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### Key Words and Document Analysis

- International Affairs
- Propaganda
- Political Science
- Sociology
- Military Organizations
- Albania
- Bulgaria
- Czechoslovakia
- East Germany
- Hungary
- Poland
- Romania
- Yugoslavia

### COSATI Field/Group

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TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1327
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ASPECTS OF NEW MILITARY REGULATIONS DISCUSSED

Deputy Minister of National Defense on New Army Regulations

[Sofia ARMEYSKI PREGLED in Bulgarian No 9, 1976 pp 7-10]

[Text] Col Gen Mircho Asenov, deputy minister of national defense -- New all-army regulations shall become effective as of 1 October 1976 in the Bulgarian People's Army: Internal Service Regulations; Garrison and Sentry Duty Service Regulations; and Disciplinary Regulations. The regulations include essentially new stipulations and requirements formulated by the Bulgarian Communist Party for the armed forces and for every military serviceman. The regulations they contain are of important ideological and political significance and equally apply to military personnel of all units, ships, and subunits of the Bulgarian People's Army, and the troops of other ministries.

The issuance of the new all-army regulations is a remarkable event in the life of the Bulgarian armed forces, marking an important stage in their development. They reflect the nature of military construction as an inseparable part in the building of a developed socialist society. In recent years, our country took gigantic steps on the path to building a developed socialist society. Great successes were achieved in the development of the economy, science, and culture. Major quality changes took places in the armed forces as well. On this basis, it became necessary to make army regulations strictly consistent with the occurred changes.

The new army regulations were drafted on the basis of the respective 1975 Soviet Army regulations and of our past experience. They include a number of stipulations contained in the old regulations. They represent the theoretical summation of the experience of the two friendly armies and of the revolutionary struggle of the Bulgarian people.
The redrafting of the new regulations does not represent merely the making of changes and the addition of individual words. Basically new rules have been introduced. The regulations are the basic documents containing the legal stipulations and norms governing the life, living conditions, and permanent activities of the forces, the organization and carrying of garrison and sentry duty, and the rights and obligations of commanders (chiefs) to reward and punish. They determine the overall and functional obligations of military servicemen, relations among them, internal order, and organization of the servicing units and subunits, laying the foundations of military upbringing.

The new regulations emphasize more completely the principle of one-man command — an important principle in the structure of the armed forces and, according to V.I. Lenin, the most accurate and expedient method of troop management.

In the light of these views, it is emphasized that every commander (chief) must implement firmly and consistently the policy of the BCP and the people's government; be the organizer and manager of the training and education of his subordinates; improve continually methods for managing the unit and the subunits; work adamantly to develop his organizational capabilities and improve his methodical skills; study everything new, positive, and progressive, and apply it in army practice.

Reflecting the basic characteristics of the armed forces of the Bulgarian People's Republic and the essentially new relations between commanders and subordinates, the regulations stipulate that the commander (chief) must combine high exactingness, principle-mindedness, and intolerance of shortcomings with trust in and respect for the people, constant concern for them. He must not allow rudeness or belittle their dignity. He must be a model to his subordinates. He must observe strictly the moral and ethical forms of behavior, obey strictly the laws of the country and the stipulations of the military oath, and military regulations, as well as his official obligations.

The solemn ritual of the swearing in ceremony will contribute to the development in the personnel of a high awareness of military duty and loyalty to the great combat traditions of the Bulgarian armed forces and to those who perished in the struggle against fascism, capitalism, and Turkish slavery. The text and provisions of the oath have not been included as an appendix, as was previously the case, but at the beginning of each regulation. This is of great importance in the education of the military personnel in the spirit of patriotism and love for their unit.

The importance of the unit's flag has been particularly emphasized. That is why the term "unit flag" used in the past has been replaced
with the term "Battle Flag of the Military Unit," which reflects its true purpose, distinguishing it from other standard flags.

One of the most important prerequisites for the successful implementation of all tasks facing units and subunits is the reliance of commanders on the party organizations. This stipulation has been further concretized in the new regulations.

The new regulations raise considerably the obligations of officials in units, subunits and garrisons. They have been elaborated for both peace and war times. The obligations of deputy commanders of units and subunits have been formulated in greater detail. They have been entrusted with the organization and qualitative implementation of the training process, the creation of a training-material base, and maintaining it in permanent technical readiness.

The duties of deputy commanders in charge of political affairs, propagandists, and club chiefs of units and subunits have been elaborated and supplemented, and made consistent with the BGP Central Committee Directive on the organizational structure and tasks of political organs in the Bulgarian armed forces.

The duties of the chiefs of the different arms and regimental services, bearing full responsibility for personnel training, have been specified far more completely.

The role and responsibility of staffs for the life and activities of the troops, providing reliable control and maintaining combat readiness, have been enhanced.

The role and significance of garrison commanders in strengthening the discipline have been enhanced. More specifically, they must systematically study the condition of military discipline and sentry duty in the garrison. They must take prompt measures for their strengthening and the prevention of accidents. They must work on upgrading vigilance and the protection of military and state secrets.

A particular role has been assigned to one of the most important problems in peacetime troop life -- sentry duty. In times of peace, no one other than sentries have the right to use arms.

In order to enhance the individual responsibility of every military serviceman for implementation of military duties, the duties of the private (seaman) stipulate that both in peace and war times he is responsible for accurate and prompt implementation of obligations and assignments and for the condition of his entrusted weapon and combat materiel. These stipulations are combined with an important supplement
added to the general obligations of military servicemen. It emphasizes that the military serviceman is personally responsible for the defense of his socialist homeland.

The new regulations refine the rights, duties and responsibilities of the personnel of the 24-hour detail and the procedure for carrying out its duties. It is indicated that the arbitrary abandonment of a post by the sentry is a military crime subject to courtmartial. It has been specified that the sentry shall use his weapon after firing a warning shot.

High military discipline is one of the most important prerequisites for the high combat capability and permanent combat readiness of the troops. Army discipline is particularly important under present-day conditions, since the technical saturation and armament of the troops have increased and since combat requires and exceptional level of organization, coordination of actions, and impeccable execution. The Disciplinary Regulations play a tremendous role in educating the military personnel in the spirit of such necessary qualities. They explain the nature of discipline in the Bulgarian Armed Forces, the obligations of military personnel in obeying the rules and regulations based on the laws of the republic and the military regulations, the ways and means for maintaining and strengthening the discipline, as well as the rights of commanders and chiefs to exercise disciplinary influence on delinquents. The regulations particularly emphasize the fact that military discipline is based on high political conscientiousness. The regulations treat persuasion and coercion as two aspects of a single educational process related to the efforts to upgrade the discipline continually.

The strength of our army lies in the political conscientiousness of the military servicemen and their profound understanding of their patriotic duty and personal responsibility for the defense of our socialist homeland and the moral and political unity of the personnel. The new regulations emphasize the importance of developing in military personnel a communist outlook and constant exactingness on the part of commanders (chiefs) toward their subordinates, combined with respect for their personal dignity and with constant concern for them. Particular attention is being paid to the need to study the individual qualities of the military personnel, to maintain regulation relations among them, and to insure the unification of military collectives.

The introduction of the new army regulations faces all commanders, staffs, political organs and party organizations with a major requirement: above all, the profound study of the regulations by all personnel must be organized. Here particular attention must be paid to the mastering of functional obligations by every official. Individual work is the
basic method for the study of the regulations by officers and sergeants. This must be organized on a planned basis. The most efficient utilization of the allocated time must be secured. Within the deadlines stipulated in the plans for the new school year, reenlisted officers and sergeants must be examined on their knowledge of the new army regulations. It would be expedient for some of the basic regulation stipulations to be studied at commander classes and rallies. Model instruction—methodical training must be offered to officers and sergeants.

The stipulations of the new regulations must be applied in army life uncompromisingly. The training process, service, and life in the armed forces, and the work of administrations, offices and officials must be organized strictly in accordance with their stipulations. Commanders and chiefs at all levels must give a personal example in the precise implementation of bylaws and demand their application and constant firm support of the regulations in their subordinate units and subunits.

On the basis of the new regulations, it is the duty of commanders, staffs, political organs and party organizations to achieve the further strengthening of the military discipline, to improve organizational work and upgrade the quality of combat and political training, thus improving the combat capability and combat readiness of the troops.

Internal Service Regulation

[Sofia ARMEYSKI PREGLED in Bulgarian No 9, 1976 pp 11-14]

[Text] Lt Gen Angel Penkov—The Internal Service Regulation includes essentially new stipulations reflecting the requirements of the BCP concerning the armed forces and the individual soldier.

The text of the military oath and the regulation on the combat flag of the unit have been placed at the beginning of the regulation. This is of basic importance in educating the military personnel in a spirit of patriotism and love for their unit. The military oath must be memorized by the servicemen and its stipulations must be observed accurately.

The term "unit flag" has been changed to "Battle Flag of the Military Unit," thus reflecting its true purpose, distinguishing it from conventional flags. It is with the battle flag of the unit that one engages in battle. It is a symbol of the unit's military honor, valor and glory. It reminds the military personnel of the combat traditions and deserved glory of the unit and of the daily obligations of the personnel in peace and war times. It is the duty of every soldier to defend the flag in battle selflessly and bravely and to prevent its capture by the enemy.
The Internal Service Regulation stipulates that orders must be given, as a rule, according to hierarchy and only under extreme necessity could a senior commander issue an order to a subordinate without informing his immediate superior. The military serviceman must report on the execution of the order both to the commander who has issued it and to his immediate superior.

The activities of military personnel addressing themselves to a commander or to someone with a senior grade have been reformulated. Before answering, they must stand at attention and report their position, military title, and family name. The new regulations also emphasize that all military personnel must always be courteous and restrained in relations among them, and use the polite form of address when communicating on official matters.

The section on "Commanders and Subordinates, Senior and Junior" has been refined.

Off duty and only outside the area occupied by the unit, general, admirals and reenlisted officers and sergeants are allowed to wear civilian clothes; enlisted personnel may wear civilian clothes only on home leave. Bulgarian Army personnel love their uniform which embellishes and disciplines them and obligates them always to provide examples and models of high standards. Our people as well respect and love the uniform. That is why Bulgarian military personnel must wear their military uniform proudly.

Chapter 2 of the regulations emphasizes particularly strongly that the commander of the unit, ship or subunit is the single commander and is personally responsible to the Bulgarian Communist Party and Bulgarian government for the permanent combat and mobilization readiness of his entrusted unit, ship or subunit. He is responsible for combat and political training, education, military discipline, and the political and moral conditions of the personnel, and the condition and preservation of weapons and combat materiel.

The regulations make it incumbent upon every commander to implement firmly and consistently the policy of the BCP and Bulgarian government, to organize and guide the training and education of his subordinates, and to organize and head the socialist competition.

In order to enhance the responsibility and prestige of commanders (chiefs) the duties of all officials have been reviewed and made consistent with contemporary peace and wartime requirements.

The regulations greatly emphasize the study of personnel practical, political and moral qualities by commanders. The commander is not indifferent to individual capabilities or to the type of people with
whom he would go into battle. All chiefs of the various arms and services are responsible for regimental personnel training in the respective skills.

A new system has been adopted for explaining the obligations of officials. It begins with an indication of their responsibilities, followed by the description of who their superiors and subordinates are. Their obligations are listed in a separate item. It is additionally stipulated that the regimental deputy commander is in charge of the organization and qualitative combat training, the creation of material training facilities, and the maintenance of internal order and military discipline in the regiment. As first deputy, in the absence of the regimental commander, he assumes the latter's duties.

The chief of staff as well is considered regimental first deputy commander. He is jointly responsible with the commander for the combat and mobilization readiness of the regiment and for its proper management in peace and war time.

New items have been included on responsibilities and duties of the commander of the separate battalion, the anti-aircraft defense and reconnaissance chiefs, the regimental deputy commander for technical affairs, the company deputy commander and deputy commander for technical affairs (senior technician), and the chiefs of the respective services.

The regulations demand of sergeants and master sergeants knowledge of the materiel and the rules governing the use, preservation and maintenance of weapons and combat and other equipment of the squad (crew, detachment); they must always demand of their subordinates to observe the military discipline and observe daily time schedules. Furthermore, they must always know where their subordinates are and what they are doing.

In peacetime, the private and the seaman are responsible for the precise and prompt implementation of their assignments and for the condition of their individual weapons and entrusted combat and other equipment. They must be profoundly aware of their duty as members of the armed forces and observe sacredly and inviolably the laws of the Bulgarian People's Republic and the stipulations of the military oath.

Specifications have been made on the procedure for the protection of weapons and ammunition in subunits. Thus for example, the regulations stipulate that fire and cold arms and ammunition must be stored in subunits in specially equipped premises or, should such premises be unavailable, in rifle racks permanently watched over by the personnel on sentry duty. The procedure for equipping weapon storage premises,
the sealing of rifle racks, shelves and pistol and ammunition cases and the guarding of their keys has been stipulated.

The regulations include a new item on the procedure for organizing and holding a stock-management day. Every week, the regiment has a stock-management day during which weapons, combat and special equipment, and ammunition are serviced, depots and training facilities are further equipped and improved, barracks are put in order, and others. The general cleaning of all living and nonliving premises usually takes place that day.

Considerable refinements have been introduced also in the "Granting Leave" section. It is stipulated that first-year military personnel may be granted leave after the swearing in ceremony, gradually or simultaneously. No more than 30 percent of a subunit's personnel may be granted leave. The leave is valid only within the garrison perimeter.

The duties of the 24-hour guard detail have been reviewed and refined. The regimental officer of the day is appointed from among the line officers. As a rule, he is a company commander or regimental staff or service officer. Procedures in the sounding of battle alarm, muster and mobilization have been refined.

The regimental officer of the day is responsible for the side arms and ammunition of the regimental staff and service officers. He must accept the arms by amount, number and sets.

The regimental officer of the day must immediately report to the regimental commander all cases of AWOL of enlisted personnel. Through the motor pool, on duty personnel supervises the return of motor vehicles to the pool, reports to the regimental commander of traffic violations, and takes measures for finding and returning late vehicles to the pool.

The chapter on "Internal Service in Depots" stipulates that the following must be installed in the depot: premises for the depot on-duty personnel, a control-technical center, a classroom on traffic safety and instruction of motor vehicle drivers and superiors, cleaning and washing areas, technical servicing and repair areas, and other premises (areas) and necessary living facilities. Motor vehicles are serviced after each use and washing in accordance with the run (preservation). Seasonal services are also provided.

The procedure for appointing motor vehicle seniors has been established. A train senior must be appointed in the transportation of personnel and of explosives or in the case of long runs; each motor vehicle must be commanded by an officer or sergeant as its senior. The senior is
responsible for the proper use of the vehicle (vehicles), for observing
the discipline and safety measures by the personnel in the vehicle
(vehicles), and observance of traffic regulations by the driver (drivers).
Drivers are categorically forbidden to allow anyone else to drive
the vehicle, including the vehicle (vehicles) senior.

The procedure for safekeeping and delivery of ignition keys, vehicle
hatches, depot premises, and depot gates has been formulated; the
obligations of the depot on-duty personnel have been refined. Such
personnel are allowed to release vehicles only on the basis of filled
travel sheets and required driver documents.

The chapter "Characteristics of Internal Service in Troop Billeting
in Training Centers and Camps" has been made consistent with the new
requirements on troops in training centers.

The regulations include a new chapter entitled "Characteristics of the
Internal Service in Troop Transportation," which includes additional
instructions on transportation of troops by air, determines the duties
of the deputy chief of train in charge of political affairs and refines
the obligations of officials and members of the 24-hour patrol.

The chapter "Sounding Battle Alarm and Muster" clearly distinguishes
between the terms "battle alarm" and "muster." It is pointed out that
the alarm is raised only for purposes of preparations for execution
of combat assignments. In the case of a regimental battle alarm, the
entire personnel participate with weapons, ammunition, combat and
special equipment, and various material facilities. A new "muster"
concept has been introduced. Should the "muster" signal be given, units
and subunits may be taken out to training, extinguishing fires and
fighting natural calamities, training the troops for action in the
case of battle alarm, and the solution of other problems. In all cases,
muster is sounded without the sounding of battle alarm, rapidly, in
an organized way, and taking camouflage measures.

Two new items have been added to the "fire prevention" chapter. The
first stipulates that each unit must have a fire prevention plan to be
approved by the unit commander and announced to all the personnel;
the second lists in detail the duties of unit commanders and chiefs
of establishments, training centers, and training grounds in organizing
fire prevention safety. Their responsibility is emphasized in observing
fire safety regulations not only in the sites and forests assigned
to the unit but in other areas where a given unit trains, has fire
practice, and so on.

For purposes of expediency, chapter 3 of the regulations includes the
functional duties of the regimental propagandist and club chief;
Chapter 8 lists the obligations of on-duty personnel in charge of cultural recreation. The functional obligations of the kitchen and mess hall on-duty personnel are combined and assigned to a new official entitled "food block (kitchen, mess hall) on-duty personnel."

The regulations include three new stipulations: "Regulation on the Pennant of the Minister of National Defense of the Bulgarian People's Republic for Bravery and Military Valor," "Logbook of the Company's Weapons," and "List of Model Inscriptions on Premise Doors."

Furthermore, refinements have been made in existing regulations. Thus for example, Appendix 1 -- "Procedure for Taking the Military Oath" -- stipulates that young soldiers and seamen shall take the oath after undergoing basic training and after having mastered the basic duties of the soldier (seaman), but no later than a month and a half from the day of their arrival in the unit. It is further stipulated that the swearing-in ceremony may take place at sites of revolutionary, combat and labor glory, as well as at mass graves of those fallen in the battles for the freedom and independence of our homeland and in the struggle against fascism, capitalism and Turkish slavery.

Appendix 2 -- "Procedure for Awarding Battle Flags and Orders to Units" -- refines the procedure for awarding battle flags, orders and honor titles in the reorganization of units, as well as the procedure for delivery, replacement, or repair of the battle flag.

Appendix 15 -- "Procedure for the Inspector's Examination of Military Personnel" -- stipulates that the inspector's examination of officers shall take place not on the basis of their military titles but their positions, conducted separately for commanders of Platoons, companies, and battalions, or units of equal status. Deputy commanders of companies and battalions must be examined separately from their commanders, while staff officers must be examined separately from subunit officers.

Therefore the new UVS [Internal Service Regulations] meet most completely the requirements of the contemporary development of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. They are a powerful means for maintaining the troops in a state of constant high combat readiness. The study and implementation of stipulations which must be studied by the military personnel is an important task facing all commanders and political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations.

The daily and purposeful interpretation of the new internal service regulations will train the troops in a spirit of faithful and boundless loyalty to the people, the homeland, and the Bulgarian Communist Party.
Garrison and Sentry Duty Regulations

[Sofia ARMEYSKI PREGLED in Bulgarian No 9, 1976 pp 14-17]

[Text] Col Khristo Iliev--Garrison and sentry duty in the armed forces of the Bulgarian People's Republic is based on the military duty and individual responsibility of every military serviceman for strictly observing regulations in the garrison and vigilantly guarding entrusted objects.

The political education of the armed forces personnel, provided by commanders (chiefs), political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations, plays a decisive role in improving garrison and sentry duty.

Everyone knows the great importance of garrison duty to army life. That is why the new regulations pay considerable attention to garrison duty. According to the new regulations, the garrison consists of all military units, and military schools and institutions located, permanently or temporarily, in a settlement or outside it, regardless of their affiliation or tasks. In the stationing of units (subunits) under different affiliations in a military town, by order of the garrison commander, a senior town commander is appointed from the subdivisions, and his duties are specified.

In garrisons where navy units (ships) are stationed, by order of the garrison commander a senior navy commander is appointed, subordinate to the garrison commander on matters of garrison and sentry duties.

The regulations emphasize that the garrison commander must systematically study the condition of the sentry duty and take measures for its improvement and for prevention of sentry duty accidents. He must also approve sentry duty documents in the case of mobilization and check no less than once every month the way the garrison and internal patrols carry out sentry duties and the proper behavior of those detained in the garrison stockade.

The garrison deputy commander for political affairs is entrusted with the organization of political work for strengthening the military discipline in the garrison.

The functional obligations of the garrison deputy chief of rear services have been further expanded and refined. His duties include additionally the submission of a plan for the approval of the garrison commander for the centralized transportation of military freight by unit motor vehicles and control over the organization of firefighting service and maintaining firefighting crews of army units in a state of constant readiness.
The obligations of other garrison officials such as the garrison military commandant, the chief of the military automotive vehicle inspectorate (VAI), the medical service chief, the garrison veterinarian, and others, have been refined and supplemented.

The military commandant of the railway (water) sector and the air field have the right to detain military personnel for gross violations of military discipline in trains, maritime (riverine) and air ships or for the commission of crimes. He must assign without delay patrols to guard transported freight.

According to the new regulations a new position -- senior officer of the military town or army district -- has been introduced. His duties have been listed in greatest detail. The purpose of this is maintenance of high military discipline and order among the military personnel in the area of the military town (army district).

Investigations of arrested personnel have indicated that in some garrisons, stockade chiefs do not record the extent and amount of work done by the prisoners. As a result of this, they work less than 10 hours per day, which lowers the educational importance of the time spent in the stockade. That is why the new regulations make it mandatory for the patrol chief to keep a record of the work done by the detained.

The obligations of the on-duty garrison patrols official and his assistant have been refined as well. In order to strengthen control over the reliable guarding of projects, they must inspect during the night, or, in poor visibility, during the day as well, the combat equipment sites and zones and enter the results of their inspection in the post's record book.

The procedure for patrol on duty report has been amended. In the past, the senior on-duty officer submitted a written report to the garrison commander; according to the new regulations, the sentry duty change record book alone must be submitted.

The heading of the chapter "Patrol Service in the Garrison" has been reworded to read "Patrolling the Garrison," since patrolling is a structural component of garrison service.

The documents stipulating the patrolling procedure (chart, patrol instructions) must reflect the problems related to the organization of the communications among patrols and the administration of the garrison's military commandant and the closest militia posts and voluntary unit headquarters.
The patrol chief has the right to detain and send to the commandant's office military personnel who have arrived in the garrison with a pass valid for another garrison.

In order to prevent cases of unjustified use of weapons (and related accidents), the regulations emphasize that no member of the patrol has the right to threaten with a weapon or fire a warning shot with a view to bringing order. The cases stipulated in the regulations constitute the exception. Further specifications are given on occasions for issuing a remark to military personnel of equal or junior rank for eliminating breaches of uniform wearing and military discipline rules. The regulations also stipulate that military personnel taken to the military commandant's office in an intoxicated state shall sign a protocol when sobered up.

The password regulation has been expanded with instructions to the effect that each patrol shall have its separate password. It has been stipulated that the unit on duty official shall give the password to his assistant only when the patrol is under the orders of the latter.

The regulations pay equal attention to sentry duty. The amendments and supplements in this matter have been directed, above all, to insuring the reliable protection and defense of all military projects, armaments, explosives, ammunition, and combat and other equipment, as well as military property constituting the material base of the armed forces of the Bulgarian People's Republic.

Since anything to be guarded, regardless of its importance, must be guarded only by sentries, the new regulations reflect the stipulations governing guard duty. The purpose of sentry duty has been refined in this connection. It is pointed out that its purpose is to provide the reliable protection and defense of battle flags, depots containing armaments and combat and other equipment, ammunition, explosives, depot territories, and various military and state sites, and the guarding of detained or sentenced individuals located in the stockade or serving in the military correction battalion.

The definition of patrol has been made consistent with the purpose of the patrol service. It has been emphasized that the patrol is an armed subunit given a combat task. The purpose of garrison patrols has been refined. Now they are appointed both for the guarding and defense of all projects. The old regulations stipulated the guarding and defense of military property by temporary patrols only in the case of loading (unloading) at a railway station (port, airport), in the case of fire or natural catastrophe, or else in accompanying special freight hauled by different types of transportation facilities. A proper supplement
has been introduced also in the organization of the reliable protection and defense of military property in other cases or of temporary depots.

Now it is permitted to draw a patrol from different subunits within the same unit, if necessary. This specification makes it possible to set up combined patrols in small units. Patrol recruitment, in this case, is done by one of the subunit commanders and appointed by the unit commander. The rights and obligations of the patrol team have been refined and supplemented.

In addition to the officials, if necessary, vehicle drivers may be also assigned patrol duties. Their obligations have been stipulated. The driver is responsible for maintaining the vehicle in constant readiness and for transporting the patrols without delay. The driver is forbidden to allow other individuals, including his superiors (i.e., the patrol chief and his assistant) to drive the vehicle. The question of guarding patrol premises has also been refined.

The regulations include stipulations refining the method for carrying sentry duty due to the changes that have been made in the protection of sites and the equipment of posts.

The regulations call for adoption of additional safety measures with a view to prevention of breakdowns in weapon handling: weapon loading and unloading must take place in specially equipped sites, mandatorily equipped with a bullet-catching device [kurshumovitel]; before loading, the automatic weapon must be looked over; the firing mechanism must be in a lowered position, and the breach carrier must not be pulled backward any further; no shell must be inserted in the magazine and the safety catch must be on.

The new regulations describe in greater detail one of the basic documents describing the method for protection of sites and sentry duty -- the post deployment system. The additional instruction has been introduced to the effect that internal patrol schedules in a military academy (institute) must be approved by the academy (institute) commander, while those of internal army unit patrols must be approved by the respective immediate superiors. Such concretizing establishes a clear procedure for approving the schedules of all internal patrols.

According to the regulations, patrol commanders, in the case of five or more posts in a site, and commanders of patrols protecting particularly important sites, may be not only officers but reenlisted sergeants; in military schools, regardless of the number of posts, they may be senior students who thus gain the required practical experience.
Should the number of sites guarded by patrols or protected by technical facilities be increased, the patrol commander must immediately assign the corporal of the guard (his assistant) personally to the post should the sentry fail to report on his duty. He must call the patrol "to arms" also should the technical protection facilities emit the proper signal. A review of violations committed by patrol members may take place only within the subunits.

Following return to the subunit (change of guards), the patrol chief must form up the patrol and report on the sentry duty not to the master sergeant but to the company (battery) commander. The patrol then returns its weapons and ammunition under the personal observation of the patrol commander and not of his assistant's.

The old regulations did not stipulate the right of the corporal of the guard to use weapons. However, since cases involving an attack against a post are possible, should the corporal of the guard be present, the new regulation includes the additional stipulation granting such a right to the corporal of the guard.

The item determining the duties of the sentry includes the refinement to the effect that the arbitrary leaving of the post is a military crime. Consequently the individual guilty of such a crime is subject to courtmartial. Furthermore, the question of the superiors to whom the sentry must additionally present arms has been refined.

The sentry must be familiar with the itinerary and movement schedule of the patrol transportation facilities and their identification marks and signals. It has been stipulated that the sentry has a right to use arms after firing a warning shot only should the violator disobey the order "Stop or I shall shoot!" and try to come closer to the post (cross the fence) or try to escape after such an attempt.

The regulations also refine the internal procedure in the patrol. A radio may be listened to only with earphones in guard premises. Resting patrols and the corporal of the guard have the right, at all times, to take off and dry their shoes and footcloths.

The old regulations did not allow the regimental commander or his superior to entrust the inspection of the patrol to their staff officers. The new regulations change this stipulation. They grant the following personnel the right to investigate patrols: individuals assigned by the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense -- for patrols of the various branches of the Bulgarian armed forces; individuals assigned by the commanders of the branches of the armed forces, chiefs of arms and special forces and their deputies, Ministry of National
Defense administration chiefs, commanders of major units and formations -- patrols of their subordinate units; individuals assigned by unit commanders -- internal patrols; individuals assigned by the garrison commander -- garrison and internal patrols within a given garrison. The regulations also emphasize that patrol inspection is entrusted by senior commanders only to individuals well familiar with the service. Individuals assigned to inspect patrols must be properly instructed.

Due to the increase in the number of people who have the right to inspect the patrols, the new regulations stipulate that officers belonging to the same military unit who have received a one-time certificate for the right to inspect the internal patrol may be allowed by the patrol chief to enter its premises and visit the posts without being accompanied by the unit on-duty officer or his assistant.

The obligations of the subunit on-duty officer and of the patrols in guarding and defending sites have been further refined in terms of organizing and carrying out patrol services in separately located radio-engineering and other special subunits. Their procedure of operations in the case of an attack on the guarded sites, fire, natural calamity, or battle alarm signal, has been determined. The regulations list the cases in which patrols are allowed to use their weapons, and the procedure for granting access to combat and other equipment and military property or to the guarded area. The method for inspecting patrols on duty has been refined.

The regulations contain refinements and supplements on features of the organization and carrying of patrol duties in the transportation of troops and military freight and implementation of garrison measures involving participation of troops. It is emphasized that military personnel of units and large units may be asked to participate in demonstrations and meetings within the subunits and the garrison limits.

Arms may be presented only by personnel armed with carbines and automatic weapons with wooden butts. If the order "Present arms!" is given, those armed with automatic weapons with folding butts stand at attention with their weapon against their chest and turn their heads in the proper direction.

The regulations include new chapters on ceremonial light displays, ceremonial posting of sentries in the garrison, and artillery salutes. New signals for sentry posting have been introduced.

The new garrison and sentry duty regulations are an important event in the life of our armed forces. They will contribute to the further
strengthening of the military discipline and order in the garrisons, and to improving the protection of military sites, equipment, and armaments, which is a necessary prerequisite for upgrading the constant combat readiness of the troops.

Disciplinary Regulations

[Sofia ARMEYSKI PREGLED in Bulgarian No 9, 1976 pp 18-20]

[Text] Col Arkadiy Nikolov—The Bulgarian Communist Party is always concerned with strengthening the discipline in the armed forces. This was also reflected in the materials of the 11th party congress.

Discipline in the armed forces of the Bulgarian People's Republic is based on the awareness of all military personnel of their soldierly duty and personal responsibility for defense of the socialist homeland. Whenever military discipline is maintained at the necessary level, it helps the leadership surmount difficulties in combat circumstances. It is the most important condition for high combat capability and constant combat readiness of the troops. The political education of the personnel, carried out by commanders (chiefs), political authorities and party and Komsomol organizations, plays a decisive role in the improvement and strengthening of conscious military discipline.

The Disciplinary Regulations are the basic document regulating problems of discipline and its requirements. The regulations describe the nature of military discipline and the obligations and rights of the military personnel related to its maintenance and strengthening. The types of rewards and disciplinary punishments, the procedure for their application and accounting, and the submission and consideration of requests and complaints are described.

The nature of military discipline is described in point 1 of the new regulations as follows: "Military discipline means the strict and precise observance by all military personnel of the order in the armed forces as stipulated in the laws, military regulations, and orders."

Discipline in the Bulgarian armed forces is based on the profound understanding on the part of the military servicemen of their social duty, their profound beliefs, communist morality, loyalty to the cause of socialism and communism, love for our socialist homeland, and manifestation of proletarian internationalism. Its conscious nature strengthens in the military personnel their will to win. It enhances endurance and activeness in battle and triggers mass heroism. This characteristic is reflected in the introduction to the regulations which reads as follows: "Military discipline in the armed forces of the Bulgarian
People's Republic is based on the high political conscientiousness of the military personnel, their profound understanding of their patriotic duty and international tasks of our people, and their boundless loyalty to the Bulgarian People's Republic, the Communist Party, and the Bulgarian government."

The regulations consider persuasion and force as two aspects of the single process related to the efforts to upgrade discipline continually. It is only through their proper combination that high conscious discipline consistent with the tasks of the Bulgarian armed forces could be established.

The exacting commander must be a good comrade as well. For this reason, he must begin by being critical of himself. That is why the regulations stipulate that the commander (chief) must always give the example to his subordinates in the strict and accurate observance of the laws, the military oath, the regulations, orders, directives and norms of communist morality.

In educational work and in the struggle for high discipline, it is important to prevent on time one or another violation. In this connection the new regulations pay particular attention to the study of the individual qualities of the military personnel, to maintaining proper regulation relations among them, to uniting the military collective, to using its forces for the elimination of the reasons for violations, and to the creation of an attitude of intolerance toward violators of discipline and public order.

The regulations make it incumbent upon military personnel to assist the commander (chief) in restoring military discipline and order, emphasizing individual responsibility for avoiding the implementation of this requirement.

Since education is based, above all, on positive examples, the role of rewards in the struggle for firm observation of regulations should not be underestimated. Such rewards strengthen in the troops faith in their forces, mobilize them for an even more conscientious attitude toward their service, and upgrade individual responsibility for discipline in subunits. At the same time, the examples of the best people mobilized unit and subunit personnel to achieve higher results in training and discipline. That is why the new regulations considerably broaden the range of awards, amend partially those now existing, and stipulate new ones. They also refine the rights of commanders (chiefs) in their use. The new regulations emphasize that every commander and chief must, within the limits of his statutory rights, reward his subordinates for sensible initiative, zeal, exploits, and distinctions in their service. Should his rights be insufficient, he may present distinguished
subordinates for awards by a senior commander. The stipulation that in addition to the rewards stipulated in the regulations commanding officers starting with regimental commander, second rank ship commander, commanders of equal status and superior commanders have the right to present subordinate military personnel for the awarding of orders and medals of the Bulgarian People's Republic, for courage and bravery displayed in carrying out military duties, for excellent results in combat and political training, for excellent mastery of use of new complex combat equipment, model troop leadership, and other important merits to the state and the armed forces is a very important measure in the upbringing of military personnel.

The granting of 24-hour garrison leave, usually not awarded, has been deleted as a reward for enlisted personnel. Practical experience has proved that it did not contribute to the education of the troops and that in a number of cases it created conditions for violations. Yet, the regulations call for granting extraordinary leave to reenlisted privates, seamen, sergeants, and master sergeants during days or hours stipulated by the unit commander in accordance with garrison procedures.

A new type of reward for reenlisted sergeants and master sergeants has been stipulated for sensible initiative, zeal, exploit, or effort in the service: promotion to the next higher rank by a grade higher than the one stipulated in the table of organization for the position held.

Commanders of separate battalions and commanders (chiefs) of units having the disciplinary authority of separate battalion commander, are allowed by the regulations, in addition to their respective position rights, to reward subordinate officers with certificates, valuable gifts, or cash; promote to the rank of corporal (able seamen), enter the names of privates, seamen, sergeants and master sergeants in the honor roll of the unit (ship), or allow short-term leave not to exceed 10 days.

The new regulations include a new section clearly depicting the method for granting rewards. It is stipulated that such rewards are to be announced verbally or by order in formation or at gatherings of military personnel. The announcement of such orders and presentation of the rewards must take place as a rule in ceremonious circumstances. Unquestionably this will positively influence further successes in training and discipline of the entire collective.

The revocation of an imposed punishment is of great educational importance to military personnel. The new regulations clearly stipulate that the commander has the right to revoke a disciplinary punishment only after it has played its educational role and the serviceman has amended his behavior through the model fulfillment of functional duties.
The time periods for revocation of penalties such as deprivation of sergeant and master sergeant rank or demotion in rank and position have been established.

In the new regulations, some types of disciplinary penalties and the rights of commanders (chiefs) to impose them have been amended. According to the regulations the commander (chief) must begin by reminding the serviceman who has violated military discipline or public order of his official duties. Subsequently, if necessary, he must determine the type of penalty within the limits of his disciplinary powers, which in his view would have the greatest educational impact. The regulations stipulate that violations committed by reenlisted sergeants and officers are to be discussed at sergeant and officer meetings. Furthermore, the violators may be tried by an honor comrade court. In such a case commanders (chiefs) are not allowed to impose disciplinary penalties.

The regulations call for a number of additional penalties: for privates and seamen -- strict reprimand; for enlisted sergeants and master sergeants -- deprivation of sergeant and master sergeant rank with transfer to a lower position; for reenlisted sergeants and master sergeants -- demotion by one rank with transfer to a lower position, deprivation of sergeant (master sergeant) rank or transfer to the reserve for the expiration of the term of service. Further specifications have been made concerning the rights of commanders and chiefs to demote in rank and duty enlisted and reenlisted sergeants and master sergeants.

The assignment of "exceptional work detail" has been deleted from the disciplinary penalties imposed on privates and seamen; the disciplinary punishment of "deprivation of garrison leave for a period of time" has been replaced with "deprivation of regular leave." This establishes the clear concepts of regular leave, special leave as reward, and deprivation of regular leave as a measure of disciplinary punishment.

As in the past, the regulations emphasize that the detention of a military serviceman is an extreme measure of influence. The present rights of commanders (chiefs) of applying this measure as penalty have been retained. Senior officers with the rank of colonel or captain first rank, as well as military servicewomen may not be punished with detention.

The old regulation on "time spent by enlisted servicemen in serving the "detention" disciplinary punishment, cumulatively, in excess of 5 days shall not be considered spent in active military service and shall be served subsequently," has been retained. This time must be made up following the discharge of the regular contingent and may not exceed 30 days.
The regulations also refine the points of what military personnel have the right to impose disciplinary penalties and on what occasions.

The regulations require punishments to fit violations. Determining the size of the punishment, it is necessary to take into consideration not only the nature of the delinquency and the circumstances under which it was committed, but also the previous behavior of the culprit, his length of service, and his familiarity with the service.

The new regulations call for increasing the strictness of the disciplinary punishment for actions committed by military personnel during combat duty or in an intoxicated state. The stipulations of the Disciplinary Regulations on the procedure for imposing disciplinary punishment on members of the patrol for violations committed in the course of sentry service have been refined and extended to all officials of the 24-hour patrol, including personnel on combat duty. In such cases a penalty may be imposed only after the changing of the guard or the replacement of the perpetrators by other military personnel. The previous stipulation according to which a military serviceman who has committed a delinquency in an intoxicated state could be subjected to preliminary detention was inaccurate, for the regulations did not stipulate the length of such detention. Now it is stated that if necessary the violator of discipline may be detained until he sober up but for no more than 24 hours, after which a punishment decision must be made.

The new regulations establish more clearly the procedure for announcing disciplinary penalties. It is forbidden to announce the punishment of commanders (chiefs) in the presence of their subordinates. The method for execution of the detention punishment has been refined.

The procedure for accounting for rewards and disciplinary punishments has been amended. It is stipulated, for example, that rewards announced by the commander to the entire personnel shall be entered in the military record of every soldier and in the officer's or sergeant's file. Instructions on means for filing and deadlines for the review of suggestions, petitions and complaints have been made fuller and more specific.

The new disciplinary regulations consist of five chapters rather than fifteen. This makes them more convenient for use by military servicemen in daily life. Other refinements and amendments have been made based on the experience acquired in application of forces regulations.

5003
CSO: 2200
PSYCHOEMOTIONAL RESILIENCE OF PILOTS UNDER STRESS EXAMINED

Sofia ARMEYSKI PREGLED in Bulgarian No 9, 1976 pp 113-116

[Article by Col Dimitur Dimitrov, senior scientific associate, candidate of medical sciences: "Psychoemotional Resilience and Flight Safety"]

[Text] The question of emotional stress is important for flight safety, for in the air force, complicated cases and emergency situations are frequent phenomena. A sudden complication of the meteorological circumstances, errors in piloting techniques, omissions in control and flight backing, breakdowns of aviation equipment, and others, could lead to strong emotional situations, i.e., to emotional stress.

Practical experience has proved that most of the fliers retain their emotional stability in emergency situations. Most of them act calmly, confidently, and expeditiously, thanks to which they are able to prevent severe flight accidents. Pilot Z.V. may be taken as an example in this respect. His airplane engine stopped in the vicinity of a large settlement at night. The situation was such that according to the Instruction, the pilot should have mandatorily abandoned the plane. However, knowing that he was over a settlement and a big plant and that the breakdown of the abandoned airplane could result in human casualties and severe material damages, and guided by a noble feeling of responsibility, he deliberately took the risk and undertook to restart the engine in the air. Even though at a low altitude, he was nevertheless able to prevent a severe flight accident.

This was no isolated phenomenon in our air force. On the contrary, situations in which the pilot must display high emotional stability are quite frequent. In fact, this is a characteristic feature of air force flying, distinguishing it from the work of many other specialists.

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However, there are cases in which, because of confusion and uncertainty, fliers act hastily and with insufficient expediency. Such was the case with pilot P. N. In a night flight, the airplane's generator stopped, and after the power of the battery was exhausted, the piloting-navigation instruments became inoperative. Radio contact with the ground was also lost. This disturbed the flier greatly, as a result of which he was unable to determine the reasons for the failures. His actions were hasty. He was unable to drop the wheel carriage entirely, landed on one wheel, and created prerequisites for a flight accident.

Consequently, in some cases the fliers act calmly and confidently and are able to cope even with the most severe stress situations; in other cases they turn out to be insufficiently trained.

We know that the behavior of a flier under circumstances threatening his life is determined by the interaction of three types of mechanisms: innate, or hereditary behavioral mechanisms (unconditioned reflexes, instincts), mechanisms providing for individual adaptation, i.e., the molding of individual experience (conditioned reflexes, prime signal communications); and mechanisms of mastering sociohistorical experience (superior level reflexes, second-signal connections).

Only the behavior of a person is programmed in the first type mechanisms. In the second and third types, in addition to behavioral capabilities the sociohistorical experience depending on individual mastery has been programmed. These three types of mechanisms are interlinked. Manifestations of inborn or hereditary behavior depend on individual and social experience, the molding of individual human behavior, and inherent behavioral type.

All this shows that the psychoemotional stability of the flier is a complex psychological structure in which the indicated mechanism types interact most closely. A good psychoemotional stability strengthens the ability of the flier to act under situations of emotional stress through his outlook, ideological convictions, and feeling of patriotism.

The importance of the emotional factor in flight safety was proved by the studies made by V. L. Marishchuk with co-authors. They have established that clearly expressed external and emotional manifestations and a drastic lowering of professional efficiency were noted in 13 percent of the fliers exposed to the influence of sufficiently strong emotion-triggering factors. Because of the characteristics of the emotional sphere they have an enhanced emotional excitability. They are more impressionable and have weaker and imbalanced nervous-dynamic processes. Usually the emotional instability of such fliers leads to stressed neurotic conditions and, most frequently, they are restricted and disqualified from flying.
It is obvious that these are individuals unsuited to the flight profession. The task of the psychological selection is to direct them toward other professions in which requirements concerning psychoemotional stability are not so strict.

Our observations have indicated that there are few such fliers in the air force, for some of them drop out at the initial training stage, followed by others subsequently.

This should not lead to the erroneous conclusion that psychoemotional stability of the flier is something invariable, permanent, impossible to change or develop. On the contrary, training and maintaining a good emotional stability is a continuing permanent process requiring a great deal of effort on the part of commanders, instructors, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, and the military collective.

Occasionally, following flight accidents and emergency situations, cases of temporary deviations in the emotional sphere may be noted. We believe that in order to maintain a good psychoemotional stability in the fliers, greater attention should be paid to some basic factors such as professional flying knowledge, firm mastery of the sequence of actions in flight, and of rules governing work with the equipment in the cockpit, the starting and handling of the engine under different systems, and so on, without which the development of good emotional stability would be inconceivable. At the initial training stage, every flier is more or less tense. This condition could be surmounted only by mastering the skill of flying. The experience of champion subunits indicates that it is the best for the flier to be allowed independent flights or be moved into a more complex training stage only after the instructor has become convinced that he has gained good and durable flight habits and skills. Should a new exercise or new piloting element have to be mastered, the preliminary training should be such that the initial independent implementation of the exercise will be successful. "In the opposite case, the possibility of a lasting fixation exists, and the creation of a so-called 'psychological barrier' with a disturbance in confidence and spirit, a hesitancy which can be surmounted later with some difficulty."

The flier must master completely his work with instruments in the cockpit and feel at ease with it. For example, experienced flier L. V., an instructor in flying techniques who has had to fly various series of a modern airplane, does not conceal the need for preliminary training in the cockpit prior to takeoff to accustom himself to the surroundings and for a psychological tune-up.

In the air, should a sudden and unexpected failure of the equipment or other emergency situation develop, the flier develops rather strong
emotional reactions. For this reason, in order to avoid the surprise factor, while still in training, the flier must acquire the necessary skill in handling such cases. This is done, to begin with, in a link trainer and then in a training combat aircraft.

The exaggeration of the difficulty and complexity of a given airplane or of mastering the technique of flying it greatly hinders the development of a good psychoemotional stability. In such cases, it must be explained to the fliers that the desired flight skill may be obtained provided that the necessary desire, persistence and industriousness are present.

All that is required is knowledge of the positive qualities of the airplane and the methods through which a difficult or emergency situation could be handled. In other words, we must promote in the flier the firm conviction that there is no hopeless situation in flight.

Greater attention should be paid to the question of the psychological preparedness of the flier before takeoff. This means total mobilization — physical, emotional and will power — for purposes of carrying out the flight assignment.

We noted a certain tuning and psychological readiness exist in a person before undertaking almost any kind of work. The more difficult, responsible and risky such work may be, the more important the significance of such preliminary concentration becomes. This is manifested most clearly in competing athletes. Sometimes the mental condition plays a greater role than physical endurance and athletic skills.

In the flier, excitement, an enhanced feeling, concentration and mobilization upgrade the physiological and psychological tone, improve the work of the sensory organs and the nervous, hormonal and cardiovascular systems, mobilize the reserves of the body, create optimal conditions for good psychoemotional endurance in flight, and the most correct actions in the case of emergency situations. Conversely, a poor mood substantially reduces the possibilities of the flier and influences his psychoemotional stability. Observations have indicated that even in piloting a link trainer, the accuracy is lowered in the presence of negative emotions and movement coordination is disturbed. The attention wanders, and errors are made in making the necessary motions. That is precisely why it is wrong on the part of commanders to announce punishments directly before flights or address sharp remarks at fliers about to fly. They ignore the fact that in such cases, the mood is spoiled and the attention is drawn away from the flight assignment. In such cases, the internal concentration and mental readiness for the flight drop, and in the final account, the psychoemotional stability of the flier is disturbed.
Shortcomings in preparations of the flights concerning the day or violations in the time breakdown, and so on, have an adverse effect on the psychoemotional stability of the flier. A long waiting period for a flight has a negative effect in this respect. The inevitable stress of mental and physiological functions in cases of long waits at the start exhaust the flier's nervous system and lower his reserves even prior to takeoff.

The psychoemotional stability of the flier in the air and, particularly, in emergency situations is related to and depends a great deal on the activities of the flight commander. Words, commands, and queries influence the flier not only through their content but their form and tone of voice. Even in a routine flight, the flier feels more confident when the flight commander issues his orders calmly and clearly. This becomes even more important in an emergency situation when the emotional stress of the flier is rather high while the perception and logical interpretation of the nature of the orders is hindered.

The individual approach is of great importance in the creation of good emotional stability. Flying practical experience indicates that an approach good for one flier is inadequate for another. The individual approach enables us as a basic principle not only to know and study the fliers but to influence them effectively on an individual basis in the course of their training and upbringing.

Should an individual approach be lacking, no significant successes could be expected in developing a good emotional stability. Thus, for example, no rude reproaches and remarks should be made to a flier who is insufficiently practiced and confident in his own ability should he make a mistake. Mistakes should be analyzed calmly, for at the initial training stage it is rather easy for the flier to lose faith and confidence. Even in the various pressure, and centrifugal tests, breathing oxygen under a higher pressure, and so on, the basic principle is to follow attentively with the help of the remote control recording equipment, the condition of the pulse, respiration, blood pressure, and cardial activities, and should such physiological indicators worsen, the test should be terminated immediately so that the flier will not lose consciousness or develop a rather strong loss of confidence. This could traumatize him mentally and shake his confidence in his own physical endurance and state of health.

The following case could be cited as an example of individual approach: experimental-psychological tests on the ground revealed that flight instructor Zh. Ch. suffered from intensified emotional instability and stress. This was the reason for a discussion of his psychoemotional condition and eventual transfer to another stores division. On the
basis of lengthy observations, good knowledge of the individual—psychological characteristics of the flier, the unit commander suggested that he be kept as an instructor, reasoning that in a test the flier was emotionally less stable, while remaining very diligent and thorough. With such qualities he could fly, being already well familiar with his work as an instructor. Even though with greater efforts, he had been able to master his work and was a good flight instructor. Transferred to do flight work in another unit and under other commanders, he would have to be grounded.

The flying of supersonic aircraft requires high performance of the body, the nervous system in particular. Observations have clearly proved that smoking, misuse of alcohol, and sleeplessness greatly disturb the activities of the nervous system and lower psychoemotional stability. The strict observance of the preflight regimen is not only and merely a disciplinary stipulation but a necessary prerequisite for retaining high work capability without which successful handling of modern flight equipment cannot be achieved.

Rest and normal healthy sleep are particularly important after night or long flights and after flying involving exceptional emotional stress. The more frequently the nerve cells are overstressed and excited, the more they must rest in order to avoid functional disturbances and pathological changes. Sleep is a protective process preserving the nervous system from overexcitement and exhaustion. It is one of the best healing procedures following all types of nervous overstress and emotion. During sleep, the entire nervous system and the body rest. A stock of energy is developed for subsequent efforts. Should sleep be disturbed as a result of nervous overstress, the air force physician must take the necessary measures.

The psychoemotional condition of the flier is also affected by family worries and troubles. Thus, for example, after flier B.B. experienced a severe flight accident in his unit, his wife changed her attitude toward his flying profession. She began to consider it dangerous and risky. Quite frequently, during flight days, she suffered from "nervous fits," demonstratively manifested, requiring emergency medical aid, calming down her concerned child and telephoning her husband. The flier did not conceal the fact that all this prevented him from concentrating on his work, dividing his attention and disturbing his emotional stability.

Of late, a number of articles, lectures, books and even official documents are unnecessarily focusing the attention on the negative sides of flying dangers, high emotional stress, and difficulties. Mention is made of the limit of human capabilities, and so on. This overemphasis of the negative aspects of the profession develops in the flight
personnel, in younger fliers in particular, excessive attention and prejudices. It is true that the work of the flier is difficult and dangerous. However, it is also true that the flight profession is one of the most attractive. Fliers forced to leave the air force for reasons of health develop a yearning and are unable to separate themselves from their profession. They display tremendous energy and persistence to be allowed to fly again.

More than any other activity, flying is linked with positive emotions stimulating the vital forces of the body. It contributes to the mobilization and development of exceptionally valuable qualities such as courage, bravery, feeling of comradeship, social duty, and others. The high responsibility and exceptional complexity of the tasks also determine the respective satisfaction from their successful implementation. Even a certain risk and dangerous situations constitute an attractive aspect which determines the romanticism of flying, and increases the confidence of the flier in his own forces. Awareness of the social significance of one's own activities and the profound respect of the people surrounding the flier justifiably reflect the social assessment of flying. The positive aspects of the flight profession should be used most skillfully in the moral and psychological training of the fliers in order to develop and maintain their high psychoemotional stability which is a guarantee for successful and accident-free flying.

5003
CSO; 2200
PEOPLE'S MILITIA LAW

Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian No 89, 9 Nov 76 pp 1-3

[Ukase No 1677 of the National Assembly on the Publication of the People's Militia Law]

[Text] The People's Militia Law

Chapter 1

General Stipulations

Article 1. (1) The People's Militia maintains public order, protects the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens and socialist organizations, participates actively in the struggle against crime, and assists in the strengthening of socialist legality.

(2) The People's Militia conducts its activities in the interests of the people and relies on the active help of the working people.

Article 2. The main direction in the activities of the People's Militia is to prevent crime and other antisocial actions and to educate the citizens in a spirit of mutual respect, observance of social discipline, and conscientious implementation of the laws.

Article 3. (1) All activities of the People's Militia are based on strict observance of the laws.

(2) The People's Militia personnel must be respectful toward the citizens, respect their honor and dignity.

(3) The People's Militia personnel are responsible for violations of socialist legality in accordance with the law.

Article 4. (1) Any orders issued by the People's Militia within the range of their competence are binding upon officials and citizens.

(2) The state authorities and officials must assist the People's Militia authorities in the implementation of their official assignments.
Article 5. The prosecutor's office supervises the legality of the acts and activities of the People's Militia organs.

Chapter 2

People's Militia Tasks, Rights and Obligations

Article 6. (1) The People's Militia has the following basic tasks:

1. To maintain public order;

2. To defend the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens and socialist organizations;

3. To protect socialist and private property;

4. To protect institutions and economic and other organizations, and individual projects;

5. Within the limits of its competence, to prevent and detect crime and other antisocial actions, and to investigate crime;

6. Together with other state and social authorities and organizations, to prevent antisocial actions on the part of minors and juveniles;

7. To control and guide road traffic within the limits of its competence;

8. Within the limits of its competence, to allow and supervise activities involving explosives, weapons and ammunition, and to control activities involving strong-acting and toxic substances;

9. To insure and control the observance of the passport system;

10. To search for wanted individuals attempting to avoid penal prosecution or defendants who have been sentenced and are evading the serving of a penal term, persons who have disappeared without a trace, or other individuals as stipulated by the law.

(2) The People's Militia may perform other tasks as well, as entrusted to it by law, ukase or legal act issued by the Council of Ministers.

Article 7. The People's Militia engages in a systematic and purposeful effort to prevent crimes and other antisocial actions. It exposes and eliminates the reasons and conditions contributing to their commission, and contributes to upgrading the vigilance of the citizens in the observance of socialist laws.

Article 8. (1) In order to eliminate established reasons and conditions for the commission of crimes or other delinquencies, and to prevent violations of the law in the activities of institutions and economic and
other organizations, the People's Militia authorities supply information to the respective managements or superior authorities.

(2) Managements and superior authorities which have received such communications must review them within one month and inform the People's Militia of the measures adopted.

Article 9. If necessary, the People's Militia organs inform the managements of institutions and economic and other organizations of crimes or other antisocial actions committed, with a view to the adoption of the proper educational and administrative measures.

Article 10. The People's Militia authorities cooperate with the other state authorities and officials, should they be illegally hindered in the implementation of their duties.

Article 11. (1) The People's militia organs must give immediate aid to individuals who are the victims of crimes or accidents, as well as those finding themselves in a helpless condition in public places.

(2) In the event of natural or public catastrophes, the People's Militia organs participate in the rescuing of people and property, organize the protection of unsupervised state, public or private property, and help with the implementation of quarantine measures in the event of epidemics and epizootics.

Article 12. (1) In response to data on crimes or other antisocial actions, the People's Militia authorities must immediately adopt the necessary measures.

(2) Should the People's Militia authorities have reliable information on the danger that a given individual may commit a crime or a gross violation of the public order, they may warn him in writing of his potential liability.

Article 13. (1) The People's Militia authorities engage in operative-investigative and other procedures, and use scientific and technical means to detect and prevent crimes and other legal violations.

(2) In the course of preliminary investigations, only the means of obtaining proof stipulated in the Penal Procedures Code may be used.

Article 14. The People's Militia authorities, when necessary, organize the special protection of institutions and economic and other organizations and their sites on a contractual basis.

Article 15. Should the implementation of their tasks make it necessary, the People's Militia authorities may demand of institutions and economic and other organizations or citizens objects, documents and information, in accordance with the conditions and procedures stipulated by the respective laws.
Article 16. (1) In the course of the implementation of their duties, following a procedure established by the Minister of Internal Affairs, the People's Militia may invite and, in cases stipulated by the law, summon citizens to appear at the units of the People's Militia.

(2) The invitation, or summons, as the case may be, also indicates the purpose of the appearance.

Article 17. Personnel who are officers, sergeants or rank and file in the People's Militia authorities may demand that citizens show their personal passports or other documents to identify themselves, should it be necessary to draw up a citation establishing an administrative violation, should an individual be accused of committing a crime, or should an individual be a witness to a crime or a gross violation of the public order, as well as in the event of an investigation of the observance of passport regulations.

Article 18. (1) At the request of institutions or economic or other organizations, the People's Militia authorities determine the addresses and places of work of individuals, should such institutions or organizations themselves be unable to do so.

(2) The addresses and places of work of individuals may also be determined at the request of citizens, under the conditions and procedures stipulated by the Minister of Internal Affairs.

Article 19. (1) Personnel who are officers, sergeants or rank and file in the People's Militia authorities may enter citizens' residential and other premises in the following cases:

1. In pursuit of, or to search for or capture an individual who has committed a crime or who is hiding from the authorities;

2. To stop a crime or a gross violation of the public order;

3. To give aid in the event of natural or other social catastrophes;

4. To check on an individual subject to a preventive administrative measure, such as a prohibition on leaving his residence during a certain period of the day;

5. To investigate the observance of passport and address regulations, should there be reliable information on their violation.

(2) Citizens' housing and other premises will only be entered during the day, except in cases which will allow of no postponement. In the cases stipulated in point 5 of the preceding paragraph, premises may be entered only during the daytime.
(3) Personnel who are officers, sergeants or rank and file in the People's Militia authorities may enter the premises of institutions and economic and other organizations at all times in the course of the implementation of their assignments.

Article 20. (1) Personnel who are officers, sergeants or rank and file in the People's Militia authorities may use coercion to take to units of the People's Militia or the People's Councils individuals:

1. Whose identity cannot be proved;

2. Who engage in acts of violence or gross violations of the public order or who refuse to heed a verbal warning;

3. Who refuse, without legitimate reason, to present themselves at a unit of the People's Militia after being properly summoned as per Article 16;

4. Who deliberately prevent the People's Militia authorities from fulfilling their obligations;

5. Who bear or use fire or cold arms, or other generally dangerous means, without the proper permission;

6. In all other cases stipulated by the laws.

(2) In the cases stipulated in the preceding paragraph, the People's Militia authorities make the necessary investigations immediately. Subsequently, unless other legal measures have been adopted, the individuals brought to the premises of the People's Militia are released no later than three hours from the time of detention and, as per point 1, immediately following proof of identity, but no later than 24 hours.

(3) In the cases stipulated in paragraph 1, points 2-6, should the individual be a military serviceman, the People's Militia authorities will only report immediately to the military commandant's office, or the commander of the unit in which the individual is serving, or the military prosecutor's office authorities, without detaining the person by force.

Article 21. The People's Militia authorities shall place in sobering premises intoxicated individuals who are unable to control their behavior or have been found in a public place in a helpless condition caused by the use of alcohol.

Article 22. (1) By permission of the prosecutor, the People's Militia organs shall place persons engaging in vagrancy or begging in homes for the temporary housing of adults.

(2) Stays in homes for the temporary housing of adults shall not exceed 30 days, depending on the time required to find employment for such individuals, to place them in boardinghouses or in homes for the disabled or for old people, or to place them under court injunction.
(3) The organization, tasks and activities of homes for the temporary housing of adults shall be settled by a directive issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs, coordinated with the office of the Prosecutor General.

Article 23. (1) The People's Militia authorities may detain citizens in cases and under conditions stipulated in the Penal Procedures Code.

(2) A military serviceman may be detained by the People's Militia authorities only for a crime of a general nature punishable by deprivation of freedom in the case that no military authorities can be found nearby, in the following cases:

1. If caught in the commission of a crime or immediately afterward;

2. If accused of a crime, with existing grounds to presume that the individual will hide or eliminate the evidence of the crime.

(3) In the cases stipulated in the preceding paragraph, the People's Militia authorities must immediately report or deliver the serviceman to the military commandant's office, the commander of the unit in which he is serving, or the military prosecutor's authorities.

Article 24. (1) Personnel who are officers, sergeants or rank and file in the People's Militia authorities may use physical force or, should this fail to produce results, auxiliary facilities, as indicated in the regulation on the application of the law, in the following cases:

1. To put a stop to violent behavior or any other severe violation of the public order;

2. In the case of obvious opposition to a militia request or ban issued in accordance with the implementation of a law;

3. In detaining and accompanying persons under guard, should there be a danger of their escape or an attempt by them on their own or others' lives;

4. In assisting other state authorities or officials illegally prevented from fulfilling their obligations.

(2) The means used, under the stipulations of the preceding paragraph, must be consistent with the nature and severity of the violation and the resistance offered.

(3) The use of physical force and auxiliary means must be interrupted immediately, once the objective has been achieved.

Article 25. (1) In implementing their obligations, personnel who are officers, sergeants or rank and file in the People's Militia authorities may use their regulation weapons in the following cases:
1. In the unavoidable need for defense and in cases of extreme necessity, should the prerequisites stipulated in the Penal Code exist;

2. As a final measure for detaining an individual who has committed a crime of great social danger and has refused to surrender after being so requested, to abandon his place of concealment, or who is using arms to resist;

3. As an extreme measure, after a warning, to prevent the flight of an individual who has been properly detained for the commission of a crime;

4. As an extreme measure against an individual who either refuses to stop or attempts to flee in the area of the state border, following a demand that he halt.

(2) In the case of minors or juveniles and pregnant women, weapons may be used only in the event of unavoidable need for defense or armed resistance.

(3) In the use of weapons, the personnel of the People's Militia must, if possible, safeguard the life of the individual against whom they are acting. In particular, they must avoid endangering the lives of other individuals. They must give aid to the wounded.

Article 26. If necessary the People's Militia authorities:

1. Shall register those who have committed crimes of a general nature and individuals subject to preventive administrative measures;

2. Shall fingerprint and photograph individuals who have committed or have been shown to have committed a deliberate crime of a general nature representing a great social danger or with a likelihood of recurrence.

Article 27. In the implementation of important and urgent official assignments, the personnel who are officers, sergeants or rank and file in the People's Militia authorities may use, free of charge, state, cooperative, or public transportation and communications facilities, for which purpose they shall issue a document, as well as private transportation and communications facilities, against payment for the expenditures incurred.

Chapter 3

Organization, Personnel and Material Support of the People's Militia

Article 28. (1) The People's Militia falls within the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is headed by the Minister of Internal Affairs.

(2) The immediate leadership of the militia is provided by the People's Militia Director.
Article 29. (1) The People's Militia units shall be set up on the basis of the territorial principle within the system of the respective okrug and rayon Ministry of Internal Affairs administrations.

(2) For some separate activities of the People's Militia, autonomous territorial or functional units directly subordinate to the People's Militia Directorate may be created.

Article 30. (1) The People's Militia shall be subdivided into:

1. General militia carrying out its assignments over the entire territory of the Bulgarian People's Republic;

2. Municipal militia carrying out its assignments in the territory of the corresponding municipality;

3. Departmental militia protecting the sites entrusted to it and securing public order within them.

(2) The municipal militia shall be maintained by the respective People's Councils, while the departmental militia shall be maintained by the respective institutions and economic or other organizations.

Article 31. (1) If necessary in order to protect institutions or economic or other organizations and individual sites to which no departmental militia has been assigned, the respective managers shall organize departmental protection by guards, assisted and supervised by the People's Militia. Such guards may or may not possess arms.

(2) Should a manager fail to take steps to organize the necessary departmental guard protection, the chief of the respective People's Militia unit shall submit the matter to the superior authority.

Article 32. (1) The People's Militia consists of officers, sergeants and rank and file, as well as administrative-technical and auxiliary personnel.

(2) Employees of the People's Militia may be Bulgarian citizens capable of performing assignments on the basis of proper business and political qualifications, education, training and health conditions.

(3) Officers, sergeants, and rank and file members of the People's Militia personnel may be appointed or dismissed, and dismissal orders may be appealed, in accordance with a procedure stipulated by the Council of Ministers.

(4) Officers, sergeant and rank and file personnel may not leave the People's Militia voluntarily prior to serving at least five years; graduates of the higher or secondary militia school must serve at least 10 years.
(5) On entering the service, officers, sergeants and rank and file personnel shall swear an oath, the text of which shall be approved by the State Council.

Article 33. (1) The People's Militia personnel who are officers, sergeants or members of the rank and file shall have the following ranks:

1. Rank and file: militia private and militia corporal;

2. Sergeants: militia junior sergeant, militia sergeant, militia senior sergeant and militia master sergeant;

3. Officer corps:

   a. Junior officers: militia second lieutenant, militia lieutenant, militia senior lieutenant and militia captain;

   b. Senior officers: militia major, militia lieutenant colonel and militia colonel;

   c. Superior officers: militia major general, militia lieutenant general and militia colonel general.

(2) The ranks stipulated in points 1 and 2 of the preceding paragraph shall be awarded to People's Militia students and cadets as well.

Article 34. (1) The ranks of junior and senior officers shall be awarded by the Minister of Internal Affairs; superior officers' ranks shall be awarded by the State Council, on the proposal of the Council of Ministers.

(2) The ranks of the rank and file and sergeants shall be awarded by the authorities stipulated in the regulation on the application of the law.

(3) Members of the rank and file, sergeants and officers may be demoted by the rank-awarding authority for gross disciplinary violations.

Article 35. (1) The officers, sergeants and members of the rank and file in the People's Militia personnel have the right to:

1. Thirty calendar days of paid annual leave;

2. Additional paid annual leave of 15 calendar days, after 20 or more years of service in the People's Militia, the armed forces or services of equivalent status;

3. Paid sick leave of up to one year, which may be extended to two years by the Minister of Internal Affairs, based on the conclusions of the medical commission.
(2) In the course of their paid sick leave, personnel shall receive full salary, and they may not be dismissed unless sentenced for a crime of a general nature incompatible with their service.

(3) In addition to leaves as per paragraph 1, People's Militia personnel who are officers, sergeants or members of the rank and file have a right to other types of leaves, as stipulated for workers and employees.

Article 36. (1) Personnel who are officers, sergeants or members of the rank and file may be dismissed from the People's Militia:

1. At the age of 55, for men, and 50 for women;
2. For health reasons;
3. For personal reasons;
4. By order: retirement, personnel reduction, transfer to elective positions or because proper employment is impossible;
5. On a disciplinary basis: for a crime of a general nature incompatible with their service, or for gross violations of service discipline.

(2) Should a dismissal be deemed erroneous and should it be rescinded, the official shall receive a monetary compensation for the entire period of the dismissal, on the basis of the last gross monthly wage; if he has been employed, he will receive the differential.

(3) The stipulations of the preceding paragraph shall also apply in the event of removal from duty on the basis of the Penal Procedures Code, if the individual removed is not criminally prosecuted, if the charges have been dropped, or if he has been declared innocent.

Article 37. (1) In dismissal as per Article 36, paragraph 1, points 1-4, or for disability occurring in the course or in connection with the performance of official duties, the officer, sergeant or member of the rank and file in the People's Militia shall receive a one-time monetary compensation.

(2) A one-time monetary compensation shall also be paid to the family of any officer, sergeant or member of the rank and file in the People's Militia who has died during or in connection with the implementation of official duties.

(3) A one-time grant will be awarded to officers, sergeants and members of the rank and file in the People's Militia dismissed for reasons of health, but with no right to disability pensions because of insufficient length of service. If it has not been possible to find employment for such a person, this grant will be paid along with the compensation as per paragraph 1.
(4) The occasions, amounts, conditions and procedures for the granting of monetary compensation and aid as per the preceding paragraphs shall be determined by the Council of Ministers.

Article 38. (1) The stipulations of the Labor Code shall apply in matters related to the labor-legal status of officers, sergeants and members of the rank and file in the People's Militia for which this chapter does not provide.

(2) The labor-legal status of the administrative-technical and auxiliary People's Militia personnel shall be established on the basis of the Labor Code.

Chapter 4

Preventive-Administrative Measures

Article 39. (1) In order to prevent crimes and other antisocial actions, the People's Militia authorities may, in particularly important cases, implement the following preventive-administrative measures:

1. Ban on leaving the place of residence, or in the case of individuals with no permanent residence, a ban on leaving a specific settlement for a period of no more than six months;

2. Placement under administrative supervision for no more than six months.

(2) Placement under administrative supervision covers the use of one or more of the following measures: ban on visiting certain settlements, leaving the residence during certain hours of the day, visiting some parts of the settlement or some public establishments, and compulsory reporting, within a stipulated time, to the closest People's Militia unit.

(3) Preventive-administrative measures are applied to:

1. Individuals sentenced for a crime against the People's Republic;

2. Recidivists sentenced for deliberate crimes against individuals or socialist or private property, for the forgery of documents and money, for certain types of smuggling and foreign-currency crimes, for the use of force or threat of force, and for resisting the authorities, as well as for hooliganism;

3. Vagrants or individuals engaging in begging or avoiding socially useful work;

4. Individuals leading a systematically immoral life;

5. Individuals engaging in antisocial actions which are a threat to the security of the country.
(4) For individuals as described in points 1-4 in the preceding paragraph, preventive-administrative measures may be applied only when actions representing a threat to public order or the security of the country are involved.

(5) One or more preventive-administrative measures may be applied to a given individual.

(6) Preventive-administrative measures may not be applied to individuals under 18 years of age.

Article 40. (1) Preventive-administrative measures shall be implemented on the basis of a justified order, to be issued as follows:

1. As per Article 39, paragraph 1, point 1, by the Minister of Internal Affairs;

2. As per Article 39, paragraph 1, point 2, by the chief of the okrug administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

(2) The order calling for the implementation of a preventive-administrative measure may be appealed administratively or through the courts, in accordance with the Law on Administrative Procedures.

(3) The order calling for the implementation of a preventive-administrative measure shall be subject to immediate execution, unless otherwise stipulated by the issuing authority.

Article 41. With good behavior, the term of a preventive-administrative measure may be reduced, or the measure rescinded, by the implementing authority.

Article 42. A directive shall be issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs, coordinated with the Prosecutor-General, on the application of Articles 39-41.

Chapter 5

Interaction Between the People's Militia, Other State Organs and the Public

Article 43. In the struggle against crime and encroachments on socialist property, and in the course of maintaining public order, the People's Militia shall coordinate its work with the people's councils, prosecutors' offices, courts, state and people's control and financial control authorities, as well as the other state authorities.

Article 44. The People's Militia shall work in close interaction with Republic authorities and organizations in the struggle against idleness, alcoholism and moral slackness, and shall give such authorities active aid in upgrading the effectiveness of public control and in the education of the working people in the spirit of law observance.
Article 45. In the course of its activities, the People's Militia shall rely on the active aid of the heads of institutions and economic organizations, labor collectives, public organizations, voluntary working people's units and the citizens.

Article 46. The People's Militia shall implement joint measures with the public organs and organizations to intensify the educational impact of the social environment, to eliminate conditions contributing to the commission of crimes and other antisocial actions, and to create an atmosphere of intolerance of those who violate socialist legality.

Article 47. (1) In their activities in the maintenance of public order and in the campaign against immoral actions, idleness and antisocial actions by minors and juveniles, as well as the battle against social and natural catastrophes, the territorial units of the People's Militia shall be subordinate to the respective people's councils, and their executive committees as well. They will execute and organize the implementation of the decisions of the people's councils and their executive committees on such matters.

(2) The territorial units of the People's Militia will report on their activities periodically, as per the preceding paragraph, at people's council sessions and to their executive committees.

(3) The obshtina militia shall report on its activities periodically to the respective people's council, while the departmental militia shall report to the management of the respective institution or economic or other organization.

Article 48. (1) In the course of their activities, the People's Militia units may recruit citizens for voluntary cooperation and present them with moral and material awards and rewards, under the conditions and on the basis of the procedures stipulated in orders issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs, coordinated with the Minister of Finance.

(2) Should a citizen lose his life in assisting the People's Militia authorities, regardless of whether or not he had been recruited for the purpose as per the preceding paragraph, his family shall be awarded a one-time grant in an amount to be determined by the Council of Ministers.

Chapter 6

Administrative-Penal Stipulations

Article 49. The head of any institution or economic or other organization who fails to fulfill his obligations as per Article 8, paragraph 2, shall be fined between 20 and 200 leva.

Article 50. Anyone who fails to implement or violates a preventive-administrative measure, as stipulated in Article 39, shall be fined in
an amount not to exceed 150 leva, unless said individual is liable for a more severe punishment.

Article 51. Anyone who, in accordance with the provisions of Article 27, and without legitimate reason, fails to make transportation or communications facilities available to an official of the People's Militia shall be fined between 10 and 100 leva.

Article 52. Anyone who fails to report to a unit of the People's Militia, without legitimate reason, after having been summoned as per Article 16, shall be fined in an amount not to exceed 40 leva.

Article 53. Individuals guilty of violating the present law and the ordinances issued on the basis thereof shall be fined in amounts not to exceed 20 leva in any instance, unless such an individual is subject to another penalty.

Article 54. (1) Violations will be established on the basis of citations drawn up by the People's Militia authorities.

(2) Penal decrees shall be issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs or his official representatives.

(3) The establishment of violations and the promulgation of, appeal against and execution of penal decrees shall be based on the procedures stipulated in the Law on Administrative Violations and Penalties.

Article 55. (1) In the event of obviously minor violations, as per Articles 50-53, which are established in the course of their commission, the People's Militia authorities shall levy a fine not in excess of five leva on the spot, against which payment a receipt will be issued.

(2) Fines not exceeding five leva may be imposed and collected as per the preceding paragraph. However, such fines may not exceed the amounts stipulated in the pertinent ordinance, again in the event of obviously minor violations of the rules governing the maintenance of public order.

Additional Stipulations

Item 1. (1) The stipulations of Articles 19 and 27 shall not apply to official and housing premises and transportation and communications facilities of foreign missions or physical individuals granted immunity from the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian People's Republic.

(2) The stipulations of Articles 16, 20-26 and 39 shall not apply to the personnel of foreign missions and members of their families enjoying immunity from the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian People's Republic.
Concluding Stipulations


Item 3. Escorts, as stipulated in Ukase No 490 of 2 December 1961 and other legal documents pertaining to the People's Militia Ukase, in terms of the supervisory-line personnel of the Prisons Department of the Ministry of Justice and its branches, shall be considered escorts in terms of the present law.

Item 4. The Council of Ministers shall approve a regulation on the application of the present law.

Item 5. The implementation of this law shall be entrusted to the Minister of Internal Affairs.

The present law was passed by the Seventh National Assembly, Second Session, Third Sitting, held on 29 October 1976, and was sealed with the state seal.

Chairman of the National Assembly of the Bulgarian People's Republic, Dr. Vl. Botev.

5003
CSO: 2200
'TVORBA's Annual Round-Robin Discussion with Top Officials

Prague TVORBA in Czech Nos 41-42, 6, 13 Oct 76

[Discussion with Alois Indra et al: "To Learn From the People, To Teach the People"]

[No 41, 6 Oct 76 pp 3-5]

[Text] We have already reported to our readers that a discussion was held recently in our editorial office, on some of the experience with the work of the representative bodies and on the preparations for the coming general elections. We welcomed to the tape recorder in our conference room four top officials: Comrade Alois Indra, a member of the CPCZ Central Committee's Presidium and chairman of the Federal Assembly; Comrade Zdenek Vavra, chairman of the South Moravia Kraj National Committee; Comrade Josef Steinz, chairman of the Mlada Boleslav Okres National Committee; and Comrade Vladimir Cermak, chairman of the Neratovice Municipal National Committee. We promised our readers that in one of the coming issues of TVORBA we would publish the transcript of this discussion. Today we have an opportunity to make good on our promise.

TVORBA: On any significant occasion we turn our attention not only to the present tasks and future plans but also to the work performed and to the relatively more distant past. Such an occasion at present is provided by the coming elections to the representative bodies. It is not by accident that our slogan in the election campaign is "More Work for the Republic." This was the slogan under which the Communists went to the polls in the first general elections after the liberation of our country by the Soviet Army. Although 30 years have elapsed since then, the thought behind the mentioned slogan is timely even today. We would be interested to hear what other experience with the Communists' political influence during elections you would like to recall in this context.

Cermak: First a few words about the slogan you just mentioned. I, too, know this slogan intimately from my past practice. It is by no means merely history. If I look back on the past 5 years, in the period after the 14th CPCZ Congress there are many similar features that bring to mind the policy of the Communist Party and the social atmosphere after 1945 and during the preparations for the first postwar elections. In both cases we have been
or are being guided by practice proven by the fact that the most effective way in which Communists can influence the consciousness of other citizens is the party member's personal example and the unity of his words and deeds. Without this basic prerequisite we could not imagine in our city the fulfillment of the National Front's demanding election program, which we are now evaluating at citizens' rallies. The results we have achieved are unquestionably the work of the overwhelming majority of our Neratovice residents. But specifically the Communists were the ones who were the most active, who by their enthusiasm and desire to help their city inspired also the other residents and the entire National Front organization. I appreciate highly their consistent efforts to achieve the approved objectives, their emphasis on continuous control, and the entire organizing work they performed in their spare time.

Vavra: I, too, believe that the slogan the Czechoslovak Communists used 30 years ago is just as timely under the present conditions as it was after our country's liberation. Of course, I do not want to make a perfunctory comparison. Despite all the peripeties of history that we witnessed or actively participated in, today--thanks to the work performed--the economic, political, social and cultural conditions under which we are preparing for this year's general elections are much more favorable. This is why we in South Moravia Kraj have been able to use the slogan "More Work for the Republic" on a qualitatively higher level, to further intensify the activity of every party member and candidate for membership.

It is not by accident that our CPCZ kraj committee adopted a principle which can be expressed in these words: "A concrete task for every Communist in the elections to the representative bodies." I could, of course, give specific examples of the experience that we have gained in this manner. But the purpose of this discussion is not the listing of good examples. In general it can now be said that the Communists in particular are heading the election campaign. In the agitation centers, in general political work or in the fulfillment of production and other tasks, we find everywhere party members or candidates for membership who are performing their assumed duties successfully. I do not have only individuals in mind. The CPCZ South Moravia Kraj Committee emphasized during the preparations for the general elections that the key to the success of the Communists' political work was primarily that within its own competence every party collective, and hence also every party organization, must be an agitator, in the widest sense of this word. I think you will agree that this is an idea which will retain its significance also after the election campaign.

Steinz: Certainly we all concur with this conclusion. The conditions that we have at present for our entire work enable us to develop further and to intensify the idea that the Czechoslovak Communists first advanced 30 years ago. The 15th CPCZ Congress expressed this fact the most concretely when it emphasized that one of the foremost tasks of every party organ and organization was to win every citizen and every organization of the National Front for actively realizing the conclusions that were oriented on the further development of socialist society. During the past 5 years, great values were created also in our okres, and we had not anticipated some of them even at
the beginning of the Fifth Five-Year Plan. Today we see that it will be possible to do even more, although the resources at our disposal are limited, for understandable reasons. Take as an example the self-help drive for municipal and community improvements. In its investment part we will have to proceed very circumspectly. But if we consider everything else that belongs in this drive, we see that here the possibilities of the national committees are practically unlimited. Specifically here it will be possible to build very worthwhile projects, even though they will not be, say, a cultural home or some other building that would be too costly under the given conditions. Improvement of the living environment, the expansion and maintenance of lawns and parks, the construction of stores, the pooling of resources to build kindergartens and day nurseries—all these and many other opportunities exist also under the present five-year plan. Much depends particularly on us Communists how we will direct this work in the coming period, how we gain the support of other citizens through our personal example.

Indra: We are discussing questions that are very important from the viewpoint of society as a whole. The national committees, on whose work our discussion is concentrated, influence the entire life of practically every citizen. Their competence extends to everything. This can be demonstrated on the authority of the national committees in relation to the centrally managed organizations. But before we turn to other questions, allow me a personal comment.

When at various meetings we begin to discuss what it was like 30 years ago, I am saddened somewhat by the fact that it was "so long ago," that I am no longer as young as I was then. On the other hand, a person rejoices when he considers the enormous work done since then by our Communist Party and, under its leadership, by the majority of our people. I am firmly convinced that we have nothing to be ashamed of, that the work in question—allow me this "exaggeration"—will be recorded in golden letters in the history of our entire country.

But let us return to your original question, to the timely significance of the very effective slogan under which our party went to the polls in 1946, in the first postwar general elections. All the elections since then differed from one another, according to the historically conditioned social atmosphere, and according to the specific tasks that confronted our entire country in the given period. The employed slogans also differed accordingly. The essence of the slogan "More Work for the Republic"—this was the key slogan of the CPCZ in the 1946 elections—remained permanently valid because it sums up succinctly the very essence of Communist policy. Specifically the essence of this policy is the CPCZ's constant concern for the development of our state, its economy, culture and politics. The purpose of this concern reduces to one thing: care for the welfare of the people, for the ever-fuller material and intellectual life of the individual and of society as a whole.

All of us at this table belong practically to the same generation. Therefore we probably remember how nervously our opponents reacted to our election slogan. In Bohemia and Moravia our opponents were primarily the National
Socialists and the Populists, respectively their leaders who acted in conflict with the interests of their regular members. Already then they abandoned fairly ostentatiously the National Front's platform, hampered or sabotaged the fulfillment of the government's Kosice program. They clearly recognized that our slogan was a great threat to their reactionary plans, because we not only voiced this slogan but all of us acted according to it. I believe every one of us gladly recalls the joint brigades in which we participated at that time, and the drives to which we invited also the other citizens. In comparison with the mere promises with which the reactionary politicians masked their real intentions, this work represented an enormous difference that was evident at first glance. The contention of our opponents that this was merely "Communist demagoguery" did not help them, as this was confirmed unambiguously by the first postwar elections' outcome.

In what sense is the mentioned slogan timely even today? First allow me what might seem to be a digression: Even today we cannot avoid a certain comparison, one that sometimes our very opponents force upon us. I have in mind a comparison of the election campaigns in the socialist and the bourgeois countries. We indeed have ample opportunity for such a comparison. Parliamentary elections were held in Italy, Portugal, Sweden and in the Federal Republic of Germany. The campaigns for the presidential elections are now taking place in the United States. Among the socialist countries, elections were held in Bulgaria, and elections in the German Democratic Republic will precede our general elections. Then what is the difference?

A person perusing the bourgeois press gains the outward impression that entire society is stricken with some sort of political fever. Closer examination reveals who is primarily stricken with this fever: the political power brokers, political managers, certain commentators and columnists. But the wide working masses have different worries. We cannot contend that in our country political emotions do not rise before the elections. But their content and form are entirely different. This is necessarily so because also the content and objective of our politics are different. In Czechoslovakia, too, the elections are a sort of political harvest, the harvesting of everything that we created during the past 5 years, in all areas of society's life. If this harvest is to produce a good yield, then we do not have to resort to demagogical attractions and to the manipulation of public opinion, as this is being done in practice by bourgeois politicians. The requirement of a very sound and realistic presentation that reflects the actual situation and the possibilities that will exist in the coming period applies to all forms of political influence: to representatives at all levels, to candidates of the National Front, to agitators and propagandists, to all officials and the news media. The conditions for demagoguery and irresponsible promises do not exist in our country: anyone attempting to use such "methods" under the conditions of constant contact with the electorate, and of constant public control, would soon be exposed and condemned, morally and politically.

A sound and realistic assessment of the situation thus means the following: to note the favorable results, not to resort to promising everybody everything, to notice and solve the problems in due time, to discuss the
problems with the people, and to listen to their views and comments. I think it is correct to say that public meetings, particularly before elections, are an important tribunal for the citizens' participation in the management and administration of the state. During the election campaign we will not have to hide somewhere in the corner at the public meetings, because we certainly will not appear there empty-handed. As the 15th CPCZ Congress emphasized, the results that are evident to anyone willing to see them will speak for us. Therefore let us not forget to demonstrate on facts that these results are our common success, the harvest that can be attributed equally to sound policy and to the active support with which the Communists' program was met among the widest masses of our citizens. During the past 5 years we again verified that work will remain the basis of our society's prosperity. In this sense the slogan of the CPCZ "More Work for the Republic" remains timely. It is worthwhile to put our whole mind, whole strength and whole heart into this work.

Allow me one more comment. All of you here are aware of the great role that the mass media are playing in present-day society. I nevertheless wish to strongly emphasize the immense, and in many respects decisive, importance of personal contacts between Communists and National Front officials on the one hand, and the voters on the other hand. Specifically this work is the most effective, for a variety of reasons. Of course, also in this respect we must rid ourselves of the remnants of formalism: for example, it will not do at all if our agitators visit households merely to invite the citizens to public meetings or to the polls. It is far more important to utilize these visits for a discussion of our policy, and of the citizens' own participation in useful public work. Here again there is much to learn from the Communists' influence on the citizens' consciousness in the postwar period.

TVORBA: Comrade Indra's answer actually brings us to the second question of our discussion. It concerns that "harvest" of performed work, in the sense of the functioning of the representative bodies during the term of office that is now ending. What basic trends that were characteristic of their work do you regard as the most significant? In your opinion, what must now be developed further, and what problems will have to be solved and eliminated gradually? We are aware, of course, that also the representative bodies in the two national republics gained much valuable experience during the term of office now ending, and therefore we intend to discuss soon also their work on the pages of TVORBA.

Cermak: On the basis of my personal knowledge and of information received from other sources, there is one thing that I would like to emphasize first of all: during the entire period since 1971, in our city we have essentially succeeded in maintaining the activity of the elected representatives and of the national committee's aktiv. At the same time, very close cooperation was established between local government and the industrial enterprises. In Neratovice this means first of all the Spolana National Enterprise. (The readers of TVORBA already know something about this, from a report that we published a few weeks ago.) A third result that I appreciate very highly is the establishment of informal cooperation between the national committee and the National Front's organs and organizations. This has broadened
immensely the "action radius" of local government's influence, in the sense that for its objectives local government was able to gain, through the social organizations, a fairly large circle of people. You also ask what are the problems that we have been unable to solve so far. One such problem, in my opinion, concerns the commissions of the national committees. Some commissions rely too much on the work of the national committee's apparatus, on its standpoints, recommendations and reports that are submitted for consideration. In this context I recall something that I learned on one of my trips to the Soviet Union. There great emphasis is placed on the greater initiative and more-independent work of the individual commissions. We will bear the Soviet experience in mind, because we wish to resolve this problem during the next term of office.

Steinz: I agree with Comrade Cermak. In Mlada Boleslav we are asking ourselves also further questions. For example, the level of work depends on the level of assistance that the okres national committee provides for local government officials in small localities; they usually perform their official duties after regular work. Here it will really be necessary to exert more effort during the coming term of office, to prevent a gradual decline in the activity of these officials. We also expect that this year a considerable number of young people will be elected as representatives to the national committees. This is a very favorable phenomenon, but it also indicates what great demands will be placed on us during the next term of office. Whether we like it or not when they say that we are more experienced, the fact remains that eventually we, too, will kick the bucket.

Indra: Of course we don't like it, but such is life.

Steinz: Certainly, but our responsibility will be the greater during the next term. We will have to devote attention to the young people, to teach them, and we must not be afraid to entrust them with responsibilities. Together with our other duties, we will have to devote every effort to this task after the elections.

And there is one more experience that I wish to mention. I greatly appreciate our citizens' interest in the public sessions of the national committees. This interest is greater than ever before. We are not entirely satisfied with the attendance at the sessions of the okres national committee. But when 200 to 300 citizens, in addition to the representatives, appear at a session of the Mlada Boleslav Municipal National Committee, this is indisputable evidence of the citizens' interest in local government. It depends on us how we are able to utilize this "political capital."

Vavra: Reflecting on the question asked, I come to the conclusion that the most important trend since 1971 has been a rise in the authority of the local-government organs, and the citizens' greater active interest in the work of these organs. Simultaneously this is concrete proof of the great support that the present policy of the Communist Party enjoys among the citizens. The National Front's election programs that we fulfilled during the past 5 years actually were nothing more than the conclusions of the 14th party congress adapted to the specific conditions of the individual krajs,
Okreses, towns and communities. Anyone who has been working in national committees for some time must admit that the activity of the people who realized the election programs is unprecedented in the history of our country. In South Moravia Kraj alone, thanks to this activity, values totaling roughly 8.0 billion korunas were created since the last election. This in itself, of course, is not enough. Much remains to be done, for example, in the area of ideological and political activity and in organizing work. Among other things, we wish to continue the good experience that we gained with the discussions between national committees and youths. More than 250,000 boys and girls participated in these discussions last year. We do not read boring reports here. These are actual discussions: we listen to the questions and comments, and then answer them.

I would like to mention also what is still bothering us, what we are dissatisfied with and want to solve gradually. This is the process of upgrading the work of the national committees' organs and apparatus.

Indra: Especially of the apparatus!

Vavra: I agree. This applies to all levels of the national committees, including also the kraj national committee. Here I have in mind particularly the level of realizing the sociopolitical mission of the national committee organs, which consists of gaining the citizens' interest to participate in the administration of public affairs. You know what I mean. Sometimes we, too, are bothered by the bureaucratic approach of some national committee workers to the needs of the people. For example, I have attempted to analyze the citizens' complaints to the national committees. The number of complaints is rising. In my opinion, this in itself is a favorable phenomenon, because it proves that the people have confidence in the national committee's organs. But I am very annoyed by the fact that a relatively large number of complaints concerns shortcomings in the work of organizations managed by national committees, and in the work of their apparatus. I ask myself why must there be such complaints at all. In sum it appears that in the work of the national committees' executive apparatus there are considerable shortcomings. The causes of these shortcomings vary: sometimes a lack of professional training, at other times political incompetence, or occasionally even character defects. We do not want the originators of these problems to hide behind the authority of an elected organ of local government and state administration. Therefore we will take stricter action in cases when the complaints are justified.

In the same way as comrades Cermak and Steinz have said, in the coming period we, too, will devote due attention to ideological and political activity and to organizing work with the aktiv of the national committees. I have in mind not only the commissions of the national committees but also the councils for citizens' affairs, the citizens' committees, and house committees. Consider, for example, the question of large settlements. Often we really cannot speak of systematic political work in such settlements. Of course, it is not enough for us merely to know the problems, we must also actively solve and effectively prevent them. Concrete results are the sole criterion of the efficiency of our work. We must continue to subordinate primarily
to this aspect all the forms and methods of political influencing, and also
the proposals that we are preparing for the new term of office.

Indra: We are concentrating today primarily on the questions related to the
work of the national committees to date. Their activity was objectively
evaluated and praised by the 15th CPCZ Congress, and we could hardly "in-
vent" a more accurate evaluation.

The representative bodies, understandably, are not operating in a vacuum;
their work is always objectively contingent upon the overall social atmo-
sphere, which they in turn influence to no small extent. The results of
the 14th CPCZ Congress created exceptionally favorable conditions for the ac-
tivity of the representative bodies. Thus when we praise highly the results
that the national committees unquestionably achieved, let us not be unfair
to our predecessors. Let us not think that "those ahead of us" were less
able and less selfless. The earlier officials, too, worked under certain
conditions, even under conditions that often were more complex and more dif-
cult than at present. They often exhausted themselves, and yet their
achieved results could not be the same as the results of which we may be
justifiably proud in the present stage of development.

You, of course, have asked about the basic trends that were characteristic
of the present national committees' work. I would like to take this oppor-
tunity to confirm an idea discussed here by Comrade Cermak: the efficiency
and high activity of the national committees and most of their representa-
tives are truly one of the most essential features of the present national
committees. This feature stems from the distinctly favorable atmosphere of
entire society after the 14th congress. This is also a result of a very
fortunate cadre selection of the representatives for the new national com-
mittees, although the situation in our country was fairly complicated after
the period of crisis: to responsible posts we selected a number of people
who previously did not have much experience in public office, and yet they
proved entirely suitable for their new work. They held on to their jobs and
brought to the national committees their enthusiasm, unusual ideas, and a
willingness to learn from the more experienced. Under the leadership of the
party organs, the national committees demonstrated their ability to accu-
rately determine the priorities of the tasks assigned them, and they exerted
great effort to ensure these tasks. A third characteristic, already mention-
ed by Comrade Vavra, is the close contact of the national committees with the
widest population strata. As a result of this contact, the authority of
local-government organs has increased, and the voters have confidence in
their representative bodies. Naturally, I would not like to generalize, for
also among the national committees some are good, some are average, and some
are below average; quite a few of them are lagging behind the mentioned de-
velopmental trends. But I think we have expressed the most essential char-
acteristics.

Your question concerns also the present shortcoming and problems that the
national committees should solve in their work. I think there is still much
to be done in the national committees' more-intensive care for the needs of
the people. This applies specifically to services, trade, to the level of
health care, the work of public transport, and a number of other areas that certainly will be the subject of justifiable criticism at many pre-election meetings. It would be amazing if the people did not speak frankly about the mentioned shortcomings.

I am convinced that specifically in this area many national committees have not done everything that could be reasonably expected of them, because they are influenced too strongly by the language of the so-called economic indicators. If you take services as a whole, for example, you come to the conclusion that the planned tasks are being fulfilled. This applies also to sales to the population, which often are surpassed. But if you talk with the people, you find that they are not satisfied. They can immediately cite facts to prove in what respect services are inadequate. Therefore we must not be misled by the mere language of percentages and numbers. Even though we cannot dispense with economic indicators in the process of management, they must not be the only decisive factor for the national committees, especially not in the sphere of services.

Take, say, trade. There objectively exist many problems in trade, and their causes are the most diverse. TVORBA, for example, recently commented on the shortage of sales personnel in Prague stores. Comrade Steinz, too, mentioned similar problems here. This is certainly true. But just try and explain to the citizens why they cannot get fresh rolls in the morning and have similar problems at 1600 in the afternoon. Explain to the people why there is no bread at these hours, and why the stores sell out other merchandise before noon, when perhaps only office workers are "able" to "hop out" to the stores during working hours. After all, bread and rolls are not shortage items in our country. Indeed, the whole thing is "merely" a question of the level of cooperation between production and trade, and particularly of a bit more flexibility and understanding of the citizens' needs. Let us not annoy the people when objectively that is entirely unnecessary! I could talk in the same vein about the level of management in transportation, or about the problems in the sphere of health care where the enormous benefits that our society provides for its members often are impaired by the subjectivistic approach of certain managers and regular workers. The national committees cannot remain indifferent to such matters; where and when the mentioned problems exist, the local-government organs should immediately hold the employees in question personally responsible.

Comrade Vavra has already discussed very specifically the third circle of shortcomings: the national committees must continue to take decisive action against the insensitivity of certain officials, particularly of workers belonging to the national committees' apparatus, who are not treating the "rank-and-file" citizens properly. Some progress in this direction has already been made, but I know personally that problems still exist. I have in mind particularly the national committees of larger cities and in some of the okres and kraj national committees. In sum, such phenomena fall under the concept of bureaucracy. In plain language, there still are functionaries who lack the sense to treat people properly, even people who come to them with unjustifiable requests or complaints. An employee of a national committee's apparatus must act as a representative of socialist state
power also under such circumstances. Only then will the citizen be able to distinguish that he is not dealing with an official of the prewar district chief's office, rather with an individual who has the interests of our society at heart. Therefore the officials of national committees must always take energetic action against any manifestations of bureaucracy. We must not be afraid to act against bureaucracy publicly and directly, specifying the officials involved. I think that more-specific action would definitely be in order. Bureaucracy in the actions of a clerk or sometimes of an official is nothing other than a manifestation of petit-bourgeois mentality, which we most certainly cannot combat in general.

There has been some improvement during the past 3 years in the ideological, political and cultural work of the national committees. But it still holds true that this activity of the local-government organs is their Achilles' heel. In the various statistic there frequently appear data on cultural or educational programs that are neither cultural nor educational. The drafts of the election programs indicate that the situation in this area is now turning for the better. But the point is "merely" that these good intentions appear also in everyday practice as soon as possible.

Of course, I do not think that I have exhausted all the problems in this area. In general, however, I am able to say this: the overcoming of the problems during the next term of office will depend on what Comrade Cermak has already discussed. Decisive will be the methods of our work. If all the national committees find a style of work such that the mentioned and other problems do not escape them, then this will be the best guaranty against any stereotypes and formalism. In the work of the national committees the objective is that they form, interpret and defend the interests of their citizens, and that they consistently implement in all areas of life the conclusions of the 15th party congress. The point is that—and here I hope you will allow me a certain exaggeration—every national committee be close to its voters, that every representative become confidant, father, brother and comrade of his electorate. The representative's duties can be summed up briefly as follows: to learn from the people and to teach the people.

[Text] In the preceding issue of TVORBA we published the first part of the transcript of a discussion held in our editorial office, on the experience with the work of the representative bodies. The participants in the discussion were: Comrade Alois Indra, a member of the CPCZ Central Committee's Presidium and chairman of the Federal Assembly; Comrade Zdenek Vavra, chairman of the South Moravia Kraj National Committee; Comrade Josef Steinz, chairman of the Mlada Boleslav Okres National Committee; and Comrade Vladimir Cermak, chairman of the Neratovice Municipal National Committee. In this issue we are presenting the final portion of the transcript.

TVORBA: It is now time to ponder the next question. One of the basic requirements stemming from the party documents, i.e., that a professional approach to the solution of current and long-range problems in our country must be combined constantly with the spontaneous activity of the widest
population strata, unquestionably applies also to the functioning of the representative bodies. Specifically what do we mean by this? For clarification we may cite this example: Although a number of problems has been solved during the past period, the fact remains that a proportion of our citizens, particularly in larger cities, still regard the national committee primarily as an executive apparatus, and to a lesser extent as elected representatives and commission members. Therefore we are interested in how the requirement mentioned in TVORBA's third question should be projected now in the period of preparations for the general elections, and in the future activity of the representative bodies.

Indra: To avoid the impression that I want to close the answer to every question, I request leave to speak at the very beginning. I think that by combining professional knowledge and skills, which are essential today, with the people's spontaneity, the national committees gained valuable knowledge particularly during the past period. If, for example, we are now balancing the results of the self-help drives for municipal and community improvements and establish that more than 50 billion korunas' worth of work was done in this manner, then this is by no means negligible. However, numerical data are unable to fully express the enormous effort that underlies the statistics in every community: what professional knowledge was needed, and how much time the individual drives required of the national committees' organs and aktivs, and of our many citizens. I do not wish to generalize and know that sometimes projects were built that could have waited, because the investment resources were lacking in other areas, perhaps within the same okres or community. In spite of this, I believe that the national committees gained also from the self-help drives very valuable experience which they now can utilize and develop further.

The important thing today is that in nominating candidates for office in the representative bodies we recommend to the voters people who not only meet the other substantive criteria but are also able to give us something in the way of professional knowledge. We want every representative to consider the discussed issues knowledgeably, without having to rely constantly on the standpoint of the appropriate specialist within the apparatus of the national committee. Recommendations by the apparatus are certainly indispensable. But the duties of the elected representatives toward their constituents include also critical evaluation and approval of objectively sound conclusions. Another task concerns continued efforts to upgrade the national committees' apparatus that, among other things, prepares for the elected organs very knowledgeable proposals and reports. Even though we know of certain problems, mentioned here by Comrade Steinz, regarding the level of pay for certain workers of the national committees, parallel with the solution of these problems it will be necessary to develop within the very apparatus of the national committees an atmosphere conducive to the deliberate utilization of the reserves that unquestionably exist in this area.

Another question that I would like to comment on concerns the drafting and gradual revision of the National Front's election programs. Comrade Vavra mentioned that we have been drafting the election programs for the past nine months. It turned out that the procedure for preparing these election
programs is a very sound one. Final approval of these important documents will be the task of the new organs that will be elected in October of this year. This will be an important phase in the formation of our long-range outlook, and particularly for this reason we should gain for it the widest circle of experts from among the public. In every city, for example, there live designers, construction engineers, construction workers, educators, cultural workers and other specialists. Specifically these people could help us eminently with their views to complete the election programs. The experience of the mentioned citizens could be valuable also in specifying the approved tasks, and in the next phase of their consistent realization.

It will be equally important, of course, to employ methods of work such that our citizens will actually be consulted on the National Front's election programs. Primarily in this way we can create now the basis for the people's spontaneous participation in the realization of the election programs. The point is that every citizen must see in practice that the tasks with which he is confronted have not been decreed for him from above, that the national committee is truly consulting him and is interested in his views, good ideas and experience. Specifically from such mutual cooperation stems eventually the people's interest in public affairs, and in the given case also their willingness to grab a pick, if necessary, so that the tasks on which we have agreed will be fulfilled.

Vavra: It really pays to utilize the people's collective wisdom. Already during the present term of office we invited a number of professionally trained citizens to prepare long-range outlooks and concepts that concerned, for example, the further development of the national economy's selected branches, and other important questions affecting the people's lives. Over 2000 persons from practice, from scientific work stations and higher educational institutions participated in this work. Thanks to them, documents were prepared that offer concrete and qualified conclusions.

The mentioned experience leads us, besides the nomination of representatives, also to the question of how best to prepare also the composition of the national committees' commissions that play an important role in the activity of the representative bodies. This is by no means a small aktiv. In our kraj it includes over 20,000 qualified people, specialists from all areas of society's life. During the present term, therefore, we would like to develop several items of information that could serve as a guide in further perfecting the work of the national committees' aktivs. I have in mind, among other things, the experience of cooperation between the kraj national committee and the creative unions; as a specific example, the Union of Czech Architects. We are solving a number of questions jointly with these comrades, or we are requesting them to prepare qualified objections to the proposals of the national committees. In the same way we are utilizing the higher educational institutions, their individual faculties and departments. In other words, we are striving to objectivize to some extent our own plans and the intentions of the individual okrees and localities in South Moravia Kraj. We appreciate immensely, for example, the work that was performed—using the mentioned methods—jointly with the Czech Ministry of Development and Technology, in the course of preparing a regional plan for the development of
the territory of the Zdar Mountains. This is a document that will serve us well for many years to come.

Then what should we add to the essence of the question asked? As Comrade Indra has already pointed out in his contribution, the National Front's election programs that are now being prepared are a concrete expression of combining professional knowledge with the spontaneous activity of the widest popular masses. Thanks to the interested organs' cooperation with the public and with specialists, we may say that these documents are now being prepared on a qualitatively higher level than in the past.

Steinz: Today in Mlada Boleslav Okres we have about 1740 representatives to national committees. This is already a great force that enables us to influence effectively the consciousness and everyday work of the people. If we combine this force with the experience of the national committees' aktivs and employees, we will create also in the coming term of office a guaranty that the tasks representing the application of the 15th party congress' conclusions to the specific conditions of our okres will be fulfilled without failure.

Indra: Allow me a slight digression. If someone were to ask you whether you are satisfied with the professional level of the okres national committees' workers, how would you reply?

Steinz: Not quite. I would have to return, Comrade Indra, to the question that you have already discussed. I have not been long in the post of chairman of the okres national committee. When I took over this post, I compared the situation within the apparatus with my experience from my earlier workplace and came to the conclusion that I could not be satisfied entirely. I will cite several examples. For 4 years, our okres national committee was without a lawyer in its Department of Internal Affairs. I was shocked also by the fact that the chief of one of the key departments within the okres national committee has not yet completed his higher education. Although the question of a university or college diploma cannot be absoluted, it is obvious that a person lacking the prescribed higher education cannot cope with a complex situation that requires qualified consideration. From this it logically followed that this was a serious problem to which I would have to devote attention during my entire term of office.

I wish to unambiguously confirm also another experience to which Comrade Vavra has called attention: in the commissions of the national committees we will have to include an even wider circle of professionally trained officials. On the agricultural commission, for example, there should be an experienced agronomist and zootechnician, because specifically they could call to our attention, among other things, what we have to do differently or where we are making mistakes. The same could be said of other areas. It is true of every area that the commissions of the national committees will be able to perform their initiative and control functions primarily if we ensure already now the essential conditions for the realization of these functions.
Cermak: The National Front met in Neratovice yesterday. We agreed on the nomination of 63 candidates for representatives. Among them there are 20 young people under 30 years of age, and 13 comrades are under 35.

Indra: That certainly is not bad.

Cermak: We could not proceed differently in Neratovice. The computer at Spolana has processed the population data and has reported that the average resident in our city is 35 years old. Why am I emphasizing numerical data? Because, among other things, I wish to demonstrate--also in relation to TVORBA's question--what immense possibilities computer technology offers us. Thanks to the understanding of the comrades at Spolana, the computer is helping the national committee also in organizing work oriented on fulfilling the National Front's election program. From the processed data, for example, we have obtained the addresses of all masons, electricians, mechanical engineers and other specialists living in Neratovice. This will not be exceptional; the comrades in Kralupy and Melnik also are preparing to adopt this method of work. You can imagine what assistance of this kind means to a municipal national committee. However, the point is not "merely" that the national committee, under the given conditions, is able to turn directly to the worker in question. In the long run we intend to use computer technology also for signaling to the national committee, for example, when a certain quantity of housing units will be vacated and where a housing unit is not being utilized adequately, so as to prevent in this manner manifestations of speculation or subjectivism.

The computer helps us also to draft a good election program of the National Front. For example, the processed data provided the national committee with arguments to ensure that the tasks involving the gradual construction of the retail network and other facilities would be in accord with the objective needs of the city as a whole. And now when we go among the citizens with specific data that show, for example, why it is more economical to transport children from the present outskirts of Neratovice to a school in the center of the city, it must be admitted that in most cases the citizens understand our arguments.

Another experience that has already produced good results concerns the decision of the national committee's council to establish ad hoc commissions of experts. Three years ago, for example, we prepared a new zoning map of the city. It turned out that one of the principal problems was transportation, complicated by too many crossing and other peculiarities in Neratovice. The task was assigned to planning and design institutes in Prague. They, of course, required qualified local opponents for the defense proceedings. An ad hoc commission of the national committee's council was formed to evaluate the submitted proposals. This commission prepared also a schedule for the operation of municipal transport. In other words, a solution was sought that actually would satisfy the people. Even though many problems have not been eliminated as yet, I believe that this example indicates how we must proceed in the coming period.

Vavra: I would like to return once more to the problems pertaining to the qualifications of the national committees' employees. So far as the apparatus
apparatus of the South Moravia Kraj National Committee is concerned, I am able to say that its level of professional training is relatively high. However, the political level of some workers remains somewhat lower. What will this require in the coming period? It will be necessary to interconnect far more closely all the aspects of the employees' qualifications: their professional and political training, and I would add also the development of positive moral traits and of ability to organize the activity of the people. Obviously, here I have in mind the sphere of education, culture and adult education, which the comrades from TVORBA have already mentioned.

TVORBA: To a certain extent we have already arrived at our last question. Important are not only the elections themselves. A demanding task will be also the commencement of the newly elected representative bodies' activity. Therefore, to what questions must we now devote increased attention, so that the transition to the next phase in the development of our system of local government and administration may truly be continuous and operational?

Cermak: For this we are preparing favorable conditions already now. In addition to the election rallies, there will take place in Neratovice meetings of the social organizations and similar meetings at the plants, where the participants will comment on the National Front's election program and will actively support this document. On this basis the plants and the National Front organizations intend to conclude concrete agreements with the national committee, in which they will assume responsibility for the fulfillment of certain tasks contained in the election program. It is also possible that in some of the agreements we will include, now or later, also other drives that have not become a part of the National Front's election program but will be an "added plus"; figuratively and literally, these drives will be contributions by this or that social organization, to its members and also other Neratovice residents.

I should mention also the other plans of our national committee. Besides the prepared training course for the newly elected representatives and the elaboration of a detailed concept of the national committee's activity, I would like to mention only one more question: to the next session of the national committee we intend to invite all the candidates running for election as representatives, so that they may acquaint themselves in due time with their future tasks. We will discuss with them our plans for assigning them to commissions of the national committee. The elections will definitely not catch them unprepared.

Steinz: We, too, will place great emphasis on the preparation and preschooling of the newly elected representatives. I could speak in detail on the question that we are now discussing, but many of the answers have already been included in the preceding discussion. Therefore I would like to express myself briefly and succinctly: Just as after previous elections, there now remains only one thing for us to do—to roll up our sleeves and continue to work honestly. There is nothing else we could do.
Vavra: I agree that the important thing at present is to properly train the National Front's candidates for their future work. Their first test will be at the election rallies. Here they cannot merely read a speech that someone wrote for them. Far more important is to give each candidate the necessary background material, which includes first of all a draft of the National Front's election program. There is only one thing we expect of every candidate: to speak to the point, realistically, in full knowledge of the attained results and of the problems that will have to be solved in his election district. First of all we must see to it that the people speak out at the election rallies. We expect them to tell us their views, even to criticize, and to amend or supplement this or that in the election program.

You will probably understand that I do not have in mind only the election rallies. We should proceed in the same manner also at all other public meetings and in discussions with the citizens. The objective is most certainly not that these meetings and discussions be marked by smoothness and by the observation of "established practices." Far more important is the activity of the people who must have wide room to express their views on the discussed problems. Already through the fact that a person is able to express his own view, which we will not reject...

Indra: And we will not attribute a priori any malicious intent to him...

Vavra: Yes. Already through this fact a person expresses and further intensifies his confidence in his national committee, and thereby also in the policies of the Communist Party, government, and National Front. Of course, it is not enough to merely listen to the people's views and comments. It is equally important to draw from them correct conclusions for the practice of the National Front, to clarify possible confusions, to inform the citizens about the approved measures and the disposition of their comments, and to ask them to actively participate in work for the public good.

The comrades mentioned here the training of the National Front's representatives and of other officials. In this we have favorable experience, which we intend to continue. However, I think that the training of representatives is merely the essential foundation to which we must link a complete system of constant assistance for every member of a representative body. I am not excluding from this system the primary task of the national committee itself. But I think that there are reserves in this respect, despite the achieved good results, also within the organs and organizations of the National Front.

But what is the most important in our methods of managing work? I would say that first of all we must strengthen the role of the municipal and local national committees that are in everyday contact with the people's work, successes and problems. That is, were local politics, in the best sense of this word, takes place directly. And that is where we must strengthen our forces.

Indra: As we are sitting here today discussing important political questions, the essence of which is expressed by the concept of social democracy, it might seem that a relatively long time still separates us from the commencement of the new representative bodies' activity. This is only seemingly true. I
actually believe that it is high time to think about the tasks that await us after the elections. Therefore, what should we emphasize first of all?

One of the advantages of our social system I see in that the elections are not some sort of "changing of the guard" in a political sense. We assume that the Czechoslovak people will again vote to retain their government in this country, and that they will express their active support for the candidates of the National Front. This fact is also the best guaranty of the continuation of the work already performed, which the new representative bodies will develop further and perfect on a higher level. Of course, we must utilize these advantages already at the present time. The national committee chairmen participating in this discussion correctly noted that in the election rallies it was necessary to consult with the people on the drafted proposals, and what opportunities existed for mobilizing the collective wisdom and strength of the Czechoslovak citizens. I have nothing to add to the views that they have expressed. Therefore allow me a few words on the work of the new national committees that will aprove, revise and specify the drafted election programs.

Everything contained in the mentioned documents must be elaborated into the annual plans of the national committees' activity. The national committees will have to prepare and approve their first annual plan of activity immediately after the elections, so that they may be guided by this plan practically from the very beginning. For this very reason I have already emphasized how important it would be not to relax the work already begun. Indeed, the preparation of a good election program is merely the beginning, after which we must anticipate further demanding tasks.

Furthermore, I think it is our duty—in the given case, the duty of the people completing their term of office—to prepare all the political, organizational and technical conditions for the commencement of the new representative bodies' work. This might seem something trivial, because our apparatus is unquestionably experienced and has a certain routine. But let us not underestimate these questions, because on their timely solution depends the successful commencement of the representative bodies' work. You will probably agree that it is important to prepare the first session of a national committee so that it will be dignified, that every representative know what is expected of him and with what tasks he will be entrusted in the coming period. You have already discussed here the composition of the national committees' commissions. Experience indicates that those top officials are right who know the personal hobbies of the individual representatives and are able to utilize this personal interest also in the public activity of each representative.

I agree with what has been said here about training the new representatives. However, in the representative bodies there will remain also experienced comrades whom it will not be necessary to teach from the very beginning. Of course, they will not want to keep their valuable knowledge for themselves. It will depend on the top officials to form from the very beginning in the collectives of the representative bodies an atmosphere of mutual assitance
and comradely understanding. Only in this case will the new representatives soon feel at home in the plenum of the national committee, not be bashful, and quickly begin to devote to their work everything that it needs.

An equally important task, mentioned by Comrade Vavra, is the work of the CPCZ and National Front organs and organizations with the Communist representatives and with representatives in general. Experience indicates that the level of this work differs widely in the individual krajes, okreses and localities. Not everywhere do the CPCZ and National Front organs appreciate that representatives should comprise their immediate aktiv. They do not always use these comrades to influence the public and do not always work with them so as to take into consideration in important decisions also the representatives' views, knowledge and experience. Not everywhere are conditions created for the work of the mentioned comrades so as to strengthen and further enhance their authority as elected representatives of the people.

The last task, but actually one of primary importance, that we are solving intensively in the period preceding the elections is to gain the public's permanent interest in the work of the representative bodies at all levels. Today this interest is obvious. But the point is that this must not be a temporary matter, limited to the election campaign. In our entire country, therefore, we must constantly seek, expand and utilize methods of political influencing that could be relatively the most effective. Even though the concept of socialist democracy has not been mentioned frequently in our discussion, it will do no harm to note that all along we have been talking about its content. Just as during every minute of the elections, also now we are striving to work so that the voters will vote for the candidates of the National Front. But we want them to vote out of deep personal conviction, not mechanically or under the influence of a certain public mood. We want them to realize that they are voting for socialism, that they are electing a person who will become a real representative of the people. In this case the representatives will be able to serve their 5-year term of office in the knowledge that they won the confidence of their constituents and have enhanced it further through honest work.

TVORBA: We wish to thank all the invited comrades for their participation in this discussion. We will now repeat the words of Comrade Steinz: "There now remains only one thing for us to do--to roll up our sleeves and continue to work."

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CSO: 2400
FORMER AMBASSADOR ANALYZES MAOISM'S CRISIS

East Berlin HORIZONT in German Vol 9, Nos 33-37, 9, 16, 23, 30 Aug, 6 Sep 76

[Article by Guenter Kohrt, GDR ambassador to the PRC, 1964-1966: "Maoism's Permanent Crisis and Growing Threat." The sixth and final installment (to cover section E. "Maoist Foreign Policy Continues on Anti-Soviet and Anti-Peace Course" and F. "Maoism's Crisis Continues") has not yet been published as of issue No 47, signed to press 15 November 1976. For related articles see JPRS 67902, 13 September 1976, No 1291 of this series, pp 1-10; and JPRS 67076, 2 April 1976, No 1223 of this series, pp 20-31]

[No 33, 9 Aug 76, pp 8-9]

[Text] This series comprises the following points:

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      3. The "Case" of Liu Shao-ch'i
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      Forming Bloc With Imperialistic and Reactionary Forces of the
      World
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      tion Movements
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F. Crisis Within Macism Continues.

Where is Macism heading for? Many people ask themselves this question.
Understandably so, because any accurate orientation on present-day world
events cannot bypass this question. All forces who stand for peace and
detente, for national independence and social progress, can anyhow not
stand indifferent to who belongs to their side and who is on the other
side of the barricade.

It is fortunate for mankind that world politics do not proceed according to
the wishes of the reactionary imperialist forces, who, with the support of
the Macist leaders, would very much like to turn the international balance
of power back again to one in their favor. Imperialism can no more extri-
cate itself from its historical defensive position, although for years now
imperialism, in its efforts to turn back the wheel of history, is enjoying
the protective salvos from Peking's leadership under Mao Tse-tung.

The forces of socialism and peace continue in their advance, and more ob-
viously so than ever before. Evidence of this fact is the impressive
balance of achievements that could be registered at the 15th CPSU Congress,
the 11th SED Congress and at the various congresses of the fraternal parties in other socialist countries. "No one of an objective mind can deny that the influence of the socialist countries on world affairs is gaining strength and is continuously deepening," stated L. I. Brezhnev at the 15th CPSU Congress, "and this is a great boon for all mankind, as also for all who strive for freedom, equality, independence, peace and progress."


The achievements of the united efforts of the Soviet Union and the socialist fraternal countries allied with the Soviet Union on the road to socialism/communism and toward securing peace are of great historical significance. "The power of the socialist countries, which is constantly increasing in all fields, has decisive significance for the revolutionary world process and for the international balance of power. The successes of socialism create ever more favorable conditions and opportunities for the struggle of the progressive and anti-imperialist forces." (Bericht des ZK der SED an den 9. Parteitag der SED / Report of the SED Central Committee to the Ninth SED Congress/, rapporteur: Comrade Erich Honecker. Berlin, Dietz, 1976, p 21) This progressive historical process, by its nature and for reasons of class differences, meets with stubborn resistance from imperialism and from all forces of world reaction. Marching along at their side, we now find the Maoist leaders of China eagerly endeavoring to surpass even the most reactionary and most imperialist forces in their hostile attitude toward socialism, peace and detente in the world. As Erich Honecker, secretary general of the SED Central Committee, emphasized at the Ninth SED Congress, "The intentions of the present leadership in Peking, to bring about a broad antisocialist, anti-Soviet front under Peking's hegemony, remain fraught with danger for the life interests of all the peoples of the world. To gain success in our struggle against imperialism and for peaceful coexistence and social progress throughout the world we must therefore of necessity conduct a systematic discussion and assessment of the theory and practice of Maoism." (Report of the SED Central Committee to the Ninth SED Congress. Rapporteur: Comrade Erich Honecker. Berlin, Dietz, 1976, p 136)

A. Power Struggle Within the Peking Leadership—and No Change in Sight

Events in Peking during the first days of April of this year had the world prick its ears. Struggles for political power within the Maoist leadership had again erupted into daylight, as has happened so frequently throughout the history of Maoism. For months already the Maoist group had been directing its imputations with ever increasing sharpness against Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who, as deputy prime minister, had conducted all government affairs during Chou En-lai's extended illness, right up to the time of Chou's death. In some questions of economic policy, Teng Hsiao-p'ing had not moved rigidly enough along Mao Tse-tung's line, but had taken a rather more "moderate" position, which fundamentally has been identical with that
of Chou En-lai. To attack Chou himself openly, however, would have been too hot an issue for Mao. It was therefore Chou's deputy, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who became the target for the Maoist sniping. The wild attacks against Teng, which reached their climax after Chou En-lai's death, however, did not run their course altogether as the Maoists had planned. The huge demonstration that took place on Peking's T'ien An Men Square on the traditional Chinese memorial days, beginning of April, were participated in by about 100,000 citizens of the Chinese capital. The stormy days at the T'ien An Men, the "Square of Celestial Peace," made it obvious for the whole world to see that Mao Tse-tung's commonweal was anything else but a domain of celestial peace. The reshuffle of personnel is but a further confirmation of this fact. The struggle for political power within the Peking leadership and the demonstrations at the T'ien An Men are visible manifestations of the permanent crisis of Maoism.

It is altogether understandable that the course of events has raised hopes in the minds of one or the other of our comrades that we may see a turn in the policies pursued by the FRC, or at least that the dangers threatening from Maoism might have decreased. However, such a change of policy is completely out of the question. The recent conflicts in the Peking leadership have not diminished the dangers of Maoism by one iota. On the contrary, the antisocialist and great power chauvinist character of Maoism has become even more pronounced and its virulence, and the dangers threatening from it, have all increased.

The leadership now in power in Peking under Mao Tse-tung has continued certain old "traditions," which in fact have been part of Maoism all the time. In the first place, it has always been, and still is, all a game of personalities. Ever since Mao Tse-tung seized power in the party and in his country, he has liquidated, with the help of his followers, anyone who was an obstacle to his anti-Marxist line and to his ambitions for absolute dictatorial powers. In these continuous purges, it has always been immaterial to Mao Tse-tung whether he was dealing with a genuine or merely with a presumed opponent. He not only persecuted Maoist-Leninists, who as a matter of principle have opposed Mao's great power chauvinism and his anti-Leninist course, but even his own comrades-in-arms became victims of his frenzied attacks, if they deviated within the Maoist regime and its strategy from the wisdom of the "great helmsman" in one or the other tactical question. Struggles of this nature, which Mao Tse-tung conducted with great brutality, even to the physical destruction of otherwise most meritorious party cadres, were always accompanied by ideological campaigns. During these campaigns, Marxist terminology was being misused and falsified to slander any, even the slightest, opposition to Mao's tyranny, declaring such opposition treason, the act of renegades, attempt at restoration of capitalism, or simply a criminal act.
B. Genuine and False 'Line Struggles'

To be better able to define correctly the present dispute, it may perhaps be useful to reflect on the struggles of the past, when Mao Tse-tung's chief aim had always been to enforce his dictatorial tyranny as an irreversible state, and to force upon the communist party and the Chinese people his own nationalistic and great power chauvinist line, with its hostility toward Marxism-Leninism. The present Maoist propaganda and historiography is fond of mentioning the "10 line struggles," or the "10 great deviations," of which six have occurred before 1949, the year the PRC was founded, and four after that event. Chou En-lai too declared at the 10th CCP Congress: "During the past half-century our party has undergone 10 great line struggles." (JEN-MIN JIH-PAO of 1 September 1973)

Disregarding the overwhelming historical details of the rightist and leftist deviations for the period before 1949, at least one basic fact clearly emerges: At the crucial point there had always been a confrontation in the Chinese party leadership of the petty bourgeois nationalistic line of Mao Tse-tung and the forces of Marxism-Leninism.

A very significant example are the attacks launched by Mao Tse-tung against Wang Ming, who, in the thirties and early forties, had been the CCP's delegate to the Comintern and who had become a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Wang Ming stood firmly on the positions of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism. He defended in particular the friendship with the Soviet Union and with the party of Lenin. Mao's attacks on Wang Ming and his comrades went on under the cover of the inoffensively sounding "movement for rectification of working styles," a slogan that was to serve as banner for ideological war, principally against internationalism. At this time already, Mao quotations had to be crammed, and during the rigorous purge connected with the movement, many party cadres lost their lives and not a few committed suicide under the pressure of the unchecked repressions.

The actual struggle between the two lines—the nationalistic and the international—is being completely pasted over and obscured by the Maoist propaganda. There is in fact also talk of "two lines" in the distorted historiography of Maoism, but in a completely different sense, twisting the truth, namely they always see on the one side the correct line of Mao Tse-tung and on the other side the line of those who deviate from Mao's line. There the Maoists engage in the nefarious trickery of including the international Marxist line in the six deviations under the name of Wang Ming line, and of declaring it explicitly to be that of an "anti-party group." In this manner the Maoists turn a genuine confrontation of two diametrically opposed lines into a scheme of their own—which they are clinging to even to this day—namely, the confrontation of Mao Tse-tung and his ideology on the one side and all "deviationists" of whatever
type on the other side, irrespective of whether a true Marxist-Leninist was concerned, or merely a Mao-follower who had strayed for just so little from the devious ways of Mao ideology.

At the same time when Mao and his group started their concentrated attacks against the international group within the party, there occurred, in parallel, a "sinicization of Marxism," that is, its nationalistic adulteration and displacement by Mao Tse-tung ideology. According to his own statement Mao considers it necessary to subject anything foreign to a treatment somewhat like with food, which ... (follows a description of the digestive process—C.K.) ... then is divided into such elements that are eliminated and an extract which is absorbed. ... In similar manner we must not swallow indiscriminately everything that is foreign." (Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy." January 1940) Mao Tse-tung explicitly related this prescription to the "application of Marxism to China," because for Mao, born into a kulak family and educated in the classics of ancient China and brought up in the spirit of Greater Han chauvinism, Marxism-Leninism was simply nothing else but something "foreign," which he had to "digest" in his own nationalistic way.

Mao's Flagrant Treason Against the Cause of Socialism

The nationalistic group around Mao Tse-tung, at that time, was not yet capable of thorough and full control of all affairs. The struggle of the two real lines was naturally continuing. Historical truth tells us that the great achievements in the struggle of the Chinese people—be it the final victory in the Chinese Revolution of 1949, or those during the first years of construction in the PRC—had been accomplished, not thanks to the "wise guidance" by Mao Tse-tung, but rather against his nationalistic line. In those days the Marxist-Leninist forces at times were in the stronger positions and could insist on having a correct course followed, namely one of progressive transformation of the country and of close cooperation with the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Mao Tse-tung, who had remained at the head of the party, agreed to that course, but later events have shown that this had merely been a tactical retreat. The Maoists took advantage of the wave of socialist sentiment and of the fraternal assistance from the Soviet Union, to enable them to cope with their initial difficulties during the first years of construction, also to build up their own strength. Then finally, at the appropriate moment, relying on the growing strength of the Chinese economy, they dragged the country on to the road of the nationalistic, great power chauvinist conceptions of Mao Tse-tung, throwing overboard any and all socialist principles which might prove to become encumbrances to their plans. Mao himself later confessed in an internal discussion: "In the initial stage, after establishing the PRC, there was no alternative. ... We were forced to take advantage of Soviet experiences and of the assistance by Soviet specialists."
Mao Tse-tung's four great line struggles that took place after 1949, in
the course of which the Mao group finally made its nationalistic and great
power chauvinist conception the ruling policy of the PRC, are linked with
the names of Kao Kang, P'eng Te-huai, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao. All
these functionaries, together with many of their followers, were eliminated
by the Mao-group, although many of them had been Marxist-Leninists and
faithful comrades-in-arms and followers of Mao Tse-tung. These struggles
have manifested certain intertwining common tendencies, namely:

1. The continued existence of the basic contradiction between the Marxist
   international course and the petty bourgeois nationalistic course.

2. Differences of opinion concerning tactical questions connected with
   the realization of the antisocialist, great power chauvinist line of
   Mao Tse-tung.

3. Personal struggles for positions of power within the Maoist regime.

One way or the other, the functionaries attacked by the Maoists were drawn
into a conflict with the line of the "great leader," allegedly the only
true line, and they thereby became impediments with regard to the realiza-
tion of Mao Tse-tung's unlimited personal dictatorship. Besides, they
also came at a very opportune moment to be used by Mao as scapegoats for
the failures which inevitably showed up as the result of the "Great Leap"
and the "Cultural Revolution," failures which threw the development of the
country back by many years.

Compared with the six "deviations" prior to 1949, the Maoist campaigns
after 1949 displayed as a new feature that there was no more talk in the
Mao-group of rightist and leftist deviations, but that they instead slan-
dered their opponents by calling them counterrevolutionaries, anti-party
factions, spies, traitors, agents of the enemy or agents of social imperi-
alism. This version was obviously aimed at distorting in China and in the
international arena the true picture of the struggles within the CCP, at
justifying the ever increasing new "class struggles" and the launching of
new ideological campaigns, and above all at camouflageing the antisocialist,
antisocialist activities of the Maoists. It is in this spirit that the Maoists
set in scene the four great deviations after 1949.

1. Mao's Crime Against Kao Kang

The Maoists used lies and forgeries to construct a "case" against an
allegedly anti-party group around Kao Kang. This campaign began in 1953,
that is, at a time when the PRC was still on the correct road of the
socialist transformation of the country and of friendly cooperation with
the USSR. But already at this stage, Mao Tse-tung was displaying a
determined eagerness to push back the influence of the proletarian
international forces, which at that time were still dominant in the CCP,
and was preparing a radical change in the party's general line to benefit his nationalistic, great power chauvinist ambitions, a change which 5 years later was indeed brought about in the notorious "Great Leap Forward."

Kao Kang, a leading party functionary in Northeast China, was a Marxist-Leninist, who practiced close cooperation with the Soviet Union and who based on Soviet experiences in socialist construction. It is exactly for these reasons that Mao Tse-tung saw in Kao Kang a suitable object for his, Mao's, attacks against the healthy international forces in the party. The same motivation made him put Jao Shu-shih, a leading functionary in East China, on the list of those to be eliminated. Mao finally succeeded by absurd "accusations" and by extortionist "manipulation" of certain central committee members to push through, in February 1954, a resolution of the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee declaring Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih to be "enemy agents" and accusing them of "divisive and fragmentative activities." The resolution was based on a report that had been compiled at Mao's instigation. The report was written—what irony of fate—by Liu Shao-ch'i, who himself became a victim of Maoist despotism in the next but one campaign. Mao had Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, those upright internationals, arrested that very month, February 1954. Early in 1955, Kao Kang died in prison, and the same fate befell Jao Shu-shih, according to Wang Ming's testimony.

[No 34, 16 Aug 76, pp 8-9]

[Text] At about the same time, Mao Tse-tung prepared to strike a blow against the creative and progressive forces among the intelligentsia. This time his victim became Professor Hu Feng, who had dared to address a "Letter on Questions of Theory" to the CCP Central Committee, in June 1954, stating his opinion on the literary and cultural process in China and indirectly expressing opposition to the Maoist line in culture, especially to the administrative methods of the leadership. This was sufficient ground for Mao to launch immediately a political campaign against the "counterrevolutionary" clique around Hu Feng, accusing Hu Feng of "war against the party leadership" and having Hu Feng finally arrested in July 1955.

Mao Tse-tung raged on to make his nationalistic course the dominating strategy of the party and of the PRC.

2. Mao's Settling of Accounts With P'eng Te-huai

In 1956, Mao Tse-tung considered the time ripe for a liquidation of the correct line, which had still been confirmed by the Eighth CCP Congress (1956), a line of socialist construction and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. This line was to be replaced with the nationalistic course of the "three banners," that is, of the "Great Leap Forward," the "People's Communes" and of the "New General Line." Mao and his group abandoned all the important resolutions of the leading organs and embarked on the adventurous road of their own anti-socialist, great power chauvinist orientation, which they later intensified
into a rabid anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, and an unrestrained hostility toward world socialism. Mao Tse-tung had usurped the entire leadership in party and state. Anyone standing in the path of this antiparty course was immediately subdued with great ferocity and great persistency. P'eng Te-huai became the first victim; he had been member of the politburo and minister of defense, and one of the leading representatives of the healthy Marxist-Leninist forces in the party. In July 1959, at an internal conference of highest party functionaries, he openly criticized the policy of the "Great Leap." He pointed to the serious consequences it was having for the economy (unproductive consumption of large quantities of material and reserves of manpower, exhaustion of the country’s wealth, etc.), as well as to the harmful effects on the relations between workers and peasants and between the different classes and levels of the population. The greatest failure of the "Great Leap" had already become apparent; gone was the well-planned, well-proportioned development of the economy. Large disproportions began to appear. Instead of a "great leap forward," not even the targets, that had been laid down in the realistic resolutions of the Eighth Party Congress (1956), i.e. before the "Great Leap," could be achieved. The 3 million tons of steel produced by workers and peasants in day and night hand labor in mini-blast furnaces and "steel smelting furnaces," by the way, proved useless, a fact that was later admitted at a central committee plenum. But it was at this time that the Maoists made ready to strike their first big blow against the socialist principle of distribution according to contribution and against the material interestedness of the workers. P'eng Te-huai had voiced the opinion that the main reasons for the "Great Leap Forward" had been petty bourgeois pseudo-revolutionary sentiment and the adventurous hegemonial aspirations of Mao Tse-tung and his followers. This was too much for Mao. As chairman of the party he was again able to pressurize many central committee members with serious threats and thereby obtain a central committee resolution, in August 1959, "on the antiparty faction headed by P'eng Te-huai." P'eng Te-huai and many functionaries who had supported him were all relieved of their functions. Nothing has become known of their subsequent fate, on which one may merely harbor serious misgivings. In later documents the Maoists have accused P'eng Te-huai of having maintained "secret relations with foreign governments," which was to mean: with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The settling of accounts with P'eng Te-huai was a well-aimed blow by the Maoists against all Marxist and international forces in the CCP. We may remind here that a short while thereafter, i.e. in the early sixties, the Maoists carried out their reactionary reversal of foreign policy by finally and definitely abandoning the road of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, by demonstrating an ever increasing anti-Sovietism and by trying simultaneously to bring about a split in the international communist movement.

3. The "Case" of Liu Shao-ch'i

The broadly conceived attack by the Mao-group against Liu Shao-ch'i (1966-1969) and against the many functionaries who had supported Liu, was closely
linked with the Maoist "Cultural Revolution," that counterrevolutionary turn-about, in the course of which all basic Marxist principles of socialist construction were completely abandoned. Liu Shao-ch'i became one of the first victims of the "Cultural Revolution." At the time when he was ousted, Liu had been member of the politburo of the CCP Central Committee and president of the PRC; in fact he was occupying the official position of the highest state functionary. What actually had been Liu Shao-ch'i's crimes? After all, he had been one of the closest followers of Mao Tse-tung and had contributed on several occasions during his career to the promotion of the personal cult of Mao Tse-tung and to building up Mao's position of unlimited power in the party and in the country. We may remind here merely of the already mentioned personal participation by Liu Shao-ch'i in the elimination of Marxist-Leninist Kao Kang. However, Liu Shao-ch'i had gradually begun to assume somewhat more sober positions and thereby had become a political opponent of Mao Tse-tung. In the beginning, Liu had taken a position of compromise regarding the Maoist "Great Leap" policy. Later, when the wreckage and debris from that policy threatened to strangle the country, Liu Shao-ch'i made strenuous efforts to overcome the serious economic and political consequences of Mao Tse-tung's adventurous policies. Liu Shao-ch'i, second man in Mao's state, obviously had arrived at a critical attitude toward Mao Tse-tung's policies. This was reason enough for Mao to regard Liu, whom he had once chosen as his successor, as now a dangerous adversary and rival. The fact that Liu, together with Chou En-lai and other Maoists of a more realistic bent, in the middle sixties during the so-called period of readjustment, has had a large share in bringing China's economy back to a stand approximating the situation before the "Great Leap," did Liu Shao-ch'i no good. Just the opposite was true.

Firstly, Liu Shao-ch'i had not only returned to a practice of planning, but also, together with his followers, committed the anti-Maoist mortal sin of employing certain forms of material stimulation. It is not the least to these measures that the period of readjustment owed its success.

Secondly, the Mac-group, relying on a comparatively stabilized economy, which Liu Shao-ch'i had helped bring about, was preparing their next major antisocialist offensive, the so-called Cultural Revolution, when it would become necessary to have an "enemy" who could be put on display to be seen far and wide. This role was allotted to Liu Shao-ch'i. It did him also no good that in the field of foreign politics he had trod the Maoist line of great power chauvinism and anti-Sovietism, a fact of which the author of this article had been personal witness. The Maoist leadership finally proscribed Liu Shao-ch'i as "renegade" and "traitors to the workers," who had hidden within the party. He was described as a "helper of imperialism, of modern revisionism and of the Kuomintang reactionaries, a man who had committed numerous crimes." (Communique of the Enlarged 12th Plenary Session of the Eighth CCP Central Committee, 31 October 1966). The Maoist blow against Liu Shao-ch'i was aimed at eliminating any real or potential opposition of whatever nature against Maoism.
4. Mao Tse-tung's "Successor" Lin Piao—the Next Victim

Lin Piao's glory and elevation to the position of official successor to Mao Tse-tung (so announced at the Ninth CCF Congress in 1969) did not last long. The terror of the Maoist "Cultural Revolution" had again inflicted deep wounds on China. The liquidation of any socialist elements that might have survived at the base was ruthlessly continued and now supplemented by a counterrevolutionary "revolution" in the superstructure. Entire party organizations were demolished. Capable cadres and specialists in the economy and in the state apparatus were chased off to undergo "reeducation" in the so-called Seventh May Schools, replaced in their positions by Mao-troopers. According to Wang Ming's statement, out of 174 central committee members, 140, i.e. almost 80 percent, were abused and exposed to severe repressions. Socialist principles in state and economic management, in planning and in material stimulation fell victim to the rabid attacks of the Mao-guards. The Maoists intended again to "leap forward" and dragged the PRC into a new catastrophe. Again there were serious repercussions in production. Again the country was in need of a "breathing space" and in need of the intervention of sober-minded Maoists, to alleviate the worst effects of the campaign. One of these apparently seems to have been Lin Piao, whom Mao Tse-tung finally chose to be the new scapegoat for the failure of Maoist policies. The Maoists accused Lin Piao, who disappeared in 1971 under mysterious circumstances, of continuing the "revisionist line" of Liu Shao-ch'i. He was abruptly marked head of an "antiparty clique" and "superspy," "Kuomintang agent," etc. Let us listen to what Yao Wen-yuan, Mao's son-in-law and member of the politburo, later had to say about Lin Piao: "Lin Piao was a fanatical proponent of material stimuli. In his secret diary, he had recorded with his own hand such obnoxious revisionist wisdoms as "material stimulation is still necessary ..." Yao Wen-yuan accused Lin Piao of "seducing young workers with wages," and Yao declared this to be nothing but an "insidious intrigue." (JEN-MIN JIH-PAO of 1 March 1975)

The latter statements make it fairly clear in what direction the wind was blowing. In fact the crucial point here was the Maoist offensive against the living standard of the masses. By freezing the living standard and by adjusting wages "downward," the Maoists intended to secure the most important source of reserves in order to be able to step up armament, their ultimate aim being the realization of their great power chauvinist ambitions. It is for this reason that Mao Tse-tung and his group not only deny, but hysterically combat the very essence of socialism, which takes man as central concern and sees its fundamental task in the expanding satisfaction of the material and cultural necessities of life of the workers.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing Ousted a Second Time

To the mentioned four "line struggles" since 1949, the Maoists can now add as "fifth case" the name of their former comrade-in-arms Teng Hsiao-p'ing.
Teng Hsiao-p'ing was one of those leading Maoist cadres who were chased off by the extremist Mao-guards during the "Cultural Revolution," the campaign which had started 10 years ago. At that time, Teng had been secretary general of the CCP. Mao Tse-tung had been party chairman. Teng had taken somewhat moderate stands, particularly in economic questions, permitting the use of economic levers, and was therefore a misfit in the landscape of the counterrevolutionary Maoist "Cultural Revolution." Besides, Mao Tse-tung had never forgiven Teng for having very bluntly expressed himself against the cult of the personality of Mao Tse-tung, after Teng returned from the 20th CPSU Congress, which he had attended as guest. At the Eighth CCP Congress (1956), Teng was daring enough to say in a speech: "Leninism demands of its party that all important questions be decided by the competent collective organ, and not by one single person. ... The 20th CPSU Congress has clearly demonstrated how important it is to follow the principle of collective leadership and to struggle against the personality cult." In the early sixties, however, Teng Hsiao-p'ing was one of the principal proponents of the anti-Soviet course. At the beginning of the "Cultural Revolution" he was designated "No 2 representative of the capitalist-roaders within the party," relieved of all his functions and humiliated and abused by the Mao-troupers.

Like the proverbial phoenix rising from his ashes, Teng Hsiao-p'ing reappeared in April 1973 and resumed the functions of a deputy chairman of the CCP Central Committee, of deputy prime minister and of deputy chief of the army general staff. What had happened? The catastrophic conditions of the country, following the reverses that cannot but be blamed on the Maoist "Cultural Revolution," demanded another breathing space in the early seventies, to refloat the stranded Maoist ship. The removal of Lin Piao had not made the slightest difference in the overall situation. Under these circumstances, even the most extremist Maoists quietly looked on as a number of cadres and specialists, censured during the "Cultural Revolution," were being rehabilitated and to a large extent returned to their original positions. Thus, with an assist from Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing was also brought back again and—of course after expressing "repentance" and proclaiming his loyalty to Mao Tse-tung—placed into the elevated functions of the Mao hierarchy that we mentioned.

The effects of the Chou En-lai/Teng Hsiao-p'ing government to raise production with the help of specialists, and to do so by giving due consideration to certain economic requirements, including the proscribed stimuli, led to a temporary stabilization. Many workers found again a few extra yuan in their pay envelopes, after previously having had all bonuses cancelled, as also any similar benefits for higher performances. These sober tendencies in economic policy, however, conflicted objectively with the holiest of Mao dogmas. They met therefore an ever increasing and an ever more outspoken resistance from the extremist Mao-group, who finally, in 1973, turned to frontal counterattack. Again the tunes of the "Cultural Revolution" were reverberating. The "extremists" launched a campaign
against the "rulers in the party who went the capitalist road," for short, the "capitalist-roaders." The attacked functionaries were accused of having proclaimed development of the economy to be highest principle, rather than "class struggle as guideline," in order to engage in "revisionism and restoration of capitalism." (Liang Hsiao, "The Economic Construction Must Take Class Struggle as Guideline," in KUANG-MING JIH-PAO of 25 February 1976) This campaign, however, found little response because many functionaries were afraid of the repressions of a new "Cultural Revolution." But the fanatic Maoists would not give up. They abruptly changed their slogan and directed their principal offensive, not against the functionaries, but against "the man in power in the party who walks the capitalist road," i.e. against Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The first visible consequence was the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng, minister for public security, to become acting prime minister in the state council on Chou En-lai's death in January 1976, rather than appointing Teng who had actually been in charge of government affairs for several years.

The Events on T'ien An Men Square

And now to the mass demonstrations on T'ien An Men Square, which started out as a tribute to the late Chou En-lai and which reached their climax on 5 April 1976. The Maoist mass media immediately found the proper terminology, speaking of "only a handful of counterrevolutionaries" and a "small band of class enemies," or of the affair of some rowdies, although the figure of 100,000 demonstrators had already been admitted. To verify its thesis of the "handful of counterrevolutionaries," the JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, apparently in precipitated hurry, published the following excerpt from a wall poster written in verse by some of the demonstrators:

"China is not what it was. Fooling people just does not work anymore! The feudal days of Ch'in-shih-huang * are gone for ever.
We demand genuine Marxism-Leninism,
That is what we are ready to sacrifice blood and life for!"

An open protest of this nature against the Peking leadership under Mao Tsetung was something new in the history of Maoism. The extremist Mao-group was terrified by the events on T'ien An Men Square. On the other hand, it gave them the desired option for a radical offensive against their principal enemy Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his followers. Mao Tse-tung and his group have had sufficient experience in destroying an enemy before he could seriously endanger the Maoist tyranny. Hundreds of demonstrators were arrested. What fate might have awaited them? News of the first death sentences have already been circulating in the world. Eye-witnesses report that a new wave of terror and repressions is sweeping the country.

* Chinese emperor of the 3rd century B.C., known for his rule of cruel tyranny. Since Mao repeatedly praised him as a model, many Chinese regard Mao as a present-day Ch'in-shih-huang—The editor.
Teng Hsiao-p'ing as "culprit" in the "counterrevolutionary incident" was immediately stripped of all his party and state functions. The Peking leadership appointed Hua Kuo-feng as prime minister of the state council. The Mao-group thereby not only ignored the party statutes, but also grossly violated the new PRC Constitution adopted at the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975. That Constitution provides in its Article 17: "The National People's Congress has the following functions and powers: amendments of the Constitution, legislation, appointment and recall of the prime minister of the state council and of members of the state council, as proposed by the CCP Central Committee ..." (The PRC Constitution. Peking, 1975)

[No 35, 23 Aug 76, pp 8-9]

[Text] According to Article 17 of the new PRC Constitution, it would have been necessary to call a meeting of the Central Committee and a meeting of the National People's Congress to appoint the successor to the late Prime Minister Chou En-lai. Neither was done. The Mao-group acted despotically and precipitately. Obviously they did not dare to convene the leading party and state organs because they did not feel secure. The following that a somewhat "moderate" Maoism in the style of Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing enjoys among the people seems to be not inconsiderable. This is evidenced by reports of unrest in various parts of the country. Further evidence is the replacement by the Mao-group of the military commanders in the provinces of Anhwei, Shansi, Hupei, Kiangsi, Heilungkiang and Liaoning, as well as of the autonomous region of Tibet. The Maoist leadership in Peking apparently considered the dismissed men to be sympathizers of Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

After Teng Hsiao-p'ing's removal from office, the Maoist leadership in Peking directed against him not only the whole notorious vocabulary of unrestrained invectives that are usually heaped on an opponent, but did not even shrink from uttering blunt threats of murder. Following the April events, an article in the JEN-MIN JIH-PAO read: "The workers ... directed their struggle against Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his counterrevolutionary revisionist line and brought this biggest unrepenting capitalist-roader down to the position of a rat scurrying through the streets with everybody shouting: Kill it!"

The efforts of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his followers had been directed toward a speeding up of the tempo, particularly in the area of the national economy, with the employment of economic levers, among other things. These aims brought them into conflict with the Maoist dogmas and with the "infallible line" of Mao Tse-tung. Teng Hsiao-p'ing also could not prevent his downfall by joining, in foreign politics, those most vivid preachers of antisovietism and hostility against world socialism. Most logically, he was also one to push for open collaboration between Maoism and the reaction-are forces of world imperialism. It is well remembered that Teng Hsiao-p'ing was a particularly eager proponent of a new world war, which, according to the wishful dreams of the Mao-group, would see a military clash
between the main powers of the two social systems, i.e. a war between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, while China would conveniently be 
warming its hands at the fire.

As we see, passionate anti-Sovietism, practiced faithfully along Mao Tse-
tung's concepts, is no guarantee for permanence of position in the Peking 
leadership. The Maoists demand blind obedience, also in all other questions 
of their reactionary anti-people line. Whenever Mao Tse-tung needed an 
opponent to be put on display, he has always been able to find one. A pe-
culiar feature of the reckless Maoist attacks during the last few years 
seems to be that Mao chose to view the second man at the top of his hierar-
chy as the dangerous rival whom he would then have to remove. This happened 
in the case of Liu Shao-ch'i and in the case of Lin Piao; Teng Hsiao-p'ing 
actually is another case of this kind. By the functions he fulfilled and by 
his capabilities, Teng had been heir presumptive to the second-ranking place 
in Mao's regime, but was removed by Mao beforehand for the reasons just 
stated. It is certainly no accident that a politically shrewd person like 
Chou En-lai, who knew his Mao and Mao's ruthless aspirations for power 
better than anyone else, had always known how to flatter Mao, but had always 
avoided to move up to the dangerous second place in the Maoist regime. 
Chou's highest position was the third-ranking place in the Peking leadership.

The ruling group around Mao Tse-tung has been able to maintain its position 
in the recent power and personalities struggles and is again tightening the 
reins within the militarist-bureaucratic regime of Maoism. But theirs was 
a Pyrrhic victory because the fundamental problems of China's socio-economic 
development remain unsolved. They are also insoluble, as history has taught 
us, with the ideology and policies of Maoism. The crisis of Maoism will 
therefore last and will unavoidably lead to new power struggles and line 
struggles, in the course of which, undoubtedly, the genuine anti-Maoist 
opposition will again grow in strength. The Maoist leadership group on 
their part announced a stepped-up persecution of all its opponents. The 
Peking JEN-MIN JIH-PAO spoke of a "handful of counterrevolutionaries who 
still occupy high offices," raising the demand that the followers of Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing "must be isolated once and for all." The newspaper also de-
clared: "The counterrevolutionary incidents on the T'ien An Men Square 
have not been fully settled by Teng's removal alone. It would be a mistake 
to rest now." (JEN-MIN JIH-PAO of 26 May 1976) This is a serious threat 
to all opponents of the regime. Only a few days after the event, 
the same newspaper had already declared that it is "a compelling necessity 
to suppress the small group of counterrevolutionaries who are attacking 
Chairman Mao. ..." (JEN-MIN JIH-PAO of 18 April 1976)

Maoists Contrive "Class Struggle"

The leading Maoist group asserts in all the mass media in a stereotype 
manner that the present personal and power struggles within the Mao-regime 
are a case of class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
Thus, the JEN-MIN JIH-PAO stated: "Chairman Mao explained, 'You engage in a socialist revolution and still don't know where to find the bourgeoisie? The bourgeoisie is right inside the communist party—those forces in power who take the capitalist road.'" The same article reviles the followers of Teng Hsiao-p'ing as "demons and monsters" and as "sabre-rattling rowdies." (JEN-MIN JIH-PAO of 18 April 1976)

This Maoist legerdemain is nothing new, as we have seen. With these tactics the Mao-group takes advantage of the as yet very widely prevalent ignorance among broad sections of the population—illiteracy is after all still estimated at almost 50 percent! In order to drum it into the populace without a let-up that Mao Tse-tung is "infallible," the Maoists think it will facilitate matters if they designate every one of their own followers as "proletarian," and declare anyone of a different opinion, whoever he happens to be, a "class enemy" and "bourgeois." This is an easy way to impress things on the mind of the people, and it is, last but not least, a means to justify employment of brute force and reckless repressive measures against anyone of a different mind, also a way to enforce the antiscientific aims of Maoism and to reinforce the personal dictatorship of Mao and his group. With these methods, Mao is using his own classical Chinese education, of which inflexibility, a doctrinaire attitude and learning by rote the philosophical quotations from the classics had been characteristic features. This then is also the basic method, using the "Mao-primer," to stolidly drum in the anti-Marxist Mao-quotations. Anyone who cannot read them must learn them by heart with the help of a Mao-trouper.

As to the alleged "class struggle" within the party, we may furthermore point to the fact that Mao Tse-tung has already denied the Marxist-Leninist concept of classes and class relations and has falsified the concept in his own subjective way. He has not more use now for his own words at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth CCP Congress on 17 May 1958, when he said: "We have overpowered and subdued the bourgeoisie in our 'Five-Anti Campaign'."* Every time Mao required the "bourgeoisie" for one of his anti-Marxist campaigns, there indeed reappeared a "bourgeoisie" of sorts—even if it appeared in the shape of his own comrades-in-arms.

The Maoists do not recognize the validity of Lenin's well-known definition, according to which classes "are distinguished from one another by their place in a historically determined system of social production and by their relationship to the means of production..." (V. I. Lenin, "Werke" [Works]. Berlin, Dietz, 1965, Vol 29, p 410) The Maoists substitute differences in earnings for class differences. They don't care whether there exists, or

* This refers to a mass movement which was propagated in the Chinese press, starting in 1952. The movement was directed against the following negative phenomena: 1. Corruption, 2. Tax Evasion, 3. Theft of Government Property, 4. Fraud, and 5. Theft of State Economic Information.—The ed.
does not exist, ownership of the means of production. As early as 1926, Mao Tse-tung in his essay "Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society" combined into one class different social groups with very different attitudes toward ownership of the means of production. Even workers and peasants were all treated alike. A propertyless state was taken by the Maoists to mean poverty. Their ideal, therefore, is the frugality of the poor peasant, the largest and poorest social stratum in China. The petty bourgeois-peasant masses were simply classified as proletariat, and this de facto abolished the leading role of the working class. In an internal organizational report of the party, dated 1949, the peasant cadres were directly described as the best section of the Chinese working class. (Cf. "Classes and Class Designations in the PRC," in DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK, supplement 1973, p 46) The workers were admonished to better take peasant frugality as example and accept the adjustment of wages "downward," as now being practiced. In this way the Maoists believe, the significant differences between city and countryside will "disappear."

It is in conformity with this anti-Marxist character of Maoism, that the Maoist mass propaganda disparages any worker who expects more pay for additional work, or even a bonus, as being a "capitalist-roader," who is on his way to "restore capitalism." We may also remind here of Mao's words in a letter to his nephew: "In politics one should look forward, in one's own personal needs of life one should look backward." (Cf. HORIZONT, 1975, No 49, p 8--the editor)

In the course of a limitless vulgarization of Marxism-Leninism, the Maoists invented even a number of other "criteria" for classes and class distinctions. As an example let us single out a particularly odd phenomenon. In October 1965, a Maoist newspaper published an article under the heading "Carry Dung for the Revolution." It said in this article, one must "overturn the dirty world of the old society." For this purpose, one must not fear dirt or spare efforts, and even perform work like "carrying manure, feeding pigs, cleaning toilets and emptying spittoons." A positive attitude toward these chores displays "strong proletarian revolutionary sentiment." In contrast, there is the bourgeoisie, "lazy and unable to distinguish between the five types of grain, apt to vomit when picking up a spittoon, or sick from the mere sight of manure...." (CH'ING-HAI JIH-PAO of 26 October 1965) Thus the world has finally been imparted the knowledge of the difference between bourgeoisie and proletariat!

Unity and Quarrels Among the Maoists

The question of what is really at the base of these quarrels between the different shades of Maoists is of course of burning interest. One may find it easier to answer this question if one, first of all, clarifies what is NOT involved in the acute personal and power struggles within the Maoist leadership. Subject of their arguments is not whether the Peking leadership is to continue its anti-Soviet policy, or whether the country should be led back to the Marxist-Leninist road of socialist construction. The argument
is also not concerned with the question whether the Maoist regime should continue its anti-peace course, or whether it should show readiness to participate in the international struggle for the preservation and protection of peace. As far as the strategic objectives and essential principles of the Peking leadership's anti-people policies are concerned, there exists a common platform for the Maoists of all shades. The essential elements of their common platform are as follows:

1. The core of Maoism is great power chauvinism. Maoists of all shades have inscribed on their banners the slogan to make China the dominant power center of the world, and to achieve this in a historically limited period of time, latest by the turn of this century. The 10th CCP Congress (August 1973) and the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress (January 1975) have demanded unequivocally that China be turned into a "powerful state," and that thereby "a greatly significant contribution is being made to benefit all mankind." Already in our days, the world is witnessing what this "significant contribution" consists in: the Maoists lovingly embrace the fascist hangman Pinochet of Chile and align themselves with the imperialist reactionary forces and its band of mercenaries during the struggle for freedom of the Angolan people.

But Mao knows what he wants. In his youth already, he was enraptured with the brutal imperial dynasties that ruled the Middle Kingdom, which he is now intent on recreating in considerably greater splendor in the envisaged Maoist world center. Twenty years ago, in 1956, Mao Tse-tung demanded during a central committee meeting, that China must be developed "not only into the political center of the world, but also into its military and technological center." He furthermore declares that one must not allow it to happen "that decades from now we may still not yet be the first power in the world."

2. Anti-Sovietism and hostility toward world socialism are especially important elements of Maoism, quite independent of any personal or power struggles that occur in the Mao hierarchy. Since the early sixties, i.e. after failure in the adventurous "Great Leap," friendship with the Soviet Union was proscribed, slandered and turned around into a growing hatred against the Soviet country and all countries of the socialist community. The struggle against world imperialism and against its principal power, the United States, was progressively being reduced. On the other hand the Soviet Union, the most experienced and the leading country of world socialism, was ultimately, in 1972, declared enemy No 1, and was to become from now on chief target for all attacks. Early in 1974, the Peking leaders completely erased the socialist world system from their political map and officially declared it "non-existent." And why this hostility toward the country of Lenin? Why this treason against the socialist system, the greatest achievement of the international workers movement? To gain a free hand in the employment of whatever—even most criminal—means on the way to Maoist great power chauvinism. It is in the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community that the Maoists see the principal impediment to their ambitions.
for world hegemony and also, last but not least, to their anti-people course in domestic politics. The Mao-group is seized with panic at the thought, the Chinese people could learn from the developments in the Soviet Union and in other socialist countries what great achievements are possible if people build up a new social order on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism. What "dangerous" (i.e. anti-Maoist) conclusions the Chinese people could draw from a comparison with their own realities! Anti-Sovietism is the Maoist recipe to counter any tendency to reinstate Marxist-Leninist policies of socialism and peace as guidelines for Chinese politics.

In the new Constitution, adopted in January 1975, the antisocialist, anti-Soviet and peace-endangering course of the Maoists was declared long-term official state policy of the PRC.

3. Logically one of the traits of Maoism is therefore also that it openly joined in a bloc with imperialism and with all the forces of reaction, as indeed the Maoists have done all through the past few years. Unconcealed sympathies for the stepped-up armament of NATO, for the political and military integration of the West European capitalist countries, for the continued presence of American troops in all parts of the world, and above all for an increased anti-Sovietism in the imperialist countries characterizes the Maoist move toward their open arrangement with world imperialism, and particularly with its most reactionary forces, in a war against world socialism, peace and international detente. In these policies the Maoists are following a "directive" from the "Great Helmsman," in which he demands that "a distinction must be made between principal and second-ranking enemies," and in which he urges to join forces with the secondary enemies within the framework of a united front, in order to use combined and concentrated force to destroy the principal enemy." (JEN-MIN JIN-FAO of 1 September 1972) The imperialist forces have therefore been promoted to allies of Maoism, a fact which is not only duly appreciated in the anti-Soviet chorus of the monopolistic mass media, but which also pays dividends for the Maoists in the form of material support being received by them from the imperialist countries.

Let us not overlook that on this reasonable road the Maoists of all shades are marching in loving unison and that the ousted Teng Hsiao-p'ing, as already mentioned, was one of the most active and eager proponents of this policy.

4. The armament and militarization of the country, vigorously promoted by the Peking leadership at the expense of the Chinese people, is a further trait of Maoism and an inseparable component of its anti-people and anti-peace politics. "To promote full preparations for possible war," is declared state policy in Article 10 of the new PRC Constitution and thereby made law for all Chinese to obey. This too is one of the guiding principles which every Maoist, regardless of shade, will observe. The armament
industry enjoys absolute priority and swallows up about 40 percent of the national budget, which means that huge resources are thus drained away from the development of the material, spiritual and cultural standard of living of the people.

The army, the main support of the Maoist regime, has also the special func-
tion of an instrument of power within the state. It is not only deployed with brutal force against unsatisfied workers, but in case of need army personnel is used to take the place of the workers in the factories. This happened in the summer of 1975, for instance, when workers in Hang-chou, the large industrial center of Chekiang province, went on strike in over 20 industrial enterprises, to fend off new assaults on their already very low standard of living. The Maoists moved troops into the city and according to broadcasts from East China, over 11,000 soldiers took up positions at the work-benches of the striking workers. This is then the way in which we have to interpret the tasks of the armed forces as determined in the Constitution! Article 15 of the Constitution provides in part: "The Chinese People's Lib-
eration Army is always to be a fighting force, but simultaneously also a work force and a production force." In the hands of the Peking leadership, the army not only serves the protection of socialist achievements, but as a security belt for the militarist-bureaucratic regime of Maoism, directed against the life interests of the Chinese people.

5. Despotism instead of socialist democracy, that is, last but not least, another essential trait of Maoism and an element of the common platform, to which all the varying factions subscribe. The working masses have been systematically excluded from every type of participation in the executive power of the country. The apparatus for force and compulsion has been considerably expanded. Democracy and legality are not only being rudely trampled upon in everyday life under Maoism, even the new PRC Constitution contains a de facto liquidation of the socialist rights and freedoms, replacing them with empty Maoist phraseology. A significant example is the elimination of the system of elections for people's representations, in China called "people's congresses," which had been provided for in the first Con-
stitution of 1954.

The abolition of the election system is paraphrased in Article 3 of the new Constitution, as follows: "The delegates to the people's congresses of all levels are elected in democratic consultations." The term "elected" is demagogy and a fraud, because in this Constitution the Maoists have prudently "forgotten" to stipulate, when, where, by whom and in what manner the said "consultations" are to come about. The Maoists arrange these now among them-

selves, so that in these "consultations," which are arbitrarily constituted by the Maoists, they themselves nominate the delegates. The people have nothing to elect anymore. At most, there is a tug-of-war within the Maoist inner circle between the various factions of the Maoist leadership. Needless to say, a reference to an election law, as in the old Constitution, is nowhere to be found anymore in the new Constitution.
For the highest people's representation, the National People's Congress, the Maoists have inserted a few additional "safeguards" to ensure a composition and method of passing resolutions favorable to their own purposes. Article 16 of the Constitution reads: "In case of necessity a certain number of patriotic personalities (which is understood to mean Mac-followers—C.K.) may be invited to participate as delegates." In this way, it is possible to manipulate the composition of this highest "people's representation" according to will. The second safeguard, contained in the same article, reads: "The National People's Congress is elected for a period of 5 years. Under special circumstances, its legislative period may be extended." A further loophole for arbitrary action reads: "The National People's Congress convenes once a year for one session, which, in case of need, may be advanced or postponed."

The so-called people's congresses of all levels have become the willing instruments in the hands of the Maoists for the realization of their anticommunist policies. The Maoist practice, which had become the custom ever since the "Great Leap" already, and particularly so after the "Cultural Revolution," of condemning the people's representatives to years of complete idleness, has now been sanctioned by the new Constitution. It seems pure irony if Article 3 of the new Constitution proclaims: "All power in the PRC belongs to the people..." (By the way, the old Constitution read: "All power ... emanates from the people." Note the fine nuance in circumscribing with this new formula the shift of power into the hands of the Maoists.)

In other words: even in constitution and legislative procedure everything is trimmed to fit the personal dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung and his group. The Mao-group decides from above, ordering those below, autocratically, when, where and on what questions "consultations" are to take place and what the composition of the gremia is to be. In this way it is possible to organize secret Maoist meetings and to declare them subsequently to have been "sessions" of the people's congresses, or of other institutions. This has indeed already been the case in several instances.

The Chinese people in factories and residential areas as well as right up to those in the highest organs of the state are precluded from any participation whatsoever in the exercise of power. The alleged "dictatorship of the proletariat," of which the Constitution speaks in its fraudulent way, is nothing else but the dictatorship that Mao Tse-tung and his group exercise OVER the proletariat and over the working masses of the Chinese people. The Peking leaders' knout is being felt right down to the family unit. Private everyday family affairs are exaggerated into "political struggles," to have every single citizen reduced to an obedient tool of Maoist politics. For this purpose a system of "large courtyards" was introduced in the cities. In these "courtyards" there are 10 or more families combined under the leadership of a "courtyard committee." The Peking press hails these "large courtyards" as a "good pattern for strengthening control and guidance in the cities." According to the true nature of the thing, it is nothing but a
method of continuous spying on the ordinary citizens, to detect and bring to
the notice of the security organs their every aberration from the Maoist
line. Even children are being trained from their earliest childhood to
practice denunciations.

The Maoist despotism has reached virtually into every sphere of social life
in the PRC. The reactionary features of Maoism have become extraordinarily
marked during the last few years; they characterize the new stage to which
the Maoist gang has advanced on its pernicious way of antisocialist and
great power chauvinist politics. The factional and personal struggles with-
in the Peking leadership have so far not brought about even the slightest
change in this state of affairs.

Reasons for In-Fighting of Mao Factions

As evident from the common platform supported by all of them, differences
between Maoist functionaries and factions are not concerned with the basic
question of the great power chauvinist strategy or the anti-people course
of Maoism. The contradictions that continuously recur between the differ-
et forces of Maoism are concerned with differences within the petty bour-
geois chauvinist camp in questions of exercise of power and means and
methods to attain identical objectives. The severity of the differences
can be explained mainly by the fact that Maoism stands in serious contra-
diction to the interests of the people and to the objective requirements of
socialist construction, and that Maoism, as a consequence, leads the country
astray time and again. To find a way to escape from this permanent crisis
requires a genuine alternative, which of course cannot be found within Maoism.
The quarrel between the Maoist factions can be reduced basically to the
question: who are the "better" Maoists, that is, who is best capable of
realizing the chauvinist great power ambitions.

During the last few years, particularly two rival Maoist factions have
crystalized within the Peking leadership.

Firstly, the extremist radical Maoists, who are frequently also referred to
as "dogmatists." Members of this faction are such top functionaries as
Chiang Ch'ing (Mao Tse-tung's wife) and the so-called Shanghai faction,
among them the above-mentioned Yao Wen-yuan, Mao Tse-tung's son-in-law. At
present this faction is closest to Mao Tse-tung and enjoys his special sup-
port.

Secondly, the more sober-minded, more practice-oriented Maoists, also known
as the "pragmatists." This faction was mainly represented by the late Chou
En-lai, but also by the ousted Teng Hsiao-p'ing and a number of other
functionaries, predominantly trade and industry cadres, who had resumed
their former functions after having been dismissed during the Maoist "cul-
tural revolution."
The differences between these two main Maoist factions with regard to the means and methods for the achievement of their identical objectives may be reduced to a few questions:

The "extremist" Maoist line is characterized by the following elements:

1. Main characteristic features of this faction are the periodically recurring shake-ups of society, the constant artificial priming of the domestic situation by perpetual campaigns, which follow one another in ever shorter intervals. The "extremists" call this method the constant "class struggle," which is to be part of a "permanent revolution." The reactionary line of the "cultural revolution" is to be continued in this way to make Maoism irreversible and to force it upon the Chinese people, even for the time after Mao Tse-tung's death, as the ruling ideology and policy for all times to come.

The "extremists" base these ideas in part on the anti-Marxist contention that socialism is closer to capitalism than to communism. In March 1975, the Chinese press propagated the following Mao Tse-tung "directive": "China is a socialist country. Before liberation it was somewhat like a capitalist country. We are still practicing the 8-level wage system, distribution according to performance and commodity-money exchanges. In these practices we differ little from the old society." (HUNG-CH'I, 1975, No 3) The qualitative difference between socialism and an exploitative society is thereby denied. The "extremists" need this unscientific thesis to provide ideological base for the assertion that de facto there is always capitalism inherent in socialism. In this way they find it easier to disparage anyone who is dissatisfied with the Maoist policies, calling such a man a "capitalist-roader," a bourgeois and enemy agent, and to attack him with all means at their disposal. From the mentioned Mao utterance, it is also obvious that the main thrust is to be directed against the socialist principle of distribution, and that any aspiration for higher wages will be discredited as "capitalistic." The "pragmatist" Chou En-lai too, by the way, foresew already that the "extremists" would continue endlessly the constant settling of accounts with their real or imagined opponents. At the 10th CCP Congress, Chou declared: "There will still be such struggles 10 times, 20 times or 30 times more. New Lin Piao's will appear, new people of the type of Wang Ming, Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Te-huai and Kao Kang." (JEN-MIN JIH-PAO of 1 September 1973) As can be seen, Chou En-lai named those five leading functionaries against whom the fierce attacks of the Maoists had been directed with particular devery during the 10 line struggles. (Cf. HORIZONT, 1976, No 33, p 8—theeditor) Chou En-lai could not foresee, however, that his closest collaborator, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, whom he had selected as his successor, would be the next victim.

2. The "extremists" among the Maoists propound the absolute priority of politics and ideology over economy. Of course they also want to develop economy and technology, and this in particular to benefit the huge armament
program that they are contemplating. But according to their conception, the economic development is to be achieved, in the first place, by means of "revolution," that is to say, in the Maoist sense, by methods of political and ideological manipulation of the masses, by oppression and extra-economic compulsion. Economic measure of the state and the objective requirements of the national economy occupy, in principle, secondary positions. To achieve development of production, it is again "class struggle" that is to do the job. In an article in the KUANG-MING JIH-PAO, this was formulated as follows: "To take production tasks as guideline would mean confusing matters of secondary significance with the guideline and to replace the guideline with matters of secondary significance." Production, accordingly, is a "matter of secondary importance." In actual fact, the article continues, "it would mean abolishing class struggle as guideline and to deny the fundamental line of our party." Class struggle, the article explains, is "the forceful motive power for the development of production." (KUANG-MING JIH-PAO of 25 February 1976)

3. Out of these positions, a further element of the "extremist" line follows quite logically: the denial of the economic laws of socialism and above all, opposition to economic levers and material stimuli. The standard of living is to be kept low to the utmost, so that exploitation of the industrious Chinese populace will yield the means for the gigantic armament costs and for the chauvinist objectives of the Mao-clique. Listen to the voice of the "extremists": "The most important thing is to create ideological clarity in this question and particularly to emphasize the principle 'everyone according to his abilities.'" Obviously this wipes out the socialist principle of distribution, "to each according to his performance." Then they go on: "We must propagate the voluntary communist work, which does not concern itself with norms or pay." (HSUSH-KSI YU P'I-P'AN, a Shanghai magazine, No 3, March 1975, p 37) This does not perchance refer to occasional voluntary "subbotniki," but to the constant, even daily, performance of extra work without pay.

As the shining example, the Chinese propaganda acclaimed in March 1975 the coal miner Ch'en Ch'ang-ch'i from the Hung-shan coal mine in Kirin province. The Chinese broadcast announce with great fanfare that this coal miner had worked no less than 422 shifts in 1974, and in their words, "has had only two Sundays rest throughout the entire year." In this manner, Ch'en had been at the coal-face for 365 days of the year." Of course this Maoist coal miner does not question his pay. Anyhow, he would not ask for paid vacations, because up to now there is no such thing in the PRC. Miner Ch'en, so the report goes on, "has been mining coal for 10 years already without expecting any special reward from the state." And now the most important remark: "Ch'en Ch'ang-ch'i correctly translates Mao's revolutionary line into action." Miner Ch'en may physically perish under this grind and exploitation, but his example demonstrates what the Maoists demand of the Chinese people to build the foundations of the Maoist chauvinist course. Wang Hung-wen, one of Mao's deputy chairman of the CCP Central Committee,
made the following claim before a Central Study Symposium in January 1974: 
"A time-work system of wages, or the payment of bonuses, has nothing to do 
with concern for the livelihood of the masses; application of such systems 
would be an affront to the working class." In the same lecture he revealed 
some really fanciful visions: "Our railway workers have laid down so many 
railway tracks. Did we on these occasions rely on hourly wage rates? Our 
champions in this struggle received 8 yuan (1 yuan equal to about 2.50 marks 
—the ditor) a month; there were no bonuses. We have been completely rely-
ing on Mao Tse-tung thought!"

Article 10 of the new Constitution promises: "The state ... will gradually 
 improve the material and cultural life of the people." However, in actual 
practice, the Maoists counter this flowery language with the demand for 
"more work for less pay."

4. Everywhere Mao-troupers are moved into top-positions. This is, quite 
logically, a further device, practiced by the "extremists" to realize 
their conceptions. In 1958, when the correct general line of socialist 
construction and of friendship with the USSR and all revolutionary forces 
in the world was abruptly abandoned with the "Great Leap," the Maoists, 
first of all, made a clean sweep of all Marxist-Leninist forces in the 
party and state leadership. In the Maoist "cultural revolution" finally, 
under the slogan "bombard the headquarters," all those Maoists were thrown 
out of office who had ever shown even the slightest objection to the advent-
urous course of the "extremists." As in the Middle Ages, the victims 
were chased through the streets, spat on, beaten and reviled, and finally 
abandoned to "public disgrace."

If and when they were again needed to pull the bogged-down cart out of the 
quagmire, they were again allowed back for a certain time of "readjustment." 
They would be chased away again as soon as possible. The whole world could 
see this happen in a drastic manner in the example of Teng Hsiao-p'ing. 
In contrast, certain "extremist" Maoists, such as Mao's wife and his son-
in-law, moved straight up into the party leadership like vertical take-off 
planes during the "cultural revolution." They became members of the polit-
buro and today firmly hold crucial positions, as, for instance, most im-
portantly, the PRC propaganda apparatus and the mass media.

The "Pragmatist" Maoist Line

The "pragmatist" line differs from that of the "extremists," but does not 
reduce the dangerous nature of Maoism, neither for the Chinese people, nor 
for the international struggle for peace and socialism. What good is it 
to anybody after all, if one Maoist faction believes its methods superior 
to that of the other faction in achieving the identical great power chau-
vinist objectives? And yet, the differing positions—whether purposely or 
not—always touch upon the fundamental questions of China's socio-economic 
development and its domestic policies. The quarrel between the varying
Maoist lines reveals ever more clearly the historical necessity to find a
genuine alternative to Maoism, that is, to return to a Marxist-Leninist
domestic and foreign policy. In the above-mentioned basic questions, the
"pragmatists" assume an attitude at times contrary to the line of the "ex-
tremists."

1. The "pragmatists" are not in favor of the constant artificial priming
of the domestic situation. In their opinion this will not accelerate
achievement of the chauvinist great power objectives, but rather hinder it.
One of the most serious accusations leveled by the Maoist press against the
"pragmatists" takes as target a statement by the ousted Teng Hsiao-p'ing:
"We have led many campaigns. ... Normal work has been made impossible by
these campaigns." (JEN-MIN JIH-PAO of 1 April 1976) The "extremists" con-
sider no less "hostile" Teng Hsiao-p'ing's statement: "As soon as a new
campaign is launched, it is the old workers and experienced cadres who will
suffer the consequences." (JEN-MIN JIH-PAO of 16 March 1976)

Although the "pragmatists" will not reduce by one iota the nascent chauvinist
objectives of Maoism, their position would mean a certain de-ideologization
which the "extremist" Mao faction resists with all the means at their dis-
posal.

2. In the "pragmatist" position it is not politics or ideology, but rather
economics, which occupies foremost place.

To achieve the Maoist objectives, the "pragmatists" see the main link of the
chain in a push for production within a stable, continuous and systematic
development. At the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975,
Chou En-lai, on the one hand, recited all the nationalistic dogmas of Mao-
ism and its war-oriented course, but on the other hand he emphatically de-
manded the "development of the social forces of production." You just
can't have one without the other—is the way the "pragmatists" view the
situation. In this sense, Chou En-lai also reminded of the "concept of the
two steps," a concept that had been evolved even prior to the "cultural
revolution." First step: " ... to build up, until 1980, an independent,
relatively complete system of industry and of the national economy as a
whole." And the second step: " ... an overall modernization, still within
this century, of agriculture, industry, defense, science and technology, so
that the national economy of our country will stand in the forefront among
all the nations of the world." (PEKING RUNDSCHAU, 1975, No 4, 28 January
1975)

Although this is all inconsistent with actual Maoist practices, it is never-
theless a concept originating from the "pragmatists," to which the "extrem-
ists" can offer nothing comparable, apart from their constant lashing and
whipping the masses to greater effort. A systematic, well-proportioned
development of the national economy is decried by the "extremists" as
"production force fetishism." One quotation repeated by the "extremists"
in their accusations against the "pragmatists" is therefore also the following statement by Teng Hsiao-p'ing: "Some of our comrades... constantly separate politics from economics... they only talk of revolution and don't talk of production. As soon as they hear someone say that production must be tackled effectively... they place the cap of 'production force fetishism' on that man's head and accuse him of plotting revisionism. No evidence can back up such a stand." (HSUEH-HSI YU P'I-P'AN, 1976, no 4) What a thing to do, to reproach, as they do, a man like Teng Hsiao-p'ing, whose realistic orientation toward production has rendered such enormous assistance to the extremist guard around Mao Tse-tung!

3. Quite logically, in pursuing their line, the "pragmatists" stand for certain means and methods in economics which had already proved effective in the first years of socialist construction, such as, for instance, planning, detailed accounting in enterprises, a differentiated wage scale and the employment of economic levers and material stimuli, such as paying bonuses, etc. However, the "pragmatists" do not concern themselves with a general raising of the people's living standard, but merely see in these measures certain objective needs which arise from the course toward a position of world power, and, not the least, from their ever closer economic cooperation with the imperialist countries. But even for this well-intentioned support they get small thanks from the "extremists," who accuse the "pragmatists" of propagating "in an especially crafty way, the idea that material stimuli may stink like cheese, but taste all the more delicious. But to cover up all their infamous doings, they merrily fly the flag of socialism." (Chang Ch'un-ch'iao in JEN-MIN JIH-PAC of 1 April 1974)

4. One further important element of the "pragmatist" line of Maoism is the demand to employ qualified specialists in important functions of the state apparatus and of the economy. Although this position too has only as its purpose to increase the effectivity of Maoism, it clashes head-on with the policy of the "extremists:" "Mao-guards to the top!" We must not overlook of course, that it is particularly within this question that the fierce power struggle among the Maoists for the dominating position within the Mao-dictatorship is being fought out, not the least also concerning the question which line shall dominate after Mao.

The "pragmatist" Chou En-lai had raised the demand "to place the best into leading positions," and it is he who proclaimed the principle: "Less personnel, but a better and simpler administration." (Cf. his speech at the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress, PEKING RUNDSCHAU, No 4 of 28 January 1975) It stands to reason that Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who thanks to Chou En-lai had regained considerable influence, tenaciously defended the demand that specialists be employed, instead of Mao-guards, who were mostly incompetent people. The Mao-trouper asserted in one of their wall posters that Teng Hsiao-p'ing had made the following statement:
"A person who has studied technology need not be a 'white specialist.' People who occupy the toilet but are unable to defecate better get out. A man who does not know his job must make place for someone else."

Disregarding the jargon that obviously seems to become the fashion among Maoists, the demand for employment of specialists is indeed a position of the "pragmatists," which meets with especially fierce opposition from the "extremists."

[No 37, 6 Sep 76, pp 8-9]

[Text] To "improve" Maoism in their sense, and to render it more effective, the "pragmatists" also object to the extremist methods of keeping the school and college youth from their studies by constant campaigns, or by the system of "schools with open doors." The Mao-group reproached Teng Hsiao-p'ing for his statement: "Merely the doors are kept open, but the schools are not operating." (HUNG-CH'I, 1976, No 2) Furious rejection also met Teng's remark: "If incompetent people occupy the lecterns, then it is time to call back the 'officials that have fled.' " (JEN-MIN JIH-PAO of 18 February 1976) The term "officials that have fled" is of course to be understood to refer to functionaries and scientists who had been chased away during the "Cultural Revolution," as had been Teng himself.

Stooges and Scapegoats

If we consider the positions and practices of the "pragmatist" line as a whole, we must conclude that these so-called pragmatists play a rather infamous role within the Maoist regime. Their half-baked "realistic" measures are not only directed toward the same chauvinist objectives that are pursued by all Maoists, they are also time and again assisting the "extremists" around Mao to escape the dilemma of their politics. Everything keeps moving nicely within the framework of the sacrosanct Maoist dogmas. Every success which the "pragmatists" help bring about, against the forces of extremism, is exclusively credited to the account of the "cultural-revolutionary" line of Mao Tse-tung and his group. The paradox of the quarrels within the Maoist leadership consist in the fact that the extremists cannot exist without the "pragmatists," but that the extremists brutally persecute the "pragmatists" as soon as the latter have done their "duty." The "pragmatists" have taken on the humiliating function of stooges and at the same time scapegoats for the "extremist" Mao-group.

There is no escaping the consequences of the intensifying struggles between the Maoist factions:

Firstly, it has become evident that the "pragmatist" line has met with comparatively wide friendly response from the workers of China. This can be explained by the fact that their aims accord objectively with the desire of the masses for calming down the political life and for greater security, and that their aims also raise hopes for a general improvement of working and living conditions. It is difficult though to see through
the antisocialist and chauvinist nature which also is a determining factor in this, the "pragmatic" line. Many therefore mistake this line for a true alternative to Maoism. The demonstrations of sympathy for the late Chou En-lai, and thereby also for Teng Hsiao-p'ing, on T'ien An Men Square openly expressed dissatisfaction with the present situation.

Secondly, the struggle between the Maoist factions has not at all been definitely resolved by the removal of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and the removal has even less solved the country's problems. Conflicts and jolts will inescapably continue to occur as long as this fundamental source of conflict continues to exist: the deep contradiction to the objective requirements of the socialist reconstruction in the PRC and to the international class-struggle for peace, democracy and social progress. The struggles will also be accompanied—as the events last April have already shown—by an increasing genuine anti-Maoist opposition. It is of course hard to determine what the present balance of power may be between the rival Maoist factions, since the "extremists" completely dominate the Chinese mass media and utilize this circumstance to spread an atmosphere of hysteria, the fear that any opposition whatsoever will be persecuted. The Maoist "extremists," for instance, did not shrink from taking the opportunity of the severe earthquakes in some regions of China to intensify their attacks against the "pragmatists." The Maoist press printed the obvious absurdity that the followers of ousted Teng Hsiao-p'ing were intending to use the natural calamity for an attempt at restoration of capitalism in China. The Maoist press therefore urged that "the battlefield of the earthquake be also made battlefield to criticize Teng Hsiao-p'ing." (JEN-MIN JIH-PAO of 11 August 1976)

Under the given conditions the mass media of course do not reflect the actual balance of power between the Maoist factions in the country. True, the followers of the "extremist" line have removed Teng Hsiao-p'ing from the central control of power, but they themselves are not in complete control of the situation. The "pragmatists" still have at their disposal relatively strong positions in the state apparatus, in the army, in most of the provinces and have the support of many functionaries at the medium or lower level, i.e. there where the pressure of dissatisfaction with the "cultural revolution" line, as it exists among broad strata of the population, is felt strongest. Even in the Maoist CCP Central Committee, the extreme Maoist forces do not seem to have a clear majority. It is for this reason that the Central Committee was not convened to effect the ouster of Teng Hsiao-p'ing or to appoint Hua Kuo-feng. On 17 February 1976 already, the JEN-MIN JIH-PAO deplored that Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his followers had split the Central Committee.

Thirdly, as a result of these critical struggles, there is also a growing influence of centristic forces. Since the power struggles concern contradictions within Maoism itself and its great power chauvinist and antisocialist course, there are of course also undecided attitudes and change-overs
between the above-named positions, the more so since the boundaries between them are fluctuating. The situation as it has thus been created and the actual balance of power, which appears so impenetrable, presumably explain why the "extremist" Maoists have not been able to appoint one of their leading representatives, e.g. one of the Shanghai faction, as successor to Chou En-lai. Many political observers consider the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng, who, it is true, enjoys Mao Tse-tung's confidence but otherwise has not been very conspicuous in the inner-party struggle, to be a compromise solution. Be this as it may, Hua Kuo-feng, coming from the same province as Mao and until then minister of public security, has moved up into the dangerous second position in the Mao hierarchy. Nobody can foresee whether this was meant as a long-term decision because the struggle between the Maoist factions is going to continue.

Judging from his past appearances before the public, Hua Kuo-feng too stands on the Maoist positions of great power chauvinism and an anti-peace line. For instance, at the so-called Ta-chai Conference in October 1975, he spoke, with reference to Mao Tse-tung's directives, of the task "to push the national economy forward so that China will be advancing in the front ranks of the world before the end of this century, a task of racing against the enemy for time and speed and doing a good job of getting prepared against war." (PEKING RUNDSCHAU, No 44 of 4 November 1975) This is the well-known orientation of all Maoists.

Maoism has become an extremely dangerous phenomenon of our times, no matter what shades of Maoism may be in power for certain periods of time. Maoism has already inflicted great damage on the Chinese people and on the cause of peace and progress in the world.

D. Maoism Cripples and Hampers China's Development

Certain aspects of Maoism characterize particularly clearly the harmful effects its policies is having on China's development:

1. Under the rule of Maoism, the development of the social production does not serve the interests of the people, but serves stepped-up armament. The fruits of labor of these hard-working people are utilized for the anti-socialist and war-oriented policies of Maoism in a way directly opposed to the workers' own class interests.

China's national economy, which has been extensively "cleansed" of all socialist elements, and thereby deformed, consists actually of two areas:

The larger area is composed of all those branches of production which directly or indirectly serve war production. Huge amounts of resources and investments are channeled to and for the use of these branches.
The other area is composed of civilian production, such as mainly agriculture and the medium and small local industries. Here the Maoist state shows itself tight-fisted. For the development in this area, the Maoists have invented the magic formula: "self-reliance." But even greatest exertions under this Maoist slogan are of little use to the workers, because the workers and peasants are deprived of a considerable portion of the increased production, which is drawn off the civilian sector and poured into war production, or used for the build-up of strategic reserves, e.g. of grain.

2. The adventurous ups and downs of the Maoist course allow the Chinese national economy to develop only most contradictorily and painfully—on a still very low overall level.

If the Maoist propaganda makes stereotype claims that the economic development constitutes "a great victory for the proletarian revolutionary line of Chairman Mao" (JEN-MIN JIH-PAO of 6 February 1976), this is nothing but a crude deception. If there have been successes at all in some branches, these have only been achieved because action at the production base was taken contrary to Maoist dogmas and some principles, like performance wages and bonuses, were applied illegally. This method could of course not be used everywhere.

Considering indirect data and comparisons made at the Fourth National People's Congress, as well as other Chinese sources, the following is the approximate stand of the production of important products in 1974: 25 million tons of steel, 390 million tons of coal, 60 million tons of petroleum, 105 billion kilowatt hours of electric energy and about 260 million tons of grain. The absolute increase in production in certain areas, must however be related to the population increase, so that pro capita production has remained almost the same since the fifties. There is indeed no way to accomplish anything better as long as this chauvinist and antisocial policy prevails. It is a policy that paralyzes the creative initiative of the workers and replaces beneficial economic and scientific-technological cooperation with the USSR and the other socialist countries with reckless antisovietism and open bargaining with imperialism.

3. In agriculture it shows up especially glaringly how the Maoist policies prevent a systematic and stable development of the national economy. Today still about 80 percent of the Chinese population are living in the countryside, but their share in the production of the gross social product is only about 20 percent. The production and living standards in the countryside are equally, and appallingly, low. Manual labor absolutely prevails. One must have seen the humiliating picture of 8 to 10 Chinese hitching themselves up to a plow to plow the field, because even draft animals are scarce. Despite the fact that 10 years have come and gone, the backwardness is still there, and with it the predominance of manual labor.
How absurd and illusory are the Maoist prophecies that agricultural production will essentially be mechanized by 1980! The state will not contribute one single yuan. Mechanization? -- Yes, but please with "self-reliance," through your own efforts! As the shining example for this method, the Maoists propagate since 1964 the model of the large production brigade Ta-chai in Shanxi province, north China. The Ta-chai movement in the villages aims at utilizing "own efforts" and Maoist "class struggle," i.e., suppression of all opposition, to increase to the maximum all taxes and impositions for the state, and at the same time to "modernize" agriculture without state help. The following is an example from the early days of the movement, witnessed by this author: The chairman of a people's commune proudly showed a handful of nails and declared that it was now no more necessary to import nails, because they were being manufactured "through own effort." Questioned as to where the nails had been imported from in the past, he named a Chinese neighboring district! This smells suspiciously of feudalistic economic self-sufficiency, when serfs were made to manufacture everything themselves by the seat of their brows. It certainly has nothing to do with socialist large-scale production.

In 1975 at the Ta-chai Conference, another propaganda theme was, to build up "small-scale industries" everywhere in the countryside. They were to produce "iron and steel, coal, chemical fertilizer, cement and machines, and to supply an increasing quantity of agricultural machines, chemical fertilizer and insect pest control chemicals to the villages." (PEKING RUNDSCHAU, No 44 of 4 November 1975) Under the slogan, to further unify and expand social property, the Maoists extracted more and more from agriculture and even started to proceed against the small plots of "backyard land," which had helped many a farmer to keep alive. These attacks were as a whole defeated due to the resistance of the peasants, who were here defending their constitutional rights.

The PRC produces only several ten thousand tractors per year. There are hardly more than 250,000 tractors in operation. For a thorough mechanization, however, about 3 million tractors would be required. It is easy to figure out how far into the next century Chinese agriculture, if under the aegis of Maoism, would have to wait for complete mechanization. This is one of the consequences of the Peking leadership's policies, a leadership that in its great power chauvinist madness has decided to have "tanks rather than tractors" and "guns rather than butter."

4. In industry it must be expected that the growth of the extremist forces and the fieriness of the new political campaigns will have negative effects on production. Of course, the Maoist "extremists" will also try everything in their power to increase production in the interest of their war economy. They will follow the proven Maoist practice of "walking on both legs," but in this context it will mean, on the one hand, to intensify the Maoist "class struggle" against every kind of opposition, and on the other hand, to tolerate for the time being and at certain localities, the economic levers and stimuli, which they had outlawed—even though they will do so most reluctantly, propagating all the time the wise ideas of the
"Great Helmsman" to do the opposite. At the expense of the workers, this method may indeed lead again, through many fluctuations and relapses, to a certain growth of the economic potential. The Maoists, furthermore, are also benefiting to no small amount from the rich rewards that the imperialist concerns are paying in the form of credits, supply of plants and equipment for the unprecedented antisovietism being displayed by the Maoists.

Under the Maoist policies, the situation of the Chinese working class is difficult and complicated, despite the fact that it is the workers in industry, construction and transportation—about 55 million in a total population of 800 million—who produce 60 percent of the social gross product. Not only do the workers have to suffer under the constant ideological campaign, Maoist "class struggles" and by being spied upon, they are above all exposed to unceasing attacks on their living standard. For instance, in larger enterprises the Maoists carry out so-called experiments to transform the 8-grade wage system, which originated in the initial years of positive construction, into a 3-grade wage system. The result will be that the workers' incomes will be adjusted downward and the individual worker's share in the national income as a whole will be reduced. The Maoist leadership will thereby provoke conflicts of interest among sections of the workers and will take advantage of such conflicts according to the motto "divide and rule."

5. The unchanging low standard of living characterizes most clearly the antisocialist and anti-people nature of Maoism. Overall, the living standard of the Chinese worker has not risen above the 1957 standard, i.e., the standard before the start of the "Great Leap Forward." The basic economic law of socialism, which aims at constantly raising the people's level of material and cultural living conditions on the basis of a high-speed development of socialist production, was completely thrown overboard by the Peking leadership. The Maoist press confirmed this fact with the words: "It is wrong to assume that all forces must be exerted toward providing better food and clothing." (JIN-MIN JIN-PAO of 12 February 1975)

Actual life in China corresponds completely with this motto. The system of rationing foodstuffs and industrial consumer goods still prevails. The monthly ration of grain, the staple food, consists of 15 kg. Vegetables, and occasionally fish, supplement the diet. Meat is extremely scarce and expensive. There is only 250 grams of fat and oil per head per month. For underclothing, shirts and clothes, generally made of cotton, there is a ration of 4.5 to 8 meters cotton cloth per year per person. The complete uniformity in the style of clothes, which reminds of a plumber's working outfit and which dominate the scenery in the cities, is the outward symbol for the uniformization and disciplining of the Chinese society under the Mao-regime. If a Chinese should happen to receive a European-cut suit, maybe as a present, he will immediately cut a few holes into it and sew on patches, in order not to attract too much attention and to avoid being attacked as a "bourgeois." This is not imagination, but self-experienced reality.
The sale of high-grade consumer goods is permitted only against industrial certificates and is furthermore held down by high prices. A bicycle, for instance, which in China is not a sporting-goods item but an important means of transportation, costs 130 to 180 yuan (1 yuan is approximately 2.50 marks—the editor), a wrist watch 110 to 240 yuan, a radio 80 to 400 yuan. To buy these "luxury items" a Chinese worker must sacrifice the entire income of a few months. In the countryside it may even mean more than a full year's income, i.e., if he would not spend anything on food during this period. In large factories the average monthly wage is 50 to 60 yuan, in small-scale industries about 40 yuan, while the average annual income of the rural population is estimated at less than 60 yuan. Though the supply of the most elementary necessities of life seems in general to be guaranteed, still how appallingly low is the living standard of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, considering that almost 27 years have already passed since the victory of the Chinese revolution and considering that the Maoist regime pretends to be a socialist system. What a mockery of Marxism-Leninism and of the humanist character of socialism, the achievements which after all have been gained in the struggle for the happiness of mankind!

6. The sociopolitical "ideal" of the Maoists is an orientation of the entire population toward the ascetic level of the poorest strata, namely the rural population. The village, according to the Maoist concept, is the great "smelting pot of society." True to this belief, no effort is made to raise the living standard of the poorer strata, but on the contrary, the level of the "more comfortably of" working class is to be lowered, so that the egalitarian poverty of the entire nation will yield more capital for the great power chauvinist war-oriented course of the Peking leadership. The leading role of the working class has been liquidated long ago, as we have seen. In the place of the firm alliance of working class, peasantry and all other working people—the highest principle of the proletarian dictatorship according to V. I. Lenin—the Maoists carry out a downgrading of the working class within the general Maoist glorification of poverty. To justify this course the Peking leaders are ready to serve up a few "ideal solutions" and theoretical justifications which make a mockery of Marxism-Leninism. The Maoist simplistic solution is called "i-kung i-nung," which means, "to be both in one person, worker and peasant." This "worker-peasant" as a sociopolitical vision and aim of Mao Tse-tung is naturally also to comprise the intelligentsia, of which a living evidence are the "barefoot doctors," who are being sent into the countryside in large numbers.

The Maoist "worker-peasant" model, in all its essential aspects, is now being tried out universally throughout the country.

During the "Cultural Revolution," and shortly thereafter, millions of city dwellers, predominantly the youth, have been sent into the countryside, peasants came into the cities as workers. In this way, city dwellers
were to get accustomed to the wretched living conditions in the countryside and become "revolutionized" by the poor peasants. At the same time the peasants who become apprenticed in the factories as a "young worker" category receive considerably lower wages than the normal workers. This method yields the Fascists additional cheap labor and purposely provokes conflicts of interest between the workers and between workers and peasants.
IMPRINTING OF FOREIGN EMBLEMS ON CLOTHING ASSAILED

Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Oct 76 p 9

[Editorial by Vasko Ivanovic: "The Colony Within Us"]

[Text] We are reporting to you from a celebration of Proletarian Brigade Day, from a movie showing, and from a meeting of a basic organization of the Federation of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia.

The celebration, the movie showing, and the meeting of the aforementioned basic organization took place recently (or could have) in Belgrade or in any other city in Yugoslavia.

1. Report From School Celebration

At the appointed time, pupils of an elementary school named after a certain proletarian brigade assemble in the school yard. These are young pupils, aged 6 to 10.

They line up in columns of twos and march with their teachers to a fine green meadow outside the city. Surviving veterans of the proletarian brigade will be speaking to them about the torments and heroism of their fathers (grandfathers, by now, really) at the battles of Sutjeska and Kozara, in the south, in the east, in the west, and in the north of our country.

A boy and a girl, by virtue of their diligence and good conduct, carry the Yugoslav tricolor with its five-pointed star and the banner of the famous proletarian brigade. Behind them, only an occasional boy or girl carries our tricolor.

Our report continues. Among these boys and girls, there must be twice as many whose blouses and lapels display the standards of the famous red tunics of the Canadian Mounted Police. Next, there are those who wear shirts bearing pictures of the resolute, happy, ubiquitous defenders of the Wild West, the U. S. Cavalry. There are many stars on the banners, and there will be many more. It is as though a detachment of the U. S. Cavalry were just returning from a successful campaign against the Indians.
The boy at the end of the procession bears insignia of the air force of a great power. This is indeed an advance: a horse is fine but can scarcely carry one armed cavalryman, but the jet on this boy's shirt can carry 5,000 kgs of napalm all the way to Vietnam.

2. Report From Movie Showing

A great American film is on: "Black Challenge."

The brilliant, uncompromising, bold white artists of America are telling a story about the horrors of racism, and they are telling it without shame, firmly, touchingly. One of the characters is a stupid, cruel sadist-racist, a young fellow with sergeant's insignia.

The movie is over. The majority of the young people are upset by what they have just seen. A somewhat plump boy has an authentically sad face, as though he were straining not to cry. On the lapel of his jacket: the same sergeant's insignia as in the movie.

3. Report From Meeting of Basic Organization

In a youth center, of which there are few, very few, a basic organization of the Federation of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia is holding a meeting.

A person who has visited Vietnam as a member of a Yugoslav delegation is speaking to the young people.

He is telling them what he saw: big holes in the ground, ruins where once had been schools, colleges, housing. Those powerful, shiny airplanes that can fly without stopping would come by every day for 7 years. For a full 7 years, they never stopped coming!

In the meantime, the lines of people without arms, of the blind, grew longer.

The girls and boys know something about this, of course, but they are still shocked to hear these horrible words about horrible lives. Murmuring and a storm of applause greet the speaker's statement that our country had always done what it could to help that country. Even when our country had not been able to do anything and when it had not been an easy thing, our country had been on the side of that other country and not on the side of the powerful country--and had not concealed the fact.

There was probably not a single boy or girl who failed to display pride because of that.

Again, at the exit, we see the markings that symbolize the foreign army about which we have been hearing--on jackets, on trousers, on lapels, on sleeves. Flags with many stars.

And now, a supplement to reports 1, 2, and 3.
Perhaps the reader will say: these reports are a construct.

What are we to say to the reader?

To the reader that expects the truth, we shall say: the reports are a construct only in part, unfortunately!

Only in the sense that we have gathered together in one school, at one celebration, at one movie showing the pictures and sights, the girls and boys, the young men and young women with foreign insignia that we have encountered in the city: in schools, in front of schools, in movie theaters, in front of movie theaters, in public squares.

Isn't that an extremely drastic act?

Perhaps it is. If so, it is much less drastic than the acts of certain of our manufacturers and self-managers, who imprint foreign insignia and symbols on their finest, most elegant products. On a beautiful vinyl jacket of domestic production, which is worn by the son of a friend of mine, a jet plane of a great power roars along underneath a foreign flag.

If armies and insignia are in fashion, then let it be our own army and our own insignia. We do not know, unfortunately, of anyone who has produced fine blue jackets with the insignia of our own air force and antiair defense, with our own falcon. Our own falcon does not seem to us at all uglier than some other birds, and we heartily recommend it.