STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN AMERICA'S COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

BY

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An Analysis of the Military's Role in America's Counterdrug Operations

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ABSTRACT

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Over the past few decades the United States has witnessed a steady increase in the number of domestic problems and crimes related to illegal drug abuse and trafficking. In an effort to combat this growing problem America's policy makers have crafted thorough strategies designed to provide conceptual frameworks for reducing this problem nationwide. These strategies include the use of DOD resources to reinforce the fight between civilian law enforcement agencies and illegal drug traffickers. While tremendous headway has been made due to DOD participation in the war against drugs, there is much still to be done.

This paper begins by examining the role of the ONDCP and analyzing current National, Military, and Drug Control Strategies to ensure a clear, consistent drug control strategy is presented from the top down. It also considers the ends, ways, and means discussed in each to ensure they are in balance. Next it looks at some of the laws involved in using the military in counterdrug operations and the current role of DOD. Finally, it recommends changes designed to improve the effectiveness of the military in fighting this war.

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN AMERICA'S COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

Military support for the first war on drugs actually began during President Nixon's tenure. This limited support involved the Coast Guard and Customs Service. The origins of Department of Defense (DOD) support for the counterdrug effort can be traced back to the Defense Authorization Act of 1981. Prior to this act, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prevented the military from participation in police and domestic law enforcement actions. However, translation of the Defense Appropriations Act into Public Law 97-86 amended the Posse Comitatus Act and allowed DOD to give limited support to federal agencies.[1]

Unfortunately, during the 1980's, the war on drugs failed to stop the increasing flow of drugs into America. Additionally, throughout this timeframe the military was resisting additional counterdrug operations from creeping into their mission. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Weinberger was opposed to using the military to fight this war on drugs and stated its use violated the tenets of the "Weinberger Doctrine".[2] Nevertheless, drug abuse soon became America's number one public enemy and Congress wanted action.[3] Therefore, in 1986, President Reagan initiated a domestic crusade against drugs known as the "zero tolerance" program. This was a demand side strategy emphasizing "getting tough" on drugs.[4] Reagan's 1986 Executive Order No. 12564 introduced mandatory urine testing a condition of employment for all federal employees.[5] Also in 1986, the President issued National Security Directive 221, which declared drug trafficking to be a threat to national security.[6] With the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, President Reagan established as a policy goal the creation of a drug-free America and formed the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).[7] Continuing with this strategy, in 1989 Congress and President Bush declared a "War on Drugs," detailing and financing the first National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). Additionally, in 1989 Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act, which tasked DOD with extensive interdiction and counterdrug missions. Specifically, for the first time this act made DOD the lead agency for detecting and monitoring the drug flow.[8]

This paper begins by examining the role of the ONDCP and analyzing current national, military, and drug control strategies to ensure a clear, consistent drug control strategy is presented from the top down. It also considers the ends, ways, and means discussed in each to ensure they are in balance. Next it looks at some of the laws involved in using the military in counterdrug operations and the current role of DOD. Finally, it recommends changes designed to improve the effectiveness of the military in fighting this war.

ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY (ONDCP)

The "War on Drugs" had been on going in this country for years with little results when President Reagan began to focus on it in the late 1980s. He realized the effort up to then had been uncoordinated and therefore had almost no effect on stemming the flow of drugs into this country. As a result, he formed the ONDCP to head the nations fight in the "War on Drugs". His intent was to form a single overall

controlling headquarters for all agencies involved in fighting this war and have that headquarters be responsible for development of the nation's counterdrug policy.

The ONDCP is the primary agency within the Executive Branch responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of the NDCS. The ONDCP oversees and coordinates both the international and domestic counterdrug functions of all Executive agencies and ensures those functions sustain and compliment the government's overall counterdrug efforts. Activities of the ONDCP include the following:

-Developing the NDCS.

-Developing a consolidated National Drug Control Budget for presentation to the President and Congress.

-Coordinating and overseeing narcotics related programs and policies of the Federal departments, agencies, and bureaus.

-Recommending changes to the President in the organization, management, and budgets of Federal agencies involved in the counterdrug effort.

-Representing the Administration's drug policies before the Congress.

-Producing legislatively-mandated studies and reports for submission to the President and Congress.[9]

The head of the ONDCP is commonly referred to as the "Drug Czar". Currently, that position is held by retired General Barry McCaffrey. He is responsible for the overall coordination of the nation's counterdrug policy and strategy in accordance with President Bush's original intent. The ONDCP is broken down into two major departments: Supply and Demand. Each of these departments is headed by a Deputy Director. These Deputy Directors for Supply Reduction and Demand Reduction are responsible for assisting with the development of strategy and the coordination of all activities within their respective departments.[10] Supply and demand are the two major areas which must be addressed in the war on drugs. This organization allows each of the two departments to concentrate on one aspect of the drug problem for maximum efficiency. It is then General McCaffrey's responsibility to ensure the efforts of both departments are consolidated and support the overall NDCS.

CURRENT POLICY

As outlined by President Clinton, the current National Security Strategy (NSS) contains the following three core objectives:

- To enhance our security.
- To bolster America's economic prosperity.
- To promote democracy abroad.[11]

The first core objective, "Enhancing Security at Home and Abroad", contains three components. The first of these is "Shaping the International Environment". One portion of this component involves

monitoring the most serious threats to U.S. security. These threats include numerous transnational threats that might affect U.S. national security interests, one of which is drug trafficking.[12] In the area of drug trafficking the NSS states the aim or "ends" of U.S. NDCS "...is to cut illegal drug use and availability in the United States by 50 percent by 2007 – and reduce the health and social consequences of drug use and trafficking by 25 percent over the same period – through expanded prevention efforts, improved treatment programs, strengthened law enforcement and tougher interdiction."[13] To achieve these ends, the NSS outlines a number of "ways" that must be used: they are education, prevention, treatment and economic alternatives integrated with intelligence collection, law enforcement and interdiction.[14] The "means" are not thoroughly discussed in the NSS; however, it does outline a commitment for a five-year, $2 billion public-private partnership to educate America's children to reject drugs. In short, the ends and ways outlined in the NSS provide about the right amount of detail for this level of national strategy and the means are outlined in concept.

In the 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen stated that in order to build on the President's NSS, America's policy makers determined that "U.S. defense strategy for the long term must continue to shape the strategic environment to advance U.S. interests, maintain the capability to respond to the full spectrum of threats, and prepare now for the threats and dangers of tomorrow and beyond."[15] These three elements, or "ends", – shaping, responding, and preparing – define the essence of U.S. defense strategy between now and 2015.[16] The QDR addresses the "ways" of accomplishing shaping, the first of these "ends", by stating that U.S. defense efforts must help to promote regional stability, prevent or reduce conflicts and threats, and deter aggression and coercion on a day-to-day basis in many key regions of the world. This second concept of "prevent or reduce conflicts and threats" is then broken down into five sub-components. The next-to-last of these five sub-components is "Reduce the production and flow to the United States of illegal drugs by means of DOD support to the joint interagency task forces operating along our coasts and southern border."[17] However, the QDR does not specifically address the "means" available to accomplish this. Once again, as was the case with the NSS, the ends and ways outlined in the QDR provide about the right amount of detail. In fact, they specifically outline DOD's role in counterdrug operations.

As has been discussed, both the NSS and QDR provide guidance on drug control. This guidance is incorporated in the newly published 1999 version of the NDCS. The 1999 strategy is similar to the 1998 version, but there are some differences, the most important of which is that the focus has shifted from just reducing demand to reducing both supply and demand. The 1999 strategy states, "It is only through a balanced array of demand reduction and supply reduction programs that we will be able to achieve a 50 percent reduction in drug use and availability and at least a 25 percent reduction in their consequences."[18]

Although the focus now includes both supply and demand, the 1999 strategy still proposes a multi-year conceptual framework to reduce illegal drug use availability by 50 percent.[19] Given this overall

"end", the 1999 strategy retains the previous years five goals and thirty-one supporting objectives as the basis for it's coherent, long-term national effort. Even though the thirty-one items are listed as objectives, they are really concepts (ways) for the five goals (objectives), and since they have more details, for the first time at the National Policy level there is a document that fills in the "means" gap. These goals are too expansive to completely detail; however the following will give a flavor of the depth and breadth of this program:

> Goal 1: Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.
>
> Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
>
> Goal 3: Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.
>
> Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
>
> Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.[20]

The thirty-one concepts are more narrowly focused than the broader goals and stipulate the specific ways in which the five strategic goals will be attained. This strategy additionally goes into sufficient detail on the resources, or "means" available to accomplish these goal and objectives. Overall, the funding recommended for FY 2000 is $17.8 billion, an increase of 4.3 percent over 1999 regular appropriations.[21] In short, the country's drug control policies are clear, coherent, and very comprehensive.

LAW AND THE MILITARY

In order to execute these drug control policies, the nation relies in part on the military. However, the military must ensure it carries out it's duties in accordance with the law. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act was written following the Civil War and ended the practice of using federal troops to enforce civilian laws within the United States. As amended, the act reads, "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." [22] In 1989 Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, further clarified this by stating that military involvement "does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or similar activity ... unless otherwise authorized by law."[23] Outside of the U.S. the Mansfield Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act also prohibits DOD personnel from participating in arrests or police actions where hostilities are imminent.[24] On U.S. soil, another legal constraint requires the military to get owner permission before entry onto private land.[25]

These laws were created to prevent the military from becoming directly involved in law enforcement activities. However, the military is permitted to provide support to federal, state, and local Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs). In accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, Chapter 18, Sections 371-381, "Military Support For Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies," Congress has allowed some latitude for military involvement:

- **Section 371, Use of Information Collected During Military Operations:** The military is allowed to pass any information collected or received during the course of their operations, training, or exercises which may be relevant to a violation of either federal or state law.
- **Section 372, Use of Military Equipment and Facilities:** DOD may make available any equipment, base facility, or research facility to enhance law enforcement capabilities.
- **Section 373, Training and Advising Civilian Law Enforcement Officials:** The Secretary of Defense may allow DOD personnel to train DLEA individuals on the operation and maintenance of either their organic equipment or loaned DOD equipment. DOD personnel may also provide any expert advise they have relevant to counterdrug operations.
- **Section 374, Maintenance and Operation of Equipment:** The Secretary of Defense may allow DOD personnel to maintain either organic DLEA equipment or loaned DOD equipment. The law also enables DOD to upgrade this equipment (including computer software) to preserve or enhance its utility. Operationally, the military is tasked to detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of air and sea traffic within and outside our country's boundaries. The military may transport Americans and foreign individuals to facilitate counterdrug activities both within and outside the United States. They will also provide aerial and ground reconnaissance, linguist and intelligence services, and construct fences, roads, and install lighting to hamper drug smuggling. Finally, the DOD is tasked to establish command, control, communication, and computer networks as well as set up bases of operation and training facilities both within and outside the United States.
- **Section 376, Support Not to Affect Adversely Military Preparedness:** This section provides a disclaimer that DOD support to counterdrug enforcement will not adversely affect preparedness of the United States military forces.
- **Section 379, Assignment of Coast Guard Personnel to Naval Vessels:** The Secretary of Transportation, after consulting with the Secretary of Defense, will assign a minimum of 500 active Coast Guard personnel to appropriate naval vessels for the specific purpose of law enforcement search and seizure.[26]

While these provisions were designed for Active Federal Forces, it must be remembered that in the case of the National Guard, the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply unless the troops have been federalized. State governors can authorize National Guard units to assist drug law enforcement agencies in the war on drugs if those units remain under the control of the state government. State-sponsored

support may take place on U.S. soil and may be directed against citizens involved in criminal activities. As a result, National Guard units are able to provide a wide range of capabilities to the DLEA.[27]

As can be seen, Congress has continued to restrict direct use of the military in counterdrug operations while allowing its support role to expand.

ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Based on these provisions in Title 10, U.S. Code the nation's Armed Forces are a viable resource in the war on drugs. The roots for DOD's current involvement in this war began in 1988 when the ONDCP was formed under President Reagan. Then in 1989 Congress and President Bush declared a "War on Drugs," developed the first NDCS, and passed the Defense Authorization Act, which tasked DOD with extensive interdiction and counterdrug missions.[28] As a result, DOD can now be used to address two of the goals in the 1999 NDCS: to shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat and to break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.[29]

President Clinton re-establishes precedence for the use of the U.S. military in the counterdrug effort in his 1999 NSS. "We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors, to provide global leadership, and to remain a reliable security partner for the community of nations that share our interests."[30] He goes on to say that there are "...vital interests – those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation. Among these are the physical security of our territory...(and) the safety of our citizens.... We will do what we must to defend these interests, including, when necessary and appropriate, using our military might unilaterally and decisively."[31]

From this NSS flows America's most current National Military Strategy (NMS), which implements the President's guidance to use our nation's military element of power when our vital interests are threatened. "Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal drug-trafficking, and other threats at home or abroad may...require the use of military forces, depending on applicable law...."[32] The NMS goes on to say that "unique military capabilities can also support domestic authorities in combating direct and indirect threats to the U.S. homeland, such as the illegal drug trade...."[33]

DOD's role in counterdrug operations is also outlined in numerous joint military publications. For instance, Joint Pub 3.0; Doctrine for Joint Operations lists counterdrug operations as an activity that military forces will participate in as a part of "Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW)."[34] Joint Pub 3-05; Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, lists counterdrug operations as a Special Operations Collateral Activity.[35] Joint Pub 3-07.4; Joint Counterdrug Operations is the capstone document for joint military planning and execution of counterdrug missions. Pub 3-07.4 lists DOD's primary roles in the war on drugs as follows:

-To act as the single lead agency for Detection and Monitoring of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States;

-To integrate into an effective communications network the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated (in part or in whole) to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the United States; and

-To approve and fund State governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement operations of the LEAs[36]

Overseas, the regional U.S. Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) are the principal conduits for providing military support to DEA and other U.S. agencies supporting U.S. ambassadors and host-nation counterdrug forces. They support detection, monitoring, and interdiction efforts and provide resources, as available, in those countries where drug production or trafficking is affecting the United States.

On the domestic scene, Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) is the military organization responsible for coordinating military support to the Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (CLEAs).[37] Headquartered at Fort Bliss, Texas JTF-6 was established in 1989, its mission originally focused exclusively along the Southwest border of the United States. In 1995, the JTF-6 area of responsibility expanded to include the entire continental United States. It is an active duty unit assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), under the operational control of the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).[38]



FIGURE 1. PRIMARY COUNTERDRUG COMMANDS[1]

[1] Joint Counterdrug Operations, JCS Pub 3-07.4, (Washington: U.S. DOD, 17 February 1998), III-6.

As part of JTF-6 over 159 active component and full time reserve component soldiers support local law enforcement agencies along our nation's 2,000 mile long southwest border.[39] JTF-6's role in the counterdrug effort is articulated in its mission statement: "JTF-6 synchronizes and integrates DOD operational, technological, training and intelligence support to domestic law enforcement agencies' counterdrug efforts in the continental United States to reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the United States."[40]

Since the military's domestic role in the counterdrug effort is to support non-military law enforcement agencies, JTF-6 coordinates requests from CLEAs. Military support is designed to assist CLEAs in their mission to detect, deter, disrupt and dismantle illegal drug trafficking organizations. JTF-6 serves as a force multiplier to law enforcement agencies with the potential to enhance CLEA effectiveness or to release CLEA resources to focus on interdiction/seizure actions.[41] All CLEA requests are validated as having verified drug related connections. In all, JTF-6 provides 38 types of missions to CLEAs that fall into one of four major categories:

- Operational Support: Typical missions include aviation medical evacuation, aviation operations, aviation reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, ground transportation, listening/observation posts, ground surveillance radar and sensors employment, and unmanned aerial vehicle flight. At any one time, JTF-6 may have tactical control (TACON) of up to 2,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and the vast majority are deployed in performance of this category of support.
- General Support: Augmentation of DLEAs with military-specific skills, training, transportation, canine support, communications, and technology. Most missions involve three to five days of training conducted by a mobile training team.
- Engineer Support: Involves road repair and various construction projects. Typical missions include constructing border fences, lighting, and law enforcement facilities.
- Intelligence Support: Entails providing military intelligence specialists for imagery interpretation, translator and linguistic support, and case-specific analysis. Reservists (federalized under Title 10) perform most of these missions.[42]

In order to request support in one of these areas, CLEAs must write directly to Operation Alliance or a state National Guard counterdrug coordinator. JTF-6 encourages all state and local LEAs to solicit support first from their state National Guard counterdrug coordinator. If the National Guard is unable to fulfill the request, LEAs may forward their request to Operation Alliance. Operation Alliance, a multi agency law enforcement body located with JTF-6 on Fort Bliss, Texas, reviews and prioritizes all requests for military support from Federal, state and local agencies. Operation Alliance is the single point of contact for requesting JTF-6 support. Once Operation Alliance approves and validates the request it is forwarded to JTF-6. JTF-6 then must find a military unit who is willing to volunteer to take the mission.[43]

The total force is involved in all of these missions. Reserve Component forces, primarily from the National Guard, commit substantial resources toward the nation's counterdrug effort. Title 32 of the United States Code provides the authority for National Guard forces throughout the fifty states and the U.S. territories to participate in counterdrug activities in support of non-military law enforcement agencies. The National Guard, as a state militia, is not subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act while not in federal service. Thus, the Guard has more flexibility than federal forces in conducting counterdrug support operations.

FUTURE PROJECTION

Despite the best efforts of DOD and the fifty plus other Federal Agencies involved in fighting this war on drugs America is not winning. America's is an open nation and its borders are just too permeable. According to the ONDCP, there is now evidence of warehousing of cocaine in the U.S. That indicates there is more supply than demand and that America does not interdict enough to affect demand on the street. History has also proven that even when America does put pressure on traffickers moving one type of drug across U.S. borders, they simply diversify and shift to another type of narcotic.[44] In fact, there are indications that even if America were able to eradicate and/or interdict all illegal drugs crossing its borders, the market would simply shift to synthetic drugs manufactured inside the USA. Drugs such as methamphetamines, commonly referred to as "ice" and "crack" are easily manufactured and have already become the drugs of choice in many U.S. cities.[45] According to a recent strategic assessment by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, "The illegal drug market long ago achieved stability and, in some cases, saturation, and that situation is unlikely to change any time soon. Without a major change in counterdrug policy and methodology, the only measurable change in the market will be in methods of smuggling or in market taste."[46]

Despite America's best efforts, and an expenditure of Federal monies in excess of $17 billion last year alone, America's appetite for drugs continues to be fully satisfied. There has been little progress made in winning the war on drugs over the last ten years. It is time to consider alternatives which may give the U.S. the upper hand in this fight.

RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE

The ONDCP laid the current foundation for fighting the war on drugs with the 1999 NDCS. This strategy emphasizes the need to reduce both supply and demand.[47] In the past the focus has been on supply reduction with little emphasis placed on demand reduction. This key to the 1999 strategy is its balanced approach, which will in effect create a "double envelopment". This focus on demand reduction will add a new dimension that has been lacking in the past. On the supply reduction side however, additional refinements can be made in the way DOD is used which will greatly increase its effectiveness.

SUPPLY REDUCTION

CONUS

In CONUS, the military's involvement in counterdrug activities is primarily through participation in missions with JTF-6. As pointed out in Joint Pub 3-07.4; Joint Counterdrug Operations, FORSCOM has designated JTF-6 as the headquarters responsible for coordinating DOD title 10 support to LEAs within CONUS, with priority to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs). Unfortunately, JTF-6 has very few organic troops and no tasking authority. Therefore, they only get units who are able to volunteer to perform counterdrug missions. Given today's OPTEMPO, not all units either want to, or are able to, find the time to volunteer for such operations. This makes JTF-6's job all the more difficult as they are forced to expend a great deal of effort just trying to find units to volunteer. This time could be better spent focusing on fighting the drug problem. What JTF-6 needs is increased authority to be able to task units to perform these missions.

Fortunately, the '99 UCP includes new and increased functional responsibilities for USCINCACOM (and his successor USCINCJFCOM/Joint Forces Command) which set the conditions for a possible solution to this issue of JTF-6 tasking authority.[48] This new UCP assigns USCINCJFCOM new and increased functional responsibilities which include:

-Serving as the Joint Force Provider of assigned CONUS based forces.

-Providing, within CONUS, military assistance to civil authorities, military support to US civil authorities, and military assistance for civil disturbances, subject to Secretary of Defense approval.

-Planning for the land defense of CONUS, domestic support operations to assist government agencies, and the binational Canada-United States land and maritime defense of the Canada-United States Region.[49]

This final responsibility is the mission of homeland defense; and one of the components of homeland defense is counterdrug operations.

The NSS repeatedly points out the need to create a stable and secure environment in which our nation, citizens, and interests are not threatened. This includes protecting U.S. citizens from transnational threats such as drug trafficking.[50] Drug trafficking is one of the primary transnational threats; therefore, the organization tasked with the responsibility for homeland defense should also include military support to the nation's counterdrug effort as one of its subordinate missions. This counterdrug mission involves coordinating military counterdrug support with civilian law enforcement agencies and already is the responsibility of JTF-6, a Task Force reporting to USJFCOM.[51]

Assigning USJFCOM the mission of homeland defense will focus future planning and execution efforts in the battle against all transnational threats, to include counterdrug operations, under one headquarters. More importantly, by highlighting the homeland defense mission, the UCP is setting the

conditions for USJFCOM to begin tasking FORSCOM units to participate in missions under the control of JTF-6. This is what JTF-6 has needed all along. If USJFCOM begins tasking units to perform counterdrug operations, JTF-6 will no longer be forced to rely on units volunteering for its counterdrug missions. This will allow JTF-6 to concentrate on fighting the war on drugs, rather than spending its time searching for units to participate in its missions. More importantly, given proper authority through USJFCOM, JTF-6 could provide significant resources to counter the drug threat, especially in areas that are manpower intensive. For example, military personnel could assist U.S. customs personnel and U.S. Border Patrol agents within the HIDTAs, and at air, land, and seaports of entry.



FIGURE 2. HIGH INTESITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREAS[2]

[2] Joint Counterdrug Operations, JCS Pub 3-07.4, (Washington: U.S. DOD, 17 February 1998), III-27.

According to Mr. William Mendel and Mr. Murl Munger, two well-known experts on military involvement in counterdrug operations, "it is generally accepted that a majority of the illicit drugs entering the United States do so across the U.S. – Mexican border." [52] They go on to say..."in any event, considerable quantities of cocaine and heroin enter the United States through the Gulf Coast ports; Caribbean routes to Florida, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands; both east and west coast ports of entry and from Canada."[53] Given the expanse over which manpower resources must be dedicated to reduce the flow of drugs into the United States, proper execution of this new homeland defense mission could have a significant impact on the illegal flow of drugs across our borders. Therefore, USJFCOM must begin tasking FORSCOM units to participate in missions for JTF-6 in order to start making progress with its new mission of homeland defense.

There are also other ways in which USJFCOM must take advantage of its new homeland defense mission. USJFCOM should not just focus their attention on consolidating the efforts of the Active and Reserve forces, they must include the National Guard as well. The Army National Guard consists of eight combat divisions that are considered part of America's strategic reserve. Unlike other National Guard units, these divisions currently have no role in any existing DOD operations plan. However, current joint counterdrug doctrine does list the six major counterdrug support missions of the National Guard as: program management, technical support, general support, counterdrug-related training, reconnaissance and observation, and demand reduction support.[54] Additionally, in Army National Guard Vision 2010, it states that these National Guard units could be redesigned, equipped, and resourced for new missions if they could better serve the Total Army in other capacities.[55] A number of these divisions could be directed to the mission of homeland defense, with command and control provided by USJFCOM. These units would also be available for other homeland defense missions such as countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and combating terrorism. Increasing the involvement of Army National Guard personnel in the nation's counterdrug effort could significantly increase America's chances of success in the war on drugs.

The military already plays a vital role in the nation's counterdrug effort. Creating a Homeland Defense Command provides USJFCOM the authority it needs to get FORSCOM units involved in keeping America safe from drugs and all forms of transnational threats.

OCONUS

Just as the changes to the UCP described above will improve DOD's ability to fight the war on drugs within the CONUS, similar change is needed to maximize DOD's ability to stop the flow of drugs into our country. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the missions, responsibilities, and force structure for commanders of unified combatant commands and establishes their general geographic areas of responsibility and functions. Currently the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia (CONUS), Antarctica, Canada, the Russian Federation, the Caspian Sea, and Mexico are not assigned to a combatant commander. The Chairman of he Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for providing military

advice to the Secretary of Defense with respect to these unassigned areas in the same manner as CINCs do with respect to their areas of responsibility.

However, the Commander in Chief U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSO), headquartered in Miami, Florida, is responsible for the general geographic area of responsibility encompassing "Central and South America and the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans from 92° W, east to 30°W, north to 8°N, west to 58°W, north to 28°N, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea and its island nations and European possessions, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands."[56]



FIGURE 3. US SOUTHERN COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY[3]

[3] Joint Counterdrug Operations, JCS Pub 3-07.4, (Washington: U.S. DOD, 17 February 1998), VI-2.

This gives USCINCSO the responsibility for all of Latin American countries with the exception of Mexico. Within this AOR, USSOUTHCOM is responsible for the following counterdrug missions:

-Providing support to reinforce cooperating host nations.

-Coordinating aerial and maritime detection and monitoring of drug production and trafficking.

-Providing counterdrug operational support to US interagencies and host nation forces.

-Providing counterdrug nonoperational support to US interagencies and host nation forces.[57]

Unfortunately, these counterdrug missions do not apply directly to Mexico since it is not included in USSOUTHCOM's AOR. However, as previously discussed, a majority of the illicit drugs entering the United States do so across the U.S.–Mexican border and considerable quantities of cocaine and heroin enter the United States through the Gulf Coast ports: Caribbean routes to Florida, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Therefore, it would be advantageous to have a consolidated plan designed to stem this flow of drugs. USCINCSO does have "shaping" responsibility for Mexico, and as previously discussed, the QDR includes "Reduce the production and flow to the United States of illegal drugs by means of DOD support to the joint interagency task forces operating along our coasts and southern border" as one of the five sub-components of shaping.[58] However, in order to bring USCINCSO's authority to perform counterdrug operations in Mexico up to the same level as the rest of Latin America it is necessary to add Mexico to USCINCSO's AOR. USCINCSO will then be responsible for all of Latin America and will have the authority to develop OPLANs for the entire region. This will make it possible for the Secretary of Defense to task USCINCSO with the mission of stopping (or at least slowing) the flow of drugs into the United States from Latin America. The United States NSS states that transnational threats such as: terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime endanger both the international community and the United States. Therefore, it is time to step up the U.S. effort against these threats by giving USCINCSO full authority to conduct counterdrug operations throughout all of Latin America, to include Mexico.

DEMAND REDUCTION

Without demand there is no drug problem. As has been seen, one of the principle differences between the 1999 Drug Control Strategy and the 1998 version is the new focus on demand reduction. The 1999 strategy states that both demand and supply reduction efforts must be advanced simultaneously, but demand must be the priority. It expands this concept by stating that prevention is the key to demand reduction. The strategy then addresses the need to educate American youth about the dangers of drugs, which will enable them to reject substance abuse.[59] Education is the number one goal in the 1999 strategy. There are nine concepts, or ways, prescribed on how to achieve this goal:

-educate parents, teachers, etc. to help youth reject drugs,

-use advertising to communicate the dangers of illegal drugs,

-promote zero tolerance policies for youth regarding drug use,

-provide students with drug prevention programs,

-parents encourage youth to engage in healthy lifestyles,

-develop community coalitions/programs to prevent drug abuse,

-media, sports, etc. avoid glamorization of illegal drugs,

-use research to develop prevention programs,

-use research to gather additional information to improve prevention programs.[60]

In other words, the 1999 NDCS has already shifted from purely a supply reduction strategy to simultaneous supply and demand reduction strategy. Therefore the guidance is already in place to begin implementing this strategy. The ends are stated, the ways are outlined in sufficient detail, and the means are made available.

CONCLUSION

As is the case with most strategic level issues, the solution to America's drug problem is as illusive as it is complex. In fact, the NDCS now suggests the phrase "War on Drugs" is misleading and tends to imply a quick victory.[61] On that note, the current NDCS deletes all references to a ten-year plan and simply uses the phrase "long-term", implying an opened ended approach to this problem. This also reflects an appreciation that despite DOD's best efforts and huge expenditures over the last ten years, little progress has been made in this "war". Therefore, it is time to make some changes.

The key is to focus on a balanced approach designed to reduce both drug supply and demand. This is the approach the United States must take to be successful. In order to reduce supply, organizational improvements must be made both in CONUS and OCONUS.

In CONUS, improvements are necessary in the method by which units are selected to work with JTF-6. Rather than the volunteer system, which has existed in the past, JTF-6 requires the authority to task units to perform counterdrug missions. Fortunately, the new UCP assigns USJFCOM the responsibility of providing homeland defense. This new and increased functional responsibility sets the conditions for a solution to this issue of JTF-6 tasking authority. Now, USJFCOM can task FORSCOM units to participate in missions under the control of JTF-6. No longer will JTF-6 be forced to reply on units volunteering for its counterdrug missions. This will allow JTF-6 to concentrate on fighting the war on drugs, rather than spending its time searching for units to participate in its missions. Therefore, USJFCOM must do away with the old volunteer system and begin tasking FORSCOM units to participate in counterdrug missions for JTF-6. This will significantly improve JTF-6's ability to fight the war on drugs and assist USJFCOM with its new mission of homeland defense.

Also in CONUS, USJFCOM will be able to include increased participation by the National Guard in counterdrug operations as a part of its homeland defense plan. A number of National Guard divisions should be directed to the mission of homeland defense, with command and control provided by

USJFCOM. Increasing the involvement of Army National Guard personnel in the nation's counterdrug effort will significantly increase America's chances of success in the war on drugs.

OCONUS, the organizational improvement required is a change to USSOUTHCOM's AOR. By adding Mexico to USSOUTHCOM's AOR, it will be possible for the Secretary of Defense to task USCINCSO with the mission of stopping (or at least slowing) the flow of drugs into the United States from Latin America. The addition of Mexico will lead to unity of effort and increased efficiency by giving USCINCSO full authority to direct counterdrug operations throughout all of Latin America.

As outlined in the 1999 NDCS, the other half of the balanced approach required to win this war is demand reduction. This new strategy has been carefully crafted to provide the ends, ways, and means necessary to reduce drug dependence and demand. This focus on demand provides another means to combat the war on drugs. This new focus will do away with the linear, frontal attack mentality of trying to win this war solely by reducing supply.

The key is to get away from the old tactics of concentrating solely on reducing supply and to begin fighting a two pronged "double envelopment" against supply and demand simultaneously. Combine this dual approach with the increased efficiencies provided by using USJFCOM's new homeland defense mission to task FORSCOM units to work with JTF-6, as well as including all of Latin America in USSOUTHCOM's AOR, and the stage will be set for America to win this war on drugs once and for all.

Word Count: 6,372

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[4] Ibid., 27.

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[20] Ibid., 7.

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