Command and Control in Stability and Support Operations: The U.S. Military Support Group-Panama

A MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT


This monograph looks at the complexity, dynamic nature, and challenges associated with Command and Control (C2) in Stability and Support Operations (SASO). Since its inception, the Army has been conducting SASO in both foreign and domestic environments. However, doctrine and institutional knowledge regarding such operations has gone largely ignored due to the overshadowing legacy and mindset of the cold-war warrior. Today's Army is engaged more than ever in SASO, and will likely continue such missions in the future. The formulation and application of a coherent Army doctrine, specifically C2, regarding such operations will help guide the force into the next century. The U.S. Military Support Group-Panama (USMSG-PM) provides a historical model that could be used to shape future SASO C2 doctrine.

First, this study looks at US Army and Joint doctrine regarding SASO and C2, to include the evolution and historical influences that continue to shape emerging doctrine. Secondly, historical background is explored regarding the nature of the US Military Advisory Command-Vietnam and how this influenced the formation of the USMSG-PM. Thirdly, the nature of the USMSG-PM is analyzed to determine the effectiveness of the C2 apparatus and to identify challenges and advantages of such an organization in a SASO environment. Implications and conclusions of the PROMOTE LIBERTY experience are then scrutinized to identify lessons learned in order to enhance and contribute to the institutional body of literature in the formulation of US doctrine regarding command and control in SASO.

It is suggested that the primacy of the political aim and adaptability should form the cornerstones of command and control doctrine in SASO. The military C2 apparatus inevitably becomes part of the political equation due to the complexity and seamless nature of such missions. To aid in meeting the overarching strategy, SASO C2 organizations require forethought and integration with the initial plan and amongst interagencies.

The USMSG-PM offers a framework for SASO C2 by incorporating into doctrine the concept of an established, joint nucleus that could be modified and tailored based on the situation. This core element could be comprised of both military and civilian personnel versed in the unique components of SASO, ready to provide a rapid response to emerging situations and able to train augmentees and units tasked for support. This would allow deployed units to focus on the mission rather than the construction of the SASO C2 infrastructure. As the U.S. Army forges its way into the 21st Century, it is challenged to look at models from the past and develop relevant, effective C2 in SASO.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout its inception, the United States Army has participated in a broad spectrum of missions ranging from full-scale war to operations other than war. Although the Army’s fundamental purpose is to fight and win the Nation’s wars, military operations other than war encompass a “wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than large-scale combat operations.”¹ Other than war missions have been conducted on both foreign and domestic soil, as the Army used its force to protect the nation’s interests and support others.² The Army often conducted these other than war operations because it was the only organization with the training, leadership, skills, and resources available to do the work.

However, doctrine and institutional knowledge regarding operations other than war has gone largely ignored due to the overshadowing legacy and mindset of the cold-war warrior. Spanning a period of over 45 years, the cold-war shaped how the Army prioritized readiness issues and its missions. The slow adaptation to the post-cold war environment has led to contemporary criticism that the Army is having a difficult time transforming itself to reflect the unpredictable challenges in today’s world environment.³ Slow transformation has occurred despite the fact that the Army has participated in 33 deployments since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, compared to only 10 in the previous 44 years.⁴ The US Army must remain flexible and competent in preparing for and responding to the full range of conflict that it may be called upon to execute.

The range of Army operations is captured in such capstone documents as Field Manual 100-1, The Army and Field Manual 100-5 Operations. Both manuals identify that the Army needs to be prepared to execute missions across the spectrum of conflict while
also being prepared to integrate the complexities of joint and coalition partnerships. Contemporary examples are captured in the full-scale conventional warfare as conducted in the Middle East with Desert Shield/Storm and in operations other than war as in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. While relatively comfortable with conducting full-scale war, the Army is challenged to continue to develop a balanced perspective and refine its doctrine and role in operations other than war.

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) doctrine is currently undergoing review within the Army as the shift from the cold-war mindset gains momentum. The emerging term of stability and support operations (SASO) will likely supercede MOOTW as the spectrum of other than war missions is scrutinized and doctrinally refined.\textsuperscript{5} SASO by its very nature is complex, dynamic, and asymmetric. The range of other than war missions encompasses a broad range of missions such as peace operations, foreign internal conflicts, combating terrorism, and counterdrug operations.\textsuperscript{6} Such missions require a combat ready force that is flexible enough to negotiate when appropriate, but responsive and lethal enough to fight and win if challenged.\textsuperscript{7}

For these reasons it makes sense to examine whether the Army is adapting and keeping pace with its increased role in SASO, and to see if lessons can be gleaned from past experiences. Past experiences can provide valuable insight and assist the force as it forges its way in the ever-increasing demands of SASO missions. Specifically, the lessons learned from establishing tailored command and control apparatuses, could provide valuable insight into the development of future doctrine and mission enhancement.
The post-conflict mission in Panama, OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY, is one such mission that could render valuable lessons regarding SASO. The year long nation building operation that followed OPERATION JUST CAUSE was complex, joint, and was challenged to adapt to an evolving situation. Analysis of the formation of the Military Support Group Panama (USMSG-PM) in OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY can serve as a valuable model regarding command and control in a SASO environment.

This paper will first look at US Army and Joint doctrine regarding SASO and command and control, to include the evolution and historical influences that continue to shape emerging doctrine. Secondly, historical background will be explored regarding the nature of US Military Support Groups in Southwest Asia and how this influenced the formation of the post-conflict formation of the USMSG-PM. Thirdly, the nature of the USMSG-PM will be analyzed to determine the effectiveness of the USMSG-PM and identify challenges and advantages of such an organization in a SASO environment. Implications and conclusions of the PROMOTE LIBERTY experience will then be scrutinized to identify lessons learned in order to enhance and contribute to the institutional body of literature in formulating US doctrine regarding command and control in SASO.

II: SASO: Past, Present & Emerging

The closure of this century has prompted the Army to review its past and seek to divine and define its role and relevance into the 21st century. Spanning the last two centuries, historical precedence illustrates the Army’s continued involvement in SASO. Although not all inclusive, examples of the wide array of SASO missions are reflected in the Army’s participation in a multitude of missions. Examples include the
Reconstruction after the Civil War (1865-1877), nation building in Cuba (1898-1902), intervention in Panama (1918-1920), reconstituting the civil infrastructures of European nations after World War II (1949-1951), pacification efforts in the Republic of Vietnam (1960’s-1973), nation building in Haiti (1994) and ongoing peace operations in both Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). This diverse range of SASO missions, both foreign and domestic, demonstrate that SASO operations are not “nontraditional” missions; Army precedence and current trends indicate that such demands placed on the Army will be greater than ever. Introspection of past and current doctrine is essential to execute the overhaul and refinement of how the Army communicates its role, relevance and doctrine regarding SASO into the next century.

Past doctrine regarding SASO is colorful and controversial as the Army struggled to reach consensus on terminology and the nature of such missions. At the turn of the century the concept was captured in such terms as “small wars,” “intervention,” and “reconstruction.” From the 1960’s into the 1980’s, doctrine development and experience gained in Southwest Asia and Central America resulted in the term “low intensity conflict” (LIC). In the last decade to the present the terminology has evolved and transitioned from “nation building,” to “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), to the emerging “stability and support operations” (SASO). Controversy, debate, and understanding of the exact nature of SASO are still ongoing in today’s military. A common understanding and consensus is needed to provide clarity to SASO doctrine. Regardless of the exact phrase used, all of the above terms capture the same overarching concept of present day SASO.
The overarching concept of SASO is entrenched in military operations that support social, political, economic, and informational actions. Such operations are also complex in both concept and execution. They can precede, occur simultaneously, and/or follow war. SASO missions by their very nature require versatility and creativity with execution being “limited only by the needs of the country and the imagination of military leaders.” At first glance, it appears the nebulous nature of SASO inherently contributes to the confusion regarding terminology, definitions and refinement of doctrine. However, with introspection it soon becomes apparent that even in “conventional war” such characteristics exist.

Carl von Clausewitz captured both the need for military leaders to have imagination and their constant challenge to overcome uncertainty. He states, “if the whole is to be vividly present to the mind imprinted like a picture …it can only be achieved by the mental gift that we call imagination” and the uncertainty of war is captured in his depiction of “chance” and “friction” of war. The characteristics of mental agility and imagination lend themselves to successful operations and leadership across the full-spectrum of conflict. Complexity, uncertainty, and constant adaptation to the situation and mission are characteristics to be found in both war and SASO. Additionally, both possess general principles that serve as a guide to attain success. Principles for SASO are identified in both Joint and Army doctrine, however, current doctrine regarding SASO continues to be plagued by the lack of common terminology and doctrinal consistency.

The most comprehensive and authoritative guide to SASO principles is captured in Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.
This publication stresses the primacy of political considerations; political primacy calls for additional SASO principles from those captured in the principles of war. Principles of SASO include the objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. The last three SASO principles are not noted in the principles of war. JP 3-07 also clearly communicates that although the principles of war primarily are linked with large-scale combat operations, they can generally be applied to SASO through different means. This is important to note since forces involved in SASO should be prepared to conduct combat operations if the situation escalates. While Joint doctrine continues to solely use the term MOOTW, Army doctrine uses the terms of both MOOTW and SASO interchangeably when outlining the principles.

Current Army doctrine regarding SASO continues to be plagued by the lack of a common terminology and doctrinal consistency. FM 100-5, *Operations*, mirrors the same SASO principles captured in JP 3-07 with the minor exception that the Principles are arranged in a different order. Of note however is the fact that FM 100-5 fails to identify and capture the “primacy of the political objectives” that is so clearly laid out in JP 3-07. In the Final Draft, FM 100-20, *Stability and Support Operations*, Army doctrine regarding SASO Principles differs with the Principles laid out in FM 100-5. FM 100-20 adds two additional SASO principles not captured in FM 100-5; they are *primacy of the political task* and *adaptability*. FM 100-20 comes closer to capturing the concepts outlined in JP 3-07, even though the terminology used is slightly different.

In addition to SASO Principles, doctrine also identifies Types of Operations in SASO. FM 100-5 and FM 100-20 are synchronized with JP 3-07 regarding the types of SASO the Army could be called upon to perform. JP 3-07 is all inclusive in outlining the
Types of Operations the Armed Forces could perform, whereas FM 100-5 highlights only those missions that the ground forces could be called upon to perform. FM 100-20 lays out the Types of Operations in a different sequence than JP 3-07 and FM 100-5, and uses slightly different terminology. However, after close scrutiny it captures the FM 100-5 List of Actions (referred to as Types of MOOTW Operations in JP 3-07) and expands on the same concepts captured in Army manuals and Joint Doctrine. Since FM 100-5 serves as the keystone to Army doctrine, it is paramount that it clearly identifies concepts laid out in Joint doctrine and provides overarching consistency and clarity concerning terminology and concepts within Army doctrine.

Consistency and clarity regarding SASO will remain difficult to achieve as long as conflicting doctrinal viewpoints are expressed regarding the relevance and the Army’s role in such missions. While FM 100-1, The Army and FM 100-5, Operations establish the historical roles and relevancy of Army participation in SASO the biggest injustice to this message is conveyed in the Final Draft, FM 100-20, Stability and Support Operations when defining adaptability. Phrases such as SASO is “outside the scope of its [the Army’s] usual interests” “Army leaders must adapt their thinking to unfamiliar purposes and methods” and “the Army must realize its potential for many useful but nontraditional activities” communicates that SASO is an anomaly. The term “nontraditional” is raised again when providing examples of training resources. This is in direct contradiction of the message laid out in FM 100-1. 17 This is exactly the cold-war warrior mindset that needs to be overcome and enlightened for the Army to embrace and tackle SASO with the same clarity it seeks with war operations.
Regarding *adaptability*, emphasis should be placed on the characteristics of mental agility and imagination. Of which, both characteristics lend themselves to successful operations and leadership across the full-spectrum of conflict. The previous edition of FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, captures *adaptability* as the "skill and willingness to change or modify structures or methods to accommodate different situations." This superceded definition captures adaptability as a key ingredient to the success of SASO and should be incorporated into contemporary doctrine. Adaptability is important in that it facilitates the Army enhancing its potential to be a learning organization, able to leverage opportunities and create the conditions for successful operations.

It is in this ability to create and anticipate that can enhance the command and control (C2) apparatus in SASO. This is because Joint and Army doctrine specify that no single C2 option works best for SASO due to the unique nature and requirements of each situation. Joint and Army definitions for C2 are verbatim and the examples and concepts in doctrinal writings compliment one another. The *Joint Command and Control Doctrine Study*, dated 1 February 1999, provides a detailed review of Joint doctrine regarding C2. It concludes consistency, adequate depth, and C2 concepts and principles are tailored to serve each joint publication’s purpose, to include SASO. Of note, JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, describes command as central to all military action, and unity of command as central to unity of effort. It also describes, in detail, command relationships. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, provides a comprehensive framework regarding C2 and the characteristics for successful execution. JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, gives C2 options for US unilateral
operations as well as multinational force organizations. Flexibility and unity of effort are consistent themes in SASO C2 in both Joint and Army doctrine.

The Army’s emerging doctrine regarding SASO operations is closer to the synchronization that currently exists between Joint and Army C2 doctrine. Emerging doctrine in the Army regarding SASO clearly identifies the historical precedence of such operations, the diverse nature of stability and support, and portrays how such operations can be conducted across the full spectrum of peace, conflict and war. The types of SASO operations laid out in the Army’s emerging doctrine dovetails with the types of operations outlined in JP 3-07. If adopted, emerging Army doctrine regarding SASO could forge a clear, consistent, and comprehensive depiction of characteristics and conditions that will enhance a common understanding throughout the Army institution. However, due to some of the current ambiguity that still exists in approved Army SASO doctrine, the definitions and concepts in the Joint publications will serve as the authoritative baseline when assessing the characteristics of the USMSG-PM in OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY.

The examination of historical precedence, current and emerging ideas regarding key doctrinal terms and concepts is intended to enable a shared common understanding of basic tenets regarding SASO C2. The Joint and Army doctrinal terms and concepts regarding SASO and C2 are paramount to address prior to taking a critical look at the USMSG-PM in OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY. Historical precedence, current doctrine, and emerging doctrine all impact on assessing the effectiveness and shortcomings of how the USMSG-PM was formed and implemented. The genesis for the formation of the USMSG-PM lays predominantly in the Army’s past experience in
It was the merging of the institutional knowledge of the past and the application of the complexities in OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY that lent itself to the unique nature of the USMSG-PM.

III. Genesis of the USMSG-PM

On December 20, 1989, the US military descended onto Panama and launched a swift combat mission that became known to the world as OPERATION JUST CAUSE. This warfighting mission captured the eyes and ears of the world as the US armed forces achieved its aims of creating an environment safe for Americans, ensuring the integrity of the Panama Canal, providing a stable environment for the freely elected Endara government, and bringing Noregia to justice. JUST CAUSE ended on January 3, 1990 as the US achieved its combat aims. However, the end of JUST CAUSE did not mean the end of US military involvement in Panama. A lesser-known mission, OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY was launched concurrently with OPERATION JUST CAUSE, exemplifying the complexity, simultaneity and seamless nature SASO operations can take.

As the invasion came to a close, OPERATION JUST CAUSE transitioned to the nation building mission of OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY. Initially, the military C2 SASO organizations formed concurrently during the conflict lay with the Commander Civil-Military Operations Task Force (COMCMOTF) and the United States Forces Liaison Group (USFLG). The COMCMOTF was charged with restoring government services. While the “USFLG was created as an ad hoc organization to provide the means to get a Panamanian police force on the streets in conjunction with US forces and to coordinate anything arising in the public security arena.” However, a desire for an
overarching C2 organization emerged to synchronize and oversee the sustained, complex, and potentially long-term nature of the post-conflict mission.

The proper organizational structure to oversee the restoration of Panama was an issue of thoughtful contemplation and introspection as the leadership considered lessons learned and the previous C2 structures used by the military, primarily those utilized during the US experience in Vietnam. On December 25, 1989, General James Lindsay, CINC, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) secured permission from General Thurman, the SOUTHCOM CINC, to assess the restoration situation in Panama and propose a long-term organizational solution. He appointed a colonel from USSOCOM to go to Panama with the mission to coordinate with elements on the ground, research doctrine, and use his own experiences in Vietnam to propose an organizational structure to oversee SASO C2 in Panama.

The colonel proposed two C2 organizations, based on the historical precedence used in Vietnam and Central America respectively. Initially the colonel put forth the interagency concept of forming a military and civilian structure based on the historical model of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), Vietnam. However, General Lindsay opposed the formation of an interagency organization, instead, he envisioned a “more doctrinal structure that was entirely military rather than interagency.” This guidance led the colonel to develop the notion of a military support group, derived from the doctrinal Security Assistance Force (SAF) which would place Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Combat Support forces all under the same command. He proposed this element would be commanded by a general officer and be subordinate to
the existing Joint Task Force (JTF). At the same time the USSOCOM colonel was researching and preparing C2 options, Brigadier General William Hartzog, J3 USOUTHCOM was also contemplating the same issue. He sent officers to collect regulations on the historical precedence of MAAGs used by the US in Vietnam.28 The hindsight of historical precedence and lessons learned allowed OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY to remedy some of the challenges faced in Vietnam, however other challenges once again reared themselves over two decades later as leaders grappled with the dynamics and complexities of C2 in SASO.

C2 and the Vietnam Experience

The US experience in Vietnam is richly captured in personal accounts, historical analysis, and official memorandum. However, much of the doctrine and institutional knowledge regarding pacification, SASO, and the challenges regarding C2 in such an environment were not embedded in the Army experience as a whole. The Vietnam experience was one that many of the leadership partaking in the Panama operation had participated in first hand. It was this personal dimension that sought to rectify lessons learned regarding C2 in Vietnam in order to apply it to the unfolding, SASO environment of Panama. However, some of the same challenges emerged two decades later ranging from the organization and mission, the leadership, command relationships, interagency coordination, personnel shortcomings, and perceptions of the host nations capabilities.

Organization & Mission

The Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) were both joint, C2 organizations in Vietnam that metamorphosed through the years. The MAAG-Indochina was approved in September
1950, starting out as a small US contingent that was designed to assist and advise the French colonial forces in Vietnam. The MAAG’s initial mission was that of an advisory role. It included monitoring the distribution and use of US equipment by the French, managing procurement, and monitoring French and Vietnamese training on the US equipment. By 1967, the MAAG’s purpose in Vietnam had evolved into assisting the South Vietnamese, their government, and their armed forces to defeat Communist subversion and aggression and “to attain an independent non-Communist society functioning in a secure environment.” The MAAG attempted to help the South Vietnamese forces attain an ability to become self-sufficient and successful against their enemies without the assistance of large numbers of US forces. However, the US role expanded and evolved thus influencing the formation of a new command and control apparatus.

The US established a unified headquarters, the Military Assistance Command (MACV), in February 1962. Its mission was to coordinate all US military activities in South Vietnam. It initially controlled all US Army support units in Vietnam as well as the MAAG advisory program; working directly with the South Vietnamese government on overall military plans and operations. The MAAG was disbanded in May 1964; its functions then integrated into the MACV. By the mid-1960’s, the MACV’s role expanded to include executing combat missions, training the South Vietnamese forces, and overseeing the advisory role. In 1967 the MACV’s mission statement was to “assist the Government of Vietnam in defeating the insurgent Viet Cong and the North Vietnam Army forces in extending governmental control throughout the Republic of Vietnam.” By 1971, the MACV role in South Vietnam was fast reverting to the original mission of
the MAAG, to function solely an advisory effort. The C2 apparatus was continually challenged to adapt to the complex, fluid political-military situation in Vietnam to remain relevant and effective.

**Leadership**

Throughout the years, the military leadership influenced the effectiveness and nature of the C2. Initially, the US military attaché, Colonel Lee Harris was temporarily put in charge as the acting MAAG chief. The military’s original proposal was for a 2 or 3 star general to be put in place, however the State Department opposed and succeeded in blocking this idea because they believed it would impinge on the prerogatives of the Ambassador. Within a month, however, a compromise was reached and the Department of Defense was successful in assigning Brigadier General Brink as the Commander of the MAAG.

Brink was fifty-seven years old at the time of his appointment and had spent most of his military career serving in the Pacific Theater, bringing with him extensive experience in Asia. Selection of Brink as the first commander of the US forces is in sharp contrast to the last US military commander to serve in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland who had no special preparation for the political-military situation in Vietnam. “His expertise lay in the areas of tactics, training, and management, and his abilities in the realms of strategy and politics were untested.” Through the years military commanders were not necessarily selected for their knowledge and experience in the region; ranging from the area expert to the novice in operations short of war. In addition to understanding the culture, the historical perspectives, and implementing an
effective US role in country, Commanders were additionally taxed with an elaborate set of responsibilities and chain of command.

**Command Relationships**

The MACV was an extraordinarily complex headquarters. The US commanders mission was greatly impacted not only due to his knowledge of the region, but also due to the challenges faced by the complex command relationships and the multiple roles required of the command. The MACV Commander was triple-hatted, serving concurrently as the Commander of US forces Vietnam, Senior Advisor to South Vietnamese armed forces, and as the Commander of US Army Component Command.\(^3\)

It was primarily an Army organizational structure, staffed primarily by army personnel and commanded by an Army General, even though it was a joint or inter-service headquarters.\(^3\)

The MACV fell directly under the US Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) in Hawaii, technically this is who they were subordinate to. However, the MACV commander in reality often by-passed the CINCPAC and often worked closely with the American ambassador in Saigon, dealt directly with the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff in Washington, DC and subsequently with the Secretary of Defense himself. The personality of the MACV commander often dictated how the flow of information was executed and how the chain of command was actually executed. For example, although one of General Westmoreland’s duties was as the Army component commander in Vietnam, the MACV commander often bypassed the Pacific Army Component Commander based in Hawaii (USARPAC); preferring to use the direct relationship he had established with the Army Chief of Staff in Washington DC.\(^3\)

The multiple duties
of the MACV commander afforded him a wide range of options and liaisons that he would ordinarily not have at his disposal; within his intricate command structure the commander was challenged to forge cooperative civilian-military relations to enhance mission effectiveness.

**Interagency Coordination**

A complex military C2 structure and the necessity to forge interagency cooperation further taxed MACV Commanders. The military structure consisted of units that fell under the operational control (OPCON) of the MACV, those Commands that existed in country that did not fall OPCON to the MACV, and those in which coordination and cooperation was expected. In addition to these military relationships, developing and maintaining good relations with attaches, the Ambassador and interagencies was paramount to a synchronized effort. However, by 1957, the MAAG organization had evolved into one that had strained relations with all these “nonmilitary” liaisons. The sentiment of the times was captured by MAAG Commander Lt. General Samuel T. Williams who professed to “see no value in having attaches in countries which also had advisory groups.” The interagency rivalry was difficult to dispel and created an atmosphere of suspicion as organizations vied for limited resources, flow of information, and perceived legitimacy. The effectiveness of the MAAG and subsequently the MACV rested on its ability to seamlessly integrate civil-military operations that were aimed at achieving a greater political aim. The inability to do so resulted in delays to execute missions, bureaucratic infighting and personality clashes.
Personnel Challenges

Although the command climate greatly impacted on the nature of the interagency relationship, additional tension resulted from the personnel challenges faced since the inception of both the MAAG and MACV. For example, the MAAG’s initial cadre consisted of approximately 30 personnel. However, the US quickly realized that the MAAG was understaffed and unable to execute its duties adequately without more personnel and it quickly grew to over 65 within a month. Within five years the MAAG staff had ballooned to over 352 personnel assigned. Despite the incremental growth of the personnel assigned to the MAAG-Vietnam, short tours and constant personnel rotations impacted on expertise and continuity. By 1959, tours for MAAG personnel in Vietnam ranged from 2-years accompanied and 1-year for unaccompanied. Just as personnel became proficient in their duties and the operational environment, they rotated out of country and were replaced by novices. Due to the personnel challenges, establishing an adept staff and fostering institutional knowledge remained a challenge that continually plagued the organization.

Another challenge faced in the personnel arena was that of linguist support. There remained a shortage of US personnel trained in both the Vietnamese and French languages. Vietnamese linguists were needed to coordinate with the local populace in executing pacification efforts while French linguists were preferred in dealing with the elite South Vietnamese government officials. Also, when the MAAG supported the French, the lack of Vietnamese linguists hindered full communication and understanding of how the US equipment was being used. This language barrier often prevented thorough monitoring and training by US forces on the equipment provided to the French
and then directly to the South Vietnamese. In order to sustain positive relations with the South Vietnamese and to placate officials back in Washington, most reports depicted unit ratings as “very good” or “excellent.” The language barrier prevented clear communication between the military forces and indigenous population, ultimately hindering US effectiveness in reaching the local populace and interacting with the South Vietnamese military.

Culture, Military, & the Political Aim

Clear communication was also tested due to the cultural differences between the US and Vietnamese. Mandatory cultural training on Vietnam was instituted over a decade into the mission and the US military came to view the Vietnamese Army as being an inherently weak organization. This was based on issues ranging from internal corruption, lack of training, and the ability of the Viet Cong to infiltrate the South Vietnamese ranks. In addition to a weak military, South Vietnam also suffered from political instability. The political instability had a direct impact on the US military goal to support the south and to get it functioning independently. A key lesson learned was that the MACV did not “render South Vietnam as independent of US support … the question of how [they] were to continue the war alone was completely sidestepped.” The Vietnam experience highlights the complexity of SASO, the need for a cohesive link between military and political objectives, and a flexible, dynamic C2 organization to effectively oversee and implement the mission.

Implications for Panama

Although certainly not all inclusive, the challenges highlighted regarding C2 in Vietnam are relevant due to the reemergence of the same issues over two decades later in
OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY. The Vietnam and Panama SASO missions do not have comparable political situations or the same degrees of US military involvement. The differences in location, cultures, US role, mission and endstate captures the diverse nature of SASO. The common thread in both is the challenges faced in forming, sustaining and evolving a relevant C2 structure in SASO. By looking at the past and drawing from previous experience, the leadership in Panama envisioned a C2 organization that would effectively deal with the post-conflict mission in Panama. Ultimately, General Hartzog concluded that the organization they were forming in Panama had the primary function of “support,” thus he coined the name “United States Military Support Group-Panama” (USMSG-PM). This was the C2 organization born to oversee and organize the US post-conflict mission in Panama.

Section IV: USMSG-PM

The overriding mission of the USMSG-PM was “to assist the Joint Task Force-Panama (JTF-PM) in the execution of the short and long-range stability and nation building operations in Panama.” This unique C2 organization, the USMSG-PM, was officially activated on 17 January 1990 and disbanded a year later on 17 January 1991. It was intended to synchronize and meet “nationwide challenges against the full range of threats to the Panamanian democracy, economic stability, and territorial integrity.” Created to anticipate and adapt to the complex, fluid situation in Panama the USMSG-PM was challenged to remain effective and relevant in executing the post-conflict mission. Unity of effort was paramount as the USMSG-PM integrated and synchronized a multitude of tasks within the US military, among a multitude of interagency’s, and in coordination with the host nation.
The Commander USMSG-PM was to develop infrastructures within Panama which could be self-supporting and self-maintaining. He was told up-front that rebuilding Panama would be a difficult task and he would be hard pressed to meet its many demands. Initial challenges identified included the ability to:

...muster in-country, regional, and global US and international assets to conduct foreign internal defense (FID), civil affairs (CA), civic action, and psychological operations (PSYOP) to build/rebuild enduring political, economic, and human service support structures which will assure Panama its rightful place among the family of nations.\(^5\)

No small task, the USMSG-PM operations had to focus on harmonious relations with the Government of Panama (GOP), the US Embassy's Country Team, and creating and sustaining enduring mechanisms. To do this the USMSG-PM had to remain cognizant of the intricate, complex legacy of US-Panama relations and precedence set by the relationship between the GOP and the Panamanian military especially in the realm of in-country infrastructures. This understanding was paramount in executing effective C2 in the SASO environment. Not making the same mistake as in Vietnam, the question of how Panama would become self-sufficient and carry-on without a strong US presence was addressed up front. A broad overview of the US-Panama historical, entangled relationship is provided to illuminate relevant, key issues the USMSG-PM would have to contend with.

**Scene Setter**

The US and Panama have a rich, intertwined political-military history dating back to the mid-1800's, this relationship shaped the contemporary challenges faced by the USMSG-PM in executing their restoration mission. The USMSG-PM was challenged to provide a supporting infrastructure while allowing the fragile Endara government to
publicly take the reigns and ultimately take responsibility for Panama's success or failure in returning to a democratic system. While an entire historical recount cannot be made here, some highlights are relevant in understanding the perspective and precedence set by the past. The historical nature of the US military presence in Panama, the unique characteristics of Panama's democracy, the creation and subsequent developments of the Panamanian National Guard and the cultural traditions of the region all bore relevance in creating and executing post-conflict programs.

**US-Military Presence in Panama**

The relationship between the US military and the government of Panama has been complex, starting in the late 1800's and continuing into the present. Between 1850 and 1900, the US intervened thirteen times as Panama struggled through forty political administrations, fifty riots, and five attempts at succession from Columbia. In 1903, the US lent military and political support to the Panamanian secessionist party and extended formal recognition of Panama on 6 November. Without the military presence of the US, it is unlikely the Republic of Panama would have achieved or maintained its independence from Columbia. Within two weeks, in return for making the republic's independence secure, the US obtained the right to construct, operate, maintain, and defend the Panama canal. This same year the US sent the Marines to Panama to protect the railroad crossing the isthmus and provide security for the canal construction.

Through the years the US military presence expanded as the Pentagon "saw Panama as a foreign country in a strategic location where military bases could maintain a US presence in the hemisphere at relatively little cost." In 1915, the Army established a formal headquarters and in 1941 the US Caribbean Defense Command was formed to
assume operational control for air, land, and sea forces in the region. This joint presence expanded through the years, into what became the contemporary US Army Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), as US-Panama military relations continued to take shape, marked by periods of relative harmony as well as strain.

Although many factors contributed to the tensions, one dominant issue that remained a constant was the Panamanian desire for sovereignty and a diminished in-country role of the US. The canal that brought the US and Panama together also drove them apart. Ultimately a diplomatic resolution was achieved in the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties, which represented a turning point in US-Panamanian relations. It was a complex, phased agreement in which over two decades the US agreed to gradually withdraw from the Canal Zone, ultimately turning the canal zone over to Panamanian control. The advent of the treaty fulfilled Panama’s vision to independently embrace her nation without a US military presence come 31 December 1999.57

The phased handover of the Canal Zone was temporarily interrupted with the US invasion of Panama in 1989, OPERATION JUST CAUSE. Although popular sentiment received the US military as liberators from the heavy-handed rule of Noreiga, it was a fragile sentiment that could quickly change if the US was perceived as reneging on the long-term spirit and conditions of the treaty. It was this delicate balance that the USMSG-PM had to maintain as it forged forward with restoration in OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY.

Panamanian Democracy & Military Influence

Another issue the USMSG-PM had to contend with was the restoration of Panama’s “democracy.” However, a review of the Panamanian political setting reveals
that restoration of democracy was an inaccurate description of what was to take place. "While the Panamanian government had been based on a constitutional framework and electoral process, it would be erroneous to refer to a democratic legacy that could be restored."58 The political system in Panama was marred by nepotism, corruption, and the absence of fair and honest elections conducted by the general populace. From 1903 through World War II, Panama experienced internal political discord due to the concentration of political power in the hands of a few traditional upper class families. These families built an oligarchy consisting primarily of old families of Spanish decent.59 Shortly after the war, in 1951, "political corruption and economic adversity exasperated Panama’s tense political climate."560 This resulted in the impeachment of the Panamanian President Arias; when he refused to vacate the presidential palace it was stormed and taken over by the Panamanian National Police Force.

The institution of the National Police Force emerged as a political protagonist, with Jose Antonio Remon at its helm. Remon converted the National Police into the National Guard, modernized the force, and with the power of the institution behind him frequently manipulated the political process. He used his power to install and remove presidents with ease.61 In 1952, Remon resigned from the National Police Force and became the nations President. It was during this time that the National Police Force fully transitioned to the National Guard, resulting in a paramilitary force that was closely intertwined with the civilian political process. The National Guard was empowered over the next three years as it grew in size, received increased US assistance and participated in joint maneuvers with neighboring countries. Its powers were tapered in 1955 upon the assassination of Remon.
The next twelve years witnessed relative stability of the government as elections were held and new Presidents ushered in, however the oligarchy returned and was challenged by growing socio-economic unrest. A turning point in Panamanian politics took place in 1968 when Arnulfo Arias, a controversial military officer, won the presidential elections. To thwart its independence, he immediately directed changes in the leadership of the National Guard. However Arias misjudged the degree of camaraderie in the Guards upper echelon as they united, conducted a coup, established a provisional junta, disbanded the National Assembly and all political parties. Political attention then shifted on the make up of the junta, meanwhile, a new leader arose in the National Guard, Omar Torrijos Herrera.

Omar Torrijos quickly consolidated political power, brutally suppressing the opposition utilizing the Guard’s Intelligence Unit to identify his enemies. He held in check civilian institutions and political parties while empowering the National Guard with continued power and influence. He encouraged Guard officers to profit from their position in government and he personally promoted officers frequently. He further empowered the force by retaining both military and police force responsibilities that defended the regime, by way of repression and human/civil rights violations. It is believed many of the officers were involved in illegal activities such as arms and drug smuggling. The National Guard continued to be shaped by Torrijos’s policies and legislation that he endorsed.

The 1972 constitution, introduced by Torrijos, made the National Guard the country’s primary political institution. He came to refer to his rule as a “dictatorship with a heart” and designated himself as the “Maximum Leader” of the Panamanian
By 1978, Torrijos stepped down as the head of the nation and legalized political parties in order to gain US support for the proposed canal treaties. Despite this show of “democratization,” political power remained in the hands of Torrijos and the National Guard. From 1968 until Torrijos death in 1981, the National Guard continued the expansion, militarization, and professionalism that had begun under Remon in the late 1940s. Following Torrijos death, the National Guard continued to dominate Panamanian politics as a successive plan was drafted and Manuel Noreiga ultimately took the reigns of power.

The military leadership jockeyed for positions within the Guard after Torrijos death and ultimately compromised on a successive plan. This occurred in March of 1982, with the “Secret Plan Torrijos: The National Guard’s Historic Compromise Timetable.” This plan is an example of the organized and long-term vision the Panamanian military had regarding political control of the nation. This conspiratorial plan, outlined by names and dates, the order in which military leaders would assume the position of the military commander-in-chief and subsequently when these leaders would then run for the presidency. Noriega was earmarked to become the commander-in-chief from 1987-1989. However, he had his own agenda and by 1983 this preplanned hierarchy was disrupted by the behind the scenes manipulation and rise to power of Manuel Noreiga.

In August 1983, after Noreiga took power, the Guard’s independence grew with the creation of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF). The PDF incorporated the National Guard, the police, the Canal Defense Force, the traffic department, the immigration service and the small naval and air forces. Noriega promised the National Guard that its reorganization would prepare it to defend the Panama Canal in accordance with the 1977
treaties as well as continuing its role in the nation's internal defense and development.

Like Torrijos, Noreiga appointed military officers to leadership positions within the PDF and placed them in key positions in a number of governmental bodies. Additionally, the military's involvement in the drug and arms trade, which started under Torrijos, flourished under Noriega's reign. The landmark legislation, Law 20, widened the scope of PDF authority and autonomy. Of note, it placed the control of all airports and port facilities under the PDF, granted the military the arbitrary power to close down the press and arrest civilians, and took away civilian authority to exercise dismissal of any PDF commander. In effect, what remained of the democratic process was eliminated and the PDF, specifically Noriega, was in firm control of the nation.

Starting in 1987, a series of events escalated the domestic political crisis in Panama ultimately leading to the US invasion. The rise of Noriega to power and the orchestration of pro-government demonstrations and anti-US riots in 1987 heightened US concerns. On 26 June 1987, the US Senate approved a resolution calling for democracy in Panama and threatened to suspend US development aid and military assistance. Within one month military assistance was cut off. Tensions between the US and Panama escalated in February 1988 due to two key events, the indictment by US Attorneys of Noriega on drug charges and the consolidation of power by Noriega after he won a stand-off with the Panamanian President, Delvalle. By mid-March, the US imposed Economic Sanctions against Panama and encouraged the PDF to oust Noriega. However, PDF coup attempts remained unsuccessful.

On 15 December 1989, tensions mounted between the US and Panama. The National Assembly approved a resolution stating that "the Republic of Panama is
declared to be in a state of war" with the US, due to the "aggression" directed at Panama in the form of the economic sanctions imposed in 1988. On 16 December 1989, the death of a US Marine killed at a PDF checkpoint and the harassment of a Navy Lieutenant and his wife who witnessed the checkpoint incident served as a flashpoint, ultimately culminating with a US military response and combat operation, JUST CAUSE.

As JUST CAUSE was being conducted, simultaneously OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY was initiated. Within weeks the USMSG-PM was formed. The USMSG-PM had to contend with the historical legacy of US-Panamanian relations, the nature of Panama’s democracy, and the ingrained role and traditions of the PDF. For 20 years the military ruled Panama, now the USMSG-PM was tasked to dismantle the PDF, rebuild it in the image of a police force and enable the fragile civilian government. Looking at the same topics as those used when assessing the US MACV, Vietnam, a review of the USMSG-PM will be made by comparing and contrasting the organization and mission, background and expertise of the leadership, command relationships, personnel issues, and perceptions of the Panamanian capabilities.

Mission & Organization

Initially conceived as a purely Army organization, the USMSG-PM metamorphosed itself just as the MAAG and MACV headquarters had in Vietnam. Both SASO C2 elements ended up having the following traits in common; they were tailored, joint, ad hoc command and control organizations that remained dynamic and flexible to meet the demands of evolving mission requirements. While counterparts in Vietnam had to shift assets and organization focus due to changing US policy, the USMSG-PM had to contend with the same type of organizational dynamics for different reasons, to shift
focus and resources as the phased military operation unfolded and gradually was turned over to civilian agencies. Adaptability to evolving mission demands and organizational structure was a common trait to be found in both C2 organizations.

The operational idea of the USMSG-PM can be traced back to a concept paper prepared in January 1990, by Colonel Harold W. Youmans, Special Operations Command (SOCCOM), for General Thurman, CINC USSOUTHCOM. It is here that the initial foundations and intention of the USMSG-PM were established. The leadership recognized that the post-conflict stability operation required a C2 operational design that would remain flexible in an emerging, dynamic environment. Leaders also recognized that SASO C2 was subject to political constraints, funding limitations, and evolving circumstances with the host nation. Specifically they considered emerging policy agreements between the US and the new Government of Panama (GOP), Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS) agency agreements, the level of available funding to execute SASO operations, the speed at which the GOP infrastructures emerged as viable self-sustaining institutions, and the deployment/redeployment decisions regarding US troops. The conception of the USMSG-PM was intended to address the wide range of considerations and tasks required in SASO C2.

This initial proposal identified success for OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY as the establishment of "stable democratic and economic institutions in Panama." From this, the proposed mission of the USMSG-PM was "to facilitate the [US governments] ability to assist the growth of these institutions." This broad, overarching mission statement served as a springboard for what was to become the original, approved mission statement for the USMSG-PM. Upon official activation and staffing, the initial mission
of the USMSG-PM embodied unity of effort for restoration by streamlining all military SASO responsibilities to the USMSG-PM. It became the military focal point, its mission was:

To conduct nation building operations in support of JTF-PM and, when required, support the development of civil and governmental infrastructures throughout the Republic of Panama. The USMSG-PM is the single focal point for coordinating, conducting, and approving all DoD nation building missions, tasks, and responsibilities in Panama.74

In the ensuing months the mission statement became refined and modified to meet the evolving situation in Panama. Within 60 days, the USMSG-PM continued to focus all DoD nation building efforts within Panama and was specifically tasked to “develop infrastructures which can be self-supporting and self-maintaining.”75 The USMSG-PM’s mission statement ultimately embodied a broader scope intended to seamlessly integrate the military effort with the political aim, its mission became to “conduct civil military operations to ensure democracy, internationally recognized standards of justice, and professional public services are established and institutionalized in Panama.”76 In addition to an evolving mission, the USMSG-PM also had to contend with ongoing changes and shaping of the C2 organization itself.

The fluctuating composition of its own headquarters as well as the make-up of subordinate units were constantly shaping the organization of the USMSG-PM. Originally the general framework of the USMSG-PM was designed as purely an Army organization, however, the desire to transform it into joint headquarters soon followed. Transformation to joint proved to be challenging due to complications regarding acquisition of personnel.
Secondly, the composition of subordinate units changed and fluctuated due to the Commander USMSG-PM’s desire to streamline the organization, units being reassigned to other headquarters, and the ongoing turbulence caused by units deploying/redeploying to support the mission. The Commander, USMSG-PM pushed for a much “flatter organization.”77 This resulted in the elimination of many headquarters elements of deployed units, allowing the units to fall directly under the USMSG-PM. Additionally, use of existing organizations was made, such as placing the Special Forces under the existing Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).78 Throughout the yearlong mission the USMSG-PM had to adapt to the fluctuation of unit rotations, which translated into initiation of new, subordinate commanders on the ground as well as the troops executing the mission.

Thirdly, interagency liaison responsibilities and support requirements fluctuated. For example, the US Embassy Country Team relied heavily on the support and augmentation of USMSG-PM personnel during the initial phases of the operation, due to the limited manpower it had in-country. As the US Embassy rebuilt its presence in-country the USMSG-PM gradually was able to reduce direct support. Changes were also made internally in the USMSG-PM, for example liaison duties were delegated from the headquarters to the Military Police elements actually on the ground working with the Panamanian Police Force. The Commander of the USMSG-PM reflected, “it has been a case of making sure you can react to the situation as you see it evolving on the ground and not be afraid to change the organization to reflect [change] without being too disruptive.”79
The SASO operations charged to the USMSG-PM entailed a wider scope than just the execution of its military missions, awareness of the primacy of the political objective had to be incorporated into the spirit and application of these missions. The primary objective of the US government after JUST CAUSE was to restore “law and order in Panama to enable the new free and democratic government to function.” The perception that the success or failure of the new Government of Panama ultimately rested on the achievement of US objectives placed the USMG-PM in both a political and military realm of responsibility. Many of the units participating in the mission had not trained on SASO and had little to no experience in such operations. It was a challenge the Commander, USMSG-PM met head on.

**Leadership**

Mirroring the regional expertise Brigadier General Brink brought to the Vietnam mission with his experience in the Pacific, the Commander of the USMSG-PM was well versed in Latin America. Colonel James J. Steele was selected and assumed command of the USMSG-PM on 17 January 1990. He was hand-picked by General Thurman to Command the USMSG-PM and was personally brought into theater for that purpose. Colonel Steele had worked with General Thurman in the past, so when the Panama operation took shape, he contacted the General and volunteered to become a part of the operation. At that time, he was on the Army selection list for promotion to Brigadier General and was biding time in a staff job following his recently completed command of an armored cavalry regiment in Europe. Colonel Steele’s experience with the conventional force was rounded out by his exposure to unconventional operations.
Steele brought unique credentials to work C2 SASO in Panama due to his regional expertise as a Latin American Foreign Area Officer, his fluency in Spanish and his experience as a former commander of the US Military Group-El Salvador. He had a reputation for getting things done, and that is exactly what the USMSG-PM needed at its helm. Getting the USMSG-PM established and fully resourced remained a challenge, from his perspective Colonel Steele notes:

As you look at this from a lessons learned or doctrinal perspective the issue of organizing some kind of a core element to go in and do this mission has got to be taken into account well before the combat operations ... Obviously you can’t use a cookie cutter approach totally on it. But you need a core headquarters [established in-country that] you can build on given the specifics of the scenario you are given ... For the most part we didn’t do a very good job of that from the outset. So we’ve been struggling in terms of just trying to do the mission and put together the organization simultaneously. Which has been difficult at times.

Although the basic mission and organization of the USMSG-PM had already been established, prior to appointing Steele as the commander, his vision and leadership clearly shaped the organization. Of all his accomplishments, his greatest frustration remained his desire to shape the USMSG-PM into a joint organization with a stabilized, experienced cadre. The specifics regarding this issue will be further discussed below under the header personnel. Suffice it to say that Colonel Steele had the challenge of working within the established structure, command relationships and the assets they were able to bring to the organization.

Command Relationships

Just as in Vietnam, the command relationships in Panama were complex. However, the Commander USMSG-PM had a clear military chain of command and was not triple hatted as the Commander, MACV. The diversity and inherent cooperation between interagencies continued to exist. The USMSG-PM exercised operational control
over the Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS), and other units such as the Engineers and Military Police assets contributing to the nation building mission. The USMSG-PM was directly subordinate and under the operational control of Joint Task Force-Panama (JTF-PM). The United States Commander in Chief South (USCINCSOUTH) exercised operational Command over Joint Task Force-Panama (JTF-PM). The formation of JTF-PM and USMSG-PM was intended to have the effect of refocusing USSOUTHCOM to regional commitments. Nonetheless, USSOUTHCOM still had command oversight and maintained a staff element focused on monitoring the nation building policy and its operational execution. All US Army forces/units/individuals participating in the nation building effort were assigned or attached to US Army South (USARSO).88

In order to execute effectively their nation building activities, all subordinate elements of the USMSG-PM were expected to coordinate with the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and the Country Team, as appropriate. All active duty Army assets were attached to USARSO while deployed and under the operational control (OPCON) of the USMSG-PM.89 The C2 relationships can be clarified by understanding the difference between attached versus OPCON, in accordance with command relationships as defined in FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics. The attachment of Army units under USARSO was due to their temporary, deployed status requiring the in-country, established command of USARSO to provide sustainment support such as quarters and rations. This allowed the newly formed USMSG-PM to focus on mission requirements and leave the day-to-day support requirements to the
established infrastructure of USARSO. OPCON status allowed the Commander, USMSG-PM to exercise command authority over the identified units. This made them subordinate to him and empowered the USMSG-PM with the authority to organize, employ, assign tasks, and give authoritative direction to such units to accomplish the mission.\textsuperscript{90} The USMSG-PM was also responsible to provide mission support, monitor and coordinate with units and agencies outside of their direct, military command relationships. Interagency coordination and support was a key ingredient to achieving a synchronized endstate.

**Interagency Coordination**

The military leaders in Panama did a much better job in tackling their interagency duties than their Vietnam predecessors. The CINC set the tone for interagency coordination in Panama by stressing the military units under his command make “comprehensive and integrated efforts”.\textsuperscript{91} Colonel Steele believed that interagency coordination was a “major success story” of the USMSG-PM. He believed the atmosphere of cooperation and the experience of the people involved allowed them to accomplish a lot with limited resources.\textsuperscript{92} The USMSG-PM interfaced with over 22 agencies and worked directly with the US Embassy on nation building programs.\textsuperscript{93} The embassy and State Department were organizationally and programmatically unprepared to respond to the post-conflict mission. General Thurman noted that due to this, the USMSG-PM “filled the vacuum in helping the Panamanian government when the Embassy Staff was suppose to be in charge of these activities.”\textsuperscript{94} The USMSG-PM continued to support the Ambassador to ensure continuity and a smooth transition.
Although the USMSG-PM did not work directly for the Ambassador, they worked closely with him and usually executed the tasks and policy that he set forth. The Ambassador’s guidance was incorporated into the USMSG-PM’s mission planning and daily execution. He stipulated four tasks to the USMSG-PM; the break up of the PDF, ensure civilian control of the public forces, expedite getting training and equipment into civilian hands, and avoid involvement in domestic politics. This last task of avoiding domestic politics remained controversial. The very nature of the USMSG-PM had political overtones, however to meet the Ambassadors intent they avoided getting themselves embroiled in GOP debates. This delicate balance required input and design to Panamanian infrastructures while ensuring the GOP set the strategy and ultimately became self-sufficient.

The complexity and diverse number of elements and issues the USMSG-PM had to contend with inevitably meant some interagency issues remained unresolved. Interagency coordination was not seen by all as a success. Although not specifically pointed to the USMSG-PM, Richard Shultz assesses the overall effort. He contends that the DoD failed to execute adequate interagency coordination in both the planning process and in the post-conflict mission. He offers this overall assessment of the Panama effort:

Looking back on the experience in Panama, it is evident that the US government was programmatically and structurally ill-equipped for the situations that followed the fighting. It lacked integrated and interagency political, economic, social, informational, and military policies and strategies to support short-term conflict resolution and longer-term stability development.

While it is true that there existed a lack of interagency unity of effort on the part of planning the SASO mission, once activated, Colonel Steele and the USMSG-PM made
the best out of the existing situation on the ground and aggressively, cooperatively interfaced with the necessary components.

**Personnel Challenges**

For different reasons, personnel turbulence plagued the USMSG-PM just as it had the MACV. Colonel Steele's desire to shape the USMSG-PM into a joint organization was never fully realized and remained a point of contention. In hindsight he acknowledged that trying to make it joint was a mistake because only the Army had committed itself to staffing the USMSG-PM. During initial planning stages, the design of the organization was not joint, therefore only the Army had coordinated for personnel fills. By reducing the Army portion to 50-60%, to make room for other service component billets, the organization ended up understaffed. The original/proposed personnel strength of the USMSG-PM was 53 total staff. All enlisted personnel and civilian administrative employees were required to have extensive, advanced computer skills. Upon activation the projected personnel strength was 77 total. The C2 element would continue to expand and contract throughout the year.

Additionally, the USMSG-PM was burdened with the constant turnover of personnel, most notably the reserve augmentee's. While an active duty core existed, they were still dependent on the civil-military skills and manpower the reserves brought to the mission. Since a reserve call-up had not been implemented, the reservists were volunteers with a tour of duty of 31 days. Colonel Steele conceded that the "MSG's civil affairs people had a real turnover problem. They were very good at some things, but you have to evaluate just how competent such an organization can be." Personnel turbulence could have been minimized if the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued an
involuntary call-up of Reserve Civil Affairs units and the Pentagon had given priority to multi-service, personnel fills. Such support would have enabled the USMSG-PM to have continuity, experience and the right military skills on-hand to steer the military’s post-conflict effort.

Culture, PDF, & The Political Aim

The rich history between the US and Panama and the appointment of a FAO as the Commander, USMSG-PM allowed for an informed, common understanding of the historical and cultural context of the region. This knowledge and experience drove the focus of the SASO effort and how it was executed. Colonel Steele understood and supported the GOP’s sensitivity in wanting to ensure it projected independence and its desire to prevent the perception that the US was running the nation. The USMSG-PM sought to stay in the background and encouraged the development of independent decision-making and implementation within the GOP. For example, the USMSG-PM recognized the importance of developing personal relationships to effectively execute its liaison missions and gain the trust of the GOP leaders. Additionally, they supported the GOP strategy regarding the dismantling of the PDF and the establishment of a Police Force. According to MSG documents, 100% of all PDF Colonels and 83% of all Lieutenant Colonels were excluded from positions in the new Police Force, and at least 50 leaders were under arrest due to exposed financial corruption. This strategy was intended to weed out the most senior leaders while allowing for the majority of the ranks to continue employment and become a part of the post-Noreiga solution.

The PDF was disembodied and a National Police Force subordinate to the GOP was established. The Air and Naval forces were made into Air and Naval services,
denied combat training and tasked to perform transport services only. The former PDF responsibilities for immigration and prison supervision were reassigned to civilian agencies. However, changing attitudes was a difficult if intangible task. The success or failure of the new Police Force rested solely with the GOP, with US agencies lending support and expertise where needed. The USMSG-PM was only one element involved in supporting the GOPs strategy.

**USMSG-PM: Success or Failure?**

The success or failure of the USMSG-PM mission can be judged in the short and long-term by the inextricable and interdependent political-military aim of establishing a democracy in Panama. This goal was achieved, within the year of the operation commencing and continues close to a decade after the withdrawal of US forces. The USMSG-PM played an important role in stabilizing the nation; it provided advisory support to the GOP, worked side-by-side with the new Police Force, and dedicated resources to the local populace by building schools, roads, and supporting community programs. By setting the conditions for Panama to ultimately assume responsibility for established infrastructures and government programs, the USMSG-PM played an invaluable role in facilitating the solid, long-term solutions to Panama’s political stability. Although the USMSG-PM was faced with many challenges, and certainly could not do its mission without a multitude of supporting agencies, it ultimately contributed to the stability and support of Panama’s lasting democracy.

**V. Implications for Future C2 in SASO**

OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY was the largest effort by the US in “nation building” since Vietnam,\(^{109}\) both experiences illustrate that command and control in
stability and support operations is complex and challenging to execute. While the Army
is well versed in preparing for and executing war, it needs to incorporate a SASO into its
training and address post-conflict strategy when forming war plans. This is difficult to do
because,

Few leaders look forward to the third day of war, the day after the fighting stops. It is
just as important to win the peace as it is to militarily defeat the enemy ... Conflict
termination is an essential link between national security strategy, national military
strategy, and post-conflict aims—the political effects desired. This holds true for both
war and measures short of war.110

Today’s army is engaged more than ever in the “third day of war.” The
formulation and application of a coherent Army doctrine regarding such operations will
help guide the force into the next century. Primacy of the political aim and adaptability
should form the cornerstones of command and control doctrine in SASO. The military
C2 apparatus inevitably becomes part of the political equation due to the complexity and
seamless nature of such missions. To aid in meeting the overarching strategy, SASO C2
organizations require forethought and integration with the initial plan and amongst
interagencies.

Interagency support and cooperation are paramount to effective military C2 in
SASO. Today’s military leaders must possess the skills of both a lethal warrior and a
tactful diplomat. Understanding of the environment, culture, and perceptions of the host
country are integral components in forging harmonious liaisons. The attitudes and
experience of the military leadership often sets the tone for military-civilian interface and
mutual support. Ultimately, the team effort contributes to achieving both the political and
military aims. In Panama, the CINC set the tone for clear communication, a spirit of
cooperation, and the ultimate responsibility for the GOP to become self-sufficient.111 The
goal to facilitate the host nation in becoming self-sufficient empowers them to create and invest in their nations future. By remaining out of the limelight, SASO C2 organizations can provide the resources and stability needed by an emerging government, allowing it to seek legitimacy as it becomes established.

Most of the shortcomings identified in SASO C2 organizations can be traced back to the ad hoc nature in which they were formed. The USMSG-PM offers a framework for SASO C2 by incorporating into doctrine the concept of an established, joint nucleus that could be modified and tailored based on the situation. This core element could be comprised of both military and civilian personnel versed in the unique components of SASO, ready to provide a rapid response to emerging situations and able to train augmentees and units tasked for support. The challenge would then be focused on mission support verses putting together the organization and trying to resource it by using out-of-hide assets or relying on the unpredictable nature of volunteers. Reoccurring challenges such as personnel strengths, available specialties, filling joint billets and stabilization could be addressed up-front and resolved prior to activation.

Dr. Shultz offers, “the MSG should serve as a conceptual model for the development of doctrine, an area in need of serious attention within the Department of Defense.” As the U.S. Army forges its way into the 21st Century, it is challenged to look at models from the past and develop relevant, effective C2 in SASO.
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ENDNOTES


2 John O. Marsh Jr., “Comments on Low-Intensity Conflict by Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr.,” Military Review, February 1989, 2-3. John O. Marsh was named Secretary of the Army by President Reagan and took office on January 30, 1981. When he retired from the position on August 14, 1989, his tenure was the longest of any U.S. military secretary in history. In 1988, he served concurrently as Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations and low intensity conflict. The U.S. Senate, in a rare move, adopted a resolution citing Marsh for his stewardship as Army Secretary.


5 United States, Army, Field Manual 100-20 Concept Paper, “Subject: Stability Actions and Support Actions,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, 1999) 1-12. This Concept Paper consists of emerging doctrine and is not intended to be used as an authoritative, approved doctrinal source for Stability and Support Operations (SASO). The overarching concepts and terminology from the Concept Paper are referred to in order to capture contemporary ideas regarding SASO. The term SASO will likely replace the term Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The term SASO is a doctrinal term and is defined in Army publication, United States, Army, Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 30 September 1997), 1-143.. Section II of this paper will clarify doctrinal terms in further detail.


Follow-on chapters in both FM's address specific operations. The term "political" is often interchanged with the term "diplomatic" regarding SASO. See also Colonel Richard M. Swain, "Removing Square Pegs from Round Holes: Low Intensity Conflict in Army Doctrine," Military Review, December 1987, 12.

Colonel Richard H. Taylor and LTC John D. McDowell, "Low Intensity Campaigns," Military Review, March 1988, 3. Taylor identified over 10 years ago the full spectrum of SASO, he uses the then common but now outdated term of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).

For consistency in this work the term SASO will be used to identify military operations other than war.

The basic meaning of a learning organization is an organization that is continually expanding its capacity to create its future, learning that enhances our capacity to create, versus the sole function of survival.

Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (see also battle command, command, commander, and command post (CP).) See FMs 7-20, 7-30, 71-100, 71-123, 100-15, and 101-5.
21 United States, Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Command and Control Doctrine Study*, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: USACOM, 1 February 1999), EX 1-EX 21; IV-1 – V-1. This publication was prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

22 United States, Army, *Field Manual 100-20 Concept Paper*, “Subject: Stability Actions and Support Actions,” 1-12. This Concept Paper consists of emerging doctrine and is not intended to be used as an authoritative, approved doctrinal source for SASO.


29 Ronald H. Spector, *The United States Army in Vietnam Advise and Support: The Early Years, 1965-1973*, 115-116. Five years later, on November 1st, the name changed to from MAAG-Indochina to MAAG-Vietnam because a separate MAAG-Cambodia had been established.


34 United States. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, “HQ USMACV 1971 Command History, Volume I” (Alexandria, Virginia: Hq Department of the Army (DAIM-FAR-RA) Information Management Support Agency, 1971), vii. During this time period US combat forces were withdrawn from country in a rapid phasedown; this required the MACV to limit its role due to diminishing capabilities and the changing US policy towards supporting South Vietnam.


39 Ronald H. Spector, *Advise and Support: The Final Years, 1941-1960*, 14, 50. Note: Spector provides a line & block chart of the MACV organization as it was in 1965, inserted between pages 50 and 51. See also, United States. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, “HQ USMACV 1971 Command History, Volume I,” provided is an organizational chart of the MACV as it was in 1971, 122-123. These charts highlight the complexity of the command by depicting elements under the Operational Control of the
MACV, those that executed what was termed Coordination & Cooperation with the MACV, and those elements that were a separate Command, not under the Operational Control of the MACV, 123.

40 The United States. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, “HQ USMACV 1971 Command History, Volume I,” 123. The term Coordination & Cooperation is taken verbatim from the Command History, an example is the MACV was expected to have Coordination & Cooperation with the US Mission Counsil.


42 Ibid.


44 Ibid, 256.


50 United States Special Operations Command, Memorandum for Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, ATTN: J3, Quarry Heights, Panama, Subject: Organization of Nation Building Forces (MacDill AFB, Florida, January 8, 1990), 3.


52 United States Special Operations Command, Memorandum for Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, ATTN: J3, Quarry Heights, Panama, Subject: Organization of Nation Building Forces, 3.


60 Thomas M. Leonard, 28.


63 Thomas M. Leonard, 41-42.


65 Richard H. Shultz, 7-8.

66 Thomas M. Leonard, 42-43.

The PDF attempted two separate, failed coup attempts against Noriega. The first attempt was made in March 1988, when the Chief of Police, Colonel Macias gathered approximately 20 officers to overthrow Noriega. However, Noriega's intensive intelligence/informant network warned him of the plan prior to the attempt so he was able to foil it. The second attempt occurred 5 October 1989, led by Moises Giroldi. This failed coup attempt is controversial due to the PDFs belief that the US would assist them if they took proactive measures against Noriega. Upon seizing Noriega the PDF attempted to turn him over to US custody only to be turned away by SOUTHCOM. Kevin Buckley, 130, 197-208.


Ibid, 1.

Department of the Army Headquarters, Joint Task Force Panama, Subject: Activation and Staffing of the US Military Support Group-Panama (USMSGPM), 1.

United States Military Support Group Panama, Powerpoint Presentation. U.S. Military Support Group Panama, (Provided by Colonel Pryor, USMSG-PM, June 21, 1990), Slide 2. This presentation was retained in archives and provided to the author by Dr Yates, Military Historian, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

James J. Steele, Colonel, Commander U.S. Military Support Group, Panama, Taped Interview conducted by Dr. Lawrence A. Yates (Military Operations in Panama, 28 June 1990). This tape was retained in archives and provided to the author by Dr Yates, Military Historian, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Ibid.

Department of the Army, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command Liaison Office, Subject: Monthly Report, Jan – Mar 1990, 1. Additionally, in the taped interview with Colonel Steele he acknowledges that he contacted General Thurman and volunteered to become a part of the mission.


James J. Steele, Colonel, Commander U.S. Military Support Group, Panama, Taped Interview.


Department of the Army Headquarters, Joint Task Force Panama, Subject: Activation and Staffing of the US Military Support Group-Panama (USMSGPM),1. The initial concept and justification for the formation of the USMSG-PM can be found in the original memo prepared by Colonel Youmans for General Thurman in, United States Special Operations Command, Memorandum for Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, ATTN: J3, Quarry Heights, Panama, Subject: Organization of Nation Building Forces (MacDill AFB, Florida, January 8, 1990).

United States Special Operations Command, Memorandum for Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, ATTN: J3, Quarry Heights, Panama, Subject: Organization of Nation Building Forces, 1-2, 11.

United States Special Operations Command, Memorandum for Commander in Chief,
U.S. Southern Command, ATTN: J3, Quarry Heights, Panama, Subject: Organization of Nation Building Forces, 3-9.

90 Complete, comprehensive doctrinal definitions of the terms “Attached” and “Operational Control” can be found in United States, Army, Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1-13, 1-114.


92 James J. Steele, Colonel, Commander U.S. Military Support Group, Panama, Taped Interview.


94 Richard H. Shultz, 64.


96 James J. Steele, Colonel, Commander U.S. Military Support Group, Panama, Taped Interview.

97 Richard H. Shultz, 3.


99 Ibid, 40. The US Army South (USARSO), Chief of Staff had coordinated the Army personnel billets with the Department of the Army for Directed Military Overstrength (DMO).

100 Richard H. Shultz, 35.

101 United States Special Operations Command, Memorandum for Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, ATTN: J3, Quarry Heights, Panama, Subject: Organization of Nation Building Forces, 3. Note: The initial proposal included 1-Flag Officer, 24-Officers, 1-Warrant Officer, 19-Enlisted, 8-Civilians for a Total of 53 Personnel.

102 Department of the Army Headquarters, Joint Task Force Panama, Subject: Activation and Staffing of the US Military Support Group-Panama (USMSGPM), Enclosure 4C.

103 John T. Fishel, Civil Military Operations in a New World, 43-44.

104 Richard H. Shultz, 35.

105 James J. Steele, Colonel, Commander U.S. Military Support Group, Panama, Taped Interview.

106 Richard M. Shultz, 35.

107 James J. Steele, Colonel, Commander U.S. Military Support Group, Panama, Taped Interview.


111 General M.R. Thurman, US CINC South, Taped Interview conducted by Dr. John T. Fishel (Military Operations in Panama, 3 April 1991). This tape was retained in archives and provided to the author by Dr Yates, Military Historian, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. While the interviewer concentrated mostly on the planning process, General Thurman expresses his philosophy that there had to be a Panamanian solution and they had to become self-sufficient, the US was there to assist them in this endeavor, not to take over.

112 Colonel Jack Pryor, Deputy Commander, US Military Support Group Panama, Taped Interview conducted by Dr. Lawrence A. Yates (Military Operations in Panama, 21 June 1990). In this interview Colonel Pryor fields the idea that the Active Army should develop doctrine and establish a C2 element with the unique skills and experience in addressing SASO. This C2 element would be a nucleus that would be augmented as the situation dictated. Note: Colonel Steele believes in this concept also, see text pg.32, Footnote 85.

113 Richard H. Shultz, xiii. Note: He uses the abbreviated acronym of “MSG” for the USMSG-PM.