Is The Army Heading For a Joint-Integration Train Wreck?

A Monograph

by

Major James F. Dickens

United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Monograph Approval

Major James F. Dickens

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Approved by:

__________________________, Monograph Director

Robert Epstein, Ph.D.

__________________________, Director of Academic Affairs

Robert Berlin, Ph.D.

__________________________, Director of Graduate Degree Program

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Accepted Date______________
ABSTRACT


This monograph argues that the Army’s Battle Focused Training system as represented in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 no longer reasonably assures tactical unit readiness for participation as the ground force elements in the joint force of the future. Because of the dynamic manner in which joint force commanders configure their force packages, unit trainers can no longer account for all of the permutations of operational contexts within the scope of their resource-constrained unit training plans. Additionally, demand for immediate responses to unplanned joint force requirements denies these same commanders any room for error in their preparations for war or conflict. As a result, these units will fail to consider and prepare for the conduct of critical joint integration tasks, which might prove vital to their performance in the designated operational environment.

This monograph examines the experience of Army units in Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (1994), INTRINSIC ACTION (1998), and JOINT FORCE (1999) to demonstrate tactical unit performance of joint integration tasks in their commitment to joint contexts not clearly provided for under Battle Focused Training constructs. Using joint and service doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (DTTP), this monograph evaluates each unit’s performance to answer three questions. First, this research establishes if the required capabilities were doctrinal. Secondly, it determines if the units had or could have accounted for the disparity between their actual state of readiness and that required for the given mission. Finally, this research analyzes whether the units maximized the use of available time and DTTP in preparation for their mission.

This monograph concludes that increasingly creative adaptive force packaging by the National Command Authority, the regional Commanders in Chief, and their operational planners will converge with a dramatic decrease in military response time to place tactical Army units at high risk of failure due to inept performance of joint integration tasks. Battle Focused Training no longer stands up under the requirements of the complex joint environment. Increased discipline on the part of operational planners is necessary in addition to renewed vigor in the collection, collation, and production of joint and comprehensive service DTTP. Only when all of the pertinent joint integration issues are accounted for in DTTP, with the requisite assignment of training resources toward them in routine or mobilization training, will the tactical units commander have any hope of achieving the kind of comprehensive readiness for rapid force-projection called for under the current National Military Strategy.
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US ARMY -- TRAINED AND READY

In 1988, the US Army's keystone doctrine for training entitled *Training the Force (Field Manual or FM 25-100)* acknowledged decreasing military response time as the preeminent dynamic of American involvement in worldwide military operations. The forecast -- that steadily diminishing response windows would deny future commanders any leisure in preparing for and taking military action and would leave them under a continuing burden to maintain comprehensive combat readiness.

The Army must be trained and ready in peacetime to deter war, to fight and control wars that do start, and to terminate wars on terms favorable to US and allied interests. The complex world environment and the sophisticated military capabilities of potential adversaries . . . have removed the time buffer the United States previously enjoyed that allowed it to mobilize and train to an adequate level of readiness before engaging in combat operations. As recent events have illustrated, our nations ability to deter attack or act decisively to contain and de-escalate a crisis demands an essentially instantaneous transition from peace to war preparedness.¹

Curiously, Army Chief of Staff, General Carl Vuono, addressed this problem in the preface to *FM 25-100* after more than a decade of relative military calm. Although the statement had rung true long before the publication of this manual, it has been ever more applicable to the Army of the 1990s faced with the challenges of acting as a ground component of a joint force in the diverse operational environments facing them into the 21st century. Yet, through careful analysis, trainers at all echelons should now see that the expanse of military possibilities so refracts and distributes training focus that it compromises the very capacity to achieve and sustain any measure of unit readiness for no-notice military action. Commanders and trainers at all levels can no longer achieve broad unit readiness to perform within the land component of a joint force through "Battle Focused Training"² alone.

EXPANDING COMPLEXITY -- UNLIMITED POSSIBILITIES

Vuono and the authors of *FM 25-100* might have been able to imagine the rapidity of onset and the complexities of the operational contingencies occurring through the 1990s even before the implementation of the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986. Yet, it is less likely that they would have predicted the ballooning demand for no-notice joint interdependence
and joint interoperability within tightly integrated joint force packages and through elaborately joint processes that have become modus operandi for the military leadership and the National Command Authority (NCA).

The NCA and the military’s Unified Commanders (CINC)s have fully embraced the trend toward increased complexity of military operations within decreasing response cycles. Civilian authority and CINC’s alike look upon Army units, with their advertised capabilities, as interchangeable building blocks for joint forces, to be combined and employed, as the situation requires. Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities states: "Today’s commanders must be adaptive. They must be prepared to assume nonstandard missions for which there is no precedent or experience on which to rely and which do not fit perceived ideas of military operations." Given the dimensional increases in training responsibility for tactical commanders that such ideas connote, readiness to perform missions without notice continuously diminishes despite the most zealous application of doctrinal training management principles.

FM 25-100 goes further to clarify that the key to success in combat is to know how and what to train at every echelon. Its theme is that professionally focused training logically produces competence, confidence, and initiative in units that then lead to successful performance of any assigned mission. In focusing, that is, in determining how and what to train, commanders consider their enduring and likely missions in order to confine their resource application toward preparing for unit performance within the realm of the probable as opposed to the realm of the possible.

However, when examining their unit’s past and looking into its future, commanders cannot help but see, that the trends indicate that US military responses to world situations and crises are and will be increasingly dependent upon the rapid force-projection of constrained multi-service force packages with immediate integration into immature theaters of war. Once integrated, these units must perform technically complex military tasks under unpredictable conditions to support the entire spectrum of national policy. Conventional war plans no longer limit the unit commander's scope.
Neither can these commanders reasonably expect for their own tasks and missions, once derived, to nest neatly within those war plans or missions of their own higher headquarters. In conducting mission essential task list (METL) analysis for the operations of the future, commanders will increasingly find themselves challenged, if not unable to limit and prioritize the collection of tasks necessary to support all of their standing missions, war plans, and applicable contingencies.

The sheer numbers of tasks necessary to support unit functionality within the theoretical permutations of force and task combinations all but preclude a condition of comprehensive readiness for conflict without the exclusion of broad patterns or categories of operations. Prescient war planning might prioritize but cannot eliminate military potentialities and so, units will either be committed as they are, or with minimal mission-specific preparation. In either case, they will hazard the risks associated with relative unpreparedness. Historically, Army units have made up for such a lack of pre-conflict readiness with the creativity and leadership incumbent in their units and soldiers.

**COMMON SENSE -- NO READINESS PANACEA**

One author suggests that “the Army often relies on the versatility, flexibility, and common-sense of its soldiers and leaders to accomplish missions.” Of all these qualities, common-sense has surely carried the day before and it will again. Yet, too much is at stake to rely upon such intangibles given the grave consequences typically accompanying poor military performance. This same author goes on to say that, despite these qualities, "training for leaders and soldiers in the tasks that they can expect to perform . . . would go far towards smoothing both planning and execution." The corollary to this is that smooth planning and execution are not the predictable products of incomplete or misguided training programs. This is especially the case when training is applied to achieve readiness for ill- or undefined contexts, with or without vast amounts of individual and unit excellence in the form of versatility, flexibility, and common-sense.
METL BASED TRAINING -- THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR

The unit's first application of common-sense is that of their commander in his analysis of mission requirements. Preliminary to any training, commanders and training managers determine the essential tasks for which his units prepare by deriving a METL. Once this is done, the commander details the multitudes of battle tasks\textsuperscript{10} and training requirements needed to apply the unit's capabilities within the scope of the mission essential tasks. Units at brigade level and below commonly derive these essential tasks and battle tasks from quarterly and annual training guidance, higher echelon training directives, and standing war plans.

Commanders then allocate limited resources against these tasks in priority and aggregate them as training plans encompassing those plans of their subordinates units. Each training plan is unique and ostensibly focuses training resources toward achieving and sustaining the highest possible levels of readiness for the unit's most critical wartime tasks. Where commanders have latitude, they typically gravitate toward training for which they are familiar and for which the body of training doctrine and resources provide the best support. In combat arms\textsuperscript{11} units, these training plans most commonly apply a go-to-war focus that prioritizes missions and tasks pertinent to combat operations under the offense, defense, and security patterns of operations.

This phase of the training planning process is where the Army's current body of doctrine tactics, techniques, and procedures (DTTP) fails the commander. Commanders rarely consider much outside the body of DTTP that is necessary to achieve full interdependence and interoperability with the other major components of the joint force. While doctrine prompts and even facilitates detailed planning and preparation for go-to-war tasks in a hierarchical Army and ground force context, it does little to prompt identification and prioritization of joint integration tasks related to these go-to-war tasks in divergent joint environments. Therefore, commanders train toward readiness on their selected METL, not recognizing a potentially irrecoverable lack of readiness for integration and
interdependence within the joint force. This condition of unreadiness is likely to persist until the units are placed under a test within the joint force, where they are required to perform or fail.

If the training oversights are minor, versatility and creativity might just suffice. If resource-intensive inabilities to interact or integrate crop up, that prove to be showstoppers, then no amount of common-sense will compensate and the shortcoming will prevent effective application of that unit's capabilities in the necessary context within the required response cycles.

THREE CASE STUDIES IN MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

To examine the potential pitfalls of Battle Focused Training for the commander of the future, this study reviews the performance of Army tactical units in three major contingencies occurring since 1994. Conditions common to all three included: Army units employed within Joint Task Forces (JTFs) outside a typical divisional context; Army units required to force-project into small and/or immature theaters of war or conflict; and, situations which required close cooperation between Army and other service components below division and JTF headquarters level.

The first operation details the readiness of JTF 190 formed primarily of the 10th Mountain Division in their execution of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and demonstrates the efficacy of focused training for a one-of-a-kind mission and operational environment given detailed war planning and a lengthy response time. Even within the scope of the extensive planning and preparatory process, important joint integration issues caught tactical commanders and units off guard, but that versatility and common-sense prevailed allowing the mission to succeed. This case study demonstrates the vast complexity of the joint and operational contexts in which conventional Army units must perform.

The second operation shows that Army units can succeed in complex, no-notice missions as seen with the emergency deployment of 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division to Kuwait to reinforce units participating in Operation INTRINSIC ACTION. 1st Brigade's rapid deployment and integration demonstrated the effectiveness of combining a unit's METL-based training program with
the Army's proven Combat Training Center (CTC) program in the light of standing war plans. Familiarity with the specific mission and joint context of INTRINSIC ACTION and the uniqueness of this particular contingency played a major role in helping the commander to focus during both training and execution and enabled high states of readiness that allowed the unit to move from Fort Stewart Georgia to the Northern Kuwaiti border in less than five days.

Finally, a brief examination of the commitment of Task Force HAWK to Operation ALLIED FORCE in the spring of 1999 demonstrates the logical progression of the joint integration implications highlighted by the preceding case studies. This operation displays the immensity of problems that can arise from no-notice integration of tactical Army units into a JTF outside the scope of doctrine or a standing war plan. It further reveals that critical unit capabilities of TF HAWK were called into question upon their integration into an unfamiliar and unprecedented joint context thereby illuminating the impact of pursuing the new extremes of joint complexity for which tactical unit commanders of the future must prepare themselves.

Though many factors contributed to the successes and shortcomings of each of these three units including versatility, flexibility, and common-sense, each prepared for their respective missions utilizing the same training doctrine. Certain disparities in their performance or the presence of critical training implications primarily proceed from the inadequacy of that doctrine and its decreased potential to produce comprehensive readiness within contemporary military operations. It is likely that the Army will continue to participate in multitudes of such operations in the near future. How long will it be before the readiness implications indicated by these three give rise to military failure?

**SCOPE OF ANALYSIS**

This analysis focuses upon tasks that are peculiar to Army units at brigade level and below, operating as the core of the ground force component in a joint environment outside of their peacetime divisional structures. It evaluates the effectiveness of the Battle Focused Training management system in preparing the units of TF 190 and 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division to execute critical
joint integration tasks for the selected operations using three sets of criteria. The first set of criteria determines whether they were called upon to provide doctrinal capabilities in a doctrinal context as indicated by joint DTTP. The second set of criteria examines whether the unit’s training plans could or should have accounted for differences between actual and necessary states of readiness with respect to the specified integration capabilities. This would be indicated by the inclusion of these tasks in contingency training, or mobilization training plans drawn from available Army and joint DTTP reference materials. The final set of criteria apply only if the preceding two sets of criteria are satisfied and assesses whether any joint integration readiness shortfalls were due to a failure to utilize training materials or the time available for preparation.

Analysis of the first two cases answers three specific questions: What specific aspects of joint task performance significantly contributed to or detracted from the success of tactical Army unit performance in the selected joint operations; How could doctrine-based Battle Focused Training have produced such an outcome; and, What are the implications for unit readiness to operate in similar joint environment of the future?
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

XVIIIth Airborne Corps, and 10th Mountain Division assault forces busied themselves with last minute preparations aboard the United States Ships (USS) America and Eisenhower, and 60 separate Air Force transport aircraft as they closed within three hours of conducting the first ever air assault of an Army infantry force from the decks of an aircraft carrier. The date was 18 September 1994 and unbeknownst to the soldiers, sailors and airmen involved, former President Jimmy Carter had just secured agreement from the military junta controlling Haiti, to support the restoration of democratic civilian control to Haiti and allow the unopposed entry of US peacekeeping forces.

In an instant, the National Command Authority communicated through the offices of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the orders aborting the plan for non-permissive entry and directing execution of the related operational plan (OPLAN) for permissive entry with an immediate transition to post-conflict operations. In that same instant, JTF 190, the permissive entry and post-conflict package reverted from a supporting and follow-on role to that of the primary player for US policy in Haiti.

Immediate challenges associated with the transition between the two OPLANs centered on reallocation of operational resources and priorities from JTF 180's combat and combat support systems to JTF 190's combat, logistic and civil support systems. This intra-theater challenge combined with the concurrent requirement for expedition of the follow-on echelons of JTF 190 to create a significant impediment to decisive execution of permissive civil assistance actions.

As the joint staffs wrestled with these issues, tactical units of 10th Mountain Division commenced with daylight air movement from the decks of the USS Eisenhower in place of the midnight airborne and special operations forces (SOF) air assaults from the decks of the USS America. Soon thereafter, they established positions throughout Port Au Prince to assume the necessary posture to conduct support operations on the island nation.
Fast on their heels, the equally professional follow-on forces of JTF 190 flowed into theater through more conventional and customary modes to contribute to what was a great military success.\(^6\) Even though the permissive entry modifications to the OPLAN virtually eliminated the possibility for the conduct of integrated combat, the combined efforts of JTFs 180 and 190 on 19 September 1994 still represented a unique and intensely integrated joint military operation, of a type never before experienced by the US Army in conflict or war. They had seemingly demonstrated that amphibious air assault was just another way of getting things done.

The skillful engineers of this success were not the strategic planners, operational planners, or training planners but the hard-working men and women of the Army and Navy units associated with JTF 190 who had broken new ground in training, integrating and making things happen. They had collectively overcome Murphy’s Law and, in the end conducted themselves commendably. It was versatility, creativity, and common sense at the tactical level that held this unwieldy and unlikely operation together.

For practical purposes, all echelons of Army forces employed in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY were tactical units. The key Army teams included in the initial entry forces of JTF 190 were the 10th Mountain Division’s 1st Infantry Brigade, the 10th Aviation Brigade, and the 10th Forward Support Battalion. Even JTF 190’s headquarters was built upon the headquarters of the division -- typically a tactical unit itself.\(^7\) Each of these units found themselves bumping-up against joint integration and interrelation problems without the benefit of a higher Army headquarters to anticipate and resolve their problems or buffer them from the immediacy of inter-service coordination.

Lessons learned from the Haiti experience reflect across all battlefield operating systems and at all levels of war and command. Several lessons at JTF level pertained to the integration of multiple and nested JTFs, with their separate Time Phased Force Deployment Data lists (TPFDDs or TPFDLs) into a single and manageable OPLAN, and the use of naval vessels like
the USS Mount Whitney as a ground force command and control platform. For the tactical units, many of the lessons learned for the entry phase of the operation revolved around the use of Army forces in an air assault operation and the use of an aircraft carrier as a force projection platform. The volumes of lessons learned about the first hours of this military operation suggest strongly that, at tactical levels, the beginnings of the operation had been anything but ordinary.

**SAME OLD MISSIONS -- NEW JOINT CONDITIONS**

In the late summer of 1994, 10th Mountain Division soldiers were no strangers to complex or exotic missions commonly categorized as military operations other than war (MOOTW) given their recent experience in Somalia. Nor were these soldiers strangers to the kind of METL-based training for combat, including air assault operations, which is common fare for go-to-war training in any Light Infantry division. Despite this, their experiences and their DTTP could have in no way prepared them for the peculiarities of the physical domain of combat in which they were about to operate.

Nearly one year prior to its execution and without the knowledge or participation of the 10th Mountain Division commander, or his staff, planning for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY had begun in earnest while the division was still decisively engaged in operations in Somalia. In that year, significant developments in the operational planning at XVIIIth Airborne Corps Headquarters converged to set the necessary conditions for a unique amphibious mission.

Doctrinally, an amphibious air assault operation was enigmatic for the Army. *FM 100-5*, the Army's keystone operational manual merely suggests the possibility for application of combat power by air assault in an amphibious assault yet it only does so while making direct reference to US Marine Corps capabilities to project force. The two Army field manuals governing the employment of forces in amphibious operations, both of which predate the development of air assault doctrine, had fallen in to disuse being three decades out of currency. Regardless, only one of these obsolescent volumes is ever cross-referenced within current operational DTTP.
The Army Universal Task List (AUTL), a document intended to link Army tasks across all levels of war with joint tasks and capabilities, refers to amphibious and air assault operations with no suggestion of their combination within a single operation. Further, it provides no performance measures or standards which are necessary to the formulation of training objectives. The AUTL does cross reference Joint Publication 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (Joint Pub 3-02) and Joint Pub 3-02.2, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation, and these are the first useful operational documents which clearly integrate the concept of air assault into an amphibious operation. These joint publications also provide cross-reference to joint and naval DTTP, which are essential to efficient planning for any amphibious operation.

Other than by referencing Joint Pubs 3-02, and 3-02.2, the Army operational DTTP overlooks other important and useful documents that might have aided the planning and training for this UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Some of these include: Joint Pub 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations; Joint Pub 3-04.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter Operations; and, Naval Warfare Publication 22-3, Ship-to Shore Movement. These three manuals constituted the most pertinent references to the conduct of heliborne amphibious assault in 1994.

A careful review of references available in 1994 indicates that only Navy and Marine Corps amphibious doctrine attempted to iron out operational and tactical difficulties to be encountered in such an operation. It seems that over the decades of focus on Flexible Defense and Airland Battle, the Army had simply lost track of its amphibious capability allowing Army doctrine to become obsolete. Logically, Army training support materials never developed to support airmobile concepts within the amphibious context.

Given the lack of precedence and the dearth of Army DTTP, it is difficult to conceive how operational planners arrived upon this combination of Army and Navy capabilities as an option for force projection. Review of the planner's AAR comments reveal that they simply
stumbled upon this option through a process dubbed enhanced or adaptive joint force packaging\textsuperscript{27} arising from the unavailability of the military means having the optimum capabilities for the operational context. An even closer review exposes potential political motives behind this combination of force intended to demonstrate a new and vital role for the Navy's carrier fleet.\textsuperscript{28}

Nonetheless, during a planning session in May of 1994, operational planners\textsuperscript{29} acknowledged that the specifics of the permissive entry mission would require either amphibious forces or an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) with forces in the Caribbean to meet the stiff response timelines required to achieve the political objectives. Planners had already determined that US Marines, the optimum means for such a contingency, would not be available for Haiti contingency due to ongoing military commitments. They also ruled out the use of the 82nd Airborne Division due to their employment under JTF 180 as the non-permissive entry package in the same operation. And so, planners suggested the use of an available light infantry force with an aircraft carrier as an ISB for a force projection platform.\textsuperscript{30}

After some discussion about the importance of detailed rehearsals to such an original concept, they continued planning ignoring their own admitted cognizance of the need to keep things simple.\textsuperscript{31} At this advanced stage of planning, this concept defied both common-sense and the principles of FM 100-7, The Decisive Force, which indicate that, within the conduct of force packaging, planners must consider the correlation between unit training and their capability.\textsuperscript{32}

At this lofty planning level, where the integration of unfamiliar men and machines threatened no real or immediate consequences, the planning efforts continued to consume critical preparatory time. On 29 July, only six weeks before the conduct of the operation, XVIIIth Airborne Corps handed off planning for the operation to the staff of the 10th Mountain Division. At the same time, they transferred all the responsibility for sorting out all of the technical and tactical complications.\textsuperscript{33} In the transfer of the OPLAN, they never referred to the contingency as an amphibious operation. Through their application of adaptive joint force packaging and the
liberal use of the time available, XVIIIth Airborne Corps planners created an unparalleled challenge for the tactical executors of the mission.

Nonplussed, the 10th Mountain Division's commanders, planners and trainers at all echelons received their mission and dutifully adjusted METL-based training plans to meet what they perceived to be their new readiness demands. Regrettably, division, brigade, and battalion DTTP provided little insight for their effort with respect to the unique joint integration issues.

The review of adjusted METL-based training plans prepared by one of JTF 190's infantry battalions reveals that someone had, despite higher's best efforts to disguise the operation, determined that this was indeed, an amphibious operation. This fact should have been a blinding flash of the obvious from operational staffs on down, but, there exists no evidence that planners in the JTF 180, division, or brigade staffs approached the planning process as an amphibious problem set. For practical purposes, JTF 190 planned and executed amphibious tactics without the benefit of any amphibious doctrine.

Evidence indicates that tactical unit references similarly failed to shed any light on the demands of amphibious or carrier-based operations. *FM 71-100-2*, the primary DTTP for Infantry Divisions, does have a small section on the division's role in amphibious operations, but, it is quick to direct attention back to operational doctrine, namely *Joint Pub 3-02* and the obsolescent *FM 31-12* before providing any useful detail. *FM 71-100-2* also describes the use of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft as if they were simply interchangeable with and indistinguishable from amphibious landing craft in the planning and conduct of the amphibious assault. *FM 71-100-2* also provides no techniques for planning or integration of an air assault operations into the amphibious operation and fails to establish conditions or performance standards for any tasks.

*FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion* and *FM 7-30, The Infantry Brigade*, two other important tactical references necessary for outlining operations in infantry units, fail to even
mention amphibious operations at all. Subsequently, the mission training plans (MTPs) associated with these FMs, which are central to the training management processes of *FM 25-100 and FM 25-101*, are similarly devoid of any reference to them.\textsuperscript{36}

Without having their mission defined in an amphibious context, and with no firm foundation in Army doctrine at any level, trainers predictably produced plans to achieve increased proficiency in that which they were already accustomed and proficient: live-fire maneuver; fire support integration; and air assault operations.\textsuperscript{37} Lacking a doctrinal roadmap to achieve readiness for an aircraft carrier-based air assault, but recognizing the need to mitigate the unknown risks inherent in so complex an endeavor, trainers planned and executed air assault training using an Army airfield as the model for an aircraft carrier.\textsuperscript{38} At least common-sense was making up for where operational planning efforts and DTTP had failed.

10th Aviation Brigade, of all forces, realized the most dramatic changes in training priorities due to the requirement for them to conduct deck landing qualification (DLQ), over-water survival training, and door-gunner qualification live fires. Of the three training events, DLQ was the most resource intensive training and demanded precise time management to meet all the gates required by the Navy to execute safe operations.\textsuperscript{39} These tasks compounded the challenges associated with the aviation brigade’s requirement to conduct strategic self-deployment to the port of embarkation concurrent with their support of combined arms and JTF rehearsals. Fortunately each of these tasks had long since been incorporated in Army aviation training publications due to the increasing use of Army helicopters in combat support, service support, and special operations modes from the decks of naval vessels.

Unfortunately, unfamiliarity with ship-board operating requirements resulted in the aviation brigade’s failure to identify and cross-examine aircraft carrier technical references. Additionally, the Aviation Brigade’s DLQ and ship-board rehearsals took place on an altogether different aircraft carrier from the one on which they were employed.\textsuperscript{40} Because of this, specific
and technical aspects of integration and interoperation would plague them during their movement and conduct of rehearsals aboard the Eisenhower in route to the Joint Operational Area.

Closer examination of Joint Pub 3-04.1 and Naval Warfare Publication 42 would have established that helicopter operations using Army aircraft from the decks of particular naval vessels is not feasible without modification to either the aircraft or ship-board equipment because of particular and inherent incompatibilities. Not surprisingly, most of the ship types listed as compatible with AH-1s, OH-58s and UH-60s, the Army aircraft employed in this operation, were amphibious assault ships and landing craft. Because aircraft carriers were neither designed nor intended for such a military application, their compatibility is not reflected either way.\textsuperscript{41} Army aircrew members and fuel handlers would learn this important lesson only after their own OH-58 aircraft had embarked on the Eisenhower and found themselves unable to refuel.\textsuperscript{42}

While the Army aviation’s DTTP provides extensive reference to deck landing qualification and aircrew certification, it provides no detailed instruction for collective training, multi-ship operations, or sling-loading of equipment. These omissions can easily be accounted for upon review of the Army’s “Memorandum of Agreement\textsuperscript{43} for Deck Landing Operations” with the Navy where it reflected that the primary purposes for employment of Army aircraft aboard Navy vessels would be: conducting Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR); combat support; and, combat service support (CSS) operations. Conspicuously absent in the agreement is anything to do with unit heliborne assault or combat operations.

Because of the gaps in their training plans nurtured by the deficiencies of the supporting publications and doctrine, 10th Mountain’s units found themselves in a position to conduct extensive and critical retraining upon embarkation on the Eisenhower. In certain instances, they were forced to provide training to naval personnel and units who were required by naval regulation or shipboard operating procedure to perform the very functions they the ground force had thoroughly prepared for under Battle Focused Training.\textsuperscript{44}
TOO MUCH TIME ON THEIR HANDS

With almost one year to plan across the echelons from XIIIth Airborne, 10th Mountain Division, and their subordinate units, there should have been little excuse for deficiencies in preparation. Operational and tactical level planners could and should have estimated all of the time and resources necessary for training to a new mission-specific METL in support of the operation. Planning could and should have resulted in the preparation and coordination of focused training or even for a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) specific to the upcoming operation, which could leverage expertise and training resources from throughout US Atlantic Command (USACOM). Inexplicably, planning above the tactical units did not lead to the production of either a training plan or a mission-specific MRE.

Despite the existence of a working war plan, and the occurrence of mission specific rehearsals for Special Operations and 82nd Airborne forces associated with the non-permissive entry CONPLAN, it was not until six weeks prior to operations that 10th Mountain tactical units were invited to begin mission-specific planning and training. Despite their most professional efforts at framing the problem, the infantry, aviation, and support units never touched upon many of the important integration aspects of this operation. Some of these issues would be forced upon them only after embarking aboard US Navy vessels steaming for Haiti.

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND HAITI'S IMPLICATIONS

After analyzing Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY against the first set of criteria established for this analysis, this research demonstrates that the application of Army force capabilities through such a context is debatably doctrinal. As unlikely as this combination of capability may have seemed, the fact remains that the Army has had and should retain a level of amphibious capability and proficiency including all forms of airmobile or heliborne assault combinations. However, given the deficiency of DTTP relative to amphibious operations existing at that time, the inconsistent reference to joint DTTP, and the absence of a standing war
plan as envisioned by *FM 25-100*, it is not likely that tactical commanders within the 10th Mountain Division should have estimated a state of readiness for such a contingency. Nor is it reasonable to assume that TF 190's planners should have developed a cogent training plan to achieve a comprehensive state of readiness within the short six-week span of time allocated toward mission preparation. Application of this second set of evaluative criteria indicates that significant DTTP failings simply and thankfully went unrecognized in the execution of the operation, as it did not tax tactical unit readiness during the conduct of wholly permissive entry options. The third set of evaluative criteria for this research does not apply since JTF 190 units did effectively leverage time and training resources between initiation of tactical war planning and execution of the mission. If this third set of criteria were applied against XVIIIth Corps and USACOM level planners, it would strongly suggest that they neither leveraged time available for the non-permissive entry aspects of this operation, nor did they leverage that small amount of DTTP available to them for planning.

The downside potential for the results of this air assault operation was high. Operation DESERT ONE still stands as a grim reminder of what can come of poorly integrated joint heliborne operations which one author suggested was "predestined to fail. . . and its failure was a logical result of a process that needs serious reform." In the USACOM Joint AAR for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, JTF 180 planners acknowledged several unique circumstances that justified the abandonment of keep-it-simple planning principles including: "the lack of air, surface, or subsurface threat." This retrospective acknowledgement does not reconcile well with the general tone of other sweeping lessons learned about the complicated joint arrangement. Statements for the record such as "Using an aircraft carrier with an infantry brigade and Army aviation was a winning combination" and "this form of movement to a potential hostile environment is a viable option" belie the host of challenges overcome in this peculiarly peaceful military engagement. What then will prevent strategic and operational
planners, when faced with the requirement to apply adaptive joint force packaging, from extracting these lessons out of context?

In general, CINC USACOM, JTF 180, JTF 190 and unit level after action reviews (AARs) for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY reflect favorably upon Battle Focused Training and how it served 10th Mountain Division in preparing for both MOOTW and the given operational context. One cannot help but wonder how attribution for success can so readily point to a system that thoroughly prepared them to integrate fire and movement in a combat environment, which, in the end were not the skill sets that accomplished this mission. What if, despite the political agreement, Haiti’s ruling junta had chosen to resist ‘permissive entry forces’ during their air movement into Port Au Prince? Then, in addition to overcoming the unfamiliar challenges of conducting an air assault from an aircraft carrier, the entire burden of fully integrating the elements of joint combat power under fire would have fallen upon the shoulders of JTF 190 reinforced by JTF 180 reserves. It is still quite likely that they would have pulled it off.

It is also not impossible to conceive that they could have suffered a similar fate to DESERT ONE whose calamity is well known, or of the US Marine Corp’s Task Force X-Ray of DESERT STORM, whose amphibious helicopterborne assault aborted fully fifty minutes into the operation due to command, control, and integration unpreparedness.52

To date, there has been no fruitful effort to integrate UPHOLD DEMOCRACY’s amphibious air assault lessons learned with tactical or operational DTTP apart from the publication of *FM 1-564 Shipboard Operations*, which codifies Army aviation specific aspects of amphibious and shipboard operations. Other critical lessons remain scattered throughout the three volumes of "Initial Impressions," and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY AARs compiled at CALL, USACOM, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, and 10th Mountain Division databases and histories. Fully five years after the operation, the doctrinal cross-references provided for this type of operation lead the trainer scarcely closer to estimating the dimensions of the problem. Having paid little
heed to the lessons learned in the success of September 1994, there is no evidence of an ongoing
effort to update Army combined arms air assault and amphibious DTTP other than the
identification of the itemized lessons learned (DTLOMS)\textsuperscript{55} by the Center for Army Lessons
Learned (CALL). In fact, Joint Pub 3-33 brashly asserts that an Army Light Infantry is capable
of conducting such an operation in the future with \textit{no} additional training\textsuperscript{51} despite the fact that
trainers will have no new handle on this particular type of complex problem.
OPERATION INTRINSIC ACTION

Unlike the contingency for the stabilization of the democratic government of Haiti, many military operations conform much more closely to conditions for which units can anticipate, plan, and train. Association of tactical units with standing JTFs or Combined Joint Tasks Forces (CJTFs) and their regular rotation through ongoing contingency operations around the world provides a framework similar to that envisioned in FM 25-100 where overarching war plans and external directives profoundly influence a unit’s METL. Operation INTRINSIC ACTION, the deployment of Army ground maneuver forces in support of the defense Kuwait is one such example.

In the months following the seemingly decisive military action of DESERT STORM, the Commander in Chief of Central Command (CINCCENT) found himself in the unenviable position of having to consolidate the military and political gains of the war short of the total and abject defeat of the Iraqi army. As time progressed, Iraq’s cooperation with United Nations (UN) sanctions as well as with cease-fire provisions continuously deteriorated, allowing them to re-emerge as a significant threat to the security within the region and especially threatening the sovereignty of Kuwait.

In the face of their increasing non-compliance with the terms of the 1991 cease-fire and subsequent resistance to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) directed inspections of potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) production and storage facilities, CINCCENT established JTF-Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) as the joint and coalition headquarters to manage the reemerging military requirements in the region. JTF-SWA received the primary mission to protect the Kingdom of Kuwait against potential aggression by Iraq through the control of airspace over the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO), and through military assistance to Kuwaiti ground forces.

In this context, the Commander of JTF-SWA initiated two major military operations of his own, which entailed the continuous deployment of substantial US ground, air, and naval forces as well as US Army ground based air defense systems. These were Operations SOUTHERN WATCH and INTRINSIC ACTION. SOUTHERN WATCH secured coalition airspace and maritime control
in the KTO as well as enforced the specific terms of the UN directed 'no-fly' regions within Southern Iraq. INTRINSIC ACTION (IA) formalized a US ground force presence and a means for direct military assistance to the Kuwaiti Army through coalition training exercises. IA's purpose was to support both the ground defense of Kuwait and the training and readiness of their armed forces.

For INTRINSIC ACTION rotations, mechanized and armored Task Forces (TFs) from the continental United States rotate for four-month tours of duty during which they provide a standing deterrent to Iraqi aggression while conducting extensive unit and coalition training. Regular rotations have been the norm, and, since August 1992, IA has maintained the near-continuous forward presence with a US Army Bradley and Abrams equipped battalion sized unit. CINCENT has requested additional ground forces and directed the rapid reinforcement of IA ground forces in response to particular regional crises. INTRINSIC ACTION Rotation 98-01 was the most significant of these crisis situations.

CINCENT FLASHPOINT

In February 1998, the CINCENT responded to Iraq's expulsion of United Nations (UN) weapons inspectors and their failure to comply with UN sanctions by requesting and receiving authorization from the NCA for additional US Army mechanized forces as reinforcement for the standing IA force. On recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) of Fort Stewart and Fort Benning, Georgia, was designated as the response force. Soon thereafter, the 1st Brigade, 3ID from Fort Stewart alerted and began deployment from their home station as the maneuver core of the 3ID.

Scarcely weeks after returning to their home station from Operation BRIGHT STAR 97 in Egypt, the 1st Brigade Combat Team (1 BCT) was called upon to deploy to Kuwait, draw a full compliment of combat equipment, and move into a position of strength along the Iraq-Kuwait border. Here they would join the already deployed INTRINSIC ACTION forces and other JTF-SWA
supporting elements to provide a robust deterrent against any aggressive action by Sadaam Hussein thereby forcing Iraqi reconsideration of their non-compliance with UN inspection processes.

Out of cycle for any normal rotation to Kuwait, 1 BCT proved the worth of their own Battle Focused Training for this particular contingency by successful force projection and rapid assimilation into the CJTF with a matter of hours from their notification. "From a standing start, the Army force was in place—its weapons northward—within eight days." The keys to their success in this endeavor were their adept execution of strategic deployment, and their efficient conduct of Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI or RSO & I) into the KTO.

**MAKING IT LOOK EASY**

Strategic deployment and RSOI constitute among the most difficult of enabling operations for a modern mechanized force and have been a significant hindrance to joint military operations in the US's recent past. This is largely accounted for by the fact that every military contingency occurring outside of the Continental United States or the forward deployed bases of Army units in Western Europe or Korea requires the projection of Army forces through joint modes of transport into joint areas of operation. From beginning to end through these processes, Army forces are completely dependent upon the capabilities delivered by the US Air Force, the US Navy, the United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and the destination theater support commands. This condition of dependence demands a commonality of procedure and priority, which can only be achieved through a combination of training, careful planning, and coordination. Only a successful combination of these three can produce such a powerful example of force-projection as is seen with 1 BCT. Conversely, shortcomings in any of these can produce challenges of strategic proportions. Deployment of units to the Gulf War in 1990 provides an illustration of such a challenge.

When examined against the history of the US military deployment to the same theater of operations during Operation DESERT SHIELD, rapid armored force projection is no small feat. In fact, in a time of extreme crisis, the Army required more than 40 days to get the first armored
brigade-sized force into Saudi Arabia during the emergency military build-up subsequent to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Follow-on mechanized echelons went on to further demonstrate how ill-prepared the Army was for such an action.67

Even in the latter stages of the DESERT SHIELD coalition build-up, the US Seventh Corps (VII Corps) struggled against perplexing logistical challenges presented by an ill-planned and unrehearsed inter-theater deployment of heavy military forces and equipment from bases in Europe to the Theater of Operations. VII Corps, disorganized by the process of their own embarkation and deployment, could neither equip their men and units in the face of imminent hostilities nor project forward of their ports of debarkation to the battlefield with any semblance of combat capability. Only days and weeks of waiting while pondering their unpreparedness solved the dilemma for the corps commander and his subordinate tactical commanders. After nearly two months in transit, an unmerciful transportation system finally completed its delivery, and VII Corps, at last, marshaled and integrated combat power into active operations. In the final summation, VII Corps' experience alone significantly delayed the coalition ground attacks of Desert Storm and might have proven disastrous had Sadaam Hussein's offensive intentions been less restrained.68

In contrast to the deployment of forces to DESERT SHIELD, 1 BCT's execution of movement planning and execution were flawless demonstrations of both the division's and brigade's grasp of the joint transportation considerations. Despite moving more than 5500 soldiers, and 10,490,000 pounds of "To Accompany Troops' equipment,"69 no significant delays or inconveniences resulted at the port of debarkation. Additionally, their skillful conduct of RSOI permitted the fielding of armored forces in battalion strength within hours of arrival. "It was power projection as the Army had planned and trained for since the end of Operation Desert Storm. It was supposed to go like clock-work, and it did."70 Their mission set new high-water marks for armored force projection although it must be noted that they had a leg-up on this operational problem.
1 BCT enjoyed numerous and significant advantages in this force-projection endeavor including, most notably, a body of effective and familiar DTTP to govern their training for war, and, the availability in the KTO of a potent Army War Reserve (AWR) package. Of the two advantages, the AWR package mentioned here provided the single most tangible benefit to 1 BCT upon their arrival in Kuwait. This particular war reserve, positioned at Camp Doha, Kuwait has a six-year history of quality performance and has made a lasting impact upon Army force-projection training, reaching far beyond the Kuwaiti desert.

During the withdrawal of ground forces in the wake of DESERT STORM, the US Army and CENTCOM established the AWR package in Camp Doha to facilitate the rapid force projection of armored forces into the KTO as required to support regional contingencies. This package fell under the responsibility of ARCENT-KUWAIT who dedicated it to support rotational units for INTRINSIC ACTION in the absence of other military requirements in the region. From that time, ARCENT-KUWAIT controlled and coordinated the brigade set of equipment with the aid of civilian contractors, who have created a uniquely efficient military arming system and meticulously maintain the set between its use by IA units. It was this user-friendly system, which greeted 1 BCT upon their arrival in Kuwait.

In order to achieve their stiff deployment timelines, 1 BCT deployed to the KTO without the bulk of their heavy equipment and drew the full compliment combat and combat support systems from among the prepositioned equipment at Camp Doha. This operation was completely dependent upon the Camp Doha’s performance and it was one of the few occasions for which the entire brigade-sized set was required for issue. Despite the scale of the requirement, Camp Doha’s processes proved themselves flawless and the arming of 1 BCT went off without a hitch.

Doha, after nearly six years of operation, was a well-oiled machine. One observer of a US Army Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT) examined the quality support provided by the INTRINSIC ACTION receiving system nearly one year prior to the deployment of the 1 BCT and
noted: "that this is a first class operation, focused on total support to the soldier. ARCENT-KUWAIT is a responsive, pro-active, mission, and soldier oriented organization."\textsuperscript{73}

**A RECIPE FOR SUCCESS**

1 BCT's transition to a war footing should have been an efficient one given the breadth and sufficiency of doctrine, tactics, and techniques available for the training manager of an IA-bound force with or without the advantages of so refined an reception and arming system as that of Camp Doha. Since DESERT STORM, the Army has diligently codified and refined the supporting and coordinating tasks necessary to accomplish this feat of force projection and facilitate a smooth entry to theater operations.

As previously stated, the key joint integration tasks central to 1 BCT's success during this operation were strategic deployment; and, Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration. Of these, the Army has long been accustomed to performing the first. The latter is a newer process, borne of the lessons-learned from years of Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises and refined with the hard earned lessons of Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. Both entail intensely joint processes.

Current joint and Army doctrine are replete with reference to 'power-projection,' 'Force projection,' and 'deployment.' *Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* provides the emphasis from the pinnacle of US military doctrine where it describes force-projection, strategic transportation, and sustainment of combat forces as "foundational capabilities"\textsuperscript{74} for the prosecution of operational art. *Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations* is consistent with this emphasis and provides a clear focus for the development of the broad expanse of joint DTTP that covers virtually every aspect of these readiness concerns. *Joint Pub 3-35, Deployment/Redeployment, Joint Pub 5-03.1, The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Joint Pub 4-01.8, Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration* and the Army's supplements to these provide the specific
instructions necessary for the planning and execution of a force-projection operation including deployment and RSOI in both deliberate and crisis-action-planning scenarios.

Army doctrine is equally emphatic starting with *FM 100-5*, which states that: "Force projection is the demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, deploy, and operate anywhere in the world."\(^{75}\) It is among the most important capabilities of the modern Army of the United States. Its emphasis on force-projection and power-projection begins in the preface of the document and pervades throughout.\(^{76}\) *FM 100-5* transfers this level of import to the tactical doctrine.

Corps level *Field Manual, FM 100-15* describes force-projection operations as "the essence of US national military strategy."\(^{77}\) It further describes the process of force projection as "inherently joint,"\(^{78}\) and delineates its full dependence upon pre-mobilization readiness. *Corps Operations* is also clear that METLs and unit-training plans must reflect and prioritize mobilization and deployment tasks\(^{79}\) including 'deployment' and 'entry' operations.\(^{80}\) *FM 100-15* details deployment, reception, and onward movement as specific responsibilities for the corps during the conduct of force-projection operations. Notably, this detailing provides no suggestion of the possibility of small unit force-projection apart from the involvement of the corps.

*FM 71-100, Division Operations* eliminates any doubt left by *FM 100-15*’s omission of divisional responsibilities by emphasizing that "all US Army divisions must be prepared to perform force-projection operations."\(^{81}\) The manual then dedicates an entire appendix to discussion of the necessary and close relationship between deployment-oriented\(^{82}\) training and readiness.\(^{83}\) It also cross-references the reader to useful DTTP specific to force-projection to the KTO: CALL *Newsletter 90-11, Getting to the Desert*, which details challenges faced by US ground forces in 1990. Shortcomings of *Division Operations* include a lack of detailed discussion of RSOI responsibilities within the division and the absence of cross-reference for specific RSOI procedures.

*FM 7-30, Brigade Operations* is consistent on the themes of criticality of deployment capability and the importance of training for force-projection operations. It is much less clear about
identifying responsibilities of the brigade for conduct of RSOI tasks instead focusing upon those
tasks central to the conduct of forcible entry or opposed entry operations. Fortunately for the training
planners at brigade level, it is precisely at this echelon of training that the supplementary tactics,
techniques, and procedures available on these issues make up for the inadequacy of the doctrine.

Since DESERT SHIELD and STORM, the US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned
(CALL) has compiled libraries of the lessons learned through the deployment and RSOI of various
units. CALL carefully maintained these lessons as they evolved through every major development
occurring in the scope of ongoing military operations. Beginning with Newsletter 90-11, Getting to
the Desert, and culminating with its production of Newsletter 97-07, Reception, Staging, Onward
Movement And Integration (RSOI), CALL's efforts ensured that brigades and other tactical units
experienced no deficiency due to lack of access to information. Each of these products represented
unparalleled efforts to capture lessons and offer practical solutions or DTTP to the trainer and leader.

CALL Newsletter 97-07 states: "RSOI is the critical link between strategic deployment and
tactical maneuver." CALL clearly treated it as such with their publication of this and other force-
projection oriented volumes and their constant review of RSOI processes and developments. These
reviews have resulted in extensive special reports of RSOI performance in the context of various
military contingencies notably including Operation INTRINSIC ACTION in 1996.85

Additional emphasis on RSOI arises from the Army's Combat Training Center Program86 and
especially the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. At the NTC, the target
training audience is the Brigade Combat Team and its subordinate units. Units conduct training
under the auspices of having deployed to Joint Task Force Mojave87 to conduct Reception, Staging,
Onward Movement, and Integration into an immature theater of war. NTC has long acknowledged
that "Projecting forces from bases in the continental United States is the major way in which the
Army responds to regional crises"88 and weights their month-long training event toward preparing
BCTs for this eventuality. Though a BCT spends only 26 days on the ground at Fort Irwin, fully seven of these are dedicated to the performance and assessment of their exercise of RSOI.99

Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) provides the framework for arming in theater and Camp Doha provides the model for the organization of NTC’s notional APA/AWR equipment.90 FM 100-17-1, Army Prepositioned Afloat Operations, and Joint Pub 4-01.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations provide the joint framework and the specific procedures for their execution in exacting detail. Additionally, multitudes of CALL publications specific to operations at the NTC such as CALL Newsletter: 99-06, CTC CSS: THE TAIL TALKS, reinforce and clarify the most effective techniques for RSOI in the NTC’s AWR/APA environment.91 In all, a virtual library of DTTP exists to support trainers at the brigade level in achieving readiness toward these critical joint tasks.

Just as operational and tactical doctrines are clear about the importance of deployment and RSOI, so too is the Army’s Battle Focused Training doctrine. FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 single-out strategic deployment in accordance with the requirements of a war plan as the most commonly identified task in the repeated examples of critical and METL tasks.92 This is a curiously consistent pattern of emphasis in two manuals that shy from prescribing solutions to METL analysis. Battle Focused Training typically suggests diversity of interpretation: "in similar type organizations, mission essential tasks may vary significantly because of wartime missions."93 With such consistency of emphasis and specificity of reference across service and joint DTTP, it is inconceivable that any competent trainer would have failed to include deployment and RSOI in some context as central and key elements to their Battle Focused Training plan.

A UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Without diminishing the accomplishment of the soldiers of 1 BCT, it must be acknowledged that they succeeded having all of the aforementioned advantages and under a very peculiar and precise set of military conditions. It seemed as though this contingency was custom-made to fit their
unit training plans as no closer match of unit readiness with respect to specific joint integration tasks could have been possible. In addition to the sufficiency of DTTP and the high quality of AWR support, 1 BCT had been the beneficiary of incomparable training opportunities, and of close association with the tactical units already on the ground in Kuwait for IA.

The reinforcement of INTRINSIC ACTION forces in February 1998 was undertaken by what was a uniquely qualified and well-prepared unit. Having recently returned from the full-force deployment as the only US Army brigade-sized unit participating in BRIGHT STAR 97 exercises in Egypt, 1 BCT had rehearsed to full scale and honed to a fine edge the critical skills necessary for real-world deployment and RSOI. Further, 1 BCT completed an NTC rotation less than nine months prior to their deployment to BRIGHT STAR which had further prepared them for the reception processes of APA at Camp Doha. Assigned as the Designated Ready Brigade (DRB)\(^4\) for the XVIITH Airborne Corps and 3ID to execute such a contingency, they were at the peak of personnel and unit readiness.\(^5\) On or about 10 February 1998, 1 BCT had no equal in terms of readiness and deployment experience. It should have been no wonder that, with or without significant warning or lead-time, this unit landed on their feet.

The final advantage enjoyed by 1 BCT was the fortuitous presence of a sister unit already participating in INTRINSIC ACTION at the time of their alert. Task Force 1-30 (TF 1-30) of another brigade in 3ID was the rotational unit in Kuwait at the time of the 1 BCT alert. TF 1-30 provided significant assistance through direct liaison and in-country coordination on behalf of 1 BCT from the moment of notification. Colonel Brandenburg, commander of the 1st Brigade cited them along with his own soldiers and officers as "significant contributors"\(^6\) to the success of this deployment.

**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND IA'S IMPLICATIONS**

The performance of 1 BCT in February 1998 lacks a contemporary comparison for a heavy force projection. The sheer rapidity of the operation in response to the directives of the National Command Authority had an impact far beyond their weight of military force. Within hours of their
arrival in Kuwait, Iraqi diplomats acquiesced and formalized a new agreement for resuming UN directed inspections. While hundreds of aircraft and dozens of naval vessels had simultaneously been repositioned within the KTO, it seemed that the strategic results were due largely to the deployment of this armored brigade.97

Yet, this operation begs the question: How doable would these actions have been in so short a timeframe, had 1 BCT not been specifically trained toward them under a Battle Focused Training program? Delays in the desired political effect or worse might have been the results of calling upon a less prepared unit to deploy and stand guard in Northern Kuwait.

Despite these potentialities, 1 BCT's participation in IA was a resounding success. Upon examination against the first set criteria for analysis of Battle Focused Training concepts, the adequacy of doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures necessary to support the deployment and RSOI of a mechanized brigade into Camp Doha Kuwait was unquestionable. In fact, at the time of their deployment and until the time of this writing, there were and are few joint integration processes that were better documented in the body of DTTP. Additionally, this DTTP was readily available to trainers and leaders at all levels in multiple media, both written, taped, and on-line to promote its use in the development and sustainment of readiness-oriented training.

After assessing the second set of criteria, the adequacy of 1 BCT's training plans toward preparation for the joint integration tasks of deployment and RSOI was also commendable. Unit actions preceding the contingency spok3 clearly for their training intentions, as this unit was clearly focused upon training for a SWA-based, AWR/APA resourced, force-projection operation. Given that every major training event in the months preceding 1 BCT's deployment had been oriented on such a contingency, and that the vast external resources provided toward many of these training events focused on 1 BCT alone, it is difficult to imagine where a clearer focus of plans or resources could have played a role. In this instance, the "several days" notice between warning and execution orders given by the JCS and NCA would and should have been more than sufficient to allow for
detailed reviews of deployment plans and the refinement of TPFDLs to enable execution to high standards of performance. 98

Because there were no deficiencies demonstrated in execution, and there was significant preparatory time available, the third set of evaluative criteria do not apply. 1 BCT suffered no failure in performance due to either utilization of DTTP or time available.

The downside potential for inefficiency in this operation was not so high as the possibilities of failure occurring in either Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY or DESERT SHIELD. While Iraqi non-compliance with UN requirements might have continued indefinitely, it is unlikely that they could have undertaken any significant offensive action across the Kuwaiti border given the SOUTERH WATCH air forces, and in-country IA forces combined with robust a Kuwaiti field force. Yet, the rapid projection of substantial ground forces secured its reputation as a potent weapon in the political arsenal of the NCA and reaffirmed this capability as the essence of military power within the national military strategy. 99

Military and public media reflect consistently positively upon how the Battle Focused Training served 1 BCT in their preparation. One must wonder about the likelihood of so high a level of performance had the operation called for force-projection through other means, to other world environments, to or through an immature theater not resourced by AWR/APA by a unit less trained in force-projection skills. Versatility, flexibility, and common sense might have proven sufficient and yet the technical aspects of performance in this example suggest plenty of room for failure.

It is not inconceivable that a force so projected could suffer a similar ordeal as that of VII Corps in DESERT SHIELD or to that of Joint Task Force HAWK in Operation ALLIED FORCE where the act of getting to and integrating in the battle constituted the most deficient and distressing element of the campaign.

A single most burdensome ramification of INTRINSIC ACTION is that the NCA has seen a flawless demonstration of no-notice heavy force-projection. How well will JCS and national security
planners recognize the unique contextual attributes of 1 BCT’s performance? How many Army
contingency force commanders should reasonably expect so refined and functional a system as that
supporting 1 BCT’s force projection? Will the NCA’s lesson learned be that power-projection is
synonymous with immediacy? Certain of these questions may never be answered. Some are
answered in analysis of JTF HAWK in Operation ALLIED FORCE.

On a very positive note, the combination of INTRINSIC ACTION, NTC, deployment, and
RSOI provide a model for the effective capture of lesson-learned and their re-integration as DTTP.
The Army’s process is continuous and dynamic, producing timely and useful documentation, which
exists at the very fingertips of the training manager. Adoption of such thoroughly integrated
analytical processes serve to insure that the tasks particular to armored force power-projection to
theaters equipped with AWR materials will succeed with or without war plans or early warning.
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

Operation ALLIED FORCE, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response to the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav Republic of Kosovo, combined certain of the problematic aspects of both previously examined operations resulting in nearly insurmountable problems for the tactical units constituting the US ground force component named Task Force HAWK (TF HAWK). This small aggregation of tactical units, primarily drawn from the Fifth US Corps (V Corps) in Europe were called upon to conduct no-notice strategic deployment into an unprecedented joint context for which Battle Focused Training had not fully prepared them.

Despite achieving a measure of success in their endeavors similar to that of TF 190 or 1 BCT from the previous case studies, the pains encountered during TF HAWK’s deployment and integration into an active air campaign combined with tragedy to cast a dark shadow across the accomplishments of this unlikely force package. It was TF HAWK’s encounter with two previously analyzed challenges from UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, and INTRINSIC ACTION, which are most worthy of examination here. These included: rapid deployment of Army units with no-notice; and deployment of Army units into a non-doctrinal joint operational environment. Unlike in the previous two operations, TF HAWK wrestled with their challenges in the face of ongoing hostilities against a resolute enemy force.

NATO ATTACKS

On 24 March 1999, NATO committed coalition air power against the ground forces of Slobodan Milosevic in both Serbia and in Kosovo. Acting in accordance with UN resolutions and North Atlantic Council\(^{100}\) (NAC) directives, the American dominated coalition commenced an around-the-clock bombing campaign entitled Operation ALLIED FORCE aimed at destroying Serbian will to wage ethnic war. From the onset, NATO forces sought to achieve the political objectives established by the UN and NAC from the air alone.\(^{101}\)
The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) had planned and refined the coalition air campaign since the summer of 1998.\textsuperscript{102} With confidence borne by previous coalition air operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO and the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark expected this war to last hours or days at the most.\textsuperscript{103} Yet, after weeks of continuous bombing, it became increasingly evident to SHAPE planners and the interested public, that the coalition objectives might not be achieved under the current strategy in time to make any difference for the Kosovar-Albanian people. This realization waxed as sentiment for more aggressive military action, especially from the British representation to NATO, prompted tough questions concerning military ground-force options.\textsuperscript{104} To the chagrin of many who feared the genocide of Kosovar-Albanians a fait accompli, there simply were no viable ground force options immediately available to the coalition or even for the United States alone.\textsuperscript{105}

**THE ARMY TO THE RESCUE -- A GROUND OPTION IN THE WORKS**

Lacking a plan for the employment of ground forces but finally receiving the permission of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense to do so, General Clark ordered the deployment of TF HAWK to staging areas in Albania as a preliminary to their integration in combat operations. Headquartered by elements of the V Corps staff, the heart of the force was a battalion-sized Apache equipped attack helicopter unit supported with long-range artillery. Also included were the necessary ground and logistical support elements for the Apaches and artillery as well as a brigade-sized armored force for use in base defenses in Albania. Notably, no intact Army organization of any type commanded by a colonel or higher was included. The total force package was initially to be comprised of fewer than 2000\textsuperscript{106} total soldiers who, upon their arrival in Tirana, Albania, fell under the command of the CJTF Headquarters, US Armed Forces South.\textsuperscript{107}

The various elements of HAWK deployed under diverse controls and through multiple means. Intra-theater movement of heavy and supporting equipment from bases in Germany into Albania occurred by road, rail, sea, and heavy airlift. The Apaches completed a self-deployment by
flying to staging bases near Tirana where they linked-up with their ground support systems. In all, the deployment took more than two weeks.\textsuperscript{108}

TF HAWK's deployment was greatly delayed by continuing inclement weather throughout Europe and the Balkans.\textsuperscript{109} Their reception in theater was further disrupted by the ongoing reception and integration of Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE, the coalition peace-keeping forces providing humanitarian assistance to Kosovar-Albanian refugees.\textsuperscript{110} The delays and confusion reflected negatively, albeit unfairly, on unit readiness and boded poorly for their rapid integration and use.

TF HAWK's readiness quickly came under scrutiny with regard to their flight crew's qualification for immediate operations under all-terrain and weather conditions in the theater. Further doubt was cast by the tragic loss, in rapid succession, of two of the twenty-four assigned Apache aircraft with their air crews to training accidents. In a veritable media-storm of controversy they continued with their staging and onward movement toward integration in the air campaign until the sudden capitulation of Milosevic and withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosoovo.\textsuperscript{111}

By that time, the calls for execution of substantial ground combat operations had dampened in the wake of improving performance by NATO's air armada. The weather, and the Rules of Engagement (ROE), both severe air-war limiting factors, had become quite favorable to the attack profiles of the coalition air planners and aircraft. Simultaneously, the assessments of Serbian losses escalated rapidly. Loosing of political constraints on military target selection and the continuing general concerns about the readiness of the elements of TF HAWK added to the operational mix to provide ample rationale for their non-employment. Though NATO's issuance of the cease-fire ultimately denied TF HAWK the chance to redeem themselves, it also may have protected them from further insult by potentially disastrous performance in a severe combat environment.

In the end, General Clark acknowledged that, though SHAPE and V Corps had explored ground offensive operations, none of these, including any plan for employment of TF HAWK, were ever completed before the cessation of hostilities on 6 June.\textsuperscript{112} NATO, SHAPE, V Corps, and TF
HAWK had all been caught flat-footed by the deployment into theater of a ground force for whom there was no realistic role.

SUMMARY OF LESSONS RE-LEARNED THROUGH TF HAWK

What then were the implications of the potential employment plan for TF HAWK and how do they reflect upon the findings of the first two case studies represented here? One joint integration specter revisited through this situation is the joint force commander’s accelerating trend toward ever-more creative and adaptive force packaging. Department of Defense (DOD) lessons learned in Kosovo indicate that there were ongoing efforts to integrate the Apache helicopter equipped elements of TF HAWK into coalition air operations and not as a preliminary to the planning of ground offensive operations. This arguable misapplication of Army aviation was an initiative that certain influential elements of the Joint Staff resisted to the point of stonewalling consideration of General Clark’s request for Apaches by the NCA for more than one week. Further evidence of the intent to employ Apaches as offensive elements in the air war arises from the timing of General Clark’s request for and commitment of TF HAWK. Advertised as an all-weather-capable attack force, they were requested during a period when coalition air strikes against mobile targets were proving consistently ineffective due to both stiff ROE and poor weather. Finally, DOD’s curious reference to TF HAWK when concluding that all elements of US forces must "regularly experiment with the innovative, independent use of key elements," confirms the frustrated intention to use of TF HAWK in an 'innovative' and 'independent' role. Therefore, without a thought for the complexities to be encountered by the tactical commanders, the CINC and his operational planners committed this helicopter unit into an unfamiliar joint context in the midst of an armed conflict leaving them to figure-out the tactical details for themselves.

A second implication follows from NATO and SACEUR having prepared neither an effective war plan for a ground offensive into Kosovo, nor a coherent plan for the integration of ground forces or Army aviation into a supporting role in the air campaign during the conduct of their
deliberate or crisis action planning. This placed the leaders and trainers of TF HAWK in the worst of all possible circumstances to prepare for that war under the principles of FM 25-100 or 25-101. They had no applicable doctrine, command directives, or operational concepts from which they could have derived and focused an effective training plan for their readiness preparation aimed at possible integration into offensive operations of an air-only campaign. Further, as a ground force thrust into an air war, they had no relevant body of personal military experience to draw upon.

Department of Defense lessons learned for operations in Kosovo as reflected in DefenseLINK\textsuperscript{117} highlight Task Force HAWK's experience as a unique in military history. From among the six primary lessons derived from ALLIED FORCE, TF HAWK's hardships appear at the top indicating that their "challenges pointed out a need to experiment with the innovative, independent use of key elements of military forces in the absence of their usual supporting and supported command elements."\textsuperscript{118} Strangely, what DOD finds is that increased and not decreased experimentation in the combination of heretofore-unfamiliar joint capabilities is warranted. With any hope that these lessons truly are learned, DOD must be implying a need for experimentation before as opposed to within the context of ongoing military operations.
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS

The 'what ifs' of the three operations under examination were never realized and so any training shortfalls were redeemed by a combination of good fortune and the versatility, flexibility, and common-sense of American soldiers upon which the NCA, JCS, and CINCs have obviously come to depend. None of the situations consummated their peace-time preparations with an armed clash and so any implications of this analysis are admittedly suggestive. These suggestions are, nonetheless, very clear.

All three Army forces secured their measure of military success in a similar manner -- through successful force-projection short of actual combat. While this hardly meets what has been the traditional measure of military success, power-projection has become the most common gauge of ground force competence under the most recent pattern of Army and ground force operations.

10th Mountain's actions during UPHOLD DEMOCRACY depended upon and succeeded through versatility, creativity and determination in an unfounded situation with a limited and under-resourced mobilization period. In contrast, soldiers of the 1 BCT, 3ID had been prepared to exacting standards through Battle Focused Training for their rapid deployment exercise long before their no-notice commitment. They were employed in a manner for which they were precisely prepared. Finally, and without any forewarning, TF HAWK lurched into an unexpected and unfounded situation for which their creative and adaptive characteristics nearly failed to suffice. All three forces claimed success in their joint integration endeavors. All three endeavors bore little resemblance to any other military contingency for which these units might have trained or for which they might have been called.

The erstwhile successes of TF 190 and TF HAWK stand in clear contradiction to keystone Joint Doctrine which states that, "the basis and framework for successful campaigns is laid by peacetime analysis, planning, and exercises." Their relatively positive performances seemingly decry Joint Pub 1's posit by perpetuating the illusion that creative and determined application to a
problem and a liberal measure of luck can compensate for a lack of the knowledge and skills necessary to operate and interoperate within any given joint context. This in itself may be an indication that contemporary measures of military success are too generous or the tests themselves far too forgiving.

By UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, and JOINT FORCE this research demonstrates that the NCA, CINCs and operational planners are increasingly uninhibited in their creativity when packaging multi-service capabilities. From INTRINSIC ACTION and JOINT FORCE it is similarly clear that the NCA, CINCs, and planners expect no-notice readiness and results independent of the peculiarities of the operational situation. Lastly, Operation ALLIED FORCE suggests that the logical convergence of these two implications occurs at or near a condition of military chaos.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Though this analysis might seem to indicate that tactical units in the Army should place a higher priority in training for joint integration and critical interoperability tasks, this is not the point. Battle Focused Training can and does produce units that are trained and ready for war and MOOTW within the general hierarchical and joint context for which they regularly train. Army performance in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, as well as those actions of 1 BCT in INTRINSIC ACTION clearly established this fact time and again. Where Battle Focused Training proves insufficient is when the necessary operational combinations shatter paradigms formed under diligent peacetime training toward traditional readiness.

In all instances where the Army commits forces into potential conflict, it must minimize the chance for such disruptions. The embedded joint integration and interoperability tasks must be a known and, if possible, familiar problem set. When this is not possible, operational planners must identify the readiness resource requirements, namely time, before penciling untried or uncatalogued capabilities-combinations against their urgent operational problems. By accounting for the spectrum of innovative possibilities in published war plans and training directives, it is possible to prevent shattered paradigms and their accompanying tactical ineptitude.

Such war plans or training directives would also make up for the conceptual deficit resulting from the lack of an over-arching war plan or operational concept required in FM 25-100's training model, thereby reconciling the training system to the current modus operandi of the operational planner. Without complete and prior consideration of these possibilities, units will continue to accomplish their 'out-of-the-box' missions with plenty of vigor but with little precision and an ever-increasing likelihood of failure.

When applying enhanced or adaptive joint force packaging, operational planners must account for the magnitude of any shift that the force packaging involves from contexts or conditions for which extant states of readiness had been achieved. They must further make this accounting in an
objective rather than subjective manner. They must consider the training ramifications for both supporting and supported components so that both arms receive adequate early warning, training guidance, and opportunity for inter-service coordination. In those particular instances, where standing war plans or training directives do not exist intact, joint force commanders must "[strike] a balance between the need to limit information and the risk of compromise" by getting their evolving concepts into the hands of tactical executors at the earliest prudent date. With increasingly innovative options, the balance must turn more toward the favor of the tactical unit.

Barring development of such prescient war plans, the Army and the CINCs must join efforts to more carefully capture and subsequently integrate the body of joint military experience into service and joint DTTP. Where required but untested joint combinations present themselves, they must interpolate and codify task, conditions, and standards or they must conduct the aforementioned experimentation.

Much of the experimentation called for within DOD's AAR of Operation JOINT FORCE is part of the Army's past, not its future. Many of the joint integrative obstacles the Army has yet to overcome are not new to the Army or to the joint force at large. Some experiences, like that of DESERT STORM's Task Force X-Ray are well chronicled by the Army's sister-services. DTTP must capture, collate, and thoroughly integrate all of the two-plus centuries' worth of US military lessons learned.

Where experience is lacking, experimentation may be the order of the day keeping in mind that Army commanders and trainers must experiment within their limited readiness means. It would be both infeasible, and illogical to pursue a course of joint experimentation and innovation without an eye for where, how, and why they would apply such combinations. Then, and only in priority, should they isolate and test new capabilities-combinations to validate the joint integrative processes arising from them.
Once collected, a more disciplined organization of the available training materials is required. First, this organization must compile all DTTP necessary to achieve a quantifiable and comprehensive state of readiness for any joint context to which their capabilities may be applied. Eventually service and joint DTTP should crosswalk between all unit types and capabilities to reflect the entire gamut of adaptive force packaging permutations deemed, feasible, acceptable or suitable by the CINCs and the implicated services. Secondly, DTTP must provide consistent and objective measures of effectiveness necessary to inform operational planners how available unit readiness compares against the proposed capability application options. Finally, all such joint and service DTTP should be made readily accessible to tactical trainers who can leverage hard-earned lessons without having to pour through piles of impertinent and tangential doctrine, sister-services training publications, and unwieldy internet databases -- or risk paying in blood for not doing so.

This then would provide CINCs and their planners adequate measuring tools to gauge the training challenges units may face given even massive shifts of their METL-influencing conditions. They could then invest their resources toward mitigating the operational risks associated with each set of tactical training challenges. Two particularly effective means of obtaining advantage over these challenges currently at use within the Army include the Combat Training Center (CTC) program, and the Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE).

CTC—THE PREMIER MODEL FOR COMPONENT TACTICAL TRAINING

The US Army's CTC program includes operations at and in support of the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). These each provide an effective model for relevant land component training aimed at producing and sustaining the competent and effective ground-force building blocks of any JTF. CTC training focuses purposefully on tactical land force effectiveness in the well-rounded context of operations in a complex theater of war as a member of a combined-arms land component in a joint environment.124
At the CTCs, units exercise their joint capabilities and resources extensively to both familiarize ground force commanders and staffs with joint capability and its potential to contribute to ground force effectiveness, as well as to promote continued development and refinement of the Army’s version of joint DTTP.\textsuperscript{125}

Joint contexts and conflict scenarios are fully scalable and adaptable to the supported CINC’s perception of relevance although clearly applied from an Army perspective. The CTCs receive integral participation from the US Air Force for both deployment and tactical air operations. The Marine Corps commonly participates as an element of the ground force at the NTC and the JRTC. Navy participation is typically limited to close air support training and support to Sea Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (SEDRES) used to deploy light force and Army aviation units from their home stations to the NTC or the JRTC.\textsuperscript{126}

The CTCs, were instrumental in developing the joint force competencies of the US ground forces employed in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.\textsuperscript{127} Since then, they have become models for military training systems employed by the US Air Force and several US allies alike. The CTCs continue to contribute to ground competency within the scope of the respective CINC’s training guidance although they typically focus on tasks most pertinent to longstanding and traditional operational contexts.\textsuperscript{128} In contrast, the MRE concept focuses outside of such traditional and hierarchical training paradigms.

**MREs -- ADDRESSING ANOTHER PART OF THE READINESS PROBLEM**

CINC Europe (CINCEUR) has come to rely, with great success, upon mission readiness exercises (MREs) in an effort to adjust the training readiness of units before their commitment in unfamiliar military contexts. These events fine-tune the specific combat and non-combat skills required to perform an assigned mission in a designated joint or coalition context within fixed response times. MREs have proven successful in the scope of preparing units for rotation into
ongoing military contingencies, but, they require significant advance warning, detailed mission
analysis, and training support from outside the participating unit.129

The time required to plan, prepare, and execute an MRE defies the current trend toward
immediacy making it most suitable to support the retraining of units for rotational commitment into
ongoing military operations. Conceptually, MREs provide an effective solution to achieving minimal
and acceptable levels of readiness for any specific mission or operational context that falls outside
the scope of those already trained for under Battle Focused Training programs.

CTCs and the MREs can only go so far as METL-focusing implements for the application of
the Army's training doctrine. With or without them, tactical units will continuously risk commitment
'as they are' while hoping that precious time will be availed them after deployment, allowing
application of training resources against a more accurate and mission-specific METL. Even then,
when pressed for time and faced with the imminent possibility of combat, trainers will aim to
overcome only the most immediate and obvious military obstacles and impediments to combining
their unit with other service's capabilities in the joint team. Without training directives, many tasks
necessary to joint integration, interoperability, and interdependence will accordingly remain
unconsidered or under-resourced resulting in haphazard preparation for joint combat. Lacking
standard procedure between services on many of the issues at hand, these trainers will face alone and
attempt to solve anew the puzzles generated by the joining of unfamiliar capabilities in innovative
joint contexts. Given the expanding complexity of joint systems and organizations, and the
shortcomings of current Army and joint DTTP, the results of such haphazard attempts at jointness are
not likely to be good.

NO MORE TASK FORCE SMITH'S

Lieutenant Thomas N. Burnette Jr., then Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans put it plainly in his 1997 article, that the true potential for Force XXI and Army After Next
cannot be realized under a training management concept which has yet to reconcile itself with the
immeasurable complexities of joint warfare in the 21st century. His call for a reexamination of training management systems and Battle Focused Training methodology appeals to the same common-sense so freely applied by our operational forces. "Today, commanders must wrestle with a far more complicated set of training challenges"\textsuperscript{130} and old training solutions may no longer be up to the increasingly complicated joint training task.

*FM 25-100* and its concept of Battle Focused Training ushered in an era of tactical Army component readiness beyond compare within the history of modern armies. With the battle cry of "No More Task Force Smith's,"\textsuperscript{131} a generation of commanders and training managers applied themselves to training simply focused upon achieving readiness for their priority wartime tasks and mitigating the possibility for failure on the future battlefield. Will the same simplicity and focus preclude tactical failure in the increasingly daring and complicated joint future, or is but a matter of time before the Army repeats the past with its own JTF Smith?

The U.S. Army has a proud record of working with the other services in joint operations. Indeed, almost every conflict in American military history is replete with examples of the services integrating their capabilities to defend our national interests. . . . . . . Americans should be confident that the Army will be a full partner in joint operations in the future.\textsuperscript{132}

Experience tells leaders that versatility, creativity and common-sense will prevail where experience and readiness fail. Current trends point toward a time and a set of conditions where this is less likely than ever to be true. The confidence of the American people for the Army to perform as the land component of the joint force of the future will quickly erode for the want of demonstrated competence.

Army units, can no longer expect to achieve comprehensive readiness for joint combat and conflict using the training principles of Battle Focused Training alone. CINC\textsc{\textregistered}s and operational planners will continue to place units and soldiers at risk by no-notice commitment of adaptive force packages for which no unit can fully prepare. *Joint Pub 3-33* and other joint doctrine mandating
creativity and versatility cannot eliminate by edict the frictions resulting from combining multi-service packages without prior notice or training.

Until the Army insures that the body of DTTP is made sufficient to the complexities of the potential tasks, each tactical unit will continue to apply their ad-hoc solutions to joint-integration problems as they happen upon them. There, they will be sustained by versatility, flexibility, and common-sense in the absence of real readiness. These three qualities will continue to manifest themselves in relative successes such as in Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, INTRINSIC ACTION, and JOINT FORCE until the joint complexities and a lack of adjustment time converge in a joint integration train wreck at or near a point of military chaos.
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<tr>
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<td>DTLOMS</td>
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ENDNOTES


2"Battle Focused Training" is the terminology used for the conduct of training by U.S. Army forces in keeping with the principles provided for in *FM 25-100* and *FM 25-101*. It commonly refers to unit and individual training based upon wartime METL in support of offensive, defensive, or security operations although the principles can be applied in general to training for any pattern or category of operations. Ibid., 1-7; *FM 25-101* is also entitled *Battle Focused Training*, U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), i.

3Unified Commanders are those commanders authorized by the NCA to command joint forces in the performance of enduring missions. With few exceptions these commanders, also known as Commander's in Chief (CINCs) command within geographic theaters having regionally focused missions. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAFT)*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1995), i.


5With the publication of *FM 100-5, Operations (Final Draft)* of 1997, this concept has been suggested for doctrinal consideration and has been broadly acknowledged, though not without debate, to be applicable to all training whether for combat, or other forms of conflict such as stabilization and or support operations. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Final Draft)*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), ii.


7Termed "Categories of Operations," offense, defense, stability, and support (ODSS) are the major patterns of operations in which US Army doctrine foresees the employment of US Army forces. U.S. Army, *FM 100-5. (Final Draft)*, 12-1; Ongoing institutional discussion aimed during the ongoing revision of *FM 100-5 Operations* argues that units cannot achieve readiness in all four categories of operations concurrently and offers three alternatives to the customary focus on 'go-to-war' tasks. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *FM 100-5 Concept Paper 3: Balancing the Doctrines of Leadership, and Training* (School for Advanced Military Studies: 1999), 9-12.


9Ibid.

10Battle tasks are command group, staff, or subordinate organization mission tasks that are central to a unit's ability to accomplish its own mission. U.S. Army, *FM 25-100*, 2-7.
11 Combat arms units refers to units which have an ability to conduct fire, maneuver, or both in support of operations. Combat arms units include but are not limited to infantry, armor, cavalry, attack helicopter, artillery, air defense artillery, special forces, and engineer organizations. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), A-1.


14 Support Operation is the current terminology for the type of missions executed within the scope of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Postconflict Operation is terminology utilized in the *FM 100-5* in effect at the time of the operation. U.S. Army, *FM 100-5 (Final Draft)*, 16-1; and U.S. Army, *FM 100-5*, C-2.

15 Technically, JTF 180 remained in command over JTF 190 throughout all entry phases of the operation. In the transition to the permissive entry OPLAN, the Commander, JTF 180 aborted the forcible entry OPLAN which had been primarily associated with JTF 180 forces, and returned the JTF 180 airborne assault forces back to their homestation, holding special operations forces in reserve. He then advanced JTF 190 as the entry forces and main effort earlier than anticipated. Shelton, "Contingency Operations in an Uncertain World," 37, 39.

16 Acclaimed in JTF 180's oral history interviews as "maybe, the most successful operation of anything close to this type that our Armed Forces have been involved in." U.S. Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *JTF-180 Oral History Interviews-07, J-3, OPS*, (Fort Leavenworth Kansas: 1996), 11.

17 For practical purposes, this was a first major operation where the CINC of Atlantic Command (ACOM) comprised a JTF Headquarters from a standing and operational division. JTF 180, as previously mentioned, was task organized primarily from an augmented XVIIIth Airborne Corps staff. U.S. Army, CALL, *UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Volume I* contains discussion of several important lessons learned about the challenges faced by a division staff when augmented to perform as a JTF staff.

18 U.S. Army, CALL, *Initial Impressions I*, i.


20 Under current Army doctrine, Army forces are projected into theater through either Forcible Entry or Unopposed Entry. Under discussion of Forcible Entry capabilities, *FM 100-5* relates that there are three options available: heliborne assault, parachute assault, and amphibious assault. The discussion goes on to emphasize that the Army specializes in the first of these two, whereas the Marine Corp specializes in amphibious assault and heliborne assault in the context of an amphibious assault. The
manual gives no indication of a likelihood that Army forces would employ through a heliborne assault in the context of an amphibious assault, although suggesting clearly that this is an Army capability. U.S. Army, *FM 100-5 (Final Draft)*, 18-22 thru 18-24; The version of *FM 100-5* in effect at the time of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, shed even less light on this subject leaving a strong suggestion that Army participation in amphibious operations would be in support of a Marine Corps assault. U.S. Army, *FM 100-5*, 2-17.


23Ibid., 172.

24In Marine Corps and Navy doctrine, heliborne, and helicopterborne are used inconsistently and interchangeably to refer to any action requiring the use of helicopters. This includes but is not restricted to actions which Army doctrine refers to as air assault or air movement.

25Flexible Defense is the operational concept defined with the publication of *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* of 1976. The principle focus of this operational concept aimed at the defeat through attrition of a numerically superior Russian force on the continental battlefield of Europe.

26Airland Battle is the operational concept defined with the publication of *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* of 1986. The principle focus of this operational concept aimed at the defeat of a numerically through air and land attacks in depth to seize the initiative from and subsequently defeat a superior Russian force on the continental battlefield of Europe.

27'Enhanced' or 'adaptive' are used interchangeably to refer to force-packaging throughout many of the XVIIIth Corps and ACOM after action review products.

28While this specific packaging of forces was new to the Army, it was not completely unprecedented, and had in fact been predicted by military analyst’s of *Jane’s Defense Weekly* more than one year preceding UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. In detailing the first time use for the of an aircraft carrier to employ a special purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in a USACOM exercise, Jane’s

29 At this point, the United States Army Atlantic Command (USACOM or ACOM) had long since delegated operational planning authority to XVIIIth Airborne Corps who had become a full fledged joint task force headquarters for JTF 180. Designation of 10th Mountain Division as JTF 190 did not occur until late July 1994, when 10th Mountain Division finally received the warning order for the permissive entry operation. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division (Light), *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Written After Action Report*, (Fort Drum, New York: 1996), 8.


37 Several documents are available detailing the adjusted Battle Focused Training Plans of the two Infantry Brigades and the Aviation Brigade. 10th Mountain Divisions Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY After Action Report reflects the generalization that: "Training areas of emphasis for subordinate commanders included: staff exercises, live fires, air assault, special aviation skills and rules of engagement." Stahl, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY*, 51.


45 See discussion about MREs in conclusions and recommendations of this monograph.


47 Colonel McNeil, JTF 180 Chief of Operations (J-3) compared the application of JTF 180 against the Haitian forces to the use of a "sledgehammer against a gnat!" when questioned about what led to the level of success they realized in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. U.S. Army, CALL, JTF-180 Oral History-07 J-3, Ops, 11.


51 Ibid., 48; and U.S. Army, CALL *Initial Impressions I*, 161 thru 162.


53 DTLOMs indicate which area of DTTP is affected by itemized lessons-learned: Doctrine; Training; Leader Development; Organization; or Materiel. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9, Requirements Determination*, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1999), 5.

54 Even after establishing that Amphibious Assault is not a principal mission of Army units, *Joint Pub 3-33 [CDROM] establishes this as an Army combat capability. It further suggests that infantry units can be employed in an air assault forcible entry operation from a surface
vessel without additional training. U.S. DoD, Joint Pub 3-33, "Amphibious Operations -- Army Units -- Amphibious Assault" capability display.

55These operations include military forces from more than one nation. 'Multi-national,' 'coalition,' or 'alliance' are terms used synonymously for 'combined' in joint doctrine. U.S. DoD, Joint Pub 0-2, I-5.

56This construct was the original and intended design of the Battle Focused Training concept. At the time of its writing, the preponderance of the Army were either forward deployed, or designated for rapid deployment to a major theater of war to fight within the context of a large scale land-based conflict against a pre-defined enemy under specific joint conditions. U.S. Army, FM 25-100, 2-1.


59Ibid.

60U.S. CENTCOM, History of United States Central Command, 2.

61For the purposes of this analysis, 'mechanized' and 'armored' are used interchangeably in referring to Bradley Fighting Vehicle and Abrams Main Battle Tank equipped and task-organized units.


63Typically the Battalion or Task Force is a balanced force of two armor and two mechanized companies or company teams with associated combat support and service support units.


65A Brigade Combat Team is a task organized unit consisting of combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations under the command and control of a maneuver Brigade Headquarters.

66Steele, "Power Projection" 16-17.


69Steele, "Power Projection," 16.


72 The set actually includes all combat, combat support, and combat service support equipment necessary to the fielding of a balanced brigade combat team (BCT) consisting of two Bradley equipped Mechanized Infantry battalions, two Abrams equipped Armor battalions, one M109A6 equipped self-propelled howitzer battalion and the associated headquarters and support units. U.S. Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSO & I)*, *Newsletter 97-07* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: CALL, 1997), chapter 4, page 4.

73 U.S. Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation INTRINSIC ACTION: RSO & I in Kuwait*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: CALL, 1996), i.


75 U.S. Army, *FM 100-5*, 3-1.

76 Ibid., iv.


78 Ibid.

79 Ibid, 3-2, 3-3.

80 Ibid, 3-9.


82 *FM 71-100* defines deployment as "the movement of forces and their support bases from any location to an AO [Area of Operation] in response to a military need or crisis." Ibid., 2-3.

83 Ibid., C-1 thru C-5.


85 See U.S. Department of the Army, Center for Army Lesson Learned *RSO & I in Operation JOINT FORGE*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: CALL, 1999); and U.S. Army, CALL, *Operation INTRINSIC ACTION*.

86 For more discussion of the CTC program, see the conclusions and recommendations section of this monograph.
Joint Task Force Mojave is a notional JTF constructed to facilitate the training event of RSOI at the NTC. This construct requires the tactical unit to interface with the joint processes of theater reception and integration. U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, National Training Center and Fort Irwin, *US Army National Training Center (NTC) Operations Group (OPS Group) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)* (Final Coordinating Draft), (Fort Irwin, California: Operations Group, July 1997).


Ibid., 12.

The references available through the CALL database and through CALL publications are innumerable. Combat Training Center (CTC) Bulletins, Trends, Newsletters, and even videos are available on-line through the CALL internet Homepage at http://call.army.mil.

*FM 25-100* is clear that the relative importance of strategic deployment capability may vary between CONUS and forward deployed tactical units. U.S. Army, *FM 25-100*, 2-2 thru 2-4; and U.S. Army, *FM 25-101*, 2-4 thru 2-8, 2-19.


Ibid., 15.

Ibid., 19.


The North Atlantic Council is the assembled body of political representatives from the NATO member countries. Its actions and directives constitute the authoritative collective policy of the NATO allied coalition. It is, by both design and the nature of its members, a political body.

Options for ground operations had been "explored" as early as May 1998. Only air options were fully developed. U.S. Department of Defense, "Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review," *DefenseLINK News* (October 14, 1999), 9, 10.

In October 1998, SACEUR refined the original air campaign plans at the direction of the North Atlantic Council to support strikes against Serbian forces. These plans were in preparation for


104 On 24 April, President Clinton pleaded with British Prime Minister Tony Blair to soften his pre-ground war rhetoric on the eve of the NATO 50 Year Summit. Dana Priest, "A Decisive Battle That Never Was," *The Washington Post* (19 December 1999), 1, A30.

105 Part of the problem with fully developing ground options was the need for consensus within the U.S. Defense establishment as well as within the NATO coalition. Based upon his initial intent to avoid a ground war and continued JCS advice toward maintaining such a position, President Clinton never allowed NATO to officially proceed with planning for a coalition ground operation until 23 May 1999. Certain covert contingency planning had taken place at NATO headquarters producing an operational plan entitled the "B-Plus Plan." The execution timeframe for the proposed ground campaign would have been around September of 1999. Priest, "A Decisive Battle," 1, A30.

106 This figure would later balloon to over 5000 soldiers after the identification of combat support, service support, and headquarters troops deemed necessary to support the operation. Jeffrey Record, "Operation ALLIED FORCE: Yet Another Wake-Up Call for the Army?" *Parameters*, Volume XXIX, Number 4 (Winter 1999-2000), 17.


109 Ibid., 17.


111 Even after the cessation of hostilities, questions regarding TF HAWK's non-participation in combat action continued. Concern centered upon aircraft and aircrew readiness with specific references to operation in unfamiliar terrain, incompatible radio systems, aircraft fuel tanks, and night vision goggle qualification. General Clark stated in a 1 July interview that the Apache units had a "full mission training plan" which they were pursuing in preparation for commitment within the theater. U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD News Briefing," Presenter Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and General Wesley K. Clark, (Thursday, July 1, 1999), 4.


113 Ibid., 16.

114 Bryan Bender, "Flight Delay," 16.


DefenseLINK is the official Internet web site for the Department of Defense available at www.defenselink.mil.


119 U.S. DoD, Joint Pub 1, IV-1.

120 'Out of the Box' or 'Outside the Box' are phrases which have become virtual mantras of creative and adaptive thought within the military. To think 'out of the box' is to be willing to actively pursue and develop concepts, which defy or appear to defy convention and or experience. In Bryan Bender's article, "Flight Delay," the Army staff, the JCS, and the White House are criticized for their initial unwillingness to consider the 'out of the box' application of Army aviation in the air war in Kosovo. Bender, "Flight Delay," 17.

121 For example, the operational planners must account for the time and other training resources required to transition a unit from a state of readiness for conventional air assault to the conduct of an amphibious air assault from a non-standard amphibious platform. Such a shift in conditions would require retraining in selected tasks, one being Carrier Deck Landing Qualification (DLQ) for Army aircrews. DLQ requires a specified number of resources. Some quick research and math will inform the planner how much time, how many pieces of equipment, and how many gallons of fuel are required to create this competency.

122 U.S. Army, CALL, Initial Impressions 1, ii.

123 TF 190's use of an Army airfield to rehearse their air assault from an aircraft carrier is an example of interpolation. Trainers deemed that the painted lines indicating the dimensions of the aircraft carrier deck and the airfield buildings approximating the ship's super-structure to be adequate approximations of shipboard conditions for the sake of the ground force rehearsals until an actual carrier became available.


125 U.S. Army, FM 25-100, Glossary 3; and FM 25-101, D-2.


128 U.S. Army, NTC, OPS Group SOP, 2-23.
Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs) are a training concept that has been refined in recent years to support the radical retraining of units from wartime 'Battle-Focused' METLs to allow them to achieve high states of readiness for the performance of stabilization or support operations. The MRE is typically applied to units that have substantial notification for rotation to ongoing U.S. and coalition contingencies such as Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and in Bosnia-Hercegovina and ABLE SENTRY in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. The MRE defines for the unit a standardized and mission-specific METL based upon the specific conditions to be found in the joint or combined area of operations. While many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) necessary for readiness are similar to those found in the participating unit's go-to-war training manuals, all of the MRE's training is focused upon achieving comprehensive readiness for the task at hand in a specific joint context or environment to the exclusion of readiness for all other tasks or mission. Often the MRE will apply non-doctrinal or extra-doctrinal tactics, techniques or procedures where the extant body of doctrine proves inadequate or impertinent to the environment for which the unit is being prepared. The concept is logically equivalent to mobilization for execution of a predetermined war plan.


Attributed to General Henry H. Shelton, Army Chief of Staff. Spoken after his appointment to that position in 1990, he refers to the US Army Task Force, comprised primarily of 1st Battalion 21st Infantry which was committed as an immediate response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea in August 1950. Commanded by LTC Larry B. Smith, this unit was quickly defeated by the overwhelming assault by a vastly superior North Korean Force near Osan South Korea. Smith and 1/21 Infantry would survive this unspectacular introduction to combat in Korea, but their efforts would become a symbol for the lack of readiness the US Army had sunken too prior to the beginnings of this war. For more on the history of Task Force Smith see James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War, (New York, N.Y.: W. Morrow, 1988), 45 - 47; Also, see historical perspective provided on force projection of U.S. forces to Korea in U.S. Army, FM 100-5, 3-9.