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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1588

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CONTENTS

PAGE

ALBANIA

Regulations on Land Use Approved
(GAZETA ZYRTARE, May 78) 1

Council of Ministers Order on Fire Prevention
(GAZETA ZYRTARE, May 78) 9

BULGARIA

BCP Daily Comments on Hua Kuo-Feng's Visit to Yugoslavia
(Editorial; RABOTNICHESKO DELO, 30 Aug 78) 14

Bulgarian Daily Scores China's Balkan Policy
(ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME, 31 Aug 78) 18

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSR Education Minister on Tasks of the Socialist School
(Milan Vondruska; RUDE PRAVO, 2 Sep 78) 21

EAST GERMANY

GDR Leaders Greet Vietnamese Counterparts on National Day
(NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 2-3 Sep 78) 23

YUGOSLAVIA

Events Surrounding 1968 Student Demonstrations Reviewed
(Nenad Ivankovic, et al.; VJESNIK, 29 Jul, 5 Aug,
12 Aug 78) 25

ALBANIA

REGULATIONS ON LAND USE APPROVED

Tirana GAZETA ZYRTARE in Albanian No 2, May 78 pp 36-44

[Council of Ministers Decision No 9, dated 27 February 1978, on "Approval of the Regulation for Registration and for Changes in the Status of Land"]

[Text] The Council of Ministers, based on law No 5686 dated 21 February 1978, "On Preserving the Land," decided: approval of the regulation entitled, "On Registration and Changes in the Status of Land," which is an inseparable part of this decision.

This decision goes into effect together with Law No 5686, dated 21 February 1978, "On Preserving the Land."

Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Mehmet Shehu

Regulation on Registration and Changes in the Status of Land

I Organization of the Land Cadastre and its Duties

Article 1

The land cadastre contains data on the areas of agricultural land, forests, pastures, meadows and nonagricultural land, as well as the changes which are made to them after the initial registration, with the intention of serving the planning of the agricultural economy.

In the registers of the cadastre office the land is registered according to the following categories: arable land, orchards, vineyards, olive groves, forest, pasture, meadow and nonagricultural land.

Article 2

The state organ specializing in evidencing land data is the office of the land cadastre in the agricultural section of the executive committee of the district people's council.

The basic data for the registration and changes in the status of agricultural and nonagricultural land are obtained through topographic and aerophotographic surveys, simple cadastral surveys and through inventories of forest areas, pastures and meadows which the forestry enterprises conduct.

Article 3

The changing of the status of land in the cadastre, after initial registration, is accomplished on the basis of the act of the appropriate organ, according to dispositions in effect and after complete transfer of the land from the old status to the new status.

The registration of agricultural land, when this is gained through the opening of new land, is done after the work of preserving it has been concluded, whereas for the fruit tree crops, after their harvesting is completed.

Article 4

The cadastre office is not permitted to make changes in the land registers without a decision by the pertinent organ and, when it is determined that the act of the pertinent organ for the change in land status is not based on an effective disposition, the case is referred to the executive committee of the district people's council which, depending on the occasion, renders a decision itself or submits it to a higher organ for a decision on whether or not to make the changes.

Article 5

The correction of material errors in the cadastral register is accomplished by written order of the chief of the agricultural section of the executive committee of the district people's council.

II The Arrangement of the Land

Article 6

The arrangement of agricultural land is done on the basis of appropriate projects and consists especially of:

- creating the network of drainage and irrigation channels;

- clearing the land of stumps and rocks, grading, temporary and permanent drainage, creating terraces, ridges, walls, anti-erosion lines, taking hydrotechnical and forestry measures (forestation of erosion areas, regulating persistent flows with traps, deep drops, bed dressing, protection from high water with canals, etc.), defining the direction and the method of working;

- the internal organization of the territory, staking the perimeter of the building area, defining the point of entry and egress of vehicles, the construction of internal roads for the passage of machinery, transportation and other vehicles.

III Conserving Land Around Buildings and Other Works

Article 7

Residential buildings, production and service buildings such as stalls, eating places, depots, workshops, repair shops, etc., social and cultural buildings such as schools, cultural homes and circles, infirmeries, hospitals, theaters, athletic fields and courts, stores, bakeries, offices and so forth, which serve the state agricultural economies, cooperativists and citizens in villages, are constructed within the perimeter of the zone approved for their construction, always being guided by the principle of conserving the amount of agricultural land as much as possible, and appear in planimetries approved according to dispositions in effect.

When, for essential and fully justifiable reasons, any of the above objects, with the exception of housing, must be built beyond the perimeter which the executive committee of the district people's council has approved, building is then permitted by special decision of the committee.

Article 8

The construction of highways, railroads, drainage and irrigation works, the network of roads and canals, power and telegraph lines, underground cables and pipelines, works for protection, utilization and exploration of petroleum, gas and minerals and every other work of this nature, upon the approval of the project, the area which these works occupy temporarily or permanently is also considered approved.

When the construction of the above works or any other work is essential and masses of olive trees, fruit trees or vineyards are damaged by them, regardless of the value of the object, the project is presented for approval to:

a) the Ministry of Agriculture, when 50 to 100 olive trees, 300 to 500 fruit trees or 10 to 20 hectares of grapevines are damaged;

b) the Council of Ministers, when more than 100 olive trees, 500 fruit trees or 20 hectares of grapevines are damaged.

Article 9

On railroad, highway and reservoir projects, the locations from which earth must be taken for building roadbeds or dams must be anticipated, taking into consideration, above all, getting the earth from nonagricultural land.

The investing organs, no later than six months after the completion of projects, are obliged to fill, grade and correct the holes created on agricultural land by the removal of earth for the construction of roads, railroads, canals, reservoirs, drillings, oil wells, etc.

Article 10

The raw material for brick and ceramics factories and for shops built by the agriclutural enterprises and cooperatives to meet their needs for bricks and tiles is obtained from land unsuitable for field crops.

On certain occasions, when land of the above nature is very distant from objects which engage in processing raw material, by decision of the executive committee of the district people's council, raw material can be obtained on the poorest quality arable land, on the condition that the investor take measures to restore and replant it within six months from the completion of the earth removal.

The removal of topsoil on arable land is done by permission of the executive committee of the district people's council when the land is restored and not removed from the land bank, and with the approval of the Ministry of Agriculture when it is not restored and is removed from the land bank.

Article 11

The boundary of land which is damaged or which is used temporarily for the construction of various works provided for in this regulation or in other dispositions, is staked out in the presence of representatives of the executive committee of the district people's council, the investor and the agricultural entity which has the land in use.

Article 12

Restoration of agricultural land which is damaged temporarily for the construction of works and for other production requirements is done on the basis of pertinent projects and allocations approved along with the projects and allocations of the works.

Article 13

Industrial and mineral waste and fluids with chemical components harmful to agriculture are to be gathered in special locations so as not to harm the land and not endanger the life of humans, animals, foul and crops. These locations are approved together with the tract of land for the construction of the work, taking into consideration that they are to be selected above all on nonagricultural land. When the need arises to enlarge these locations, the pertinent organ decides according to special dispositions.

IV Changing Land

Article 14

The change in agricultural land, from forest, pasture and meadow land to agricultural land through the opening of new land, is done:

a) by approval of the executive committee of the district people's council on the basis of the proposal of the pertinent forestry enterprise, when the new land is opened on degraded forest land without prospects for restoration, on scrubland, pastureland and meadowland which the agricultural enterprises have in use and on the collective pastureland of villages;

b) by approval of the Ministry of Agriculture, when the new land is opened on pastureland which entities of other districts have in use, and on up to 5 hectares of industrial forestland;

c) by approval of the Council of Ministers, when the new land is opened on over 5 hectares of industrial forestland.

Article 15

The change from fruit tree crops to arable land, as well as among orchards, vineyards and olive groves, is decided by the executive committee of the district people's council.

Article 16

The change from agricultural land to nonagricultural land, caused by erosion and other great forces, is decided by the Ministry of Agriculture when it is verified through a technical report of the agricultural section that restoring and returning it to agricultural land is impossible.

Article 17

The use of arable land for fruit orchards or forest is categorically prohibited. By decision of the executive committee of the district people's council, fruit trees can be planted in the flatland zones on permanent vegetable land at a distance no less than 16 meters from row to row and with tops pruned so as not to inhibit the development of vegetable crops.

When, for the need of rebuilding degraded vineyards and vegetable gardens, for avoiding parasite damage and other diseases and for unification of blocks, it is necessary to effect shifts among such cadastral items as arable land, orchards and vineyards, shifting them without affecting the amount of arable land on a district level is permitted by decision of the executive committee of the district people's council. In these cases, the arable land taken must be of a poorer quality or equal to that which is released.

V Transfer of Land Usage

Article 18

Upon approval of the opening of new land by the pertinent organs, according to this regulation, the transfer of land usage is also considered approved.

Article 19

Transfer of land from one enterprise to another is done:

a) by approval of the ministry or other central institution, when the transfer is made between subordinate enterprises;

b) by approval of ministries or other central institutions, in agreement between them, when the transfer is effected from one enterprise or institution to another enterprise or institution which are subordinate to them;

c) by approval of the ministry or other central institution and in agreement with the executive committee of the district people's council, when the transfer is effect from an enterprise which is subordinate to the ministry or other central institution to an enterprise which is subordinate to the executive committee of the district people's council or vice versa;

d) by approval of the executive committee of the district people's council, when the transfer is effected between enterprises subordinate to it.

Article 20

The exchange of land for a more rational arrangement and use thereof in approximately equal amounts and quality between enterprises, institutions, agricultural cooperatives and citizens is decided by the agricultural section of the executive committee of the district people's council, whereas the exchange of land between two entities of different districts is done by agreement between executive committees of the pertinent district people's councils and by approval of the Ministry of Agricluture.

Article 21

The transfer of land from one agricultural cooperative to another without replacement or with a disproportionate replacement is decided by the executive committee of the district people's council, after conferring with representatives of the pertinent agricultural cooperatives.

Article 22

The transfer of land from an agricultural cooperative to an agricultural enterprise or vice versa is done by decision of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Article 23

The organs which decide on the transfer of land from one agricultural entity to another also decide on the transfer of commercial, administrative and sociocultural buildings constructed thereon, when these transfer along with the land.

Article 24

The granting of land to and the withdrawal of land from citizens for construction purposes is done by the organs which have the right to issue building permits, according to dispositions in effect.

Article 25

Land at the personal use of citizens transfers to the use of enterprises, institutions, military units, social organizations or agricultural cooperatives by decision of the people's council of the combined village, the people's council or the executive committee of the city, or the executive committee of the precint people's council for Tirana.

Article 26

The state organs which have the right to decide on changes and transfers of land, the agricultural entities and every interested citizen, when changes occur on the land that they have in use, are required to notify the pertinent cadastral office within 30 days from receipt of the decision or of the land change, for the purpose of making the pertinent notations in the cadastral registers, on the basis of article 3 of this regulation.

Article 27

Decision of the Council of Ministers No 37 dated 10 March 1971 on "Approval of the Regulation for Organization of the Cadastre and for Changes in the Status of Land" is rescinded.

5658
CSO: 2100

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ORDER ON FIRE PREVENTION

Tirana GAZETA ZYRTARE in Albanian No 2, May 78 pp 30-35

[Council of Ministers Order No 2 on Fire Prevention, dated 25 January 1978]

[Text] In order to implement the orientations of the Albanian Workers' Party, that the protection of socialist property from fire become a matter for the broad masses of people, that discipline and the sense of responsibility among workers in enterprises, institutions, military units, agricultural cooperatives and social organizations be reinforced and that state control of fire prevention be increased, the Council of Ministers issues this order:

Article 1

The ministries, the other central institutions, the executive committees of district people's councils, the enterprises, the agricultural cooperatives, the commands of military units and detachments and the social organizations are obliged to take fire prevention measures.

Article 2

The ministries and the other central institutions have the following major fire prevention responsibilities:

a) to direct and organize fire prevention work;

b) to exercise control over the objects of their system for the execution of legislation and other regulations regarding fire prevention;

c) to issue regulations on fire prevention consistent with the danger inherent in the technological processes which the objects of their system have;

d) to send to the training courses which are organized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs the commanders and deputy commanders of volunteer fire prevention groups, whose expenses will be paid by the respective ministries and other central institutions;

e) to publish brochures and various propagandistic materials on fire prevention.

Article 3

The executive committee of district people's councils, the enterprises, the institutions, the agricultural cooperatives, the commanders of military units and detachments and the social organizations have these major fire prevention tasks:

a) to organize with their workers, within the general framework of the Civil Defense of the Republic, volunteer fire prevention groups, and to conduct with them educational work and professional training to prevent and extinguish fires;

b) to take preventive measures and, in keeping with the technological processes and working conditions, to establish internal rules for fire prevention at their objects;

c) to establish facilities which signal the appearance of fire;

d) in keeping with the technological processes and work conditions, according to their importance, to equip the site with stationary systems, exterior and interior hydrants, reservoirs and water pumps, extinguishers and other means which serve to extinguish fires, whereas on the city and village streets the hydrants are to be installed by the communal services enterprises;

e) to secure telephone communications and maintain the roads and bridges ready for the rapid movement of firefighting equipment.

Article 4

Albanian and foreign citizens are obliged to follow the fire prevention regulations in state, cooperative and individual residences.

The General Directorate of Communal Economy is to issue rules for fire prevention in the home.

Article 5

The projects for the construction of new buildings, for reconstruction and additions at civil and military objects are done according to the requirements of the regulations entitled, "Fire Prevention Measures in Planning All Types of Buildings," and "Fire Prevention Measures in Planning Petroleum Industry Projects and Safeguarding Fuels."

Article 6

The enterprises, institutions, cooperatives and commands of military units and detachments, besides the fire prevention regulations of the ministries and other central insititutions to which they are subordinant, are also obliged to carry out the requirements of fire prevention regulations of ministries and other central institutions at objects and in activities which have the same type of work.

Article 7

The expense of carrying out the requirements of articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this order is met by the ministries, the other central institutions, the enterprises, the institutions, the agricultural cooperatives, the social organizations, the military commands and by the citizens themselves.

Article 8

When it deems necessary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs establishes fire departments in cities. The number of workers and the cost of establishing and maintaining these departments are met by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The enterprises, institutions and agricultural cooperatives establish fire departments or name fire prevention inspectors at objects which pose a serious threat of fire or explosion and within the authorized number of personnel in the organization. The number of workers and the cost of establishing and maintaining fire departments and inspectors are provided for by the respective enterprises and cooperatives, where their organization and management, excluding those of the Ministry of People's Defense, is provided for by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Completion of the departments with equipment and firemen is done by the institutions and enterprises which have them on their roster.

The fire departments and the fire-fighting equipment which the objects have are used solely to extinguigh fires.

The maintenance and repair of fire-fighting equipment is done pregressively by the district motor pools and garages and, when these do not exist, by those in the nearest district.

Article 10

The internal affairs organs, the fire prevention service of the Ministry of People's Defense, the civil fire inspectors, the commanders of volunteer fire prevention groups at the objects, the technical security inspectors and those responsible for the forest sectors, within the sphere of their activity, have the right:

a) to inspect the various objects at all times for fire prevention measures;

b) to order the removal of materials and things when their presence poses a threat of fire or explosion;

c) to use, if needed, all means of transportation, telephone lines and every other means of enterprises, institutions and agricultural cooperatives which help to extinguish fires and to save lives.

Article 11

The fire prevention services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of People's Defense have the right, respectively:

a) to give permission or approval, according to the occasion, for the construction of projects according to special dispositions;

b) to issue orders and to take immediate measures to remove any fireplace which might cause the object to burn;

c) to blockade enterprises, departments, institutions or means of transprotation subordinate to executive committees of district people's councils, when they pose an extreme threat of fire or explosion, as well as those subordinate to ministries, when general production is not interrupted.

Article 12

The violation of dispositions provided by items b, c, d and e of article 3, by articles 4, 5 and 6, by the first paragraph of article 9, as well as repeated violations after set fines, when serious consequences have not been caused by these violations, are punishable as administrative offenses with fines up to 300 leks by the district chief of police, and for military objects, by the inspectors and commanders of fire departments of the military unit and detachment.

The decision of the chief of police can be appealed within five days from the date of the communication to the head of the district internal affairs branch, whereas the decision of the inspector and commander of the military department in the fire prevention branch of the Ministry of People's Defense is final.

The workers of the fire prevention service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the Ministry of People's Defense, the People's Police, as well as the fire prevention inspectors have the right to hold a proces-verbal for verification of the offense.

Article 13

For violation of fire prevention rules in state, cooperative and personal residences, the workers of the People's Police and of the fire prevention service of the Minsitry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of People's Defense, have the right to issue fixed fines of 10 leks.

Article 14

Council of Ministers Order No 2, dated 15 April 1967, entitled, "Fire Prevention," is rescinded.

Article 15

This order is effective 15 days after publication in GAZETA ZYRTARE.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Mehmet Shehu

5658
CSO: 2100

BCP DAILY COMMENTS ON HUA KUO-FENG'S VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 30 Aug 78 p 5 AU

[Editorial article: "Hua Kuo-feng's Visit to Yugoslavia Has Ended"]

[Text] The BCP and the people's republic follow a consistent policy of comprehensively developing the relations and cooperation with all Balkan states and primarily with the socialist countries. This basic class policy is in keeping with the vital interests of the Bulgarian people, the neighboring countries and peoples and with the cause of socialism, peace and security.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria which is situated in the center of the Balkans is particularly interested in maintaining lasting and stable relations of peace and good neighborliness in this area in which countries of different social systems, members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, as well as nonalined countries are coexisting.

In his speech in Blagoevgrad on 15 June 1978, Comrade Todor Zhivkov emphasized: "We fully assess the entire complexity and contradiction of the situation in our region. However, we are not pessimists. We regard the future with optimism and we are not sparing and will not spare any efforts so that the Balkans, the former power-keg of Europe, can more and more remove the threat of war and more implement into life good neighborliness and understanding. We believe that this noble cause will succeed not only in the Balkans but also throughout the world because it is in keeping with the aspirations of the people, because the cause of peace and security enjoys the full support of the constructive foreign policy of the great Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries and because this cause is being supported by all peaceloving forces.

The long-time efforts of imperialism and reaction to fan and use for their own purposes the existing differences and problems among the Balkan countries in the spirit of the policy of "divide and rule" are well-known. These efforts spearheaded against the interests of the Balkan peoples have been reinforced during the past few years by the systematic moves and combinations of Maoist China on the Balkan Peninsula to which Peking attaches an essential

place in its worldwide, anti-Soviet and antisocial plans. The goal pursued by Peking is to establish an atmosphere of mutual distrust among the Balkan peoples, to set them one against another, and to instigate them against the Soviet Union. The Chinese propaganda recounts the history of the Balkan peoples, their national liberation struggle, their efforts to build their present relations on the basis of existing political realities and in conformity with the adopted international norms in a false and tendentious light. Attempts are being made to cast suspicion on the last century of Russian assistance for the liberation of the Balkan peoples from foreign dependence and slavery. Also underestimated is the importance for the Balkan people of the defeat of the German fascist army by the Soviet Army as well as the subsequent liberation of the Balkans from fascism. Particularly malicious are the anti-Soviet fabrications regarding the present USSR policy toward the Balkan countries and peoples. Peking also presents the Balkan countries' participation in the Warsaw Pact in a particularly slanderous manner.

The Balkan socialist countries are a subject of the Maoist "differentiated approach" which includes in itself various methods. From a conspicuously displayed friendship and manifestations of willingness for developing the comprehensive ties, down to rude pressure and blackmail depending on the assessment of the Peking leaders whether a given country could be exploited or not for anti-Soviet and antisocial purposes. The recent letter of the Albanian workers party to the CCP Central Committee revealing the Chinese pressure on Albania for making it join the Peking-planned "military alliance" among certain Balkan states testifies to the aspiration of the Chinese leadership to use the Balkan states for its plans. It is hardly necessary to explain against whom such an "alliance" was aimed.

Chinese activity in the Balkans has recently increased. The visit of Hua Kuo-feng to Yugoslavia has just ended. It is hard to believe that anyone would oppose such a visit had it served to the interest of peace, detente and cooperation. Unfortunately, the Chinese leader visited the Balkans with no such intentions. He availed himself of the opportunity and set forth the well-known Chinese theses that are in variance with the interests of the peoples.

The speeches by Hua Kuo-feng were full of definitions on "hegemony," "dictation" and so forth which the Chinese leadership is trying to ascribe to the Soviet policy. These definitions can be actually best attributed to the great-chauvinistic policy of Peking. This truth has already been experienced by a number of close and distant countries related with China. China has territorial claims toward certain countries, toward others it rattles weapons and also resorts to various forms of pressure--from manipulating with economic and military "aid," with numerous refugee communities in certain countries or with the support for the antigovernment elements up to open armed provocations and occupation of foreign territories.

The most outspoken example of Peking's hegemony is the attempt to dictate its control over the Vietnamese people. Some facts about the Maoist leaders' unceremonious approach toward Albania have also recently become known.

One must assess the appeals on "strengthening" the nonalined countries' movement as addressed by Hua Kuo-feng in his Belgrade speech in the light of the Peking's great chauvinistic and hegemonic policy. What the Maoists actually need is not a nonalined anti-imperialist movement but a movement that is closely connected with the anti-Soviet and antisocialist line of Peking. One is impressed by the fact that neither the official speeches of the hosts nor the statements of the guests indicated any anti-imperialist orientation of this movement. It is obvious that this is not a matter of accidental oversight or omission. The Maoists would like to head the nonalined countries, to subjugate them to their political goals and include them in a "broad united front" planned by them against the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist community. This is why the Chinese leadership supports those forces in this movement that want to divert it from its true goals and orient it against the interests of the developing countries themselves, to deprive these countries of their natural allies and to turn them into small change in the deal between imperialism and Maoism.

Or let us discuss the issue of war and peace. In Belgrade, Hua Kuo-feng said that "the factors of war were noticeably increasing." It is true that he tried to veil this known Maoist theses with perfidious deliberations of peace and to justify this with the assertion that the threat of war was emerging from the struggle for supremacy between "imperialism and hegemony." All phraseology of peace uttered by the Chinese leader resound falsely today taking into account the preparation for war in China which is tremendous in its scope, the total militarization of the Chinese society in all spheres and the actual alliance of the Maoists with the most outspoken warmongers. You cannot prepare yourself for war at home and promote this preparation as a state policy and while on a visit try to present yourself as a peace-lover because you have just happened to mention the pure truth that the peoples and particularly the Chinese people love peace.

This again reveals the deep and irreconcilable discrepancy between the desires of the peoples and the thoughts of the Maoists. This is why it is difficult to explain the stand of those who quietly pass by the truth without being aware that today Maoism means a threat to peace and security.

During his visit, Hua Kuo-feng spoke about Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The actual attitude of the Maoists toward the great Marxist-Leninist teaching is no secret to anyone.

Instead of proletarian internationalism, China has for years been inculcated with national chauvinism and hostility against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. How could there be any feelings of internationlism in people who conduct dissident and subversive activity in the international

communist movement, wage an irreconcilable struggle with the CPSU and the other fraternal parties, slander the domestic and foreign policy of the countries of the socialist community, deny the very existence of this community, exercise blackmail against neighboring socialist countries and instigate the socialist countries against each other. Disguised under Marxist phraseology, Maoism has actually turned itself into one of the most dangerous forms of contemporary anticommunism, acting in close collusion with the anticommunism of the imperialist bourgeoisie and the other reactionary forces.

Hua Kuo-feng's visit is further evidence of Peking's true goals: together with imperialism to undermine the peoples' efforts to reduce tension, strengthen peace and security, find new rostrums for anti-Soviet and antisocialist statements; to expand the range of its "differentiated approach" toward individual socialist countries; to drive a wedge between the relations among the Balkan countries; and to confuse mutual trust and understanding on the Balkans.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, in close cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, consistently works for strengthening the understanding and good neighborliness among the Balkan peoples. The Chinese leader's visit cannot be assessed otherwise but as an attempt to destabilize the situation in this area.

A tolerance toward Maoism and a spirit of compromise in the struggle against it means to objectively assist the anti-Soviet, antisocialist, great chauvenistic and hegemonic course followed by Peking.

The BCP and the People's Republic of Bulgaria will continue to unmask this meaning of Maoism and will also decisively resist the Maoist intentions and maneuvers which present great danger to peace and security in the Balkans, in Europe and throughout the world.

CSO: 2200

BULGARIAN DAILY SCORES CHINA'S BALKAN POLICY

Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 31 Aug 78 p 6 AU]

[Unattributed article: "Transparent Goals"]

[Text] Being a socialist country, the People's Republic of Bulgaria is consistently and steadily conducting a principled and constructive policy in the Balkans which fully coincides with the vital interests of our people. This is a policy of understanding, a mutual confidence and of developing good neighbourly relations with all Balkan countries. For 33 years the Balkan Peninsula, which has earned unenviable fame as Europe's "powder keg," has lived in peace. This is a great benefit and serious achievement. Socialism became a strong, stabilizing factor of peace in the Balkans under the new historic conditions.

With its general and dynamic foreign policy socialist Bulgaria has a real and indisputable share in consolidating this positive process. Situated in the center of the Balkans and border states with different social systems, our country is vitally interested in consolidating the principles of peaceful coexistence between the peoples of this sensitive region. Therefore, it actively opposes the self-interested aspirations of the imperialist forces striving to sow discord and confrontation among the various Balkan states.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria is opposing and will continue to oppose the dirty policy of Peking's Maoist leadership, which in recent years with increasing diligence is using the rusty weapons of the rude pressure, blackmail, slander and diversion of all kinds, and is striving at creating an atmosphere of suspicion between the Balkan countries and sowing hatred and hostility among them. For every sensible man it is no secret that the Chinese leaders are attributing an important place in their strategic plans to the Balkan Peninsula. Having promoted anti-Sovietism to the rank of state policy and using all means, they have a special malice in their slandering of the USSR peaceful policy in the Balkans as well as the role of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact. It is not by chance that for a long time many Western political observers have been saying that the Chinese leaders are striving by all means to create "their own base in the Balkans."

Recently one can witness more and more facts which categorically confirm that this has become a permanent and basic line in China's foreign policy. With fanatic stubbornness Mao's heirs strive at undermining the ideological and political unity of the socialist community and are actively introducing the malicious method of the so-called "differentiated approach" toward the socialist countries, consistently popularized by the well known Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Unfortunately, one must note that the recent visit to Yugoslavia by Hua Kuo-feng, chairman of the CCP Central Committee and chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, is yet further proof in this direction. The world public has had the opportunity to be convinced that the Chinese leader did not travel thousands of kilometers in order to build peace and understanding among the European countries, but in order to set the Balkan countries against each other, and against the USSR.

During this 8-day visit there was not one single speech or toast by Hua Kuo-feng which was not satiated with rude anti-Soviet attacks, malice and hatred toward the first socialist country in the world. In confronting the logical historic process, the Chinese leader did not spare any effort in promoting the slogan of struggle against hegemony and in attributing to features to Soviet foreign policy which are organically alien to the USSR.

It is now clear that the internal policy of the Chinese leadership as well as its activity on the international scene aims at securing China's great power and expansionist plans in the final account. The events have indisputably proven that these plans are a serious threat for China's neighbors. Today no one doubts the fact that Kampuchea's provocational attacks against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam are inspired by Peking. China abruptly halted its economic aid to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and organized a campaign of slander and blackmail around the artificially created problem of the Vietnamese citizens of Chinese origin. The case of Albania, against which China is also acting from the position of the rude interference is also indicative.

With a pharisaic pathos Hua Kuo-feng pleaded with his hosts in Belgrade to make more efforts in "strengthening" the nonalined movement. All this is happening when politicians and political strategists in the West are publicly calling China "NATO's 16th member," and when it is no secret that China is concluding alliances with the world's most reactionary regimes. The goals which are being sought in this direction are more than transparent: The Maoists are striving to lead the nonalined countries, to subject them to their hegemonic goals and to set them against the USSR and the other socialist countries. It is amazing, as well as indicative, that Hua Kuo-feng's speeches as well as the speeches of his hosts do not mention the anti-imperialist direction of this movement. It is easy, therefore, to discern the direction in which the heirs of the "great helmsman" are trying to push this movement.

Preserving world peace is now a vitally important issue for the peoples of the whole world. However, Hua Kuo-feng used the opportunity he had in Belgrade to repeat the well known and cynical Chinese thesis that "the factors of war are growing." This will hardly amaze anybody because contemporary China's militaristic ambitions have been unmasked by the world. Today there is no other country which devotes 40 percent of its national budget for military needs. Striving to achieve military dominance by all means, Peking's representatives are searching virtually everywhere for modern weapons. They are also concluding alliances with the most outspoken militarists who have been thrown into history's garbage. The Maoist prophecy about the unavoidable war and the opposition to the policy of detente in international relations is dangerous for all nations and leads toward undermining the efforts for establishing a lasting peace in the world.

Hua Kuo-feng's visit to Yugoslavia once again clearly revealed the great power and hegemonic goals of China's foreign policy. Peking is striving to stop the process of detente in alliance with the most reactionary imperialist forces, to create a "broad and united front" against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, to drive a wedge between the Balkan peoples, and to undermine the confidence and cooperation in the Balkans.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria has earned great international prestige with its consistent policy of strengthening the understanding and good neighborliness among the Balkan peoples, a policy which is being implemented in close cooperation with the USSR and the other fraternal socialist countries. Therefore, our public can only evaluate the real motives behind Hua Kuo-feng's visit in Yugoslavia as an attempt to sow unrest in the Balkan Peninsula. All Bulgarian working people--Communists, United Agrarian, members of the fatherland front and members of the Komsomol, fully supporting the peaceful foreign policy of the BCP and the people's government, will further categorically oppose and unmask the adventurous attempts of the Maoist leadership which represent a real danger for the peace and security in the Balkans and the world.

CSO: 2200

CSR EDUCATION MINISTER ON TASKS OF THE SOCIALIST SCHOOL

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 2 Sep 78 p 3

[Article by CSR Minister of Education Milan Vondruska: "Education for Socialist Present and Future Times"]

[Excerpts] The year 1978 became a positive milestone on the magnificent road of socialist development in Czechoslovakia, from the point of view of the achievements attained as well as because of its jubilee characteristics and events. It is in this extraordinary jubilee atmosphere, inspired by reviewing the work accomplished upon entering the second half of the Sixth Five-Year Plan that we open this new 1978-1979 school year. Its leading idea is the application in our socialist school--as well as in all other sectors of social life--of the principle of the leading role of the CPCZ, while establishing by yesterday's successes and today's creative work favorable prospects for a peaceful life which is firmly rooted in the certainties of developed socialism and international cooperation.

An extraordinarily responsible but also honorable duty awaits all our teachers, educators and educational and school workers in the coming school year: To develop education and teaching creatively and with fresh initiative; improve the contents, methods and forms of educational activity; perfectly master the principles of Marxist-Leninist education and to apply them within as well as out of school. Simultaneously, it is necessary to aim the school fully at optimal exploitation of the time fund for educational activity. It is exactly here where numerous problems and shortcomings still exist, currently influencing even the teacher's social activity.

As far as teaching aims are concerned, we face in the 1978-1979 school year a very demanding task to continue the introduction of a new concept of teaching process, which is deeply rooted in creative thinking of students, their independence, activity and longing for self-education. It is not only in the interest of every human being, but it is primarily an objective demand of the development of science, technology and management.

It is our duty to do everything not only to preserve but to accelerate the rate of growth of social development. One of the efficient ways leading toward it is broad application of scientific information and research results, a scientific, committed approach to work and to life in general. Therefore, we want once more to more broadly develop in this school year scientific solution of the young generation's preparation and to help thus to accelerate social development. Our goal is quite naturally education leading to scientific weltanschaung, but this is not the only goal. We encounter here further aspects of preparation of logically and creatively thinking and acting people, workers of high quality and with initiative. In the conditions of developing scientific-technological progress, the role of mathematics and natural, technical as well as social sciences grows extraordinarily. They positively influence the spiritual development of young people, cultivate their precision, sense of organization, objectiveness and the longing to know and simultaneously to change the world.

For the contemporary school--and it will be even more recognizable in this school year--the methods of training by memorization are not any longer characteristic. They have been replaced by an educational process typified by productive acquisition of information. The student is being directed, depending upon his age, to independence while he acquires knowledge and he must be able to use practically everything he has learned, to use acquired information and knowledge in practical life. Beginning practically with the first class, and we may rightfully say already from the pre-school age, we need to form every individual as a future qualified expert, to awaken in him an interest for creativity, solution of problems, ingenuity.

As far as totally concrete tasks are concerned which await us in the following 10 months of educational and teaching work, we may mention, as an example, the introduction already of the new concept of educational process into the three grades of the 1st level of elementary school and a repeated increase in the numbers of students passing from the 8th grade of basic 9-year schools into secondary schools. Furthermore, the polytechnic character of high schools (gymnasiums) will be increased so that their graduates will have a steadily increasing specialized education immediately useful in practical life. The main accent will be put on developing the reconstruction of the content of vocational education which will mean new quality in the system of preparation of the young shift of the working class and thus a deeper and broader democratization of our total education.

We are still facing a crucial part of our work and fulfillment of our tasks. Although we have partial problems and shortcomings, we are well aware of them and shall solve them with communist consistency.

In the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, socialist patriotism and internationalism we shall further increase specialized as well as the politico-educational function of our school with the aim to convert knowledge into means of moral improvement of man approaching the era of communism.

CSO: 2400

GDR LEADERS GREET VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS ON NATIONAL DAY

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 2-3 Sep 78 p 1 AU

[GDR leaders telegram to SRV representatives on the SRV's National Day]

[Text] To Comrade Le Duan, general secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party [VCP],

To Comrade Ton Duc Thang, president of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [SRV],

To Comrade Truong Chinh, chairman of the standing committee of the SRV National Assembly,

To Comrade Phan Van Dong, premier of the SRV, Hanoi.

Esteemed Comrades,

On the occasion of the SRV national holiday we convey to you, the VCP Central Committee, the National Assembly, the SRV Government and the fraternal Vietnamese people the most cordial congratulations and fraternal greetings on behalf of the SED Central Committee, the State Council, the Council of Ministers, the People's Chamber and the people of the GDR.

Under the leadership of the battle-tested VCP, headed by the unforgotten and highly esteemed Comrade Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnam working people 33 years ago founded the first worker-peasant state in southeast Asia. From the very first day of its existence the socialist Vietnam has waged a heroic and victorious struggle against imperialism aggression and outside interference.

With joy, admiration and sympathy the GDR working people are following the enormous efforts of their Vietnamese class brothers in overcoming the consequences of the war and in socialist construction. We sincerely share your joy at the successes achieved in implementing the decisions of the fourth party congress of the VCP.

The international reputation of the SRV is constantly growing. At the side of the other states of the socialist community it is making an important contribution to the constant progress of the forces of socialism, of democracy and of peace in the world. With great joy the GDR welcomes the SFR's admission to CEMA as an important event in the interest of Vietnam's flourishing and of further strengthening the community of socialist states.

The SRV's active and peace-loving foreign policy, especially its endeavors to develop good-neighborly, mutually advantageous relations with the states of southeast Asia, constitute an important factor of peace, of security and of socialist progress in Asia and in the world. The GDR resolutely supports the SRV's just positions for defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity against expansionist efforts as well as against all attacks of imperialism and of the international reaction.

To our great satisfaction the traditional fraternal relations between our two states are developing more successfully every year. The treaty on friendship and cooperation signed on 4 December 1977 has given a new impetus to this development and has led to a new quality in the relations between our two parties, states and peoples. We assure you that the GDR will make every effort also in the future to universally deepen the fraternal cooperation with the Vietnamese people in building socialism and to grant solidaristic support in all fields.

We wish the fraternal Vietnamese people from the bottom of our hearts great new successes in the further socialist construction and you, personally, the best of health and energy in your responsible work.

[Signed] Erich Honecker, SED Central Committee general secretary and GDR State Council chairman,

Willi Stoph, GDR Council of Minister chairman,

Horst Sindermann, chairman of the GDR People's Chamber.

CSO: 2300

EVENTS SURROUNDING 1968 STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS REVIEWED

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jul, 5 Aug, 12 Aug 78

[Series of articles by Nenad Ivankovic, Djordje Licina, Vlado Rajic and Meri Stajduhar: "1968 Student Demonstrations Without Myths"]

[29 Jul 78, pp 18-20]

> [Text] We are publishing a chronology of events, an introductory article and the recollections of people who were directly involved in those events in Zagreb because of both rightward and "leftward" tendencies to impart to those events a context and dimensions which they did not have.

Chronology of Events

From 2 June in Belgrade to 8 June in Zagreb

> This is a chronology of the student unrest between 2 and 9 June 1968 which offers a general picture of the events, especially at Zagreb University. The account as written makes no claim to offer a complete survey of events, since there are very few written documents concerning them, and there are no systematic notes and eyewitness accounts.

The student demonstrations in Belgrade began on Sunday evening, 2 June 1968, in front of the building of the Culture Center in New Belgrade, where a popular music performance entitled "Friendship Caravan" was to be held for students and youth brigade members who had been working on construction of the new part of the city on the other side of the Sava River. After they had demolished parts of the auditorium (the scheduled performance was not held because of the disturbances), the students, among whom there were--as was later ascertained--a certain number of hostile elements and troublemakers, started off toward Belgrade. However, the police were waiting for them at the underpass near the building of the Federal Executive Council. On that

occasion the policemen used sticks to scatter the demonstrators, who tried to break through the cordon by force. Several persons received serious and light injuries in the conflict.

Conflict in New Belgrade

Having been prevented from reaching the city, the demonstrators returned to Student City, where they continued their protest throughout the night. On Monday morning a rally was held in Student City at which the students called for some of their demands to be met immediately: that the large social differences in society be diminished, that the problems of unemployment be resolved with more dispatch, that authentic democracy be ensured in all domains of public life, and that more rapid and fundamental establishment of self-management relations be at the same time facilitated.

Following the rally the students started off toward the center of Belgrade to undertake supposedly peaceful demonstrations. However, the column of marchers was halted at the underpass where its progress had been blocked the previous night. For more than 2 hours the demonstrators stood before the police cordon, which did not allow the throng to reach the city. In the highly electrified atmosphere Veljko Vlahovic, president of the Belgrade City Conference of the League of Communists, then appeared before the demonstrators and proposed that student spokesmen talk with him and Milos Minic, president of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. The demonstrators accepted that proposal. The talks between Veljko Vlahovic and Milos Minic on the one hand and the student representatives of the other ended with an agreement that the students would refrain from demonstrating in the center of the city, and they would be given means of presenting all their objections and demands in their university schools. However, when this culminating agreement was announced to the demonstrators gathered near the underpass, a commotion ensued, and the conflict came to a head. Dissatisfied with the turn of events, the demonstrators tried to break through the police cordon, and a physical showdown took place. The policemen used their clubs, threw tear gas bombs on the demonstrators and then dispelled them.

In the days that followed the student dissatisfaction and unrest were carried over to the university schools located in Belgrade, and the students issued the ultimatum that their demands be met.

Zagreb: First News of the Demonstrations

What was happening meanwhile at Zagreb University, and how did the students in the capital of Croatia react to the events in Belgrade? That is the topic of this chronology.

Monday, 3 June 1968

After the first news of the student demonstrations in Belgrade a briefing was held in Zagreb in the early morning hours of a part of the City Committee

and the University Committee of the League of Communists. At that time it was not known, however, what the causes and consequences of the disturbances were, and a decision was made to wait for exhaustive information from Belgrade.

At 1900 hours that same day a meeting was held in the headquarters of the University Committee of the Presidium of the Conference and Committee of the League of Communists, of the University Committee of the League of Students and of the secretaries of the organizations of the League of Communists at the various university schools. The committee secretary Nikola Filipovic spoke about the problems of the university organization of the League of Communists in the context of general social developments, referring particularly to difficulties in higher education, while the president of the conference Dusan Calic spoke about the problems of the university and the direction taken in actions of the League of Communists. He said that party members must themselves be the spokesmen of the progressive demands of the students, but within a lawful framework. The discussion raised two fundamental questions: was it more essential to resolve internal university problems or urgent socioeconomic dilemmas confronting our self-managed society and the League of Communists. A firm consensus was reached to the effect that these problems had to be solved simultaneously and that the principal point of departure must be the platform of the League of Communists which had been adopted. It was resolved that the second regular university conference was to be called for 9 June 1968 in view of the events in Belgrade and those which might be expected in Zagreb and also in view of a number of issues on which the university organization of the League of Communists had been working. It was at the same time agreed that faculty and student assemblies would be held in the university schools to debate the key sociopolitical and economic problems in Yugoslavia and in the republic, as well as the problems currently faced by the university, in particular the position of the students in the mechanism of self-management.

At that same meeting Pero Pirker, president of the city conference of the League of Communists, informed those present about the events in Belgrade.

What happened that day at the schools of Zagreb University and other higher educational institutions? By and large the first news of the demonstrations in Belgrade went unnoticed.

Tuesday, 4 June 1968

During the night between Monday and Tuesday, after the press, radio and television had informed the public about the events in Belgrade, a group of students gathered in the dormitory in Sarengradska Street with the intention of sending a telegram of support to the Belgrade students. The secretary of the University Committee and the president of the university board of the League of Yugoslav Students spoke that same night with this group, in which there were a sizable number of members of the League of Communists, and they ultimately decided to hold a meeting of the University Committee of the LCY

and the university board of the League of Yugoslav Students on Tuesday morning, the principal topic to be the events in Belgrade.

The "Initiative" of the So-Called Action Committee

On Tuesday morning the intended meeting was held and sent support to the Belgrade students in their justified demands. The resolution, which was printed up and distributed to Zagreb students in the university schools and dormitories, stated which demands of the Belgrade students were being supported. That same resolution condemned the actions of law enforcement agencies against the demonstrators in Belgrade.

That morning the City Committee was informed that a delegation of Belgrade students was in Zagreb with members of the editorial board of PRAXIS at the School of Philosophy; the delegation had come to the capital of Croatia unannounced in order--it was said--to inform sociopolitical organizations at the university about events in Belgrade.

On Tuesday morning Celestin Sardelic, president of the Zagreb University Board of the League of Yugoslav Students, traveled to Belgrade to inform the student leadership there of the positions taken by the Zagreb students.

In the meantime councils of residents in the Zagreb dormitories and LCY secretariats scheduled student assemblies at which the Belgrade events were to be evaluated. The entire University Committee, several members of the City Committee, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia and the Croatian Assembly went to the meetings held in the Sava, Sarengradska and Mosa Pijade dormitories in order to present to the students as exhaustive information as possible about the events in Belgrade.

The student assembly at the Sava dormitory opened with the words: "We have no student organization, it does not exist." Soon thereafter the assembly was, however, turned into a provocative demonstration, and groups of organized extremists shouted out anarchistic slogans. Dusan Calic, Nikola Filipovic and Nikola Ban, members of the University Committee, tried to give the rally an organized and constructive direction, but this was difficult for them, since the group already mentioned obstructed them with shouting and interruptions. It was clear even then that groups of this kind would attempt to take advantage of the situation at the moment for harangues and for imposing their reactionary ideas, which inevitably led to disorders. Nevertheless, the events in the Sava dormitory were very significant for the University Committee, since in that assembly they managed to separate the troublemakers and rowdies from the main body of students and to prevent them from going out into the streets. After the students had chosen their spokesman, they set off for the meeting at the headquarters of the City Committee of the League of Communists, where the delegation presented its demands. The meeting in the headquarters of the City Committee ended with a resolution that the committee of students from the Sava dormitory would be expanded to include student spokesmen from the other dormitories, who would be elected in similar assemblies.

At a meeting of the residents in the Mosa Pijade dormitory, where those present included Ante Josipovic, member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia and Nikola Filipovic, secretary of the University Committee of the League of Communists; a committee of students was also elected to join with the committee from the Sava dormitory.

That same day a rally was organized in the dormitory in Sarengradska Street. It began to 2030 hours, and it ended at 0200 hours. It was attended by residents of several dormitories and by several members of the City Committee and University Committee of the League of Communists. The assembly did not adopt the proposal that a committee be created with student representatives, but called for establishment of "a new form of government at Zagreb University and in society at large," that is, that a so-called action committee be established.* It was resolved at the same time that a large rally would be held at noon on Wednesday in the Student Center and that a meeting with Mika Tripalo (secretary of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia) would be sought. The atmosphere at the meeting was considerably electrified. There were shouts "Into the streets!" "What have you accomplished in 20 years?" "The government should resign." The group shouting the slogans hissed down every speaker who attempted to defend the positions of the League of Communists and the University Committee.

That same night a delegation of Zagreb students (having proclaimed itself a delegation on its own initiative) arrived from Belgrade headed by Sime Vranic, a student of the School of Political Sciences. The vociferous group proposed that that "delegation" appear before the meeting at the Student Center, which was scheduled for noon on Wednesday.

In the meantime the first meetings were beginning to be held at the university schools and other higher educational institutions in Zagreb and were closely following the events in Belgrade. In the evening a meeting of the production section of the School of Mechanical Engineering and Shipbuilding was held; it talked about the proclamation of the University Board of the

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* Three so-called action committees were created during the week of the most intensive disturbances at Zagreb University. The first was created even on Tuesday, 4 June, in the meeting of students at the dormitory in Sarengradska Street. The second was formed the next day at a rally in the Student Center, and the third at a meeting on Thursday, 5 June, also in the Student Center. All three committees had a common denominator: they advocated the ideas of violence and demonstrative threats, endeavoring to use the justified demands of the students to inaugurate their own--essentially antisocialist and undemocratic--methods, in which one could spot even then the political and ideological tactics of Croatian nationalism which escalated in 1971.

League of Yugoslav Students and the student demands.* That same evening a meeting was held of the faculty activ at the Pedagogical Academy in which there was discussion of the events in Belgrade. In the meeting a message was passed on to students of the Senior Postsecondary School for Physical Education to join in all the events being organized in accordance with the resolutions of the University Committee, which a large portion of the students did in fact do. On Tuesday morning a telephone message arrived at the Academy for Pictorial Arts from the Belgrade Academy concerning the events in the capital. The Belgrade students asked for support.

The most intensive activity was felt at the School of Philosophy. A group of students from Belgrade had arrived early in the morning along with Milan Miric, editor in chief of the journal RAZLOG [REASON]. The students talked with Professors Gajo Petrovic, Milan Kangrga and Ivan Kuvacic. The dean of the school, Dr Petar Simlesa, who attended the conversation for a time, cautioned them to go first to the board of the League of Students and the University Committee of the League of Communists.

Not long thereafter posters appeared at the school announcing the rally at noon on Wednesday in the Student Center. At noon a meeting was held of the secretariat and section secretaries of the League of Communists in the school. Those present were informed about the situation in Belgrade and also about the demands of the Belgrade students. A resolution was passed to create a joint committee of the secretariat and the school's committee of the League of Students, whose task it would be to gather information on the standard of living of the students and also on problems of employment. As for the demands of the Belgrade students, it was stated that everything progressive and constructive in those demands would be supported. At that time

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* The University Board of the League of Students supported the "progressive" and "revolutionary" demands of the students of Belgrade University in an eight-point proclamation. The proclamation set forth the following demands: democratization in all domains of the life of society, reform and modernization of instruction at the universities, larger participation of students in self-management at the universities and in the political life of the country, self-management of the students in making decisions affecting their material interests so as to overcome social inequities of students, abolishment of all privileges that exist in society and consistent implementation of the principle of remuneration according to work, creation of conditions so that the children of workers and peasants have a higher representation at the university, immediate creation of jobs for young specialists, and uncompromising persistence in carrying out the economic and social reform.

In that same proclamation the University Board of the League of Yugoslav Students and the students of Zagreb University condemned the use of physical force against the Belgrade students and the decision of the Serbian Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs banning public gatherings of students.

it was still thought that those demands came down mostly to the problem of the standard of living, instruction and self-management. Only general mention was made of the demands for democratization and reduction of social inequities.

Wednesday, 5 June 1968

At 0800 hours a meeting of the Presidium of the University Conference of the League of Communists, the University Committee, the secretaries of the organizations of the League of Communists in the various university schools and deans of the university schools was held in the offices of the University Committee. Dusan Calic, president of the University Conference, and Nikola Filipovic, secretary of the University Committee, informed the participants in the meeting about the situation at the university, about the events which had taken place the day before, about the meetings in the dormitories, and about the attempts of the group of extremists to disrupt constructive discussions. Particular mention was made of the efforts of the so-called action committee to hold a rally in the Student Center. It was proposed that meetings of the League of Communists and the League of Students be held in the schools of the university, and it was recommended that the priority issues be raised and that the resolutions be taken to the conference of the League of Communists of the university scheduled for Sunday.

In the morning a group of students representing the so-called action committee formed in the dormitory in Sarengradska Street talked with Mika Tripalo. He set forth for them his position concerning the way to resolve current student issues, and said among other things that it was not a good idea to hold any kind of rally, since that was not a solution at that point.

That same morning Pero Pirker and Dusan Calic went to the University Board of the League of Yugoslav Students and talked about the possibilities for carrying on a constructive dialog with the students instead of a rally and street demonstrations. It was stated on that occasion that disturbances would not be tolerated, and the position of the League of Communists (readiness for dialog and constructive resolution of all issues) was explained.

[5 Aug 78, pp 26-28]

[Text] Wednesday, 5 June 1968

The rally in the Student Center began at 1230 hours and was attended at the beginning by only about 70 students. They refused to listen to the assurances of members of the University Committee and the University Board of the League of Yugoslav Students, who proposed that they go away peacefully and resolve their demands in organizations of the League of Communists and the League of Students. As time passed the number of participants in the assembly increased: about 2,000 students gathered. From the beginning the rally was attended by an active student group of no great size which wanted at any price to get the entire body to demonstrate in the streets.

The rally was opened by a student from Belgrade who spoke about events in the capital, sharply attacking the police for "brutal violence against the students." He sought full support from his Zagreb counterparts. Professors and students from Zagreb then spoke, some of them already well known as devotees and followers of the views advocated in the journal PRAXIS.

They judged the situation to be the beginning of a new social revolution in Yugoslavia, one which would not recognize any legal institutions whatsoever nor the vanguard role of the League of Communists. Some of the rally's organizers deliberately attempted to turn the assembly into street demonstrations. That, they said, would be authentic support of the Belgrade students. Those who gave the rally its ideological bent and organized it also brought to the Student Center the actor Fabijan Sovagovic, knowing full well what they were doing; Sovagovic did not know the background of events, and, carried along by the events and the atmosphere, he began to recite Krleza's poem "A Bloody Morning Will Dawn," which gave a still stronger and militant feeling of euphoria to the entire assembly, which was already in a destructive mood.

The next day, however, having become aware of the context in which events were taking place, Sovagovic declared that as a form of political struggle at this juncture demonstrations would be a dangerous and reactionary action.

When the principal organizers of the rally called upon someone to refute their assertions, Slobodan Lang, a medical student, asked for the floor. He attempted to speak along the lines of the platform of the League of Communists, but the leaders of the meeting and their supporters interrupted him and shouted so that he could not complete his speech. Nikola Filipovic, secretary of the University Committee, attempted to talk about the need and possibility for resolving the problems by other methods than by rallies and demonstrations, but he was hooted down and insulted by a group of rowdies and extremists.

Then, on invitation of the organizers of the meeting, who were joined by others, there were speeches by professors of the schools of philosophy, law and economics Gajo Petrovic (who came to the rostrum amid shouts of "Gajo, lead us into the street, lead us into the fray"), Vanja Sutlic, Sime Djodan, Marko Veselica, Milan Kangrga and Bogdan Cosic (who was hindered by the whistles and interruptions of those present). Slavko Macarol, dean of the School of Geodesy and prorector of Zagreb University, also spoke at the meeting.

Gajo Petrovic declared that he was "amazed that a social revolution had begun and said that it should demolish all existing structures." Vanja Sutlic favored the "well-known communist solutions," while Djodan aimed his speech against the bureaucratic forces in possession of the surplus value of labor,*

* The next day Sime Djodan also spoke to students of the School of Philosophy at a rally which was illegal. In his speech Djodan asserted at one

and Marko Veselica said "that the bureaucratic forces defeated at the Fourth Plenum still have great power and this is the principal battleground, not slogans about socialism, humanism, brotherhood and unity," Kangrga called for revolutionary action, saying that he was opposed to going into the streets, and Cosic and Macarol called upon the students to examine rationally all the consequences should they go out into the streets. Ante Rumora, student of the Academy for Dramatic Art and one of the members of the so-called action committee, called upon the students to occupy the movie theater, from where, he said, they would put questions to the Croatian Parliament, which was supposed to convene at just that point. The participants in the rally then broke into the theater by force and continued their assembly there. During a brief intermission the participants were "informed" that "a curfew had been introduced in Belgrade and tanks and the armed forces had come into the streets to prevent meetings of workers and students."

During the rally a so-called action committee of the revolutionary students, including all the speakers except Bogdan Cosic, was formed. The committees held a session on the premises of the Student Center. At the meeting Gajo Petrovic called for resolute and full support of the events in Belgrade, proposing that the Belgrade proclamations be adopted. In the theater there were shouts to the effect that the Belgrade students were starving to death and would not hold out long unless the Zagreb students helped them--by demonstrating. However, these were deliberate attempts at provocation at a time when the great majority of students had already cooled toward the idea of going into the streets.

The organizers of the rally called for caucuses of students to be held on Thursday at 1000 hours in all the schools of the university and for a joint meeting of workers and students to be held in the Student Center at 1500 hours.

It was proposed that Zagreb University be renamed the Socialist University of the Seven Secretaries of SKOY [communist youth organization]. The proposal was adopted by acclamation.

The rally in the Student Center ended at about 2000 hours.

That same evening some members of the so-called action committee occupied all the offices of the University Board of the League of Students, took down all the displays and posters in the Student Center and draped flags and their own slogans around and placed their own watchmen in front of the offices.

The University Committee met with members of the City Committee in the headquarters of the City Committee of the League of Communists at 2330 hours.

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point that "Croatian students are behaving like geese in a fog," reproaching them for inertness and a kind of political blindness. Djodan was to advance the same arguments in much more extensive form again in 1971.

The proclamation of the University Committee sent to all faculty members and students at the university was adopted at the meeting. The proclamation was printed during the night.* At that same meeting the committee agreed concerning further action and resolved to try to normalize the situation by the method of political struggle rather than to use force.

In the meantime members of the League of Communists at a majority of the university schools and higher educational institutions in Zagreb took control, explaining the position of the University Committee and agreeing on action to be taken so as to prevent undesirable incidents. An around-the-clock watch was agreed on, and constant liaison with the University Committee was established. The position of the League of Communists as to how all the political issues were to be resolved was supported in the discussion. Only certain students and professors came out in favor of the Belgrade demonstrations and of demonstrations in general as a form of political struggle (two professors and one student at the School of Technology, some members of the secretariat of the League of Communists at the School of Political Sciences,** and at the Academy of Pictorial Arts a group of students demanding a 24-hour strike and occupation of the academy's building).

Thursday, 6 June 1968

After midnight between Wednesday and Thursday one member of the City Committee went into the Student Center to give to the students and others who had

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* The proclamation demanded consistent implementation of the socioeconomic reform through further redistribution of the surplus value of labor to the advantage of the working class, so that on that basis the problems of unemployment, education and culture, the standard of living, and the university and university students might be solved. The proclamation then advocated further democratization of the sociopolitical system, the application of effective measures toward distribution according to the results of work, and, along the same lines, elimination of all material and social privileges. The proclamation went on to demand an immediate change in the social composition of student bodies throughout the educational system, especially at the university, full right to make decisions on the basis of self-management by students concerning all key issues of the university, and particularly concerning conditions that had a bearing on their standard of living, democratic vote of confidence in all faculty members on a periodic basis, and elimination of conservative-hierarchical structures and monopolies at the university. The proclamation concluded by supporting all the progressive and justified demands of the Belgrade students.

** A small group of vociferous people were particularly active at the School of Political Sciences, shouting the slogans: "We Have Listened Enough for 20 Years," "We Want Action by the Revolutionary Students," "We Want the Political Police To Be Abolished"; they deliberately spread misinformation to the effect that "the police are not letting the students into the factories, the factories are blocked off," and so on.

occupied the offices of the university board the message of the city and university committees to the effect that demonstrations would be prevented by every means and that the principal initiators would bear full political responsibility for any disorder.

About 0900 hours Professors Gajo Petrovic, Mladen Caldarevic, Milan Kangrga and the student Sime Vranic came on the invitation of Dusan Calic to speak with Calic Pero Pirker at the City Committee of the League of Communists. On that occasion Gajo Petrovic was informed of the University Committee's proclamation and the position of the League of Communists toward the events, and particularly toward the proclamation of the so-called action committee, concerning which it stated that party members rejected it. He was asked to immediately disclaim the proclamation of the action committee, which he refused to do. In the meantime Dusan Calic was talking with Mladen Caldarevic, a lecturer at the School of Political Sciences, who stated clearly that he was a proponent of perpetual rallies and assemblies as a form of political action. He also said that on the night between 4 and 5 June he and two other persons at the School of Political Sciences had mimeographed leaflets which were distributed in the morning of 5 June. Dusan Calic also talked with the student Sime Vranic, expounding to him the positions of the city and university committees. Vranic's answer was sharp: he said that he did not recognize the League of Students. Calic then warned Vranic that he had violated party discipline, since he had gone to Belgrade on his own and acted there in the name of the Zagreb students, although the party organization had not authorized him to do so. He answered that he felt that the revolution was taking place in Belgrade and that his place was there. During the conversation in the City Committee of the League of Communists Professor Milan Kangrga also stated that he thought that the aims of the students rallied around the so-called action committee were progressive.

During the morning student caucuses were held at almost all the university schools and higher educational institutions, most of them at the initiative of the League of Communists and the League of Students. A great majority of the students at them favored the proclamation of the University Committee and the action of the League of Communists, condemning the initiative of the so-called action committee as undemocratic and reactionary.

A rally called the previous day by the so-called action committee was held on Thursday after 1500 hours, first in the courtyard of the Student Center and then in the movie theater, which those present broke into. The Professors Vanja Sultlic, Gajo Petrovic, and Ivo Supek, and several students, including one from Belgrade, spoke at the meeting. A new action committee, now including Professor Mladen Caldarevic, was elected at the meeting. The students went away a short time after 2200 hours, after it was announced to them that their new proclamation and resolutions, which were basically identical to those of the previous day, would be published in VJESNIK and carried over the radio and presented to the university and city committees and to the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia. At the end of the rally it was resolved that the new

action committee would organize the rally in the Student Center at noon on Friday if this were not done.

On the night between Thursday and Friday the Presidium of the University Conference and the committee of the League of Communists met and resolved on maximum commitment from party members in the new situation that had come about. It was recommended to the rectorate of the university that instruction and examination continue normally and that organizations of the League of Communists in the schools of the university provide monitors to keep order.

Friday, 7 June 1968

At the university a Riot-Control Staff was established in the early morning hours. The staff issued an order that all members of the League of Communists at the university be mobilized, that a group be set up for maintaining order at the schools of the university and in the Student Center and that the group which had been causing the disorders be broken up.

The staff very effectively mobilized the membership of the League of Communists at all schools of the university except the School of Philosophy, where the secretary of the committee himself, Dr Ljubo Boban, took on the obligation of security with several other members. Students of the Law School and School of Economics went to the Student Center in large numbers to offer their services to the staff. The student party members took the situation completely into their own hands, and the scheduled rally did not take place. The isolated group of demonstrators near the main entrance tried to cause unrest among the students who were keeping order, but they were unsuccessful.

In the meantime workers from some of the factories in Zagreb offered the staff their aid in preventing a possible rally, but they were told that the student party members had the situation completely in their own hands and that their help was not needed.

At 2200 hours the last group of students quietly left the yard of the Student Center.

Moreover, at some schools of Zagreb University conferences of the League of Communists and the League of Yugoslav Students were held throughout that day, pointing up some of the outstanding problems in our society and at the same time condemning the methods of pressure and street demonstrations.

Saturday, 8 June 1968

The round-the-clock watch was continued in the Student Center and at the schools of the university. However, there were no gatherings at all at any of the schools, nor in the Student Center.

During Saturday the University Committee of the League of Communists and the Presidium of the conference met twice: the first time at noon, when the discussion was about the conference of the League of Communists of the university, which had been scheduled for Sunday, and the second time in the evening, when the University Committee by unanimous decision, in the presence of members of the presidium and representatives of the City Committee and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia expelled from the League of Communists Mladen Caldarevic, Gajo Petrovic and Sime Vranic because during the events at Zagreb University they had gone to extremes in their statements, had taken demagogic and anarcholiberal positions, and had thereby attempted to shatter the League of Communists, and all the institutions of our self-management with it. In that way, it was stated in the supporting arguments, they were preparing a blow to the League of Communists, to self-management and democratization in their effort toward so-called democratization of society by means of typical violent and undemocratic methods centering around negation of all types of self-managed and institutional forms and procedures.

[29 Jul 78, pp 18, 20-21]

[Text] Editorial Comment: "The Manipulated and the Manipulators"

In spite of the fact that we still do not have overall historical analyses and assessments of the 1968 student disturbances in Yugoslavia, we can still say that the June events were not imported and were therefore most directly grounded in the sociopolitical conditions in the country at that time. Moreover, that sociopolitical context should be understood as a necessary element in the development of self-management in our society, that is, as an integral part of the overall development process which began in the era of establishment of the first workers' councils and which today is in the phase of further construction of the political system of socialist self-management democracy.

We have emphasized this because we feel that Yugoslavia's level of sociopolitical development today is the only authoritative judge of history and therefore of the events which are part of it. Which is to say that if today we are the witnesses of the construction of socialist self-management democracy (a democracy based on the pluralism of interests in self-management), then that fact should be taken as a yardstick.

However, that particular fact is very nimbly skirted in discussions of 1968 (as evidenced by certain very fresh examples), and the events of that year are judged on the basis of a variety of outlooks and ideological concepts.

One such statement is the thesis that all that happened after the "revolutionary June" was nothing other than manipulation. The origin of this argument lies in an inability to see the continuity of our community's social development and also, certainly, in a kind of theorizing which, swimming over the surface of society, is fed only by the difficulties which necessarily accompany the processes of our socialist community's development.

Consequently, for such interpreters the last 10 years, which are most eloquently portrayed by the 1974 Constitution, the Law on Associated Labor, and the 10th and 11th congresses of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, are either the work of a deus ex machina (since they do not see the continuity of development inaugurated by the economic and social reform in the mid-sixties) or on the other hand facts whose value and socialistic import they are simply unwilling to acknowledge.

So much for the premises which we start from in interpreting the student unrest in June 1968.

Before sketching the sociopolitical context in which the June events fall, there is one other distinction worth making. That is, there have been attempts to portray the student ferment in Yugoslavia as an integral part of 1968 in the world or even to overemphasize the impact which the student movement in the West had here in Yugoslavia. However, such interpretations reveal their emptiness as soon as one points to the social roots and aims of the student movement in the West.

There is no doubt that the student movement in the West is contextually defined by the "affluent society," a society based on a degrading form of human work and dehumanization of free time. That is why students and leftward-oriented intellectuals, in the framework of New Left ideology, which is today in a state of disintegration, tend toward a revolution whose aim is a fundamental change of a social system comprised in the form of late capitalism and the obscene world which that system perpetuates.

At no point, on the other hand, did our students question our sociopolitical system, that is, socialism.

To return to the June events in Yugoslavia, is, as we said, a return to the sociopolitical situation of that time. And it was primarily defined by the coordinates of the economic and social reform. In this connection it is important to emphasize that the economic reform, which quickly became a social reform as well, was inaugurated (by the 1963 Constitution and the decisions of the eighth congress in 1964) with the intention of overcoming the statist structure of the economy (and indeed of society as a whole) and of affirming instead the principle of income so as to strengthen the material base of socialist self-management and in this way overcome the lag that had occurred in the country's economic and social development.

So, if we are to understand the historical significance of the reform and the sociopolitical context of that time, it is important that we look upon the reform on the one hand as an abandonment of the old system, which had exhausted all its potential for constructive development, and on the other as a revolutionary seizure of the social fabric of our community to promote the liberation and development of the socioeconomic and political relations of which we are today the witnesses and which are the prerequisites for construction of socialist self-management democracy.

The Guidelines on the Most Important Tasks of the League of Communists in Developing the System of Socioeconomic and Political Relations, which were adopted immediately after the events in June 1968, and which had been in the works considerably before those events, state: "Our entire social development and contemporary social events confirm the far-reaching and lasting significance of the orientation of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia toward social self-management, whose achievement has opened up a new stage in development of our socialist society."

A bit further on they state: "With the social and economic reform the way has been opened for the long-range and profound transformation of our economy and society toward construction of a more highly developed and modern economy and a social superstructure based on the principles of self-management."

The Reform and Its Opponents

However, the reform was implemented under conditions which were objectively difficult and problematical.

We must state at the outset that it was supported by a relatively small number of progressive people and that it faced a very powerful opposition represented by the forces advocating statism and centralism.

President Tito spoke about this at the Sixth Congress of the League of Yugoslav Trade Unions (27 June 1968): "The economic reform has had the support of the broad strata of our society, but it has not had the support of all those who make decisions. It has not had the support which it should have had. On paper, in verbal declarations, we are all in favor of the economic reform, but when steps and actions have to be taken--then there is resistance, both overt and covert. Resistance is offered to our economic reform and indeed to our society of self-managers as a whole from various quarters."

The reform, as we know, initiated a strong process whereby economic organizations attained greater independence in the social system, and this tended to weaken the power of statist structures. For that reason the resistance to the reform in the first years of its development was extremely powerful, and this is certainly one of the reasons why it was slow to be achieved and why there were therefore shortcomings and deformations. That is also why the Guidelines, to take one example, emphasized the urgent need to overcome the remnants of statist alienation of resources from the producers as fast as possible, since to a considerable extent this was frustrating the development of self-management.

Moreover, the economy had begun to orient itself more strongly toward the market, since self-management and destatization, as was emphasized in the Guidelines, "are necessarily being achieved in the present stage of development in the context of commodity production and the market," which certainly brought with it contradictions and sources of certain dangers and deformations in the development of socialist relations. This applied first of all

to a strengthening of the power of technobureaucratic forces and to substantial social differences which had not resulted from work and which, in part inherited from the old system, were strongly manifested in that phase of social development.

It is also worth emphasizing that the economy had reached a phase when the new system was still not established, but the old one had been thrown out. Given the difficulties we have mentioned, this caused a stagnation whose consequences were very high unemployment (the new-job rate in the 1966-1968 period was equal to zero), and this occurred at a time when 700,000 young people with secondary and senior postsecondary specialized training had come of age to go to work when 100,000 of our workers were going abroad to work.

However, we should state that the Guidelines noted that the reform "is being carried out under objectively difficult and problematical conditions, and the difficulties in implementing it are beyond expectations," which means that certain difficulties were counted on, but not to that extent.

As for the political system, the Guidelines emphasized that although it had undergone essential democratization, the most appropriate direct connections still did not exist between all levels of political decisionmaking and the self-managed base of society. There was a large gap between representative bodies and the organs of sociopolitical organizations and direct democracy as a revolutionary spontaneous activity of the masses, as a form of free expression and formation of the interests of social forces at the base.

Nevertheless, the tone was also set for the political life of Yugoslavia by the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY, which had shattered the unitaristic-centralistic Rankovic-Stefanovic grouping, and that certainly contributed to more rapid democratization of social relations in all domains of life. The reorganization of the League of Communists and of the State Security Service are also evidence of this.

Democratization of Public Life

So, the year 1968 was marked by a general democratization of public life, which certainly gave freer access to various currents of ideas in Yugoslavia, and certainly that had a certain impact on the politicalization of young people at the universities as well.

But that same year, as we have said, also abounded in a number of shortcomings and deformations which came to the surface and became the real basis for student dissatisfaction.

We should, of course, add to this the difficulties affecting those students in particular. The material situation of students was not very good (few dormitories and scholarships, poor food in student dining halls, etc.), and at the same time self-management was underdeveloped in the schools of the university, and the social composition of students was not what it should have been.

However, that same dissatisfaction (unemployment, social inequities, lagging development of self-management, and so on) was also felt by the working class, indeed much more seriously than the students, yet it did not react in the way the students did, nor did it take up their challenge when the students struck for 7 days in Belgrade. Were we to say now that the 7-day strike of students in Belgrade, along with the disturbances in our other university centers (Zagreb especially) were truly only an expression of a spontaneous reaction to a kind of crisis situation in society, then we would have a hard time explaining the behavior of the working class.

But let us recall the beginning of the events in Belgrade. On 2 June the sponsor of the entertainment review "Friendship Caravan," which was VECERNJE NOVOSTI, and the Belgrade Youth Center scheduled a performance in the camp of a youth work project referred to as "New Belgrade 68." The performance was to be held in the open air, but at the last moment there was a change of plans because of bad weather, and it was held in the auditorium of a worker university near Student City, where the cramped space allowed for no one to enter except the youth project workers. Yet some students and others wished, nevertheless, to attend the performance, and they tried to enter by force. There was a conflict in which the police intervened. This was the proximate cause of the 7-day student strike in Belgrade.

Immediately following the conflict between the students and the police at the underpass in Student City, that is, that same night, an action committee was formed, and it decided on demonstrations. The action committee consisted of some 20 students, and they did not allow members of the Board of the League of Students of Student City to be included as members.

In this case it was obviously a question of an organized group of students who did not recognize the legal representatives of the student organization and who were under the powerful influence of the well-known thesis of absolute spontaneity and unlimited freedom of expression and of the manner and presentation of political views which were explicitly manifested in 1966 during the demonstrations against the war in Vietnam.

As we know, those demonstrations were organized on their own, bypassing all university institutions (though they were referred to) and in the face of a ban by the Belgrade police, by certain professors who damaged our foreign policy thereby.

That is, they so arranged the demonstrations, which broke out into fights and destruction, so as to take advantage of them for their own political aims, as evidenced by the report of the Commission of the University Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, in which the following, among other things, is stated: "Of particular political importance and weight for the university party organization, and especially for the organization of the League of Communists at the School of Philosophy, is the fact--which was indeed emphasized by the student demonstrators in a talk with the commission--that within the school (both before and after the rally) the view was

widespread that Yugoslav foreign police concerning Vietnam was opportunistic, indecisive, subordinated to the interests of buying grain from the United States, etc. These comrades emphasized to the commission that this thesis had a greater impact in enflaming passions against the police and political forums than the conflict that occurred when the demonstrations were being broken up."

This example eloquently illustrates how certain professors, particularly those who had criticized our society even earlier from the standpoint of unsparing criticism of the entire status quo, long before the student strike in Belgrade, had been doing everything toward ideological indoctrinization of some of the students and toward using even the slightest pretext for open demonstrations, whereby they could again enter the political scene.

The Same Sponsors

The June events were in large part sponsored by those same professors and their student followers, who made clever use of the justified dissatisfaction on the part of the enormous majority of students and turned an unpolitical event into demonstrations, making abundant use of the method of pressure and blackmail.

This is evidenced by many views of those self-styled ideologues used to lead the mass of students astray. For example, STUDENT (special edition No 1, 4 June 1968) carried a professor's speech delivered at the Law School in Belgrade, from which we quote the following excerpt: "It is easy to see that there are quite a few reasons for unrest, disturbance and dissatisfaction. The world in which we live is far from being what we would like, and hardly in any respect does it resemble the world we would like to embrace as our own. What is being created everywhere around us, that powerful public apparatus which breaks down and encompasses everything, that sluggish and hypocritical social milieu which depresses and overwhelms us, all of this is lagging far behind Marx's humanistic vision of a human community, if it has any relation to it at all."

Another professor at the School of Philosophy in Sarajevo (4 June 1968) interpreted in this way the "causes of the rebellion in Belgrade": "... young people have not reconciled themselves to the fact that the prospects of Yugoslav society in the future are clouded over and lost."

This is shown still more clearly by the events in Zagreb. That is, they followed after the Belgrade strike had been learned of, and when we overlook the usual solidarity among students, then it becomes obvious that they were responding to provocation by ultraism and in part also by the nationalism of infected little groups of students and certain professors. What they wanted above all was to obstruct the existing social and political institutions, as is in part indicated by the chronology we have given of precisely those events, and above all by their proclamation in which the LCY Program is nowhere mentioned. Yet the second point of the proclamation does say that the

working class, together with the Marxist intelligentsia, should become the real decisionmaker on all key sociopolitical issues, which is a notorious PRAXIS-oriented thesis aimed directly at disavowal of the LCY.

On the other hand in Zagreb there were nationalists operating covertly under the shield of the program of the League of Communists, and it was very difficult to identify them, especially since for a time they were acting shoulder-to-shoulder with the radical-left groupings, but then, after the latter had begun to lose the dominant position among the students, they attempted to take the initiative into their own hands. The thesis they came forward with, nevertheless, revealed their intentions unambiguously. At the rally in the Student Center they called upon the students to abandon all the rhetoric about socialism, humanism, brotherhood and unity of our nationalities and adopt appropriately developed economic conceptions. (The year 1971 clearly demonstrated the consequences of that viewpoint.)

We should also say that the ideological leaders who figured as the spokesmen of the students had to come before the public with demands which were derived from society's problems and which a majority of the students could support. Nevertheless, even here nothing new was said, since even in late March, and then at the joint session of the Presidium and Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the LCY (20 May 1968) it was stated that there was a lag in working out the conceptions for future development of the socioeconomic and political system, in finding true answers to current issues and in realizing the policy that had been adopted by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, particularly in implementing the socioeconomic reform, and in the most recent past all this had led to enactment of the Guidelines.

But the way in which the demands were presented is of interest. Here we are dealing with the method of pressure and blackmail with the express intention of having someone "from above" resolve the social difficulties that had arisen, which primarily meant an appeal to centralism on the one hand and on the other a failure to understand the essence of self-management and the sociohistorical framework in which it makes its appearance.

It is therefore inaccurate to say that the June events were a conflict between the progressive socialist forces and the politocracy, precisely because certain demands were made in such radical fashion (the demand for full employment, and radical reduction of social inequities and redistribution of the national income follow by and large the principles of leveling) but they played right into the hands of that entire front of statist forces which had taken up battle emplacements against the reform--on the edge, that is, of the politocracy. After all, at the given moment of history those demands could not be met otherwise than by a renewal of government power and centralization, and they meant a blow to the policy of intensive economic development and to self-management, a return to autarky and extensive economic development, a strengthening of centralism and statism, instead of a withering away of the state and the development of socialist self-management.

They were, then, in opposition to the direction which later social development has taken toward destatization and decentralization, the results of which have become part of the foundations on which we are building our self-managed community today.

In conclusion it is also worth saying that it was the principal figures in the June events (the organized groups of teachers and students we have mentioned) who spoke in the name of "freedom" and "democracy," not caring a whit that by those actions and intentions they were threatening democracy in our country.

In a statement made to the public immediately after the events in Belgrade President Tito had the following remarks to make in this connection: "... gradually as those demonstrations developed and after they were carried from the streets to the auditoriums and lecture halls at the university, there was a certain infiltration of various elements alien to us and not based on socialist viewpoints, elements not based on the positions taken by the Eighth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, elements not in favor of implementing the economic reform. In short, there was an infiltration of those elements which wanted to take advantage of this situation for their own purposes. They included various tendencies and various elements, from the most reactionary to the most extreme, pseudoradical elements...."

[29 Jul 78, pp 18-20]

[Text] Eyewitness Account

Slavko Sajber: "I Told Some of Them at the Time That Everything to the Left of the Left Was Rightwing"

We talked about the events of June 1968 with Slavko Sajber, who at that time was a member of the Zagreb City Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia and who happened to be at what is called the hub of events in the Student Center.

"That was a strange year," Sajber says. "Looking at the events of the world as a whole, in my opinion the young generation had at that time gotten over the shock it had experienced in grasping the horrors of the recent worldwide slaughter and the danger of a new one, having come to understand almost fully the world in which it lived and all its contradictions and peculiarities. In my judgment many of those rebellious young people's movements presaged something constructive; the young people in the West wanted to change society, the young people in Yugoslavia on the other hand wanted to achieve faster realization of those goals which we had so clearly pronounced in our programs and laws."

Sajber, however, stresses that there is no basis whatsoever for equating events in our country with those in the world, which, according to him, has

been done by a small number of young people, but also by quite a few of those who put themselves in the leadership of that "rebellion"--especially certain professors gathered around PRAXIS and several people known even at that time as nationalists.

"To say that events, say, in West Germany and in Yugoslavia had the same roots, sources or whatever you want to call the spark which aroused our young people to express their ideas and views in demonstrations and rallies, would be a manifestation either of error or heavy politics. Neither the one nor the other is inherent in our young people, in the end it proved that," Sajber said.

"I was sympathetic to the views in Zagreb, Belgrade and other places all over Yugoslavia until it became clear that sinister forces and the quasileft and the real right wing, groups and grouplets of people--most of them university teachers--who were attempting to bend the affair in the direction of their own ideas and ideologies and to use them for their own unclean and obscure aims and interests had become involved in the reaction to certain problems and deformations proper to young people. It is clear that all that was covered over by so-called leftwing slogans--after all, it is equally clear that our young generation is socialist and leftward-oriented, and nothing else would have even a minimum chance.

"I said at the time to some of the youth leaders that everything that is further to the left than the left is rightwing. It is like flying an airplane eastward--and if you go too far--you cross the dateline and come to the west. Some of them understood that and accepted it, and others did not. Many of the latter escalated in 1971, which means that in 1968 they had already crossed the dateline--they were actually rightwing even at that time."

Some Could Not and Some Would Not Understand

"I would like to explain some of my reflections--although memories of those events have faded. I would like to say that the young people in the West stood up against the establishment, while young people in our country rose up against the protracted resolution of numerous problems in our society. The purpose there was to tear down the old in order to build the new--while in our case the purpose was to promote faster construction of the new. This is a specific feature of our events, which some could not and some would not understand. Moreover, there is nothing new in what I say. The petty politicians who seize the opportunity to take over guidance of the action of the young people were mainly interested in an attack on the LCY, while our party it was that led the people into battle and simultaneously overthrew both fascism and capitalism in our country, which settled accounts with Stalin, which initiated the processes of a showdown with statism, nationalism, technocracy, and so on. The party--though not alone--but at the head of the movement of both young people and old people, in the leadership of our nationalities and the working class, is the creator of all our achievements and the driving force behind the action to clear up the adverse aspects and

problems which have existed and now exist. That is the way it was up to 1968, and that is the way it is today in 1978."

Question: How did you come into direct contact with the events at Zagreb University? How come you were the one?

Answer: At that time I had already left my professional post in the City Committee, having remained a member of it, and I was the director of Slavija Lloyd--as indeed I am today. At a meeting of the City Committee which was attended by certain republic leaders and comrades from the university--at the time of these events--I was designated to go to the Student Center and to coordinate the City Committee's work there with the University Committee and the League of Students. It was thought that as a former youth leader--and a somewhat resourceful man in some eyes, I and the comrades from the university might in various ways--including exerting a direct influence among young people--have an effect on events and explore ways out of the situation that had come about, not because of the ideas which the students advocated at the beginning of the entire action, but because of the deformations and escalations in a direction imposed by certain teachers who were manipulators.

Strange Bedfellows

Question: Who were those teachers?

Answer: I am referring to individuals who, incidentally, except for the ideas which they have analyzed in their offices, never did anything, and even today are not doing anything, to overcome the obstacles which our society confronts. All they do is to point to the obstacles--usually magnifying them and distorting them. They included vociferous followers of PRAXIS, Pugwashites, nationalists, former followers of the Cominform--strange bedfellows indeed.

Naturally there were also responsible, sober and correct professors who, however and unfortunately, did not receive the same number of minutes for their speeches or attain the same number of decibels as those others. The former acted in one way in public and in another way behind the scenes. They went off to some of the offices in the Student Center and then brewed up their poison on the basis of interest groups--and also coalitions--then they coated the poison with leftwing rhetoric and then dealt it out to a mass of between 2,000 and 3,000 students from balconies and improvised platforms. It was surprising to see Veselica, Djodan, Ivo Supek, Gajo Petrovic, Rudi Supek and certain others--who supposedly were from opposing schools--engaged on the same job in the same political kitchen. I don't know if they were, but they acted very similarly or in the same way--enflaming passions, calling people into the streets, calling for demonstrations and destruction, interjecting as if incidentally a mass of very perfidious and dangerous bits of misinformation. They gave us plenty to do.

Question: To what extent was Zagreb a part of the events in the country's student movement at that time?

Answer: The events in Zagreb took much the same course as in other communities. We were not against ferment among the students or against their becoming political, nor were we in favor of playing down the problems inherited from the past or caused by the slow implementation of the economic and social reform; and we had nothing against young people raising their own particular problems and putting them on the agenda. We had meetings in the university schools, in the dormitories, meetings with the students and professors in the League of Communists and the Socialist Youth League, and so on. We were very much against one-sidedness and exaggeration, negativism, etc., and we were also against street demonstrations, heckling and destruction, which some people pressed for from the very beginning of the unrest. We spotted what was authentically on the left and what was quasileftwing, what was truly on the right and what was concealed behind leftwing rhetoric, we spotted the coalitions of those rightwing-leftwing and leftwing-rightwing groupings. Unfortunately we ourselves did not have complete unity in looking on those events--since some individuals in the city and republic took exception to the judgments and firm position of the City Committee, and that made it harder for us to act.

Question: What was your most important task at that point at the very heart of events--in the Student Center?

Answer: To control the deviations that had already occurred, to prevent escalation of the destructive element and manipulation, to stand in the way of the spread of the incredible rumors which were supposed to enflame passions, and to coordinate action there on the scene with the action being taken by the City Committee. You can imagine how important it was, say, to prevent the spread of the rumor that students had been massacred in Belgrade, that trucks were carrying away the dead, and that Rankovic's tanks were on the move toward Zagreb, that barricades should be erected around the Student Center and all the university schools (some of the schools had begun to drag heavy pieces of furniture to the entrances, and so on). This deliberate fabrication was cooked up by the self-appointed chiefs of operation Djodan and Veselica--it was even sent around by telegram--and it seriously excited and confused gullible people.

Tails Were Cut Off by Persuasion or by Force

After arriving at the Student Center we chased Djodan and Veselica--who were in cahoots with individuals in the city and republic leadership--from the offices of the "headquarters" and prevented them from operating in the almost legal manner they had succeeded in up to that time. We also cut the tails off the other groups either by persuasion or by force and prevented them from working on the premises of the Student Center, where they had equipment and other "revolutionary" paraphernalia for their action. It was not so very easy, but it went quickly. I must say that we were joined and

excellent work was done by many students who quickly saw where all that was going and the turn it was taking, by many party members, professors and a majority of the comrades on the University Committee, as well as comrades from the University Board of the League of Students and comrades from the Student Center. It was important to have those who belonged there involved, rather than we from outside, or the police, who were nowhere around.

Question: Did you succeed in tying together the tangled threads, and did everything go smoothly with the coordination?

Answer: Well, everything did not exactly go smoothly--but there were fewer problems with those in the center than with those outside. Individuals belonging to the city and republic leadership were acting in evasion of or in opposition to the positions taken by the City Committee. There were also odious attempts to have the police intervene in order to fan the flames. We maintained close contact with the City Committee and reported that things were going well, that there was no need at all to aggravate the situation. Gruic, who was then secretary of the City Committee, told me that the City Committee had nothing to do with such a position. It was clear that people were operating along two lines, and we intensified our caution and activity in our own domain and along our own course of action: explaining and political action, separating the mass from the leaders, and increasing the number of those siding with us.

Question: Which events or episodes you know of have been etched in your memory and reflect or illustrate the atmosphere in the Student Center?

Answer: There are many. First I remember how the "leaders" Veselica and Djodan left their "headquarters" complaining that they had been authorized by esteemed comrades and that we were throwing them out on our own hook. But in cowardly fashion they did leave and then continued to loiter on the grounds. It was amusing to read afterward in VUS [VJESNIK U SRIJEDU] how the two of them had been the leaders of the "1968 student movement." Or, when those in the theater decided to send emissaries to work organizations and to the radio and television station and VJESNIK with proclamations, someone said that the police would stand in their way. One fellow got up and suggested that Sajber, a member of the City Committee, be held as a hostage until the emissaries returned. Comrade Stokalo rushed out of the theater to tell me about this and met me right at the entrance to the theater, which was precisely where I was headed. So I did not become a hostage. We were also lucky with the emissaries from Belgrade. The young man and woman came to the door (which still had a sign saying "headquarters" left by the "leaders" who had been removed), asked if this was the headquarters, who was in charge here, and so on. We said they had come to the right place. They brought messages and reports and asked for reports to take back, and they also brought leaflets stating among other things that Yugoslavia was facing civil war, that the students were not going to be taken in by false promises, that the workers should be raised up in rebellion, and so on. They expressed the dissatisfaction of the Belgrade staff that they had not taken

to the streets in Zagreb, that their colleagues in Zagreb had allowed themselves to be "forced into courtyards and theaters," etc. They ended by asking me what I would do now. Nothing, I answered, except buy you a ticket back to Belgrade on the express. There were quite a few such scenes.

Question: What were the subsequent developments, and how did it end?

Answer: The falling away was evident every day. More and more of the students began to see it was nonsensical to continue these marathon rallies. More and more they could spot the manipulation, could see that the "chiefs" were strange political bedfellows, there was less and less to say and to hear, and, the important thing, no one from outside was reacting either nervously or roughly, and no one was joining them--least of all the workers in the factories--which the "chiefs" had persistently promised. Those professors and student "leaders" who saw that they were losing the battle, that they could not bring the mass of young people into confrontation with the League of Communists and this society, were getting more and more nervous. That was the crucial thing, this more mature consciousness and awareness on the part of the students--and our actions were aimed in that direction. That last day we were also talking with a group of professors, Vanja Sutlic in particular, who agreed to address the students in the theater and appealed to them to go home. He said something like this: "We have said everything we had to say, to say anything more would be to refute what has already been said. We raised our voices against the deformations in our society, but not against the society--continuing our action would mean that we ourselves are becoming a deformation."

We believed that that kind of intervention was necessary and that nothing more would be required to break down the house of cards. We were right. It then was clear who was thinking what and in what manner about everything, about everything that had happened and everything that was hoped for, or was merely thought to be achievable by a single demonstration, for lack of a better word. So, out of the approximately 2,000 students in and around the theater--all went away after singing the International except for some 70 led by Djodan and Veselica, who hooted down Sutlic's words and stirred around in the empty theater for a few minutes more. That was in fact all they could do.

Question: What sort of lessons, Comrade Sajber, do you draw from all of this, and what sort of lessons ought to be drawn?

Why Do We Make of the Year 1968 Something That It Was Not?

Answer: In addition to my mentioning Professor Sutlic and his quite proper speech to the young people, I would like to add that it was not he who saved the day, as the saying goes, from turning to something worse. What I mean is that his words would have been lost in the hooting if the young people listening to him, who had come to stand apart from those others, had not become aware. It was that, that awareness on the part of young people, which

was the most valuable thing that those events brought to light, and we can still count rather seriously on that. The year '68, you see, clearly showed that full confidence should be placed in young people, and they should be given the place they deserve. They showed on that occasion that they do deserve it.

We have not altogether taken advantage of the lessons of 1968. Even today we frequently say that the doors of the League of Communists or some other door should be open to young people. This is not right. It is after all their party, their society. What door? How long is there to be a door? It reminds me of the saying about knocking on an open door--but is the door wide open? But it is a mistake to set the problems of young people aside as something separate and outside the problems of society, and this is a manifestation of our old disease of thinking that young people must only listen and learn from their elders, and that is all there is to it! Fortunately that has never been the case. Moreover, I think that the elders can sometimes learn from the young, and that is not a bad thing to listen to them from time to time. I also think that the year 1968 was only an episode. The foundations of our society, the social edifice and the constant work being done to add to it and improve it have occurred--to take only years ending in the numeral 8--in 1938 and 1948 and 1958 and 1978. There will also be a 2008! Why, then, make of the year 1968 something that it was not? However, I agree with the positions expressed by young people that year--as indeed today--to the effect that programs must be carried out, and I also accept the fact that we who are older than the young, and those who are older than us, sometimes take ourselves as the unit of measurement and behave toward young people in the same manner that caused us to sharply reproach those older than ourselves.

[5 Aug 78, pp 26-28]

[Text] Marinko Gruic: "The Followers of PRAXIS and the Nationalists Acted Together and Carried on Direct Collaboration"

Question: We spoke about the events at Zagreb University in June 1968 with Marinko Gruic, who at that time was secretary of the Zagreb City Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia.

Answer: The student unrest in Yugoslavia, in Belgrade, Zagreb and elsewhere, should certainly be examined in the broader context of socioeconomic and sociopolitical developments in the country, and indeed in the city. The socioeconomic problems had become clotted, and the economic or social reform was at that time going through serious trials. Every inroad of the reform was met with pressures and blows from powerful antireform structures, conceptins and forces. Some of the adverse occurrences and aspects accompanying this in that complicated situation had been drawing attention, especially among young people.

In this connection one must by no means neglect the situation at the university either.

Question: Are you thinking about the protracted length of studies, the slow development of self-management?

Answer: Yes, precisely. To a fair extent the student is an object in the teaching and educational process, and also in life at the university. It is clear that we cannot place an equal sign between all the schools of the university. Positive inroads had been made, but on the whole it was still obvious that the old relations had become petrified, and to a certain extent, along with the broader social problems, this had contributed to the dissatisfaction of the young generation.

This Was Our Own "Native" Product

Question: Are the student disturbances our "product" or the consequence and reflection of the student rebellion in the West?

Answer: In my opinion we should look first for the roots of student dissatisfaction in our own conditions, in our situation at that time. The student unrest is, then, our native "product." The student rebellion in the West might have only given an additional impetus.

In assessing the student unrest, it seems to me that we should also pay attention to certain specific features in particular communities.

Question: Which, for example, in Zagreb?

Answer: First of all, in spite of various attempts at pressure and manipulation, I feel that by and large the student unrest was successful in achieving political articulation without taking on any serious forms of excess. There were no riots or street demonstrations, though that danger did threaten. Also, when we are discussing Zagreb, we should give these disturbances their true dimension. That is, people talk about some kind of movement, about the large numbers involved, and so on, but in fact at the height of the greatest flood tide in those actions only about 2,000 or 3,000 students were involved, which is some 10 or 15 percent of all the students in Zagreb at that time. Among them there were also quite small but more aggressive nuclei, but the majority of those present were motivated by young people's interests.

The enormous majority of the students, there is no doubt about it, were committed to socialism, and even in their dissatisfaction and rebellion they were expressing the desire for faster progress. To be sure, there was also some naivete, and sometimes support was expressed for things which would objectively have taken us backward from the standpoint of society if they had been adopted.

But unacceptable ideological and political currents, that existed in the city and elsewhere even before that, attempted to take advantage of the

student ferment in Zagreb and to put it to bad use. At the very outset an attempt was made to impose a small group from one of the previous university boards of the League of Students, which advocated some sort of what we might call the theses of peasant radicalism, but both intellectually and politically it was both elementary and flimsy. When the unrest took on a certain intensity, the nucleus from PRAXIS soon became actively involved in an organized way; it saw the student unrest as the "beginning of the true social revolution" and wanted to lead it. It displaced the previous little group on the scene without much effort.

There were also other currents and eddies that became involved in the action, including certain individuals whose statements and behavior smacked somewhat of nationalism. The arguments and outlines of the nationalist concept began even then to come out in the open and attempt to impose themselves. For a time the PRAXIS people and these nationalists, still disguised to some extent (but later out in the open) acted together and were involved in direct collaboration, and then later they separated.

Both the PRAXIS people and the nationalists attempted to use the student dissatisfaction and to manipulate the students for political ends.

Question: Was it really a movement?

Answer: There was ferment, several thousand students were involved, and there was a certain ideological and political unrest. But it really is difficult to speak of a movement, since even the smallest nucleus--in concepts, in ideological and political commitments and in makeup--was extremely motley. It is difficult and indeed impossible to organize a true movement with people who are heterogeneous in their political ideology and social origins.

No one has spoken publicly about this up to now.

Question: What was the situation in the City Committee, and what was the reaction to events?

Answer: By and large nothing has been said about this in public up to now; that is, there has been some gossip and arbitrary assertions, all depending on how it suited various people at a particular moment.

At the beginning there was unity and agreement on the basic approach in the leading political structures in the city and republic, but in the course of the student disturbances certain differences and discord and direct conflicts did occur.

The City Committee and the Executive Committee of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Zagreb adopted the following essential points at the very outset:

i. to be resolute in opposing disorders and attempts to obtain demands by pressure and bypassing existing organisms, since anything else would signify

a negation of the relations of self-management and would play into the hands of certain antiself-management forces;

ii. to do everything possible at the given moment toward consistent implementation of the economic and social reform, in which there was a serious lag, which had contributed to the dissatisfaction and the student ferment. Also to work more resolutely on faster and more effective resolution of the outstanding problems of students.

Differences and Discord

Question: If basic positions like that were unanimously adopted, what then was the basis of the differences and discord?

Answer: The manner of implementing the resolution and especially the question of the attitude toward the various currents that existed. Several officials in the republic, the president of the city conference and some of the university officials were inclined toward a somewhat cautious approach and negotiations, toward negotiations which would have pursued the strategy of using one and then the other current at various times, that is, of playing one current against the other. To be specific, the PRAXIS people were first contacted and talked to, and later individuals were used who displayed radicalistic commitments with a nationalistic flavor, who afterward were given broad room in which to act. At one point that group in the leadership, or actually its very core, was prepared for the most drastic undertaking, one which would have had very far-reaching and adverse repercussions for this society.

At the same time the City Committee and some of the activists at the university favored waging the battle on theplatform of the League of Communists, relying more strongly on the working class and the majority of students, and going into battle with the most unacceptable ideological and political currents (both the PRAXIS people and the nationalists), rather than to cooperate with them.

Two Lines and Two Points

Question: And what happened in practice; what specific form did this situation take at the City Committee in Mesnicka Street?

Answer: On the more delicate issues and at the more sensitive moments the negotiations with the PRAXIS people and then with the nationalists often took place without the knowledge and as a rule without the involvement of the City Committee. When we learned about these actions and spotted the adverse political repercussions, the City Committee and we who were members of it took steps which we deemed politically justified.

To be specific, at certain points we had two lines (in fact even two points) from the Student Center where the events were taking place: one went to the

president of the city conference, the other to the secretary of the City Committee (something similar occurred again in the 1971 events).

On the line defined by the resolutions of the city and university committees, binding members of the League of Communists to use every legal political means to fight against disorders and street demonstrations in this situation, on Wednesday, 5 June 1968, D. Bilandzic, a member of the City Committee, was sent at night to the Student Center to convey that position to the group of university professors and students (mainly gathered around the editorial board of the journal PRAXIS) who had taken over certain offices of the University Board of the League of Students and who were preparing slogans and other texts to be used in continuing the student ferment, for ("peaceful") street demonstrations and for appeals for the workers to join in. Since they did not obey that position and did not carry out the resolution of the committees, because they violated the principle of democratic centralism, three members of the League of Communists (Petrovic, Caldarevic and Vranic) were expelled from the League of Communists a few days later.

There were no great differences on matters of principle at that point concerning the PRAXIS current even in spite of certain cautious moves taken by individuals belonging to the city and republic forums.

But the differences soon became evident with respect to the increasingly aggressive behavior of individuals who had evidenced nationalistic commitments in the student ferment.

On 5 June the PRAXIS people and the nationalists acted together and cooperated very closely, to say no more than that, in rallies outdoors and in the movie theater at the Student Center and in the newly formed action committee of "revolutionary students." However, when the University Committee, with the support of the City Committee and several members of the Central Committee, rejected the proclamation in the night between the 5th and 6th of June, and when it was decided that the party platform would be taken into battle at the faculties and the university, Djodan and Veselica took advantage of this and under the appearance of a resolute struggle for the policy of the League of Communists or, more precisely, the "progressive core of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," utterly radicalizing certain theses, obviously wanted to achieve other political ends. While Djodan and Veselica were aggressively pushing forward, and some of the leading people in the city and republic were sanctioning them, encouraging them and praising them to the skies, the City Committee was taking steps against them which the leadership structures mentioned above did not take kindly to.

"What Do You Mean, What Is the Matter? They Are Talking About a Coup d'Etat...."

Question: What was that about?

Answer: When the PRAXIS grouping, thanks to the organized action of the League of Communists, began to lose its support on 6 June and to actually

retreat, Djodan, Veselica and some others abruptly set themselves apart from them and tried to take over the leadership entirely under the cover of the fight for the policy of the party, but obviously to achieve certain other aims. The nature of those aims could be divined from some of the statements and actions, especially of Djodan at the rally in the Student Center and at the School of Philosophy, and of Veselica at the School of Economics.

At one point on 6 June it turned out that these were not any sort of accidental "flights," but far-reaching ambitions. Now they and their followers took up space in the Student Center and set up the "Headquarters of Revolutionary Forces."

It is interesting how we learned about this. Marijan Detoni, a professor at the Academy of Pictorial Arts, came into the City Committee that day all excited. We have been friends for many years. I asked him: "What is it, Marijan, what has happened to you?" He looked at me: "What do you mean, what is the matter? There is talk of some kind of coup d'etat, of tanks which are supposedly heading toward Zagreb and the like."

He said that they had received a message at the academy, actually termed "Order No 1," which spoke about an extremely problematical situation, about how barricades had to be set up and preparations made for every eventuality, including the worst. That order had alarmed and confused people, which is why he had come to the City Committee to see what was going on.

I asked who had sent the telegram and where it had come from, who had signed it? I thought it was someone's bad joke. He told me that the order had been sent by some "Headquarters of the Revolutionary Forces," that it was sent from the Student Center and that it had been signed by commander in chief Djodan and deputy commander in chief Veselica.

I immediately agreed with Slavko Sajber, who on behalf of the City Committee had spent a long time in the Student Center at the time of the events, that he and Vlado Stokalo, secretary of the Commission for Ideology, would again go to the center and order Djodan and Veselica to stop their activity and leave the premises, or else we would call the police to throw them out. Sajber did this and other jobs and tasks in the center effectively.

I really do not know how Djodan and Veselica set up their "headquarters" and undertook such activities, nor whose consent they might possibly have had. I do know, however, that it was said at the time that Djodan and Veselica had been authorized by one group from the republic and city leadership (in Mesnicka Street), and dismissed by another group (again from Mesnicka Street). In any case, at that time both of them were glad to be seen in the company of certain officials and treated, particularly Veselica, as celebrities.

Question: You mentioned some preparatory project which would have far-reaching and adverse repercussions. What was that about?

Answer: In the afternoon of 6 June, when the student ferment in Zagreb had already begun to fall off and when participants in the Student Center had gathered (withdrawn) into the movie theater, or actually occupied it without authority, several officials of the republic and city met and took a decision for the police to intervene. They obviously detoured around us from the City Committee by intention, since at that time we were in the building.

Let Them Issue a Written Order!

When the comrades from the police told us what was being demanded, we asked for those who had made that decision to issue a written order to that effect, since the consequences--should it occur--would be drastic, and it should be known who was responsible. Otherwise all the odium would fall on the police.

In other words, we were for preventing the demonstrations and disorders in the street by all permissible means, even by police action if necessary. But to intervene with the police indoors in the phase of holding rallies in the verbal "revolution" we deemed it to be an act that was politically unacceptable and morally out of the question. Before any possible use of the police, I asked that an extraordinary meeting of the City Committee be held, saying that otherwise I would withdraw. I was supported by the members of the City Committee who were present and also by certain comrades who happened to be there, Viktor Posaric, a member of the City Committee, in particular, who had just returned from the Student Center.

That is why the police action did not take place; had it been necessary for the police to intervene, it would not have done so on its own, but by command. As far as I could gather the senior officials of the city's Secretariat for Internal Affairs and police were against the police going into the movie theater and clashing with about 1,000 students, professors and others who were there.

Question: Was there cooperation and coordinated activity between the party leaderships of Zagreb and Belgrade?

Answer: The cooperation between the two committees was exceptionally good during the student unrest. Every day we exchanged opinions by telephone, particularly with comrades V. Vlahovic, the president, and S. Zatezalo, then the secretary of the Belgrade City Committee. We regularly informed one another and agreed on the action to be taken.

Interview of Celestin Sardelic

> We put several questions to Celestin Sardelic, who in 1968 was chairman of the University Board of the League of Students of Zagreb University.

Question: On Tuesday, 4 June 1968, immediately, that is, after the people in Zagreb learned of the student demonstrations, you traveled to Belgrade. Why?

Answer: Since at that time I was the chairman of the University Board, I attended the meeting which was held in the headquarters of the Presidium of the League of Yugoslav Students in Belgrade. The meeting was called in connection with the student events, and during it the principal information concerning the events at the universities was presented, and basic assessments of the events were adopted.

Question: Rather frequent emphasis is put on the fact that the student actions of that time were organized through other channels than the League of Students. At times the fault is laid at the door of the League of Students. What do you think about that?

Answer: A certain critical attitude toward the political organization of students is rooted in the universal nature of any movement which smacks of institutions and organizations (those which are established at least, if not its own), and in this case it is a question of specific reasons which showed that in large part our student organization was caught flat-footed by the student rebellion and because of its inertness did not show the greatest competence in giving an ideological shape and organizational structure to the political ideas and social unrest of young people.

Question: You were at the center of activity during the June events. What was your judgment at that time? How did you personally see them?

Answer: We emphasized at that time, and even today we hold to the same judgment, that by and large it was a student rebellion with a socialist orientation. In saying that I do not imply that we were dealing with a consistent ideological program; on the contrary, there was a whole spectrum of orientations whose common element was their criticism of the status quo and irregularities and their radicalization of demands for consistent construction of socialist self-management. Even then, of course, rightwing interpretations of the student demands were spotted, although the movement as a whole had a leftist-radical orientation.

Basically what we wanted was to preserve the constructive socialist program of the student demands, to eliminate the political troublemakers (who were trying to make hay of the crisis situation that had come about), to oppose the method of pressure and street demonstrations, and to avert a possible confrontation between students and law enforcement agencies.

Question: Who is really the heir of 1968?

Answer: The assessments of the student events in Yugoslavia frequently range along a continuum from a fundamentalist rejection of all the student demands to an uncritical acceptance of all the slogans and forms of behavior. Instead of avoiding debate and engaging in ideological mystification, I feel that we must provide a Marxist analysis of the events and make a critical judgment of the social roots and purport of the student events. The June events in Yugoslavia, however much they may have resembled a

reflection of the world year of student rebellion, nevertheless came about in an altogether concrete social context that abounded in elements of social and political crisis.

Since the events of June 1968 there has been a kind of phenomenon, or tendency if you like, which we might call a battle for the ideological and political legacy of the student events. In the seventies, in the framework of the nationalistic mass movement, there was a rightwing attempt to make use of the student events, and since that time (and even today) there have been attempts to interpret the June events from leftwing and radical positions. My opinion is that we must constantly make efforts to counteract the ideological mystification of all attempts, whether they be rightwing or "leftist" to make use of the ideological trace and political legacy of the student events.

In that context--today in an essentially altered social and political situation--it amounts to ideological provocation, and it may also constitute political opposition, to interpret the student events from the positions of leftwing radicalism.

Zeljko Brihta's Recollection of the 1968 Student Rebellion in Western Europe

> Zeljko Brihta covered the student rebellion in Western Europe in the spring of 1968 as a correspondent of VJESNIK. Here is his assessment of events 10 years ago and what he has to say about the destinies of the student leaders of that time.

Only memories, most of them melancholy, have remained, or even less than that. The angry young French and West German students from 1968 are no longer students in 1978 (in that time they either finished or dropped out), nor are they young (nature takes its toll), nor are they angry, at least not enough to be a danger either to themselves or to others. Some of them are still relatively well known as progressive figures or leftists, they are still dissatisfied with society and the world around them; some have made their peace with the establishment and have crossed to the other side of the barricade taken down long since. But all have by and large realized what they were capable of and what they were not capable of. And since they achieved little--and in that manner could not have achieved more; unfortunately.

The former "Red Danny," Daniel Cohn-Bendit--whose hair and speech were red--is selling books in Frankfurt. Rudi Dutschke is writing books and doing scholarship, subdued and resigned, but not mute and tranquil, at least not altogether. Horst Mahler, the lawyer and defender of the restless young people, is sitting in jail as a terrorist and self-critically describes those to whom he--later, but now no longer--belonged, the Badermainhof group: "They weakened the progressive forces, to some extent they demoralized them and probably isolated and discredited socialists with the people

even more." And again: "In the Babylonian confusion of theories (this) left was bound together only by a negative common denominator: it abstractly rejected capitalism."

Some no longer reject it, but work for it--as well-paid managers, public relations men, specialists, whatever is available. Abstraction, however, is inherent in them--or, as they would say, immanent in them--long before that was understood by Mahler and certain others. Yes, to be honest about it: at that time, at the beginning, this newsman found those whom he came to know back in 1967 in West Germany to be quite likable, and he was not the only one. He sympathized with them to the extent that the university system at that place and time could only appear antipathetic to any progressive man. They wanted to clear it of the cobwebs accumulated over the centuries, and they opened wide the doors and windows of the university, and they created a wind and a draft.

But--and that was not the reason: whosoever sows the wind, reaps the whirlwind; sometimes even a whirlwind is necessary, the only question being whom it carry where? The further they emerged from their own precinct (in both France and West Germany), the more abstract and "alienated" the angry students became, and the less they knew what they wanted, where they were going, and with whom. When they left the lecture hall and went into the street, in every sense of that expression, they did not get closer to the factory, to the workers. Regardless of the various exceptions, they remained alone, a kind of intellectualist elite, albeit "progressive" (in one way or another). It is not far from loneliness to despair. Those who make an assault on their own, with no base behind them, may end up as desperadoes.

They themselves, then, were carried off by the draft--not because the order against which they fought (or thought they were fighting) was a good one, not because it could not be better or should not be replaced by a better and different one. It carried them off because in time they became destructive (and only that), because it seemed they were only destroying the bad and old without knowing what the good and new was which was to be built on the ruins, because--by contrast with many revolutionaries--they did not know what kind of society they were striving for if they were striving for anything except disorder and anarchy. Having found themselves necessarily in a vicious cycle, they went astray and distanced themselves from the true concerns of their countries--and also from the true people in them.

And so: "A high percentage of today's rebellious young men will be tickled pink to be hired as actors in the social comedy against which they are rebelling today.... Those in Paris who are today shouting along the boulevards are risking nothing more than one semester, and not even that, but when the shooting was going on in Algeria, they were not so vociferous.... It is not entertaining to live without ideas for decades, so once again there is a thirst for 'The New,' but no one is able to explain what 'The New' really is.... According to Marcuse: a 'revolutionary intelligentsia' running the world, but the professor does not tell us what that is supposed

to mean.... Ridiculous formula...." (Miroslav Krleza, DNEVNIK [journal], May 1968)

And so? What is left? What has remained? What was engendered (or degenerated) by the year 1968 in the West? They were looking for the impossible at the wrong time and in the wrong place and in the wrong way, they were attacking windmills like Don Quixote, and they were churned up by the sails except for those who chose to run into the mill, where they are happy and contented even today.

[12 Aug 78, pp 28-29]

[Text] Interviews With Student Participants in the June Events

Writing about the student events in 1968, on which we are publishing in this issue the third (and last) installment, is more like walking a tightrope than following a well-known and traveled path where everyone knows all the facts and knows what he thinks about it. We are also persuaded of this by the great diversity in fundamental assessments of the June events and by the aversion which some of the participants have to recalling in public the roles they had in those events and especially the way in which they "played" them. In this third installment we present the results of our interviews of students who in 1968 were politically mature and grew up in confrontations in their own ranks and outside them and later found their place in society. They were not statists then, nor are they today. The reader will immediately note that even the student ranks, for want of a better term, were not unified in their judgments and assessments, and in particular that some of them thought differently from the people we have already interviewed. Some are at odds with VJESNIK, both of that time and also at present. This polemical attitude, which is more or less explicit, demonstrates in several ways the heterogeneity in attitudes, but it also points up (as one person we interviewed actually mentioned) the need for a thorough study of 1968, both of the student unrest and also of the broader social context in which it fitted and out of which it grew. But this analytical measurement, this digging through archive materials, this kind of study and assessment, are not, we feel, a newspaper's job. Following the interviews of participants in the June events, we are also adding a comment on what PRAXIS wrote on this topic in 1971.

Interview of Slobodan Lang

Question: One of the participants in the student unrest in June 1968 was Slobodan Lang, at that time a relatively little known (at least for his

political actions) medical student. But in those years young and committed communists were making their appearance every day. Not long after that restless June Slobodan Lang became president of the League of Students of Zagreb University.

Answer: It seems to me that 1968 was a radical break in the social activism of young people. Until that time the activists were almost always from the schools of social sciences, while the "natural scientists" would make only the rare excursion into civic involvement. Only in the late sixties did students of architecture, technology, or, say, medicine begin to examine the content of their studies in a specific social context. The idea of socialist self-management was not sufficient in and of itself, and young people were openly asking: How am I to achieve this idea of socialist self-management, not in society at large, but in the most concrete terms? How is it to become a part of my own life? What does it mean--concretely?

Question: Those questions probably sprang up out of the position of students in society?

Answer: Of course. The standard of living of students at that time was really that of a beggar. That engendered the markedly leftist and radically oriented demands for inclusion of students in the process of self-management decisionmaking and for resolution of difficulties in the mechanism of self-management.

Today we should see the basic truth in those demands: none of the students at that time was seeking or fighting for a different kind of government of his own choosing. Not a single leftist principle was called into question, much less the overall aims of society. The students were in fact seeking complete achievement of the political system of self-management, not so they might become some kind of political powermongers, but so that they would really have an opportunity for direct decisionmaking in their workplace, in the university school or as future engineers in a factory.

Question: This made a fair impression on you at the time?

Answer: Indeed it did. There was a real sense that there should and had to be a faster advance in the development of social relations. One especially impressive aspect of this was that the students of the schools of the natural sciences rejected so decisively, clearly and committedly that technocratic logic to the effect that they ought not have anything to do with politics or, better put, with determined social commitment. I think that the change of direction on the part of that broad base gave rise to very important and worthwhile consequences. The political system is traveling along precisely those pathways the students were seeking (for work to be the standard of involvement, and of personal and collective satisfaction). Moreover, altogether new contents and ideas of use to society make their appearance. The development of ecology, for example, began in Yugoslavia in 1968, and the idea of urban sociology has also been developing. And in medicine, for

example, more and more strength is being gained by the idea that one does not treat the disease, but the patient as a man!

That is why I reacted at that time in a rather unexpected way (surprising even myself), but out of pure conviction. However, some found it strange at that time that I was "defending" the party, when I was not delegated.

Question: Was the party under attack?

Answer: At no time, as far as I know. A problem arose, however, because up until that time there had not been such open criticism of the party. Suddenly and very spontaneously there was natural Marxist criticism of errors in achieving the social goals that had been proclaimed. The student demands did not oppose those goals. On the contrary.

Nevertheless, there is no question that groups of various kinds did want to take advantage of that situation and that ferment. There were even those who intended to shape some completely new values overnight. I think that even in 1968 one could see what might happen over the next 3 or 4 years. It was along those lines that I spoke at the time, that was the position I tried to advocate.

It was incomprehensible to me, however, that a time could come when the party leadership would harbor mistrust of young people. That is almost like harboring a lack of confidence in themselves and in the party itself. After all, it is not possible that all the leftwing protests since 1945, particularly those coming from young people, are mere deviations. Even if we concede that some of them were--young people should be offered the opportunity to confirm and strengthen their communist commitment through concrete involvement. After all, even then it was clear that young people want the system of socialist self-management, but not as something belonging to someone else, but as something of their own. I therefore think that the expulsions from the League of Communists at that time were somewhat unnecessary, perhaps even hasty. It was said at the time that the main danger came from the ultraleft. However, subsequent events demonstrated that a far greater danger was coming from the right. After all, as far as I know, not a single left-oriented student of that time later became a nationalist!

Interview of Marin Gerskovic

Question: We put only one question to Marin Gerskovic, who in 1968 was a student in the School of Political Sciences and was president of the Commission for International Cooperation of the League of Yugoslav Students (and is now secretary of the Commission for International Relations and Cooperation of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia): How do you look upon the student events in 1968?

Answer: Before we begin this conversation I would like to say that I do not agree with the way in which your newspaper has taken up the topic of 1968.

The chronology and overall approach to the topic from the standpoint of recollections as to who did what and where makes it possible, as Sardelic has said, to use the year 1968 and the student unrest as a tool, but not from the positions of leftwing radicalism. On the contrary, VJESNIK's writing in three installments is evidence of the minimal dimensions of the danger of leftwing radicalism.

The approach to the topic in the first two installments gives the reader the idea that the most dangerous conflicts were in the committees and offices and causes him to conclude that the motive behind the articles written so far was not to analyze the social and political events of 1968, but an account of which the upshot is that 10 years later the debate still concerns people, their behavior and the need for decorations and punishment, and most probably this is all because of some present political motive of the most everyday variety.

The events at the university are presented as the central event of 1968, the events among the students are portrayed as an altogether unfounded rebellion inspired by "sinister forces" making a tandem of "leftwing radicals" and "nationalists." All of this, according to that scenario, ends with the well-known happy ending in which a majority of the students, after several days of "confusion," realize their error with the help of the "good guys" and renounce the "leaders" who had captured their allegiance. How nice it would be if political struggles were that simple!

I do, of course, remember those events, since I followed them both in Zagreb and in Belgrade. I have always looked upon them as a school for gaining political experience, in which a man tests himself and his positions.

I was 22 at the time, like most of the active students. I see no point whatsoever in drawing "reports" today about who did what, since all those reports are not only politically harmful, but they have a destiny similar to that experienced by the "report" of Veselica and Djodan in VUS.

I hope that this kind of discussion will not be continued in the pages of VJESNIK, and that everything that VJESNIK has written, assuming even the best intentions, should be taken only as an impetus for more serious work, so that those events are given their real dimensions and put in the space and time of overall social developments. That is what has been lacking in the account of events.

I will present just one statement as evidence: that the conficts around the auditorium in Student City in Belgrade were only a pretext (but not the cause) of the "student unrest" and that in both Belgrade and Zagreb there had already occurred a number of events at the university of which the June events can be taken as a logical consequence.

The late sixties (1965-1970) were important both on the international and the domestic scene. Though I agreed with the statement that what happened

at that time in Yugoslavia was authentically our own, as always is the case did have indirect or direct connections with events in the world. For us those were the years when the economic reform was becoming a social reform as well, when the guidelines were being adopted, and when the fight was being waged for the first congress of self-managers and over it, i.e., the Ninth LCY Congress was being prepared. The student events are only a part of those developments, and in large part a reaction to them, and for that reason they were different in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, and so on.

However different they were, they were also connected. An analysis would probably show the correctness of the thesis that there was political unity in the developments in Yugoslavia and a mutual linkage of everything that happened (and is happening) in each republic separately.

Once again, from the student standpoint, I would mention that at that time we were 20 years old, that we knew each other quite well, though we had been known to take different positions. Even today I can say that I know the positions that would be taken in various situations by every one of the participants I knew then during those events (and also in the 1971 events) at the university. After all, that was an exceptional and important test in which people in all disciplines and in different fields became active, and afterward it is certain that we did not remain the same as we were before.

So once again on this occasion I would like to encourage a more serious analysis which would show the place which those student and university events have in the overall context of the European scene, of the crisis in the international working class movement, in the overall changes taking place in our society and in the goals, Guidelines, constitutional amendments and changes in the party, as well as the place taken by unitaristic-centralistic, technocratic and nationalistic forces. Neither then nor now do those forces represent a relevant social force unless they are also at work in the League of Communists and in its leadership structures.

Interview of Inoslav Besker

Question: Inoslav Besker is today the editor in chief and responsible editor of the publishing house of the Center of Civic Activities of the Socialist Youth League of Croatia, but in June 1968 he was a student of philosophy and a member of the Presidium of the City Conference of the League of Croatian Youth in Zagreb and of the Republic Conference of the League of Croatian Youth, and was at the same time the deputy editor in chief of OMLADINSKI TJEDNIK [YOUTH WEEKLY]. He was, then, at the very center of events in those hot days of June, and as a member of the student action committee of that time, he was even arrested and convicted of a misdemeanor under the Basic Law on Public Assembly. How did he become involved in the disturbances 10 years ago?

Answer: When the students began to gather in Zagreb I was in Belgrade. I had gone to Belgrade on 4 June together with seven colleagues; we wanted to

see what was happening there with our own eyes. On 3 June all kinds of rumors ran through Zagreb about conflicts in Belgrade, and they were carried by the press and radio, and as usual, one could not find out anything for sure.

Partly out of personal curiosity and partly out of a newsman's curiosity, we arrived in Belgrade where we found buildings occupied on Student Square and a very euphoric atmosphere. It seemed as if something essential was really happening. Perpetual rallies were being held in the Hall of Heroes and in the lobby of the Captain Misa Building, and few of the slogans that were shouted or the banners had much to do with the skirmish in front of the Culture Center in New Belgrade where the whole ruckus began.

Even then, some 20 hours after the disorders broke out, the focus was on demands of quite broad political significance. From what I was able to hear, the general political goals of the League of Communists were not being questioned, nor the institutions of self-management, but rather the protests and demands were aimed primarily against the "Red bourgeoisie" and against what later came to be called "unjustified social differences."

To be sure, even then there were some questionable characters trying to infiltrate, for example, someone who I think was referred to as Djilas' lawyer, whatever, but the Belgrade students themselves shot him back out into the street in a moment--just as in Zagreb they hooted down and frustrated Djodan, who had begun to launch slogans about Croatia as a goose in the fog (in 1971 his bright colleagues in the leadership couldn't "figure out" that he was a nationalist and throw him out of the party until Tito came to the Weiss Villa and explained some things to them, which means that the students of '68 were 3 years ahead of the game).

Question: When you returned to Zagreb events had already taken their course, had they not?

Answer: Certainly. But at that time--at dawn on 5 June--we really had no idea that things had already gotten out of control here and that some action committee had been established. When I went to the Mosa Pijade dormitory, where that committee was meeting, I was horrified when I realized that the leadership had been taken by people who not long before had been driven out of office in the student organization by an action taken by the party. A few of us who were present, primarily members of the League of Communists, saw that things were out of hand and that no one in the party leadership was doing anything to orient the spontaneous rebellion toward support of basic socialist principles. Sime Vranic (who I think was the only member of the University Board of the League of Students who was present) was the most astute in the argument that took place (in the end he expounded certain general principles and managed on that platform to get rid of the discredited student politicians who had already scheduled and publicly announced a rally that same morning in the Student Center.

Things, then, had already gotten out of hand, and over the next 2 or 3 days it was just a question of who would take up the reins. For all of us born since the war this was the first encounter with a political rally in the true sense of the word, and we all got our bearings as best we could.

However, it was not just the young people who were confused. As far as I can remember, the first organized activity by any party leadership began only on the fourth day, 7 June, and even then that was not a political action, but a simple putting out of the fire. Up until then everyone was left to himself to find his own bearings, and so students and professors and some workers at the Student Center, and, even more, prorector of the university Macarol, secretary of the University Committee Filipovic, and others sat at the same table during meetings of those ill-fated action committees and participated in the writing of proclamations with what appeared to be the same enthusiasm.

Certainly some members of the action committee were thereby led into error, since the presence of the prorector and the secretary and their participation in the work imparted a fair amount of legality to that body. Only when I ended up in court did I realize that there were "responsible" members of the action committee and then those others....

Question: As a witness of the events in Belgrade and as a participant in the events in Zagreb, can you compare the unrest in those two cities from this vantage point?

Answer: There were several essential differences between the events in Belgrade and Zagreb. In Belgrade several thousand people, perhaps even some 10,000, participated in the rallies, while in the Zagreb Student Center there were no more than 2,000 or 3,000 people even when the crowds were biggest, and more than half of them were mere onlookers, those same people who gather and gawk when traffic accidents occur.

All in all there were only between 200 and 300 really active people, which takes a good bit of seriousness out of the whole affair. In that confusion, which is what I see it now to be, many asked for the floor, but I am convinced that nothing was organized in advance, and that the PRAXIS people themselves were taken unawares by the situation. Actually I am referring to certain members of the PRAXIS editorial board, since the editors were a very diverse group even then, no question of there being any common denominator. Some members of that editorial board also were speakers, but as far as I can remember none of them called upon the students to go into the street even by implication. The proposal which became established was that the discussion be carried back to the base, to the schools of the universities, and that thereafter a central rally would be held in a few days and the representatives of the authorities would set forth what they intended to do. It was that challenge that constituted the beginning and the end of the method of pressure that was used. But when there was massive ferment, when it began to rain, when the loudspeaker system broke down, and when part of the crowd

began to move in waves toward the exits from the courtyard of the Student Center, I do remember that Gajo Petrovic, along with many other members of the action committee, did argue against people going out into the street, and then, together with some of us, he closed the large door of the exit. Then someone opened the movie theater, and the crowd was channeled inside, and that was the most intelligent move.

A day later, on 7 June, everything really was dispersed, and only a few assemblies were held in the schools of the university. And that shows the extent of the uncontrolled spontaneity in events.

Another essential difference between Zagreb and Belgrade lay in the fact that the student demands in Zagreb were put in broader terms, since the students demonstrated a desire and effort to point to the basic social roots of certain problems which had been oppressing them, among others. These demands were written in haste, in euphoria, and perhaps even in panic, and they do allow for the possibility of ill-intentioned and even antiparty interpretation.

But insofar as I recall the spirit of the discussion in which the demands were formulated, an effort was made to interpret the LCY Program in a relevant way and apply it to the factors of the crisis at that time. Finally, the crisis did not arise at the universities, nor was it imported from the West, nor from Poland and Czechoslovakia, where it was demonstrated that the student rebellion could help to unclog the channels of social action. But if in Belgrade a banal fist fight is sufficient, and in Zagreb no more than news of it, then the disturbances which cause a gnashing of teeth in some places even today, however peripheral those commotions and however small the number of people involved, it is clear that the causes lay elsewhere. Nor is it accurate to say that those disturbances were aimed against the self-management forms of social decisionmaking. The university student at that time had no self-management mechanisms whatsoever even in his vicinity, the student organization was incompetent and compromised, as indicated by its attempt to become involved in world student unrest just a few days before the demonstrations with a torchlight procession out of an operetta to support the rights of man, ending in a banquet for chosen participants and, of course, a scandal which kept the young people's press humming. The university party organization also had a share in creating the climate of mistrust; it was inert and disunited to the point where not long afterward it offered no resistance in allowing bourgeois ideology to make its first important breakthrough at the university.

Both the inglorious fate of that party organization, in which the most distinguished prewar and wartime communists simply abstain from participation in the leadership, and also other events demonstrated the aptness of the basic spirit of the student demands. After all, Tito's speech on television on 9 June, and the Guidelines of the Central Committee of the LCY, and, most of all, the famous Letter, emphasized precisely those problems which had aroused the students. It is obvious that essential interests of the working

class were involved (although the students formulated them in very global terms and not specifically), while the channels of political structures were obviously clogged up at that time as far as those interests were concerned, and they had to be unclogged, even from above, by the Executive Bureau, so as to give the base a chance, for example, to debate and adopt the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor. In that sense, then, the students were not lying when they displayed slogans to the effect that their interests were identical with the interests of the working class.

Recollection of Slobodan Snajder

Slobodan Snajder, today editor in chief of publishing activity for the Zagreb Center for Cultural Activity of the Socialist Youth League, was also one of the participants in the events in June 1968. What did 1968 mean to him, and how did he experience that year at Zagreb University? This is what he says.

The year 1968 in Yugoslavia is an integral part of the subjective mythologies from a great diversity of sources, both adapted and unadapted, many of whom no longer recognize either themselves or others, having lowered the criteria of their public posture. It shares the fate of similar social movements which did not manage to achieve the articulateness of a social subject in its own right. So, in political terms it was an episode without importance, without consequences except in terms of subjective mythologies. In political terms energy that went unused and was spent in various directions, was reformulated, and so on: a suitable topic for a mature political editorial.

So, we have wised up a lot. It is time for us to recover from this "childhood disease" which "raged" so senselessly for those 4 or 5 days. I don't suppose we'll put in for "double pay for time spent at the front." Whatever was wagered has been returned. There was never any real risk. (As a writer I am inclined today to think about risk in other categories. For me writing is a demonstration. "Going into the streets" is equivalent in my terms to being read. The effort to achieve integrity of one's acts--anything, certainly, but free of contradictions--that is something, right off the top of my head, which cannot be improvised.)

So, everything has changed, the people, the context. In just 7 years biological man changes all his cells. It is smart, then, to mark off a more mature position at a distance. Then comes reading. We have been informed. A pinch of cynicism is mandatory here. It seemed that Berkeley and Paris and Belgrade and Zagreb all belonged to the same world. Today books are published (about Berkeley, about Paris); it is also the topic of an entire industry.

But there is more than one "but."

Regardless of this powerful industry of the mind, life was lived very intensively those few days at the university in Zagreb, people were alive politically. Whatever authentic political experience I have comes from that time.

All the elements were there. The formulation of the right to ask questions, attainment of political articulateness through "negative criticism," the stress on certain social demands which were already on the agenda, the reconstruction of the institution of political life at the university which had become bureaucratic, improvement of the university, a new sensitivity to art and culture in the sense of a redefinition and a new place for them under the sun. We learned what was left and what was right in a real-life situation, getting our bearings in the intellect, but also in smells and colors and sensitivity. That is how politics becomes at least a part of one's destiny.

Speaking in global terms, it seems to me today that the "dying out" of the year 1968, which also had its convenient forms, lies in some indirect relation to subsequent events at the university. The apathy which followed is perhaps a part of the immanent dialectics of such cases of eruptive politicization. In global terms, the movement had a socialist orientation, which is being acknowledged more and more, but the methods are disputed. The usual cosmetic job: the goals are okay, the socialist purport of many slogans and manifestos was evident, but the manner of assembly was wrong. But one must understand that those patterns of assembly were spontaneous and self-managed and, it seems to me, more responsible than even those who "defend June" are inclined to believe. They therefore are inseparable from the "June positions," which again, I would say, had been proclaimed to the general public before June and which de facto have been insisted on even afterward, at least by some. But the atmosphere at the university has changed fundamentally. It would perhaps be a job for a political scientist, a sociologist or even a writer to investigate that abrupt change. If anyone still thinks it to be important, let him avoid subjective mythology.

This, then, was the subjective measure which the events of 1968, that measureless 1968, have for me; it is a year which still belongs to our youth, and perhaps we have even learned something from it. Along with the political meaning of those events, there are also the colors and the smells, such a spectrum that I don't know where to begin.

What PRAXIS Had To Say

When a journal (PRAXIS)* devotes almost 500 pages to the events in June 1968, its sole reason being that it could not allow "so many mystifications and ideological-political manipulations from all quarters to be woven and overlaid ... on those events," as is stated in the introduction (page V), then certainly it deserves attention. Especially since it is trying to be lumen, fortitudo et solatium (light, strength and consolation) for all those free spirits who are brave enough to reject any manipulation, except, of course, manipulation by the PRAXIS people.

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* An issue of PRAXIS subtitled "June 1968. Documents," bearing the date 1969, went on sale in 1971. It was banned by court order immediately after publication.

And the latter was staged with real cleverness. For example, the statements made by particular students are quoted extensively and in their entirety, while some of the professors were asked (and they agreed) to write down the speeches they delivered to the students after the fact, as they remembered it, and then, say, the Guidelines are quoted only in excerpts. All of this on behalf of objectivity and explication.

But the documents are not merely "documents," and the editors did not forgo some introductory material and an abundance of footnotes in which they make every effort to help unfettered minds to think at least a little less freely. This, of course, as the titles suggest, out of purely scholarly motives and intentions.

Thus it supposedly is a scientific fact that the 1968 events had to do with a real and true student movement in Yugoslavia and with a still more real and truer "deep social conflict," or, more simply and accurately--a revolution.

If we overlook the New Left ideology of the West which obviously peeps through this scholarly play at politics by the PRAXIS people, the fact remains that our Marxist intelligentsia (which is what they like to call themselves) has become so intelligent that it simply can no longer be satisfied with Marx' thesis which they like to stress that philosophy is the head of the revolution (emancipation of man), while the proletariat is its heart. In 1968 there was a distinct parting of the ways between the head and the heart in that our working class unambiguously confirmed the truthfulness of the theory that "the seriousness of a people's response to a theory is always a reflection of the seriousness of its needs."

Certainly they renounced the proletariat long before it renounced them, since from the position of criticism of the entire status quo the only thing remaining outside the range of criticism is the Marxist intelligentsia itself. So it continues to remain the head, but also the heart within the framework of its naive Platonism. The students, then, in 1968 were to play the role of the heart so as to fulfill the "revolutionary formalities" and at the same time to retain the idea of an intellectual elite.

But disguising the real background of their intentions (the desire for political power), they animo deliberato constructed the thesis of the student movement, which was supposed to find its legitimacy in the thesis of a profound social conflict, for which, in accordance with a fine old tradition, no evidence whatsoever is given. Perhaps it would not be out of the way in this place to mention that more students participated in the demonstrations against the war in Vietnam (in 1966 in Belgrade) than in the demonstrations in June 1968.

Nevertheless, it is insisted that there was a student movement, and this interpretation has nevertheless has taken on some strength; PRAXIS with its usual ferocity has attacked the thesis of political realism "as a measure of

the possible established a priori," setting against it the idea of "constant practical testing of the possibilities of human history." However nice that "humanistic" metaphor sounds, it inescapably reminds one of a drunk roulette player who tries all the possibilities of the game of chance with the same exaltation, losing nothing, because he is playing with someone else's chips.

These games with someone else's chips have never been renounced by the PRAXIS people even in their "objective" presentation of testimony concerning the June events, pleading even after those events for the thesis that in Yugoslavia "there is a continuity in the objective causes of social conflicts," whereby they clearly showed that they are waiting for a new opportunity for action, suggesting this also to others for whom those documents were to be ideological preparation.

They believed that even if they failed in their intentions, there was hope that they might become political martyrs. After all, as someone said, you can never be alone, but you can be persecuted.

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