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The report contains information on the Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.
# TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

## No. 1378

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CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING ACTIVITIES

In Nikolayevskaya Oblast

Moscow SOVETSKY PATRIOT in Russian 4 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Ye. Yushchenko, civil defense chief of staff of Partizanskaya iskra kolkhoz, Krymka, Nikolayevskaya oblast: "These Indefatigable Enthusiasts"]

[Text] I heard the phrase which has been placed in the heading at one of the conferences in the kolkhoz office. At that time, the discussion concerned the organization of lessons with the public on civil defense. All this tedious work was assigned primarily to the DOSAAF activists. And they did not err. N. Asauletko, V. Koshovenko, L. Osadchiy, A. Ostapenko, L. Lykhvar, and others coped with their assigned duties successfully. In the person of the DOSAAF members the civil defense [CD] staff of the installation has reliable and unselfish assistants.

Let us take, for example, the development of plans for the complex installation and command-post exercises or the conduct of lessons with kolkhoz workers and other CD measures. Here, the DOSAAF members are the staff's first assistants. For example, when it was necessary to work out several practical actions with the personnel of the animal protection team prior to an exercise, the deputy chairman of the DOSAAF committee, S. Grechanyy, organized such a lesson. T. Geyko conducted a practical lesson on how to conduct the protection of the granary, vegetable storehouse, and wells with the field workers. On the assignment of the DOSAAF committee, it was he who told the kolkhoz workers how to improve the basements of their homes as shelters.

On a recent exercise, the DOSAAF activists participated in the conduct of party-political work. In accordance with the plan of the party bureau, N. Karvatskiy, L. Grechanyy, and others conducted talks and briefings with the kolkhoz workers. N. Sadovskiy and the commander of the medical team, L. Kuksina, published operational news sheets. The chairman of the committee himself, L. Osadchiy, prepared a broadcast over the local radio net and a photo newspaper and he set up a photo showcase on materials of the exercise.

All the people were covered by party-political work on the exercise. And this contributed to the high morale and the striving to demonstrate all their skill
and activity. Among those who distinguished themselves were the following members of the defense society: team commanders V. Koshovenko, A. Bezulya, and O. Moyseyenko, the commander of the group for the protection of public order, S. Popik, and others. Many were rewarded by the CD chief of the installation. Among them were society members V. Katran, the commander of the communication section, L. Lykhvar, and the members of the medical aid team headed by T. Malina.

This year, the kolkhoz workers are facing difficult tasks on the production of agricultural produce. Along with this, there is much to be done on the further improvement of civil defense. And we are counting on the assistance of the DOSAAF members. For this is a reliable force on which we can always rely.

In Valka, Latvia

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 18 Jun 78 p 3

[Article by S. Ivanov, Riga: "A Complex Installation Exercise"]

[Text] The complex installation civil defense [CD] exercise in the city of Valka proceeded in an unusual manner. At the designated time the nonmilitary formations of the enterprises and institutions travelled out to the driving ground of the local DOSAAF auto school which is under construction. Students from the training organizations also arrived here. Dump trucks, vehicles, excavators, bulldozers, and other necessary equipment were placed at their disposal. Each formation had a specific task. One was responsible for the erection of a scaffold, another--for a railroad platform, a third--for a circular route, and so forth.

The members of the formations had an attitude of high responsibility toward the lessons and operated smoothly and with knowledge of the matter. As a result of the exercise, a circular route, an area for primary military training, a roadway bridge, a "snake," a scaffold, and other obstacles were installed on vacant land.

In the Moscow Area

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 18 Jun 78 p 3

[Article by V. Shchilkin, Moscow: "By Figurative Means"]

[Text] The DOSAAF primary organization of the city's motion picture association is operating in close contact with the civil defense [CD] staff and participating in the conduct of various measures. Through the efforts of the DOSAAF members, for example, civil defense corners were established in all production subdivisions. Displays with various training materials were set up for the leaders of the exercises and this helped in the more intelligible presentation, to the students, of the problems being studied. On the proposal of Yu. Sharachkin, a DOSAAF activist, colorful posters were
stitched together by subject in the form of unique "booklets." It was convenient to use them on the lessons.

The DOSAAF propagandists are performing considerable work. Members of the society, communists A. Gashchenko, A. Perevalov, V. Borisenkov, and others are conducting lectures and talks on CD and telling the workers and employees about the actions of the MPVO [local air defense] in the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The activity of our DOSAAF primary organization in propagandizing CD knowledge was noted with the pennant of the society's Baumanskiy raykom.

In the Odessa Area

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 18 Jun 78 p 3

[Article by N. Ryabov, Odessa: "Pioneer Detachment in Motion Picture Frames"]

[Text] The motion picture frames which tell about the young heroes of the Great Patriotic War and how the pioneers and school children helped their fathers and older brothers to smash the fascist aggressors are replacing one another.

Then, episodes flash on the screen which were taken recently in the pioneer camp of the Odessa streetcar-trolleybus administration. This shows the youngsters' lessons on civil defense. The young successors of the heroes are clearly accomplishing practical tasks on the ground in a "stricken area," using field expedients, and rendering first aid to "victims." The lessons which were captured on film are conducted by S. Chernik, an experienced military instructor, in a well thought out and instructive manner.

The colored documentary chronicle film, "Civil Defense in a Pioneer Camp," won a prize at the republic viewing of amateur films. It was created by a DOSAAF activist of Odessa's Primorskiy rayon, reserve officer B. Okhotnikov. The film enjoys great popularity among the young viewers.

In Kremenchug

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Jul 78 p 3

[Article by I. Yashan, Kremenchug: "The Concern of the Party Committee"]

[Text] There was no real contact between the civil defense staff and the DOSAAF committee of the Kremenchug neftekhimstroy construction-assembly trust for a long time. Each one worked the best it could, without relying on the help of its neighbor. It was clear that matters suffered from such isolation. Then the members of the party committee had a thought: why can't the efforts of the civil defense [CD] staff and the society's committee be combined and their actions coordinated? But before undertaking something, they decided to study their activity, strong and weak aspects, and capabilities and to learn how they can help one another.
After this the CD chief of staff, I. Geleverya, his deputy, G. Patrakhin, the chairman of the DOSAAF committee, G. Pepov, and activists in mass-defense work were invited to a meeting of the party committee. A basic discussion took place. There were also mutual reproaches. Most important, both sides found a common language.

The first joint step was the equipping of a classroom for lessons in civil defense and primary military training with the draftee youth. The personnel of the CD staff had nurtured a thought for quite a while: to construct a modern training ground on which scouts, rescue personnel, fighters of the emergency-technical teams, and so forth could improve their practical skills. But this was beyond the capabilities of the staff alone. It was decided to assemble and have a short talk with the members of the DOSAAF committee. They weighed everything thoroughly, estimated capabilities, and proposed putting this question before the party committee. But not simply to put the question; they worked out a plan for the construction of the training ground ahead of time. It was envisaged that builders, staff personnel, and members of the defense society would be involved.

Leaders of construction subunits, formation commanders, staff personnel, and members of the DOSAAF committee were invited to an expanded session of the party committee. The absolute majority of those attending actively supported the important measure. Specific recommendations were introduced.

That was at the end of last autumn, and now the most laborious work has already been accomplished. The equipping of the training sites is under way. In a short time, the trust will have a modern training ground—the basis of a training-material base which will permit the men and commanders to raise their practical ability to a new level. And this with minimum expenditures. This is what is obtained from coordination in work, the combining of efforts, and the striving to make one's maximum contribution to the common cause of improving mass-defense work at the enterprise. Next on the list is the building of a shooting gallery. There is no doubt that the CD staff and the DOSAAF committee with the support of the party committee will cope with this task successfully.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that the party committee headed by V. Odintv is creatively directing the varied activity of the party and public organizations of the construction administrations and is pointing their efforts toward the accomplishment of the tasks for the third year of the five-year plan, among which a prominent place is also occupied by the improvement of mass-defense work.

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NAVAL TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Aboard a Minesweeper

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Capt-Lt N. Gormalev: "Experience Is at the Adjacent Mooring...."]

[Text] The minesweeper put out to sea on another mission. Komsomol members stood watch at many action stations. Suddenly the engine began to falter. The mission had to be terminated.

It was later determined that Komsomol members were not directly to blame for what had happened. An inspection indicated, however, that some of them did not know their job very well and sometimes fail to observe the manual when standing watch. Some commit infractions not due to lack of discipline but due to ignorance. It would seem that this would serve as a warning to Komsomol activists on the minesweeper, that the Komsomol committee will draw the proper conclusions, will monitor the men's technical training, will get a military-technical information dissemination council into operation, and will make every effort to assist the commanding officer in improving organization of competition among young enlisted personnel for excellent knowledge of equipment and weapons.

Komsomol committee secretary Warrant Officer Yu. Denisov, however, is highly optimistic, stating that the technical knowledge of Komsomol members is increasing, that no equipment malfunction or breakdown has occurred through the fault of Komsomol members. As we have seen, however, there is no real foundation for such optimism at the present time.

One of the responsible jobs done by Komsomol members is transfer of fuel from the main to the auxiliary tank. There is a special fuel level indicator which when necessary automatically shuts off fuel flow. On one occasion young sailor A. Koval'chuk was on watch during this operation. It is not clear whether this Komsomol member was not paying attention or whether the automatic device failed, but in any case fuel overflowed. The engine was operating when the fuel gushed out of the full tank. Fortunately there was no fire. But some of the fuel was ruined, and the men had to do a lot of work to clean up the mess.
These happenings do not jibe with the optimistic statements by the Komsomol committee secretary. Everything can be explained quite simply, however: the Komsomol members failed to pay adequate attention to this incident as well, considering it to be "trivial." They did not trouble to determine how well the young sailor knew the equipment and whether he needed assistance. Nor did they bring to light any other factors contributing to the sailor's mistake.

These and other cases of ignorant operation of equipment attest to the fact that at the present time the ship's Komsomol committee is failing to do purposeful work on organizing among Komsomol members competition to improve their specialized knowledge. Activists underrate the role of competition among personnel for meeting pledges to surpass standards in readying weapons and equipment on an alert. The best specialists still fail to exchange knowledge with young personnel. Only this can explain the fact that Seaman A. Pavlov and several others had been serving on board the minesweeper for 3 months and did not yet know whom they were competing for best knowledge of occupational specialty and for early proficiency rating promotion.

The ship's Komsomol activists take insufficient interest in the activities of noncommissioned officers in directing socialist competition among their subordinates for excellent maintenance of their assigned area, thorough knowledge of equipment, efficient employment of equipment in any situation, and operation without malfunction or breakdown. Not a single Komsomol member noncommissioned officer spoke at the Komsomol committee meeting. But this is essential. Some noncommissioned officers lack experience, while some others underestimate their role in this important area. A discussion on the committee would make it possible to determine who among the noncommissioned officers need assistance and who should be severely reprimanded for failing to do their duty. If this is not done, one cannot speak of an active search for reserve potential for improving quality and effectiveness of technical training.

In short, they do not look for new forms of improving the specialized knowledge on the part of personnel. Nor are old, tested forms high in the esteem of the ship's Komsomol activists. Komsomol members do not remember when was the last time there was held on board the minesweeper an equipment experts evening, a technical quiz game, competition for best knowledge of the ship and for the title of best specialist. Technical study groups have not been in operation for quite some time.

Of course the ship's commanding officer, Capt-Lt V. Vlasov, and his executive officer, Sr Lt A. Tsiplyakov, bear primary responsibility for deficiencies in organization of technical training and the personnel mistakes discussed above. They are also substantially to blame for the fact that the work of the Komsomol committee is not directed toward ensuring excellent accomplishment of combat training tasks and increasing personnel technical knowledge. Neither the commanding officer nor the executive officer have ever attended Komsomol meetings in the combat departments, nor have they suggested to the activists
how better to organize dissemination of military-technical information. Therefore it is not surprising that practically no businesslike decisions promoting improvement in personnel technical training have been adopted at Komsomol bureau meetings in the combat department.

Nor were such errors of omission noted by the deputy commander for political affairs, Sr Lt V. Shashura. Otherwise he would have found time to hold an instruction class for the Komsomol activists, giving them practical assistance in problems of organization of dissemination of military-technical information. Such assistance is very needed, for many of the deficiencies in the performance of the Komsomol committee secretary, Warrant Officer Yu. Denisov, are due to a lack of experience -- this was the first time he was elected to this position.

Instruction classes on problems of organizing dissemination of military-technical information on a subunit scale, and exchange of advanced know-how would also greatly benefit the ship's Komsomol activists. Particularly since it is not necessary to go very far for experience. At the adjacent mooring there is a minesweeper under the command of Capt Lt V. Korotkiy. This commander skillfully directs the activities of the Komsomol organization. Komsomol committee member Sr Lt G. Martens, who is responsible for the activities of the technical study groups, chose knowledgeable, conscientious leaders. They are regularly invited to attend meetings of the military-technical information dissemination council, where study group leaders present methods recommendations and suggestions on improving the quality of study group sessions and on drawing as many sailors as possible into the study groups.

Komsomol activists participated directly in preparing for and holding evening activities devoted to exchanging know-how in weapons operation and maintenance. The ship's finest specialists, with high proficiency ratings, spoke that evening -- PO 1st Class V. Revun, and POs 2d Class V. Shkurat and P. Pochtarenko. The Komsomol organization is demanding on those who are rather lazy about studying their weapons and equipment and who seek a pretext to wriggle out of technical study group classes. Hearings for remiss personnel are held at Komsomol group meetings and combat department bureau and Komsomol committee meetings. Criticism helps Komsomol members correct deficiencies. For example, Sn. V. Kirițiu was given a stiff talking to by his comrades, as he had violated regulations on equipment operation. This Komsomol member drew the correct conclusions and is now conscientiously improving his technical knowledge and servicing equipment without failing to observe the demands of the corresponding documents.

Komsomol activists carefully monitor the men's performance in meeting socialist pledges aimed at thorough study of equipment and weapons. It is not mere happenstance that for a long time there have been no equipment failures on this minesweeper through the fault of Komsomol members, and the crew accomplishes all tasks with excellent marks. At a recent exercise the men did an excellent job in sweeping mines, while Komsomol member Sn A. Dochkin scored a kill on an air target with the first salvo.
The personnel of the entire subunit should assimilate the positive experience of this leading Komsomol organization. But at the present time the lagging performers at the adjacent mooring are unable to utilize it to an adequate degree to improve the quality of combat training. And one of the reasons for this is the sluggishness of the Komsomol committee of the ship subunit. The committee headed by Lt V. Vasil'ev was unable for a period of 3 months following reports and elections to distribute pledges among activists and to appoint a person responsible for dissemination of military-technical information. The Komsomol committee and all activists must work persistently to carry out the advice given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his address at the 18th Komsomol Congress: "It is time, comrades, for us to learn to adopt advanced know-how in a businesslike manner and to completely accomplish every useful activity."

The resolutions of the 18th Komsomol Congress evoked in Komsomol members an aspiration to serve even better. And this praiseworthy aspiration should be encouraged and supported in every way. Securement of combat equipment operation without malfunction or failure depends in large measure on the contribution made by the Komsomol organizations of the ships and improvement in the men's specialized knowledge.

Pacific Fleet Commander on Training Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Adm V. Maslov, Commander, Red-Banner Pacific Fleet: "Training with the Ocean Test"]

[Text] During his visit to our fleet, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, observed from the deck of the cruiser "Admiral Senyavin" the actions of various naval forces at a bilateral tactical exercise. "Today I was present at your fleet exercise," stated Leonid II'ich during a speech on board the cruiser, "and I can state with great satisfaction that fleet personnel and the fleet command have accomplished a great deal in mastering new equipment and improving skill in the conduct of naval operations." This high praise from Leonid II'ich Brezhnev inspired our navymen, who have done a great deal to strengthen navy combat readiness and who have completed the winter training period with fine results.

We observed the exercise with particular attention and enthusiasm. This exercise was distinguished by swiftness and massiveness of strikes, and demanded a high degree of organization of control and coordinated action between forces. In order successfully to accomplish the assigned missions in this situation, the commanders of the ships involved had to display all their skill and all the experience they have acquired in the course of combat training and on long ocean cruises.
We should emphasize that in addition to a complex tactical situation, the exercise was also distinguished by great psychological stress. Each and every commander, each and every crew member realized that not one single action on their part should be erroneous and not one chance false step should negatively affect accomplishment of the assigned missions. Essentially this type of situation is characteristic of actual combat. In this sense the bilateral naval exercise corresponded to those conditions of combat operations for which we are training ship commanders and crews.

To speak of the Pacific Fleet today means to speak primarily of the presence of our ships in the ocean, their combat readiness, their capability to carry out the assigned missions. Extended blue-water cruises are the principal type of combat training for the men of the Pacific Fleet. On ocean cruises naval personnel consolidate practical skills learned in base, improve combat proficiency and cohesion of crews, while the professional skill of ship commanding officers becomes perfected. At the same time on cruises this skill finds the most practical application, is tested and evaluated on the most rigid criteria.

Demanded of the commander is a high degree of responsibility for confident accomplishment of the missions assigned for the crews and for maintaining the ship in a continuous state of combat readiness. At the same time the commander is faced with the task of achieving, under conditions of extended tough equipment operation, optimal equipment operating conditions, utilization of equipment service life, ensuring reliability of shipboard systems and propulsion units. It is inconceivable to achieve this without continuous purposeful training and indoctrination of personnel, without planned, scheduled party-political work, the purpose of which is to mobilize personnel for skilled and resolute actions throughout the entire cruise.

In sending ships out to distant waters, we understand quite well that successful crew activities far from base are determined first and foremost by the degree of preparedness, spiritual and military maturity, as well as the professional qualifications of the ship commanders. And if, working with a commander in base and at sea, higher-echelon commanders have succeeded in transmitting to him their own experience and know-how, in teaching him independence, and in instilling in him a high sense of responsibility, then on the distant ocean as well the commander will respond to the situation and will successfully accomplish the assigned tasks in any and all conditions.

The commander of the large ASW ship "Marshal Voroshilov" was compelled to come to the assistance of another ship under gale conditions. The circumstances forced Capt 1st Rank A. Kosov to head into a low-pressure area, which seamen, according to the laws of navigation, always seek to avoid. Nor did all subsequent events and the commander's decisions proceeding from them fit into the framework of customary actions. Nevertheless Capt 1st Rank A. Kosov performed with confidence, boldness, took a calculated risk when necessary, and succeeded in accomplishing the mission, in spite of heavy icing. This feat was possible because the officer had gone through the great school of ocean cruises and had solidly assimilated the lessons taught to him by his superiors.
Almost every cruise to distant waters puts commanders to unusual tests. And it is the commander's duty intelligently to utilize a cruise and all its potential for improving the combat skill of the crew and for his own professional growth. One can judge by the recent extended cruise of the large ASW ship "Retivyy" how great these opportunities are and how effectively they can be utilized.

We must say that the state of affairs on board this ship had caused us considerable concern and agitation. On the other hand the command had firm confidence in Capt 3d Rank Yu. Ryzhkov, who due to circumstances had been appointed commanding officer of the "Retivyy" not long before it put to sea. He readied for the cruise in the most serious manner. Working purposefully with his subordinates and efficiently utilizing each and every mile at sea, skillfully relying on the party organization and guiding its activities toward successful accomplishment of the assigned tasks, Capt 3d Rank Yu. Ryzhkov soon achieved excellent results. Competing with other ships for best accomplishment of combat training tasks, the crew of the "Retivyy" was constantly the winner. Capt 3d Rank Yu. Ryzhkov himself appreciably improved his tactical and seamanship proficiency during the long cruise and now is rightly considered one of our finest commanders.

Such leading commanders as Capt 1st Rank A. Makarenko and Capt 2d Rank V. Prokopov also work at sea persistently and skillfully.

The navy also contains, however, commanders who insufficiently productively utilize the conditions of extended cruises. Some of them lack purposefulness, persistence, and demandingness on themselves. Others have not yet developed the ability to accomplish in a planned and comprehensive manner the diversified tasks arising on a cruise. For example, reliability and a cruise free of equipment breakdowns of course demand the most serious attention. However, the commander is not only a navigator but also a tactician and combat organizer. He should be prepared for combat at all times.

In order for a commander persistently and productively to improve his training at sea, it is necessary constantly and purposefully to teach him this, to develop a need for self-improvement and professional growth. Operations at sea are no simple matter, and commanders must be indoctrinated in the spirit of viewing every cruise as a significant step in crew training and in his own development. There is a large field of activity here for combined unit commanders, staffs, and political agencies, the coordinated efforts of which determine operations success to an enormous degree.

The most important thing in training and indoctrination of ship commanders is their training as organizers of combat, capable of employing optimal tactics, making it possible comprehensively and fully to utilize the capabilities of the ship and crew to achieve a decisive victory. Consequently we spend much time at sea in order to acquire experience and to be able when the time comes to engage in combat and to emerge victorious.
The commander prepares primarily and chiefly for organization and conduct of combat. But this training always is of a specific character. Here also an important point of departure is precise knowledge of the tactical capabilities and actual combat readiness of one's ship. There are frequent instances where victory in mock engagements is won by a ship which seems to be inferior to the "adversary" in specifications and performance data. Analysis indicates that the vanquished did not know to an adequate degree what he was capable of accomplishing under specific conditions. On the other hand the victor, realistically estimating his forces and capabilities, utilized them with the greatest effectiveness.

There is no doubt that commander erudition should be extensive and diversified. But nevertheless the commander must first of all study the features of that theater in which he will be operating in combat if it comes to military action. Here too there can be no limits in tactical training on concrete items. For example, today it is no longer sufficient for a commander to be able to perform in combat only the mission assigned his ship at that moment. As a tactician he should look ahead and rise to the level of the thought process of the commanding admiral. Only if he does this, in case communications are disrupted, the flagship is put out of action or in case of other control interferences characteristic of modern combat, the ships will operate in a coordinated manner, following a single plan, completely accomplishing the common mission.

With an increase in the length of a training cruise there are also increased demands on the ship's commanding officer as an indoctrinator. He must have the ability to plan not only consumption of energy resources, fuel and provisions but also expenditure of the energies of the crew and their recovery, and he must have the ability to maintain high morale among his men. This means that he must thoroughly know all the capabilities to accomplish this both on the part of the crew and the ship, and he must employ them thoughtfully, purposefully, planning for the entire duration of the cruise. Today's nuclear-powered submarine is incomparably superior to the diesel submarine in comfort, convenience, and life support systems. However, in the absence of vigorous, well-planned, well-conceived party-political and mass cultural work, the effect from all the technical innovations may prove to be minimal.

Of special importance at sea for mobilization of naval personnel for successful training, excellent watch duty and flawless operation and servicing of equipment is socialist competition. Its moral aspects -- boosting of the service activeness of personnel and responsibility for accomplishing the ship's missions, unity of the crew, development of healthy competition and mutual assistance -- open up great opportunities for increasing a ship's combat readiness, improving crew proficiency and skill. For the second year our nuclear submarine under the command of Capt 1st Rank A. Kazakov was the initiator of socialist competition in the Navy. The crew headed by this intelligent, energetic officer achieved substantial success in combat training. This nuclear submarine's long cruises were performed with high marks.
This ship became a unique laboratory of advanced know-how in the Navy, and this know-how is being extensively utilized in other units and combined units.

It is impossible to raise the level of the professional skill of ship commanders today without well-organized analysis, synthesis and dissemination of advanced know-how. Efficient, full exchange of information on advanced forms and methods of work within the framework of combined units and the fleet as a whole is of prime significance. We must state that great opportunities for this are provided by competition between ships and the campaign for an outstanding combined unit. The leaders win extensive recognition, and the achievements of the top performers become points of reference in the work of all navy collectives.

The fleet military council and political directorate devote the closest attention to development of commanders and improvement of their professional skills. We work constantly with combined unit commanders, staffs, and political sections locally. We devote special sessions to these matters. The military council also considers it essential to conduct direct work with ship commanders. Sending crews out on particularly complex, critical cruises, we call in the commanders for a report on progress in preparing for the cruise, brief them on accomplishing the main tasks, and we always emphasize the necessity of utilizing all the possibilities of a long cruise for comprehensive improvement of command qualities.

Every day, receiving reports on the performance of our fleet's ships on the ocean expanses, we think about how commanders and their crews are coping with the complex tasks assigned them. And we always come to the same conclusion -- they are handling them as we have taught them, as we have instilled in them a feeling of responsibility for carrying out their lofty military duty to the homeland.

Party Membership Criteria Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Rear Adm N. Shikhov: "We Were Hasty"]

[Text] In a few minutes a group of submariners will receive their probationary membership cards. The comrades have already gathered in the political section. On the outside they appear calm, and they are even chatting about things not directly related to the forthcoming event. But I know that inside they are quite nervous.

Ahead of them lies a year of hard work and study. This is the critical probationary period. During this time the junior members of the party family will be in particularly acute need of attention and confidence on the part of their senior comrades, of assistance by those who have had a wealth of life and service experience. Will all party collectives be able to work with young members in such a manner that each has the opportunity to apply a maximum of effort and can comprehensively reveal his abilities?
As for the party organization headed by Warrant Officer V. Popov, it will
definitely draw all young Communists into the active affairs of the crew,
will surround them with care and attention, will choose an assignment for
each taking into account his capabilities, and will monitor its execution.
They are strict and at the same time cautious about accepting leading sub-
mariners into the party; they thoroughly study their professional and moral-
political qualities.

Young Communists are instructed to speak to the men, and wall and radio new-
papers as well as combat leaflets are put out. This definitely develops
habits and skills of civic work. But Warrant Officer Popov, for example,
believes that CPSU probationary members must also be assigned more complex
tasks: for example, by the end of the year of probation to increase not
only their combat qualifications but also to assist their fellow submariner
in doing the same. Or, let us say, to study the experience and know-how of
one of the leading submariners and to acquaint the entire crew with it.

Another concern of the party bureau is the young Communist study group. It
has been in operation here for a long time. Its members study the CPSU
Rules and Program, the proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress and CPSU Central
Committee decrees. Study group classes are conducted by party activists,
political section personnel, party veterans, war veterans, and distinguished
people from industrial enterprises.

The party organizations of many other ships work just as innovatively and
solicitously with probationary members. But it would be premature to claim
that no errors occur in matters of accepting to party membership and in-
doctrination of young Communists. For example, the party organization of
a certain submarine, which several months back accepted to probationary
membership in the CPSU Warrant Officer A. Marakulin and PO 1st Class V.
Zhil'tsov, was very soon forced to reverse its decision. The reason: these
comrades failed to justify the confidence placed in them and proved to be
people who were mistakenly allowed to join the party.

One does not frequently encounter such a situation. And the political sec-
tion sought to determine the causes of such a serious mistake. Analyzing
the work of the party organization, they drew attention to a very curious
fact. Present at the meeting when they decided to accept Warrant Officer
Marakulin to probationary membership were Communists who knew that at his
previous assignment the candidate for membership was not distinguished
by a high degree of discipline and that he had a great fondness for alcohol.
But they kept their counsel, apparently in the belief that this was a thing
of the past. Marakulin reported to his new assignment on the submarine at
the height of crew preparations for a long cruise, and immediately proceeded
to work hard. He also did a good job handling his duties while at sea. His
zeal was noted.

On the basis of a single cruise, the Communists formed a positive opinion
of this man, and they decided that he was worthy of party probationary
membership. But how does Warrant Officer Marakulin conduct himself during off-duty hours? What is his moral countenance? For some reason these questions were ignored by the party organization. Now they were gesturing helplessly: "We were hasty about accepting Marakulin. If we had known it would turn out this way...."

But why did they need to hurry? Why did they not take their time about looking into his case? After all, it is a question of purity of party ranks. Is it right in such a matter to display haste, leniency, and lack of thoughtfulness?

Nor can the following be considered normal. Party membership applications are being considered, documents are read. Then, as a rule persons giving recommendations are interviewed. And they most frequently repeat what is already stated in the recommendations. But is there a need for this? Would it not be more useful to interview other party members in order to learn what they think about the applicant? It would be even better if this were an open meeting. Perhaps some party-unaffiliated would also present their opinion of a fellow serviceman. The applicant would then become more visible to all.

As we know, the majority of young Communists come into the party via Komsomol. As a rule they honorably justify the confidence of their recommending Komsomol organizations. But unfortunately this is not always the case. Take, for example, Petty Officer 1st Class Zhiltsov. It would seem that the Komsomol organization treated the question of a recommendation for him as a routine matter: "The lad requested, so why not help him out? We shall recommend him!" And this is not an isolated instance. Unfortunately it happens that the presiding officer at a Komsomol meeting merely states that a certain Komsomol member is requesting a recommendation to party membership, and immediately comes voices from the audience: "We know him. He is a worthy individual. Let's vote." Apparently Communists should teach Komsomol members to be more careful to ensure that people receive lessons in principledness.

Several months have passed, but the party members still remember what took place in the submarine's party organization. It is a good thing that the political section examined the situation and helped the comrades draw the requisite conclusions from the mistakes they had made. But when was this work done? After indifference and formalism displayed in accepting candidates to party membership had allowed weeds to sprout. Therefore the political section is also partly to blame for the entire incident.

The effort to keep our party ranks pure is a primary obligation of all party organizations and the duty of each and every Communist.

Training Shortcomings

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank D. Chumak: "Will the Sea Teach?"]

[Text] SrLt V. Obukhov walked up to the open porthole. An escort had just returned from a long cruise and was tying up to the pier. The officer's
eyes brightened for a moment, and then he frowned, thinking to himself: "When are we going to sea? We do nothing but sit in base...." He then saw before him the commanding officer's face. The latter would have replied: "It is a fine thing that all you officers are anxious to get to sea. But have any of you rigorously addressed the question of whether you are prepared to be tested by the ocean?" And he certainly would have looked over a mine specialist Senior Lieutenant Obukhov, for his subunit is currently among the poorer performers.

...Valentin Obukhov graduated from service school with distinction. And of course he did not dream that his job would turn out this way. He is a hard-working officer, knows his occupational specialty well and can intelligently explain to the men everything they need to know. But nevertheless it was precisely Obukhov's relationship to his men which engendered the impression that he was an insufficiently skilled indoctrinator. Suddenly and unexpectedly Seamen A. Vanin and A. Shmygalev, who supposedly were experienced specialists, failed the proficiency rating examination. In addition, they began committing disciplinary infractions. By the end of the training year it turned out that precisely such individuals as Vanin and Shmygalev, that is, sailors in their last year of service, had failed to meet their socialist pledges.

These events evoked a sharp response on board the ship. Sr Lt V. Obukhov was pointed out his errors of omission in indoctrinational work with his men. But even after this things in the subunit improved only slowly.

Attempting somehow to explain these failures to himself, Obukhov began increasingly insistently arriving at the conclusion that the situation could be corrected only by a long and difficult ocean cruise. It would teach the men respect for their occupational specialty, would arouse interest in improving qualifications, and discipline would improve.... It is true that the sea indeed exerts a positive influence on a crew. The very cruise environment promotes consolidation of the collective and increases the responsibility of each member for the assigned task. But this does not take place spontaneously, but in the course of vigorous, purposeful indoctrinational influence by commanders and political workers on personnel. But is Senior Lieutenant Obukhov ready for such work at sea if certain pedagogic problems appear unresolvable in the calm base environment?

We must state quite frankly that the combat department commander works willingly with the newcomers and men in their second year of service, and results are achieved. But Senior Lieutenant Obukhov has no genuine working contact or full mutual understanding with those who should be his primary assistants, his support -- men in their final year of service. In addition, in his opinion there is no need for this.

Unfortunately Obukhov is not the only one with such an opinion. There are other such officers, particularly younger ones. And although they prefer not to state their opinions aloud, nevertheless in their heart they do not have very great hopes about work with "difficult" petty officers and seamen.
And yet it is precisely the indoctrinational effect on the man in his final year of service, who has a certain opinion of himself and his virtues, who possesses sufficient experience, authority, who has proven himself to some extent in the collective, which demands of an officer a more subtle, genuinely individual approach, one might even say pedagogic skill. And if the officer-specialist genuinely shows his ability primarily in difficult situations, where a maximum of ability and knowledge is required, the skill of the officer-indoctrinator is also genuinely tested in the most difficult areas of mutual relationships with his subordinates.

Sr Lt V. Obukhov must understand this. But apparently, having encountered early on one or another "difficult" man and failing to achieve the desired results, this officer decided that his tactics were wrong. It is a good thing if the difficult situation of the beginning indoctrinator is noted by senior comrades or if he himself turns to them for help. But what if "help" comes from elsewhere? Sometimes there are "well-wishers" who induce young officers to resolve matters of mutual relations amicably, so to say, by compromise.

Precisely in this manner an attempt was made to "convince" Engr-Lt N. Kozhankov by his top noncom — a warrant officer with many years of service. It is to Kozhankov's credit that he refused to agree to doubtful compromises, and although it was difficult at first to pursue a hard line, nevertheless the officer achieved his goal. Now Engineer-Senior Lieutenant Kozhankov is the commander of an excellent combat department and enjoys great respect and affection by his men, although in matters of service, discipline and order he never made compromises with anyone. Here men in their final year of service are naturally and deservedly considered the most highly qualified, efficient and reliable specialists.

An idea involuntarily comes to mind: Senior Lieutenant Obukhov should at least once come to Kozhankov for advice, for in one's collective, on one's ship there are officers whose indoctrinational skill is to be envied. What is the problem? Or does not one "borrow" lacking experience here? It is of course hard to believe that. Obviously the ship's commanding officer and party organization must work in a more planned manner with the development of young officers as indoctrinators, also utilizing toward this end the experience and know-how of the finest subunit commanders.

The work style of a certain ship commanding officer comes to mind. Capt 3d Rank A. Pechkorin believed with reason that an experienced seaman is an officer's primary support. The commander constantly taught his officers to devote special attention to seaman and petty officers in their final year of service, to make every effort to encourage their good initiative, to promote their service and civic activeness, and at the same time firmly to hold the commander line.

The efforts made by Captain 3d Rank Pechkorin proved fruitful. It has become tradition in his crew that all personnel serving their compulsory military
obligation be discharged into the reserves as specialists 1st Class. Some
time later a new initiative was born on the ship — every man in his third
year of service was to work on the performance standards of the top
proficiency rating and to train a specialist 1st Class as a worthy replace-
ment. Young party member CPO N. Mishchuk was the initiator of this useful
initiative, which spread to other ships as well.

In such cases they sometimes say: the people there are quite different....
It is true that they are different. But they have become what they are
under the skilled influence of their superiors, as a result of serious,
painstaking, and (he who has enjoyed even one success knows this) very in-
teresting work.

It is of course a good thing that Sr Lt Valentin Obukhov is anxious to
got to sea. And in this case it is also good because he sincerely desires
to see positive changes in his subunit. But nevertheless it remains a
question whether the sea will teach Obukhov how to work with his subordinates.
His experienced senior comrades will surely assist him. And obviously the
young officer should begin preparations for sea duty by turning to them.

3024
CSO: 1801
TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN MISSILE UNITS

Missile Battery Maintenance

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 6 June 78 p 1

[Article by Col A. Malyshev and Lt Col Yu. Ukraintsev: "Identical Conditions, but Different Results"]

[Text] In the missile battery final preparations for technical servicing procedures were in progress. Subunit commander Capt R. Oleynichenko had assigned tasks to the officers, briefed them on the principal stages and sequence of performing the operations, and held an instruction session on observing safety rules. In conclusion he recommended that they utilize the positive know-how amassed in performing the last servicing operations and specified the performance figures the specialists should seek to achieve, taking into account prior-attained results. Platoon leaders Lts S. Kriventsov and A. Malinovskiy detailed the tasks to their crews.

In both platoons the men worked skillfully and knowledgeably, precisely adhering to the rules specified in the manual. It seemed that both the end results and quality of the work performed would be approximately the same. But things worked out quite differently. Lieutenant Kriventsov's men performed the job much better than their competition rivals, and yet they worked under identical conditions. What was the problem? The fact is that officers Kriventsov and Malinovskiy approached organization of maintenance procedures and competition in the course of performing servicing operations in a different way.

Prior to completion of the first stage Lieutenant Kriventsov carefully checked to verify how the network schedule was being followed, the quality of operation performance, and how the specialists were assisting each other. All this enabled the officer to sum up results in a businesslike manner and objectively to appraise achieved results. The crew led by Jr Sgt F. Romishevskiy was adjudged the competition winner. It was also given a challenge banner.

During the succeeding hours the competition among the men became even more intensive. The specialists worked hard and enthusiastically. The men under Pfc V. Skorokhodov also snapped to. At the second stage of servicing operations
they succeeded in overtaking their rivals and winning the challenge pennant. Junior Sergeant Romishevskiy's men of course did not want to yield ground. Endeavoring to catch up, they proceeded to work in haste, and they performed some operations with poor quality. This was noted by the platoon leader. When the results were next totaled up he reminded the men that high-quality performance of servicing and maintenance procedures is a most important condition for equipment combat readiness and a guarantee of its flawless operation. And although the crew headed by Jr Sergeant Romishevskiy substantially surpassed performance standards, the challenge pennant remained in the hands of its rivals.

During a break the missile crewmen gathered around small portable panels. Displayed on the boards were the duties of the crew members, safety rules to observe during performance of maintenance procedures, and grades for performance of operations. There was also a combat leaflet. It named the top performers: Pvt V. Rodimtsev, L. Petrovskiy, and I. Kil'diyarov.

In totaling up the competition results Lieutenant Kriventsov not only noted the success of the best performers but also stated why they had achieved success and revealed the essence of their know-how. He also pointed out errors and deficiencies, analyzed their causes, and offered advice and recommendations.

At the next stage the crews worked with even greater zeal. The men monitored one another and gave mutual assistance. As a result the servicing and maintenance procedures were completed with high quality and ahead of schedule.

Competition in the platoon led by Lt A. Malinovskiy was organized differently. This officer did not monitor his men's actions in performing the various operations, and he totaled up the results only after completion of all jobs, on the basis of the end results. He specified the crew which in his opinion best performed the task and stated the names of the leaders and laggers. But there was no analysis of why certain of the men excelled while others lagged behind.

Certain errors were also made during performance of maintenance procedures. But the platoon leader also failed to mention them and to analyze their causes.

Simple recording of the actions of specialists with a detailed analysis of how a given result was achieved and whose mistakes affected the overall result provides little benefit. One can state that such an approach diminishes the emotional enthusiasm of personnel directly in the course of their work.

The experience of leading subunits indicates that in order to maintain a high level of competitiveness during the period of maintenance procedures, it is extremely necessary to proceed stage by stage in totaling up competition results. In such a case each man, in proceeding to the following operations, definitely knows that his zeal will be noticed and graded. The flame of competition will genuinely burn.
It is evident from the example of organization of competition by Lieutenant Kriventsov how important it is to utilize clear and graphic devices in competition, skillfully to employ diversified forms of moral incentive, to note the men's initiative, and promptly to point out errors. Effectiveness of competition also depends in large measure on the leader's ability to encompass with his influence all personnel without exception. Also characteristic is the fact that Lieutenant Kriventsov noted the actions not only of leaders and laggars but also of average performers, who in general did not make mistakes but initially failed to display particular zeal. In the final analysis he succeeded in arousing initiative and activeness in them.

To achieve competitiveness among personnel is one of the primary tasks accomplished by the commander who is organizing competition. It is essential to bear in mind thereby that competitiveness should form in personnel feelings of friendship and mutual assistance, in other words should play an indoctrinational role.

Experienced commanders, evaluating the overall results of crew performance, take into account not only the achievements of leading performers and the quality of equipment servicing and maintenance, but also the performance of the laggars, those who are the last to complete their work. What does this provide? Leading performers and specialists Ist class seek to assist their fellow crew member alongside performing their own task. Conditions are created for strengthening the unity of the collective and for development of mutual assistance and comradely mutual aid.

Efficient, quality performance of servicing and maintenance operations on equipment is an essential condition for a high degree of subunit and unit combat readiness. Skillful utilization of the possibilities of competition, initiative and innovativeness of air defense personnel in the process of performing servicing and maintenance operations makes it possible to accomplish this important task at a high level, guaranteeing flawless operation of combat equipment.

Training of New Personnel

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jun 78 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt A. Bondarenko, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "If We Make Common Cause"]

[Text] The alert instantly brought the antiaircraft missile crewmen to their feet and "scattered" them to their stations. The command post reported the appearance of a new target. Fast and small, it was sharply varying both altitude and heading. The radar operators had to work at full energy, calling on their entire experience and knowledge.

After the practice drill ended, the subunit commander, officer Bogucharskiy, noted with satisfaction that his men had performed with greater precision and
smootherness than at previous practices. Smiling happily, he said to the approaching party organization secretary, Capt. N. Shundyk, and Komsomol committee secretary Warrant Officer G. Panasenko: "We are reaping the fruits of the work done by our Komsomol members as well. An excellent harvest.... The men are competing with enthusiasm. As a result additional seconds were gained."

The commander's words compelled Gennadiy Panasenko mentally to return to the recent past, recalling how the campaign for seconds had begun, to ensure that Komsomol members set the pace at every training session, seeking to save time and act as reliable assistants to their commanders in organization of competition on concrete tasks and performance standards. From the first days of the training year the Komsomol committee worked to ensure that each and every Komsomol member honored the 18th Komsomol Congress with new achievements in skilled mastery of his military occupational specialty. But not everybody experienced success from the very outset. On one occasion Panasenko visited a class being conducted by Sr Lt V. Korobov, a member of the Komsomol committee. The officer was conducting a routine training drill with the radar station crew. The men were trying, but they could not seem to get it right. Again and again they responded to their leader's commands, but they failed to achieve the desired results.

"No matter how hard I try, there is no noticeable improvement," Korobov complained during the break. "The crew cannot detect a target at maximum range. I realize that the specialists are still inexperienced and only recently arrived from the training subunit. They have the knowledge, but they are lacking in skills of fast and precise work with the equipment. But they will be tested in the fairly near future...."

"This evening we shall meet together," replied Panasenko. "We must have a talk."

"The young radar operators are still rather far from that automatism in their work achieved by their predecessors," Panasenko concluded to himself as he left the radar shack. "But if they are assisted and, most important, if their own thinking is awakened, things can be accelerated...." That same day a long and detailed discussion between the Komsomol secretary and the radar operators was held in the Komsomol committee. During this discussion Panasenko learned much about his Komsomol members which inspired firm confidence in their future success.

Some time later Senior Lieutenant Korobov shared his joy with Panasenko: "These new boys are smart. Working together, they found a solution. Things have now gotten moving...."

Private Zadorozhnnyy made a device which made it possible to save a whole minute in their combat work. And now the crew, even though it lacks practical experience, has succeeded, upon receiving an alert, in locating the target at the far end of the detection zone, at maximum range.
"I also have come up with an idea," continued Korobov. "I want to make a little device...."

This Komsomol activist did not postpone things. Soon everybody knew that the crew under Korobov's command had surpassed the performance standard for checking equipment for operation. This was the result of adoption of the efficiency innovation suggestion by the Komsomol committee member.

Gennadiy Panasenkov, together with the activists, made every effort to support the search for time reserves and the effort to improve the quality of combat performance which was taking place among the Komsomol members. These items remained constantly on the agenda of committee sessions and Komsomol meetings. Day after day news about the achievements of Komsomol member innovators kept being received by the committee, as a unique headquarters of initiative and the campaign to gain seconds.

More and more seconds were gained in the persisting daily quest. The skill of the antiaircraft missile crewmen also improved, and their proficiency ratings rose. After 6 months of service Komsomol members P. Anis'kin and I. Zadorozhnyy earned a second class rating. The digit "I" appeared on the wings of the specialist proficiency rating badge of Komsomol activists officers S. Andronov, V. Korobov, V. Vesin, and others.

In order to speed up improvement in the efficiency of the missile crewmen, the Komsomol committee assumed patronage over the activities of the military-technical knowledge study groups and helps commanders and party organization more efficiently arrange technical training for Komsomol members and other young people. Committee members constantly participate in the holding of competitions for the title of best specialist and crew. Special Komsomol committee bulletins are dedicated to competition winners. Komsomol activists organize get-togethers where top-rated specialists speak to their fellow soldiers. And the know-how of leading performers becomes accessible to all.

The results of the diversified organizational activities of the Komsomol committee are in evidence. At the present time all Komsomol members here possess a proficiency rating if appropriate. And the subunit is deservedly called a high-proficiency subunit. For more than 3 years now the collective has maintained the title of excellent and reconfirmed it at a recent inspection.

Mobile Missile Battery

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jun 78 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Andronov: "All Missiles Fired Score Kills"]

[Text] The missile crewmen were en route when they received orders to attack the "aggressor's" antitank reserve, which was heading for one of
the flanks of our advancing subunits. The men swung into action. Receiving reports from his men, missile battery commander Capt V. Zhigalev noted with satisfaction that they were performing smoothly.

The battery commander could not help but admire the performance of the crew under the command of Specialist lst Class Lt V. Nikishin. In competitions this crew had time and again placed high and had been awarded a challenge pennant. Excellent performance smoothness achieved in the course of competition enables the men to surpass specified performance standards by 10-12%.

At one time things were going worse for their competition rivals. Explaining the reasons for the poor performance of his men, deputy crew commander Sgt N. Kalenik pointed to the inexperience and poor physical conditioning of young missile gunner Pvt A. Zagurila. After all, missiles are a crew-served weapon, and effective missile employment naturally depends on the efforts of each crew member. Poor performance by one individual can nullify the work of many. Nevertheless the main reason for the crew's poor performance was not Zagurila. Here is what the battery commander said on this subject, for example: "The reasons for lagging in performance lie in our methods miscalculations. Overrating the individual preparedness of our men, we prematurely began holding combined practice drills. Seeking to catch up as fast as possible with the leaders, the crew members focused most of their attention on speed, forgetting about quality in meeting performance standards. We were also somewhat wrong from a methods standpoint in organizing competitions between crews at the final stages of study of the given topic. The men of one crew would be working hard, while the others would be playing the role of an audience. Training time was lost."

They had to change somewhat the sequence of holding comprehensive practice drills in the battery. Now they are organized only after the men master their duties. There has been a change in the attitude of the officers toward competition. In the past many could be accused of a superficial approach to assessing the results of the men's labor. Now each officer regularly totals up results, focusing attention thereby on the moral aspect of the matter and the moral growth of the men.

The method of holding competitions was changed. The driver-mechanic and missile gunner of the leading crew began assisting the rivals. At practice drills Pvt A. Karmakov worked with missile gunner Pvt A. Zagurila and driver-mechanic Pvt V. Tambalayev with Pvt Ye. Novikov.

A field exercise constituted a test of the missile crewmen's proficiency. The crews operated in a complex situation and resolved unexpected scenario problems. The results attested to increased skill, but rigorous testing and detailed analysis also revealed deficiencies.

At the suggestion of party members, missile experts officers Yu. Turovets, A. Brovan' and V. Nikishin took over supervision of improvement in the
proficiency of various specialists. They are synthesizing the know-how of the finest specialists and ensuring that their achievements become the standard for all. In the battery there has been an appreciable improvement in the proficiency of personnel mastering adjacent occupational specialties. For example, Pvt S. Sklyarov is capable of replacing the computer and missile gunner. Driver-mechanic Pvt Ye. Novikov has mastered all crew occupational specialties. And it is not surprising that on the eve of a live-fire exercise Sgt N. Kalenik's men surpassed their rivals in proficiency.

...The seconds passed agonizingly slowly.

Fire!

A thunderous roar erupts. Raising clouds of dust, the missile streaks skyward.

The missile crewmen fired four missiles, and all four scored kills. Somebody carefully wrote the word "five" on the scale on the still-warm launcher. This is the grade for the men's combat proficiency, achieved through hard work.

New Training Methods

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jun 78 p 1

[Article by Col A. Mikheyev: "On a Shortened Timetable"]

[Text] High up in the sky the vapor trail of a target drone could be seen. The bright dot of a missile was swiftly closing with it. Then the missile crewmen saw a white puff of smoke and target fragments plunging earthward....

The mock engagement with the "hostile" aircraft ended successfully. At the postexercise critique the unit commander named the outstanding performers. The first to be named among the officers was Capt V. Grzhibovskiy. At first glance this seemed surprising, for he did not directly participate in the missile firings. But the missile crewmen were well aware of his contribution. Particularly grateful to Captain Grzhibovskiy were the radar operators, whom he had taught to perform skillfully.

For several years in a row Captain Grzhibovskiy was the best guidance officer. It seemed that he had totally mastered the methodology of training classes and practice drills with radar operators. But then the unit commander advised him to study theory of stage-by-stage forming of mental actions and concepts, which had begun to be successfully applied in the leading units. Grzhibovskiy immediately saw what excellent prospects this theory offered for training operators. A thoughtful person of innovative thinking, he developed on the basis of this theory a method of gradual improvement in the knowledge and practical skills of specialists taking into account the capabilities of technical teaching devices. The method specified the sequence of learning skills with increasing speed of tumbler switch manipulation, wearing protective gear against mass destruction weapons, and during the operation of various annoying and attention-diverting elements.
Captain Grzhibovskiy submitted his suggestions for discussion by the unit methods council. The council members had high praise for the theoretical substantiations of the new method. But how would it work out in practice? What would be the result? Only experimentation could provide an answer to this question.

It is not at all easy to become an experimenter, for hard work is required, and it always contains a significant element of risk. What if things do not work out? How are you going to look your commanding officer and fellow soldiers in the eye, as well as those with whom you conducted the exercise? Yes, innovative boldness, great strength of will and persistence are needed here.

Captain Grzhibovskiy proceeded with the experiment. His initiative was supported by the unit commander. The experimental group contained young personnel who had successfully passed a radar operator aptitude test. Grzhibovskiy conducted their training together with guidance officer Sr Lt V. Klimov. The capabilities of training simulator equipment, technical teaching devices and objective monitoring were maximally utilized at the training sessions and practice drills.

Officers Grzhibovskiy and Klimov analyzed in detail the training progress of each operator. Pvt S. Politsanov, for example, successfully accomplished missions on a "clean" target. When tracking a target with jamming he would make mistakes and was unable to improve beyond the level of a mark of satisfactory. Captain Grzhibovskiy elucidated the pattern of his errors. They were characteristic of all operators but were differently manifested. A special device was built. With its aid they succeeded in improving the quality of practice drills in complex air situation conditions. All this played a positive role.

Grzhibovskiy, with the aid of subunit innovators, developed and incorporated a device (reminiscent of game automata) which records accuracy of target acquisition and tracking as well as missile guidance to target. If an operator achieved an excellent result, a signal display would indicate this fact. This increased the game element at practice drills and developed competitiveness among the young operators.

At first some officers distrusted this device. However, the young operators practiced with great enthusiasm and achieved excellent quality in performance of operations, also practicing during off-duty hours. The skeptics were forced to alter their opinion.

Finally the experiment came to an end. The time required to train young operators to stand independent alert duty was greatly reduced. But how about quality? A test showed that quality was fairly good. Soon a team of young operators, led by Senior Lieutenant Klimov, took first place in the competitions held by higher headquarters.
Shortly before departure for the firing range the proficiency of the young operators was thoroughly tested by highly-experienced specialists from higher headquarters. They gave the highest proficiency mark. Live firings at the firing range confirmed the objectivity and accuracy of the grading.

Thus the experiment ended with complete success. It was not simple or easy, as it might seem at first glance. Behind this success stood selfless labor and innovative search on the part of officers Grzhibovskiy and Klimov. As training progressed they introduced corrections, improved individual elements, eliminated some items, suggested some new things, and considered the recommendations of the unit commanding officer and the advice of experienced methods specialists. This work is still continuing.

Firing Training Test

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jun 78 p 1

[Article by Capt G. Kosenkov, Red-Banner Far Eastern Military District: "Fiery Inscription"]

[Text] A warning alert was announced early in the morning. They had long awaited this moment, since the minute they had entered the dry ground of the firing range, scorched like a combat zone. Every man waited with identical inner tension and cool restraint. But the subunit commander, officer A. Galitskiy, was waiting particularly anxiously.

The sky was pitch-black. Way off in the distance, tens of kilometers from their position, the sky was lit by the exhaust flames of aircraft taking off. The scopes came alive. Picking up speed, the targets were advancing, maneuvering, generating behind themselves dense trails of interference. The faces of the missile crewmen became tight with concentration. Their actions were spare and economical.

The targets kept approaching -- they were now at the edge of the firing zone. Now the entire crew was waiting for the main command. At this moment nothing was more important than these tiny pulses on the screen. The very sense of time disappeared, leaving only tension, only a fierce desire to accomplish the mission excellently.

"Fire!" the guidance officer commanded, his voice toneless and somehow commonplace. His voice was immediately dissolved in the mighty roar of a missile. The cab shook, followed by ringing silence. How long these seconds seem, as the two blips on the screen -- returns from the target and missile -- approach one another! And how difficult it is to restrain one's joy when these blips, colliding, break up like electrical discharges into small luminous sparks!

"Fire!"

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Once again a roar erupts, and once again followed by silence, and the scattering of luminous sparks on the screen.

Missile combat is swift, but many weeks and months of hard work and the search for advanced training techniques are compressed into those few minutes of combat.

After the firing exercise was completed, officer Galitskiy walked over to the launcher. Others were already there: the fire-singed, blackened launcher structures were covered with inscriptions. Somebody had written with capital letters the word: "VICTORY!" Galitskiy read this word aloud and sat down wearily on a small hillock. Yes, victory. For many of his men it was the first one — the most meaningful and memorable victory. For him it was the ninth.

How time flies! It seemed just yesterday that he had reported for duty to that remote "point." A low-pressure system was causing heavy rain. The wind was smashing gray-hued waves against the high shore. Impacting on the cliff face, they would then noisily retreat.

Aleksandr Galitskiy immediately fell in love with the region. And he did well at his job. He successfully mastered the occupational specialty of senior technician. The battalion Communists elected him party organization secretary. It was a bit difficult finding time for both military service and volunteer work, but he gradually acquired experience, and successes brought joy and satisfaction. And he was helped by the subunit commanding officer, political worker, and party members. He decided to master an adjacent occupational specialty, for a party activist should show an example and move forward in all things. Soon, at a critical moment in a tactical exercise, the inspecting officer's scenario called for Galitskiy to replace the guidance officer. Later, at the firing range, he was once again tested on the guidance display. The high-speed, low-flying target was downed with the first missile.

Thus the officer's skill grew in the course of his busy daily labor. Experience and know-how were amassed in training and indoctrinating subordinates. Some time later he was promoted to the position of subunit commander.

And once again — a distant "point." His responsibilities grew. For many years in a row the subunit maintained a rating of excellent, and this increased to an even greater degree the responsibility of the new commander. How could they achieve higher performance in combat improvement? At a party meeting a discussion was held on unresolved problems and on how to advance further. Party members presented many sensible suggestions. For example, the suggestion to develop a training simulator for training specialists to work under complex conditions. The suggestion was presented by Sr Lt A. Vorob'yev. Others suggested renovating and improving training facilities.
In some ways facilities did not fully satisfy present requirements. All these suggestions were implemented in a practical manner.

Analysis of competition pledges indicated that the pledges of some specialists were patently understated and that these men were capable of meeting tougher targets. Pledges were revised upward. They began working more vigorously to achieve a high degree of competitiveness at every training session.

On one occasion the missile crewmen were working on a regular training problem. They were performing skillfully and with swiftness. Suddenly the commander ordered Pfc Ye. Shilovskikh to determine on the basis of the radar return the type of aircraft and its performance data. But Shilovskikh had difficulty coming up with an answer.

This incident resulted in a businesslike, principled discussion on the level of training of proficiency-rated specialists and an innovative approach to organization of their training. In the subunit they began devoting greater attention to methods training of instructors and began more thoroughly thinking out each practice drill. The commander looked into the doings and concerns of each and every officer, warrant officer and noncommissioned officer, helped them master advanced methods, and taught them the skill of organizing competition.

The training period came to an end. Testing the proficiency of the subunit's missile crewmen, officers from headquarters created a complex situation. According to the scenario, several crew members were knocked out of action. Sr Lt A. Vorob'yev and Pfc Ye. Shilovskikh performed duties one level above their position and successfully accomplished the job. The target was hit at maximum range. The subunit received a mark of excellent.

And now the most difficult test -- actual firings on the range -- was behind them. They had once again clearly demonstrated a high degree of efficiency of organization of the training process and competition in the subunit. This meant that he, Galitskiy, had been proceeding correctly and that they must continue just as persistently seeking and mobilizing reserve potential for further improving the combat proficiency of the missile crewmen.

3024
CSO: 1801
BASIS FOR CASHIERING FORMER PLATOON COMMANDER RELATED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 June 78 p 4

[Article by Lt Col V. Filatov: "Good Name"]

[Excerpts] Initially the editors received a letter from his mother-in-law. "Lyuda's mother" is what she called herself in the letter.

Subsequently there was a meeting at the newspaper office with the author of the letter, with Lyuda, and with Vladimir, a former platoon leader. The mother-in-law did most of the talking, asking that "Vladimir be rehabilitated in the army, because..." — this was followed by a list of arguments in favor of reinstatement. The daughter backed up her mother. Vladimir sat silently, his palms pressed between his knees. He gazed at the floor in front of him, his back erect and shoulders straight. One could sense an officer's bearing. . . .

Pursuing her point, the mother-in-law stated that the government had spent a good deal of money on training her son-in-law, and he should be allowed to work so that this money would not be wasted. She placed on the desk a clipping from the district newspaper, containing many nice things about Vladimir: he was a guards lieutenant and commander of an excellent-rated platoon.

The mother-in-law placed on the desk another newspaper clipping, this one from our paper, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. This clipping was about Lyudmila, not so much about her personally as about the people who helped her get settled in a new home, in a distant garrison, about the activists on the women's council who showed solicitous concern.

We could understand the mother-in-law — her son-in-law had been cashiered from the army, cashiered with an uncommon explanatory cause: "For disgracing the name of officer...."

Her son-in-law could have become an officer with a future. He graduated from the Moscow Suvorov Military School and later from the Higher Combined-Arms Command School. Nature had endowed him with excellent health — he was the school boxing champion. Extensive knowledge backed up by practical army experience indicated a future as an outstanding officer.
And yet now he was sitting next to his mother-in-law in an ill-fitting civilian suit. He had worn an officer's uniform slightly more than 2 years. He was not making excuses and was not requesting anything. At a certain point it began to seem that the conversation was taking place in two forms: with the mother-in-law -- question-and-answer and her long monologues; with Vladimir -- in heavy, unspoken silence.

He had planned to make the army a career. It did not matter to him what garrison or in what region he served. He was not the type that, as soon as he earns his diploma, proceeds to write requests to every echelon in the chain of command asking to be released from the army because it had turned out not to be his cup of tea, although he had been by no means averse to receiving 4 years of education at government expense. Nor was Vladimir a naive mama's boy who, having barely tasted the hard army life, proceeds to whine and snivel. He had served in a garrison which was twice as far to his native Moscow (Vladimir is a Muscovite) as to New Delhi or to Baghdad, for example, and he was cashiered out of the army. And the Communists in the party organization of which he had been a member voted to dismiss him from the party.

Following that meeting and the order discharging him from the army, Vladimir visited a great many different offices, from the division command and district commanding general to high officials in Moscow. They patiently listened to his case. But what could they do? There was no possibility of reinstatement....

We often hear the words: "The name of Soviet officer...." We frequently say: "He is a real officer!" And of course this always sounds like the highest praise and approval.

I was visiting paratroopers and saw officers who in their 25 to 28 years in the service have mastered not two or three but many difficult military occupational specialties. Their skill would be the envy of a professional hunter or professional radio operator, a fine chef and top-grade mechanic, a competition parachute jumper and martial-arts athlete. I shall not enumerate all the weapons each of them has mastered! I shall say only that the list runs from knife to missile. Almost all the airborne officers are Communists.

I also visited the eastern part of the Baykal-Amur Mainline. In the mechanization and earth-moving battalion, which is constructing both the haul road along the rail line and the roadbed for the rail line, there are about 20 different kinds of vehicle and equipment: from dump trucks, excavators and bulldozers to compressors, drilling rigs and stump pullers -- too many to enumerate. I saw officers who have a consummate mastery of all this equipment, who extremely skillfully handle it and supervise maintenance and repairs as well as any plant specialist, but under different, as they say, extreme conditions -- in a gravel pit, on the line, at temperatures of -50°Celsius.
Get-togethers and conversations between L. I. Brezhnev, toilers and military personnel during his trip to Siberia and the Far East as well as the profound thoughts and counsel contained in his books "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Land] and "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth] constituted a powerful mobilizing force in personnel competition for efficient accomplishment of each and every combat training mission both during preparation for and in the course of the combined-arms exercise.

The military aviators took as a guide to action the impressive words of reminiscence spoken by Leonid Il'ich about how, in an incredibly difficult combat situation, the men of Malaya Zemlya displayed unprecedented staunchness, coolness, calculation and hard daily labor.

A party and Komsomol activist conference was held in the unit. They discussed how to conduct more efficiently indoctrinational work with the men, how to coordinate it more closely with performance of forthcoming tasks, and how better to deploy and utilize the activists. A businesslike, high-principled discussion was also held at party and Komsomol meetings, where the subject of discussion was the vanguard role of Communists and Komsomol members. The range of party influence on people, their moral and combat maturing is broad and all-encompassing.

Carrying out the party meeting resolution, Pilots 1st Class officers A. Aver'yanov and G. Kileyev, experts at combat utilization, shared their experience and know-how, telling their comrades how to score a kill with a missile on an unfamiliar gunnery range more effectively and on the first pass. Maj V. Krasnokutskiy conducted a training class with aircraft ground technicians on high-quality preparation of an aircraft for the next mission.

The key focus of party-political work in the squadron is indoctrination of personnel, efficient, comprehensible explanation to each man that overall success and victory in combat depend in large measure on his initiative and activeness. Both the commander and party activists work persistently to adopt advanced know-how into practical activities and utilize all the best things which promote combat readiness.

During the summer training period personnel are filled with resolve to meet their socialist competition pledge -- to ensure that the excellent squadron becomes a squadron of first-class pilots. And the aviators are working as hard as they can. They are vigilantly standing guard over the homeland's Far-Eastern borders.
MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT COMBAT TRAINING DESCRIBED.

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jun 78 p 1

[Article by Maj B. Karpov: "School of Coordinated Action"]

[Text] The guards motorized rifle regiment under the command of Grds Lt Col A. Nikolayev is one of the right-flankers in socialist competition in the [Red-Banner Baltic Military] district. His men are known for their high degree of tactical proficiency. This is due in large measure to the fact that they commend bold actions of initiative at field exercises and devote considerable attention to organization of coordinated action under the complex conditions of today's combat.

As soon as emplacements could be seen through the binoculars in the "enemy's" forward defensive positions, motorized rifle battalion commander Grds Capt A. Krasikov began personal reconnaissance together with the commanders of the cooperating and attached subunits. In organizing for combat he considered the weather forecast, which "promised" low cloud cover. This would make it harder for the air support and consequently for the motorized riflemen as well. This meant that combat success would be determined to an even greater degree by precise coordinated action on the part of all ground and air forces.

Toward morning the forward "enemy" positions were hidden in a whitish mist. On the one hand this made it more difficult for the attacking troops, while on the other hand it helped them: under the cover of the mist the motorized riflemen and tank crews reached the "enemy's" forward positions on schedule and took the "enemy" by surprise.

Well-organized coordinated action played a role here as well. Penetrating the defense, the advancing troops discovered a number of new points of origin of "hostile" fire. They were particularly active on the left flank. The commander of the left-flank company, Grds Lt G. Bandurko, immediately requested fire, and the artillerymen under the command of Grds Capts V. Kostinskiy and V. Churakov swung into action. The "enemy" emplacements were neutralized.
The company under the command of Grds Sr Lt A. Kirmosov was also compelled to fight under difficult conditions. The "adversary," executing a maneuver, counterattacked into the company's flank. Here too the outcome was determined by the precise coordination among motorized riflemen, tank crews and artillerymen. The counterattacking "adversary" was halted with an attack into the flank and with frontally-delivered fire. The battalion commander, preventing the "enemy" from digging in, engaged fresh forces, and the motorized riflemen initiated pursuit.

The battalion's success at this stage of the exercise was also promoted by the fact that the commander, foreseeing the difficulties they might encounter while advancing along the roads in the exercise area, muddy from frequent rains, made sure in advance that the subunits were supplied with a sufficient quantity of brushwood and took other measures to improve the capability of the combat vehicles to move. In combination with the excellent skill of the driver-mechanics and the wheeled vehicle drivers, as well as precision work by the technical services, all this helped maintain the requisite pace of the attack.

The motorized riflemen and the men in the subunits of other arms also defended themselves skillfully against air attack. Anti-aircraft crews, advancing in the battalion's combat formations, maintained close air surveillance. Observers in the companies worked in close coordination with them. Therefore fire against "hostile" air targets was effective.

The exercise was a good lesson for the commanders of the participating subunits. They became convinced once again how important it is in modern combat skillfully to organize and continuously to maintain close coordination between anti-aircraft crews and other means of combatting hostile aircraft. The battalion commander devoted serious attention to this. Studying the terrain, he carefully analyzed potential routes of approach by "enemy" helicopters. This enabled him to conclude that an air attack could be expected on the battalion's right flank. The anti-aircraft battery attached to the battalion, under the command of acting commander Grds Sr Lt A. Susorov, was moved to this point. Instructions were radioed to the commanders of the anti-aircraft platoon and motorized rifle company advancing on the left flank, instructing them to be ready to repulse helicopters. As was indicated by the course of events on the battlefield, Captain Krasikov's assumptions proved correct: the "enemy" attempted to deliver an air attack precisely where it was expected.

The importance of this foresight, which played a substantial role in accomplishment of the combat training missions by the subunits, was emphasized during the post-exercise analysis by the exercise director, motorized rifle regiment commander Grds Lt Col A. Nikolayev.

"The ability of the combined-arms commander to foresee all possible variants of hostile air actions in a given tactical situation and to take defensive measures in conformity with this," he noted, "is one of the determining conditions of successfully repelling airstrikes, and consequently accomplishment of the combat mission as well."
All exercises here involve a complex situation. In the course of these exercises commanders are given the opportunity to model the most diversified engagement variants, including those involving vigorous air actions. Joint exercises by motorized riflemen and pilots are also beneficial. Officers and all personnel obtain a fuller comprehension of the capabilities of air forces and air action variants in a given tactical situation, as well as of the most effective methods of repelling attacks by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft and utilization of the terrain to protect troops and deploy antiaircraft weapons. An important role in the organization and conduct of these activities is played by the regiment's air defense chief, Grds Lt Col V. Silin.

Of course there were also deficiencies in the exercise. The weapons of the motorized rifle subunits designated for delivering fire on "enemy" helicopters were not intelligently utilized at all stages of the exercise. The tank crews and artillerymen did not always show the requisite concern for protection against air attack. The results of the exercise are being thoroughly analyzed. But one thing is clear: it was an excellent school of coordinated action and tactical skill for all participants.
VICTORY DAY POSTCARD CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Col (Ret) N. Sedykh: "An Annoying Lack of Taste"]

[Text] The Kiev Mystetstvo (Iskusstvo) Publishing House put out a picture postcard by artist A. Gorobiyevskaya, entitled "9 May," in honor of Victory Day. This would seem to be a good thing to do. On this day Soviet citizens honor a great event. And how pleasant it is to receive a picture postcard the content and layout of which are in keeping with the people's memory of that great day in May.

Apparently the Iskusstvo Publishing House was guided by this good intention. However, as is evident, good intentions are not sufficient in any endeavor.

First of all we should state that the postcard is designed in a deliberately jesting manner: a smiling little fellow wearing a general's cap, literally enveloped in a general's parade uniform. The medals and decorations on the uniform are as if deliberately placed not in the manner they should be. Everything is all mixed up, backwards, not as is specified by present regulations on wearing decorations.

It is not surprising that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is receiving letters from war veterans and reserve officers, in which the authors express their perplexity. This postcard "cannot help but evoke feelings of astonishment and resentment," writes war veteran L. Voskoboynikov from Gor'kiy. "Is its content in conformity with the lofty theme?" His opinion is shared by Col (Res) B. Robul from Donetsk.

It remains merely to add that 500,000 copies of this postcard were printed.

3024
CSO: 1801
FAR EAST MILITARY DISTRICT AVIATION TRAINING RESULTS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jun 78 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Zhuravlev: "Army and Navy Combat Training: Stacked High"]

[Text] Lt Col Vladislav Ivanovich Zhuravlev has been appointed KRSNAYA ZVEZDA regular correspondent for the Red-Banner Far Eastern Military District. Today we are publishing his first news piece.

The June sky is clear above the Soviet Far East. Supersonic aircraft bearing a red star take off day and night, in various weather conditions. The labor of our military aviators is filled with an ardent desire to achieve new success in socialist competition for further strengthening combat readiness and consummate mastery of equipment and weapons.

On these June days I visited airfields and talked to pilots and ground crew, aviation support services personnel, their commanders and political workers. And I frequently have the feeling that I had known many of them for a long time. I recalled a conversation with the aviation commander of the Red-Banner Far Eastern Military District, Lt Gen Avn V. Pan'kin. He proudly enumerated the names of the top-performance specialists and particularly noted the proficiency of the aviators in the squadron under the command of Capt I. Belozor.

For 2 years now this subunit has maintained a rating of excellent. This rating was confirmed during the winter training period. Recently several pilots here took the difficult examination for first class and passed it successfully.

Capt Ivan Belozor is a young commander. He has commanded a subunit for only a year and a half, and of course he would have had great difficulty without the assistance of senior comrades and Communists. They solicitously shared with this officer their experience and knowledge, helping him in his development as a commander. Ivan Vasil'yevich has served 6 years in the Far East and considers himself a veteran Far Easterner. He came to this region right out of
flight school. He really liked the vastness of the region and the heart-felt generosity of the people. He climbed all the rungs of the regimental command ladder, right up to squadron commander, and witnessed the transformation of the Far-Eastern Region.

The squadron's young pilots have also made appreciable progress in improving their combat proficiency, and this success is not mere happenstance. The party organization constantly assists the commander in training and indoctrination of personnel. The Communists extensively publicize the experience and know-how of the competition leaders and through personal example draw the men into the campaign for high-quality accomplishment of every combat training task. The regimental commander told me that at the initiative of party members experienced methods-specialist officers elaborated an optimal variant for training each and every pilot to the level of a specialist lst class.

The individual approach is a sophisticated tool which requires pedagogic skill and tact. This fact is realized both by the commanding officer and the members of the methods council. For example, officers A. Aver'yanov and G. Kileyev analyzed every piloting mistake in such a manner that it will become an instructive lesson for all. They remember in the unit how Capt V. Yeliseyev made an error on a training flight. While on his landing approach, instead of fully lowering his flaps, he raised them. He pushed the wrong button. Suddenly, like a peal of thunder in a clear sky, he was in a potential accident situation. The incident could have shattered the pilot, shook his faith in his own ability. At the methods council they decided that closer attention must be paid to Yeliseyev in flight training. They discussed with him in detail the reason for the error and gave him an additional drill to perform with an experienced instructor along. As they say, this labor was repaid a hundredfold.

Today's aviator combat training routine is illuminated by a bright, unforgettable event — the squadron's participation in a combined-arms exercise observed by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The air warriors were compelled to perform in a complex situation. Visibility was limited. And in order to gain the element of surprise, they approached the target at low altitude, flying at great speed. The effectiveness of a missile attack in such a situation is determined by precise calculations.

The missile attack by the squadron led by Captain Belozor against "enemy" installations was precise and devastating. At the exercise the pilots demonstrated outstanding proficiency and the excellent combat capabilities of their fighter-bombers. A squadron from the Red-Banner Helicopter Regiment imeni V. I. Lenin also did an excellent job. It was led into the attack by party member Maj M. Sivolap.
Vladimir was also directly involved with weapons and combat equipment. But at what level of comprehension of responsibility was all this? While on guard detail he committed a gross violation of regulations. At a field exercise with his platoon, he arbitrarily took the controls of an armored personnel carrier without any right or authorization and ran over a man. He attempted to extend the rules of the boxing ring, as they say, far beyond the ropes.... A person becomes an officer only once, but life demands that one demonstrate every day that one deserves this title.

Our way of life is a concrete concept. Every day the editors receive letters in which the authors write with gratitude about their superior officers, with whom they live and serve. The authors of these letters thank the officers for helping them to find themselves, to determine their place, their cause, and their position as a genuine citizen.

We speak of the lofty title of Soviet officer. We say that our officer is viewed as the embodiment, as the incorporation of all the finest things. We say that the officer is a symbol, an aesthetic figure, a heroic image.... But why this emphasis on the officer? Perhaps this resounded with particular force from that day when Vladimir Il'ich Lenin gave a parting admonition to the first Red commanders to perform exploits in the name of the revolution. "A revolution is worth something only if it is able to defend itself," he taught us. Today V. I. Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist homeland is a component part of the plan for building communism in this country. The Great Patriotic War constituted the greatest test of our officer corps. And our officers passed this test with honor. Hundreds of thousands of officers were awarded decorations, and every other Hero of the Soviet Union was an officer. Today as well the troubled days of peace engender new heroes, new decorated officers. Today approximately 90% of army and navy officers are Communists and Komsomol members.

The officer is in plain sight of everybody. He is seen every minute by dozens, hundreds and thousands of favorably-inclined individuals. The title of officer incorporates the honor not only of the person wearing the officer's uniform and not only the entire officer corps as a whole, but also the honor of each and every one of our citizens. Otherwise how can one explain that people react immediately and resolutely to the slightest discrepancy between the officer's uniform and the conduct of the person wearing it?

"When I see an officer on the street or on a bus, and if there is something about him that is not quite right, that ruins the rest of my day. I want so much for our officer to incorporate everything beautiful..." writes an elderly woman from Kostroma....

Another letter is about an officer who began drinking heavily. His fellow soldiers and officers wrote that it pained them to see such a thing happening, because for them an officer is more than simply a familiar person whom they know well or not too well. An officer in another battalion began displaying rudeness toward his comrades and his subordinates. Once again a letter was written to the editors. These letters are not so much about the
concrete behavior of a specific individual, although considerable has been written in this vein, as about an ideal, an image, that spiritual beauty which should distinguish the Soviet officer. People want to see themselves in our officer and to see themselves better, purer, worthier. They want to become stronger and more courageous from contact with an officer.

The countenance of the people is the names of its finest sons. Here are only a few names of our contemporaries — Pokryshkin, Tupolev, Sholokhov, Mares'yev, N. Kuznetsov, Karbyshev, Korolev, Gagarin.... Each of them is a symbol of the socialist homeland. And each of them either once did or does now bear this lofty title. A magnetic force. Embodiment. An example to emulate in one's life.

In our difficult times an officer is doing a big and continuous job. He is high in the sky, far off on the sea; the hands of officers are on all buttons of the reliable shield of our homeland. The officer, in conformity with his professional code, is prepared at all times to take on himself the attack, to give his very life. An exciting book was recently published, entitled "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Land]. Its author is CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Mar SU L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The book is written about that time when Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev was an officer, a colonel, and he was at the very heart of the fighting, where the fate of the war was being determined. It is a vivid, heroic chronicle of our officer corps, of all military personnel, of the entire people.

This is the genealogy, the biography of the Soviet officer corps. Interwoven into it are the biographies of thousands upon thousands of our dedicated officers. Firmly fused into it is their every deed: heroic and bright, outstanding and routine, elevated and commonplace — this is what comprises daily life of the officer of our army and navy.

The biography of this former graduate of a higher combined-arms command school did not interweave into the great biography of our officer corps, did not become a part of it. Vladimir was cashiered from the army for disgracing the name of officer, for grossly violating regulations while in command of a guard detail. The security detail was guarding four important installations, two of which, as Vladimir put it, were not very important — guard posts were set out there only at night. They contained weapons, ammunition, and combat equipment, plus a warehouse containing emergency supplies. "Performance of guard duty constitutes execution of a combat mission and demands of personnel precise observance of all the points... of Regulations, a high degree of vigilance, unbending resolve and initiative," states the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties.

Listed in the specifications of the dishonorable discharge were not only drunken carousing but also other previous escapades brought to light in the course of the investigation.
Now Vladimir was sitting there silent. Perhaps he was seeing those nearby mountains at which he had gazed many times from the guardhouse window; perhaps he was right now feeling the breath of the baking wind which blows in that area from the nearby desert. There are a great many service caps on that post, because it is close to the border of a foreign land....

I do not know why Vladimir came to the newspaper office. Perhaps he could not withstand the pressure put on him by his mother-in-law and his wife. Perhaps he actually entertained some hope. He is presently residing with his mother-in-law. When Vladimir came home in civilian clothes, his father, an old soldier, threw him out — after this incident there was not enough room for the two of them under one roof.

The army is a complex and responsible organism. The fate of many people depends today on the officer. And the officer is not entitled to take even one wrong step. For this reason Vladimir found neither sympathy nor understanding in any of the officers he visited; for this reason the Communists unanimously voted to throw the former lieutenant out of the party, and for this reason his own father refused to let him live under the same roof....

Toward the end of the conversation at the newspaper office his mother-in-law also fell silent. She sat there, kneading a kerchief on her lap. She then uttered a deep sigh, turned to her son-in-law and said that which undoubtedly had been wanting to come out during the entire interview: "It is too bad, but the fact is that a good name is in a person's own hands. It is true that a white dress takes no spots."

She rose, and the three of them left the office.
GRADUATE WORK AT CHEMICAL DEFENSE ACADEMY DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jun 78 p 1

[Article by Lt Col A. Kozlov: "Taking Troop Experience Into Account: State Examinations Are in Progress"]

[Text] A businesslike and solemn atmosphere is prevailing these days at the Military Chemical Defense Academy imeni Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko. Students in the graduating class are taking state examinations, professional proficiency examinations.

Defense of senior theses is in progress in the department headed by Maj Gen Tech Trps A. Izmaylov. They are all different, but they have one common feature: a close link with the experience and needs of line troops and utilization of the latest scientific advances. And it is not surprising that the materials prepared by the students have already attracted the attention both of theorists and practical specialists.

Engr-Maj V. Luk'yanov began his research quite some time ago. The purpose of the research was to find ways of improving troop control with the aid of electronic computers. In his paper the student convincingly demonstrated that today there should be further improvement of systems which contain groups of people, automatic control systems and final control elements.

It was not easy to examine these problems applicable to the tasks of the chemical warfare troops. But the officer relied on solid work experience in units and subunits. He was greatly assisted by the counsel of his thesis advisor, Candidate of Technical Sciences Col Ye. Tabolin. It is characteristic that even prior to defending his thesis, his research results were adopted for practical incorporation. The result was a grade of excellent. The subcommission chairman, Col V. Kaver, "reproached" Luk'yanov on only one point: he should have stated that he himself had derived some of the formulas anew. Luk'yanov had failed to mention this.

Capt V. Ivannikov was working on a different problem. It was situated at the juncture of several sciences. He needed to consult with specialists in various departments at the academy. Ivannikov gathered and processed a
large quantity of statistical material, analyzed it, and made a number of concrete suggestions which make it possible greatly to reduce time requirements and improve the quality of processing situation data when the adversary is employing mass destruction weapons. The conclusions reached by Captain Ivannikov will promote further research in this area.

S. Lashin's senior paper is closely connected with practical troop activities. It is a well-known fact that under conditions of employment of nuclear missile weapons utilization of optical-electronic reconnaissance devices and weapons control are made difficult. How can these difficulties be reduced to a minimum? Under the supervision of department chairman Doctor of Technical Sciences Engr-Col O. Ukke, Lashin succeeded in developing unique methods of designing equipment and in presenting specific recommendations on its utilization.

The majority of senior projects maintained a high scientific-theoretical level, with utilization of special methods and the latest developments. This attests to the fact that the graduating students have mastered their military occupational specialty well and are capable of skillfully and effectively performing the missions today facing the troops.

But Academy graduates should come to the line units not only as highly-qualified specialists. They will be training and indoctrinating their subordinates. Therefore throughout the entire course of training primary attention was devoted to forming in the students a Communist philosophical outlook and equipping the officers with knowledge on the social sciences and methodological problems of military theory and practice.

Government examinations are continuing. But one can already state that soon the line units will receive a new detachment of ideologically conditioned, highly-qualified specialists. They will be successfully accomplishing complex tasks pertaining to further strengthening the combat readiness of units and subunits and will ably train and indoctrinate their men.

3024
CSO: 1801
TRAINING OF MILITARY INFORMATION OFFICERS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Col M. Zhuravlev, lecturer of Political Directorate of Red Banner Siberian Military District: "Lecture Propaganda: Quality and Effectiveness--A Lieutenant Speaks"]

[Text] It was a little over three years ago that Lt Anatoliy Lytkin gave a two-hour lecture for the first time to students in a political study group. The topic was rather complex--the development features and aggressive nature of imperialism. But Lytkin precisely identified the main theses of the topic, reinforced them with references to works by Lenin and cited convincing examples. The lecturer's very manner of speaking with the students--a lively and trusting manner--inspired the soldiers to listen carefully to his every word. Interest in the lecture did not abate for a minute.

And later there was a talk in the unit headquarters and party committee. Strange as it may seem, opinions were divided as to Lt Lytkin's possibilities as a nonregular lecturer. Some of the officer-party members tried to convince the others that those such as Lytkin should be boldly entrusted with giving lectures on difficult topics, and not only to the privates and sergeants. Others, however, had doubts. One lecture was successful, they said, but others might not come off. It was a difficult matter to prepare and give a lecture. So wouldn't it be better to appoint an experienced comrade as a lecturer?

I recall that it took great efforts at that time to prove to the comrades that young does not always mean green. And with regard to A. Lytkin, he developed into a good lecturer and became a staff propagandist.

I recalled this story in connection with publication of the CPSU CC decree "On the Status and Measures for Improving Lecture Propaganda." This party document defines precisely the tasks, ways and directions for further improving an important sector of ideological work. And one of its requirements is to bring young propaganda personnel actively into lecture work. This means we must persistently seek those among the young officers who are capable of taking the party's living word into the masses and who possess certain essential qualities for such noble work.
As a rule, those lieutenants who received specific propaganda skills within the walls of a military university feel more confident than others at the rostrum. And a university can give such skills, and there are many opportunities here.

I had occasion to visit the Novosibirsk State University not long ago. A talk was being given here by well-known scholar-atheist M. Rizhskiy to cadets of the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined-Arms School imeni 60th Anniversary of the Great October. The cadets were students in the faculty of atheist-lecturers, set up at the initiative of scholars of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the school's political department. This faculty represents important and necessary work! There already have been four graduations of 30 students each. Beginning with this training year, the faculty shifted to a two-year training program. A series of lectures on the history of religion is given for students. They study the methodology of speaking to a mass audience and acquire practical skills.

The school of young internationalist-lecturers also provides school graduates a great deal in this regard. It has been in operation for eight years now under the chair of scientific communism. Col M. Fentisov, head of the chair and a candidate of historical sciences, and many instructors show great interest and, I would say, inventiveness in the organization of its classes. They give the school's students lectures on current problems of the party's foreign policy work and the international position of the USSR; hold classes on a course of the theory, practice and methodology of lecture propaganda; and arrange for the school's students to give lectures and briefings to workers of the city's enterprises. Cadets quickly acquire lecture skills and many already have merited positive comments. Here is one of them. A. Batskov, secretary of the party organization of one of the shops at the Novosibirsk Condenser Plant, wrote: "Lectures by cadets S. Pan'kov, N. Malyshev and A. Proretskiy were interesting, pithy and emotional. It is even difficult to believe that they were given by people who are barely 20 years old."

Still another interesting and instructive form of accustoming future political officers to lecture propaganda is the elective "Fundamentals of Communist Morality and Soviet Military Ethics," arranged by the chair of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Here senior students deeply study questions of moral indoctrination and they are given recommendations on how to hold a talk on these same topics. They themselves speak to the first-year students under the direction of instructors.

Some might say: "But this is a military-political school! That is how it should be there." But the young lecturer's school also operates successfully, for example, at the Barnaul Higher Military Pilots' School imeni Chief Mar Avn K. A. Vershinin. This means that there are opportunities in other schools as well for shaping lecture skills in future graduates.
A second aspect of the problem is working with young officers as nonregular propagandists directly in units. Today everyone recognizes how necessary this is, but when it comes time to decide just what should be done in this regard, there invariably begin to be references to the difficulties. Granted that the opportunities in units are fewer than in a school, but they still are there.

For example, here is how it is done in the combined unit where Officer V. Sedel'nikov is a political officer. Here the political organ took over the main part of the work with young propagandists. Once a month all lieutenants who are political study group leaders and nonregular propagandists are assembled for four hours. Over half the time is set aside for improving the methods skills of the young propagandists. Practical classes are conducted. One of the last classes, in particular, examined in detail the techniques and methods for using technical means of propaganda in political classes. The lieutenants also remembered the practical class—a so-called open seminar—in Sr Lt A. Serzhantov's group. There is something to be learned from him. In particular, the young propagandists here adopted the techniques for increasing the students' activeness and forms for summarizing the points discussed.

As we can see, much is being done by the political organ, but the units of the combined unit also are not sitting idly by. Young propagandists are given detailed recommendations prior to each lecture and seminar which they are assigned to conduct. Each one's readiness for classes is checked with special care. If a young officer did not speak at a seminar where the content and methodology of the next classes was being discussed, one of the experienced propagandists would have a chat with him without fail. The senior comrades analyze the young lecturers' successes and failures and share their own experience with them.

Unfortunately, not everyone everywhere has this desire to "mess around" with the young lecturer. Such painstaking work often still is replaced by hasty briefings and general instructions which do not obligate one to anything. The work suffers from this in the final account.

And finally, one further sore subject concerning training plans of young lecturers' schools in the military schools. For the time being, these plans are drawn up arbitrarily and, as one will see, they are far from always well-conceived. A strict system or consistency sometimes cannot be seen in them. Many school instructors and political officers express opinions that the need possibly has matured for more skillfully developed and scientifically grounded plans. This will allow better arrangement of the work of the young lecturers' schools and an increase in the level of training future officers as propagandists. It makes sense to find the time for such training as well. This will allow us to set in motion with an even greater return an important reserve for further developing oral propaganda—improvement in the training of young lecturers.

6904
CSO: 1801
CHIEF OF ENGINEER TROOPS ON TASKS AND CAPABILITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Engr Trps S. Aganov, Chief of Engineer Troops of USSR Ministry of Defense: "Engineer Combat Support"]

[Text] The art of engineer support to combat operations had great significance in all phases of the development of military affairs. It is not by chance that the Main Military Engineer Directorate was set up in the young Red Army as early as 15 June 1918. It is one of the oldest in the Armed Forces.

Measures of engineer support to combat operations during the Great Patriotic War were distinguished by an enormous scale. The experience acquired on its battlefields is of permanent importance, for the outcome of battle largely depends on how positions, weapons emplacements and defensive structures have been organized, to what extent movement routes and crossings have been reconnoitered and prepared, and whether or not camouflage has been competently handled. In other words, it depends on how effective is the engineer combat support, which is called upon to make friendly troop operations easier and to hinder or disrupt the enemy in accomplishing his plans.

The military-technological revolution, the appearance of qualitatively new types of weapons and combat equipment and the rapid development of tactics lifted the role and importance of engineer combat support even higher.

Thanks to party and governmental concern, the engineer troops have received new, first-rate equipment. Today they are capable of accomplishing combat missions at high tempos and in any situation. The heavy-duty track-layers, mechanized bridges, engineer obstacle-clearing vehicles, river crossing equipment for different purposes, highly maneuverable ponton bridge parks and effective mineclearing means—it is impossible to imagine tactical exercises or our Army's military routine without this engineer equipment. The engineer troops are the primary executors of missions of engineer combat support.
How can thorough engineer support to combat operations be provided in the shortest possible time? How can the efforts of engineer subunits be brought together in the best manner in the interests of combat with those of motorized riflemen, tankers and artillerymen, whose capabilities have increased so sharply? The organizer for combat—the combined-arms commander—decides these questions. It is hardly necessary to mention that he needs high competency and firm organizational skills in the area of engineer support.

The practice of troop exercises provides many examples of the careful, detailed organization of engineer combat support. For example, Lt Col V. Lyalin, commander of a motorized rifle regiment, recently showed profound knowledge in this area. The motorized riflemen had to operate over terrain abounding with natural barriers and engineer obstacles.

Lt Col V. Lyalin took a thoughtful and serious attitude toward accomplishing all engineer missions. His warning orders, statements during ground reconnaissance and, finally, his decision for combat took account of the realistic capabilities of the subunits and provided everything necessary for overcoming various obstacles. In carrying out the commander's will, the regimental engineer service chief managed to organize engineer reconnaissance well, coordinate it with combined-arms reconnaissance and assist the officers of motorized rifle, tank and artillery subunits in the accomplishment of engineer missions. Attached engineer subunits with their specialized equipment were used very effectively in the exercise.

Today one senses special currency in the well-known words of Lt Gen Engr Trps D. M. Karbyshov, a major specialist in matters of engineer combat support, who emphasized that engineer organization of positions is a tactical matter and a matter for the combined-arms commander. Moreover, as maneuverability of combat operations increases, this mission becomes more and more complex. All steps will be taken in modern combat to reinforce troops with various types of engineer equipment. Commanders of engineer subunits and chiefs and specialists of the engineer service will have responsibility for their skillful, effective employment. Much, however, also will depend on the readiness of motorized rifle and tank subunits to accomplish a number of engineer missions with their own resources, and on the commanders' ability to ensure their fulfillment in an organized manner.

With the present tempos of combat operations, the combined-arms commander's ability to arrange coordination with engineer subunits acquires ever increasing importance. It is understandable that much also depends on the professional training of engineer subunit officers and on their ability to subordinate everything to the interests of combat and to delve deeply into its concept.

Take a specific mission, for example: laying minefields on avenues of possible "enemy" counterattacks. Minefields which are laid competently and opportunely represent an important prerequisite for success in combat. The
combined-arms commander, a person with a broad tactical outlook, is called upon to decide where it is most advantageous to place them and how they should be combined with small arms and artillery fire. And in addition, only the combined-arms commander can make the work of the combat engineers who are laying the minefields easier by screening them with fire and, if necessary, assigning personnel for immediate laying of the mines.

The role of a single commander's will and firm control is just as important in crossing water obstacles. Rate of the crossing is determined not only by the technical specifications of crossing equipment and the capabilities and training of engineer subunits, but also by the ability of motorized riflemen, tankers and artillerymen to load aboard the transporters and ferries and disembark from them. Personnel are armed with these skills in joint problems and practices by soldiers of different combat arms.

The experience of the tank subunit commanded by Capt. A. Yefimov is instructive in this sense. The tankers often hold joint practices with soldiers of the neighboring assault crossing subunit and with ponton men. The acquired skills were displayed to the full extent in a tactical exercise. Capt. Yefimov firmly directed the movement of the assault crossing and ponton equipment to the river precisely at the designated time and place, and they loaded in the least possible time. The water barrier was crossed in an organized manner and at a high tempo.

All opportunities have to be used to develop in commanders the ability to direct a troop crossing, teach them to use available means competently, and arrange commandant's service. More attention should be given to the mastery of methods for independent crossing of streams, narrow rivers and canals by motorized rifle and tank subunits.

But do combined-arms commanders always strive to accomplish missions of engineer combat support to the full extent and do they always possess sufficient skills in this area? Unfortunately, not always. In one exercise, for example, Maj. V. Kozlov, a motorized rifle battalion commander, turned to the regimental engineer service chief for help even in those cases where neither special equipment nor specialized knowledge was required to accomplish the mission. But in real combat there is at times no one to consult with. There is no question that the combined-arms commander must have a good knowledge of the capabilities of engineer subunits, of their equipment and features of their operations.

Engineer subunit officers in turn are obligated to broaden their tactical horizons steadily, to delve into the nature of modern warfare, and to acquire skills of interworking with combined-arms subunits. The effectiveness of tactical-special training by engineer subunits depends on how close the situation in problems is to combat reality. Under all conditions, however, the final polishing of engineer subunit personnel training is done in the combined-arms tactical exercise.
Regimental engineer service chiefs have a special role to play in improving the personnel's engineer training. Their official position has changed substantially in recent years, their responsibilities have increased and duties have expanded. Today the engineer service chief is responsible for organization of unit engineer support and for training all personnel in his specialty. This assumes an active position in the training process and in accomplishing many tasks of command training. Engineer service chiefs majors Ya. Linev and P. Solovey and Capt N. Burlakov have high authority in the units. They regularly hold classes with officers and warrant officers on engineer matters, they conduct control problems in subunits, and they make a worthy contribution to organization of competition in tasks and norms.

Engineer combat support is steadily developing and improving. There is a creative generalization of the accumulated experience at all echelons—from subunits and units to the central apparatus of engineer troops. Adoption of everything new in engineer troop training and in engineer training of the combat arms is a task which never will be removed from the agenda.

Summer combat training must enrich combined-arms commander with skills in organizing engineer combat support and must raise to a new level the field training and combat readiness of engineer subunits and units.

Personnel of engineer troops received with a sense of gratitude the warm words about combat merits of the combat engineers expressed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the books "Malaya Zemlya" and "Vozrozhdenie" [The Rebirth]. Even today there are among those who wear the emblems of our combat arm many people whose work merits high praise. Among the leaders of socialist competition are soldiers of the subunits headed by Lt Col V. Yaremchuk, Maj P. Fetishchev and Maj P. Andreychikov.

It is the task of commanders, political officers, staffs and party organizations to direct the soldiers' enthusiasm and political activeness to further increase the quality and effectiveness of the training process and the effectiveness of socialist competition, and to provide for an integrated accomplishment of all tasks of increasing combat readiness.

6904
CSO: 1801
COMPLAINT OF CONSTRUCTION TROOPS REFLECTS WORK DEFICIENCIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jun 78 p 2

[Letter and Comment by Lt Col F. Semyanovskiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Faulty Method"]

[Text] Dear Editors!

We are military construction personnel. We are building a residence. We have set up an integrated team headed by Soviet Army Employee A. Shipilov. We are trying to work well, and have come out the winners in socialist competition more than once.

But we would like to tell you about what is hindering us from serving, building and resting normally. To begin with, the length of our working day is 14-15 hours. We work on Saturdays and Sundays. In closing out the detail, however, the foremen give us eight hours work on the time-board, while Saturday and Sunday are not included in the time-board at all...

Pfc A. Panasenkov, secretary of military construction company Komsomol organization; Sgt N. Povsten; Jr Sgt A. Irinar-khov; Jr Sgt V. Pavlishin

I visited the military construction detachment from which the letter had come on a Sunday. The people were on the projects (this was an ordinary work day for them). Twenty-five persons headed by Sr Sgt G. Oberemkov were building a nine-story residence.

Personnel of another military construction company headed by Lt V. Adayev were engaged in erecting still another building. The teams were preparing mortar, laying bricks and working within the building.

And people headed by WO A. Marakutsa were also working at the third project assigned to the detachment. As it turned out, the entire detachment was on the projects on this day.
I chatted with its commander, Col Nikolay Il'ich Kuzoyatov. He did not deny what was written in the letter.

"Of course, we are not working of our own desire on the days off. We commanders are interested in seeing that the military construction personnel are free on Sunday and that cultural activities can be held with them. With regard to 'instructions from above,' I will now show you a book of telephone messages and you yourself will understand everything."

We took the telephone messages which had come to the detachment over the last two months. The contents of all of them resembled each other like twins: work on Saturday; work on Sunday.

All were signed by chief of the UNR [work supervisor's office], Engr-Col V. Zdzyarskiy. Another characteristic detail also attracted attention. The orders to assign people to work on days off would begin with the stereotyped words: "In connection with centralized delivery of bricks..." There was no "centralized delivery" on Sunday at those projects which I had occasion to visit, just as there was none on other days off. To the contrary, the builders complained that interruptions in supply of materials on those very days off lowered their labor productivity.

Just how can we explain this position of the UNR chief to whom the military construction detachment is subordinate? There is a simple reason. Several projects have been assigned to the detachment. Heads of the UNR naturally are interested in seeing that these projects are placed in operation as quickly as possible. This is a praiseworthy desire. But the fact that they do not consider people's personal time or the need to conduct political enlightenment and mass cultural work among the military construction personnel cannot be justified by any arguments.

As shown by the experience of foremost construction collectives, success comes not by overtime work or by extending the work week, but by the precise, skilled organization of the construction process. Proper allocation of specialists, their timely supply with materials and professional training make up the answer.

It remains to hope that the faulty practice flourishing in the military construction detachment comes to an end. And as quickly as possible.
FAULTY NCO SELECTION PROCESS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt A. Tvoronovich: "Know Subordinates Better: The Lesson"]

[Text] I consider the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA rubric "The Practice of Individual Work" to be very necessary and useful. Many authors who have appeared under this rubric correctly emphasize the importance of a thorough study of subordinates by officers, warrant officers and sergeants. Mistakes in this matter cost very dearly, of which I became convinced from my own experience. I would like to relate one story which possibly will serve as a lesson for young commanders and political officers.

It was in the first year of my service as an officer. Immediately after school I was assigned as deputy battery commander for political affairs. Soon I had to choose an appropriate candidate from among the sergeants for the post of battery first sergeant. I consulted with battery commander Capt V. Usov, who also was a novice in the group, and our choice fell on Jr Sgt F. Lipnevich. He was commander of an electrical generator team, had a secondary education and had a good knowledge of equipment. All this produced the proper impression on the battery commander and myself. And it appeared to us that Jr Sgt Lipnevich looked like a first sergeant just from outward appearances.

But with all our striving, he just did not make a good battery first sergeant. There was a noticeable drop in internal order in the battery with his appointment. It was typical that Lipnevich tried to show active work with all his appearance when the commander and I were in the subunit. But when we were not there, he essentially removed himself from his duties. And what was the result? There were more frequent instances of a violation of the uniform and negligent performance of duty by the orderlies. Instead of indoctrinating his subordinates in conformity with regulation requirements, Lipnevich would resort to shouts and obscenities.

Just how could we have made a mistake in assessing the junior sergeant's job and moral qualities? An analysis showed that we judged Lipnevich basically by external data: the uniform looked good on him, his face was

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strong-willed, and he gave commands in a firm, resounding voice. But as a squad commander he did not show special zeal in service. He showed a tendency toward the demonstrative side of things or, in other words, he liked to put up a smoke screen, as they say. The battery sergeants saw this and so Lipnevich had no authority with them.

Unfortunately, the commander and I had no knowledge of this. Moreover, we did not talk with the sergeants and considered advice from them to be a superfluous matter for us. And so we learned our lesson. Of course, we demanded that Jr Sgt Lipnevich perform his duties strictly according to the regulation and we ourselves strived to devote more attention to maintaining internal order in the subunit.

Our mistake was even more vexing in that, as we later saw, there were good sergeants and skilled methodologists and indoctrinators in the battery. For example, Jr Sgt P. Karbakhtsyan enjoyed great authority. Just why had we not noticed his high command qualities right away? Because he was not distinguished outwardly in any way, was quiet and did not overemphasize his successes.

Jr Sgt Karbakhtsyan became the battery first sergeant when Lipnevich was released to the reserve. And the new first sergeant fully justified the trust. He had a sense of responsibility and was distinguished by his industriousness, initiative and high exactingness. Our party organization accepted Karbakhtsyan as a candidate member, then as a CPSU member.

Years went by and even now I recall our battery first sergeant with the kindest, most sincere words. And most important, I try not to overlook such people in life, but to study and know my subordinates better.
COMPLAINT ABOUT DELAY IN PROVIDING SERVICE FACILITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by K. Petrov, chief of personal service combine: "The Commission Decided, But Things Did Not Get Going"]

[Text] It would appear that everyone knows the important role played in the life of a military post by cultural and personal services establishments. It is therefore very strange that our officers' club has not been working for the fourth year now. It is being repaired. Its repairs are going at a snail's pace, but it is well that they are at least going. But the bath and laundry issue can be considered to be fully "penned up" for us.

The post command repeatedly turned to the senior chiefs on this matter. Finally a reliable commission arrived. It studied the status of cultural and personal services installations on the spot, drew up a detailed plan for eliminating shortcomings and planned for the construction of a new bathhouse. After this the plan was sealed and authenticated with ten signatures. Over two years already have gone by since that time. Judging from the commission's plan for erecting installations, a new bathhouse, for example, should have appeared on post long ago. But there still is no such bathhouse. And how could there be, if a plan has not even been prepared yet?

Just about the very same situation shaped up with construction of a new boiler room as well as with work to reconstruct the personal services combine.

I turned to various echelons many times, reminding them of the plan outlined by the commission and about the need to begin construction of a bathhouse and other personal services installations, without which it is impossible to get by on post. There is already a weighty volume of answers which come from officials of various directorates of the North Caucasus Military District. But judging from what is written in it, no one is taking seriously the decision of the commission which operated on post, or our concerns. Strange but true.

6904
CSO: 1801
HELIICOPTER FLIGHT TRAINING PROCEDURES IMPROVED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 June 78 p 1

[Article by Lt Col I. Onishchenko, Red Banner Volga Military District: "In Military Schools Today: The First Starts"]

[Text] It could be seen easily even with the unaided eye how difficult it was for the cadet to handle the rotary-wing craft. The helicopter would "yaw" from side to side and in no way wanted to "hover" where it was supposed to. But then something happened and it quieted down, submitted and became obedient.

"Everything is as it should be!" I heard the instructor's voice not far away. "Now, judging from everything, there should be complete order."

But ahead were more difficult assignments: flights in the pattern and to the zone.

"Now everything is new for the young ones," remarked Maj V. Shchankin, first class instructor-pilot and deputy squadron commander for political affairs. "They still take off unsurely, and they make mistakes in landing. That is how it always is at first. Come back in a month or two and you will see a completely different picture."

This year young cadets of the Syzran' Higher Military Pilots' School began flying earlier than usual. Of course it is still difficult to draw any final conclusions regarding this innovation, but even now the commanders, political officers and instructors note that the future officer-aviators are working with enormously greater interest: the thought about imminent take-offs forces them to work with a full output.

And the flights themselves are organized in such a way that the spark of competitiveness does not die out for a moment. There is a struggle for quality in every take-off and every landing and for skilled and precise use of radios. Results are summarized and winners are determined at the end of each flying day. In so doing, many components are considered, including the preparation for the flight and repeat flights, efficiency in the take-off and much more.
In order to see graphically how training is being improved and what has been achieved today, the squadron also takes results of the past day for comparison: fulfillment of the planning chart and socialist pledges. Flights, flight groups and individual cadets are characterized from these points of view. The name of the person who achieved the highest results is given without fail. The next time he is given the right to raise the flag over the take-off command post and be first to lift off.

That day Cadet A. Dorogov was first to take off. He invariably achieves high marks under the direction of instructor-pilot 1st class Sr Lt O. Pit'yevoy. It seemed that this time, too, he would have no rivals, but competition is competition. When results were summarized, it turned out that Sgt S. Pichugin, who had been prepared for the flight by instructor-pilot 1st class Capt V. Krivyy, coped somewhat better with the assigned tasks. He successfully performed the planned exercises and was first in the subunit to receive authorization for going on to the next more difficult exercises.

Each take-off was carefully analyzed. The talk at the critique was not only about mistakes which had been made, but also about their causes. Specific measures were planned on the spot to eliminate these mistakes.

Cadet A. Tregubov landed a rotary-winged craft. It appeared that he had coped successfully with the assignment. Nevertheless, a certain lack of confidence with which some elements were performed in flight did not escape the experienced instructor. For example, Tregubov allowed the helicopter to slip in a turn. After the appropriate briefing the cadet was sent to the trainer.

That is how it is in everything: identify the mistakes and immediately plan ways to eliminate them. For this reason the flying expertise of the young cadets rose with each passing day. And for this reason Maj Shchankin says that in a month or two the future officers will begin to feel much more confident in the air.

The sun sets slowly over the horizon. Still another flying day comes to an end. And again the squadron summarizes its results. This time the flight commanded by Maj P. Rybakov has achieved success in competition. Capt Krivyy also is named among the instructor-pilots whose subordinates flew better than the others. The work of WO V. Ryabov, a flight technician, and M. Paseku, a radio electronic equipment specialist, is highly praised. They also deserve credit for the fact that the cadets' training has risen to a new level.

Careful preparation for each flight, a detailed analysis of mistakes made by cadets in piloting, and publicity and comparability of results achieved in competition--these are the day to day working principles in the squadron commanded by Maj S. Alfutin. The experienced specialists who helped the young ones take their first step into the sky see their main task to be making classes go better and more effectively tomorrow than today.

6904
CSO: 1801
TRAINING RESULTS IN OUTSTANDING FIGHTER SQUADRON DESCRIBED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 18 June 78 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Bganka, Squadron Commander, 1st Class Military Pilot: "Right-Flankers of Competition for 1978: With Consideration of the Features"]

[Text] Capt V. D'yakov, a fighter pilot, moved to the attack position against the air "enemy" with a power maneuver, quickly detected the target and in a matter of seconds hit it with the first missile from a tactically difficult position. The range reported by radio that the target had been destroyed. At the suggestion of party organization secretary Capt M. Vidyakin, after landing at the airfield Officer D'yakov shared with the pilots his experience in the successful intercept and told about the features in the attack on the air target. In subsequent sorties the other crews also delivered accurate missile attacks.

The squadron has many masters of accurate live launches. Many aviators raised their class ratings back in the winter training period. Every other specialist attained 'excellent' marks. During the summer training we are striving to keep first place in competition, confirm the title of outstanding squadron, and for a third time win the Challenge Prize imeni Twice Hero Soviet Union B. Safonov.

Just what helps us implement what is outlined in combat training plans and in socialist pledges by personnel? One of the chief directions in the work of the commander and party organization is propaganda of foremost experience with consideration of the features of operational training missions to be accomplished. Of course, there are broader opportunities here during days of ground training. This includes demonstration classes, presentations by experienced specialists to their coworkers, and other activities which can be planned ahead of time and conducted at the subunit level.
Flights where the military labor of personnel is rigidly regulated by the planning chart are another matter. Here efficiency in organizing an exchange of experience of the best personnel is especially important. Let us say that a pilot has performed an advanced exercise in the air with an outstanding mark. He is assigned to tell his comrades how he operated in flight, and what those who have to accomplish a similar mission should pay attention to. In addition to individual talks, we also make wide use of visual agitation means. This of course makes it easier to increase the effectiveness of competition and its mobilizing role in the struggle for high quality in accomplishing operational training missions.

Experience convinces us that in order to master sophisticated modern technology expertly, we need the concerted, coordinated efforts of the soldiers, an atmosphere of mutual exactingness, and a feeling of personal responsibility for common success by each person. This is why we are concerned in particular for the indoctrinational role of competition. What do we place main emphasis on here? A study of subordinates and a knowledge of their individual features. Therefore, from the first days of service of the young pilots and technicians, their commanders, chiefs and instructors become thoroughly familiar with them. They help them plan specific goals in professional training and competition. In analyzing the fulfillment of individual pledges, they also consider a person's attitude toward work, his participation in social life and his observance of regulation requirements.

We have many examples of thoughtful, purposeful work with the youth. I will mention Capt Aleksey Stepanovich Markin, a flight commander and lst class pilot. We generalized his foremost experience of flight training and disseminated it among the other instructors. What distinguishes this officer's work as an indoctrinator of subordinates? He is able to explain to a trainee competently and show if necessary how best to prepare for and accomplish an upcoming exercise. Party Member Markin also sets the example with regard to service. He is always exacting toward himself in everything concerning flying rules and military discipline. The people see this and emulate the commander. It is not without reason that this flight has high indicators in air training and is one of the best in the regiment. And the youth here receives good conditioning.

Take pilot Capt B. Perminov, for example. There was a time when, after arriving in the squadron, he did not have sufficient training in flights and one sensed he had gaps in his knowledge of theoretical disciplines. How could the aviator be helped in eliminating the shortcomings as quickly as possible? We decided to place Perminov in the flight commanded by Officer Markin. And we did not err. The more experienced comrades in the friendly, cohesive collective immediately came to Perminov's assistance. They examined the mistakes exactingly and advised how best to eliminate them. And this very thing is effective training using foremost experience. The officer very quickly acquired the necessary skills and began to accomplish advanced flying assignments confidently.
Comradely mutual assistance of the best specialists became the rule in the squadron. Ours are always ready to share any useful discovery and they also assist a rival in competition. For example, party members captains V. Nadvorskiy and M. Vidyakin are competing with each other. Each, of course, wants to see the crew he heads be in front in all indicators. But during the last summarization of results Officer Nadvorskiy's subordinates were the winners. Vidyakin also helped them achieve success. These crew commanders often can be seen together analyzing objective monitoring materials, comparing their calculations and sharing experience.

The aviators' summer combat training is imbued with party concern for indoctrinating ideologically conditioned air fighting men who expertly master sophisticated equipment and weapons. Party members set the tone in training and service. They set the example of absolute fulfillment of socialist pledges and strengthen friendship and military comradeship in the collective.

I recall a recent party meeting where the talk was about the fact that although our squadron was outstanding, the reserves for combat improvement were far from exhausted. They also lay in the propaganda of foremost experience. Those officer-party members who summarized competition results in crews and groups hastily and essentially in a formalistic manner and who showed little concern for adopting foremost experience were justifiably criticized.

The Letter of the CPSU CC, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU and Komsomol CC on Development of Socialist Competition in 1978 emphasizes that we must increase publicity of competition and widely disseminate and adopt the experience of the leaders. This requirement obligates us to improve the work style in struggling for quality of combat and political training. The squadron's aviators are full of desire to work so that there is not a single laggard next to the leaders. And so our youth has been targeted for a first-class goal in flight training. We are striving to fulfill our socialist pledges completely.
NEED FOR FUEL ECONOMY BY THE MILITARY STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 June 78 p 2

[Article by Engr-Col Gen V. Nikitin: "For Economy and Thrift: Use Fuel Effectively"]

[Text] It is generally known that the party devotes great attention to increasing the effectiveness of use and economy of fuel and energy resources. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "No matter how our society's riches grow, the strictest economy and thrift remain the most important condition for development of the national economy and for increasing the people's welfare.

"It is our high party duty to carefully calculate and effectively use every ruble, every hour of labor, and every ton of production and to put an end once and for all to mismanagement and slipshodness."

A decree recently adopted by the party central committee on organizational and political work of the Kemerovskaya Oblast CPSU committee to economize on fuel and energy resources at enterprises and construction sites of the oblast was aimed at solving this important state problem. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out the need to cut various types of losses in the national economy to a minimum during meetings with workers in the course of his trip through rayons of Siberia and the Far East.

The party's requirement for rational, thrifty use of everything we possess also relates fully to the Armed Forces. At missile troop positions, at ranges, at airfields, and on the expanses of seas and oceans--everywhere the strenuous military labor of Soviet soldiers is in full swing today. They have been entrusted with powerful technology. It is just as important for each of us to regard material means thriftily and expend them economically and with greatest effect!
The struggle for economy is not something isolated from the overall process of combat and political training. The principle here is as follows: the higher the organizational and methodological level of classes, practices and exercises, the more effectively and thriftily the supplies, and particularly fuel are expended. Now, for example, more and more attention is being given to integrating problems and subordinating all types of combat training to the interests of tactics. Thus training problems in several disciplines are practiced simultaneously and skills of interworking among subunits are improved. And all this takes place in the course of one problem. A different approach to matters would require considerably more trips to the field, which means more fuel.

The struggle for economy is one of the important directions of socialist competition, which is widespread in the Army and Navy. The pledges of many soldiers reflect their striving to achieve fuel economy. But the economic effect is not only achieved by a struggle to fulfill these specific pledges. Take for example the competitors' striving to learn to hit targets with the first round, burst or launch, to attain high quality in performing every operational training mission, and to introduce into practice progressive methods for maintaining, servicing and repairing equipment. Achieving these goals means to expend less ammunition, engine operating resources and fuel without detriment to the quality of troop training.

As the experience of units and subunits which achieved high indicators in competition shows, the greatest economy is achieved where the training process is precisely organized and where every trip to the field, every flight and every ocean deployment is preceded by thorough training. Before taking the controls of a tank or aircraft or occupying a battle station at the machinery of a ship, every soldier practices in detail the techniques and tactics of operation in diagrams, on mock-ups and on trainers. This provides both a saving of resources and a guarantee that the operational training mission will be accomplished with high quality on the authorized equipment. For example, in the Belorussian Military District and in some fleets a fuel savings of 20-30 percent is achieved as a result of careful use of trainers in preparing pilots, tankers and other specialists. Good organization of base training helped achieve a significant fuel economy aboard ships of the Black Sea Fleet in 1977.

Initiators of socialist competition in branches of the Armed Forces achieved noticeable results in supply economy, including fuel economy. Just take the guards air regiment of the Southern Group of Forces. Effective use of the combat capabilities of the aviation system and precise flight planning allows the aviators to achieve high quality in accomplishing operational training missions with minimum expenditures of engine operating time and fuel. For example, the air squadron of this regiment commanded by Gds Maj K. Ovechkin saved hundreds of tons of aviation fuel the past year.
The fact that foremost units do not allow overexpenditure of fuel in spite of intensive use of combat equipment shows the great capabilities of all subunits, units and ships in this regard. We are speaking primarily of skilled mobilization of internal reserves for increasing the effectiveness of fuel use on the basis of an improved organization of combat training in units and on ships and an improvement in the production process in military construction subunits.

It would appear that the main attention of the construction personnel should be focussed on ensuring the precise and rational functioning of the transport conveyor in delivering supplies and structural elements to construction sites. Unfortunately, it still often happens that excessively long trips which could be made by rail are made the responsibility of motor transport due to the irregular material and technical supply of construction sites. Some construction organizations make poor use of truck trailers. Imprecise organization of the transport process at construction sites often leads to additions in the volume of shipments made, as a result of which there are preconditions for squandering fuel and lubricants. It is the duty of commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations to set up a firm barrier to this.

As practice shows, many reserves for increasing fuel economy are revealed in the improvement of equipment maintenance. For example, the unit where Maj A. Pogorelov is chief of the fuel and lubricants service conducts a thorough technical diagnosis of each vehicle prior to its departure on a run and on its return to the motor pool. Regular classes with drivers during which matters of fuel and lubricants economy are treated have become the practice in a number of units of the Leningrad Military District.

The qualitative condition and level of maintenance of equipment have a direct effect on the regime of economy. For example, take adjustment work on the engine. The following figures attest persuasively to its importance. Poor adjustment of the fuel apparatus or a malfunction in the diesel engine fuel supply system increases the fuel expenditure by 30-35 percent. Lack of a seal of the carburetor economizer valve, an increase in the capacity of the main jet of 10 percent as compared to the greatest size, improper placement of the ignition advance angle, or late cleaning of carbon lead to losses of 5-15 percent of the fuel. Is it necessary to mention what this could lead to with poor equipment maintenance at the unit or combined unit level?

The struggle for economy of fuel and lubricants produces best results where party, Komsomol and trade union organizations take an active part in this matter along with commanders and managers of rear service organs and technical services, and when people’s control groups and stations make their contribution to it. The leaders here, of course, should be officers of the fuel and lubricants service. They are called upon not only to exercise supervision over the expenditure of all types of fuel, but also to disseminate the experience of the leaders who economically
expend fuel and lubricants. The initiative of those officers of the service who, with the help of the command element and party and Komsomol organizations, have set up training methods rooms in units and combined units, outfitting them with the necessary visual aids and recommendations on the rationale and most economic use of fuel and lubricants in combat and transport equipment, merits support.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress: "No one should have any doubt that our party will do everything to ensure that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union continue to possess all necessary means for performing their important mission of being guardian over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the bulwark of universal peace." This fundamental party line shows up in particular in the full supply of fuel to the Armed Forces. Its effective use and all possible economy on the basis of high organization of military labor and steadfast improvement of the expertise of specialists is our patriotic duty and our response to the party's concern for strengthening the Motherland's defenses.
PROBLEMS IN GRADUATE DEGREE WORK OF OFFICERS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 June 78 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen N. Kozlov, deputy chief for training and scientific work of the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin: "Certain Problems of Working With Post Graduate Students: The Path to Science"]

[Text] The Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin has long prepared scientific and pedagogic cadres in the field of social sciences. Many chairs and instructors can rightfully be proud of their pupils. Lt Gen Ye. Nikitin, professor, doctor of historical sciences, has over 50 of them and Maj Gen A. Barabanshchikov, professor, doctor of pedagogic sciences, has over 30. One now meets officers in almost every military educational institution who took their first steps into science in our academy. The growing scale of preparing scientific-pedagogic cadres is shown by the fact that the number of dissertations defended over the last five years has almost doubled in comparison with the previous five years.

It would be incorrect, however, to speak only about the quantitative aspect. At the present time demands on scientific-pedagogic cadres are constantly growing. This means that it is necessary to improve constantly the process of training and indoctrination of post graduate students. Therefore the command element, political and scientific research departments, chairs and party organizations of the academy always keep these matters at the center of attention.

Much is done in the academy to ensure that future military scientists can fill in and deepen their knowledge in the field of Marxist-Leninist theory, their chosen specialty and foreign languages. The best instructors are brought in to give lectures and hold seminars with them. Post graduate students are given an opportunity to attend classes at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU CC, the Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov and other universities of the capital.
New forms and methods of working with post graduate students are introduced into practice more and more widely: Problem lectures, theoretical interviews and seminars on the most important issues of Marxist-Leninist theory and CPSU policy. Much is being done in this regard by Professor Maj-Gen N. Pankratov, Professor Col M. D'yachenko, Professor P. Sokolov and Honored Worker of Science of the RSFSR F. Khrustov.

In addition to the theoretical preparation of post graduate students, considerably more attention has begun to be given in recent times to their pedagogic practice. To this end there are provisions for an independent study of literature and tests in pedagogics and psychology as applied to tasks accomplished by the higher school, and regular attendance at methods conferences and training problems conducted by experienced instructors. With the help of a scientific director, each post graduate student develops and gives lectures and holds seminars with students. All this unquestionably facilitates the formation of high professional skills and qualities.

Demands continue to increase on dissertations. We strive in every possible way to see that the selection and research of a topic have an applied scientific nature and include the resolution of a particular, specific problem. The results and conclusions drawn by the person performing the dissertation must accordingly contain practical recommendations for troops and military educational institutions.

For example, the specialized council on historical sciences did not immediately approve the dissertation topic of Lt Col V. Koval'. It was suggested that the officer expand it and make it on a larger scale. The post graduate student heeded these recommendations and now is performing research touching on matters of scientific planning of party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy.

About a year ago the chair of scientific communism heard the scientific report of Capt 3rd Rank V. Pus'ko, who was working on a dissertation on the topic "Military-Technical Policy of the Marxist-Leninist Party as a Factor Strengthening the Defenses of the Socialist State." Maj Gen V. Samoylenko, Col K. Vorob'ev and Col A. Timofeyev gave the post graduate student a great deal of advice which helped him find the most effective ways for further scientific research, analysis of the material he assembled and for subsequent generalizations.

Similar working methods also are used by other chairs. They pursue one goal: to achieve currency in scientific research, its practical value, and its close tie with those problems which now are being resolved by commanders and political organs.
Much has been done in the academy to improve the training of scientific and scientific-pedagogic cadres. But the Communist Party teaches us to be critical of what has been done and give primary attention to what still has not been brought to completion. Unfortunately, those matters still remain and it is impossible to close our eyes to them.

Take, for example, the work with external post graduate students and with officers working on dissertations, the majority of whom are instructors of military educational institutions. Monthlong courses are held annually with the external students. The chairs and scientific directors periodically travel to outlying areas to advise an officer conducting research and give him practical assistance. Thanks to this many external students and persons working on dissertations successfully develop and defend their candidate dissertations within the established deadlines.

Many, but not all of them. Some external students do not keep within the deadlines set for preparing dissertations. It Col A. Gulyashinov completed his external post graduate work back in 1974, but he still has not defended his dissertation. It is obviously difficult for him to combine scientific work with his practical work. But commanders and senior chiefs are not showing proper exactingness toward Gulyashinov. And it would appear that we for our part have not done everything to give the officer specific assistance.

It is no secret to anyone that it is very difficult to conduct scientific research and simultaneously perform one's official duties. This requires extreme concentration and the ability to plan time properly. Much also depends on the commanders and chiefs whose subordinates are working on dissertations. But cases are still encountered where external students and competitors for dissertations are not given support or are deprived of privileges provided by appropriate documents. This is absolutely inadmissible, for we are speaking about an important matter--preparing scientific cadres for the Armed Forces.

The preparation of competitors to take candidate tests requires further improvement. As we know, their goal is to establish how thoroughly an officer has mastered Marxist-Leninist theory, what his professional knowledge and scientific and cultural horizons are, and the extent to which he is prepared for independent research work.

Many officers go before examination commissions every year. The majority show a high level of theoretical and professional training, but we also encounter those who are poorly prepared. For example, at the December session last year 15 percent of those tested received only satisfactory marks. Is this admissible for future scientists? In our view, the reason for this is as follows: some assume that to pass the test successfully it is sufficient to "refresh" in the memory that knowledge with which they once completed the higher military educational institution.
This is understandably a deeply erroneous opinion. Several years have passed since receiving the diploma. During this time science and its individual branches have succeeded in striding far ahead. One who intends to become a scientist always has to remember this and keep in step with life, as they say, maintaining close ties with the academy and with the chair which corresponds to the chosen specialty, and take an interest in what new things have appeared in the given area.

As experience shows, these ties allow one to better prepare to enter post graduate work and to pass candidate exams. But the chairs for their part also have to show appropriate interest in selecting worthy candidates for training and in timely identification of those who really have an inclination for scientific and pedagogic activities.

To this end the academy maintains close ties with political directorates of branches of the Armed Forces, political directorates of military districts and fleets, and with many military educational institutions. The chairs keep a close eye on how service is shaping up for our graduates, especially for those who as students worked actively in the military scientific society and took part in contests. It is in this way that we succeed in identifying the cream of the crop.

Much has been done by the academy collective to further increase the quality of preparing scientific cadres. What has been achieved, however, is not the limit. Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress obligate us to go further and achieve more. We must not forget that we are preparing scientists and military teachers in the field of social sciences. This places especially high demands upon us.

Those who complete post graduate work and the competitors who successfully completed work on candidate dissertations are called upon to be fervent propagandists of our party's theory and policies. They are to indoctrinate ideologically conditioned officers for all branches of the USSR Armed Forces who are utterly devoted to the socialist homeland. Our primary duty is to prepare them thoroughly to accomplish these important tasks and help them take their first step into the great science.

6904
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COMPLAINTS ABOUT LIVING CONDITIONS IN TANK REGIMENT STATED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jun 78 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lt Col V. Kholodul'kin, from Central Group of Forces: "A Reader Requests Intervention: When There Is No Time For It"]

[Text] The commanders and party and Komsomol activists of this guards tank regiment do a great deal to improve the everyday life of privates and sergeants. There is cleanliness and order in offices and sleeping areas. The grounds of the military post, buried in profuse verdure, resemble a real oasis: flowers in beds and along the lanes, stone borders shot with faultless whiteness.

I was told that all this was largely due to Guards Lt Col G. Vasil'yev, deputy regimental commander for rear services, and his subordinate officers and warrant officers. The housekeeping personnel really had worked a great deal to create real order in the compound and comfort in the soldiers' barracks. Then suddenly a complaint about Guards Lt Col Vasil'yev came to the editors from members of families of military service personnel living in dormitories.

They complain that in recent years the dormitory premises had not been repaired (although funds had been issued for this), that in the early spring the dormitories often were not heated due to a lack of coal, while the boiler rooms were almost in an emergency condition. And finally, the residents complained that the sewer line was in a poor condition, there were no panes in the toilets and showers, and they were not properly outfitted. Due to a lack of common kitchens and personal services rooms, there was nowhere to prepare breakfast or dinner, and moreover, the electric wiring in many rooms was faulty.
After reading this complaint, which was followed by almost half a hundred signatures, it was difficult to believe that such disorders, to put it mildly, were occurring in an establishment subordinate to Officer Vasil’yev, known as an experienced and concerned rear services official.

But the people wrote truthfully about all this. Even more unseemly facts were revealed on the spot. Platoon commander Gds WO S. Fasenko, for example, told us:

"I have been living with my family in the dormitory for over four years, and there still has not been a day that we did not complain about some kind of disorder. Judge for yourselves: You come home late at night from an exercise and would like to wash up from the road, but there is no water. You take a bucket and run to the next dormitory for water."

"And there is no coal in our dormitory, or the stoker has disappeared who knows where. And so you have to go to the boiler room yourself and stoke up the boiler," added Gds WO V. Kisil’.

Both holes in the floors and a bad roof also were discovered.

It is basically the families of warrant officers and extended-term service personnel who are living in the dormitories about whom we are speaking. The overwhelming majority of them have small children. Frankly speaking, the kids' lives are sad when interruptions in the water, fuel and electricity arise and when the wind blows through a broken window and water drips from the ceiling. It is even more bitter to recognize that all this appeared as a result of the indifferent attitude toward the needs and requests of the service families on the part of regimental rear services workers headed by Gds Lt Col Vasil’yev. As a matter of fact, at one time a water and sewer line were hooked up to the dormitories, there were boilers of good quality installed in the boiler rooms, and stokers and cleaning women were assigned. Each year the necessary funds are allocated for equipment repairs in places of common use. In short, all conditions were there to satisfy the requests of the residents. But this did not take place. Why?

"You see, the KECh [billeting and maintenance section] gives us little money for repair of equipment in the dormitories," says Gds Lt Col Vasil’yev in justification.

"That's not true, Gennadiy Nikolayevich," says Engr-Capt V. Petrovskiy, chief engineer of the KECh, immediately breaking into the conversation. And he begins to count off on his fingers, as they say, the amount of boards, window panes and other supplies allocated for repairs which were not used for the intended purpose, but for other needs of the regiment.

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One other detail of no small importance also was explained. KEC'h officials had purchased more than ten electric ranges for installation in the common kitchens. For more than a year now, however, the electric ranges have been sitting at the depot, while the kitchens that were not there, still are not there, although there are spacious rooms specially set aside for them in each dormitory. What's the trouble? It turns out, in Officer Vasil'yev's words, that the rear service workers "somehow have no time for kitchens; current repairs have worn them out."

His assistants also expressed themselves in approximately the same way—Gds WO I. Lukashevich, chief of the billeting and maintenance service, and Soviet Army Employee T. Gladkikh, dormitory commandant. But it is not just anyone, but they themselves who bear personal responsibility for living conditions in the dormitories. And if one of them performs his official duties poorly, the guilty party should be held strictly liable. And the regimental commander, his political deputy and the party committee's secretary should have the first word here. It is their immediate duty to display constant concern for the everyday living of members of officers' and warrant officers' families, to look into their needs and requests and to give them day to day assistance and support.

It is completely incomprehensible as to why the regimental command element and party organization so far have ignored the disgraceful things occurring in the service families' dormitories. It is as if we were speaking not about the needs of subordinates and their family members, but about some insignificant facts which do not merit attention. True, the admission by Gds Lt Col I. Polkhov, regimental political deputy, is reassuring:

"We are guilty of everything. But I promise that we will hold those guilty of the poor state of affairs in the dormitories strictly liable and will put things in proper order there."

Well, as they say, we'll wait and see.
PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE ONE-MAN COMMAND DESCRIBED

Moscow KTRANSAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jun 78 pp 2-3

[Article by Docent Col A. Bityanov, Candidate of Historical Sciences: "Indoctrinational Function of One-Man Command"]

[Text] The present level of development of military affairs and the complexity of the tasks facing the Soviet Armed Forces demand further strengthening of procedure laid down by regulations, organization and discipline at all echelons of the army and navy. This in turn dictates the unshakable principle of one-man command, the necessity of better application of this principle, as well as the necessity of enhancement of the role and authority of commanders, who bear full responsibility for the combat readiness of the units and subunits under their command.

One-man command, states the CPSU Program, constitutes a most important principle of organizational development of the USSR Armed Forces. This party program point reflects the fact that the objective laws of development of military affairs, the organizational structure, nature and function of the army and navy, as well as the character of activities of their personnel -- that all this inevitably presupposes centralization of commander authority and the strictest co-subordination and personal responsibility of military personnel. The absence of these fundamental principles of military organization "...quite often," stated V. I. Lenin, "leads inevitably to catastrophe, chaos, panic, polyarchy, and defeat" ("Pn. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 39, page 46).

Speaking of one-man command as a method of military leadership, V. I. Lenin pointed to its indisputable advantages over any other methods. In what are these advantages concretely expressed?

First of all, in the fact that one-man command best ensures unity of will and action, a high degree of organization and discipline on the part of a large number of people in the process of their joint activities, subordination of the will of thousands to the will of one, absolute obedience by the soldier masses to the commander, flexibility and efficiency of troop control. Secondly, one-man command increases the personal responsibility of each commander for the state of combat readiness and combat efficiency of the unit or
subunit entrusted to him, both in peacetime and under combat conditions. Third, the obvious advantage of one-man command is also expressed in the fact that it most fully promotes elucidation and comprehensive utilization of the capabilities of commanders, their professional and party qualities.

The entire 60 years of experience in development of the Soviet Armed Forces persuasively shows that their high degree of combat efficiency and combat readiness are inconceivable without strict centralization in troop leadership, without one-man command, and without firm military discipline. The Leninist idea that one-man command under conditions of the army and navy is the only correct procedure has been confirmed time and again.

Experience has also proven the fact that one-man command, performing its main function — the function of organization and troop control — at the same time exerts indoctrinal influence on military personnel.

Troop control means managing people. Successful execution of such control is achieved on the one hand by skillful organization of the soldier masses and their combat activity, as well as maximum utilization of all the capabilities of personnel for accomplishing the assigned missions. On the other hand, troop control means constantly increasing the social responsibility of military personnel, achieving conscious performance by personnel of their obligations, their duty. This also predetermines to a decisive degree the indoctrinal significance of the principle of one-man command. It is precisely by means of this principle that influence is achieved in large measure on the will, consciousness and feelings of personnel, of which the process of indoctrination of military personnel is formed.

The principle of one-man command is directed toward maintaining and all-out strengthening of strict procedure laid down by regulations as well as organization in line units. The stronger and more solid this procedure is in turn, the more effectively the indoctrinal function of one-man command is manifested. The entire tenor of military life predetermines the indoctrinal significance of military service as a school of self-mastery and discipline, political conditioning and professional training.

Consequently, the principle of one-man command exerts comprehensive indoctrinal influence on people. Securing precise troop control, a high degree of discipline and organization, strict subordination and personal responsibility, this principle promotes the creation of a good political, moral, and professional atmosphere in the military collective, shaping of the character and personality of military personnel, and toughens their will.

Of course all these goals are reached not spontaneously, not automatically, but as a result of day-by-day, purposeful organizational, political and ideological work by commanders, staffs, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations. Our party has always examined and continues to examine the question of strengthening one-man command in a close unity with activation and enhancement of the effectiveness of party-political work in the
Armed Forces and strengthening of the role and influence of political agencies and party organizations on all aspects of army and navy life.

One-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces rests on a solid political and social foundation and contains no class antagonisms. It is constructed in full conformity with the basic principle of organization and activity of our state -- the principle of democratic centralism formally spelled out in the new USSR Constitution. It embodies a unity of goals and interests, the socio-political and ideological unity of the Soviet people -- a new historical community of people.

The USSR Armed Forces are an inseparable part of this new community. They constitute an indestructible fighting family, consolidated into a monolith by a Communist philosophical outlook, class unity, and vital commitment on the part of all personnel to accomplish the tasks of building communism and reliable defense of the achievements of socialism and communism. This community and this unity are not contradicted by the fact that the commander is invested with one-man command, that both the control and indoctrination functions of this principle are mediated precisely through him. V. I. Lenin emphasized that there is definitely no fundamental contradiction between socialist democracy and the granting of power with broad authorities to individuals, for one-man commanders are designated by a genuinely popular Soviet Government, choosing them from among the most worthy representatives of the people, capable of successfully implementing party and government policy and of correctly expressing the will of the toilers.

Soviet commanders -- bearers of one-man command in our Armed Forces -- come from those same classes and social groups as their subordinates. They constitute embodiment of the class, revolutionary and fighting spirit of the army and its finest traditions. Our command cadres are answerable to the party and Soviet Government and run the units entrusted to them on behalf of the people, which dictates their unquestionable authority and profound respect among their subordinates. In the Soviet Armed Forces relations between superiors and subordinates are based on mutual trust and total dedication to the homeland and to the Communist Party, on a common aspiration worthily to carry out one's sacred duty to the people.

All this defines the social essence, class character and party-mindedness of Soviet one-man command, and dictates the thrust and force of its indoctrinational effect. The high degree of effectiveness of this influence is achieved thanks to the fact that Soviet commanders:

are guided in all their activities by Marxist-Leninist theory, implement CPSU policy, and unswervingly observe Leninist principles of troop leadership;

bear personal responsibility to the Communist Party and Soviet Government for combat and political training, the state of weapons and equipment, military discipline, etc;
exercise the power and authority with which they are invested in strict conformity with the USSR Constitution, the laws of the Soviet state, and the demands of military regulations.

To implement one-man command under conditions of the Soviet Armed Forces and a socialist army means to approach the job from a party, government position. This means combining high demandingness and an implacable attitude toward deficiencies with trust in and respect for people, and constant concern for them. This means relying on collective know-how in daily commander activities, maintaining constant contact with the men, and skillfully utilizing public opinion, the army and navy community. Only in this way can one ensure increasing indoctrination effect of one-man command on personnel.

The strength of one-man command in the Soviet Army and Navy lies in the fact that it is carried out on an indestructible party foundation. One-man commanders are inalterably supported in their activities by the party organization. To rely on the party organization is not only the right but, as stated in the Internal Service Regulations, also the obligation of the one-man commander. Regulations specify that the commander shall firmly and consistently implement CPSU policy, serve the Soviet people in an exemplary fashion, and direct the efforts of military personnel toward strengthening the Armed Forces of the USSR.

The demands of regulations embody the demands of the party and Soviet State on command cadres, who are called upon to be skilled one-man commanders and indoctrinators. The party has always devoted and continues to devote great attention toward training such cadres.

The political, professional and moral qualities of commanders determine to a decisive degree the effectiveness of the principle of one-man command, its indoctrination influence on personnel, and the moral-psychological atmosphere in the military unit. Those high demands which the 25th CPSU Congress imposed on leadership cadres as a whole apply fully to army and navy command personnel.

Speaking at the congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated: "Today's leader should organically unite within himself party-mindedness and thorough competence, discipline, initiative and an innovative approach to his job. At the same time, in any sector the leader must consider sociopolitical and indoctrinational aspects, must be sensitive to others, to their needs and demands, and must serve as an example both on and off the job."

These instructions are also of great importance for the practical activities of command cadres invested with one-man command.

One-man command presupposes a dialectical unity of authority and responsibility, the plenitude of which is expressed in the commander's decision and order. The commander's order is an order by the homeland. It constitutes the basis of troop control and has the force of law for subordinates; it must
be carried out unquestioningly, precisely and promptly. Herein lies the
authority of the order and herein lies the strength of its indoctrinational
effect. With what attitude was an order received? How were people enriched
spiritually and morally in the process of total execution of the order? What
mark was left in their hearts by the word addressed to them? All these are
important aspects of the indoctrinational function of one-man command.

Mar SU K. Rokossovskiy stated in his book "Soldatskiy dolg" [Soldier's Duty]:
"It is the dream of each of us to be such that our men execute an order with
affection."

Here too the most important thing is the commander's ability to combine the
principle of one-man command and collective decision in one's work, to rely
on party and Komsomol organizations, to consider the opinions and suggestions
of one's subordinates, one's assistants. In the process of daily contact with
Communists and Komsomol members and with other personnel, commanders listen
carefully to their voice, take counsel with them, take into consideration
their experience and suggestions. This promotes development of activeness
and initiative on the part of subordinates and increases in their eyes the
authority of the commander, and enables the latter to make more correct deci-
sions and to implement them with confidence.

The practical experience of the Soviet Armed Forces has proven that strengthen-
ing of one-man command is effected only in a unity with activation and im-
provement of indoctrinational work in the line units and fleets, with develop-
ment of initiative and innovativeness in Soviet military personnel, improve-
ment in their ideological conditioning and discipline. And naturally the
most important element in this work is the one-man commander himself.

What are the ways of increasing effectiveness of the indoctrinational func-
tion of one-man command and strengthening of the commander's authority?
First and foremost the commander should be a model of excellent moral fiber,
political consciousness, and should serve for his subordinates as an example
of dedication to the socialist homeland, to the people, the Communist Party,
and Soviet Government, an example of flawless execution of the demands of
Soviet laws, the military oath, military regulations, and his service duties.
An officer with excellent party qualities is always strict and demanding on
himself.

One of the important indicators of a commander's party principledness is his
attitude toward criticism. Party criticism is a most important means of
indoctrination of cadres, an effective method of correcting deficiencies.
Elaborated under the influence of criticism are an implacable attitude
toward shortcomings and the ability to draw a lesson from mistakes, objective-
ly to evaluate the state of combat readiness of the unit, subunit or naval
ship entrusted to a commander.

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, emphasizing in his book "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth]
the necessity of the principle of one-man command, states that it is a bad
thing when a one-man commander ceases to pay heed to criticism.
An essential condition for enhancing the indoctrinal role of one-man command is mastery by command cadres of a Leninist work style. And the Leninist style, as was noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, is an innovative style, to which subjectivism is alien, permeated by a scientific approach to all societal processes. It presupposes a high degree of demandingness on oneself and others, rules out smugness and complacency, and opposes all manifestations of bureaucracy and formalism.

The commander's authority and consequently the indoctrinal effect of his organizational and control activity are determined in large measure by his firm knowledge of his professional duties. Subordinates are always severe in assessing an officer's professional qualities.

The indoctrinal effect one-man command is also determined to a considerable degree by how strictly the commander observes moral and ethical standards of conduct. Of great importance are ease of access and a commander's modesty in relations with his subordinates as well as during off-duty hours, the ability to draw people to him and to be attentive toward them. Nothing injures the authority and prestige of the leader as callousness, arrogance, and conceit. Rudeness, arrogance and unfairness should be alien to the Soviet commander.

In his book "Malaya zemlya" [Little Land] Comrade L. I. Brezhnev writes: "The habit of raising one's voice, which still occurs although not extremely common, is deeply repugnant to me." Leonid Il'ich notes that a leader should not forget that his subordinates are subordinates only in service, that they serve the cause of the party and state, and in this regard all are equal.

The right of one-man command does not give one the right to be callous toward others and to insult people. If one has such an attitude toward subordinates, one-man command does not perform its indoctrinal function but exerts a negative effect on the men. Even a serviceman who has committed an infraction and who has been subjected to punishment should see in his commander an older comrade who in punishing is seeking to have the guilty party realize that violation of military regulations is incompatible with the honor and dignity of the Soviet fighting man. Conscientious observance of the demands of regulations and orders is a most important feature of Soviet military discipline.

An order is not subject to discussion. But it is possible and necessary to communicate its significance and meaning to the minds and hearts of the men, to achieve its conscientious execution. Here also an important role is played by political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, which are obligated to employ all forms of indoctrinal work to mobilize personnel for carrying out a commander's order. And it is the duty of the commander himself to take the care to ensure that his subordinates understand well the importance of his orders and instructions.
A commander's authority and skilled execution of his duties are determined in large measure by his ability to unify personnel, to lead them in carrying out the assigned task. And this definitely presupposes personal contact with subordinates. It is precisely personal contact with enlisted personnel which makes it possible to know for certain the attitudes, thoughts and aspirations of one's subordinates, the positive and negative aspects of the combat training of military personnel. A commander's closeness to his subordinates, his high principles and at the same time accessibility enhance a commander's authority and open up the way to a soldier's heart.

A commander is sometimes figuratively compared to a driving oscillator, to the operating frequency of which the entire unit is tuned. The more deeply and thoroughly he masters the art of indoctrination, the fuller he takes into consideration the moral consequences of his decisions and actions, and his conduct, the more vivid and easily seen the mark left by him in the minds and hearts of his men, the more rapidly and confidently we advance along the road toward forming excellent political, moral and professional qualities in the armed defenders of the homeland.
OBLIGATIONS OF NEW GRADUATES OF SERVICE ACADEMIES CITED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 30 Jun 78 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Lofty Duty of Academy Graduates"]

[Text] Thanks to tireless concern by the Communist Party and Soviet Government for further strengthening our Armed Forces, each year the army and navy receive new ideologically conditioned, highly-qualified officer cadres. A few days ago was graduation day at service academies. The day before yesterday the USSR Ministry of Defense and Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy held at the Kremlin a traditional reception for the finest graduates, commanders, political workers and faculty members at service academies.

The people attending the reception responded with great enthusiasm to the greeting from the CPSU Central Committee, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR Council of Ministers, presented by Mr. Su D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense and member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

The message of greeting emphasized that this year's graduates have completed their training at a most significant time. Our country has adopted a new USSR Constitution and has celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution and the 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces. Competition to fulfill and overfulfill the targets of the 10th Five-Year Plan is spreading nationwide. The CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers expressed deep confidence that the new detachment of graduates, just as the entire officer corps of the army and navy, will continue in the future working with a sense of great responsibility on implementing the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress pertaining to strengthening our country's defense capability.

Together with the officers of the USSR Armed Forces, our fighting friends from the armies of the brother socialist countries have also successfully graduated from service academies. Study at Soviet military higher educational institutions has enriched their knowledge, armed them with Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology, and has become a school of proletarian internationalism.

During their training at service academies the students received strong ideological conditioning, profound political, military and specialized knowledge, and
acquired practical skills in organization of training and indoctrination of personnel. Among the graduates of service academies are many officers and general officers who graduated with distinction and gold medals. They include Capt 1st Rank R. Timerkhanov, Lt Col V. Sokolov, Maj A. Latyshev, Engr-Maj V. Maksimov, Capt V. Ivannikov and P. Prudnikov, and many others.

Service academies offer officers fine training. However, as Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, stressed in his speech at the Kremlin reception, training at a service academy is only one of the stages on the road to mastery of a high degree of combat skill. Military affairs are moving forward. And in order always to be at the level of the demands of the time, it is essential continuously and purposefully to add to and deepen prior-acquired knowledge, persistently to improve practical skills, to broaden one's horizons, and to raise one's political and cultural level.

Upon their arrival at line units, the graduates of service academies should immediately get into the busy rhythm of army and navy life, taking active part in accomplishing the complex and diversified tasks pertaining to further strengthening the combat readiness of units and naval ships, improving the quality of personnel training, and maintaining at the requisite level military discipline, order and organization. In the course of training exercises, flight training missions and long naval cruises, which take place in a complex situation maximally approaching the conditions of modern combat with a powerful, well-equipped adversary, at all training sessions and practice drills it is essential to teach one's subordinates and at the same time also to learn, thoughtfully to study and adopt advanced know-how, and skillfully to utilize it in one's practical activities.

Indoctrination of personnel is a most important duty of army and navy commanders and political workers. Imposing high demandingness on officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel, and indoctrinating them in a spirit of unswerving observance of the military oath and regulations, as well as constant vigilance, one must devote attention to one's subordinates, be concerned with them. In order to achieve high results in service one should skillfully utilize the life-giving force of socialist competition and rely on party and Komsomol organizations.

Success in training and indoctrination of personnel are determined to a decisive degree by the level of ideological-theoretical training of officer-leaders. Service academy graduates should continue studying Marxist-Leninist theory, the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress, and the writings of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. One must turn more frequently to his reminiscences, "Malaya zemlya" [Little Land] and "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth], which teach us to live and work in the Leninist manner, instill party principledness and human kindness, dedication to the heroic traditions of the older generations, and provide an inexhaustible infusion of enthusiasm and productive energy.
The officers and general officers who have graduated from service academies are going to the line units with an ardent desire to give all of their knowledge and energy to their forthcoming service. Every effort must be made to support and strengthen this enthusiastic attitude. Commanders, political agencies and party organizations are called upon to do everything necessary to ensure that the graduates master their new duties as rapidly as possible. Every effort should be made to support their initiative, to instill a feeling of personal responsibility for the assigned work sector, to teach them critically to evaluate achieved results, and to motivate them to proceed further and achieve more. It is no less important to draw academy graduates from the very first days into the work of the party organizations and community affairs.

Interesting and responsible service in line units awaits academy graduates. Broad prospects are opened up before them. Wherever the graduates of service academies may be assigned, whatever tasks face them, they should at all times be implementers of everything new and advanced, should display an example of industriousness, a conscientious attitude toward one's work, and march in the front ranks of those who are mastering modern weapons and equipment, who are seeking out the most effective and efficient ways and modes of their combat employment, and who are making their contribution toward the development of military science and improvement of methods of training and indoctrination of personnel.

It is the sacred duty of service academy graduates honorably to bear the lofty title of Soviet officer and to ensure continuous combat readiness on the part of units, naval ships and combined units, guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

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ANTI-SOVIET NATURE OF MAOISM EXAMINED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, Jun 78
signed to press 30 May 78 pp 101-108

[Article by N. Vladimirov and V. Pavlov: "Maoism--A Policy Towards Militarization and War"]

[Text] The foreign political activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state are a vital factor exerting continual influence on the international climate of the modern world. The consistent energetic struggle for peace and security, for the relaxation of international tensions, and to supplement political detente with military detente has won our country, which recently noted the 60th anniversary of Great October, the deep respect and support of world public opinion.

From the first foreign political act—the Decree on Peace up until the new USSR Constitution, where for the first time in the history of humanity the propaganda of war has been constitutionally forbidden, our party and the Soviet state have retained the continuity of the main trends in the struggle for peace, freedom, and independence. "The world has been again convinced that the state given birth to by October consistently, in a principled manner, and with great success," said L. I. Brezhnev, "is conducting in the international arena a policy of peace and friendship between peoples and a policy that is honest and just."1 The Soviet Union conducted and conducts this policy in relations with all states, including China as well.

The Soviet state on 2 October 1949, that is on the day following the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the KNR [People's Republic of China—hereafter PRC].2 Fulfilling its international duty, the USSR provided the PRC with
fraternal aid in the reestablishment of the country's economy destroyed during the war with Japan and during the civil war and American intervention which followed thereafter, and in the elaboration and fulfillment of plans for development of industry and the national economy. The Soviet Union assisted China in building 256 industrial enterprises, shops, and installations equipped with the latest equipment. Also created were important branches of industry such as the automobile, tractor, aviation, power, heavy and precision machine building, instrument building, radio technology, and others. Between 1954 and 1963 alone, the Soviet Union transferred to the PRC more than 24,000 sets of scientific and technical specifications, including plans for the construction of 1,400 large enterprises. Long-range credits totalling 1,816 billion rubles were provided to China under conditions advantageous to her. 4 Highly evaluating the disinterested assistance of the Soviet Union, the PRC Central Committee in the political report at the 8th Party Congress which took place in September of 1956 underscored that "the Soviet Union furnished enormous assistance to the cause of socialist construction in our country. . . The Chinese people will never forget this comradely assistance. . . The unity and friendship of China with the great Soviet Union and with the other countries of socialism based on common goals and mutual assistance are eternal and indivisible. A further strengthening and reinforcement of this unity and friendship signifies for us the vital international duty and the basis for the foreign policy of our country." 5

But, soon after the congress, nationalistic elements in the PRC leadership headed by Mao Tse-tung, pursuing great-power hegemonic ideas, as early as 1958 expounded the adventurist course of "the three red banners" ("the new general line," "the great leap forward," "peoples' communes"), which attracted the majority of the party cadres who did not immediately recognize its disastrous nature.

Having embarked on the militarization of the life of society and strengthening of the army, a course of inflaming the nationalistic passions within the country, the Mao Tse-tung group began an open slanderous campaign against the socialist countries and communist parties, primarily against the Soviet Union and the CPSU and arranged military provocations in order to strain the international situation.

All of this pursued specific goals. On the one hand, to divert the attention of the party and the people from internal difficulties, create within the country a situation involving military hysteria, and to ignite nationalism, and on the
other hand to realize its hegemonic ideals by using any means. It was under these very conditions that the petty bourgeois nationalistic wing in the PRC leadership led by Mao Tse-tung unfurled the so-called "cultural revolution," which reemphasized the socialistic conquests of the Chinese workers, destroyed the union of the working class and the laboring bureaucratic peasantry, and led to the establishment of a military bureaucratic dictatorship.

On the eve of the 9th PRC Congress (April 1969) and especially following the congress, the campaign to enforce the military psychosis in the country, which had been conducted under the slogans "subordinate all work to preparations for war," and "convert the 700-million man nation into 700 million soldiers and the entire country into a unified camp," was sharply stepped up. Almost the entire population capable of working was signed up as members of the "emergency volunteer corps," subordinated to the army command element. The people were forced to dig foxholes and build bomb shelters. Some civilian enterprises were converted to the production of military items; buildings were camouflaged and military units [chast'] and cargoes were transported en masse via the railroads.\(^6\) Instances in which Chinese military subunits [podrazdeleniye] violated the Soviet border increased and it even came down to armed provocations organized by Peking, in particular on the Ussuri River.

The course towards militarization and preparation for war found further development at the 10th PRC Congress (August 1973). Thus, if the 9th PRC Congress approved the "great strategic idea," of Mao Tse-tung "to prepare in the event of war," which between the congresses was supplemented by Mao's directives "dig deep tunnels (trenches, shelters, and bunkers--author), to store grain everywhere," then the 10th Congress, repeating these slogans, added a new one: "Be completely prepared for the possible aggressive war from imperialism and especially for a surprise attack by the Soviet Union."\(^7\)

The first creation of "emergency volunteer corps" ("minh pin") detachments, primarily in the cities, was a new manifestation of the militaristic plans after the 10th PRC Congress. The overall number of members in the emergency volunteer corps in a short time increased by several times, with approximately 20 million of them undergoing intensified training.\(^8\)

The militarization exhausted the resources of China, already limited without this: direct military expenditures used up more than 40 percent of budget allocations.\(^9\)
The time which passed after the death of Mao Tse-tung showed that the new Chinese leadership has no intention of abandoning the path of Maoism, of critically evaluating the vicious Maoist directives, and of accomplishing the transformation of the country onto the rails of peaceful socialist construction. Events transpiring in the PRC in September-October of 1976, being nothing other than a palace revolution which along with eliminating several political leaders and their cohorts did not cause any cardinal changes in policy. The 11th PRC Congress which was held in August of last year in Peking gives witness to this. From its materials as well as from the new PRC regulations it follows that the theoretical basis for the activities of the Communist Party of China remain primarily the directives of Mao Tse-tung on "continuation of the revolution with a dictatorship of the proletariat" on the class struggle under the conditions of socialism, on the spasmodic development of the economy, on the conduct in the future of many more "cultural revolutions," on the preparation for war.10

Mao's followers took up the militaristic torch and their general strategy of pushing the world towards war is being realized through practical policy. They continue to assert that: "...sooner or later war will break out. We must have a clear understanding of the situation that is unfolding, prepare to do battle, and be prepared for the fact that large-scale war will soon break out."11

The adventurist policy of preparing for war has substantially undermined the economy of the country. The Chinese press does not publish statistical data on development of the national economy. But, from partial and incomplete reports which sometimes appear on the pages of Peking newspapers, it is evident that the economic situation in China remains exceptionally difficult. Thus, for example, the central organ of the PRC CC, JEN-MIN JIN-PAO [People's Daily] reported that in 1976 industrial production dropped as compared with 1975.12 Production of steel decreased from 26 million tons in 1975 to 21 million tons in 1976.13 Operation of rail transportation is sporadic. Agriculture finds itself in a difficult situation. In 1976 its production dropped in comparison to the previous year by approximately 5 percent. China's foreign trade volume dropped from 14 billion dollars in 1975 to 13 billion dollars in 1976.

The desire on the part of the Chinese leadership to stimulate a further arms race and to conduct military preparations at growing rates, without considering the harm inflicted upon the development of the country's national economy, creates a
serious threat to China's neighboring states and to the entire world. Military industry protected itself in every way and developed given the stormiest internal shakes and muddles in China. Based on U.N. data, the volume of PRC military expenditures reached 21 billion dollars in 1976 or almost one half of the entire centralized state budget of the country. The Peking leadership is not slacking up in building its nuclear missile potential and creation of medium-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. During 1976 there were four nuclear tests in China, when in the past they had only conducted one per year. The PRC is allocating significant resources for strategic armaments.

Militaristic circles in the imperialist countries, primarily the USA, Japan, FRG, England, and France have no objection to providing assistance in the development of China's military industrial potential, having in mind to strengthen it (within limits which they feel will not be dangerous for these states themselves), since they see in it a strong enemy of the Soviet Union and of the entire socialist camp. The English magazine METAL BULLETIN wrote that West German, English, French, and other West European banks provided China with credits in excess of a billion pounds sterling and that "there are no limits," in increasing this sum. Japan has provided significant support to China. Visits to the PRC by scientists in the field of nuclear physics and missile experts, to include individuals of Chinese extraction who live permanently in these countries, have been stepped up. China's purchases of technology and equipment used in military shops are expanding in the capitalist countries and they are sounding out the possibilities of acquiring factories linked to military production. The Japanese news agency KYODO SUISIN recently reported a large deal involving the Japanese company Nippon Steel building a metallurgical combine with a capacity of 6 million tons of steel per year on the Yangtze delta. China is also achieving cooperation from the Japanese metallurgical industry in efforts to modernize the Anshan, Peinch'i, Shihchinshan, and other extant combines.

In the words of the American weekly NEWSWEEK there are approximately 5,000 items of the newest military technology on the shopping list of the Peking emissaries who are travelling throughout the countries of Western Europe and Japan. And, some circles in the West are assisting the Peking militarists to turn the crank of the arms race. As the WASHINGTON POST reported, China acquired from France a large consignment of HOT anti-tank missiles. The PRC bought anti-tank helicopters in West Germany and are achieving agreement in the purchase of the Leopard tank.
US Minister of Defense H. Brown recently spoke in Washington in support of a more "elastic" approach to the question of exporting American weapons to the PRC. We are talking about a memorandum to highly-placed bureaucrats in the Pentagon, the NEW YORK TIMES wrote, which "specialists within the government and outside are taking as a signal that the United States will look favorably upon the sale of technology which the Chinese are acquiring. The range of requirements that China has for technology of a defensive nature is very broad and includes components for radars, jet engines, modern reconnaissance systems for satellites, and military equipment."

Mao's heirs do not hide the fact that their desire completely coincides with the general strategic directive of the "great helmsman" to convert China into a world political center as well as his aims of establishing the global hegemony of Peking. In order to reach the intended goal as rapidly as possible, the leaders in Peking are striving to use the most effective possible foreign policy means along with accelerated creation of a military-industrial complex in the country.

The foreign policy line of Peking cannot be examined without taking into account the task of converting China into a "mighty world power" by the year 2000, a task set forth in the documents of the 11th PRC Congress as well as in the new Chinese Constitution passed at the first session of the All-Chinese Meeting of People's Representatives [VSNP] at the 5th convocation on 5 March 1978. As the foreign press noted, great stress has been placed upon modernization of the Chinese Armed Forces in the program of the so-called "four modernizations" in the economy, culture, and military spheres in the program put forth at the session. The announcement by Hua Kuo-feng that the military industry of the PRC "must in full measure, using production capacities, energetically elaborate, assimilate, and produce in an even greater quantity and even better quality modern types of conventional weapons and strategic weapons," and the fact that, at the first session of the permanent committee of the VSNP which took place on 7 March, a decree on introduction of longer periods of active military service for the soldiers of the Chinese Army was passed all give witness to this. Thus, we are talking about placing the material and organizational base along with the realization of the strategy retained in a form as it was formulated under Mao Tse-tung, with its enterprising nature, its trend towards the days of the Great Khan, and with its territorial pretensions. At the same time, within the
frameworks of this policy, Peking is heading even more to the right and manifesting a greater desire to join up with imperialism.

The Maoist theory of "three worlds," which serves as the theoretical foundation for the Chinese leadership joining in a block with imperialism and reaction has found official confirmation in the materials of the 11th PRC Congress.

Mao's adherents in Peking clearly realized that the basic obstacle on the way to their chauvinistic and hegemonistic plans are the incontrovertible and obvious achievements on the part of the Country of Soviets and of the other countries of the socialist fraternity in domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, Peking's tactic is to distort that policy, primarily of the Soviet Union, to accuse it of the most incredible sins, to attribute to it truly inhuman intentions such as the fact that the USSR "does not avoid for even one minute the thought of enslaving China." And therefore, as Teng Hsiao-p'ing announced in his interview with the president and general director of AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE Claude Roussel, "it is necessary to disrupt the global plan considered by the Soviet Union and I hope that the entire world will join in this affair--the third world, the second and even the first world, that is, the United States." The statement by Teng Hsiao-p'ing concerning creation of a "united front" against the USSR can be called nothing other than a provocative prank. In a note from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered on 19 May 1977 to the PRC embassy in Moscow for transmission to the Chinese state, it said in particular, "those who call for the organization of a crusade against the Country of Soviets should not forget how similar campaigns against our country ended in the past. Historical experience has already pointed out the bankruptcy of such calculations." In accordance with far-reaching designs, Peking is directing the activities of its broad propaganda apparatus. The ideological preparation of the population and personnel of the Chinese Armed Forces is being conducted from a position of militarism and anti-Sovietism. It reflects the aggressive course of the present Peking leaders and calls upon them to be indoctrinated in a spirit of blind loyalty to the leaders who have come to replace Mao Tse-tung.

Under the cover of the myth concerning the "Soviet threat," Chinese propaganda attempts to justify the activities of Peking leaders to convert the country into a military camp. In the lead article of the army newspaper CHIEH-FANG CHUN-PAO [Liberation Army Daily] published on 4 June 1977 and
then reprinted by all central Chinese newspapers, the importance of the task of accomplishing accelerated modernization of the Chinese Army is explained primarily by the necessity for China to acquire "real force" in the struggle against the USSR and to conduct the "timely and complete preparation for war so as to obtain the best chances for the achievement of victory." At a meeting on questions of the industrial development of China on 9 May 1977 Hua Kuo-feng announced "we must without fail be prepared to fight. We must not let the time slip for time will not wait."21 "We must be imbued with the idea of war, we must be prepared to fight. . . ."22--former minister of defense Yeh Chien-ying echoes him.

The new leaders of China expounding their anti-Sovietism and militarism in the form of their program as their long-range goal, calling for an acceleration of modernization of the army, stepping up preparations for war, strive to denigrate the fraternal assistance of the Soviet Army during the Second World War, its liberation mission, are trumpeting the imaginary "Soviet threat," are distorting the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Armed Forces with honor are fulfilling their sacred duty in the defense of the peaceful labor of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries, the conquests of socialism. They never threatened anyone and are not preparing to attack anyone. This is inimical to the policy of the Soviet state and of our party and contradicts our convictions and principles.

The world hegemony of China as the chief strategic goal, world war as the means to its achievement--such are the basic factors which in recent years are penetrating the entire domestic and foreign policy of Peking.

The foreign policy strategy of China has been directed towards intensification of the contradictions between socialist and imperialist states, especially between the USSR and the USA, towards the use of conflict situations for inflaming tensions, for the unleashing of a new world war.

The position of the Chinese leaders in the solution of all basic contemporary problems carries a negative and more often a provocative nature. In particular, this manifests itself in the activities of the Chinese delegation at the United Nations. Since 1971, when China's rights in the UN were reestablished, it has not introduced a single constructive proposal, has not come forth with a single positive initiative in support of comprehensive peace and international cooperation, it has not joined a single agreement which has been directed toward cutting back the arms race and strengthening international security, including the 23rd session of the General Assembly.24
Peking is encouraging in every way possible military preparations and a constant arms race on the part of the NATO countries and announces the necessity for strengthening the political unity of the EEC states and their conducting a uniform line in foreign policy and defense in the face of the "Soviet threat." This is clearly manifested in the hostile reaction on the part of Peking to the proposal by the Warsaw Pact countries concerning the signing of a Treaty on the Non-First Use of Nuclear Weapons by the participants of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in support of the positions of the NATO military clique on this question. The Chinese press comes forth with attacks on Soviet initiatives in connection with the Geneva Talks on Reduction of Armed Forces and Weapons in Central Europe, against the USSR position on the whole on these talks, supports and approves the intentions of the USA and other imperialist states to continue the arms race and increase military might, and supports the idea put forth by the Pentagon concerning production of neutron weapons and their deployment in Western Europe.

In the struggle against positive tendencies towards relaxation of international tensions, Peking is banking on the most reactionary bourgeois state and political leaders, on the generals linked with the Pentagon and NATO. They are given the most welcome reception in the Chinese capital.

"Peking has converted itself into a Mecca of reactionary forces," wrote the communist newspaper of Luxembourg ZEITUNG VOM LETZEBURGER VOLK. 25

In turn, imperialist circles attach ever greater significance to China in their calculations on weakening the positions of socialism, on attempts to disassemble the unity and coordination of the socialist states. And here, the interests of the Peking leaders coincide with the interests of the most aggressive circles in the United States, equally so for the other western powers as well as Japan. The Chinese leaders during meetings with American representatives have often tried to underscore that the concurrence of US and PRC positions on a majority of international problems is more important than questions of a bilateral nature. The American General Haig, the commander in chief of NATO, gave such a high evaluation to Peking's anti-Soviet position that he considered it possible to announce recently in an interview with an English newspaper that "it is not entirely without logic to state that China is the 16th member of the North Atlantic Pact." 26

Chinese leaders continue their steady attempts to persuade the ruling circles in Tokoyo to join an anti-Soviet alliance,
requiring the inclusion in a treaty on peace and friendship with Japan of an article concerning "the joint struggle against hegemony," actually directed against the USSR. The Chinese leaders have come down to the fact that they are advocating the recreation of the Japanese military potential, the association of China with Japanese militarism in an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist front in the East. Mao Tse-tung strived for exactly the same thing.

Providing support to Peking in its far-reaching plans and intentions, western reactionaries substantiate this by the "threat" supposedly hanging over China from the . . . Soviet Union. And, in order to "to save China," they are calling for the immediate supply to Peking of large amounts of weapons and the creation by China of a "more reliable defense" which will ensure "the defense of its territorial integrity."27 Reading similar appeals by the inspirers of the "Cold War," one involuntarily recalls the statement by an American professor of law in the legal faculty at Harvard University Jerome Alan Cohen, who wrote in FOREIGN AFFAIRS: "One cannot but be amazed by the astonishing short-sightedness of certain leaders in the West who are so blinded by anti-communist prejudices that they do not note the enormous danger of the Maoist policy for their own peoples."28 To affirm his opinion, the author puts forth the expression that is active in Asia at the present time that the military might of China is nothing other than "an attempt to feed a tiger which will then be prepared to eat those who are feeding it."29 The anti-Sovietism of Peking in spite of the assertions by Chinese leaders and their apologists among the imperialist camp is not the outcome of a clash of interests between China and the Soviet Union but stem from the great power chauvinistic course of the Maoists. Peking is masking its hegemonic policy as a struggle against the mythical "Soviet hegemony." On an anti-Sovietism platform PRC leaders intend to join with the most reactionary leaders in struggle against detente and against peace.

Fraternal parties and socialist states are successfully rebuffing the anti-Leninist concepts and policy of Maoism. The hopes of the Maoists on breaking up the socialist fraternity, its authority, and its influence in the world have been dashed. They have been unsuccessful in hindering the expansion and strengthening of the ties of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries with developing states. They have not succeeded in torpedoing the process of relaxation in international tensions.
The Soviet Union consistently and unswervingly conducts in its relations with China the course elaborated by the 25th CPSU Congress—to rebuff the inflammatory policy of Peking, to defend the interest of the Soviet State, of socialist cooperation, of the peaceful communist movement, to henceforth conduct the principled struggle against Maoism. In addition, the USSR is prepared to build relations with China on the principles of peaceful cooperation. The Soviet Union has always advocated normalization of relations with China and moreover has not closed the doors for the solution of problems which have arisen between the USSR and the PRC. This was clearly and carefully stated at the 25th CPSU Congress, at the October (1976) CC CPSU Plenum, in the report by L. I. Brezhnev "Great October and the Progress of Humanity," and in other documents.

The appeal of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet sent on the eve of the session of the VSNP to its Standing Committee again gives witness to this. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet proposed that our countries issue a joint announcement on the principles of mutual relations between the USSR and the PRC which must be built on a foundation of peaceful coexistence, firmly support the principles of equal rights, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, and the non-use of force.

Speaking about Soviet-Chinese relations, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev, responding to questions from the chief editor of the Japanese newspaper ASAHI noted that "Our position on this account is well known. We advocate the normalization of interstate relations with China. Reestablishment of true friendliness between our countries would have important significance not only for the USSR and the PRC but also for improving the international situation as a whole.

"If in Soviet-Chinese relations to this point there have not been changes for the better, then this is the responsibility of the other side. The new leadership of China, unfortunately, is following the old and I would say hackneyed rut."30

Maoism, which is the foundation of the activities of the present leaders of the CCP, is a petty bourgeois nationalistic
movement inimical to Marxism-Leninism. Its ideology and policy are directed against the basic principled positions of Marxist-Leninist teachings, against the very essence of socialism and the foundations of the international communist and workers' movement. Maoism is a conglomeration of subjectivist-voluntarist vulgar materialist ideas called upon to substantiate the adventurist anti-Soviet policy of Peking. It has undergone a long evolution which was determined by the desire to adapt it to those political goals which Mao Tse-tung established for himself, as did his successors at various stages of development, and is a cover for their great power hegemonistic designs. The words and deeds of the present Chinese leaders who have replaced Mao Tse-tung affirm the correctness of the principled evaluation of Maoism presented by the 25th CPSU Congress. "The feverish attempts by Peking to undermine detente, not to permit disarmament, to sow distrust and hostility among states, its desire to provoke a world war and to warm its hands during this war," said L. I. Brezhnev, "is a great danger for all peace-loving peoples. Such a policy on the part of Peking profoundly contradicts the interests of all peoples. . . . It is now not enough to state that the Maoist ideology and policy do not coincide with Marxist-Leninist teachings. They are directly hostile to them."Peking's leaders, proclaiming fidelity to Mao's domestic and foreign policy, to the nationalistic and great power course, support the fundamental problems of contemporary life along with the extreme right forces of imperialist blocs and of the military-political and closed anti-communist alliances, called for an intensification of their struggle against the Soviet Union, for the preservation of armed forces and military bases in Europe, Asia, for an increase in military budgets, for a growth in the nuclear might of the imperialist states. They are striving to undermine the process of detente and to oppose the cause of disarmament in every possible way. The leaders of Peking are attempting to hinder the implementation of the decisions of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the maintenance of security in Asia through collective efforts. The Maoists are sowing their poisonous seeds of mistrust and hostility everywhere, they are attempting to exacerbate relations between various countries and peoples, to provoke a new world war in the hope that the great powers of the world will be engulfed in the world fire. And, all this is being done in the name of the strategic goal of establishing Chinese world supremacy.

The anti-socialist militaristic course of Peking and its provocative activities in the international arena are angrily
being condemned by all the progressive forces of contemporary life and are being looked upon very seriously by the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist fraternity. The line followed by the leadership in Peking which is dangerous for the cause of peace, progress, and socialism in the final analysis is doomed to failure.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 24 December 77.


15. Ibid.

16. METAL BULLETIN No 9, 1977, p 77.


18. From a report by Hua Kuo-feng at the 1st Session of the VSNP. Report by the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 6 March 1978.


22. Ibid.

23. [Not included in original text]

24. KOMMUNIST No 12, 1977, p 118.


27. Ibid, 14 September 1977.


29. Ibid.

30. PRAVDA, 7 June 1977.


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REVIEW OF BOOK ON EMPLOYMENT OF TANK ARMIES IN OFFENSIVE WARFARE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 30 May 78 pp 112-115

[Article by Prof, Mar Armd Trps O. Losik: "Tank Thrust"]

[Text] History and modern times are linked by strong threads. Know-how from the past facilitates understanding the vital objective laws and tendencies of military art under contemporary conditions and modern days facilitate correctly comprehending it, taking into account changing conditions and based upon the latest achievements in science and technology.

In a speech at the 16th Trade Union Congress L. I. Brezhnev underscored that communists look backwards not only with justifiable pride to note the scale and the historical significance of what has been done: "We look upon the past as a very rich reservoir of know-how, as material for thought, for critical analysis of our own decisions and actions." 

When studying know-how from the Great Patriotic War, important significance is attached to the memoirs and research elaborated upon by those who participated as direct organizers of the victories of the Soviet Army over the armed forces of Fascist Germany--our military leaders and commanders.

It is gratifying that in recent days the military reader is receiving more and more interesting books which bring to light problems in planning, organizing, and guiding military operations on a varied scale as well as problems of combat and operational employment of the branches of troops and services of the armed forces. Among these is the work by Army Gen A. I. Radziyevskiy entitled "Tankovyy udar" [Tank Thrust] which substantiates the know-how of the combat operations of tank armies in front offensive operations.
during the past war. It is based upon a large amount of documentary material from Soviet archives, official regulations, military-historical publications, and the memoirs of the greatest military leaders.

The Soviet Tank Troops always were the main shock and maneuvering force of the Ground Forces. The massed employment of tank formations [soyedinenyi] and field forces [ob’yedinenyi] on the axes of the main thrusts of the fronts in cooperation with the other branches of troops and with aviation ensured the high dynamism of the combat operations and gave front operations a great spatial scope and maneuvering character.

Many works have been devoted to specific problems of the history of the foundation, development, and combat employment of tank troops overall and tank armies in particular in the most vital operations of the Great Patriotic War. Nonetheless, the work being reviewed does not duplicate them. It is independent research in which the state of the armoured troops on the eve of the war is analyzed in depth, the problems of creating tank armies and the reasons for doing so are examined, and the processes of the development of the organizational structure, combat capabilities, and the foundations for their employment in different operations are traced. Concrete examples bring to light problems of preparing for and conducting offensive operations and maintaining and reestablishing the fighting efficiency of tank armies.

The book consists of an introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion. Its basis was not to describe the operations of the war with participation of tank armies as this has been often done in the past, but is rather an analysis of the problems of military art involving the missions which they accomplish. Such an approach made it possible to bring to light basic trends in the development of the art of employment of tank armies on the offensive.

The basic prerequisites for creation of tank armies and the development of their organizational structure, combat capabilities, and foundations for their employment in the operations during the past war are examined in detail in the first chapter. The titanic activities of our party and government to transform the Soviet Tank Troops on the eve of and during the war into a powerful strike and maneuvering force of the Ground Forces are shown in examples and facts. This allows the reader to more deeply understand the enormous significance of these measures which directly affirm the great vital force and leading nature of the Soviet social and state structure. It is pointed out in the book that "the growing capabilities of the Soviet military economy, the requirement
to conduct offensive operations of a large scale with decisive goals, the generalization of combat knowhow, the nature of the enemy defense, and its deep echelonment with the presence of powerful tank groupings within the composition of the defending troops stipulated in their aggregate the creation during the war years of a qualitatively new type of operational field force—tank armies" (page 24).

Also deserving of attention is the analysis of the development of the organizational structure and combat capabilities of tank armies. The process of the organizational development of tank armies at first mixed and then of homogenous composition is traced in the work. Here, their strong and weak aspects, combat purpose, level of subordination, the role of artillery, PVO [air defense], reconnaissance, logistics, command and control organs, and communications are pointed out. Quests for the optimal variant of the organizational and TOE structure of the tank army facilitated increasing its strike, fire, and maneuvering capabilities (page 32). It became an independent operational field force flexible and well controlled. Its organizational structure of a homogenous composition accepted in 1943 proved itself and was not substantively changed until the end of the war.

On the basis of war experience it was pointed out in the work that methods of preparing for and conducting front operations greatly depended upon the conditions of the operational and strategic situation, the composition of the various operational field forces, and the science of employing extent resources. The results and indicators of these operations often were determined by the high vitality of tank armies. Being the highest operational field forces within the armored and mechanized troops, they were a resource of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command [hereafter the Stavka VGK] and were attached to the fronts which were operating on the vital strategic axes. Their location was determined by the decision of the commander of the front and sometimes by the Stavka VGK as well, depending on the concept of the operation, composition of the army, the nature of the enemy defense, the correlation of the forces of the sides, and terrain conditions. Being part of the main grouping of the front, tank armies were the basic means for developing tactical success into operational success. Possessing great shock force and high mobility, they inflicted massed strikes, rapidly moved the combat operations into the operational depth, pursued the enemy at high rates, and facilitated the successful conduct of operations to surround large enemy groupings. The leading role in the
rout of the enemy reserves moving up and rebuffing his counter strikes fell to them.

Advancing with large gaps between them and the remaining forces of the front, tank armies with support from aviation from the march made assault crossings of river barriers, overcame intermediate defensive lines in the depth, and stubbornly held occupied bridgeheads and installations until arrival of combined-arms formations (page 44). A significant place in the work being reviewed is allotted to analysis of the work of commanders and staffs when preparing for operations. It should be noted that researchers are not always successful in presenting in a generalized form the multifaceted and complex art of preparing the offensive operations of tank armies during the war. Its all the better that the author successfully solved this problem. Pointing out the importance of the assigned problem, he uses the well-known Leninist principle that "every encounter includes the abstract possibility of defeat and there is no other means to diminish this possibility than organized preparation for the encounter." The materials in the book affirm that the assigned requirement lay at the foundation of the activities of the command element and staffs in preparing for all large operations.

Various conditions and methods of elaborating operations are examined in the second chapter. The process of making the decision for the operation by the commander of the tank army, the sequence of planning the combat operations and assigning missions to subordinates by staffs is analyzed, the forms and methods of organizing cooperation within the tank army and with assigned and supporting units [chast'] and formations as well as with aviation and artillery are pointed out, and the system of organizing control and communications points as well as planning party and political work are brought to light.

Presented in the third chapter is an analysis of conducting offensive operations by a tank army. It investigates problems that are vital to tank armies: their commitment into the engagement and pursuit of the enemy, meeting encounters, assault crossing of water barriers, operations for encirclement, command and control of tank formations during the operation. Knowhow in surmounting a number of intermediate enemy lines of defense in the operational depth and the accomplishment of maneuver have been investigated especially carefully. The author comes to the conclusion that when tank armies are breaking through intermediate lines of defense "success is ensured primarily by the effectiveness of the reconnaissance
conducted and its rapidly bringing to light the weak spots in the enemy defense, by the decisive operations of forward detachments, by the massed employment of resources on the selected sectors, and by diligent cooperation of all branches of troops and aviation" (page 148). As far as maneuver is concerned, it is a vital component of almost every offensive operation during operations by armored formations and by a tank army as a whole in the operational depth.

Maneuver was employed "for transferring efforts from one axis to another, gaining the flank and rear area of enemy groupings and their encirclement, by-passing strongpoints of resistance, decisive employment of successes that arise, repulse of an enemy counter attack, and for other purposes" (page 151).

A significant place has been allotted to operations for encirclement and destruction of large enemy groupings in which the Soviet Army achieved such a high point of military art never before seen by any other army in the world. The tank troops played a leading role in these cases.

Accomplishment of multifaceted tasks in operations became possible thanks to the operations of the tank armies not only during the day but also at night or under conditions of restricted visibility. Ensuring careful and stable command and control achieved by the establishment of a sequence of movement of formations subordinate to commanders and staffs based on times and on lines and by the assignment of conditional signals for the location of command and observation points acquired special significance here. Light signals backed up by signals via radio were widely used for communications in night battle.

Methods of troop command and control and the style and working methods of tank army and tank (mechanized) corps commanders in supervision of the combat actions during the operations are brought to light in the chapter. Evaluations are provided that are confirmed also by specific operational-tactical indicators, substantiated conclusions, and recommendations.

The value of the research is that the conclusions and generalizations made are based on analysis of the knowhow of the activities of a number of soviet tank commanders such as S. I Bogdanov, M. Ye. Katukov, A. G. Kravchenko, D. D. Lelyushenko, P. A. Rotmistrov, P. S. Rybalko, and many others.
The problem of maintaining and reestablishing fighting efficiency of troops overall and armored troops in particular are analyzed in the fourth chapter. It always occupied an important place in military art. By virtue of the development of the means of the armed struggle its solution has become more and more complex since the increase in the destructive power of weapons and the growth in the intensity of combat operations have made the defense of the troops and equipment more difficult and their losses have risen accordingly. This required a search for more effective ways of maintaining and reestablishing efficiency of units, formations, and field forces, which remains applicable under contemporary conditions as well. It should be pointed out that the author has made a rather successful attempt to examine ways to solve this problem in tank armies during the Great Patriotic War. Their fighting efficiency in those years was maintained and reestablished by ensuring the high level of the political and moral state and the offensive passion of personnel, the conduct of goal-oriented operational training of staffs and the combat training of the troops, making up for losses in the command and control organs, bringing formations and units within the army up to strength with personnel, weapons and military equipment, formation of combined detachments under specific conditions of the situation, maintenance of supply reserves at the established level, and uninterrupted restoration of damaged equipment. Thus, for example, giving witness to the significance of the restoration of equipment is the fact that during the years of the last war at least 60 percent of all combat vehicles during preparation for an operation were readied to go back into action after repair (page 220), that is, restored tanks and self-propelled vehicles were the main source for making up losses. The numerous examples from combat experience on the part of tank armies presented in the book convincingly affirm the conclusions made and speak to the applicability and continuity of the combat experience of the past war under modern conditions.

The author places great attention on the forms and methods of party-political work, the roles played by political organs and party organizations which guaranteed the high moral spirit, great offensive passion, and continual combat readiness of the troops. Numerous examples of the heroic feats of officers and soldiers, of the art and military mastery of subunit [podrazdeleniye] and unit commanders exert a useful and indoctrinal effect.

The readers' job is facilitated by the large number of interesting attachments, tables, and statistical data which
successfully supplement the book's content. It contains the basic specifications of both Soviet and German Fascist armored equipment. Several indicators of the offensive operations of tank armies in 1943-1945 have been presented and the proportion of overall and average daily losses of tanks and self-propelled vehicles in the tank armies in specific operations in the Great Patriotic War have been presented, as has the relationship of the tanks and self-propelled vehicles in the tank armies that were destroyed and those subject to restoration to make up losses. Also of interest are the diagrams of the organizational and TOE structure, the composition of a tank army, its field command and control, as well as a number of illustrated diagrams.

There are certain shortcomings in the work as well. Thus, the data presented on pages 19-20 on the availability of tanks within the active forces of Fascist Germany in 1941-1942 do not correspond to the latest materials published in volumes 4-6 of the "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of the Second World War]. It states on page 20 that the enemy 25th Tank Corps participated in the encounter at Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943. That corps at that time was part of Fascist Germany's 1st Tank Army on the southern wing of the German troops. The title of attachment 5 (page 266) contradicts the content. Attachments number 10 and 13 are not basic diagrams (variations) as pointed out in the book but reflect actual facts from specific operations. The inaccuracies however, do not decrease the overall significance of this useful and necessary work.

The historical and theoretical work by A. I. Radziyevskiy will undoubtedly assist our officers and generals in increasing their military-historical and special training and will facilitate the combat and operational training of troops and staffs.

I would like to express the wish that more new works similar to this book appear on book shelves in order to generalize experience in operational and tactical employment of tank units, formations, and field forces during the war years.

The party nature and high theoretical level of the research accomplished is the best guarantee that our military readers will look upon this work with great interest.
1. PRAVDA, 22 March 1977.


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ERRATUM: This is a corrected version of an article that appeared in JPRS 71718, 21 August 1978, No. 1371 of this series, pp 51-52.

NEED FOR CLASS RATING SYSTEM FOR METROLOGISTS NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Colonel-Engineer S. Shabalin: "Military Metrologists Need a Class Rating System"]

[Text] It would surely be unnecessary today to convince someone of the importance of metrology. It has long since become an independent science involving measurements, the methods and means of insuring their unity, and means of achieving the required accuracy. Metrology intrudes in an active way into various spheres of human activity, including the military one. Moreover, metrological support determines to a great extent the level of combat readiness maintained by units and ships. This fact imposes special requirements upon the military metrologist, a specialist in the operation, checking, and repair of measuring equipment.

The laboratory operation of measuring equipment requires a continually increasing knowledge of both the equipment itself and the means of conducting measurements. Efficient utilization of standard precision equipment would be unthinkable without a high level of technical training and knowledge of the bases of the theory of probabilities and mathematical statistics, physics and electrical engineering, and radio engineering and methods of analyzing the results of measurements.

Active duty personnel have available to them a good school in armed forces metrological units. The skills they acquire in maintaining military equipment and reconditioning instruments sometimes open up to them new areas from which to select specializations and careers to pursue after their service in the army.

Considering the requirements imposed nowadays for the training of military metrologists and their increasing role in assuring combat readiness, the time has perhaps come to take a centralized look at the matter of introducing a system of awarding class ratings to specialists in this area. Enlisted men and officers of metrological units must now test for a class rating in other specialties unconnected with their main job.
Upon fulfilling the general requirements for all class-rated specialists in the armed forces, the military metrologist could, for example, become a "master", having the same proficiency level of a "senior inspector", or, having been rated excellent in training and examinations in the appropriate organization, a specialist 1st class, who may check instruments for no fewer than two types of measurements (for electric and radiomeasuring, for example); a specialist 2d class, who may check one type; or a specialist 3d class, who may check and mark a limited number of pieces of measuring equipment. One could give analogous class rating features for measuring-instrument repair specialists as well.

The effort to improve the class rating system will help military metrologists increase their knowledge and improve their skills; it will be of tangible benefit to the overall effort to improve metrological support for weapons and military equipment; and, as a result, it will contribute to raising the level of combat readiness of our Armed Forces.

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