THE SED IN THE 1980'S--NEW PROGRAM
AND STATUTES FOR THE PARTY

By
EBERHARD SCHNEIDER

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THE SED IN THE 1980'S--NEW PROGRAM AND STATUTES FOR THE PARTY

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Summary

Since the transition from Ulbricht to Honecker was established in law by the fundamental amendment of 7th October 1974 to the GDR Constitution, it has manifested itself as being of major political importance, by virtue of its conceptional nature, through the adoption of a new programme and statute by the IXth Party Congress of the SED, held in East Berlin from 18th to 22nd May 1976. The elaboration of the second programme (the first programme dating from 1963) had become necessary in order to take account of the "great changes both within our country and in the international status of the GDR" (Honecker). The question raised by the present report is that as to how the "great changes" such as the international recognition of the GDR, the country's admission to the United Nations, and the conclusion of the Basic Treaty on German-German relations, in the field of foreign and inter-German policy, the world-wide economic constraints with their effects on the GDR both nationally and as a member of the Eastern Europe bloc, in the economic field, and, finally, the ever closer approach towards the ultimate target of Communism, as prescribed by the ideology, find their programmatic expression in the new Party documents. The question as to how the two Party programmes differ from each other must be asked with a view to discerning the political features characteristic of the Honecker era. And, finally, the report investigates the extent to which the new programmatic declarations allow for a prognosis of the future policy of the SED, and in which fields.

The author lets the old and the new Party documents speak for themselves in detail on their basic messages, so as not to restrict, by giving too concise quotations, the readers' scope for drawing their own conclusions. There follows an interpretation from a viewpoint within the GDR system, which puts the political messages of the new Party documents, as revealed in recent GDR publications, into their ideological context, in order to convey to the Western reader as authentically as possible the significance and consequence of the SED's programme. The conclusions drawn from a point of view at variance with the GDR system lead in their conjunction to the following findings:

1. The new Party documents (second programme and fifth statute) are, by comparison with their predecessors, shorter, make a more concise impression, and are more concise in their political statements. The four-month debate on the drafts of the Party documents, the "people's discussion", turned into the most far-reaching and intensive ideological discussion ever carried on in the GDR. It went through various phases and proceeded with a relatively high degree of frankness for a time, though without ever departing from the control and guidance of the Party. Of the 4,350 petitions and proposals received and presented at the IXth Party Congress of the SED, 707 led to a total of 176 supplements and amendments to the drafts of the programme and statute. The most important corrections made to the draft programme from a political point of view embody:
a) the guarantee of "liberties and social rights" irrespective of philosophy and religious conviction, and

b) planned promotion of private craftsmanship.

2. In the new Party documents, the inter-German question has been displaced by international problems as no longer being any question at all, since history had already passed its judgement. Parallel to the construction of the "developed Socialist society," a separate "Socialist nation" was coming into being in the GDR, the nature of which was determined by the socio-economic order prevailing there. The German nationality which the "Socialist nation" of the GDR would still like to have in common with the "bourgeois nation" of the Federal Republic of Germany was of secondary importance and was not sufficient to merit the formation of a common German nation.

3. The diplomatic recognition of the GDR by more than 120 countries, being a self-evident reality, is not mentioned at all in the programme. The GDR's admission to the United Nations in 1973, which the country had been striving for with all its might for decades, is referred to self-confidently and more or less by-the-way in a general formulation as being an invitation to the GDR to help in solving international problems.

4. The GDR's close connections with the USSR and the intensified integration of the second German state into the Socialist community of nations are expressed in all clarity in the new Party documents. This integration is being achieved in the military and foreign policy fields by the GDR's membership of the Warsaw Pact and in the scientific and technological fields by means of the "socialist economic integration" of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. This link and integration is surmounted ideologically by the far-reaching Socialist integration concept of the gradual "convergence of the Socialist nations."

5. Declaring itself modestly to be a section of the world Communist movement, the SED is following, with its new programme, a policy of "proletarian internationalism," as if the Conference of European Communist Parties held in East Berlin in the summer of 1976 had never taken place.

6. Withdrawing from unrealistic and polemically exaggerated positions towards the Federal Republic of Germany, the EEC and NATO, the SED, whilst continuing to stand by its detente concept of "peaceful coexistence," would like to expand the GDR's relations with the crisis-stricken "imperialist" West, against the background of a worldwide balance of power which is shifting more and more in favour of Socialism.

7. Its policy towards the West does not preclude the SED from continuing its manifold solidarity with the social (in the Western industrialised nations) and the national (in the developing countries) liberation
movements, for its international policy of peaceful coexistence does not promise a freeze on the social status quo. It recommends the establishment of an "antimonopolistic democracy" (to the Western industrialised nations) and an "anticapitalist course of development" (to the coloured nations) as intermediate tactical stages on the road to social and national liberation.

8. The new Party documents commit the second German state to continuing the construction of the "developed Socialist society" as its own form of the "dictatorship of the proletariat". The establishment of the performance- and class-orientated society which bears this designation is being achieved under the guidance of the SED, whose leadership role in all fields is being increasingly emphasized. As its main instrument in implementing this process, the SED uses the state, whose executive and control functions are by no means on the decrease as the country progresses along the road to a stateless Communism, but are rather expanding.

9. The core of the GDR's version of Socialist economic policy is the "unity of economic and social policy" in recognition of the growing demands of the individual and society. This combined policy is reflected in a - for GDR standards - impressively extensive and comprehensive social programme, the most important measure of which is the promotion of housing construction, which has been neglected for decades. The SED relates social policy closely to economic policy because it realises that it will only be able to put its social policy into effect if the relatively high rate of economic growth attained to date can be maintained or even increased slightly. For the economy of the GDR with its shortage of manpower reserves, this means primarily increased pressure to produce more, for, if the basic patterns of the present planning and control structures are to remain unchanged in the face of the increasing cost of raw materials and growing consumer awareness among the population, the planning targets can only be fulfilled by improving labour productivity.

10. It is in the fields of policy on the social order and on the German-German question that the difference between the first and the second programme and, therefore, the transition from Ulbricht to Honecker manifest themselves most clearly. While Ulbricht in his later period with his concept of a "developed communal system of Socialism" over-emphasized the separate identity of the socialist phase, which was actually conceived only as a transitional stage on the way to Communism, and thereby transposed the ultimate aim of the Communist society of the future - the Socialist "principle of hope" - out of the realm of reality and into that of mere ideology, Honecker intends to venture the gradual transition to Communism in the near future. In this aim, Honecker resembles the early Ulbricht who envisaged a "short transitional period of a few decades" in his first programme. The re-inforced ideological bond between the present and the ultimate phases of the
development of society is such that the boundaries between the Socialist and the Communist stages of development are kept deliberately fluid, so that the two phases will virtually merge unnoticed into each other.

11. Furthermore, the "comprehensive construction of Socialism" in the first programme and the creation of the "Socialist community of man" to break down the class barriers, which Ulbricht envisaged, were conceived on an all-German basis. Pending the realization of a "stable entity" in the form of a "Socialist nation," a German Confederation with the GDR as the nucleus of a re-unified Socialist Germany was to serve as an interim solution. Honecker's consistent and uncompromising rejection of any form of reunification foregoes the option of a unified Communist Germany in the new programme by virtue of the, for him, irreversible integration of the GDR into the Soviet sphere of influence.

12. On the basis of its new programme, the SED will continue its policy of wide-reaching and intensive integration into the Eastern system of military and economic pacts dominated by the Soviet Union. In doing so, it will concentrate its efforts increasingly on ideological co-operation and co-ordination.

13. The GDR will maintain and possibly expand its relations with Federal Republic of Germany to the extent to which the advantages to be gained from these relations, and which lie primarily in the economic field, outweigh the burdens accompanying them, primarily as a result of increasing East-West travel. In pursuit of its own interests, the SED will, on the one hand, attempt to avoid a relapse into the hard-stand German-German confrontation of the Cold War whilst, on the other, not hesitating for one moment to freeze relations with the Federal Republic, should the German-German intercourse develop its own dynamism to the extent that it becomes a danger to the political existence of the GDR.

14. The fact that no mention is made of the (West) German Communist Party in the new programme - the SED does not want to overemphasize the, in effect, special nature of the relationship between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany - should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the SED intends to declare its solidarity with social and national liberation struggle and actions in all parts of the world more emphatically and selectively than has been the case to date.

15. In the field of domestic policy, the SED will continue to refine the State's instrumentarium of control and power and to make it more effective, in order to reduce to a minimum the risks to the domestic situation which may arise as a result of detente policy.

16. Since the new programme provides for the continuing construction of the "developed Socialist society" accompanied by the gradual transition to Communism, it is to be expected that the remnants of private enterprise in the handicrafts and the retail trade will be dismantled
in the medium term, i.e. as soon as the unsatisfactory supply situation in the State sectors of these branches has improved.

I. Historical Background

The Second program and the fifth statute of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] were unanimously approved at its ninth party congress held in East Berlin between 18 and 22 May 1976. The drafts of the new party documents were published in the SED central organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 14 and 16 January 1976 and subjected to the broadest and most intensive ideological discussion ever conducted in the GDR. The new program was drafted by a 42-member "Party Program Review Commission" appointed during the sixth central committee conference on 7 July 1972 and directed by SED boss Erich Honecker (1). Karl Wilhelm Fricke noted in this connection that originally only one revision of the old party program had been intended "in the light of the resolutions of the eighth party congress" of 1971. The old program was no longer mentioned at all in the subsequent discussion (2). Obviously, the changeover from Ulbricht to Honecker was to be given clearer expression in terms of the program than had been intended at first. Kurt Hager, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary for science, education, and culture, was elected secretary of the program commission; with the participation of "leading social scientists and experienced party officials" (3) he was charged with doing the actual programmatic work. The 22-member party statute revision commission, which was appointed parallel to that, was directed by Paul Verner, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary for security questions.

According to the activity report presented by Erich Honecker at the ninth party congress, it had become necessary to work out a new party program "because the GDR is entering a new phase in its social development." "Here it is important," continued the party boss, "to take into account the great changes both at home and with regard to the international position of the GDR in the party program and to lend emphasis to it. The program outlines the SED's fundamental goals. It provides a clear orientation in our party's struggle for the road to communism. It will be our action guideline for a period of several five-year plans" (4).

The first party program, adopted at the sixth SED congress in 1963, according to Ulbricht's report, was "for a long period of time to determine our party's development and at the same time that of the first German worker and peasant state" (5).

The 11 June 1945 KPD [Communist Party of Germany] charter appeal can be considered the first program document (6). In this connection, the German people were reminded that it does bear "a significant part of shared guilt and shared responsibility for the war and its consequences" and conclusions were drawn in it regarding Germany's future political development. The appeal culminated in the invitation "to finish the job of bourgeois-democratic transformation which was begun in 1848." The charter appeal was
certainly oriented along all-German lines in order to give the KPD an opportunity actively to participate in shaping political developments in all four occupation zones. But it rejected "forcing the Soviet system on Germany" because that "is not in keeping with present-day development tendencies in Germany."

The SED pledged itself to socialism as the "banner of the future" in the "Basic Principles and Goals of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany" which have been proclaimed during the merger of the KPD and the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] into the SED in April 1946; this merger took place at the party congress under Soviet pressure (7). The next party congress was given the directive of drafting a party program. This assignment was not completed at the second party congress in 1947. In return, the third party congress in 1950 observed that the "principles and goals" are outdated. There was no longer any talk of any program.

The fourth party congress in 1954 had been preceded by Stalin's death in May 1953 and the uprising of the GDR population on 17 June 1953. The construction of socialism, which was adopted at the second SED party conference in 1952, was stopped in June 1953 by the introduction of the "New Course." The SED had many more burning problems to solve than to work out a party program, although a program commission had indeed begun its work after the third party congress.

The fifth party congress finally adopted a program draft. But since the CPSU had in the meantime begun likewise to draft a new party program, the SED waited until its acceptance in 1961 so that it could be guided in its program drafting efforts by the new CPSU program. Critical foreign-policy events, such as the Cuban [missile] crisis and the Indian-Chinese border war, as well as the economic reform discussion in Moscow produced a situation in which the program draft, approved at the 15th central committee conference in October 1962, was published only after seven weeks at the end of November 1962 and was approved three months later with by no means minor amendments (8).

The gradual development of the SED's ideological-political self-concept is clearly reflected in its various statutes. While, in its 1946 charter statute, the SED presented itself as an open membership party, the second statute of 1950 clearly marked the change that had taken place toward the Stalinist Cadre Party. In its third statute of 1954, the SED clearly reported its governmental and internal societal leadership claim which it then proclaimed in its fourth statute of 1963 within the all-German framework (9).

II. Discussion of Party Documents

The discussion of the party program and party statute drafts, the great "popular discussion," as it was called in the GDR, took place in four phases according to the opinion of observers.
First phase: A series of spontaneous approval declarations by party members and GDR citizens not belonging to the SED was published immediately after the publication of the program draft on 14 January 1976 in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and in No 2, 1976 of the magazine EINHEIT; the draft of the new statute was submitted to the public on 16 January 1976.

Second phase: Several days later, those professors, who were more or less involved in drafting the new party documents, even if only if an advisory function, came out during the last week of January with interpretive basic articles on the individual chapters of the party program. Here we might mention Otto Reinhold, Werner Kalweit, Gerhard Schuessler, Hermann Klare, and Juergen Kuczynski (10).

Third phase: Immediately after the completion of the report on the "Results of the Activity Report and New Elections in the Departmental Party Organizations, Basic Organizations, and Local Directorates," on 2 February 1976 (11), a series of articles containing critical questions and specific amendment proposals was published (12). This relatively open discussion came to an abrupt end after the speech by SED boss Honecker at the kreis delegate conference in Weisswasser on 14 February 1976 in which he expressed his displeasure about the course of the popular discussion so far and considered it necessary to have the "kreis directorates, the base organizations tighten up the political direction" of the popular discussion "and organize it even more goal-oriented." He further stressed this at the conference of SED officials: "We must not let the popular discussion idle along by itself. The important thing here is not just to register or pass on individual opinions, questions, and arguments. The uselessness of this sort of thing is obvious" (13).

Fourth phase: Between 15 February and 16 May, the comments on the program and statute drafts in the SED press boiled down to the well-known declarations of obligation and success reports expressing broad approval of the party documents (14). On the basis of the rather surprising reprint (15) of specific proposals addressed to the Ninth Party Congress, one might perhaps, one day before its opening, speak in terms of a brief paragraph fifth phase of party document discussion.

The following was suggested in the comments reprinted shortly before the start of the party congress: the gradual introduction of the 40-hour week in industry, primarily in multishift enterprises; the introduction of a monthly paid household chore day also for single women; the introduction of shift work also in retail trade in order to make it possible to keep the shops open longer; coordination of the train schedules of the German Railroad and of GDR Motor Transportation; introduction of a flexible age limit; rise in minimum pensions; gradual improvement of basic wages; construction of recreation facilities in newly built housing developments; fare reductions for school children as of the age of 10; increase in child allowance; creation of more spaces in nurseries; low-interest loans for young, married extended service personnel of the NVA [National People's Army]--to give just a superficial impression of the problems tackled.
The third and fifth phases of the popular discussion should not really create the impression of a completely free and uncontrolled discussion. Here is why: "First of all, the publication of the party congress documents was begun quite deliberately only after the activity report and election meetings in the base organizations in order to nip in the bud any possibly trouble-making discussions during the party meetings with the rank and file of the membership from the very beginning; besides, the temporarily rather open discussion also served for a foreign-policy and a domestic-policy purpose; the idea was to provide evidence that the 'spirit of Helsinki' is also and above all at home in the GDR" (16).

1. Amendments to Program Draft

From the report of the program commission, which was presented by Kurt Hager, Politburo member and central committee secretary, at the ninth party congress, we can tell that, overall, "1,905 proposals for supplementation or amendment of the program draft" were submitted. All of these proposals supposedly were examined carefully; 442 proposals were adopted in the form of almost 125 amendments or supplementations in the program. "But the program commission was unable to consider numerous proposals. The reasons for the rejection of these proposals are to be found primarily in the excessively detailed formulation of proposals not in keeping with the character of the program, as well as repetitions or stylistic changes which would not improve the wording in any way" (17).

Going into the individual program chapters, Hager reported that some proposals expressed the wish that the preamble contain "a more detailed description of past history. But that would have led to a considerable expansion of this program part and at the same time it would cut down one repeatedly emphasized advantage of the program, that is, its clear and concise text."

In the chapter on the "Developed Socialist Society," some authors of proposals suggested an expansion of the list of its characteristic features. "The program commission arrived at the view that the characteristics formulated here contain the fundamental and essential features of the developed socialist society."

Other people submitting suggestions demanded the "identical formulation of the primary mission (the economic growth of the GDR--the author) in the program and in the directive." Hager replied: "We consider that to be correct and we recommend that we retain the well known and proven formulation of the eighth party congress." Some fundamental aspects of SED social policy were included in the new program based on the suggestions; they pertained to the "promotion of young marriages, the expansion of the possibilities for short-haul recreation and spare time organization, as well as the improvement of medical care."

Some proposals suggested that most of the intelligentsia be included among the working class--something which the program commission rejected. "Such
proposals overlook the fact that essential differences in terms of activity and qualification continue to exist along with the common features between the working class and the intelligentsia under socialism. The necessary emphasis on the existence of differing classes and strata and the leading role of the working class do not imply any downgrading of the intelligentsia.

The Evangelical Church in the GDR has criticized the fact that the new program draft, in contrast to the old program (18) mentions neither the basic principle of separation of church and state, nor the guarantee of freedom of worship. That could lead to a situation--according to the comment from the directorate of the Evangelical church in the GDR in March 1976 address to Hans Seigewasser, state secretary for church questions--where "freedom of conscience and faith would no longer be clearly guaranteed for all those citizens who cannot pledge themselves to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism" (19). For East Berlin Bischof Schoenherr it is clear that, when it comes to a party which stands on the grounds of Marxism-Leninism, one cannot deny that it actually subscribes to atheism. In his opinion it is however unavoidable that one will, full of confidence, have to tackle the tasks of the future as part of a team effort "if this ideology is to be implemented with all of its components for everybody" (20). Indeed, the state guaranteed "freedoms and social rights," such as the "right to work, recreation, free education and health protection, material security in old age and in case of sickness or in case of the ability to work" precisely in response to that criticism, not only, as provided for in the draft, "independently of racial and national origin," but now also, in the approved SED program, independently of "ideology, religious belief, and social position." According to Kurt Hager's report in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, this process looks like this: "Complete equality for all citizens in our society, following a series of proposals, was expressed even more precisely in the program, in agreement with the GDR constitution" (21).

Another politically significant change relates to the inclusion of the passage, in the SED document, to the effect that self-employed craftsmen are to be "promoted according to plan." The draft version only called for craftsmen to be "included in the solution of supply problems." At the ninth party congress, Honecker explained why self-employed craftsmen are to be given special support: "We assign great significance here to the promotion of crafts enterprises which deal directly with the supply of the population as well as private retail trade, commission retail trade, and commission restaurants" (22). At the second Central Committee Plenum, Honecker on 3 September 1976 added the following by way of emphasis: "Solid and further growth possibilities in long-range terms are presented by our policy also to the craftsmen, the private retail merchants, the small businessmen, and the many others who, with their diligence, contribute to a situation where people feel comfortable with us under socialism. Anybody who is not receptive to these questions is stifling initiative which will help improve our people's material and cultural life" (23).

This greater emphasis on the crafts is explained by reasons of supply functions and operations as we can see from the quotations. (Private crafts
account for more than 80 percent of all repairs and 2/3 of all services in the GDR. The share of private retail merchants and commission merchants, in other words, private retailers with more or less high levels of government participation, out of the total sales volume comes to more than 10 percent (24). Because the SED derives its strategic goals from Marxist-Leninist ideology and, in this sense, in its new program also wants to promote privately owned crafts establishments, because it defines communism as the "classless society" in which the "means of production are the uniform property of the people and where all members of society are socially equal," the turnabout in its crafts policy is probably more tactical in character in order to stop the shrinkage process in the crafts which has been underway since 1972. Quite consistently, the new crafts policy has already led to a series of specific promotion measures, such as, for example, on 25 March 1976, the publication of a guideline from the State Bank of the GDR regarding the award of low-interest loans to the PGH [artisan producer cooperatives] and privately owned crafts enterprises. Besides, the lump-sum tax rate for enterprises with only one employee and with with a repair and service operations share of at least 70 percent was introduced in April 1976, retroactive to 1 January 1976. Furthermore, the bookkeeping regulations were made easier (25).

According to the report by Kurt Hager, the new program takes into consideration a series of proposed changes aimed at "even more emphasizing the role of the educational system in developing all around, developed socialist personalities, formulating the polytechnical character of our general-education middle schools even more precisely, and placing more emphasis on the acquisition of knowledge on the foundation of the Marxist-Leninist image of the world.

According to the report, there were some supplementary fundamental statements on security and military policy in the program. "Many proposals on national defense express insight into the connection between the struggle for peaceful coexistence and the necessary increase in defense preparedness for the protection of socialism and peace" (26).

2. Changes in Statute Draft

The report of the statute commission to the ninth party congress was delivered by Paul Verner, Politburo member and central committee secretary. He said that 2,445 proposals had been received, "the overwhelming majority from groups, from party members and party membership applicants, but also from executive committees and members of friendly parties and citizens without any party affiliations" (27). The statute commission supposedly "discussed and analyzed" all proposals and suggestions "with a sense of responsibility." Among the proposals submitted, 265 resulted in 51 amendments in the statute draft.

Following the supplementation proposals, Chapter III ("Party Buildup and Internal Party Democracy"), expands the right to summon party aktif con-
ferences to "secure the uniform orientation and formation of the party." Chapter VIII ("Party and Free German Youth") furthermore contains some supplementary statements which "express the significance which our party assigns to the education and development of the younger generation." And, finally, membership dues for persons earning more than M1,000 and up to M1,200 per month were reduced from 3.0 percent to 2.5 percent of the total gross income.

"Numerous proposals and letters could not be taken into consideration in the statute. Some contained suggestions which were expressed in the new program. Others related to questions which had already been settled through the central committee's resolutions and directives. A whole series of proposals boiled down to the idea of burdening the statute down with too many detailed regulations. Proposals which are in the nature of motions were passed on to the corresponding agencies for clarification" (28).

III. German Policy

1. Reunification Policy Turned Down

The most fatal change in the German policy of the new party program consists in the present rejection of any kind of reunification concepts. In the old program, the SED still referred to itself as "party of peace, national dignity, and national unity"; it maintained that it was fighting for the "elimination of the division of the German nation" which had been "caused by German and foreign imperialists" in the form of a "German confederation" (29); the new program on the other hand advocates the view that the GDR is developing into a "socialist German nation." With these statements, the SED is continuing the process of adjusting fundamental political documents to its policy of delimitation toward the FRG which it launched at the end of the sixties. This process was ushered in with the fundamental amendment of the second constitution of the GDR on 7 October 1974 and was continued one year later with the new friendship treaty which the GDR signed with the USSR on 7 October 1975.

Between the "socialist GDR" and the "capitalist FRG" there is taking place, according to the new party program, a "lawful process of delimitation in all sectors of social life." Relations between the GDR and the FRG are taken up in accordance with that in the program's foreign policy chapter. The new program, in contrast to the old program, does not have an independent part dealing with a policy for Germany. The statements on German policy, dressed up in foreign-policy garb, are declared to be the specific expressions of the principles of "peaceful coexistence" (30). Party boss Honecker's activity report likewise mentions a policy for Germany only in passing. With regard to "keeping the German issue open," Honecker made this clear: "Nothing is open any longer here. History spoke long ago" (31). This is why the impression is suggested here that the FRG is just another capitalist state like many others. To be sure, the West German state, in addition to the USSR, is the only state that is mentioned by name in the
new party program. The usual negative cliches on the Federal Republic, which were still being propagated page by page in the third program, cannot be found in the new program.

The SED retained its name and did not rename itself as the Communist Party of the GDR, along the lines of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, although it considers itself now only to be the "conscious and organized vanguard of the working class and the working people of the socialist German Democratic Republic." In response to the question as to "why the party statute did not also change the name of the SED," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND replied the following with regard to the last part of the name: "'Germany' is correct because our party represents socialist Germany" (32). In the Politburo activity report to the 13th conference of the SED central committee, Honecker on 12 December 1974 advanced a kind of socialist sole-representation claim when he stressed that the GDR "in contrast to the FRG represents socialist Germany" (33). That could be an indication that the present rejection of any reunification and the implementation of the delimitation policy do not constitute the SED's last word on a policy for Germany.

2. Development of "Socialist Nation" in GDR

The first program still stuck to the premise of the continued existence of a German nation and gave the West German communists advice as to how they should organize the struggle for German unity on the basis of the social system in the GDR, whereby they had to start with the idea that the GDR is the nucleus of a reunited socialist Germany. As a transitory solution, pending the attainment of that goal, they recommended the creation of a confederation which was to achieve a gradual reduction of bonds of both states with the different power groupings. Except for the first party program, this German policy was even expressed in a separate national document which was adopted on 17 June 1962 as the unaltered draft of the SED by the National Congress of the National Front in the GDR (34).

The concept of the "socialist nation" in the GDR—the "socialist German nation" is mentioned in the new party program in only one place—springs from a concept of nations which combines economic, social, political, ideological (that is to say, the social-historical factors), and ethnic factors into a dialectical unit, whereby the social-historical factors, which are typical of the particular social-economic social formation, determine the nation's character. Ethnic factors—such as language, mores, customs, life habits, etc.—in the opinion of the SED add up to the nationality of a nation.

While the nation is supposedly the product of capitalist development and is supposedly going through a metamorphosis toward the socialist nation, in order then finally to disappear completely in communism, the development of nationality goes back to the time of origin of the class society, in other words, it is supposed to be considerably older than the nation. Nationality supposedly will also exist longer because the overall complex of ethnic factors is more adaptable to the social-economic, political, and ideological processes. According to this socialist nation concept, nationality is one
component of a nation whereby the ethnic element is not enough to determine the nation. The nation is the more comprehensive concept because it encompasses both the social-historical and the ethnic factors. On the territory of the GDR, there is supposed to be developing--together with socialist society--a socialist nation with a qualitatively new content compared to the capitalist nation which continues to exist on the territory of the Federal Republic. By nationality, the citizens of the GDR--with the exception of the national minority of the Sorbs--continue to be Germans. But in the meantime, new mores, customs, and life habits have developed in the GDR and they are in keeping with the socialist way of life so that the ethnic factors, which determine nationality, are also supposed to start changing (35). At the 13th central committee conference Honecker in December 1974 already made a distinction between "citizenship--GDR, nationality--German" (36). He found it necessary to relativize this rigorous position, which was expressed in the constitution that had been amended 3 months earlier because it ran into resistance from the population itself and because it encountered disbelief in the eastern European countries with their pronounced national traditions.

The new party program starts with the idea that the "foundations, content, and forms of national life changed qualitatively" along with "the socialist revolution and the shaping of the socialist society" in the GDR. "In conquering power, the working class created the decisive prerequisites for the formation of the socialist nation." (The program draft still contained the rather broader phrase, "constituted itself as nation.")

In the new party program, the socialist nation is described as a "stable community of classes and strata with ties of friendship among them, a community free of antagonistic contradictions, led by the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party." The essential features of this socialist German nation are shaped by the working class. The SED directs the process of fashioning the socialist German nation in the GDR according to plan. It advocates the development of the socialist national culture and promotes the unfolding of socialist national consciousness.

According to the new party program, the socialist nation's economic foundation is the "socialist national economy" which unfolds on the basis of social, that is to say, state ownership of the means of production (factories, banks, shipyards, mines, etc.) (37). In the socialist nation of the GDR, Marxism-Leninism is the ruling ideology, in other words, the atheistic ideology, which starts with the idea that the history of mankind develops according to historical laws and is aimed at the worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism-communism.

3. Delimitation and Collaboration

The "lawful process of the delimitation" of the GDR from the FRG, which is allegedly taking place according to the party program, was observed by Honecker already at the eighth congress of the SED in 1971: "Our party's
basic line starts with the idea that the entire course of the development and consolidation of our socialist state objectively leads and must lead to a situation where the contrast between us and the GDR, which walks the capitalist road, becomes stronger and that therefore the process of delimitation between the two states will become more and more profound in all sectors of social life" (38).

Hermann Axen, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary for SED foreign relations, expressed himself even more clearly in international communism's theoretical magazine PROBLEME DES FRIEDENS UND DES SOZIALISMUS: "The decisive economic, class-oriented political foundations for the development of the socialist nation in the GDR preclude any 'approach' or 'commonality' with the socially opposite capitalist nation in the FRG. Relations between the GDR and the FRG are not characterized by any 'commonalities' but rather by unbridgeable contrasts, by the irreconcilable contrast between socialism and capitalism" (39). If there are indeed no common features between the two German states, why then is a policy of separation [delimitation] necessary to begin with?

The delimitation which the SED is pursuing—in order not to provide any further nourishment for the hope, springing up in many GDR citizens in the wake of detente policy, to the effect that Germany's reunification might be possible after all—should not be equated with isolation or some kind of [self-imposed] blockade. This separation, which supposedly takes place step by step as an objective process, not only does not exclude collaboration with the other German states, but, in the opinion of the SED, constitutes the prerequisite for such cooperation. Unfortunately, both the new party program and Honecker's activity report do not contain any specific ideas as to the further development of German-German collaboration.

The cooperation desired by the GDR is to materialize primarily in that field in which it will not get into conflict with the separation policy it is pursuing, that is to say, in the sector of the economy. The FRG's policy is aimed at enabling collaboration with the second German state to unfold as broadly as possible. Because the collaboration desired by the GDR is to take place according to the principles of equality and mutual advantage, it is legitimate for the FRG to engage in collaboration in those forms and sectors which are in its interest. Any cooperation with the second German state runs into the limitations of its separation policy, that is to say, cooperation with the FRG, based on the interests of the east Berlin leadership, must not lead to an approach among the two German states with the goal of subsequent reunification because that would mean that the GDR would be abandoning itself.

4. Statements on Berlin Policy

The old party program strives for the creation of a "Free City of West Berlin" with which the GDR is supposedly ready to establish relations. The new program on the other hand speaks of the "Quadripartite Agreement" which,
according to western terminology, is referred to as the Four-Power Agreement, applicable to all of Berlin. The GDR prefers the term "Quadripartite Agreement" because it includes itself as a party to the agreement on the Soviet side. Like the USSR, it emphasizes that the Four-Power Agreement only deals with West Berlin in order to suggest the idea that four-power status applies only to West Berlin. This assertion was not matched by action when, during the 17 October 1976 People's Chamber Elections, East Berlin did not constitute a separate election district (40). The East Berlin People's Chamber deputies, like the West Berlin Lower House deputies, were elected by the East Berlin city assembly (41).

Deviating from past practice, the Four-Power Agreement is referred to in the new program as "Quadrilateral Agreement" without the otherwise customary and disputed addition of "West Berlin" as the area of applicability desired by the GDR in this case. In the new SEG program, the party only promises strict compliance with the Four-Power Agreement. The second part of the formula about "strict compliance and full application," which Brandt and Brezhnev had signed in their joint declaration on 21 May 1973 (42) was dropped here. Instead, the SED considers it "necessary further to normalize relations between the GDR and West Berlin." Relations between the GDR and West Berlin are moreover taken up in the foreign policy part, separate from the mention of relations between the GDR and the FRG, so that the impression arises that West Berlin involves a separate state.

IV. Foreign Policy

In its new program, the SED established the following "contents, goals, and tasks" for its foreign policy:

"Together with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states to secure the most favorable international conditions for socialist and communist construction;

"To consolidate the unity, compactness, and all-around collaboration of the socialist states and to promote their friendship and further approach;

"To support the struggle of the working class and the communist and worker parties in the developed capitalist countries and further to consolidate relations with those parties;

"To support the social and national liberation movements throughout the world in the form of solidarity and closely to work with the national liberated states;

"To implement the policy of peaceful coexistence in relations with the capitalist countries;
"Decisively to turn the aggressive forces of imperialism back, to preserve mankind from another world war, and to secure peace lastingly" (43).

1. Relations With Eastern European Countries

(a) "Proletarian Internationalism"

Both the old and the new program base relations among socialist countries on the principle of "proletarian internationalism." This principle originally signified the international solidarity of the working class against the national bourgeoisie and international capital. During the time between the two world wars, the solidarity concept was narrowed down to refer to the discipline of the individual parties within the international communist movement, directed by the Comintern under Soviet leadership. The principle of "democratic centralism," which is typical of the internal party sector, was just about transferred as is to international party relations. This narrower interpretation of the principle of proletarian internationalism" from the very beginning precluded any approach toward any polycentric developments within the international communist movement.

After World War II, the principle of "Proletarian Internationalism" was "further developed" in terms of its narrower meaning--on the basis of the forced adoption of the Soviet development model by the eastern European countries--inasmuch as it regulates not only relations among communist parties but also among socialist states. "A characteristic new feature of proletarian internationalism consists in the fact that it becomes the ideological foundation of international relations of the socialist countries" (44). Related to the countries of "real socialism" in eastern Europe, "proletarian internationalism" becomes "socialist internationalism." The principle of "socialist internationalism" thus characterizes relations between the eastern European states and the communist parties while the more comprehensive principle of "proletarian internationalism" applies to relations between the eastern European communist parties and the nongoverning communist parties of the national communist movement, to relations with the western European communist parties and the Japanese CP as well as to the communist parties of the Third World and the Fourth World.

Relations among socialist states are fashioned according to the principles of "socialist internationalism." These qualitatively higher-grade foreign-policy relations can be compared to relations between family members and get their degree of intensity and thus their model character from the fact that they take place not only on the government level but also the party level. They are based on the collective sovereignty of the socialist countries, which has a class character because the socialist states are states in which the working class exercises power, according to the self-concept of those states. The western concept of the individual sovereignty of each individual state is termed outdated for the socialist states--as they call themselves--all of which belong to the same social system.
"Socialist internationalism" pledges the socialist countries to constant mutual aid, if necessary, also of a military kind, to beat off counterrevolutionary attacks, regardless of whether they spring up in the form of military aggression from the outside or inside the particular country, as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968, or even within the ruling communist party.

Hermann Axen, Politburo member and central committee secretary, in an article in PRAVDA described the consequences of the principle of "socialist internationalism" as follows: "The common nature of the class interests and goals of the socialist countries demands of them that, in their domestic and foreign policies, they start not only with individual interests but also with the common interest, it demands that they see not only their own necessities but simultaneously the interests of the community of socialist states but also those of the overall antiimperialist movement" (45).

The new SED program speaks of "proletarian" but not "socialist internationalism" in order not to confuse this principle to the eastern European countries but in order to make clear the far-reaching aspect of this principle through the inclusion of all communist and worker parties. Indeed, the concept of "proletarian internationalism" is used in a double sense in its broader version as "proletarian internationalism" and in its narrower definition as "socialist internationalism." Thus the SED is "a firm and inseparable division of the international communist and worker movement, a party of proletarian internationalism." Starting "with the international character of the historical task of the working class, it makes its contribution in the progressing revolutionary world process, it discharges its international class obligation" (46). In its narrower meaning, "proletarian internationalism"—meaning here "socialist internationalism" as such—is fashioned by the "effective tie-in of common and national interests." "These relations embody a qualitatively new type of international relations. They are based on the social-economic, political, and ideological common features and on the laws of the blossoming and approach of socialist nations. The socialist community creates the example for the future worldwide community of free and equal peoples" (47). In his guest address at the ninth party congress, M. A. Suslov, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, emphasized "proletarian internationalism" as the "strongest weapon of the working class." Deviation from this principle supposedly contains the "danger of losses and defeats. All of our movement's gains are connected with this principle" (48).

The principle of "proletarian internationalism" was one of the principal disputed points between the autonomist communist parties of Italy, France, and Spain as well as the ruling communist parties of Yugoslavia and Romania, a country that is a member of the Warsaw Pact, on the one hand, and the CPSU on the other hand. Preparations for the conference of European CPs—which was finally held in East Berlin on 29-30 June 1976 after 16 preparatory meetings over a period of 20 months—were handled by the SED. A failure of that conference, in whose materialization the SED spared no effort, would also have signified a tremendous loss of prestige for the communists in the
GDR. The autonomist parties were not prepared to let themselves be disciplined by the CPSU and pinned down on the Moscow line. The Kremlin took these objections into account and the conference finally settled on a definition of the discredited principle of "proletarian internationalism" which returned to it its original meaning without using the disputed term as such. According to the joint final document, the communist parties "will develop their internationalist, comradely, voluntary collaboration and solidarity on the basis of the great ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, coupled with strict compliance with the equality and sovereign independence of each party, noninterference in internal affairs, respect for the free choice of different roads in the struggle for progressive social transformation and for socialism." In order to forestall any misunderstanding, the following was furthermore emphasized: "The struggle for socialism in one's own country and each party's responsibility toward its own working class and its own people are tied in with the reciprocal solidarity of the workers of all countries, all progressive movements and peoples in the fight for freedom and the consolidation of independence, for democracy, socialism, and world peace" (49). These emancipatory sentences sound more sovereign than the program statement to the effect that the SED is a "firm and inseparable division of the international communist and worker movement, a party of proletarian internationalism!"

(b) "Brotherly Bonds" With the CPSU

The SED feels that it has "brotherly bonds with the CPSU, the most seasoned and experienced communist party." Friendship with the Soviet Union remains a "source of strength and foundation of the development of the socialist GDR." In the old program, the Soviet Union was celebrated as the "center of the international worker movement," as "bulwark of Marxism-Leninism at peace," as touchstone of the policy of the communist and worker parties and the socialist states" (50); in the new program, as far as the SED is concerned, "the attitude toward the CPSU and the USSR is the touchstone of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, to the revolutionary cause of the working class and its historical mission" (51). Using not quite as emphatic formulations, the SED in the new program also elevates the CPSU to the status of criterion for the "orthodoxy" of each Marxist-Leninist party.

The new constitution of 7 October 1974 contains far-reaching bridges of ties to the USSR, in other words, this is a basic document of government law and it contains provisions which are binding not only for SED members but for all GDR citizens. As a kind of substitute for separation from the German nation—which is still featured in the 6 April 1968 constitution—the new constitution points up the prospects heading East. Article 6, paragraph 2, proclaims that the GDR "forever and irrevocably is allied with the USSR." In the new GDR German-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 7 October 1975, in article 1, both sides one year later expressed the intention of—in agreement with the principles of "socialist internationalism" consolidating "relationships of eternal and unalterable friendship and brotherly mutual aid in all fields" (52).
The new program and statute obligate all party members to advocate the "unalterable friendship, collaboration, and brotherly alliance with the Soviet Union" and to conduct an "uncompromising struggle against all phenomena of anti-Sovietism" (53). In the old statute, the commitment of the SED members to "unalterable friendship with the Soviet Union" was enough. There was as yet no talk of fighting against anti-Sovietism. According to the old statute, the SED was above all to be guided by the "experiences of the CPSU and the ideas of its program." According to the new statute, the SED "untiringly" is developing in depth "unalterable friendship and the brotherly alliance with the CPSU, the vanguard of the international communist movement." Close collaboration implemented since 1970 between the SED and the CPSU in the fields of party relations and ideology, spelled out officially in December 1973, leads us to assume that the SED intensively and exhaustively consulted the CPSU in drafting its new party documents (54).

(c) "Approach of Socialist Nations"

The new program describes the relations of the socialist countries among each other as a process of the "systematic approach of the socialist nations in all fields of social life" (55). This new formula can be found neither in the old SED program, nor in the amended constitution of the autumn of 1974 but it can be found in the preamble of the new autumn 1975 GDR-USSR Friendship Treaty. The concept of approach stems from Lenin and can be found in his early writings on the policy of nationalities. Lenin applied it to the blending of nations within the Soviet multinational state. As he sees it, the approach among nations is a link in a process involving several steps, such as "equality of rights among nations (ravno-praviye) of nations," "self-determination right of nations (samoopredele-niye)," "approach of nations (zblizheniye)," aimed at the goal of the blending (zliyaniye) of the workers of all nations" (56).

The SED confines the formula of the "lawful process" of the "approach among socialist nations" not only to the nationalities of the USSR but extends it to all socialist nations (57). According to the new party program, the "approach among socialist nations," in addition to the social-economic, political, and ideological common features, represents the foundation for new-type international relations which exist between socialist countries in the form of "proletarian internationalism"—meaning here "socialist internationalism" (58). Within the framework of the restrictive interpretation of the concluding document of the East Berlin Communist Party Summit, Soviet ideologists conversely try to base the "objective approach process" of the socialist nations and countries on the "tried principles of socialist internationalism." The sovereignty of the socialist countries supposedly develops on the foundation of an approach process fashioned in this way (59).

The formula about the "systematic approach among socialist nations" in the new party program is dialectically tied in with the statement to the effect

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that a "socialist nation" is developing in the GDR (60), a process which is
being controlled and directed by the SED according to plan. The reciprocal
dialectical relationship between the fashioning of a socialist nation in
the GDR and the approach among all socialist nations is explained as fol-
lows: "The socialist nation cannot at all develop outside the materializa-
tion of proletarian internationalism... The socialist nation thus does not
develop in isolation but rather in connection with and as part of an approach
to the other socialist nations" (61). And: "Socialist patriotism and prole-
tarian internationalism spring from the same source—the class interests and
goals of the working class. They also reflect two sides of the implementa-
tion of the historical mission of the working class, whereby internationalism
is the predominant one" (62).

The formula about the systematic approach process among socialist nations is
related to the "socialist economic integration" of the CEMA, the eastern
European economic community. This "socialist economic integration" forms
the foundation for the approach process among the socialist nations (63).
Eastern economic integration presupposes increasing equalization of the
economic development level of the CEMA member countries. If this eastern
European integration is to be achieved in a sense extending beyond the
economy, in a sense resembling the EC—which is indicated by the formula
about the approach among nations—then there is no legal foundation to be
discovered for such far-reaching target projections in the fundamental
documents of the CEMA, that is to say, neither in the statute of the CEMA
which was last amended on 21 June 1974, nor in its 1971 complex program.
Besides, the set of instruments of the CEMA would not at all be sufficient
successfully to carry out such a socialist integration process. It is more-
over difficult to imagine that all member countries of this eastern European-
Asian (Mongolian People's Republic, also a member)—American (Cuba, also a
member) economic community would be ready to go along with such an approach
and integration process.

Bilateral treaties according to the model of the new friendship treaty be-
tween the GDR and the USSR, which is expressly stated in the new party pro-
gram, are a more suitable instrument for the lawful approach process among
socialist nations. In his recommendation speech on 4 December 1975, Soviet
foreign minister Gromyko, within the context of the ratification process,
in addressing the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, analyzed the
new treaty with the GDR as an "event of historical significance, not only
in relations between our states and peoples; it is very significant for all
member countries of the Warsaw Pact, for the entire community of socialist
states" (64). In signing the friendship treaty with the GDR on 6 October
1975 in Moscow, Brezhnev elevated the "course toward the further approach
of our peoples and nations" to the status of the treaty's "nucleus" (65).

The adoption of Lenin's old formula about the "approach among nations"
from the theoretical discussions in the party-program and international
law documents represents a new political quality in relations between the
GDR and the USSR. It is an instructive example for the ideological
buttressing of new political developments which have now become necessary. It makes it obvious to conclude that this involves a reply to the expansion of the EC and its integration challenge. A political superstructure with the integration formula of "approach among socialist nations" is to be erected on the basis of a "socialist economic integration" of the CEMA countries. If the measure the running time of this process by the period of validity of the new friendship treaty, it would probably extend to the year 2000.

(d) "Socialist Economic Integration"

Within the community of eastern European countries, the new party program strives for "socialist economic integration" (66) which, in terms of its structure, is based on multilateral agreements which only contain recommendations but no binding instructions. Because the concept of "socialist economic integration" was introduced only in April 1969 at the 23rd Extraordinary Council Meeting of the CEMA in Moscow, by the heads of parties and governments of the member countries, as a reply to the increasing integration of the EC (67), it cannot yet be found in the first party program. The 1963 SED program only speaks of the "socialist international system" whose "ever stronger member" the GDR was becoming (68).

We learned little about the content of "socialist economic integration" from the fundamental CEMA documents. The highest CEMA representative, N. V. Paddeyev, describes the integration process as follows: "Socialist economic integration is a process which is consciously and according to plan developed by the communist and worker parties and the governments of the CEMA member countries, a process of international socialist division of labor, of approach among their economies and of the development of a modern, highly-effective structure for the national economies; it is a process of the gradual approach and equalization of their economic growth levels, the formation of profound and stable connections in the main branches of the economy, in science and technology, a process of the expansion and consolidation of the international market of those countries as well as a process of the perfection of commodity-money relationships (69).

More far-reaching target projections for the eastern European integration processes were developed in East Berlin at the beginning of the seventies: "Socialist economic integration of the CEMA countries (in the broadest sense) is understood here to be represented by the increasing, long-term-planned interlocking development and gradual blending of the different socialist national economies into a uniform economic organism" (70). "Socialist economic integration" is said to be a part of the process involved in a "comprehensive integration of socialist nations, states, and national economies—an integration in terms of culture, education and science, in the government machine, politics and military affairs, in other words, in the totality of social relations" (71).
It is especially the Romanians who are resisting such far-reaching integration concepts. In the June 1975 issue of the central party organ SCINTEIA, the Romanian economist professor Paraluta wrote that the system of the planned regulation of economic relations among the CEMA countries could only assume the form of coordination which would mean that the decisive element—that would persuade a country in any form whatsoever to participate in economic collaboration and cooperation or socialist integration—is and could only be the convergence of interests among the national economies. The center of economic management and decision-making is and must be a national political center. This function cannot be taken over by just any international forum, without impairing national sovereignty (72).

The SED assigns "decisive significance" in its new program to "socialist economic integration." This is supposed to be of decisive significance to the "steady economic and social growth" of the GDR. Within this integration of the CEMA, a "decisive role" is assigned to the "further development and constant in-depth advancement" of collaboration between the GDR and the USSR. This CEMA integration supposedly strengthens socialism in "economic competition with capitalism." The SED is for the following:

"The full utilization of the advantages of international socialist division of labor and cooperation," related to the CEMA;

"The gradual development of an integrated fuel and energy industry";

"The coordinated development of machine-building, of the consumer goods industry, and of other branches of the national economy";

"The in-depth development of specialization and cooperation in research and production on the basis of joint long-term programs" (73).

The intensification of collaboration in the critical areas listed establishes "rising requirements for the quality of management, planning, and stimulating the economy." The SED therefore is in favor of the "perfection of the coordination of planning activities" because national economies organized on the basis of economic planning can be integrated only through the plan (74).

In the first party program, the SED demands the drafting of "uniform plans" (75). Here, the Soviet ideal concept of a uniform five-year plan for all CEMA countries probably plays a role; this is a concept which the USSR had to drop after several attempts because of resistance from some member countries, especially Romania. Moscow was forced to be satisfied with the minimum solution involving coordination of the individual national five-year plans. This coordination was accomplished for the first time in drafting the plans for the years 1976-1980, not as a subsequent briefing for the individual state planning commissions on national five-year plans which had already been finalized, but as permanent consultation and coordination process during the entire plan preparation phase. Moreover, all national five-year plans of the CEMA countries for 1976-1980 for the first time will con-
tain a chapter on "planning measures of socialist economic integration" (76), in other words, the national planning share in the planning of joint large-scale CEMA projects. The legal foundation for planned coordination can be considered to be the protocols on the coordination of economic plans, which the GDR signed between autumn 1975 and the spring of 1976 with the USSR, with Poland, with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Mongolian People's Republic (77).

At the 30th CEMA conference on 7–9 July 1976 in East Berlin, it was observed in an announcement that there are "more and more elements of commonality in the policy, economy, and social life of the CEMA countries," that there is "a gradual equalization of the development level." The "in-depth development of multilateral collaboration" and the "gradual approach and equalization of the economic development level" of the CEMA countries are considered to constitute an "objectively necessary, historically lawful process of their advance in building socialism and communism" (78).

2. Relations to Western Industrial Countries

(a) The Theory of Imperialism

According to the analysis of the new party program, the "general crisis of capitalism" is growing worse in the western industrial countries. This crisis is supposed to be characterized by the rapidly advancing "concentration and centralization of capital," which supposedly has already assumed such proportions that it is spilling beyond national boundaries and is spawning "international monopolies." Capitalism, and its most developed form, imperialism, are supposed to be the "cause of hunger, misery, as well as the political and mental oppression of a significant portion of mankind." Its parasitism and rottenness increasingly characterized its society. All that confirms Lenin's thesis: "Imperialism is dying capitalism."

Capitalism, which revolves, not around man, but around profit, is now supposedly being "shaken by cyclic and structural crises in the economy." "Unemployment and growing social uncertainty among workers, inflation, and currency crises as well as the plunder of the environment supposedly have become "permanent phenomena."

This "unequal economic and political development of capitalism" supposedly led to the formation of "centers of the imperialist world which rival each other." Competition between them is becoming keener. The "growing political instability of monopoly rule and its governments" allegedly is going hand in hand with the "increasing decline of bourgeois democracy." The "ideology and culture" of imperialism are also supposed to be in the midst of a profound crisis (79).
This rather somber painting of crisis becomes understandable at least in ideological terms only against the background of Lenin's theory of imperialism. According to it, imperialism is characterized by the following features:

"1. Concentration of production and capital, which has reached such a high development stage, that it creates monopolies which play the decisive role in economic life;

"2. The merger of bank capital with industrial capital and the rise of a financial oligarchy on the basis of finance capital;

"3. Capital export is assuming special significance;

"4. International monopolist associations of capitalists, which divide the world among themselves, are taking shape;

"5. The territorial subdivision of the world among the capitalist big powers is over with; they are now fighting for a redistribution of the world" (80).

In this sense, Honecker issued the following warning at the ninth party congress: "A clear view for new possibilities of advancing on the road to peaceful coexistence never lets us overlook the fact that imperialism has not lost its aggressive and expansive essence" (81).

Apart from the fact that the first program was considerably more voluminous than the second one and therefore covered all topics in greater detail, it is interesting to note that the new program lacks one feature which, according to the SED view, is supposed to be typical of West German and western capitalism and which to this very day was included in the standard repertory of imperialism research in the GDR (82)--that is to say, the characteristic of state monopoly capitalism. According to the first part of the program, state monopoly capitalism springs from the blending of the power of the monopolies with government power." Monopoly capital supposedly uses the "bourgeois state, regardless of its present form, as an instrument of its rule." The "blending of the power of the monopolies with the power of the West German state apparatus" is above all in "the interest of the armament concerns" and serves for the "militarization of the economy and of all social life."

The SED obviously found itself forced to engage in a certain amount of ideological moderation in order to make it easier for its lower-level and medium-level functionaries to accomplish the ideological squaring of the circle, that is to say, to reconcile the fact of the group of treaties with the FRG with the basic statements of Marxist-Leninist analysis of capitalism. Perhaps, the SED likewise did not want to raise the critical question as to why it pictures the concentration tendencies and the state-monopolist development—which it thinks it can diagnose in West Germany—as a horrible evil. Actually, the SED only has to wait for the further
presumed concentration process in West German state monopoly capitalism because it would then lead directly to GDR style socialism, in other words, state monopoly capitalism at its best.

(b) "Peaceful Coexistence"

While the development of foreign relations between the GDR and the socialist countries takes place according to the principles of "socialist internationalism" and only according to those principles, the second German state is trying to develop its relations with the capitalist countries and with the FRG--countries with a different social system--according to the principles of "peaceful coexistence."

Both the old and the new programs subscribe to the principles of "peaceful coexistence" (83). "Peaceful coexistence" supposedly demands "respect for the principles of sovereignty, equality, and territorial integrity of each state, regardless of whether it is big or little, noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, and respecting the right of all peoples to the free decision of the question of their social-economic and political system, as well as a guarantee that disputed international issues will be resolved through political channels, through negotiations" (84).

According to Honecker, the SED's advocacy of "peaceful coexistence" is "not of a tactical nature." It is the expression of the "main tendency of international development," which is detente (85). Here of course one must not overlook the fact that "peaceful coexistence" is considered to be a "special form of the class struggle between states having different systems" and that it may "neither be transferred to relations between antagonistic classes within the capitalist states nor that it may be compared to the national liberation movement." "The policy of peaceful coexistence," says the GDR textbook "Wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus" further, "cancels the class struggle out neither within the capitalist states, nor on an international scale" (86).

The concept of "peaceful coexistence" is understood better and more in depth if one keeps in mind that it not only does not contradict Lenin's theory of the revolution but instead even constitutes one of its essential components. As a form of the class struggle on a worldwide scale, "peaceful coexistence" signifies the competition of the two systems in all imaginable fields, with the exception of the military dispute. "Peaceful coexistence" differs from the Cold War by virtue of the element of cooperation for mutual advantage, whereby this cooperation is supposed to extend primarily to the economic area.

The competition among the two systems and thus also the policy of "peaceful coexistence" will continue until the worldwide victory of socialism over capitalism. The peculiarity of the concept of "peaceful coexistence" after all consists precisely in the fact that its result--the worldwide spread of socialism--was built in from the very beginning and was predetermined.
Basically the only thing that counts now is accurately and correctly to set
up the individual steps toward the historically predetermined goal, that is
to say, to create more favorable conditions for the implementation of the
policy of "peaceful coexistence" by further shifting the balance of power
(economic, military, political stability, state consciousness, etc.) in
favor of socialism.

Although the competition among the two systems is being carried out within
the framework of "peaceful coexistence" in all fields, avoiding a war,
victory is to be won on a battlefield that is unfavorable to capitalism, a
battlefield into which the countries of socialism force it, that is to say,
the field of the economy. In the area of the economy it is supposed to be
proved that the socialist form of economy is economically more efficient and
socially more just than the capitalist one (87). The threat to the capitalist
system accordingly consists in its own shortcomings and problems which it cannot
master with its own means and instruments inherent in the system so that
it will lose out to socialism.

There is no coexistence in the field of ideology. During times of "peaceful
coexistence" on the contrary the ideological struggle is stepped up because,
by means of the closer contact among the two systems, they get to know each
other better and they stand out more, as a result of which their differences
emerge more clearly so that the ideological contrast between them keeps
growing. In this connection, the text book "Wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus"
has this to say: "New possibilities open up under the conditions of peace-
ful coexistence but there are also higher requirements for the peace forces
in the ideological offensive against capitalism. The ideological struggle
increasingly becomes one of the main forms of the conflict between the
socialist and the capitalist world" (88). And the new party program observes:
"The role of the ideological struggle grows along with the change in the
balance of power in favor of socialism and peace."

The concept of "peaceful coexistence" represents the only, in itself noncon-
tradictory combination of the Marxist dogma of the worldwide spread of
socialism with the objective compulsion of a broad and intensive economic
as well as technological cooperation with the west. The west should cul-
tivate and intensify such collaboration to its own advantage because this
is the only kind of collaboration that is expected of the west. The other
side does not interpret any western accommodation and assistance as such
because it starts with the basic idea that collaboration is to mutual
advantage and that would mean that anything the west does is done to its
own advantage.

If the ideological struggle cannot be avoided, then one should press for the
reciprocity of the battlefield on which it is being carried out. One
absolutely cannot see why this ideological struggle may be fought only on the
soil of western societies. If this involves a battle of arguments and if the
development of history allegedly leads to the worldwide victory of socialism
anyway, why should the other side need to fear such an ideological dispute on
its own territory? Or is it not sure as to whether the dynamics of "peaceful coexistence" under certain circumstances could be turned against socialism?

(c) European Policy

According to its new program, the SED "will continue to contribute constructively so that Europe will become a continent of security and lasting peace." The new program does not mention the CSCE; instead, the SED strives toward the "creation of a collective security system in Europe" (89), in keeping with the Soviet CSCE concept of the end of the sixties. That system originally was to have been created at an all-European conference which barred the United States, as a leading western power--which belongs to Europe not geographically but politically--from participation (90).

Together with the states of the socialist community, the SED wants to "work for the further expansion" of the treaty system between East and West and for the "further development of relations with the capitalist states."

The decisive criterion for European security and collaboration according to the new program remains the "recognition of the inviolability of Europe's postwar boundaries" (91). Like the final act of the CSCE, the SED speaks of inviolability and not of the untouchability of boundaries so that, at least theoretically, peaceful border changes or an elimination of boundaries between the two German states remain possible.

The old program also attacks the EEC as an "international state-monopolist organization" and NATO, whose economic foundation it forms, as "the most extreme wing of international imperialism" (92). In view of the acceptance of the EC as an economic community by the USSR and the submitted CEMA treaty draft on mutual collaboration with the EC, the new program does not reveal any statements against the EC, not to speak of the astonishing failure to mention NATO.

3. Relations to the Developing Countries

In keeping with the ideological principles of GDR foreign policy, relations with the developing countries are arranged neither according to the principles of "proletarian-socialist internationalism" nor according to the principles of "peaceful coexistence"; instead, they are based on solidarity with the national liberation movements. The new program therefore observes that the "national and social liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America" is supposed to be an "important component of the worldwide revolutionary process" (93). The socialist states, the international worker movement in the capitalist countries, and the national liberation movements among the colored peoples constitute a united front in the antiimperialist struggle. This is why the SED, according to the activity report of its secretary general, has set itself as one of its "priority foreign policy goals" the "antiimperialist solidarity with all peoples fighting for their national and social liberation" (94).
According to the ideological foundation currently in vogue, the permitted "support" of national liberation wars—in extreme cases, even by sending allied troops—must not be confused as being practiced solidarity with a possible parallel action by western countries because that would involve impermissible "interventionism" which must be condemned, in other words, a "policy of shame and failure." In the opinion of N. Khmara in the theoretical magazine of the Soviet armed forces KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, "intervention is one of the most important forms of the political struggle of international capital against the worker movement, against the national liberation movement, against the forces of democracy and progress" (95).

As an intermediate stage on the road from national liberation to the build-up of a socialist society, the new program introduced the phase of an "anticapitalist development way" for the peoples of the Third World (96). According to the ideology of historical materialism, the colored people—who, prior to the time they shook off their colonial yoke, were partly still in a semi-feudal state—strictly speaking must first run through the capitalist development phase in order then to be able to start building socialism. But since this entails the risk that the young peoples might stay in that phase longer than necessary, a new intermediate stage was developed which avoids the capitalist phase and which is to serve only as a transition stage on the road to socialism, that is, the "anticapitalist" development way.

4. Basic Character of Our Epoch

Looking at it historically, the basic character of our epoch, according to the new party program, is characterized by the "transition from capitalism to socialism." "Socialism has already gained a foothold on several continents. It exerts ever more decisive influence on worldwide developments" (97). This development supposedly takes place on the basis of historical laws. The leading class in this worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism is supposed to be the working class which, suppressed under capitalism, exercises power under socialism and thus also liberates all other workers from exploitation. Its vanguard, the party, has deeper insight into these historical factors, it knows where this development leads and from that knowledge monopoly it derives its leadership claim in terms of mobilizing the masses and giving them the means necessary so that the social-policy goal can also be attained. Since this involves a worldwide transition, it takes place under the direction of the international communist movement, and the SED views itself in its new program as a "division" of that movement.

The appeal for the struggle against dogmatism and sectarianism, which was still supposed to be conducted according to the old program, has been discontinued according to the new program. Instead, the SED in its new program lines up against anticomunism, anti-Sovietism, and nationalism (98). The elements, which guarantee the unity of the communist world movement, consist in the uniform concepts of a socialist society which are expressed in the
general laws of the socialist revolution and socialist construction. These
general laws were adopted at the 1957 world conference of communist and
worker parties and are valid to this very day. On the basis of the most
recent differentiation tendencies within the international communist move-
ment, they have recently been emphasized more than in the past:

"The leadership of the working classes by the working class, whose vanguard
the Marxist-Leninist party is, in the implementation of the socialist revolu-
tion in one form or another and in the erection of the dictatorship of the
proletariat in one form or another;

"The alliance of the working class with the bulk of the peasantry and the
other strata of working people;

"The elimination of capitalist property ownership and the establishment of
social property ownership of the most important means of production;

"The gradual socialist transformation of agriculture;

"The planned development of the national economy, aimed at the construction
of socialism and at raising the living standard of the workers;

"The implementation of the socialist revolution in the field of ideology and
culture and the development of a numerically strong intelligentsia devoted
to the working class, the working people, and the cause of socialism;

"The elimination of national oppression and the establishment of equality
and brotherly friendship between the peoples;

"Protection for the gains of socialism against the attacks of domestic and
foreign enemies;

"Solidarity of the working class of the particular country with the working
class of the other countries, that is to say, proletarian internationalism" (99).

Just as the SED, in its new program, introduced the intermediate step of the
anticapitalist development way on the road to the socialist transformation
of society, with regard to the developing countries, so was the intermediate
step of an "antimonopolist democracy, which opens the way to socialism" (100)
advanced for the capitalist countries of the west in order to win also those
people in West Germany as supporters who for the time being are not prepared
to take an oath on the flag of GDR-socialism.

The principles of "peaceful coexistence," which the SED declared to be the
foundations for foreign relations with western countries, apply only to
the area of relations between states. Because the SED is not prepared to
give any guarantee for the preservation of the social status quo in the
western countries, the laws of the class struggle continue to apply on
the level of social relationships. For this variant of an expansion of the eastern-style socialist system to western countries, the CPSU coined the term "social liberation struggles" which are being mentioned in one breath with the national liberation struggles. The SED expresses its solidarity with these "social liberation struggles" and, by supporting them, would not violate the principles of "peaceful coexistence," from its viewpoint. Instead, the following applies according to the new program: "The struggle for social progress and socialism and the struggle for the peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems constitute a unit" (101).

V. Security and Military Policy

The new party program precisely describes the significance of the Warsaw Pact organization as the "main field for the coordination of the security policy and military policy of the states of the socialist community" which must consistently "be strengthened and expanded" (102). In contrast to the old program, the new program has nothing to say about the demand of the European conference of communist parties for the "simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact--and, as first step, their military organizations--"(103), which was once again picked up in the Bucharest declaration of the political advisory committee of the Warsaw Pact on 26 November 1976 (104).

"Peaceful coexistence" is listed as the political foundation for the security of the GDR and that "peaceful coexistence" must be implemented against the "aggressive forces of imperialism which continue to be dangerous and influential." Moreover, the SED in its new program pledges itself to the "further strengthening of the defense preparedness" of the GDR through "unshakable arms comradeship with the Soviet Army and the other brother armies," through the "service of GDR citizens in the NVA, in the border guard forces of the GDR, or another armed component, through socialist defense education, particularly for young people, through education in revolutionary vigilance in terms of loyalty to their socialist homeland, the GDR through the untiring strengthening of the factory militia, through the society for sports and technology, by building up civil defense and through the comprehensive back-up support for defense tasks in all areas." In contrast to the program draft, the program's final version made special mention of the Society for Sports and Technology in this passage. All personnel of the GDR military establishment have the "duty always to assure a high level of fighting power as well as combat or action readiness under all conditions." This calls for a "high quality of Marxist-Leninist and military training" (105).

The "strengthening of the armed components" of the GDR is supposedly based "primarily on leadership by the Marxist-Leninist party." From that results the "growing role of the party organization in all sectors of socialist national defense." According to the speech by Army General Heinz Hoffman, Politburo member and defense minister, at the ninth party congress, this role is expressed by the "unity of communist ideology and high military skill levels" (106).
In a lecture on 1 December 1975 at the "Karl Marx" party college, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the NVA, army general Hoffman bluntly described the dimension of possible military conflicts. In his report "The Armed Forced In Our Time," which was reprinted 3 months later in the SED theoretical organ EINHEIT, he said: "We thus do not share the view—which is advocated even by progressive individuals in the peace movement—that a just war is no longer possible in the atomic age, that a nuclear war is no longer a continuation of the policy of the fighting class but only an atomic hell, the end of the world." Hoffman makes unmistakably clear the role which the armed forces play in the transformation of a capitalist society into a socialist one: "So far, history reveals no actual case in which a socialist revolution was made victoriously, without the guns speaking their powerful words or without the guns at least having been aimed and loaded!" According to Hoffman, Lenin already came out "against all phantasizing about peacefully growing into socialism on the road of reform without any conflict." There could be no peace under capitalism. "The social foundation," according to Hoffman's conclusion, "for 'eternal peace' will be created only in the socialist revolution, where, in the form of the working class, the reins are seized by a force which is able to command and guarantee peace because it once and for all extirpates the roots of war" (107).

According to the new party program, "socialism" and "peace" are considered to be the highest values worth defending even ahead of the "defense of the GDR." Because there are no territorial limitations on the protection of socialism and peace, this statement applies not only to the areas of applicability of the Warsaw Pact, which concerns only eastern Europe (108), but, after the new friendship treaty, implicitly, also to the Soviet-Chinese border (109).

VI. Social Policy

1. Concept of "Developed Socialist Society"

"The crucial question in the program draft is the development of the strategic concept for the next historical phase of the GDR's historical development" (110). This strategic concept—as formulated by Professor Otto Reinhold, central committee member and director of the Institute of Social Sciences attached to the SED central committee—is the "developed socialist society." According to Kurt Hager, Politburo member and central committee secretary, the objective—of "further shaping the developed socialist society" in the GDR "and thus creating the fundamental prerequisites for the gradual transition to communism" is supposed to be entirely "realistic and in keeping with social requirements because the GDR now enters a new phase of its social growth" (111). Hermann Axen, Politburo member and central committee secretary, believes that "further shaping of the developing socialist society" represents the "decisive aspect of the ninth party congress," the "general line of the ninth party congress" (112).
In the program, the most detailed chapter II ("Shaping the Developed Socialist Society in the GDR") and IV ("The Party--Leading Force In Shaping the Developed Socialist Society and in the Transition to Communism") tell us something about the content of the SED's social-policy objectives. With the help of the following ten features, the party program attempts to come up with a descriptive definition of the "developed socialist society."

1. The "primary mission" of the "developed socialist society" supposedly consists in the "further elevation of the people's material and cultural living standard on the basis of a high socialist output growth rate, the increase in the effectiveness of scientific-technological progress and the growth of labor productivity."

2. This primary mission is to be accomplished on the "main road" of the "intensification of social production."

"Developed socialist society" furthermore means this:

3. The "inseparable unity" of "economic policy and social policy";

4. "Further developing and perfecting relations of comradely collaboration and mutual aid between the workers, strengthening the collectivity through social relations";

5. The elevation of the "role of the working class and its party as the leading force in society";

6. "To consolidate the socialist system of government and law on an all-around basis and broadly to unfold socialist democracy";

7. "Further to elevate the socialist consciousness of the broad masses and actively to bring out their Marxist-Leninist ideology and communist morality";

8. "Close class and arms comradeship with the Soviet army and the other armies of the Warsaw Pact states";

9. "Socialist economic integration of the CEMA" and the "systematic approach among the socialist nations";

10. Creation of all conditions so that "social relations and the physical and mental abilities of the individuals can fully unfold" (113).

The new SED concept of the "developed socialist society" differs from Ulbricht's "developed social system of socialism"—which he proclaimed at the seventh congress of the SED in April 1967 and which represented a very general declaration of intention with the following characteristics:

"1. a high level and rapid growth of the social production forces,

"2. stable and developing production conditions,
"3. a strong socialist government,

"4. all-around development of socialist democracy,

"5. high level of education for the workers,

"6. improvement of their working and living conditions,

"7. permeation of all walks of community life with socialist ideology and culture" (114).

With this program for society, Ulbricht, according to Hans Lades, "through the forced use of science and technology, through the 'mastery of the scientific-technological revolution,' by building the system theory into his concept, wanted to force a breakthrough to a harmonious 'socialist community of people,' to a modern socialist industrial state which would set an example for east and west" (115).

The old 1963 party program contained only a rather little developed concept of society for which it coined the formula of the "comprehensive buildup of socialism" in the GDR which established the assignment of:

- Developing the national economy, "rapidly further increasing output and labor productivity based on maximum standards in science and technology in order to make the life of the workers pleasant and beautiful, to do a better job in meeting their growing needs";

- "Fully to implement" the principle "from each according to his abilities--to each according to his work";

- "Developing and expanding the new socialist relations between the workers";

- "Making education and culture the property of all workers";

- "Turning the GDR into a modern socialist state which would represent the new Germany toward the entire world" (116).

The "developed socialist society" erects the GDR not in isolation, but its development "is the next strategic goal for all socialist countries." In the "developed socialist society" we are not dealing with a "national concept" because "neither the GDR, nor the majority of the other socialist countries, one might say, all of them except the Soviet Union, are in a position alone to erect the developed socialist society and to launch the gradual transition to communism" (117). Within the socialist community there is supposed to be a "uniform view" as to the essence and the fundamental criteria of the "developed socialist society" (118).

The "developed socialist society" is characterized not only by the fact that it supposedly leads to the "systematic approach among socialist nations" but
the tempo of its erection supposedly depends on the "further change in the international balance of power in favor of socialism, on the growing strength of the international revolutionary movement as a whole" (119).

The old party program still propagated the "comprehensive buildup of socialism" in the GDR with a view to the FRG. This buildup of socialism accordingly was to take place independently of the social-policy development in the FRG but under the special conditions of the "historically developed situation in divided Germany." The headstart, which the GDR claims it has in social-policy development as compared to the FRG, was particularly emphasized in the old program. In this sense, the old SED program declares the "buildup of socialism" in the GDR to be the "fundamental condition for the resolution of the national issue in Germany and thus also for the reunification of the nation which is split into two states." The German nation was to "attain stable unity" only as a "socialist nation." Until the materialization of a German unity imagined in this fashion, the "buildup of socialism" in the GDR--according to the old party program--would "further shake the foundations of German imperialism in West Germany; it will strengthen West Germany's peace-loving, democratic forces in their struggle against imperialist and military rule" (120).

The new program contains nothing about the buildup of socialism conceived in all-German terms. On the contrary, as Secretary General Honecker stated at the third central committee plenum on 28 October 1976 in East Berlin, the erection of a socialist society in the FRG means nothing at all with regard to reunification with a socialist GDR: "By casting his vote and by acting for his socialist fatherland, the voter once again confirmed that the first socialist state of workers and peasants on German soil--I want to emphasize the first state here because we cannot rule out the rise of a second one--is a firm component of the great community of socialist states" (121). According to the speech by Kurt Hager, Politburo member and central committee secretary, at the conference of GDR social scientists on 25 November 1976, the GDR is "forever a part of the community of socialist states" even if one "naturally" has nothing against the idea "of the GDR not remaining the only socialist German state" (122).

2. The "Party's Leading Role"

The social-policy concept of the "developed socialist society" is expressed above all in the party's leading role in the state and in society. The SED refers to itself as the "leading force in shaping the developed socialist society" in its new program. The party leaves no doubt as to its leadership claim in the old and in the new program. The new program says this: "The further development of its leading role in all walks of community life is an essential prerequisite for the maturity of conditions for the general transition to the construction of community society" (123).

The SED derives its leadership claim in the new program from the fact that it is supposedly a "Marxist-Leninist party of the working class and of the
entire people." In the new program, the working class is considered the "principle political and social force of social progress and the numerically strongest class." "It is the carrier of political power," continues the program and justifies the working class' claim to rule as follows: "It is closely tied to socialist state property; it produces most of the material wealth of society as a whole. Its interests at the same time express the basic interests of the entire people. Its position in social production, in leadership by the Marxist-Leninist party, enabled the working class—as the most highly organized, disciplined, and conscious class—to direct the struggle of all working people for social progress. It can accomplish its historical mission because Marxism-Leninism—the only scientific ideology—is the foundation for its action" (124).

The working class enters into an alliance with the class of cooperative farmers while it only collaborates with the stratum of the intelligentsia and the other working people according to the new program. In the first SED program, the intelligentsia was still capable of being a party of the alliance (125). The new program propagates "social approach" between the classes and strata, a "historically significant and long-drawn-out process" which takes place under the leadership of the party "on the grounds of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the ideals of the working class." This social approach process is to lead to the "consolidation of the people's political-moral unity" through the "unfolding of the socialist way of life" (126).

In 1967, Ulbricht postulated a great identity of interests and ideology along the party, state, and population with the concept of the "socialist community of individuals"; the new party program has nothing to say about that. Ulbricht's concept of harmony had been criticized already back in 1971 by Kurt Hager, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, shortly after Ulbricht's ouster in October 1971. The concept of "community of socialist individuals" is not supposed to be precise. It would imply class relationships which have not yet taken shape (127). Instead, the existence of classes and the special character of relations between them has been stressed more frequently since Honecker. This is expressed in the new program through the greater emphasis on the leadership role of the working class and its spearhead, the party.

The "further fashioning of the party's leading role in all walks of life" as the "essential prerequisite for the further shaping of the developed socialist society"—according to Honecker, in his activity report—represents an "objective necessity" (128). With regard to this objective need for an increase in the party's leadership activity during the construction of the "developed socialist society," Professor Erich Hahn, department head in the Institute of Social Sciences attached to the SED central committee and elected central committee membership candidate at the ninth party congress, in his main report "Objective Laws and Conscious Action Under Socialism" at the Fourth GDR Philosophy Congress on 12 and 13 December 1974 in East Berlin, stated among other things that this increase represents a lawful process. The party's leadership activity is expressed above all in the conscious
utilization of the given historical social-policy development laws which include the worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism as the principal law. This growth of the subjective factor—which supposedly is expressed in a most concentrated fashion in the party's leadership activity—resides in the essence of the communist society formation (129).

According to the "Directive of the SED Central Committee for the Conduct of the 1975-1976 Party Elections," the further shaping of the "developed socialist society" creates "higher requirements for political leadership by the party." These requirements are expressed above all in a qualitative improvement in its leadership activity. "The necessary improvement in the quality and effectiveness of leadership activity is aimed at having the party politically permeate and lead all social development processes. Here, complex and forward looking work assumes increasing significance for the harmonious fashioning of all aspects of life. Political-ideological work is an remains the core of party work" (130). Sketching this activity in further detail, Honecker said this at the ninth party congress: "Party work does not mean administering things; instead it means convincing and mobilizing people in all walks of social life." In this connection he included the press, radio, and television among the "party's ideological weapons" (131).

The state is the party's principal instrument in building the "developed socialist society." The new program says on that score that the SED's policy is aimed at the "further all around strengthening of the socialist state of workers and peasants as a dictatorship of the proletariat." The state is supposed to be the "principal instrument of the workers, led by the working class, in shaping the developed socialist society and on the road to communism" (132). There can be no talk here of the state gradually withering away on the road to the stateless communist society of the future. On the contrary, all of the state's functions are being strengthened. The old program does not contain any such clear emphasis of the instrumental role of the state which is to be strengthened all around and at the same time its growing political significance. On that issue, Honecker said in his activity report at the party congress: The state, this "battlefield of the working class and its allies, by no means loses significance along with the further shaping of the developed socialist society" (133). No doubt is left here: "Never do we consider the state as an end in itself; it is always the principal instrument for consistently implementing the policy of our party which lends scientific expression to the interests of the working class and the entire people" (134). "Power is the very first thing" for Honecker when it comes to building the socialist society. "The law is an important tool in exercising power." "The worker and peasant state," Honecker continued consistently at the ninth party congress, "brings out the class interests, which it represents, through socialist law" (135).

The main direction, in which the socialist government described has developed, is the further unfolding and perfection of socialist democracy. The highest form of socialist democracy according to Honecker's activity report is the "dictatorship of the proletariat." "Without it, no socialist society has
been erected anywhere in history so far" (136). This socialist democracy, with its "rich, manifold substance is infinitely high above everything that is called democracy and self-determination in capitalist states" (137).

The dictatorship character of such a socialist class state relates to dictatorship against the former leading class of the overthrown capitalist social system and its political ideas as well as representatives, whereas democracy is being implemented toward the working class and its party. To begin with, the concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat" has a triple meaning in Marxist-Leninist political science theory:

"First of all as designation of the class essence of the socialist type of state for the entire period of the transition from capitalist to communist society;

"Second, with respect to the characteristic of the overall system of the political power of the working class at whose head stands the Marxist-Leninist party and in that the socialist state acts as the main instrument toward the implementation of the interests and objectives of the working class;

"Third, as the characterization of a certain development stage of the uniform socialist type of state" (138).

The "dictatorship of the proletariat," as the highest form of socialist democracy, is in keeping with the present development stage of the GDR. But the dictatorship of the proletariat will not always prevail in the GDR. On the road of "political, economic, social, and intellectual-cultural changes, the state will enable the dictatorship of the proletariat to grow over into the state of the entire people." The USSR supposedly has already reached that stage. "There, the developed socialist society has been erected and social property ownership of the means of production has been fully implemented." In the GDR state of "workers and peasants" and in the "Soviet state of the entire people" we are dealing with "two development stages of the uniform type of socialist state." There are no contrasts between these two stages, there is only a "differing degree of implemented historical mission of the working class" (139).

The state, which is specially underscored because of its political significance, faces rising requirements based on progressing "social growth." "There are higher requirements in terms of the quality and effectiveness of central government administration." According to Honecker, "it is necessary to step up efforts in order even better to familiarize the citizens with the party and the government's measures aimed at the accomplishment of the primary mission and the results achieved." The new program establishes the assignment of constantly consolidating the authority of the deputies" (140); in his activity report, Honecker demanded: "During the sessions of the people's assemblies we need a lively and critical atmosphere" (141).
3. "Socialist Way of Life"

As a response to the western discussion about a higher quality of life, the eastern countries have coined the concept of the "socialist way of life" which could not yet be found in the old party program. The "socialist way of life" is contrasted against the concept of "life style" as being considerably more comprehensive and richer in terms of content." The bourgeois sociologists are trying to deny the class foundations of the way of life by using the term "life style." "The fundamental difference between the socialist way of life and that of capitalist and other antagonistic class societies springs from the fact that there are no class conflicts here" (142).

The concept of the way of life is "applicable both to a society and to a class and to an individual." The latter appear as "carriers of a certain way of life which has developed under the influence of historical conditions and they try at the same time wherever possible to shape those conditions in the direction that corresponds to their interests" (143). The "socialist way of life" is referred to as a qualitatively new step in fashioning interpersonal relations in all spheres of community life, in production as well as in social activity, in the various walks of community life, in residential areas and in the family, among friends and in individual recreational activities." It is supposed to be aimed at making sure that "the workers will be creatively active in many different ways, will develop their individuality, and will be able to lead a life rich in content, full of culture, and filled with meaning" (144).

The "socialist way of life" is supposed to be based on the "socialist power and property ownership conditions." It gets its content and its character from the "socialist production conditions" and the "class character" of the socialist society which is expressed by the fact that the working class is the "decisive social force." From that results the "uniformity" of the "socialist way of life," especially the "uniformity of political-moral requirements" addressed to the citizens of the socialist class state. Humane action is meaningful when it participates in the "struggle of the progressive social forces"; morality is inseparably tied in with politics, with the "interests of the proletarian class struggle." The attitude toward work, "socialist labor ethics," which contains not only the achievement of "high work performance" but also a "conscious attitude toward the worker and peasant government" (145) is supposed to be of the utmost significance for the development of the "socialist way of life and morality."

According to the new program, the fashioning of the "socialist way of life" is "inseparably tied in with the development of socialist personality, whose thinking and action are characterized by socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. That includes loyalty to socialism and the readiness to protect and defend its gains." The socialist way of life furthermore includes a "lively, interesting dissemination of the scientific ideology of the working class." The relations among "men in all spheres of life, between young people and senior citizens" are to be "characterized even more by comradely assistance
and consideration within the framework of the socialist way of life. The new party program lists the following additional special features of the "socialist way of life":

"Criticism and self-criticism in the collectives";

"Individual responsibility for assigned tasks";

"Development of physical culture and sports";

"Complete equality of marriage partners, growing economic independence of women and ever better possibilities for participating in social life with equal rights";

Education of children and teenagers so that they will be "healthy individuals, full of the joy of life, so that they will be socialist personalities"—this being a "high social obligation of the parents";

Opposition to action consisting of "egotism and avarice as well as Philistinism," such as the "effort to become rich at the expense of society." The SED resolutely turns against "heartlessness and lack of consideration in interpersonal relationships, against hypocrisy and cynicism, against unworthy behavior toward the opposite sex." It demands a decisive struggle against law violations, against asocial behavior and rowdyism as well as alcohol abuse" (146).

The old party program narrows the content of the "socialist way of life down to the "principles of socialist ethics and morality" which Ulbricht, along the lines of the Ten Commandments, had formulated as follows:

"1. Thou shalt always work for the international solidarity of the working class and all working people and for the unauthorable solidarity of all socialist countries.

"2. Thou shalt love thy fatherland and always be prepared to use thy entire strength and ability for the defense of the worker and peasant government.

"3. Thou shalt help terminate the exploitation man by man.

"4. Thou shalt accomplish good deeds for socialism because socialism leads to a better life for all workers.

"5. In the construction of socialism, thou shalt act in the spirit of mutual help and comradely collaboration, respect the collective, and take its criticism to heart.

"6. Thou shalt protect and multiply state property.

"7. Thou shalt always strive to improve thy performance, thou shalt be economical and thou shalt consolidate socialist work discipline.
"8. Thou shalt educate thy children in the spirit of peace and socialism into all around educated, physically strong individuals with a strong character.

"9. Thou shalt live a clean and decent life and respect thy family.

"10. Thou shalt practice solidarity with the peoples who fight for their national liberation and who defend their national independence" (147).

4. The Dialectic of Socialism and Communism

The determination of ideological position in the new SED program, which many GDR observers and analysts had been looking forward to--to the effect that socialism has been completely built in the GDR and that one could now start building communism--did not materialize. Instead, it is being said that there is an outlook for the continuation of the buildup of the "developed socialist society" and a simultaneous, gradual transition to communism. The SED will not make any additional problems for itself and at the same time avoid setting up any ideological phases or stages.

The first program in 1963 wanted to accomplish the gradual transition to communism, "measured by historical criteria," within "a few decades"; it contained Ulbricht's "developed social system of socialism," the SED's concept of society in the years 1967-1971, as the essential element of a definition of socialism as a social formation which is relatively independent and which has existed for a longer time. In this medium-term social strategy--which placed too much emphasis on the independence of the phase of socialism which actually was conceived only as a transit stage--the final goal of the communist society of the future was moved from the realistic perspective only into the ideological perspective. That made it easier for the party leaders to accomplish their political task because they no longer had to worry about the demanding assignment of actually instituting communism.

The idea of thus making the socialist interim stage a "final objective" involved the danger of having it solidify into a separate form of society, with communism never materializing at all. In the wake of the 24th CPSU congress in 1971, the Soviet ideologists harped on the idea that socialism and communism are not two different social systems, but rather two phases of one and the same communist society formation. In its self-concept after the 1917 October revolution, the Soviet Union first of all laid the foundations of socialism in order then to erect the "developed socialist society" on them as obligatory model for all brother countries. In the meantime it has switched to building up communism by supposedly creating the "material-technical basis" for it--something which was supposed to have been accomplished according to the applicable CPSU party program from 1961 until 1980 (148). The transition from the lower stage of socialism to the higher stage of communism was supposed to take place gradually as a long-term development process. The decisive factor in the further development of socialism into communism here
is supposed to be the "organic tie-in of the latest achievements of the scientific-technologic revolution with the advantages of socialism" (149).

At its eighth party congress in 1971, the SED adopted that new line. Party boss Honecker said this in his activity report along these lines: "There is no rigid dividing line between socialism and communism which, as we know, are two phases of the communist formation of society. On the basis of the development of the socialist production conditions and their material-technical base, socialist society gradually grows into the communist one" (150).

According to a commentary in the SEG central organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, the new thing in the assignments contained in the SED party program is the "reference to the gradual transition to communism. Communist society is "our goal" (151). Party boss Honecker made this clear at the 14 February 1976 kreis delegate conference in Weisswasser: "There is no Chinese wall between socialism and communism. At the eighth party congress we already discarded the false theory of socialism as being a relatively independent social-economic formation because it does not correspond to the development laws of human society, such as they were explained by Marx, Engels, and Lenin" (152). The transition between socialism and communism instead is supposed to be rather fluid. "Prerequisites for the transition to communism develop gradually in the areas of the material-technical base, in the method of production, and in consciousness" (153).

The new party program defines communism:

As "the classless system of society in which the means of production will be uniformly state property and all members of society will be socially equal, where all members of society will develop their mental and physical capabilities in an all-around fashion and use them for the benefit of the community";

As a society in which the "production forces, the sources of social wealth, will be developed according to plan and will be utilized with maximum effectiveness for the benefit of the people";

As a society in which people will increasingly "become the masters of nature and of their own social development";

As the "society of all-around educated people with a high consciousness level";

As the "society for whose member work, to the benefit of society, is the first vital need";

As the society in which prevails the following principle: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs" (not according to his performance, as under socialism, so that, under communism, in contrast to socialism, we are not dealing with a performance society).
To attain the ultimate communist goal, there are three "inseparably interconnected tasks" which must be accomplished—according to the new party program:

"First of all, the creation of communism's material-technical basis;

"Second, the development of communist production conditions and the communist character of work;

"Third, the development of communist social relations and the education of the individual in communist society" (154).

The old party program also contains similar basic statements on the dialectic of socialism-communism. For lack of a separate long-range imagination, the SED ideologists in the old program were satisfied with quoting the corresponding definition of communism from the 1961 CPSU party program: "Communism is a classless social system in which the means of production are uniformly state property and where all members of society are socially completely equal, where the production forces also grow along with the all-around development of individuals on the basis of the constant progress of science and technology, and where all sources of social wealth flow more fully and where the following principle prevails: From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs. Communism is a highly organized society of free, working individuals with a high consciousness level, in which there is social self-administration, where work for the benefit of society becomes the first vital need for all, in other words, a necessity which everyone has become aware of, and where everybody will use his abilities with the utmost benefit for the people" (155).

The new SED program wisely enough contains no precise statements as to the exact time of communism's erection. The "tempo of building the developed socialist society and of the transition to communist construction is a matter of work, of consciousness, of creative initiative and of the organized action of millions of working people in the cities and rural areas" (156). The 1963 program still spoke in terms of a "short transition period amounting to a few decades." The first program wanted to distribute "material and cultural goods for every member of society in keeping with his growing needs, individual demands and inclinations" so that "individual consumer goods will become "the unrestricted property of each member of society" (157). The new program on the other hand dispenses with a detailed description of the communist distribution principle. It does mention the known formula: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs" and instead places greater emphasis on the "prerequisite for the implementation of the communist distribution principle," the "very high productivity of social labor."

The discussion about the ration of the buildup of the "developed socialist society" and the gradual transition to communism took a rather surprising turn a few months before the start of the party congress. Manfred Banaschak, editor-in-chief of the theoretical magazine EINHEIT, in July 1975 placed the phase of communism in the far distance: "We have a long way to go before we
can speak of the communist, classless society—and that includes the idea that we can write on our flags that work has become the first vital need. That requires above all a corresponding material-technical basis and a labor productivity level which in the end must make it possible to distribute according to needs. But we are still far from that and therefore also far from many other forms of expression of corresponding social maturity which are based on that or which condition each other reciprocally" (158).

Half a year later, Professor Reinhold pointed out specifically that it would take "15-20 years" to build up the "developed socialist society." It would be a long way to communism. Socialism and communism are "not two processes which are separated from each other in terms of time or space." Reinhold mentioned the following prerequisites for communism: 1. The kind of production force development where "social wealth is available in a large volume, thus making distribution according to needs possible"; 2. Consciousness development, which would be expressed above all in the socialist attitude toward work so that "work will have become the first vital need." That presupposes that the character of labor has been altered by the "organic tie-in of the scientific-technological revolution with the advantages of socialism"; 3. The development of a uniform form of communist property in the sense of an elimination of the difference between cooperative property (LPG [agricultural producer cooperatives], PCH) and higher-grade state property (VEB [state enterprise], VEG [state farm]) within the communist property ownership system would be required (159).

In February 1976, Honecker himself became involved in this discussion about the schedule for communist construction by declaring the following at the Weisswasser kreis delegate conference: "Now it is, instead, the question of the gradual transition to communism as a timely task which moves into our field of vision, not as a task which will be tackled only in the year 2000." According to Honecker, socialism "already contains in itself many elements of communism and the transition to the creation of the material-technical base of communism will, during the next several years, put the question of the gradual transition to communism on the agenda" (160).

The vision of the future, outlined in the party program, continues to be rather imprecise, as in the old program. The cleverly dialectical tie-in of socialism with communism is so undertaken that the prerequisites for the gradual transition to communism are created simultaneously through the comprehensive and all-around buildup of the "developed socialist society," so that both phases, so to speak, can merge imperceptibly, as a result of which the party is relieved of the duty to commit itself to specific years, as did the CPSU in its party program. Moving the communism phase up closer in terms of time will probably continue to exist only as an ideological demand and will not be specifically materialized in the form of the material-technical basis which must be created as a prerequisite for the communist society of abundance. The GDR's economic problems will demand the very greatest efforts by the party in terms of attaining the past growth rates also in the future.

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VII. Economic Policy

1. The Economic Primary Mission

The directive for the 1976-1980 GDR 5-year plan, which was adopted along with the new program and statute at the ninth party congress, proclaimed the primary mission of national economic growth, adopted at the 1971 eighth party congress, "to continue to raise the people's material and cultural living standard on the basis of a fast growth rate of socialist production, greater efficiency, faster scientific-technological progress and labor productivity growth," and to continue this effort during the coming five-year plan "consistently as a long-term strategy orientation." According to the party's plan directives, this primary mission represents a unit with two aspects which are not listed individually (161). In the opinion of western economy analysts, this, first-time division of the primary mission into two parts makes it possible "to replace the priority increase in private consumption with corresponding priority on increasing investments and nevertheless to declare that the old primary mission will be retained" (162).

As the "main way" to accomplish the "primary mission," the new program mentions the intensification of social production. As the "main factor" of the required intensification, the program lists "scientific-technological progress." The possibilities of scientific-technological progress in turn are exhausted above all by improving both the quality and the efficiency of labor. In another chapter, the program mentions the individual as the "main production force" (163). Indeed, the GDR economy, which is rather poor in reserves, rests mainly on human labor and expects from it the greatest contribution to the attainment of the desired economic growth rates. This is why the new party program gives the following assurance: "The increase in labor productivity is the most important source of economic growth" (164). At the second central committee conference early in September 1976, party boss Honecker emphasized this: "We must never lose sight of the fact here that our entire economic growth must be assured to the extent of 85-90 percent by increasing labor productivity" (165). The desired increase in the labor productivity of blue-collar workers and white-collar employees in industry by 130-132 percent, for the coming five-year plan, must, to be sure, be achieved to the extent of 60-70 percent by using the results of scientific-technological progress (166), but for the individual, the demanded labor productivity increase will mean higher performance demands. The new SED program states: "The performance principle is the basic principle of distribution under socialism and it is being implemented consistently" (167).

The plan directive wants to achieve the rise in labor productivity, at the worker's end, by means of a "performance-oriented wage policy," which last but not least is supposed to develop the "socialist attitude toward labor" in depth (168). Prime Minister Stoph more clearly formulated the labor-policy objective of the GDR in his 1 November 1976 government declaration when he demanded "even better utilization of work time" (169).
Western investigations on the 1971-1975 five-year plan fulfillment rates arrived at the following result:

"The GDR economy during the past five-year plan grew steadily and rapidly. The increase in the economy's producing and distributing sectors came to 5.5 percent. The number of employees increased only to a minor extent. Growth was accomplished through above-average rise in industry which at the same time shared in an above-average manner in investments and employment. The increase in the produced national income was greater than that in the national income used" (170).

According to the available directive, the 1976-1980 five-year plan calls for the following performance increases:

"In 1980, the produced national income is to be raised to 127-130 percent compared to 1975 and it is to amount to M182-185 billion in 1980. Industrial commodity output must be increased to 134-136 percent. The labor productivity of blue-collar workers and white-collar employees in industry is to be raised to 130-132 percent. Expenditures for science and technology are to amount to about 4.2 percent of the national income. In agriculture, the total yield from crop production is to be raised to 120 percent compared to the average of 1971-1975. Livestock will be maintained at the same level and an increase in the state yield from slaughter cattle to 2,300 kt [kilotons] and milk production to 8,200 kt is to be achieved in 1980. This is an increase of about 9 percent compared to the 1975 national economic plan. Construction production in the area of the ministry of the construction industry must be raised to 132-133 percent; an increase to 127-128 percent is to be achieved in the national economy as a whole. The transportation industry is to increase its service volume, in keeping with the requirements of the national economy and the population, to 124-126 percent for freight transportation and 107-109 percent for passenger transportation. During the period of 1976-1980, M240-243 billion in investments are to be made in the national economy, including M7-8 billion for participation in
joint investment projects with the USSR and the other socialist countries, particularly for the exploration and exploitation of raw material deposits" (171).

A precise breakdown of investments and thus also of the economic-policy main-points--greater promotion of the heavy industry or the light industry and the consumer goods industry--can be detected from the detailed five-year plan.

A forecast of GDR economic growth during the coming five-year plan indicates that, with a slight increase in the number of employees and rising capital intensity, it is possible to continue the economic growth rate achieved so far. Here, foreign trade problems would seem to take up the produced national income by no more than 1-2 percent per year. This points to a declining rate of private consumption out of the used national income and that is in keeping with the distribution strategy pursued so far (172).

2. "Unity of Economic and Social Policy"

The economic primary mission's accent was shifted as a result of the heavy propaganda emphasis on the "unity of economic and social policy" both in the party program and at the party congress. According to the new party program, economic and social policy supposedly contributes "to the further approach among the classes and strata." The housing construction program is referred to as the nucleus of social policy which forms a unit with economic policy by virtue of the circumstance that the "gradual improvement in the living standard of all working people calls for great achievements in socialist production and steady economic growth." With this ambitious undertaking, the SED has set itself the goal of solving the housing problem by 1990 (173). According to Honecker's statements at the party congress, a total of 750,000 apartments is to be created through new construction and modernization, including 550,000 new apartments, between 1976 and 1980. According to the secretary general's calculations, this would mean that 2.2 million GDR inhabitants would wind up with better housing conditions. During that time, 350 billion are to be spent for "complex housing construction" (174).

The program lists the following additional social measures:

"Differentiated extension of vacations;

gradual transition to 40-hour week;

further promotion of families with several children;

improvement of living conditions of retirees primarily by creating suitable jobs for senior citizens (175).

The SED did not take up the specific accomplishment of this social-policy measure package, roughly outlined in the program, after the ninth party
congress but, oddly enough, one week later. One can only guess at the reasons for this rather unwise delay. It would probably be obvious to explain this by saying that opinions within the top SED leadership bodies were still divided on that issue at the beginning of the party congress. The majority of the top officials obviously hoped that they could thus even further postpone a so comprehensive social program. The population's big disappointment after the party congress probably forced the SED to respond quickly.

What are the social-policy measures that were adopted by the SED central committee, by the federation executive of the FDGB [Free German Labor Union Federation], and by the Council of Ministers GDR (177)?

Extension of pregnancy and maternity leave from eighteen weeks to twenty-six weeks effective 27 May 1976;

Raise in minimum gross wages for full-time blue-collar and white-collar workers from M350 to M400 per month effective 1 October 1976;

Differentiated rise in monthly incomes of M400-500 by M15-40 as of 1 October 1976;

Increase in minimum pension for old-age and disability retirees from M200-240 to M230-300 as of 1 December 1976;

Increase in minimum pension for retirees on accident-connected disability pensions from M240-M300 effective 1 December 1976;

Increase in disabled veterans' pension from M240-M300 per month effective 1 December 1976;

Increase in spouse allowances within social welfare from M75 to M100 as of 1 December;

Increase in social welfare benefits for single persons from M175 to M200 per month as of 1 December 1976;

Increase in social welfare benefits for married couples from M250-M300 per month as of 1 December 1, 1976;

Reduction of working time for shift workers in the three-shift or continuous shift system from 42 hours per week to 40 hours per week as of 1 May 1977;

Reduction of working time for shift workers on two-shift system from 43-3/4 hours per week to 42 hours per week effective 1 May 1977;

Reduction of working time for full-time working mothers with three and more children as well as for mothers working on the two-shift system with two children, effective 1 May 1977, by extending the present regulation calling for 40 hours per week to all mothers with two children;
Extension of vacations by three days effective 1 January 1979 (178).

The anticipated lowering of the retirement age did not materialize. That measure would have meant not only an additional financial burden on the GDR social welfare budget but at the same time would have taken valuable labor out of the production process; after all, the SED, on the other hand, is trying to create suitable jobs for retirees in order somewhat to make up for the manpower shortage. Besides, the lowering of the retirement age would have enabled an additional group of persons to benefit from the provision permitting trips to the west to visit relatives; this would have been a psychologically and politically and unwise measure, considering the fact that GDR government agencies have about 50,000 expatriation applications on file from GDR citizens who want to move to the "crisis-shaken" FRG.

The idea of tying this tremendous social-policy program to economic policy is intended to make it unmistakably clear to the population that it will be possible to carry that program out only if the planned growth rates are implemented fully and on schedule; in some portions, that social-policy program promises much broader social benefits than comparable regulations in the FRG and in by no means few areas does it still lag behind West German standards. It was not by accident that NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, on the day the social-policy measures were announced, warned that "one can only consume that which has first been earned" (179).

3. Management and Planning Problems

The GDR's economic problems, which spring from the system itself, result from its orientation in terms of economic planning. The new party program devotes a separate subsection to these difficulties in which it declares the "reduction in costs, cheaper and simpler administrative work, as well as strict implementation of the savings principle" to be "unalterable principles of economic management in the socialist state" (180). The party's efforts toward the further perfection of management, planning, and economic incentives (181) according to the program are concentrated on strengthening democratic centralism by "effectively combining central government management and planning with the creative activity of the workers and the individual-responsibility-based activity of the enterprises, combines, VVB [associations of state enterprises], and cooperatives as well as local government agencies" (182).

In his activity report, Honecker demanded that the "plans be derived better from national economic analyses and forecasts and that social requirements be more explored here." On the other hand, the secretary general demanded that the "planning of important national economic interrelationships be stepped up considerably, in other words, this involves the even better balancing of the national economy." To make sure that the 1976-1980 plan will become a "plan of all-around intensification, of the further increase in the efficiency and quality of production," Honecker instructed the party organizations as well as the "responsible government and economic agencies" to "exercise stricter control over the ways in which the fulfillment of the
production plan came about." Why did the party boss emphasize the aspect of "how?" The next sentence in his activity report gives us the answer: "Where this happened at the expense of a production effort that does not meet requirements or at the expense of quality, corresponding conclusions should be drawn for the judgement of the performance and measures should be instituted to bring about changes" (183).

There is a secret reform of the economy mechanism hidden behind the formula of the "perfection of the management, planning, and economic stimulation" of the GDR economy. It is expressed in the following new orders:


The SED avoids the concept of "reform" because this at the same time would be an admission of shortcomings and mistakes in the existing economic planning and management mechanism.

A pressure for reform sprang from the rise in the living standard based on the proclaimed economic primary mission, from the stepped-up efforts to achieve greater economy with the slogan of intensification, from the faster tempo and intensity of "socialist integration" within the CEMA, and on the basis of the new ideological concepts of a "developed socialist society" (184).

From Honecker's statements on national economic planning and management questions we can already detect that this hidden reform is characterized by two tendencies: First of all, the centralist character of the reform prevails here. As important examples for the "reconstruction of the management system from the aspect of stepped-up centralization of decision-making authority" (185), we might mention two laws and one decree which are interconnected: The 16 October 1972 "Law on the Council of Ministers GDR," the 12 July 1973 "Law on the Local People's Assemblies and Their Agencies in the GDR," as well as the 28 March 1973 "Decree on the Tasks, Rights, and Duties of State Enterprises, Combines, and VVB" (186).

The second characteristic feature of the "perfection" of the planning system is expressed in the increased turn toward mathematical models and methods coupled with the increasing use of electronic data processing (187). Thus, the final version of the program was enriched with the term "mathematical methods." At the party congress, party boss Honecker announced that "modern scientific-technological instruments of management activity, especially electronic data processing, must be used more and more efficiently and their utilization must be expanded according to plan" (187).
4. Foreign Trade

As was to be expected, the Soviet Union is the GDR's main economic partner in the new program. According to Honecker's statements, the GDR will import the following products from the USSR between 1976 and 1980: "88.2 million tons of petroleum, 21.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas, 21 millions tons of hard coal, 15.9 million tons of rolled steel, 375,000 tons of cellulose, 425,000 tons of cotton, 212,000 tons of copper, 28,920 tractors, 9,035 heavy trucks, 282 diesel locomotives, as well as 3,052 dredgers and graders." The GDR in return is making a contribution "to the equipment of enterprises in the Soviet Union with modern equipment, to a rich and tasteful supply of consumer goods, to the mechanization of agriculture and other national economic tasks." In return for the procurement of raw materials, the GDR is required to participate in investments designed to develop raw material production in the USSR and in other eastern European countries. The order of magnitude of GDR investment participation in the USSR, given for the period of 1976-1980, comes to M7-8 billion. The biggest participation project of the GDR in the USSR is the construction of the natural gas pipeline from Orenburg to the western Soviet border. Of course, collaboration between the GDR and the USSR is not confined only to the sector of commerce and investments. According to Honecker, 80 percent of the tasks of the "science and technology state plan will be accomplished through collaboration with the Soviet Union" (188).

During the five-year plan which has just expired, the GDR, in the opinion of eastern trade experts, attained the highest nominal sales volume increase in its foreign trade since it came into being. Instead of the planned 59 percent, the increase came to 75 percent. "The high nominal overfulfilment does not correspond to the price-corrected fulfillment with an increase of 50 percent. This discrepancy is due, on the one hand, to the severe price rises on imports from western industrial countries and developing countries in 1973-1974 and, on the other hand, the new contract prices in the CEMA for 1975 which are expressed primarily in the more expensive raw material imports from the USSR" (189).

At the ninth party congress, Honecker clearly indicated what great national economic significance the GDR today assigns to exports in order to even out its tremendous deficit in western trade, particularly in inner-German trade; he did that by setting up the goal of "raising the growth rate of overall GDR exports considerably faster than the output growth rate" (190).

GDR products are to become more competitive especially on capitalist markets which is why the state economy supposedly needs "greater mobility in production" in order "to be able to react faster to the delivery demands of foreign customers." This is why, according to Honecker, "the enterprises of industry and foreign trade must do an even better job in quickly adjusting to the actual requirements on the foreign markets." At the same time the secretary general announced an "uncompromising struggle against all attempts by the imperialist monopolies and states to shift the effects of their crisis to us" (191). If we keep in mind that the crisis came up in western industrial
countries in different degrees of intensity, we will have to observe moreover that the GDR cannot stay out of international economic events at the moment but must subject itself to their rules and laws in that it goes to the international market.

According to the plan directive, the SED is trying to improve the structure of GDR foreign trade: "The share of machine-building products and of electro-technology and electronics out of exports going to the developing countries and the capitalist industrial countries must be increased" (192).

According to the regional structure in GDR foreign trade, the CEMA countries are in the lead with 66.2 percent (1975), and here again the USSR, which accounts for 53.9 percent of GDR foreign trade with the CEMA countries (1975). The share of the socialist countries, which do not belong to the CEMA, out of GDR foreign trade came to 3.5 percent in 1975. GDR trade with western countries takes up 25.9 percent (1975) and 4.4 percent (1975) with the developing countries (193). Overall, exports to the "socialist economic area" according to the plan directive are to be raised to about 150 percent on the basis of the CEMA contract prices applicable in 1974.

Foreign trade, planned coordination, and cooperation above all in the problem areas of oil, energy and raw materials; machine-building; agriculture and food production; light industry; and transportation, according to the communique of the 7-9 July 1976 30th CEMA conference, are to help gradually equalize the development level of the member countries (195).

VIII. Statute Amendments

The new SEG statute is distinguished, compared to the old one, by a certain effort to tighten up and to be more specific. The shortened preamble of the new statute no longer mentions the "victory of the glorious Soviet people over German fascism" (196); instead it concentrates more on the description of the current political situation and its lawful further development. With regard to basic political statements, the statute follows the foreign-policy and social-policy directions of the new party program. In the new statute, we will look in vain for the old statute's pledge to a "united Germany of peace, democracy, and socialism" (197). West Germany or the FRG are not mentioned at all in the new statute, not even in the negative formula of West German imperialism. According to this new, the fifth statute, there has never been a common German past and there is no second German state.

The new statute, like the new program, describes the current social-policy situation with the ideological formula of the "developed socialist society and the gradual transition to communism." Quite consistently, the SED members now for the first time may call themselves "communists" according to the new statute. The party has also broadened its social membership base because its ranks combine not only, as according to the old statute, members of the working class, the class of cooperative farmers and the intelligentsia, but likewise the "other working people."
Relations with the socialist countries are based on the principles of "proletarian internationalism" and are shaped according to the requirements of "socialist economic integration" (No. 2, c), which the old, the fourth statute of course could not yet have anything to say about. The SED—which, according to the new statute, wants to make "its contribution to the enrichment of Marxism-Leninism"—is conducting an "uncompromising struggle" not only "against all phenomena of bourgeois ideology" but against the phenomena of "anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, against nationalism and racism, against any revisionist attitude toward Marxist-Leninist theory" which are mentioned by name here for the first time (198).

The economic-policy tasks of the party members, and of the party's bezirk, city, kreis, and city bezirk organizations are stated more precisely, to the extent that they must "work toward a fast growth rate of socialist production, higher efficiency, and scientific progress and"—as stated of course also in the old program—"the increase in labor productivity" (No. 2, b). The following were newly included in the list of duties of party members: "To come out against subjectivism, disregard of the group, egotism and unjustified optimism and against the inclination to become intoxicated with success" (No. 2, h). Every party member moreover is now obligated "at the right time" to respond to the "proposals and criticisms" from the "masses" and "to bring about the necessary changes" (No. 2, c). Ulbricht's dekalog of the Ten Commandments of socialist ethics was dropped.

In organizational terms, the possibility of resigning from the party was once again introduced—something which was not provided for in the fourth statute but which was contained in the first statute (199). Expulsion from the party takes place without any changes "if a party member has committed a criminal act which must be prosecuted in court and thus damaged the interests of the party and the state,...if his guilt has been clearly established" (No. 13). Practical handling is considerably more severe inasmuch as every party member, who is threatened with criminal proceedings, is automatically first expelled from the party because a SED member cannot be tried in court.

Following the Soviet model, party boss Honecker in the new statute gave himself the title of secretary general (No. 42) without however expanding his authority. In return, the authority of the leading party organs in the "bezirks, cities, kreises and city bezirks, industrial centers, industry branches, combines, and big enterprises, in urban residential areas, communities, and community associations" was expanded on one point inasmuch as they can now summon party aktif conferences also "to organize the collaboration of enterprises in agriculture and the essential food industry" (No. 29); this clearly underscores the importance and urgency of smooth production procedures in accordance with the plan in these problem sectors of the GDR economy. The party organizations in the enterprises, in agriculture, in educational institutions, and in all "other installations and organizations" are urged in the new statute, through their control over the activities of the enterprise managements, "to discharge their responsibilities for the political management of social development in their sector" (No. 63).
The party organizations in the ministries and in other central and local government agencies in the new statute get the right to supervise the "activity of the apparatus in the implementation of party and government resolutions and in compliance with socialist legal norms" (No. 63), while the old statute still—in the opposite sense—started with the idea that the party organizations in the ministries and government agencies "cannot perform any supervisory functions due to the special working conditions of the government machinery" (200). If the party organizations in the government agencies are now given a control or supervisory function, this means accordingly that there are no longer any working conditions in the government machinery whose peculiarity could have arisen only from the specific administrative function of government agencies. If this no longer obtains, then the government agencies, in terms of the type of their activity, obviously have become so much alike the party organs that they have lost their specific activity characteristics. Overall, the party's leading role in all sectors, be it the government, the economy, or society, is expressed in the new statute.

The position of the membership meetings of the base organizations was strengthened along the party base; according to the new statute, the directorate of the base organizations must account for its activities to them with regard to the execution of party resolutions (No. 57, e). Otherwise, the organizational structure and the function of the individual party organs remained unchanged in the new statute.

IX. The SED At Its Ninth Party Congress

According to the central committee activity report submitted to the party congress by Honecker, the SED at the start of the party congress had 2,043,697 full-fledged members and membership candidates in 74,306 base organizations. Since the last party congress in 1971, 2,099 base organizations were newly created in order "further to increase the party's influence in important branches of the economy and sectors of society" (201).

By occupation, 56.1 percent of the party members and candidates are workers; by social origin, 74.9 percent of the members and candidates come from the working class; 5.2 percent are cooperative farmers and 20.0 percent are members of the intelligentsia. Besides, 31.3 percent of the SED members are women; 12.2 percent of the members are under the age of twenty-five. One out of every three "college and technical school cadres in the GDR" is a full-fledged SED member or applicant.

According to the report of the credentials committee—which Erich Mueckenberg, Politburo member and chairman of the central party control commission delivered to the ninth party congress—2,519 party congress delegates were elected by secret ballot during the bezirk delegate conferences (202). According to the party statute, the party congress has a quorum if more than half of all party members are represented at it by delegates. "The formula for delegate election is determined by the central committee" (No. 37).
Nothing is known about that formula or key which extends not only to the purely arithmetic representation ratio.

Moreover, 64 percent of the delegates of 1,914,382 full-fledged SED members attended a party congress for the first time; 63.6 percent of the delegates authorized to vote--127 delegates attended the party congress only in an advisory capacity--are workers; 8.2 percent according to Mueckenberger's report are cooperative farmers and 25.4 percent were members of the intelligentsia; 2.8 percent of the delegates belonged to other social categories. There is no way of telling whether the category of workers designates actual job activity or social origin. In the first case, the workers at the party congress, judging by the party's total membership, would have been over-represented by about eight percent; in the second case, they would have been underrepresented by about eleven percent. As far as the age breakdown is concerned, 14.2 percent of the voting delegates were under twenty-five, in other words, their percentage was higher than their share out of the total membership. The share of women delegates was 28.6 percent, in other words, just about 3 percent below their share out of the total party membership.

The party congress, the party's highest body, elects the Central Committee, the party's highest organ between party congresses which are held every five years. According to the Soviet model, the old central committee was enlarged from 133 full members and 41 candidates to 145 full members and 57 candidates. Among the 20 new full central committee members--eight central committee members had passed away since the eighth party congress in 1971 or were not reelected--seven come from the government, including five ministers: Rudi Georgi, minister of machine tool and processing machine-building; Hans-Joachim Hoffmann, minister of culture; Heinz Kuhrig, minister of agriculture, forestry, and food industry; Horst Soelle, minister of foreign trade; Gerhard Weiss, deputy chairman, council of ministers, and permanent representative of the GDR with the CEMA. The new central committee members furthermore include six party functionaries, including three central committee secretariat section heads: Manfred Feist, chief, foreign information section in the central committee; Wolfgang Herger, chief, youth section; Werner Hering, chief, health policy section. Two new central committee members are leading FDJ [Free German Youth] functionaries: Helga Labs, secretary, FDJ central council, and chairperson, "Ernst Thaelmann" Pioneer Organization; Erich Postler, secretary, FDJ central council.

Three new central committee members are industrial managers: Joachim Bialecki, manager of a soft coal combine in Hoyerswerda Kreis, Cottbus Bezirk; Wolfgang Biermann, general manager, Zeiss Works, Jena; Erich Mueller, general manager, "Walter Ulbricht" Leuna Works, Halle. All three of them are industry managers, not skilled workers. From agriculture, neither LPG chairmen, nor a cooperative farmer was elected to the worker party's second-highest body (203).

According to the age breakdown, the new central committee consists of ten persons between the age of 30 and 39, 83 between 40 and 49, 64 between 50 and 59, 26 between 60 and 69, 15 between 70 and 79, and 4 who are 80 years
and over. Compared to the last 1971 central committee, we note that the group of persons between 50 and 59 was increased by 20 members—this being the most noteworthy age change—so that the 1971 central committee average age of 51.1 years went up to 52.9 years for the 1976 central committee. In terms of occupation, the 1976 central committee looks like this: Seventy-one members come from the party apparatus; 56 from the government machine, 20 are economy functionaries, another 20 are mass organization officials, 16 come from the field of culture and science, 10 come from agriculture, 8 are party veterans and miscellaneous, and 1 is a member of the NVA. "As far as the sector is concerned in which the primary activity is exercised," commented Peter C. Ludz, "we detect a relative numerical constancy. That applies particularly to the party, economy, and agriculture apparatus and to the sector of culture and science. In the main functional sector of the economy, a detailed analysis of course did reveal that it has assumed greater weight. Something similar applies to agriculture. For the government sector we can register a numerically smaller increase; the representation of the mass organizations went up strikingly. The increase to 20 representatives from the mass organizations in the 1976 central committee is essentially due to greater consideration being given to FDJ functionaries" (204).

At its first session on 22 May 1976, the newly elected central committee chose the Politburo from its midst; between the semiannual central committee meetings, it is the highest party organ and the actual power center of the GDR. Just as the central committee, elected on 4 March 1976 at the 25th CPSU Congress, made only minor changes in the Moscow Politburo by expanding it, we find that three candidates of the East Berlin Politburo were made full Politburo members so that it now has 19 full members. Following the Soviet model, the chief of the GDR secret service, Colonel General Erich Mielke, minister of state security, was elected to full membership, along with the highest party functionaries of GDR regions which are to be particularly promoted or where we have main points of modern growth industries: Konrad Naumann, first secretary, Berlin SED berzig directorate; and Werner Felle, first secretary, Halle SED berzig directorate. As a result of these new admissions of relatively young SED functionaries (Naumann is 47, Felle is 48)—only Mielke is an exception with 68 years—the average age of the Politburo goes down to 59.4 years.

The following new Politburo membership candidates were elected: Horst Dohlus, 50 years old, central committee secretary for party organs, the actual organizer of the party congress; Egon Krenz, 39, first secretary, FDJ central council; Werner Walde, 50, first secretary, Cottbus SED bezirk directorate (205).

Somewhat difficult to interpret is the appointment of Politburo membership candidate and editor-in-chief of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Joachim Herrmann, to the central committee secretariat for culture and science, to join 63-year old Kurt Hager. Until now, each central committee secretariat was directed only by one central committee secretary; Kurt Hager moreover does not reveal
any indications of old age, sickness, or resignation; it is therefore to be assumed that Herrmann has moved up to a waiting position in order to relieve 71-year old Albert Norden, Politburo member and central committee secretary for propaganda (west). This assumption is obvious inasmuch as Herrmann from 1965 until its dissolution in 1971, directed the State Secretariat for all-German and, later on, West German questions attached to the council of ministers GDR.

Abbreviations and Short Titles


ND--NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, organ of the SED Central Committee, East Berlin.

PFS--Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus, magazine of the communist and worker movement, German edition, East Berlin.


FOOTNOTES

1. ND, 8 Aug 1972, p 1.


12. ND, 3 February, 10 February, 1976.

13. Same as Footnote 152.


15. ND, 17 May, 1976, p 3ff.


21. Same as Footnote 17.


23. Same as Footnote 165.


26. Same as Footnote 17.


29. Program, pp 210-256.


32. ND, 7 February 1976.


36. Same as Footnote 33.


40. "Resolution of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic on Election Districts and the Number of Deputies to be Elected in the

41. ND, 26 October 1976, p 8.

42. "Joint Declaration on the Visit of CPSU Central Committee Secretary-General L. I. Brezhnev to the FRG," BULLETIN DES PRESSE- UND INFORMATIONSAMTES DER BUNDESREGERUNG, Bonn, 22 May 1972.


50. Program, p 318.


64. IZVESTIYA, 5 December 1975.


68. Program, p 260.


72. SCINTEIA, BUCHAREST, 2 and 3 June 1975.


75. Program, p 322.


77. ARCHIV DER GEGENWART, No 20214-20216.


83. Protol, Vol 2, p 254; Program, p 249.


88. Same as Footnote 85.


90. See "Security Conference in Europe--Documentation 1954-1972--Efforts At Detente and Approach in the Political, Military, Economic, Scientific-

92. Program, p 244.


114. Lades, Hans, "On the Function of the 'Developed Social System Under Socialism' In the GDR," "FROM POLITICS AND CONTEMPORARY HISTORY," Supplement to the weekly magazine DES PARLAMENT, Bonn, 6, 6 February 1971, p 3.


120. Program, pp 334, 336ff.


125. Program, p 240.


143. Ibid., loc. cit., p 844.


147. Program, pp 302ff.


152. Honecker, Erich, "Our Documents Reply to the Questions of Today and Tomorrow," from the speech of the SED Central Committee First Secretary to the Weisswasser kreis delegate conference, ND, 16 February, 1976, p 3.

153. Same as Footnote 151.


155. Program, p 331.


160. Same as Footnote 152.


172. Same as Footnote 170.


176. Schulz, Hans-Dieter, "Why One Week After the Close of the Party Congress?" DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 7, 1976, p 679. Differing data are supplied as to the costs of the social program that was adopted; at the Second Central Committee Plenum in September 1976, Hermann Axen gave a figure of M14.3 billion (Axen, Hermann "From the Politburo Report to the Second SED Central Committee Conference," ND, 3 September 1976, p 1); at the Tenth FDJ Parliament, Secretary General Honecker mentioned M14 billion (ND, 5-6 June 1976); on 11 July 1976, radio GDR mentioned a total cost of M10 billion. Western experts estimate the costs at M17 billion.


179. Same as Footnote 177.


182. Same as Footnote 180.


184. Erdmann, Kurt, "Rationalization or Reform of the Economic Mechanism in the GDR?" "Analyses of the Research Agency for All-German Economic and Social Questions," Berlin, 2, 1976, p 54. Statements on the reform of the planning and management mechanism are based mostly on this knowledgable and introductory analysis.

185. Ibid., loc. cit., p 7.

186. The two laws and the degree were published in a special brochure in 1973 by the East Berlin State Publishing House.


188. Protocol, Vol 1, p 96.


190. Protocol, Vol 1, p 64.


197. Ibid., loc. cit., p 16.


