NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.


Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.
**BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Report No.</th>
<th>JPRS 68833</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Recipient's Accession No.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Title and Subtitle</td>
<td>TRANSLATIONS ON VIETNAM, No. 1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No. 11, 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Report Date</td>
<td>28 March 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Author(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Performing Organization Rep't No.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Performing Organization Name and Address</td>
<td>Joint Publications Research Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1000 North Glebe Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arlington, Virginia 22201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Contract/Grant No.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Type of Report &amp; Period Covered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Supplementary Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Abstracts</td>
<td>The report contains information on military, political, sociological, economic, and technical developments in Vietnam, selected from Vietnamese and foreign newspapers and periodicals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture (Social Sciences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technological sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**17c. COSATI Field/Group** 2, 5C, 5D, 5K, 06, 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>18. Availability Statement</th>
<th>Unlimited Availability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sold by NTIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Springfield, Virginia 22151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 19. Security Class (This Report) | UNCLASSIFIED |
| 20. Security Class (This Page)   | UNCLASSIFIED |
| 21. No. of Pages | 55 |
| 22. Price | A04 |
The following contains selected translations from the theoretical, military and political journal of the Vietnam People's Armed Forces published in Hanoi.

CONTENTS

Giap Discusses Requirements of Army in Economic Construction  
(Vo Nguyen Giap) ................................................. 1

Quang Ninh Official Details Guidelines of Army's Economic Work  
(Nguyen Duc Tam) .................................................. 33

Haiphong Uses Armed Forces in Construction and Production  
(Nguyen Manh Ai) .................................................. 36

Song Lam Group's Buildup of Basic Units Outlined  
(Tran Nguyen Do) .................................................. 42

Navy's Role in General Offensive Described  
(Doan Ba Khanh) .................................................... 44
GIAP DISCUSSES REQUIREMENTS OF ARMY IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 11, Nov 76 pp 14-45

Speech by Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap at the Economic Management Class held in October 1976 for high and middle level cadres of the army: "Advancing Bravely into Battle on the Economic Front and, Together with All the People, Winning Victory over Poverty and Backwardness and Building a Prosperous and Strong Socialist Vietnamese Fatherland." The Preamble and first three parts of this speech, as broadcast by Hanoi Domestic Service, were published in FBIS Asia and Pacific DAILY REPORT, Vol IV, No 231, 30 Nov 76, pp K1-K13.

Dear Comrades,

Since the total liberation of our country and the shift of the revolution to a new stage, high and middle level cadres and our entire army have studied the resolution of the 24th Party Plenum and the various resolutions of the Political Bureau on military tasks and on the army's participation in economic construction. Our entire army recently conducted a political education and self-criticism and criticism drive to bring about a strong change in our concepts, thinking and actions in order to successfully complete the army's task in the new stage.

Over the past 30 years and more, under the party's banner of many battles and many victories, our armed forces, along with all the people, defeated two big imperialist powers--France and the United States--thereby completely liberating the country and advancing the entire country to socialism.

Over the past year and more, our army, maintaining a high spirit of vigilance, has always been ready to fight and firmly protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, air space, territorial waters and offshore islands of our beloved fatherland. The units stationed in the newly liberated areas have actively mopped up remnant enemy troops, resolutely suppressed counter-revolutionaries, maintained political security and social order and enthusiastically participated in the overall revolutionary struggle of our people in the South.

In its economic construction task, our army has rapidly established a system of guidance agencies from the upper to the lower echelons, arranged its forces, urgently formulated plans and begun its work in various fields.
I recently made some visits. Everywhere I went, I saw our troops working with enthusiasm and a high sense of discipline; although they are still encountering difficulties in their material and spiritual lives and still lack equipment, they have begun to achieve definite results. Military Region 3 has actively deployed its forces in capital construction, forestry, fishing and so forth. Military Region 9 planted tens of thousands of hectares of rice in a very short amount of time in order to finish their planting on schedule. Many units in the Central Highlands and the coastal area of Military Region 5, along the Truong Son route and at the Thong Nhat railroad worksite in Military Region 4 as well as many units of other military regions have obtained initial results in labor and production. The various army corps and branches and services have also made active preparations for and started their work in economic construction.

Thus, from the North to the South, from Gao Lang to Minh Hai, from the mainland to the islands, our cadres and soldiers are displaying the spirit of being ready to fight and defend the fatherland and the spirit of unselfish labor and are working with the people to overcome the aftereffects of the war and build the country.

The Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee has clearly defined the task of our army in the new stage as follows: being ready to fight and defend the fatherland is the political task of foremost importance; engaging in productive labor, economic construction and the construction of the country are a very important political task.

The task of being ready to fight and defend the fatherland has recently undergone a change. Some cadres still have a somewhat simplistic understanding of this matter. We must view the task of maintaining combat readiness with a new eye, the eye of the collective owners of a unified and independent country, a relatively large socialist country. Accustom to the way of thinking and acting prevalent in the long war of liberation, some of our cadres did not readjust their viewpoint, their methods of thinking and acting after they began the task of defending the country under the new circumstances which exist. We must try to gain a more profound, full and specific understanding of the new requirements of the task of being ready to fight and defend the fatherland, both in the immediate and long-range future. Therefore, our cadres and soldiers must endeavor to make truly strong progress in order to raise the level of combat readiness of our armed forces in every respect; we cannot be satisfied with our present level of combat readiness and stop trying to raise it.

The results achieved by units in economic construction are commendable. However, we must realize that this is only the first step, our task is still very large and very new. Economic construction, as is the task of maintaining combat readiness, is the common task of the entire army. What do we mean by the entire army? We mean all the military regions, the army corps, the various branches and services, the main force troops and the local troops. We mean all the staffs of our army from the headquarters to the district units, all units must support the tasks of maintaining combat readiness and participating in economic construction very well. All units
everywhere must maintain a high level of combat readiness and enthusiastically engage in productive labor; neither of these tasks can be given light attention.

In war, time is a force. In construction, time is also a force. We cannot procrastinate. We must work in an ever more urgent manner. We must make the best use of every hour, every minute. Our cadres and soldiers have made efforts; now, they must redouble their efforts. We believe that, in view of their glorious "determined to fight and win" tradition, our armed forces, together with all the people, will surely record new feats of arms on the economic construction front just as they recorded major achievements in the recent resistance against the United States for national salvation.

Our party is now concentrating on making urgent preparations for the 4th Party Congress. The party congress is an extremely important political event in the Vietnamese revolution. This party congress will have a decisive impact upon the development of the revolution in our country and the bright future of our nation.

In the atmosphere of enthusiasm throughout the country, may our entire army bring about a truly strong change and record many outstanding achievements in both the task of building up the army and maintaining a readiness to fight in defense of the fatherland and the task of participating in productive labor and economic construction in order to greet the glorious congress of our party and be ready to carry out the revolutionary line and tasks that will be set forth by the Party Congress.

For our army, the economic front is a new front. To perform economic work, the army must have an understanding of economic laws and understand economic science. This intensive economic management class, like many other classes which have been and are being held by the various military regions, army corps and branches and services, is a manifestation of our army's determination in carrying out the task of building the economy and the country.

I have talked with you on several occasions about the task of being ready to fight in defense of the fatherland and about the problem of building a regular, modern people's army in the new stage. Today, I will concentrate only on the matter of the army carrying out its task of building the economy and the country.

I. A New Era, New Tasks(*)

As you know, with the brilliant victory of the spring of 1975, a new era began in our country. It is the era in which our entire country is independent, free and unified and advancing toward socialism. The aggressor enemy has been swept away. Our country is at peace. Our people now have favorable conditions never enjoyed before for concentrating all of their forces on building socialism and building a prosperous, strong fatherland. The 24th Party Plenum announced the determination to endeavor to virtually complete the construction of the material and technical base of socialism in 15 to 20 years. In the new era, the people of our entire country will devote all their energy and talents to building our country so that it becomes a socialist country with a modern economy, industry and agriculture, advanced
culture and science, a stable and strong national defense system and a civilized and happy life.

Our party has set the slogan of action as: "Everything for production, everything for socialist construction, everything for the prosperity and strength of the fatherland, the happiness of the people." This slogan can be realized only in this new era.

Our people and army fought for decades and made countless sacrifices of blood to reach this day. This is why they are extremely enthusiastic in the face of the new strategic task of the revolution, namely, completing national reunification and advancing the entire country rapidly, strongly and steadily to socialism.

As the revolutionary task changes, the military task also changes because the military task is always based on the political task.

Whereas, during the resistance against the United States for national salvation, the military task of our country's revolution was to wage a people's war--a revolutionary war--to liberate the South and defend the North, today, the military task in the new stage is to build a stable and strong national defense system to steadfastly protect the independent, unified and socialist Vietnamese fatherland. We must build the country in conjunction with defending it. We must possess a truly high spirit of building the country, possess a truly strong will to defend the country; neither of these aspects can be given light attention. You probably still remember the advice given by Uncle Ho during a visit with sailors. He said: "Before, we only had the nights and the forests. Today, we have the days, the skies, the waters, our long and beautiful coastline and we must know how to defend them." This is a very profound thought. Indeed, the skies and waters are ours but they were controlled by the enemy. In the war of resistance against the French we had to go into the mountains to prepare to build our navy and into the forests to prepare to build our air force. Now that our fatherland is independent and reunified, all of the territory--the air space, the territorial waters and the vast continental shelf--has become ours. We must build a stable and strong national defense system to preserve our independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

How should we develop our national defense system? In wartime, all of our people must fight the enemy for national salvation; in peace time, all of our people must build socialism and develop and defend the country. Our national defense system is a national defense system of all the people. Each citizen has the obligation to build and defend the fatherland. Each male youth has a military obligation and a work obligation. Our army, which was the nucleus in the fight of all the people against the enemy for national salvation, is, today, the nucleus of the national defense system.

The strength of the national defense system is a combined strength. It is based on the comprehensive strength of the socialist system which is comprised of political-moral strength, economic strength, scientific-technical strength, military strength and so forth. Having achieved political independence and autonomy, we must build an independent, autonomous economy and a more modern
system of large-scale production in order to be able to build an independent, autonomous and modern national defense system. Only in the socialist system can we have the conditions needed to fully implement, with new content and quality, a very basic general principle of our forefathers, namely, making "the people prosperous and the country strong." All of us understand that the national defense system is strong only when the system is stable and the economy is strong. Building a strong national defense system is also designed to defend the fatherland, protect the fruits of the peaceful labor of our people in socialist construction. Building a strong national defense system is an important part of the entire construction of socialism in our country. Our entire country must be a vast worksite building socialism and a strong, inviolable battle position. Our youths have a military obligation coordinated with their work obligation. The army is a combat force and a force in productive labor and socialist construction. This is a very correct, very creative major policy of our party.

Therefore, when talking about the military task, we must realize the political task; when talking about the national defense task, we must realize the economic task; and when talking about the task of defending the fatherland, we must realize the task of building the country. Army cadres, primarily high and middle level cadres, must possess the overall point of view, the strategic point of view so that they can deeply understand the situation, the revolutionary task and the army's task in the new stage.

I have repeated these points so that you can use the common tasks of the revolution as a basis for gaining a deeper understanding of our army's present tasks. Under the new circumstances in which our entire country is independent, unified and advancing to socialism, maintaining our combat readiness to defend the fatherland is the most important political task of the army. This must be thoroughly understood. Our army must constantly heighten its revolutionary vigilance, train well, keep a firm grip on its weapons, be ready to thwart each act that would violate our independence and sovereignty, be ready to thwart each daring scheme of counter-revolutionaries and firmly maintain political security and social order; at the same time, it must build up its forces so that they are truly strong, maintain a permanent peace and be prepared to wage a victorious war to defend the fatherland if the imperialists recklessly carry out aggression against our country. We must never forget that the nature of imperialism is aggression; as long as the imperialists exist, we must always be vigilant. The U.S. imperialists were defeated in Vietnam and Indochina, but international imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism has not yet given up its sinister schemes in the world, including Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, in the new stage, what must the army do while the entire country is concentrating its strength on socialist construction? Can it be an unproductive force? Certainly not. The army is a large force and must produce material wealth and build socialism along with the people of the entire country. Our army must do this and has the conditions needed to do this well. Therefore, we must consider it the glorious obligation of the army in the common revolutionary undertaking of our country. At the same time, it is a very basic preparation for the long-term combat readiness of the country and the army itself. Thus, the two tasks of the army in the new stage are of great strategic significance. To build a prosperous and strong country, our army must successfully carry out both tasks.
In the new stage with its new tasks, our cadres must also change their way of thinking. In the past 30 years, our army's important task was to fight. This is why everyone considered fighting glorious. This is correct but, after all, what is the purpose of fighting to liberate the country? The purpose was, as Uncle Ho taught, to make our country "grander and more beautiful." Working to build socialism, build the country is a very glorious undertaking. Our army's combat achievements over the past several decades were very great achievements. But it would be a serious mistake to be satisfied with these achievements and not try to record more. Our people and army fought continuously and suffered untold sacrifices and hardships to regain the right of ownership of the entire country and the right to freely build our country in peace time and build socialism throughout the country. To build socialism and a comfortable, happy life, we must work and endeavor to overcome hardships. However, some of our cadres do not think in these terms when they receive economic construction assignments. Is there anyone here who thinks like these cadres? Certainly no one does. I think that everyone must be aware that revolutionary tasks have been changed, and that if we do not undergo a strong change, it will be very easy for us to remain backward and we will not be able to keep pace with the development of tasks. Therefore, the entire army must undergo a strong change in its thinking as well as its practical organization. All cadres, beginning with high level cadres, must undergo a change, a strong change. Any comrade who is "the slightest bit indifferent" will find that this attitude will have a bad effect upon the performance of his task.

On the basis of our country's specific situation, the party has assigned the army two basic tasks. Thus, our army is not only the principle tool of force of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but it is also an assault force of the party on the economic front, as stated in the resolution of the Political Bureau. This is a new development in the army's tasks. Some comrades maintain that production is part of the function of our army because our army has always been a combat unit, a production unit and a mass proselyting unit; the only difference is that conditions now exist for the army to engage in production on a larger scale. This viewpoint is correct in part but it is clearly not an adequate viewpoint nor does it reflect an awareness of the new aspects and strategic importance of our army's economic construction task.

Building the economy is an important political task of our army and an essential task of a revolutionary army and a socialist system. The dictatorship of the proletariat state, the nucleus of which is the alliance of workers and farmers, is the state which fully reflects the right of ownership of the working people; the working people exercise their right of ownership primarily through the state and under the leadership of the party of the working class.

In carrying out its two tasks, our army will fully reflect our people's right of ownership in building our country as well as defending it. For this reason, our army must strongly develop the spirit of collective ownership and complete both of its tasks in the new stage of the revolution very well.
In summary, these two tasks meet the requirements of the revolutionary task and the military task; they are consistent with the laws of the existence and development of our nation, the laws of the socialist revolution and socialist construction in our country; they reflect the nature of the revolutionary army, the socialist system, reflect the right of collective ownership of the working people of our country in the new stage. Correctly understanding and carrying out these two tasks well are a matter of thoroughly comprehending the line of the party and are a matter pertaining to the class stand and political responsibility of each of our cadres and soldiers. Therefore, may each individual and each unit display the high spirit of initiative and creativity of the collective owner, take advantage of favorable conditions, overcome each difficulty and complete the task of being ready to fight in defense of the fatherland and the task of building the economy and the country in a very excellent manner.

II. Advancing Bravely into Battle on the New Front and, Together with All the People, Winning Victory over Poverty and Backwardness

Our people have entered a period of developing their country in peace with the pride and confidence of a victorious people.

Our country is independent and free, our fatherland has been reunified. We have a progressive political system and a powerful military force; however, our country's economy is still poor and backward. What is the present standard of living of our people? If you look at the food, clothing, housing, means of transportation, cultural and spiritual means, and so forth, you will see that the standard of living of our people is still low and they still lack many things. We have rid ourselves of the shame of losing the country. Now, we must immediately embark upon the task of developing the economy and the material and technical base of socialism, eliminating poverty and backwardness and bringing prosperity to the country and a civilized life of comfort and happiness to the people.

This is a march to a new front—the economic front—and is a very great yet very difficult and arduous undertaking, "a bloodless war," as Lenin said. As you know, this war in our country is only beginning.

Our people and army will certainly win on the new front as they won in the war of national salvation to regain independence, freedom and unity for the fatherland.

You have studied our national history and know well that our people not only have written extremely glorious pages in the history of their struggle against foreign aggression, such as the battles of Bach Dang, Chi Lang and Dong Da, but also have had periods of economic and cultural prosperity, such as those under the Le, Ly and Tran Dynasties. This was prosperity in a historical context, and we understand that it was still very limited because it was achieved within the framework of the feudal system when our people did not have ownership of their country. The new era is completely different. We have the party's very revolutionary and scientific lines on socialist
construction and economic construction. We have a certain number of material and technical bases and the experience of 20 years of socialist construction in the North. The rich natural resources of the country are now in the hands of the working people of our country, the collective masters of society. We enjoy favorable international conditions and our country has great prestige in the international arena. With these basic advantages, although our economic situation is still fraught with difficulties and the consequences of the old system and the war of aggression waged by the imperialists are still rather serious, our people will certainly overcome them and make our country a reunified socialist country with a modern industry and agriculture, a strong national defense system, advanced culture and science, a civilized and happy life and a worthy position in the world as set forth in the resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum.

By successfully building the material and technical base of socialism and building the system of large-scale socialist production, we will forever eliminate poverty and backwardness; provide a firm guarantee for the complete victory of socialism in the struggle to determine "who defeats whom" in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between socialism and capitalism; lay the basis for a strong national defense system; and insure that our fatherland forever exists in independence, freedom, prosperity and happiness.

This is a very great undertaking. Its significance is extremely large. The party has given our army the responsibility of being the assault force on this front. Therefore, our cadres and soldiers should be extremely enthusiastic, thoroughly knowledgeable, think clearly and have high determination. Our entire army must march valiantly to the new front and, with all our people, endeavor to develop our national economy and enable it to reach the level of development of the advanced countries of the world.

The struggle on the economic front is a very arduous and complex one. Because we are advancing from small-scale production directly to large-scale socialist production without experiencing the stage of capitalist development, our difficulties are even larger. We must realize this. Not only must we struggle against nature, but we must also struggle against the anti-socialist forces, struggle to abolish the customs and practice of earning a living privately in a fragmented, decentralized manner. Therefore, we must have a high revolutionary-offensive spirit and march to the new front with the posture of a victor, the valor of a revolutionary soldier, ardent socialist patriotism, scientific knowledge and intelligent, creative minds.

There are still some comrades who clearly realize the importance of the army's task of performing economic work but still somehow wonder whether this task will affect the army's combat readiness. As I said above, we must perform our task of maintaining combat readiness well, very well, because it is our army's most important task. Any place or unit which has failed to closely coordinate these two tasks should reorder its activities. However, we should also realize that economic development and combat readiness are
closely linked, that the economy and the defense of the nation are closely linked. Only with modern industry will there be iron and steel to produce weapons; only with modern agriculture will we be able to virtually resolve the grain problem; only with modern communications and transportation will we be able to respond to the army’s great need for mobility. Today, we cannot talk about a high state of combat readiness and a strong national defense system if we cannot build a strong economy. Only with a strong economy will we have a strong national defense system. Therefore, the economy, the national defense system, economic construction and combat readiness are basically united. As the army carries out its economic task and all the people carry out the task of building a prosperous and strong socialist economy, the level of combat readiness of the country will, in the final analysis, also be raised. Of course, this does not mean that if we have a strong economy we will automatically have a strong national defense system. In the process of building the economy we must constantly strengthen the national defense system and coordinate the economy with the defense of the nation. A strong economy and a strong national defense system are the firm bases for protecting the socialist fatherland and preserving everlasting peace in our country.

Some of our comrades are even concerned that if the army carries out the economic construction task, its discipline is likely to become loose and it will be difficult to build a modern, conventional army. This is exactly what will happen if the army carries out its economic construction task in a decentralized and unorganized manner with loose military management and an organizational system which does not allow for the development of strongpoints. In this case, our army will not become a modern, conventional army and labor will not be highly productive. Therefore, we must tightly control our army whether it is working in industry, capital construction or agriculture, tightly control the forces engaged primarily in economic construction as well as the forces engaged primarily in maintaining combat readiness so that they comply with the guidelines of large-scale socialist production and organize their labor in the large-scale industrial manner. This means that we must carry out production under a plan, regulations, rules, technical standards, a centralized, unified leadership and a clear division of responsibilities and organize labor in a scientific, tight manner; working in a disciplined, technical and highly productive manner must be the style of labor.

Therefore, performing labor and economic construction tasks also provides the conditions for forging the sense of organization and discipline, forging centralization and unity, forging an accurate, scientific style, and so forth. These are very basic requirements for raising the level of conventionalization and modernization of our army.

Our cadres must give very much attention to and want to further heighten the level of conventionalization and modernization of our army. It is important that we fully understand that the building of a conventional, modern people’s army must have the purpose of supporting the political task and military task of the party and the tasks of the army. Therefore, through
the performance of these two tasks, we must continue to accelerate the buildup of our army while developing the strengths of the conventional, modern people's army in order to perform both of these tasks very well.

The economic construction front is a new front to our army. The cadres of our army are still very weak in economic knowledge, knowledge of economic management, knowledge of science and production technology, and so forth. Our cadres must clearly realize this weakness, study humbly and seek the assistance of state economic agencies.

Our army has an ardent love of the country and socialism, possesses a glorious combat tradition, practices strict, self-imposed discipline, has a high level of organization, possesses the spirit of working while studying, possesses the conventional style, works in the manner of large-scale industry, and so forth. These are the strongpoints which our army built and developed in the war of national salvation. Today, the army must develop upon these strongpoints and create a strong position for itself in its economic construction task.

In the fight against poverty and backwardness, our army is a new strategic force, an assault force of the party. To fully adhere to the line on the socialist revolution and the line on the construction of the socialist economy and develop the strengths of its military organization in its new task, our army must endeavor to achieve results that will have a strong impact upon the development of the socialist economy, thereby making worthy contributions to accelerating the completion of the state economic plan while providing good support of the effort to build an increasingly strong national defense system.

III. Thoroughly Understanding the Party Line on Building the Socialist Economy and Developing the Assault Role of the Army on the Economic Front

In production as well as combat, the secret of success is thoroughly understanding the strategic line, the general task and the specific tasks set forth by the party during each stage of the revolution. In its performance of the economic task along with all of the people to help build the material-technical base of socialism, the army must clearly understand the specifics of the socialist revolution, the line on building the socialist economy and the line on building the national defense system in our country that have been set forth by the party.

You have researched and studied the party's line on building the socialist economy. Today, I will only emphasize a number of points to help you think about what our army must do in its economic work to fully implement the line of the party.

The major characteristic of the socialist revolution in our country is the advance from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production. How should socialist construction be carried out in view of the fact that our economy is very poor and our material-technical base is very weak? Where should we begin, what should our foundations be?
The report delivered by Le Duan, the first secretary of our Party Central Committee, at the first session of the 6th National Assembly pointed out: "We must give priority to the rational development of heavy industry on the basis of making every effort to develop agriculture and light industry; coordinate industry and agriculture; build a modern industrial-agricultural economic structure for the entire country; simultaneously carry out central economic construction and local economic development; coordinate the central economy with the local economy; coordinate the economy with the defense of the nation; endeavor to broaden our economic relations with the socialist countries and the other countries on the basis of maintaining our independence and sovereignty and benefiting the construction of an independent, autonomous economy."(1)

This is the line for building our new economy. It is a correct and creative line, a very revolutionary and scientific line. This economic construction line correctly reflects the fundamental economic law of socialism and the law of developing from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production in our country. This has been our test in the 20 years of socialist construction in the North and, at the same time, we have referred to and applied the experiences of the fraternal countries in socialist construction. This line is primarily based on our abundant labor force, rich natural resources and economic potential consisting of more than 20 million workers, a rather large agricultural potential, tens of millions of hectares of forests and forest land, a coastline which stretches for more than 3,000 kilometers, a vast continental shelf, a certain number of material and technical bases, etc. A factor of decisive significance and an important force in stimulating the birth and development of the system of large-scale socialist production is the new, beautiful system, the system of socialist collective ownership of the people within which manual workers, farmers and the stratum of socialist intellectuals have developed their role as the masters of society, the masters of nature under the leadership of the party.

In the economic construction line, our party has outlined the general structure of the new economic system in our country; it is an economic system within which industry and agriculture must be combined within a unified and modern structure, within which the central economy and the local economy must be combined within a unified structure; it is an economy which must be closely coordinated with the defense of the nation; it is an economy within which self-reliance based on economic independence and autonomy must be coordinated with the broadening of international relations.

This, the most efficient economic structure we can possibly have, reflects the new division of labor based on the collective ownership of the working people and is designed to accelerate production and rapidly raise labor productivity for the sake of the prosperity and strength of the fatherland, the happiness of the people. This economic structure will be built through the process of establishing and developing production forces in conjunction with establishing and improving the socialist production relations, carrying out the scientific-technological revolution, transforming manual labor into
mechanized labor, redistributing and redeploying social labor, and so forth. This economic structure reflects the law of building the country in conjunction with defending it and coordinates the spirit of independence and autonomy with the broadening of international economic relations.

The central task during the entire period of transition is socialist industrialization. We must make every effort to accelerate the scientific-technological revolution and build a system of large-scale, mechanized, automated and electrified production in which the science of chemistry is applied, a system of highly centralized, specialized, federated and cooperative production that applies the achievements of advanced science and technology and develops and efficiently utilizes the labor and natural resources of the country.

Our party emphasizes the strategic significance of building a modern, unified industrial-agricultural structure within the socialist economy and establishing, at the very outset, the viewpoint of closely and smoothly coordinating the development of industry and agriculture. Therefore, giving priority to the development of heavy industry must be based on making every effort to develop agriculture and light industry. We must, at the very outset, coordinate the development of industry and agriculture within a tightly unified structure in which each stage of development of heavy industry immediately supports agriculture and light industry and has a marked effect upon agriculture and light industry.

As you know, in the history of the development of society, agriculture has always occupied a very important economic position. Because, in the processes of production and reproduction, is there anything as important as the reproduction of labor, specifically, anything more important than supporting the life of man? To live, we need food, clothing, housing and education, most importantly food and clothing. Agriculture is a basic economic sector that supplies society with grain and food, it is an important base for the development of industry, an important base providing export goods and goods to meet the needs of strengthening the national defense system.

We must bring about leaps forward in agricultural production even while our industry is still young and weak in order to, first of all, virtually resolve the problem of food for the people, provide a full supply of raw materials for domestic industry, especially raw materials to meet the clothing needs of the people, and provide exports. Concentrating our efforts on developing agriculture and developing light industry does not mean that light attention will be given to heavy industry, especially the machine, metallurgy, energy, chemical and other sectors. Because, only by developing the central industrial sectors can we provide agriculture with tools and technical equipment and gradually lay the material and technical base for future economic development plans.

We must also rapidly develop the forces of the capital construction sector and rapidly develop the building materials production industry in order to soon meet the large construction needs of the country following the long,
fierce war, meet the need to rebuild many municipalities, cities and villages and build the material-technical base of socialism on an increasingly large scale.

We must restore and develop, in a strong, comprehensive and coordinated manner, the communications-transportation sector to support the economic and travel requirements of the entire country.

Our poor country has been heavily damaged by the war and the requirements of building and developing the economy are very large and very pressing but our liquid capital is limited. The party is giving much thought to how we can develop the great potential of the more than 20 million workers in the construction of the country on the basis of the immediate and long-range requirements of the development of agriculture, light industry and heavy industry and on the basis of the natural resources and potentials of the country.

The socialist revolution and the development of our fatherland into a modern, powerful socialist Vietnam are a noble, great undertaking requiring the enthusiasm, energies, intelligence and talents of the entire party, all the people and the entire army.

Together with manual workers, farmers and socialist intellectuals, the army is an important force in socialist construction in our country. On the new front, the army must fully develop the strongpoints and strengths of its military organization in the field of economic work and make a positive contribution to the redistribution of labor and production forces in the strategic areas throughout the country, thereby producing more material wealth for society.

Our army is an organization which has been built on conventional procedures, operates in the style of large-scale industry (strictly speaking, its style is only "relatively" large-scale industrial in nature) and has important technical potential which can and must be mobilized in production.

As I stated above, it is important that we have a full understanding of the revolutionary line of the party in the new stage. Only in this way can we have a clear view of our objectives and guidelines and appropriately organize our forces in order to march bravely into battle on the new front and win new victories.

As you know, in war, the question of selecting the direction and target of attack is a key aspect of military art. If the chosen direction and target of attack are correct, our forces will be able to utilize their strength and have a strong impact upon the entire situation. Now that our army is engaged in economic work, which direction should it choose, in which sectors should it work, and where and how should it perform its work in order to make the most positive and effective contributions possible along with all the people to bringing about a strong change within our economy? These are very important questions affecting our country as a whole as well as each area and locality.
We must deeply study and find answers to these questions on the basis of the task and plan for developing the national economy, the capabilities and strengths of the army and the requirement of coordinating the economy with the defense of the nation. Here, I only want to suggest some ideas to guide you in this study. Our army, by nature, is highly capable of utilizing its strengths in capital construction and in opening lines of communication, building roads and so forth.

The capital construction sector must be rapidly strengthened. Numerous factories, water conservancy projects, hydroelectric power projects and other economic projects must be constructed in order to create the material and technical base of socialism; much housing and many cities destroyed during the war must be reconstructed and we must build additional cities and towns as well as civilian projects (schools, hospitals and so forth) in the new economic areas; capital construction projects involved in the establishment of new state farms and forestry sites raise many requirements; and very pressing requirements concerning the production of building materials, especially cement, lime, bricks, tiles, and so forth demand major investments of manpower and wealth. A very important contingent of the forces of the army engaged in the economic task will be organized into strong construction forces which, together with the workers of the state's construction sector, will meet the very large and pressing construction requirements of the country.

Communications and transportation also demand strong, comprehensive and coordinated development. Our country has very convenient maritime transportation routes but it absolutely must expand the network of roads, rail lines and even air routes. We must build additional strategic routes and expand the network of roads to the remote border areas; we must rapidly restore the Thong Nhat railroad and build additional rail lines; we must improve and expand the system of airports, seaports, and so forth to support economic and national defense requirements as well as the travel requirements of the people. On this communications front, the forces of the army must uphold their tradition of "cutting across the Truong Son Mountain Range to save the country" and use their experience and capabilities to make a worthy contribution to the major task assigned us by the party.

We must also realize that the development of our country is raising pressing problems, among which agriculture is a "hot spot." The situation demands that we rapidly bring about a profound revolutionary change, change the face of agriculture and build a system of large-scale socialist agricultural production, a system of agriculture which becomes increasingly modern and develops comprehensively in conjunction with the zoning of specialized farming areas, a system which has an efficient distribution of labor, high labor productivity and high output. Our country is not very large, it is rather densely populated, there is a very small amount of farmland (only 1 hectare for every 10 persons) and the distribution of labor is inefficient. Despite many efforts and many noteworthy achievements in agricultural production, the grain problem continues to be a pressing problem. To bring
about a leap forward in agriculture and virtually resolve the grain problem in the next several years, we must concentrate our efforts on this "hot spot" and resolve many problems related to the organization of production, technical equipment, the "green revolution," and so forth.

Economic as well as national defense requirements demand the development of economic potentials not only in the lowlands, but also in the midlands, the mountains, the coastal areas, and so forth. The construction of new economic areas coordinating agriculture, forestry and industry, the opening of new land to cultivation in strategically important areas in keeping with the common plan of the state and coordinating the economy with the defense of the nation are a pressing requirement, one which poses many difficulties and demands a strong assault force. The army has the ability and conditions needed to undertake this work. On the basis of the state plan and the special characteristics and capabilities of each area and locality, the army has been assigned the task of opening new agricultural-industrial economic areas at strategically important places and establishing specialized farming areas for grain and industrial crops.

We will work in agriculture and forestry, we will catch fish, harvest marine products and raise industrial crops in order to help resolve the grain and food problem for the entire country and supply raw materials for industry and exportation, thereby helping meet the consumer needs of the people.

Opening remote, virgin areas, building new agricultural-industrial economic areas and forestry areas from the ground up and exploiting the territorial waters, islands and continental shelf will open new areas of wealth and new national defense potentials for the fatherland. Our march to these important and difficult places demands that our troops display a heroic spirit, revolutionary zeal and a very high spirit of unselfish labor; at the same time, it demands that we be thoroughly familiar with new scientific and technical knowledge in production.

As for the units tasks with maintaining combat readiness, how should they coordinate this task with economic work? All these units must organize production forces and spend a certain amount of time in economic work under appropriate requirements, not only for the purpose of improving their standard of living, but also for the purpose of producing material wealth for society in accordance with the general economic guidelines and task.

The national defense industry, with its existing material and technical bases and together with fulfilling its basic function, must coordinate with the machine sector of the state to make noteworthy contributions to completing the very large and urgent tasks of the machine sector in our country by producing tools for use by troops in economic construction and producing a number of consumer goods to help support the lives of the people.

The above are a few thoughts concerning the guidelines of our army's economic work. The responsible staffs have adopted initial plans. The important matter I would like to discuss is that the objectives and guidelines of the
army's economic work must fully reflect the economic line and national defense line of the party. The cadres on the various echelons of the army must have a deep and full understanding of the party's line and the task of the army; they must fully understand that the intention of the party is that the troops of the army engaged in economic work go to the "hot spots" on this front and make worthy contributions to those areas and economic sectors which have work that must be completed on an urgent basis. Only in this way is it possible to adopt correct guidelines for formulating the plans of units and, on this basis, motivating and organizing our entire army to carry out its economic construction task very well.

The party's line on the socialist revolution and socialist construction has clearly pointed out that the process of building the overall structure of the new economy in our country is a thorough, profound revolutionary process, it is the process of simultaneously carrying out the three revolutions (the production relations revolution, the scientific-technological revolution and the ideological and cultural revolution, the key one being the scientific-technological revolution).

Briefly stated, the production relations revolution in our country basically involves establishing the system of socialist public ownership of the instruments of production under the two different forms of national ownership and collective ownership and establishing the system of collective ownership in all three areas: ownership of the instruments of production, ownership in economic management and ownership in product distribution.

To develop the socialist economy, it is necessary for the segment of the economy under national ownership (the state-operated economy) to grow on the central level and on the local level as well as within each economic sector and necessary to develop the dominant role of the state-operated segment in the national economy.

As you know, industry is under national ownership with the exception of a number of joint public-private industrial installations and capitalist installations in the South that have not been transformed. Within agriculture in the North, the segment under national ownership presently comprises a very low percentage, and this percentage is even lower on a nationwide scale. The percentage which the segment under national ownership comprises of the structure of our country's economy is not large even though it plays the dominant role. On the economic front, in capital construction, in the opening of roads as well as in the construction of new economic areas, the forces of the army, which are comprised of hundreds of thousands of troops, are a large army of tightly organized, highly disciplined workers who possess the character of the working class and the style of large-scale industry. Our army's construction of large installations and economic units for the state will make an important contribution to strengthening the segment under national ownership, strengthening socialist production relations.

The economic installations undertaken by our army will be large or medium scale installations. All large construction projects, large worksites,
state farms raising grain or industrial crops, large forestry sites and new agricultural-forestry-industrial economic areas will be under national ownership. These economic installations will make a noteworthy contribution to strengthening the socialist production relations in our country and cause the state-operated economy to rapidly grow on a nationwide scale as well as within each locality, in the basic economic sectors and in the important land areas of our fatherland.

The army will perform economic work on a large scale, medium scale and small scale but it must endeavor to move in the direction of large-scale socialist production. In keeping with this thinking, the primary forces engaged in economic work in the important regions and economic sectors must try to organize their forces on a large scale and immediately undertake large-scale socialist production. With a thorough understanding of the party's strategic point of view, the deployment of the forces of the army for economic work in any area or sector will be designed to establish economic bases under national ownership to serve as the "fulcrums," the "leading economic" centers which, together with the other economic sectors on the central and local levels, will cause the socialist production relations to grow deep roots, blossom and bear fruit throughout our country from the lowlands to the mountainous forests, from the border to the islands.

Thus, the army's participation in economic construction will make a positive contribution in the struggle to resolve the problem of "who defeats whom" during the period of transition in our country. We must coordinate with the various localities and state economic sectors to develop the dominant role played by the segment under national ownership, help strengthen and support the form of collective ownership within the locality and, at the same time, absorb and transform the private economy.

The production relations revolution not only consists of the establishment of the system of socialist ownership of the instruments of production; rather, it is also of important significance in fully developing the system of collective ownership in the field of the economy on the basis of which labor is organized and managed very well for the purpose of achieving the highest possible labor productivity and the fastest possible expanded reproduction.

The reorganization of the economy and the construction of the system of large-scale socialist production demand that labor be organized in a very scientific manner and that new forms be created for absorbing everyone in work; we must know how to organize labor units and heighten labor discipline. As Lenin said: "We must focus our entire attention upon the matters relating to labor discipline because labor discipline is the key to the entire construction of the socialist economy, it is the foundation of our understanding of the dictatorship of the proletariat."(2)

Under the conditions of small-scale production and backward technology as they exist in our country at this time, the experiences gained in the buildup of the army, the organized, disciplined, unified and precise nature of the
operations of the military organization and the large-scale industrial style are strongpoints, strongpoints suited to the requirements of the new organization of labor and the requirement of building a new social discipline. We have only begun the task of economic construction and our qualifications and abilities in economic organization and management are still limited; however, we must know how to utilize the strongpoints mentioned above in labor and the organization of labor and how to coordinate the nature and characteristics of the military organization with the requirements and nature of economic work so that we can utilize the strengths of the military organization on the new front.

The deployment of the forces of the army for economic work as well as the organization of labor units on the production front in the various sectors, localities and areas must be done on a suitable scale and under a suitable form of organization in order to be able to employ the strengths of the military organization in economic work. On the economic front, it is possible to establish large production brigades to undertake economic projects of the central level and construct roads, capital construction projects and new economic areas. Our provinces have from 1 million to 2 million inhabitants and there are local troops in every province. By adhering to the policy of coordinating the labor obligation with the obligation to defend the fatherland, the province can mobilize and organize troops to perform economic work on the scope of the province.

The district, as you know, is the basic economic unit coordinating agriculture and industry and the basic national defense unit on the local level. The district local army units must be developed into strong military forces in order to protect the locality and, at the same time, developed into work units performing capital construction tasks within the district. The problem we face is that we must not only deploy main force troops to the economic front, but must also mobilize the entire local army to work on this front.

We must endeavor to perform economic work from the central to the local levels and build and strengthen the national defense system from the central to the local levels so that in the future we have a modern national defense system based on a modern industrial-agricultural economy.

IV. In Economic Work, as in Combat, We Must Be the Masters of Science and Technology

I would now like to discuss the need for our army to become the master of science and technology in its economic work.

In economic work, as in combat, we must be the masters of science and technology. In combat, the purpose of being the masters of science and technology is annihilating the enemy and taking control. In economic work, the purpose of being the masters of science and technology is to conquer nature, develop production and produce wealth for society.
In the advance from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production our must serious shortage is the shortage of material-technical bases. In order to strengthen the socialist economic system, the alliance of workers and farmers and the dictatorship of the proletariat; eliminate the thinking, psychology and habits of small-scale production; strengthen and cause the development of socialist thinking; win victory over poverty and backwardness; bring a civilized, happy and prosperous life to our people; uphold the right of collective ownership of the people and be the masters of society as well as nature, we must develop large-scale industry, must carry out the scientific-technological revolution.

In the world today, a very broad scientific-technological revolution is taking place in the socialist countries as well as the developed capitalist countries. In this scientific-technological revolution, in contrast to the industrial revolution of the 18th century, the proletariat has seized political power in a number of countries and is playing a positive role in this revolution. The socialist countries have reached several pinnacles in the scientific-technological revolution.

Today, man is delving ever more deeply into the microscopic world and the macroscopic world and strongly developing mechanization, electrification, automation and the application of chemistry. Science is becoming an extremely important direct production force. Domestic requirements as well as international circumstances are urgently demanding that we accelerate the scientific-technological revolution and are opening favorable conditions for us to do so. The best course for us to follow in the scientific-technological revolution is, as the party has pointed out, to carry out orderly development in accordance with the law of advancing from small-scale production to large-scale production; at the same time, we can and must take a leap forward and immediately begin using modern technology, even the most modern technology.

Over the past several years, the manual workers, collective farmers and socialist intellectuals of our country, following the course charted by the party, have accelerated the scientific-technological revolution and recorded many achievements, achievements worthy of enthusiasm and pride. On the agricultural front, for example, with very small and rudimentary initial material-technical bases, we have conducted research and experiments, applied the achievements of the "green revolution" in the fields of Vietnam and begun to reach practical conclusions concerning a number of scientific and technical matters in farming and livestock production in our country. The revolution in crop varieties, the fine results achieved in the cross-breeding of livestock and the changes of revolutionary significance in intensive cultivation and the increase in the number of crops grown per year have created model units that have raised the yield of paddy to 5-7 tons per hectare in many areas and provinces. This proves that under present conditions, collective farmers, under the leadership of the party and in close alliance with manual workers, have gradually become the masters of science and technology and won initial victories.
Our army, which includes combat troops as well as the troops engaged in productive labor, must accelerate the scientific-technological revolution. We possess both capabilities and experience in this area.

During the years of the war of liberation, we had to contend with a large, powerful army equipped with much of the most modern technology of imperialism. Our armed forces, which were at first equipped with rudimentary weapons and were gradually equipped with much relatively modern and modern equipment, weaponry and technology, developed the technical base for taking a leap forward. In reality, our army carried out a large scientific-technical revolution in military operations and became the master of modern, complex equipment and technology which it used in an intelligent and creative manner to win victory over an enemy whose strengths were equipment and technology. A rather important percentage of the achievements of science and technology, such as electronics, automation, precision machinery, remote control guidance, and so forth has been applied within the army.

The first and most important characteristic of the scientific-technological revolution within the armed forces is the most scientific and revolutionary coordination possible of man with technology, in which the most decisive factor is brave, intelligent and creative persons who know how to become the masters of modern technology. The unique aspect of our situation is that the army has, over the past several years, very rapidly trained persons who are the masters of modern technical equipment which our industry is not yet capable of producing, such as missiles, aircraft and other modern technical weaponry and equipment. The soldiers and cadres of our army, the persons who use and operate this modern weaponry and technology, have taken a major leap forward in terms of their scientific and technical knowledge. This also proves the ability of the Vietnamese to rapidly learn modern science and technology. This ability is a precious asset, an important factor in the effort by man to become the master of science and technology.

The second characteristic is that through self-reliance and the creative thinking of man as the master of science and technology, we made the fullest possible use of rudimentary or semi-modern technical equipment to win victory over an enemy who had more modern equipment. In everything from the deployment of booby-traps and stakes to kill enemy troops to the use of rifles to shoot down the supersonic aircraft of the United States, from the use of wire rings to detonate magnetic bombs to the use of not very modern weapons and equipment to defeat the most modern equipment of the United States, including B-52's, the Vietnamese man, the guerrilla and the soldier displayed their creativity and scientific minds in studying and learning the laws and becoming the masters of technology.

The third characteristic is that, through organization, we frequently realized greater effectiveness from science and technology than the inherent effectiveness of the science and technology in question. The realities of combat proved that through the art of coordinating, skillfully coordinating, many different types of technical branches in the organization of forces we were able to win unexpected victories that went beyond the technical
calculations of the enemy. This is the great strength of organization, command and leadership.

The successes of the army in science and technology during the war provide a good foundation and show that our youths, under the leadership of the party, possess great capabilities in the scientific-technological revolution in our country. However, in the face of the huge strides taken by the present scientific-technological revolution in the world and in the face of the need to bring about leaps forward in science and technology in our country, the army must still make tremendous efforts. In this field, we will begin falling behind the minute we become the least bit satisfied with our achievements.

The entire army must continue to accelerate the scientific-technological revolution and must apply and develop upon the major characteristics mentioned above in the course of carrying out the scientific-technological revolution in production.

Establishing the objectives, guidelines and stages of development of the scientific-technological revolution in our country is a major job requiring detailed research, a full understanding of the special characteristics of the people, instruments of labor and natural conditions of our country and a clear recognition of our starting point, namely, our existing technical base.

The scientific-technological revolution in our country must be a broad movement participated in and carried out by all workers. On the economic front, this movement must be expressed as a movement to make innovations and inventions, improve techniques, rationalize production and raise labor productivity. The key forces of this movement are the corps of scientific and technical cadres on the various echelons and the corps of skilled workers. On the one hand, we must display the spirit of self-reliance and make full use of each existing technical capability in our country which includes rudimentary technology, semi-modern technology and modern technology; on the other hand, we must know how to utilize the inherent strengths of the socialist economic system, assistance from the socialist countries and international trade to acquire modern technology, even the most modern technology in the world.

On the new front, the economic construction front, our army, on the basis of the practical experiences gained in becoming the masters of science and technology in combat, must fully adhere to the following several major principles:

First, it must highly develop the human factor in the effort to become the masters of science and technology.

In the war of resistance, our soldiers, imbued with the thinking "there is nothing more precious than independence and freedom," gave their lives for the country and fought with absolute bravery and intelligence. Today, on the new front, we must take steps to heighten the level of political awareness and socialist patriotism so that everyone possesses the consciousness and enthusiasm, the spirit and attitude of socialist and communist work. Only when our cadres and soldiers fully develop their self-consciousness, their
loyalty to the revolutionary undertaking and their spirit of sacrifice and determination will they devote their energies, intelligence and even their lives to carrying out their tasks in the new stage. Only in this way can they develop the desire to move forward and become the masters of science and technology on the production front. Here, the political-spiritual factor is extremely important. The high development of the human factor in the relationship of coordinating men with technology will make it possible for the intelligent, creative Vietnamese man to exercise collective ownership and make the highest possible use of existing technical equipment. To accomplish this, it is first of all necessary to teach the spirit of collective ownership to everyone.

Secondly, the stages of development of the scientific-technical revolution in our country must coordinate orderly development with leaps forward, make full use of the present capacity of manual production, gradually and boldly upgrade production to semi-mechanization and mechanization, coordinate the rudimentary with the semi-modern and modern and make every effort to acquire the most modern technology.

Being thoroughly imbued with the spirit of being the masters of science and technology also means that we must make full use of all of the equipment and machinery we have, make full use of the capacity and effectiveness of the existing material and technical base, develop self-reliance, initiative and creativity and produce work tools as best we can in accordance with the capabilities and requirements of the production front. In the war, we knew how to create a combined strength in order to defeat the enemy; technologically, we also developed the combined strength of means and weapons, from bamboo stakes to missiles, in order to defeat the enemy. On the labor front, our army must, with regard to technology, endeavor to do the same thing. We are going to this front for the purpose of winning victory over poverty and backwardness with all the tools and means we have at our disposal, from the rudimentary to the relatively modern and the modern.

Our guideline is to make every effort to bring about technological leaps forward. In all fields of production, capital construction, industry and agriculture, we must give our attention to applying modern technology and advanced methods. We must do this well in those sectors and fields that require coordination but we can also do this on key jobs and at key worksites.

Thirdly, we must have a full understanding of another important factor in the effort to become the masters of science and technology, namely, the organization of production and the organization of labor.

We must give attention to the spirit of socialist awareness of soldiers and workers and consider the human factor the decisive factor; however, we must also give full attention to the organizational factor.

The scale of the organization of labor does not totally depend upon technical means. We can have forms of small and medium size labor organizations that
are equipped with modern and semi-modern technology and also have manual labor worksites which are very large and at which there is a coordination of the rudimentary and the modern, manual labor and mechanized labor. The main guideline is that we must advance to large-scale, modern production.

Organization is a science, an art. On the economic front, we must also search for and create the most efficient forms of organization possible in order to rapidly raise labor productivity.

Economics is a science. To be skilled in economic work, we must possess knowledge of economics, must know the laws of economics. The focus of our efforts on the economic construction front is not enemy troops whom we must annihilate, but nature; our target is not the annihilation of the enemy but the conquering of nature, the production of material wealth. Here, it is necessary that we have an understanding of economic laws and an understanding of the laws of nature.

The struggle on the new front demands that our cadres and soldiers broaden their vision, broaden the scope of their thinking. We possess the military knowledge, the scientific knowledge, the knowledge of the social sciences, natural sciences and technical sciences to wage the social struggle and the struggle against nature. We began becoming the masters of science and technology in combat; now, we must continue this effort and move forward with enthusiasm to become the masters of science and technology in production. The knowledge we accumulated in combat must be put into practice in labor. With the experience gained in leadership, in commanding combat operations and in managing troops, cadres must now endeavor to manage and lead production, manage labor and manage the economy in accordance with economic laws well. Our army, which achieved high combat efficiency, must now endeavor to achieve high labor productivity. Our army must try to become a collective which is skilled in combat and socialist construction and, along with the working class, become an assault force on the productive labor front.

V. The Army, a Large School Training and Forging Youths To Be New, Socialist Persons

Here, I will discuss in detail the very heavy and glorious responsibility the party has assigned the army, namely, the responsibility of training and forging youths to be new, socialist persons.

Training and forging youths to be new persons, socialists is a very large and important matter because, as Uncle Ho taught: "To build socialism, it is first of all necessary to have socialists."

Thus, who is the new, socialist man? Succinctly stated, he is, in the words of Le Duan: "The Vietnamese worker exercising collective ownership"(3); he is a man who has a deep love of socialism, a man who "thinks correctly, possesses noble feelings and has the intellect and ability to be a worker
who is a collective master; the master of society, the master of nature and the master of himself."(4)

These qualities are not formed accidentally. They are the combined result of the three revolutions, among which the ideological and cultural revolution is of particular importance. Therefore, while carrying out the ideological and cultural revolution within the army, we must have a full understanding of what is involved in the training and forging of youths to be new, socialist persons.

Our army is organized, led and educated by the party. Marxist-Leninist ideology is the dominant ideology within our army. Forged in the realities of prolonged, arduous combat, our army rapidly matured. In this combat, wave after wave of youths who joined the army were trained and forged as soldiers who are loyal to the party, the fatherland and the people, soldiers who possessed a high will to fight, possessed knowledge and ability on the front of the armed struggle and displayed a very high sense of ownership in the liberation of the nation and the defense of the fatherland.

Today, the male youths of the entire country will join the army in their turn to fulfill their obligation of protecting the fatherland in coordination with fulfilling their labor obligation. This is a very large and very valuable force. Of course, the majority of these youths have been educated by the socialist school, the Youth Group, the new social system, and so forth. Our army must develop upon the results of this process so that the army becomes a large school training and forging youths to be new, socialist persons.

This is a very large, very glorious responsibility. Our army must not only be the primary tool of force of the dictatorship of the proletariat and an assault force of the party on the economic construction front, it must also be an effective tool of the party and state in teaching and forging youths to be new persons.

The youths serving in the army must endeavor to become soldiers who possess a high spirit of socialist collective ownership in the construction of the country and the defense of the country; they must become persons who possess ardent socialist patriotism, fight bravely and tenaciously in defense of the fatherland, work unselfishly for the sake of socialism and the prosperity and happiness of the people and possess the noble international spirit. They must boldly delve into science and technology in the military field and the economic field and constantly improve their practical and organizational ability in order to perform both tasks of the army well. The youths within the army must also be persons who possess the new style, the conventional style, the style of heavy industry, which is consistent with the development of a modern, conventional people's army, with large-scale socialist production.

These requirements are very high. Can our army fulfill this responsibility to the young generation, to the country? I think that we can and must. If we know how to develop the above mentioned strengths of our army, namely, its
glorious combat tradition, its large-scale industrial style of conventional organization, its strict, self-imposed discipline and its style of urgency and accuracy in a manner consistent with the need to become the masters of modern science and technology, our army will surely fulfill its responsibility as a large school training our youths to be "determined soldiers defending the fatherland, skilled socialist workers."

Thus, how should the training and forging of youths to be new persons be carried out? Through the practical activities involved in the completion of the combat readiness and labor tasks, we must teach and forge youths and gradually meet the requirements concerning the revolutionary qualities and practical ability of the new man. Each unit must be a school. Battle positions, training grounds, worksites, factories and so forth must be schools. The entire army must be a large school.

The above demand that youths possess a very high spirit of self-improvement and demand that the party organizations, the staffs and the cadres on the various echelons within the army possess a very high spirit of political responsibility and conduct detailed, scientific and comprehensive organizational work. We must think about and develop methods and measures for training and forging the hundreds of thousands of youths between the ages of 18 and 20 so that they are new, socialist persons after several years of serving in the army. All areas of work within the army must also be oriented toward carrying out the two tasks of the army and supporting the requirements of training and forging new persons. Here, I will only make a few suggestions. For example, we must not only bolster the spirit of socialist patriotism, but we must also heighten, in a fundamental manner, their level of socialist awareness, their spirit of responsibility in building and defending the fatherland, their sense of working for the sake of socialism, their sense of organization and discipline, their attitude toward socialist property, their spirit of obeying the law and the rules of socialist life, etc. These are the manifestations of the spirit of socialist collective ownership. We must also adopt programs, measures and plans for providing military and economic training, academic training, scientific and technical training and specialized occupational training. We must widely organize on-the-job training and the "work-study" form of training. In the war, our army recorded very useful experiences in "learning while fighting." We must develop upon these very valuable experiences in the new tasks.

VI. Improving the Leadership Ability of the Party Organizations, Making Every Effort To Provide Cadres with Elementary and Advanced Training and Conducting Good, Timely Policy Work

The army has the two tasks of maintaining its readiness to fight in defense of the fatherland and participating in economic construction; every unit must perform these two tasks, in varying proportions, of course. Thus, new requirements are raised concerning the leadership activities of the party organizations in units.

It is necessary to suitably rearrange and strengthen the various party organizations in order to truly strengthen the leadership provided by the
party committee echelons and party chapters of the two tasks of units. The party organizations must provide close leadership of both of these tasks and be deeply involved in the task in which the unit is specializing. In units specializing in economic construction, the party organizations must gain a thorough understanding of the matters related to the economic construction task and effectively develop the role of the leadership organization. The leadership of the party organizations in these units must insure that there is a thorough understanding of the lines, programs and policies of the party in each activity involved in economic construction; develop the management function of the commander; mobilize the masses to participate in the management of production and life in the spirit of collective ownership; and teach party members, cadres and soldiers to endeavor to meet the plan norms assigned by the state.

We must bring about a strong change in the understanding and thinking of each cadre, soldier, party member and Youth Group member so that everyone fully comprehends the two political tasks of the army and displays the same high revolutionary-offensive spirit he displayed during the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation.

The organizations of the party must build new determination and become deeply involved in providing scientific-technological leadership in economic construction. Economic construction differs from the armed struggle, each field has its own separate laws. The law of the armed struggle is the law of annihilating the enemy, building up our forces, becoming stronger with each battle and winning increasingly large victories. The law of economic construction, namely, producing material wealth for society, requires the constant increasing of labor productivity and the constant expansion of reproduction. The scientific and technical matters encountered in the field of production are brand new to our army. The party organization must lead the mobilization of the mass movement to learn and become the masters of science and technology in production as well as in military operations.

The party organizations must also give their attention to leading, mobilizing and organizing the entire unit in fully carrying out economic management regulations and rules in production and the management of plans to insure that production plans are both accurate and suitable; they must organize and encourage every force to correctly implement production regulations and technical standards; they must teach compliance with the control regulations governing construction, production, acceptance and delivery in order to insure project quality and product quality. They must maintain and encourage the maintenance of work time discipline; always consider the leadership and organization of labor a science; know how to maintain and develop upon the strengths of the army in the organization of labor; coordinate mechanized labor with semi-mechanized and manual labor in the closest and most efficient manner possible; give attention to fully developing mechanized forces and gradually reduce the amount of manual labor employed; and adopt specific plans for utilizing and dividing labor in a manner that avoids the waste of labor. They must provide good leadership of the management of materials and liquid capital in order to develop financial
capabilities and material-technical bases as highly as possible, practice economy, combat waste and misappropriation and increase the returns from investment capital.

Here, I would like to express a few thoughts on the subject of cadres. Much has been said on this subject to date. Today, I only want to discuss several matters related to the economic construction task of our army. Over the past 30 years, our army's corps of cadres has, as pointed out by the Party Central Committee, developed many important strengths. In the total victory of the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, each cadre made his own contribution. As I said earlier, cadres, especially high and middle level cadres, must have a comprehensive point of view, a strategic point of view. When talking about the military task, we must talk about the revolutionary task; when talking about the defense of the nation, we must talk about the economy. Through practice, our cadres have become increasingly aware of the fact that if they do not have an understanding of the economy they cannot perform their military task well.

Although our corps of cadres has received much political training and been forged in reality, many comrades still have a subjective, less than dialectic point of view. We cannot be satisfied for one minute with our achievements. We must make every effort to study and deepen our knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and develop revolutionary and scientific methods of examination in order to understand and resolve problems.

The training of a corps of cadres who possess ability in economic construction is of decisive significance in the completion of tasks. Leadership and command cadres throughout the army must be farsighted, have a broad range of vision and understand the country's situation. They must possess modern military knowledge so that they can train and manage troops in maintaining their readiness to fight in defense of the fatherland; at the same time, they must have a knowledge of economic laws, the management of large-scale socialist production and science and technology.

School activities must be strongly reoriented. In conjunction with programs and training classes in military knowledge, it is necessary to urgently expand the practical training classes in economic management on all echelons so that every cadre learns a certain amount of economic management knowledge within a short amount of time. On the other hand, we must select persons for training as technical cadres and economic management cadres and gradually establish a corps of management cadres and scientific-technical cadres who are young, possess well developed manual skills and are proficient in their occupation in order to meet the long-range requirements of the task of the army in economic construction. We must rapidly provide scientific-technical cadres, technical workers and professional personnel with permanent occupations so that they can confidently delve deeply into their work, utilize everything they have learned and support their sector or trade.

In the present situation, it is very important that the various sectors of the state assist the army by providing it with cadres and training cadres who possess economic and technical knowledge so that the army can complete its economic construction task.
I will now discuss the matter of policy activities, a matter with which everyone must be very concerned. Previously, policy activities within our army were designed to support combat well; now, they must be designed to resolve post-war problems well and support the army well in its maintenance of combat readiness and economic construction. The army's economic task is a basic, long-range task. The army is the place where youths fulfill their military obligation in coordination with their labor obligation. It has forces whose main task is maintaining combat readiness and forces which specialize in economic construction while also being tasked with providing military training and maintaining combat readiness. Thus, it is necessary to research and establish suitable policies. The responsible staffs must conduct more detailed research. A policy must be adopted concerning specialized and technical cadres and personnel. We must research a policy concerning draftees in productive labor and soldiers who re-enlist in the army which is designed to strengthen and develop the corps of key technical cadres and personnel. If we do not adopt suitable organizational measures, do not give our attention to providing soldiers with technical training and do not adopt correct policies, it will be impossible to maintain the technical corps and, as a result, impossible to stabilize the technical labor force. We must research and establish an appropriate ratio between technical cadres and personnel who serve as the nucleus and draftees.

The Political Bureau has assigned the army the responsibility of becoming a school so that youths who join the army are able to fulfill their military obligation of being ready to fight in defense of the fatherland and fulfill their obligation to work in the construction of the country. Thus, there will be some soldiers who will leave the army after their term of service and some who will remain in the army to serve as its nucleus and shift to the professional military personnel system, for example. These cases require policies that are correct. Attention must be given to implementing the various subsidy systems for persons engaged in strenuous labor in full accordance with existing regulations. At the very outset, we must concern ourselves with improving the material and spiritual lives of troops, protecting them on the job and maintaining their health. We must concentrate our efforts on providing good living conditions for troops so that they can produce much material wealth for society.

Depending upon their specific task, the forces engaged in economic construction must eventually be stationed on a permanent or relatively permanent basis in the specific areas assigned them. Only in this way is it possible to create the conditions for resolving problems related to the family life and living conditions of the cadres and soldiers performing economic work. These are very legitimate requirements. We must gradually build housing, schools, clubs, and so forth. In the large production corps undertaking the construction of areas that correspond to a district in size, we must endeavor to build towns and coordinate with the locality to bring citizens to these areas, including the families of cadres and soldiers, thereby helping bring the cities and the countryside closer together and cause cadres and soldiers to be more closely attached to their work.
VII. Strengthening Our Unity and Closely Coordinating with the Sectors of the State and the Local Governments and People

In economic construction, the army must have a full comprehension of the political line and economic line of the party and carry out the unified economic plan of the state. Earlier, I stated that the construction projects and the specialized farming areas assigned to the army are integral parts of the socialist economy, that is, they are part of the state-operated economy of the socialist state and under the ownership of all the people. Some projects constructed by the army will, once they have been put into use, be managed by the army on a permanent basis or for a certain period of time, such as building material production projects, state farms, forestry sites, etc. There will also be projects of the various ministries, sectors and localities which the army will construct under economic contracts. With regard to the construction of roads, railroads and industrial and civilian projects, the construction forces of the army will construct and assemble projects not only for the Ministry of Building, but also for many sectors and localities. Consequently, the army must actively and effectively establish close coordination with the ministries, sectors and economic agencies on both the central and local levels in the spirit of socialist cooperation.

As regards leadership and command relations, the forces of the army engaged in economic construction will still adhere to the leadership and command principles of the army. With regard to its economic construction task, the state will assign the army a plan and supply it with technical cadres, materials and capital. The army will manage and guide the organization of the plan's implementation.

Thus, the Political Bureau resolution clearly defines the responsibility of the forces of the army engaged in economic work and the responsibility of the state sectors; at the same time, it defines the relationship of socialist cooperation between the forces of the army engaged in economic work and the various sectors of the state. This relationship must be based on the economic contract regulations and procedures established by the state. In its economic work, the army must comply with the principles, policies, regulations, procedures and rules of economic-financial management established by the state, implement the cost accounting system and be responsible for the property put under its management by the state just as the other economic organizations of the state are.

The cooperation of the ministries, sectors and central and local economic agencies with the forces of the army engaged in economic work must also be based upon a division of labor in accordance with the function of each organization and upon the principles of economic management. In Military Region 4, I visited a road construction unit and found that although it is a large unit it lacks technical cadres to supervise the construction of a rather large stretch of road bed. Thus, if the army does not take the initiative and seek the assistance of the ministries and sectors in many areas, especially assistance in the form of technical cadres and personnel, it will find it difficult to complete its task. Of course, the army must make every effort to learn and try to resolve its difficulties by itself.
The production management ministries are the agencies which establish and integrate the plan on a sector-wide basis, a portion of which will be assigned to the army; they will provide the army with additional management and technical cadres, supply it with technical materials and special purpose equipment, provide it with guidance concerning the sector's technology and create favorable conditions for the army to complete its task. The ministries will also guide and inspect the specialized economic construction sectors of the army within their sectors as regards the implementation of production plans and the economic-financial management policies and regulations of the state.

The integrated ministries have the task of providing the conditions needed for the army to rapidly begin the production tasks assigned it and helping and inspecting the forces of the army specializing in economic construction in order to insure strict compliance with each system, regulation and law of the state.

The construction projects and specialized farming areas to be undertaken by the army are located in all of the military regions and provinces of the country; many units will be assigned construction plans and norms by the various localities. The province is a strategic unit, it is the unit which coordinates the central economy and the local economy; all sectors are closely related to one another on a nationwide scale as well as within each province. The provincial party committee and provincial people's committee are the agencies directly responsible for the entire economy within the province and the standard of living of the local people. The projects and specialized farming areas which the army will be assigned the task of constructing within the various localities are based on economic and national defense requirements, are in the interests of the economy and the national defense system, in the interests of the central economy and the local economy and will be constructed for the sake of the prosperity and happiness of the people of the entire country, most directly the people of each locality.

In the realities of present circumstances, namely, the fact that our country recently experienced a long, fierce war, the coordination of planning by sector with planning by territory in the construction of the country for the purpose of building the national economy whose sectors are balanced and efficiently distributed in the various territories of the country is still being researched and planned on a long-term basis. Therefore, there are many areas for which localities have not had the opportunity to conduct planning and which the state now intends to turn over to the army; thus, the army must establish close relations with the locality. Ordinarily, when deciding whether to turn an area over to the army for development, localities must take the following into consideration: can the job be done best by the army or the locality? Should civilians be brought in from other places? What kind of long-term planning should there be?

We must fully adhere to the guideline of the Political Bureau: it is best to let the locality develop those places which it is capable of developing. At places where the locality is still encountering difficulties in mobilizing
The forces in economic construction must give full attention to uniting with the local people. When army units undertake economic construction within an area it is very good that they are welcomed by the provincial party committee and provincial people's committee; however, we must also take steps to insure that they are welcomed by the local people, otherwise these units will not be able to fulfill their task. Because, when performing economic work within a locality, all jobs, both large and small, are related to the immediate interests of the local people. We must take into consideration all the aspects of the political, economic and social relations throughout the country and within each locality in the process of endeavoring to advance from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production and, on this basis, establish the best possible relations between the forces of the army in economic work and the local people. Army units that accept construction tasks within an area must go to each district, township and cooperative to give the local people a clear understanding of what they are doing and gain their support. They must wholeheartedly help cooperatives and the local people in their everyday work and give attention to assisting the families of wounded veterans and war dead and families who have made contributions to the revolution. With regard to the private economy, they must comply with the policy of the locality and wholeheartedly help the members of this economy shift to the collective economy. While performing its combat readiness task as well as its economic construction task, the army must conduct mass proselyting activities and foster beautiful feelings between the army and the people. In ethnic minority areas, it is even more necessary to give attention to implementing the nationalities policy of the party and state as best possible.

The thoughts I have presented above represent the full implementation of the fundamental aspects of the revolutionary line and task of the party in the tasks of our army in the new stage, primarily the economic construction task, a new and important political task of our army.

In advance of the 4th Congress of the Party, our entire party, all our people and our entire army are promoting an intense revolutionary activities movement throughout the country.

Displaying revolutionary heroism and the revolutionary-offensive spirit and upholding its "determined to fight and win" tradition, our entire army is accelerating its emulation movement to record achievements in tribute to the party, record many outstanding new achievements to greet the party congress and is ready to thoroughly carry out the revolutionary line and task which the congress will set forth.
With ardent socialist patriotism, with a high spirit of revolutionary vigilance and high combat readiness, and through brave, creative and intelligent labor, our army will make the greatest possible effort to be worthy of being the tool of force of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country, worthy of being an assault force of the party on the economic construction front, and will, together with all the people, make our country a prosperous and strong socialist country and be ready to fight and firmly defend our beautiful fatherland.

FOOTNOTES

* Subtitles provided by TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.

1. The outline of the Political Report of the Party Central Committee at the 4th Party Congress (NHAN DAN Newspaper, 5 November 1976) set forth the socialist economic construction line in our country as: "Gradually carrying out the socialist industrialization of the country and advancing our country's economy from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production; giving priority to the rational development of heavy industry on the basis of making every effort to develop agriculture and light industry and coordinating the industrial and agricultural development of the entire country within a modern industrial-agricultural economic structure; simultaneously carrying out central economic construction and local economic development and coordinating the central economy with the local economy within a unified national economic structure; coordinating the development of production forces with the establishment and improvement of the new production relations; coordinating the economy with the defense of the nation; endeavoring to broaden our economic relations with the fraternal socialist countries and other countries on the basis of maintaining our independence and sovereignty and benefiting all parties; making Vietnam a socialist country which has a modern industrial-agricultural economy, an advanced culture and science, a strong national defense system and a civilized and happy life."


3. Le Duan: Political Report delivered at the first session of the 6th National Assembly.

4. Ibid.
Article by Nguyen Duc Tam, secretary of the Quang Ninh Provincial Party Committee; "The Role of the Army in Economic Construction in Quang Ninh Province"

Quang Ninh is a province which presently has a rather large force of the army in labor, production and economic construction. Over the past several years, cadres and soldiers have been present in practically every area within the province and become close to many economic organizations and the local people. The army has made a more than small contribution to the performance of the province's economic tasks. After receiving the Political Bureau resolution on the army in economic construction, our provincial party committee held discussions with the military region Command and established unified economic construction guidelines and tasks for the army within the locality for the next several years, in an effort to successfully carry out the task assigned by the party and state.

Over the past 30 years and more, under the clear­sighted leadership of the party and with the whole­hearted help of the people, our army fought with extreme bravery and, together with the people, defeated the French colonialists and won victory over the U.S. imperialists, thereby recording brilliant feats of arms and advancing our war of resistance for national salvation to total victory. Today, now that the country is independent and free and the fatherland has been reunified, our army is both the primary tool of force of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a force which is always ready to firmly defend the socialist fatherland, and an assault force on the economic construction front. Although it is not a front on which blood must be shed, the economic front is no less difficult or decisive; it is a front which demands that cadres and soldiers highly develop their talents and intelligence and work with the people to win victory over poverty and backwardness and bring prosperity and happiness back to the people. Engaging in productive labor to build the economy, build the country is also a very fine tradition of our army, an army born of the people to serve the people.

Quang Ninh, a province located in the lowlands of the fatherland, measures 7,064 square kilometers and has a population of more than 700,000. Our province
contains three distinct economic areas: the industrial area, the mountainous forests and the coastal area. Each area has its own strongpoints and conditions exist for coordinating them as common strongpoints in the restoration and development of the economy. The lowland and mountainous forest areas contain much land suited to specialized farming and the production of additional crops each year, such as the grain, food and industrial crops of rice, potatoes, soybeans, etc. In the forests, there are many types of valuable timber, such as ironwood, hackberry, tau, pine, fila o and white sandalwood and many types of medicinal plants together with large grassland areas that are very well suited to the development of livestock production. The coastline is approximately 200 kilometers long and contains rather large sources of fish. Here, sea dikes can be constructed in order to increase the amount of farmland.

Industrially, the province has central industry and local industry and sources of such valuable resources as coal, limestone, sand for the production of glass and dirt for the production of building materials.

The province also has a large seaport that can accommodate ships of the 10,000 ton class, a tourist area and a superior culture. Generally speaking, Quang Ninh has a relatively complete economy. It has key sectors and secondary sectors. The economic capabilities and potentials mentioned above are very basic favorable conditions enabling our locality to travel down the road of building a system of large-scale socialist production, thereby providing a life of comfort and happiness to the people of the ethnic minorities while contributing to building the central economy and making the fatherland prosperous.

However, in addition to the very basic advantages mentioned above, our province is also encountering certain difficulties. Several aspects of the economy lack balance. Our province does not have the capabilities needed to fully develop its potentials, for example, communications and transportation are undeveloped in the mountainous forest area and along the seacoast and we are still encountering difficulties with trade among the various areas. The province has more than a small amount of labor but it is not distributed uniformly nor efficiently. Hong Gai City has a population density of 910 persons per square kilometer; lowland districts such as Dong Trieu have a density of 228 persons per square kilometer while mountain districts such as Ba Che only have 11 persons per square kilometer. As a result, we have been unable to successfully develop the natural resources of the mountainous forests, rivers and ocean waters which are the economic strengths of the province.

Due to the requirements of the socialist industrialization of the country, the central industrial sectors in Quang Ninh will, in the immediate as well as the long-range future, develop at a rapid rate and on a large scale. The requirements faced with regard to improving the standard of living of the people following the war are also very pressing. Consequently, the party organization and people of the province must endeavor to develop the local economy at a rapid rate in order to accelerate production, gradually
improve the standard of living of the people within the province and support the development of the central economic sectors, especially the coal sector.

The economic development task of our locality for the next several years is: making full use of each capability and potential the locality has in its manpower and wealth and displaying a high spirit of self-reliance in order to rapidly develop the economic sectors, with efforts concentrated on agriculture, forestry, fishing and the production of building materials and consumer goods; giving attention to developing the economy of the mountains and the islands in a manner coordinated with the national defense system and gradually building the economic structure of large-scale socialist production.

In carrying out the task mentioned above, in addition to the efforts of the national economic sectors, the army's participation in economic construction within the locality will make a positive contribution to overcoming the difficulties and developing the strengths of the locality; the army will not only produce material wealth, but it will also help redistribute the social labor force, increase the population density in sparsely populated areas, develop natural resources, the economy and the culture, protect the forests, land and waters and strengthen the national defense system.

Our provincial party committee has always thoroughly implemented the party Central Committee's policy of coordinating the economy with the defense of the nation and the Political Bureau resolution on the army's participation in economic construction. Even during the war, the army participated in a number of projects, such as oil pipeline and road projects. Since peace was restored, the economic activities of the army have been intensified. Recently, our provincial party committee held discussions with the command of Military Region 3 and unanimously agreed to make Quang Ninh a key economic construction site of the army troops within the military region, primarily in such fields as the construction of industrial projects, the production of building materials, capital construction, road construction, the opening of new economic areas, afforestation and the eventual harvesting of forests, and so forth.
HAIPHONG USES ARMED FORCES IN CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCTION

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 11, Nov 76 pp 55-60

Article by Colonel Nguyen Manh Ai: "Haiphong Armed Forces Make Every Effort To Carry Out Their Economic Construction Task"

In keeping with the resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum and the Political Bureau resolution on the army's participation in economic construction, the Haiphong Command took the initiative in deploying its forces in local economic construction and has begun to achieve good results.

Having begun with small production units equipped with rudimentary tools, we now have large production units in many different sectors and trades, such as the production of building materials, the repair of machinery, ocean fishing, fish sauce production, the construction of sea dikes, housing construction, excavation and transportation, etc.

Over the past several years, units have produced hundreds of thousands of tons of lime, hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of stone, millions of bricks, thousands of improved vehicles and more than 500,000 liters of fish sauce while constructing and repairing more than 4,500 square meters of housing. They have also begun the construction of sea dikes which are projected to result in the opening of nearly 100 hectares of salt fields and more than 2,000 hectares of rush fields. During the past year, 12 hectares of salt fields were completed and more than 100 tons of refined salt were test produced. Recently, success was achieved in the production of cement and improvements are being made in order to put production on a continuous basis.

All products have been produced under the state plan and cost accounting and meet the requirements of local economic construction.

Through their work in economic construction over the past several years, although the results achieved have not been many and the economic returns have not been high, the cadres and soldiers of Haiphong learned more about viewpoint and recognition and gained experience for advancing even more strongly in their economic task in the new stage.
1. Gaining a thorough understanding of the task, building high determination, establishing the same line of thinking from the party committee to the units and formulating correct, accurate production plans and guidelines.

In the course of carrying out the economic construction task, the collectives of the party committee and the command discussed, carefully analyzed and evaluated the capabilities of troops in economic work. In August 1973, under the guidance of the Military Region Party Committee, the Military Region Command and the Haiphong Municipal Party Committee and Municipal People's Committee, the Haiphong Command and its party committee adopted a resolution stating: "In conjunction with their tasks of building up their forces, maintaining combat readiness and being ready to reinforce the South, troops must participate in work and production in order to help rapidly heal the wounds of the war, build the material and technical base of socialism, reduce national defense expenditures and improve their own standard of living. Also through work and production, troops will be trained in the sense of organization and discipline, the conventional style..." This resolution was thoroughly disseminated within all party committee echelons and units. At first, many persons did not have a clear understanding of it and thought that the use of troops in work and production would pose obstacles to the maintenance of combat readiness and the training of troops in conventional operations. There were also some who thought that troops should only engage in production for the purpose of being self-sufficient and improving their standard of living; troops should not and cannot, according to them, carry out production on a medium or large scale.

Through determined educational efforts, we gave the various leadership and command echelons, staffs and units a correct understanding of the task of having troops participate in economic construction and the construction of the country and coordinating economic construction with the strengthening of the "key" security and national defense installations within the locality. At the same time, we boldly organized a number of units specializing in production. These units were primarily involved in the production of building materials, namely, lime, bricks, sand, stone and cement; the construction and repair of housing and warehouses, the leveling of sites for water conservancy projects, fishing and the production of fish sauce under the guideline "from the easy to the difficult, from the small to the large." In November 1974, the party committee standing committee and the command reviewed the performance of the labor task during the previous year and agreed that the guideline mentioned above was a correct one and laid the foundations for subsequent production tasks. Cadres and soldiers underwent many good changes with regard to their understanding, thinking and actions, actively participated in work and completed the production work assigned them.

To develop upon the results that had been achieved, we continued to guide units, including combat ready standing units, wounded and ill veterans who had spent the necessary time in convalescence and the regional, district and municipal military staffs to gain their voluntary participation in work and production and we gradually put production under cost accounting procedures.
When the Political Bureau issued its resolution on the army in economic construction, our party committee reviewed and evaluated the attitude and thinking of cadres and soldiers in order to adopt educational plans and measures suited to each objective. We conducted a widespread political activities drive to give each cadre and soldier a full understanding of the basic viewpoints concerning the army's economic construction task, the relationship between economic construction and the strengthening of the national defense system, etc.

Under the light of Political Bureau's resolution, our cadres and soldiers seriously reviewed their strengths and weaknesses and became more enthusiastic over and confident in the great capabilities our army has for performing this important political task. On this basis, every unit took the initiative to research and study economic management methods and became determined to increase the scale of their production and bring about a strong change from the administrative-supply system to the cost accounting system, from intermittent production to production under contracts with the state. We assembled the necessary forces and established the following main targets: the medium and large-scale production of building materials and the reclamation of land from the sea for the purpose of building new economic areas along the coastline and on the islands. On this basis, we consolidated our combat ready forces and established a tactical defense zone to protect the port city, thereby helping protect the mainland, coastline and islands of the fatherland.

The militia and self-defense forces, in addition to regularly playing the key, assault role on the production front within the locality, were assembled by us to work at the city's sea dike construction site. We organized these forces into battalions and larger size units, placed them under the direct command of the regional, district and city military staffs and coordinated with the water conservancy and commerce sectors to provide them with technical support and support of their everyday needs. Work plans were implemented under cost accounting ceilings and under the guidance of the Municipal Agriculture Committee.

2. Developing upon the strength of the industrial city which has mountains, coastal waters and islands and seeking the wholehearted assistance of the enterprises and agencies within the city for the purpose of formulating plans for the development of production.

When the plan for having troops participate in economic construction was established, we directed our attention toward the special characteristics of the port city, the industrial city in which there are many developed economic sectors and much advanced production experience. These are favorable conditions that enable troops to study production experiences and, in particular, seek assistance in the form of materials and technology from the economic sectors within the locality. At the same time, we also gave attention to the city's geographical characteristics. Haiphong has many limestone mountains which provide favorable conditions for the construction of building material production installations and chemical plants. The
seacoast and islands also provide favorable conditions for developing the economy of the coastal area, such as salt production, fishing, and fish sauce production, and reclaiming land from the sea in order to put more land under cultivation. As soon as we began deploying forces for work and production on a small scale, we received the encouragement and support of the Municipal Party Committee and People's Committee and the Municipal Planning Committee assigned us product consumption norms and supplied us with necessary materials and equipment, thereby creating every possible favorable condition for us to complete our production plan.

In 1973, after the end of the war of destruction, there was a very large and pressing need for building materials within the city. Our party committee and command organized a unit to produce building materials, primarily lime. At first, we were only able to establish a small production unit consisting of one platoon and a very meager amount of capital. By the end of 1974, we had produced more than 7,000 tons of lime and over 8,000 cubic meters of stone. In 1975, we increased the size of this production installation and produced 10 percent of the city's lime. Today, we are producing more than 50 tons of lime per day.

To meet rising construction needs, we researched the production of cement by the Cupola Method to make full use of local raw materials and supplies. On 19 May 1975, with the help of the Municipal Scientific-Technical Committee, the Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education, the Haiphong Cement Plant and many other enterprises, the first test batch of cement was produced; it was of high quality and met technical standards. The Municipal People's Committee constructed a power line to provide a stable electric power network to support cement production. Today, we have constructed at this site a combined production installation excavating stone and producing lime and cement, one which has more than 600 workers and has been equipped with several machines, such as steam presses and grinders, in order to coordinate production, coordinate manual labor and machines, increase output and help meet the rising construction needs of the city and national defense requirements.

3. Building and training the corps of economic management and technical cadres and applying the offensive thinking and conventional style of the army in the economic construction task.

This is a matter of key significance in the good completion of tasks. At the very outset, the party committee stated that economic construction is a new task involving many difficulties and adopted the policy of using work and production to forge the concept of work, the work skills and the economic knowledge and knowledge of economic management and planning of cadres and soldiers and gradually establish an economic management command system and a corps of technical cadres and skilled technical workers.

In the lime and cement production unit, we at first only had one engineer, a draftee, in charge of technology. We sent 16 cadres to other units and provinces to learn the technology of Cupola cement production. Now, the
cadres and soldiers who studied while they worked are capable of insuring technical compliance with production regulations.

In the elementary and advanced training of the corps of technical cadres, we have given full attention to seeking the assistance of the various agencies and enterprises in Haiphong by regularly inviting experienced economic leadership cadres and technical cadres to present and discuss specific matters; on the other hand, we and the cadres of units have visited enterprises to gain experience and relied upon the technical cadres and skilled workers who are fulfilling their military obligation. At present, we have nine engineers, 50 middle level technicians and many persons qualified to take charge of the various technical jobs. We have also trained nearly 200 wounded veterans as technical workers at the various production installations.

As regards command cadres and economic management cadres, we have, depending upon conditions and capabilities, enrolled them in on-the-job economic management classes held by the city and opened trade training classes within units. At the same time, we have given full attention to political and ideological education so that every cadre is satisfied with his job, enthusiastically displays the revolutionary-offensive spirit, dares to think and act and takes the initiative in each job assigned to him. We always maintain and apply in economic construction the tactical thinking and conventional style of the army. When scheduling projects, efforts are always concentrated on key projects. Units engaged in economic work must still maintain the regulations on assemblies, daily duty and shift changes, flag ceremonies and weekly evaluations and complete their annual military training program; in this work, cadres must set good examples and practice what they preach in order to stimulate the movement and set examples for the masses to follow.

However, the training of the corps of economic management cadres and technical cadres still does not meet the requirements of the present task and regulations and policies are being implemented slowly or inappropriately. In the immediate future, we will take positive steps to overcome these difficulties and weaknesses so that we can better meet the rising requirements of our task.

4. Strongly developing the capabilities of the masses in the effort to meet assigned economic norms and plans.

To engage the masses in intense revolutionary activities, we must first of all concern ourselves with teaching politics on a regular basis. The labor force we are managing is comprised of many different elements: standing troops, wounded veterans, militiamen and self-defense forces whose qualifications and ages vary. However, everyone, as a result of political activities and education, fully understands that working is the glorious obligation they have in building socialism and molding the new man. On this basis, everyone has worked voluntarily and learned while working. A strong "determined to win" movement focusing on the three targets of working and
producing in a technical, disciplined and highly productive manner has been launched in all units. We have regularly maintained the system of drills and inspections in each task on all production jobs, such as crushing stone, digging, drilling holes in stone, using explosives and producing bricks, lime and cement. Each job is under norms, quotas and cost accounting and prompt productivity bonuses are paid. In 1975, the lime and cement production unit received a bonus of 24,000 dong, which included pay for a 13th month for more than 200 cadres and soldiers.

As regards soldiers in compulsory labor (military personnel who committed shortcomings and were placed in one unit), we have been able, through training and challenges, to return many of them to the army or to their locality upon completion of their military obligation. Of those who were returned to the army, many had the honor of participating in the victorious offensive of the historic spring of 1975. Beginning with simple jobs, such as digging and leveling foundations, many soldiers have since learned the techniques of drilling holes in rock, producing lime, cement, salt and fish sauce, operating lathes, working with metal, carpentry, house construction, whitewashing, etc.

Over the past several years, our cadres and soldiers, in the revolutionary-offensive spirit, the spirit of daring to think and act, have volunteered to undertake the most difficult jobs at the most important places of the city, the most important places on the economic front, to coordinate economic construction with the strengthening of the national defense system. Despite our initial achievements, we still have several weaknesses in such areas as economic management ability, production technology, support of the spiritual and material lives of soldiers and the organization of labor safety that must be corrected.

Through the achievements that have been recorded, we have correctly evaluated the ability of the local armed forces to perform economic work, we have gained an even deeper understanding of the great significance of the Political Bureau resolution on the army in economic construction and we are even more confident in our development.

In the "loyal, courageous and determined to win" tradition of the heroic port city, we are determined to develop upon each of our strengths and correct our weaknesses and shortcomings in order to join the rest of the army and all our people in creating an intense, strong work and production movement to record practical achievements in celebration of the 4th National Congress of the Party, thereby helping make the port city an economically prosperous and militarily strong city of the unified, socialist Vietnamese fatherland.
SONG LAM GROUP'S BUILDUP OF BASIC UNITS OUTLINED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 11, Nov 76 pp 61-70

Article by Senior Colonel Tran Nguyen Do: "Regularly Building Strong Basic Units in the Process of Performing Tasks (the Experience of the Song Lam Group)"

Excerpt After completing its combat mission in the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, the Song Lam Group, together with other units, carried out the military management task and has, since then, been carrying out the task of protecting Ho Chi Minh City. At the same time, the group has been carrying out the task of building a strong military corps under the guideline of accelerating the development of a conventional, modern people's army and begun its task of participating in economic construction and the construction of the country.

In the war, the group party committee fully realized the decisive importance of building strong basic units in the completion of each political and military task assigned by the party as well as in helping build strong regiments and divisions. Under the new circumstances, the group fully realizes that it is even more important to build up basic units at this time in order to complete its tasks well, the military management task, the task of protecting the city and the economic construction task. These tasks require many efforts on the part of the leadership and command echelons, on the part of all of the cadres and soldiers within the group.

With a full understanding of the fundamental matters involved in the buildup of the basic units of our army, on the basis of the present strengths and weaknesses of companies and on the basis of its own immediate and long-range tasks, the Song Lam Group actively and urgently carried out the buildup of its basic units in accordance with the very correct guidelines set forth by the Political General Department and the Military Corps Party Committee in recent years and the specific policy and measures discussed and unanimously approved by the group party committee.

First, the group closely linked the buildup of basic units to the performance of each political and military task of the company as well as the entire group; the buildup of basic units always has the purpose of successfully completing
each task and, at the same time, every effort is made to build strong basic units through the performance of tasks. Only when the company is strong and cadres and soldiers are highly determined and highly skilled is it possible for the basic unit to complete its task well. On the other hand, only by being challenged in the realities of combat and work is it possible to correctly evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each unit and each person in order to provide them with additional training.

The group has made every effort to insure that all companies within the group make uniform, steady progress. Because, every company is an integral part of the group and must perform an important portion of the group's task. If the group does not have many strong companies or if, in addition to a few strong companies, there are many weak ones, the group will surely be unable to perform its military management task or its task of protecting the city well and unable to rapidly become a strong military corps.

The group's policy is to build each basic unit into a unit that is strong in every respect, strong politically, ideologically and militarily, strong in terms of its rear service support, strong in terms of its personnel and organization, its cadres and soldiers, primarily its cadres and party members and especially its company cadres and party chapter committee members. The group concerns itself with cultivating the qualities, virtues and skills, the understanding, thinking and actions of each individual and unit in order to build strong personnel and strong organizations and put each of the activities of troops on an increasingly regular basis under tight, uniform rules and regulations.

The group considers the buildup of basic units to be primarily the responsibility of the party committees and commanders on the various echelons and the common responsibility of each cadre and soldier in the basic units. It is also the responsibility of all headquarter, political and rear service staffs and the leadership, command and mass organizations within the company. Only in this way is it possible to employ each force and strength of the group in the buildup of the basic units.

Under these guidelines, the Song Lam Group has been conducting a campaign for more than 1 year to build up the group's basic units by means of fundamental, effective measures in the course of carrying out its military management task, its task of protecting the city, its task of building up the army and its economic construction task and has achieved initial results.
NAVY’S ROLE IN GENERAL OFFENSIVE DESCRIBED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 11, Nov 76 pp 71-77, 84


[Text] In the general offensive and uprising of the spring of 1975, the people’s navy completed several very large and new missions, thereby contributing along with all the people and the entire army to the total victory of the general offensive and uprising.

Under the conditions of limited technical equipment and personnel, the navy independently, and in coordination with friendly branches and local armed forces, fought many battles and liberated the islands and archipelagoes in the southeastern and southwestern territorial waters of the fatherland, thus making a contribution to the total victory of the general offensive and uprising.

The navy also participated in battles to occupy a number of coastal targets and, even during the first days of the general offensive, it conducted operations in the enemy’s rear area and obstructed the enemy on a number of river and coastal routes.

By means of many different modes of operation, the naval transport units transported a large volume of weapons and other combat equipment to the battlefield during the period of preparations for and in the course of the general offensive. When the offensive gathered speed, naval transport units transported troops by sea, thus making a practical contribution to increasing the mobility of the strategic military corps. Never before had so many transports been mobilized. During the period of preparation and in the course of the development of the general offensive, the transports of naval group X alone traveled some 200,000 nautical miles. Naval transport personnel also took part in many landings, thereby making an important contribution to the victory of these battles.

The navy also fulfilled its assault task of opening channels in the newly liberated coastal areas and seaports, thus creating favorable conditions for and insuring the safety of the other ocean transportation forces.
Through the general offensive and uprising of the spring of 1975, the navy underwent new stages of development. In this article, we have presented the advances made by the navy in its combat operations at sea through the completion of its combat tasks in the general offensive. These advances can be seen in the following several major points:

1. The combat capabilities of the navy were consistent with the new characteristics of the battlefield and met the rising requirements of its missions.

The people's navy took part in the general offensive and uprising of the spring of 1975 after 20 years of development and combat. In the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, our navy victoriously completed many combat missions in both northern and southern Vietnam, including some of strategic significance. In its buildup and combat operations, our navy matured and gained some experience; this provided firm foundations for the branch to record new advances in the general offensive.

Prior to the offensive, with the exception of the ships employed in strategic transport operations, the combat operations of our navy usually occurred within limited areas, were extensively prepared for, could be directly supported by coastal forces, etc. In the general offensive, the majority of our navy's ships went into combat for the first time in the waters of southern Vietnam, a long, wide and unfamiliar area of ocean and archipelagoes with complex terrain lying far off shore which are difficult to recognize and easily cause a lack of navigational safety (due to submerged reefs, obstructions, etc.). In addition, the battlefield situation was very urgent, the need to be combat ready was high and combat operations were conducted under all weather conditions (at night, in heavy rains and floods, in high winds and waves, and so forth) which made combat operations at sea more difficult and complex. Within the area of operation, U.S. naval units, in addition to forces of the Saigon puppet navy, were also active. In such a situation, safe and accurate movement by sea was both a technical navigational requirement and a tactical requirement. Only on the basis of completely safe and highly accurate movement by sea could it have been possible to attack the right target and execute our tactical plans. Navigational capabilities became a foremost requirement in combat operations at sea. In their combat operations during the general offensive, the ships of our navy met this requirement. Despite the lack of some navigational charts and the fact that many ships were not equipped with modern navigational equipment, as a result of applying the methods of "dead reckoning" and celestial navigation and the experiences gained in previous operations at sea, all ships were able to guide themselves to targets with a high degree of accuracy and absolute safety under every operational condition (near shore, far from shore, at night, in high winds and waves, in very urgent battlefield situations, and so forth). It can be said that the units of our navy were able to reach any point in the territorial waters of the fatherland to complete the missions assigned them. The improvement in navigational capabilities was most evident in lengthy combat operations far
at sea. In all of these operations, naval units maintained absolute safety, accurately followed the course set in their combat plans and occupied the correct tactical positions, thereby making it possible to victoriously employ the planned methods of attack.

Operations far from shore and far from support bases required that naval personnel possess high technical proficiency and be the masters of each weapon and piece of equipment on their ships. The realities of the combat operations conducted during the general offensive confirmed the advances made by our navy in this area. This mastery of weapons and equipment was reflected primarily in the skillful use of the weapons and equipment on ships and strict compliance with the regulations on using and maintaining these weapons and pieces of equipment. Naval artillery crews made marked progress with regard to their ability to fire naval artillery at sea as seen in the sinking of troop ships at night and the firepower support of troops landing to occupy islands. This was the first time our naval artillery units provided sea to land firepower support of infantry troops and these units met battle requirements. The use of power generating equipment, signal equipment, reconnaissance equipment, and so forth also met the requirements of lengthy operations far from base. Our naval personnel rapidly became skilled in the use of weapons and equipment taken from the enemy and promptly put them to use in combat. After taking over the management of the A.T. base, unit P. immediately began restoring the operations of the ship repair yard and, a few days later, put a number of "inoperable" ships taken from the enemy into use in combat operations. These ships fought effectively in the battles to occupy T. and V. Islands. As a result, of achieving proficiency through training in the techniques of combat at sea and knowing how to employ their inherent strengths under the new conditions, the amphibious assault forces fulfilled their assault missions in the occupation of the islands. The rapid and accurate operations of these units created favorable conditions for infantry units to achieve success in all landings, including landings by force.

Ability to endure waves and wind is an important factor that must be taken into consideration when evaluating the combat capability of naval personnel at sea. Under the conditions of continuous combat lasting for many days, it is even more necessary that personnel have high endurance. Forged in many years of arduous combat, the ability of our navy to endure waves and winds was tested in the general offensive which proved that advances had been made in this area, advances which met the new special requirements of the battlefield and the new requirements of the mission. Many ship crews operated at sea for many months in a row throughout the territorial waters from northern to southern Vietnam and experienced many periods of high winds and waves but still maintained their combat personnel strength and completed each mission assigned them. For the first time, many amphibious assault units spent many days at sea in order to attack targets several hundred nautical miles from the mainland. These units lived under very arduous and tense conditions caused not only by the high winds and waves but also by the need to maintain a very high level of combat readiness at sea and very severely curtail daily activities. Due to tactical requirements,
many operations involved weeks of travel at sea yet, even though their health had declined somewhat, they quickly went into combat when they reached staging areas and achieved high combat efficiency. It can be said that these amphibious assault units made very great efforts and met tremendous challenges to their ability to endure winds and waves, challenges never before experienced. This was the result of the long amount of time spent in physical training and in forging the will to fight of the amphibious assault troops of the navy.

The combat capabilities of naval personnel were not only expressed in the advances mentioned above, but also in many other areas. Here, however, we will only discuss the advances most clearly evident in the actual operations of our navy in the general offensive. Of course, in addition to these advances, there were weaknesses and aspects of operations that did not fully meet the requirements of the development of the situation and which must be studied and corrected so that the combat capability of our navy is constantly heightened to meet the rising requirements of its mission.

2. Increasingly varied and effective methods of attack were employed.

Faced with numerous limitations, our navy, under the guideline of "taking the offensive" and "attacking any target in sight," employed methods of attack suited to each battle and combat objective on the basis of its assigned mission, the comparison of forces between us and the enemy and other specific conditions. During the opening days of the general offensive, in order to coordinate with operations on the Central Highland's battlefield, naval sapper units used deep penetrations or "pre-deployment" to attack the enemy on river and coastal routes, at enemy naval bases and other targets in coastal areas. In the Hue-Da Nang campaign, combat vessels boldly penetrated the coastal flank of the enemy and set up a blockade to help prevent the enemy from fleeing. Vessel N., manned by a small force, penetrated all the way to Da Nang by sea. This unit arrived in Da Nang at the same time the first infantry units did. The bold operation conducted by unit N. heightened the panic and confusion of the fleeing enemy. It brings to mind the tactic of a deep penetration by sea coordinated with fronts on land to attack an important coastal target.

Most deserving of attention in the methods of attack of our navy in the general offensive was the attacks to take occupation of islands. Our navy independently or in coordination with friendly branches and services conducted combat landing for the first time. This was a new development in military art by our navy. Despite the limitations faced, this development led to the appearance of new factors that have helped provide a practical basis when researching the development of our navy's methods of attack.

Our combat landings occurred at a time when the enemy, although faced with the danger of total collapse, was still vainly trying to prevent the development of our offensive to Saigon. At sea, although puppet naval forces had been seriously depleted, they were still capable of conducting regular support and resupply operations for the islands south of Cam Rang. The puppet navy was
also capable of providing a certain amount of infantry firepower support. The aircraft carriers and marine forces of the United States were still prowling about the combat zone to serve as a "deterrent" and support the evacuation. Meanwhile, we were encountering certain difficulties and limitations in conducting combat landings.

Despite the difficulties and complications mentioned above, our combat landings in the general offensive achieved victory and underwent continuous development in terms of their scale and the methods of attack employed. In terms of their scale, combat landings progressed from landings of small units lasting a short amount of time to campaign size landings (involving many troops, multi-phase missions, many days of combat, and so forth). With regard to the methods of attack, they gradually developed from primarily ambush tactics to landings by force with combat coordination among various branches and services. From coordination among several naval personnel, they developed to infantry landings with direct air and naval firepower support. Generally speaking, although the amount of time between attacks on islands was very short, our methods of attack developed and were improved to some extent with each attack.

The development of combat landings in the recent general offensive clearly reflected the present guideline for the development of combat operations at sea, namely, the combat coordination of branches and services in which air and naval firepower support plays an indispensable role. In the recent general offensive, naval artillery vessels made advances in applying the tactics of surface combat vessels when performing such missions as supporting landings, providing firepower support, destroying enemy warships, patrolling the naval combat zone, etc. Naval artillery vessels recorded the advances mentioned above under conditions in which the enemy did not have air supremacy. Therefore, regardless of what the future role of naval artillery in combat operations at sea is, it will still be closely linked to the effectiveness of the combat support and coordination between aircraft and naval artillery vessels.

The landing force transport units carried out their landing force transport missions in exact accordance with the method of attack adopted for all of the combat landings. This was also a new step forward by naval transport personnel. The realities of combat landings confirmed the indispensable role of landing force transport ships in combat landings. The participation in combat by these units revealed problems concerning the organization of combat operations that must be studied in detail, such as the protection of landing forces when disembarking, advancing to the beach and establishing a beachhead.

Until the general offensive, the landing troops of the navy only had experience in launching independent attacks (or attacks involving limited coordination) on individual targets. In the general offensive, they participated in many combat landings coordinated among various branches and services and completed their missions well. This was a new development
in the methods of attack of the navy's landing units. It also opens
guidelines for researching the organization and use of this force in
future combat operations at sea.

3. New advances were made in organization and command.

In the general offensive and uprising of the spring of 1975, the navy
mobilized the largest force ever mobilized and simultaneously completed
many different missions in unfamiliar areas far from material-technical
support bases. These special characteristics, together with other
limitations, caused command activities on the various echelons of the navy
to encounter very many difficulties. However, in the entire course of
the general offensive and uprising many efforts were made in the organization
and command activities of the navy and they virtually kept pace with the
rapid development of the situation.

In the new and complex missions necessitated by the general offensive, many
combat decisions were proven to be both correct and creative as evident
in the use of forces and the establishment of modes of operation suited to
each mission and each different combat objective. Many decisions proved
to be very bold and timely as a result of which we were able to complete
missions of great importance employing only small forces. The penetration
by vessel N. to Da Nang, the use of border unit 75 to attack and occupy
the T. Islands and the organization of forces and combat operations in the
liberation of H. Island were decisions consistent with the guideline of the
general offensive of taking "bold, lightning fast" action; they were proof
that "opportunity is strength." In the subsequent battles to liberate the
islands, the rapid organization of forces, the establishment of correct
modes of coordination, and so forth made it possible for a number of newly
organized units to quickly go into combat, achieve high combat efficiency
and meet the need to develop the forces of the navy in the general offensive.

The accuracy of decisions reflects the quality of the work of the command
staff because it is this staff that prepares the conditions and supplies
information on the situation so that the commander can make his decisions.
In the very urgent and complicated situation, the command staff's assessment
of the situation virtually met the requirements of timeliness and accuracy.
In the reconnaissance of the enemy, new requirements also appeared, such as
the need to have reconnaissance forces which could travel at high speed and
cover a large area of operation and which possessed good reconnaissance
signal capabilities; the need to coordinate many different modes and means
of reconnaissance, and so forth in order to keep pace with the very rapid
development of the combat situation at sea.

In signal and liaison operations, although we had to establish many long
distance signal networks in a very short amount of time, we did meet the need
for accuracy, timeliness and continuity in signal operations, thereby fully
supporting the command of forces and the assessment of the situation throughout
the general offensive. In combat operations at sea in which we coordinated
with other branches and services, as a result of appropriately coordinating
the use of all the signal and liaison equipment of the navy with the signal and liaison equipment of the infantry, air force and so forth, we maintained close liaison among the various headquarters and between headquarters and landing forces throughout the course of combat.

The liberation of V. Island was the largest landing and involved the heaviest fighting of all the combat landings during the general offensive. It required the use of a large volume of supplies and increasingly large material-technical support. Despite the very short amount of time available for preparations, material-technical support operations met the requirements of the battle. This was a typical example of the efforts and advances in material-technical support operations in a battle that lasted for many days and took place far from shore. Several experiences were gained in the battle concerning the calculation of support requirements, the organization and use of support forces for a lengthy battle at sea, etc. Resupply operations in this battle alone required the use of many different means of transportation.

In the general offensive and uprising of the spring of 1975, the navy conducted combat operations under very different conditions than it had ever experienced before. The general offensive created new favorable conditions and new capabilities for the navy and, at the same time, faced the navy with very large, new and complex missions. Under the direct leadership and guidance of the Central Military Party Committee and the High Command, with the tremendous support and assistance of other branches and services and with a full understanding of the strategy of the Party Central Committee, the entire navy made very great efforts and moved forward to victoriously carry out each mission in the historic general offensive and uprising of the nation. The navy's completion of its missions was praised as being of strategc significance in the long-range development of the country. Many new matters arose in the course of completing these missions. These are valuables experiences which lay the groundwork for research to develop useful, practical ideas concerning the growth of the navy in the new stage of the revolution. Within the scope of one short article, we are only able to present a few initial ideas. A detailed review of each aspect, each mission, and so forth in the general offensive will surely result in many more useful ideas.

7809
CSO: 4909

- END -