
comrades in the Chinese leadership.
Within the highest decision-making
body, there was a force opposing
Mao’s policies, and faced with this
opposition, Mao had to rally the
support of others to strengthen his
position. Brezhnev’s power at pre-
sent is by no means absolute. In
negotiating with the United States,
he has had to consult with other top
officials before making a decision.
In contrast to this, Kim Il-sung’s authority in the north Korean political system has no limit. The Workers’ Party is Kim’s creation just as the People’s Army is. Almost all the technocrats and political elite now managing the north Korean government and Party are the products of the Kim Il-sung system. In this situation, the relationship between Kim and the nucleus in the ruling structure cannot but be vertical and one-sided.

c) Power Group and the Masses

The north Korean political system has the Workers’ Party, military, and the administrative body of bureaucrats as its major components. As it pursues a “society without classes,” social strata as seen in non-Communist countries should have disappeared or should be at least in the process of disappearing in north Korea. However, in the opinion of foreign scholars and journalists who have visited north Korea, the country has a distinct social hierarchy contrary to common belief. Though they are different from social ranks in capitalist society, there have developed what can be clearly defined as upper, middle and lower classes in north Korea, according to those first hand observers. The upper class consists of high-ranking party members, the middle class engineers and Party cadre members, and the lower class general workers and farmers. One unmistakable symbol of the upper class distinguishing from the middle class is the cars they use, the foreign observers say.

This indicates that north Korea has not completely got rid of the social distinction between officialdom and the masses, a legacy from the days of the Yi Dynasty and the subsequent Japanese colonial rule. In north Korea, the Party has organized the masses throughout the country, but the grass roots are participating in the political system rather passively, being actually controlled by a small group positioned high up in the Party hierarchy.

In other words, the gulf between the political elite group and the masses is very wide. Hence arises the necessity of the mobilization strategy of “mass line.” Like other Communist countries, north Korea adopted the organizational principle of “democratic centralism,” but centralism is observed while all democratic elements are conveniently discarded. This means that the tradition of centralism from the old society could not be completely uprooted. Kim Il-sung’s recent appointments of high-ranking party leaders on the level of deputy premiers to serve concurrently as chairmen of provincial people’s committees are therefore seen as a move to strengthen provincial administrative functions. It can be easily presumed that discordant relations prevail between Party cadre members in provinces and the grass roots and between members of the central and provincial Party organizations, making it necessary to take such a drastic measure. The gap between the political center and provinces had caused trouble even in China and Soviet Russia. In Russia, the system is still heavily center-oriented but China has emphasized balance between the center and provinces with provincial organizations exercising considerable autonomous power. The north Korean
system, on the other hand, has been thoroughly center-controlled from the start and has not shown any sign of decentralization.

Under this heavily centralized system, Kim Il-sung had to design some mass-mobilization method by himself to engage farmers and workers in economic development projects. The so-called “Chongsan-ni method” and “Dae-an factory method” were devised in efforts to achieve mass mobilization in the most effective manner by eliminating rifts between the Party committees pursuing ideological lines and the management committees stressing only productivity.

These “mass lines,” pursued by the Party for industrialization and increase of agricultural productivity, are actually “instructions from above” and only a one-way action to drive the mass toward the goal set by the central government. The vertical nature of the north Korean power structure can be well proved by the fact that there are absolutely no interest groups of any sort supporting special interests among the masses. A generally accepted view among Western scholars studying the Soviet political system is the proliferation of various interest groups in that Communist country in recent days. This most significant change in the Russian system made interest groups link the masses to the party. In China too, a number of interest groups are active, particularly in the provinces. These groups produce their own publications and films, hold mass lectures for people’s enlightenment, and strive to have their opinions reflected in policies.

However, in north Korea, there is no indication that the formation of such voluntary or interest groups is allowed. What is evident there is that the Party and the masses are linked only vertically by the monolithic system’s mobilization method.

II. Political Process Within the Mobilization System

There are two ways of interpreting political processes in political science. The “distribution theory” conceives a political process as competition among many different individuals and groups to obtain limited resources or values in a political system. The political process in Western European democracies fits this theory. The role of pressure groups and the intervention of mass media and numerous other interest groups in policymaking by the government are all related to the distribution of value in society. All these inputs are processed into outputs as policies through the government’s authoritative decisions. The other theory sees a political process as the process of adapting a political system to a changing environment. The process is understood as a process to maintain the political system. The nature of the political process taking place in north Korea cannot be conceived with the theory of distribution. Under the north Korean system, activities for specific interests by groups are prohibited and only the Party controls the political process. In north Korea, political process begins with government decisions which are conveyed to the lower echelons through the Party organization.
The political process in north Korea can be adequately explained with the second theory. Under this theory, political process touches only the elite group consisting of leaders of the Party, armed forces and bureaucracy. This elite may try to represent specific interests of their respective organizations, but vertical relationships in each organization prevail over horizontal relationships among the different organizations in the political process.

3) Elite and Political Process

Prof. Suh Dae-sook asserts that the north Korean leadership now enjoys comparative stability. He says that the Pyongyang leadership underwent two major reshuffles, the first immediately after the end of the Korean War and the second after the fourth Party congress in October, 1966. Contrary to general belief, the purges of the so-called Yenan and Soviet factions and the reshuffle after an abortive coup attempt were rather minor and partial, according to Prof. Suh.

The first major reshuffle after the war, as Prof. Suh observes, was made in response to the challenge from the South Korean Workers' Party faction and the second one resulted from the division of the "Partisan faction," also called the Kapsan faction, between 1967 and 1968. In the first purge, Park Hon-yong and other figures from the South Korean Workers' Party were removed and in the second, which is believed to have also been affected by external affairs involving south Korea and the United States following the Pueblo incident, a number of ranking military officers belonging to the Kapsan faction were ousted. While the first purge resulted from factional strife, the second was the consequence of policy differences within one political faction. This sort of political contest is likely to continue as the main pattern of the north Korean political process in the future.

In this mode of political process, an important question arises as to what effect the purges bring to the organizations to which the purged belonged. It is conceivable that some immediate followers may also be eliminated in purges, but it is doubtful if the effect of such purges will spread further. In view of the peculiar characteristics of the north Korean system, the effect of confrontation and struggle in the top leadership should be confined to that level. As it is very hard to look into the political process or policymaking process in north Korea, which is completely veiled in secrecy, only inference from the Soviet pattern is possible.

In north Korea, the weight of the 15 Political Committee members seems immense and power dynamics among them form the basis of the north Korean political process. Detailed data on the personalities, backgrounds, and the ways of thinking of these elite figures are hardly available and, therefore, close examination of their interactions is extremely difficult. The only conclusion is that north Korea serves as a good example of oligarchy with a small elite group playing a decisive role in political process.
b) Mass Manipulation and Political Process

Mass manipulation is an important political technique in a totalitarian society like North Korea. As Kornhauser observed in his "Politics in Mass Society," totalitarian society is a system in which an elite can directly manipulate the masses and there are no intervening groups between them.

"Mass line" is a political operation aimed at achieving a direct link between the political elite and the masses, which is an ideal state for Communist society. Mao Tse-tung made the best use of it and Kim Il-sung limited him. Especially since 1960, Kim has presented the slogan of "Chongsan-ni spirit and method" to spur the organizing of the masses. In short, the Chongsan-ni method is direct assistance from the upper to the lower echelons, with complete knowledge of local situations, to speed up the achievement of projects. It is a method developed from the awareness of the fact that, without the direct involvement of the elite in the work of the masses for technological, cultural and ideological innovations, the political system is difficult to maintain. In the course of enforcing the Chongsan-ni method, Kim Il-sung took steps to eliminate various traditional social institutions, such as family relations, religion, and the old economic and educational systems which hinder the guidance of the masses by the Party. By this method, the small elite group successfully established a system of controlling the vast masses through the Party organization.

Therefore, the political process at the level of the masses was absorbed in, and limited to, their participation in the Party organization. In the absence of any other organization that can compete with the Party and demand the loyalty of the masses, the Party alone exercises full control of the people. The military and the administrative networks have some authority of their own but their role cannot but be secondary and auxiliary as the two institutions are subject to party control.

Under this structural binding, it is very doubtful whether the participation of the masses in political process can have any practical meaning. Their participation cannot be spontaneous or voluntary at all. The way and scope of such participation are decided by the Party which sometimes expands and sometimes reduce them.

In fact, the only possible way for the masses to participate in the North Korean system is through the study and discussion of the Party line and self-criticism, sessions, which they call "democratic participation." Besides this, the people participate in the election of delegates, which is a purely ceremonial event. This kind of political participation is actually "mobilized participation" and serves only to strengthen the legitimacy of the existing political system and Kim Il-sung's rule. The election is nothing but an occasion of expressing one's loyalty to the political system.

Under the influence of China, mass movements are fully utilized in North Korea. Mass movements are promoted in order to rally the physical and spiritual forces of the masses toward the attainment of govern-
ment-set goals. Mass movements are carried out for the purpose of thoroughly infusing the Kim Il-sung’s “Juche Thought” and pushing long-range economic development plans, and sometimes as a means to remove Kim’s political foes. Typical of mass movements were the “Morning Star Movement” and “Chollima Movement.” The mass movement as a means of mobilization strengthens the people’s sense of participation and can change the way of thinking of the participants. By the mass movement and the concentrated study and discussion of Juche Thought, the people are regenerated as a new type with their mode of behavior tailored to political system. In this sense, the north Korean residents engrossed in the psychodrama of mass movements are not participating in any political process in the conventional sense but are undergoing a kind of religious conversion through continuous rituals. In this process, they are made to dispense with traditional behavior and accept Communist ideology and the Communist code of conduct. This is the “Socialist education” in north Korea which is particularly stressed for the adult generation.

But in north Korea where social groups representing special interests are not allowed to exist, there can be no collaboration between bureaucrats and interest groups. If there is any, it must be condemned as abuse of official power by the bureaucrats or as making a decision that goes against the interests of the masses. In China, Mao Tse-tung most severely criticized bureaucracy which he defined as the worst evil.

Rift between the Party organization and the bureaucratic system is quite possible as is resistance or repercussions among bureaucrats against Party control. In China, Mao utilized such mass movements as the Cultural Revolution to suppress resistance by bureaucrats, and this well indicates the seriousness of the problem of bureaucracy in Communist societies. To operate a large political community, a bureaucratic organization is inevitable, but this may entail degradation of the revolutionary spirit and weakening of party control.

Even Kim Il-sung’s system seems to have failed to work out an adequate answer to this problem. As observed earlier, Kim’s assignment of top Party leaders to concurrent positions as chairmen of provincial people’s committees may be an effort to cope with the ill effects arising from the control of lower-level administrative machinery by the central authority, though the real intent behind the measure is not clear yet. Since the 1960s, north Korea has recruited hundreds of thousands of administrative personnel from collective farms and factories and had them manage field projects.
under a kind of collective leadership. But coordination and cooperation were not satisfactory between the management committees and the Party committees, and Kim Il Sung referred to this problem in many of his addresses and instructions. The relations between the Party and bureaucracy involve tension and confrontation in most other Communist systems, too.

Characteristics of this problem in a certain Communist political system can bring about different features in its overall political process. The north Korean system cannot be an exception and how it will take care of this problem draws our keen concern.

NOTES


3. Prof. Chongsik Lee describes Kim Il Sung as a "petit Stalin" but it is more correct to define him as a totalitarian dictator because he has a character strikingly different from that of the conservative dictators appearing in many newly born states and he maintains his dictatorial power through a one-party system.

4. Kim Il-pyong, Communist Politics in North Korea, New York, Praeger, 1975, p. 42. Prof. Kim observes that the north Korean system carried out its version of the Cultural Revolution in these three stages.


6. This observation differs considerably from previous interpretations. This opinion was presented by McFarquer, formerly editor of China Quarterly and at present a British member of parliament, in his lecture on "the Origin of the Great Leap Forward" given at the Asian Institute of Research Institute, Korea University, on Sept. 8, 1977. He made the same point in a question-and-answer session after the lecture.

7. Former U.S. president Gerald Ford replied so when interviewed by the NHK network of Japan on Aug. 29, 1977. Ford called Brezhnev "a man of contrast" and explained that he was sometimes very hard to handle but sometimes showed considerable flexibility. At the Vladivostok conference, Brezhnev was seen consulting with his colleagues and watching their advice during a recess. But he made decisions himself.

8. This conclusion was made through a conversation with Prof. Jun Nishigawa, who made a visit to Pyongyang some years ago. He said that despite its vocal emphasis on equality, he witnessed many examples of inequality and wondered if this had anything to do with Korean tradition.


PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

MAGAZINE INTRODUCES 'THREE-REVOLUTION RED FLAG'

Pyongyang KOREAN YOUTH AND STUDENTS in English No 3 (154), 1978 p 13

[Text]

The Three-Revolution Red Flag represents a highest citation for a unit which carries out well the tasks of the three revolutions while joining in the Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement.

It is conferred by decree of the Central People's Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The units which are given the flag are honoured at the same time with citations of President of the DPRK, and each member of them is given a three-revolution honour badge as well as the state letter of commendation.

The flag's ground is red and fringed with gold strings. It tells much with a group of pictures placed in round in its middle.

The round picture's upper part has the emblem of the Workers' Party of Korea founded and led by the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung. In the middle are placed a man worker and a woman farmer riding on a dashing Chollima (winged horse) which symbolizes the Chollima Workteam Movement and the Three-Revolution Red Flag Movement both initiated by the great leader, he tightly holding to him a "Kim Il Sung, Selected Works" and a red flag with inscription: "Three Revolutions", she holding a sheaf of rice stalks.

Underneath are the drawings showing the ever-prospering socialist fatherland under the wise leadership of the great leader, with three revolutions being vigorously carried out—a dam of a hydro-power station, furnaces, factories and standardized plots, educational and cultural institutions, a television tower, magnificent many-storeyed apartment houses, and cosy modern rural dwelling houses.

Going around them are gears
and rice decorated with laurels with magnolia flowers. This shows our people’s determined will to unite firmly under the great leader’s wise leadership on the basis of worker-peasant alliance led by the working class, to defend securely their socialist fatherland and to scale ahead of schedule the ideological and material fortresses of building communism.

The flag bears in its lower part an inscription of golden embroidery: “Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” “Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

On its back side is embroidered in gold a slogan, “Let’s Vigorously Launch the Three Revolutions, Ideological, Technical, and Cultural and Scale ahead of Schedule the Ideological and Material Fortresses of Communism.”
ECONOMY

ECONOMIST EXAMINES NORTH KOREAN LABOR POLICY

Seoul VANTAGE POINT in English Vol 1, No 5, Sep 78 pp 11-18

[Abridgment of article by Yi Won-chun, professor of the ROK Air Force Academy: "North Korean Labor Policy and Its New Labor Plan"]

[Text]

Introduction

One of the big problems facing North Korea today is the economic setback caused by a marked decrease in labor productivity. Labor policies of Socialist countries which eschew profit-seeking as a motive for increased productivity, lessen the zeal of workers and farmers for production, resulting in decreases in labor productivity. In this respect North Korea is a case in point.

To seek a breakthrough in this dilemma, most Socialist countries launched the "Construction of Socialist" movement before the 1950s and paid great attention to the hike of labor productivity by infusing the spirit of competition for production into the people's minds. As a result, the Soviet Union launched the Stakhanov Movement in the 1930s and the Khakhannov Movement in the 1950s. Likewise, Communist China inaugurated the "Great Leap Forward" Movement in 1958.

North Korea also adopted a similar movement, called Chollima, in March 1959. But the Communist countries could not raise labor productivity by way of such pre-modern methods of competitive production. They failed to encourage the zeal of workers and farmers although the latter lived under a closed Socialist system.

Socialist countries in Eastern Europe succeeded in raising their labor productivity by allowing personal profit to some extent borrowing the trait of capitalism. For example, the Soviet Union was able to raise its labor productivity by adopting the Kharkov Bonus System, the so-called Liberman method, advocated by Prof. Liberman in 1962. Communist China also tries to hike its labor productivity by introducing the profit incentive into its economy.

In line with these trends, North Korea replaced its labor decree for workers adopted on June 24, 1946 with the "Socialist Labor Law" enacted April 18, 1978 at the second meeting of the sixth session of the Supreme People's Assembly.
The motives for the new law are:

First, the old law was legislated without proper consideration or experience so as to meet the inclination of workers and thus it was labeled inapplicable to the reality of North Korea.

Second, some discrepancy was found between the law and other labor-related regulations based on the Socialist Constitution adopted on Dec. 27, 1972.

Third, the revision was aimed at substantially increasing North Korea’s labor productivity to push the Second Seven-Year Economic Plan.

New Labor Law and Labor Policy

Under the Socialist economic system, labor boycotts the idea of free competition and individual profit-seeking, and is mobilized under the principle of collectivism for common profits. So profit-seeking and other individualistic labor activities are totally disregarded under the North Korean economic policy based on collectivism.

The only assignment for an individual is to attain the target set for him or her. According to the newly enacted Socialist Labor Law, labor is described as the holiest and most honorable work. Article 3 of the law stipulates, “Labor under Socialism is the collective work of laborers for the common purpose and interest. ... Laborers help each other and work collectively under the basic spirit of collectivism -- one for all and all for one.”

So North Korea pursues the streamlining and classifying of its economic plans under collectivism and sets up legal labor organizations (Ref. Article 10) within the scope of the whole economy to raise labor productivity by mobilizing the labor force more effectively (Ref. Article 25, 26 and 27).

Labor organization and mobilization, according to the old law, was possible by making it compulsory for every worker to be affiliated with the general league of all trades. But the new law materialized the organization and mobilization in writing as seen in Articles 27, 31 and 49.

Work Hours and Daily Evaluation of Work

Article 28 of the North Korean Constitution stipulates, “Daily work hours for workers are eight hours ...” The eight-hour system was also stipulated in Article 1 of the old labor law.

In Article 33, “... eight-hour work, eight-hour rest, and eight-hour study should be observed by labor organizations to the letter.” This article is very peculiar in that equal hours of labor, rest and study make up one’s daily schedule, which is as strict as military life.

The stipulation of the eight-hour study period is aimed at accelerating the idolization of Kim Il-sung. It also purports indirectly to ensure the execution of one’s duty in case one is devoid of zeal and is likely to fail in one’s assignment during the eight-hour work period.

Even in school education, eight hours of study a day is a rarity. So it is a great burden for laborers who are exhausted by forced work to have eight hours of study a day.
At the fifth Congress of the Workers’ Party, it was emphasized that the study program for workers for more than two hours a day should be conducted without fail. It is presumed that even two hours of study a day will be difficult for workers in North Korea. In these circumstances, eight hours of study will be impossible unless part of it is covered by the eight-hour work period.

So the reality seems to be that they make up for failure of the stipulated eight hours of study with extra hours of labor. The old labor law allowed 250 extra work hours a year. But the new law forbids any extra work (Article 63). Article 20 of the new law, however, goes like this, “Each assignment should be accomplished in excess of the target by day, month and quarter.”

So the new law endorses the idea of extra work to accomplish excessive targets. The extra work can be deducted from the study hours. Needless to say, the eight hours of labor had not been observed for some 30 years beginning in 1946 when the old labor law was implemented. It is also exemplified by the North Korean practice of setting the labor hours as 12 to 14 hours a day.

The evaluation of labor accomplished is conducted by day and by month. In accordance with the daily evaluation, labor productivity, management and maintenance of equipment, ideological attitude toward labor, the capacity of finding solutions to difficulties in the course of production activities and the observance of safety measures are the criteria for daily evaluation.

Labor Age Limitations and Student Conscript Labor

North Korea implemented an 11-year compulsory free education system April 9, 1973, when the Supreme People’s Assembly passed a law calling for compulsory secondary schooling for 10 years and pre-school education for one year.

Students are 16 years old in North Korea when they finish the compulsory education course. Article 29 of the new Constitution enacted in 1972 stipulates that one’s labor begins when one reaches 16 years of age. The article further prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16. This provision is in accordance with the 11-year compulsory education system. Before that, there was a labor law which stipulated that 14 years of age was the minimum for work. This conflict of laws went unremedied for five years until a new Labor Law was enacted.

North Korea seems to have extended the age limit for labor from 14 to 16 to keep pace with the 11-year compulsory education, although it is short of manpower to such an extent that it is bound to mobilize the aged and women for labor. Pyongyang is forced to map out various measures to make up for a 10 per cent work force reduction triggered by the extension of the compulsory education system. They include technological innovation aimed at further refining the skills of the work force, the extension of working hours designed to increase the women’s share of work and the stepping up of the mobilization of women for labor.
Worse still, the north Korean regime is expected to step up mobilization of labor of the students, who are not entitled to any reward for their service. The compulsory labor mobilization of the students dates back to March 2, 1959, when the cabinet passed Decree 18. Under this decree, primary school pupils are subject to five weeks of compulsory labor a year, while secondary school students are to work for eight weeks a year. It also imposes 10 weeks of compulsory labor on college students every year. They have to dedicate four weeks to serving in industry, another four weeks to working on construction, and two weeks to agriculture. Pyongyang’s compulsory education is, therefore, different in character from south Korea’s in that it is given in reward for this compulsory labor.

North Korea forces students to exceed their target by 200 per cent on the ground that working hours are short. Once mobilized for compulsory labor, they have to work over 15 hours a day. They also are subject to extra work, mobilized for expanding school grounds, building new classrooms and running factories attached to schools. Therefore it can be said that the students of north Korea have to participate in compulsory labor one third or half of the year. As regards the curricula of north Korean students, the fourth graders of primary schools must undergo week-long on-the-job training, secondary school students four-week-long training and college students six-week-long training a year. All these courses are given either at factories or farms. This shows that north Korean students are subject to labor for most of the time except for elementary school days. Considering all this, the stipulation of the Labor Law concerning the age limit for labor merely serves a nominal purpose.

Another characteristic of the Labor Law involves the establishment of the pension system on the basis of seniority. There used to be no such thing in the previous Labor Law or in the Constitution. The newly implemented system, however, has no special meaning. Article 74 of the Labor Law stipulates that the state shall provide pensions to male workers when they reach 60 years of age and female workers when they reach 55, so long as they have served the state for a certain period of time.

This misleads us into thinking that north Korea prohibits work for men older than 60 years of age and women older than 55 years of age. We must, however, understand clearly what is meant by serving the state for a certain period of time. The Communist regime admits this service only when, in the case of men, they produce worker’s pocketbooks showing they passed daily, monthly and quarterly checkups on 44 years of service (from 16 to 60 years of age). If the stipulation was effected from 1946, when the previous law went into force, only those who reach 60 years of age in 1990 will be entitled to the pension.

The article regarding pensions is designed to assuage the discontent of both the young and the old. The former have shown dissatisfaction with the implementation of the collective farming system. The latter complain of extended age limit for labor. Talking with country folk during a 15-day on-the-job training
at Chongsannii Agricultural Cooperative, Kim Il-sung instructed the aged to take part in compulsory labor to make up for the shortage of the work force. He said that north Korean people should celebrate their 60th birthdays when they are 90 years old.

Article 78 of the Labor Law provides that the state shall take care of the aged and disabled at old folks homes. Each province has an asylum where the aged are subject to manual labor including taking care of vegetables. The regime accommodates the aged in these asylums to preclude the possibility that the young may have sympathy for the aged, just as they feel for their parents, when they work together.

Women’s Labor and Equality of Sexes

Immediately after the enactment of the previous Labor Law, north Korea legislated a law governing the equality of the sexes in an attempt to place the social position of women on a par with that of men. This law is designed to mobilize women for work to make up for the shortage of manpower. Article 62 of the Constitution provides that women shall have the same social positions and rights as men do. This is a reaffirmation of the equality of men and women.

Friedrich Engels says that the first condition for the liberation of women is to mobilize all women for public industries. This has materialized in the Soviet Union. It is a desirable system for north Korea to increase the socialist productivity of labor. The ratio of women’s participation in labor has been surging. The year 1953 registered 26 per cent. The ratio stood at 29 per cent in 1958, when collective farming was implemented. The year 1960 scored 35 per cent. It went up to 37 per cent in 1964 and again to as high as 53.7 per cent in 1971. This was one result of the mobilization of some 500,000 youngmen for the army.

It follows from this that north Korea has to put women to labor in a bid to compensate for the shortage of manpower. In 1961, the regime decided to increase the ratio of women to the whole work force to 60 per cent in the education and health fields, and to 50 per cent in other spheres, while gradually substituting women for men in all fields.

What is worse, Pyongyang has stepped up efforts to mobilize young men for military purposes including the regular army, the worker-farmer militia and military guide groups ever since the early 1960s. This necessitated the mobilization of the weaker sex for labor. Therefore north Korea made it obligatory for women to take part in labor under the pretext of the equality of the sexes. It placed women under strict labor regulations by setting up a slogan, “Those who do not work shall not eat.” Women who refused to work were sent to concentration camps on charges of violating labor regulations. They were sometimes put on trial after being branded as reactionaries. And food was rationed in proportion to their labor. So they had to work in order not to starve.

Article 16 of the Labor Law stipulates that those women who have three children shall work for the state for six hours a day. Article 31 of the law provides that the state shall establish nurseries, kindergartens,
pediatric clinics and other facilities to pave the way for women to actively participate in social welfare work. The stipulation further says the state shall set up domestic workshops so that those women who cannot afford to take part in social labor may engage in production. Article 59 of the law says that the state shall not put women in arduous and dangerous jobs and that those women who have infants or are pregnant shall not be put to work at night. Article 16 and 59 lead us to believe that North Korea does not put women to work or it reduces working hours for women. As food is rationed in proportion to labor, women have to work hard to score higher marks and thereby receive the proper amount of food.

Women are apparently exempt from arduous or night work, but the labor share of women in the early 1970s was 70 per cent in light industries, 60-70 per cent in farming, 30 per cent in forestry, 20 per cent in mining and 15 per cent in heavy industries. It is surprising that women should be employed in mining or forestry, let alone farming. This shows how unrealistic Article 59 of the law is.

Working Regulations and Criminal Liabilities

Article 18 of the Labor Law stipulates that workers shall govern themselves and it shall be the duty of the workers to observe the regulations. The article further provides that everyone shall keep working hours and regulations faithfully and that no one shall leave his workplace arbitrarily. Article 69 of the law also says that everyone shall sincerely take part in labor and observe pertinent regulations. Article 24 of the previous law stipulates that every laborer has to abide by regulations, and that the state shall have the right to discharge those who fail to observe the regulations. To be discharged means that they shall not be entitled to their food rations, even though they starve to death.

The Supreme People's Assembly issued an even stricter decree Aug. 3, 1953 which prohibits everyone from leaving or changing jobs. It also provides that those who fail to observe this provision shall be put on trial and be subjugated to forced labor for six months to one year. Under this provision, those who employ those absent without leave shall be referred to trial and be held criminally responsible.

This stringent provision is aimed at increasing labor productivity through complete mobilization. It is also designed to make machines of men by strictly controlling the people and forestalling any possible revolt. It seeks to utilize people as mere tools of Communist dictatorship by depriving them of their rights to choose jobs.

However, Article 5 of the current Labor Law claims that North Korea grants the right and freedom to choose jobs. This is another trick to cheat workers. This stipulation says that all people shall have the right to work and that all shall have the right to choose whatever jobs they like and have aptitudes for. This is merely designed to mislead innocent workers to believe that North Korea is a "paradise for workers."

Article 18 of the law stipulates strict regulations for labor, which North Korea regards as a duty, while granting the right and freedom to
choose jobs. This conflicting provision is another proof of the regime’s evil schemes to exploit workers. At any rate, the laws of North Korea are full of empty words, far from protecting its citizens or granting them any rights. This is true of the present Labor Law.

Labor Productivity Enhancement Drive

While announcing the adoption of the Labor Law designed to carry out the seven-year economic plan at the second meeting of the sixth-term Supreme People’s Assembly on April 18 this year, Kim Il-sung said that it totally depends on the exercise of the initiative and talent of the workers how soon the regime will build a better Socialist and, later, Communist society. He also said it depends on how much the workers increase their productivity. That is, North Korea seeks to hike productivity, while speaking of the construction of a Socialist country and the organic utilization of the work force.

At the time the previous Labor Law was legislated, North Korea believed that productivity would go up if only workers and farmers were mobilized. Experience told the regime that it had to have each unit of production compete in order to stop productivity from declining. North Korea collectivized workers and farmers to have them compete with one another. This found expression in the inauguration of the Chollima Movement, which was followed by the Chongsanri Method and Taeae Project. These drives aimed at increasing productivity are provided for by the Constitution.

Article 9 of the Labor Law provides that it is the task of socialism to increase productivity continuously and hasten production. The article goes on that the Chollima Movement shall be further stepped up, replacing the thought, technology and culture drives, to further consolidate the economic as well as political structure, while guaranteeing the enhancement of productivity and the hastening of production. This means that North Korea intends to push up productivity by appealing to ideology instead of allowing the workers to pursue profits.

It is noteworthy now that some Communist countries are adopting some capitalistic methods. Some Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union and Communist China distribute farmlands among farmers. After learning that unit productivity is higher for private lands than public ones, Communist countries are tending to increase the private ownership of land in their efforts to increase productivity. One unit ownership land averages 0.3-0.5 hectares. However, North Korea continues to look to conventional methods of production competition used by Socialist countries before the 1950s. It is therefore no wonder that North Korea’s closed economy is the most backward of all.

Conclusion

North Korea enacted the Land Reform Law March 5, 1946 in an effort to expropriate and redistribute land. It also legislated the Labor Law June 24 in the same year. The law governing the equality of the
sexes was enacted July 30 in the same year. The north Korean regime was engrossed in gaining the support of farmers and workers, who accounted for the majority of the residents. At that time, it was rather hard to obtain their cooperation because they were still eager to own property. Shortly after the Korean War (1950-1953) ended, the north Korean regime began to place its residents under strict control in a plausible attempt to reconstruct the state wrecked by the war.

However, north Korea had to extend its first seven-year economic plan, launched in 1961 to 1970. The second six-year economic plan, started in 1971, ended in utter failure, making it impossible to devise a subsequent plan. Then the regime termed 1977 as the year for completion. It was not until 1978 that north Korea mapped out another seven-year plan, which got bogged down. In the initial stage of the plan, the north despaired of the plan, replacing the old Labor Law with a new one in a desperate attempt to carry out the seven-year plan.

After all, the new Labor Law is merely a rehash of the previous one, containing the old-fashioned methods the Communist countries employed to mobilize the workers. Based on the new Constitution instituted in 1972, it further strengthens labor regulations for regimentation of workers.

cso: 4220
INFORMATION ON NORTH KOREAN INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

[The following information on North Korean factories, mines, and other industrial facilities has been extracted from Korean language sources published in Pyongyang. The following abbreviations are used in the source-lines: NS=NODONG SINMUN; MC=MINJU CHOSON; NC=NODONG CH'ONGNYON.]

[Text] Sangnong Mine

- Strippers have cleared away 50,000 tons, 80,000 tons, and 150,000 tons this year (MC 22 Jun 78 p 1)

Ulyul Mine

- New large-size conveyor belt installed (NS 24 Jun 78 p 3)

Hyesan Youth Mine

- As of the 15th, exceeded its half year plan by 2 percent, 6.2 percent in pit construction, and 15 percent in ore production (MC 28 Jun 78 p 1)

8 November Mine

- Bettered its half year plan by 4.5 percent, pit construction plan by 18 percent, tunnelling plan by 37.6 percent, and fulfilled exactly its ore production plan (MC 28 Jun 78 p 1)

Yongyang Mine

- All pits have improved stripping and cutting (NS 30 Jun 78 p 4)

Komusan Cement Plant

- Exceeded one month quota during the "100 days of combat" by 6 percent (NS 1 Jul 78 p 1)

September Textile Mill

- One work team completed their year's plan last 20 March (NS 1 Jul 78 p 2)

8 February Vinalon Complex

- Producing 1.6 times as much vinalon as in early June (MC 1 Jul 78 p 1)
Ch'onnaeri Cement Plant

thermal power generators normalizing power production 1.3-1.4 times higher to aid in increased clinker production (NS 2 Jul 78 p 3)

Komdok Mine

increased daily ore production 1.5 times over previous amounts (MC 2 Jul 78 p 3)

Kumya Youth Coal Mine

increased coal production 3.5 times over that of the past (NS 4 Jul 78 p 2)

Musan Mine

exceeded half-year plan 1.5 times over last year's results, with aid of three revolutions team members (NS 4 Jul 78 p 3)

Namp'o Electrode Factory

automating production, with an automatic conveyor belt for electrode assembly (NS 5 Jul 78 p 2)

Pyongyang Steel Plant

rolling shop plans to raise production 10 percent over the present through improving equipment efficiency (NS 5 Jul 78 p 4)

Hoeryong Grain Plant

exceeding plans by 20 percent daily in corn and grain processing (MC 5 Jul 78 p 1)

Ch'ongsong Youth Coal Mine of the Sunch'on Region Coal Mining Complex

all units are exceeding their quotas for the "100 days of combat" by 10 percent daily (NS 6 Jul 78 p 2)

Popdong Farming Machinery Factory

conserving resources during "100 days of combat" (NS 6 Jul 78 p 4)

Sungni [Victory] Truck Consolidated Factory


Ch'ongch'onggang Power Station

the first and second shifts have raised steam production 30 percent per shift (NS 7 Jul 78 p 2)

Kowan Disabled Veterans' Daily Necessities Factory

producing plastic hose (NS 7 Jul 78 p 2)

Tanch'on Magnesia Factory

recycling waste materials into fertilizer (NS 7 Jul 78 p 3)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plant/Company</th>
<th>Accomplishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Musan Mine</td>
<td>completing construction of a new crushing yard and conveyor belt (MC 8 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ongjin Chemical Fibers Plant</td>
<td>normalizing still higher standards of production (MC 8 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Ch'aek Iron Works</td>
<td>raised production of pig iron 35 percent, and steel 37 percent, raising production 1.6 times over the same period last year (MC 8 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 April Iron Works</td>
<td>raised production of blister steel 1.2 times over previously (MC 8 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ulyul Mine</td>
<td>ore carried to sea via large-size long-distance conveyor belt (MC 8 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Chong-t'ae Electric Locomotive Factory</td>
<td>producing electric locomotives, passenger cars, and electric cars (MC 8 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yondae Coal Mine</td>
<td>completed first half year plan by 13 June, with aid of three revolutions team members (NS 9 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sinwon Machinery Factory</td>
<td>manufacturing water sprinklers (NS 9 Jul 78 p 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komdok Mine</td>
<td>with the long-distance conveyer belt finished, youth workers are preparing materials and facilities necessary for second-stage construction (NC 9 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wiwon Mine</td>
<td>miners exceeded tunnelling plans by 1.3 times (NS 10 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 February Union Youth Coal Mine</td>
<td>exceeded year plan's indices by 1.3 times every month (NS 10 Jul 78 p 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sup'ung Power Station</td>
<td>raising power production during &quot;100 days of combat&quot; (MC 11 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
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<td>Sinyuson Coal Mine</td>
<td>finished its first half year plan by 10 June (NS 12 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sinuiju Chemical Fibers Plant</td>
<td>participating in campaign to conserve raw materials (NC 12 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Factory</td>
<td>Achievement</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 February Factory</td>
<td>improving production of piston rings (MC 12 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sariwon Textile Machinery Factory</td>
<td>raised production 1.7 times over the last quarter during the &quot;100 days of combat&quot; (NS 13 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuwon Coal Mine</td>
<td>finished its half year plan on 17 June, with help of three revolutions team members (NS 13 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinuiju Pulp Plant</td>
<td>finished second quarter plan one month early in support of paper production, with aid of three revolutions team members (NS 13 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaesong Shoe Factory</td>
<td>exceeded half year plan by 20 percent over last year, with aid of three revolutions team members (MC 13 Jul 78 p 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namp'o Glass Factory</td>
<td>producing 1.5 times more plate glass than before, and exceeding the &quot;100 days of combat&quot; quotas by 20 percent in chemical glass (NS 14 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ongsu Chemicals Factory</td>
<td>completed phosphate fertilizer production plan for the fertilizer year on the 11th (MC 14 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May Factory</td>
<td>setting records in casting parts for coal cutting equipment (MC 14 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 July Railroad Factory</td>
<td>normalizing high production levels for component parts and spare parts for locomotives and freight cars (MC 15 Jul 78 p 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapsan Mine</td>
<td>raised ore dressing ability 1.3 times (MC 15 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanch'on Ladies' and Children's Garment Factory</td>
<td>completed year's plan early and produced 50 types of items more than last year (NS 16 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ulyul Disabled Veteran's Factory  the spinning shop, dyeing shop, and burn-
  ishing dye shop all registered great suc-
  cesses (NS 16 Jul 78 p 1)

Pyongyang Shoe Factory  raised overall industrial production
  amount 13.6 percent and goods' produc-
  tion amount 3.5 percent for 40-day quota
  during "100 days of combat" (NS 16 Jul
  78 p 3)

Kangdok Fireproof Goods Factory  drawing on the experience of having made,
  with aid of three revolutions team mem-
  bers, a coking furnace and heating furnace
  for the Kim Ch'aeil Iron Works (NS 16 Jul
  78 p 3)

Sukoh'on Disabled Veterans' Factory  makes soap (NS 16 Jul 78 p 4)

Youth Chemical Complex  producing urea fertilizer at an increase
Urea Fertilizer Factory  of 20 percent over the "100 days of com-

Factory where Comrade Kim Myong-
dal is Working  SWYL members holding anti-U.S. meetings
  (NC 16 Jul 78 p 3)

28 August Factory  making more mining and coal mining equip-

Musan Mine  exceeding its plans 1.4 times every month,
  over last year's results, with aid of
  three revolutions team members (NS 17 Jul
  78 p 4)

Ch'ongjin Slate Factory  workers learning scientific techniques
  in order to raise production (NS 18 Jul
  78 p 2)

13 April Iron Works  producing more high quality blister steel,
  in conjunction with three revolutions
  team members (NS 18 Jul 78 p 3)

Chonch'on Rock Drill Factory  workers and three revolutions team mem-
  bers exceeding production plans by 25
  percent in 50 of the "100 days of com-
  bat" (NS 18 Jul 78 p 3)

Sinuiju Textile Mill  doubled steam production while saving
  hundreds of tons of coal a year by rais-
  ing combustion efficiency (NS 18 Jul 78
  p 3)
Pyongyang Elevator Factory workers are mobilizing internal reserves for higher production (NS 18 Jul 78 p 4)

Sinch'ang Coal Mine improving the cultural life of the miners (MC 18 Jul 78 p 3)

22 July Factory youth heat management technicians of the heating work team are struggling to conserve coal (NC 18 Jul 78 p 1)

Pyongyang Power Station overfulfilled its 50-day plan for the "100 days of combat" by 2 percent (NS 19 Jul 78 p 1)

5 July Electric Factory the first insulator shop, second work team has fulfilled its year plan (NS 19 Jul 78 p 1)

Hamhung Machine Tool Factory has substantially converted to press and die casting (NS 19 Jul 78 p 3)

Kosan Plastic Pipe Factory more than doubled combat quotas every day (NS 19 Jul 78 p 3)

Sog'wangea Plastic Pipe Factory doubled production results while conserving labor (NS 19 Jul 78 p 3)

8 August Factory making 400-hp diesel engines (MC 19 Jul 78 p 3)

Double Chollima Hamhung Disabled Veterans' Plastic Goods Factory making plastic bowls, plastic belts, plastic flowers, and rain coats (MC 19 Jul 78 p 3)

Mangyongdae Machine Tool Factory nearly doubled production quotas for the "100 days of combat" (NC 19 Jul 78 p 1)

Kangso Coal Mine squads and platoons set high goals for July and are achieving them (NS 20 Jul 78 p 3)

Tongdaewon Garment Factory exceeded year's plan last 9 July and completed "100 days of combat" quotas (NS 20 Jul 78 p 3)

Unhung Mine completed "100 days of combat" quotas on 13 July (NS 20 Jul 78 p 3)

Pyongyang Rubber Factory raised production of folding hoses 45 percent daily (MC 20 Jul 78 p 1)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Factory Name</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 June Rolling Stock Factory</td>
<td>forging workers increasing production (MC 20 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilchu Factory</td>
<td>workers studying &quot;treatise on socialist education&quot; (NS 21 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huiryong Grain Factory</td>
<td>processes corn, grain sygar, and tobacco (NS 21 Jul 78 p 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongsong Disabled Veterans' Daily Necessities Factory</td>
<td>in Hamhung City's Yongsong-kuyok [district] makes portable water buckets, and soy sauce bottles (NS 21 Jul 78 p 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongsong Foodstuffs Factory</td>
<td>processes many foodstuffs including sea tangle, sugar, fermented rice drinks, and salted fish (NS 21 Jul 78 p 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 April Factory</td>
<td>innovating in machine tool production (NC 21 Jul 78 p 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangdong Coal Mine</td>
<td>in 40 days of the &quot;100 days of combat&quot; raised coal production 10 percent (MC 22 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kowon Disabled Veterans' Daily Necessities Factory</td>
<td>making vinyl sheeting, briefcases, bookbags, and irrigation hoses (NS 23 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonch'on Coupling Wagon Factory</td>
<td>finished &quot;100 days of combat&quot; quotas (NS 25 Jul 78 p 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Chemical Complex</td>
<td>dropping consumption standards of naphtha 9 percent per ton of urea fertilizer and reduced petroleum consumption standards 3 percent (NS 26 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May Forestry Machinery Factory</td>
<td>finished &quot;100 days of combat&quot; quotas early (NS 26 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ongjin Garment Factory</td>
<td>exceeded first half year plan by 2 percent as of 9 April (NS 26 Jul 78 p 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokch'on Region Coal Mining Complex</td>
<td>improving tunnelling with aid of three revolutions team members (NS 26 Jul 78 p 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ongsu Chemical Plant</td>
<td>lowering electricity consumption while increasing phosphate fertilizer production (NS 26 Jul 78 p 4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ch'ongjin Disabled Veterans' Plastic Goods Factory

producing briefcases, raincoats, jacks (NS 27 Jul 78 p 4)

P'ungin Coal Mine

platoons are increasing basic and preparatory tunnelling (NS 28 Jul 78 p 3)

Kumsong Tractor Factory

modernizing and mechanizing production process (MC 28 Jul 78 p 3)

T'aet'an Mine

achieved 60 days' iron ore production quota in half of the "100 days of combat" (NS 29 Jul 78)

Taehung Wood Goods Factory

producing 30 types of goods including clothes cabinets, quilt cabinets, cupboards, matches, and pencils (NS 29 Jul 78 p 2)

Puryong Metallurgy Factory

lowered power consumption 20 percent per ton of alloy steel (NS 30 Jul 78 p 1)

Aoji Chemical Plant

normalizing high production rates while reducing materials consumption (NS 30 Jul 78 p 2)

Hyesan Iron Goods Factory

subplant producing household items and hairpins (NS 30 Jul 78 p 3)

Tongnim Chemical Machinery Factory

increasing production (NS 30 Jul 78 p 4)

P'ungsan Flax Mill

raised flax yarn gathering rate 1.5 times over national standards (MC Jul 78 p 1)

Yongdok Wood Chemicals Factory

completed year's plan as of 25 July (MC 30 Jul 78 p 1)

Sinuiju Cosmetics Factory

youth and SWYL members improving political work in toothpaste shop (NS 30 Jul 78 p 3)
Hungnyong Coal Mine

coast cutters in many pits are exceeding quotas (NS 31 Jul 78 p 1)

Pyongyang Rolling Stock Repair Plant

exceeded cargo car repair plan by 43 percent daily during the "200 days of transport revolution" (NS 31 Jul 78 p 1)

Wonsan Cornstarch Plant

raised starch recovery rate 4 percent compared with previous times (NS 31 Jul 78 p 2)

Ch'angsong Mine

The ore dressing shop of the Ch'angsong Mine has switched motors and transformers to more suitable models and have conserved some 3,000 kw/hours of power. (NC 2 Jul 78 p 2)

Kim Ch'aek Iron Works

At the rolled steel factory of the Kim Ch'aek Iron Works, youth workers of the steel shop, using good heat management and technical expertise in oxygen blowing, are making two more insertions of pig iron per shift. (NC 5 Jul 78 p 1)

Kanggye Power Station

Energy combatants at the Kanggye Youth Power Station are finishing construction of the intake headraces. (NS 6 Jul 78 p 3)

Kosong Disabled Veterans' Bamboo Products Factory

Mechanizing to make 10 types of products, including finetoothed combs, rice cookers, pots, flower or fruit baskets, and tea trays. (MC 7 Jul 78 p 3)

Kaech'on Region Coal Mining Complex

One tunnelling platoon of the Youth Pit of the Namchon Coal Mine of the Kaech'on Region Coal Mining Complex advanced 336 meters in one month. (NC 7 Jul 78 p 1)
ECONOMY

BRIEFS

HALF-YEAR PLANS COMPLETED--The following Kangwon Province enterprises have completed their first half-year plan: Wonsan Tractor Repair Factory, Sambong Chemical Factory, Wonsan Confectionary Factory, Ch'olwon Mine, Wonsan Chemical Factory, Wonsan Garment Factory, Ch'onnnae Wood Products Factory, and the Munch'on Fish Processing Factory. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 22 Jun 78 p 1] 9122

COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE--Communications sector functionaries of the North Hamgyong Province Management Office have, in recent years, raised the number of telephone circuits 1.6 times, broadcasting power two times, and the number of television relay sites ten times. They are modernizing telegraph and telephone facilities and raising broadcast power still higher. Functionaries of Myonggan-kun [county] themselves installed radiotelephones and modernized industrial telephone facilities. Functionaries of the Ch'ongjin Wire Broadcast Bureau are increasing broadcast power as well as modernizing wire broadcast facilities. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 28 Jun 78 p 3] 9122

VOLUNTEER CONSTRUCTION LABOR--About 3,000 volunteers come daily to the Taedongang Storage Battery Plant construction site. Volunteer workers, who come once their regular day's work is completed, come from the P'yongch'on-kuyok [district] Cargo Truck Station, P'yongch'on-kuyok City Construction Station, 5 October Electric Factory, the Educational Textbook Printing Plant, and the Pyongyang Marine Transport Station. A large number of students come as well. [Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 28 Jun 78 p 3] 9122

COMMUNICATIONS STATION--One SWYL member from the Samch'on-kun County Communications Station has recycled 200 insulators, more than 1,000 meters of plastic wire, and more than 100 meters of steel wire. [Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 28 Jun 78 p 3] 9122

MAGNESIA PLANT CONSTRUCTION--At the Tanch'on Magnesia Factory, the 41st Mining Industry Construction Station put up 10 silos, raising them 20 meters in 10 days. The 33rd Chemical Factory Construction Station set new records in rotary kiln chimney construction. The 41st and 43rd Mining Industry Construction Station have set the goal of completing all erection work by the end of July. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 30 Jun 78 p 4] 9122
RAILROAD ELECTRIFICATION—The second unit of the Speed Battle Youth Shock Brigade is holding meetings in support of its goals for railroad electrification between Taedonggang and Sinsong. The unit is determined to finish roadbed lowering and station enlargement before the end of July and to finish transformer equipment assembly and track extension by 30 August [Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 30 Jun 78 p 4] 9122

STEEL WORKS CONSTRUCTION—At the Kim Ch'aek Steel Works, the 23rd Metallurgical Factory Construction Station workers and three revolutions team members are working with unprecedented speed in foundation construction for the cold rolling machines. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 1 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

HEAVY MACHINERY FACTORY—Workers of the Metallurgical Factory Unified Construction Station held meetings to settle the problems of construction of roads at the work site for the Taean Heavy Machinery Factory. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 2 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

MINING ADVANCES—Miners and three revolutions team members at the Hoch'on Youth Mine and the Sangnyong Mine have set unprecedented records in pit construction, tunnelling and cutting. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 2 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

INCREASED CATCHES—Youth fishermen of the third squadron of the T'ongch'on Fisheries Station have raised fish catches 1.5-1.6 times every day. [Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 2 Jul 78 p 12 91]

RAILROAD CAR REPAIR—SWYL transport workers at the Mandok Station, in order to avoid the loss in cargo train utilization rates attendant on sending two freight cars for repair to the Hoch'on Passenger Car Company, determined to fix the cars themselves. In just a few months they have repaired more than 20 cars and transported 800 tons more cargo. [Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 2 Jul 78 p 2] 9122

COAL MINING COMPLEX—Coal combatants of the Kujang Region Coal Mining Complex have completed and exceeded their first half-year plan. Mining innovations were recorded at Yongdung, Yongmun, and Yongsu Coal Mines. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 3 Jul 78 p 2] 9122

GEOLoGY SURVEY UNIT—Members of the Geological Survey Unit where Comrade Chong Yun-ho Works are taking to heart the on-the-spot teachings the great leader gave in South Hamgyong Province, and are taking surveys with the goal of obtaining regular ore production by the second quarter next year. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 4 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

WONSAN SHIPYARDS—Boat builders at the Wonsan Shipyards are participating in the "100 days of combat," and have raised work speed. Workers and three revolutions team members in the pipe manufacturing second work team, responsible for general assembly, have increased assembly speed 2.5-3 times over previous speeds. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 5 Jul 78 p 1] 9122
IWON MINE TUNNELING--In the first 30 days of the "100 days of combat," miners of the Iwon Mine have exceeded tunneling and coal production plans. Tunnelers have taken large-size compressors up to the ore face and are running their tunneling equipment, such as rock drill rigs, full speed. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 6 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

KOWON REGION MINES--Miners at the Sudong and Tunjon Coal Mines, under the Kowon Region Coal Mining Complex, are modernizing coal cutting facilities, as well as adopting more transportation equipment, thus exceeding coal production plans. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 6 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

NORTHERN REGION MINING--Coal mines subordinate to the General Bureau of Northern Region Coal Mining Industries adopted their new year's plans calling for production 43 percent higher than last year, and have fulfilled all indices of their half-year plans. The Ilsin and P'ungin Coal Mines finished their production plans early and are doing well in basic and operational tunneling. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 7 Jul 78 p 2] 9122

YOUTH CHEMICAL COMPLEX--Workers at the Urea Fertilizer Factory of the Youth Chemical Complex set a goal of raising urea fertilizer production more than 1.2 times during the "100 days of combat." With the aid of three revolutions team members, they are running equipment full blast to achieve their goals. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 7 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

CEMENT PLANTS--Cement Plants subordinate to the General Bureau of Building Materials Industry are completing production plans early, with the help of three revolutions team members. The Komusan Cement Plant exceeded its production plans for one month of the "100 days of combat" by 6 percent. The 8 February Cement Plant also has been showing great results in cement and clinker production. Workers at the Puraesan Cement Plant raised raw materials crushing capabilities 1.2-1.3 times, and increased production per hour of baking. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 7 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

CH'Olsaong Locomotive Station--Transport combatants of the Ch'olsong Locomotive Station, subordinate to the Ch'ongjin Railroad Bureau, responsible for ore concentrates shipment to the Kim Ch'aeik Iron Works, are exceeding their plans 1.3 times daily, by improved locomotive repair facilities. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 7 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

TELEVISION FACTORY--Construction workers of the Ch'onnikil Youth Shock Brigade, working on the Taedongang Television Receiver Assembly Factory, is in the final stages of structural construction. The assembly shop has more than doubled its combat quotas during the first month of the "100 days of combat" for concrete construction and roof construction, as well as the upper and lower watermain network. [Pyongyang NODONG CH'ONGNYON in Korean 7 Jul 78 p 3] 9122.
TANCH'ON MAGNESIA FACTORY—The 33rd Chemical Factory Construction Station, at the expansion construction site for the Tanch'on Magnesia Factory, is increasing welding speed to finish steel structure construction early. Workers of the 41st Metallurgical Industry Construction Station have completed the raw materials yard. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 9 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

PUCH'ANG POWER STATION—During the "100 days of combat," the Pukch'ang Power Station is exceeding its plans by more than 3 percent daily on generating equipment. Workers are producing 3,000 kw/hours more power than nominal capacity. In this way, workers will be able to produce 100 million kw/hours over the year's plan. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 9 July 78 p 3] 9122

PHOSPHOROUS FERTILIZER PRODUCTION—Mines and smelters subordinate to the Mining Committee, responsible for producing phosphorous ore and phosphorous fertilizer, are raising production. Miners in various pits of the Yongyu Mine, with three revolutions team members, have a 98 percent ore dressing recovery rate. Miners at P'ungryon Mine are setting new production records by mobilizing internal reserves to the maximum. The Namp'o Smeltery is raising production of sulphuric acid in order to raise production of phosphorous fertilizer. The Mup'yong Smeltery has raised production of sulphuric acid 1.2 times. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 10 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

TAEAN FACTORY—The 53rd Construction Station, at the Taeon Heavy Machinery Factory Construction Site, is showing great results in roof construction, in conjunction with the 21st Metallurgical Factory Construction Station. Workers are also finishing construction of the more than 3,000 meters of interior roads. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 11 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

TAEAN CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT—Workers at the 26 March Factory produced an extra 1,000 meters of rubber insulated wire and forwarded it to the Taeon construction site. The Kangson Steel Works, Kim Ch'aek Iron Works, and Hwanghae Iron Works sent construction Materials. Others sending materials included the 8 February Cement Plant, Ch'ongjin Slate Plant, Hamhung Hume Pipe Factory, and the Namp'o Glass Factory. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 11 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

PYONGYANG REGIONAL INDUSTRIES—Entities subordinate to the Pyongyang City Bureau of Regional Industries are exceeding production plans. The Kangnam Chemical Plant exceeded its daily plans 60 percent in production of oil paper for floors. The Plastic School Supplies Factory overfulfilled its plans 1.4 times daily in production of toothbrush cases, eyeglass cases, and abacuses. The Taedonggang Steel Products Factory tripled production of scissors, lighters, and nail clippers. The Nangnang [Lolang] Disabled Veterans Plastic Goods Factory is exceeding daily plans 1.3 times. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 11 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

LAND AND SEA TRANSPORT—Transport workers subordinate to the General Bureau of Land and Sea Transport at the Hamhung Railroad Bureau, taking ore between Kungol and Munch'on decreased turnaround time by one-third over last February and raised transportation amounts 1.5 times, compared with daily average
results last May. Truck transport combatants under the General Bureau have overfulfilled cargo haulage plans more than 60 percent in just 40 of the "100 days of combat." Trucks of the Pyongyang First Long Distance Vehicle Transport Station use two trailers going in the direction of Sinuiju, Haeju, or Kaesong, and one trailer in the direction of Hamhung and Wosan. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 11 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

HAEJU PORT ENLARGEMENT--In the work of Haeju Port enlargement, workers on prefabricated materials production have been struggling to complete steel reinforcement, falsework for concrete pouring, and concrete placing. Falsework laborers have tripled emplacement speed. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 12 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

MACHINERY FACTORY AGITPROP--Recently, party functionaries at the Nakwon Machinery Factory used the experience of party functionaries from the Huyong Coal Mine, as related in a NODONG SINMUN article, as a model for conducting propaganda and agitation. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 12 Jul 78 p 2] 9122

CONCENTRATED TRUCK TRANSPORT--Guidance functionaries at the Unsan Long-distance Vehicle Transport Station organized truck fleets of 10 vehicles each and sent them to the Yongdae Mine for concentrated transport of coal. The station has conserved fuel by 30 percent while exceeding transport quotas 120 percent. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 13 Jul 78 p 2] 9122

MAGNESIA FACTORY INTERIORS--Construction personnel at the Tanch'on Magnesia Factory, having completed the furnace brick assembly and roofs for the materials yard and production area, are progressing to such factory interior items as water, fuel, steam, electricity, and communication networks. Works on the furnace at the rotary furnace construction site is more than half done. Construction on the No 1 rotary furnace body is finished, and assembly for the No 2 furnace is in the last stages. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 13 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

RAILROAD BUREAU STATISTICS--In June, the Pyongyang Railroad Bureau carried 1,352,700 tons, the Hamhung Railroad Bureau 1,172,300 tons, Ch'ongjin Railroad Bureau 817,300 tons, and Kaech'on Railroad Bureau 658,900 tons over fixed traction amounts. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 14 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

NAMP'O PORT CONSTRUCTION--Steeplejacks and workers on 150-ton crane ships are working evenings on dock construction for Namp'o harbor enlargement. The dredging shop obtained the assistance of the captain of the ship "Hyoksin-Ho" in expediting night operations. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 14 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

POWER STATIONS--Workers and three revolutions team members at thermal power stations have produced 47 percent more power. The Pyongyang Power Station, running all equipment at capacity, is producing 10.5 percent over capacity. The Pukch'ang Power Station operators are unflagging in raising power production. Workers at the Ch'onghe'onggang Power Station are also running
equipment full blast. Technicians and workers of the Hoch'onggang Power Station, having made new-style turbines, raised turbine efficiency 2.5 percent. Workers at the Kanggye Youth and Changjin Power Stations are readjusting intake watercourses so as not to lose a single drop of water and thus produce more power. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 14 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

REGIONAL INDUSTRIES--The Tanch'on Herbal Medicine Factory has overfulfilled its year's plan 6 months early by one percent, and raised by 1.3 times the number of types of goods produced. In supplying foodstuffs to the people, the confectionary and soft drink teams of the Kwangch'on Foodstuffs Factory; Yongt'ai Branch Factory; P'ogo Branch Factory, sugar and pastry teams of the Tanch'on Soy Factory have all finished their year's plans early. The Kwangch'on Disabled Veterans' Factory and the motor work team of the Kwangch'on Iron Goods Factory have already exceeded their year's plans. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 16 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

STORAGE BATTERY PLANT --At the Taedonggang Storage Battery Plant construction site, workers of the Namgu Residential Construction Station have been innovating to quadruple assembly speed. Two work teams responsible for roof drainage work have manufactured roof drainage binding agents, and raised work efficiency three percent. They set up ceiling cranes and strung cable-ways to raise efficiency in equipment assembly. Workers of the Pyongyang Light Industry Base Construction Station have completed construction of the pipe forging ship, compressor room, pump area, oxygen storage area, and the oxygen-hydrogen generation area. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 17 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION-- Workers subordinate to the Kaech'on Railroad Bureau have erected operations buildings constituting 60 percent of their construction plans, and have completely finished roadbed lowering. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 18 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

LOCOMOTIVE STATIONS--The West Pyongyang Locomotive Station recently loaded 158,000 tons over traction standards and the Pyongyang Locomotive Station loaded 67,000 tons over. The Sinsengch'on Locomotive Station loaded a good deal of freight over traction standards also. The Ch'olsong Locomotive Station is struggling to load more ore concentrate for the Kim Ch'aek Iron Works. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 20 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

MINE CONSTRUCTION--Mines subordinate to the Tanch'on Region Metallurgical Industries Consolidated Work Station are raising ore production. The Komdok Mine is working on second stage construction for its long-distance conveyor. The Yongyang Mine is nearing construction of its inclined tunnel conveyor. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 20 Jul 78 p 1] 9122
MUSAN MINE CONSTRUCTION—The 25th Metallurgical Factory Construction Station is innovating in construction on the crushing yard and stripping conveyor for the Musan Mine. They raised efficiency on assembly of the large-size crushing machinery and are attempting to finish it one month early. Workers are raising speed to finish frame assembly on the ore moving conveyor. They are 50 percent above daily plans on conveyor frame construction and the debris-settling reservoir delivery pipes. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 21 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

RAILROAD PLAN FULFILLMENTS—Under the Kaech'on Railroad Bureau's Kanggye Branch Bureau, Sansinwon, Manp'o, Munak, Kuo, Nammun, Kongbuk, and Hwangp'o Stations fulfilled their year's cargo handling plans early. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 22 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

HWANGHAE REGIONAL INDUSTRIES—Fifteen South Hwanghae Province regional industries, including the Anak Disabled Veterans' Cultural Goods Factory, Ch'ongdan Plastic Goods Factory, and the Haeju Vinyl Chloride Factory raised production 1.5-2 times over last year. The Sinwon Disabled Veterans' Foodstuff Factory is mobilizing regional reserves for better quality processing. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 22 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

DRUG PRODUCTION—Entities subordinate to the General Bureau of Pharmaceutical Industries have attained 51.2 percent of pharmaceuticals quotas and 51.6 percent of medical instruments quotas during the first half of the "100 days of combat." The Hamhung Disabled Veterans' Medical Instruments Factory passed its goals by 77.5 percent by 16 July. The Pyongyang Medical Instruments Factory has fulfilled 55.1 percent of its goal and the Chollima Disabled Veterans' Medical Instruments Factory has fulfilled 65.5 percent. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 23 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

RAILROAD TRANSPORT—Transport combatants subordinate to the Hamhung Railroad Bureau have loaded 15,000 tons above daily plans. Others, such as the Kowon Locomotive Station raised concentrated transport levels 1.7 times over May by slashing train stopping time. The Tanch'on Passenger Train Station has raised passenger car repair speed 1.5 times. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 23 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

KUJANG STATION ENLARGEMENT—Combatants involved in enlargement of Kujang Station are loading sand and pebbles, mixing mortar, and pouring concrete. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 23 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

CENTRAL BANK BRANCH—Twenty-two functionaries of the Kwaksan branch of the Central Bank passed the national technical examination some time ago and were certified as vice economists. All are continuing to study with the goal of becoming economists within 3-4 years. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 23 Jul 78 p 3] 9122
SPECIAL QUOTAS COMPLETED—The Ch'onma Combined Feed Factory completed its "100 days of combat" quotas on the 10th. Eleven factories of North P'yongan Province have also done so as to the 18th, including the Kwaksan Disabled Veterans' Plastic Goods Factory; Sonch'on Coupling Wagons Factory; Ch'onma, Kusong, Ch'olsan, and Kwaksan Combined Feed Factories; Ch'angsong Ladies' and Children's Clothing Factory; and Ch'angsong Garment Factory. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 26 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

BLOOMING MILL PRODUCTION—The blooming mill shop of the Kangson Steel Works has raised production 1.2 times per hour, compared with the same period last year. At the same time, they have lowered raw materials consumption five percent. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 28 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

HWANGHAE STEEL WORKS—Workers at the Hwanghae Steel Works are making greater use of automation equipment already installed to raise ever higher production of pig iron, steel, and rolled steel products. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 28 Jul 78 p 2] 9122

COAL PRODUCTION INCREASES—Coal mines in South Hamgyong Province are participating in the "100 days of combat." The Kowon Coal Mine is continuing to raise anthracite production, while tunnellers have exceeded combat plans 100 percent daily. Miners at Ungok Coal Mine are normalizing high production standards. The Sudong Coal Mine is also achieving great results in anthracite production. Miners at the Tunjon Coal Mine are daily exceeding their combat quotas by 25 percent. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 28 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

MINING COMMITTEE FACTORIES—Machinery factories under the Mining Committee are registering great successes. The 28 August Factory is producing jaw crushers and block loaders with high efficiency. The Pyongyang Coal Mining Machinery Factory is raising production of hydraulic comprehensive machine braces by 1.3 times. The Hoeryong Coal Mining Machinery Factory is increasing machinery for making mine cars. The Chonch'on Rock Drill Factory is meeting daily plans for the "100 days of combat." [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 28 Jul 78 p 1] 9122

MINE QUOTAS MET—The Mandok Mine of the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex established quotas for the "100 days of combat" which were 1.3 times those of the first quarter, and has been meeting them splendidly. [Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 30 Jul 78 p 3] 9122

YANGGANG REGIONAL INDUSTRY—Among Yanggang Province Regional Industries, the P'ungso Leather Processing Factory has made leather working machines and is overfulfilling plans every month. The Paegam Meat and Vegetable Processing Plant, Yonam Spinning Mill, and Yonam Foodstuffs Factory have exceeded every monthly or quarterly plan by more than 1.8 times. The Samsu Wood Products Factory is producing at 1.3 times last year's level. [Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean 30 Jul 78 p 1] 9122
VINALON COMPLEX--In Hamhung there is the February 8 Vinalon Complex, the monumental creation of our era, the chuche era. The vinalon factory was built after our own design, and with our technique and home-made machinery and equipment. The foreign guests do not fail to visit this factory which produces annually 50,000 tons of chemical fibre from stone. They are deeply impressed here. [Excerpt] [Pyongyang FOREIGN TRADE in English Apr 78 p 29]

ELEVATOR MANUFACTURE--The Pyongyang Building Machinery Factory turns out elevators to meet domestic needs and fills orders from abroad. Among the elevators are passenger elevators, freight elevators, passenger-freight elevators, etc., which are used in apartment houses, hotels, schools, department stores and hospitals. Elevators range from small ones of less than 125 kg for libraries and restaurants to large ones of more than 3,000 kg for industrial buildings and public buildings. Elevators are exported through the Korea Machinery Export Corporation. [Excerpts] [Pyongyang FOREIGN TRADE in English Dec 77 p 13]

CSO: 4220
FISHERMAN DEFECTOR DESCRIBES LIFE IN NORTH KOREA

Seoul VANTAGE POINT in English Vol 1, No 5, Sep 78 pp 19-22

[Interview with Oh Yi-sop: "Liberation Has Made Women's Position Worse"]

[Text]

Oh Ri-sop, one of the five north Korean fishermen rescued by the south Korean navy after their boat sank in south Korean waters on June 26, gave the following account in an interview with Naewoe Press. Oh, deputy skipper of the north Korean fishing boat, chose to remain in south Korea, while the other four returned to the north on July 3. The interview reveals the general picture of fishermen's life in north Korea — Ed.

Question: When did you start your fishing career and what was your major work?

Answer: I have been engaged in fishing since I was transferred from Pyongyang to the port city of Nampo some 30 km southwest of the capital 10 years ago.

We, fishermen in Nampo are at sea from April to December and call at the port once every 30 to 45 days. In each visit we stay at the port one to three days. We caught anchovies in the West Sea and salted them in kegs. The salted anchovies were transported to the port by a ferry boat.

While staying at the port during the January-March off-season, we prepare for the fishing months repairing nets and boats.

Q: How much did you make and what is the pay scale for fishermen?

A: I, deputy skipper of a fishing boat earned a monthly average of 100 won. It consists of basic payment and some fringe benefit which is determined by the quantity of fish I and my colleagues aboard my boat catch in the previous month. We are paid a bonus when our catch exceeds the assigned quota and have our basic payment cut down when our catch is below the quota.

The basic payment is 1.60 won a day for freshmen, 1.80 won for those with two to five years of experience, 1.90 won for those with five or
more years, 2.2.20 won for deputy skippers, and 2.30-2.50 won for skippers.

Q: Will you tell us about the purchasing power of the north Korean currency?

A: They pay 0.62 won for 1 kg of rationed grains. The official price of a man’s suit is 150 to 180 won and that of a school uniform is 30 won. A Soviet-made wrist watch is priced at 350 won, but a second-hand one sells for more than 500 won in the black market. One laundry soap is rationed for 0.5 won. A bowl of noodle made of Indian corn flour is sold at 1.50 won at restaurants.

Q: How is the clothing condition in your fishing village?

A: We fishermen have two suits – one for summer and another for winter – which are “special presents” from Kim Il-sung. But we paid for them. In north Korea nothing is given free. They pay for everything rationed.

Most fishermen and laborers in north Korea wear fatigue clothes whether they are at work or on the street. Many single women report to their work places wearing skirts and blouses. Some married women wear one-pieces and many others, mompe, the trousers worn by Japanese women during World War II, and shirts when they go to work. When they start work, they change blouses or shirts with fitagues.

Q: How was your housing condition?

A: We, seven members of my family, lived in a compartment of 30 square meters with one room and one kitchen in a one-story tenement house equipped with four compartments for four households. Most laborers and fishermen live in this kind of house. Two-room or three-room apartments are allowed for those with high positions in the Party and the government. Twenty-six households usually form the smallest residential unit, ban, and all of them make do with one three-compartment latrine each for men and women and an extra urinal for men.

Major household fuel in north Korea is coal. Each household is rationed 500 kilograms of powdered coal a month which the residents mold into a certain type.

Q: Will you explain food rations in north Korea?

A: One day’s ration of food grains, composed of 50 per cent of rice and 50 per cent of minor cereals, is set at 700 grams for adults (of 17 years of age and above) with occupation, 400 grams for jobless adults who stay home for some reasons, 500 grams for high school students between the ages of 15 and 16, 500 grams for primary and middle school students between the ages of 6 and 14, 400 grams for children between the ages of 3 and 5. The north Koreans receive food rations good for only 26 days each month in an economization campaign which started two years ago. We, fishermen are allowed to cultivate some 100 square meters of land around our homes.

Liquor, sugar and cake are among the most precious items rationed. Liquor and cake are rationed four times a year – on New Year’s Day, Kim Il-sung’s birthday (April 15), the founding anniversary of the north Korean regime (September 9), and
that of the Workers’ Party (October 10). On these occasions every family is allowed to buy 0.7 liter of hard liquor, Soju, 500 grams of sweets and 500 grams of cake.

Many women work outside home to get more grain rations. The food rationing is so strict that nobody is willing to eat at others’ home and no one can move his or her residence without permit.

Q: Is there any religious activity in north Korea?

A: None at all, to my knowledge. I will tell you an episode. A Party secretary in Nampo was stripped of all of his positions in 1966 when some one reported to the authorities concerned that the secretary’s wife secretly visited and consulted a female fortuneteller.

Q: North Korea boasts that it liberated women from heavy house chores. What is your comment on this assertion?

A: The north Korean policy to provide women with jobs has made women’s position worse. Their employment would free them from the role of housewife at home if someone took it over or their homes were equipped with modern appliances.

Despite their hard work outside, the working women still have to cook food, wash clothes, and do other things traditionally assigned to women. My wife was not an exception. I often saw my wife wash clothes after 10 p.m. North Korean workers usually return home after 10 p.m. because they have to attend various meetings after their work. They leave home for work at about 7:30 in the morning.

Q: What do you know about crimes in north Korea?

A: During my stay in Nampo City, I heard of two cases of rape. The culprits were executed in public. I have not heard of any case of theft committed by adults, but larceny of grains is prevalent among students of elementary and secondary schools. Mothers usually lock their grain box when they go to work and boys sneak into empty houses to steal grain destroying the lock.

Q: How about traffic accidents, fire and disease?

A: Traffic accidents hardly occur in north Korea because they have not many vehicles. As regards fire, I heard of one case in Nampo shipyard, which is for military use, three years after I was transferred to the city from Pyongyang. Inflammation of liver, tuberculosis and hemiplegia account for the highest death rate in north Korea.

Q: How are weddings and funerals conducted?

A: When a man and a woman want to marry, they should first ascertain their partner’s age; they cannot register their marriage if the bride’s age is below 26 and the bridegroom’s, below 30. Without the registration, they can hardly live together because of the ration system. They also have to check their partner’s personal and family backgrounds to see, among others, if he or she falls into the anti-society or anti-state category.

For a wedding ceremony, the state rations three bottles of liquor, 10kg of vegetables and some noodle. Kim Il-sung’s instruction is that the attendants of a wedding ceremony should not exceed five.
For funerals, five bottles of liquor and some noodle are rationed. If a worker of a company dies, the company collects 2 won from each employee’s salary to finance the funeral. The funeral service is held two days after the death. A coffin is priced at 28 won and a vehicle is rented for 30 won. Every one is buried in public cemeteries.

Q: What kind of newspapers and broadcasts are available for fishermen in the north?

A: I have read the Pyongnam Ilbo, the only daily published in South Pyongan Province. In north Korea there are Rodong Shinmun, organ of the Workers’ Party only for Party members, and provincial dailies. As to broadcasts, only the (north) Korean Central Broadcasting Station programs are available for the north Koreans. Most north Koreans listen to broadcasts relayed by town stations. They can hardly get other stations because all radio dials are fixed at the KCBS channel.

The monthly publication, Political Knowledge, is delivered to every fisherman. The monthly always carries Kim Il-sung’s speeches, decrees and items on ideological affairs.

Q: The north Korean mass media depict south Korea as a hell. Do the north Koreans believe them?

A: Those who are 40 years of age or above doubt such reports since they know the Cholla provinces in the south are the major granary of Korea. But those who are below 40 believe the reports on “the hellish state of south Korea.” They have no chance to learn about things outside north Korea, and even outside their village. No one wants to open his or her mouth to tell the truth.

Q: What do you think is the fate of your family in the north?

A: If the past practice stands, the north Korean authorities will take no immediate action against my family. They must have told the neighbors of my family and other north Koreans that I did not return because the south Koreans detained me. But in two months they will remove my family to some place, probably a mountainous area, at night.
NEW COUNTY ESTABLISHED IN YANGGANG PROVINCE

Seoul VANTAGE POINT in English Vol 1, No 5, Sep 78 pp 24-25

[Text]

North Korea on August 7 elevated District No. 5 in Yanggang Province to the county level and renamed it Taehongdan County. According to north Korean broadcasts on August 8, the new county annexed part of the neighboring Sunjiyon County of Yanggang Province and Yonsa County of North Hamgyong Province. With the birth of Taehongdan County north Korea has one special city (Pyongyang), two cities under the direct control of the central government (Kaesong and Chongjin), nine provinces, 37 districts, 152 counties, 4,169 dong (precincts) and 214 labor wards. (See Chart 1). Each labor ward comprises more than 400 workers, employed in mines, fishing villages, factories or enterprises. The newly born county consists of one up (town) and nine labor wards. Up, or the capital of a county, is an administrative unit smaller than city but larger than dong. Taehongdan up was born of former No. 5 labor ward.

The new county, which is deep in the mountainous area bordering Manchuria has been all but a barren area until a national farm was established there in July 1952. National Farm No. 5 with an area of 30,000 ha (300km²) accommodated migrants from other parts of the country under the central government policy. National Farm No. 5 was reorganized later into District No. 5 which is considered as a county-level unit.

In view of the fact that the administrative change took place in the first year of the new seven-year economic development program (1978-1984) and amid the “100-Day Battle” (June 1-September 8), an expert on north Korea says, Pyongyang appears bent on developing more farmlands for increased food production. He also views that the north Koreans intend to intensify the idolization of Kim Il-sung because the region is known as the “historic site of Kim’s anti-Japan fight” during Japanese colonial rule.

North Korea has effected more than 20 administrative rezonings since the nation was divided in 1945. Pyongyang, the second largest city after Seoul in Korea, was elevated to a special city in 1946. The present nine provinces were
derived from the original five: North Hamgyong, South Hamgyong, North Pyongan, South Pyongan, and Hwanghae provinces. Another administrative change made this year gave birth to Taean City in former Kangso County in South Pyongan Province on March 29.

(Chart I)

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<th>City</th>
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GEOGRAPHY

YOLTUSAMCHOLLI PLAIN DESCRIBED

Pyongyang KOREA TODAY in English Jun 78 p 48

[Text] The Yoltusamcholli Plain is one of our granaries, extending along the left side of the lower Chongchon-gang River, in the northwestern part of South Pyongan Province. It covers a vast area of over 300 square kilometres in Anju, Mundok and Sukchon Counties. It borders upon the sea for the most part and is much influenced by oceanic climate. Its annual mean temperature stands at 9 degrees C, the monthly mean temperature is 10 degrees C below zero in January, 23 degrees C in August, and the annual mean precipitation is about 900 mm.

It is 20 to 50 metres above the sea and is flat, gently sloping down to the sea.

Before liberation it had thousands of changbo of paddy fields, but all of them were poorly irrigated and suffered much from flood and drought every year. Consequently, its yield was very poor.

After liberation it underwent a radical change. Under the constant concern of the great leader Comrade Kim Il Song, the Pyongnam Irrigation System was established with several thousand-ri long canals and many pumping stations and lock gates, and other irrigation facilities. As a result, the age-old desire of our peasants for irrigation came true and it was freed from flood and drought damages forever.

Today the industrialization and modernization of farming is being energetically carried out on the plain, and peasants there do farming with greater ease and reap bumper harvest every year. Last year, Sukchon County produced 26,000 tons more of grain than the previous year, and Mundok County 23,000 tons more. The per-changbo paddy rice output of the Sangpal Cooperative Farm of the latter reached 8.7 tons.

Today the plain has turned into a plain yielding rich crops every year, into one of our leading rice producers, and into a flowering modern socialist rural area.

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CHRONOLOGY

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN AUGUST 1978

Seoul VANTAGE POINT in English Vol 1, No 5, Sep 78 pp 27-32

[Text]

1 Deputy Premier-foreign Minister Ho Dam and his mission return home from Yugoslavia after attending the Nonaligned Conference held in Belgrade on July 25-30.

1 A Burmese economic mission arrives in Pyongyang for a 12-day visit.

1 A Chinese painting-exhibit team arrives in Pyongyang for a 16-day visit.

1 An economic mission led by Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Pang Taeyul (녀 팑 영) returns from a visit to Malagasy.

1 A Libyan social welfare and insurance mission winds up its visit to Pyongyang.

1 A Hungarian journalists mission leaves Pyongyang.

2 A journalists mission led by Kim Song-gol (김 성 굴), president of the (north) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), leaves on a tour of Asian countries.

2 A Chinese railroad mission leaves Pyongyang by train.

2 President Kim II-sung presides over a joint meeting of the (north) Korean Workers’ Party Politburo and the Central People’s Committee to evaluate the results of the Belgrade Nonaligned Conference.

2 KCNA reports a new film was cranked up recently to depict a mechanized family of nine, all of whom are tractor operators.

4 Ambassador Choi U-jin (최 우 진) to Ghana presents his credentials to the head of that country.

5 A Polish journalists mission arrives in Pyongyang for a 10-day visit.

5 The 8.1 women volleyball team of the Chinese People’s Army arrives in Pyongyang.
The Central People's Committee announces a decree on the formation of Tachongdan County in Yanggang Province.

Rodong Shinmun, organ of the (north) Korean Workers' (Communist) Party, publishes an editorial urging a greater sense of responsibility and more creativity among workers.

Rodong Shinmun editorially calls for preparations against winds and floods.

A special envoy of South Yemen President Ali Nasser Muhammad arrives in Pyongyang for a five-day visit.

A Burmese art troupe arrives in Pyongyang for a 12-day visit.

A Mali government mission arrives in Pyongyang for an eight-day visit.

President Kim meets with the visiting Burmese economic mission.

President Kim meets with the outgoing Nigerian ambassador.

A Party mission leaves for Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

The visiting Burmese art troupe gives its first performance in Pyongyang.

An architectural mission returns from a visit to the Soviet Union and Romania.

A Romanian aviation mission arrives in Pyongyang for a 10-day visit.

A Nampo City friendship mission returns from a visit to Romania.

A Rodong Shinmun editorial urges more care for national assets.

A Party mission returns home from a visit to Romania and Poland.

A Libyan mission arrives in Pyongyang for a four-day visit.

North Korea and Tanzania sign an agreement on cultural exchange for 1978-1980 in Dar es Salaam.

Ambassador Chang Hang-ryong (장 헌 뭉) to Pakistan pays a farewell visit to the head of state of that country.

The (north) Korean Central Broadcasting Station (KCBS) reports north Korean delegates attended a conference of nonaligned countries on broadcasting and communications satellites held in New Delhi recently.

A Chinese Communist Party friendship mission arrives in Pyongyang for a 19-day visit.

President Kim meets with the visiting Libyan mission.

The Taedonggang Women's Volleyball Team of north Korea and the visiting Chinese 8.1 women volleyballers meet in goodwill matches in Pyongyang.

President Kim meets with the Mali government mission.
President Kim and Premier Lee Chong-ok exchange telegram messages with Brezhnev and Kosygin on the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of national liberation, August 15.

North Korea and Libya sign a protocol on the results of a conference held between the two countries in Pyongyang. The two countries at the same time concluded an agreement on cultural cooperation.

A Czech science and technology mission arrives in Pyongyang for a nine-day visit.

A Nigerian trade and industry mission arrives in Pyongyang for a nine-day visit.

A Rodong Shinmun editorial urges readiness for autumn crop harvests.

Radio Peking reports the north Korean National Symphony Orchestra touring China gave performances in Hangzhou of late.

Ambassador Kim Bong-nok (김 푸 께) to Norway presents his credentials to its king.

Rodong Shinmun publishes an editorial on the occasion of the August 15 Liberation Day urging greater efforts for the construction of a better "Socialist fatherland."

A military friendship mission led by Lt. Gen. Oh Kuk-ryol (오 규 립), returns from a visit to China.

The new Romanian ambassador arrives in Pyongyang to take up his post.

Chongchon Bridge, the longest one in north Korea spanning the Chongchon River in South Pyongan Province, is opened to traffic.

The visiting Burmese art troupe gives performances in Pyongyang.

KCBS and Radio Pyongyang report letter-relaying races from provincial factories, farms, and offices to President Kim in Pyongyang, started August 15 to deliver those "loyalty" letters before or on the 30th founding anniversary of the government, September 9.

A Chinese military friendship mission led by Vice Defense Minister Su Yu arrives in Pyongyang.

North Korea and Romania sign an aviation agreement in Pyongyang.

The (north Korean) National Symphony Orchestra visiting China winds up its four-day performance tour in Shanghai.

KCBS reports north Korean technicians won first place in a wireless communications competition among Socialist countries held in Hungary on August 5-12.

An economic mission led by Finance Minister Kim Kyong-ryon (김 경 릴) returns from a visit to the Central African Empire.
19 Rodong Shumun editorially urges fulfillment of the on-going “100-day battle” by mobilizing the people’s revolutionary zeal to the hilt.

20 An art festival including opera, music and dancing opens in Pyongyang to continue through the end of August to celebrate the 30th founding anniversary of the government, September 9.

20 Youth and students wind up their five-day sports event for the 4.18 Cup Swimming and Water Polo Championships in Nampo City, South Pyongan Province.

21 President Kim receives credentials from the new Romanian ambassador.

21 Ambassador to Seychelles Chang Il-man (장 일 만) pays a farewell call on President Albert Rene.

21 An economic mission led by Lee Ji-chan (리 지 찬), minister of power industry, returns home from a visit to Romania, Hungary and Poland.

21 A Polish aviation mission arrives in Pyongyang for a nine-day visit.

22 A Rodong Shumun editorial urges increased production of consumer goods during the “100-day battle” period.

22 Radio Pyongyang reports foreign sailors of the ships which were calling at Hungnam port held a joint rally recently to express their support for the north Korean unification policy.

22 A Romanian construction mission arrives in Pyongyang for a five-day visit.

22 An agricultural science mission leaves for China.

23 The Yonpung-ho, 20,000-ton freighter, is launched.

23 Kim Song-gol, president of the KCNA, who has been leading a journalists mission to Asian countries, meets with Premier Morarji Desai of India in New Delhi.

24 A five-day competition of mountain climbing, marching and camping among youths and students (men and women) closes in Chagang Province. The event was held to celebrate the 30th founding anniversary of the north Korean government, September 9.

25 President Kim meets with the outgoing Algerian charge d’affaires.

25 A wireless communications team returns home after participating in a competition held in Hungary among Socialist countries.

25 A model aircraft-flying team returns home from a world competition held in Romania recently.

26 Rodong Shumun editorially urges increased production of fertilizer in preparation for the new farming season.
President Kim sends a condolence message to the acting president of Kenya over the death of President Kenyatta.

A sports delegation of Chochongyon arrives in Pyongyang to compete in an athletic meet slated there on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of founding of the government.

The new Ghana ambassador arrives in Pyongyang to assume his post.

The outgoing Algerian charge d'affaires leaves Pyongyang.

An international friendship exhibition hall which displays the gifts, letters and souvenirs President Kim received from leaders of other countries, opens in a rite attended by Kim Il-sung, Premier Lee Chong-ok and other dignitaries.

President Kim meets with a Chinese Communist Party mission.

President Kim receives credentials from the new Ghana ambassador.

North Korea and Poland sign an aviation agreement in Pyongyang.

A Party mission returns home from a visit to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

A special advisor of the Jamaica premier arrives in Pyongyang.

An assembly mission led by Son Song-pil (손 성 훈) leaves for West Germany to attend the 65th International Parliamentarians' Union (IPU) conference.

The new Mongolian ambassador arrives in Pyongyang to take up his post.

Radio Pyongyang reports a Chinese painting exhibition is being held in Wonsan through September 3.

President Kim decorates the visiting Chinese military delegates.

A group of Korean residents in the Soviet Union arrives in Pyongyang as a congratulatory mission to join in celebrating the 30th founding anniversary of the north Korean government, September 9.

KCBS reports that meetings are held in various places to learn and discuss Kim Il-sung's ideology in commemoration of the 30th founding anniversary of the north Korean government, September 9.

North Korea marked the 20th founding anniversary of the Kang Ban-sok Revolutionary Institute with a reporting session held with the presence of Lim Chun-chu, secretary general of the Workers' Party Central Committee, and other government officials as well as students of the institute.

Newly-appointed Ambassador Ilwang Hon (일왕Hon) to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) leaves Pyongyang for Rome to take up his post there.
The 33rd Vietnamese independence anniversary is observed in a ceremony held at Moranbong Theater in Pyongyang.


An economic mission led by Pang Tae-yul, deputy foreign trade minister, leaves for East Germany to attend Leipzig International Market.

An economic mission leaves for Bulgaria.

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END