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**TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE**

**POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS**

No. 1442

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HUNGARIAN SUPPORT OF ROMANIAN LIBERATION WAR

Bucharest REVISTA DE ISTORIE in Romanian No 4, Apr 77 pp 645-671

Article by Stefan Csucsuja: "The War for Independence in the Progressive Hungarian Public Opinion of the Time"

Our historiography has made known, at least in part, the positive expressions of the Hungarians in Transylvania in connection with one of the crucial events in the modern history of the Romanian people: the union of the principalities. In contrast, up to the present time, Marxist historiography in Romania has not included in the field of its research the response and, in general, the echoes that the other great, decisive event in the evolution of the Romanian nation—the war of independence in 1877-1878—caused among the Hungarians in Transylvania, although the making of such investigations is justified for many reasons.

First, research oriented in this direction would help substantially to clarify the complex social and national relations in the Transylvania of the dualist age, and in this way the historian concerned primarily with the history of the war of independence can obtain new data, in many cases even of a special value, from a field in which only the history of the mutual ties has the power to shed new light.

The revelation of these aspects is also justified because the investigations made would have as a result—in our conviction—an important historical conclusion with political significance, that is, they would again show, for another age still little researched, that here too the line of the good relations between the inhabitants of different nationalities—and especially between the Romanians and the Hungarians—in Transylvania was unswerving and continuous.

Finally, the study of the Hungarian echoes of the war of independence is urgently required also because this investigation modifies essentially the view formed by bourgeois historiography with regard to the main coordinates of the subject researched.

It is necessary for us to point out that bourgeois historiography and the political literature, both Hungarian and Romanian, have drawn biased conclusions
from isolated cases of manifestations that had nothing in common with the Hungarian popular masses but instead constituted the result of maneuvers of the great powers. There even were attempts to present some unofficial expressions opposed to the war of independence waged bravely by the Romanian people as characteristic of all Hungarian public opinion.

On the basis of superficial information, selecting the documentary material in the spirit of nationalistic subjectivity, the bourgeois historians have asserted that the attitude of the Hungarians in the period of the war of independence was univocal, that is, negatively univocal, since Hungarian public opinion would have been unanimously on the side of the Turks in the matter of the Romanian-Turkish confrontation in 1877-1878. However, this absolutization, which does not take into account the popular manifestations and ignores the deep currents in the flow of history, does not correspond at all to reality and even in a biased manner tried to sow discord between the Romanians and the Hungarians. Consequently, the task of the Marxist historians results on its own and is evident: the problem must be approached objectively, there being formed—on the basis of the existing sources and by applying the methods of historical materialism—a correct picture of this phase of the Romanian-Hungarian ties, in order to contrast it with the old views.

These are the guidelines that we are trying to promote within the limits of the present study. And the sources of the time, the press, an abundant memorialist literature, and the considerable number of documents of the time offer us the possibility of truly knowing the attitude of the most diverse strata and elements, both with regard to the Hungarians in Transylvania and with regard to those who lived or worked in old Romania. The sketching of this varied public opinion, taking into account the permanent factors that molded Romanian-Hungarian relations, developed and strengthened for centuries in a row, demonstrates convincingly that in 1877-1878 the attitude of the Hungarians did not represent at all an uninterrupted series of inimical manifestations, since there appeared groups—and not few—that, alien to the nationalistic currents of the age and orienting themselves according to their own interests, even under the conditions of the ratios of force defined by the great powers, managed to grasp that the Romanian people were waging a just struggle for their own independence. Moreover, some gave effective support or also actively integrated themselves into the struggle of the Romanian people, although under the conditions of the time, under the avalanche of vehement propaganda unleashed by the dualist governments and by their parties and corporations, and in view of the reality that in 1877-1878 the war in the Balkans also was implicitly a clash of the two great powers, Russia and Turkey, such a position implied great consistency and farsightedness.

Studying the positive effects of Romania's war of independence among the Hungarians in Transylvania, we adopted as a starting point, first of all, the fact that Transylvania was then going through precisely the period of the consolidation of dualism. A regime whose establishment raised new and even stronger obstacles in the path of the process of the transformation of the East-European peoples into nations and the formation, that is, the
achievement, of the unified national states consolidated its position in the eighth decade of the last century. Because of the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire tried to keep by force in a single oppressive framework the various peoples and nationalities found on the path of development and that it ensured the domination of the Hungarian ruling classes in a part of the empire, the antagonisms connected with the national problem intensified very greatly. The tense atmosphere existing with regard to this problem determined the position of the Hungarian ruling classes toward all the national movements within the empire. The Hungarian ruling classes viewed suspiciously any national movement, thus the Romanian national movement too, and consequently Romania's war of independence too, finding it contrary to their interests, because an independent Romanian national state would have increased, potentially, the force of the Romanian national movements in Transylvania, bringing nearer, too, the prospect of the achievement of union. Their hostile attitude found its expression in the press, in parliament and in the meetings of the political parties in power. However, we must also mention in this regard that certain circles of the Hungarian ruling classes, such as, for example, Iuliu Andrássy, the foreign minister of the empire, and his entourage, convinced of the inevitable collapse of the Ottoman Empire's power in Europe, supported the cause of Romania's independence, if only because they saw in it an obstacle to "the Russian expansion toward the Balkans."

It is incontestable that even under the specific sociopolitical conditions in the age of dualism, in the so tense atmosphere of national relations, the broad masses preserved their progressive traditions—because the regime established by means of the concluding of the dualist pact meant a heavy blow and an age of exploitation and oppression, although the ruling classes presented dualism as a victory of the entire Hungarian nation, whereas in reality it represented only their victory over the Hungarian people. The Hungarian ruling classes tried to present their narrow class interests as the cause of the entire Hungarian nation, connecting it, without even appealing to the popular masses, with the destiny of a corrupt empire and dynasty that history had condemned to perish.

Collaboration in everyday life existed among the Romanians, the Hungarians and the Saxons in Transylvania. Alexandru Roman, one of the leading personalities of the Romanian national movement in the dualist age, was elected as deputy in a district in the comitat of Arad, by the unanimous vote of the Romanian and Hungarian peasants, against the opposition candidate of the landlords. An item in the press of the time informs us that the Hungarian peasants in Uliuc declared that "they will side with their Romanian brothers with whom they have lived and want to live in peace and good will." Signs of the collaboration between the inhabitants of Transylvania also appeared in Brasov: in the "brotherly agreement" concluded on 22 April 1871, "the Romanians, the Germans and the Hungarians in Brasov promise each other to step toward the future together in all their local affairs on the basis of the principle of national equality." Friendships were made and amity was developed between the Romanians and the Hungarians in Transylvania. In the press of the time, the account of the
demonstration occasioned by the concert of Reményi Ede in Cluj was titled "Romanian-Hungarian Brotherhood." In the period just before the establishment of dualism, Hungarians and Romanians decisively declared themselves to be for friendship and collaboration: Ioan Ratiu for the Romanians and K. Papp Miklos for the Hungarians.  

There were also those who continued to strengthen the thread of friendship between the Romanians and the Hungarians, in the field of literature and culture, serving in this way mutual knowledge. In 1868, the Hungarian writers saluted, in the person of Elena Ghica (Dora D'Istria), a promoter of Romanian-Hungarian and, in general, Southeast European cultural ties. Hungarian translations of Romanian folk poetry appeared. In the same period, Marki Sandor published a volume of studies of great importance: "Bihari Roman Irok" (Romanian Writers in Bihor). In 1871, Iosif Vulcan was received among the members of the prestigious literary society Kisfaludi Tarsasag (the Kisfaludi Society). It is worth mentioning that in the salute given on this occasion the secretary of the society stated that only the ruling classes bore the responsibility for the instigation of hatred.

Finally, there appeared initiatives for also transplanting all these efforts into political life. Here is what George Baritiu wrote to Visarion Roman in the period of preparation for the conference in Miercurea: "More precisely, I ask you that we not raise our claims against any nation but combat parties, and especially the aristocracy."

The passivists' conference at Turda (1870) also decided that in the struggle against dualism it was necessary to collaborate with the Hungarians in Transylvania. They tried "in every way to warn the Hungarians about the danger that results for them and for us from the dualist system and to help together, as much as possible with them, to change the system and restore the autonomy of Transylvania," GAZETA TRANSILVANiei wrote.

The efforts at Romanian-Hungarian rapprochement appearing throughout the age found a decisive confirmation in the person and activity of Lőcsei Mocsary. His election in 1868 in the district of Caransebes was one of the most important moments, if not even the most important moment, of the Romanian-Hungarian ties in the last century. Mocsary was elected as a member of parliament in a purely Romanian electoral district—namely, at the proposal of the Romanian National Party. Incontestably, Mocsary had been known, up to then, as a militant for defending the rights of the nationalities, since he realized, as far back as in the phase of preparing the draft, that the law of nationalities, in 1868, far from guaranteeing their development, hindered it, because although conceived in the spirit of the French Revolution—it provided to everyone broad rights in fields like the use of the native tongue, local autonomy, education and confessional matters—it did not recognize axiomatically the collective rights of the nationalities and it sanctioned only individual rights, proclaiming the false principle (on which the policy of national oppression was later based, for decades in a row) that the inhabitants of Hungary were all members of the Hungarian political nation. This was the
main reason why Mocsary opposed this law with such vehemence. The action taken by Mocsary in defense of the rights of the nationalities included an even wider area in the period of the government of Coloman Tisza, who was not disposed to apply even this law, although it too would have helped substantially to ease the tension and, especially, would have improved considerably the situation of the nationalities.

In the parliamentary struggle for the rights of the nationalities, Mocsary found allies among the Romanians in Emil Babes, Iosif Hodosiu and others, fighting alongside them so that—as he said in the farewell letter addressed to his electors in Caransebes—"this vital problem (the national problem) can be developed in the best direction."10

This activity of Mocsary's—conscious, deliberate, and of great importance in the mutual relations of the Romanians with the Hungarians—can be regarded as a continuation of the traditions of solidarity and it had a strong influence on their later development. Mocsary saw this clearly, as is shown by the above-mentioned farewell letter to his Romanian electors, in which he synthesized his view regarding the nature and essence of the ties between the Romanians and the Hungarians in the age of dualism and expressed his firm conviction that the existing ties were going to evolve further under the sign of friendship for their benefit, there thus acquiring durability all that he did in this field. "The very fact that I had the honor to represent the district of Caransebes will not disappear without a trace. The trace of it will remain and the fact that, precisely when these conflicts were raising great waves, the Romanian National Party entrusted this parliamentary mandate to a Hungarian...will constitute a not only interesting but also significant contribution," he wrote.10a

Mocsary also stated a basic truth when he declared that the Hungarian popular masses had nothing in common with the oppressive policy of the dualist governments. "The national policy does not spring from the heart of the majority of the Hungarian people..., the majority of the Hungarians are not to blame for the supremacy of the wrong ideas, but those who, setting themselves up as leaders of the people, are pursuing foreign political goals. The majority of the Hungarian nation does not lean toward racial hatred but is all the more receptive to justice, responding warmly every time to the call to promote the spirit of justice and the brotherly sentiments."11

The Romanian-Hungarian solidarity was not limited only to Transylvania but was promoted in a wider framework. Referring only to the period prior to the events in 1877, we find that, for instance, the great changes occurring in the life of the Romanian people on the other side of the Carpathians were followed with lively interest. So it also came to pass on the occasion of the union of the two principalities, when the Romanian national state was born. In the accounts referring to the proclamation of union, the newspaper KOLOZSVARI KOZLONY (the Cluj Monitor) depicted Cuza in extremely glowing colors, according great importance to the fact that the ruler of the united principalities possessed great popularity among the masses and especially to
the point that "he is among those who, in 1848, raised the flag of the freedom of the principalities."12 "In Bucharest, there happened what had to happen," since the Romanian people were consistent in their demands and objectives. "This choice will not be able to be annulled," another newspaper declared.13 And the ironic observations of the press, against Turkey, offer us proof of the lack of popularity of the oppressive policy of the Ottoman Empire. "Nec ossa habeas; not even those few poor bones, that barely visible shadow of prestige, are left of it."14

On the occasion of the union Ludovic Kossuth's regard for the Romanian people was again shown. "Such a spirit is necessary to a people in order for them to be able to forge their homeland, or to be able to regain it, if they lost it," he wrote from exile.15

The Hungarian forces in favor of independence and especially the revolutionary exiles sought an ally and support for liberating their homeland in the progressive Romanian forces that had achieved the union. Along the line of this aspiration for collaboration, as far back as in the year of the union—1859—there arose the Cuza-Klapka agreement, by means of which the young Romanian state promised the liberating Hungarian forces substantial help against the Hapsburgs. The agreement was based on precisely the views of the same Teleki László who as far back as in 1848 had been aware of the great force and power of the national idea and thus had striven from conviction, both then and after the revolution, for the achievement of collaboration between the Romanians and the Hungarians.

The democratism of the progressive Hungarian forces, the constant collaboration with the Romanian people (of which we had the occasion to offer examples even from the period of dualism), and the nature of this collaboration had as an effect and also led to the genesis of objective and even positive opinions about Romania's war of independence in 1877 and created the possibility of reaffirmation of the sympathy and appreciation accorded to the Romanian people by the progressive Hungarian forces.

However, we cannot deny the fact that in the 1877-1878 period Hungarian public opinion was truly contradictory in many regards. It is necessary to take into account the historical fact that for a long time a considerable part of Hungarian society did not see, that is, was not able to see clearly, the true character of the war. The explanation must be sought in the suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1848, which still influenced strongly Hungarian public opinion. As we also pointed out and as is known, Romania had to force recognition of its declaration of independence by means of a war waged alongside Russia, which had supported up to then the war of liberation of the peoples in the Balkans. So, owing to the efforts made jointly on the front, the Russo-Romanian brotherhood of arms also manifested itself fully in this war. In contrast, on its outbreak in 1877, the Hungarian people saw developing its forces the same czarist power that, allied with the Hapsburgs, had carried out the armed intervention in 1848, putting an end to the revolution that promised national independence and social freedom to the
Hungarian people. For precisely this reason, even after 1848 the Hungarians
followed with continual concern all the czarist political and military ac-
tions. We must also mention that the fact was not without effect that,
after the defeat of the revolution in 1848, the revolutionaries obliged to
take the course of exile had also found shelter—just like the Kuruts of
Francisc Rakoczi II—in Turkey. Naturally, this does not mean that the Hun-
garian refugees would ever have been supporters of the oppressive Ottoman re-
gime. On the contrary, the truth is precisely the opposite, because, living
in Turkey, they grasped even better the oppressive and anachronistic charac-
ter and always followed with sympathy the war of liberation of the peoples in
the Balkans. However, it is a fact that the progressive Hungarian forces re-
garded the czarist power as a strong pillar of European reaction that—in
their opinion—threatened the Hungarian popular forces.

However, it must be specified that the anxiety of the progressive Hungarian
forces was not identical to the much-discussed and much-commented-on "danger
of Pan-Slavism" invoked by the Hungarian ruling classes. The Hungarian rul-
ing classes' fear of the national movements of the Slavic peoples in the em-
pire, the fear that its very integrity would be attacked, constituted the mo-
tive for the emphasis on the "Pan-Slavic danger." In fact, the propaganda of
the ruling classes had nothing in common with the progressive antisemitism of
the generation in the Age of Reform or with their concern for Hungarian inde-
pendence: they were worried about the movement of the Slavic peoples in the
empire, which was able to become fatal for their domination.

Finally, it deserves to be noted by us that it would be wrong to believe that
the nationalism of the ruling classes would have been totally without effect
and that it would not have had an influence from top to bottom—just as it
would be wrong for us to conceal the fact that in 1877 the evolution of
Hungarian public opinion was also affected by the tension existing as a re-
result of the intensification of national contradictions. These factors too
indeed had their effects, but they were not the main ones, and their influ-
ence was able to manifest itself only in a restricted circle and for a short
time.

Regarding the positive manifestations connected with Romania's war of inde-
pendence in 1877-1878, the Hungarian press in Transylvania offers valuable
information.

Undoubtedly, Hungarian journalism was influenced by the political relations
specific to the time and bore the imprint of the tension accumulated on the
national problem. Nevertheless, in journalism on the whole, each newspaper
represented a separate nuance. Each one reflected the opinion of a wider or
more restricted stratum or of a political group. The fact is not without
significance, since it explains from many viewpoints the progressive forces'
possibility of expressing their opinions in the columns of the newspapers,
although they were in the service of the class, party and national politics
characteristic of dualism. And likewise is explained too the fact that many
objective news items and comments showing a real political sense were
published in the period of the war for independence. In the case of political dailies—such as MAGYAR POLGAR (Hungarian Citizen) in Cluj, SZABADSAG (Liberty) in Oradea, or ALFOLD (The Plain) in Arad, representatives of the progressive orientation—the concern was almost systematic and the editorial staffs of the respective newspapers also devoted space to expressions of sympathy. Even in other newspapers—for instance, KELLET (East) in Cluj—(although taking a position not always identical to that of progress) a number of editors, animated by the exigency of objectively informing the readers, published in connection with Romania writings of a positive note. In fact, some newspapers were run by people who, even before, had been disposed to faithfully serve the cause of Romanian-Hungarian rapprochement (and we will mention here only K. Papp Miklos, publisher and editor of the newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR). Among the correspondents of the Hungarian newspapers in Transylvania there were also those who were considered friends of the Romanians or even those who really acted in favor of the cause of the independence of Romania. Among the articles sent from Romania we found one signed by Szathmary Papp Karoly, a noted artist and well known as a participant in the war of independence. In ERDELYI HIRADO (The Transylvanian Herald) in Tîrgu Mureș there appeared Vándory Lajos, the same one who founded a Hungarian language newspaper in Bucharest and was considered a competent and dedicated spokesman of the little people. Regarding Veress Sándor, who, residing for a long time in Bucharest, sent his articles for publication to VASÁRNAPI ÜJSAG (a Sunday newspaper) and other newspapers, we know that, living in Romania, he too was among those who had participated in the war.

We also mention here the fact that the study of the press in the respective period—very abundant and complete—convinced us that in the period of the war for independence there were times when a great or even overwhelming part of it praised Romania. So it came to pass on the occasion of the heroic battles on the Balkan front at Plevna, Grivita and Rahova or in the phase of the diplomatic efforts that followed these victories.

As far back as at the end of 1876, when the eastern crisis was deepening more and more, an extensive exchange of opinions about Romania's situation was held in the columns of the Hungarian press in Transylvania. The political newspapers' comments, made in connection with the diplomatic news, (although leaning toward the preservation of peace) attest to the fact that the opinion about the imminent outbreak of the war between the two rival powers, Russia and Turkey, was general. In this context there was posed frequently and discussed at length the question as to what the attitude of Romania, sandwiched between the future belligerents, would be. Most of the political press, in accordance with the interests of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, felt that the most suitable policy on the part of Romania would be neutrality. This part of the press felt that an eventual alliance with Russia would not be beneficial but, on the contrary, even dangerous to Romania, and it maintained that, in the given situation, such a diplomatic, that is, political and, especially, military, act would have serious consequences for Romania. 17

Contrary to this view, there also arose—although still sporadically—the other, more anchored in reality, according to which Romania, although in a
very difficult situation precisely because of the nearness of the great powers, would not even be able, under the given conditions, to consistently implement a neutral policy, in which in fact it was not even interested, since, intervening in the conflict, (an article in KELET said, for instance) it would step much more surely toward the much-desired goal, toward state independence, than by means of a policy of neutrality, whose results would be in many regards doubtful.18

The commentator of the newspaper MAGYAR POLGÁR did not even raise the question of the eventuality and possibilities of neutrality. The Cluj newspaper was convinced that, as soon as Russia launched its war against Turkey, Romania—guiding itself according to its own interests and not for other reasons—was also going to enter the war.19 The commentator of MAGYAR POLGÁR based his conclusions on an analysis of Romanian political life or, more precisely, on the dominant trends in Romanian political life, showing himself to be truly well informed.

The newspaper MAGYARAD (Oradea Mare) in Oradea also took a position close to this opinion. In fact, in June 1876, Romania formulated, in seven points, its demands toward the Sublime Porte—the newspaper said—and "it conditioned its neutrality toward the Porte" precisely on the fulfillment of these demands, but, showing themselves disposed to accept five of the seven demands contained in Kogalniceanu's note, the Turks did not satisfy Romania at all. So, in this situation, "the dispute between the Porte and the Romanian government can only lead to the declaration of war."20 To Romania there remained no alternative but war, the newspaper MAGYAR POLGÁR again specified a little later, stating that all these things happened because of the Porte's position toward the Romanian government's note, although, at the respective time, the Porte could have avoided war by satisfying the Romanian demands, and Romania would have obtained its independence, which "it already exercises de facto."21 On the basis of the information received from its correspondents, MAGYAR POLGÁR demonstrated that the Turks themselves were convinced of Romania's entry into the war, in order to gain its independence, "and so they are making their military preparations with feverish haste." However, the newspaper added, with a rather ironic tone, "for the preparations the Porte needs only money—which it lacks most of all."22

Starting from the findings made by Romanian historiography, we can judge that this part of the Hungarian press correctly evaluated the main lines of Romania's policy shortly before the Russo-Romanian-Turkish war. The Romanian political circles, indeed well informed, did not exclude, especially after the agreement at Reichstadt, the eventuality of a war, and Kogalniceanu himself, expressing the will of the nation, as so many other times up to then, oriented Romania's policy toward preparation for war. In his notes of 1 and 5 August 1876, he asked the Romanian diplomats accredited abroad to inform the great powers that because of the rejection of the demands contained in the seven points the public opinion of the country compelled its government to give up the policy of neutrality.23
In this context there was posed on its own the question, which in fact many Hungarian newspapers in Transylvania also posed: to what extent had Romania succeeded in preparing for war; what military, material and human forces was it going to be able to mobilize in the case of an anti-Ottoman war? Seeking the answer, the newspapers in Transylvania had, in near unanimity, favorable judgments about the military preparation of Romania. However, we specify that these favorable opinions referred only to the military and human factors proper, because the material situation of the country, especially in the field of finance, was regarded as being insufficiently solid.

"Along with the union of the principalities in 1859, the army acquired sounder organization," said MAGYAR POLGAR, for example. "The Moldavian and Wallachian troops were fused into a united Romanian army, and military service took on great significance."24 In the last 10 years—said the same newspaper, returning to the subject—"the Romanian army has reached a prestigious level, it has an eminent officer corps and is equipped with excellent armament."25 MAGYAR POLGAR grasped correctly that Romania had made great efforts to raise its defensive capacity—although, like the other newspapers, it attributed, with regard to the modernization of the army, an overly great role to the Prussian consistency of Carol I and the agility of I. C. Bratianu.26

Competently analyzing the Romanian army's structure and organization, MAGYAR POLGAR and other newspapers praised its different branches. For instance, MAGYAR POLGAR stated about the cavalrymen that they "are strong and have good bearing" and the foot soldiers "fight well, under the command of good officers." The border guards "protecting the borders of Romania" were equipped with excellent Peabody carbines and, "like the line infantry, are good marchers, having good commanders."27 Even the conservatively oriented newspaper EBEDES (Renaissance)—although amplifying beyond measure the merits of Carol I—stated that "the equipment of the Romanian army is excellent, the officers are good, the troops are noted for discipline and other military traits."28 According to the unanimous opinion of the Hungarian newspapers, the artillery "constitutes the best organized part of the Romanian army."29

An army in which such a spirit prevailed and which had such traits—under the conditions in which the concluding of the alliance with Russia was regarded by the respective newspapers as already a certainty—was able to engage in war with hopes of victory. And indeed, the events occurring on the way drove Romania toward war.

The conference at Constantinople, set up in order to balance at least temporarily the interests of the great powers, ended, as is known, without a result. Advised by England—in order to avoid the future decision of the conference—the Porte published on 23 December 1876 its constitution, which, liberal under the conditions of Turkey, but injurious to Romania's interests, had to lead to serious incidents. The wording of some of the articles of the Ottoman constitution justified the conclusion that the Porte regarded Romania as an organically integral part of the Ottoman Empire and, in a capacity of a suzerain power, it claimed the right that the Romanian ruler be confirmed on the throne by the sultan.
The newspapers in Transylvania not only reported the incident in detail but also, without exception, stressed Romania's credit for adopting a firm stand and pointed out that Romania had sufficient fears to see in articles 1, 7 and 8 of the Ottoman constitution an attack against its autonomy.\textsuperscript{30} MAGYAR POLGAR declared itself to be in agreement with Romania's strong protest and reported that in all corners of the country the Sublime Porte's attitude aroused indignation.\textsuperscript{31} The newspaper KELET also spoke about the arousal of Romanian public opinion and about the growth of the anti-Ottoman movement among the young people: "The Bucharest young people declare themselves to be against the Turks and ask the minister of war to arm them and to train them for military service."\textsuperscript{32} "The Ottoman constitution had a very depressing effect on Romania," said ERDELYI HIRADO in connection with this question.\textsuperscript{33}

Reading a number of issues of the newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR, with material devoted to problems connected with the war for independence, we can convince ourselves of the progressive character of the Cluj newspaper. MAGYAR POLGAR condemned the above-mentioned constitution, in the name of truth and of the principles of law. It felt that the procedure and the constitution of the Sublime Porte had an antipopular character and that it never constituted a work based on the principles of true liberalism, which it attributed to it. In many articles in MAGYAR POLGAR there was expressed the opinion that the time chosen by Turkey for publishing the constitution was not able to have an effect other than that of provocation and that by means of this the development of Andrássy's "peacemaking mission" was also thwarted. Finally—a thing in fact very relevant in the context of our exposition—MAGYAR POLGAR stated that with regard to Romania the Ottoman legislation was completely dissociated from reality and did not take into account the fact that Romania was completely autonomous and—in the newspaper's opinion—"a truly independent country."

The Romanian popular masses living in Bucharest were prepared to express their protest against the Ottoman constitution by means of a vast demonstration on Calea Moșilor. In the given situation, the government, in order to avoid complications, banned this demonstration, but on the very next day it sent to the Porte, through the foreign minister, a very strong note. The protest note, which contained the firm demand of respect for the rights and the status of Romania and which was delivered by Ion Ghița, caused detailed comments in KELET and in MAGYAR POLGAR.\textsuperscript{34} "Romania is not a segment of the Ottoman Empire, I. C. Bratianu declared in his New Year's message," reported ERDELYI HIRADO in its turn in connection with what happened in Bucharest, adding that such statements "had an inflammatory effect on the representative and the listener."\textsuperscript{35} EBREDES also criticized the steps taken by the Porte and drew attention to "the strong demonstrations" in Romania, although, in accordance with its orientation, it added that all these things facilitated the alliance with Russia, which would be—according to this newspaper—a very regrettable act.\textsuperscript{36} In any case, however, the newspaper EBREDES was to later characterise as a provocation the procedure used by the Porte and found the protest of the Romanian parliament to be fully justified.\textsuperscript{37}
ERDELYI HIRADO felt that, of all the protests against the Ottoman constitution, the most characteristic one, with a wider reverberation, was the intervention of Bratianu, since it judged that in the Romanian political arena the leadership role had passed into the hands of the radicals: the people and especially the young people listened to the radicals and to Bratianu. Regarding a mass protest, like that of the Romanians, this was a factor that the Porte had to take into account in any case. Interestingly, because of its correspondent, the Tirgu Mures newspaper believed itself capable of knowing that "the Porte also recognized that Romania's protest in regard to articles I, VII and VIII of the constitution is justified." And if this in fact happened—the newspaper ERDELYI HIRADO continued the above reasoning—"then Bratianu will be able to indeed assert that not in vain has he been in prison and in exile so many times for his homeland." This was a way of judging the efforts of Bratianu—efforts considered useful—for the cause of independence.38 "The new Ottoman constitution caused very great unrest," the political daily NAGYVARD also wrote, on 10 January 1877, in order to then inform the readers about the new waves raised by the event. As if the Porte would have wanted to demonstrate that no error had crept into the wording of the articles of the constitution, as if it wanted to express its intention of practically applying its provisions, because, as the Oradea newspaper mentioned with irony, under the pretext of "the disorder discovered in the telegraph office in Icăni," the Turkish government very severely reprimanded the directorate of the Romanian posts.39 "Icăni is in Moldavia, and the telegraph there is Romanian," the newspaper NAGYVARD wanted to stress, however, in the next issue.40

It is also very interesting—and thus worth pointing out—that in the dispute caused by the Ottoman constitution the newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR resorted to arguments of the most convincing sort and to methods of the most effective sort, contrasting the presumptive "constitutional" rights of the Porte with the real situation. Under the title "Romania Nepe, Intezmenyei es Hadserege" (The People, the Institutions and the Army of Romania) the newspaper published a series of articles, presenting in detail the remarkable development of Romania in the past decade. From the viewpoint of Romania's economic prosperity, the newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR attributed a leading role particularly to the railroad network. The spread and generalisation of railroad transportation caused the ursurge in trade. "The more and more flourishing trade, combined with the developing industry, increased the importance of the cities, changing their outer appearance as well," the newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR concluded, referring to the economic life of Romania.41

Speaking about the country's political situation, the newspaper returned to a previous statement, namely, the finding that "Romania is a rather independent country," and then specified: "...its constitution greatly resembles that of Belgium." Regarding Turkish domination, of it "there remained only an insignificant annual tax," MAGYAR POLGAR said and pointed out that the vague Ottoman suzerainty over Romania also resulted from the fact that the Romanian army had long since exceeded the established strength and staff; on the other hand, Romania had not only trade agreements proper with
Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia and France, but, moreover, representatives in nearly all the big cities of Europe, and in their turn the European powers maintained representatives in Bucharest. Regarding the two Romanian chambers—the newspaper continued—on 24 January 1876 they passed a law by virtue of which the government had authority to coin money bearing the likeness of the ruler. After all this, the newspaper MAGYAR POLGÁR thought it right to again specify that "Romania can be considered independent: at the head of the executive power is the prince, and the legislation is done in two parliamentary bodies." Then, in order to complete the image of Romania offered to the readers, the newspaper also added that there "free press, free education, mandatory wherever there are schools, and all confessions are exercised freely."42

Undoubtedly, the author of the series of articles in MAGYAR POLGÁR tended to be objective, as the tone used and the data published show. His success, in many regards, is explained by means of the source to which he resorted. Much of the data used came from the Romanian memoirs published by D. Bratianu, which shows that, to a certain extent, the author of the articles adhered to the viewpoint expressed in these memoirs. Probably, however, the views of Romanian politicians according to which Romania would have been a completely independent state, even before the proclamation of state independence, also had a notable influence on the formation of his opinions.43

Nevertheless, the journalist's reasoning is confirmed in many regards. "Romania cannot be regarded at all as being a part of Turkey," he also wrote in December 1876, "since by virtue of the agreements44 it has the right to an independent existence." "It is true that Romania cannot conclude offensive alliances, but it has the latitude of the alliances meant to guarantee its existence." It was not disputed that "formerly it was put under the protection of the Ottoman Empire," but Romania never gave up its sovereignty. The only connection that still kept it linked to Turkey was "the payment of tribute, but this does not affect its sovereignty at all."45

For a long time, the diplomatic complications caused by the Ottoman constitution and the protest movement in Romania occupied a leading place in the Hungarian press. VASANNAPI UJSAG characterized Romania as "a vigorous and loyal state"46 and the newspaper KELET informed its readers that as a result of the vehement protests of the Romanian government and people the Porte eventually had to respond by means of a note that was retractive to a certain extent. Sent on 10 January, it contained the promise that "it will give articles I, VII and VIII of the constitution an interpretation meant to dispel the confusion regarding the interstate ties between Romania and Turkey." Such a promise—the newspaper KELET stated—"means, in any case, a victory for Romania, but it is not content with that."47

Turkey's intention to validate its presumed rights over Romania (an intention also shown by the incident connected with the constitution) consolidated the camp of those who were militating for the concluding of the agreement with Russia. In the conference on 1/13 April, the Romanian government ultimately
decided in favor of the alliance with Russia, whereupon, on 4/16 April, an agreement signed by Mihail Kogalniceanu for Romania was concluded.

The Romanian-Russian agreement, condemned in the Hungarian press (for the reasons already mentioned) as early as in the draft phase, thus reached the epicenter of the attacks, staying in this situation until the end of the war.

However, the specification that, even under the avalanche of vehement criticism and disapproval, here and there in the Hungarian press it is also possible to pick out objective findings in connection with the agreement is not without interest. Some comments attest to the not unimportant understanding of the fact that the core of the Romanian policy and its main line remained the mention of autonomy and the gaining of independence. Among the better informed commentators, cognizant of Romanian political life, there were some who—presenting the question of the agreement—did not conceal the fact that both in the time of preparation and in the perfecting of this document of great political, military and diplomatic importance Romania had great concern for defending its sovereignty. "Romania grants free passage to the Russian army. The czar is obliged to respect the rights and integrity of Romania," MAGYAR POLGAR said, summarizing the content of the agreement.48 Concerning itself with the debates held in parliament on the Romanian-Russian agreement, KELET, for instance, stated that the Romanians' attitude toward Russia was determined by the fact that Russia "guarantees the rights and recognizes the political individuality of Romania"49 and its territorial integrity.

"Passage of the Russian troops is allowed on the condition of noninterference in the country's internal affairs and of strict compliance with the itinerary set for the troops," the Arad newspaper ALFOLD concluded.50 The newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR published that part of the speech given by Kogalniceanu in parliament by means of which it was brought to the cognizance of the entire world that, in concluding the agreement with Russia, the present and future goal of the Romanians was the defense of the rights of Romania.51 Then, returning again to the speech, the newspaper quoted: "the Romanian people intend to defend their institutions, nationality and individuality."52

We mention that, analyzing the Romanian-Russian agreement and its effects, MAGYAR POLGAR—in a nevertheless interesting way—attributed to the other powers the responsibility for the agreement concluded by the Romanians with Russia, because they did not take into account or into discussion "the Romanian statement" (Kogalniceanu's proposals, formulated in seven points) without also taking into account the Porte's responsibility in this regard. In the opinion of the newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR, the Porte "should have satisfied the complaints of Romania, thus raising a strong barrier in the path of czarism,"53 because the Romanian popular masses were worried about the czarist power. Romania was always wary of the abuses of this power.54 The newspaper SZABADSAG in Oradea also expressed itself in somewhat the same way, saying that the Austro-Hungarian monarchy committed a very great oversight by means of the fact that it did not do everything possible to achieve relations of alliance with Romania, although they would have had a special importance.55
In the columns of the Oradea newspaper there recurred, perhaps as an echo of the events in the decades prior to the time with which we are concerned, the idea of the plan for the collaboration of the little people, because, evoking the unfortunate nearness of the great powers, the newspaper stated that "the Romanian element is just as isolated as we, the Hungarians."\(^{56}\)

The Romanian-Russian agreement regulated the conditions of the anti-Ottoman collaboration of the two countries, implicitly also offering to Romania the possibility of waging war against Turkey. In essence, this meant the denunciation of the Paris treaties, arising in the period after the Crimean War. Referring to the problem of the agreement with vast implications, which at that time went beyond the sphere of the interests proper of the two partners, one of the correspondents of the newspaper KELET attributed to Kogalniceanu the statement (already made, the correspondent asserted) that he was no longer disposed to recognize the consequences of the Paris treaties.\(^{57}\) Referring to the way in which the great powers were going to receive the so-called statement, KELET expressed its conviction that "the European governments will not react vehemently," because with regard to Romania the above-mentioned treaties no longer had practical consequences.\(^{58}\)

After M. Kogalniceanu and Baron Stuart signed the much-discussed agreement (the former for Romania and the latter for Russia) the most urgent steps to defend the country's borders were immediately taken: the regular army and the territorial units were mobilized, the tasks of the people's insurrectional units were elaborated and regulated, and the law of military requisitions was promulgated. Sitting in session on 24 April, the parliament debated the ratification of the agreement as well as the financial situation of Romania on the brink of war, making decisions also with regard to other measures referring to the defense of "the rights and interests of Romania." The atmosphere of the entire country evolved under the sign of hurried, feverish preparations.

In view of the importance of the events in Romania, at the end of April and the start of May, the newspapers constantly published new news and gleanings from the Bucharest newspapers of different political nuances. For example, MAGYAR POLGÁR reproduced them in a regular column titled "Bukaresti Szemle" (Accounts from Bucharest), so that the readers were able to form an exact image of the events in Romania in the period just before the proclamation of independence. In fact, the Hungarian newspapers in Transylvania felt that the concluding of the Romanian-Russian agreement marked not only the abolishment of the relations up to then but also the start proper of the state of war between the Ottoman Empire and Romania: "therefore, very soon we can expect the proclamation of independence of Romania."\(^{59}\)

The spirit that prevailed in Romanian public opinion was characterized by tense waiting, reflected also in the progressive Hungarian press, when the Turks began the artillery bombardment at Calafat, Bechet, Oltenita and the other Danubian cities, and the Ottoman troops committed more and more frequent violations of the Romanian border—the armies themselves attested that, in fact, the war had begun.\(^{60}\)
The Romanian people received with enthusiasm the war meant to legitimate the independence of Romania. The most dynamic stratum of society was the young people, who organized in Bucharest, on 25 April, a conference also reported by the newspaper KELET. On this occasion, the 3,000 studious young people decided to immediately set up a legion of school youth. The correspondent of the newspaper VASARNAPI UJSAG expressed with much accuracy the atmosphere that prevailed among the Romanian people and their determination to fight, with weapons in hand, for independence. As is known, the Romanian people harbored a permanent and marked antipathy toward the Hohenzollerns installed on the throne of the country: repeated antimonarchical movements occurred in Romania. Up to that time—the newspaper said—Carol I was, in the eyes of the people, only a foreign officer, come to take the place of that Cuza who had parcelled out land. Now, however, in 1877, the attitude held toward the Turks and connected with his name, and—VASARNAPI UJSAG remarked—"now it is felt that he started the war against the Turks—and this war possesses great popularity here," the people were disposed to wage it even under the command of Carol.

The Romanian parliament was equal to his call (it is to be noted that in the view of the bourgeois Hungarian press the parliament was the main platform where the will of the people was expressed). In any case, Romania was in a situation that a country with a parliamentary form of government only rarely gets the chance to experience—it said in the commentary in MAGYAR POLGAR—since on the capital problems and thus also on the question of independence the accord and harmony between the parliament and the government were complete. "The parliament decided that as a result of the Turkish provocations the government is to try to take all the necessary steps to defend the territory of the country." "For the Romanians," it was also asserted in KELET, "independence is a splendid goal; the attention concentrated on the homeland neutralized the conflicts between the parties."

By means of a statement, the Romanian government drew the attention of the European powers to the Turkish attacks on the Danube and to the raids for booty in villages and cities. Concomitantly, the Romanian representatives in Paris, Vienna and Rome made it known to the governmental circles in Europe that Romania had taken the necessary steps and was going to act with all firmness against the Turkish provocations. Referring in detail to the statement, MAGYAR POLGAR reproduced as follows the statement of Kogalniceanu: "Romania will never allow the Turkish soldiers to set foot on Romanian soil .... The army will operate will all its power against any Turkish plan of this sort." In fact, at that time, the newspapers were to announce that the defense of Romanian interests was accomplished not only through the forums of diplomacy but also directly, by an appeal to arms. "The resistance of the Romanians foiled the landing of the Turks at Oltenita," the newspaper KELET communicated, in order to relate on the next day a new military operation: "The Turkish units embarked on six ships tried to cross the Danube near Giurgiu. After a long skirmish, the Turks were forced to retreat." Then: "the Turks unleashed an artillery bombardment on Calafat, in order to divert attention from a steamboat that was navigating downstream. Nevertheless, the
Romanians damaged it."69 "The batteries of Romanian artillery, 'Independele,' have very well-grouped firing," the newspaper NAGYVARAD stated, giving an account of the battles on the Danube.70

The young Romanian army and its officer corps had a high fighting spirit and morale from the very start of the war events, stated the newspaper KELET,71 which, quoting sources in Bucharest, said that "the bearing of the army is one of the best; one reads in the eyes of the soldiers (it is a question of the units headed toward Calafat) the determination to do their duty under any circumstances. Despite the sorrow of the family companions, one did not see in the soldiers any trace of hesitation because they had to go where duty called them. The reservists were also asked if they go happily to callup or, in case of war, into the line of fire; the answer was amazing: 'when the homeland calls us,' one said for all, 'we go happily, anywhere.'"72 In his article of 28 May, devoted to the artillery duel held between Vidin and Calafat, a correspondent of the newspaper ERDELYI HIRADO dwelled on the same trait of the Romanian army. In fact, the correspondent began by praising the courage and military virtues of Carol I, but, reading his account, one can easily grasp that he was trying to offer to the reader as accurate a picture as possible of the battles in the respective zone and of the atmosphere that prevailed there. "The prince gave a good personal example. He stood—calmly and casually—in the most exposed point, scrutinizing Vidin through a spyglass, without worrying about the shells that buzzed around him. The gunners coped unflinchingly, the battery commanders directed fire calmly, without a bit of flinching. In a moment of respite, the crewmen had just begun to laugh at a jeering remark of one of them, when, suddenly, a shell came to explode with a boom right in the immediate vicinity of the parapet; the earth opened up like a volcano, in an outpouring of fire and sand; then, after the disappearance of the cloud of dust, everything returned to the previous calm."73 Finally, it is interesting to note that right then, around the middle of May, the correspondents of the newspaper KELET were informed that the Romanian army was not going to limit itself to defending the left bank of the Danube but was going to take the offensive on the right bank.74

On 9 May 1877, the centuries-long struggle of the Romanian people was brought to fruition, the great event took place: the proclamation of the state independence of Romania.

In most of it, the Hungarian press in Transylvania felt that the proclamation of Romania's independence constituted a great, remarkable change occurring in the political life of Europe. In big letters the newspapers announced the fact, considered sensational even on a European scale. And—stressing the Romanian parliament's spirit of initiative, together with its capacity to guide the country's destiny toward the path of total independence—they added that in the days to follow "other important decisions are also expected."75

The first commentary on Romania's proclamation of independence appeared in the newspaper KELET and contained, in many regards, a number of sensible judgments. Thus, in this commentary it was said that the proclamation of
independence constituted the natural result of a long evolution, it being able to be regarded especially as an attainment of the political objectives pursued tenaciously by the Romanians since 1857. One of the commentators of MAGYAR POLGAR expressed the opinion that Romania's independence was directly beneficial from the viewpoint of the establishment of peace in Eastern Europe. According to this opinion, the commentator stated that "it would be good if the powers would jointly guarantee the independence of Romania." Let us add, however, that for MAGYAR POLGAR the political mission of independent Romania would consist primarily of the act of constituting a effective barrier to the expansionist tendencies of the great powers.

These considerations spurred the editorial staff of the newspaper KELET to take into discussion the matter of the possibilities of an alliance being concluded with independent Romania. The newspaper judged: it is undoubted that—stepping just since then onto the path of true independence and being faced with the damages caused by war and with the diplomatic difficulties—Romania, if only because of czarism, was going to lean toward this alliance and even was going to seek it. In the issue of 27 May, the newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR quoted a characteristic fragment from a speech given by Carol I: "Romania returns to its old independence, in a capacity of a free people, as a useful, peaceful and advanced member of the great family of European countries."

The Hungarian press in Transylvania did not neglect, either, to present completely the parliament's memorable session, of a truly historic importance. Under the title "A Függetlenség Kikialtasa a Képviselőházban" (The Proclamation of Independence in the Parliament), both KELET and MAGYAR POLGAR published extensive accounts based on news and newspaper articles from Bucharest. The main characteristic of this information is the objective tone and the intention to accurately inform. In order to suggest how detailed the image offered by, for example, KELET was, it is sufficient for us to quote only the first line of the article: "The session opened under the chairmanship of Costache Rosetti, at 0130 hours, there being present 88 deputies and, in the gallery, many people and ladies of the elite...." There then followed, completely, the much-anticipated interpellation of Deputy Fleva and the response of Kogalniceanu. The newspaper also quotes the well-known phrase, which went down in history: "We are independent, we are an independent nation..., before the representatives of the nation I declare without a bit of doubt or fear that we are a free and independent nation." The reference added to the end of the report on the session of parliament goes to the core of the problem and is so eloquent that it is equivalent to a broad commentary on Romanian political life. The gaining of independence—it is noted in this reference—set in motion the entire Romanian society—all its component classes, strata and elements, regardless of political affiliation—and the controversies raised in this matter referred only to the method of solution. "In Romania, all the parties became one with regard to the proclamation of independence, and there even arose a rivalry in establishing to whom went the merit of the first word."
The commentator of the newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR did not forget, either, the international significance of the independence gained by Romania, pointing out that "The proclamation of Romania's independence marks the beginning of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire" and that it radically changed the relations in Southeastern Europe. The decline of the Ottoman Empire implied the liberation of the other Balkan peoples: "for instance, Serbia has consolidated its independence." It was clear to the whole world that Romania nonetheless had to assert its independence by means of a war, just as it had also become equally clear that the great powers' maneuvers directed against Romania had failed—the newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR stated. "Romania's independence meant a formidable blow for the diplomatic schemes," the Cluj newspaper then specified.\footnote{81}

After the proclamation of independence, along with the unfolding of the war the news furnished from the front and the more and more numerous commentaries also contained, constantly, chapters that presented Romania in a favorable light. In connection with the different positions adopted by Romania, MAGYAR POLGAR felt it necessary to specify that "entered the war because it was not able to decide its dispute with Turkey except by an appeal to arms."\footnote{82} The newspaper wanted to emphasize that Romania, by means of its participation in the war, was not smoothing the way for czarist expansion but was actively participating in the war in order "to foil, with weapons in hand, the crossing of the Turks to this side of the Danube."\footnote{83} Romania wanted to avoid at any cost the spreading of the theater of military operations to the territory of the country. Regarding the great powers—although they may have been asked—they did nothing in defense of the territory and neutrality of Romania.\footnote{84}

The Hungarian newspapers in Transylvania noted with much satisfaction the fact that, throughout the war, Romania tried to promote its sovereignty. "From the very start, Prince Carol and the Romanian government accepted military collaboration only on the condition that the Romanian army operate independently and that Russian troops not be inserted among the Romanian troops."\footnote{85} And with the same sympathy they announced the news that "the Romanian government denied all the rumors according to which the Romanian army would be integrated into the Russian army. The Romanian troops will fight independently, under their legitimate command."\footnote{86} The newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR regarded Brigadier General Manu as worthy of esteem and sympathy, "because he was not disposed to accept orders except from his own headquarters."\footnote{87} The newspaper SZABADSAG pointed out that Prince Carol consistently promoted the rights of Romania even when he permitted\footnote{in italics} the passage of the Russian troops near Bucharest only so that they would not be forced to make a detour. Right about that time, the Oradea newspaper claimed to know that "with regard to the interpretation of the agreement in April there is a radical contradiction between the view of the Russians and that of the Romanians."\footnote{88} From all this it followed—MAGYAR POLGAR said—that the Romanians were aware of what, in short, it is possible to express and it is customary to express as follows: "for ourselves we fight."\footnote{89} K. Papp Miklos, the editor and publisher of the newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR,
after reviewing the many hostile manifestations of the Porte, the evolution of the ties between Russia and Romania, the latter's efforts to guarantee its own sovereignty, and the circumstances of its entry into the war, did not hesitate to declare to those who made hostile statements against Romania: "let us look at things a little more closely and, certainly, Romania's guilt will no longer appear so terrible to us!"  

Following the news published daily, the reader was able to find in the Transylvanian Hungarian newspapers that the Romanian army defended the line of the Danube by itself, until the arrival of the Russian troops, when closer collaboration between the two armies began. From the very start of the war, a number of Romanian military actions, executed competently, aroused admiration, which was also reflected in the columns of the Hungarian press in Transylvania. The Turkish gunboat Abdul Aziz "was thrown into the air with such skill that it was immediately destroyed completely. Marine Major Murgescu, the commander of the steam launch that performed the operation, was decorated." It was a question of the action performed successfully on 24 May by the Rindunica, which had received important tasks in removing the Turkish Danubian fleet from battle. The issue of 5 July of the newspaper KELET specified that a leading role in the success of the crossing at Zimnicea went to the Romanian army and the Romanian sailors.

After the battles on the Danube, at the end of the summer of 1877, all the Romanian forces were engaged in war. Between the Russian high command and the Romanian high command there arose a detailed agreement on the conditions of the Romanian participation in the campaign in the Balkans and of the collaboration with the Russian army. The agreement recognized Romania as an equal belligerent partner. Consequently, it went into the Balkan war in a capacity of an independent country, master of its destiny. "The Romanian army will operate as an independent formation, alongside the Russian army, and remains subject to its own regulation. The two armies operate by agreement; the Russian generals will not have the right to interfere in the leadership of the Romanian army or to intervene with regard to its actions. Prince Carol's rights of supreme commander remain intact," MAGYAR POLGAR informed its readers, referring to the principles and the content of the agreement.

After the concluding of this agreement, the Romanian army was present in the biggest battles in the Balkans. The Russo-Romanian troops were grouped around Plevna, one of the most important systems of Turkish fortifications in the Balkans, defended tenaciously by the famous Osman Pasha. On 16 August, Prince Carol was named supreme commander of the siege armies at Plevna.

The battles fought there were followed with lively interest by all European public opinion. The attention of the Hungarian newspapers in Transylvania was concentrated first of all on these battles. In the newspapers KELET, MAGYAR POLGAR, ALPFOLD, NAGYVARAD, SZABADSAG and others, a new column appeared: the short, concise title was set in well-marked letters: "Plevna, Plevnai Harcok" (The Battles at Plevna) or "Hirek Plevnarol" (News From
Plevna). In addition to this, on the first page, one's attention was drawn particularly to the news about the siege of Plevna, and there too the more synthetic commentaries were also published. It seems extremely important to us that precisely the writings devoted to the battles at Plevna contained perhaps the most numerous and most sincere praises for the Romanian army, for its high command and, in general, for Romania. There, in these columns, the most wonderful homage was paid to the completely extraordinary human effort that the Romanian soldier had made for the good of his homeland; there, considerate and respectful words were said about his bravery and his soldierly virtues.

"The positions at Plevna will be able to be occupied only with maximum effort. The assault must be made in a valley, on the coast, a half-hour's journey, in a terrain completely without the slightest cover, right in the fire of the enemy. There the Turks have built permanent redoubts, inaccessible to the infantry," said MAGYAR POLGÁR in a description of the battlefield of the Romanians.94 "The positions at Plevna, lying before the Romanians, are very strong both in terms of position and by means of craft," ALFOLD added,95 and VASÁRNASI UJSÁG reproduced the drawing made by Szathmary Papp Karoly, titled "Plevna," as an illustration meant to show the place where the battles had been fought.96

The Romanian troops composed the right wing of the siege army. "The Romanian positions form a big semicircle whose chord is equal to nearly 4 geographical miles" and they were face to face with "the strongest Turkish lines through natural conditions and through craft."97 Despite the unfavorable terrain, the Romanian high command "has the conviction," it said in MAGYAR POLGÁR, "that the Romanian soldier will do his duty with self-sacrifice."98

Indeed, news about the Romanians' acts of heroism constantly arrived from the fronts in the Balkans. ALFOLD related with admiration the great Romanian attack on 8 September (our emphasis). "Despite the deadly artillery fire, the Romanians made bayonet charges several times against the Turkish trenches in the first line."99 A day later, MAGYAR POLGÁR announced that certainly "the Romanian 5th Infantry Regiment together with one of foot soldiers captured the positions of the Turks, and Carol moved his headquarters nearer to Plevna, at Vrbita."100 SZABADSÁG wrote that the Romanian 4th Division also made many attacks causing great losses to the Turks.101

During the offensive known by the name of "the third battle of Plevna" the sweeping attack against the fortifications at Grivita began on 11 September. Prior to this, the Romanian troops had performed reconnaissance maneuvers characterized by KELET as daring.102 According to the opinion expressed by the cited newspaper (an opinion not shared by military historiography103), the Romanian high command accorded great attention to preparing for the attack, since "the fortifications at Grivita are unanimously considered to be the key to Plevna."104 Regarding the Romanian army, it fulfilled the expectations in all respects. "The Romanians distinguished themselves brilliantly in the assault against the redoubt at Grivita," said the newspaper SZABADSÁG
in Oradea, translating the opinion held by POLITISCHE KORRESPONDENZ. "Two assaults were repulsed in the sight of the czar. On the occasion of the third one, the soldiers scrambled up the Turkish parapets, using assault ladders. In this assault, the Romanian 3rd and 4th divisions were represented to a great extent by volunteers."105 "In the unprecedentedly murderous battle, the Romanians attacked the farthest redoubt at Grivita three times, falling to a man,"106 KELET said about the heroic stubbornness of the soldiers, Romanians. In fact, after the first battles at Grivita, the Bucharest correspondent of the newspaper KELET wrote: "We told the readers of these columns long ago that the Romanian army...will win if it is well commanded. All the dispatches coming from the battlefield at Plevna have proved us right. The Romanian army has coped creditably in the storms of the battles—and it alone is not to blame if Plevna has not yet fallen."107 In the next issue of the newspaper KELET we find similar opinions: "...from the remarks of impartial witnesses, it follows that the Romanian infantry and especially the Romanian artillery deserve words of praise."108 At the same time, Bekesy Karoly, the editor of the newspaper KELET, published a synthesizing commentary, attributing a decisive role to the appearance of the Romania army on the front in the Balkans. In his objective writing, he said that "there has not yet been any war that presented such unexpected moments and such a kaleidoscopic development as the one now, in the Balkans. The center of gravity of the events of maximum importance is now in the south, now in the east, now in the west....Suddenly, however, the picture changed, through the entry into action of a new factor that returned the campaign's center of gravity to Plevna. This factor, whose importance shows us which way the scales will tip, is the Romanian army." In concluding, Bekesy specified that "without the collaboration of this army it would not have been possible to go on the attack against Plevna—nor would it have been done."109

When certain unofficial circles of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy noisily expressed their delight that Plevna was not able to be conquered even despite the efforts made by the Romanians, and the Turks managed to temporarily preserve their forces, and when the above-mentioned circles perorated to an unjustified degree about the military virtues of the Turks—the news (not at all rare in some Hungarian newspapers) about the atrocities committed by the Turks was highly effective and performed an unmasking function. This very eloquent news as such was often published purely and simply without any commentary. KELET, referring to the letter of a correspondent in Bucharest, told first about the note addressed to the great powers by Kogaliniceanu on this subject. The Romanian foreign minister asked the European powers to use their influence over the Porte in order "to restrict the war to the limits of legitimacy" and so that "the bashibazouks do not massacre the innocent, robbing them."110 In an article devoted to the great sacrifices required by the battles at Plevna, MAGYAR POLGAR also unmasked the atrocities of the Turks. After it pointed out that on 6 September, in just 1 attack, more than 20 Romanian officers lost their capacity to fight, the article said that "...among the Romanian officers killed, we mention Major Sontu and Capt Walter (Maracineanu—Stefan Csucsuja); Col Candiano Popescu was seriously wounded." Further on, MAGYAR POLGAR said that "Maj Nicolae Ioan and Captain Nastase,
wounded in battle, were, in the true sense of the word, cut into pieces by
the bashibazouks. The latter, following the Turkish regular troops, kill the
wounded by hitting them with picks. The fallen Romanians still lie on the
battlefield, and the Turks always shoot at those who try to bring in the
wounded. It is thus clear that despite the denial made by Savet Pasha the
Ottoman troops rigorously execute the order according to which no mercy is
permitted for the Romanian soldiers."111

From the very eve of the siege of Plevna, K. Papp Niklos, the above-mentioned
editor of the newspaper MAGYAR POLGAR, firmly combated the Turcophilic cur-
rents, attacking in many of his articles precisely their propagandistic argu-
ments. Under the eloquent title "Ne Altassuk Magunkat" (Let Us not Delude
Ourselves) he wrote, in the article printed on the front page: "the confi-
dence in the victory of the Turkish armies is not very well founded. Every-
thing that is happening in the east must be completely clear to us." Then,
vehemently attacking the biased distortions, he continued in the following
terms: "For a part of the Hungarian press the aim and mission that devolve
upon it are not, it seems, to inform the public as impartially as possible.
On the contrary, it seems that their leading interest would be that of de-
picting the situation of the Turks as rosily as possible, even if in reality
it is not. Some newspapers make a true sport of informing the public in a
way absolutely favorable to Turkish affairs. Any information coming from the
Turks is proclaimed holy and indubitable. Regarding the enthusiasm of the
peoples in Turkey for the war, in the majority of the reports it seems very
dubious. But this does not stop us, those in the country, from continuing
the fight according to our convictions."112

The articles of a positive tone devoted in the Hungarian press to Romania and
its war of independence did not escape the attention of GAZETA TRANSILVANII,
either. The Brasov newspaper, with a great influence on Romanian public
opinion in Transylvania, spoke with much satisfaction about the fact that in
a part of the Hungarian press "the opinion is not unfavorable" to Romania.
In this regard, GAZETA TRANSILVANII quoted the newspaper HON (The Homeland),
which appreciated the Romanian government's firm attitude and its aspiration
toward independence, and the newspaper ALFOLD, which published a very signif-
icant "appeal for union," stating in it that the Romanians and the Hungarians
must be sincere friends under any circumstances and that up to then only the
evil policy of Vienna sought to divide the two peoples by means of machina-
tions.113 Appearing in the issue of 28 August 1877, the appeal launched by
ALFOLD also had a very favorable response in other organs of the Romanian
press. After GAZETA TRANSILVANII, TELEGRAFUL ROMAN in Sibiu also saluted it
eulogistically without delay.114 In fact, the above-mentioned Arad newspaper
had spoken in the same spirit, even before the formulation of the appeal—for
example, in the issue of 17 August, an issue in which it wrote that "the Ro-
amanians and the Hungarians can have a future only together" and thus "we must
collaborate; then we will be able to encounter many dangers without fear."115

After the sweeping attacks against the system of fortifications at Plevna,
the Romanian military operations, meant to hinder the troop movements and the
supply of the Turks—together with the success of these operations—did not cease to remain in the attention of the Hungarian newspapers in Transylvania. The Romanians foiled the Turks' attempt to break through, and on 19 October the attack against Grivita 2 began. "After thorough preparations made by their artillery, the Romanians approached within 20 meters of the big Grivita redoubt, coming from the direction of the small one."117

The Romanian army had given countless examples of heroism and tenacity and thus it was natural that Prince Carol "speak with much optimism about the new operations that will be performed against Plevna."118 The finding made by MAGYAR POLGÁR in the sense that the Russo-Romanian preparations at Plevna excluded any possibility of failure had a very great significance at a time when the supporters of the Turks had launched a frenetic campaign in favor of their thesis.119 In fact, MAGYAR POLGÁR gave a detailed account of the preparations at Plevna. "For the Romanians, 2000 people are digging around the trenches and the batteries." It seemed very characteristic to the Cluj newspaper that, seeing the preparations in the Romanian sector, the experienced Russian General Todleben—the defender of Sevastopol in the Crimean War—said just this to Carol: "So did we too have to do, from the very start." The well-reinforced trenches, the vast defensive works, "are all to the credit of the young Romanian army," the cited newspaper specified. Then, "it can be asserted that they are proceeding with foresight in all respects. The path of retreat is also well protected, and if the batteries that dominate the Osmach Valley are put into operation, it would be almost impossible for the Turks to pass that way toward the Danube," MAGYAR POLGÁR concluded the presentation of the preparations of the armies just before the great offensive.120

An exact account of the attack begun on 19 October was then published. "Two regiments of foot soldiers and the 7th Line Regiment attacked the trenches of the Turkish redoubt, occupying the first line of communication, but, reaching the fortifications, they found other trenches about which they had known nothing—and they had to withdraw."121

Plevna still required new offerings and great sacrifices in human lives, it becoming the theater of many other fierce battles, where much perseverance was required. An article in ERDELYI HIRADÓ spoke about precisely this, expressing solidarity with the heroes at Plevna, these simple soldier peasants, suffering people, sapped by cold and snow, "who stayed for weeks at Plevna, under a rainy sky, in the mud of the trenches."122

The battles at Plevna were followed with lively interest, because—as the newspaper KÉLET was also convinced—they were going to have a decisive influence on the European war.123 The reports were concerned, in their majority, with the operations performed by the Romanians at Plevna, pointing out that, on the front there, the initiative stayed entirely on their side.124 Then, when the battle for Rahova, an outer fortification in the system at Plevna, began, the news items about the successes of the Romanian troops and about the vigorous action under the command of Colonel Slăniceanu followed one another at a constant rate, supplemented later by more detailed commentaries.
"After many more days of bloody fighting, the Romanians occupied Rahova by means of a combined attack. While Colonel Slaniceanu besieged Rahova, the Romanians crossed the Danube to Bechet. One part of their troops occupied Rahova, the other pursued the Turks in march toward Vidin. The Romanian units holed the bottom hull of a Turkish gunboat and occupied the locality of Libri Palanka. By means of this, the communications of the Turks are completely blocked between Vidin and the lower Danube."125

The siege ring thus tightened even more. Day after day, 500 cannons hammered Plevna. The resources of the Ottoman troops were completely exhausted; moreover, the entire Turkish army has become very demoralized. On 10 December, Osman Pasha tried to break through the encirclement, but without success. On the same day, the Romanians occupied Opanezul, advancing up to Vidin. The Turks surrendered en masse. The Romanian 5th Line Regiment managed to reach Plevna first.126 Osman Pasha communicated to Colonel Cerchez that he surrendered; on the very same day, 45,000 Turkish soldiers laid down their arms before the Russo-Romanian army.

Among the accounts about the festivities that followed the fall of Plevna we also find objective writings in the Hungarian press. KELET and MAGYAR POLGAR published in full the general order given by Carol after the surrender of Plevna and, later, the response of the senate. "The bravery and self-sacrifice of the army and the immeasurable sacrifices made by the people attest to the vitality of the nation," the newspaper KELET translated. "On the making of peace, Romania will emerge from this war with a well-defined political situation, as an independent state."127 "Plevna fell before our heroism," said Carol's general order, "on the day when the finest army of the sultan and his bravest and most famous commander, the victorious Osman himself, were defeated, and they laid down their arms before us."128

MAGYAR POLGAR reported that, at the time of the discharge of the Russo-Romanian army that had besieged Plevna, Grand Duke Nicholas himself pointed out the credit gained by the Romanians in the war and that in that way the bravery of the Romanian troops had acquired the highest confirmation.129

The matter of Romania's independence continued to occupy a central place in the Hungarian press in Transylvania even after San Stefano, and it can be stated that all the commentaries and news were of a positive tone. The Hungarian press in Transylvania pointed out—in connection with the battles just concluded—that the military effort made by the Romanians was one of considerable proportions, that to the Romanian army went an important role in the victory gained over the Turks, and that the entire Romanian populace had made great sacrifices in the interest of its own independence. In essence, precisely by means of these factors the Hungarian press demonstrated the rights that were due Romania in a capacity of a victorious belligerent. The newspapers in question decried the fact that Russia concluded the armistice at San Stefano without Romania's participation, although, according to their information, Gen Ion Ghica had been sent to Bulgaria to represent his country in "the eventual negotiations."130 MAGYAR POLITKAR declared plainly that, since
Romania's collaboration was absolutely necessary for successfully concluding the war, "justice would dictate that the ally on the battlefield also be taken into account in the arena of diplomacy." Carrying the same idea further, MAGYAR POLGAR stated that Romania had the right "to compensation proportional to its participation in the campaign, receiving this compensation in the form regarded as the most fitting." In any case, however, it was indisputably entitled "to have its independence legitimated once and for all and the neutrality of its territory declared."131

MAGYAR POLGAR published the complete text of the debate that took place in the Romanian parliament shortly before the congress in Berlin, implicitly expressing its approval of the things said on that occasion. "For the country you must speak up with determination and courage," the newspaper quoted from Ion Chica and, later, from the statement of Bratianu, in which he stressed Romania's intention to participate in the congress not just in a capacity of an observer. "We are going officially to the congress, in order to defend our cause before the great powers and to convince the congress...to not make a decision without listening to us too and to admit the justice of our cause."132 After the conclusion of the debates in the Romanian parliament, KELET made the following remark: "...we must recognize that the two Romanian chambers had splendid conduct."133 The same newspaper mentioned that "not only the great powers that concluded the agreement but also the small states are preparing for the congress" and that the Romanian delegation, as far as the editorial staff was informed, was to be headed by Bratianu and Kogalniceanu. The Romanian statesmen started for Berlin with the desire to ensure there the territorial integrity of the country and with the firm determination to get the congress to recognize Romania as an independent and neutral country.134

This time, on the way to Berlin, Bratianu "did not again receive a cool reception in Vienna," the newspaper KELET stated.135

Finally, let us note here a conclusion that we regard as very characteristic and revealing—one of the last echoes in the press from Romania's war of independence. The newspaper KELET specified that "the eastern policy nevertheless has beneficial consequences: we recognize that it is not necessary to live in enmity with Romania. In this part of Europe, the Romanians and the Hungarians must become allies."136

These expressions of the press clearly show the viewpoint of the Hungarian newspapers in Transylvania and attest that in their judgements on the war of independence the progressive Hungarian forces and public opinion, although not having a fair attitude in all respects, were oriented in general in accordance with the joint Romanian-Hungarian traditions and adopted positive positions with regard to the efforts of the Romanian people.
FOOTNOTES


2. For example, the works: I. Minea, "Hungarian Political Manifestations in the Romanian-Russo-Turkish War in 1877-1878," CERCETARI ISTORICE, Iasi, No 3, 1928; and Szadeczky-Kardoss Lajos, "A Szekely Nemzet Tortenete es Alkotmanyra" (The History and the Constitution of the Szekler Nation), Budapest, 1927.

3. CONCORDIA, No 2, Yr VI (1866).

4. GAZETA TRANSILVANIEI, No 35, Yr XXXIV (1871).

5. BUKARESTI MAGYAR KOZLONY (The Bucharest Hungarian Monitor), 4 August 1860.

6. The first translations were made by Acs Karoly and Zilahy Karoly.

7. "A Szomszed Nepekkel Valo Kapcsolataink Tortenetebol. Valogatais het Eveszazad Irasaibol" (From the History of the Ties of the Hungarian People With the Neighboring Peoples. Selections From the Writings of 7 Centuries), Budapest, 1962, p 526.


9. GAZETA TRANSILVANIEI, No 12, Yr XXXIII (1870).


12. KOLOZSVARI KOZLONY (The Cluj Monitor), 27 and 30 January 1859.

13. MAGYAR POLGAR (The Hungarian Courier), 10 and 13 February 1859.

14. PESTI NAPLO (Pesta Journal), 26 February 1859.

15. Lajos Kossuth, "Irataim az Emigraciobol" (My Documents From Exile), IV, Budapest, 1880, p 380.
16. The expansionist tendencies of czarist Russia caused a certain anxiety, even among the peoples in the Balkans, although its support constituted an inexhaustible source for their war of liberation. See: Apostol Stan, "State Independence in the Political Thought and Practice of the 1859-1877 Period," REVISTA DE ISTORIE, No 10, 1975, p 1510.

17. KELET, 16 January 1877.
19. MAGYAR POLGAR, 4 January 1877.
20. NAGYVARAD, 1 August 1877.
21. MAGYAR POLGAR, 22 July 1877.
22. Ibidem, 6 August 1877.
23. "Istoria României" [The History of Romania], IV, Bucharest, 1964, p 593.
24. MAGYAR POLGAR, 10 February 1877.
27. Ibidem, 4 May 1876.
28. EBREDES, 19 May 1876.
29. MAGYAR POLGAR, 25 July 1877.
32. KELET, 21 January 1877.
33. ERDELYI HIRADO, 6 January 1877.
34. KELET, 11 and 16 January 1877.
35. ERDELYI HIRADO, 9 January 1877.
36. EBREDES, 10 January 1877.
38. ERDELYI HIRADO, 9 January 1877.
39. NAGYVARAD, 10 January 1877.
41. MAGYAR POLGAR, 20 February 1876.
42. Ibidem, 6 and 10 February 1877.
44. The provisions of the agreements in 1856.
45. MAGYAR POLGAR, 28 December 1876.
46. VASARNAPI UJSAG, 3 January 1877.
47. KELET, 17 January 1877.
48. MAGYAR POLGAR, 3 May 1877.
49. KELET, 6 May 1877.
50. ALFOLD, 2 February 1877. Cf. with the issue of 6 May.
51. MAGYAR POLGAR, 8 May 1877.
52. Ibidem, 13 May 1877.
53. MAGYAR POLGAR, 22 April 1877.
55. SZABADSAG, 6 May 1877.
57. KELET, 3 May 1877.
59. MAGYAR POLGAR, 8 May 1877.
60. KELET, 10 May 1877.
61. Ibidem, 4 May 1877.
63. VASARNAPI UJSAG, 24 June 1877.
64. MAGYAR POLGAR, 23 May 1877.
65. KELET, 29 April 1877 and 26 May 1877.
66. MAGYAR POLGÁR, 9 May 1877.
67. KELET, 16 May 1877.
68. Ibidem, 17 May 1877.
70. NAGYVARAD, 10 June 1877.
71. KELET, 17 May 1877.
73. ERDELYI HIRADÓ, 7 June 1877.
74. KELET, 17 May 1877.
75. MAGYAR POLGÁR, 23 May 1877.
76. KELET, 26 May 1877.
77. MAGYAR POLGÁR, 26 May 1877. Cf. with the issue of 3 May.
78. KELET, 9 January 1877.
79. MAGYAR POLGÁR, 27 May 1877.
80. KELET, 31 May 1877.
81. MAGYAR POLGÁR, 5 June 1877.
82. Ibidem, 16 December 1877.
84. Ibidem, 24 April 1877.
85. KELET, 18 May 1877.
86. Ibidem, 16 May 1877.
87. MAGYAR POLGÁR, 11 August 1877.
88. SZABADSÁG, 16 May 1877.
89. MAGYAR POLGÁR, 16 December 1877.
91. KELET, 9 June 1877.
93. MAGYAR POLGAR, 23 August 1877.
95. ALFOLD, 13 September 1877.
96. VASARNAPI UJSAG, 1877, p 549.
97. MAGYAR POLGAR, 14 September 1877.
99. ALFOLD, 13 September 1877.
100. MAGYAR POLGAR, 14 September 1877.
101. SZABADSAG, 14 September 1877.
102. KELET, 25 September 1877.
104. KELET, 25 September 1877.
105. SZABADSAG, 18 September 1877.
106. KELET, 16 and 18 September 1877.
112. MAGYAR POLGAR, 7 June 1877 (morning edition).
113. GAZETA TRANSILVANIEI, No 67, Yr XL (1877).
114. TELEGRAFUL ROMAN, No 68, Yr XXV (1877).
115. ALFOLD, 17 August 1877.
116. MAGYAR POLGAR, 11 October 1877.


122. ERDELYI HIRADO, 13 May 1877.

123. KELET, 7 May 1877.

124. ERDELYI HIRADO, 29 May 1877.

125. KELET, 27 May 1877.


127. Ibidem, 18 December 1877.


129. MAGYAR POLGAR.

130. KELET, 12 January 1878; MAGYAR POLGAR, 12 January 1877.

131. MAGYAR POLGAR, 3 July 1878.


133. KELET, 5 and 9 June 1878.


12105
CSO: 2700
ALBANIAN DAILY MARKS ROMANIAN LIBERATION DAY

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 23 Aug 77 p 1 AU

[Editorial Article: "A Historic Event for the Romanian People"]

[Text] The date 23 August has entered into the history of the Romanian people as the most significant day. Romania was liberated from the foreign Fascist yoke 33 years ago on 23 August 1944. The Romanian people achieved this great victory through struggle, sacrifices and persistent efforts for national liberation and social progress against the Fascist German occupiers and the domestic Quislings. The struggle and efforts of the Romanian people for national liberation assumed extensive dimensions in the Summer of 1944 when the Red Army, led by J.V. Stalin, as well as the other Anti-Fascist peoples of Europe were dealing destructive blows from all sides to the barbaric Hitlerite aggressors. It was at that very time that the progressive and patriotic Romanian forces, led by the Communists, rose up courageously and resolutely in armed struggle against Fascism and reaction until they repelled the occupying troops of Nazi Germany from the national territory, and overthrew the Military-Fascist Dictatorship of Antonescu.

The liberation of Romania from the Fascist yoke and the overthrow of the Quisling regime created suitable conditions and new prospects for the Romanian people to march onto the road of political, economic and social transformations. But, as shown by the events of the first years after the liberation, the efforts of the Romanian people on this road encountered the undermining and many-sided activity of the external imperialist enemies and internal enemies, who were not reconciled to the existing situation. In the face of this, sabotaging activity and the plots of enemies the Romanian people continued their efforts to defend the 23 August 1944 victory and advance toward independent national progress and development. The industrious Romanian people overthrew the monarchy, shattered the hostile plans of the imperialists and their tools and on 30 December 1947 proclaimed the country a people's republic.

In the past, before the liberation, the antipopular regimes and the foreign imperialist monopolies oppressed and exploited the broad working masses of the Romanian people, plundered their national wealth, and turned Romania
into a source of raw materials, cheap labor force and a base for conspiracies against other countries. However, with the victory of 23 August 1944 the Romanian people got down to work to overcome the poverty and backwardness and eliminate the serious consequences of the past.

During these 33 years since the liberation the Romanian people have achieved a number of successes in developing and consolidating the national economy and culture, thereby creating new branches in industry such as the energy, machinebuilding, electronics and chemical branches and so forth. By their creative work, the Romanian workers have been able to increase industrial and agricultural production several times beyond that of the preliberation period.

The Albanian people rejoice over the successes achieved by the fraternal Romanian people in the development and progress of their fatherland. On this occasion of their national holiday, the 33rd anniversary of the liberation of Romania from the Fascist yoke, our people convey to the Romanian people congratulations and voice the wish that they will achieve new successes in the progress and prosperity of their country.

CSO: 2100
BRIEFS

GDR STUDENTS IN USSR—At the end of July 1977, 300 youths left the GDR to study in the USSR during the 1977/1978 school year. In the coming academic year, the USSR is accepting a total of 500 students, 100 teaching assistants, and more than 300 scientific trainees from the GDR. Academic focal points are natural sciences and technical subjects, social sciences, medicine, economics, literature, and languages. The students recently assigned to the USSR spent the previous year at the Halle University Institute for Preparation for Study in Foreign Countries. With the inclusion of the above students, the number of GDR residents currently studying in the USSR has grown to over 4,000, who are distributed among about 90 colleges in the USSR. [Text] [Bonn INFORMATIONEN in German No 16, 1977 Jul 77 p 7]

CSO: 2300
WORKERS REFUSE TO TAKE FAMILIES TO NEW POSTS

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 24 Jul 77 p 2

[Article by Pavilo Gjide: "About a Foreign Attitude, Thoroughly Petit-Bourgeois"—Concerning "Family Men" Without Families]

[Text] In general, our cadres, educated and raised with care by our party, are well known for their selfless zeal and their deep party spirit in carrying out their duties. Witness to this is their involvement in revolutionary initiatives, a concrete expression of the correct understanding of the situations which we are facing, and their readiness to shoulder heavy responsibilities. Our people have great faith in the party, the communists and the cadres, because they have seen that they have made great sacrifices. The party stresses that we must protect this faith as we would the sight in our eyes. The slogan, "to work, to fight and to live as under encirclement" inspires and mobilizes all the people. This means the cadres, regardless of whether they are chosen or appointed, are seen as going through life matching the word to the deed, subjugating personal interest to the common interest, living in the bosom of the classes. Their close relationship with the classes, by being humble pupils of the people, has protected them from subjectivism and bureaucratization, has raised their consciousness and politico-ideological maturity, has developed their revolutionary characteristics, such as honesty, obedience and devotion, to the affairs of the party and socialism. In this educational and re-educational process our cadres have made their valuable contribution. Hundreds and thousands of them have gone to work where they are needed by the fatherland. In every direction they have gone they have generally shown themselves ready and prepared. This has been the situation in general.

Parallel to this healthy situation there have been instances of negative attitudes on the part of some cadres. In this article we will speak about the petit bourgeois attitudes and concepts of certain cadres, attitudes that do not agree with the revolutionary spirit and high preparedness of our people who are educated by the party to live and work where the interests of the nation demand.
A transferee, from Tirana to Shkoder, Gac Mazi, who formerly had a responsible position, had the following conversation with a friend who was interested in problems concerning transfers.

How are things, asked the friend.

Good. As a bachelor... What brings you here? he answered quickly, as if to change the conversation.

I have come to change you into a family man....

The transferee smiled ironically and replied:

Why are you concerned with me. I am reconciled to living without my family. I am waiting to retire....

I have nothing personal against you, I am interested in those who do not carry out the directives of the party. I am interested in those family men who do not take their families with them.

This typically bourgeois concept shows that we have to deal with a very serious problem. The matter is that some cadres transferred in the last two or three years from Tirana to Elbasan, Kruje, Durres, Lezhe, Mat and Fier have not taken their families with them. We cited these districts because they are the choice areas, they are closest to Tirana and the number of cadres moved to these areas is fairly large. This reluctance to take the family along creates hesitations about getting down to work, or as the old saying goes, unwillingness to lay their heads wherever their cloak is spread, therefore they prefer to be highminded and insist on not destroying "the old nest." "Why is it absolutely necessary to take our families with use?"—this is how Subi Baboci, Muharrem Bushi, Vaso Bazhani, Baftjar Shehu, Apostol Kotani, Premti Koleta, etc., see their transfers when they refuse to accept authorization for a house, when they are silent and don't look for a house or a job for their wives. Motivated by shallow judgments and narrow interests, influenced by the foreign idea that they are "creating conditions to return from whence they came," they prefer not to move their families. They think and act in this manner because they have not accepted as theirs the great party slogan to work, fight and live like revolutionaries, as under encirclement wherever the fatherland has need.

It is clear that the majority of our cadres work and live at headquarters because, as the party points out, the factories, the schools, the mills, agriculture and livestock are there. Production and construction take place there, the producers of material and spiritual needs are found there. This should not be forgotten for a single minute. There are two other reasons: first, it takes time to educate, revolutionize and revitalize the cadres; second, if the transfer were to be made conditional (the return by all means to the point of origin), then the intellectualist concept that "nothing can be done without us" would be crystalized.
However, some people do not see things in this way. "I have talked many times with comrades here in Diber District," communist Drimiter Budina writes in a letter. "Whereas, during the last 2 years I have accepted the situation as it is (without my family), now I am advised to set an example and bring my wife here. Apart from other considerations, this would create the hardship of leaving two daughters at home alone. . . . where is the parent that would not worry about how these girls would make out in their daily lives, when at times even with parents at home they have left the iron connected. Work in peace, when you have two daughters away from the family?..." (Explanation: the daughters are grown, — ed.). One cannot be devoted to one's work, one cannot pretend to "understand the class struggle" or "to understand the situation, the encirclement and blockade," when one leaves the family behind so as not to disturb their petit-bourgeois comfort. No one, not even the wives, the majority of whom are cadres, can or must reconcile themselves to these deeply petit-bourgeois attitudes. They must raise their voices, they must not remain indifferent, they must go at once where duty and the general good call. Families cannot exist under the condition "oh to be in Tirana with you, oh that I should fall and die in Tirana, without you." If such a family exists, it is built on foundations of petit-bourgeois interests, on foundations that are unacceptable and completely contrary to our socialist morality.

Some cadres say: "I'll stay and wait," "perhaps my persistence will drive them mad," "I have given much for the government and the party, perhaps they will let me go back again." Other continue to say: "Just wait a little bit, soon I will have done 3 years," "the time has come for me to retire...." "In evaluating my request, a thousand times justified," a communist from Durres writes, "take into consideration my contribution given during the war, as a young communist in October 1942, as an old partisan without ambitions of a career...." The letter writer is asking to return to Tirana, he is asking that his merits "be respected." In reply we ask: Why don't you respect the party directives? Who says that your merits are not respected? This does not mean that the merits of the people who work over there, and there are thousands of them, are not recognized.

Some cadres, such as Meleq Babani, Riza Taushani, Taxhedin Bahollli, Vedat Ismaili, Mirush Puto, Kristaq Hobdari, Argji Pilika, etc., although holding responsible positions, are not ready to work and live as family men where they have been transferred. We are not mistaken when we say that these men still hold responsible positions. The misfortune is that they set a bad example. A cadre in Elbasan says: "My wife does not want," another complains, "I have sick children," yet another says, "I own a house." Let us analyze these concepts, is it possible that when you asked to be accepted into the party you did so only with your wife's "permission?" No, neither wife nor children or personal house should become obstacles to going where the fatherland needs you, and where the party tells you to go. Sometimes, in Elbasan, people have waited for a better place to live in (?!). Others complain that they are making "sacrifices" by staying in a hotel. But why? For one reason and one reason only, so as not to take their families with
them (?!). No one imposes on them these so-called "sacrifices" of which they speak. As long as you are given housing, the assurance of a good job and conditions are good, what "sacrifices" are we talking about. These are not sacrifices, but baseless pretensions.

There are some cadres that twist the party directive. They have opportunities to teach at the university, but instead they spend 60 percent of the time taking part in sessions and "commissions," and only 40 percent of the time is "devoted" to staying at headquarters (?!). Here the institutions of higher learning are to blame for encouraging and permitting these actions. Spurred by the concept of "let us activate as much as possible the co-workers," from outside they exaggerate by activating only these workers. It is surprising that instead of reflecting in the face of the comments, in the face of sound public opinion, they try to justify themselves by obstinately asking that they be heard since it is their right. It is also surprising, but nevertheless true, that actions like these are supported by the executive committees of the peoples council, because they keep silent and because they extend the housing deadlines. An example: The executive committee of the peoples council of Mat District was asked to determine "when shelter would be available for the transferee," for Apostol Kotani the date was set for 1980, the year of his retirement (!). Furthermore, when it is known that Haki Casili is to be transferred to Tropoje, why does the party committee of region no 2 in Tirana approve the appointment of his wife as secretary of the basic organization. Why is she not told "start for Tropoje."

We think that it is appropriate to mention something else here. Among the cadres that have gone to the villages are some comrades with various responsibilities, heads of cooperatives, party bureau secretaries, chairmen of peoples councils of the united villages, who have not taken their families with them. From Tirana District, for example, only one took his family with him. In Lushnje out of 87 men only 10 have taken their families. This kind of situation exists in other districts too. The party has always stressed that the cadres not only must have close ties with the masses, but they must live among them. Then why are their attitudes not analyzed by the basic party organizations, or by the trade union organizations? Concessions of this kind are harmful. They represent liberalism and opportunism and as such it is necessary to be harshly critical of them. In the final analysis we should not be content to say, that this one or that one is at fault, and that we, the basic organizations, are not to blame. Every basic party organization should carry out its allotted duty and not allow the situation to get to the stage where because of such petit-bourgeois attitudes it becomes necessary for someone to be fired, or to be ousted from the party. On the other hand, the party committees and the executive committees of the district peoples councils should take measures to see that the newcomers are not considered as guests, or as transferees who have come to pay a "debt," but should assure them a good job, good living conditions, and especially work for members of their families.
Finally, we are not trying here to make a list of all those who have not established themselves with their families at the places of transfer. Perhaps it will be necessary to draw attention to this problem again. We think that in some of the problems that we have mentioned here each one will see himself. Each one should go through the Marxist-Leninist analysis "what should my thoughts and actions be?" Look into himself: "How am I?" "Am I right or have I gone wrong somewhere?" If this analysis is not done by the man himself, then the basic organization, the collective, others should do it. It should be corrected at once without complaint and without wasting time. It is possible, the party suggests, that someone will say: "Excuse me but I have a problem, I cannot leave the city because I have a sick wife...." When a man says that he cannot leave the city for the country because he has a sick wife, he should get the following answer: "Go at once, where duty calls, even in the villages there are sick wives, and some are even born there, even in the villages, as everywhere else, there are people with rheumatism, or other ailments. Why do we have hospitals? When it is necessary take her there. Are Tirana and the other large cities the only places where there are sick people of this category? Don't we have sick people in the highlands too? What do they do over there?" Towards this kind of justification from a communist or a cadre, we must be severe, because the communists and the cadres must be the first to make sacrifices and the last to have pretenses.

There are good working and living conditions everywhere in our country. Everyone everywhere in our country says, "we are doing well, everything is here, we have economic stability, etc...." The party has fought and will continue to fight to improve the living conditions of the people, of all, following the principles of showing favoritism towards none. As long as all the necessary conditions exist everywhere, there is no need for "family men" to live without their families. There is no reason for them to maintain foreign attitudes that are deeply petit-bourgeois.
WEST GERMAN COMMENTARY ON GDR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Bonn VORWAERTS in German No 30, 28 Jul 77 p 7

[Article by Walter Leo: "The Collective Gives Detlev Another Chance -- From the Everyday Operation of the 'Customary' Practice of Criminal Justice in the GDR"]

[Text] One hears a lot about trials with a political background which take place before GDR courts. But people in the Federal Republic know little of the everyday justice of minor and serious criminal offenses in the GDR. Nevertheless this justice could serve as an object of study for those who are interested in a justice of the reintegration of the perpetrator into society.

One imagines someone like Detlev, just 18, as an "industrious young man": hard-working, intelligent, and, seemingly, honest. But the impression is deceptive. Detlev steals whatever he can. As an apprentice painter, a lucrative trade even in the GDR, he does not need to do this at all. But it takes hold of him again and again. It began when he was only 15, with 8 months of reform school; he had been found guilty. Then back to the old job. Touched by Detlev's promise to improve, his colleagues say it might just happen. But then he was in court again, this time in Magdeburg City District Center. Three new thefts made him a recidivist. The expectation for the future is inescapable. Detlev is not going to stop pilfering.

A workman who loses no opportunity to be a thief, who cannot be admitted to any dwelling, who brings discredit on his whole profession? The first angry reaction of his colleagues at work is also: Kick the fellow out of our collective. Detlev's path as an auxiliary worker and convict seems marked out in advance. For him it is a catastrophe and for society a burden and also a cause for distress in that it has not overcome this problem.

It was thanks to these three aspects, which combine the human, the practical, and the ideological, that Detlev is getting still another chance. With a criminal record he would not easily find any work at all here. But
his collective made up its mind to work further with him and even vouch for his reintegration - in writing, and therefore binding. "We would probably be making a great mistake if we were to prevent him from completing his training as a specialist," said the spokesman of the collective to the court which, as is usual over there, acts as "defender of society" or prosecutor.

Eagerness To Learn Used as a Yardstick

Important for Detlev, and favorable for him, are also the statements of his colleagues at work, who -- in accordance with the trial procedure -- participated in the proceedings as character witnesses. They confirmed that Detlev showed active remorse, made good the damages, and begged the pardon of the victims. But most important, he is completing his middle examination. For the state attorneys and judges of the GDR (a professional judge and two lay judges with fully equal rights as assessors), the enthusiasm with which youths strive to continue their interrupted path to the 10th class is usually an essential yardstick for the success of reintegration. Today the medium examination (10th school year) is the normal starting point for 90 percent of GDR pupils for professional life. Whoever does not achieve this also becomes more easily liable to prosecution.

As is usual in such uncomplicated cases, Detlev dispensed with a professional lawyer. He actually could not have defended Detlev so convincingly as those who know him in everyday life and who must have had enough of him after so many thefts from customers. It is all the more effective if they decide not to drop him after all. That is not always easy and one might ask oneself how some "brigades" would decide if they did not know that their attitude was recognized and even respected by the state. If attorneys successfully plead for acquittal or probation, the case is usually settled for them. But it is not until then, on the other hand, that "their case" begins for the colleagues at work, for they are corresponsible for the reintegration. Their positive -- or even negative -- statement has appropriate weight in the trial procedure.

In the usual everyday justice of the GDR -- trials with a political background are another matter -- "the people," in whose name the law is dispensed, in effect participate. On the one hand this is the result of the prevailing ideology, but on the other hand it has its own logic: Society, into which the person affected is to be reintegrated, is brought into the active administration of justice.

In court practice further consequences emerge in that it is no longer the individual guilt of the perpetrator that is judged, but his personality and his capacity for reintegration. Only the state attorney and judge may determine guilt. But the colleagues at work are indispensable for the judging of the person and for a successful reintegration. Thus in jurisprudence the rule also equally applies that the deed is viewed in conjunction with the perpetrator, and the unity of the organs of justice with the environment of the perpetrator (called the "collective" here).
The fact that the state attorney is obliged by law to take into consideration the mitigating aspects too, to get the reintegration under way and to supervise it, facilitates a satisfactory result. The result is usually a sentence of probation with a fixed period of restriction to the place of work.

The rate of recidivism, a yardstick for the success of any type of justice which relies on reintegration, amounts to only 20 percent (according to a 1972 report of the Federal Government) and therefore lies clearly below the rate in the Federal Republic.

New Efforts Toward "Education in Law"

Where the personality of the perpetrator weighs so heavily in the scales of justice, the danger of effecting injustice on different people through the application of formal equality is avoided. But fortuitous occurrences which arouse uneasiness remain. For what if it were not Detlev, for whom his collective vouches, standing before the court, but for the same crime a housewife without a collective behind her, whose prospects for reintegration are therefore not as good? Would she not be forced to believe, if they refused her probation on that account, that she was being treated unjustly?

And are the work collectives not overburdened? Aren't personal feelings worked off in the court and personal conflicts brought out? Or colleagues whitewashed due to comradeship? Understandable objections. Actually the reasonable participation of "forces of society" in justice requires an awareness of law and habits of thought which could be attained only through systematic education -- and it is not without justice that the GDR is described as an "educational dictatorship."

What the GDR is mobilizing in this respect is really astonishing. For there is a huge number of lay people who are regularly involved in court practice: as assessors (about 50,000) and members of the social courts, which are competent for delicts below the kreis court threshold (up to 250,000), or youth counselors (30,000). In addition [there are] many public consultations, legal indoctrinations, discussions, and lectures for the public. Leading the way in this are the state attorneys, whose tasks include not only the usual "struggle against crime" specified in the new law on state attorneys, but also -- along with "surveillance of strict adherence to legality" -- the "propagation of the law." Legal education rates as "explanation of the political content of the law and the communication of legal knowledge."

The fact that efforts toward greater awareness of the law were intensified in this sense primarily since the eighth party congress of 1971, has, together with the dropping of new criminal statistics, aroused the suspicion that criminality in the GDR has increased threateningly. This is of course denied, but the highest GDR economic authorities see a problem "which must be taken seriously."
The impression is therefore all the more inescapable that even if the crime figures as a whole have remained unchanged, the number of crimes which are economically harmful has increased. Under this heading is certainly the widespread laxity with regard to the handling of "socialist property," which is treated as though it had no owner. Since private initiative -- for example in construction of one's own home and renovation of old buildings -- is even encouraged, but the means often lacking, self-help is close by, at least for plant employees.

The total number of crimes, according to official data, has averaged 130,000 in recent years, but in the Federal Republic on the other hand 2.7 million -- a ratio which appears too fantastic to believe. The assumption that only the sentences of the state kreis and bezirk courts have been included in GDR statistics is false.

Even the data for the social courts are included in the statistics, and the proceedings of the conflict commissions in the plants must be reported to the police.

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SOCIAL MAKE-UP OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP ANALYZED

Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian No 8, Aug 77 pp 3-10

[Article: "Realization of the Party's Social-Political Leading Role"--Speech of Sandor Borbely, Hungarian delegation leader, at the 11-13 May International Communist Party Conference in Warsaw.]

[Text] Delegations of nine fraternal parties conferred in Warsaw between 11 and 13 May. They conducted an exchange of opinions on the issues of strengthening the party's growth and organization. Comrade Sandor Borbely, leader of MSZMP's delegation, spoke at the conference. We are publishing the abbreviated text of his speech below.

The rich experience of the international workers' movement, first of all, of the CPSU and of the fraternal parties of the other socialist countries, is always a big help to our party. The latest conferences of the fraternal parties are particularly rich in lessons. Starting out from this, our party believes in and actively supports our session to exchange experiences. Therefore, it participates gladly and with great interest in these conferences.

We are working on carrying out the resolutions of the 11th congress in our country. The party's policy meets active support among the workers, peasants, intellectuals and the working populations, because it consistently expresses society's fundamental interests and the historical goals of the working class. As we are a governing party, our policy and entire activity is definitive in the country's and society's life. In the social and political life our party fulfills its leadership role.

Our party's leadership role is built on the mutual trust between the party and the people. Our people trust the party, because they have become convinced that it represents correctly the people's everyday and long-range interests, and its policy is the main assurance of the uplifting of the
entire society, of socialist growth. At the same time, our party is aware of the fact that it can realize the historical goals of the working class only in close cooperation with the people. Therefore, it considers its historic mission as service to the people.

Our party concentrates its attention on the main processes of social growth. The 11th congress' resolution and the program declaration accepted there also mirror this. Seizing the essential characteristics of political, economic, cultural and ideological life, the party determines the direction of our progress and directs and organizes the construction of an advanced socialist society with the mobilization of the broadest masses, on a broad social scale. The party's ideological-political standpoints and resolutions are represented by party organizations and communists working in various areas of the national and social life, and are realized through the political influence of these.

Strengthening the party's leadership role necessarily requires the scientific foundation of politics. Therefore, in preparing the decisions, the thorough and many-sided examination of the social processes and interrelations, the theoretical generalization of political experiences of the national and social sciences have moved into the foreground. This is how our party satisfies the increased requirements lodged by the building process of an advanced socialist society.

Strengthening of political management gains expression in the development of work sharing between the party and the national and social organs. Their characteristic tasks have become well defined under the circumstances of building the advanced socialist society. The unnecessary parallels in their work have mostly been eliminated, and they are fulfilling better and better the functions stemming from their existence. The party's Leninist working style and the definition of their areas of activity promoted the operation of these organizations as they were designed and the growth of their independence and political responsibility. Based on the party's ideological-political standpoints, they work out independently the specific measures necessary for the solution of their tasks, and the methods of carrying these out.

The social composition, ideological preparedness, behavior and exemplary public life of the membership of communist parties are among the fundamental issues of party politics. This requires particular attention under the circumstances of building socialism, when the communist parties operate as governing parties. Composition of the membership of a party which fulfills leadership role in society's political life significantly influences the policy's character and the consistency of its realization. Therefore, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party has always attributed great significance to this. It follows the objective processes taking place in society with attention and keeps in step with the requirements of social growth.

The party always deduced the necessary consequences regarding its own development, also. The historical results of the last 2-3 decades, of laying
the foundations for socialism and building the advanced socialist society, significantly influenced, and influences also today, our political leadership work, its structure and the political role of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in it. Changes in socio-economic conditions and in society's structure have created a new situation, which also affected the party membership's numerical growth and social composition.

The class structure of Hungarian society was transformed with the victory of socialist production conditions. Not only did the bourgeois and landowner classes disappear from society's life, but essentially so also did the strata of small merchandise producers and private owners, and the federation of working classes and strata standing upon the foundation of society's ownership came into existence. Qualitatively, this is a new condition compared to the earlier one, since it increasingly creates the conditions to terminate class differences. Today in our country the rapprochement of basic classes determines the main direction of society's development. A determining trend in this process is the numerical and qualitative improvement of the working class. This is society's largest class, its ratio within the population approaches 60 percent, and it has a decisive role both in producing the national income and in society's political life. As a consequence of the economic-technical growth, internal stratification of the working class is more complicated; the number and ratio of workers with high technical qualifications, of those performing intellectual work to a significant extent and also of those working in the service branches is increasing.

A further important item in social growth is the changed situation of peasantry in the cooperative farms. With large-scale agricultural operations coming into existence, with the strengthening of industrialized production and with the modernization of technology, the number employed in agriculture—primarily the number of production cooperative members—decreases. Today, this latter is 15 percent of the total population. Interests derived from joint farming connect the peasantry of production cooperatives to socialism; from the standpoint of their production activity and their lifestyle, they are approaching the [industrial] workers, and this is also expressed in world outlook and political behavior.

A characteristic trait in the Hungarian society's development is that, as a result of the scientific-technological progress, the number and ratio of those in intellectual occupations is growing rapidly, particularly the stratus of specialized employees within this. Today, 24 percent of society is composed of intellectual and white collar occupations. Due to its number and position, this large social group exerts significant influence on society's life. It is a favorable phenomenon that the ratio of intellectuals and white-collar workers descendant from workers or coming from workers' environments is increasing.

A characteristic auxiliary phenomenon of the rapprochement of classes and strata is the gradual decrease of essential differences between physical and intellectual work, between city and village.
Our party has also deduced the consequences relating to its composition from the significant changes taking place in society's structure. First of all, the social basis from which the party can attract replacements has broadened. Starting with the second half of the 1960's, and particularly since the beginning of the 1970's, parallel with the strengthening of our political influence, large numbers of the non-worker strata, primarily intellectuals and white-collar employees, to be accepted into the party. At this time 44.6 percent of the party membership belongs to the workers' class, 6.7 to TSZ [production cooperatives] peasantry and 40.8 percent to intellectuals. According to original occupations, 60 percent of the party membership are workers, 12 percent peasants and 25 percent intellectuals and white-collar employees. This reflects the changes which have taken place in society's structure and occupations. Thus we can say that our party, considering its social composition, is the party of the working people; every class and stratum of the population is represented proportionally among its members.

Does the modification of composition, the increase in the ratio of non-workers strata and the broad representation of every working stratum of society not cause change in the party's class character? We may answer this question by saying that our party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, remained in its class character as the party of the working class. Its program declaration accepted at the 11th congress established: "The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party is the revolutionary leading team of the working class, which also unites in its ranks the most conscientious segment of the peasantry of production cooperatives, of the intellectuals and of society's other working strata." With the goal of building the advanced socialist society, the party's policy demonstrates well that it is working on the realization of the interests and historical goals of the working class. Today this has already become the interest of the entire society, and we may say that we are working on its realization with the active participation of the entire society.

Following from the party's class character, the ratio of workers among party members is, of course, not immaterial to us. The line of direction and realization of policy is inseparable from the party membership's social composition. In certain respects, the party's policy reflects those living conditions under which the party's members live. In addition to the coincidence of fundamental interests, the party's members bring with themselves the characteristic interests, efforts and views of their class and stratum. In the interests of consistent realization of the class character—besides developing the ideological-political unity and the unceasing strengthening of ideological work—we must insure the proper ratio of workers in the party, and, if this is required, then also the circumspect regulating of its social composition.

The present ratio of workers within the party is in harmony with the requirements of progress and provides appropriate strength and support to carry out the tasks before the party. This extent of participation by the workers makes the political and ideological influence effective for the entire working
class. We find the most educated members of the working class among the members of the party. Some 60 percent of the worker party members are special workers and highly trained workers (front line directors of production, technicians, foremen). They enjoy great respect, have political influence in the plants and are also the most decisive factors in production.

Besides maintaining the party's class character, another cornerstone of our work is to maintain the party's leadership group character even in the midst of the broadening of its social basis and the rapid increase of the number of its members. The number of party members has been increasing at the proper rate since 1957, to more than double; today it is 7.6 percent of the total population. The party, through its organizations, encompasses the entire society, its every essential political, economic and cultural institution, and operates the mechanism of proletarian dictatorship effectively through their cooperation.

Considering its number of members, the MSZMP is a mass party, but its politics and the practice of social construction prove unambiguously that it fulfills its role as leadership group and carries out its fundamental calling to realize the interests of the working class and of the entire society. In spite of its relatively large number of members, it does not dissolve into society, but remains a directing and leading force. It gathers society's best into its ranks: those who stand on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism in ideological, political and moral respects and who are ready to fight with all their might for the realization of the party's policy, to create the new society being born.

The close relationship of the party and the masses and our policy of alliance attracts the sympathetic strata surrounding the party and smooths the road of many thousands of workers outside the party to the communist party. Our society's ideological position also creates a favorable situation for rapprochement with the party. Due to the party's wide-ranging ideological-political and educating work, during the last 3 decades Marxism-Leninism gained a significant place in people's thinking, and, even if it has not yet become exclusive, it is in a position of hegemony, and conquers the hearts and minds of more and more people. Ideological approximation exists between the communists and those outside the party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and the political differences are ever more decreasing. Besides the favorable effect of objective social changes, the ideological-consciousness for becoming a communist and a party member are also better.

With proper circumspection, one must not fear that the party will be diluted due to the increase in members. Dynamic growth of the party's ranks is a natural phenomenon in the process of the development of society's unity and socialism. Numerical growth causes dilution only if we make ideological-political concessions in the acceptance of members. This is precisely the reason why an order of magnitude valid for all time and all situations cannot be established regarding the number of party members. The way the number of members shapes up is influenced by many factors: society's social structure, the level of development of class relationships, specific political and
ideological circumstances, the immediate tasks of social growth and the immediate political goals before the party. All these must be taken into consideration when we examine the party's elite group character in connection with membership numbers. The number of party members must be regulated in such a way that the line between the leadership group and the working masses does not fade. Party members must show the way to the other workers in being prepared ideologically and being conscious politically, in both activity and in moral requirements.

Maintaining the party's elite group character, besides the other factors, also depends on the level and conscientiousness of our membership admittance work. Our party's starting point in membership admittance requirements is that besides proof of industriousness and being equal to his work and the exemplary fulfillment of his obligations as a citizen, the party membership candidate's agreement with the party's policies must be manifest not only in broad generalities but also in every detail of his activities. This refers particularly to his own circle of activities. He should spread and defend it, and work and fight with all his abilities for its consistent realization.

The person requesting acceptance into the party must familiarize himself with the fundamentals of our politics, the party's organizational regulations, its operating principles and the requirements lodged against party members already prior to acceptance into the party. The basic organization sees to this in an organized manner, either through group or individual instruction.

Requirements for party members are high also with respect to ideology. The larger expectancies were last defined also by the Central Committee's 26 October 1976 resolution. Analyzing thoroughly the level of party memberships ideological-political development, it called attention to the timely questions of strengthening socialist consciousness. It emphasized that the party's members should, in broad aspects, familiarize themselves with the fundamentals of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, study and learn the basic teachings of the classics, the dialectic and historical materialist outlook, follow with attention the latest results of social sciences and familiarize themselves with our party's rich revolutionary history, with the fraternal parties' experiences of theoretical value and with the ideological-political requirements of proletarian internationalism. The Central Committee's resolution placed the elevation of the level of party education and improvement of its efficiency at the center of our work.

We can achieve further results in solving the economic and political tasks of the coming era only if we progress more rapidly than before in developing socialist thinking, behavior and lifestyle. In the continued growth of our society, the social consciousness of people, to what extent and how they can identify themselves with our goals and how their convictions become specific practical actions have becomeprime questions.

Besides the internal characteristics of the present stage of our society's growth, international factors also justify the increased role of ideology.
Our party can respond to the growing tasks of the sharpening international ideological battle only if it increases its own ideological firmness, internationalist convictions and its political maturity.

The party also lodges specific moral requirements against its members. Building the new society also demands faith in the cause and devotion, steadfastness, discipline, courage and self-sacrifice from the members of the leadership team. First of all, the party members must possess the traits characteristic of the social man. Their exemplary behavior is indispensable to the strengthening of the socialist moral comprehension and practice. A large part of the workers judge the party on the basis of the behavior and activity of party members whom they know from their environment. Friendly relationships of the party members with those outside the party is an important element of the relationship between the party and the masses.

It may appear that the party is willing to accept only "ready communists" into its ranks. Though traveling the road which leads to the party and becoming a party member is undoubtedly an outstanding achievement in becoming a communist, yet it does not mean that through this anyone has become a "ready communist." The most solid and best prepared communists are characterized exactly by the unceasing self-improvement. This is the only way they are able to apply successfully the party's policies in all situations and in every question. The future party member demonstrates not only his convictions by entering the party, but also expresses that he wants to work and fight for the party's cause, and satisfies its moral standards.

Conscientious, organized preparation for party membership is an important part of the party-building work. The KISZ organizations, trade unions, the workers' guard and, increasingly, the socialist brigades as well are schools of communist education and preparation for party membership. On the basis of experience obtained during the educational work done there and carrying out the assignments, it can be judged precisely whether the person intending to become a member has fully matured for party membership. There are old, noble traditions in the communist movement for training the best workers as party members. Already in the time of illegality this was one of the most beautiful and most responsible party assignments, which the communists performed with the knowledge that it is a part of taking care of the party's fighting ability and future. Now, with the acceleration of the requirements related to party membership, we are giving out even more such party assignments to the best trained and experienced communists, and we increase the responsibility of the KISZ organizations in nominating young party members.

Party membership reserves are today, in general, provided by the generation which grew up in our socialist system. They consider the results of socialism to be natural; they judge its mistakes and shortcomings more sharply. We must consider that they have no direct experiences with capitalism and the sharper forms of class struggle. In our party-building work we turn our attention to those youths, first of all, who have already proven their pledges to society in their work.
Acceptance of women is a unique task in party-building work. The number of women among active workers is on the increase, but the increase of their ratio in the party does not keep in step with this increase. Presently 27 percent of the party membership are women, and the greater part of them are intellectual workers. Even today activity of women in public life is affected disadvantageously by several factors. Therefore, our party organizations are making increased efforts to ensure that women, primarily working women, are represented in the appropriate proportions among the members of our party.

A decisive condition of consistently realizing the party's leadership role is that policy leaders faithful to the workers' power and suitable in every respect for the requirements of building socialism should work in positions of management. In the era of building the advanced socialist society, the significance of cadre work is constantly increasing. In connection with strengthening the party's leadership role, the 11th congress called attention to conscientious, planned cadre work. Questions of cadre policy have become factors influencing the development of the entire society. With scientific-technological progress, with the increase in the level of education and with the escalation of local autonomy, leadership work and the person of the leader have come into the center of attention. Parallel with this, due to the increasing publicity, leadership activity today takes place not only in the sight of the given community, but also before broad public opinion.

Only those who serve the people and represent their interests; who understand the party's policy, openly stand up for it and can assure that it will be carried out; who think in an internationalist manner; who possess the political training necessary for their area of work; who are led by the society's interests in their decisions; who are morally beyond reproach and who are causing social democracy to be realized in their areas of work may work in leadership positions. Under the circumstances of building the advanced socialist society, this is the contents of the suitability of political leaders.

With respect to suitability in their occupations, the party expects from the leaders that, besides proper training in their trade or their area of work, they should also possess modern practical experience. Systematic development of knowledge in their profession and keeping in step with the domestic and international development of economic life, science and technology are important requirements.

From the viewpoint of leadership ability, the party today considers those leaders who think with courage, make suggestions, dare to make decisions and act independently and responsibly examples to be followed. A fundamental requirement is the ability to organize, supervise and aid in execution, and also to employ the democratic working style.

The majority of the leaders, as the 11th congress of our party also established, live up to the requirements lodged against them. They work honestly and do their best. Our results achieved in the building of socialism prove their
self-sacrificing work. But a smaller part of them do not keep in step with progress and are not up to the requirements; their leadership style, political training and behavior are not in harmony with the party's cadre policy principles.

We strive to realize consistently the above requirements. We are paying increased attention to the political and ideological preparation of leaders. In accordance with this, party regulations and national regulations which determine what political-ideological training is necessary to fulfill the various leadership functions were formulated. This is a precondition for fulfilling any leadership post. We have built up the system of continued political education. We pay prime attention to the training of the leaders of the political apparatus and of the economic life.

For the leaders who lag in development, we try to achieve the fulfillment of higher requirements with patience, willingness to help, maintenance of political confidence and educational work, and by assuring the availability of training opportunities. If someone is not able to carry out his leadership work properly in spite of this, we relieve him and place him into a position commensurate with his traits and abilities. We seek a solution for him which is fair both from the political and moral viewpoint. Most of the time people who deserve respect and appreciation, behind whom there are sacrificing years spent in successful work, are involved; therefore, appropriately for this, we take care of them. We view the responsibility of those who behave in ways unworthy of their leadership assignments differently, because this causes serious political damage.

Those leaders represent directly the party and the party's policy before the workers who direct them in their work. Besides other factors, they influence their relationship to the party the most strongly, because the party's policy is felt and evaluated to no small extent through their work and behavior. Therefore, it is particularly important that leaders should know they have arrived at their leadership and power posts to represent the interests of the working class and of society. They may not confuse the power of the working class with their own power, nor the interests of the people and of socialism with their own interests. In this respect, Comrade Janos Kadar emphasized in the closing message he delivered at the 11th congress:

"This congress properly establishes that in the Hungarian People's Republic the power of the working class is realized, which expresses the interest of the entire population. I would like to add to this that the power of the working class must be taken literally. This power, which in Hungary directs the life of our whole people, is the power of the working class. Naturally, to realize power, and for its everyday practice, posts of power are also needed. In this country, a significant portion of these posts are filled by workers, but the power is not theirs personally; it belongs to the working class. They only received an assignment to assure the power of the working class, to protect and assert it. This is not their personal power, but a service."
To a significant extent, the strength and firmness of the workers' power depends on the proper selecting of leaders. In the era immediately following the obtaining of power, we were placing masses of politically solid workers and poor peasants in leadership posts. This at the time was a historical necessity; this was the only way the working class was able to secure politically the leadership and management of society. But since then, a new socialist intellectual class has grown up--to a significant extent composed of workers and peasants, or the children of these--which, in every area of society's life, is able to take care of the tasks of specialized leadership also from the political viewpoint.

The present stage of the building of socialism demands more from the leaders: deeper knowledge, broader horizons, more experience in public life and clear vision in the affairs of the world. With the transformation of society's structure and the development of the popular intelligentsia, in accordance with the party's policy of alliance, all leadership positions can also be reached by those outside the party, if they have proven with their work and behavior that they are in all respects adequate to the requirements for cadres. In the building of an advanced socialist society, there is a need for the work of the entire people, of every honest man desiring to be creative. The party's cadre policy principles are in complete harmony with this.

We have removed all administrative obstacles from the path of the socialist intelligentsia's success. But this does not mean that only the intelligentsia represents the replacement basis for becoming a leader. This would not be healthy from two viewpoints. On the one hand, at the time of their becoming leaders in large numbers, the workers and poor peasants had direct, living relationships with those working in production, and this has remained. This helped them greatly in their work. They possessed a social background and outlook formed by productive work which provided an advantage in the making of decisions. We must not renounce this even today, in the age of the acceleration of scientific-technological growth and of higher requirements.

On the other hand, the democratism of our socialist system requires that under today's circumstances also we should maintain the flexibility and openness of society's structure. The danger of society's structure becoming rigid is increased in the present stage of growth. The possibility of advancing in society is part of the essence of socialism, even on the path of becoming a leader. Our political interests dictate that the leadership and white-collar employee strata should not become ossified, but should constantly be refreshed from the sphere of production. The best of the workers and peasants should assume the leadership posts of the social, political, economic and cultural life.

Of course, today the process of becoming a leader must be aided with other tools than were necessary at the beginning of socialist construction. At that time there was no time and opportunity to prepare the workers selected from production with proper expertise for leadership. But today we have the time and also the opportunity for it, and we are creating the conditions necessary
for this. Today there is no need any longer to make concessions in the sphere of leadership ability and professional requirements. It is a generally valid experience that today the intellectual from a work or peasant background fulfills the assignments entrusted to him in the directing and organizing of society at a high level. On the party's part, all tools and methods of assistance must continue to be used in the interest of forming fully valuable leaders.

In years past, we have made significant efforts, with encouraging results, to promote physical workers who have matured for leadership, in the interest of preparing them for their new vocations. We have improved and are improving their abilities and leadership fitness with conscientious, planned political and vocational schooling and practical assignments. We urge in the interest of this goal that the conditions of continued learning for worker and peasant youth, who are in disadvantageous situations for social reasons, be improved.

The results of socialist building work in our country prove that the leadership group absolutely necessary to build socialism has come into existence as a result of the party's cadre policy. We are now working on further improving the conditions of leadership for the realization of the advanced socialist society by establishing higher requirements, training and education of the leaders and the proper selection and preparation of replacements. This is why the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party is engaged so intensively in cadre work; this is why it considers that one of the most important tools of the realization of the leadership role.
BROADENING OF DEMOCRACY WILL NOT DIMINISH LEADING ROLE OF PARTY

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Jul 77 p 3

[Article by Sandor Jakab, department head of MSZMP's Central Committee: "Broader Democracy--Greater Responsibility"]

[Text] The resolution of our party's 11th congress—in continuation of the efforts of earlier congresses—strongly emphasizes that "the prime requirement for the growth of the socialist society, of the country's life, and of our political system is the ever-more-complete opening up of socialist democracy," and, within this, "the development of democracy in the plant [or] at the place of work is a task in the forefront." In harmony with this, the following is found in the program declaration: "The development of plant democracy had definitive significance from the viewpoint of strengthening the leading role of the working class, improving the efficiency of the economy and increasing the responsibility of the workers. To this end, the existing opportunities must be better utilized, and new forms and methods must also be sought. The internal management system of the enterprises must be further perfected. Expression of opinion and participation in decisions and supervision must be made easier for the workers."

Successful Experiments

On the basis of these principles and resolutions, broad-based work developed in the period following the congress for the improvement of the plant democracy's contents and system of institutions. The party organizations—understanding their political responsibility for the role they fulfill in the operation and growth of plant democracy—urged the state and social organizations to new initiatives. As a result of these, the traditional forms of plant democracy gained in contents and proved to be suitable for the collectives of the enterprises to actively participate in working out the medium-range and annual, local, economic and social plans in this framework and to work out and evaluate the collective contracts, labor competition rules and innovation task plans.

Besides enriching the contents of the existing forms, experiment was also initiated at 50 enterprises to search out new forms. Two new forums were
tried: At 25 enterprises [there were] conferences of representatives of workers elected for the occasion; and in the other 25 [there were] joint conferences of the bodies of the elected trade-union trustees and of the trade-union leadership organs.

Of the two, the latter form proved to have more strength of life in the experiments. And this is no accident. Under the circumstances of the Hungarian society, the framework of the trade unions are more suitable for the healthy operation and growth of plant democracy. The trade-union movement looks back on a century-old past in our country, and the trustees and the trustee organizations often played central roles in this movement.

MSZMP's Central Committee, the National Council of Trade Unions [SZOT] and the government were also caring for the progressive traditions of the working class in this area, when they jointly decided that it is expedient to enrich these organizational forms of the work place's or the plant's democracy by increasing the circles of authority of the trustees and trustee organizations. This decision expresses appreciation and trust towards the trade-union movement and towards the self-sacrificing activities of the several hundred thousand trade-union trustees performed in the interest of socialism and the workers. On the other hand, this also provides further opportunities to enrich trade-union activity, so that an ever increasing part of the over 4-million organized workers would take more-effective part in directing our society and shaping the fate and living conditions of the people.

The New Forum

The joint forum of the body of trade-union trustees and chief trustees and of the enterprise's trade-union councils or committees is the new forum of work place democracy which discusses, provides opinion on, takes a stand on, or makes decisions about issues affecting the work and living conditions of the workers. Thus, it takes a stand on the main principles and ratios of the annual wage improvement and distribution of the sharing fund; makes decisions in questions of the collective contract, the enterprise's social plan and the welfare and cultural funds and gives its opinion about the medium-range and annual plans and, together with this, about the annual activity of the enterprise's economic management.

Democracy of the workplace of the plant is an organic part of our socialist democracy, and, as such, belongs under the institutional system of power. The need for its healthy and systematic growth stems from the essence of our socialist society, from the historic destiny of the working class. Without it, reaching our society's goals--thus society's long-range communist self-government--is unimaginable. But the present tasks of building the advanced socialist society also demand its conscientious, determined development.

With the content of plant democracy becoming richer, its effective operation makes the decisions of economic management better founded in a number of questions. The working collectives feel more that decisions made this way--and
prior discussion of the execution of other tasks and the alternatives thus developed—are their own, and this increases their activity and their initiative motivation in the work, in carrying out the decisions and the tasks. Thus, this is also one of the important ways of accelerating our economic growth, but, at the same time, it is also an indispensable condition of the continued growth of socialist thinking, the socialist way of life, and socialist conscience.

The developing of socialist democracy is first, of all, a tool. But it is not only that; it is also a goal at the same time. Good atmosphere at the place of work; socialist relationship between subordinates, management and socialist communities and growth of the socialist personality are important for us not only because these are favorable conditions for better work and for the fulfillment of our economic tasks, but also because of itself—because it is among the fundamental goals of our society.

Political Leadership

There are opinions, though scattered, in connection with this increased circle of authority of the trade-union organs—the trustees and trustee bodies—according to which the trade-union trustees have more rights than the party trustees, and this endangers the party's leadership role. Well, those who think this way, are incorrectly interpreting our party's policy. One of MSZMP's greatest historic merits is precisely that it has restored and establishes in practice the Lenin principles regarding the party's leading role, the relationship between the party and the mass organizations. It is conducting a policy which requires, makes it possible and even urges—through its members working in the mass organizations—that the social and mass organizations should participate in the shaping of our political goals and in carrying out the jointly worked out tasks. This is one of the main sources of our successes so far achieved. This is how the cause of building socialism becomes—from the cause of the party and the cause of the working masses—a national program.

The expanded circle of authority—the role of the mass organizations and thus, of the trade-unions in the operation and growth of plant democracy—does not diminish the party's leadership role and political responsibility. On the contrary. The political responsibility of the various level party organs, base organizations, party groups and every party member greatly increases in the interest of growth and healthy operation of plant democracy. This greater responsibility requires further strengthening of the party membership's ideological, political and activity unity and escalation of the party members' activity. The opportunity for specific party assignments broadens, and the party's mass-political activity becomes more effective.

Realization of the Central Committee's resolution requires improvement in the party's directing and in raising its level [of participation] at the enterprise level also. In order for the party organizations to become politically responsible for, and political leaders of, the plant democracy's operation and
growth, it is indispensable to become thoroughly knowledgeable of, and to analyze the mood of, the entire enterprise, the processes realized there and of the individual collectives. All these demand a great degree of independence from the enterprises' party organizations, from their leadership organs, the leaderships of the base organization and the party committees. It is required that, with the knowledge and spirit of the party's policy, they themselves work out the specific local political tasks, the ways, characteristic forms and methods of carrying it out, and to organize, assist and oversee the execution.

Leaders and Collectives

According to the resolution, the activity of economic management is annually evaluated and judged in the forums of plant democracy—in plants with smaller employment, at the workers' meeting; in larger enterprises at the joint meeting of the trade-union trustee body and the trade-union leadership. This is a new thing in this form. The purpose of this decision is to make collective supervision of the economic management possible. It provides an opportunity for the enterprise's community to make their opinion of the managers' work known, so that those may also take part in rating the manager who best know their activity on the basis of their everyday experience. Giving opinions on the work of managers also means the healthy growth of the democratism of cadre and personnel work.

Together with the growth of plant democracy and the rating of management at the trade-union forums, the principle of individual responsibility must, of course, continue to prevail. Coordinated, organized and disciplined execution of economic measures cannot be imagined without this. Joint growth of plant democracy and individual responsibility are, under the circumstances of socialism, two facets of the same process, augmenting each other. The economic manager who relies on the collective's opinion, who not only "endures" the workers evaluation but asks that the workers should evaluate and rate his activity, can more confidently demand discipline and performance and can better use the rights given by individual responsibility. In this dual, closely interrelated process the socialist-type collectives and leaders develop, and the real democratic, socialist relationship between the workers and managers is fulfilled.
'LE SOIR' COMMENTS ON POST-AMNESTY SITUATION

Brussels LE SOIR in French 3 Aug 77 p 3

[Article by Pol Mathil: "After the Amnesty in Poland"]

[Text] The amnesty decreed in Poland on the occasion of the 22 July national holiday is to be attributed to both politics and justice. This amnesty allows the authorities, without losing face, to end the detention of nine members of the KOR [Workers' Defense Committee], a committee created after the June 1976 riots and strikes and to release the last five workers arrested after last year's strikes.

Paradoxically, however, the Polish press was the last to announce this attempt by Gierek to turn the page on the affair.

The release of the KOR members indubitably constitutes a victory of what might be considered the moderate wing of the Polish Communist Party leadership. Now, for the past several years and particularly since 1968, certain Warsaw newspapers have been dominated by the supporters of exceptional measures concentrated in certain departments of the police and the party apparatus. LE MONDE's special envoy was surprised to hear Rolinski, the editor in chief of ZYCIE WARSZAWIE, one of the most virulent newspapers at the time of the campaign against the dissidents, state that he had no recollection of the words of the first secretary concerning the use of "political means to solve current problems...."

The sabotage of Gierek's efforts and the crisis within the party apparatus are all the more dangerous because, although the release of the opposition representatives indubitably improves the political climate in Poland itself and Poland's image abroad (a few weeks away from Gierek's visit to Paris), the amnesty cannot settle the problem under dispute since the problem itself remains basically unchanged.

This problem involves primarily economic difficulties and especially serious supply difficulties. To meet the most urgent needs, in 1976 the government imported 7 million tons of cereals and 80,000 tons of meat. Despite this
effort, the queues in front of the shops are interminable, with the situation becoming almost ridiculous. According to the latest anecdote circulating in Warsaw, the name on the outside of the shop used to say "butcher shop" and one found meat inside. Today the label says "meat" but inside one finds only the "butcher." Bitterness is also increasing over the extensive activity of the parallel but official foreign exchange market whereby one can buy what is not to be found in the regular shops. Warsaw, according to its inhabitants, is today the only place in the world where the dollar quotation never stops rising.

Then there are political problems. Make no mistake about it: the amnesty is the result more of a just evaluation of relations of strength than of any clemency on the part of the authorities. The movement in favor of the KOR and its imprisoned members has spread in an unprecedented manner since the "Polish spring" of 1956, when the surge of the people imposed a change of the team in power.

Beginning with a hunger strike in a Warsaw chapel, followed by another conducted by the students of Gdansk, the action in favor of the KOR has assumed remarkable dimensions. Protest letters have been signed by thousands of intellectuals, by thousands of students, among them the students of Krakow, who were paralized last May by a 5000-member strong funeral procession of students after the suspicious death of Stanislaw Pyjas, a KOR collaborator. The Church has used its moral authority to defend the oppressed. On the other hand, appeals from eminent personalities have been addressed to the "Eurocommunist" parties. On the occasion of the June 1976 anniversary of "black Friday," two petitions caused a sensation in the capital: the first came from the little village of Zbroza Duza, where 349 signatures were collected by the parish priest; the second was signed by 89 miners of the "Zlywice" coal mine, in Silesia, Gierek's personal fief.

Under these circumstances, the amnesty can only be a first step toward the beginning of a real dialog between the authorities and the people. The KOR members, in their first statement following their release, announced their determination to continue their action. Their team has just been reinforced by new participants, such as Professor Kielanowski, a famous physiologist and member of the Polish Academy of Sciences. We have also just received another issue (no 11) of the KOR bulletin, specifically citing the names of the most repressive journalists. Two new publications have appeared through the "samizdats" market: the first "Zapis" (Bloc-Notes) publishes a volume of more than 200 pages containing certain works censured by the authorities; the other describes itself as a "practical guide" against recruitment attempts by the secret police.

In short, the democratic opposition has become in Poland a fundamental moral and political factor. As Professor Kolakowski, a great philosopher and spokesman for the KOR in the West has expressed it, any would-be realistic policy must take this new phenomenon into consideration.
COLUMNIST COMMENTS ON NEW HITLER BIOGRAPHY

Warsaw PERSPEKTYWY in Polish No 30, 29 Jul 77 p 6,7

[Review by Marian Podkowinski: "A Monument for Hitler"]

[Text] I was at the showing of the film, a highly controversial and much debated one in the FRG, based on the script by the well-known historian Joachim C. Fest and Hamburg producer Christian Herendoerfer and entitled "Hitler--the History of His Career." I had to go to Cologne to see the film since it still is not being shown in Bonn. The movie theaters in the capital would rather show pornographic films. There were no crowds in the Cologne movie theater either, although this film, which has been billed for a long time, has been on the screen for only a week. An older audience predominated in the theater, which was half filled at most.

Of course, Fest's film was not aimed at foreign audiences. The film was intended to show Hitler's image to young people in the FRG, who are fed quite sparingly with the history of the last years of the Third Reich, and to explain to them his motives and the incentives for his activity during the 12 years of the so-called Thousand-Year Reich. And it was also meant to show the Fuehrer's youth and the route he covered from the common lodging house in an impoverished city section of imperial Vienna to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin. And it was intended to explain how it was possible for an "obscure soldier from World War I" to become the leader of a brown Germany which attempted to force all of Europe to its knees.

I must admit that the psychological charge which filled the movie theater in Cologne for 150 minutes was able to drug many of the spectators there. For Fest, just as in his well-known biography of Hitler (which had a circulation of more than half a million copies), did not follow the usual route of portraying Hitler as an ordinary madman obsessed with a mania for power but showed the fascination which Hitler produced in the German people between the two World Wars with his program of the "restoration" and return of Germany to its lost greatness of at least the Bismarck period, and Hitler's demagogic cleverness and political perfidy were able to some extent to package even the most sinister program as an object of desire and yearning that was digestible for Germany.
In this film, Fest does not dismantle the image of Hitler the criminal which the world did not know; yes, he does recall Hitler's genocide, which certainly cannot be concealed nor justified by anything, but primarily he directs the spectator's attention to the period of Hitler's "greatness" and the implementation of a program to "lead Germany out of its misery and polite humiliation." What many authors (and especially Hitler expert Werner Maser, or even Albert Speer in his memoirs) have attempted recently, namely, to "humanize" Hitler to a certain extent, Fest has achieved in his film. At the movie theater, for a few deutsche marks one can see—the older generation, once more, and young people, for the first time with their own eyes—how Hitler disposed of "traitors to their own people" and of communists and, on the other hand, how he counteracted unemployment, constructed superhighways, how much of a father-figure he was for youth, how he settled many issues in Germany and attained nothing but successes in foreign policy. The politicians of the Weimar Republic, on the other hand, were all failures. Involuntarily, a comparison with the present situation in political life suggests itself to many a spectator in the West German movie theaters.

I imagine what the young German spectator is thinking at such a moment, beholding this very path taken by Hitler to achieve glory and power, seeing him surrounded by the rulers of the world, recording his behavior during the memorable Berlin Olympic Games or in the company of friends or even Eva Braun at Obersalzberg, when he appeared with his she-wolf Blondi or fondled the children of Goebbels and Goering, letting them tug on his forelock. What thoughts now can disturb the young man in the FRG who was never told the whole truth about the times of contempt and Hitler's genocide? For after the viewing of this film, Hitler's personality will leave an impression which cannot be erased. Already in the first sequences Hitler stalks about the screen "true to life," giving everyone his fatherly smiles, as he visits youth in the work camps, or he reviews the triumphant troops in Berlin and in Nuremberg, always dressed in a modest uniform and high boots, more rarely in civilian attire, unless he is addressing Krupp's workers. How different the impression produced by all of this is, after all, from the old cliches, when Hitler's image following the war was exclusively one of a madman who, raving, gnawed carpets or threw himself about his room like a mad dog.

The one and the other image are objectively untrue. For at these splendid parades and meetings, which have been shown at the movie theater again and which, viewed today, attest eloquently to Hitler's power and popularity, Hitler of course incited his listeners openly to wage war and to wipe out peoples in the name of the greatness of the Reich and, stroking the blond heads of the German children handing him flowers, would go of course to the platform from which he preached total extermination for other children. He did not conceal this by any means. He said what he wrote earlier in "Mein Kampf" and what—as we know—he implemented with the complete consistency of a politician devoid of scruples and human feelings. At these meetings and parades Hitler did not in the least come across as a criminal in German eyes, since no one in the Weimar Republic would vote for such a Hitler. And, after all, as recently as 5 March 1933, when he was already chancellor.
and when the Reichstag was set on fire in order to eliminate the communists and liberals, nearly 44 percent of the voters cast their votes of their own accord for the NSDAP [National Socialist German Workers Party]. Fest showed today's spectator the fascination with Hitler in the Reich. When we behold on the screen how hysterical people throw themselves upon him, want to kiss his hands, cry and wail that they have not been so honored, we are witnesses to the national insanity which Hitler cynically utilized in order to implement his criminal policy.

With what adoration Hitler was greeted in Berlin following his victory over France! In these sequences Fest's film is a crushing judgment on public opinion in the Reich. But on the other hand, Fest, and not he alone in West German historiography, is trying to justify this fascination by emphasizing the achievements of the "commander" up until his aggression against Poland. This part of Hitler's career takes up two-thirds of the film and certainly appeals to the present-day German spectator more strongly than the war sequences and the history of the fall of the dictator, if only because these latter events have been shown more frequently and more eloquently than Fest's film portrays them. Fest says in his commentary on the film that he wanted to show in a different manner and without bias that aspect of Hitler's career which has remained controversial to this day in the historical literature of the FRG; that if he did not show his—as Fest says—unquestionable successes and did not point out the fact that Hitler managed to lead Germany out of the Weimar chaos, the attachments felt by the Germans to Hitler also in the period of the war defeats would not be understood. The film does this so convincingly that I imagine the confusion which must arise in the mind of the young German when he leaves the movie theater. For I doubt whether he has read the foreign literature on Hitler, since they do not teach this in the schools, and it is more the older and interested people who have recourse to the books by Fest, Maser, or Speer. And no one will bring the older generation to reason even this way.

Leaving the movie theater, the young man may even find understanding for his father or grandfather who was fascinated by this Hitler, who promised him that he would lead the nation out of "Jewish bondage." Perhaps he is sorry today that the Jews were murdered, but in the film they are portrayed as dirty ghetto dwellers, unproductive consumers of Aryan bread. The aggression against Poland is presented as a war "adventure," and the overthrow of France as retaliation for Versailles. And the attack on the Soviet Union? That was more a tragic mistake. And who does not make mistakes?

Fest's film undoubtedly brings the spectator so much nearer to the person and activity of the Fuehrer that when, towards the end, the photographs of a broken dictator who faces total bankruptcy are shown, he may even evoke pity and compassion, especially in the young spectator who does not know the history. For he was already so close to his goal and at almost the final moment he had no luck—thus could it be approached in general. If the revision of the portrait of Hitler to date were to be based upon this interpretation, it would be a dangerous version and one corresponding to a defined
social order—just 30 odd years after World War II, when the outlines of the tragic truth about those days are slowly being obliterated, and primarily in the FRG.

In this context the views are already beginning to be spread that, strictly speaking, Hitler was not at all as evil as he is painted, that he did not even want the murder of the Jews, for that was Himmler's and Heydrich's idea. British historian David Irving devoted as much as an entire chapter to this notion in his latest book, maintaining that up to 1943 Hitler believed that he was only sending the Jews to new areas of residence. The German historian from Tuebingen Uwe-Dietrich Adam writes in his book "The Policy Towards the Jews in the Third Reich" simply that in essence the massacre of the Jews would not have taken place if not for Hitler's defeats in the East.

Together with the premiere of Fest's film, a special illustrated documentary on Hitler furnished with eloquent photographs from the years of his prosperity, and hagiographic writing materials belonging to his former coworkers and historians have appeared within the framework of the publishing cycle "The Third Reich in Word and Picture." In the preface to this "work," the editor of the edition, Christian Zentner, cannot forgive himself for writing that "such an eminently gifted man" as Hitler had to end so very badly, for he did not manage to subdue his hunger for power. In the opinion of this author, the "tragedy of Hitler's epoch" was to lie in this fact alone. And after all, so much good was done then for Germany. In an interview with historian Werner Maser, who recently revealed himself to be a critic of the Nuremberg trials, declaring their sentences to be an act of vengeance against the victorious Germans, this exchange of opinions can be found: "Can you imagine that one day we will have a monument erected to Hitler?" Maser's response goes: "But there is already a monument which recalls the destruction done by the plague. Why not set a certain day to erect a monument which would recall Hitler?"

After watching Fest's film in Cologne, I think that in a certain sense such a monument to Hitler has already been erected—not with stone, to be sure, but with celluloid, but who knows which lasts longer today.

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CSO: 2600
CEAUSESCU CABLES SAM NUJOMA ON 'NAMIBIA DAY'

Bucharest AGERPRES in English 0904 GMT 26 Aug 77 AU

[Text] Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, sent to Sam Nujoma, President of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) most heartfelt congratulations and wishes to win final victory as soon as possible--national independence.

The Romanian head of state reaffirmed full support and active solidarity with the heroic fight of the Namibian people for removing foreign oppression and for its right to resort in this fight to any means, including military, for the attainment of its ideals of liberty and dignity.

I wish to assure you, the telegram reads, that in concordance with our consistent stand of militant solidarity we are determined to act most firmly in keeping with the understanding established during the talks we had for deepening cooperation between the Romanian Communist Party and the South West African People's Organization to further give to the Namibian people our whole political, diplomatic, moral and material support to promote close relations of friendship and collaboration with the future independent Nambia, in the interests of both our peoples, of the general cause of fight against imperialism, colonialism and racism, for peace, independence and social progress.

With these thoughts and feelings, I express my conviction that the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO will win fresh and decisive victories in its just fight, passing over to the building of a new life in a free and independent homeland.

CSO: 2020
The process of homogenizing Romanian society will also have deep implications for the number and structure of the population. Most important among them we can mention first the absolute and relative reduction in the rural population and, second, a number of social-vocational and educational changes in the structure of the population in general. The reduction in the number and percentage of the rural population is being achieved in two main ways: a) the transition of some rural locations to the category of cities as a result of their development and b) the annual migration of a portion of the village population, particularly the youth, to cities, that is, to the economy's nonagricultural spheres. Changes in the social-vocational structure are being produced particularly as a result of the demands of social-economic progress and the scientific-technical revolution, the overall rise in the level of education and vocational training. Against this background, the conditions are created for the gradual disappearance of certain basic differences between the "rural" family and the "urban" one considered with regard to their social-economic characteristics. These differences, relatively pronounced ones today, are seen in practice and in a different demographic behavior. The specific expression of this behavior is the size of the family which, as is seen in the data below,* differs significantly from rural to urban. Let us see:

* The data are from research carried out by the author in 1973 in the counties of Arad, Satu-Mare, Sibiu, Iasi, Tulcea and Bucharest Municipality on a group of around 13,000 families.
The Comparative Structure of "Urban" Families and "Rural" Ones
According to Number of Children (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Without children</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With one child</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With two children</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With three children</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With four or more children</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is significant that actually there is a minimal difference between the percentage of urban and rural families who adopt the model with two children. Its being a matter of around one-third of the total number of families, we can consider that a certain homogenization of the demographic behavior already has been produced, however its orientation was not the transition of the urban family from one child to two children, but rather the transition of the rural family from the model with three children to the one with two.

The phenomenon cannot be considered categorically as a negative one, given the new living conditions of the population working in agriculture which do not make necessary the presence of as large a number of workhands as in the past in the peasant's family when there was generally manual cultivation of the land by the members of the "patriarchal" type family. The reduction in mortality also has contributed to forming the desired size of the peasant family without too large a number of children being necessary for this. In the past (before World War II), around one-sixth of the children of the rural family died even in their first year.

However, it is no less true that the situation of the "extremes" of the structure presented above requires analysis and special concern.

We make the following determination: The percentage of families with four or more children in the rural environment is six times larger than in the urban environment, while, accordingly, the percentage of families without children is around two and one-half times less in the rural than in the urban environment.

Logically we ask: How will social homogenization affect the way and rate of forming a family? Such a question is especially required since, as a result of the disappearance of certain basic differences between the social-economic characteristics of the urban and rural family, one can imply that certain differences in their demographic behavior also will disappear.
Under the conditions of the appearance and consolidation of a generalized family model, relatively homogenous socially, economically and culturally, its size will depend on the demographic behavior adopted. Our research carried out in various areas of the country on different categories of families permits us to consider that a "single" behavior will be formed within a relatively short time (around two decades) and that it will be caused by several main factors such as a) length of the marriage, b) social-vocational category and c) level of education.

A. Length of the marriage will have a pronounced action in the first stage (around 10-15 years); that is, during the period of urbanization of certain former rural locations as well as "assimilation" of the urban way of life by those coming to the cities from the rural environment. During this stage, the rural population—that is, the one working in agriculture, although it will not represent a large percentage of the total working population—will continue to control its own reproduction to a lesser extent than the urban population. For this category of the population, the main parameter on which the formation of the family size will depend will be the length of the marriage for a certain period.

From this viewpoint, what is the situation of the urban family and that of the rural one now? Let us answer this question before making the appropriate demonstration with figures:

a) The size of the rural family is directly proportional to the length of married life (of the marriage);

b) The size of the urban family is determined to an insignificant extent only by the ability to reproduce (the control exercised by the family over its size is more efficient and more frequent).

During the first year of marriage, a child appears in 13.5 percent of the urban families and in 32.6 percent of rural ones. Only around 4-5 percent of rural families remain without children after 5 years (actually for medical reasons), while it is nearly 16 percent for the urban family. When does the family reach its final size? The most prevalent (modal) type of family is already formed after 6-7 years of marriage in the rural environment, when more than 60 percent of the couples have two or three children and approximately one-sixth of them have four or more.

Differing from the "urban" family, the "rural" family is not included in the ranks of "decreasing output" or in that of stabilization once they have been married a longer time. On the contrary, after they have been married 10-14 years the percentage
of married couples with four or more children continues to increase so that as they reach 20 years of marriage the proportion of those with four or more children rises to around 40 percent. This proportion is achieved in the urban environment only by the family with two children.

Under these conditions, the rural family's final size can be evaluated only after at least 20 years of marriage, when the model family becomes the one with three or four children for more than 50 percent of them. In the case of the "urban" family, there are insignificant changes in its size after around 10 years of marriage: Around 38 percent remain with one child, while around 35 percent remain with two, with the percentage of those with three children fluctuating at around 10 percent.

Thus, we see that the parameter of "length of the marriage" is basic for forming the rural family, while it has secondary importance for the urban family. Also one can consider that in the case of the "urban" family its size is formed primarily under the influence of certain nonbiological factors (social, economic, cultural and so forth).

The uninterrupted length of the marriage has a differentiated favorable action on forming the family's size. From the nature of this action we see that simply belonging to urban or rural is not a decisive factor in forming the family's size. Only the elements or aspects which bring to light the varying economic, social and cultural structure of the urban and rural population can explain the mechanics of forming this size. The forming of the final size of the family is also influenced by the parameter of the women's "average age at marriage." Since this age is lower in women with a reduced level of education due to the shorter length of schooling and as the number of women in this category is larger in the rural environment, it is clear that the length of the marriage in the rural environment also will be longer. Under these conditions there are more favorable conditions in the rural environment, even from the beginning, so that the family has a larger number of children independent of the influence of other factors. The research carried out shows the following situation with regard to the women's average age at their first marriage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education of the women</th>
<th>Average age at marriage (years and months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Women</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With undetermined elementary school</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With general school</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With secondary studies</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With higher studies</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As a practical conclusion we mention the need for certain measures in the future to specifically influence the population for whom the length of the marriage is not a basic condition for reproduction. These measures will be all the more necessary as the process of social homogenization develops more rapidly, involving the reduction in the number and percentage of the rural population as well as changes in the structure mentioned above.

B. The role of the social-vocational category. The social-vocational category to which the married couple belongs is an important factor in forming the family's size. However, this does not act independently of other factors, primarily the length of the marriage. No matter what social-vocational category they belong to, the married couple needs a certain period of time to adopt a certain behavior and to form a certain size. Seeking to bring out the extent to which the married couple favors a certain family model or not by their attitude, we took into consideration the couples belonging to various social-vocational categories but who also had an uninterrupted marriage of at least 10 years. The results of our research permit us to show the following picture from this viewpoint:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social category</th>
<th>Childless</th>
<th>one child</th>
<th>Two</th>
<th>Three</th>
<th>Four or more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectuals</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see that the phenomenon of "childless" family is hardly prevalent in the peasant-cooperative member category, relatively frequent for workers and much more prevalent in the category of intellectuals-office workers.

In the case of this last category, then, each eighth family disappears without leaving at least one heir.

The above structure also offers us the opportunity to determine the presence of a phenomenon of compensation—that is, more intense reproduction—from the peasant-cooperative member category in particular. However, taking into account that this social category will fall both numerically as well as percentagewise in the future the particular phenomenon has a transitional nature.
The social categories which will be the dominant ones in the future—that is, workers and office workers—intellectuals—are characterized by the size of the relatively similar family with two or three children. This permits us to consider that the broadened reproduction of the country's population will be possible in the future by taking action along the line of certain measures of demographic policy not for all families but only for certain categories of them which have larger reserves for increase and, especially, for the category of intellectuals—office workers. In particular in this regard we have in mind directing the means of social-economic influences and stimulating the population's reproduction along this line.

The degree of vocational qualification is a complex parameter which also has great importance in forming the family's size. Basically it is a matter of large groups of the population which differ according to special type of their social-economic activity within the same social category.

In order to complete the picture offered by the figures in Table 1 with regard to family structure depending on belonging to different social categories, below we give several more detailed figures referring to the same problem but aiming at the main vocational categories of the women in the families researched (12,591 women of which 5,406 were agricultural production cooperative members, 2,141—qualified workers, 729—average cadres, 353—higher cadres and so forth). In this way we seek to bring out the practical demographic importance the long-range vocational categories will have in the future, categories which are formed under the influence of social-economic progress as well as the transitory nature of certain categories which, although important now, will be reduced absolutely and relatively in the future under the influence of the same conditions.

| Table 2 |
| The Size of Families According to Vocational Category of Women (Regardless of Length of Marriage)—in % |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vocational categories to which the women belong</th>
<th>Percentage of families with:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qualified workers</td>
<td>0  1  2  3  4 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unqualified workers</td>
<td>19.0 37.0 29.0 9.2 5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary specialized cadres</td>
<td>18.8 30.0 31.8 5.9 13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher cadres</td>
<td>22.8 41.9 27.8 6.3 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary personnel (qual.)</td>
<td>25.8 49.6 21.0 2.8 0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>9.6 17.1 37.0 17.8 18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP female members</td>
<td>9.4 23.5 33.2 16.4 17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfied job (physical)</td>
<td>8.1 18.5 29.7 19.9 24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified job (intellectual work)</td>
<td>15.3 24.7 30.9 16.5 12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Let us examine the situation of the extremes in this case, too, before anything else. In the category of childless families, the greatest percentage is held by secondary and higher specialized personnel who have, on the other hand, the lowest percentage in the group of families with four or more children. Certain trends demonstrated in recent years in the developed countries, however, permit us to assert that this, too, is nothing more than a transitional situation. However, this aspect will be examined separately in the following (with regard to level of education).

In the long-range categories (qualified workers, secondary and higher cadres), the dominant model now appears to be that of the single-child family. Since they do not even at least ensure a simple replacement, it is necessary that certain measures which could change their demographic behavior be in the center of future concerns.

The vocational categories to which the broadened model of family is specific are, in particular, those which in the future will be reduced both numerically as well as in percentage (agricultural production cooperative members, unqualified workers, housewives and so forth). This aspect, too, justifies the appropriate orientation of the measures of demographic policy toward the long-range categories which will develop in the future. The fact that all the transitional vocational categories (unqualified, auxiliary personnel, housewives and so forth) are part of the group of families which reproduce to the limit (two or three children) is not able to contribute in the future to ensuring average sizes of the family socially necessary on a national level.

C. The level of education is one of the most important factors on which the forming of the family's size depends in the current stage. Certain authors, basing themselves on research made in several developed countries, consider that the level of education can be considered even more important than income with regard to its action on forming the size of the family.* Really, correlated with the qualification, this concentrates in itself both the social element (vocation, belonging to one of the social-vocational categories and so forth) as well as the economic one (incomes and other conditions of material living).

Since Romania's population in the current stage is still deeply differentiated according to level of education, it is normal for this to determine or to influence to a great extent

*Judith Blake, "Income and Reproductive Motivation" in POPULATION STUDIES No 3, 1967, p 165.
the forming of the family's size. Expressing this size by the average number of children the results of our research show the following situation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Children born to 100 women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined elementary school</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than seven elementary grades</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-10 elementary grades</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher studies</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The inverse correlation we see between the level of education and family size in Romania, although it is specific to most countries, still has a transitional nature. Thus, this is not an immutable law with a universal and permanent action. Thus we can consider that the level of education will grow and will become generalized parallel with the rise in incomes according to the country's economic development. In these conditions, the child will not represent a burden for the family budget to the same extent as today, especially since society will continue to take over a large portion of it (free medical assistance and education, places in nurseries and kindergartens and so forth). Coming to aid these evaluations, as I mentioned above, is the international experience of some developed countries and recent trends which have appeared and been determined by specialists. Here is our example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Number of children per 100 women marriages of more than 15 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary or lower secondary</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower technical school</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher studies</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated according to "Rapport sur les Relations Entre la Fecondite et la Condition Sociale de la Famille en Europe; Leurs Repercussions sur la Politique Sociale", Strasbourg, 1971, pp 39-40

Taking into account that secondary education will become generalized in coming years in Romania and that the forms of post-secondary school qualification will be extended, one can suppose that on this basis the degree of the young people's economic independence also will rise. On the other hand, under conditions where society continues to demonstrate increased attention to the family, we can consider that favorable conditions will exist so that the married couple can adopt a positive behavior toward their own reproduction.
ROMANIA

ROMANIAN, SOVIET HISTORY BOOK WRITERS MEET IN MOSCOW

Bucharest REVISTA DE ISTITURIE in Romanian No 4, Apr 77, pp 766-767

Article by Gheorghe I. Ionita: "The Second Meeting Between Romanian and Soviet Specialists, Authors of History Books"

In conformity with the plan for cultural and scientific collaboration between Romania and the USSR, the second meeting of specialists in the two countries on problems of the mutual treatment of the history of the two peoples in textbooks was held in Moscow on 24-28 January 1977.*

The Romanian delegation to the meeting consisted of Comrades: Stefan Stefanescu, corresponding member of the Academy of the Romanian Socialist Republic, director of the "Nicolae Iorga" Institute of History, dean of the history faculty of the University of Bucharest, and head of the delegation; Dumitru Berciu, university professor, doctor docent, head of the Department of History of Romania at the University of Bucharest, and member of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences of the Romanian Socialist Republic; Gheorghe I. Ionita, university lecturer and doctor at the University of Bucharest; Ilie Sarzea, university lecturer and inspector general in the Ministry of Education and Instruction; Vasilea Neagu, professor and editor at the Didactica and Pedagogica Publishing House; and Leontin Pastor, second secretary at the embassy of the Romanian Socialist Republic in Moscow.

The Soviet delegation consisted of: academician I. I. Mint, head of the delegation; N. P. Kuzin, member of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences of the USSR and deputy head of the delegation; N. V. Vinogradov, deputy director of the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Languages and Literature; A. G. Kolosov, head of the History Teaching Laboratory of the Institute for Scientific Research on Teaching Content and Methods of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences of the USSR; F. P. Korovkin, chief scientific researcher at the Institute for Scientific Research on Teaching Content and Methods of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences of the USSR and author of textbooks; I. P. Rahmova, chief scientific researcher at the Institute for Scientific Research on Teaching Content

* In REVISTA DE ISTITURIE, No 12, 1975, pp 1938-1939, we told about the first meeting.
and Methods of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences of the USSR; and A. A. Iazkovaa, chief scientific researcher at the Institute of World Economics of the Socialist World System.

The following comrades representing the Soviet side also participated in the meeting: M. I. Kondakov, first vice chairman of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences of the USSR; I. R. Berhin, doctor docent, chief researcher at the Institute of History of the USSR, and author of textbooks; V. I. Grosul, chief scientific researcher at the Institute of History of the USSR; M. M. Zaliskin, university professor in the History Department of "Lomonosov" University in Moscow; I. D. Zverev, academician and secretary of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences of the USSR; V. A. Orlov, chief researcher at the Institute for Scientific Research on Teaching Content and Methods of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences of the USSR; B. S. Popov, department head at the Higher Party School within the Central Committee of the CPSU; L. E. Semionova, chief scientific researcher at the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Languages and Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; G. M. Karopov, chief methodologist in the Ministry of General Information Education of the USSR; and V. E. Stepanova, chief editor of the "History" editorial staff of the "Prosvescenie" Publishing House.

The discussions, held in an atmosphere of comradely cooperation, made it possible to debate basic problems of the history of the two countries and formed conclusions meant to help improve the presentation of the history of Romania and the USSR in textbooks. The delegations made proposals to be taken into account in the future activity of preparation of textbooks.

At the end of the discussions the protocol of the meeting was concluded, it being specified that the third discussion on the problems of history books is to be held in Bucharest at the end of this year, with the stage of fulfillment of the provisions of the protocol being analyzed on that occasion.

On 27 January, the Romanian delegation was received by M. A. Prokofiev, the minister of general information education of the USSR, who appreciated the utility of expanding the contacts and the collaboration between the two countries on the problems of education and stressed the Soviet side's interest in also expanding the cooperation to other fields of instruction and education of school youth. In this context, the Romanian side's invitation that the future meeting in Bucharest discuss the following subject was accepted: "The History Book—an Important Means of Patriotic, Revolutionary, Internationalist Education of Youth."