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TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE - POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 1415

Joint Publications Research Service
1000 North Glebe Road
Arlington, Virginia 22201

The serial report contains articles on official party and government pronouncements and writings on significant domestic political developments; information on general sociological problems and developments in such areas as demography, manpower, public health and welfare, education, and mass organizations; and articles on military and civil defense, organization, theory, budgets, and hardware.
# TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE

## POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1415

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COMMUNIQUE ON KADAR-CEAUSESCU TALKS

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 17 Jun 77 p 3 AU

["Communique of Janos Kadar-Nicolaе Ceausescu meeting", 15-16 June in Debrecen, Hungary and Oradea, Romania]


They were cordially greeted by the working people and representatives of party and state organs of the two cities.

Janos Kadar and Nicolaе Ceausescu had talks in a frank, cordial and comradely atmosphere. They agreed on a communique on the results of the talks.

The Romanian side reported on the implementation of the 11th RCP Congress resolutions, the party program devoted to building a comprehensively advanced socialist society and Romania's progress toward communism, as well as on the foreign political activities of the Romanian party and state.

The Hungarian side valued the noteworthy results attained by the Romanian people, led by the RCP, in building a comprehensively advanced socialist society and wished them further successes in implementing the 11th RCP Congress resolutions.

The Hungarian side reported on the manner in which the resolutions of the 11th MSZMP congress were implemented in practice, the construction of an advanced socialist society in the Hungarian People's Republic and the international activities of the Hungarian party and state.

The Romanian side highly valued the successes attained by the Hungarian people, under MSZMP leadership, in building an advanced socialist society and wishes them further successes in implementing the 11th MSZMP Congress resolutions.
The sides emphasized that the interests of the Hungarian and the Romanian people are mutual and that their objectives are identical in building socialism and in the struggle waged to consolidate peace and security and for social progress. The strengthening of the two countries' friendship and the constant development of their relations is based on firm foundations.

They stressed with satisfaction that friendship and cooperation between the MSZMP and the RCP and the Hungarian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Romania are successfully developing on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, as well as on the principles of solidarity, equal rights, nonintervention in domestic affairs, sovereignty, national independence, mutual respect, mutual benefit and comradely assistance, in the spirit of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance concluded in 1972.

They emphasized the decisive significance of party relations in the further development of the two countries' political, economic and cultural cooperation. They confirmed their determination to insure the two parties' continued efforts to expand and deepen interparty relations.

They established during the talks that economic relations between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Romania are undergoing noteworthy development, primarily in the area of commodity turnover, which will more than double under the provisions of the current five-year plan, as compared with the previous plan period. Results have been attained in the coordination of plans for the people's economies [sentence as published]. A certain progress has been made with regard to specialization in production and cooperative ventures, to which, also, the activities of the Hungarian-Romanian mixed government committee for economic cooperation have contributed.

They stressed that there are further great possibilities to expand bilateral economic relations. It is necessary to better utilize the advantages arising from the complex CEMA program. They particularly stressed the significance of more modern forms of economic cooperation and tasks connected with identifying and exploiting possibilities for specialization in production and cooperative ventures. They expressed their determination to make continued efforts to take better advantage of favorable conditions arising from being neighbors, in the interests of the economic development of the Hungarian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Romania.

A protocol on expanding barter trade, a postal and telecommunications cooperation agreement, an amendment to the agreement regulating border crossing privileges, an agreement on the mutual establishment of consulates general and an agreement to renew the 1969 water management accord were signed on the occasion of the top-level meeting.

The sides concluded that the expansion and further development of cultural relations play an important role in strengthening friendship between the Hungarian and the Romanian peoples, in intensifying mutual acquaintance and trust and in fostering progressive historical traditions.
They agreed to continue to expand their cooperation in the areas of ideology, culture, education, the sciences and the arts in order to promote Hungarian-Romanian friendship and cooperation. In this respect, the two sides valued also the activities of the Hungarian-Romanian mixed culture and history committee.

The sides agreed that the existence of the Hungarian ethnic minority in the Socialist Republic of Romania and the existence of the Romanian ethnic minority in the Hungarian People's Republic is a consequence of historical development and many centuries of being neighbors and an important factor in the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

Insuring a just, Marxist-Leninist solution to the ethnic minority issue and equal rights and extensive development of ethnic minorities is an essential element in the socialist construction underway in the two countries and in the intensification of friendship between their peoples and Hungarian-Romanian friendly relations.

The sides agreed that such a solution is consistent with the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, as well as with international norms adopted by the United Nations with regard to the enforcement and safeguarding of the rights of ethnic minorities.

Resolving the problems of ethnic minorities—of citizens of the countries concerned—is the domestic affair and responsibility of each of the two countries. At the same time, it is stressed that the two neighboring countries' ethnic minorities should increasingly be a bridge in bringing the Hungarian and the Romanian peoples closer together.

They have established that there is mutual willingness and firm determination to further strengthen cooperation between the MSZMP and the RCP and the Hungarian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Romania in every area and to consolidate their friendship for the good of their peoples and the common socialist cause.

An extensive exchange of views took place at the talks on the development of the international situation. It was established with satisfaction that the forces of socialism, social progress and peace have constantly expanded in recent years and that their influence is increasing. They stressed the outstanding significance of the struggle by the socialist countries for world peace, social progress and the victory of socialism. At the same time, they stressed the significance of the contribution by all anti-imperialist, democratic and progressive forces and the developing and nonaligned countries to extensive revolutionary, national and social transformations and the favorable change in the international balance of power to the advantage of detente, understanding and international security and cooperation.

The Hungarian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Romania continue their efforts to make the favorable international processes irreversible, to intensify detente and [to work] for peace and international security in Europe and the whole world.
They emphasized that the course of international events verifies the correctness of the appraisals and positions elaborated at the Bucharest session of the Warsaw Pact countries' Political Consultative Committee. They stressed that the implementation of the proposals set forth in the declaration and the documents would contribute to consolidating peace and security on our continent and would also promote an improvement in the international atmosphere.

Hungary and Romania take a resolute stand in favor of concrete and effective disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and they support the reduction of armed forces and armaments. They have reaffirmed their previous position in approving the simultaneous liquidation of the military blocs opposing one another. They welcome the UN General Assembly resolutions on the conclusion of a worldwide treaty to relinquish the use of force in international relations. They support convening a UN General Assembly extraordinary session devoted to disarmament and express the hope that this session will constitute an important step toward promoting disarmament and convening a world disarmament conference.

The two countries actively promote the observation of the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act, which is an inseparable whole, and the realization of the recommendations adopted there. They reaffirmed their determination to actively participate in the work of the Belgrade meeting toward the attainment of genuine progress in strengthening security and consolidating and intensifying mutually beneficial cooperation on the European continent.

The two parties and countries are in solidarity with the peoples struggling for national independence and social progress and against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism and racial discrimination.

They emphasized that a just settlement and lasting peace in the Middle East can be attained only if Israel withdraws its troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and insures the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish an autonomous and independent state, and if the independence and security of all countries of the area are guaranteed.

They support the just settlement of international conflicts by peaceful means in other areas of the world as well.

They favor increasing the role and effectiveness of the United Nations in resolving fundamental international issues on the basis of the UN Charter.

It was established at the talks that the strength and influence of the international communist and workers movement is increasing. The sides confirmed their parties' resolute intention to contribute to further strengthening the unity of communist and workers parties on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, international solidarity, voluntary comradely cooperation and complete equality of rights, while respecting the right to a free choice of various paths in the struggle waged for a progressive social transformation and the victory of socialism.
They emphasized the great significance of the Berlin Conference from the viewpoint of uniting the efforts of the communist and workers parties in the struggle for peace, security, cooperation and social progress.

The friendly meetings and discussions in Debrecen and Oradea, held in a frank, cordial and comradely atmosphere, served well to expand the MSZMP-RCP cooperation. They contributed in every area to the development of cooperation between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Romania and to strengthening friendship and solidarity between the Hungarian and the Romanian people committed to socialist construction.

During the visit, the Hungarian side has confirmed [as published] the invitation for a party-government delegation from the Socialist Republic of Romania to visit the Hungarian People's Republic. The Romanian side has accepted the initiative with gratitude.


[Signed] Janos Kadar, first secretary of the MSZMP Central Committee;

Nicolae Ceausescu, RCP general secretary, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

CSO: 2500
'LE FIGARO' PONDSER DISAFFECTION WITH USSR IN GDR

Paris LE FIGARO in French 16 Jun 77 p 2 LD

[Jean-Paul Picaper Berlin report: "The GDR--Young People's Resistance to Sovietization"]

[Text] During the past 2 1/2 years an anti-Soviet current has appeared among the East German population. Young men in Rostock greet one another with a clenched fist, shouting "Russen raus aus Deutschland" (Russians get out of Germany).

Hostility began to become apparent shortly before the return in the spring of 1975 of Soviet ambassador, Petr Abrasimov, to the huge building on the Unter-Den-Linden in Berlin, an enormous, massive building which brings to mind a parasitic administrative center of a province of an empire rather than the offices of an embassy.

Passive resistance is on the increase in the plants of GDR, which has become merely a border region of "Sovietia." The people cast sidelong glances at the West through "strange apertures." The most attractive offers no longer lure cadres into the Dresden region because reception of Western television programs is difficult there.

An after effect of the "hot summer" of 1976: Three young men and a girl from Rudolstadt in Thuringia were recently sentenced to long terms of imprisonment by the Gera court following a trial in Camera. They had asked the authorities for the right to demonstrate against violations of human rights. Even though it is less spectacular than in Poland, where the "Movement for Human and Civil Rights," created 2 months ago already has more than 1,000 members, and less virulent than in Czechoslovakia, where 81 signatories of Charter 77 were recently dismissed from employment, East German opposition is the most noticeable feature of the Honecker era.

Soviet Grain

Ambassador Yefremov, who was recalled by the Kremlin in March 1975, was unable to check the GDR-FRG rapprochemen. His successor has put a stop to
Honecker's "neorealistic" policy: An end was put to debates among intellec-
tuals; consumer goods are no longer given priority; a stop has been put to
the development of special inter-German relations; a friendship treaty with
Moscow has been signed, and a new government has been formed. Honecker
was disavowed but was able to stay in power by changing direction: "Without
the USSR all our development would be unthinkable," he stated in October
1976, asserting that a letter from Brezhnev to the East German Central
Committee informed it that large quantities of Soviet grain would be
delivered.

The East German secretary's "disclosures" were not made without ulterior
motives. The Soviets had vetoed the supply of a nuclear power station by
Bonn to the GDR which would have been paid through exports of electricity
to West Berlin. They preferred to see such a power station built in
Kaliningrad. Thereupon the East German administration refused at the
beginning of 1976 to let cables carrying electric current from Kaliningrad
to West Berlin pass through its territory. The Bonn-Moscow deal came to
nothing. In November 1976 Stoph, head of the East German Government,
accompanied by economic experts, had to go to Moscow to remind the Kremlin
of the principles of "socialist solidarity." Austrians and Japanese are
now building two oil refineries--at Schwedt and Boehlen--in the GDR, but
Western nuclear power is still banned.

It appears that reality of power has passed into the hands of pro-Soviet
officials, members of a kind of a shadow cabinet, who are often little known
in the West, including the Wolf, who was put in charge of broadcasting by
Zhukov in May 1945 and is now head of East German espionage, and film
director Konrad Wolf, chairman of the Academy of Arts of the GDR. Their
father, a communist writer, emigrated to Moscow where they were brought up.

CSO: 3100
NEWS MEDIA CRITICIZED FOR EXAGGERATION

Sofia BULGARSKI ZHURNALIST in Bulgarian No 5, 1977 pp 18-19

[Article by Stefan Genov, director of "Raznoiznos" [Raznoiznos exports various goods]: "So That the Readers Will Not Laugh at You...."]

[Text] My work is indeed offering me the possibility to have a broad look on the country's achievements in comparison with the needs of the market and the world. There is no mercy and consideration in those places; when the customers look at the merchandise they are not interested in the labor discipline of the workers that produced the merchandise. From this vantage point I can be quite critical toward the news media people. I must immediately call the attention to the basic weakness: the measure! The people put it quite right: don't lose the sense of proportion!

The successes of our country are many and we have a feeling of dignity when we face our trade partners, but when I myself watch a TV program about the achievements in the production of a certain product with which I deal, or when I read a press report about it, there are moments when I begin to feel uncomfortable—the superlatives used to describe something are too many. They are so many for each achievement that the reader or the listener becomes confused about the gradation of these successes. For ordinary achievements the qualification "most, best" are pouring out so generously that when it comes to really significant achievements, achievements that really give us a sense of pride, we have no strong words left to qualify them. I have even joked with colleagues: isn't it imperative to change a little this grammar of superlatives?

The sense of proportion comes by itself if one knows the economy. Journalists ought to study the facts more carefully. For if a given product produced by a certain plant is indeed a great success compared with the development and growth of this plant, this same product compared with similar products of other plants may represent a modest achievement only. The workers themselves are very well aware of the real value and quality of the product, and when they hear or read the great praise they begin to lose faith in journalists. Therefore, do not wear off the yardstick! Measure ten times, but use the scissors only once!
Another important element in our propaganda is the use of the slug. Seemingly journalists do not like to work with the slug, they do not suggest, they do not allow the consumer of the information to chew the bite by himself, instead, they are in a hurry to chew it for him. This is unpleasant; it is insulting to adopt an attitude toward the reader as if he was mentally retarded. As if we, the journalists, are telling him in advance: you are stupid, let me explain it to you! Therefore, do not wonder if, as a result, you get a negative effect. People frequently get indignant of the way in which facts are presented to them, and not because they distrust the facts. Why do you have to explain that the thing that moves on the rails is a train, since we all know it from the time of old man Yotso [Old man Yotso is the protagonist in a short story written by Ivan Vazov. Yotso became blind shortly before the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turks; later, although blind, with the help of his imagination he was enraptured by the achievements of new and free Bulgaria, namely the construction of a railroad and the train he was "watching" every day. He imagined the locomotive as a huge beast spewing flames and steam].

And...the participation of the reader...I frequently have the feeling that the author of an article is making me stand against the wall in front of the entire class and, through his arguments, he is teaching me what is good and what is bad. The argumentation of a thesis in an article must be done by the reader-accomplice, and not by a postulant. Political journalism is not a directive but a cooperation. A report must invite the reader to reflect and to act. If you don't want the readers to laugh at you, then treat them as your equals, respect them. In showing your reader that you respect him, means that you have already done half of your job as a propagandist.

Something else which is important—use the precise word! A few moments ago I received a phone call and I was invited as a "professional" to attend a "cultural event." It occurred to me to ask them whether they could also invite me for a non-cultural event too. This expression is widely used at the suggestion of the press. Is this the only expression used? Our conversations are infested by expressions about which one would heartily laugh if he was to pose for a moment and think about them. But we are in a hurry and we have no time to reflect, even when we feel like laughing. Speech is the job of journalists. They have the honor to do this job with the Bulgarian language.

CSO: 2200
HAJEK RE-EMERGES AS UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR

[Editorial Report] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 24 June 1977, page 5, makes its first mention of Jiri Hajek, former editor in chief of TVORBA, party weekly for politics, science and culture, whose name simply disappeared from the masthead of TVORBA issue No 38 (published on 15 September 1976) and whose removal was never officially announced, let alone explained. The RUDE PRAVO article does not refer to this, nor to the fact that Hajek was dropped from the list of parliamentary deputies in the October 1976 election. Entitled "Over a Book by Jiri Hajek--Maturation of a Generation," it is a favorable review written by a politically orthodox RUDE PRAVO editor, Jan Kliment. After approvingly recounting the contents of Hajek's book, Kliment says: "We know the author to be an educated literary and theater critic and theoretician, writer of many books about writers, and so forth. Today he is holding the post of professor at the Philosophic Faculty of the Charles University in Prague."

CSO: 2400
DEFENSE MINISTER ADDRESSES GST CONGRESS

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 20 Jun 77 p 3 AU

[Report on speech delivered by Army Gen Heinz Hoffmann, GDR minister of national defense at the Sixth Congress of the Sport and Technology Society [GST], Karl-Marx-Stadt--date not given]

[Text] In August this year the GST will be 25 years old. In this quarter century, it has gathered valuable experiences which are of great benefit for the education of the youth and all working people to be class-conscious builders of socialism and its staunch defenders. After these initial remarks Heinz Hoffmann, member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee, outlined the successful development of the socialist defense organization and listed the reasons for this impressive balance sheet.

The GST progressed thanks to the diligent work of the working people, who, by their outstanding performance in production, created the prerequisites for it. It has been the subject of the continuous care and assistance on the part of the SED and its Central Committee, who have always done everything necessary to make it possible for the youth to observe its citizen's rights and duties as builders and defenders of socialism increasingly better. The GST grew and was consolidated thanks to the effectiveness and revolutionary elan of countless FDJ [Free German Youth] members who always marched in the vanguard when it was necessary to strengthen the armed organs and the national defense of the GDR.

Army Gen Heinz Hoffmann pointed to the great historical truth, which, 60 years after the October victory, is as valid as it was at that time: A revolution is only worth something if it knows how to defend itself. Acting in accordance with this finding of Lenin's, the GST has contributed to promoting the readiness and ability of the working people to reliably protect what has been created by the hands of the people.

Work, freed from exploitation, and the military striking force of the victorious workers class have made the flourishing of the socialist states and 30 years of peace in Europe possible, declared the speaker, and he pointed to the gigantic efforts of the Soviet people and the party of Lenin at the fronts of work and of the military protection of the revolution. Every step forward in the
struggle for peace and detente, for implementing the policy of coexistence, has been won by struggle: by the growing political, economic and military might of socialism—and particularly the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states allied with it—as well as by the actions of the anti-imperialist forces.

Heinz Hoffmann dealt extensively with the policy of the socialist states and the international workers' class for securing favorable conditions for building socialism and preserving peace. The outbreak of a thermonuclear-missile war must be prevented in the interests of all mankind. That is why the socialist states are insistently struggling for limiting and eliminating the danger of war, for the limitation of armaments and for complete disarmament.

The forces of peace must wage a hard struggle against the strong political and economic forces of imperialism and against very deeply rooted reactionary interests. This also involves the complicated task of making the main imperialist powers take real steps of disarmament. It involves achieving a halt to the strategic arms race, the reduction of forces and arms—particularly in the regions where they are most concentrated—a halt to the further development of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, a ban on them and their ultimate annihilation.

Heinz Hoffmann said that a more effective socialist national defense also contributes to securing the policy of peace and stressed the necessity of a high level of vigilance. The GDR must make its contribution to the peace program of socialism, in foreign as well as military policy. As does every member of the Warsaw Pact, it contributes to the comprehensive strengthening of socialism. We are struggling jointly with our allies for every success in negotiations, and we see to it that the balance of strength is not altered to the disadvantage of socialism, stated the GDR defense minister.

He dealt further with the ideopolitical work in the GST for the implementation of the Ninth SED Congress decisions. It is one of the organization's most essential tasks to convey to the young generation a certain degree of basic military knowledge, ability and skill and, at the same time, to develop and strengthen their readiness to apply their whole personality to the protection of socialism.

Army Gen Hoffmann pointed out that new ways should always be sought and tried to convincingly expound to youth the complicated dialectic between the successes of socialism in the struggle for peace and detente and the defense efforts of the socialist countries. One must help youth recognize the aggressive nature of imperialism and to make them understand that the tendency toward war, inherent in imperialism, is based on the striving of the concerns for super-profits and for the expansion of the dominance of the state monopolist system of rule and on the capitalist ownership of the means of production.

Heinz Hoffmann then spoke about the instructive and close-to-life transmitting of the revolutionary military traditions of the workers' class. Many outstanding revolutionaries proved their mettle in the class battles of the Weimar
Republic, in the antifascist resistance, in the trenches at Madrid or at the side of the Red Army. Those who today are 17 or 18 prove themselves in the struggle for good results in their studies, for exemplary production performances and in protecting the socialist fatherland. The passing on of the experiences of that time becomes effective, above all, when our youth discovers anew the correctness of the revolutionary teachings in the class struggle of our days and has them confirmed.

Army Gen Hoffmann then dealt with the premilitary training, the main field for acquiring military knowledge and for the patriotic and internationalist education in the GST. Trustful personal talks should be held there and political education performed primarily where the comrade of the GST can show what is in him and what he can do [sentence as published]. Such traits of will and character required for the future builders and defenders of socialism and communism as courage and firmness, endurance and purposefulness, readiness to act and a collective spirit are acquired, above all, through the fulfillment of demanding tasks.

The Politburo member expressed appreciation for the indefatigable work of the members and training group leaders, a great part of which has served in the National People's Army and the border troops. He paid tribute to the thousands of honorary functionaries who are performing exemplarily and who devote a considerable part of their free time to the defense organization. Years of diligent, conscientious and responsible work for the strengthening of the socialist state merits greater recognition. That is why, as of 1 September 1977, a great number of those who exercise honorary functions in premilitary training, combat spirit and other fields will receive material rewards.

Heinz Hoffmann expressed the conviction that the GST will fulfill the task posed to it by the Ninth SED Congress to increase the contribution to the military protection of socialism. He stated in conclusion: what the GST has created and achieved, particularly in the last few years under the leadership of the party of the workers' class and in close cooperation with the FDJ and the National People's Army, is an excellent basis for the future work of the socialist defense organization.
COMMENTARY CALLS FOR BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

East Berlin DER MORGEN in German 7 Jun 77 p 2

[Commentary by Peter Fischer]

[Text] "One of the most acute present-day conflicts endangering humanity results from the growing contrast between the humanitarian possibilities of science and technology and the manner in which imperialism employs science and technology for the development of newer and newer devastating instruments of war."

This statement by Prof Kurt Hager, Politburo member and secretary of the SED Central Committee, is reflected today, among other things, in the misuse of chemistry for the production of dangerous means of mass destruction. The struggle for the prohibition and destruction of such weapons, therefore, has belonged for a long time to the main directions of the struggle for the limitation of armaments and disarmament.

Since the Imperial German troops inaugurated chemical warfare for the first time near Ypres in 1915 with chlorine gas, humanity has been confronted with this danger. Shortly after World War I, therefore, attempts were made to put an end to further development in this area by prohibiting in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 the employment of chemical as well as bacteriological weapons. This prohibition, to be sure, was ratified in 1927 by the USSR and by many other countries, among them the United States, but was ignored for decades. It could not prevent the production of chemical weapons in World War II and also could not check afterwards the massive development of such means of combat.

After 1945, therefore, new efforts had to be undertaken to actualize the Geneva Protocol and to achieve effective results through new agreements. Proposals, especially by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, to prohibit jointly both chemical as well as bacteriological weapons, could not be realized at once, however, in the face of the resistance of imperialism. Thus, to begin with, an agreement concerning the prohibition of the development, production and storage of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxic weapons was concluded in 1972. Since then a similar agreement on chemical means of combat has been on the agenda.
The array of those things that ought to be prohibited here, moreover, became very great in recent decades. Today, there are instantly deadly chemical means of combat, as well as such which cause protracted illness or temporary disability. There are, to enumerate but a few, eye, nose, and throat irritants, vesicant agents and nerve poisons. The United States achieved a high peak of "practical testing" during the Vietnam War when millions of hectares of land were damaged for decades and 2 million humans were disabled, crippled or killed.

Beyond that, the latest stage of the escalation of chemical armament is represented by the so-called binary weapons, in which, to begin with, scarcely poisonous chemical materials that store well are combined in such a manner in a shell or missile that they mix upon firing of the weapon into highly toxic, chemical-warfare agents.

Inasmuch as not all states are ready at the present time to accept a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons immediately, there have also been negotiations since 1974 regarding a first step in which, first of all, the most dangerous, most deadly types of chemical warfare [agents] are supposed to be barred. The Soviet-American communiqué of July 1974, which came about following negotiations of then U.S. President Nixon in Moscow, forms the point of departure for it. Since then, consultations of Soviet-American experts have taken place twice in Geneva, specifically in August 1976 as well as a few weeks before the beginning of April in 1977. At the same time, useful foundations—as the most recent communiqué indicates—were laid for further conversations. That is optimistic, but the desire for a world of lasting peace also calls for the further consistent struggle of all progressive and peace-loving forces in this field.

8824
CSO: 2300
CRIMINOLOGY TO CONSIDER SOCIOLOGICAL VS BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

West German Commentary

Bonn IWE-TAGESDIENST in German No 86/87, 5-6 May 77 p 2

[Report from Berlin: "Crimes of Violence in GDR To Be Researched More Closely." A translation of the East Berlin law and political science journal, referred to below, follows this commentary]

[Text] In the East Berlin law and political science journal STAAT UND RECHT criminologists from Leipzig University are advocating the more thorough exploration of the causes and circumstances of violent crime in the GDR. In this connection and with reference to the socialist social order, they say, it would also be useful to elucidate the importance of biological and psychological factors in the make-up of criminals in general and violent and sexual criminals in particular. There is said to be statistical evidence that mentally retarded persons, psychopaths and neurotics represent a considerable percentage of violent and sexual crime in the GDR.

At the same time the Leipzig scientists emphasize their differences with bourgeois criminology because the latter holds that biological factors, especially deviations from the norm in the biological and psychological sphere, have crucial criminological importance, and indeed in some instances provide a fatal predisposition to crime. In fact biological and psychological anomalies are subordinated to social determination and of importance in the commission of crimes only if destructive environmental phenomena influence the offenders, or if environment, education or other influences are ill adapted to the peculiarities of these people. The decisive factor is always the active interaction of man with his immediate environment. Investigation of violent crimes has always demonstrated that "in the actual instances rudiments of the past or imperialistic influences," variously intertwined with the offender's environment, have operated, and that these peoples personalities have less consciousness and stability than others to resist such factors.
GDR Criminologists' Discussion

Potsdam-Babelsberg STAAT UND RECHT in German Vol 26 No 4, Apr 77 signed to press 25 Feb 77 pp 385-392

[Article by Prof Dr Kurt Manecke, Prof Dr Walter Oorschewski and Dr Rolf Rindert, jurisprudence section, Karl Marx University, Leipzig: "On the Significance of Biological and Psychological Anomalies in the Causes and Conditions for Crimes of Violence and Sex"]

[Text] As part of its research tasks socialist criminology in the GDR must also elucidate the question whether in the socialist order of society biological and psychological anomalies of offenders are of importance for the determination of crime in general and violent and sexual crimes in particular. This question arises mainly for two reasons:

1. Marxism-Leninism and, on this basis, socialist criminology, start from the standpoint that man is the sum of social conditions. Man, though, is not thereby reduced to only his social existence. He is considered a bi-social living creature, "social because his nature is social, and biological because this nature is housed in a living human organism". If certain malfunctions of biological and psychological features occur, especially in the brain, this is bound to affect and determine the actions of these persons, regardless whether the ultimate behavior is or is not criminal.

Along with the findings of natural sciences as relating to social science research, advances especially in biology and genetics as well as medicine are gaining increasing importance. The question of the significance to be attributed to biological and psychological anomalies from the aspect of determining crime as a socially conditioned phenomenon is particularly important in the field of violent and sexual crimes, because biological and psychological anomalies tend to be more involved in such crimes than in other groups of offenses. This holds true especially of oligophrenias of slight or medium severity, dementia, brain damage of various kinds, psychopathies and neuroses.

2. Past and present bourgeois criminology in several of its trends and sub-trends starts from the standpoint (although for various reasons and with differing emphasis) that biological factors, especially deviations from biological and psychological norms, are of crucial criminological importance, in fact almost fatally predestine crime. Biological factors are given preeminence in the determination by the biological or bio-psychological school. It is therefore necessary to link the definition of Marxist-Leninist attitudes to the significance of biological anomalies in the social determination of crime with the rejection of and opposition to these bourgeois interpretations. It is also imperative for a contribution to be made to the ideological debate. Lenin emphasized that this debate requires us specifically to reject and refute the mechanistic transfer of biological knowledge and terms to society, the attribution of socially determined phenomena to biological and psychological factors, the replacement of social connections by
biological and psychological phenomena. Socialist criminology therefore requires us at one and the same time to acquire natural scientific and medical knowledge, digest it and reject and combat the unscientific and reactionary conclusions drawn from it by bourgeois criminology.

II.

Let us begin by describing the significance of mental retardation, brain damage and dementia in the determination of violent and sexual crime. To do so we must explain the role of the brain in the interrelation between the objective external world and the psyche.

The psychological processes, including logical-abstract thought, shape consciousness in the totality of their most complex forms. The brain is the organ of psychological processes including consciousness, while objective reality, the natural and social environment, represents the source of the psychological. The psychological processes and, therefore, consciousness also, are a function of the brain, an internal state of the brain. The brain reflects objective reality and regulates human behavior. In its capacity as highly organized matter, the brain conveys the interrelations between the external and the internal world. The psyche therefore reflects objective reality, and is the indicator as well as the regulator of human behavior and a function of its material substratum, the brain. As the psyche is a function of the brain, especially of the higher nervous system, pathological damage of the brain must necessarily lead to disorders in the development of the psyche in the ontogenesis and actual-genetically in the interrelation between the individual and the external world. The analysis of the personality, lifestyle and criminal behavior of brain damaged and mentally retarded offenders clearly demonstrates the impairment of normal interrelations between offenders and the environment by pathological brain processes. This will be explained in detail with respect to debility and imbecility.

Due to their inability to think normally, the mentally retarded usually fail to achieve an educational level consonant with social requirements. Nor are they, as a rule, able to interiorize a superior moral structure and well-founded political-ideological convictions (unlike citizens with a normally developed ability to think). In addition mentally retarded offenders often grow up in unfavorable surroundings or are exposed to other adverse influences. It is therefore often either entirely impossible or possible only to a limited extent to instill in them sound moral and disciplinary values, socially desirable behavioral standards. This offers particularly fertile soil for the irruption of negative behavioral models. The low standard of education consequent upon the mental retardation as well as the hardly differentiated, in some respects primitive moral and politico-ideological structure of the personality, mean that these offenders are in general restricted to unskilled work, frequently have little commitment to their jobs, spend their leisure hours in primitive pursuits and usually achieve only a very low standard of social classification.
In many cases unfavorable personality development results from the interrelation between biological peculiarities due to mental retardation and adverse social phenomena which, often by the lack of appropriate education adapted to the peculiarities of these offenders, are either checked inadequately or not at all. In the sum total of the causes of criminal behavior biological peculiarities are of special significance.

Furthermore there are connections with the commission of crimes which relate to the actual offense. These offenders poor ability to think impairs their ability to consider the consequences of their criminal behavior. They commit offenses in situations where discovery is inevitable, and in which other offenders (unless drunk) generally refrain from such commission owing to "undue risk." Quite often this inadequacy is linked with lack of conscience with respect to individual responsibility toward the socialist society. The result is lack of reflection and self-control. Lack of willpower also stimulates the commission of offenses in the actual external circumstances of the crime. Mentally retarded persons are often lazy and apathetic on the one hand, and on the other liable to be much influenced by chance situations. Due to their suggestibility they are unable strongly to resist temptation. We therefore observe the inseparable meshing of defective morals, willpower and reason.

We are also bound to mention a certain search for compensation as another factor for the commission of crimes by the mentally retarded. Mentally retarded persons are often denied success in important social spheres; yet they also crave success and appreciation. As they are usually unable to achieve these by their performance (not all citizens take into account the lesser ability of the mentally retarded; in fact they are often quite unaware of the debility), they tend to veer to other spheres and attempt to gain the respect of negative persons by crimes which sometimes are of a particularly aggressive nature.

Finally it must be pointed out that mentally retarded persons are subject to frequent states of agitation, impulsive actions and violent reactions which influence the commission of the offenses.

As we see there are many connections between mental retardation and crime. The essential feature of all these relations consists in the fact that, due to mental retardation, the interrelation between the personality and the environment is impaired, while crucial features of socialist personalities are inadequately (if at all) developed, making it difficult for mentally retarded persons to fit into society. Adverse social determinants tend to affect the inadequately developed internal conditions. Lastly the unfavorable internal structure as well as destructive social influences often fail to be balanced by education adapted to the peculiarities of the mental defective. Mentally retarded persons are particularly apt to commit offenses due to the lack of ability to weigh the consequences, insufficiently developed conscience and defective willpower. Defects of intellect, lack of willpower, of moral and politico-ideological backbone lead to inadequate self-control and adversely influence the interrelations between the environment and the personality.
during the ontogenesis and the actual offense. The situation is rather similar in the case of offenders with brain damage, including dementia. Altogether, it may be noted that, independent of the pathogenesis of biological anomalies, the appropriate interrelations between offenders and the world around them are much more difficult. The actual circumstances may therefore variously influence the resolution to commit offenses.

The following connections are to be noted between psychopathy and the commission of violent and sexual crimes: Psychopathy is coupled with many characteristic abnormalities, deformation of the will, emotional disturbances and parathymic conditions which exert destructive effects on the interrelation between personality and environment during the ontogenesis and the actual commission of the crime. Psychopaths are generally inconspicuous from the intellectual aspect, nor is there any noticeable alteration of their brain substance.

Similar to mentally deficient and brain damaged offenders, psychopaths have in common the fact that their relations to the environment are frequently disturbed—despite the many different character abnormalities affecting the will and emotions. Psychopaths clash with their fellow humans; frequently they fail to come to terms with society to the extent characteristic for the normal citizen; as a consequence of their anomalies they are easily influenced by adverse circumstances. Unfavorable conditions may well reinforce their abnormalities and produce criminal behavior in response to the conditions prevailing at the time of the offense.

Much the same holds true for neurotics. Although neuroses and their origins must be strictly distinguished by psychopathy, psychopathic and neurotic offenders have this in common: Their interaction with the environment is disrupted as the result of their psychological anomalies, and that may be of importance for the determination of the respective crimes.

III.

Based on the above we will now appraise the role of biological and psychological anomalies in the causal and conditional complex of crimes, especially in the field of violent and sexual crime.

1. Crime is socially determined. That applies to the general phenomenon, to each crime and, without exception, to the commission of crimes by offenders with biological and psychological anomalies. It is a fundamental tenet of Marxism-Leninism that the social being determines consciousness, that man is the sum of social conditions. That tenet also applies to the determination of the violent and sexual crimes committed by offenders with biological and psychological abnormalities.

When we are emphasizing the social determination of crime in general and various offenses in particular, comprehensively considering the social and natural determinants of actual offenses and classifying biological and psychological anomalies in social determination, we must always base ourselves on the secure scientific knowledge that crime in the GDR is totally against
the nature of the historic inevitabilities of socialism and does not arise from them. The social determinants of crime in socialism are surviving social phenomena which, by their very nature, are rudiments of the exploiter system (not least in the consciousness of the offender), or are incited by imperialistic influences. As we have shown, they give citizens with biological or psychological anomalies the impetus for the commission of crimes. The predominant and constantly further developing socialist production and living conditions do mean, however, that citizens with biological and psychological anomalies can in principle act in a social manner and in fact manage to do so. The comradely cooperation and mutual aid inherent in socialist production conditions is of particular importance for the stable behavior of these citizens. Medical help by the facilities of the health care system and especially the care and general assistance rendered by society as a whole can deal with, reduce or arrest many of their specific problems. As we do in connection with any crime, we must also ask in the case of offenses committed by citizens with such anomalies why the socialist social system failed in that instance to prevent the crime. Investigations always show that various rudiments of the past or imperialist influences have operated—often coupled with unfavorable conditions in the environment of the criminal—and that, due to personality defects, these people were less able to muster consciousness and/or stability than other citizens.

These connections must be emphasized as contrasting with the situation in imperialist society. The causes of crime inherent in the imperialist social system result in the steady expansion and exacerbation of crime. The fundamental contradiction within capitalism, its culmination in imperialism and the phenomena related to this involve in crime persons with biological and psychological anomalies. The imperialist social order "produces" crime and also affects the rise of biological and psychological anomalies (for instance neuroses) by unemployment, fear of the future, alienation, and so on, and subsequently exposes these persons even more strongly to crime. In these instances the biological and psychological anomalies are subordinated to the causes of crime determined by imperialism, and they result in crime only jointly and in interrelation with the many contradictions of the imperialist social system. From this aspect the soil is cut from under the feet of logistic interpretations of crime in imperialism; at the same time no scope is left for considerations involved in the convergence doctrine.

2. Biological and psychological anomalies are of no importance for the determination of crime as a general phenomenon nor for violent and sexual crime in general; they are significant, though, for the determination of a considerable number of offenses, especially in the field of violent and sexual crime. This has been proven by statistics as well as by the demonstration of interrelations between social, biological and psychological factors in offenders with biological and psychological abnormalities. However, biological and psychological anomalies are in principle subordinated to social determination. They lead to crime only together and in interrelation with the most varied social determinants in the entire complex of causes and conditions. Biological and psychopathological processes are relevant in the commission of
crime only if destructive environmental phenomena influence the offenders during the ontogenesis or the actual commission of the offense, or if the environment, education and other influences are inadequately adapted to the special needs of these persons. The decisive factor at all times is the active interaction of people with their immediate environment, and here again the actual social factors, especially influences on the job, by the work collective, the family and various other microgroups are crucial.

3. Only exceptionally, especially at the border of criminal irresponsibility, is it possible for biological and psychological abnormalities to be the decisive factors. In general the peculiarities of the individual citizen—even if social circumstances are added—do not normally motivate crime. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that the vast majority of brain damaged, mentally defective or psychopathologically and neurotically influenced citizens do not commit crimes.

4. The importance of biological and psychological anomalies for the determination of the individual crime must never cause us to attribute to them either crime in general or violent and sexual crime as a significant group of crime. According to the dialectic, general, particular and individual crime as a general phenomenon characterized by statistical inevitabilities, must be distinguished from the individual offense. While the individual offense is determined by the nature of crime as a general phenomenon, it also has many accidental elements which are significant for the specific offense but not for crime in general and therefore do not affect the total phenomenon. Biological and psychological peculiarities may, therefore, be significant for the determination of the individual offense, but never for the determination of crime. One cannot draw conclusions from the specific to the inevitabilities of the general phenomenon.

5. The authors are quite aware of the inadequacies and difficulties in the ascertainment and unambiguous classification of biological and psychological anomalies. It is therefore crucial to eschew any careless, speculative or preconceived appraisal and classification of the phenomena listed. It is usual among many bourgeois psychiatrists and criminologists to hold preconceived, speculative and biased notions and generally to consider offenders psychopathologically deviant, so that all crime is ultimately ascribed to genetic and psychological peculiarities or even abnormalities. The bourgeois psychiatrists and criminologists Stumpel, Ridl, Rattenhuber, Schnell, Frey, Schiedt and Vervaecck, for example, "traced" some 40-100 percent psychopaths in a sizable group of offenders. Even the bourgeois criminologist Goeppeinger was compelled to criticize this procedure. He pointed out that often the crime or lifestyle is attributed mechanistically and with an "awesome carelessness" to psychopathological personality features. 10

It is our intention, in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist awareness of the social background of crime, to contribute to the discussion on the significance of biological and psychological anomalies for the determination of violent and sexual crime.
FOOTNOTES


2. Our research in the field of crime against socialist property and personal property as well as some other types of crime showed a much smaller percentage of biological and psychological anomalies.

3. Oligophrenia is a mental deficiency, either congenital or acquired in infancy, which usually affects the ability to think and has three defined degrees: Debility, imbecility and idiocy. Criminal responsibility is excluded in the severest case, that is idiocy; it is frequently excluded or restricted for imbecility but never excluded in cases of simple debility.

4. Dementia is a mental deficiency acquired after infancy. There is, for instance, epileptic, organic, senile or paralytic dementia.

5. In cases of psychopathy we note psychological anomalies manifested as character abnormalities and disturbances in the emotive, functional and instinctual area, owing to which social integration always takes the form of conflict. There is no unanimity about the definition. It is difficult to distinguish psychopathy from mere severe social maladjustment, nor is it easy to differentiate between it and certain neuroses. Szewczyk defines psychopathy as mental deviation from the norm, which falls short of mental illness and is usually hereditary.

6. By neuroses one generally understands a usually reversible disorder of the higher nervous system of a certain chronicity, which is primarily caused by exogenic noxa (this definition was made mandatory for the GDR by the Congress for Medical Psychotherapy, held in Bad Elster from 9-11 June 1959). The neurosis is a functional maladjustment consequent on unnatural or disordered digestion of experiences.

7. Biologism is a school of bourgeois ideology, which either discards or neglects social inevitabilities with respect to human existential and behavioral modes as well as to social structures, their development and determination, and which elevates biological factors to a metaphysical absolute.


ERRATUM

In JPRS 68334, No. 1408 of this series, 29 June 1977, article on pages 38-86, "Socialist Peace Strategy in View of Belgrade Analyzed", please make the following changes:


Rearrange pages as follows: Page 85 should be page 81; pages 81-84 should be 82-85.
BRIEFS

DBD STATISTICS--As was announced at the end of the Tenth DBD [Democratic Peasant Party of Germany] Congress in Schwerin, the DBD now has 92,000 members, over 26 percent of whom are women. The party is divided into 6,200 basic units. The technical qualifications of DBD members have changed since the previous party congress in 1972: "For example, the number of skilled workers has increased from 33,000 to 44,500; the number of master farmers from 9,600 to 11,500; the number of members who have completed technical-school training from 11,650 to 13,900; the number of advanced-school graduates from 4,700 to 6,000." In addition, the party executive committee report states that 75 percent of the members participate regularly in membership meetings and that 94 percent of the members are readers of BAUERN-ECHO, the DBD newspaper. [Text] [Bonn INFORMATIONEN in German No 12, Jun 77 p 8]

CSO: 2300
HUngarian paper reviews exchange of party cards, Cema session

Budapest MTI in English 1718 GMT 26 Jun 77 LD

[Text] Budapest, 26 June MTI--Sunday's NEPSZABADSAG devotes a major comment to what the communique of the recent HSPW Central Committee session says about last year's revision of the party membership cards and its experiences. The article says that during political consultations of major significance, conversations accompanying the revision of the membership cards, 760,000 party members voiced their opinions. "This also shows that it was not simply conversations between members of the party leaderships and the members, but a comradely dialog within the big family of communists." The party committees have forwarded several proposals of national importance to the Central Committee. Nearly 40 percent of them deals with questions of party life, 30 percent of them with the situation of certain branches of the economy.

"This is the chief conclusion following the ultimate evaluation of the opinions [words indistinct] the conversations and members [words indistinct] says: "The revision of the membership cards has [words indistinct] of the internal life of the party. These experiences will have a stimulating influence on the further strengthening of our whole party life, the democracy within the party, its order and discipline. The essence of tasks in this connection is that in the whole of the party more effective steps should be taken to purposefully use the party forums defined in the organizational statutes, also to make these forums full of content to a larger extent, to defend the Leninist norms and help them prevail, to preserve and encourage the healthy and democratic spirit of debates evolving during the revision of the cards."

NEPSZABADSAG adds:

"During the revision of party membership cards some members were struck off from the list of members or were excluded, this latter only in a negligible number, and some others left the party. In all the party membership was reduced by 20,760, and this affected 40 percent of the basic unity. Over half of the 20,760 left the party by themselves. Their chief motive was: they could not live up to the requirements of membership.
Among them many elderly and retired people left the party because—having left the familiar atmosphere of the party organization of the workplace—they often could not fit into the new environs, to the district or regional basic unit. This is one of the reasons why the Central Committee holds it necessary to revise and to remake in a more flexible way the regulations as for where the retired party members belong (which party unit) and how they can transfer. Only 34 of those leaving the party cited political motives. However, the number of the members of the HSWP—due to the admission of new members in the meantime—has practically remained the same."

Another article in NEPSZABADSAG deals with the recently concluded 31st session of the CEMA. It says that the Warsaw discussions had a working character, first of all. Emphasis was laid—along with the accounts of the work done—on the future of the cooperation of the CEMA countries.

Summing up the results of the Warsaw session the paper writes: "In recent years the CEMA countries have made major strides towards realizing the goals enshrined in the complex integration program. But the future poses even larger demands, therefore, it is the important duty of each member country to, following the guidelines of their parties, incessantly strive to perfect the structure and working methods of their common organization. It can be said in this respect that the work done during the 31st session of the CEMA, and the jointly accepted resolutions, have served well the cause of the socialist community and the progress of each member state."
DEPUTY PREMIER INTERVIEWED ON CEMA MEETING

Budapest Domestic Television Service in Hungarian 1800 GMT 26 Jun 77 LD

[Interview with Istvan Huszar, member of the HSWP Politburo and deputy premier]

[Excerpts] The 31st CEMA session ended in Warsaw last week. Here is
Istvan Huszar, who was a member of the Hungarian delegation at the council
session. He is a member of the HSWP Politburo and our deputy premier.
[live]

[Question] [Passage omitted on reason for holding session in Warsaw] If we
compare previous CEMA sessions with this one, what differences do you see,
what particular characteristics does this one have?

[Answer] [Passage omitted on the observers from Vietnam, Laos, Korea and
Angola and the commemoration of the great October Socialist Revolution]
The session was of special significance because, in my opinion, we received
a comprehensive review of the progress of the program of objectives,
decided on last year and (?proposed) earlier. This CEMA Session defined
further tasks relating to this.

[Question and answer omitted on long-term cooperation plans up to the year
1990 in the field of raw materials and energy, development of the machine
industry, food production, household goods and transportation]

[Question] You mentioned the energy issue and raw material problems.
Energy-saving programs exist throughout the world, even in the rich
United States. Did the Warsaw CEMA Session discuss this?

[Answer] We are talking about long-term programs of objective, about long-
term development concepts, thus current economic issues were not on the
agenda. The problem of energy and raw materials is such that it cannot
be solved by (?small) measures but it can be solved once and for all on the
basis of long-term development concepts. Our negotiations, however, were
not based on a position of an abundance of energy but on the position that
we should use our sources of energy rationally and in joint cooperation to
the benefit of the whole community. It is understood, however, that we
should use them economically. In the long term this means that develop-
ments in every sector of the people's economy—in industry, agriculture,
transportation, everywhere, including certain areas of industry—should be energy-saving and should first of all be in the energy-consuming sectors which are close to the sources of energy.

[Question] The public has long held an old preconception. If something is slightly defective, it can still be sold to our CEMA friends and conversely, too. Did you consider this issue?

[Answer] I like the way you put that. Old preconception. It is very difficult to free ourselves of our preconceptions, although the present does not justify the legitimacy of the preconception. Nowadays it is impossible to sell bad quality goods anywhere—products which are unsatisfactory—and they can be sold only very cheaply and at great expense. The leader of the Hungarian delegation, Comrade Lazar, emphasized with great stress that great discipline and better quality is needed everywhere in industrial development and deliveries.

[Question] We began this conversation by saying that the CEMA is a council. After 3 days at the negotiating table, what did you feel as the Hungarian representative—how strong a voice does Hungary have in this great council?

[Answer] Countries of equal rank, and equal rights participate in CEMA. Everyone participates with the same rights and responsibilities—Hungary also participates with great responsibility and a lot of activity—in the work of the CEMA. I think that the member countries of the CEMA pay attention to what we say, in the same way they pay attention to other countries and I think that CEMA member countries trust the representatives of the Hungarian People's Republic. I think, therefore, that we work responsibly and conscientiously within CEMA, they pay attention to us, and that we are respected members of CEMA.

CSO: 2500
IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE DIVORCED FROM STATE RELATIONS

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 21 Jun 77 p 3 AU

[Article by Pal Racz, Foreign Ministry under secretary of state: "Our International Activity]

[Excerpt] Parallel with trends of growing interstate cooperation, we must make allowances for the process of an intensification of the struggle between ideals, the ideological struggle between the two world systems. This is creating a new and seemingly lasting situation in the present era, for which we must prepare ourselves better than heretofore and to which we must become accustomed. We accept this struggle, but we oppose any endeavor that intends to turn issues of an ideological nature into a matter of official interstate relations.

Everything we are doing in Hungary to effectively bring human rights to perfection—which, incidentally, accords with the contents of the Helsinki Final Document—arises from the building of an advanced socialist society and our humanism and principles. Everything we are doing and many other things besides are a natural concomitant of socialist construction. Thus, they do not come to pass to enable us to earn a good testimonial from our capitalist partners, but because they are demanded by our policy in principle and the normal requirement of the development of socialist democracy.

Also, we profess that interstate cooperation and the ideological struggle come into play simultaneously and they do not necessarily have a reciprocal effect on each other. Peaceful coexistence benefits all sides and, thus, it is a fundamental interest of all countries. The Hungarian government observes and strictly applies the norms of peaceful coexistence. At the same time, we resolutely oppose the practice of a so-called selective coexistence, because it violates the sovereignty of individual countries and harms the international atmosphere as well.

Certain influential political circles of capitalist countries refuse to abandon the goal of dividing the socialist countries. Through underhanded
practices, flattery and other means, they bring some into prominence and, through crude slander and discrimination, they aim to isolate others. However, the division of the socialist countries cannot be the price for detente. Any such attempt is at variance with the cause of detente. Consequently, no socialist country can be isolated and thrust into the background in East-West relations and at international forums on account of the fact that the forms and methods of accomplishment of socialist construction are manifest differently in the country concerned. Although the propaganda campaign and discriminatory treatment launched in the matter of human rights is made to appear to be aimed only at certain socialist countries by the West, it does, in fact, concern the entire socialist community. By all means, we resolutely reject such attempts.
DETENTE: U.S.-soviet relations discussed

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 19 Jun 77 p 3 AU

[Article by Ferenc Varnai: "For Detente"]

[Text] It is understandable if those who ponder the probable development of the world situation pay particular attention to evaluating the development of Soviet-U.S. relations, since the latter affect world peace, the development of European security, the Middle East situation and conditions in the Far East and Africa alike.

We can remember that, in the decades when these two countries of the world--countries alike in their tremendous might, but fundamentally different in their social systems and objectives--sharply opposed each other also in the international political arena, the world was in the grip of the Cold War. And, when the process of detente began, the development of Soviet-U.S. relations was simultaneously the stimulus and reflection of this process. Warlike forces were compelled to retreat.

Demagogy and the Arms Race

However, even if they were repressed temporarily, the forces profiting from international tension have never ceased to exist pursuing an acutely anticommmunist and anti-Soviet policy have again intensified their activity.

In their acts against detente, they are perceptibly pursuing two closely interrelated lines. Attacking the socialist countries, they have initiated a large-scale propaganda campaign to create the impression that human rights are being trampled underfoot there, while they declare themselves as the champions of these rights. Simultaneously, they are trying to throw sand in the cogs of the machinery of the negotiations aimed at curbing the arms race, which operates gratingly in any case.

As for the demagogic campaign pursued over human rights, what we are facing, according to indications, is not some temporary tactic, but a long-term concept. What lies behind this plan is the endeavor to use it, in the period of the sweeping crisis of the capitalist world, a crisis extending to all areas of life, to deter the masses acting with increasing resolve against
the dictatorship of monopoly capital from following the example of the socialist countries and, at the same time, the endeavor to try to make the new U.S. leadership, which, at home and throughout the world, continues its predecessor's policy of gravely violating fundamental human rights, appear as the embodiment of "moral purity."

The Cruise Missile and Politics

Then, according to a proven recipe, the anticommmunist atmosphere thus fomented serves also as "motivation" to intensify the arms race and overturn the agreement prepared in Vladivostok on the limitation of strategic weapons. For, to be sure, the policy pursued by the new U.S. government to date raises a threat of strengthening the arms race and strengthening it, at that, in an area which constitutes a particularly great danger for mankind.

For instance, exempting the so-called Cruise (winged) Missile from the effect of agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons—as the U.S. leadership demands—involves many risks. Instead of a curtailment of the arms race, the systematization of these modern electronically guided, small missiles, which can be launched from land bases, planes, surface ships and submarines alike and the development of appropriate antimissile systems would trigger a new wave of armament. And expenditures would continue to increase by leaps and bounds.

Unfortunately, the attitude adopted by the U.S. Secretary of State at his Moscow negotiations in March showed that the new Washington Administration has deviated from the previous agreements and the principle of equal security and is trying to revert to the policy of unilateral advantages. It is disregarding and revising the agreements concluded by previous U.S. presidents (Nixon and Ford). The attitude of disavowing international agreements concluded by previous governments can hardly be regarded as a policy permeated by an appropriate state responsibility.

Perseverance and Compromise

However, the Moscow talks have shown also that the Soviet Union, which is always ready to reach rational and flexible compromises, does not let itself be blackmailed and that, while it rejects attempts to attain unilateral advantages, it is prepared to continue the talks on the basis of the principle of equal security. Evidently, this has indeed produced certain results. At their Geneva Meeting at the end of May, Gromyko and Vance agreed that the Vladivostok agreements must serve as the point of departure for further talks. However, according to indications, the Americans persist in making the restriction of the production of Cruise Missiles subject to the discontinuation or the restriction of the production of Soviet medium-range bombers—these are not strategic weapons—on the grounds that both weapons have similar ranges. Still, these two kinds of weapons are not of equal value, if only for the reason that the United States has military bases in the vicinity of the Soviet Union's borders, so that, for instance, Cruise Missiles mounted on planes taking off from there can reach the territory of the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union has no bases from which its bombers of the above type could reach U.S. territory.
In any case, it has been agreed to continue the talks on a quantitative and qualitative limitation of strategic weapons with the aim of reaching an agreement.

Who Offers What as Proof?

Another important prerequisite for broadening the policy of detente is the fact that a sober position has been adopted also by West European bourgeois political circles and influential U.S. capitalist groups which take realities correctly into consideration. Since they are interested in maintaining normal relations with the socialist countries, they have gradually adopted the policy of peaceful coexistence and fruitful cooperation between countries with different social systems.

Also, the participation of the capitalist countries' progressive forces is indispensable in the struggle underway for peace and the further development of detente, which constitutes a joint cause of mankind. They help this struggle also, for instance, when the best representatives of the U.S. working people demand that the Washington Government should not offer its demagogic acts against other countries and its intervention in their domestic affairs as proof that it is a champion of human rights, but prove it where it has a realistic opportunity to do so--in the United States.

And, speaking of proof, at the time when Nixon became president, the supporters of progress the world over had many justified reservations toward him, for Nixon had made his name known earlier through anticommunist trials. However, once he assumed the presidency, he was obliged to make realistic allowances for the balance of power and he embarked on the path of the normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations and the limitation of the arms race, which had plunged also the United States into extremely heavy spending. It was not concealed even in U.S. political circles at the time that, following the decades of Cold War, severely anticommunist propaganda, only a politician whose name and past guaranteed that he would not "sell out the country to the Reds" dared to initiate such a turnabout in the United States. (And the Watergate scandal, a run-of-the-mill sordid affair in U.S. political life, was responsible for Nixon's ultimate ignominious resignation, a scandal whose exposure and publication was the consequence, among other things, of an unprecedentedly sharp internal struggle for power in U.S. ruling circles.)

The presidency has now been assumed by a Democratic Party politician who tried to best his Republican opponent by espousing a liberal policy in the election campaign. Is it possible that he now wants to "rectify" the image that he created during the election campaign by his toughness toward the Soviet Union before influential Cold-War circles?

The Lesson Is Meant for Carter as Well

However, Nixon's lesson is meant for Carter as well. It is one thing to pursue an anticommunist policy in the United States, and shaping world
politics is something else again. It took many decades for the present balance of power in world politics to develop and they are not changed through a new U.S. administration's ascendency to power.

Of course, there are and there probably will be setbacks and obstacles in the development of Soviet-U.S. relations. Yet, there is no call for pessimism. Those who would want to return to the Cold War would find themselves up against the determination of the socialist countries struggling to make detente irreversible; the working masses, who have grown very robust indeed in awareness, organization and might; and the multitude of the young countries that have entered the path of independence. This is a force that nobody can overcome, a reality that no one can change. Bourgeois politicians taking into consideration the realities and pursuing a sensible line must realize this. And not even those can escape it who want to torpedo detente under the label of "human rights."

CSO: 2500
ROLES OF POLITICAL UNITS DURING 'SHIELD-76' GIVEN

Warsaw WOJSKO LUDOWE in Polish No 1, Jan 77 pp 45-49

[Article by Col Jan Kordas and Lt Col Jan Dajek: "Organization and Direction of Party-Political Work During the 'Shield-76' Maneuvers"]

[Text] The interallied maneuvers were held under the motto: "In class-oriented alliance and brotherhood of arms, in the defense of peace and socialism." This corresponds to both the present international situation and the peace policy of the socialist community. The character and principles of the conduct of the "Shield-76" maneuvers were consistent with the provisions of the final document of the CSCE concerning the permanence of the process of detente, peaceful coexistence, and security of states. Military representatives from Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden observed the maneuvers.

The "Shield-76" maneuvers were a manifestation of class and ideological unity, brotherhood of arms, and the high degree of preparedness and combat capability of the Warsaw Pact, the unfailing shield of peace and socialism. It is worth noting that the military delegations of all the Warsaw Pact member countries and Cuba took part in the maneuvers, which were led by the ministers of national defense of these countries, and there were also delegations of the armed forces of Mongolia, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.

The maneuvers were an important event in the life of our country and the army. In hosting the soldiers of the allied armies, Poland presented them with the beauty and contribution of our country. From the evaluations already available we know that the Polish side as a host and the Polish army as an organizer of the maneuvers and accompanying political, propaganda, and social events were equal to the task. Polish soldiers demonstrated a high moral and political level, model discipline, and masterly handling of weapons and combat equipment, and, on the other hand, the society extended hospitality and friendship to the soldiers of the brother armies.

The maneuvers greatly enriched the past experience of commanders and staff in the realm of organizing and conducting combat operations under a coalition system. It also provided the party-political machinery with experience in directing and conducting its work during maneuvers of allied armies.
As an exceptionally important and complicated training and ideological-upbringing undertaking, the "Shield-76" maneuvers required both due preparation of the structure of the bodies directing party-political work and the definition of goals and tasks of political-propaganda activity. Use was made of rich experience gained in the past during maneuvers of this type, especially during the "Odra-Nysa 69," "Brotherhood of Arms," "Shield-72," and other maneuvers. This experience showed unanimously that regardless of the structure of the direction of given maneuvers, the ideological-upbringing and training effects gained depended to a great extent on energetically conducted party-political work conducted at all levels of command.

It is for this very reason that several months before the maneuvers began, the Main Political Administration of the Polish Army, in close cooperation with the main political administrations of the other armies involved, after making the necessary arrangements with the central institutions of our army and state, defined the concept of party-political work in relation to the content, form, and methods of operation and the basic arrangements in the realm of directing party-political work. This concept was supplemented by a document which was sort of a program encompassing the intended political-propaganda undertakings in the area of preparing for the maneuvers.

Four basic goals of party-political work were set down:

Maintenance of a high moral-political level and model discipline on the part of the Polish army units taking part in the maneuvers,

Solidifying and deepening friendship and a sense of brotherhood-in-arms among the soldiers of the armies on maneuvers and strengthening their belief in the cohesiveness and strength of the Warsaw Pact countries;

Tightening the bonds of friendship between 'the brother armies' soldiers on maneuvers and the population residing in the areas in which the maneuvers take place, and popularizing the record of achievement and long-range prospects for Poland's further social and economic development;

Improving the way in which the party-political bodies participating in the maneuvers organize and conduct ideological upbringing during combat operations, and upgrading their principles of cooperation with the party-political bodies of the allied armies.

The preparatory period was devoted, among other things, to the meritorical and methodical preparations for maneuvers on the part of the party-political bodies, political machinery, and groups of party and youth activists. The jurisdiction and the scope of tasks and responsibilities of the persons operating at the various levels of party-political leadership were also defined.

In keeping with the concept of party-political work during the maneuvers, principles were established for radio, press, and television coverage, editorial work for a "Shield-76" field newspaper, dissemination of propaganda
materials and newspapers, a supply of cultural propaganda equipment, and so on.

A characteristic feature of the preparatory period was the army Main Political Administration's designation of the basic targets for party-political work way before the maneuvers began, and then, through working consultations with the maneuver instigator group, the central institutions of the defense ministry, and the party-political bodies of the allied armies, the establishment and coordination of all the details relating to or having an effect on the organization of party-political work and the direction of that work.

During the implementation of the adopted program of preparations and the drafting of a detailed timetable for the political-propaganda presentations planned for the time the allied armies were to be in our country, it was found necessary to conduct working meetings between the representatives of the army party-political bodies and local officials of the party and the administration and with the leadership and management of work establishments and schools. These meetings made it possible to compose joint drafts and to establish ways of carrying out the scheduled program of presentations.

In order to draft documentation and coordinate undertakings to insure that the army's party-political machinery was properly prepared for the maneuvers, a permanent working group was created within the army Main Political Administration. The group's tasks were specified in detail, and the members systematically accounted for them. The group included officers of the organizational, propaganda, culture and education, and supply departments. They organized and held the necessary consultations with the representatives of the party-political bodies of the brother armies taking part in the maneuvers, drafted comprehensive documentation related to the direction and conduct of political activity during the maneuvers, and watched over the preparations which subordinate party organizations made for the maneuvers. Representatives of the group also took part in visits to regions of the maneuvers either in connection with arrangements made by the army's general staff or on their own. They also worked in continual cooperation with the maneuvers instigator group and the institutions involved.

Similar groups were created at the level of the political administrations of the military districts and branches of the armed services taking part in the maneuvers. Details of implementation were made dependent on decisions of the heads of the political administrations, because the tasks laid down for the individual administrations varied. Officers working in the working group of the army Main Political Administration went to make up the party-political bodies created for the period of the maneuvers. The situation was similar at lower levels of command.

Three main principles were adopted in the direction of the party-political work.

The first principle concerned cooperation among the party-political bodies of the allied armies participating in the maneuvers. The essence of this
cooperation is expressed in the ideological and defense unity of the socialist countries, the coalition nature regarding a possible future battle, and the needs stemming from army operations, close contact during the execution of combat tasks, or temporary operational subordination. In keeping with the principle adopted, party-political work among the armies on maneuvers was conducted independently, according to the principles and customs adopted by a given army and applied by the political apparatus, the structure and propaganda-cultural outfitting of which was determined by each of the armies taking part in the maneuvers. Tasks in the realm of political work as established by the superior political body for the allied armies pertained only to general problems, without going into internal matters specific for a given army. Cooperation in party-political work was organized and conducted at various levels of command, mainly in the bodies directing the maneuvers.

The second principle concerned the jurisdiction and tasks of the various groups directing the party-political work. The political bodies focused their activity on setting major goals, directions, and tasks for party-political work and on giving assistance and supervising subordinate groups. On the other hand, the party-political machinery in the tactical groups and units worked directly with the subordinate armies.

The third principle was connected to the organization of political-propaganda presentations accompanying the maneuvers. This applied both to undertakings conducted among the armies on maneuvers and those in which the society of our country participated. We adopted the principle that the appropriate party-political bodies of our army would first of all handle the function of coordinating the undertakings in which soldiers of the allied armies took part and the function of organizing the presentations set up among the society.

It can be said that these principles provided the proper platform for conducting party-political work during the maneuvers among the allies. The principles were followed mainly in handling the following matters:

Setting the goals, directions and tasks of party-political work during the maneuvers,
Allocating power and means and establishing who was to carry out the various tasks,
Drawing up conclusions and proposals in the realm of political operations at the various command levels,
Establishing and transferring tasks,
Organizing, using, and disseminating information,
Organizing cooperation in the area of party-political work,
Overseeing and assisting subordinate units,
Establishing the forms and range of television, radio, and press coverage for the maneuvers and setting up the distribution of newspapers and propaganda material,
Exchanging and disseminating experiences and popularizing leading soldiers.
The need to create a joint body to organize the party-political work during the period that the maneuvers were in progress arose out of the interallied nature of the maneuvers and the principles adopted for conducting that work. The group created was the interallied political group, which became part of the staff directing the maneuvers. Representatives of the political bodies of the armies engaged in the maneuvers went to make up the group, but officers of the Polish Army's Main Political Administration made up the main core of the group.

The work of the interallied political group was based on cooperation among the individual armies' representatives, who directed the party-political work in the subordinate armies taking part in the maneuvers, in keeping with its principles of organization and command in the allied armies. There was an interchange of views and experiences within the political group and other allied bodies created for the duration of the maneuvers, like the press center, the publisher of the four-language field newspaper, TARCZA-76, and during the daily briefings the circle of interested parties evaluated the steps taken and defined the directions of action and methods of carrying out joint tasks for the immediate future.

The party-political work in the armies on maneuvers was directed by the permanent political machinery, whose location and tasks was adapted to the organizational structure of the maneuvers. The execution of these tasks was facilitated by the location of the concentrations of the allied armies and the Polish army. The number and size of the groupings depended upon the plan for the course of the maneuvers.

The political administrations of the military districts and branches of the armed services, those administrations involved in the maneuvers, created coordinating groups and propaganda-organization groups. In cooperation with the party-political organizations of the allied armies, these groups took it upon themselves to organize the political-propaganda in their own areas. On the other hand, directional officers with a command of German and Russian were assigned to the various allied concentrations.

The various groups created for the duration of the maneuvers to direct party-political work had clearly specified tasks and jurisdictions.

The interallied political group handled general problems of party-political work. In addition, they directed the following:

- The organization of central political-propaganda and cultural events,
- The work of the press center,
- The publication of the field newspaper, TARCZA-76,
- Shooting of a documentary film on the maneuvers,
- Supply of technical propaganda equipment and cultural-propaganda materials,
- Activity of military bands and artistic groups,
- Organization of exhibitions and a museumobile,
- Provision for the dissemination of publications and propaganda materials.
Through its chief, the interallied political group was under the political affairs deputy to the commander of the maneuvers and worked in close cooperation with the various bodies of the staff of the leadership of the maneuvers. The resolution of all problems of party-political work fell within its jurisdiction. In this connection, it established a suitable system for collecting and circulating information and for overseeing the implementation of the undertakings planned, in order to maintain the proper tenor of political morale, discipline, and atmosphere among the Polish Army soldiers on maneuvers.

The consistent briefings of the directing staff of the interallied political group, in which representatives of the party-political groups of the brother armies took part, made it possible to assess on an ongoing basis the effects of political propaganda and also to introduce the necessary corrections into the plan of operations as needed.

The party-political group created to organize work among Polish Army soldiers engaged in the maneuvers was an integral part of the interallied political group. Besides the political work during the war games, it directed the organization of political-propaganda presentations among the armies and the civilian population. Its responsibilities also included providing for propaganda for the regions of army concentrations and observation points for practical operations, the gathering, drafting, and dissemination of reports (information), and the supervision of party-political work, its effects, and the problems and needs of the subordinate armies.

A special task of this body, like that of the entire political machinery participating in the maneuvers, was activity to insure a high level of political morale, discipline, and proper attitudes among the armies on maneuvers.

The guiding officers from the Polish army's Main Political Administration assigned to the political administrations of the military districts and branches of the armed forces played a large role in the proper direction of the subordinate party-political bodies.

Among the basic tasks of the guiding officers operating in the political administrations of the military districts and branches of the armed forces were the following:

Seeing to the implementation of the plan of detailed political-propaganda undertakings,
Giving help to the political administration in coordinating political-propaganda and cultural presentations,
Maintaining close contact with superiors and, if necessary, referring tasks and instructions assigned by them to subordinate bodies.

The political administrations of the military districts and branches of the armed forces which assigned appropriate strength and means from their depots to participate directly in the maneuvers were engaged mainly in the following:
Mobilization of the armies for perfect execution of tasks during the maneuvers, and influencing the level of their political morale, discipline, and attitudes and their everyday conditions;

The political machinery's meritorical and methodological participation in the maneuvers;

Insuring a high ideological-political level of the political-propaganda undertakings in their area and among subordinate armies;

Coordinating matters concerning presentations accompanying the maneuvers, events in which the population participated, with local officials;

Providing the propaganda setting for concentrations of their own armies, observation points, places where political-propaganda and cultural presentations were organized, and headquarters of maneuvers command;

Preparation of their own artistic groups and bands for appearances during the maneuvers and arrangements for their quarters, as well as for the quarters of the artistic groups of allied armies.

It was a special task of the political administrations to maintain constant daily contacts and to coordinate all the details of joint action with the political machinery of the allied armies in the various concentrations. Separate organizational groups and leading officers accomplished this task.

The work of the party-political bodies and political machinery of the tactical groups and squads of the Polish army participating in the maneuvers was based on appropriate standards documents of the Polish Army's Main Political Administration, which establish principles of political operations at a given level of command under combat conditions. On the other hand, "Materials to Assist Organizers of Propaganda Work During "Shield-76" Maneuvers" was the guide for organizing the presentations to accompany the maneuvers. This material included, among other things, scripts for the most important political-propaganda presentations typical for the maneuvers, and the instructions contained therein at the same time provided proposals for the joint organization of presentations with the allied armies.

The party-political apparatus at the tactical level concerned itself mainly with so-called real ideological upbringing and political propaganda work among the soldiers, during the "Shield-76" maneuvers, just as it does during every military exercise. Here it availed itself of the support of leaders, staff officers, the branches of the armed forces and the armed services, and party and youth organizations. It conducted its work under the conditions of field training, adapting its forms and methods to correspond to the situations and needs and the available means and materials.

In concluding our deliberations on the subject of certain aspects of directing party-political work during the "Shield-76" maneuvers, we can say that the system adopted, which was based on close allied cooperation among the party-political bodies of armies on maneuvers, was proper and effective.
The following factors lay at the heart of the efficient, effective operations of the party-political bodies and political machinery:

Due consideration of the concepts and also of the many details of operations during the maneuvers, and coordination with the allies and, where necessary, with local officials;

Careful definition of tasks and undertakings and establishment of means and equipment for their implementations, along with the proper assignment of jurisdiction among the various bodies directing the party-political work;

Great initiative on the part of political officers, initiative based on knowledge and experience, resulting from their commitment to the implementation of tasks stemming from the lofty goals of the maneuvers.

Because of this, the effects of the ideological upbringing and training work were positive, and discipline was perfect. Occupational safety and hygiene, military secrecy, and the maintenance of vigilance were observed to the letter.

The high military-political effects of the "Shield-76" maneuvers achieved were the result of the proper operations of all the party-political groups which took part in the maneuvers. The undertaking and conducting of continual, effective party-political work both during the preparations stage and throughout the maneuvers should also provide fruit now that the maneuvers are over. The aims of the various levels of the party-political bodies were on many planes and were adapted to current needs and situations. All experience previously gained was used in the interallied political-propaganda activity, and at the same time this experience was enriched with new content and diverse methods and forms.

It should be stated that the properly directed and conducted party-political work during the "Shield-76" maneuvers produced the anticipated ideological-upbringing and training values, expressed in the attitudes of the soldiers and in their discharging their obligations during the maneuvers. This work was effective in popularizing the ideas of defense among the Polish society, especially among young people.
SOCCER PLAYERS FACE FILM STARS AT 23 AUGUST STADIUM

Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 6 Jun 77 p 4

[Announcement: "Performance Organized 'For the Account of Humanity' [Earthquake Relief""]

[Text] The Association of Filmmakers of Romania and the Association of Artists in Theatrical and Musical Institutions in the Socialist Republic of Romania present on Monday, 13 June 1977, at 1800 hours, at 23 August Stadium, an extraordinary musical, sports, and entertainment program, "Film Stars," with the participation of the following stars of Romanian cinematography (listed in alphabetical order): Violeta Andrei, Coca Andronescu, Mircea Albulescu, Stefan Banica, Ion Besoiu, Vasile Boghita, Octavian Cotescu, Ilarion Ciobanu, Jean Constantin, Puiu Calinescu, Nicu Constantin, Iurie Darie, Ion Dichiseanu, Mircea Diaconu, Dumitru Furdui, Vladimir Gaitan, Marin Moraru, George Mihaita, Sergiu Nicolaescu, Dan Nutu, Draga Olteanu, Margareta Pislaru, Irina Petrescu, Amza Pelea, Florin Piersic, Emanoil Petrut, Sebastian Papaian, Dem Radulescu, Victor Rebengiuc, Colea Rautu, Dumitru Rucareanu, Silviu Stanculescu, Paul Sava, Vasilica Tastaman. The team of film actors will be headed by Szoby Cseh in the "soccer match" between the combined soccer team of the Capital and the "film stars" team.

The lineup of the "film stars" team: Florin Piersic, Marin Moraru, Jean Constantin, Stefan Banica, Puiu Calinescu, Nicu Constantin, Sebastian Papaian, Mircea Diaconu, Vladimir Gaitan, Colea Rautu, George Mihaita, Silviu Stanculescu, Dan Nutu, Dumitru Furdui, Dumitru Rucareanu, Dem. Radulescu (captain of the team).

The lineup of the combined Bucharest team: Dudu Georgescu, Raducanu, Vigu, Dumitru, Satmareanu I, Iordanescu, Neagu, Sames, Satmareanu II, Mircea Sandu, Zamfir, Dobrău, Manea, Nastase, Anghelini, Chérán (captain of the team).

Writer Ion Baiesu will be the umpire, Horia Caciulescu, the line referee, Cristian Topescu, the announcer, and Nea Marin, the commentator.
Artistic director: Cezar Grigoriu.

Tickets are on sale at distributors in the enterprises and institutions, at the box offices in the Palace Hall and 23 August Stadium, and at ticket stands at the following places in the Capital: Piata Romana, Bariera Vergului, Piata Moghioros, Podgoria, and Piata Pantelimon.

CSO: 2700
PARTY'S HANDLING OF EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY

Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian No 8, Apr 77 pp 28-30, 35

Article by Dr Teodor Brates: "Decision and Action in Exceptional Situations"

During the critical days of the struggle to remedy the results of the earthquake on 4 March and to rapidly restore all socioeconomic activity, the millions of Romanian citizens had a regular operational program in the decisions of the Executive Political Committee of the Party Central Committee and the directives of the party secretary general at the points where the decisions were being made in the midst of the people and events. The priorities, main directions of attack and ways of implementing the assigned tasks were determined each day. The media of mass communications promptly reported all decisions of the administrative staff to those called upon to act, which was a highly important factor for uniting the efforts to resolve both immediate and long-range problems in a single direction.

The measures taken in this period were considered decisive in the recent joint session of the high administrative authorities of the party and state. The decision adopted at the close of the proceedings pointed out that "The entire effort made under these difficult circumstances again demonstrated the organizational and political capacity of our party, which is successfully performing its role as a political leader of our entire nation, as well as its revolutionary resolve and its close ties with the working masses."

Naturally in an exceptional situation exceptional measures and methods were used. But at this distance it is quite clear that those measures and methods were essential contributions both to the solution of the immediate problems and to the enrichment of the science and practice of management with original elements of the widest theoretical and operational interest.

No doubt in time the researchers will determine the series of lessons to be learned from this experience. Within the limits of this article we can only make a few observations on some factors that the events suggest as promising subjects of theoretical investigation.
Means Subordinated to the End

In the emergency created by the earthquake on 4 March it was necessary to consider the facts rapidly and decisively. From the very start effective individual and collective initiatives were taken in the most urgent directions, according to the particular circumstances in enterprises, districts and communities. But since the effects of the earthquake were national, the effort had to be organized on the same scale. This requirement was met directly by the presidential decree that Nicolae Ceausescu transmitted to the nation by telephone as soon as he became aware of the earthquake. This political-legal action declared the state of emergency and started a decision-making process that had to be extended as the situation developed.

First we note the objective of the effort, which the decree very clearly summed up as elimination of the results of the earthquake, prevention of further losses and victims, and arrangements for the normal course of all socioeconomic activity.

From the analytical viewpoint of the science of management the stage of determining the purpose is vital, especially in the case of action on the level of the entire social system. Transition of this system from one state to a new one involves inertia factors and unpredictable trends, the effect of which can be eliminated or mitigated solely by preparing and applying a coherent and efficient program. The objective stated in the presidential decree combines the requirements of the moment with those of national development as a whole, in accordance with the fundamental aims.

While no effective action is possible without a precise definition of its purpose, it is equally true that the purpose itself is abstract and devoid of mobilizing power unless it is accompanied by adequate means of implementation. The first decision on the level of the entire social system, namely the presidential decree, is indicative of the unity between the means and the end. Urgent measures were adopted which all party and state activists as well as those of the mass and public organizations, the military units and those of the ministries in charge of the power, telecommunications and transportation networks, medical care and supply of the public were called upon to carry out. This again indicated our society's capacity to allow for both the critical elements, in accordance with the needs right after the earthquake, and for the whole, namely the multitude of factors determining mastery of the situation and orientation of its evolution in the necessary and desired direction.

It should first be noted that the planned measures and the forces engaged in implementing them concern the structure and content of the internal social system. The action was started in dependence upon what is called stored energy in management science, namely the decisive forces accumulated in the process of building the new order, the organized forces or the political, economic and administrative institutional structures that can carry out the assignment.

The inner support and the material and spiritual guarantee that the people as a whole can overcome these difficulties and provide for the progress of our entire society lie in what is the vital center of our social system, namely the party's political leadership of society, a leadership dependent upon the people in structure and constantly followed by the people.
The party's intimate contact with the masses on both the political-ideological and the organizational levels, from the basic units in the local organs and every communist's role to that of the higher administration, has become more intensive and profound than ever before during this period. The ways and means employed, which naturally depend upon the conditions of time and place, also convey to us the impression of a generally valid approach. This point was specially emphasized by the party secretary general in his closing speech at the meeting of the high administrative authorities of our society: "Every party committee, every people's council and every activist must even better understand that we can perform our great tasks only in close cooperation with the masses and with a constant concern for every worker."

Judgments and Decisions

After the main objective of the whole effort was defined, a series of analyses made it evident that we must regularly make a series of decisions to directly affect the development of events through organized mass action and awareness of the objective requirements. It was a question of a process, and therefore the measures taken were highly generalized on the level of all social phenomena, and characterized by rapid changes throughout an intensive evolution.

As we know, immediately upon his return from the visit he made to African countries Nicolae Ceausescu and other party administrators inspected the points in Bucharest that had suffered the most from the earthquake. This analysis was required by the series of emergencies and the need of a preliminary evaluation of the situation. And in view of the nature of the phenomena (although the comment also applies to other circumstances), no statistics or reported information could replace direct observation in contact with the facts interpreted in the general sense of the effects of the earthquake, the progress of aid, and the need of forces and means. Moreover the condition of the affected population and the losses to economic and municipal capacities in the other areas struck by the earthquake were evaluated through telephone conversations with the first secretaries of the Party County Committees.

The quantity and especially the quality of the information were the material that was factually analyzed, interpreted and converted to decisions in the working sessions of the Executive Political Committee of the Party Central Committee.

The problem that arose in the effort to accomplish the main objective was that of scheduling the tasks and establishing a priority that would meet the social standards of effectiveness.

Rescue of the survivors came first in the adopted decisions as an aim in keeping with our society's humanistic nature itself. No forces or means were spared to remove earthquake victims from the ruins and wreckage, and heroic efforts were made on behalf of every life. In the same humanistic spirit decisions were made to give medical aid to the injured, to shelter the victims, and to provide the population with an adequate supply of vital products.

The future was also considered, by placing a priority on normalizing economic activity, repairing the damaged enterprises and installations, consolidating
order and discipline, and better organizing production to compensate for the losses and to fulfill the plan tasks.

This stage of the decision-making process revealed some essential characteristics with a validity beyond that of the moment and offering lessons of a general nature. We should like to mention a few of them.

A primary conclusion to be drawn from the experience acquired was expressed very clearly by Nicolae Ceausescu: "The party and state organs will have to make a regular and increasing effort to solve the many living problems of the masses. We must all realize that the activity of the party and state organs must be permeated like a red thread with the spirit and planned policies of the party in regard to further consolidation of its ties with the masses and complete and constant reliance upon the masses."

Meanwhile it should be pointed out in connection with the science and art of management that the nature of the situation was immediately understood, namely the modification of the values and the reciprocal effects between the physical-natural and the social-historical aspects of the human action. This gave rise to a rapid reaction in the distribution of society's resources to meet the new situation. The masses abruptly changed the aim of their activity and major material and technical means were concentrated upon objectives other than their original purpose. This activity was not without its difficulties and defects, but in general neither the major requirements nor the whole, the long-range objectives were overlooked. The fact that the established goals could be reached in a short time indicates the social validity of the measures.

Another factor, flowing from the foregoing one, involves consideration of all aspects of social activity and the main types of human activity, productive, social-political, and educational, in their particular interaction and over a long period.

And finally, the political-organizational and the social-psychological aspects should be correlated. As we have seen, the decisions of the Executive Political Committee adjusted the whole organizational and institutional system to the new circumstances and concentrated it directly upon practical action. As political organs, the party and its organizations guided the whole effort directly. At the same time both the facts and the state of mind had to be exactly evaluated in order to make the psychosocial decisions. Such phenomena as panic, disorientation, resignation and despair had to be forestalled so as to favorably dispose the state of mind and the predominant trend of public opinion to the established purpose. And here we readily see the preponderance of the political factor that was fully manifested. The clear orientation of the activity of the party organizations made of the communists' example, even under tragic circumstances, a veritable tonic and a decisive psychological factor. The communists were always in the thick of it. An entire party was present day and night at the most stricken points, acting calmly and courageously under the most difficult conditions. And in their turn the wide dissemination of the decisions made at the highest administrative level and the timely information about the situation and the progress of rescue work, repair of the damage and supply inspired the population with confidence and resolve, transforming hardship into strength.
All this again expressed the principles of dialectical materialism: People's objective interests correlated in a policy become social aims and are then implemented by people's activity.

The entire effort to rapidly remedy the results of the earthquake and normalize socioeconomic activity clearly had the regulatory character of a directive, which acquired a suitable legal and political-organizational form.

The normalizing system incorporated both generalized party experience, including that in such emergencies as the floods of 1970 and 1975, and new elements as well. If we follow the approach and the solutions to the main objectives in the communiques concerning the sessions of the Executive Political Committee, we find that the evolution of the respective processes, the progress at each point, and the new requirements arising in the meantime were constantly and simultaneously considered.

Forces and means constantly increased quantitatively and qualitatively were assigned to rescue possible survivors (even many days after the earthquake). The first measures to shelter the afflicted population were followed by others to assign housing and distribute furniture and clothing. Once the destroyed buildings were dismantled, they began to consolidate the least damaged ones and prepare final measures. Each communique included precise directions as to the various aspects of the task of restoring and continuing socioeconomic development. The judgments and directions were also unquestionably of a regulatory, obligatory nature. Otherwise no organized or coordinated action could have been taken. But additions and necessary changes, as the case might be, were regularly made in every field. General measures were required under some circumstances and very differentiated ones under others.

We shall cite some significant examples.

In determining measures to repair the damaged industrial capacities as soon as possible, the party administration indicated that their application should be based upon the state of each enterprise and the effectiveness of the structural and technical solutions under the conditions of the earthquake. Consequently capacities were recommended that would be safer to operate and more economically effective. In this connection experience showed that lighter and smaller installations, plastic roofs, simple walls etc. better resisted the earthquake. The analyses and decisions called for immediate cessation of practices that had proved counterindicated, such as excessive use of bridge cranes, irregularities in the structural modification of buildings, and undue ornamentation.

The decisions of the Executive Political Committee went beyond the scope of economics (the critical field of all social development) and touched upon practically all fields of human activity. At the same time and in full accord with the principle of democratic centralism, a number of measures of solidarity with those who had to suffer and of protection of the national wealth and the values of socialism were regarded as directives of a regulatory nature.

The social relations characteristic of our order and the standard system of socialist ethics and justice proved fertile ground for the harmonious combination
of both aspects of the basic organizational principle of party and state activity, namely centralism and democracy. Mutual aid, prompt help to the one in need, purposeful assumption of additional productive and public tasks, and self-reliance in resolving difficulties all interact and combine in a mass action of a pronounced creative and humanistic character.

Central coordination, planning and determination of priorities lent the purposeful action a framework and climate favoring initiative and individual and collective creation. The explanation is twofold: Clarity of purpose generated extraordinary energies, while the institutional, organizational system was employed with a flexibility open to any effective initiative.

The process of fulfilling the assignments involved thousands and tens of thousands of citizens, workers, soldiers, physicians, students etc. whose aptitudes were converted into courageous and truly heroic deeds in the course of rapidly organizing and reorganizing the entire activity in Romania's emergency. Thus the struggle to save lives, to restore and go on developing the economy, and to rebuild Bucharest and other afflicted cities was also a major contribution to the achievement of our society's humanistic ideal of the formation of fully developed personalities.

The Purpose Constantly in View

The approach of the Executive Political Committee and the party secretary general quite strikingly brought out the virtues of control as an essential element of management, and some features of previous experience were intensified and enriched in this field too. We refer to the fact that the existing control structures functioned and rapidly adjusted to the new situation as soon as the action began. The main form was the political control on the part of the party organs and organizations, a control which acquired a pronounced character of direct guidance and coordination. The mass and public organizations as well as a number of specialized state organs exercised control, according to the situation, to say nothing of the internal control of the production workers in operations to restore the damage or in the services field, so that we readily see that there was a mass participation in this phase of management too, as an expression of the democratism of our order.

Of course the quantitative aspect cannot be considered alone. The fact is particularly important that, beginning with the party administration and on all levels and in all sectors, control was based upon an intensive and comprehensive analysis of the situation in its evolution, and that the complex socioeconomic phenomena were examined in their correlation and interaction. The high standards whereby both the central and the local decisions were carried out was a highly significant qualitative element, high standards combined with resolve, objectivity and party loyalty.

The constructive aspect of control was also emphasized, as it was more and more clearly exercised to prevent negative phenomena or repetition of errors, to expedite generalization of the ways and means that had proved effective, and to promote favorable experience.
In discussing the phase of control as a means of checking and of social approval of decisions, we do not mean a separation in time and space of the stages of the act of management. The joint session of the Party Central Committee, the Grand National Assembly, the Supreme Council for Socioeconomic Development, and the central party and state activists under the exceptional conditions at the beginning of March confirmed more pointedly than ever the need, in directing the socioeconomic processes, of simultaneous action in all areas of management from diagnosis to decisions, from organization to coordination, from control to formation of the psychosocial climate, and from justifying actions to analyzing their results. Actually the effort was made to correlate all these phases, in view of the requirement both to carry out the assignments as soon as possible and to accurately coordinate the many aspects and processes subject to purposeful action.

From this standpoint too the communiques concerning the sessions of the Executive Political Committee are an original model of analysis and correlation of all components of scientific management, of direction of a composite activity by composite methods. It was graphically demonstrated that science and practice, decision and action, and execution and control are a uniform whole when they are characterized by a uniform conception. It was also demonstrated that they can always be improved when the uniform conception is itself open to improvement.

We may accordingly conclude that in the confrontation with an exceptional situation the constants, the motive factors, and the factors of duration, development and progress were checked as well as the extensive potentials of the social organism created by the party, and especially the system of democratic centralism, to adjust to the changes and to decisively influence activity in the desired direction, the one stated in the program adopted by the 11th Party Congress, namely construction of the fully developed socialist society on Romanian soil.
BRIEFS

OBITUARY OF SCIENTIST--The collective of the Gastroenterology Center and Clinic announces with deep sorrow the death of the esteemed and distinguished Prof Dr Docent Tiberiu Sparchez, corresponding member of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania. [Excerpts] [Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 6 Jun 77 p 4]

DEATH OF ACADEMICIAN--Academician Prof Dr Docent Coriolan Dragulescu, chairman of the section of chemical sciences of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, professor of inorganic chemistry at the Traian Vuia Polytechnical Institute in Timisoara, director of the Timisoara scientific research base of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and director of the Timisoara Chemistry Center died on 1 June 1977 after a long illness. [Excerpts] [Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 3 Jun 77 p 4]

ORTHODOX CHURCH OFFICIAL--The president of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Archimandrite Ion Cucosel is recognized in the position of bishop-vicar in the diocese of Arad, Ienopolea, and Halmagiu to which he was elected by the Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church on 16 November 1976. [Excerpt] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I, No 45 bis, 2 Jun 77 p 4]

CSO: 2700
SLOVENIAN OFFICIALS STRESS SELF-PROTECTION, NATIONAL DEFENSE

Orozen Speech in Tacno

Ljubljana DELO in Slovenian 12 May 77 p 2

[Text] Ljubljana, 11 May 1977--Today at the instruction center of the RSNZ [Republic Secretariat for Internal Affairs] in Tacno Marjan Orozen, republic secretary of internal affairs briefed reporters who cover the field of people's defense, security, and social self-protection on the principal objectives of the internal affairs authorities in the next period.

Orozen first mentioned that the authorities will endeavor to establish stability, peaceful development, and security of the citizens' persons and property. In this connection efforts will be made to contain crime and other unsavory matters at the present levels if it should be impossible to reduce them.

At this point, he placed special emphasis on prevention; security authorities should primarily contribute to prevention of various punishable offenses and infractions without, however, omitting the measures of repression in instances where laws are violated.

Marjan Orozen said that the preventive system has already been implemented particularly when the authorities began to operate on the basis of security districts instead of sectors so that now every militiaman on his beat is equally alert with respect to traffic infractions, actual crime, and occurrences of inimical activity or violations of constitutional legislation and laws on associated labor.

He also mentioned that positive results already are becoming apparent because the incidence of crime is inversely proportional to the preventive activity.

Among the more useful approaches that will be developed by security authorities, the republic secretary in the first place mentioned research on the causes of punishable offenses and gathering of factually supported evidence as opposed to evidence based solely on statements.
Dore Dovecar, republic undersecretary of internal affairs, speaking on the law on social self-protection, security, and internal affairs, dealt primarily with the specific objectives in implementation of this law and spent some time discussing certain difficulties.

Social self-protection cannot be covered by only one law, it must be considered in every statutory provision and decision. Likewise, people's defense and social self-protection should not be treated as separate concepts because they both constitute a defense structure of our social order which is precisely the reason why we must treat the problems of security and defense together, the security being a prerequisite for effective defense.

"Only after several years of conscious involvement by all of us shall we be in a position to discuss self-protection with much greater facility and accuracy. As it is, it still happens that it is thought in some organizations of associated labor that self-protection is solely the domain of professionals while theirs is the duty to do the work," said Dore Dovecar.

The republic undersecretary emphasized among other things that a militiaman is always a militiaman regardless whether he is in uniform or in mufti. He emphasized that the employees of internal affairs authorities are not only people who are concerned with social self-protection, their most important role is to organize social self-protection and later serve as consultants.

In conclusion Dore Dovecar said that there was no general prescription for implementing social self-protection because this is a matter of each individual person and organization. "Even if we coordinate all the self-managing actions this will not necessarily mean that we have accomplished our objective. We shall succeed only when self-protection truly becomes a part of ourselves."

In the afternoon Franc Bajt and Franc Molan, assistants to the republic secretary acquainted the journalists with the extent of economic crime in our society and preparations for the various activities in connection with the Security Authorities Day.

Orozen Article

Ljubljana DELO in Slovenian, 13 May 77 p 2

[Text] Ljubljana, 12 May 77—following is a reprint of the article by Marjan Orozen, republic secretary of internal affairs published in the recent issue of VARNOST [Security], a publication of the Internal Affairs Authorities employees.

Our society is in all respects developing into a community of working people which provides more perfect material, political, and social conditions for an equal and free development of all people.
Through this, the causes of social tensions, conflicts and deviations that weaken the internal cohesive strength of society and its capability to resist outside pressures are gradually but inexorably disappearing.

Conscious and organized social action and preparedness of the working people under the leadership of the League of Communists and in a self-managing manner are coordinating various interests and by doing so, they overcome contradictions and the spontaneous action of the social—as well as natural—laws. This social action and preparedness implies in essence the broadest possible social measure which introduces new dimensions to the domain of security and protection of the foundations of our sociopolitical order, the feeling of security of the person, his own wealth and the wealth of society.

This all inclusive society's crime prevention program, this awareness, understanding, and readiness for action is, together with the system of self-protection, gradually beginning to evolve into an enduring and well organized action of all working people and citizens in local communities, basic organizations of associated labor, and elsewhere.

It is being implemented with the study and evaluation of the security situation, planning of security, social, personnel, and other standards, measures, and actions of self-protection, by planning security of society's resources under their management, and by crime preventing activities of the self-managing people's protection. In this way protection and security are placed on the broadest possible social base. The broader and the more developed this base is, the more present it is in the universal awareness and action, as an element of the new socialist, communist morality, the lesser will be the opportunities for lawbreaking, social disobedience, and so on, the lesser will be the need for measures of repression and social coercion which we never did nor do we now consider to be the only effective means although of course, we are not relinquishing them altogether.

Our experience so far confirms the correctness of our decision to resolve the instances and cases of individuals whose conduct discredits the achievements of the self-managing socialist democracy in all walks of life, human creativity, and work through a critical and open ideological and political treatment and that not only through administratively repressive measures except, of course, when an immediate threat to the foundations of our constitutional order or constitutional rights and obligations of our citizens is involved.

It would be incomprehensible and contrary to certain interests and goals of the society if our entire security system did not in the course of its operation become involved in these efforts, if it did not encourage and foster the process of developing security into a matter of social concern, if it did not resolutely assert the principle that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and if it did not itself operate in a preventive way.
By posing this question I do not mean to say that the workers of the internal affairs authorities of our socialist republic underestimate or spurn this assignment. On the contrary. There are numerous indications that they, well aware that the processes of socialization are a factual necessity, are jointly with other social agencies taking action to direct, organize, and implement this task.

The preventive mode of operation is gradually reaffirming itself. It is set as the primary goal of the plan of action. Why? This is dictated by the openness of our society and its resolve to remove the root causes of socially adverse occurrences through changes in the worker's socioeconomic situation within the associated labor. We are not stressing this because of some resistances but rather because we wish to overcome and remove as soon as possible the remnants of certain views and ways of thinking from the recent past when the importance of preventive action was clearly underestimated and when it was thought that repressive measures were the only effective way of handling the problems. That was a period when some members of the society thought that security personnel in a "democracy" should maintain a low profile and appear only after an offense has been committed. Who profited from such philosophy? Crime, illegal, and unconstitutional activities but certainly not the socialist self-managing society.

This is borne out by the tendencies in these occurrences which were on the increase during that period. Today every decent citizen realizes that unhindered development of a socialist self-managing democracy requires an effective public security service with clearly defined social responsibilities and equally indispensable strong and effective armed forces for defense against external aggression.

The frequency of incidence of criminal offenses and infractions is inversely proportional with the preventive activities of all workers in the security system, particularly the militia which is the largest public uniformed service highly visible to all citizens and criminal offenders. Its increased public presence "in the field" is inevitable. It must not shut itself in offices, it cannot effectively operate out of patrol cars, over the telephone, responding to calls, and the like. People must see it in an agency that exists for their protection and security. This is the essence of a security district as a basis upon which to build the security system.

Effective preventive operation of the militia has an indirect influence on the work of the rest of specialized services whose task is the discovery of criminal offenders. Inadequate effectiveness and capability of the militia would tend to proliferate the number of employees in these services which would in turn lead to duplication. Effectiveness of a "general" service limits the need for expanding numbers of specialized services, including state security, to a relatively small size. This enhances the responsibility of the militia as well as that of other entities. It is on the basis of its performance that citizens often judge the work of the entire internal affairs authorities organization and form their own opinions about these authorities and its employees. It is not by accident that every instance of discourteous, brutal, and uncivilized conduct draws public comments and furnishes tempting subjects for humorous stories about the militia that may or may not be founded.
In view of this it is not by accident that renewed demands are being made for repeated analysis of educational programs, ideopolitical action within the collectives, special training programs for officers in preparation for their responsible assignments, appreciation of preventive action within the system of personal income distribution, problems of educational value of disciplinary boards, and the like.

Such course of policy would require that in the future the number of workers in the militia be conformed to the adopted systemization of functional positions, that the principle of total and specific responsibility for the security status of a district be fully implemented and, that we do all we can to raise the ideological, professional, and technical level of the entire militia system to an even higher level of day to day effectiveness and preparedness for every contingency.

Consistency in the endeavors to constantly reaffirm in practice the fact that the entire security system of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia is an integral part of the campaign for new social relationships, will undoubtedly constitute the most important contribution of the internal affairs authorities employees to the endeavors of the League of Communists of Slovenia at its 40th anniversary and a token of appreciation to Comrade Tito at the occasion of his 40th and 85th jubilee.

At this occasion I wish to express on behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the People's Republic of Slovenia as well as on my own behalf expressions of appreciation to all workers for their successful collaboration during the last year and extend my sincere congratulations on the occasion of the 13 May holiday of security forces which is with the developing of social self-protection becoming increasingly more a holiday of all working people of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Setinc Speech in Koper

Ljubljana DELO in Slovenian 13 May 77 p 2

[Text] Koper, 12 May 1977--Franc Setinc, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia addressed the Security Day celebration at the Koper theater. Following are excerpts from his speech.

"What is that which we must defend and because of which we are developing the system of people's defense and social self-protection? Certainly not the monopolies and privileges of individuals and special interest groups. Nor is this being done to maintain in power one or more political parties, such as other regimes, state monopoly, and the like. In speaking about defense of our achievements our creativity and our universal opportunities we have in mind the system we are developing in which the working people
are becoming increasingly more independent managers of all public affairs. This independence is based on social ownership, right to work with society's means of production and the inalienable right to dispose with the results and conditions of their present and past labor. This is the freedom of authentic interests of the working people in a system within which the task of the subjective factor, especially the LC [League of Communists] and the state, is to facilitate an egalitarian, democratic and hence self-managing coordination of interests and to prevent any manipulation of people by intermediaries. To this purpose we have dedicated our system of deputies and our Socialist Alliance through which the authentic interests of the working people and citizens are to become free and decisive and where the leading ideopolitical role of the LC must come to the fore in the form of its unique creativity. Our goal is getting the working people to identify themselves ever more closely with the social order we are developing so that they will consider it their own and be ready to defend it at all times. Here I do not only have in mind the threat of aggression but also the socially harmful acts, lack of discipline, and negligence which are gradually eroding or even undermining the results of the working people's creative efforts. Here the system of social self-protection, which, of course, must be firmly rooted in the social base itself, makes an essential contribution to preventive action, that is, to removal of the causes for varied negative occurrences that weaken the fibre of the people's defense. The objective of social self-protection is to insure timely and effective reaction on the part of every self-manager and citizen, each individual self-managing community, political, and social organization to prevent, in cooperation with government agents, any attempt at attacking our commonwealth and especially any attempt at attacking the self-managing rights and material basis of self-management.

Assertion of the Citizen-Self-Manager

In our country we are building a security system based on complete affirmation of citizens-self-managers also in this field. This is something quite different than a police state system not infrequently encountered even in the countries priding themselves on their democracy and system of personal liberties. This, of course, does not imply that we no longer need a high quality and modern professional security system; it means that this system is not a government authority setting itself above the society, rather it is becoming to an ever greater extent a tool in the hands of the people, an instrument of self-management."

Setinc mentioned that the service always has been a protagonist of revolutionary struggle and that the majority of its members always endeavored to raise the service's level of awareness and responsibility which is greatly appreciated by our people. He added:

"Our working people are aware that they must develop a system of social self-protection with a modern, well-developed service of high quality so they may be able to build in peace a new society and a more rewarding life."
In this they are bound to consider the future generations since no one can be indifferent as to what heritage will be left to posterity. What we have accomplished so far is a reliable assurance that we shall not have to be ashamed before history and the generations that will come after us. Although there are still many things that must be done before socialism becomes a definite reality, we can be proud of what we already have. We are discovering new avenues of life at every step. In the first place we can be proud of an enriched cultural life and new ways of thinking of our people. We can be happy with the Slovenians and Italians living side by side in brotherly and creative harmony in this area and with the healthy atmosphere of effective cooperation we established on both sides of the border. This was a substantial contribution to the Osim agreements as a first important practical step in the spirit of the Helsinki agreement. This is also a most persuasive rebuttal of all those who are so fond of finding fault with us."

Setinc then spoke about the awareness of our people who are no longer willing to remain obedient subjects of the state but instead desire to live independently and control their own destiny. Character, not regulations, status, and the like, is the backbone of man-self-manager. He then said:

"Our life has not been easy so far, either. We have gained valuable experience in our struggle when we had to resist pressures from all sides and uphold time and again our truth and, above all, our determination to remain where we are and what we are. We respect friends and even enemies who are accepting us such as we want to be. There are increasingly more people abroad who do not care to indulge in speculations as to what will happen after Tito. They understand only too well that a self-managing and nonaligned Yugoslavia is an important factor of peace and stability in this part of the world. They know us well and they realize no one can destroy or change what Tito and the [communist] party have achieved because the system they have built is so strong that it can outlast the present and future generations. The permanence and continuity of Tito's achievement can be limited by no pro- or post-Tito era. Those who are preoccupied with the question what will happen after Tito are in fact underestimating Tito's work albeit they may seem to praise it."

"At this occasion I should like to underline the leading role of the League of Communists in connection with all essential issues concerning defense and security which also is insured, among other things, with the organization of the people's defense and social self-protection. We also are increasingly more effective in developing the social role of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People which alone can insure that the implementation of the objectives in this domain will be most closely allied with the life interests of the working people and citizens organized in the basic self-managing communities rather than remain merely a task for officials detached from the people."

"An important ingredient of our efforts for socializing the security requirements is the people's defense which is established as a special organizational form of social self-protection in local communities and basic
organizations of associated labor. The formation of people's defense was well received by our people who are ready to take an active part in it. In the people's defense they see a possibility for achieving their rights and obligations, in brief, for effective implementation of their assignments in the framework of social self-protection. This readiness to cooperate in the people's defense must be attributed, among other things, to the fact that people's defense, its accomplishments and its close ties with the people are well known from the time of the war of national liberation."

People's Defense—A Weapon in the Hands of the People

"It should be emphasized that even the present results of the people's defense, modest as they may be for the time being, support the correctness of this decision. Among other things, we had the opportunity to observe the good organization and effectiveness of the people's defense at the occasion of the recent manifestations in our republic. Such examples also can be found in your area. This certainly exerts a favorable influence on the political and security situation in the society's base. No other government authority can substitute for this. The people feel that the people's defense rather than being an extended arm of some government institution is truly a tool in the hands of the people, their means for effective organization of self-protection in the broadest sense of the concept."

Franc Setinc concluded his speech with the following words:

"It is fitting and proper that at the occasion of the important jubilees of Tito and the [communist] party, which are the jubilees of the people as well, the accomplishments of the security service receive special mention. You can be proud of the services you render to the people and the party. For self-management, homeland, and liberty are inseparable. They represent the loftiest values that are worth protecting and defending. We have achieved them under the leadership of Tito and the party. Tito was carried to the top by the irrepressible desire of the Yugoslav people for youth, liberty, independence, and equality in international relations. This is what Tito obtained from the people and that is why he could give so much to the people. All that he could."