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CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Uzbekistan Construction Trust

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 22 Dec 76 p 4

[Article by N. Popov, Chief of Staff for Civil Defense of the "Uzorgtekhvostroy" Trust, Uzglavvodstrov: "A Common Matter"]

[Text] The new training year in the civil defense system began on 1 December. Just as in past years, lessons on civil defense were begun in an organized manner in our collective.

...There are many departments and services in our trust and groups for the study of civil defense have been created everywhere. As a rule, the lessons are conducted by the production managers and leading specialists. And of course, before beginning the instruction it is necessary to train the supervisors themselves. Two-day methodological assemblies are organized for them in civil defense courses of the Chilanzarskiy rayon. The activists also obtain practical skills here.

Much labor has been applied to the creation of the material and technical base for the lessons. Civil defense corners have been set up in each department and the necessary literature, graphic aids, and posters have been assembled. Engineer V. Razvalyayeva, group chief Z. Kirichenko, and deputy department head A. Tolstolugova are conducting the work in their groups in an interesting manner. They have succeeded in creating a large group of activists who are accomplishing all matters in an interested and qualified manner. The organizers of civil defense can always obtain methodological assistance in the library which was established in the headquarters. Files of the newspapers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, and FRUNZE VETS and the journal VOYENNYE ZNANIYA are stored here. There are also methodological studies on the subjects of the 20-hour program. We reinforce each lesson by showing a training film.

Socialist competition plays a large role in improving civil defense. Twenty-five departments of the trust have joined in it. The management of the trust, party bureau, local committee, and staff have worked out the conditions
for the socialist competition. The winners are awarded monetary prizes and certificates of honor.

The results of the competition and contest are summed up quarterly and almost every time there are new departments and services among the winners. We were convinced long ago of the value and effectiveness of the competition. Comparatively recently, civil defense work in the production planning and administrative-economic departments caused many unfavorable criticisms. Criticism and the example of the best had an effect in the last analysis. Civil defense corners were set up in the departments which became some of the best, photo newspapers were organized, and displays were set up. And here is the result. The production planning department won first place in the results for passing the civil defense norms.

Practical lessons are a unique summary of all the work. We conducted a lesson on the evacuation of workers, employees, and members of their families to an out-of-town zone.

Party, trade-union, and Komsomol organizations participated in its preparation and conduct. Each had its own specific work sector. Thus, the chairman of the public department of personnel, Yu. Arbuzov, was responsible for the actions of the communications group. And it worked without interruption. The members of the medical detachment headed by Ye. Koyfman and the public order group which was led by the department head, N. Pozharova, also accomplished their duties clearly and confidently.

Of course, there still are shortcomings in our work. And using the experience which we have accumulated, in the coming year we plan to improve civil defense further.

The Moscow Motor Vehicle Plant

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jan 77 p 2


[Text] A Moskvich—a reliable, comfortable, vehicle which is simple to operate and is well known in the entire world comes off the assembly line every 80 seconds at the Moscow Automobile Plant imeni Leninskiy Komsomol (AZLK). The enterprise is successfully accomplishing the plan for the first year of Tenth Five-Year Plan and has made a confident start this year. But AZLK is famous not only for its labor successes. It is rightly considered one of the leading enterprises of the country in regard to the state of civil defense.

The deputy director for civil defense, Mikhail Iosifovich Savin is speaking at an expanded session of the plant’s party committee.
"Much has been done, comrades," he stresses in his report. "But far from all reserves have been used for the further improvement of civil defense...."

"What claims do we have against the main specialists? Which of the shops are holding back matters?" These questions were asked of Comrade Savin by the secretary of the plant party committee, Anatoliy Konstantinovich Zhidkov. They were not asked out of idle curiosity. It is impossible to get by without party influence on those who have a listless attitude toward civil defense problems or consider them secondary....

After the session of the party committee, we and Savin visited the shops of the plant, became acquainted with the civil defense activists, and attended the lessons. The best specialists are leading them.

For example, take the experienced physician-enthusiast Tat'yana Sergeyevna Parfenova. She puts her soul into the training of the medical detachments. To a great extent, the medical aid stations have been equipped in a high-quality manner thanks to her efforts and concern. She has taught hundreds of young female workers to render first aid in a qualified manner in case of necessity. The medical detachment trained by Tat'yana Sergeyevna won third place in the city competitions.

"We have many such civil defense activists," says Mikhail Iosifovich with pride.

"What is the secret of your success?" we were interested.

Mikhail Iosifovich thought for a minute and then answered firmly and confidently:

"The close coordination of the efforts of the plant leadership and the party committee which are directed toward the further improvement of civil defense."

And this actually is so. The members of the party committee are taking an active part in the discussion of the annual work plan, plans for party-political support of exercises, and other measures. As a rule, the party activists are the deputy commanders of the formations for political affairs.

There are many specialties at the plant. For example, there are bulldozer drivers, tractor drivers, physicians, and nurses. One of the important tasks is the use of each specialist in the cause of civil defense in accordance with the category closest to his basic profession. At the enterprise, all life is subordinate to the accomplishment of the production plan. But nevertheless, civil defense lessons are organized regularly here.

Moral and monetary incentives for the civil defense activists are widely employed at the plant. Socialist competition has been initiated between shops. Monetary prizes have been established for the winners. The leaders are awarded the badge "Expert in Civil Defense of the USSR" and "Badge of Honor of Civil Defense USSR."
Mikhail Iosifovich Savin is an energetic and demanding person who knows his business in its finest details. And his strength as an organizer and leader is in his ability to rely on people who are responding to good undertakings with all their soul.

Among the activists who are ready to accomplish any difficult task, Mikhail Iosifovich named the deputy chief of the construction-administration shop, B. Sadovnikov, the senior engineer of the weak-current system, Yu. Frolov, mechanic-electrician of the main designer's department, P. Kozlov, and research engineer V. Loskutov.

"We respect them," says M. Savin, "they are engaged in civil defense in accordance with their call of duty."

In accordance with their call of duty.... This means on the strength of their understanding of the necessity for civil defense as an important and state matter.

In the Minsk Tractor Plant

Mosców SOVETSKY PATRIOT in Russian 6 Feb 77 p 3

[Article by S. Asle佐v, Minsk: "Combat Collaboration"]

[Text] "Civil Defense Day was conducted at the MTZ Minsk Tractor Plant. In the morning, a talk on what should be done on the occasion of the civil defense signal was broadcast over the plant radio network. And when it sounded, the emergency-rescue detachments and medical detachments moved harmoniously to the place for the lesson. Thousands of tractor builders observed their coordinated actions.

Then the mass passing of the norms for the 20-hour Civil Defense [CD] program began. Those who had passed the norms set off to hear lectures and reports and to view training and documentary films on civil defense. On that day, exhibitions and exhibits of literature and training-methodological aids for CD and photo displays which show the deeds of the enterprise's civil defense were organized throughout the entire plant.

And when the results were summed up, it turned out that the best results were achieved by the teams of the press, third foundry, pattern-making, and other shops. They functioned skillfully in a difficult situation and exceeded the established norms.

"Civil Defense Day" was a good means for propagandizing the knowledge and practical skills for defense against weapons of mass destruction. Thousands of personnel of the tractor plant took part in it as did almost all members of volunteer detachments and fighting men of the paramilitary formations. "Civil Defense Day" was prepared by the joint efforts of the enterprise's administration, party committee, CD headquarters, and committees of DOSAAF and the Red Cross.
The example which has been presented shows how the combat collaboration of the administration, CD headquarters, committees of DOSAAF and the Red Star, the Znaniye [Knowledge] society, and other organizations which are interested in the matter of propagandizing civil defense knowledge is strengthened in joint work. This necessary and important work is supervised by the plant's party committee which is headed by A. Kozlov.

As early as last spring, the party committee worked out and approved a plan for propagandizing civil defense knowledge at the plant. The instruction of the 25th Congress of the CPSU concerning the necessity for the further strengthening of the country's defensive capability was regarded as of paramount importance. All this was closely tied to the questions of practical instruction and the passing of the CD norms and the acquisition of profound knowledge and firm skills in defense against contemporary weapons of mass destruction.

The plan is being implemented successfully. In accordance with it, meetings were held in the majority of the shops and departments of the plant with the following agenda: "The course of the training of workers, technical engineering personnel, and employees in civil defense and improving the propagandizing of CD knowledge." Secretaries of party bureaus and civil defense personnel gave reports. In the course of the discussion of the reports, the communists expressed a number of suggestions which were directed toward the further improvement of civil defense. Party meetings helped to mobilize the workers and employees of the plant for even more active participation in civil defense measures.

Questions of propagandizing CD knowledge were also examined at seminars for editors of wall newspapers and personnel of the plant radio broadcasting system. The CD staff and DOSAAF committee of the plant have their own plans for propaganda work.

The measures which have been adopted are helping to make the propaganda more combat-active, interesting, and purposeful. In 1976 alone, 78 lectures and 22 reports were given at the plant while 246 talks on civil defense were conducted. Their subjects speak for themselves: "The 25th Congress of the CPSU on strengthening the Armed Forces of the USSR," "Civil Defense—a national matter," "Propagandizing CD knowledge—an important sector in the mass defense work and military-patriotic education of the workers," and many others. Lectures and reports were given by the chief of staff for civil defense of the plant, S. Buryakov, his deputy, T. Astakhov, DOSAAF activists, and lecturers of the Znaniye society. As a rule, thousands of workers of the tractor plant were the listeners.

The plant newspaper TRAKTOR and radio broadcasting system are doing their worthy bit in propagandizing civil defense knowledge. Only recently, more than 30 articles on civil defense were published on the pages of the newspaper. Their authors are CD personnel and activists of DOSAAF and the Red Cross and Znaniya societies. Dozens of presentations were given over the plant radio broadcasting system. The listeners especially remembered the presentation by
the civil defense chief of the rayon, chairman of the Zavodskiy rayon executive committee of Minsk, V. Chaykovskiy.

Motion pictures are a powerful propaganda means. Remembering this, the CD staff and the DOSAAF committee organized more than 100 showings of motion pictures which were attended by thousands of tractor builders. Great interest was caused by the motion picture films, "On Defense of the Motherland," "A National Matter," "The Duties of the Population during Threat of Attack," "If Danger Arises," and others. As a rule, the viewing of the motion picture films is organized in the MTZ Palace of Culture.

The CD staff and the DOSAAF committee are also making skillful use of such a propaganda form as civil defense corners. Now they are being created in all shops and departments of the plant. Training posters are hung here and there is methodological and reference literature here. Photo displays entitled "The Every-day Work of Civil Defense at the 'MTZ!'" are being created everywhere. They reflect the training, competitions, and demonstration lessons of the paramilitary CD formations, medical detachments, and their activists.

For stronger ties between CD and the DOSAAF organization, staff worker M. Kashayev has been elected to the society's committee. He has been charged with propagandizing civil defense knowledge.

Recently, the training of specialists for the paramilitary CD formations by the DOSAAF collective is becoming an ever stronger form of collaboration. In this training year alone, the plant STK [sports technical club] has already trained more than 110 third-class drivers. Two more groups are now being engaged and their graduation will take place in November.

The tractor-bulldozer drivers are of special interest for CD. On their machines, they can clear away the rubble of destroyed buildings and participate in emergency rescue work. The plant STK has also organized the training of such specialists. Theory is being taught by engineer V. Shevchik while practical driving is being taught by N. Shimanovich and A. Makarenko. More than 100 men have already completed these courses. And the next group is now being prepared for the examinations. The graduates of the DOSAAF club are taken on the roster of the CD staff.

The combat collaboration of the CD staff and the DOSAAF committee is helping to make the civil defense organization of the Minsk Tractor Plant, one of the biggest in the capital of Soviet Belorussia, even stronger.

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TANK CREW COMBAT TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASTAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jan 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Kryukov, tank regimental commander: "In the Interests of Tactics]

[Test] The second month of the training year has started. In competing to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the men are working constantly on carrying out the plans and programs for combat training, the socialist pledges, in focusing their efforts on improving the quality and effectiveness of military work. The effectiveness of the exercises depends largely upon the ability of the leaders to closely coordinate and subordinate all types of military training to the requirements of tactics. The comments published below describe the ways for actually solving this problem.

The exercise of driving the combat vehicles in the company commanded by Sr Lt V. Zubarev started with reconnaissance. The officer indicated to the crews the forward defensive line of the "enemy" and the location of its antitank weapons, and determined the procedure for crossing the mine fields and areas of man-made obstacles and destruction.

As soon as the tanks had gone out on the route, the senior lieutenant, in using the organic radios, began to give various inputs for the trainees. And ahead there appeared a "mine field" designated by striped markers. There came the command "cross the obstacle with a mine-clearing tank attachment."

Two tank troops dismounted from the tank ahead and rather quickly mounted the attachment. However, the leader remained dissatisfied with the actions of his subordinates as they had not considered that the "enemy" could fire at the halted tank. The operation had to be repeated.
The crew commanded by Jr Sgt Ye. Petrov was given a different input, and the track had to be replaced in an open area of terrain under "enemy" fire. Here also there were mistakes. The tank troops endeavored to come out through the turret, but when the commander pointed out their mistake, it took them a long time to open the escape hatch which had not been used previously. Then there was another mistake. The entire crew worked on the damaged track, although in the given situation it was impossible to stop observation and not use the tank's weapons. In correcting the mistakes, the crew acquired a range of skills needed in battle.

Other inputs by the leader of the exercise also helped to raise tactical skills. Some crews were given the mission of driving the tank in protective equipment against weapons of mass destruction, others had to evacuate "wounded" from the vehicle and give them medical aid, while still others had to throw grenades into a trench which had been dug nearby the route. The exercise was well provided with simulation devices. On the route, explosions occurred sporadically and targets appeared. And the actions of the trainees were judged considering the tactical situation.

Increased attention to tactics is shown at each exercise. For example, take tank firing training. In the course of it, the gunners and commanders of the tanks not only work out the methods of firing, but also study the performance of the tank's antitank weapons and tactics.

Recently the nighttime tank firing training in the regiment has been noticeably more complex. These have been carried out observing all blackout measures, the trainees have used only the night vision instruments, they have carried out more inputs, and more frequently train in protective equipment. Such a method of conducting the training has increased the trainees' interest in the exercises. The crews endeavor to go more profoundly into the nature of modern combat, and to subordinate all their actions to the requirements of tactics. However, I would like to note that the activity of the trainees depends not only upon the character of the missions being carried out, but also upon the ability of the commander to explain their importance and to organize the exercises considering modern requirements.

Let me give some examples.

Recently I attended tank firing training in the company commanded by Sr Lt K. Zharikov. The tank troops were learning to fire at bobbing targets. The exercise was clearly organized, and the gunners showed good results. But still the company commander noted that individual soldiers, although fulfilling the exercise, had not mastered high firing skills. And he gave the following fact as proof. He named the tank troops which had opened fire at the last seconds at the bobbing targets. The desire of the men to receive an excellent evaluation was understandable. But certainly the enemy would not wait, and in combat victory would go to the one who got the shot off first. The commander acted correctly when he reduced the grade
for those who had been slow in firing, and thus had acted incorrectly on tactical grounds. When the gunners had realized what was required of them, they began to fight for each fraction of a second and for the quality of each round.

In the interest of raising the tactical skills of subordinates, Capt Ye. Koptelov assessed the achievements of the tank troops in the course of the firing. In firing, each gunner or tank commander himself selected the method of firing at the moving targets: that is the method of tracking the target or the method of anticipating it. The last method is simpler, as a point is chosen and then one waits until the target "stumbles onto" the line. This method was basically taught at the tank firing exercises. Firing by tracking the target is more complicated, but on the tactical level is preferable as the enemy is constantly under fire. In summing up the results, Capt Koptelov declared the winners of the competition to be those soldiers who acted proceeding from the developing tactical situation and did not seek an easy way to success.

During the present training year, the chiefs of the regimental services are making a more tangible contribution to organizing the exercises which include the working out of tactical questions. While previously they were involved with the personnel only for their own subjects, now they are present during all the battle drill exercises and training. In the course of them, they work on the standards for engineer and military medical training, military topography, and protection against weapons of mass destruction. For example, recently the personnel under the leadership of the chief of the engineer service of the regiment, Capt V. Ranni, thoroughly mastered the procedures of putting up a shelter for equipment and personnel using aimed explosions, and worked on the standards to provide camouflage.

The headquarters exercises are also conducted instructively in the regiment. A majority of them is carried out in the field, using simulators. The officers assess in detail the combat capabilities of the "enemy," and they learn to organize coordination with attached and supporting subunits, using the organic communications for this.

The staff and party organization of our regiment are doing a great deal to raise the tactical and military-technical training of the officers to a new level, to provide them with advanced methods, and on this basis bring about higher field skills of all the personnel. The work plans of the party committee provide for the carrying out of a number of measures aimed at raising the responsibility of the officers for their own personal training. There will be the wide practice of hearing reports by communists on these questions.

In the competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the personnel has assumed the pledge of struggling for the title of outstanding regiment. A further rise in the tactical skills of the tank troops will be an important condition for achieving this goal.
IMPORTANCE OF PARTY WORK IN TRAINING PRACTICES STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Guards Lt Col A. Poshatalov, chief of the Political Department of the Guards Zaporozh'ye Tank Division of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "A Creative Approach"]

[Excerpts] On 21 December 1976, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article by the member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the national air defense troops, Col Gen S. Bobylev entitled "Party Political Work and the Mastery of Military Equipment." The title of this article became an editorial headline under which we will publish materials devoted to raising the party political influence on the effectiveness and quality of mastering modern weapons and military equipment by the personnel of the Army and Navy.

On the tank training field, final nighttime exercises were underway. The weather was bad. The route where the inspection exercise of driving the combat vehicles was carried out had become a complete jumble. However the tank troops of the company commanded by Sr Lt V. Kachan demonstrated flawless skills.

One of the staff officers observing the course of the exercise, as if thinking to himself, let slip:

"An excellent machine, our tank!"

WO [praporshchik] N. Gulimanov who was nearby agreed willingly with him, and unexpectedly added:

"With pleasure I would follow the route on a T-34. It also was an excellent vehicle...."

During the next minute, a spontaneous conversation developed about Soviet tanks and their fighting qualities. Gulimanov had soon won the attention
of the people around. No one noticed the bad weather, so interesting was it to listen to the warrant officer.

Nikolay Nikolayevich [Gulimanov] has served a quarter of a century in the army. During all these years he has been involved with armored equipment. He was a driver and then an instructor in a training subunit. Now he is the technician of a tank company, one of the leading ones in the division, and secretary of the company party organization. He had the fortune of driving the legendary T-34 and the combat vehicles of the other generations. Gulimanov has been the permanent leader of the company technical circle. And not merely the leader but the very soul of this circle. The warrant officer has helped many soldiers and sergeants become outstanding specialists, and love the armored equipment with all their heart.

Col Gen S. Bobylev, in his article, already recalled the demand of the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. Ustinov, voiced by him at a practical scientific conference for the leading political workers of the Army and Navy that each man must master modern weapons and military equipment. Scarcely anyone would say that this is an easy problem or that it can be done easily. At the same time, life shows that it is carried out most successfully in those troop collectives where fervent party concern is shown for instilling in the men an affection for their weapons, and confidence in its combat capabilities and reliability.

I would like to return to the tank company commanded by Sr Lt Kachan. It is the best in the unit. Here a high level of combat training has been achieved by all the specialists. For example, more than 70 percent of the drivers have become specialists first and second class. And it is more than the fact that Sr Lt Kachan and the other officers of the subunit are skillful instructors of their subordinates. An essential role is played by that atmosphere of involvement and unabating interest by the tank troops in understanding all the fine points and secrets of the weapons. And the company party organization headed by WO Gulimanov helps the commander actively in maintaining this atmosphere.

It has been noted that only the person who loves his specialty and all that is related to it can become a true master. This applies fully to us, military personnel. There is one result, for example, when a tank driver studies a certain unit in merely obeying his duties. But it is something completely different when the soldier is vitally interested in the machine, and when he desires to go further and reach what is usually termed "A to Z." To encourage such a desire is what we must work for, in using the entire arsenal of the forms and methods of party political work for these purposes. This must be done primarily in the inferior levels of the troop organism, that is, in the platoon and company, where the military skill of the personnel is directly formed. And it is essential each time to critically assess the effectiveness of one's influence.
In the tank company commanded by the CPSU member, Sr Lt R. Tazidinov, upon the initiative of the party organization, a question and answer evening was held devoted to the history of the creation of the Soviet tank troops. Seemingly the measure was carried out actively. However, the secretary of the company party organization, Sr Lt N. Misyurev, called a meeting of the communists:

"Let us sum up the results: Where did our evening succeed and where not...?"

In exchanging impressions, the organizers of the meeting noted the detail that the drivers showed the greatest interest in the conversation. The gunners were less interested. Particularly the young ones which had arrived from the training subunit. The communists explained this by the fact that the drivers are technically more skilled and for this reason more meticulous persons. They had been more involved in technical training, and naturally this category of specialist developed a permanent and profound interest in the equipment.

And thus they came to the decision that it was essential to do more work with the gunners and loaders. The company party organization involved the best Komsomol specialists in this work subsequently.

Just one touch, but, in my view, a very expressive one showing the ability of the party organization to reach the very essence of the matter in military-technical propaganda, and to see behind the mass of soldiers the individual and what impression is left in his awareness by the measures carried out.

Here I could give other examples of a truly creative approach by our commanders, political workers and party organizations to training the tank troops and indoctrinating respect for the equipment and their specialty in them. However, it cannot be said that this is the situation in all the subunits and units of the division. At times we encounter facts of an indifferent, formal attitude toward military-technical propaganda, an under-evaluation of its effectiveness, and attempts by certain party activists to put this important matter exclusively on the shoulders of the commanders.

Once I spoke with Maj V. Isakov, the chief of the unit armored service. He was a member of the party committee and on the speakers group. In a word, he was one of the persons who must set the tone in military-technical propaganda, and show true party concern for making it daily, convincing and militant. But it turned out that during the year, Maj Isakov had spoken only once to the tank troops giving a lecture which he himself did not prepare, as he took its text from the unit propagandist.

In such instances, usually the question is asked of what was the matter with the party committee? Unfortunately, until recently the party committee was not alarmed by either the content or the quality of military-technical propaganda in the unit. The problem was that the appearances were good. There were a plan for the work of the speakers group approved by the party
committee and the subjects of lectures and reports on military-technical questions. But the content of this plan involuntarily led one to the thought that it had been drawn up not so much for the sake of actions as for form. Month in and month out the plan repeated the same subjects merely changing the names of the speakers. In essence, the party committee was not interested in what the activists were to speak on, whether their speeches conformed to the training program, to the specific missions of the socialist competition, or to the struggle of the men to fulfill all the assumed pledges, for what audience the lectures were designed, and so forth.

The political department of the division took all of the necessary measures to make the party committee and party organization of the unit alter the style of their work. But this very fact serves as a good lesson for the future. In thinking about it, one again comes to the conclusion: nothing so impedes us from raising the effectiveness of military-technical propaganda as a formal, bureaucratic attitude toward it on the part of individual leaders of the party organizations. It is simply impossible to carry out military-technical propaganda without a constant straining of creative thought and without search and inspiration.
POOR CONSTRUCTION OF MOTOR TROOP FACILITIES CRITICIZED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 4 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by A. Tertychnyi, Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent: "The 'Unconquered' Tanks"]

[Text] The editors received a letter from officer L. Ryabchenko announcing that in the subunit where he served, facilities had long been under construction for storing fuel, equipment and providing for its normal operation. The construction was being carried out by the UNR [Office of the Work Supervisor] where Engr-Col A. Volodeyev is the chief. However, the pace of the work and its quality is such that the dates for completing the projects are constantly missed.

And this took me to the construction site.

Not only the drivers but also the construction workers know that you cannot go anywhere in a motor vehicle without fuel. And hence, when 3 years ago they were ordered to build a new more suitable fuel and lubricant dump at the site of the old one, they began the job without delay. The pits were dug, the tanks were put in, they were covered with dirt and packed down.

However, the vehicle operators were not able to use the new dump long. As soon as the rains started, a strange phenomenon occurred on its territory. The wet earth in a number of places swelled and... an unknown force pushed the tanks to the surface.

The motor troops asked the construction workers how they had been able to build the tanks so that after a rain they appeared on the surface like mushrooms.

"We built according to the plans. That is where the problem lies," they answered.

The owners of the dump turned to the designers, an organization where Engr-Col G. Sergeyev is the chief.
"We must admit it is an unsuccessful plan," agreed its authors. And they drew up a new one.

And a second time the construction workers buried the tanks.

"Now they will certainly cause no trouble!" they assured the client.

And in actuality, this time the tanks did not crawl out of the ground. At least until they were quickly pulled to the surface...by the construction workers themselves. This happened as follows. Soon after the dump had begun to operate again, the dump head noted that the tanks were half full of water, and that a large amount of motor fuel had disappeared somewhere. Having carefully inspected the area of ground around the dump, he discovered that the earth was saturated with fuel like a sponge.

How had the leak occurred? The construction workers stated that this again was the fault of the designers who had incorrectly indicated the level for installing the tanks, because of which the rainwater got into the intakes of the tanks and forced out the fuel. The designers blamed the construction workers for everything, stating that they had laid the concrete cushion under the tanks with a deviation from the plan.

It would be hard to determine who was the more to blame. But the carelessness was apparent in the work of both the designers and the builders. A good deal of time has passed since the dump stopped working. An important commission has visited the construction project three times, and after extended reflection concluded that the tanks, finally, should be installed properly. And a final date was set, 15 November 1976. A new blueprint was drawn up. On it were the signatures of the responsible officials and the instructions from the chief of the UNR to the construction workers: "Begin work." But here everything bogged down.

"It is impossible to carry out the work," said the chief of the construction-installation section, Engr-Capt V. Biler, "because we do not have a crane now which could place the tanks."

And it is not known when a crane will be available. And for now the fuel dump stands idle.

Unfortunately, this case is not the only indicator of the quality of the work done by the organizations participating in the construction. For example, for the same subunit the construction workers have built a motor vehicle servicing station. Two months ago it was completed, but as yet has not operated due to a minor "detail," it does not have a compressor, and there are no hoses for removing exhausts. The time for completing the warm-water vehicle washing station has long passed. But it also stands idle due to the delayed delivery of equipment.
The motor troops have repeatedly turned to the superior construction organization which is led by Engr-Col A. Litvinenko with a request to accelerate the course of the work and to improve its quality. And in response there have been promises, but nothing gets done. Isn't it time to get this work off dead center and finally complete the construction which has been greatly drawn out?

10272
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DIFFICULTIES IN INTRODUCING ADVANCED TRAINING METHODS VIEWED

Moscow KRA\NMAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jan 71 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Tank Trps A. Bogdanov, Deputy Troop Commander for Military Training of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "The Thoroughness of a Search"]

[Text] The tactical exercise involving field firing left a bitter taste in your mouth. It was not so much the average results shown by the battalion fighting on the main axis that were upsetting as the instances of the repetition of mistakes made 3 months ago. And the commander of the tank regiment had assured us on the eve of the field exercises that the company commanders had introduced the advanced experience acquired in the Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy motorized rifle regiment. But why wasn't this experience felt?

A group of tank officers had actually visited the motorized rifle troops. The observations and conclusions were given in an extensive report. But during the check it turned out that the report contained generally known recommendations which had almost nothing new. In a word, the tank troops had paid a visit to the motorized rifle troops and that was it. They had not delved into the particular features of the experience of the motorized rifle troops.

Another fact was disappointing. The district combat training department had generalized what in our view was positive experience in organizing and controlling the combat of the motorized rifle and tank subunits in mountain-desert terrain. The district staff recommended its study and introduction into troop practices. The district newspaper FRUNZEVETS on its pages even described the experience of the leading companies. However, the valuable advice and recommendations of the tank troops were not taken up. Neither the command nor the regimental party committee found them important. And thus the documents sent out were left to lie on the staff desks.
And how is the experience of the best regimental educators introduced here? Sr Lt V. Sovenkov, for example, is best in commanding his subordinates on the training field. This officer has worked out and employed an original method of platoon command. From one brief signal, the commanders of the platoons and the tanks, in using an ordinary watch dial, without error determine in what direction they are to advance or deploy in battle formation. Under the conditions of radio jamming or rugged terrain, this method has proven its advantage. The innovation merits the closest attention.

Unfortunately, the regimental staff did not promptly support the initiative of the young officer. And they had to pay for this. At the crucial moment of combat, the commander of one of the companies, under conditions of heavy radio jamming, was unable to give orders to his own and attached subunits. The "dial" method, unfortunately, had not been mastered by the officer.

And at present in the tank regiment the opinion is supported that their own experience does not produce anything new. This cannot be agreed with. But many officers clearly do not have that feeling for the new, the ability to see the future, to look in depth, or the desire to seek out the best ways to solve the crucial problems. This obviously is the root of a certain nonchalance in the approach to organizing the socialist competition in the unit.

A different approach to generalizing and spreading advanced experience is practiced in the Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy motorized rifle regiment. Here the search is carried out, to put it figuratively, to the entire depth. The commander, the party committee and the staff carry out joint, purposeful and consistent work in this direction. The valuable experience in the unit is collected carefully, bit by bit, and is discussed at the procedural council. All the best is quickly disseminated.

At one time, for capturing an advantageous line in the mountains, the commanders of the advancing sides without fail created a significant superiority in forces over the "enemy," concentrating the subunits on limited sectors. In the regiment it was strongly felt that this method could entail unjustified losses for the advancing troops. The command urged the officers to seek out new methods for conducting combat in the mountains.

Soon thereafter, by common efforts, specific recommendations were worked out and introduced into practice. They were based upon the experience acquired by Maj V. Koptyayev. During the exercises, the officer created mobile flanking cross country detachments. In fighting boldly and decisively, they appeared by surprise on the "enemy" flanks and in the rear. The battalion achieved success with equal or even fewer forces.

As can be seen, a concerned and truly party attitude on the part of everyone to disseminating advanced experience provides good results. The regimental commander, Lt Col A. Stel'makh, and the chief of staff, Maj G. Tsay, are constantly improving the forms and methods for disseminating innovator
methods. The experience of the best commanders is passed on and introduced directly in the field, during firing, and in demonstration, battle drill and tactical exercises.

The regiment has made effective use of the time which preceded the start of the new training year. The regimental commander and party committee created an enterprising group which included the best instructor officers. Having studied the experience of the district training center, they introduced much of this in the regiment. The improved training facilities made it possible to "liven up" the training field. Now a company or platoon, in advancing from one line to another, does not waste training time. The trainees in the course of the move carry out various missions: Either they conduct radiological reconnaissance, they repel an attack by a ground or air "enemy," or they cross mine fields and "contaminated" areas. All of this, undoubtedly, helps to improve the quality of the exercises and their effectiveness.

Advanced experience, as a rule, does not lie on the surface. The commander must have professional competence, the ability to penetrate, and the quality of distinguishing true experience from the seeming which merely at a cursory glance appears to be advanced and progressive. It must be confessed that there are still instances when certain commanders and party organizations are involved in searching for the "effect" rather than the effective innovations.

Such a mistake was made, for example, by the deputy commander of a tank regiment, Maj V. Vas'ko. He actively supported and introduced into practice the experience of organizing nighttime tank firing where, as it turned out later, weaknesses and violations of the conditions of the exercises had been "programmed in." After the training facilities had been brought up to conformity with the requirements of the guiding documents, the crews did not repeat the good and excellent results achieved the day before.

To show attention to something new does not mean to introduce it immediately. This should be preceded by a thorough study of it, a practical check and certainty that it actually contributes to a more effective solving of the posed missions.

Each commander understands that the possibility of repeating the experience is a most important Leninist principle in organizing the socialist competition. The successes in the struggle to improve the quality and effectiveness of combat training are inconceivable without a systematic and constant introduction of advanced training and indoctrinational methods and procedures into practice. But, in realizing this, unfortunately not everyone knows what is demanded from them in practice.

In one of the units of the district, a seminar was held at which the winners of the socialist competition spoke. It was thought that they would tell of their experience in detail. But instead of this, many of the speakers merely listed the measures carried out, and gave the seconds and minutes
which they had cut off the standards. In the foyer of the officers club, stands were put up under the general slogan "The Experience of the Advanced Men—Our Valuable Wealth." But in fact the stands had portraits of the officers and warrant officers [praporshchik] with brief texts such as: "outstanding educator," "able indoctrinator," and "high-class specialist." But behind these phrases you could not see or feel the experience which, in actuality, of course existed. The problem was that in the unit they did not encourage the personnel to search for the new, they did not develop in them a creative attitude toward advanced experience, and did not instill in them the notion that the mastery and introduction of this experience involve protracted, painstaking and multifaceted work.

Unfortunately, individual staff workers do not burden themselves with a detailed study of the new procedures and methods which they encounter. The following case comes to mind. In the unit where a representative of the superior staff was visiting, they were working out a new method for crossing mountain passes. But the officer did not question the specialists about the fine points of this method, and did not go into detail. His report to the senior chief was general, not concrete, and abounded in negative facts. Such an approach which I would call formal to generalizing and disseminating advanced experience could nip a useful undertaking in the bud.

To delve into everything new and progressive in a Leninist manner, and to invest one's knowledge and practical skills in it—this we are obliged to do by the historic decisions of the 25th Party Congress and the October (1976) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The military council of our district constantly urges the commanders and political bodies to seek out, generalize and disseminate advanced experience. We see in this one of the important reserves for raising the combat readiness of the troops and the formations, the field skills and the effective mastery of the equipment and weapons. For precisely this reason at present, when the training year—the year of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution—is just beginning, it is important to put the existing reserves in action. Advanced experience is those precious seeds from which a full ear of great successes grows.
EFFECTIVE SMALL-UNIT COMBAT TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jan 77 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt N. Yelovik, company commander: "Duel on the Minefield"]

[Text] As is known, the activeness of the "enemy" in exercises and training and the strengthening of the impact of its real presence are factors which raise the results of training time. But among some there is the opinion that this can be achieved only on large-scale exercises. However, the training and exercise practices in the subunits indicate the invalidity of such an opinion.

A minefield. An hour ago it was set out by the field engineers of one of the squads of our company, and the operation was properly carried out. Each mine had been buried under a heavy layer of snow and properly camouflaged. The drifting snow also helped in the camouflaging, in covering up the tracks of the mine laying group.

And now the squad under the command of Pvt V. Bondarenko, the mine clearing group, began its work.

To clear a passageway in a minefield means to carry out an entire complex of work. The exercise leader, the platoon commander, Lt A. Verketis, merely indicated the approximate search area. Consequently, the trainees had to carefully examine a significant area of terrain before locating the expected signal in the earphones of the mine detector. But what if the mine was not in a metal housing, but in a plastic one? Then it would be significantly harder to find. Several mines must be located before it is possible to determine how many rows there are in the minefield and to ascertain the spacing. It is quite possible that the "enemy" has placed certain charges not in a strictly geometric position but rather arbitrarily. Then maximum attention is required and a careful examination of each square meter. Then comes the immediate work with the found charges, their neutralizing and removal from the passage. Then the passage must be clearly designated and a high throughput capacity must be provided.
The time for all of this, of course, is limited. The tank subunit to which the field engineer squad has been assigned must attack by the designated hour across the passageway cleared to the strongpoint of the defending side.

The frost was minus 20. But the field engineers did not notice the cold. To carry out the mission as quickly as possible, effectively and without "losses," this desire motivated each man. The soldiers showed a great deal of initiative, creativity and resourcefulness, and these included more than one-half of new recruits. And to a significant degree this is explained by the interest in the exercise which excelled in great dynamicness and complexity of the tactical background.

Among the missions carried out at the start of the training year, an important place is held by the carrying out of initial training of the soldiers in the maximum shortest time, and the rapid shaping up of the young recruits. This is essential for achieving firm teamwork among the subunits.

The second month has passed since the start of the training year. This is not so much time to achieve the teamwork of the squads. But the inspection exercises conducted recently in the company have shown that this task in fact has been carried out. The "acceleration" in the training of our specialists is largely explained by the constant work done by the officers and sergeants in the company in improving their procedural skills.

First of all, it is essential to mention the greater complexity of the tactical background in each exercise and training session. Even when the new soldiers are working on the simplest subjects, let us say, the placing and removing of individual mines, the instructors are introducing them into the dynamics of modern combined-arms combat. The new soldiers actually carried out individual missions, but this occurred against a background of the actions of mine laying or mine clearing groups. Thus, the questions of coordination in the squads were also worked on in parallel.

In the exercises there are fewer simplifications and indulgences. It is no secret that these are largely explained by the hypothetical character of the "enemy." But if there is an enemy, then, as a rule, it is weak, passive and easy to "deal with." And hence in the course of the training process we have tried out the testing of the experience and skills of two servicemen or two adjacent squads as in the initially mentioned episode, and such exercises assumed immeasurably greater dynamicness and acuteness. Of course, this required the clearer planning of the training process. In a company, in 1 day it is not so easy to prepare exercises for two special subjects, even for setting minefields or clearing them. But the end result, as practice shows, is worth such effort.

One other important thing: the situation in such "two-sided" exercises makes the men compete, and consequently, raises their efficiency.
Six mines were found. The squad commander, Pvt V. Bondarenko, hurries to make up the diagram of the minefield, as this mission, in addition to clearing the passage itself, had been given by Lt A. Verketis to the mine-clearing group. According to the report of Bondarenko, the field consisted of three rows. But the young squad commander had not considered that the passageway being made could merely "tip" the edge of the minefield, and in this instance the subsequent rows, if they did exist, would not be detected. And this was the case, as the field was a four-row one. A clear mistake! But the mine clearing group did not know of this yet. For the trainees, one thing was clear that the squad under the command of Pvt A. Gorshinskiy who had set out the minefield had done their work well. And certainly the standard was a rigid one for them as well. They also had to solve a number of various inputs. This included driving off the attack of an air "enemy," destroying its diversionary group, and so forth. Naturally, the subordinates of Pvt B. Bondarenko wanted to work as efficiently.

Just how much this succeeded can be seen from a detailed analysis of today's exercise. The best squad will be determined. The reasons of the leader are more than convincing as on the scales rest the facts of initiative and daring, and at the same time the miscalculations disclosed in the duel of the two opposing sides.

10272
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TRAINING METHODS OF AIR DEFENSE RADAR OPERATORS DISCUSSED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 12 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Engr-Col G. Suleymanyan: "Battle Does Not Tolerate Routine"]

[Text] In front of me is a table showing the results of one of the recent tactical exercises involving the radar operators. The vivid colors of the columns of figures show that a majority of the crews worked confidently under the most difficult conditions. But in the tables there are also columns colored in pale tones meaning that the crews fulfilled the missions only satisfactorily.

How can this "spread" in the indicators be explained? Certainly the opportunities for improving skills are the same for all. In reflecting on this, involuntarily the following case came to mind. One of the crews of the sub-unit commanded by Capt V. Romanshchak had to track a large number of targets under conditions of heavy jamming, and solve a number of inputs involving the maneuvering of their means and combating a ground "enemy." None of the inspectors doubted the success of the radar troops. A preliminary check showed that the specialists were well trained and the equipment was working flawlessly. And then the first blips turned up on the screen, followed by other ones. The density of the attack increased minute by minute. And then the rhythm of the crew's work unexpectedly began to be disrupted, and comments, suggestions and criticisms were heard. And this was followed by the first failures in tracking the targets.

After the training session, the commander stated that the crew had simply let him down. He considered the mistakes made by the specialists as being in the category of accidental ones, and for greater conviction recalled that in the preceding training session the radar troops had won a high grade. However one thing was clear for the inspectors: here it was no accident.

But what then was the reason? Certainly a majority of the crewmen were high class specialists, and opposite their names in the corresponding logs were outstanding grades. In order to answer this question and, as they say, to shed some light on the "accident," let us make a small digression.
As is known, the most important and crucial moment in training radar troops is teamwork brought up to the very limit for all the crew members. If there is no teamwork in the actions of the specialists, then there can be no question of achieving success, particularly under difficult conditions. And how is such teamwork achieved? First of all, by correctly organizing training sessions involving course problems, and by providing a logical succession and high quality of elaborating them. Such training sessions do not start all at once, but should be preceded by careful, preliminary training of the young soldiers who have recently joined the crews. In the leading subunits, this is carried out according to a strict system, the essence of which can be expressed thusly; step by step.

Let us examine this from the example of the subunit commanded by Capt Yu. Lavrinenko. First of all, the new men are instructed in the particular features of carrying out combat missions at the given position, and they master the optimum operating conditions for the equipment, the system for processing and giving information, and the possible variations of action by the air and ground enemy. Then comes the second step, the working out of interaction between the crewmen. Here again the principle of successiveness is used: initially the crew operates with a simple air situation, and then with the reaching of a certain level of skills, the situation is gradually made more complicated, and the quantity of information, commands and inputs increases. Capt Lavrinenko carries out all of this both in general training sessions involving the full crew, as well as training sessions for special, specific studies "earmarked" for an individual crewman or group of specialists.

Of course, such an approach to training requires painstaking work and great effort. It is one thing to instruct each specialist individually and something quite else to achieve mastery and teamwork in the crew as a whole. This will not come about with several training sessions. There must be daily, strictly thought out and planned training with a gradual reaching of the standards, with the improving and honing of skills, and the consistent complicating of the air situation. If for any reason one crewman evidences a delay in improving his skills, these shortcomings must be immediately eliminated and only then move ahead. That is, in the development of the individual specialists and the entire crew, the proper sequence should be strictly observed. A violation of it inevitably leads to a situation where the skills of the crew either slow down or halt altogether.

If, considering all that has been stated, we look at the organization of the training process in the subunit commanded by Capt Romanshchak, then the so-called "accidents" appear in their true light. Before the dynamic battle which was full of acute situations had started, Capt Romanshchak confidently reported to the staff officers the data concerning the number of target trackings, the range of detection, the percentage of class specialists, and the results of fulfilling the socialist pledges. All this information made a good impression. But they basically described the individual training of the specialists. The commander particularly did not take up the
most important thing, that is, the quality of working out combined missions by the crews. On the other hand, the battle itself showed this eloquently and in plain terms: the teamwork among the crews had not been fully achieved.

Unfortunately, individual commanders spare no effort and time to make each specialist individually achieve a high percentage of class ratings, but for some reason then forget the capacity of the crews to pass the strictest test. How is this explained? By a desire to carry out the missions more easily, and to excel for the inspecting officers from a superior staff in high figures and percentages. Of course, all of this occurs where the unit staff inspects the course of combat training in the subunits superficially and formally.

Any exercise, tactical exercise or training session achieves its purpose only in the instance when the situation itself demands from the commanders and specialists a maximum straining of thought and will, decisiveness, initiative and creativity. Only then is it possible to test the true "safety factor" of one or another crew. Seemingly it would not be difficult to do this by creating a difficult situation for the crew in the exercises, and then its successes and shortcomings will immediately be apparent.

However, certain commanders follow the path of simplifications and weaknesses. Occasionally one arrives in a subunit, talks with the officers prior to the tactical exercise and sees that they are informed about a great deal and often about the start of the exercise, the purpose and the inputs. Where does this information come from? And it turns out that someone has learned from adjacent units or the senior comrades from the unit staff have been concerned about this. For what reason? To protect the subordinates and safeguard them against "accidents." But what is the purpose of such training? Of course it is not difficult to obtain a high evaluation for it. But it will scarcely be possible to achieve the main purpose of letting the crew feel the pulse of true battle and to thoroughly check out the specialists.

At times one meets commanders who are not fully aware of how to plan, organize and conduct an exercise or an instructive quiz training session. Either they simplify the purpose, they disregard the elements of surprise, or do not fully utilize real aviation flights. As a rule, this happens as a consequence of the fact that the unit staff does not accustom the subordinate commanders to the independent elaboration of the forthcoming exercises. But why? This question is sometimes answered thus: "It is easier to do it yourself than to assign it to someone else and then have to redo it."

The logic is certainly simple and understandable. But as a result it turns out that the subunit commander is given completed diagrams and plans which are to be analyzed, fulfilled and reported on. And then the exercise starts, and the radar troops are put under conditions where they must act, let us say, without contact with the superior command post. The commander must solve a whole complex of problems. But how can he act with initiative and
creativity, if beforehand he has merely been accustomed to ready-made solutions? And here begin all sorts of requests, clarifications and suggestions. The exercise loses a great deal in the sense of a further rise in the skills and teamwork of the crews. The commander himself obtains little as a tactician, educator, organizer and leader of combat.

I would like to take up separately the question of the method of giving inputs. Their purpose is to bring the training and exercise conditions as close as possible to actual combat. Recently the arsenal of inputs has been significantly enriched. More often an attack by the ground enemy is simulated, the failure of equipment, a high level of radiation at the position, and so forth.

But certain commanders here do not avoid the use of conditional or simplified conditions. The following case comes to mind. The "enemy" had made a "nuclear strike" at the position of one of the subunits. The radars and the command post had been "hit." But at the superior command post, this was "not noticed," and they continued to use the information from this company.... The episode speaks for itself.

As is known, an input is a model of unexpected and complex situations. And we feel they should be given not always from the command post, but from wherever they might arise in actual combat. Let us say, a diversionary "enemy" group has appeared and the scout should report this to the subunit commander. The road to the back-up position has been "bombed," and let the commander obtain this information directly from the area of the maneuver (by using radio). Certainly, in individual situations the inputs can be given from the command post.

At times, one can hear the opinion: why in training sessions think up special inputs if they are not always given in the guiding documents? Certainly, this is not always done. But is it possible to schedule everything out to the last detail in such documents? And where is the initiative and creativity of the commander?

In our view, we must struggle decisively against the force of habit and the desire to work in the old way. And these old habits are still felt. A commander even in solving new problems may follow the well-trodden path. Certainly the obsolete lives on for a long time because it has been tried out hundreds of times, and supposedly, does not fail. The introduction of something new is more complicated. And at the outset you do not know how to proceed. But it is essential to set to solving questions raised by life itself. This is required by the interests of the cause, combat readiness.
CHIEF OF AIR DEFENSE RADAR TROOPS ON TRAINING QUESTIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen M. Beregovoy, chief of the National Air Defense Radio-Technical Troops: "Under Difficult Conditions"]

[Text] An important condition for raising the effectiveness of radar support for the combat of missile troops and flyers is the broad use of automated control systems (ASU) in our troops. This not only reduces the time for handling the information, but also significantly raises its accuracy. This makes it possible to more fully realize the combat capabilities of the antiaircraft missile installations and the interceptors. The turning over of the functions of processing data on the air situation to electronic computers increases the number of handled targets and raises the reliability of the data concerning them.

It can be said without exaggeration that the use of ASU is the basic way for resolving the contradiction between the constantly increasing demands on radar data and the objective capabilities of the commanders and staffs to perform complex tactical calculations. Precisely this has caused the increased demand on each commander and each radar and ASU specialist for their training, the ability to skillfully operate the equipment, make maximum use of its capabilities, and act decisively and boldly. And for precisely this reason the mastery of the military equipment and weapons, the strengthening of confidence in their force, and the development of teamwork in each crew, subunit and unit as a whole are one of the most important tasks in training and indoctrinating the radar personnel.

Our leading units and subunits serve as an example of the exemplary solving of this many-faceted problem. I might refer to the experience of the subunit commanded by Maj R. Zhemetro, winner of the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" Third Degree, and specialist first class. In the training and indoctrination of the men, the commander ably uses active and purposeful party political work and the socialist competition. Here competitions for the best specialist, and contests for a knowledge of one's military equipment and air attack weapons have become a permanent fixture in their life.
Success in solving the problems of combat training is inconceivable without introducing the most effective forms and methods of training. In our units and subunits, a definite system has developed for training highly skilled specialists. First of all, there is a vocational and psychological selection of the young soldiers. This is done by commissions which include the best educator-officers. In using specially elaborated tests and programs, they disclose the professional suitability of the men to master one or another specialty and above the radar and ASU operators.

In the radio-technical troops, the operators are often called the first violin in the military collective. The most crucial position is entrusted to him, and he is the first to come into contact with the air enemy. The operator must constantly know and "see" the air space in his sector, and show maximum activity in work. For this reason, in the process of the medical and vocational selection of new recruits, and in making up the training groups of operators, the most thorough consideration is given to the state of health of the man, the resiliency of his organism to fatigue, acuteness of vision and hearing, and the ability to rapidly analyze a situation.

The new training method based upon the principles of the theory of the gradual development of skills and knowledge has helped to accelerate the time and improve the quality of operator training. The essence of this method has already been disclosed on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The training process is so organized that the operators from the very outset without a mistake perform all the actions related to the inspection, turning on and monitoring the functioning of the radar, and for detecting and tracking the targets, initially without jamming and then with it. A lack of mistakes is achieved by the gradual and sequential executing of all operations using specially compiled diagrams of the guiding principles of actions (OOD). The diagram contains instructions on the nature of the actions, and includes the necessity of first learning the methods and procedure of work by rote.

The introduction of the new method entails a significant reorganization of the entire training process. This is complicated and important work. But it fully repays itself. In using the new method, good results have been achieved by the subunits under the command of Maj A. Yeremeyev and Capt N. Ogiy. The officers, warrant officers [praporshchik] and sergeants assigned in these subunits as instructors for teaching the use of the OOD diagrams without fail undergo additional training. They sharpen their educational skills and thoroughly study the requirements of the new methods.

The method of individual assignments is also widely used in our troops. The assignment gives the subjects to be studied and the time allotted for working on them. Supervision is exercised by the platoon commanders (the radar chiefs). They grade the specialists.
In the course of individual training, particular attention is paid to the detection and tracking of small and high-speed targets, actions under jamming conditions, and the ability to correctly select the operating conditions of the radar and its individual systems with the maneuvering of a target.

For successfully solving the problem of training operators to track targets under the conditions of a complex air situation, a number of units uses the method where an experienced back-up man works next to the basic operator. The back-up operator follows the air situation and is ready at any moment to give information without additional familiarization with it, and also promptly correct the mistakes made by the young specialist, without taking over for him. Through the back-up, the commands, target designations and so forth are given to the basic operator.

In the course of such training, precise actions and complete reciprocal understanding between the specialists are developed. Such training should be conducted not only in one's own subunits, but also at the training points (UTP). Here it is important to clearly plan the work of the UTP, the procedure for the arrival for the crews here, the course of the exercises, and to staff the points with experienced instructors.

The individual training of the operators and other specialists is improved in the second stage of the training, that is, in the process of autonomous training, where interaction between the personnel of the crews is developed.

Unfortunately, individual commanders overlook the questions of the quality of operator training. This is eloquently shown by the following fact. In the subunits commanded by Sr Lt Govorov, the operator, Pvt Frikazchikov, was permitted to stand independent duty. It turned out that he did not have sufficient practice in tracking the targets or the skills of using the operating conditions of the radars under different conditions of the air situation. He had not undergone training at the UTP. In training sessions on the sub-unit level, as the commander later affirmed, this specialist did master his functions. But as soon as he had to act under a difficult air situation, the gaps in his training immediately became apparent.

I would particularly like to mention the personal example of the commander in improving combat skills. At present a radio-technical unit can be successful led only by a commander who has high morale, political and psychological qualities, a broad tactical viewpoint and a profound knowledge of the tactics of our own troops and the air enemy. The commander should work constantly on improving the quality of command, and seek out new tactical devices designed for the maximum use of the capabilities of the equipment, and for raising the effectiveness of radar support of the weapons.

In the dynamics of modern combat, a commander must have quickness of thought, and the ability to clearly assess the situation even from incomplete and often fragmentary data, to take intelligent decisions for controlling
the subordinate crews and subunits, and to rationally allocate their efforts depending upon the particular features of the developing situation. The elaboration of these qualities is achieved by effective commander training, by the systematic conducting of training and exercises, and by proper analysis of them.

In planning combat training, the commanders and staffs and each exercise leader should carefully analyze the content of the training missions and determine specific goals for each training section, subject and individual exercise. The situation in training should correspond to the most characteristic tactical methods of an air enemy. The solving of this problem is possible only with the side use of the UTP, simulators, trainers and other technical training devices.

Particular attention must be paid to training the young and recently promoted officers. The specific features of the radio-technical subunits, as a rule, located a significant distance away from the unit command, require that the young commanders in a brief period of time become able and skilled leaders, and attain highly effective use of the radar equipment. For this reason their development and military maturing should be constantly at the center of attention of the senior commanders, political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations.

The necessary level of skill and teamwork in the crews is ultimately achieved by organizing daily training of the combat crews, in conducting comprehensive inspection of the functioning of the radars and ASU, as well as by raising the quality of the comprehensive training of the combat crews and radio-technical subunits together with the missile troops and flyers. The main purpose of the comprehensive training is to develop the methods and procedures of combat control and teamwork among all the specialists of the crews. Each training session should be preceded by a careful elaboration of diagrams of the expected attack, and they should determine the degree of using ground jamming generators, the lines of creating jamming using them, the routes of the simulated targets, and so forth.

In the process of working with real targets, work is carried out on controlling the data sources over the appropriate communications channels, target allocation, and so forth. At the end of each training session a detailed analysis is made during which the disclosed shortcomings are analyzed and the tasks are given for eliminating them, while the actions of each crew member are analyzed.

Combat training necessitates a precise rhythm and an increase in success. Each deviation from the rigid requirements of today entails undesirable consequences. Precisely this explains the fact that instances are still encountered of the delayed detection of targets. Mistakes are made in measuring altitude, the composition of group targets, and so forth.
Tactical exercises are a higher form of improving the combat skills of the air defense troops. During them coordination is developed between the radar operators, the missile troops and the flyers, and the ability of the commanders to correctly organize combat and use the modern ASU is tested out. For this reason, particular attention must be given to their organizing and conduct. In each exercise, it is important to create a complicated but instructive situation making it possible for the commanders to improve their tactical and military skills, to sharpen the practical skills of commanding subordinates, and develop new tactical procedures and methods for detecting air targets under the conditions of jamming, and instill in the personnel high morale, military and psychological qualities as well as initiative and creativity.

In analyzing the exercises, the actions of each crew member, the subunit and the unit as a whole must be thoroughly evaluated, the reasons for the disclosed shortcomings must be brought out and measures taken to eliminate them.

Inspired by the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the materials of the October (1976) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the radar troops are fully determined to work even better, and to achieve new successes in the socialist competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

10272
CSO: 1801
TRAINING OF AIR DEFENSE RADAR OPERATORS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jan 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Col O. Tret'yakov of the Red Banner Baku Air Defense District: "The Method and the Result"]

[Text] In terms of sharpness and intensity, this exercise was a serious testing of the combat skills of the radar operators. The "enemy" airplanes flew at various altitudes, they frequently maneuvered, and used heavy jamming, endeavoring to break through to the defended objective. However, the radar operators of the subunit headed by Capt Yu. Lavrinenko, under these complex conditions, showed enviable skill, having been able to provide uninterrupted tracking of all the targets, including the low-flying ones.

The main and determining reason for the success of the subordinates of Capt Lavrinenko lies, in my view, in a firm knowledge by each man of his mission and the procedure for carrying it out with any, even the most unexpected changes in the air and ground situation. And this is achieved by the most rational and effective training methods. In explaining, for example, to the young soldiers the purpose of a radar and its performance, Capt Lavrinenko does not limit himself to just figures. He also "decodes" them, in relating this closely to the particular features of combat work at the given station, and at the end of each exercise without fail holds a training session so that the operators reinforce the obtained knowledge in practice. Capt Lavrinenko pays particular attention to a knowledge of the air attack weapons by each specialist, that is, the possible density of the attack, the enemy tactics precisely on the given direction, and so forth.

This must be emphasized, for instances are still encountered when the radar operators seemingly have a poor knowledge of the performance of modern air attack weapons. And when they are asked questions requiring a practical calculation, some of them have a difficult time in answering. And this is nothing more than the result of learning numerical figures by rote without proper analysis of them.
In training the young specialists, Capt Lavrinenko, among other aids, uses a mock-up of the coverage. On it with great accuracy are indicated the topography, the location of the radar facilities, and concealed approaches which the air enemy might use are designated. Each specialist is also issued cards which have been worked out in the subunit showing diagrams with the target flight profiles, the possible areas of target maneuvers in altitude, speed and course. And in tables beneath the diagrams for each such maneuver, optimum operating conditions of the radar are given, as well as the time during which the operator must be able to make all the necessary switching.

But how are these cards used in training the radar operators? Initially, quizzes are given during which the specialists solve inputs. For example, at such a range a target is expected to maneuver in altitude. What operating conditions of the radar must be selected for constantly tracking the target? The next stage of the exercise is also conducted in an instructive manner. An attack by an air "enemy" is simulated from a certain direction. According to the data on the card, the time is determined during which the operator must in fact carry out all the required actions for uninterrupted tracking of the target....

Of course, during such exercises the station is not actually sending, and the trainees do not see the blips of real targets on the screens. Nevertheless, the benefit of such a training method is beyond doubt.

Also noteworthy are certain stylistic touches in the work of Capt Lavrinenko such as concreteness in giving assignments to subordinates, a careful check of their knowledge and skills, and profound analysis of shortcomings.

Unfortunately, not all commanders have mastered the art of conducting exercises and training in an effective manner, or bringing them closer to the conditions of real combat. Some of them during the training are unable to quickly give their subordinates clear and concrete missions, and to promptly reassign the operators depending upon the existing situation. Naturally, this reduces the effectiveness and quality of the exercise. Let me give the following example.

In the course of a training session, the operators of a crew headed by Capt V. Pankov initially located and tracked the air targets with confidence. But when a new target appeared, the data on it were late in coming.

In analyzing the training session, Pvt S. Belebeyev, guilty of the delay, said that the target had been in a "foreign" sector.

Need it be said that the justification was clearly invalid. Certainly it is well known that the operator must carefully track all the blips on the radar screen and promptly give data on the new targets appearing in the coverage. Why did Pvt Belebeyev violate this requirement? As it turned out, he had a poor and only very general notion of the mission confronting him. And for this reason he became confused at the crucial moment.
Other instances are encountered when in certain other crews the missions are given unclearly and sound approximately thus: "Detect and track targets in a broad range of altitudes...." And this leads to a lack of coordination in the actions of the specialists, to mistakes in work, and to the giving of parallel information by several operators.

Or, for example, take the analysis of the training sessions. Seemingly all commanders understand the importance of a detailed analysis of the work done by the specialists, but in fact some of them reduce the analysis to such conclusions as: "As a whole the crew met the given mission." But how did each specialist work, what was the essence of the positive experience, and what shortcomings were disclosed? No answer is heard for these questions. And it is a pity.

The analysis of each training session is quite differently organized in the subunit headed by Capt Lavrinenko. In the course of it, the officer uses the standard tables, as well as materials of objective control which make it possible to have a concrete analysis of the promptness of giving the data and their accuracy. The results of the work of each specialist are compared with the standards. For this reason the men clearly see which of them made mistakes at what stage in the training, and how to avoid them in the future.

It is correctly said that as the method is so goes the result. Advanced training methods have made it possible for Capt Lavrinenko to achieve a continuous rise in the skill of the radar operators and to successfully have them fulfill their socialist pledges.

10272
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EFFECTIVENESS OF POLITICAL WORK IN THE KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen V. Dement’yev, Military Council Member, Chief, Political Directorate, Red Banner Kiev Military District: "Team Leadership"]

[Text] As was emphasized at the 25th CPSU Congress, the primary party organizations "are called upon to have a more active influence on heightening the effectiveness of production and accelerating scientific-technical progress, and they must show constant concern for creating an atmosphere of friendly work and creative enquiry in every collective...." The congress' requirement also pertains wholly and completely to the activity of army and navy party organizations.

Fulfilling the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, our district's political agencies and party committees have done much to improve the content, style, and methods of the work of primary party organizations. Implementation of recommendations produced by a scientific-practical conference of political executives in the army and navy, which discussed pressing problems in party construction and in strengthening party influence on the life and training of the troops, is having a favorable influence on the work of party organizations. Much attention is being devoted to team leadership in the activity of party organizations as one of the important levers for creating a business-like, active, and creative atmosphere at work.

Team leadership is a tested party principle. It guarantees adoption of sound decisions capable of insuring achievement of effective results in all activity of the party collective.

Let me cite the experience of the party organization in an aviation unit in which Major V. Kvitka is the secretary of the party committee. His work is distinguished by efficiency, creativity, and strict exactingness. It is not by chance that the unit is one of the best in the district in relation to combat and political training. The fundamental problems of heightening the combat readiness of the airmen is constantly in the party committee's center of attention. Moreover, all of these problems are solved collectively, efficiently, and creatively.

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The following order has been instituted in the party committee: Each of its members is responsible for the area of the organization's activity in which he is most competent. But this does not mean that an active member is deprived of participation in discussion and solution of other problems. On the contrary, efficient advice and suggestions are always expected from everyone here. The pressing problems of airman training and life are subjected to deep analysis at the committee's meetings.

As a rule preparation for discussion of the problems is assigned to one or two members of the party committee, who mandatorily seek the help of specialists from among the active party members. They study the problems beforehand and work up specific proposals, which are then discussed by the committee. Such an approach promotes deep penetration into the essence of the problem, permits sound decision-making, and develops a persistence in attaining the assigned goal and creative initiative in the party committee members.

Great credit in the fact that all of the committee members work actively and fruitfully belongs to the secretary. Major V. Kvitka is a well trained party worker, and he has an inherent ability to attentively listen to people's opinions and to extract practical benefit from their proposals. This is his working style. It has met the approval of all communists. People readily go to the party committee for advice and assistance, but more often they do so to suggest their own opinions and submit proposals. The communists know that everyone is going to listen to them here, that their proposals would be discussed and analyzed and, if they meet the needs, all steps would be taken to insure their implementation.

Here is just one of many examples. During flying practice two pilots, majors A. Tabulin and A. Miz'ko, turned their attention to the following detail. When the procedures for flying assignments were followed, little fuel remained in the airplanes after long flights. This amount was not enough for extensive maneuvering when airplanes had to be landed at auxiliary air bases in poor visibility. Communists Tabulin and Miz'ko worked up a proposal for improving the procedures. They went to the party committee secretary with these proposals. Together with experienced airmen--party committee members officers Yu. Baulin, V. Lukin, and Yu. Lyulin--Major V. Kvitka thoroughly discussed the pilots' proposal and recognized it to be valuable and timely. It was the subject of thorough discussion at a party committee meeting, which the commander and aviation specialists attended.

The commander made the appropriate decision, implementation of which made a great contribution to the struggle for accident-free flying and pilot training. The entire party organization and all personnel learned that this was the result of initiative displayed by two communists. This elicited a new influx of creative activity among the people, which was expressed by new valuable proposals directed at improving the air skills of the airmen. Incidentally the overwhelming majority of this unit's communists are true masters of military affairs. As we can see, collectivism in the work of the party committee is an important source for further development of their activity.
Is this the way it is everywhere? Unfortunately I cannot reply positively to this question as yet. On looking into the activity of other party committees and party offices, one would discover not even the traces of collective effort in working out and making decisions with, so to speak, a searchlight in daytime. We encounter cases in which the secretary tries to do everything himself without relying on the experience and knowledge of others and without considering the opinions of the communists. This is often the product of excessive confidence in one's own organizational capabilities and, simultaneously, underestimation of the capabilities of other communists. Other extremes are encountered as well: For example a secretary might be all too tactful. So tactful that sometimes he feels uneasy about ordering a particular party committee member to do a job and monitoring his work. Thus he tries to do everything for everybody. He is like a carriage horse harnessed in such a way that he trots in tandem rather than leading. There can be only one result: The activity of elected party agency members decreases. Their participation in the work of the office and the committee is restricted to attendance of meetings devoid of lively exchange of opinions, acute criticism and self-criticism, and mutual exactingness.

Such a situation evolved in the party organization in which Major N. Avdonin is the secretary. Many of the party committee members did not have permanent duties, and they worked passively. Moreover some of them could not even serve as examples of organization for their comrades. Problems were discussed at party committee meetings with a lack of interest, and without critical analysis of the state of affairs. Such a working style had a negative influence on the initiative of the communists.

Communist Senior Lieutenant A. Arapov, the battalion chief of staff, who was elected to the party committee, energetically took to his work with the activity inherent to him. He prepared himself thoroughly for his first party committee meeting, at which the personal example of a communist in strengthening military discipline was discussed. The activist deeply analyzed the work of the battalion party organization. During the party committee meeting he presented his thoughts persuasively and suggested a number of concrete proposals.

The party committee members supported Comrade Arapov by adding the following clause to their decision: Communists I. Ivanenko and V. Koval' were to speak on their personal contribution to better discipline at the next party committee meeting. But a month went by, and then another, and the communists were never heard. Senior Lieutenant Arapov asked the secretary why the party committee decision had not been fulfilled. Major Avdonin replied that the need for this had been eliminated and that he personally had done the appropriate work with the communists on an individual basis.

Of course, in the first place such a stand by the secretary clearly contradicts the principle of teamwork. The secretary had ignored the opinion of party committee members. In the second place he made an error, the consequences of which would not be difficult to predict: The party committee
member, who took on his job conscientiously, suddenly felt that the secretary had no use for his energy.

During the next party committee meeting Comrade Arapov simply kept quiet. Subsequently, on encountering several more cases of lack of interest, he came to the opinion that silent attendance at committee meetings was all that was required of him. Of course we cannot justify the position of this person. But the secretary carries a great part of the blame for this.

I should note that such cases are far from sporadic. It stands to reason that they have an unfavorable influence on development of collectivism in the activity of party agencies. They can in no way be ignored. In the same way that we cannot ignore another extreme in violation of the principle of collectivism—dictatorship. Not long ago a party commission of the district's political directorate examined the case of Communist N. Zubkov and reprimanded him. What were the grounds for this? Communist Officer N. Zubkov preferred tongue-lashings to persuasion. Capitalizing on his authority, he put pressure on the communists, forcing them to support his every idea when considering decisions at party meetings. He himself hardly participated in party-political work at all. In a word, the unit's political section failed to evaluate N. Zubkov's behavior adequately in time.

Understandably the appropriate work was also done with workers of the political section. But it is not enough to analyze an incident and point out the shortcomings of the comrades. It is much more important to see the cause of the incident, to reveal its roots, and to plan the ways to eliminate the shortcomings. In this case it is especially important to constantly and purposefully teach active members to work on the basis of Lenin's principles of collectivism in the activity of party organizations.

As we know, the essence of party team leadership lies in personal responsibility of every member of the party agency for the work of the party organization, in joint, collective discussion and solution of problems in party life, and in active participation by all members of the party office and the party committee in fulfilling the adopted decrees. Team leadership not only does not exclude but actually presupposes personal responsibility of each member of the party office and party committee for a particular area of the work.

The effectiveness with which party committees and party offices utilize the rich experience of our party in leading the laboring masses depends to a decisive degree on the activeness and efficiency of party organizations and on their influence on all aspects of the life and activity of the unit's and subunit's personnel.

11004
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COMPLAINT ON LACK OF SUPPORT FOR COMBAT VETERANS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jan 77 p 2

[Letter to the Editor by Maj (Ret) N. Borovikov: "Red Tape"]

[Text] Dear editor,

The Uzhgorod City Military Commissariat, Zakarpatskaya Oblast sent questionnaires to us, the war veterans, in April 1975 in connection with the approaching holiday of the 30th anniversary of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Among other questions, the questionnaire had the following: "What complaints and requests do you have?" Quite naturally, veterans evaluated this questionnaire as the military commissariat's intention to help them in solving the problems and issues they faced. This always elicits a grateful response. And so I conscientiously spelled out my request: To help me receive an authorized medal, a chest insignia, a wound certificate, and so on.

I had understood that many questionnaires had been sent out and that workers of the military commissariat needed a certain amount of time to thoroughly dig into the essence of our requests and begin satisfying them. A month passed. Three. Five. Concerned about the progress, I wrote the city military commissariat. There was no response. Another half year passed. Once again I turned to the city military commissariat. In response I received a letter signed by the city military commissar, reporting that "...requests made by veterans of the Great Patriotic War have been generalized and sent to the appropriate institutions and organizations of the city for their resolution." However, if you please, what sort of relationship do a good half of our requests have with "appropriate institutions and organizations of the city" when their resolution falls directly within the competence of the city military commissariat itself? Strange, isn't it? And I do not understand why in an effort to show apparent concern the military commissariat produced a lot of red tape which, incidentally, is still present today.

11004
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CRITIQUE OF TANK BATTALION COMBAT TRAINING

Moscow KRIASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Guards Capt V. Golovin, Tank Battalion Chief of Staff: "But Will There Really Be Time To Make Up Time?"

[Text] In my letter I would like to touch upon problems which I think cause anxiety in many people. Why is it that in the concluding stage of training a number of questions must be studied in blitzkrieg fashion? Why do we often discover omissions in combat skills which can be corrected only at the price of disrupting the order of the day and the lesson schedule? Who is at fault in this?

During the week I attended lessons in tactical training in a tank company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant P. Kozhevnikov. The subject was "The Tank in the Offensive." It was a good subject, since it afforded the commander a broad field for creativity. An instructive tactical situation could be created in such a lesson, the combat capabilities of a tank can be demonstrated to the fullest, and the problems of control and many other elements of the offensive battle could be worked out.

But the lesson disenchanted me. Work on the subject began 12 minutes late, simply because Guards Lieutenant Yu. Kudryavtsev, who was performing the responsibilities of a company commander, failed to check the readiness of the combat training vehicles the night before. They had not been fueled, and the situation had to be corrected before the vehicles could leave. The result was a late start.

Many other facts also indicated that the company officers placed an inadequate value on training time and showed little concern for making use of every minute with maximum payoff. As an example tank crewmembers were working on the standards on protection against mass destruction weapons at a training place supervised by platoon commander Guards Senior Lieutenant M. Matveyev. A battle situation was not simulated. The actions of the "enemy" were not spelled out.

Why was the platoon commander teaching his subordinates in this simplified way? Guards Senior Lieutenant Matveyev explained that they still had to
study the subject "The Platoon in the Offensive" and that there was still a lot of time in which to work on the standards in a simulated battle situation. He argued that they would be able to make the time up.

"Make the time up." Yes, the training year has just begun, and this is only the second month of winter training. But can we seek security in the fact that there is still a lot of time? And is there in fact a possibility for making up lost time? After all, a lesson conducted inadequately makes an impression on a large number of subsequent lessons, preventing them from attaining a high level of quality.

Joining the socialist competition for an honorable welcome for the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the soldiers of our battalion adopted high socialist pledges. They can be satisfied only if training is intense, if the training process follows a sharp rhythm, and if a strict system of pledge accounting is maintained. Today is the time we must think about the end result, about achievement of the planned goals. This is precisely what is asked of us by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and the Komsomol Central Committee on the all-union socialist competition.

It should be stated that most of the battalion's officers have been adhering to this course in the socialist competition since the first days of the training year. As an example the lessons conducted in the company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Portnov are distinguished by high quality. The officers do everything to see that every training day, every lesson makes the greatest contribution to fulfillment of socialist pledges. Incidentally I was fortunate to visit this company while the same lesson was going on. It was the same subject, but Guards Senior Lieutenant Portnov had organized it much more effectively and instructively. On the night before, he conducted a lesson on teaching procedures with the group commanders, checked their readiness, and carefully thought out the tactical background of the lesson. The field exercise was of tangible benefit to the tank crewmembers.

When a commander approaches organization of the competition in this manner and thinks about the end result from the first days of training, unconditional fulfillment of socialist pledges is insured. This can be seen from the experience of that same company, commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant Portnov. And, on the other hand, a slow start, reliance upon the hope that "we can make the time up" produces mediocre results. It is precisely because of this "we can make the time up" business that a blitzkrieg becomes necessary before an inspection, and naturally it would hardly promote good training. Unfortunately there are many confirmations of this. Last training year the company headed by Guards Senior Lieutenant N. Soldatov failed to satisfy its socialist pledges on technical training, receiving only a satisfactory grade on the standards. And yet very great hopes were placed here on the last months. True, a lot of study went on before the inspection. But "cramming" did not help.
In order to keep the same thing from happening again this year, we intensified control over the quality of the training process and over progress in fulfilling socialist pledges. We encouraged subunit commanders to maintain clarity in management of the competition: Every enlisted man, sergeant, warrant officer, and officer must always know his progress in pledge fulfillment. In other words everyone must be able to see the achievements and the way toward higher indices.

Life teaches us that high exactingness in evaluating the achievements and intolerance of laxity, simplifications, lack of organization, and those who place their hopes on the concluding stage of training are invariable prerequisites for achieving the planned goals.

11004
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IMPORTANCE OF CORRECT COMMAND LANGUAGE STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Tank Trps K. Ganeyev, Department Chairman, Military
Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov]

[Text] One of the indications of a commander's exactingness is his ability
to issue orders and instructions distinctly and briefly. A tremendous mobili-
zizing force can be felt in a commander's order given firmly and clearly.
Most of our officers understand this well and work persistently to continually
improve their command language. At the same time we occasionally still
hear certain commanders using words in their orders which hinder understanding
and fulfillment of the tasks by subordinates.

One of the errors we encounter is softening of the imperative form of
commands and orders. Instead of the command "Fall in" one of our comrades
may say "Fall into formation!" Rather than ordering, when necessary,
"Stop speaking in the ranks!", he may ask: "Why are you noisy?" I think
there is no need for proving that such a tone and manner are harmful.

Suworov himself said that nothing will drive people to evil more readily than
a weak command. An officer who does not show a commander's clarity in his
instructions and requirements does a great deal of harm to the training and
indoctrination of subordinates. After all, today, at a time when control
of troops in battle has become significantly more complicated, a special
ability to quickly, briefly, and clearly issue orders and instructions is
required of the commander. Every minute is precious in a combat situation.
Sometimes even seconds may determine the success of a battle. As with all
ambiguities in an order, a delay in giving the order may have an expensive
price tag. This is why a commander issuing an order must know how to
present its content in such a way that subordinates would have no uncertain-
ties about the nature of the task. This pertains to both oral and written
orders. In both cases the most important points must be emphasized so as
to avoid ambiguous interpretation by subordinates.

These requirements of command language are complied with as a rule at exer-
cises, during field gunnery, and in other conditions close to those of real
battle. Here the officers act energetically, and their language is laconic
and militarily strict. But under ordinary conditions some of them, as I have mentioned, do not show concern for the correctness of their terminology and fail to display high self-discipline. An officer who is always composed, smart, and ready for immediate action would never allow himself verbosity, haziness, and cliche. Naturally besides everything else, the officer must have a firm knowledge of the requirements of the manuals and regulations.

Of course mastering command language does not mean acquiring a steel-hard voice. Maximum clarity in thinking, logic in deliberation, and accuracy and clarity in conclusions are required. Constant practice and strict self-control are necessary. Improvement of command language should be approached as one of the most important tasks of officer training. Only in this case would the commander's speech develop as his tactical and tactical-special training improves. Training sessions with radio resources, especially ones conducted on a tactical background, have a great deal of benefit in this regard. They promote development of the habits of briefly presenting decisions and instructions, and punctuality. Practice has also demonstrated the usefulness of writing short written reports and instructions as a way for improving command language. This pertains especially to those reports and instructions that have to be transmitted by radio and other technical communication resources. Adequate attention should also be devoted to the problems of improving command language at lessons conducted within the system of commander training.

11004
CSO: 1801
ONE-SIDED COMBAT TRAINING EXERCISES INEFFECTIVE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 77 p 1

[Article by Lt Col A. Shpin', Senior Officer, Combat Training Section, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "But Who Is Defending?"]

[Text] Firing their guns and machineguns, the tanks bypassed a gentle hill and, reforming into company columns, rolled into a ravine.

"The battalion has rammed through the 'enemy' defenses and continues to exploit its success," reported Captain K. Kryzhnyy by radio. Meanwhile undestroyed targets, including unsuppressed antitank resources, had been left behind by the tanks. Consequently in a real battle such an optimistic report would hardly have been announced by the battalion commander. It is much more difficult to "ram" the defenses of a strong "enemy" than appeared in this exercise.

This episode reveals a shortcoming typical of several other exercises, especially one-sided ones. This shortcoming is neglect of the "enemy," ignorance of his true power and combat capabilities, a simplified viewpoint on tactics.

The opposing side was represented in this training battle by practice targets set up throughout the entire depth of defense. But this depth was excessive for one battalion and reflected the overall concept inaccurately. Moreover, many of the targets were set up without a consideration for the tactical situation.

The shortcomings in representing the "enemy" became especially blatant at the moment of counterattack. Noticing the counterattacking tanks, company commanders senior lieutenants N. Chunarev and V. Churbanov deployed their subunits and opened stationary fire at them. Frankly speaking, the outward appearance was impressive: The motionless practice targets were riddled with shells in just a few seconds.

Then I asked one of the company commanders:
"What type of tanks were counterattacking?"

All I received in response was silence. But is a tank crew really indifferent to the sort of enemy combat vehicles it meets? After all, different tanks have different thicknesses of armament, different gun calibers, different capabilities of the sighting devices, and so on. It is best to use one tactic against heavy vehicles and another against light ones. It is more advantageous to fire at some from great range, while it is better to come closer to others. In this case the specific features of the "enemy" were not taken into account.

I also observed something similar among the gunners of the supporting battery. The crews worked beside their guns efficiently, and clear commands could be heard. But then a staff officer asked Senior Lieutenant N. Sokol specifically what "enemy" the battery was firing at, but he could not get a sensible answer. Once again, this was because the "enemy" was represented as an undefined, faceless opponent. The scouts did not have to use identification characteristics to find the targets. The gunnery officer had no need for analyzing the information (for practical purposes it was nonexistent), or for determining and evaluating the sort of influences affecting fulfillment of the combat mission by the tank battalion.

An exercise becomes truly instructive only when the "enemy" prevents the subunit from advancing calmly, constantly keeps the students under stress, and forces them to maintain active reconnaissance, evaluate the radiation situation, repel air or ground strikes, and surmount obstructions and minefields. In other words when the battle must be fought against a strong, cunning "enemy."

Can such an "enemy" be represented in a one-sided exercise? Is this task within the capabilities of the commander?

I recall a tactical exercise involving field gunnery, in which a motorized rifle battalion commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Bartuli participated. The exercise leader carefully thought out the concept of the exercise. To represent the "enemy," he selectively combined practice targets of all types with simulated bomb bursts, fire from various types of weapons, and launchings of signal flares. The "enemy" maintained active radio communication. Besides everything else, this forced the battalion commander to organize radio reconnaissance. In many ways it helped Senior Lieutenant Bartuli to reveal the composition, strength, and intentions of the "enemy," and to precisely determine the start line of his reserves.

There were no verbal "inputs" on tank and artillery fire in this exercise; everything could be observed and felt.

It is not simple to create an instructive target situation and to simulate "enemy" fire and activities. Platoon, company, and even battalion commanders have restricted possibilities for thoroughly simulating "enemy" activities. Simulators are usually manufactured by local efficiency experts. Sometimes
they are effective, but usually they are far from perfect. I believe that training centers should be called upon to play the dominant role. As an example mobile simulation teams carrying various acoustic, smoke, and signal resources and practice targets were employed in this training battle, which I believed to be successful in terms of representing the "enemy." These teams knew the concept of the exercise, and they were given clear instructions as to what to do in each stage and how.

The exercise in which the battalion commanded by Captain Kryzhnyy participated demonstrated that the best experience had not yet reached this subunit. Hence the instructiveness of the field exercise was low.

11004
CSO: 1801
OFFICERS CRITICIZED FOR LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN SERGEANTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Capt V. Semenchenko, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Such Is the Habit"]

[Excerpts] Platoon commander Lieutenant A. Nikulin was fussing about at the technical servicing point at a vehicle assigned to Private D. Popkov, a young driver. Junior Sergeant Ye. Subbotin, the department commander, was standing beside him.

"You can't trust this soldier with anything," the lieutenant raged, examining a broken spring on an oil seal.

The officer's displeasure was understandable. Attempting to repair the seal, Private Popkov made it even worse.

"Comrade Lieutenant, let me do it," Junior Sergeant Subbotin appealed to the platoon commander. "I can do it."

"No, no, I'll fix it myself."

We should say to Lieutenant Nikulin's credit that for the most part things go well for him owing to his youthful spirit and activity. Very often, he wins in one way but loses in another. As an example was there more harm or more good in the fact that the platoon commander himself repaired the oil seal? I believe that except for the lost time, the losses in this case were obviously in morale. After all, the department commander was essentially not trusted. Most probably the next time in a similar or perhaps more complex situation the junior sergeant would await the officer's interference and would not make any decision independently.

Sergeants have an important place in troop training and indoctrination. The qualities a subunit acquires depends in many ways on junior commanders, on their ability to teach and indoctrinate subordinates, and to mobilize the soldiers to overcome the difficulties they encounter. To successfully solve the tasks imposed upon them, sergeants need more than a deep knowledge
and a commander's skills; it is not enough to be good teachers. They must also act independently within the limits of the authority given to them by the regulations. But what does happen in fact?

Some officers continually do the job of junior commanders. Strange as it may seem, this is often done with the agreement and even on orders of senior supervisors. Sometimes an officer supervises housekeeping work by a group of two or three persons. Sometimes officers lead their subunits to the dining hall and bathing facilities, and on occasion they are appointed dining hall duty officers and subunit duty officers. I recall a case where Officer V. Snegur painted practice targets during preparations of the target field for firing at a time when he, an experienced specialist, was awaited by tank crewmembers performing registration fire.

In another company you might encounter an officer in the early morning who knows neither sunset nor sunrise. He is known as the "protector." As an example Lieutenant Nikulin, who serves duty as the "protector" several days a month according to a schedule approved by the commander, scrupulously performs responsibilities which rightfully fall upon the company master sergeant from reveille to taps.

Other officers do the same thing. This is done not because Senior Sergeant Danilov is unable to handle his responsibilities. A duty officer is appointed "just in case." As insurance. Perhaps "protectors" are appointed because if something goes wrong somewhere the company commander would have someone answerable; moreover it would be easier for him to answer to the senior supervisor, since an officer responsible for the error was present at that time in the subunit.

In some subunits junior commanders are not trusted to conduct lessons with subordinates in their specialties, in tactical training, and in other disciplines. It is not surprising that such commanders stop feeling like commanders and that their responsibility for the work assigned to them dulls.

Doubtlessly it is much more difficult and more complex to teach a sergeant the best procedures for teaching soldiers and to impart to him the skills of an educator; much more so than to do the work yourself. However, the same battalion possesses officers who meticulously work with junior commanders.

Understandably, development of command qualities in sergeants is a complex process, hardly a quick one. However, the experience of the best units and subunits shows that the effort produces substantial results.

As my discussion with Lieutenant Nikulin and other officers was coming to its end, Major I. Yakimenco, the battalion commander entered the company office. Turning to Senior Lieutenant G. Ogay, the company commander, he said:
"Your subordinates removed an engine from a vehicle and are servicing it at the motor pool. That is not right. See that the engine is sent to the technical servicing point."

"Yes sir!" the senior lieutenant replied as he placed his cap on his head.

"Where are you going?"

"To the motor pool. I will order the drivers to..."

"Send the orderly," the battalion commander stopped the officer. "Let him send your instructions to the sergeant. What's the matter, don't you trust him?"

"No, I guess not. But, you know, it's a habit..."
COMBAT TRAINING PROCEDURES IN AIR DEFENSE MISSILE BATTALION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 77 p 1

[Article by Capt A. Zubtsov: "The Technician--a Responsible Person"]

[Text] The situation in the air was changing every 10-15 seconds. Several blips from "enemy" airplanes were moving on the screens, winking with green fire. Under the cover of jamming, the swift, maneuverable targets were traveling at different altitudes, trying to penetrate to the defended objective.

This was the first time some of the young specialists were acting in such a situation. However, none of them lost their composure. The reports followed one another distinctly and promptly. The missilemen were surpassing certain standards. Private A. Akhundov distinguished himself especially well. His indices turned out to be unexpectedly high, attracting the attention of the lesson leader. After a few repeated inputs the officer found out what was going on. Attempting to satisfy the standard, Private Akhundov was "simplifying" individual operations, thus attempting an obvious whitewash.

The system technician, Lieutenant S. Tsirulev, was present next to Akhundov. In response to the leader's question as to why he had not taken any steps on seeing such simplifications, the young officer responded that this was not his affair, that commanders were present, and that they would do what must be done.

Word of this incident and others spread throughout the battalion. The commander and the party activists seriously pondered over the role and place of the system technician in troop training and indoctrination. The question as to their role during combat duty was especially acute. We know that in such a situation every specialist is involved with his own work. The commander also performs his function and is not always able to monitor the activities of all subordinates. Meanwhile the system technicians of the duty crews can help commanders more actively to constantly maintain a high battle spirit among the soldiers.

It cannot be said that we had not worked before with this large detachment of specialists. Growth in their occupational skills was always in the
field of view of the commander and the party organization. I recall a briefing by Lieutenant S. Chernetsov who, in the presence of all battalion technicians, described the methods he used to improve the procedures and skills of working with the apparatus, and the way he structures independent training and fights for fulfillment of pledges in honor of the 60th anniversary of Great October. The discussion was effective and useful.

Lieutenant Chernetsov influences the consciousness of the soldiers chiefly through personal example. During one intense training session in which missilemen were repelling a massed "enemy" strike, the radar screen suddenly went dead. This was a new input. The operator became confused. However, the system technician, Lieutenant Chernetsov, acted calmly and precisely. Having an outstanding knowledge of the basic circuit, he corrected the "fault" in just a few seconds.

That day the crews operated with special inspiration, following the officer's example.

Technicians carry the principal burden as lesson leaders during supplementary training sessions. We conduct such sessions regularly. As a rule they last up to 1 hour.

Systems technician Lieutenant Yu. Shepelev conducts such training sessions competently. He manages work on problems and standards in such a way as to insure high-quality fulfillment of each step. Considering that specialists 1st class and very young manual tracking operators are present in the crews, the officer "doubles up" on the training places. As an example he places Private R. Nuriyev who has no practical experience together with a person who has participated in combat training launches. This helps the young soldiers to assimilate the best working methods faster.

Lieutenant Shepelev usually serves duty with the same specialists. He learned their capabilities and interests. The officer advised Junior Serjeant V. Zenkov, who possessed a 1st class qualification, to master the responsibilities of the system technician and help Private O. Savchenkov to master an associated specialty. The lieutenant developed a system of individual lessons for Private Nuriyev. Considering that the operator was losing control in complex situations, Shepelev suggested that Specialist 1st Class Private Yu. Shukan help the young soldier to acquire the skills.

Shepelev assigns separate grades to each operator in relation to target detection, lock-on, tracking, and in relation to fulfillment of the standard as a whole. Moreover he mandatorily reveals the causes of delay or error, and he explains the reasons for the best training time. The record is posted on the "Today's Distinguished Soldier" board, and it remains there until it is surpassed.

We have a summary record of fulfillment of socialist pledges by system technicians. It reflects not only the personal successes of the officers but
also the indices of the crews in which they work. Such an approach to evaluating the organizational and educational work of technicians forces them to actively influence the course of the socialist competition and seek unutilized reserves.

As an example Lieutenant Chernetsov was competing with systems technician Lieutenant Yu. Lyuksunov. Operator Private A. Nagin and Private T. Tomkovich helped Chernetsov to win. Lieutenant Chernetsov had developed and introduced an efficiency proposal together with them, permitting satisfaction of one of the most difficult standards on equipment operation in just a few seconds. Lieutenant Chernetsov's experience was generalized and disseminated. Soon others began to follow the officer's example, to include Warrant Officer Mishchenko.

The commander and his staff developed an efficient system of commander training of system technicians. Reliance was placed on the teaching skills of the officers.

Developing individual assignments for system technicians, Major G. Lobov and Captain A. Kuznetsov indicate where and how the time for completing particular operations could be reduced.

System technicians are actively participating in summarization of the competition's results. They are helping to reveal and eliminate problems in missileman technical training, and generalizing the experience of the best soldiers.

Active participation of system technicians in troop indoctrination and in the socialist competition opens new horizons before them and permits them to display their creative capabilities more fully and make a greater contribution to the subunit's combat readiness.
STRESS ON INVESTIGATING ALL PRECONDITIONS FOR ACCIDENTS FOR FLIGHT SAFETY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Col A.Yarchuk, Chief, Air Flight Safety Service, Odessa Military District, Pilot 1st Class: "Although an Accident Had Not Occurred"]

[Text] Performing one of his first solo flights in an airplane new to him, pilot Senior Lieutenant Yurii Kostyuchenkov almost overshot the runway. The flight leader assessed the pilot error as a precondition for a flying accident. Flight commander Major Anatoliy Parkhomenko, who had observed the landing of his subordinate, also attached the most serious significance to the pilot error. He took pains to immediately analyze its causes, and he made a thorough report about the incident to the squadron commander.

It turned out that the pilot had not taken account of the condition of the landing strip: It was wet following a thaw. In this case he should have devoted special attention to braking. But what did Kostyuchenkov do in fact? He was slow in deploying his parachute, which was therefore employed with insufficient effectiveness.

On hearing Major Parkhomenko's report Major Leonid Nishcheta, the squadron commander immediately convened the pilots and recalled the need for promptly deploying the landing parachute in combination with competent use of the brakes. Later, during the flight critique, he thoroughly analyzed the cause for the near-accident and, from the standpoint of aerodynamics, he explained the nature of physical phenomena encountered during landing and the specific features of landing an airplane under various conditions. During the preliminary training day the flight commander held training sessions with the pilots in the airplane cockpits. Then the commander thoroughly tested the knowledge of the pilots on this problem.

Owing to prompt action no more errors of this sort were observed again in the squadron. It has long been the rule in this squadron to reveal the slightest shortcomings in compliance with flight regulations, to publicize them and, what is most important, to prevent such incidents in the future by all possible forms and methods. This subunit has been operating for
12 years without flying accidents. During this time the squadron was armed with equipment of greater and greater perfection. Presently the airmen have dominion over modern missile carriers, and they have mastered all of the combat tactics inherent to these aircraft.

I could also name other air subunits which have been operating for a long period of time without flying accidents. As a rule the quality of combat training missions is higher than in subunits where less attention is devoted to insuring flight safety. Why? Because, and flying practice assures us that this is true, achievement of high quality in airman flight skills is inseparable from the fight for accident-free flying. This is a double problem. After all, the success of any flight depends to a decisive degree on thorough training of each specialist, strict compliance with the requirements of the manuals, and uninterrupted work on the aviation equipment. And if the commander carefully evaluates the activities of his students, this permits him to direct the process of training and education competently and more effectively from the standpoint of teaching practices, and to prevent possible errors in the activities of the students.

But sometimes things go differently. While visiting a certain subunit and acquainting myself with notes in the flying accident precondition accounting log, a strange thing caught my eye: The list of near-accidents entered in the log seemed altogether too short. The squadron commander assured me that nothing more had been noticed. Then I had to recall to the officer that inspectors had been present at the squadron the day before, they had attended the flights, and they had noted a number of errors in the flying assignments.

As we can see, the squadron commander wanted to whitewash the true state of affairs. But is there really any benefit in apparent well-being? After all, if a pilot error or some mistake by a technician are not treated as preconditions for a flying accident, the needed work to correct such mistakes is not being done. Such an attitude toward errors carries the danger of their repetition, perhaps with even more serious consequences.

At the beginning of this article I described pilot Kostyuchenkoov's landing error. But there the commander took immediate steps to prevent repetition of such a near-accident. Meanwhile such steps had not been taken in the squadron which had been commanded by Major N. Seliverstov until recently, even though the aircraft had overshot the runway; the flights were allowed to continue. So? Soon another aircraft overshot the runway even further, being saved from damage only by sheer luck.

Recently, reviewing the entries in the flying accident precondition log of one of the subunits I noted that the list was longer than the number of remarks made by the flight leaders. "Why so many, Leonid Ivanovich?" I asked the commander. He explained that a number of the errors and shortcomings of the specialists had been revealed only after detailed analysis of objective control materials.
It should be noted that a true respect for recorder tape had been nurtured in the pilots, engineers, and technicians of this subunit. The commanders do not simply hand over all of the materials of the control recorders to the chiefs of the objective control groups; instead, they first analyze the materials themselves and bar pilots from subsequent flights until they review the tapes. Hence we see exactingness in evaluating flight quality and adherence to principles in approaching every deviation from the established requirements. As an example the description of one near-accident included the name of an officer who had won competitions for best technician many times in the past. But in this case he was given the blame for the incident: He had not checked the tightness of the oil tank plug, and oil pressure dropped during flight. Immediately after the airplane landed the position of the plug was photographed, and despite his former record the technician had to pay the price.

When visiting units and subunits, safety service inspectors—pilots with the highest qualifications having command experience—monitor compliance with the requirements of the documents, help the commanders and chiefs to plan and organize the flights, and teach strict adherence to principles in evaluating specialist training. As an example inspector pilot Colonel V. Ivashchenko did the right thing when he temporarily relieved the authorized flight leader, Lieutenant Colonel G. Belousov from his duties for violating the regulations of stacking airplanes in the air.

Recently I had the good fortune of attending a meeting of communists in the headquarters party organization of which Major I. Usnich is the secretary. I noted with satisfaction the great deal of attention the communist officers devote to the problems of organizing the socialist competition for heightening the quality of aviation equipment preparation, and of unfailingly complying with the established order and flight regulations.

Our best commanders, political workers, and party organizations nurture the airmen precisely in the spirit of such high exactingness, intolerance with deficiencies, and strict, precise compliance with flight regulations. They concentrate the efforts of the personnel on further improvement of aerial skills and flight safety.

11004
CSO: 1801
HELIQUPTER SQUADRON CLOSE SUPPORT COMBAT TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jan 77 p 1

[Article by Col V. Uglov and Correspondent Lt Col A. Zakharenko: "Helicopter Pilots Make the Strike"]

[Text] Refueling and replenishing the# ammunition, the rotary-winged machines appeared over the battlefield many times that day. Crews commanded by senior lieutenants N. Boldyrev and N. Malyshhev and other officers struck their targets faultlessly, competently surmounting the "enemy" antiaircraft defenses.

What was the root of the skillful, confident actions of the helicopter squadron? After all, it is not simple to support ground troops on the battlefield. Taking off for an assignment, the crews must have a good knowledge of the aerial and ground tactical situation, the terrain, the specifics of the antiaircraft defense system, and many other things. In today's dynamic combined arms battle the helicopter pilots often have to select their optimum routes and the directions of attack while in the air.

This is precisely what had to be done by the squadron commanded by Major V. Bolotov. The success of the airmen was chiefly the product of a deep knowledge of the tactics of the ground troops and their combat capabilities. On the day before, the helicopter pilots analyzed the tactical situation which had evolved in the course of the exercise and studied the specifics of the forthcoming activities well. Of course many of the details were worked out in the course of battle. But careful preliminary preparation helped them to confidently orient themselves in the dynamics of the battle in the presence of sudden changes in the situation. Thus it is not by chance that the crew in which Lieutenant V. Vinnitskiy is the pilot-operator, and other crews of the squadron demonstrated high effectiveness in air strikes against ground targets.

Recommendations by the teaching council have become a good support to the helicopter pilots in performing complex flights and using new tactics. Lessons and tactical flying exercises were held with the squadron personnel on the eve of the exercise. Experienced commanders analyzed the problems
associated directly with the actions of helicopter pilots supporting ground troops in various conditions of battle. Joint analysis of the former actions of the crews demonstrated that not all of them could capitalize upon such capabilities with identical effectiveness. Generalization of experience in combat flying gained by the outstanding crew commanded by Military Pilot 1st Class Captain I. Yakovlev was useful. The methods he uses to destroy targets with the first attack, with the first missile launching are fully within the capabilities of most other crews in the squadron.

Finally, the training sessions. Held regularly in the squadron, they help the flight crews to acquire sounder skills in work with the cockpit's fixtures, in controlling the combat vehicle in the air, and in handling the armament in combat; this makes it possible to exclude possible errors and save valuable time. During such lessons the airmen also work on the skills of acting efficiently in complex meteorological conditions and when surmounting an enemy antiaircraft defense system.

The squadron's helicopter pilots invariably achieve high effectiveness in combat flights. Striving for new successes in combat training in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of Great October, the squadron personnel zealously responded to the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCUTU, and the Komsomol Central Committee on the all-union socialist competition, and they are increasing their efforts in the struggle for complete satisfaction of their pledges.

11004
CSO: 1801
PROPER WINTER STORAGE OF VEGETABLES STRESSED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 27 Jan 77 p 4

[Article by Col I. Teselkin, Chief, Provisions Supply Section, Order of
Lenin Moscow Military District: "Dependable Storage of Winter Reserves"]

[Text] Potatoes and vegetables hold an important place in our nutrition. As an example they contribute over 30 percent of the daily norm to the soldier's ration. Potatoes and vegetables contain many carbohydrates, mineral salts, and vitamins, which promote proper metabolism in the human body. They also contain gustatory and aromatic compounds, owing to which the food is assimilated better.

Various dishes, garnishes, and snacks are prepared from potatoes and vegetables in the mess halls of the troop units. When combined with meat, fish, and other products, the result is full-valued, high-quality food. For this reason potatoes and vegetables should remain in the soldier's ration throughout the entire year.

Understanding this well, the commanders, political workers, officers, and junior specialists in the rear services of most of our district's units have assumed a more responsible attitude toward procuring and storing potatoes and vegetables this year. Despite the unfavorable weather conditions the plan for potato and vegetable procurement has been completed successfully. All products have been prepared for long-term storage in the established assortment.

Now it is very important to create and maintain optimum conditions for storing these reserves, and to prevent spoilage. In this connection I would like to recall the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the October (1976) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "Today, in addition to growth in agricultural production, the task of making more effective use of that which agriculture is already providing us is becoming more and more pressing. There is nothing worse than losing valuable products needed by the consumer, products in the production of which considerable amounts of money and intense labor by kolkhoz farmers and sovkhoz workers had been invested."
"It would be especially pertinent to recall this in the present year. We won the battle of the harvest at the price of tremendous, intense effort. But to insure complete victory we must win the next battle as well—the battle for protecting the generous gifts of the land...."

These words pertain fully to us, the troop housekeepers, and to the unit commanders and political workers, who have the important task of preserving all food intended for the soldiers until the next harvest.

There can be no "secondary issues" in this matter. We know, for example, that potatoes, beets, carrots, and onions liberate heat and moisture during storage. They contain a great deal of water and serve as a good nutrient medium for microorganisms (fungi, bacteria). For this reason conditions preventing disease must be created during storage. Such conditions can be achieved by selecting resistant strains, by protecting potatoes and vegetables from mechanical damage, by presence of well-equipped storehouses, and by maintaining within them the required cleanliness and the necessary air temperature and relative humidity.

All of this was taken into account in most of our units during procurement and preparation of vegetables and potatoes for storage. Products of the most stable strains have been placed in carefully prepared storehouses.

Many units built special awnings under which the potatoes and vegetables were sorted, graded, and dried before storage. This produced an extremely tangible impact and considerably reduced spoilage of these valuable products. Other steps were taken as well. In particular, onions with moist root necks were dried before storage in buildings in which heating units were installed and stoves were heated. Storage itself of the onions was organized on lattice racks in layers not more than 15-20 centimeters thick.

We also subject common onions to snow storage, an effective storage method. First, when the temperature is below -3°C, we prepare a snow blanket 30-40 cm thick, on which we place boxes of onions weighing 9-12 kg each. These boxes are arranged in pyramids in a checkerboard pattern and then covered with snow. Then these boxes are covered with kraft paper, matting, and straw mats, after which a final layer of snow about half a meter thick is added. Depending on the storage time the pyramids are covered with a layer of wood shavings 40-50 cm thick. The pyramid is up to 2 meters wide and 1.2 meters high. This method is employed very successfully by, in particular, rear services officers N. Rusanov and N. Reshetnikov.

Examples of a thrifty attitude toward valuable products can also be found in many of our other units. For example the Guards Tank Kantemirovskiy Division has been storing potatoes and vegetables for a number of years without exceeding the permissible losses. Many good words can be said about the rear service workers of other units in the district, particularly about officers I. Pritsker, D. Timakhovskiy, Ye. Shaforostov, and V. Litvinov, and Warrant Officer V. Reutov. The units in which they serve employ
the most progressive methods for storing valuable products: Carrots are stored on an earthen floor in stacks 70-75 cm high and up to 1 meter wide at the base, with sand between each layer.

Beets are stored in bins up to 1.5 meters high. Some units also use the following method to store beets--in bins above potatoes, in a layer up to 15-20 cm thick. In this case the beets protect the potatoes from excess moisture in the upper layer. The method of storing potatoes in containers and boxes is being introduced. Experience shows that this method decreases the losses to a minimum.

Unfortunately we still encounter cases in which certain rear services officers as well as commanders and political workers do not exhibit adequate concern for storage of potatoes and vegetables. Thus preparations for winter storage of vegetables were conducted poorly in the unit in which Captain V. Bokachev is the chief of the provisions service. The potatoes were placed into storage without sorting and drying, as a result of which they soon began to experience spoilage. Onions were stored together with carrots at a high relative humidity. Officers of the district provisions service were forced to intervene to correct the situation: They resorted the unit's potatoes, lowered the height of layers in the bins, moved the onions to a separate building, and established rigid control over temperature and relative humidity in the storehouses. A subsequent inspection demonstrated that these measures insured good preservation of the potatoes.

The rules of winter vegetable and potato storage are not difficult to understand, but they are strictly mandatory. Any deviation from them carries the danger of serious consequences. Strict control must be established over everything--maintenance of the required temperature and humidity, and prompt sorting. The generous gifts of the earth must be protected from spoilage.

11004
CSO: 1801
DOSAAF EFFECTIVENESS IN MOSCOW OBLAST DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 2 Feb 77 p 3

Article by V. Smirnov, SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent, based on round-table discussion: "The Committee Was Elected. What Has Been Done?"

The defense society's election campaign ended with the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress. As you know the congress was preceded by meetings and conferences at primary groups, and later at rayon and city units. The newly elected committees have begun work. It is not without reason that they say -- the first step is the most important. What has already been done and what is scheduled to be performed in the near future in carrying out the decisions of the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress? A round-table discussion about this was organized by the editors of SOVETSKIY PATRIOT at the Podol'sk DOSAAF gorkom. The defense group which this committee heads is one of the leaders in socialist competition in Moscow oblast. Besides its people, representatives of committees from other rayons, leaders of primary organizations, and important workers from the oblast DOSAAF committee participated in the round-table discussion.

S. Serga, chairman of the Podol'sk DOSAAF gorkom and delegate to the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress: "The importance of further strengthening primary DOSAAF organizations was emphasized with renewed vigor at the 8th DOSAAF Congress. We are currently directing the efforts of the gorkom toward accomplishing this task, and we are striving to see that each local group is a center for mass-defense work.

"After the reports and elections the gorkom first of all concerned itself with the training of chairmen of primary organizations. To begin with we held a general seminar where all newly elected chairmen got together. Here the work was centered around the program recommended by the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR. There was a discussion of the aims and goals of the
society, and the forms and methods of work among DOSAAF groups. We based the study of the basic questions on our advanced primary groups.

"This seminar represented the beginning of our use of a detailed, comprehensive plan for training chairmen. One of its interesting features was the individual approach to setting up the training. This training is being conducted separately for chairmen of industrial, rural, school and institutional DOSAAF groups. Recently, for example, we brought together the leaders of shop and section organizations. The chairman of the city council ispolkom R. Chizh appeared before them and spoke about the tasks of DOSAAF committees which arose out of the decisions of the October (1976) plenum of the Central Committee CPSU and the speech of L. I. Brezhnev at it. Then we proceeded to a thorough study of planning, accounting and reporting. The discussion, of course, went beyond the limits of theory. The chairman of the DOSAAF committee of the Machine Building Plant imeni Ordzhonikidze N. Kozhakov and other comrades shared their experience.

"The subject matter of our seminars is quite varied and to the point. We are attempting to plan them with the interests of those participating in the training in mind. One of our discussions touched upon today's youth, and the knack of studying its interests and enlisting young people in mass-defense work. We decided to devote a special seminar to this subject. In attendance were primarily chairmen of school primary organizations and military instructors, however there were also numerous leaders of other DOSAAF committees involved in working with young people. The directors of schools 29, N. Shere-
met'yev, and 3, honored RSFSR school teacher L. Matveev, shared their work experience and spoke about methods and techniques used by them in studying the interests of young people and their education."

SOVETSKIY PATRIOT: "Sergey Zosimovich, the methods used by your committee in training chairmen are interesting and instructive. But besides the seminar sessions what other forms of training and indoctrinating personnel are employed in the work of the gorkom?"

S. Serga: "Together with the seminar training we feel individual instruction and expanded visiting conferences of the presidium which we are conducting at primary organizations are very effective ways of training chairmen. We un-
veiled this work immediately after the reports and elections under the slogan 'Control and Aid!' For example, soon such an expanded conference of the gork-
kom presidium will take place at the primary organization of the Akkumulyator scientific-production association. Here the chairman of the DOSAAF committee Nikolay Aleksandrovich Lavrinenko has not been able to get things organized. We are also inviting the new chairman of the DOSAAF committee of the experi-
mental chemical-metallurgical plant of Giredmet /State Scientific Research and Planning Institute of the Rare Metals Industry/ A. Somov, since this will be along his line of training. Let him observe what his colleague is criti-
cized for. Of course, at these critical reviews the secretaries of the enter-
prise party committees, whose defense work represents the basis of the critical examination, are also present."
P. Dronov, deputy chairman of the Moscow DOSAAF obkom: "I would like to turn the attention of the participants in our round-table meeting to another, what we believe is, interesting initiative of the Podol'sk DOSAAF organization, which originated right after the reports and elections and was the result of a constructive analysis of the criticism and suggestions voiced at meetings and conferences. The matter deals with the so-called combined primary DOSAAF organizations and the rights of rayon committees.

"One combined organization was made up of numerous DOSAAF organizations. Retail establishments handling manufactured items and foodstuffs, enterprises of the dining facility trust, the rayon hospital, various shops, hairdresser and barber shops, etc. were included in it. As you know, mass-defense work in this sector was always a problem for us. This can be explained by the lack of a material base and funds, the smallness of the active membership, and other 'objective reasons.' All the schools were included in another combined organization. Coordination of the activities of these groups, a concentration of efforts and funds, and a single guiding influence over them represent the driving force behind this new idea. Such an approach towards resolving the problem is in response to the requirements of the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, which has called on committees to raise the work of the primary organizations of general schools to a new level. I should emphasize, this type of approach toward the mass-organizational work of committees is new. Therefore the Podol'sk experiment is under the close scrutiny of the Moscow DOSAAF obkom.

"I want to stress the following concept: the formation of large combined organizations does not at all mean an elimination or weakening of the numerous primary organizations. On the contrary, their activities are being stepped up, they are growing in strength, and they are picking up momentum due to more effective leadership."

SOVETSKII PATRIOT: "The chairmen of the newly created combined units are here at our round-table discussion. I would like to find out about the initial results of this interesting experimental form, as they say, from the horse's mouth."

A. Neykov, chairman of a combined DOSAAF committee of the Podol'sk city section of people's education: "Our organization includes 27 DOSAAF school groups. As the newly elected chairman, I began by going around to all the schools and ascertaining what potential they possessed, what was going well, and where work had to be done. The question was, where to go from there. It turned out that most committee chairmen had a rather vague notion about paperwork and accounting. The questionnaire 'Work of the primary organization,' as well as the handbook 'Documentation at the primary level,' were worked up and passed out to each one. Then a joint resolution of the city section of people's education and the presidium of the DOSAAF committee entitled 'Competition among primary organizations dedicated to the 50th anniversary of DOSAAF and the 60th anniversary of the October revolution' was approved. We worked out a calendar-plan on mass-organizational and sports work involving the competition and socialist obligations of the committee.
"Many chairmen doubted whether they would be able to enter into active work so quickly. We decided to provide instructional assistance to the 'average performers' and slow people: by holding five conferences of the presidium of the combined committee based on advanced schools. The expanded presidiums, which I will cover in detail, first of all involved the training of personnel, and a demonstration of what schools can organize and how they should go about it. We held the five conferences of the expanded presidium and five analytical-seminar-meetings. Thus, we added to our arsenal the method of training used by the gorkom.

"We worked out the subject 'Strengthening the material-technical base' using schools 18 and 20. Through its own efforts school 18 erected a 25 meter firing range and has three classes for training motorists, radio-operators and marksmen. School 20 is doing well with its museum, excellently organized military-patriotic work, and shooting activities, which, incidentally, are being set up on a neighboring range. We conducted a seminar on the subject 'Development of military-technical sports' using school 25. Here there is a group radio station and the students hunt 'for foxes.' Besides the radio activities, shooting sports and skiing-shooting (biatlon) are well underway here, as well as motorcycle activities.

"In conjunction with the seminar sessions at expanded presidiums we are hearing from chairmen of primary organizations. We are trying to do this in order to be able to make a comparison. For example, together with the chairman of the DOSAAF committee of school 20 we listened to A. Golenkov from school 14, who even with the help of sponsors from the Ordzhonikidze plant is just barely getting by."

S. Dunkov, chairman of the combined DOSAAF committee of the Podol'sk ispolkom: "While my colleague Anatolly Nikolayevich Neykov has approximately identical conditions at all his local groups, all my organizations differ sharply in their capabilities, have varied enrollment, and almost no material base. And the main thing is that there is no experience in mass-defense work. Until recently it was all limited to the payment of member dues and dissemination of lottery tickets. This is why we first of all set up a non-T/O section of mass-organizational work and military-patriotic propaganda.

"In the retail trade facilities, the dining facility trust, and other groups activists have already helped to equip DOSAAF information rooms and draw up visual displays, plus organizing lecture work. The section has provided a great deal of help to the committees in allocating duties among their members and in the planning of work.

"Next is the development of military-technical sports and organization of training in small groups and courses. We managed to come by the city sports-shooting club as our base. We have already transferred funds for renting the range over the whole year, we are conducting training according to a previously worked out plan, and we are holding competitions. There are two vehicle units in the organization. We are considering developing motor vehicle and motorcycle sports using them."
P. Yeliseyev, chairman of the DOSAAF committee of the Yakhrana Order of the Red Banner of Labor Spinning-Weaving Mill: "Our group is composed mainly of women. We have hundreds of girls involved in shooting and motorcycle groups, plus others learning to operate radio and electronic equipment. But they did not stop here. After the reporting-election conference approximately 50 girls appealed to me: 'Mr chairman, can't you do something, we want to be sky-divers.' Our committee thought it was a good idea. But how to set up the activity was the problem. We had no equipment nor instructors, and the training units were at the Yegor'yevsk aeroclub -- some distance away. We requested assistance from the DOSAAF obkom, but our idea was given the cold shoulder. Actually, we had everything: the means for organizing the training, the enthusiasm of the young people, and the readiness of the committee to oversee the work. Only support from 'above' was needed. We had just wanted to introduce something completely new into the activities of our DOSAAF group."

SOVETSKIY PATRIOT: "During the course of the reports and elections numerous critical remarks and suggestions directed at improving the work of committees were voiced at the meetings and conferences. How is this criticism being handled and how are the activist councils being implemented?"

Yu. Pozdnyshchev, chairman of the DOSAAF committee of the Elektrostal' Electrical Metallurgical Plant imeni Tavosyan and delegate to the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress: "The DOSAAF reporting-election conference was held in October of last year at our plant. During the reporting period the group grew in size and improved organizationally. This was to a significant degree the result of the competition announced at the plant between shop groups, which was directed at implementing the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and honoring the 50th anniversary of DOSAAF.

"A series of measures was introduced and directed at improving all work of the organization. Three non-T/O sections were set up under the committee: a mass-organizational and propaganda unit, a technical training unit, and a military-technical sports unit. Such a structure, in our opinion, permits us to maintain constant control over all sectors of work and coordinate the activities of shop organizations.

"Here are some results from our 1976 work. Currently 91 percent of all plant workers are in the DOSAAF ranks. The training of motor vehicle and motorcycle operators, telecommunications experts, radio-telegraph operators, sky-divers, 'fox-hunters,' airplane model builders, and ham radio operators is being conducted in courses and small groups. A total of 875 technical specialists were trained. In the military-technical sports competitions 647 people fulfilled the norms for rated sportmen. And the GTO /Ready for work and the defense of the USSR/ tests were passed by 1,730 individuals.

"The work conducted here consolidated the position of the organization at the plant and its influence has grown. However, there was a good deal of criticism and some good suggestions at the conference. All suggestions and
critical comments have been carefully studied, and a plan containing measures for eliminating the shortcomings has been put together. For example, this year we are increasing the training of technical specialists. We are training 20% motorcyclists, 50% more than last year. We are doubling the training of category 'V' drivers. We are training another 150 sky-divers. We are expanding our sports activities. A two-story building has been turned over to us and we have already reequipped it as a military-technical training facility."

SOVETSIK PATRIOT: "In the statements of the participants in our meeting there have been repeated references to the All-union competition for improving mass-defense work in honor of the 50th anniversary of DOSAAF. Ostensibly, this is currently an important aspect of the work of DOSAAF committees. We would like to hear a more detailed account of this work."

V. Slavnov, chairman of the committee of the DOSAAF plant primary organization: "At first our group was not very active in the All-union competition for better primary organization. You might even say this work was neglected in our group. The main topic of discussion at the DOSAAF reporting-election conference centered around this. It was decided to better organize this work, properly plan it out, and focus all activities of the newly elected committee on it. And we began from here.

"First, we carefully drew up the rules for the competition. All our subunits were broken down into two groups based on their capabilities. For rating the results we adopted the numerical grading system which will be used in adding up the totals. What does this mean? Let us say we had a situation in a local group where all workers were members of DOSAAF, for this we would give a mark of 50. For 90 percent membership we would give 40, and for 80 percent -- 30. As you see, the limit defined by the rules of the All-union competition is quite insignificant here and we are striving for something larger.

"The number of points is determined in exactly the same way for results in all other areas of work. A special commission has been established to keep a close eye on the course of the competition, continually inform the group about the achievements of top workers, and make public the poor work of laggards.

"Five prize-winning positions will be determined in each of the groupings. The awards include money which will be given for the greatest addition to the material base. We expect to have the results by 20 June."

V. Romanov, chairman of the DOSAAF committee of the Eksiton Plant in the city of Pavlovskiy Posad: "This is not the first time we are drawing up comprehensive plans for mass-defense work at the enterprise. It is being done under the leadership of the party committee with the help of trade union and Komsomol organizations, the Yunost' sports club, the Znaniye society, and other public elements. The current plan differs from its predecessors in that it includes rules for the All-union competition for better formulation of mass-defense work in primary organizations. With this in mind the committee conducted a great deal of work on organizing socialist competition between shop
and section DOSAAF organizations, and advisory assistance in setting up DOSAAF information rooms in each local group. In order to be the winner of the plant competition, a shop organization must not only participate more in trips to sites of revolutionary, military and labor heroics, plus sports competition, but also have not less than 30 percent of the DOSAAF members engaged in military-technical training. The training of young people of pre-induction and induction ages for service in the USSR armed forces, the presence of permanent teams in 4-5 military-technical sports, the passing of GTO tests in rifle shooting by not less than 80 percent of DOSAAF members, etc. are counted for the competition. We are already approaching the desired results on the majority of items."

S. Galenzovskiy, chairman of the DOSAAF committee of the Nedelinsk Poultry Plant in Odintsovskiy Rayon: "I was elected chairman of the DOSAAF committee for the first time. I called the newly elected committee together to delegate the duties. Where did we start?

"With Sergey Bulavin, a skiing-shooting champion (biatlon), who obviously should handle the training of people in this sport. Then Aleksandr Churkov, a master of sports, also was available: he is heading the shooting sports... But then it was not easy to delegate the duties among the rest: it was all new for each one, they all were involved in mass-defense work for the first time. But in the end the duties were assigned and each person found the work to his liking.

"At the factory we have 14 sectors, and 14 local organizations, consequently, each member of the committee has two organizations for which he must analyze the work, render practical assistance, and exchange experience... We are drawing on experience from everywhere, even here at the SOVETSKY PATRIOT's round-table discussion I have made interesting notes about the work methods of the Podol'sk people. We are making every effort to introduce the best approaches into our work."

From the editors. In the course of the round-table discussion the leaders of the DOSAAF groups in Moscow Oblast shared their interesting ideas about the work of DOSAAF committees and exchanged the initial results of their work following the reporting and elections. New trends were unearthed especially in the organization of chairmen training and in the manner of handling the numerous and kindred groups. We would like our readers to join in this discussion and talk about the first steps of their committees, as well as all the new things which are being currently introduced in their work.
DOSAAF TASKS BASED ON RESULTS OF 8TH ALL-UNION DOSAAF CONGRESS

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 6 Feb 77 p 1

Article: "Increasing the Effectiveness of the Work of All DOSAAF Elements"

Text: The beginning of this year was especially significant for the 80 million members of DOSAAF. On 23 January the country marked the 50th anniversary of DOSAAF. The country has a high opinion of the society -- for its great contribution to the development of mass-defense work and the training of workers for defending our socialist homeland DOSAAF USSR was awarded the Order of Lenin.

The 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress was held 25-26 January in the great Kremlin palace. It summed up the patriotic work of the numerous DOSAAF elements for the previous five-year period, and also outlined ways for further improving mass-defense, military-patriotic, training, and sports activities. The composition of the congress was quite significant. The overwhelming majority of delegates were communists and Komsomol members, and people with secondary and higher educations. Approximately 5000 delegates had participated in World War II and 52 people had received the titles Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Socialist Labor.

The report of the chairman of the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR, A. I. Pokryshkin, entitled "Report of the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR and upcoming tasks of DOSAAF organizations in light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress" was heard and discussed, as well as the report of the Central Auditing Commission of DOSAAF USSR which was presented by the chairman of that organization, G. V. Tomilin. The congress approved a detailed resolution of the review report and a decree on partial changes in the DOSAAF Regulations, and also elected the governing bodies of the defense society.

The Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU, Ya. P. Ryabov, took part in the congress work and delivered a major speech.

After looking back over the 50 year history of the society it is possible to firmly state, Secretary Ya. P. Ryabov noted in presenting the high award to DOSAAF, that the society fully deserves the confidence of the Communist Party and Soviet government. Hand in hand with its successes the society's popularity with the people continues to grow. DOSAAF is now one of the largest public organizations in our country.
It should be noted that the top DOSAAF forum was held amidst great political enthusiasm and under the banner of close cooperation among the 80 million DOSAAF members in support of the CPSU and the Soviet government. A deep gratitude was expressed in the reports and all addresses of the delegates to the CPSU, and personally to Secretary-General of the Central Committee CPSU L. I. Brezhnev, for their constant interest in DOSAAF and their high opinion of the society's work.

Great and glorious things have been accomplished by DOSAAF people during the period between the two DOSAAF congresses. As was noted in the review report, during the last five years the number of organizations which year after year achieve major successes increased greatly. Top positions in socialist competition are held by DOSAAF organizations of the cities of Moscow and Leningrad, Krasnodarskiy, Khabarovskiy, Stavropol'skiy and Primorskiy kray, Bashkir and Tatar ASSRs, Volgogradskaya, Kuybyshevskaya, Moscow, Omskaya, Rostovskaya, Saratovskaya and Tul'skaya oblasts, and the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia and Uzbekistan.

Unfortunately, it was noted at the congress, there are still some organizations which lag behind. The committees of these organizations still are not fully utilizing their potential for improving the work of the primary organizations and transforming them into a center of mass-defense work, everything is not being done toward increasing the quality of training of specialists for the armed forces and the national economy, and the problem of overcoming the known bias in developing military-technical sports has not been solved.

Those lagging behind over a period of years are the DOSAAF organizations of Turkmen and Tadzhik SSRs, Altayskiy Kray, Buryat, Kalmyk, Mordovian and Yakutsk ASSRs, and Arkhangel'skaya, Irkutskaya, Kostromskaya, Novgorodskaya, Tomskaya, and certain other oblasts. Over a long period of time they still have not eliminated serious shortcomings in their work.

DOSAAF organizations, it states in the resolution of the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, under the leadership of party and Soviet organs must make every attempt to achieve a high level of quality and effectiveness in their mass-defense work, the dissemination of military information and the military-patriotic indoctrination of workers, as well as in the training of young people for military service and personnel in the general trades for the national economy, the development of military-technical sports, and the strengthening of the material-technical base. In resolving these tasks it is necessary to expand the day-to-day cooperation with trade unions, the Komsomol, the Znaniye society, Soviet committees of war veterans, draft boards and military units, organs involved in education, vocational training, culture, and mass information, and sports organizations. We must take an active part in preparations for the 60th anniversary of the October revolution and mark our country's glorious jubilee with new labor achievements and an improvement in the everyday operations of DOSAAF organizations.
In speeches from the rostrum of the DOSAAF congress, many delegates spoke about ways of improving the operations of committees, as well as the further upgrading of mass-defense, military-patriotic and sports work. They introduced specific proposals and recommendations aimed at achieving efficiency in the work of all DOSAAF elements -- from the primary organizations up to the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR.

The congress proved to be a real school in patriotism and civic mindedness, a school of advanced methodology. This is how many delegates described the top forum of DOSAAF in their letters to the editors. These people included chairmen of DOSAAF committees of primary organizations, raykoms and okoms, propagandists, teachers, and experts in industrial training.

In analyzing how the decree of the Central Committee CPSU and Council of Ministers USSR of 7 May 1966 was being carried out, delegates comprehensively discussed ways of further improving mass-defense work, the indoctrination of the Soviet people in patriotic thinking and being ready to protect our country, and dissemination of the heroic traditions of our people and their armed forces.

In giving great importance to military-patriotic propaganda, the congress emphasized the need to strive for further improvements in light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. The work of propagandists and DOSAAF publishing organs, which have thoroughly delved into the ideas and decisions of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, was viewed positively, as well as the future prospects for the building of communism, which have inspired and mobilized DOSAAF members in the struggle to increase the economic and defensive might of our country.

Among the forms of military-patriotic propaganda which have stood the test of time we find Leninist readings, lectures, and meetings, plus get togethers and meetings with veterans, film festivals, clubs and lecture groups. The mass-defense work weeks and months, along with the all-union inspections of mass-defense and military-patriotic work in regular schools, tekhnikums, vocational-technical schools, cultural-educational institutions, and parks of culture and rest, received high praise from the public and universal recognition. Indeed, the trips to revolutionary, military and labor historical sites and military-sports games "Zarnitsa" and Orlenok " were massive.

Having noted the clarity, purposefulness and effectiveness of military-patriotic propaganda, the 6th All-Union DOSAAF Congress stressed the urgent need to continue the agitator-propaganda work on explaining the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress to DOSAAF members, and to broadly disseminate among the people the world-wide historical significance of the October revolution and the achievements of the Soviet people in building communism. A congress resolution requires that committees improve their leadership in military-patriotic work, paying particular attention to raising its level in DOSAAF primary and training organizations, show more support for the propagandists and civic-minded citizens, and systematically provide them with instructional assistance.
The party and government are giving much attention to the work of DOSAAF in indoctrinating young people and training them to carry out their sacred duty -- to protect the country.

The following data were presented at the congress in summing up this work: during the reporting period the number of training organizations which successfully performed the tasks assigned them grew markedly. In the 1975-1976 training year 94 percent of the draftees completed their training with good and excellent ratings. Also 92 percent passed the OTO \( \text{\textit{Ready for work and the defense of the USSR}} \) tests, and 70 percent received sports ratings.

Convincing results! That is why it is a pity, that at some schools and DOSAAF clubs the training of draftees is being conducted poorly and the political indoctrination work with students is not being properly handled. These matters are being resolved too slowly in Kaluzhskaya, Murmanskaya, Tuvinskaya, and Kurskaya oblast organizations and the Kazakh SSR.

Sometimes under approximately identical conditions the results are different. The Tatar and Mary oblast organizations were cited in a report to the congress. First, year after year they are among the prize winners, and the challenge Red Banner of the Ministry of Defense for success in training draftees has been awarded repeatedly to them. And second -- they are chronic laggards. In a number of DOSAAF schools in the Mary ASSR the training process is below par and discipline is not maintained at the proper level.

The congress has required committees to improve their guidance of DOSAAF training organizations, to better the teaching methods, to broadly introduce new methods and up-to-date equipment into the training process, to skillfully make use of scientific recommendations and advanced techniques for this, and to strive toward a combining of training and indoctrination. It is necessary to give special attention to the level of practical training of specialists. Resolving these tasks set by the congress requires a strengthening of the material-technical base and an improvement in the training areas used for motor vehicles, airplanes and radios.

More and more DOSAAF is becoming the forge for people in the general trades for the national economy. During five years a total of 8 million highly qualified specialists -- this is the number which is a worthy gift to the 50th anniversary of DOSAAF and the DOSAAF congress. The sports-technical clubs played a decisive role in this work.

Criticism was voiced at the congress regarding committees which are not giving the proper attention to the training of personnel in the general trades, and are not considering it an important integral part of their work. In the addresses of delegates and in a resolution of the congress attention was focused on the need to devote more effort to the training of young people in specialties which have applied military significance, to consider the real needs of the national economy during planning, and to give more attention to new types of specialties which will be needed in the future.
On the eve of the congress joyous news spread over the whole country -- a group of the leading DOSAAF sportsmen and trainers had been awarded USSR medals and orders. This high recognition of the work of representatives of military-technical sports inspired the whole DOSAAF community.

Success in military-technical sports abounds: some 40 million took part in the 6th Spartacus Games of the USSR, and over five years more than 12 million rated sportsmen and 6,000 masters of sports have been trained. During the same time 323 world records were set by our sportsmen. A good base has been established for sportsmen: in 1972-1976 more than 100 large sports complexes were introduced.

However, far from everything has been done, not all reserves have been put to use. There is a lag in the development of radio and motor vehicle-associated sports. The laggards include -- Kaliningradskaya, Orlovskaya and Tomskaya oblasts. Permskaya, Sverdlovskaya, Kurskaya and other oblasts have not fulfilled their obligations in training rated sportsmen.

What must be done in order to move ahead in the development of military-technical sports, how do we overcome the shortcomings of some republics and oblasts? People giving speeches and reports at the congress spoke about this. An important and valid approach is the expansion of the STK /Sports-Technical Club/ network and intensification of the clubs' work. There would be sports at every primary and training organization, and therefore there would be a strengthening and improvement of their sports base. There was also serious talk about making military-technical sports accessible to the younger generation -- pioneers and grade-school children.

In its resolution the congress ordered the increased popularization, organization and reporting of competitions, and an attempt to basically combine the general physical development, technical skills and high determination of sportsmen, as well as their readiness to carry out the tasks for protecting the country. It is also necessary to improve the work of DOSAAF organizations in emphasizing the passing of the GTO series of tests by the populace. Soviet sportsmen must actively work at strengthening their leading role in the international sports arena.

The creation of a strong, fully up-to-date material-technical base is a task now facing DOSAAF organizations. The problem of building DOSAAF facilities and outfitting training organizations with the newest equipment, as well as the problem of a further concentration of the production capacities of DOSAAF enterprises, was discussed in full at the congress. The resolving of these tasks, it was emphasized at the congress, requires prudent management, strict savings, and improvement in the system of control and planning.

The report of the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR, the speeches of delegates, and the resolution of the congress mentioned the organizational improvement of DOSAAF groups and the further strengthening of the style and methods employed in committee work. During the reporting period over 20,000 new primary DOSAAF organizations were created, and now their number has reached
330,000 in the country. To make all groups vitally active and transform them into centers of mass-defense work -- this is the task currently being carried out by DOSAAF committees of all levels.

In fulfilling the demands of the 25th CPSU Congress, the guiding organs of DOSAAF must master the Leninist style in their work, more clearly understand the needs of primary organizations, and eliminate any elements of bureaucracy and high-handedness. A sympathetic, responsive attitude toward workers, and an attempt to constantly learn more and master advanced techniques and progressive control methods -- these things are a matter of honor among all committee leaders.

The absence of good organization and checks on execution of orders, plus a lack of initiative on the part of certain workers charged with conducting the mass-defense, training, sports and other work, are the main reasons for existing shortcomings and the lagging of a number of organizations. A demanding attitude towards oneself and one's subordinates, and the ability to inspire people and get them to carry out the important tasks -- this is the "secret" behind successful committees and chairmen.

The 50th anniversary congress demonstrated the great friendship and cooperative attitude of DOSAAF toward the defense and sports organizations of friendly socialist countries. Envoys of 11 countries took part in the work of the congress -- Bulgaria, Hungary, Viet Nam, East Germany, North Korea, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. In their speeches the leaders of the delegations were unanimous in their declarations about the growing influence of DOSAAF USSR and assured the delegates to the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress of their friendly feelings toward the peoples of the Soviet Union.

In turn the 8th DOSAAF Congress assured our neighbors that DOSAAF will in the future do everything it can to further strengthen the brotherly friendship and fruitful cooperation with all defense and sports organizations of the socialist countries based on the principles of socialist internationalism and the foreign policy of the CPSU and in an atmosphere of genuine equality and joint interest.

The basic tasks of DOSAAF regarding implementation of the plans of the 25th CPSU Congress and the further improvement of mass-defense work, as well as the ways for accomplishing these tasks, are contained in the decisions of the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress. DOSAAF committees and all activists must relay these decisions to each DOSAAF member and mobilize them toward achieving new successes in developing patriotic activities for the glory of our nation.

In a letter to the Central Committee CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, and the Council of Ministers USSR, unanimously approved by the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, it states: "DOSAAF members have a feeling of great pride toward their socialist homeland. They unanimously approve of and wholeheartedly support the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet government, and the tireless everyday work of the Central Committee CPSU and its
Politburo headed by Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev."

In the name of all members of the twice honored DOSAAF organization, the congress assured the Central Committee CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, the Council of Ministers USSR, and the Secretary-General of the Central Committee CPSU that DOSAAF is closely rallying its ranks around the Communist Party and is carrying out the tasks placed before it under the party's tested leadership with honor.

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DOSAAF PRE-DRAFT TRAINING DISCUSSED

In the Moldavian SSR

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 6 Feb 77 p 3

[Article by S. Grigor'yev, inspector of the Department of Primary Military Training of the Ministry of Public Education, Moldavian SSR, Hero of the Soviet Union, Kishinev: "What Did the Comments Show?"]

[Text] The Ministry of Public Education of the Moldavian SSR periodically sends inquiries to the troop units in which the graduates of the republic's schools are serving with the request that they send their comments concerning the quality of their preparation for military service and express their desires and suggestions on improving NVP [primary military training]. This permits an objective evaluation of the effectiveness in organizing the primary military instruction in our schools and adopting measures to eliminate shortcomings and improve all work.

In 1976 we received about 500 comments from commanders of units and subunits as well as letters from the graduates of the schools. The absolute majority evaluate the results of primary military instruction favorably.

Twenty-four graduates of the Moldavian schools are serving in one of the troop subunits. Officer M. Aliyev notes the good training of all the youths for military service. The majority of them became experts in combat and political training in compressed times.

This testifies to the fact that the organization of the primary military instruction in the schools of the republic is basically attaining the assigned goal.

Special significance is had by the critical remarks of the officers and sergeants concerning the further improvement of primary military training.

The course chief of the Riga Higher Military Command Red Banner School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov, Major I. Kurnosov, reports that a graduate of the Ungey secondary school, Cadet Yu. Blyudo, has not learned
to follow orders and has been punished for a lack of self control although he studies with grades of "good" and "excellent."

A company commander writes about a graduate of the Rybenitsa secondary school No 3, Cadet G. Savchuk, that he has been punished for an unconscientious attitude toward the performance of duties and violation of discipline in formation.

The facts which have been presented indicate that the instilling of discipline and the ability to perform in the course of the preparation of students for military service has especially important significance. In this connection, it will be no exaggeration to say that the main task of the course in NVP consists of molding a conscientious and scrupulous attitude toward the accomplishment of their honored military duty to the Motherland in the youths.

Some comments noted the weak physical tempering of the draftees. Thus, an officer of one of the military units, Comrade Panchenko, writes: "The physical training of some of the draftees is at a low level. Their strength and endurance, that is, those qualities without which a soldier can in no way get by, are weakly developed."

The school program on physical culture for the ninth and tenth grades does not completely ensure the preparation of the youths for service in the Armed Forces. The section which lists the tasks of the subject does not even mention this.

Almost all comments point out that with sufficient theoretical knowledge on the principles of military affairs, individual graduates have poor practical skills in drill and in firing and tactical training.

We informed the troop units about the distribution of hours among the sections of the NVP program. On the whole, the majority of the commanders agree with the program which is now in effect.

We were interested in the assistance which was rendered to the students by the military and technical training conducted in the school and in mastering a military specialty. As a result, the following was established. In those cases where about 35 hours are spent on military-technical training, especially on the specialities of vehicle driver and tractor operator, it is of little value. In accordance with the statements of the graduates, the study of the specialities of vehicle driver and tractor operator in accordance with the full course on the basis of the decrees of the Council of Ministers USSR is rendering great assistance in the mastery of the corresponding military speciality. For example, a graduate of the Drepkautskaya school, N. Nemtsev, writes: "They sent me to learn to be a tank commander because I studied the tractor well in school." A graduate of the Dondyushanskaya school, A. Grigorash, reports that the military-technical training which was taken in school gave him the opportunity to pass the examination for a driver's license ahead of schedule.
An analysis of the comments from the troop units permits drawing the following conclusions.

Basic attention should be paid to the molding of a moral-psychological attitude toward military service among the youths and the profound striving for the exemplary performance of their duty to the Motherland. In the course of primary military training, discipline and the necessity to execute orders and instructions conscientiously and implicitly, exactly and on time should be instilled. The entire pedagogical collective and the school’s Komsomol organization should take a very active part in the attainment of this goal.

In the course of lessons in physical culture in the ninth and tenth grades, more attention should be devoted to cross-country training and strength exercises as well as forced marches. The military instructors should establish closer contact with the physical culture teachers and coordinate their work with them.

Despite individual desires to increase or decrease the number of hours for various sections, the comments of the troop units directly concerning primary military training testify to the fact that the present program, on the whole, ensures the attainment of the assigned goal. However, what is common for the overwhelming majority of the comments is the fact that some graduates have poor practical skills in the disassembly and assembly of the assault rifle, in the accomplishment of drill procedures and the duties of the sentry and orderly, and in the use of protective means and radiation and chemical reconnaissance instruments.

Consideration of the remarks and suggestions from the units will permit the schools of the republic to improve the quality of training of the students for military service. For this, it is necessary to improve the training material base and the methodological skill of the military instructors and to make wide use of leading pedagogical experience.

In Kiev Military District

Moscow SOVETSKII PATRIOT in Russian 6 Feb 77 p 3

[Article by Maj Gen V. Noskov, assistant commander of troops of the Red Banner Kiev Military District for Military Educational Institutions and Paramilitary Training: "The Youth Arrives at the Unit"]

[Text] The effect of primary military training on the successes of the youth in army service is systematically analyzed in the troop units and military educational institutions of the Red Banner Kiev Military District. And the following conclusion can be drawn: primary military instruction has a beneficial effect on the formation of the young soldier.

Practice has shown: If the youth successfully mastered the program for NVP [primary military training] in the school, they master a military speciality
under army conditions in a short time, experience fewer difficulties, and become experts of combat and political training more rapidly. I will refer to specific examples. Cadet of the Poltava Higher Military Command Signal School A. Solov'yev, a graduate of the 8th secondary school in the city of Yevpatoriya, showed profound knowledge and firm practical skills in drill and in tactical and military-technical training upon his arrival at the school. Thanks to this, he has been successfully mastering the program of a higher military educational institution from the first days.

The commander of one of the troop units comments as follows concerning the young soldiers: "Privates A. Asmanov and A. Stritutskiy, graduates of the 79th and 20th secondary schools of the city of Dnipropetrovsk, showed profound knowledge of the provisions of the military oath, the construction of small arms, and good physical training upon arrival at the unit. These and other young soldiers are mastering military affairs successfully and are steadfastly enduring the burdens and deprivations of military service."

And one more conclusion suggests itself from the analysis which has been conducted: the overwhelming majority of the young servicemen are well trained for service in the army.

In recent years, the number of youths who desire to enter the military educational institutions after completing secondary school is constantly growing. This is to the great credit of all those who are occupied with the instruction and education of the students in the secondary general educational schools.

In giving its due to what has been attained, we must conduct a search for new ways to improve primary military training in the secondary educational institutions. We will achieve this goal if, along with the study of the favorable experience, we concentrate our attention on omissions and determine clearly what is not being done or has been done poorly. Familiarity with primary military training of the young servicemen and cadets in the first courses of the district's military schools showed that their practical skills and knowledge in the scope of the training program are insufficiently high at times. Thus, in 1975 in the Kiev Higher Military Engineering Twice Red Banner Signal School imeni M. I. Kalinina, of the total number of cadets who were accepted for the first course and were subjected to a special check only 30 percent knew the instruction of the assault rifle well and only 20 percent were able to accomplish the firing procedures correctly.

In one of the district's troop units, knowledge in combined-arms training of several dozen youths who had just begun service was checked. It was learned that the young soldiers had poor skills in using the assault rifle. The ability to accomplish the norm for the defense against weapons of mass destruction was checked in this same unit: to put on the gas mask in 12 seconds. Not one of the youths could accomplish it.

Both in the school and in this unit individual young servicemen showed a superficial knowledge of the combined-arms regulations and poor skills in
the accomplishment of drill procedures. Here, we are talking about the initial skills which are envisioned by the program for primary military training.

In analyzing the effect of primary military instruction on the formation of the young soldiers, we cannot fail to pay attention to the question of their physical training although this is not a section of NVP. Physical training is an integral part of the entire process in training the youth for service in the army. The importance of this problem is indisputable.

The physical tempering of some draftees does not yet meet the requirements which have been imposed. As a result, when first performing their service the youths experience serious difficulties, especially when passing the competitive examinations for the military educational institutions. Because of poor physical training, individual entrants are not admitted as students in the school. Cases are rare where young soldiers cannot accomplish the established norms for chinning, grenade throwing, and the one-kilometer run.

Contemporary military affairs are imposing high requirements on the physical training of the people. If the daily schedule in the army is accomplished by minutes, then in actions in servicing weapons the count is conducted in seconds. And, as is known, contemporary combat equipment is serviced collectively. We now are working with complexes (tank, contemporary radars, and other more difficult complexes). The crews of these complexes should operate as synchronously as possible.

Experience shows that with the arrival of the young serviceman in the army omissions, let us say, in his military-technical training are made up more rapidly. It is more difficult to make up skills in physical development. This is why more attention should be devoted to this question in the schools.

The basic reason for shortcomings in the primary military training of the youth is its poor supervision on the part of local organizations of popular education and school principals. It has been established that if the republic and oblast organs of popular education demonstrate the proper sense of responsibility to NVP as a state task, in some places it is still underestimated in rayon and city departments of popular education.

From talks with school principals the opinion is often created concerning their superficial concept of their role in the supervision of primary military training. This also explains the low results in the training of pupils in accordance with the NVP program, let us say, in some schools of Khar'kovskaya oblast which received unsatisfactory grades during a check by the district jointly with the Ministry of Education.

All problems are resolved correctly, quickly, and in a quality manner in those schools where their supervisors devote proper attention to military education. Thus, the principal of the 17th secondary school in the city of Ipren', Kiyevskaya oblast, Lidiya Fedorovna Zin'kovskaya, delves into the essence of the military instruction of the youth with the knowledge of the
matter and constantly renders practical assistance to the military instructor in organizing the educational process. And the result is obvious: for five years, the school has occupied first place in the rayon for results in socialist competition in the best training of the youth for service in the army and for the number of graduates who desire to enter the military educational institutions. The school has a good training material base for lessons on NVP and a museum of combat glory has been established. And what is more important, all teacher personnel are taking an active part in the military-patriotic upbringing of the youth.

The path to successes in training the youth lies, first of all, through the constant improvement of the military and special knowledge of the lessons' supervisors. But the methodological work with the military instructors does not always meet the requirements which have been imposed in full measure.

The role and significance of the training material base is common knowledge. Unfortunately, it does not yet permit ensuring high quality of lessons in all sections of the program of instruction in all rayons and educational institutions. There still are not enough shooting galleries for firing from combat and small-caliber weapons or equipped sports and defense camps for the conduct of five-day field lessons.

These shortcomings and the causes which give rise to them require the adoption of urgent measures for the further improvement of primary military instruction of the youth. Just what are these measures? I will mention the most important of them.

The responsibility of the school principals for the quality of primary military instruction and the condition and improvement of the training-material base should be increased in every possible way.

Professional ties should be improved between the military commissariats, the organs of popular and professional-technical education, public health, and internal affairs, civil defense headquarters, DOSAAF, physical culture, and sports committees. Joint work is especially important in organizing a check: along with other questions, special attention should be paid to the quality of conduct of lessons by the military instructors.

Work on the construction of shooting galleries for firing from small-caliber and combat weapons, sports complexes, and sports-defense camps for the conduct of five-day field lessons should be made more active.

The necessity to solve the following problems has also become urgent: concerning the purposeful training of the military instructors in pedagogical institutes for secondary schools in rural country from among the persons who have performed their service in the army and have demonstrated an inclination toward pedagogical work; concerning the implementation of new standard plans for general educational schools and boarding schools which
envision all objects for the training-material base for the conduct of NVP (for the present the schools are being constructed in accordance with old plans—without shooting galleries, storerooms for the storage of weapons, and other objects).

The period connected with the solution of problems on the introduction of primary military instruction, the organization of the training process, and the search for forms and methods of instruction has been left behind. At the present time, the main task of primary military training is ensuring its high level and the practical molding of moral-political and psychological qualities of the pupils—the future servicemen.