THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE

by

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# The African Crisis Response Initiative: Command and Control of a Multi-National Force

## Abstract (maximum 200 words)

As the lone remaining superpower, the United States is often viewed as the world’s police force and expected to help restore order wherever problems arise. But as the size of the United States’ military continues to shrink and the number of regional conflicts continues to grow the United States finds itself in a precarious position. How can it help attain regional stability throughout the world with an ever shrinking military? The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is one tool being used in an effort to attain this goal in Africa. The overall aim of the ACRI is to train a division’s worth of battalions in the necessary tasks to conduct limited Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) and Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HUMROs). The hope is that with this capability, African nations will be capable of solving their own problems with only minimal assistance being required from the United States. The purpose of this thesis is to identify critical factors and considerations for command and control of a multi-national force in Africa, participating in either PKOs or HUMROs. This thesis will examine recent conflicts in Africa, what lessons have been learned by peacekeeping forces used there, U.S. command and control doctrine, and what is currently being done with ACRI. The thesis will conclude with recommendations for what must be done on both the international and brigade level in the area of command and control, in order to provide the necessary framework to make ACRI successful.

## Subject Terms

- African Crisis Response Initiative
- Command and Control
- Peacekeeping Operations
- Humanitarian Operations
THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE

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ABSTRACT

As the lone remaining superpower, the United States is often viewed as the world's police force and expected to help restore order wherever problems may arise. But as the size of the United States military continues to shrink and the number of regional conflicts continues to grow the United States finds itself in a precarious position. How can it help attain regional stability throughout the world with an ever-shrinking military?

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is one tool being used in an effort to attain this goal in Africa. The overall aim of the ACRI is to train a division's worth of battalions in the necessary tasks to conduct limited Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian Assistance Operations. The hope is that with this capability, African nations will be capable of solving their own problems with only minimal assistance being required of the United States.

The purpose of this thesis is to identify critical factors and considerations for command and control of a multi-national force, on the African continent, participating in either PKOs or HUMROs. This thesis will examine recent conflicts in Africa, what lessons have been learned by the peacekeeping forces used there, U.S. command and control doctrine, and what is currently being done in the ACRI. The thesis will conclude with recommendations for what must be done on both the international and brigade level in the area of command and control.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRF</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C3IC</td>
<td>Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center</td>
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<td>CAX</td>
<td>Computer Assisted Exercise</td>
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<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations Center</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<td>DROC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>Executive Outcomes</td>
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<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Mozambique Liberation Front</td>
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<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>General Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>HUMRO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Operations</td>
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<td>MDMPP</td>
<td>Military Decision Making Process</td>
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<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Military Professional Resources Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>Program of Instruction</td>
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<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Voluntary Organizations</td>
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<td>Renamo</td>
<td>Mozambique National Resistance</td>
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ROE  Rules of Engagement
RPF  Rwanda Patriotic Front
RUF  Revolutionary United Front
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SOF  Special Operations Forces
SME  Subject Matter Expert
STX  Situational Training Exercise
SWAPO  South West Africa’s People Organization
UN  United Nations
UNAVEM  United Nations Angolan Verification Mission
UNITA  National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USASOC  United States Special Operations Command
ZANU  Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU  Zimbabwe African People’s Union
I. INTRODUCTION

The strengthening of peacekeeping forces on the African continent is clearly in everyone's interest. It is high on the list of priorities of our African partners, who have repeatedly stated their intention to play a determining role in the creation of peace and stability on their own continent.

- Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie

A. BACKGROUND

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was first proposed by the United States Department of State "in September 1996 in response to a very real fear that we might see an eruption of ethnic violence in the Great Lakes Region comparable to the great tragedy that we witnessed in Rwanda in 1994." (McCallie, 1998, p. 4) Many, to include the United States, now realized that it was no longer possible to sit by and watch the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people. The genocide that occurred in Rwanda took place only months after the United States had been involved in a

fire fight in Somalia where 18 American servicemen were killed and another approximately 74 were wounded. This event was present in the minds of both the United States government and the American public as the decision to become involved in another peacekeeping mission in Africa loomed.

The ACRI concept represents an effort by the United States to ensure that such genocides, and other tragedies, can be prevented in the future. It also "provides the international community an alternative to doing nothing or committing forces to direct military intervention. This initiative will also improve the capability of African nations to respond quickly and solve African problems." ²

Another factor that cannot be overlooked is that of cost. Between 1994 and 1997, the United States European Command, alone, spent in excess of $53 million on contingency operations in Sub-Sahara Africa.³ If a capability can be created, whereby U.S. forces will not be needed, or will only be required in a limited capacity, it is likely that the initiative will prove to be cost-effective as well.

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³ Ibid.
Many African countries, along with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), were receptive to the ACRI idea when it was first proposed in 1996. But several were not. Some who were skeptical worried that the United States was attempting to disengage from future involvement in African conflicts. This was troublesome to these countries because they believe that U.S. presence and involvement helps to stabilize the region.  

Although some resistance continued toward the creation of the ACRI program, there was sufficient interest from enough African countries that planning was undertaken. In consultation with policy makers and military officials in numerous African and European capitals, various changes were made in the course of designing the program. For instance, it became clear that African leaders did not want a standing military created, but rather wanted to see the creation of an inter-operable capability (McCallie, 1998, p. 5). They also felt that the initiative should be closely tied to other peacekeeping training initiatives that were already taking place on the continent. Similar programs were being conducted by both France and Great Britain and neither

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European nor African partners wanted to create the perception of competition (p. 5).

Once the decision to move forward with the initiative was made, the concept needed to be formalized so that it could be put into operation. To help begin this process a mission statement was developed for the initiative. The ACRI mission is to:

Identify, organize, equip, train, deploy, and advise capable African forces to conduct operations such as limited Humanitarian Operations (HUMRO) or Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) which would provide a more secure environment for either refugees or internally displaced people and would facilitate the wholesale delivery of humanitarian aid, in order to minimize human suffering and deter violence.5

This capability would be created through two separate, but very much connected, programs of instruction (POI): the battalion level and brigade level POIs. While U.S. military personnel created the POIs, they were not solely reflective of U.S. doctrine. These POIs incorporated doctrine from Nordic Peacekeeping Manuals, NATO, the UN, as well as U.S. doctrine.6

As addressed in the above mission statement, the ACRI program is designed to create a capability, but it is not

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5 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) ACRI Concept Brief, dated 04 NOV 97.

6 Ibid.
intended to abandon African participants once the capability is created. It is realized that there are numerous areas in which further assistance will be required to make this initiative work in the future. For instance, sustainment operations, the ability to project forces, and the continued need for training require longer-term participation by the U.S.\textsuperscript{7}

Again, while some African countries wanted no part of the ACRI program, numerous others did. Not all of the countries that desired to participate in the program were selected to do so. Assessments were conducted by private companies to determine the potential of various countries to participate in peacekeeping operations. Capabilities that could be assessed on paper included personnel performance, basic equipment, size of the force, transportation capabilities, engineering, communication, and logistic capabilities, along with mission/force headquarters abilities.\textsuperscript{8} The next step was for a pilot team to conduct on-the-ground assessments. It was upon the recommendation

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.

of this body that specific countries were then invited to participate in the program.

U.S funding for this initiative has been dedicated through fiscal year 2001. After that, a reassessment of the initiative will be made to determine whether the program has proven beneficial and warrants continued funding. What will be difficult to determine in this regard, though, is whether or not the program has indeed been effective. Even though countries participate in the program, receive the training and accept the equipment, there is no requirement that they participate in response to conflict, either on or off the continent. It is the responsibility of each ACRI-trained country to determine in which contingency operations it will participate. If only a few conflicts arise over the next several years and they do not affect the national interests of ACRI-trained units, those countries may decide not to participate in any peacekeeping effort. This may give the appearance that the initiative is not returning dividends. But what such a conclusion would ignore is that conflicts may have been averted because a peacekeeping capacity, through ACRI, already exists. Therefore, the choice the United States Congress will face in deciding to continue funding, given a plethora of other programs, all of which seek support, may be a difficult one.
B. PURPOSE

The aim of this thesis is to identify critical factors and considerations for command and control (C2) elements of ACRI-trained units above the battalion level. The development of a viable C2 capability will be one of the more challenging aspects of the ACRI program, but it will also be one of the most critical. Without the ability to command and control either PKOs or HUMROs, all the other efforts of the program will be for naught. And only by proving that these African countries have truly gained the capability to command and control their own multi-national operations on the African continent will the U.S Congress and European allies be likely to continue to support this initiative. The initial deadline has been set for the end of fiscal year 2001. If this capability does not exist by that time it is possible this program will disappear and the United States will once again appear incapable of making a long-term commitment to the African continent.

In the ACRI, battalions will be trained in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. The battalion POI has been taught numerous times to date, but the brigade level training is just beginning. The subject of C2 at the brigade level is addressed in two different portions of the ACRI program: Phase I of the brigade POI and Follow-on
Training Iteration 5. At this time, it is not clear how well the fit is between this instruction and what may be required to create a viable C2 structure or capability for a multi-national, African headquarters. For instance, when battalions deploy, they will normally operate as organic units. Therefore, they will be capable of using their own C2 structure. But the ACRI-trained brigade headquarters will most likely not be a headquarters consisting of members from only one country. This will make the issue of providing competent C2 much more difficult.

While the brigade headquarters is the primary focus of this thesis, I will also explore the relationships that have been developed between ACRI and various international, regional, and sub-regional organizations. Their involvement and support of this training initiative will be just as crucial to its long-term success.

At the same time, while concerned mainly with the ACRI, the findings and conclusions generated by this thesis hold relevance for peacekeeping training initiatives in other regions of the world. Certain dynamics of conflicts and aspects of conflict resolution in Africa may be unique, but many of the tenets and principles of commanding multi-national forces are generic and similar no matter where in the world peacekeepers find themselves.
C. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will be organized into six chapters, including this chapter. The following chapters will cover:

1. Chapter II: African Wars

This chapter will address some of the more prevalent trends in African conflicts by examining some of the more recent wars on the continent, including those fought in Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Western Sahara. Although each of these conflicts has its own peculiarities, there are also common threads which we may be able to pull together in order to better approach conflict resolution or, better yet, conflict prevention. Some of the major trends that can be identified are that wars in Africa tend to be internal struggles in which regional actors often interfere; economies and infrastructures are destroyed with major implications for post-conflict recovery; the use of private armies and child soldiers can likewise cause devastating long-term effects; and there is also the issue of ethnic disputes which conflicts often intensify.

2. Chapter III: Lessons Learned from Previous PKOs

This section draws on lessons learned from the conflicts discussed in Chapter 1, as well as wars and PKOs in Somalia, Cambodia, Cyprus, and Bosnia. The primary focus
here is on lessons what impact on the ability of a multinational headquarters to provide effective command and control to PKOs or HUMROs. Some of these lessons will deal directly with the structure of the headquarters element, while others relate more to interagency coordination and the environment within which the headquarters must function.

3. Chapter IV: U.S. Doctrine

While the development of the ACRI POI took into account several different sets of doctrine, this chapter will focus solely on U.S. doctrine, paying particular attention to aspects of it that deal with command and control. The majority of the information for this section was garnered from Joint Publication 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, Field Manual 90-41, JTF Liaison Handbook, Field Manual 100-8, Army in Multinational Operations, and Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations.

4. Chapter V: ACRI

This chapter will lay out all aspects of the ACRI, to include the battalion training plan (both initial and follow-on), the brigade training plan, the equipment provided, and the various organizations involved (both

9 The doctrine chapter focuses solely on U.S. Doctrine since this has proven the only doctrine available to review.
military and political). I will also cover various factors/capabilities that do not exist within the program. These include a logistical sustainment plan, continued and consistent international or regional sponsorship, and a permanent coordination cell.

5. Chapter VI: Conclusions

This section will tie together findings developed from the previous four chapters.
II. AFRICAN WARS

A. BACKGROUND

Since the end of the Cold War, the situation in Africa has changed significantly. No longer are the United States and the Soviet Union fighting to gain allies. Currently, Russia is more concerned about maintaining its own internal stability than projecting its power abroad. And while Russia struggles with its current situation, the United States is in a much better position to pick and choose when and where it will intervene and to whom it will provide support. The record shows that Africa has not been one of the primary choices.

Another factor that has shaped African war is the ongoing legacy of colonialism. Granted, most African countries have had their independence for at least thirty years, but the effects of colonialism can still be seen.

These factors, along with others, will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter. Some of these factors are unique to Africa, and affect wars in Africa accordingly, while others are not. The following sections will look at the sources of or causes for conflict, the resources that affect the conduct of these wars and the peacekeepers that
attempt to resolve them, and some of the problems that must be dealt with in the aftermath of conflict.

B. SOURCES OF CONFLICT

1. Government vs. Guerrilla

One of the main features of African wars, from the mid-1950s to 1997, is that these fights have tended to be internal power struggles. Government forces will be faced with one or more rebel groups that want to dislodge those that are in power. This was the case in Mozambique, where the government forces were confronted by the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) and the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo).\textsuperscript{10} In Liberia, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was the primary antagonist of the government forces.\textsuperscript{11} The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which is the ruling party in Angola, was primarily opposed by the rebel group called the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

\textsuperscript{10} A more detailed account of the struggles in Mozambique can be found in Richard Synge's \textit{Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94}.

\textsuperscript{11} A more detailed account of the Liberian Conflict can be found in the Magyar and Conteh-Morgan book, \textit{Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia}.
And the struggles in Rwanda have involved the Hutu and Tutsis, with the two swapping power repeatedly since the departure of the Belgians in the 1950s. These are just several examples of the many conflicts that have revolved around attaining or maintaining power.

2. All or Nothing

In many of these conflicts the struggle for power is often viewed as one of all or nothing. Those who are in power are rarely willing to accept members of a guerrilla force, or opposing factions, into the existing government. The same can be said for guerrilla forces, once they have succeeded in taking over a state; they rarely, if ever, offer positions to former members of the government they just ousted. Many times, too, ethnicity plays a role in the struggle for complete power. As one looks at ruling governments or guerrilla parties, one notices that most of these organizations are dominated by members of a single ethnic group. The importance of ethnicity will be discussed at greater length later in the next section.

This desire for victory, as opposed to a settlement of the conflict, often creates a situation wherein neither side

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12 Angola’s last best chance for Peace: An Insider’s Account of the Peace Process by Paul Hare provides a thorough look at the history of the conflict and a detailed look at the peace process.
is willing to end the conflict until its opponents are destroyed or unable to mount further opposition. The destruction of the opposition creates an environment in which there is very little threat to those in power. This was the situation in Liberia, in 1992, when Charles Taylor and the NPFL refused to negotiate a settlement once they had the upper hand and they felt that they were capable of defeating the government forces (Conteh-Morgan, 1998, p. 38). In Angola, UNITA continually breaks cease-fire agreements whenever it believes that its position in the new government will not be as strong as its members have been led to believe (Hare, 1998, p. 95). By choosing to continue the fight, both the NPFL and UNITA demonstrate a desire to gain complete control of the government, as opposed to settling for only a share of the power.

C. ETHNICITY

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the end of the Cold War and colonialism have changed how wars are being fought today. These two factors, along with governments' inability to control the entire country, has made the issue of ethnicity ever more important. At times ethnicity may truly be the underlying cause of the conflict. But at other times, ethnicity may just be a tool that
politicians use to get what they want, namely power. In their study of Sierra Leone and Liberia, Bruce Jackson and Jeffrey Larsen state that ethnicity "is used by political entrepreneurs to mobilize mass support for their private causes and agendas by appealing to people's crude nationalistic instincts." (Jackson & Larsen, 1998, p. 2-8).

Ethnicity has played a role in numerous conflicts as various ethnic groups have struggled to gain or retain power. Yet, the role of ethnicity still varies greatly from conflict to conflict. Here are three cases in which ethnicity has been important, but in a different manner each time.

1. Kenya

In the mid-1950s, portions of the indigenous Kenyan population (including the Kikuyu) were agitating against the colonial rulers from Great Britain, as well as against white settlers. Many of these agitators only sought land reforms, but others were striving for full independence. In this struggle, the Kikuyu bore the brunt of the burden. While Mau Mau was not successful from a tactical or operational point of view, independence did eventuate. Great Britain left Kenya, though when all was said and done, the landless Kikuyu at the center of the struggle were not the ones who gained power in the new government. The fact that the
Kikuyu dominated Mau Mau helped to set the stage for the Kikuyus' influence in the post-colonial rule Kenya, although key leaders from among the Mau Mau fighters did not attain any key positions of power even though they were often best suited for such positions.\textsuperscript{13}

2. Rwanda

In Rwanda, there are three primary ethnic groups. According to the 1991 Rwandan census the Hutu comprise the largest (approximately 90\% of total population), followed by the Tutsi (approximately 8.4\%), and the Twa (less than 1\%). These numbers will vary depending on the inclusion or exclusion of refugees, but the demographic dominance of the Hutu is indisputable (Des Forges, 1999, p. 40). For decades, the Hutu and the Tutsi lived side by side in the same villages. And though there may have been tension, they managed to get along well enough, most of the time. From prior to Rwanda gaining independence in July of 1962 until today, however, there have been a number of ethnically motivated massacres. The largest ones occurred in 1959, 1963, 1973, and 1990 (p. 38-40). That was until April 1994, when one of the worst genocides in recent history transpired. The incident that was the catalyst for this

\textsuperscript{13} Maloba's Mau Mau and Kenya provides a more in-depth record of how and why Mau Mau was excluded from power.
genocide was the shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane, as he returned from Dar es Salaam. Although his killers have never been identified, many believe that the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) was responsible for the shootdown. Some Rwandans believe that Habyarimana was killed by the RPF to avoid the need to accept the Arusha Peace Accords, which would have prevented the RPF from gaining a complete military victory and total control of the country. Others believe that some of Habyarimana's own supporters may have wanted him killed, because they feared he would implement the Accords, resulting in reduced power for themselves (p. 182). Regardless of who was responsible for Habyarimana's death, it is clear that the events leading up to the genocide and the genocide itself represent a colossal struggle to either gain or retain power.

3. Liberia

In Liberia, there are approximately 16 indigenous ethnic groups. In addition to these, there are also Americo-Liberians, who were returned slaves from the United States. Members of this last group, although constituting only a small percentage of the population, have always viewed themselves as superior. Up to 1980, the Americo-Liberians dominated the government, civil service positions, and the majority of high profile positions in the country.
(Jackson & Larsen, 1998, p. 2-7). Even after the overthrow of the Americo-Liberian True Whig Party by Samuel Doe in 1980, ethnic problems remained negligible. Doe formed alliances with various ethnic groups and shared some power. But when Doe’s regime appeared to be eroding, others interested in gaining power began to play the ethnicity card. Consequently, Doe turned to members of his tribe, the Krahn, for support (p. 2-7). Doe and the Krahn eventually lost, but this serves as yet another example of the ways in which ethnicity can be used to manipulate the feelings of core supporters in an effort to retain political power for a minority.

D. POROUS BORDERS

1. Limited Control

In many African countries, the national government does not have the ability to govern the entire country. This was most recently seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC), when Laurent Kabila was able to gain a strong foothold in the eastern portion of the DROC before taking over the entire country. In Somalia, the government’s control of the entire country had been in question for several years, especially in the north. This lack of control finally peaked in December of 1990 when “organized
armed violence finally made its way into Mogadishu and overturned Siad Barre and any semblance of civility left in the capital.” (Simons, 1995, p. 93)

The absence of national rule in certain parts of the country can create a power vacuum. The opportunity is therefore posed for various guerrilla groups to gain supporters for and a base from which to run their operations and position their supplies. And when a guerrilla band has control of such an area, its ability to receive assistance from across international borders increases dramatically.

2. Regional Involvement

While African conflicts have generally been internally generated fights, they have often been imparted an international flavor. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union (or their surrogates) became involved in virtually every conflict on the continent. They often provided the necessary resources to conduct the war, in an effort to gain influence in the region. In the post-Cold War era the superpowers have become much less involved in these conflicts. This has allowed for regional involvement to resurface. While regional involvement may have appeared absent during the Cold War, regional influences tended to simply be masked by the presence of the superpowers.
As previously mentioned, many African governments have never exerted complete control over their countries. This is to say that the local authorities wield more authority in many areas than do the national governments. Often, areas along the border may be uninhabited, especially if there is no border crossing point or road network. This creates a situation whereby guerrilla forces, or forces of another nation, can move from one country to another with little to impede them. The ability to do so will have a significant impact on both a guerrilla force’s ability to prepare for action and its ability to sustain action.

3. Sanctuaries

The ability to operate from a sanctuary greatly benefits a guerrilla force. The force can prepare for any type of actions that it might undertake in relative safety. When afforded such an opportunity, the guerrilla force can consolidate its units in fewer locations than if it was operating in the country where the guerrillas are contesting power. This reduces the strain on logistics, improves the ability to train the force, and allows the chain of command to better prepare all of its forces for future operations.

The Mau Mau in Kenya offers a perfect example of a guerrilla force that was not able to operate from within a cross-border sanctuary. Instead, they were restricted to
areas within Kenya. The colonial forces of the British Empire, along with Kenyans loyal to Britain, were thus able to isolate the Mau Mau forces and eventually eliminate them. The lack of an available sanctuary outside of Kenya had a significant impact on the Mau Mau fighters' fortunes.

In the more recent Liberian conflict, Charles Taylor's NPFL forces launched their initial campaign from Cote d'Ivoire into Nimba County on Christmas Eve of 1989 (Richards, 1996, p. 3). The reasons why Cote d'Ivoire may have allowed the NPFL to launch from within its borders include, but are not limited to, the desire to gain economic benefits from Liberia's mineral wealth if the NPFL gained power, personal relationships between the president of Cote d'Ivoire and the leadership of the NPFL, and Francophone-Anglophone hostilities with Nigeria. Any or all of these made a 'porous border' beneficial.

In Zimbabwe's struggle for independence from British colonial rule in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the presence of sanctuaries was again important, yet with a somewhat different effect than in Liberia. ZANU and ZAPU were the two organizations struggling for independence.

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14 The lack of a sanctuary and its effects on the Mau Mau Movement are discussed in Mau Mau and Kenya, by Wunyabari O. Maloba.
against the Rhodesians. While both groups maintained representation and headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, they did not necessarily see eye to eye. Neither group believed that the other should exist (Windrich, 1975, p. 59). Although seeking the same goal, the two organizations conducted the majority of their military operations independently, with ZAPU operating primarily from Zambia and ZANU from Mozambique. The ability to operate from two separate sanctuaries forced the Rhodesians to spread their resources thin, but also created the opportunity for them to exploit disagreements between ZAPU and ZANU.

4. Flow of Weapons and Supplies

To sustain a fight once it has begun requires many resources. Some, such as the will to fight, are intangible. Many others, like weapons and supplies, are very tangible. While the leadership on both sides of the fight will provide the ideological impetus for the fight, the tangible items have to come from a real place on the ground. These can originate in one of two locations: internal to the country of conflict or external to it.

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15 Windrich, in *The Rhodesian Problem*, discusses operations launched from Zambia, while both Finnegan, *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique*, and Lan, *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*, focus more on operations launched from Mozambique.
For the government forces, receiving supplies from sources within the country is the easiest and best option. Guerrilla forces may also be capable of drawing resources from within the country of conflict, especially if the government is not capable of maintaining control over the entire country. As desirable as it may be to attain supplies from within the country of conflict, though, this is not always possible.

Guerrilla forces may instead have to look for external support for their cause. When supplies can be found in a neighboring country, the guerrillas may actually find themselves in a more advantageous position. With porous borders providing relative freedom of movement into the conflict area, the guerrillas can acquire what they need, while retaining their supply bases in a safe location. For the government forces to destroy these supplies would entail invading a sovereign state. By doing this, they would risk incurring an international incident.

5. Borders

The fact that colonial powers ignored tribal and ethnic considerations when drawing up international borders has only aided those seeking sanctuaries. With many borders being so porous, crossing borders is usually not very difficult. Also, the fact that other members of the same
ethnic group may often be found on the other side of that border makes life for those seeking sanctuary much easier. At times, those found across the border may actually be refugees from previous conflicts.

E. PRIVATE ARMIES AND MERCENARIES

As the face of war has changed over the years, many practices, which had been acceptable, have now proven to be unacceptable. Many of these unacceptable practices have found their way into documents such as the Geneva Convention and The Law of Land Warfare. Consequently, though they have been excluded from accepted practices in war, some continue to be used. One of these practices that is on the rise in Africa is the use of private armies.

Private armies were very popular in Europe centuries ago, but fell out of favor toward the latter part of the nineteenth century (Thomson, 1994, p. 82). Recently, they have proven resurgent in Africa. Yet, their role today is one that is much different than it was in years gone by. Today, these organizations do not substitute for the armed forces of a particular country, but rather augment existing forces. Some specialize in the actual conduct of war, whereas it is more appropriate to label others trainers. No matter what label is applied, there are many preconceived
notions about what private armies represent. In a press conference to discuss the on-going conflict in Sierra Leone, Kofi Annan, the United Nation Secretary General, "bristled at the suggestion that the United Nations would ever consider working with 'respectable' mercenary organizations, arguing that there is no 'distinction between respectable mercenaries and non-respectable mercenaries." (Shearer, 1998, p. 68)

But despite the considerable uproar over the reemergence of private armies, there is still an ever-growing role for them to play. The change in the world order from one of bi-polar superpowers to one of a uni-polar superpower has created an environment that is much more favorable to small, regional conflicts. And as the number of conflicts increases and the size of militaries continues to shrink, a vacuum is being created. The growing gap reveals that with more conflicts around the world there are fewer soldiers in the more developed nations capable of assisting in their resolution. This vacuum is being partially filled by private armies. Private firms prove to be cost effective, have a rapid response time, and are unencumbered by international political considerations. Such advantages, however, are also accompanied by drawbacks. Not only do private armies/firms exist to turn a profit, but
there is very little oversight of their activities. Worse, the resolution of conflict may not be one of the main concerns of private armies and may actually be harmful to them, because it puts them out of a job. Also, the lack of oversight can create an environment permissive of questionable actions. Finally, the government that hires such firms admits, by doing so, that it is incapable of handling the existing problem itself, so it is probably safe to assume that it will not police or effectively criticize those it has hired so long as their actions prove to be successful. This creates a potential situation in which the ends will justify the means to the extent that unwarranted, and unchecked, suffering may be inflicted on the local population and atrocities may occur.

While there are many private companies operating around the world today, here I only provide a brief review of the more prominent organizations and summarize some of the African actions in which they have participated.

1. Executive Outcomes

This organization’s headquarters is located in South Africa. EO is primarily staffed by veterans of the South African Defense Force. It has conducted the vast majority of its operations on the African continent, with major operations in both Angola (September 1993 - January 1996)
and Sierra Leone (May 1995 - February 1997) (p. 73). In an effort to remain more credible in the eyes of the international community, EO has restricted its operations to those supporting existing governments. Its level of involvement in both Angola and Sierra Leone has varied over time, but has included tasks in areas such as logistical assistance, training of host nation forces, and direct combat actions.

2. Sandline Ltd.

Sandline Ltd. is headquartered in England. In many instances it has been tied to Executive Outcomes. Sandline will often take on the tasks of training and providing supplies, while handing over any direct combat involvement to Executive Outcomes.

3. Military Professional Resources Inc.

MPRI is a U.S.-based firm headquartered in Alexandria, VA. The vast majority of the company's staff consists of retired U.S. military personnel. According to its web page, MPRI is "a professional services company that provides private sector leader development and training and military-related contracting and consulting in the U.S. and international defense markets." (www.mpri.com, 1999)

MPRI has avoided a direct role in military action and remained much more involved in the training of various
forces. Its greatest and most public success has come from its involvement in the Balkan Conflict. It is believed that MPRI has provided assistance to both the Croatian government and the Muslim-Croat Federation (Shearer, 1998, p. 74).

Hitting much closer to the subject of this thesis is MPRI's involvement in providing some of the staff and leadership training to both the Battalion and Brigade Programs of Instruction for the African Crisis Response Initiative. The use of MPRI in this role has been pursued not because MPRI possesses a unique capability, but because it has available staff people whereas the U.S. military does not.

F. DESTROYED ECONOMIES

In many instances, the lack of a viable, local economy has impacted on the decision of both soldiers and guerrillas to both mobilize and demobilize. When the economy is so weak that groups feel they have no hope for an acceptable future, they may feel that their only recourse is to fight. Even if this does not result in an improved economy, should an opposition group win, its members will find themselves in a better position to benefit from the meager resources that are available.
On the other hand, when the issue of demobilization arises, the state of the economy will also be an issue. In situations where there is an extremely weak economy, soldiers tend to be reluctant to put down their weapons and return to a peaceful existence. While they may never have wanted to serve in the military or belong to a guerrilla movement, bearing arms has provided them with a modicum of power that placed them in a relatively advantageous position. Once they give up those weapons and return to a normal existence, they lose that advantage. Given a choice between entering a bleak economy or keeping their weapons, guerrillas may well choose the latter and a path of banditry in order to support themselves and their families. While this course of action may not appear to be very desirable from an outsider’s point of view, we have to understand that the composition of most African economies and the effects of war only add to the problems that many fighters on all sides often face as they return to civilian life.

1. Agrarian Economies

For instance, in many African countries, the primary source of income for the average man is agriculture. Most of what is grown by an individual is used for subsistence, while any small surplus can be sold for cash or used to barter. In countries where conflict exists or has recently
ended, upwards of 72% of the labor force earns its living from agriculture. (See Table 1 below)

In some of the warring countries, land mines have been used in unprecedented numbers. This has been particularly the case in Angola and Mozambique. At times, land mines have severely restricted the use of arable lands. Reduction in the land available for farming can have a significant impact at the local as well as regional level. If the available lands can not sustain life for the inhabitants of a region, families or communities may be forced to re-locate or the standard of living may drop even lower than is the norm for these struggling communities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of Labor Force in Agriculture</th>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
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<td>DROC</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Western Sahara</td>
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Table 1.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16} Data compiled from the CIA World Fact Book located at www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ao
The impact of this on soldiers and rebels who are returning home can be huge. It will be very difficult for them to gain farmable land in their home village or in a new area unless they are provided previously cleared land by the government. In Namibia, demobilized South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) soldiers routinely returned to their villages in 1989. Although soldiers were worried about what would await them, since no land was set aside for them and many had as many as 10-12 dependents they had to care for, a short-term solution was devised. Each soldier was given a "one-off payment". (Weiland/Braham, 1994, p. 98) This provided each soldier with enough money to attempt to reintegrate himself into civilian society or get by until it was possible for him to join the new Namibian Defense Force. Although this technique proved relatively successful in this instance, there are potential downsides from using such a method. It is possible for such a sudden influx of money to upset a fragile local economy. Also, this type of solution is more of a stopgap solution as it does not address the needs of its recipients in the long run.

2. Small Business

The opportunity to return to other sectors of the economy, such as small business, is often more restrictive than attempting to return to agriculture. In general, small
businesses are found in urban areas and are often run by foreigners. The strength of this segment of the economy is often weak and is only further hurt by war. Unless the returning soldiers and guerrillas had a previous connection to the owner of the business it is highly unlikely that they will be able to secure employment in this sector. This situation, again, becomes a factor when it comes to members of armed forces deciding whether or not to put down their weapons.

G. DEVASTATED INFRASTRUCTURES

Many of the conflicts in Africa have lasted several years, if not longer. The destruction to infrastructure has consequently been monumental, further crippling already fragile transportation, communication, and energy supply systems. The effects of this destruction are felt in numerous ways. The following sections will address both problems that must be dealt with by civilians and by peacekeeping forces.

1. Roads

In many countries in Africa, the roads are bad. War makes them worse. In Mozambique, for example, the use of roads was severely restricted both during and after the war due to the widespread use of land mines. While the efforts
made to solve the problems posed by land mines have been substantial, the initial task was overwhelming. For example, in 1994 there were approximately 981 identified mined areas in Mozambique. Many, but not all, of these areas were near roads and trails. By late 1995, over 9,055 kilometers of road had been cleared of over 10,000 mines and 22,000 pieces of unexploded ordinance (Synge, 1997, p. 79-80). And while this effort has taken place, the number of identified mined areas has not decreased, but increased to over 2,000 known locations (p.80).

The impact of this threat cannot be overstated. Not only is the local population hesitant to use the roads, but often aid workers will refuse to use them as well. This may result in particular areas not receiving the aid they desperately need. Problems are also created for any peacekeeping force that may be present. Time, resources, and dollars will have to be directed to deal with this problem, instead of going directly to the population in need. Another indirect result of this issue is that without the use of the roads, both the military and NGOs/PVOs will need to find alternative methods for moving around the country. No matter what alternative method is selected, planners must be aware of the impact the alternative will have on both costs and time.
2. Railroads

The presence or number of railroads within any given African country may vary greatly, but their primary function is the same. While they clearly provide a means of transportation for the population, their main purpose is to move goods. Given that most people are tied to the land, there is very little need, on a regular basis, for large numbers to be moved around the country or region by rail. But when a particular country has natural resources that are being mined or otherwise exploited, the rail lines become critical for shipping these products to ports, refineries, or across borders to meet external demands. The DROC and Liberia are both countries with natural resources that require movement by rail. And in each of these countries, the use of the rail lines was severely restricted by the civil wars that occurred.

In DROC the total distance of useable rail lines was drastically reduced due to fighting. Only one rail line runs north-south in the eastern part of the country, where the vast majority of the mineral wealth is located. Any disruption to this line significantly impedes the flow of these resources.

In Liberia two out of the three existing rail lines in-country were shut down due to the civil war (www.odci...
1999). Much as was the case in DROC, in Liberia the RUF was in a position to disrupt the use of the rail lines and control territory, which deprived the government of benefiting from exporting the country's natural resources.

In countries where mineral resources are vital to the national economy, such as Angola, DROC, and Liberia, more effort will have to be invested in restoring and maintaining rail lines, since these are critical to the country's economic well-being. Beyond ensuring the security of these lines, the direct impact on a peacekeeping force will most likely be minimal, especially if access to clear roads is good or adequate air assets are available. However, the significance of making sure these lines are up and running should not be overlooked in terms of assisting in the restoration of a viable national economy.

3. Communications

As is the case with both rail lines and road systems, the communication networks that exist throughout the continent fail to match the standards that one would find in either Europe or North America even in the best of times. For instance, in Mozambique, there are approximately 70,000 phones, according to 1998 estimates, to service a population in excess of 18 million people. In Rwanda, there is no phone service available for the general public. In Angola,
the situation is much the same, with phone services only available for government and business use (www.odci..., 1999).

In some of these countries, as well as in numerous others, the quality of the communication networks was not affected by war; the quality had always been poor. In other countries, conflict has further eroded an already weak network. We see this in both Angola and Sierra Leone. Military actions were largely responsible for the loss of the limited capabilities that did exist (www.odci..., 1999).

The impact that the loss of communications can have on NGOs and peacekeeping forces is serious. NGOs do not usually bring with them a significant communications package that can provide communications around entire countries. The strain on a peacekeeping force is also increased when the communications infrastructure is non-existent. With requirements to monitor forces throughout the country, communicate with the leaders of member countries, and coordinate with the sponsoring organization, the loss of communications via phone, fax, and Internet can create unnecessary and extraneous problems, especially if the lack of a communications net is not taken into account ahead of time.
4. Clean Water

There are very few African countries where running water is available throughout the country. In many instances, this service is restricted to urban areas. For the vast majority of the population residing outside large population centers water is obtained from one of two places. Ideally, people have access to a well. Otherwise, they must acquire their water from naturally occurring sources, such as lakes or rivers.

While the general population is accustomed to this situation, it may present certain problems for those attempting to resolve conflict. One of the first steps that is usually taken in an effort to resolve a conflict is to demobilize armed forces on all sides. In the case of government forces the task is much easier. Soldiers will often be restricted to their existing bases. But for guerrilla forces the task is much more complicated. Often these forces will be placed in semi-permanent camps. Ideally, these camps will be located away from population centers to prevent the guerrilla forces from interacting with the general population. These areas, normally, have very limited access to water. This requires that water, along with food and all other necessary supplies, be brought to the base camps. The strain that is placed on logistics
systems for something as simple as supplying water may prove to be too great to handle, which may result in guerrilla forces then departing these base camps. Again, the more that problems such as these can be foreseen and addressed prior to peacekeepers arriving on the scene the better able they will be to respond effectively once on the ground.

5. Energy

The disruption of power is another common occurrence during times of conflict. Attempts to disrupt the energy supply may be made by rebel forces keen to display the government's inability to provide for its citizens. In Mozambique, Renamo delighted in destroying transmission lines that carried electricity to urban areas. They were so effective that in 1988 the city of Beira had power for an average of only five days a month (Finnegan, 1992, p. 90). This had disastrous effects both on local businesses and the flow of water, which required power to operate the necessary pumps.

In Somalia, it was not uncommon for the government to withhold power from its own citizens. This was done in an effort to prevent nightly gatherings of people opposed to the government. It was also rumored that power would be discontinued at times in order to prevent the flow of information. This scenario appeared to take place weekly
when the BBC news broadcast was scheduled to air (Simons, 1995, p. 95).

Peacekeeping forces should be aware that energy is a resource over which people have fought in the past and that its distribution is often highly politicized. They should plan ahead so that they are capable of providing their own power. Their ability to likewise provide at least limited power to the local populace may also earn them a measure of instant credibility.

H. DEMOBILIZATION

One task that normally confronts peacekeepers at the end of a conflict, is the need to demobilize the fighting forces. The following sections will address some of the considerations that should be considered before demobilization begins, realizing that these considerations will be different for government and guerrilla forces, with special considerations being required when dealing with child soldiers.

1. Accountability of Guerrilla Forces

As part of any settlement, whether agreed upon by all of the concerned factions or imposed by an outside organization such as the United Nations, the need to demobilize forces is always present. Demobilization of
government forces is usually not an extremely complicated process. These forces are normally located within kasernes and reasonably accurate rosters of active members of the military are available.

But for guerrilla forces, the issue is much more complicated. Since these forces normally operate from remote bases and are often extremely decentralized, it is very difficult to accurately determine the size or membership of the guerrilla force. This is a problem that can weigh heavily on the government, because it is relatively easy for it to be deceived concerning the actual number of guerrillas involved in the campaign. Weapons can also become an issue. Guerrilla forces will often move only some of their force to cantonment areas and turn in only old and unreliable weapons. At the same time, these forces themselves may consist of boys who have been detained or recruited, but are not the best fighters in the guerrilla force.

Even should guerrilla forces actually comply with any agreement that has them demobilize and arrive at cantonment areas, there is very little assurance that they will remain there. At times, these forces have used the resources of the demobilization site to their advantage. Sites normally provide shelter, food, and medical treatment. The
guerrillas can send their forces to these sites for what amounts to a refitting. After they have been fed and received any needed medical attention, guerrillas can then slip out of the cantonment area and return to their regular base.

Difficulties such as these plagued operations in both Namibia and Angola. In Namibia, SWAPO forces proved difficult to account for and restrict to bases. As stated by D. Prem Chand, the Military Component Commander of UNTAG, "there was no question of clear-cut bases, and SWAPO could not provide us with the detailed organizational tables containing the details of personnel, weapons, and ammunition, something that is standard for a regular army." (Weiland/Braham, 1994, p. 93) Because of this lack of knowledge about what existed within the SWAPO ranks, it was easy for SWAPO to keep various units outside of the cantonment areas. This proved to be significant when SWAPO forces broke the cease-fire agreement on 01 April 1989, which resulted in heavy fighting over a ten-day period near the Angola-Namibia border (p.94).

In Angola, UNITA was accused of acting in a less than honorable manner in regard to the demobilization of its troops. The Angolan government claimed that many of the UNITA soldiers who were arriving at the cantonment areas
were underage or were not real soldiers (Hare, 1998, p. 99). This was just one indication of what was widely believed to be only a partial demobilization of UNITA forces. Both the Angolan government and the UNAVEM military command believed that UNITA failed to turn in all of its heavy weapons or dismantled its command and control system. UNITA openly proclaimed that it had so-called mining police in the diamond areas of the Luandas; few doubted that these were actually military forces under another name. Other reports indicated that UNITA had positioned some of its crack military units across the border in the former Zaire (p. 104).

The full reasons behind these lapses may never be known, but the fact remains that there was very little that could be done to ensure the total demobilization of the UNITA forces without a continuation of the conflict or external involvement by a peacekeeping force.

2. Child Soldiers

The deployment of child soldiers is generally viewed as an unacceptable practice, yet child soldiers continue to be used throughout the world, and particularly in Africa.\textsuperscript{17} Organizations such as the United Nations and Amnesty

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{African Guerrillas}, by Christopher Clapham, discusses the use of child soldiers in Ethiopia, Uganda, Liberia, and the Sudan.
International admit that there are more than 300,000 child soldiers participating in conflicts around the world today.

Dealing with this problem is extremely difficult for many reasons, but one of the most significant is simply in defining who exactly is a child soldier. The United States takes the position that a child soldier is someone under the age of 18, while many other countries, along with the United Nations, are pushing legislation that would define a child soldier as anyone who is 15 years old or younger.

Many of the children who are found taking up arms do not do so voluntarily. Often they are kidnapped and held captive. They are then faced with only two options: fight or die. Other children have become orphans, due to the fighting that has taken place in and around their homes. Often, armies or guerrilla groups become the children's families by default. They have nowhere else to turn and are looking for security, a sense of belonging, and possibly revenge.

The problem of child soldiers is as much an issue at the time of demobilization as it is during fighting. Children cannot be treated as adults and cannot be expected to return to life as it was before the war. For many of these children, war is the only way of life they have known. Special measures will need to be taken if these underage
combatants are expected to become productive members of society.

Some countries have begun to recognize this. In June 1994, during the demobilization of forces in Mozambique, Renamo admitted to still having over 2,000 child soldiers in the field. In an effort to deal with this issue a special demobilization program was designed for those under the age of 15. Both the International Committee of the Red Cross and Save the Children Fund-USA were involved in this program and attempted to reunite many of these children with their families (Synge, 1997, p. 97).

The use of child soldiers was also common in Liberia. Charles Taylor recruited hundreds of youth, including those who had been orphaned after a government offensive into Nimba County (Abdullah & Muana, 1998, p. 179). In addition to being used in combat roles these Liberian child soldiers were also used as 'child brides' for rebel leaders, were employed as runners, and served as laborers in the illicit diamond industry that supported the RUF cause. Leaving the RUF was virtually impossible. It was common for RUF youth to be tattooed with markings identifying them as RUF members. Thus, if they escaped or deserted, they "risked summary execution by both RUF and the Sierra Leone Army." (p.180)
III. PEACEKEEPING LESSONS LEARNED

A. BACKGROUND

Peacekeeping Operations have taken place for years. With the end of the Cold War, these operations have become much more common. This new environment has made these types of operations almost routine occurrences in Africa, with operations taking place in Western Sahara, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Mozambique. The fact that these operations have been so prevalent provides a wealth of lessons learned, some of which should have informed peacekeeping operations. Regretfully, it appears that each successive operation falls prey to at least some of the pitfalls suffered by missions that have already concluded. The purpose of this chapter is thus to analyze some of the more common lessons learned from prior PKOs, with particular attention being paid to issues that may affect command and control. Not all of these issues will have a direct impact on the command and control structure of the military component of a PKO, but all have some impact on how commanders assign missions, respond to crises, or deploy forces.
B. DELAYS IN DEPLOYMENT

Very often, the environment into which peacekeepers are deployed is very tenuous. The situation on the ground may change from week to week, or even day to day. One of the many reasons that deployments are continually slow is the length of time that is required to build consensus in an international body and produce a mandate. The acquisition of the necessary funds is also time-consuming. So is the mustering of volunteer contingents from enough countries. Two operations that suffered from exactly these pitfalls are Mozambique and Angola.

In the case of Mozambique, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed on October 4, 1991 (Synge, 1997, p. 22). While a symbolic UN presence arrived fairly quickly, the first element of the main body of peacekeepers did not reach Mozambique until the second half of February 1992, more than three months later (p. 27). Contributing to these delays were the United States’ reluctance to fund a specified portion of the operation and the lack of readily available peacekeepers. Many of the countries that normally contribute to PKOs were already involved in the ongoing UN mission to Cambodia (p. 32).

For this mission, the time lag proved to be very serious. Both the government forces and Renamo started to
take advantage of the delays and find loopholes in the GPA. It was only thanks to general exhaustion on both sides and the overwhelming desire of the general population for peace that the situation remained tenable until the arrival of the peacekeeping force.

The delays in Angola bear some similarity to those that occurred in Mozambique, but with one significant difference: the strength of the mandate. From January 1989 to the middle of 1997, the United Nations authorized four separate missions in Angola. Starting with the first United Nations Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) the UN provided inadequate financial and human resources (Durch, 1996, p. 103). As each subsequent mission was authorized, these resources increased. But even after the resources increased, delays in deployments persisted. UNAVEM II was approved on February 8, 1995, but it was not until the first week of June that the first infantry battalion arrived from Uruguay (Hare, 1998, p. 87).

The presence of a weak mandate can retard progress in much the same way as a delay in deployment. Sometimes it is worse. In the Angola instance, the weak mandates of both UNAVEM I and UNAVEM II placed a UN force on the ground in Angola that was incapable of enforcing the peace agreement.
Having thus built a reputation for being ineffective, the UN may have done far more damage to itself than if it had been tardy in arriving, but arriving with a credible force.

C. LACK OF IMPARTIALITY

The desire for peacekeepers to remain impartial is a widely held goal. But achieving impartiality has been, and most likely will continue to be, extremely difficult for peacekeepers to manage. The desire for impartiality appears to be quite simple. If both sides trust the peacekeepers to treat both sides the same, these parties now have someone whom they can trust, whereas in the past, there was no one everyone trusted. But this can be extremely difficult to pull off. There are times where one side in a conflict will accuse peacekeepers of favoritism in an effort to gain concessions. In other instances, the peacekeepers themselves will favor a particular side because it suits their own national interests.

In Angola, the conflict raged for so long that most of the neighboring countries had been involved, or identified, with one of the factions at some time during the conflict (Hare, 1998, p. 134). This created a situation in which a peacekeeping force drawn from neighboring countries may very
well have proven detrimental to reassuring citizens that the peacekeepers would be impartial.

In Rwanda, the indifference of the UN and much of the international community aided in the intervention of parties which clearly displayed partiality. As the Rwandan genocide approached, most countries ignored the obvious indicators and chose to do nothing. Some of this lack of action had to do with recent events in Somalia, where the U.S. military became involved in a major firefight with Somalia militiamen, resulting in the deaths of hundreds. Regardless; only France and Senegal took any kind of immediate action in Rwanda. Their response proved to be ineffective as a peacekeeping effort. It was widely perceived by various groups, especially aid groups, that France was acting in bad faith. The French acted in such a way as to demonstrate their support for the government forces and their opposition to the RPF (Durch, 1996, p. 385).

We see a very similar situation in Liberia vis a vis the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG forces. In this case, tensions existed between the Anglophone and Francophone countries of ECOWAS, as well as there being animosity directed specifically toward Nigeria, given its dominant
role (Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, 1998, p. 33). ECOWAS, as a multi-national organization, never achieved a unified approach to solving the Liberian problem. Nevertheless, actions were still taken. Cote d'Ivoire allowed Charles Taylor's NPFL to launch operations from its soil (Richards, 1996, p. 3). Later in this same conflict, peacekeeping changed to peace enforcement, as the Nigeria-dominated ECOMOG force began to take offensive actions against the NPFL (p. 59). When this offensive strategy was undertaken, both Ghana and Senegal outwardly questioned Nigeria's strategy (p. 65).

Impartiality in peacekeeping, as in many other situations in life, is something that may never totally be achieved. The fact that a nation provides some level of military support to an operation already indicates that it has some level of interest in the outcome. While a military commander of a peacekeeping force may himself not be totally impartial, he must understand and expect that others within the mission may likewise have their own interests and aims. He would be wise to take this into account as he assigns missions to various contingents and interacts with both contingents and belligerents.
D. LIMITED INCORPORATION OF CIVILIAN POLICE

Police fill a unique role in societies around the world. Their purpose is to provide basic law and order. One of the most important factors that needs to be considered when looking at the role of police in comparison to the role of the military is that police are accustomed to interacting with civilians. To a large degree, members of militaries are not. This is a very important distinction because, in PKOs, interaction with civilians is a common occurrence.

Because of the unique capability that civilian police (CIVPOL) play in most societies, their presence is becoming more and more common in PKOs. Yet, this has resulted in several significant problems. Each police force, while in its own country, operates under and enforces its own laws. Little is ever done for CIVPOLs prior to a deployment into a PKO to train them about the laws of the country they are entering. This remains the case with the ACRI and will be discussed later in the thesis. Other potential problems are that most CIVPOLs have a limited language capability and limited equipment with which to sustain themselves for extended periods of time. Add to this the fact that international bodies, such as the UN, have not planned the incorporation of CIVPOLs into missions very well.

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The deployment of CIVPOLs to Mozambique in support of ONUMOZ provides numerous lessons learned for future PKOs. While the CIVPOLs did have a positive affect on opening certain Renamo controlled areas to UN voter registration elements, there were not many other positive outcomes that resulted from this mission (Synge, 1997, p. 120). Over 1,000 CIVPOLs were provided from 29 different countries for this mission. This large assortment of police contingents resulted in a wide variety of training standards, on both the contingent and individual level, resentment from the existing Mozambique police force, poor preparedness on the operational and logistical levels, and a lack of language capabilities, culture, and police traditions (p.120).

In Angola, the CIVPOL situation was very similar to that in Mozambique. Again, this police contingent received no training of any type prior to its deployment. Individuals operated according to the experiences gained in their home countries (Durch, 1996, p. 116). To add to the lack of training, the CIVPOL never clearly understood its role. As the situation on the ground continued to change, the role of the CIVPOL continued to evolve. At various times, the CIVPOL worked for either the military or electoral observers. Neither of these roles was expected or
planned for and often resulted in resentment from the CIVPOL contingent (p. 116).

While the problems of using a CIVPOL contingent in PKOs are numerous, the potential gains are large. When a competent CIVPOL contingent that has received the proper training prior to deployment and sufficient support once deployed exists in a PKO, the strain on the military component will be reduced. To achieve this end, PKO sponsor organizations, such as the UN, will need to better plan for the incorporation of CIVPOLs into a PKO and military commanders will need to ensure they understand the intended role of the CIVPOL and their capabilities and limitations.

E. CONTINUITY

In any organizational setting, continuity of key players is normally viewed as beneficial. This is true for both PKO and HUMRO as well. When key players are involved in a mission for an extended period of time there are many benefits to be gained. These players, particularly the diplomatic and military senior leaders, will have a better appreciation for the situation on the ground, they will have built personal relationships with the faction leaders, which foster trust and understanding by all, and they will have been able to determine a particular course of action and
then implement that course. If leaders change on a regular basis, the likelihood of any of this occurring will be severely reduced. The cases of Namibia and Liberia provide two contrasting examples of the significance of continuity.

In Namibia, the level of continuity was extremely high. Martti Ahtisaari worked as the UN commissioner for Namibia for a year and a half prior to being appointed the Secretary General’s Special Representative in 1980. At that point he was able to bring together and maintain a team of senior officials right through to the conclusion. With the exception of General Prem Chand, who joined as force-commander-designate in 1980, the key staff had all been associated with UNTAG since its initial survey mission in 1978. (Weiland and Braham, 1994, p. 61)

With UNTAG not concluding its business until December of 1989, these key leaders worked the same problem for almost ten years. This degree of continuity is almost unheard of, especially in a UN-type mission. Nevertheless, what was gained was that the peace process was tended to on a full-time basis, with no change in direction, and the cohesion among the politicians, diplomats, and military leaders was extremely good. This proved to be very important, especially as the mission changed from one of peacemaking to one of peacekeeping (p. 185).
In the case of Liberia, the level of continuity was drastically different. The efforts to solve the crisis in Liberia were handled primarily by ECOWAS, not the UN. This alone caused several problems. Under the guise of ECOMOG, Nigeria assumed a dominant role in the conflict resolution. When the existing animosities between Anglophone and Francophone countries were added to this, there appeared little chance that consensus would be attained at the international level (Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, 1998, p.33). Regional tensions reflecting colonial legacies turn out to have severely affected ECOMOG’s ability to establish continuity over a significant period of time. In addition, various countries would volunteer their forces and then withdraw them after they determined that only Nigeria’s national interests were being pursued. This was the problem that caused Senegal to withdraw from the mission (p. 58). In addition to problems that arose concerning the international make-up of forces, Nigeria created added difficulties for itself. In the first fourteen months of the mission, Nigeria changed mission commanders four times. While each of these commanders exercised considerable authority over the running of the mission, each approached the job in a very different manner. Initial commanders were relatively passive about peacekeeping, while subsequent
commanders expanded their role and undertook limited offensive action (p. 59). This change in strategy raised numerous questions and opposition from both Senegal and Ghana (p. 65). The lack of continuity and consensus among the ECOMOG countries involved in the mission thus resulted in a very divided approach to the mission and only added to the existing animosities within the region.

Although continuity may be very difficult for mission leaders to achieve, since each country has the ability to withdraw from a mission by its own choosing, some steps can be taken to aid in the pursuit of consistency over time. First, the leadership within the sponsoring body must use great care in initially choosing appropriate leaders for both the diplomatic and military portions of the mission. Once these positions are filled, individuals who are assigned to those positions should be left in place for as long a period of time as is possible. The benefits of this can clearly be seen in the Namibia case. At the military level, meanwhile, the multi-national commander must be judicious in terms of how he sets about conducting the operation. He must seek out the advice of the contingent commanders, even if he does not follow their recommendations, to at least give the appearance of being interested in their concerns. The need for consensus
building will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
IV. U.S. DOCTRINE

A. BACKGROUND

United States military doctrine is one of many tools available to assist the military in accomplishing its mission. Doctrine can be found on an almost endless array of topics. Not only is doctrine available for the separate services, different branches, and portions of each service, but for joint operations as well.

One area where much progress is being made is that of coalition warfare doctrine and multi-national operations doctrine. It seems likely that most future operations carried out by the U.S. military will be on a multi-national level. The days of unilateral action are not gone, but are increasingly rare.

The level of detail that exists within U.S. doctrine may, at times, appear to be very broad. But what must be remembered is that doctrine is not a step-by-step checklist for how to accomplish each and every mission. Rather, doctrine is a guide, which helps point commanders and staffs in the right direction and to which they can turn when they may not be sure what actions should be taken or what resources are available.
When comparing U.S. doctrine to the doctrine of other countries, the notion that our doctrine is not very detailed all but vanishes. Many of our allies and friends feel that U.S. doctrine is very detailed. In fact, they believe that it is much too detailed. This is a point of view that we in the U.S. must keep in mind when preparing to operate in a multi-national setting. When operating in a combined environment, the level of detail in planning and the timeliness of the planning may not be equal to the standards that U.S. forces are used to or expect.

These differences do not mean that U.S. doctrine cannot be useful to other countries or alliances, such as ACRI-trained peacekeeping units, but it must be remembered that differences do exist.

This chapter will examine various aspects of U.S. doctrine for Military Operations Other than War and Command and Control. The focus will be on the aspects of this doctrine that are relevant to coalition operations.

**B. ROLE OF THE COMMANDER**

The role of the military commander in a multi-national operation is similar to that of a commander in a unilateral operation, yet the challenges and potential obstacles he faces are even greater. The fact that the commander, who is
usually appointed by the sponsoring political organization, has to deal with numerous national contingents makes his job ever more complex, especially since he faces a situation in which his building consensus is potentially more important than his being decisive. As Joint Pub 3.0 states, a Joint Force Commander "may be required to build consensus to achieve unity of effort." (JP 3-0, 1993, p. 1-5)

The commander's ability to accomplish consensus building will be made easier if he develops a personal relationship with the contingent commanders. These relationships can be enhanced by the Joint Force Commander making personal visits to each of the national contingents, keeping the other commanders well informed of what is taking place, avoiding preferential treatment of any one contingent, and familiarizing himself with the personalities of the other commanders and staffs (FM 100-8, 1997, p. 1-5). The ability to accomplish these tasks becomes all the more critical when dealing with nations where self-esteem, group honor, and face-saving are of great importance (FM 100-23, 1994, p. 3-3).

Another relationship that is extremely important is that between the military commander and the political organization controlling the operation. This relationship must be one of close coordination to ensure that both the
military commander and the political leadership are clear about two key principles: the objective and unity of command (FM 100-8, 1997, p. 1-2). As political leaders jockey for position in a crisis, the objectives of the mission may very well change. Because of this, the military commander must have a firm and current understanding of the changes that are taking place. Along with knowing what is happening in the political world, the military commander must keep abreast of the status of his force. Often, in multinational operations, various contingents will arrive and depart periodically. With these arrivals and departures, the capabilities of the military force will also change. It is crucial that the political leadership is made aware of the capabilities and limitations of the military at all times (FM 100-8, 1997, p. 5-2).

The relationship between military commanders and political leaders is so important that U.S. doctrine addresses it directly. It states that the Joint Force Commander may act as a buffer between the political and military components of an operation, while his Deputy Commander handles the day-to-day military operations. (p. 2-6) Dealings with political leaders can imply interactions with many different offices and agencies. The leader of any country's military contingent will always have the
responsibility to deal with his own government, but the multi-national force commander could well find himself dealing with representatives from international organizations (i.e. UN), regional entities (i.e. NATO, OAU), and sub-regional associations (i.e. ECOWAS, SADC) simultaneously.

C. COMPOSITION OF STAFFS

While commanders make the decisions, it is their staffs that provide them with the information that allow them to make good decisions. In the setting of a multi-national operation, the information that is provided by the staff to the commander is all the more important, because the commander will likely lack familiarity with all of the capabilities and assets that are provided to him. Because of this difficult setting, it is common to find robust staffs for multi-national operations. Joint Pub 3-07.3 addresses three separate staffs that may be available to the Joint Force Commander (JP 3-07.3, 1999, p. II-14).

1. Personal Staff

The Personal Staff, as defined in Joint Pub 3-07.3, provides the commander with the following individuals: a military assistant, a political advisor, a public affairs officer, an interpreter(s), and liaison officers from the
armed forces of the parties involved in the conflict (p. II-14). The military assistant will perform many of the same duties as a military aide. Some of these tasks would include, but not be limited to, coordination of transportation, arranging meetings with various commanders and contingents, and forwarding correspondence or information to the appropriate element. The political advisor would assist the commander on staying up to date on the changing political environment and pointing him in the correct direction when dealing with various elements of the political leadership. The legal advisor is likely to play an especially crucial role for the commander, because while the commander may be comfortable with the laws of his own country, he must also have a firm grasp of international law, the local laws in the area of operation, and the laws and customs of the various contingents working with him on this operation. The legal advisor must provide all of this information to the commander.

The public affairs officer can also play a crucial role. The need for the public to be kept informed, both in country and in the homelands of the various contingents, is vital. Not only does this awareness affect the safety and security of the soldiers on the ground, but it also impacts on the support that can be expected from the general
population of the countries from which the various contingents deployed. The commander’s ability to interact with the media and the manner in which he allows access to his command can go a long way toward accomplishing these objectives.

The potential need for an interpreter is abundantly clear and the role of liaison officers will be covered in detail later in this chapter.

2. Military Staff

Joint Pub 3-07.3 lists the following individuals as members of the military staff: the Chief of Staff, a Deputy Chief of Staff, and an operations staff (p. II-14). While there are no details about the specific composition of the operational staff, it is safe to assume that this staff, at a minimum, would consist of the normal, primary military staff members. Those members would include a personnel officer, an intelligence officer, an operations officer, a logistics officer, a plans officer, and a communications officer.

In multi-national operations, the normal composition of the military staff is that of a composite staff. With this type of staff come numerous benefits, as well as several liabilities. One of the main benefits of a composite staff on which sit representatives from all or most of the
contingents is that the level of expertise about all capabilities increases. The representative from each component to the staff should be an expert not only on his particular job, but on the capabilities that his country brings to the table as well. In addition to being an expert on his nation's capabilities, the staff officer should be capable of educating his fellow staff officers about his country's equipment, terminology, culture, religion, and language (FM 100-8, 1997, p. 1-6). One of the main drawbacks to a composite staff is that the staff is likely to take longer than an organic staff would to learn to operate together. In addition to potential language and communication problems, the issues of doctrine, reporting procedures, level of detail in orders, and timeliness may also be matters that must be dealt with. Over time, a composite staff will go through numerous evolutions before it becomes fully proficient, but one thing that it will always be able to do is provide an opinion about whether missions are appropriate, achievable, and equitable for all contingents (FM 100-8, 1997, p. 1-6).

U.S. Doctrine also addresses how to deal with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). One element which is not always included as a part of a military staff, but is better
capable of handling this task than any other is the Civil Military Operations Center. This center is manned by members of Civil Affairs units and is responsible for coordinating all military civic action projects and coordinating with NGOs and PVOs to try to maximize the effectiveness of the assets available. These efforts may be focused on improving the living conditions of the host nation population in general, the plight of displaced persons, and/or that of refugees. Some of the normal tasks undertaken by the CMOC are the coordination of transportation and security for supplies, restoration of water and electricity, and the improvement of sanitary conditions within communities. What must be remembered is that these functions do not take place in an isolated arena. They must be closely coordinated with the normal operations staff.

3. Civilian Staff

In UN-sponsored missions, the civilian staff, at a minimum, will consist of a chief administrative officer. This staff’s primary function is to provide overall direction of the force’s administration, with particular attention paid to matters having financial implications (JP 3-07.3, 1999, p. II-15). For operations sponsored by other political organizations, such as ECOMOG, the OAU, or SADC,
the same type of staff could be provided. While this staff is not the overall decision-making body, its efforts can be extremely important in ensuring that the political decision-makers and the military command are both heading in the same direction regarding policy.

D. LIAISONS

The use of liaisons within a multi-national operation, while potentially very consuming of manpower, can prove absolutely essential to the successful completion of the mission at hand. The main function of the liaison is to act as his unit commander’s representative to another unit commander. In the following sections, I will briefly cover what the functions of the liaison should entail, who should perform these duties, and the appropriate location for liaisons.¹⁸

1. Functions of the Liaison

The primary responsibilities of the liaison are to advise the commander of the unit to which he is sent and to keep his commander informed of what is going on in that unit. To do this he must have direct access to the commander of the gaining unit (FM 90-41, 1998, p. vi). He

¹⁸ To get a detailed look at the functions and responsibilities of a liaison, refer to FM 90-41, JTF Liaison Handbook.
should not attempt to perform his functions through an intermediary. If an intermediary is used, the chances of a misunderstanding will only increase. To be capable of providing the best advice possible to the gaining commander, the liaison should monitor all current operations, coordinate with the commander and his staff, advise them on the best use of his country's contingent, and assist the commander and his staff in learning as much as possible about his unit (p. v). These actions will be slightly different if working with an NGO or governmental agency. In this situation, the liaison will not necessarily be informing civilian leaders about how to use his unit, but rather how his unit can assist the particular agency or organization.

To accomplish these functions, the liaison will need to work with the staff he is supporting, but at no time should the liaison be viewed as augmenting that staff. He does not hold any responsibility to perform staff functions. Tying the liaison to a staff function would prevent him from accomplishing his assigned mission.

2. Selecting the Liaison

The selection of the liaison can be even more important than where a liaison is assigned. If the wrong individual is chosen, he may prove to do more harm than good. Since
the liaison is the special representative of the commander to another organization, it is essential that the sending commander have the utmost confidence in him (p. III-1). To effectively perform his responsibilities, the senior liaison should be equal in rank to the receiving unit’s operations officer (p. III-1). This may not always be possible, especially if the liaison is coming from a small contingent. But at the very least, the liaison must also be proficient in the language of the unit he is working with, be professionally competent about his own unit’s capabilities and limitations, and be flexible enough to deal with other cultures and organizations (p. IV-1).

3. Location of Liaisons

There is no set rule for where liaisons should be located. The commander directs them to locations where he feels their presence is necessary. For a multi-national level commander, possible locations where he might feel the need to station liaisons are with other contingents, various government agencies, NGOs and PVOs, and international organizations (FM 90-41, 1998, p. I-1). The assignment of liaisons between commands or agencies should be reciprocal whenever possible (p. I-1). This may not be feasible at all times, but when it is accomplished, effectiveness is likely to increase.
E. COMMAND STRUCTURES

The availability of different kinds of command structures provides commanders with the flexibility to use various structures as they are presented with different situations, different experience levels, or as the situation changes. A commander may opt to use the same structure throughout an operation, or determine that it would be appropriate to change the structure during an operation.

The current world situation, in which there is only one superpower and increasing numbers of regional conflicts, will require that an ever-increasing number of coalitions be organized to help resolve these conflicts. Based on the level of experience that members of coalitions or alliances have in working with each other, different command structures are likely to prove to be a better fit in varying situations. The command structure used by NATO, which has existed for over 50 years, may not be appropriate for a newly formed coalition, where the employed forces have never previously worked together. Joint Pub 3.0 identifies three different command structures that may prove effective for multi-national operations. These are parallel command, lead nation command, or a combination of the two (JP 3.0, 1993, p. VI-5). Each of these structures will be discussed in the following sections.
1. Parallel Command

Parallel command is considered one of the simplest command structures. The primary characteristic of a parallel command relationship is that nations will retain control of their own deployed forces (p. VI-5). It is also possible that some nations, with small contingents, may agree to their forces being made subordinate to the central command authority or another contingent. This occurs most often when a particular unit has a unique capability not possessed by the remainder of the forces, and this element is broken apart to provide the unique capability to all participating countries.

2. Lead Nation Command

This structure is most commonly applied when one nation provides the preponderance of forces and resources (p. VI-6). In these situations it is not uncommon for the lead nation to retain its own command and control structure and employ other national contingents as subordinate elements. The staff in this type of structure could be comprised solely of members of the lead nation, but more often than not the staff will be integrated with members from the other contingents. This will generate a higher level of expertise about the capabilities and limitations of the various
contingents, as well as engender them with a greater feeling of cooperation throughout the coalition.

3. Combination

This structure combines various aspects of both the parallel and lead nation structures. The manner in which this structure is normally employed is for two to three nations to act as lead nations, with various forces arrayed beneath them as subordinate forces. The various lead nations then act in a parallel command structure with each other.

This relationship was used during Desert Storm for the Coalition Forces that opposed the Iraqi Forces. Acting as lead nations for the Coalition Forces were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Saudi Arabia. These four countries were arrayed in a parallel command structure. Saudi Arabia acted as a lead nation for all of the Arab and Islamic nations participating in the coalition (p. VI-7). This was done for religious and cultural reasons. While this was not the simplest command and control structure that could have been used, it proved to be very effective.

4. Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC)

The C3IC is the cell that allows for a parallel or combination structure to exist with relatively separate
contingents operating toward one goal. The primary functions of the C3IC are to facilitate the exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among all coalition forces, and provide a forum so that routine issues can be resolved on an informal basis by staff officers (p. VI-6). This cell is the mechanism by which the Coalition Forces were able to conduct successful operations during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Without the use of the C3IC, the ability to coordinate operations and maximize effectiveness of available resources would have been severely hampered.

F. FORCE STRUCTURE

The force structure for a multi-national operation has no set pattern of implementation and will be different for each operation. Yet, there are several factors that should always be taken into consideration when determining how to best use the available force structure. Language, regional familiarity, experience, available equipment, and professionalism are all factors that should be taken into account when assessing the capabilities and limitations of each national contingent. Some of the other major factors and force types will be discussed in the following sections.
1. Unit Integrity

Joint Pub 3-07.3 addresses the fact that "units that trained together and operate within normal chains of command and under established procedures are more likely to be successful in any mission to include peacekeeping operations." (JP 3-07.3, 1999, p. I-14) This characteristic will hold true for any national contingent, just as it does for U.S forces. The benefits are even more obvious when dealing in a multi-national setting.

2. Interoperability

In multinational operations, the issue of interoperability can be critical. In assessing the situation, a commander must determine the level of interoperability that his command possesses. This can be accomplished by considering the abilities of national contingents, the type of units available, the equipment involved, and the capacity of support forces to support all contingents (FM 100-8, 1997, p. 2-15).

The level to which forces are interoperable will aid the commander in determining the manner in which he should array his forces. There may be times when language is the main consideration for deployment of forces, but in other instances past history or common equipment may have more of an impact on the deployment of forces.
3. Reserve

Whether participating in a multi-national force or acting unilaterally, U.S. forces will always maintain a U.S. reserve (JP 3-07.3, 1999, p. x). This is done as a force protection measure to ensure that should any unit, particularly a U.S. unit, find itself outgunned in a combat situation, the US will always be capable of reacting. For multi-national operations without U.S. participation, the use of a reserve should be adhered to at all times. This should apply for peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement operations.

4. Special Operation Forces

U.S. Special Operation Forces are very well suited for participation in the peacekeeping environment. Whether they are utilized is another matter, but the type of training that SOF forces receive prepares them to cope well in the peacekeeping environment. Based on SOF’s regional orientation, cultural awareness, and language capabilities, these forces are well suited to act as liaisons with the local populace, other military forces, national contingents, and various other agencies (p. II-10). In addition to the above stated capability, SOF also provide the U.S. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs capabilities, which can gather information, train and organize security
forces, and conduct area assessments, both prior to and after the introduction of conventional forces (p. II-10).

G. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The following elements of planning are key in the preparation for, and conduct of, operations other than war. This does not comprise a checklist delineating what should be done and in what particular order, but should serve as a guide to be used as a commander and staff prepare for their role in a military operation other than war, such as peacekeeping. The following list can be found, in greater detail, in Joint Pub 3-0, Chapter V. The factors are listed in the order in which they appear in Joint Pub 3-0 and do not necessarily reflect their relative importance.

1. Interagency Coordination

In operations other than war, the military component of the operation is just one aspect of a much larger operation. Different governmental organizations, NGOs and PVOs, as well as foreign governments and militaries will normally be involved in these operations. Given the kind of environment that has to be fostered if operations such as these are to succeed, the ability to act both quickly and effectively has to be greatly reduced to allow for more consensus building. It will be this consensus building that proves critical to
developing a sense of trust and cooperation amongst all participants.

2. Command and Control

This element of planning has been discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this thesis. The one key thing to remember, in regard to command and control, is that each situation will prove to be unique and require a different solution. But through the use of doctrine, a commander should be able to identify several options from which to choose.

3. Intelligence and Information Gathering

The need for accurate and timely intelligence and information gathering is just as important in Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) as during war. This is one of the key factors in ensuring that the proper force protection measures are in place. The gathering of information should begin as the mission has been authorized. Information should not be restricted to just military assets, but should be generated from all available sources. This ties in very closely with interagency operations. Before making any determinations about the collection of information or how it will be distributed, the Joint Force Commander must consider the capability of a unit to receive external intelligence support, its ability to store
information, the timeliness of the collection systems, and the agencies and organizations that are available to conduct these operations (JP 3-0, 1993, p. V-5).

4. Constraints and Restraints

The main restriction that is always present in military operations is the Rules of Engagement (ROE), but in operations other than war ROE is just one of many constraints and restraints. Because of the multi-national setting of these types of operations, the international agreements regarding each mission must be considered before they are carried out. In addition to securing each nation's acceptance, the military command should have a working knowledge of the constraints and restrictions under which all of the NGOs and PVOs operate. This understanding will help facilitate unity of effort from all involved agencies.

5. Training and Education

The focus on training and education in U.S. doctrine applies to the development of interagency operations. Many of the operations other than war that the U.S. becomes involved in arise with minimal notice. This severely restricts the amount of coordination that can be achieved between agencies once the mission has arisen. Therefore, educating various agencies about each agency's capabilities and conducting joint training exercises prior to actual
operations will greatly enhance the ability of all agencies to accomplish the given mission to the highest level possible.

6. Postconflict Operations

Postconflict operations are the primary facet of operations other than war. While the military component of the organization conducting the operation may be well suited to conduct these operations, it will not do so alone. The military's involvement will usually decrease over time and transition to other agencies, NGOs, and PVOs. Typical postconflict operations include refugee control, the reestablishment of civil authorities, support of truce negotiations, civic action programs, and public affairs operations (p. V-5). The planning for these operations should begin as soon as the mission is undertaken, even if the implementation is not set to begin for months or years.

H. PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

These principles are very similar to the Principles of War. The differences, although small, are significant in identifying the different environment in which peacekeeping operations take place. In war, the military is used to destroy forces and resources and to take and hold ground. In peacekeeping operations, the mission is quite different.
Often, military forces are used to keep belligerent parties separated and assist in returning a ravaged land to peace and order. The principles used for operations other than war are: objective, security, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, and restraint (JP 3-07.3, 1999, p. I-7).

1. Objective

The objective for a peacekeeping operation will often change throughout the duration of the mission. Both the military component and the civilian components must keep each other informed to ensure they all fully understand what the current objective is.

2. Security

While it is normal for the peacekeeping force to be invited into the country where a dispute has been taking place, it is always possible that the situation on the ground could change and place the peacekeepers in danger. This has occurred in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Liberia, to name just a few instances. A peacekeeping force should always maintain the capability to defend all of its components and should consider force protection to be one of its primary missions.

3. Unity of Effort

Unity of effort is usually a difficult principle to maintain on a consistent basis. As the situation on the
ground changes and various contingents come and go, commitment to the mission will change. It is important for commanders to attempt to achieve as much unity of effort as possible to hold the existing coalition together on the ground, as well as back home in the countries that have sent contingents.

4. Legitimacy

Legitimacy is usually gained from the mission receiving approval through an international agency. The most common manner in which this occurs is for the United Nations to issue a mandate for the mission. Mandates can also be awarded by various regional organizations, such as NATO or the OAU. A mandate from an international body that is removed from the fighting and neutral vis a vis the conflict confers immediate legitimacy on the mission.

5. Perseverance

Perseverance may be one of the most difficult principles to maintain, because it may require the commitment of nations for years. And while nations are willing to resolve disputes, it can become increasingly difficult to remain committed as time passes. Historically, one can look at peacekeeping missions and see where cease-fires have been broken and reestablished, parties have entered and left negotiations, and international mandates
have been issued and then been extended time and time again in order to keep the force present while attempts are made to still resolve the conflict. Often, it is difficult to see progress being made. This is especially the case for those back home, far removed from what is taking place on the ground. It is a testament to the leadership of a given mission when it can maintain a level of commitment from all contingents involved.

6. Restraint

This principle is the one principle that differs most from the Principles of War. The ability of peacekeepers to employ minimal force and apply negotiation techniques and mediation skills proves to be much more useful than shooting at every provocation. There is a very thin line that must be straddled to achieve restraint while still ensuring that the force remains protected to the utmost.

I. FUNDAMENTALS OF PKO AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Joint Pub 3-07.3 identifies fundamentals of both peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations. The fundamentals of peacekeeping operations are listed as firmness, impartiality, clarity of intention, anticipation, consent, integration, and freedom of movement (JP 3-07.3, 1999, p. II-2). The fundamentals for peace enforcement
operations include impartiality, restraint, settlement versus victory, coercion, and presence of civilians (p. III-3). Each of these factors will carry varying degrees of importance depending on the conflict and while the two sets of fundamentals are listed separately, many characteristics are applicable in both types of missions. The following sections will address the characteristics that appear to be most important in the majority of operations.

1. **Impartiality**

While doctrine and common sense call for impartiality to be observed, this is rarely achieved. Too often (as we considered above), the peacekeeping force consists of contingents that have some connection to one or more of the warring parties. If they have no connection, they still may possess an interest in the outcome based on political, religious, or economic links. Developing at least the appearance of impartiality may be one of the greatest challenges that a commander will face.

2. **Settlement versus Victory**

Very closely tied to impartiality is the need for peacekeepers to help the parties to the conflict reach a settlement, as opposed to attempting to help one side reach victory. This often places the peacekeepers in a position wherein they need to help create consensus building and
power sharing rather than allow one dominant group to emerge from the conflict with all of the rewards and power. This may prove to be almost as difficult as remaining impartial. Rarely is the case found where either party is willing to give up any of the power it already possesses.

3. Clarity of Intentions

By clearly explaining the intentions of the peacekeeping force to all factions, the chance of a misunderstanding occurring will be drastically reduced. Not only will this build a sense of fairness and trust amongst all parties, but may also aid in the force protection of the peacekeepers themselves. If the peacekeeping force is truly impartial and honest with the belligerent parties, and those parties truly want to see a settlement reached, this openness will prevent confusion and the appearance of favoritism and will lead all parties to feel that they are trusted and part of the solution that is at hand.

4. Presence of Civilians

The presence and suffering of civilians will add to the confusion of these types of missions. When combatants, especially irregular forces, are mixed with civilians, their identification becomes very difficult. This was a scenario that confronted peacemakers in Somalia when they were faced with militiamen who would hide amongst both women and
children. Any amount of fighting that might take place where forces are intermingled with civilians will inevitably result in civilian casualties and collateral damage. There are measures that can be taken to reduce the amount of damage that might occur, but commanders must realize that these problems will arise.

Whether fighting is still going on or has just concluded, many civilians will become displaced or are already refugees. Regardless of which category exists in greater numbers, the mere existence of either will prompt the arrival of humanitarian assistance groups. These NGOs and PVOs will often be found within the war zone prior to the peacekeepers themselves arriving. While the intentions of these organizations are, for the most part, to help end the suffering, sometimes they can exacerbate it. For instance the resources that they bring into the conflict area are often fought over by competing factions or stolen, to later be sold on the black market. This money can then be used to buy weapons or support militias.

The requirement for these organizations to deal with the peacekeeping forces is virtually non-existent. They are private organizations operating independently of any mandate except those set by their own organization. Therefore, they are not in a position to demand help from the peacekeepers,
yet they also have no responsibility to assist the peacekeeping force. These factors create a situation in which the peacekeeping force will be operating alongside other international organizations that are capable of accomplishing great successes, as well as creating vast problems.
V. THE ACRI

U.S. engagement in Africa has been episodic, with no basis in a coherent strategy...

- Dr. Nancy J. Walker

ACRI as currently construed does not fundamentally alter the African security environment or lead automatically to an organic African capability for peacekeeping. It does not deal with major military shortcomings in command and control, logistics, planning, and mobility.

- Dr. Steven Metz

A. BACKGROUND

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is a Department of State initiative that is designed to enhance the capabilities of African nations in the skill sets needed to conduct both peacekeeping and limited humanitarian assistance operations. Some individuals, organizations, and countries have viewed this initiative as a way for the United States to disengage from events in Africa. Others regard this as an attempt on the part of the United States to help African nations help themselves to solve their own problems. The truth can most likely be found somewhere between these two views.

The African continent is usually viewed as an area of the world where the United States has very limited strategic
interests. To some degree this is true, yet the continent does factor into U.S. interests on numerous levels. Strategic resources, such as gold, diamonds, platinum, uranium and phosphates can be found throughout the continent, many health risks such as AIDS and Ebola are a problem, and many troubled nations are struggling to maintain a semblance of law and order. This last factor, to include the presence of terrorists and an ever-increasing passageway for illegal narcotics trafficking, severely impacts not only regional stability, but potentially that of the United States as well.

The ACRI program is one tool that can be used to help better secure regional stability. As smaller conflicts erupt around the world and the military budget and available manpower continue to shrink, it becomes more difficult for the U.S. to maintain a presence in all locations. By constructing a program that sets out to train other countries to maintain the capability to conduct stability operations themselves, the United States can come out a winner on several fronts. If done correctly, the United States will be seen as a country that has helped others to improve their security and welfare. This is also an efficient use of available military resources. With limited participation by U.S. soldiers, the ACRI program can be
conducted, monitored, and maintained so that the future need for U.S. military personnel in times of conflict will be drastically reduced.

The training that is offered in the ACRI program has not been offered to all countries, and rightfully so. The remainder of the chapter will describe in greater detail the content of the training, which countries were selected and why, the legitimacy of the program, and how it is, and will need to be, financially supported.

B. TRAINING

Training is the body of the ACRI program. It is this portion of the program that will benefit most from the effort put forward by the U.S. government. There are two primary portions to the training concept: the battalion portion and the brigade portion. Specific tasks are associated with each portion, as well as a various lists of participants who may be present for either or both POIs. The following sections will address the various participants and the battalion and brigade POIs.

1. ACRI Participants

Each ACRI training iteration will have various participants. Some participants will be present for each iteration, while others will attend periodically or for just
a portion of an iteration. The following participants are some of those likely to have the greatest impact on the success of the program.

![Diagram of training participants]

**Figure 1.**

**a. U.S. Trainers**

Currently, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is providing most of the trainers for the ACRI program. Elements from the 3rd and 5th Special Forces Groups and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command have carried the bulk of the effort, with the 3rd Special Forces Group in the lead. Their language abilities, cultural awareness, and experience as trainers of foreign forces make the Special Forces soldiers ideally suited to conduct a mission such as this.
In addition to the members of USASOC, other conventional units are providing limited numbers of subject matter experts (SMEs) to provide some of the more unique portions of the POI. These include trainers in logistics, engineering, and medical services.

Civilian firms have also been included in the U.S. training package. The two primary companies involved in this effort are Military Professional Resources International (MPRI)\(^{19}\), located in Alexandria, Virginia and Logicon, located in Leavenworth, Kansas.\(^{20}\) MPRI is a firm filled with retired military personnel, many of whom were senior officers in various branches of service. Their involvement centers on staff training and leadership tasks. Logicon is a small company with numerous retired military members. Its role is to bring computer simulations to Africa to assist in the training of host nation or composite staffs.

\(^{19}\) Details on MPRI can be gathered at their web site, www.mpri.com.

\(^{20}\) Details on Logicon can be gathered at their web site, www.logicon.com.
The POIs that will be taught by these trainers are broken into three major components. They are as follows:

1. Initial Battalion Training Plan. The ACRI training concept is for U.S. trainers to provide a 60-day program of instruction to African units in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. This is to be accomplished by conducting multi-echelon training for all the necessary task areas and culminating with a battalion level field training exercise (FTX).²¹

The POI is broken into five distinctive portions (See Figure 2). Each segment of the POI will begin after the completion of the previous portion. Training cycles may differ in the length of time required to complete each phase, depending on both the trainers and the

competence of the host nation battalion. The five phases, in order, are as follows.

\[(a) \text{ Receive and Equip HN/ Improcess}\]

This phase takes longer than one might think. It is important that this phase be completed with great attention to detail. It is during this phase that all equipment that is associated with the ACRI program will be signed over to the host nation battalion. This includes the issuing of individual clothing to each soldier who will participate in the training. Also, as part of the inprocessing, each soldier receives an eye exam. If the soldier is in need of glasses, he will be fitted for and provided glasses at this time. This may be the first time that the soldier has seen the world clearly in years (McCracken, 1998, p. 10). Consequently, this effort serves to not only improve the abilities of these soldiers, but also demonstrates the value that the U.S. Army places on the individual soldier.

\[(b) \text{ Common Tasks}\]

This phase will be short in duration, but is of immeasurable value to the program, since this is when the training that is applicable to every soldier will take place. These tasks can include, but are not limited
to, basic marksmanship, basic medical skills, and human rights training.

(c) Multi-echelon Training
This phase dominates the training. It can take upwards of 30 days to complete. Concurrently, training will be conducted on individual/platoon/company tasks for the infantry companies, functional area training for the combat support and combat service support elements (i.e. engineers, military police), civil affairs and psychological operations training, leadership training, and military staff training (McCracken, 1998, p. 12). A detailed list of all pertinent tasks can be found in Appendix B.

This represents the most dynamic phase of training since many different elements will be receiving training from various training elements simultaneously. In an effort to maximize the time that is available, the U.S. trainers will focus their efforts on utilizing the “train the trainer” technique (McCracken, 1998, p. 11). This technique entails U.S. trainers providing initial training to the officers and NCOs of the host nation. After host nation officers and NCOs have successfully learned the identified tasks, they will then proceed to train the remainder of their own soldiers. This method is used for
several reasons. One, it allows for a better student-to-instructor ratio. More attention is thus paid to each student. Second, rather than U.S. trainers, it lends officers and NCOs from the host nation credibility if they are seen teaching the tasks.

(d) Collective Training
During this phase, the various elements that have been receiving instruction separately will begin to train together. This will allow each element to gain a better appreciation for how it fits into the bigger picture.

(e) Battalion Training
At the beginning of this phase, the battalion will be given a few days to regroup and refit. It will then receive a mission to conduct, which represents the culminating exercise of training. The host nation will be involved in the creation of this scenario, starting at the beginning of the training cycle. This scenario will normally include the participation of 2,000 to 4,000 local villagers. They will fill the role of displaced persons, creating a very realistic training environment (p. 12). During the final FTX the host nation battalion will be evaluated on 11 critical tasks that are identified in the POI (p. 12).
(2) Follow-On Training Concept. It is evident that once the initial training has been completed, some level of sustainment training must take place if the host nation battalions are going to be capable of maintaining their level of proficiency. The idea behind the Follow-On Training Concept is to provide that training. Currently, the plan is to conduct periodic training iterations over the course of several years (See Figure 3). There are five programmed training iterations, with the intended target audience varying between the battalion staff, leaders, the entire ACRI trained battalion, and a multi-national command post exercise.

**Figure 3.**
(3) Brigade Training Plan. Under the ACRI training program there are no true brigades, nor will entire brigades be trained at any given time. The size of the trained unit is a battalion. The purpose behind the brigade training plan is to train a brigade-level staff, combat support, and combat service support personnel so that they are capable of supporting the efforts of a multi-national brigade-sized force in both peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations (3rd SFG, 1999, slide 3).

**ACRI BRIGADE TRAINING PLAN**

**PHASE I (CONTRACT WITH SELECTED MILITARY INSTRUCTORS)**

**Staff Functions**

- CS/CSS
- Special Staff
- CMOC

**In Process**

- CPX/CA

**Response Cells**

- Maneuver
- NGO/PVOs

**MDMP & Staff Functions**

**PHASE II (SF & MILITARY AUGMENTEES)**

**Staff Functions**

- Logistics
- Medical
- Signal
- Transportation
- Support

**CMOC**

**CMOC**

**PFHUMRO**

**PFHUMRO**

**Scenario**

(Figure 4)

The training that is provided in the Brigade Training Plan POI can be broken down into two distinctive parts. Each phase will use different trainees and trainers. The breakdown is as follows.
(a) Phase I
The primary trainers for this phase are private U.S. contractors (MPRI). Military instructors will augment them, while Special Forces soldiers will provide the overall exercise direction. The primary focus of the training in this phase is on staff functions and the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Those receiving instruction will include Combat Support, Combat Service Support, special staff, and Civil Military Operation Center personnel. The aim is to improve the ability of the staff to effectively and efficiently perform its roles at the brigade level. The vehicle that will be used to practice and evaluate the requisite set of skills is the Command Post Exercise (CPX) and the Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX).

(b) Phase II
The planned primary trainers for the second phase of training will be Special Forces soldiers augmented by additional military personnel. Many of the soldiers who are participating in this phase of training will not have taken part in any other ACRI training. Therefore, they will need to receive the same basic skills training (i.e. human rights, medical, marksmanship, etc.) as that offered during the battalion training. Once this portion of Phase II is completed, the trainees will be
broken down into their functional areas and receive more specific staff function training. To test and evaluate the training, Situational Training Exercises (STX) will be provided for each of the special staff sections. The training will conclude with a PKO/HUMRO scenario that mirrors the scenario that was used during the CPX/CAX conducted during Phase I.

b. Host Nation Contributors

Participating Host Nations provide battalion sized elements for training. These battalions are first observed by an ACRI pilot team to ensure that they meet the minimum required standards. This step is taken to ensure that the training team has a good sense of where the battalion stands going into training and that the battalion is on a relatively comparable level with the other battalions receiving the training. The normal configuration for the battalion will be a well-supported infantry battalion (See Figure 5). Currently, seven countries have committed to, and been approved for, participation in the ACRI program. These countries are Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin, and Cote d’Ivoire.
c. Regional Observers

Observers from various African countries have been, and will continue to be, invited to watch the ACRI training. This is done for several reasons. The first is the hope that countries that observe the training will gain interest in the program and become potential future participants. The second reason is that even if the observing countries do not become participants, they may still support the program. This can be beneficial in several ways. These countries could show their support for the ACRI trained battalions when regional or sub-regional organizations seek to improve military-to-

![ACRI Notional Host-Nation Battalion Diagram]

Figure 5.
military relations with ACRI countries, or possibly become donor nations to the ACRI program, without becoming directly involved.

d. Donor/Observer/Trainers

This section deals primarily with countries from the European Community. It is hoped that donors will help defray some of the costs associated with the program, particularly relating to equipment procurement for the trained battalions. For instance, vehicles will be required for forces once they are deployed into a conflict area. Thus, observers from outside Africa have been invited to ACRI training. In addition, the more aware European countries become about ACRI the more it is hoped they will better coordinate their own PKO training programs with the ACRI POI. Also, ACRI has welcomed trainers from these other programs in order to foster coordination among the efforts made by various countries involved in PKO training in Africa. Already, for instance, Belgium has provided 15 trainers to the initial training in Ghana (McCracken, 1998, p. 13).

One other noteworthy group of observers who are key to the continued success of the program are members of the U.S. Congress. Several Congressional Staffers have
observed ACRI training (McCracken, 1998, p. 13). Without the continued support of Congress, the ACRI program will no longer exist.

e. **UN/NGO/PVO**

This section deals primarily with organizations that will impact on the humanitarian efforts of the program. While the ACRI trained battalions will not have a large capacity to conduct humanitarian relief efforts, they will be placed into situations where they are working alongside organizations that do have this mission. If these organizations can be incorporated into the training portion of the program, this will only make it that much more likely that the relationship between military peacekeepers and humanitarian organizations will improve in future operations.

f. **Combined Training Assistance Teams**

This element consists of both U.S. and host nation evaluators. Their primary responsibilities are to observe and evaluate the final FTX and provide a report to the host nation (McCracken, 1998, p. 13).
C. CREDIBILITY

The ability of a program of this scope to succeed is largely tied to the legitimacy that is associated with it even prior to its inception. The more organizations and countries that view it in a positive light, support it, or participate in it, the better its chances of succeeding. This section will identify some of the major organizations and countries that have stepped forward to support the ACRI program.

1. United Nations

The United Nations has been highly supportive of efforts of regional organizations to solve problems within their own areas. The reasons for this are many and include limited funds for operations such as peacekeeping, the over-deployment of UN peacekeepers, and the difficulty associated with creating the necessary consensus to act in the wake of crises and on a case by case basis.

In light of these difficulties and the high level of coordination between agencies within the U.S. government and the UN, the United Nations has been a major supporter of the ACRI program. In an effort to gain the UN’s backing, the program of instruction (POI) to be used for all of the ACRI training was provided to the UN prior to its implementation. While this then led to several minor revisions to the POIs,
the efforts resulted in the United Nations publicly supporting ACRI.

2. Organization of African Unity (OAU)

The OAU is Africa’s equivalent of the UN. It is an organization of independent states, formed in part, to protect its members’ sovereignty. Although this goal is important to all the OAU’s members, “there is no provision in the Organization’s Charter for the use of military force as an instrument of conflict resolution.” (Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, 1998, p. 22) Originally, it was never envisioned that the OAU would need to become so heavily involved in helping to resolve internal wars. Because of this, the OAU now finds itself in the same situation that greatly restricted UN efforts during the Cold War. Whenever any member state objects to a humanitarian or peacekeeping mission, the OAU often becomes incapable of acting (Henk and Metz, 1997, p. 4). And with many of the African conflicts generating regional interest, if not involvement, it is extremely likely that some member state will oppose action in almost every instance.

Just as the UN has supported the ACRI, so has the OAU. In an effort to ensure that the program properly addresses the needs of the African community, the OAU has been consulted throughout the development of the ACRI. While
this support is highly desirable, and possibly essential, the OAU will need to alter its history of inaction if it hopes to become a constructive member of conflict resolution, or prevention, efforts on the continent.

3. European Community

While the ACRI program may not have earned the support of the European Community as a whole, it has gained favor with several key players. Those countries are the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. The support of these three nations is significant, because they all have long-standing ties to many African countries. Many of these were former colonies of Britain, France, and Belgium, some as recently as the early 1970s. Both France and Great Britain recently conducted a major review of their commitments to involvement in Africa. Two of the results have been that both countries are cooperating more closely with the U.S. and other European nations in matters concerning Africa, and both have sought a reduction in troop presence on the continent (Rice, 1997, p. 21-22).

4. U.S. Congress

Enough Congressional support existed, initially, to create the ACRI program. But, as with any program, results will be needed to maintain that support. Ambassador McCallie, the former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia and original
special coordinator for the ACRI, was the individual responsible for keeping Congress informed about the progress of the program. The continued support of Congress is critical to the existence of the program because that is where the funding originates. The initial funding package covered five years and approximately $75 million. This funding addressed everything from airflow to and from exercises to the equipment provided to the individual soldier receiving the training.

In order to maintain the support of Congress, demonstrable progress has to have been made. The fact that ACRI is having an impact may be very difficult for its supporters to prove. ACRI is a training concept and nothing more. The nations being trained are not committed to participate in any particular conflict and the lack of visible results may make garnering future support difficult. But while these results may be difficult to see, the continued support of the program will have impacts far beyond the ACRI itself. In his testimony to the House Subcommittee on Africa, Dr. Steven Metz discussed the potential diplomatic repercussions and erosion of American influence in Africa if the U.S., having started the ACRI,
then decreases or eliminates support for the program.\textsuperscript{22} This alone should cause Congress to seriously reconsider any decrease in funding or support for the ACRI.

D. FINANCIAL SUPPORT

As addressed in the previous section, the United States has provided the largest percentage of funding for the ACRI. This funding has been dedicated through Fiscal Year 2001. Funding beyond Fiscal Year 2001 is not clear; it could continue or it could dry up. If the funding is discontinued, all the efforts that have already been made will have been wasted. Only through continued support to the program will the desired capability remain.

The funding that already exists has been substantial enough that numerous training iterations have taken place. As part of each training iteration, the host nation battalion that has received the training has also received a significant equipment package. The equipment primarily addresses communications, individual soldier clothing and equipment, force protection, and medical needs.\textsuperscript{23} There are

\textsuperscript{22} Taken from the Congressional Testimony of Dr. Steven Metz, a researcher at the Army War College, to the House Subcommittee on Africa on October 01, 1997.

\textsuperscript{23} A completed list of provided equipment can be found in Appendix A. This list was reproduced from U.S. European Command Concept for Development of the ACRI, 28 April 1997.
two reasons these are being provided. The first is that several of the countries being trained do not have proper clothing and equipment for all of their soldiers. Secondly, all battalions that are trained will thus be trained on and familiar with the same equipment. This will greatly alleviate the problems associated with insufficient interoperability, especially in the area of communications, as well as reduce future costs during deployments.

Ideally, other countries that have interests in Africa but may be incapable of taking on a larger role can become donor nations. While financial support from these countries could be used during the training portion of the initiative, it will prove even more necessary in the event of contingency operations. As identified earlier, only certain types of supplies have been provided to the ACRI-trained countries. In-theater transportation is one of the major areas where the U.S. is hoping that donors will provide future support.24

24 The hope of donor support in the area of transportation is identified in the 01 May 1997 ACRI Procurement Priorities List for FY 1997, as addressed by the Joint Staff J-5. While this list is only a draft, the desire for donor nation support will never disappear, if only to give the appearance of a multi-national effort.
E. WHAT IS LACKING

What must be remembered about the ACRI program is that it is a training program and nothing more. While this program lays the foundation and builds the capacity for African countries to solve some of Africa’s problems, it does not create anything more than a capability. Providing this alone will be quite an accomplishment given the current state of many African militaries. Yet, there are many issues, which remain to be addressed if the ACRI is to provide the maximum benefit to both Africa and the United States. Some of these pertain directly to the military structure of African nations, but many others are external to the military. Of these, most relate to the political structure of African countries, regional and sub-regional organizations (i.e. OAU, SADC), and the United Nations. The following sections will address some of the unresolved issues or limitations of the ACRI program.

1. Sponsorship

The ACRI program is a U.S. Department of State initiative that has gained the support or acceptance of various organizations. The United Nations has been kept apprised of the POIs that comprise a good part of the program, to ensure that these are acceptable to the UN. The fact that the UN would support a program such as the
ACRI should come as no surprise. The UN very much favors efforts that will lead to conflict resolution and regional stability. It is also in favor of regional and sub-regional organizations solving problems within their own regions without the direct involvement of the UN.

Just as the UN has displayed support for this program, several of Africa's regional (OAU) and sub-regional organizations have been supportive as well, although they were skeptical at first. The OAU has worked closely with the UN in identifying measures that should be taken to help increase stability in Africa. These measures include the ACRI program. Of the two primary sub-regional organizations that have commented on the ACRI program, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), ECOWAS member states have responded much more favorably. Five ECOWAS countries have committed to the ACRI program. They are Senegal,

25 In Dan Henk's and Steven Metz's, The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond, the authors identify the initial reservations expressed by many African leaders: minimal advance warning of the initiative, lack of continuing interest in previous efforts, undefined relationships with international bodies (e.g. UN), unclear command and control relationships, and insufficiently specified external support.
Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Benin. This sign of support for the ACRI program could be even more important than it appears. Until the start of this program, most peacekeeping actions that these ECOWAS countries participated in were under the control of the Nigeria-dominated ECOMOG organization, the military arm of ECOWAS. Support for, and participation in, ACRI may demonstrate a desire on the part of less powerful ECOWAS countries to gain a better balance between themselves and the more powerful Nigerians.

Support for the ACRI program from the SADC member states has been much less enthusiastic. In some instances this can be tied to SADC countries' involvement in other peacekeeping efforts that are already ongoing in the region. In April 1997, Zimbabwe hosted a peacekeeping exercise dubbed Blue Hungwe. This exercise was in response to SADC placing Zimbabwe in charge of regional peacekeeping operations. Not only was this effort viewed as a success, but it also involved eight SADC countries as participants and observers from two others (Henk and Metz, 1997, p. 35).

Another reason for SADC's hesitation to participate is that some countries (e.g. Botswana) view the ACRI program as a way for the United States to disengage from
Ironically, while the United States would very much like to see more SADC countries involved in the program, some of these same member states fear the reduced interest of the U.S. on the continent if they were to participate.

2. Troops

One of the most critical aspects of the ACRI program, which cannot be emphasized enough, is that there are no dedicated troops associated with the program. Originally, this program was called the African Crisis Response Force, but this drew criticism and concern from many African leaders, including Nelson Mandela. They feared that any such designated troops could be used at will by the U.S., France, and Great Britain as they saw fit, to include participation in operations outside the continent. To alleviate those fears and gain the needed support of African leaders, the program's name was changed to African Crisis Response Initiative. In all probability, this change has had a minimal impact on the actual intent of the program. Various battalions are

26 This impression was conveyed to the author by LTC James Smaugh, former Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, Gaborone, Botswana, after the initial visit by representatives from the U.S. Department of State to discuss the ACRI with members of the Government of Botswana.
being trained to possess the capability to conduct PKO and HUMRO. Although all of the ACRI trained battalions will receive the same training, it has been recognized as likely that they will find themselves operating alongside components from other countries that have not participated in ACRI. This could occur under the guise of a UN mission, inside or outside of Africa, or in a scenario similar to what took place in Liberia, with Nigeria dominating the ECOMOG contingent. This very issue was the reason that numerous different doctrines (i.e. U.S., Nordic, UN, etc.) were drawn upon for the development of the ACRI POI.

Even so, not having any troops permanently associated with the program leaves a serious hole in the ability of ACRI to meet its desired objectives and could potentially be damaging to its continued existence. The ability of an ACRI contingent to deploy rapidly is seriously reduced without the presence of any permanent military representation at any of the international, regional, or sub-regional organizations that may sponsor a peacekeeping mission. Without an activation cell or coordination element in existence prior to the development of a crisis, the ability to launch a peacekeeping mission quickly will be severely reduced.
This issue deserves serious attention. As discussed previously in the Lessons Learned chapter, delays in deployment are continually present and can often jeopardize the success of the mission prior to it even beginning.

3. Funding

The continued existence of the program depends on continued funding by Congress. If Congress does not see the ACRI-trained units participating in peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operations, the level of support could quickly vanish. And lack of participation in such operations should be a major concern.

Numerous elements of ACRI-trained battalions have participated in peacekeeping operations to date, but not one entire battalion trained as an ACRI battalion has deployed. And without any stipulations about countries having to act in a crisis, the U.S. will find itself in a difficult position if it wants to apply pressure on a specific country regarding its lack of involvement at any time in the future. Each country could easily come up with a whole list of reasons why it could not or did not want to participate in any particular operation, while the U.S. would have to be wary of the level of pressure
it decided to apply, lest more support be lost for the program.

4. Logistical Sustainment

Logistics have been, and will continue to be, a major problem for many African militaries. Many African militaries have difficulty sustaining operations in their own countries, which is significantly easier than doing so in another country. If ACRI-trained battalions are going to succeed, they will most likely require the assistance of outside support in the area of logistics. The bulk of this support will probably come from either the U.S. or a European power, although several African countries, such as South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria, have credible capabilities in this area. Support needed may include, but is not limited to, aircraft to deploy with and sustain the force once in country, foodstuffs, vehicles, and power (both electrical and fuel).
VI. CONCLUSIONS

As of now, the ACRI has achieved several worthwhile goals. These include the training of more peacekeepers who can be used on future missions across Africa and around the world and the program has helped to show that the United States, and countries in Europe and especially Africa are concerned about the current international security situation and are taking steps to improve it. But all of this may be wasted if a coherent command and control system is not established to oversee the capabilities that have been gained through the ACRI and other such programs.

There are different levels of command and control that must be addressed to properly answer the necessary questions and each of these questions can be answered in a variety of ways. Some answers will prove to be more satisfactory than others, but all will be a step in the right direction.

This chapter will address two primary command and control issues: what steps must be taken on the international/sponsor level, and what considerations should be taken into account by a brigade headquarters element in providing command and control over a multi-national peacekeeping effort both prior to deploying and once deployed? In the second part of this chapter I will suggest
what those individuals who will carry out the command and control of these operations should be aware of prior to an actual crisis being addressed.

A. INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

One factor that continually works against peacekeeping efforts is time. Currently, those who seek to solve situations in Africa that become crises are more reactive than proactive. Even if the situation is monitored from afar, little if any action is taken to prevent the crisis from developing or to prepare to interdict the situation. This was clearly the case with the events that led up to the genocide in Rwanda. Many factors were involved in the lack of timely action (some of which have been discussed earlier in this thesis), but it is also evident that it is unrealistic to depend on the United Nations to solve every problem. That is why additional steps must be taken to ensure that the peacekeeping capabilities that are currently improving within Africa can be properly employed. If one looks at NATO as an example of a well-established international organization with an elaborate command and control structure, one would see an entity that still requires considerable time to decide whether and how to use
its capabilities. This is because consensus must be built, and consensus-building always takes time.

However, based on the history of regional and subregional organizations in Africa today, the same level of success and competency cannot be expected in Africa as is found within NATO. The OAU does have a Crisis Management Center, but this body has proven to be largely ineffective in solving the types of disputes that would call for peacekeepers. The organization was not designed to undertake such actions, but finds itself in a situation today where it may be required to do so more often. The OAU, meanwhile is the only overarching organization on the continent with a presence in all member states.

Beyond just lacking an effective C2 node for peacekeeping operations, Africa’s transnational infrastructure also proves disadvantageous to any multinational coalition coming together quickly. Communications are poor within many countries and become even less reliable when they are needed to coordinate events between countries. In 1996, as part of the JCS Flintlock Exercise series, I witnessed the first attempts to run a regional exercise in southern Africa. For this exercise, the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) invited contingents from Namibia, Mozambique, Malawi, and Lesotho to participate in the training. Once
the contingents arrived the training proceeded relatively smoothly, but getting to that point proved very difficult. In trying to determine which of the countries would actually participate in the training, the BDF received confirmation from Namibia, Malawi, and Lesotho. As the exercise began, a contingent from Mozambique arrived unannounced and the contingent from Lesotho never arrived. This is just a small example of the kinds of trouble that can be found at the sub-regional level during a training exercise. There is no reason to believe that the situation would improve at the regional level during a crisis.

In addition to the problem of communications, transportation will continually be a problem for any operation covering a large area. As discussed earlier in this thesis, the road and rail networks that often exist in conflict areas are often unreliable, whether due to the conflict or just normal disrepair. This can create a situation where some areas will be isolated and unreachable by either road or rail. Even if they can be reached, the length of time may become a factor due to the distance needing to be covered and the condition of the route. When one looks at the ability of African countries to provide airlift for an operation, it must be realized that assistance from either the United States or Europe will be
required to provide this capability. Of course, this will also add to the time required to deploy a force into a conflict area -- which offers yet another compelling reason for having some type of C2 cell established prior to the identification of a crisis.

Although, early on in the discussion phase of the ACRI it was determined that there was no desire to establish a standing force, which would have been difficult and potentially wasteful anyway, the need for a standing C2 element has not gone away. And while this thesis has focused on the ACRI, the C2 node would not necessarily have to be limited to ACRI countries. This node could be used to support all of the peacekeeping initiatives that are taking place around the continent. With an established C2 cell in existence, the ability to make more timely decisions would be greatly enhanced. Not only would coordination difficulties, due to poor transnational infrastructure, not inhibit the initial planning phase, since enough individuals would already be gathered together, but establishment of such a C2 cell would also aid in several other areas. Members from the various countries would become more familiar with each other, reducing the likelihood of potential misunderstandings and miscommunications. This would certainly assist in the consensus building process.
It would also reduce the ability of one hegemonic power taking unilateral action, which might not be in the best interests of other countries in a particular region.

With a centrally located C2 cell established on a permanent or even semi-permanent basis, even more could be done to improve the functioning of a multi-national force. Data could be centrally stored and continually updated. Pertinent data would include which nations have units available for PKO duty, the names of key leaders who have prior PKO experience and where they served, specific logistic information for each country and lists of potential liaisons and interpreters.

Another critical area that a permanent C2 body would be well-suited to address is determining which countries should comprise the PKO/HUMRO force. Granted, it is often the case that all countries that volunteer are needed, but heads of state do not always volunteer their military units to be part of a peacekeeping force for the noblest of reasons. Sometimes their own national interests are their primary concern. One could argue that countries would only ever become involved when their national interests are involved, but this is not the issue. The issue is that if a nation participates in a PKO in order to attempt to ensure that one
side in the dispute either retains or gains power, then a problem exists.

A situation like this could arise as it did in Angola where, because of the longevity and breadth of the conflict, neighboring countries found themselves eventually supporting one or the other side. Or it could be that colonial and linguistic animosities create built-in affinities, as has been the case in Liberia. It is given these sorts of regional, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and historic conflicts of interest that it makes sense to have an international decision-making body determine whether a peacekeeping force from the immediate area would be effective or whether it would be better to field a force composed of units from elsewhere on the continent. Potential problems will not always be able to be eliminated, but if they are addressed early on by a C2 node designed to look after the concerns of the continent, we are more likely to see better results.

Where to put such a C2 cell is another key issue that must be addressed. Although there are several locations that might make sense, the most logical would be at the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The OAU already has credibility as an international organization that has been in existence since 1963. In addition to its headquarters in
Addis Ababa, it also has regional offices in Maputo, Lusaka, and Luanda, along with an office in New York, which is capable of engaging in detailed consultations with the United Nations. Although the track record of the OAU is not very good in matters of PKO and HUMRO, that does not mean that it could not be improved enough to take on this responsibility. The work that must be done to press home the importance of this most definitely must be done by top-level diplomats. Describing the kind of pressure that might be required is beyond the scope of this thesis, but setting up a permanent C2 under the auspices of an organization like the OAU deserves attention. For without such a permanent C2 node, or the ability to quickly establish one in which everyone is already familiar with the manner in which they must conduct business, the money that is being spent now and in the near future will be wasted and the intended goal of regional stability unmet.

B. BRIGADE LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS

As was discussed in the Doctrine Chapter, there are several structures that can be effectively used to provide C2 at the Brigade level. Depending on each particular circumstance, one may prove to be a better choice than another, but that will never be determined until the actual
implementation of a PKO force. Even so, certain factors can be taken into account in the training of C2 elements and should be included in the decision making process of that leadership. The current Brigade Training POI appears to focus on staff responsibilities and the interaction with certain NGOs and PVOs. While these skills are certainly necessary and worth training on, it appears that some other significant areas are being neglected. Each of these may not prove important in every crisis, but they will all likely appear over the course of numerous deployments. If the leadership of a multi-national force learns to make the right kinds of assessments on a regular basis it will avoid many of the pitfalls that have plagued PKOs in the past.

1. Ethnic and Cultural Differences

The unit commander must work with the forces that are provided to him. He must take into consideration the make-up of the available forces. Not only does he need to concern himself with whether or not a particular unit may have some ethnic tie to one of the warring factions, he must also be concerned that there are no pre-existing animosities between various peacekeeping forces. If it appears that there may be some of these present, the force commander can attempt to prevent potential problems by carefully choosing the manner in which to array his forces. He can keep forces
separate by separating them geographically or by assigning them very different, non-overlapping missions. If he mistakenly ignores potential ethnic tensions early on, a commander may inadvertently create additional problems with which he must deal. Ideally, commanders want to mitigate any potential for friction by taking advantage of whatever commonalities or cross-cutting ties there might be.

The need to separate forces may also be of benefit to a force commander for no other reason than to improve effectiveness. This will often be the case when language becomes an issue. For obvious reasons, too, it would make sense to place units with a common language near one another, if there are no other reasons to keep them separated.

2. External Agencies

As discussed earlier in this thesis, the presence of external agencies (i.e. NGOs, PVOs) is something that should be expected by a force commander. They will be present and the force commander will need to establish some type of relationship with these agencies. The current ACRI training plan has addressed this issue and positive steps are being taken to improve mutual understanding between the military and private agencies. These efforts should be continued and possibly increased. The better that each side (military and
civilian) understands each other today, the better they will be capable of working alongside each other in the future.

But one asset that has proven to be crucial to previous PKOs and is not currently included in the ACRI program is civilian police. There are several reasons why this aspect of peacekeeping has been neglected, one of which has to do with the legal aspects of training civilian police forces. Whether this issue is ever addressed in U.S. legislation in the future is hard to know now, but the fact that this asset is not included in the training plan should be identified and dealt with. Even if civilian police forces are restricted from participating in the training, there may be other solutions that are viewed as acceptable. Inviting key members of various police agencies to attend ACRI training as observers may be one potential solution. Another may be to include some training to staff elements on the historical use of CIVPOL units in PKOs. At a minimum this would assist the military force commander to better understand how he should properly employ this force should he become responsible for CIVPOL employment. Just as with the NGOs and PVOs, CIVPOL will be present in future PKOs and it would be beneficial for the ACRI military commanders to understand the proper role and use of these forces.
3. Liaisons

The importance of using liaisons in a multi-national operation is considered important in U.S. Doctrine. It has also proven to be of great value in previous PKOs. Due to the complexity of these operations, the use of trained liaisons alleviates many unforeseen and unnecessary problems.

The topic of liaisons is not addressed in Phase II of the ACRI Brigade POI. It is unknown at this time if the contractors have included this type of training in Phase I, but since that training is focused on the Military Decision-Making Process and staff functions I consider it unlikely. Although the topic of liaisons is addressed in the Battalion POI, the focus is on conducting liaison operations with NGOs and PVOs. There is no mention of liaison operations between various headquarters or contingents. I feel that inclusion of such tasks would prove beneficial at all levels. FM 90-41, JTF Liaison Handbook, provides a solid basis from which lesson plans could be derived for inclusion in the Brigade POI.

C. SUMMARY

Finally, no one of these recommendations, if not acted upon, will make or break the ACRI. But when they are compiled and compared with what can be learned from previous
conflicts in Africa, I believe, that they would only be beneficial should they be incorporated into both the ACRI and the decision-making bodies that sponsor PKOs and HUMROs in the future. We must remember that as Americans we will be viewed as the outsiders when we attempt to assist African nations in solving some of their problems. But that does not mean that we do not understand the need for cross-cultural communication and mutual cooperation from all parties involved, in order to solve future conflicts. We, as Americans, should not assume that our African partners have any better appreciation for these issues than we do just because they represent African governments. Too often, it is the lack of commitment to ideals by governments that often lead to the conflicts we are attempting to avoid and resolve in the first place. Therefore, I believe we must not only help build a peacekeeping capability, but also a better atmosphere of trust and cooperation. This can only be done by fostering continual, constructive interaction among all parties involved.
APPENDIX A. EQUIPMENT PACKAGE

Each unit participating in the ACRI program will receive the following equipment. Some small differences may exist, as to what is actually distributed for each iteration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HF Radio</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF Repeaters</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP-350 VHF Hand.</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Stations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-chargers</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spare Batteries</td>
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<td>GP-350 Software</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeater Software</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Station Software</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5Kw Generators</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Detectors</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini-M SATCOM</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Vision Goggles</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load Bearing Equipment</td>
<td>800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrenching Tool</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Pack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canteen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canteen Cup</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canteen Cover</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspenders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Aid Kit</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uniforms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trousers</td>
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<td>Blouse</td>
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<td>Boots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDU Caps</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP Medium Tents</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP First Aid Kits</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lighting Equipment</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Field Kitchen</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigeration Van</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B. ACRI BATTALION TASKS

The following tasks are those tasks used for the baseline from which to begin each battalion-level training iteration. All of the tasks are grouped according to common subject matter.

PEAEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Basic Fundamentals of Peace Keeping Operations
Organization and Responsibilities at Check Points
Types of Actions at Check Points
React to Civil Disturbance
Conduct Liaison and Negotiate
Employ a Quick Reaction Force (QRF)
Escort a Convoy
Establish a Lodgement
Secure a Route
Provide Command and Control
Protect the Force
Disarm Hostile Parties
Conduct a Hasty Breach
Establish a Blocking Position
Building Search
Process Captured Documents and Equipment
Handle Captured Insurgents and Hostile Parties
Control Civil Disturbance
Control Civilian Movement
Link-up with a Convoy
Defend a Convoy
Cordon and Search
Demonstrate a Show of Force
Move Dislocated Civilians
Employ Field Sanitation Measures
Apprehend/Detain Non-Combatants
Establish an Operation Base/Defense Plan
Monitor Prisoner Exchange
Exercise Command and Control
Plan for Media
Liaise with Local Authorities
Prepare an Area Assessment
BASIC RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP

Introduction to Basic Rifle Marksmanship
Basic Rifle Marksmanship

COMMON TASK TRAINING

Physical Training
Map Reading/Land Navigation
Voice Communications Procedures
First Aid
Hygiene and Sanitation

LIGHT INFANTRY TACTICS

Camouflage Yourself and Your Equipment
Hand and Arm Signals
Individual Movement Techniques
Select Hasty Fighting Positions
Move Tactically as a Squad
Cross Danger Areas
React to Contact
Squad Attack
Consolidate and Reorganize
Break Contact
React to Ambush (Near/Far)
React to Sniper
Process Known or Suspected Enemy Personnel
Reconnoiter Area
Conduct Route Reconnaissance
Perform Point Ambush
Apply a Field First Aid Dressing to a Wound
Battlefield Carries
Occupy Observation Post/Listening Post
Use Challenge and Password
Conduct a Tactical Road March
Warning Order/Operations Order
Defensive Positions
Field Expedient Antenna (Jungle Whip)
Enter and Clear a Room (Squad)

BATTALION CRITICAL TASKS

Execute Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
Establish and Operate a Series of Observation Posts
Employ a Quick Reaction Force
Establish and Operate Checkpoints
BATTALION CRITICAL TASKS (cont.)

Plan for and Interact with the Media
Liaise with Local Authorities
Negotiate with Belligerents
Conduct Convoy Escort Operations
Establish Lodgement
Provide Command and Control
Protect the Force

INTELLIGENCE

Process Captured Documents and Equipment
Identify and Process Detainees
Collect and Disseminate Information
Prepare the Intelligence Estimate
Prepare the Intelligence Annex to the OPORD
Analyze Incoming Information
Manage the Intelligence Effort
Process Specific Information Requirements Data
Process Threat Information and Intelligence
Maintain Intelligence Data Base
Establish Operations Security
Monitor Implementation of OPSEC Measures
Develop a Physical Security Plan
Conduct Counter-Intelligence Operations

MANEUVER

Disarm Belligerents
Establish a Blocking Position
Control Civilian Movement
Cordon and Search
Demonstrate Show of Force
Control Dislocated Civilian Traffic
Apprehend/Detain Non-Combatants
Protect Non-Combatants and Facilities
Monitor Prisoner Exchange
Establish a Crossing Point

FIRE SUPPORT

Provide Fire Support
Provide Maneuver Battalion Fire Support Planning and Coordination
Plan and Coordinate Deployment of Fire Support Assets
Prepare and Coordinate Fire Support Documents
FIRE SUPPORT (cont.)

Coordinate/Control Use of Maneuver Battalion Support
Documents
Plan and Prepare Pre-Planned Close Air Support
Process Immediate Close Air Support

MOBILITY AND COUNTER-MOBILITY

Prepare an Engineer Estimate
Prepare an Engineer Annex
Report Obstacle Information
Perform Engineer Battlefield Assessment
Plan/Direct Engineer Reconnaissance
Conduct Mine Clearing Operations
Conduct Breaching Operations
Repair/Maintain Existing Airfields

AIR DEFENSE

Provide Air Defense
Plan Air Defense
Develop Air Portion of Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield (IPB)
React to Early Warning
Use Passive Air Defense Measures
Take Active Air Defense Measures Against Aircraft
Provide Air Defense for Static Assets
Plan and Coordinate Air Defense for Convoys
Deploy and Occupy Positions

LOGISTICS

Conduct Maintenance and Recovery Operations
Provide Humanitarian Assistance
Conduct Sling Load Operations

BATTLE COMMAND

Command and Control the Battalion
Perform S-3 Operations
Operate the Command Post

CIVIL AFFAIRS

Evaluate Civilian Infrastructure
Enforce Populace and Resource Control Measures

CIVIL AFFAIRS (cont.)

Assign Tasks to Appropriate CA Teams
Report CA Information
Direct CA Support/Detachment
Coordinate Foreign National Support
Conduct Civic Action Activities
Conduct Humanitarian Civic Assistance Activities
Monitor the Conduct of CA Operations
Identify Information Requirements
Prepare Civil Affairs Annex
Prepare Area Assessment

PSYOP TEAM

Employ PSYOP Team
Conduct Staff Coordination
Plan for PSYOP Mission
Collect PSYOP Information
Prepare PSYOP Annex
Prepare Tactical PSYOP Products
Supervise Conduct of Dissemination Activities
Disseminate Audio Products
Disseminate Video Products
Conduct Face-To-Face PSYOP

MILITARY POLICE

Conduct Route Signing
Conduct Route Reconnaissance
Conduct Refugee Control
Conduct Special Circulation Control Measures
Conduct Area/Zone Reconnaissance
Secure Designated Persons
Handle Captured/Detained Belligerents/Non-Combatants
Perform Security of Designated Convoys
Perform Security of Tactical Operations Center
Perform Area Damage Control
Conduct Base/Base Cluster Coordination Defense
Conduct Denial

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation of Dislocated Civilians
MEDICAL

Establish Medical treatment Facility
Conduct Preventive Medicine/Field Sanitary Operations
Provide Medical Care to Non-Combatants
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