Force Protection In Support and Stability Operations (SASO)

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

Force Protection in Support and Stability Operations (SASO): by MAJ. Tim W. Quillin, USA, 49 Pages

This monograph examines force protection and how it affects maneuver in SASO. In recent deployments around the world commanders have stated that force protection is their number one concern. Therefore this monograph examines how force protection affects maneuver and ultimately mission accomplishment.

The monograph first reviews what force protection is, as defined by the National Command Authority (NCA), U.S. Congress, and Joint and U.S. Army doctrine. This section as found that there is not a clear definition of force protection. Commanders have interpreted force protection to mean defensive action to protect friendly troops instead of offensive action to prevent enemy interference to the desired end-state.

The next section reviews what success is in SASO operations, using the characteristics of peace operations found in Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations*. This section shows how the tenets of Army operations determine success in SASO. Without the tenets of versatility, initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization, the SASO force cannot have freedom of maneuver and ultimately achieve mission accomplishment.

The monograph then examines the U.S. involvement in Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy to determine the specific force protection measures used in those operations. Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy both had major force protection influences that affected mission accomplishment. In Somalia the siege mentality prevented U.N. forces from operating after dark, allowing the Somali warlords to freely intervene to counter UNOSOM II missions.

The monograph concludes by answering the research question of that force protection does influences freedom of maneuver and mission accomplishment in SASO. The author then gives recommendations that force protection should include both offensive and defensive action, and focus more on preventing enemy action and less on friendly protection.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War the United States has voluntarily participated in an increased number of peace operations around the world. The U.S. commitment to the U.N. has increased deployments to places like Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia. As the past proves, these missions can be as deadly as war.

The U.S. brings with it several unique capabilities that require her involvement in peace operations. The U.S. rapid deployment capability and the ability to project power anywhere in the world has made the U.S. the most capable nation to intervene in the international community and solve conflicts. Additionally, logistics and maneuver capabilities are why U.S. military involvement is a prerequisite for success in most peacekeeping operations around the world.[1]

Since the Clinton Administration announced the policy of Engagement, the U.S. military has found itself supporting a large number of operations in every corner of the world. The current administration sees the U.S. military supporting any Support and Stability Operation (SASO) in almost any capacity.[2] The policy states that the U.S. is willing to participate if U.S. general or specific interests will be advanced. Moreover, the Administration believes that peacekeeping is

the best way to prevent or contain international conflicts.[3]

As U.S. policy of commitment to the U.N. suggests, the U.S. military can expect more SASO operations in the future.[4]

The increased number of SASO operations places the U.S. military in unfamiliar and sometimes hostile nations. With this increase of deployments comes a greater risk to personnel and equipment.[5] Today the U.S. military is deployed in over eighty-six nations, with 100,000 troops, supporting contingency operations and exercises worldwide.[6] These increased deployments make the U.S. military a target of opportunity for any group wishing to make a name for itself or to counter U.S. policy.

Identifying the strategic and operational objectives in a SASO environment is difficult. The unique nature of the mission requires forces to be capable of a broad range of tasks ranging from humanitarian assistance to simultaneous combat operations. The range of missions possible pose threats that are usually subtle and indirect. This inability to control the environment often focuses the emphasis on the cost of the operation in terms of people and equipment. This increased focus on protecting personnel and equipment has caused force protection to have a widening identity of its own.[7]

The American attitude towards force protection can be explained by what is called the "Desert Storm Syndrome," an unjustified perception that the military can perform operations casualty-free.[8] Potential

casualties have become the Achilles heel of U.S. military operations. The American people value the sanctity of human life and can be easily turned against foreign interventions when they see fatalities flashed across their television screens, as with the bombing of the Marine barracks in 1983 and the Rangers in Somalia in 1993.[9] The Clinton Administration and the Defense Department, in response to an increased sensitivity to casualties, has elevated force protection to a stand-alone task. Force protection inherent in everyday operations has now become the number one concern over mission accomplishment. Commanders have been directed to consider force protection as a separate and distinct priority mission.[10] This directive in force protection has senior commanders becoming extremely conservative in their decision-making, fearing the potential of casualties. This reluctance to use force at a time of increased deployments could put U.S. servicemen and women in greater harm or show that the U.S. is not willing to commit to accomplishing the mission when the probability of casualties is high.

If the U.S. wishes to use military force to get involved in SASO operations, it should expect that at least one party to a conflict is likely to contest its involvement violently. Unfortunately, the U.S. has misconstrued SASO to mean the absence of any threat to U.S. forces. If the consent to the peace agreement fails, the U.S. must be willing to use force or the peace mission could become very bloody.[11]

The U.S. policy of Engagement has increased the number of worldwide deployments for the U.S. military. With these increased operations comes the potential for casualties. The American people, because of Desert Storm and political promises, believe that military operations can be nearly casualty-free. If U.S. wants to be the only superpower, it must be engaged in world events and accept all the risks that come with superpower status.

This monograph answers the research question "do force protection concerns limit freedom of maneuver and mission accomplishment in SASO?" The research for this monograph examines the commonalities of lessons learned in force protection in Operations Restore Hope (Somalia) and Uphold Democracy (Haiti), and their effects on maneuver. The study considers the definition of force protection as defined by the legal requirements of Title X, U.S. Code, and Joint doctrine. The criteria used for the assessment are the tenets of Army operations (Versatility, Initiative, Agility, Depth, and Synchronization) as outlined in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* and FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. The author uses the case studies of Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) and Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti) to compare the imposed force protection measures with the criteria to build a framework and answer the research question.

Chapter 2 is a review of what force protection *is*, as defined by the National

Command Authority (NCA), Congress, Joint and U.S. Army doctrine. This chapter is mainly a review of key legal documents and military manuals giving the reader an appreciation of what the Nation and military community understand as force protection.

Chapter 3 considers what *success* is in SASO operations. The characteristics of a successful peace operation are the tenets of Army operations.[12] This chapter shows how the tenets of versatility, initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization determine success in SASO. Without these five tenets the SASO force cannot have freedom of maneuver and ultimately achieve mission accomplishment.

Chapter 4 focuses on force protection measures in Operations Restore Hope (Somalia) and Uphold Democracy (Haiti). This chapter determines the specific force protection measures used to accomplish the mission in these two operations. This chapter highlights the importance placed on force protection by the leadership of the units involved in both operations.

Chapter 5 analyzes the imposed force protection measures in Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy against the criteria of the tenets of Army operations. The author shows how force protection can influence freedom of maneuver and possibly affect mission accomplishment.

The paper concludes with Chapter 6 and answers the research question whether force protection influences freedom of maneuver and mission accomplishment in SASO. The author

cites specific recommendations for improvement based on the evidence found during the research.

CHAPTER TWO

DEFINITION OF FORCE PROTECTION

This Chapter examines what the National Command Authority (NCA), and U.S. Congress have directed as force protection requirements. Additionally, this Chapter examines Joint and U.S. Army doctrine and compares what operational commanders use as guides as they implement force protection measures.

It is important to understand the definition of force protection and how commanders implement protective measures while maintaining adequate combat power and freedom of action. There is not a clear doctrinal or legal definition of force protection that explains how to maintain freedom of action and protect the fighting strength of the unit in SASO. Force protection has an overarching meaning that includes medical care, safety, anti-terrorist countermeasures and physical security, among others.

All military authority comes from the U.S. Constitution and is directed through Congress and the NCA. It is the Constitution and U.S. Legal Code that give commanders the authority to organize and employ military forces. The President and the Department of Defense outline their strategies through the National Security Strategy and the

National Military Strategy. The following section will examine what each one says about force protection.

Code of Law and the National Command Authority

Title X, U.S. Code empowers commanders to employ U.S. forces to accomplish tasks assigned to them by the NCA. It does not specifically establish guidelines for force protection.[13]

Under Title X, commanders have the authority to organize, employ, and coordinate forces within their command to accomplish missions assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Commanders are responsible for their units' actions and are required to report to the SECDEF whenever forces assigned to their commands are insufficient to achieve mission success.[14] Force protection, through command authority established in Title X, is the inherent responsibility of all commanders.

The United States National Security Strategy states that the goal of national security is to protect the lives of U.S. citizens and interests abroad while not allowing a hostile nation to dominate in any region that is critical to U.S. national interests.[15] This policy does not specifically mention force protection as a requirement. It is obvious, however, that protection of U.S. personnel is a

critical factor and commanders must protect their force while executing a policy of Engagement around the world.

The National Military Strategy defines force protection as:

> Force protection enables US forces to maintain freedom of action from pre-deployment through employment and redeployment. Fluid battlefields and the potential ability of adversaries to orchestrate asymmetrical threats against our forces require that we seek every means to protect our forces. Comprehensive force protection requires the employment of a full array of active and passive measures. Force protection measures initiatives and must thus address all aspects of potential threat.[16]

The National Military Strategy clearly implies that force protection is more than an anti-terrorist protection capability. It implies that force protection is both offensive and defensive in nature. Force protection should never restrict freedom of action. It should have the ability to counter all conventional and asymmetrical threats. The National Military Strategy gives commanders the freedom of action to counter the enemy as rapidly as possible to complete the assigned mission and protect their forces in the process.

The NCA, Congress and the National Security and Military Strategies all require military commanders to protect their forces. The National Military Strategy states specifically that force protection is a means to counter enemy action. Congress gives commanders wide authority to

act, as they deem necessary, to accomplish missions assigned to them by the NCA.

Joint doctrine has further defined force protection to include several additional requirements other than to counter enemy action and protect U.S. forces.

Joint Doctrine

Joint Doctrine defines force protection as a:

> Security program designed to protect service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personnel protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence and other security programs.[17]

This Joint definition does not address the larger issue of providing protection to the force while maintaining freedom of action and conserving combat power. The Joint definition implies that nearly everything a commander does falls under the label of force protection.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* says that protection is a measure that must be considered before combat operations commence and includes enemy action, health, welfare, maintenance, safety and fratricide. Protection, according to Joint Publication 3-0, must strive to protect the fighting potential of the force from enemy combat action.[18]

Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,* gives six principles for operations other than war: objective, unity-of-effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Security is defined as "never permitting hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage." The principle of security implies that freedom of action is necessary and that force protection should promote the application of combat power to counter enemy activity that could bring harm to friendly units.[19]

The definition of force protection in Joint doctrine covers everything from personnel services, medical support, and combating terrorism.

Several Joint manuals nearly contradict each other by indicating that security is 1) offensive action against the enemy and force protection is 2) defensive in nature. The two are mutually exclusive.

U.S. Army Doctrine discusses force protection in several manuals. The two this chapter examines are FM 100-5, *Operations,* and FM 100-23, *Peace Operations.*

Army Doctrine

FM 100-5 discusses force protection in several areas. The first area is in the dynamics of combat power.

The four elements of combat power are maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership, and are what give units the ability to fight. FM 100-5 talks about protection—but not force protection—as one of the elements of combat power. These four elements combined will determine the outcome of military operations. The dynamics of combat power define protection as conserving the fighting potential of the force so the commander can apply it at the decisive point.[20] The manual further defines protection as consisting of:

1. Operational Security (OPSEC) and Deception
2. Protecting Health and Maintaining Morale
3. Safety
4. Fratricide Avoidance

These four areas align closely with the Joint definition and do not mention countering action against the enemy. This definition of force protection clearly consists of defensive and preventive tasks. Further, it does not guide commanders as they struggle with preventing enemy action against their forces.[21]

The second area where protection is mentioned is under the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) of Mobility and Survivability. Survivability is defined as those actions that protect the force from enemy weapons systems and natural occurrences. The main focus is on hardening of facilities and fortifications. However, it does mention

OPSEC, deception and dispersion as measures to protect the force.[22] These measure of survivability also focus on defensive actions, with almost nothing to enhance the freedom of maneuver for the commander other than to protect the force from enemy actions.

The next section in FM 100-5 where force protection is mentioned is in chapter 13, "Operations Other than War (OOTW)." Under the principles that guide OOTW, two measures directly relate to force protection.

The first is security, defined as, "Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage." Security is a priority consideration for commanders as they execute military operations in SASO, and regardless of the mission commanders must protect the force at all times. Accomplishment of the mission is the commander's number one concern and he must counter all activity that may keep him from reaching that end. Moreover, the commander must maintain the ability to transition from peaceful situations to combat operations rapidly.[23]

This definition is the first instance throughout Joint and Army doctrine that directly indicates the use of *offensive* action to implement force protection measures. The issue here is that the definition is under security and not specifically under force protection. The dilemma is that the definitions of security and force protection give

little understanding of what force protection *is,* and may contradict each other in terms of offensive or defensive actions needed to maintain freedom of maneuver.

The next principle of OOTW in FM 100-5 that relates to force protection is "restraint," defined as "Apply appropriate military capability prudently." Prudent use of military power refers directly to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the application of force in SASO. Since the nature of SASO missions is highly political, restraints are placed on tactics, weaponry, levels of violence, and the use of excessive force all of which could jeopardize the mission in a political context.[24]

Although these two principles of security and restraint describe the issues of SASO, they do little to illuminate the understanding of how a commander is to implement force protection.

FM 100-23, *Peace Operations,* also discusses force protection. In FM 100-23, force protection is defined as:

> Commanders attempt to accomplish a mission with minimal loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies by integrating force protection measure into all aspects of planning and execution. Force protection consists of operational security (OPSEC), deception, health and morale, safety, and avoidance of fratricide.[25]

This definition closely resembles the Joint definition and the definition of protection under the dynamics of combat power found in FM 100-5. However, in FM 100-23 there

is no chapter that describes how a commander is supposed to plan for and conduct force protection operations.

Conclusion

From the NCA and U.S. Congress, through Joint doctrine and down to the level of U.S. Army doctrine force protection has evolved into a program that includes every aspect of taking care of soldiers and combat operations. The NCA and Congress have given wide guidance to commanders on *how* they implement force protection. However, mission accomplishment is always a commander's primary concern.

Joint and U.S. Army definitions of force protection emphasize force protection as a health, safety, and morale issue and minimize action to counter the enemy through firepower and maneuver. Force protection has come to mean so much it creates confusion among commanders and jeopardizes mission success. A dynamic force protection definition that focuses on maintaining freedom of action and countering the enemy would create a more secure environment. Although the use of force should only be the last resort, overprotecting soldiers could be taken as a sign of weakness and poor commitment to the mission.

To better understand what freedom of action is, the next Chapter looks at the tenets of Army operations as found in FM 100-5 and FM 100-23.

CHAPTER THREE

SUCCESS IN SUPPORT AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

Success in SASO is defined through the tenets of Army Operations.[26] In this Chapter the author discusses how the tenets of versatility, initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization achieve success and give the commander the ability to maneuver and ultimately achieve mission accomplishment.

Maneuver is the movement of forces to gain a positional advantage in relation to the enemy. It gives commanders flexibility and keeps the enemy off balance. Maneuver, when used properly, protects the force.[27] In SASO missions, as in all operations, maneuver is needed to exploit the situation and counter the enemy and is prerequisite to achieve mission success.

Versatility

> Versatility is to the decathlete as agility is to the boxer. The decathlete trains for and competes in ten events, the boxer only one.[28]

Versatility is the ability of a unit to do many things competently. In SASO, military units must be able to transition to many different tasks simultaneously. To be versatile means that a commander must be able to shift focus rapidly and transition from one mission to another with

little notice. Versatility requires that the unit be multifunctional and competent in many tasks. Several planning limitations can restrict versatility. The first is the force structure (or force capacity) that is allowed into the theater of operations. A reduced task organization (type and number of units organized under an operational commander) will greatly affect the mission capabilities and tasks a unit can perform. The second are the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Because of political and mission requirements the ROE can constrain a unit to only certain actions. A more restrictive ROE minimizes a unit's freedom of action and can ultimately take longer to accomplish the mission. This is not to say that ROE is bad, however. A well-developed ROE gives a unit legitimacy and may keep armed conflict from resuming.

Initiative

> The initiative here means an army's freedom of action as distinguished from an enforced loss of freedom. Freedom of action is the very life of an army, and once it is lost, the army is very close to defeat or destruction.[29]

The first step in initiative is to take action. In the context of SASO, initiative implies that the commander sets the stage for events to happen. The initiative, in SASO, is maintained through offensive or uncompromising action. The commander must never let the parties to a peace accord set

or control the events to favor one side over the other. A well-trained unit maintains the initiative through centralized planning and decentralized execution. This requires commanders to thoroughly analyze the situation and anticipate events to have the ability to act faster than the enemy and take control of events before they get out of control.[30]

In SASO, initiative is given to the commander through a clear military purpose, accompanied by an achievable end-state and ROE that delegate the authority to react to every foreseeable situation to enforce the peace accords of an operation. Without initiative a peacekeeping force cannot reach the operational or strategic/political end-state. Initiative gives the commander freedom of action and is offensive or proactive in nature.

Agility

> Flexible Response is the capability of military forces for effective reaction to any enemy threat or attack with action appropriate and adaptable to circumstances existing.[31]

The ability to move quicker than the enemy as the situation or conditions change is the essence of agility. Agility enables a commander to maintain the initiative and control the environment so as to prevent hostilities from resuming. Agility allows the SASO force to concentrate combat power quickly against enemy vulnerabilities.[32]

A requirement for agility is mental alertness. The ability to anticipate requirements, act decisively with the required force package, and within the commander's intent is crucial to mission accomplishment.

An agile force in SASO must have a sufficient force structure and a flexible ROE. This allows a commander to adapt and apply forces within the mandate of the peace accords.

Depth

> Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose.[33]

In SASO operations the commander achieves depth by applying every resource to carry out the purpose assigned. Deep operations require anticipation of events and the proper application and synchronization of resources to affect the conditions for long-term success.[34]

In SASO operations, depth is affected through the proper sequencing of events and the proper application of the other sources of national power: diplomatic, information, economic.

Synchronization

> The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.[35]

Synchronization requires all unit actions to occur simultaneously toward a common purpose. This is done through proper use of every resource to its fullest extent. Synchronization is achieved through a clear commanders intent and understanding of time and space relationships to maximize depth throughout the operation. Commanders and their staffs accomplish synchronization through simultaneous and sequential operations that maximize every available resource.[36]

Conclusion

The tenets of Army operations give commanders the ability to maintain freedom of action. Units that have a robust task organization, aggressive ROE and clear political and military end-states are more likely to succeed and sustain fewer casualties in SASO missions.

The ultimate goal of the commander is to accomplish the mission and provide for the maximum protection of the force. This is best carried out with a versatile force that maintains the initiative and conducts synchronized operations in depth. In a SASO environment, proactive action that enforces the peace accords aggressively is the best force protection a commander can provide.

The next Chapter examines Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy and the implemented force protection measures. The author discusses how difficult it is to conduct SASO operations with a restrictive ROE and the corresponding impacts of force protection.

CHAPTER FOUR

Somalia

After the fall of Somali President Siad Barre, the country of Somalia fell into a bloody civil war that left the weakest of their society dying from starvation.[37] Somalia's descent into anarchy split along clan lines and created constant turf wars and struggles to control the flow of food supplies from international relief agencies and local producers. Control of the food supply became a source of power for the warring clan factions. The clan factions controlled food distribution by extortion, threats, and racketeering. By 1992, millions of Somali women and children were dying of starvation.[38]

The terrible conditions in Somalia attracted the U.N. and the U.S. through a constant cry from the media and international relief agencies. As the situation in Somalia grew worse, pressure from the international community and U.S. Congress compelled the Bush Administration to act with humanitarian aid in order to restore the flow of food to those who were suffering from the aftermath of civil war and subsequent anarchy.[39]

On December 4 1992, President Bush ordered the U.S. military to begin deployment into Somalia. The task given to the military was to alleviate widespread famine and

starvation. The Defense Department explained that the deployment was necessary because "the level of violence was increasing faster than the humanitarian effort to try and deal with the situation," and that a large military force was needed to overpower the warring factions and secure delivery of relief supplies into the country.[40]

The forces chosen to deploy and form the Joint Task Force Somalia (JTF-S) were the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division, 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and several logistical units. Their mission was to provide a secure environment and assist Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) to continue relief operations to the starving Somalis.[41] The mission, called Operation Restore Hope, lasted from 2 December 1992 until 4 May 1993, and was led by the U.S. military. The operation consisted of four phases: Deployment, securing of port facilities and airfields, expansion of operations to provide security to relief operations, and the hand off to U.N. forces.[42] The operation was called United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM) I, and was later to be followed by UNOSOM II.

UNOSOM II lasted from 4 May 1993 till April 1994, and transferred formal control of the Somali relief effort from the U.S. to the U.N. The U.N. objectives during this new phase expanded from security and relief operations to include rebuilding the Somalia economy and government.

These new U.N. objectives spurred renewed clan fighting for power and control of the new government to be formed. Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed increased pressure to maintain control by aggressive action towards the U.N. forces. This increased pressure resulted in a number of firefights, ambushes, sniping and mining of roads between the U.N. forces (which included the U.S.) and Somali warring factions.[43]

During Operation Restore Hope, the primary concern for U.S. commanders and their personnel was force protection.[44] There were several issues of when to use force, how much of it to use, and how to coordinate it.[45] Balancing force protection and the need to maneuver against the enemy was a difficult task for commanders.

The force protection measures in Operation Restore Hope focused mostly on defensive protection of personnel to prevent casualties. All operations were conducted from base camps. Base camps were built as defensive castles with anti-tank ditches to prevent "Beirut style" car bombings, reminiscent of the tragic 1983 suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon.[46]

Units were required to complete any missions away from the compounds during daylight hours. If a convoy or unit was away from its home compound after night fell it had to bivouac at a new compound. This required detailed planning

to ensure missions were safely completed during daylight hours. The result of this policy was a nightly rain of mortars by Somali clans into the compound. Moreover, the lack of friendly action at night allowed the enemy to mine roads and establish ambush sites for the next day.

Patrols at night to counter mortar attacks were limited and not conducted often enough to have a major effect on the enemy.[47] Additionally, soldiers wore flak jackets and Kevlar helmets, and sandbagged vehicles for increased protection from snipers and mines.

All convoy operations were required to be multi-vehicle and have an automatic weapon.[48] Cages were built on the back of vehicles to add additional protection for troops riding in the back, thus limiting their ability to defend themselves during ambushes.

Rules of Engagement (ROE) were established to allow the force maximum protection. The ROE allowed the soldiers to defend themselves, their unit, U.S. property, and other personnel who were under the protection of U.N. and U.S. forces. The ROE allowed for the use of deadly force when personnel were in danger, or to protect special equipment from theft that would give the enemy an advantage. A Toyota pick up truck with a machine gun mounted in the back called a "technical" and Somali possession of automatic weapons warranted the U.S. use of deadly force, subject to immediate

engagement. The difficulty came from indirect threats such as hostile Somali crowds where soldiers were reluctant to use deadly force when appropriate because soldiers felt that risk of legal prosecution (due to killing "innocent" crowd members) was greater than the threat from the Somalis.[49]

Operation Restore Hope did not significantly stress U.S. peacekeeping forces, however. It did expose a potential weakness in the U.S. and its ability to sustain casualties. Additionally, from the defense perspective there was no definable mission and realistic plan. Without a coherent mission and plan, commanders were reluctant to send troops to engage the warring factions and increase the possibility of casualties.[50]

Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti)

Events in Haiti began to concern the U.S. when the President, Jean-Bernard Aristide, was deposed seven months after his election by a military coup led by Lieutenant General Raul Cedras. Immediately after the overthrow, the U.S. began to examine several political and military options with a purpose of creating a stable and secure environment, and to restore President Aristide to power.[51]

On September 19 1994, the U.S. began Operation Uphold Democracy to reinstate President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The initial deployment of forces called for a forced-entry

mission led by the 82d Airborne Division. Once the country was secure, the plan called for a transition to peace-enforcement, led by the 10th Mountain Division.[52]

As the invasion force left Fort Bragg, N.C., the conditions in Haiti began to change. President Clinton sent a negotiating team, led by former President Jimmy Carter, which included retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powel and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. Their mandate was to convince General Cedras to settle the situation without bloodshed. The delegation met with Cedras as the invasion force was en-route to Port-au-Prince. At the last possible moment they reached an agreement to avert a forced-entry and allow for a peaceful entry by the 10th Mountain Division.[53]

This abrupt switch in the method of entry left significant uncertainty of the conditions on the ground.[54] The troops were told that the Fad'H (Armed Forces Haiti) were now considered to be friendly and part of the legitimate government of Haiti. Nothing in the earlier planning had prepared the initial entry forces for a plan of cooperation and mutual respect with what was once considered the enemy.[55]

The initial posture of U.S. forces was to show a visible military presence that was imposing and reassuring to the public at large. General Hugh Shelton, the XVIII

Airborne Corp commander, wanted a strong military presence that would assure Fad'H cooperation to the agreements.[56] This new situation changed the nature of the problem from expectant combat to Operations Other Than War, an environment that required a new set of skills other than merely shooting and maneuvering.[57]

The changing environment added greater complexity and confusion to the initial force protection measures. The commander of the 10th Mountain Division, Major General David Meade, placed force protection as a very high priority. During the first weeks of the operation soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division were not allowed to fraternize "in any way" with the local populace. This "no fraternization" policy created confusion among the troops, not knowing how to act with respect to Haitian on Haitian violence.[58]

Kevlar helmets and flak jackets were worn whenever troops were out of the living compounds and moving in the cities among the Haitian people. All vehicle convoys had to move during daylight hours and at least one vehicle mounted an automatic weapon for security. This high level of security and no interaction among the people left the impression with the local population that the country was not secure and stable, and that U.S. soldiers would not let its guard down.[59]

After the initial few days of the mission it was noticeable that U.S. forces were slow getting out of the compounds. This force protection measure, of keeping troops inside the protected areas, unknowingly left the streets open to thieves and armed thugs. This was particularly harmful and dangerous to those Haitians who voluntarily came forward with critical information that was helpful to the U.S. mission.[60]

The characteristics of Operation Uphold Democracy required U.S. forces to establish a more visible approach and avoid the "siege mentality" that was evident in Somalia. The purpose of the mission, to establish a secure environment and restore President Aristide to power, made it necessary that U.S. forces engage with the population. This engagement was controlled through the use of a detailed ROE.

The ROE for the initial entry forces was generally successful in protecting soldiers. The elements of the ROE allowed soldiers to protect themselves with deadly force when they felt threatened from attack. The initial ROE did not allow U.S. forces to detain Haitians seen committing a criminal act. This changed after September 21st when a woman was killed in a crowd directly in front of members of the 10th Mountain Division. The ROE was modified to include the use of force—to include deadly force—to prevent the loss of human life.[61]

The ROE evolved little as the threat to U.S. forces was better understood and minimized. Many soldiers felt the ROE created an environment of an active enemy, when in fact that threat was nominal. This constant belief that the threat to U.S. forces was greater than it really was created a constant tension between the Haitians and the U.S. military.[62] One soldier mentioned that the real threat to soldiers and success of the mission was the chain of command, because of the emphasis they placed on force protection over mission accomplishment.[63]

Operation Uphold Democracy presented a unique set of circumstances to U.S. forces. The changing situation on the ground, created by political leaders, required a different set of force protection measures than previously experienced.[64] The change from a non-permissive to permissive environment created confusion about what force protection measure should be implemented. Commanders not wanting to repeat their experiences of Somalia overreacted with a strict force protection policy that prevented soldier from engaging with the local people. This failure to engage created misconceptions that hindered the initial mission accomplishment.

CHAPTER FIVE

Analysis

This chapter analyzes the force protection measures used in Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy. The analysis compares the imposed force protection measures with the tenets of Army operations, examined in Chapter 3. Additionally, the analysis examines how the NCA, U.S. Congress, and doctrine define force protection.

Doctrine

Doctrine does not clearly give a definition of what force protection is when it comes to protecting soldiers in SASO. Joint and Army doctrine do not clearly articulate to commanders how to implement adequate force protection and keep mission accomplishment from becoming second priority.

Commanders have problems balancing mission requirements and the need to protect troops. There are several reasons why this occurs. First, intolerance for casualties places a premium on force protection disproportionately.[65] Second, definitions in Joint and Army doctrine reveal that force protection is not clearly defined and is considered defensive in nature. Finally, because of the complexity and political nature of SASO, force protection has risen to a significantly higher priority relative to mission accomplishment.

Title X, U.S. Code requires commanders to report to the U.S. Congress and the NCA when their forces are inadequate to accomplish assigned missions. However, Title X does not require the civilian leadership to respond with a mission change or greater force capacity to achieve mission success. This creates a problem as to the real purpose of the mission when military force is restricted from achieving the declared end-states. In SASO, many other factors (economic, governmental agencies, non-government organizations, and humanitarian assistance) play in the success of the operation. Therefore, because of the misunderstood end-state and dependence on other agencies to achieve success, military commanders decide to play "not to lose" rather than "to win" when deployed in SASO.[66]

The tenets of Army operations give the commander the ability to maneuver and ultimately achieve mission success. The next section compares the force protection measures used in Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy to the monograph criteria, the tenets of Army Operations.

Versatility.

Versatility is the ability to perform many tasks simultaneously. In Operation Restore Hope versatility was minimized through a misperceived understanding of the ROE. Troops had difficulty using deadly force when controlling crowds. The ROE called for the protection of sensitive equipment that would give the enemy increased capability with

deadly force. However, there was a fear of prosecution, so troops would rather face attack from unruly crowds, trying to steal their equipment, than execute the ROE. Additionally, daylight-only operations restricted several engagement opportunities with the Somali people. The policy of no operations at night limited the number of tasks that could be performed. Commanders were limited to securing the food supplies and distribution points, allowing little interaction with the Somali leadership and people.

In Operation Uphold Democracy versatility was limited by a very restrictive force protection policy that evolved little throughout the mission. The mission called for engagement by U.S. soldier to show the people of Haiti that the country was stable and secure. However, the force protection measures imposed by the 10th Mountain Division commander restricted any contact with the Haitian people.

The complex situation in the beginning days of Uphold Democracy made it difficult to develop a ROE that fit the nature of the problem. Troops were not allowed to engage with the Haitian people or detain Haitian criminals. This resulted in mistrust of American soldiers and misunderstanding of what the U.S. was trying to accomplish.

Initiative

Initiative is the foundation of offensive action and is proactive in nature. In Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy, initiative was sacrificed through the

unwillingness to get out among the people. In Somalia the bunker mentality and daytime-only missions limited commander's ability to take the initiative. Somali warlords would position at night and fire mortars into living compounds of U.S. soldiers. On August 8 1993, Somali clansmen mined a paved road with a command-detonated mine that killed four military policemen as they began their morning missions of route security.[67] The daytime-only policy allowed Somali warlords freedom to move and position their forces. In Operation Uphold Democracy, initiative was sacrificed because of a restrictive force protection measure that did not allow soldiers to engage with Haitians in any form. This policy allowed armed criminals to roam the streets contradicting the mission of secure and stable environment.[68]

The complex political conditions in Haiti and an unclear military purpose in Somalia made it difficult for commanders to take the initiative and develop a clear ROE. Without a clear purpose and ROE, imposing adequate force protection measures that complement the mission became difficult.

Agility

Agility is the ability to maintain flexibility and to anticipate and react to enemy action. Agility in Operations Uphold Democracy and Restore Hope was limited because of the unwillingness to engage with the population and react to clear offensive action by the enemy. The lack of engagement prevented the commander from anticipating

events and to react decisively to enemy action.

The complex nature of both operations made it difficult to completely understand the nature of the problem. This poor understanding of the problem made anticipation of events challenging and hard to develop a clear course of action. An agile force, able to react quicker than the enemy, must have a clear understanding of the problem. When a force clearly understands the nature of the problem, a more defined course of action develops. In both operations the agility of the force would have been greater if the complexity of the problem was better understood.

Depth

Depth is the application of combat power in time, space, and resources to achieve an intended purpose. In Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy depth was achieved through the application of combined arms operations. U.S. Army units are generally good at applying combined arms solutions to every mission.

During Operation Uphold Democracy SOF and conventional forces did not coordinate efforts to engage with the population. Special Forces (SF) teams, out in the country, established a more hands-on approach of force protection. Their efforts of engagement established trust and cooperation between the Fad'H and the U.S. Special Forces teams in the area. The policy of not wearing body armor and Kevlar helmets, and greater

interaction with the population built trust among the people. These methods proved useful in finding cache sites and disarming possible attackers who were opposed to the mission.[69]

Operations in depth must use of all forces in country to achieve the mission. The use of SOF and conventional forces is only one area where U.S. operations need improvement. In SASO a combination of forces and anticipation of events provide for the greatest possible success. Depth in SASO is achieved through the application of effort over time. A good example is the policy of engagement conducted by SF teams in Operation Uphold Democracy.

Synchronization

Synchronization occurs when all available units coordinate their action to achieve a common purpose. In Operation Restore Hope, SOF and conventional forces did not coordinate their efforts. During the raid of October 3, 1993, TF 2-14 Infantry was assigned as the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for U.N. forces. However, TF 2-14 Infantry was not briefed on the mission until there was a requirement for their inclusion late in the operation.[70] The failure of the October 3rd mission ultimately drove the U.S. to abandon the mission in Somalia completely. The tenets of Army operations give military units the ability to maintain freedom of action. U.S. force protection policy in Haiti and Somalia contributed to the failure of both operations. Force protection measures must be weighed against the desired

end-state to provide the best application of force. Force protection when properly understood should amplify military capabilities.

Current doctrine defines force protection as a defensive measure to protect military units against enemy action. However, maintaining the ability to maneuver and pursue offensive action is requirement to achieve victory when using military force.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

The research for this monograph clearly shows that force protection does limit freedom of maneuver and affects mission accomplishment. In combat, commanders cannot substitute force protection or any other important task in place of mission accomplishment without jeopardizing the mission. If military leaders are conservative and lack aggressiveness to pursue the desired end-state, then it will be apparent when forced to balance force protection and freedom to maneuver.

Military and political leaders feel that risk management, integral in all military operations, does not include risking the lives of American solders in the name of peace.[71] Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili expressed his concern to the U.S. Congress over this issue:

> Not only are we setting a standard by which this country will judge us but…that it might begin to have an impact on our young commanders who have the sense that if they go into an operation, and despite their best efforts, suffer casualties, that someone's going to be looking over their shoulders. How tragic it would be if we did that because we would grow a group of leaders who, through their hesitancy, would begin to endanger people. [1]

As an example, commanders in Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy stated that their number one concern was force protection.[72]

The current definition of force protection, in Joint and U.S. Army doctrine, contributes to the problems of balancing force protecting and mission accomplishment. Force protection has evolved to mean every aspect of soldier welfare and safety. As it is currently defined, force protection drives commanders into a defensive mind-set that makes them reluctant to use military force in fear of casualties. However, it is this fear that creates a greater number of casualties in the long run, because of an inability to take the offensive and pursue all those who oppose the peace process.

The pressure to prevent any casualties, combined with the Clinton Administration's policy of Engagement and tragic experiences in Somalia, have created major limitations on American military peace operations. The issue has the potential to impede the U.S. ability to project national power. The perception throughout the world is that an overwhelming force protection policy and fear of sustaining casualties has reduced U.S. willingness to use military power as an effective tool in SASO.[73]

Recommendations

If success is to be achieved in places like Somalia and Haiti, the military must develop a better definition of force protection. No one will argue that protecting the

force will always be important as long as American men and women are put into harm's way. The current method of protecting the force however, allows potential adversaries to exercise their desires against the peace process. Therefore, the military needs a force protection definition with a proactive offensive flavor. This proactive mindset will change force protection to have greater flexibility to counter those who oppose the peace process.

Peace operations are different than conventional military operations, but they are no less important to the nation's national defense that they need to be treated as aberrations. They are, however, different enough from traditional military operations that a commander and staff must consider the other elements of national power to achieve success. The friction that is created from different government agencies trying to achieve success in SASO threaten failure in future operations if left unattended. In future SASO missions, a single operational commander is needed to focus and synchronize the elements of national power. A single commander would synchronize the efforts of all the different government agencies to a common purpose.[74]

If force protection measures are to be successful, military commanders and their staffs must be able to define the desired purpose of the operation. In Somalia and Haiti,

commanders had difficulty translating the diplomatic end-state to clear military objectives. Ambiguity in defining the purpose of the operation makes it difficult to establish an effective ROE and a force protection policy that accomplishes the end-state of the operation.

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