BACKGROUND TO MAY 1977 ISRAELI GENERAL ELECTIONS
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RABIN AND PERES COMPARED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Feb 77 p 13

[Article: "The Two Candidates"]

[Text]

Yizhaq Rabin
Age 55
Birthplace Jerusalem

Shimon Peres
54
Poland (Viniew)
**Rabin**

**Education**
- Beit Hakhinukh, Tel Aviv
- Khadduri Agricultural School, School of Commerce, Tel Aviv
- Kfar Tavor
- Graduate of Staff School, Britain

**Family status**
- Married, with a daughter and a son

**Disciple of**
- David Ben-Gurion, Yizhaq Sadeh

**Intimate friends**
- Amos Eren, Haim Zadok, Golda Meir, Yehoshua Rabinowitz

**Present opponents**
- Shimon Peres
- Abba Eban

**Personal qualities**
- Shy, finds difficulty in creating close contact

**Work methods**
- Diligent, ready to work 20 hours a day if needed, orderly, ready to listen to advisors, but mostly decides alone

**Position on the occupied territories**
- For far-reaching territorial concessions in Sinai, Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria, in exchange for peace.

**Position on Palestinians**
- In favor of a solution of the Palestinian problem within the framework of Jordan, ready for an autonomous Palestinian entity linked to Jordan, but opposed to a third state.

**Peres**

**Education**
- Ben Shemen Youth Village
- Administration Course, Harvard University

**Family status**
- Married, with a daughter and a son

**Disciple of**
- David Ben-Gurion, Berl Katznelson

**Intimate friends**
- Moshe Dayan, Yizhaq Navon, Abba Eban, Gad Ya'agov, Asher Ben-Natan

**Present opponents**
- Ahдут Ha'avodah, MAPAM, Bloc chiefs of MAPAI

**Personal qualities**
- Easy going, likes people, good listener

**Work methods**
- Team worker, very strict, can work from 6 AM to 1 AM

**Position on the occupied territories**
- Opposed to annexation of Judea and Samaria by Israel, but is also opposed to entry of foreign forces into West Bank. In favor of a functional division, not a territorial division of Judea and Samaria.

**Position on Palestinians**
- Rejects the PLO as a framework for dialogue with Israel. Recognizes the need to solve the Palestinian problem, in the framework of a general settlement with the Arab countries.
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<td>For convening the conference in its prior composition, discussion of a general settlement or an end to the state of war. For Palestinian representation from Judea and Samaria and Jordan--within the Jordanian delegation.</td>
<td>Believes that Geneva should only be a formal framework for the signing of agreements to be reached in bilateral discussions, outside of conference walls; in any case, prefers the incremental progress.</td>
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| Order of domestic priorities | Creation of "round table," fighting corruption, raising public morale, reducing gaps between various segments of the population. In favor of governmental reform, between the Histadrut and government, profit sharing by workers, in exchange for an 8-hour work day and increased productivity. | In favor of bridging social gaps, longer public school days, settlement of labor disputes by involving workers' committees in agreements between the Histadrut and government. |


| Prefers coalition with | The Independent Liberals and Democratic Change. | The Democratic Change, NRF, and Independent Liberals. |

| Prominent deficiencies | Closed off, isolated. | Talks playfully, not always clear in meaning. |

| Prominent qualities | Analytic powers, personal integrity, thoughtful, but decisive. Executive ability, improvising. | Ability to address broad groups, quick, capable of |

| Principal failures | Did not achieve supreme authority in party. Challenged in work. | Insability to appease the "bloc" leaders in MAPAI for his share in creating Rafi. |

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CONTRADICTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT FOR CHANGE SCORED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 23 Jan 77 p 9

/Article by Teddy Froys: "A Junk Warehouse Opposite a Department Store"/

If the Alignment and the Labor Party are an ideological department store, the Democratic Movement for Change cannot be viewed as other than a junk warehouse. First, it collects everything, generally second-hand. Alongside old Rolls Royces and used Leica cameras, rusty sardine cans, faded plastic bags and worn patent leather shoes are scattered in the warehouse of the Democratic Movement for Change. In addition to Ya'akov Halfon this warehouse contains all types and categories. How will the house furnished with all these accessories look is anybody's guess, but it will lack uniformity, style or taste. In itself the organization in the center of the political map is worthy of sympathy provided it has a common denominator. However, the colorful loot that the new movement is collecting can be given a name, but not a title with a common denominator, because how much can Meir Zore'a and Shmuel Toledano or Amnon Rubinshtein and Issar Harel have in common?

When Shmuel Toledano was asked to explain the merger between him and the former director of Megar'ey Israel, he answered that Zore'a was a man with commendable traits of character and despite their differences of opinion there was strong friendship and a mutual feeling of respect between them (see "It Is a Pity That He Is Going," DAVAR, Tuesday 18 January 1977). This merger could be understood if it were a question of a gathering of friends at the home of one of them, the other being among the guests. However, it is not a question of a social gathering, but of a party organization, where opinions and world outlooks, not friendship, should be the determining factors. This is not to say that friendship and esteem are superfluous within a party framework, but in themselves are not a sufficient basis for a joint political activity.

In a very interesting article published in HA'ARETZ in October 1965 Amnon Rubinshtein clarified this question. Writing about RAFI, A. R., one of the founders of the Democratic Movement for Change, ridiculed the emphasis placed by RAFI members on the friendship among their people and on their
talents and moral traits. A. R. wrote that in society character and friendship are of prime importance and political views should not obscure them. The opposite is true of politics. Even when feelings of friendship are absent, two people indifferent to each other and even hostile to each other can work for a common goal provided their views are unanimous. Today these statements apply to the Democratic Movement for Change and its heads should examine that article by Amnon Rubinshtein.

Among the latest acquisitions of the Democratic Movement for Change, apart from Shmuel Toledano, the Free Center and Israel Katz can be mentioned. In contrast to the opinion prevalent among the public, the wholesale acquisition of all Tamir's people is more acceptable than the retail addition of Israel Katz. Indeed, the political views that Shmuel Tamir has expressed since October 1973 do not exactly correspond to the views of the founders of the Democratic Movement for Change, but they can coexist with them, although with some difficulty. On the other hand, the political views of the founders of the Democratic Movement for Change and those of Issar Harel, Meir Zore'a and Dan Tolgovski have no common political denominator. The sarcastic statement on these three figures issued by the Movement for Undivided Land of Israel was appropriate. Indeed, how can their past views coincide with the declared positions of the founders of the Democratic Movement for Change?

The joining of Dr Israel Katz with the Democratic Movement for Change is very strange. The former director general of national insurance has critical views of the social policy of past governments and he pointed out many flaws and distortions in this field. His arguments are directed more against the lack of a clear policy and incorrect methods of activity than against insufficient funds. If we sum up the overall opinion of Dr Katz, it can be stated that much more can be done with the sums allocated for social purposes if expenditure procedures are changed. Most of the changes he recommends will necessitate a more energetic activity on the part of the government. For example, he complains that girls on a certain level are not accepted in the IDF. Here he clashes head on with the viewpoint expressed by the founding fathers of Leshinuy. They complain that the government greatly interferes in areas where it has no business to do so. In their opinion, government interference should be reduced, not increased—the exact opposite of what Katz demands! This is not a dispute on a certain paragraph or move. This is a total contrast between the classic liberal concept of the Democratic Movement for Change (reduction of government interference in economic and social life) and the viewpoint of Dr Katz. As far as the views of Dr Katz are known (and they are known), the Democratic Movement for Change (only the general viewpoint of which is known) is the last of all the movements by means of which he will be able to realize his aspirations with regard to Israeli society. For example, in Herut or among the Black Panthers there are people whose trend of thought is much closer to his than the world outlook of the intellectuals in the Democratic Movement for Change.
Apparently, it can be stated that the blank social calendar of the Democratic Movement for Change will enable Dr. Katz to shape a social manifesto in his spirit. This can be correct with regard to certain details. This cannot be true with regard to the basic concept of the Democratic Movement for Change. The viewpoints, not the details of execution, of the Democratic Movement for Change and of Dr. Katz are abysmally different and no Israel Galili or a formulating magician will be able to bridge the abyss. If Katz has concluded that he no longer has a place in the Labor Party, he would do better to turn, for example, to Independent Liberals. The liberalism of Independent Liberals is in the spirit of the social humanism of the 20th Century. The liberalism of the Democratic Movement for Change is according to the classic model of free competition, as formulated by Adam Smith in the 18th Century, and it is difficult to find ideology as remote from Israel Katz as the neo-liberalism embodied by the Democratic Movement for Change.

It is difficult to guess how the Democratic Movement for Change will cope with all the accessories, junk and acquisitions in its warehouse. Since it does not have a positive world outlook, the Democratic Movement for Change constitutes a protest movement according to the version of 1977, which, like the Bet Hashitta conference, cries out: "This is no longer possible." However, how will it be possible, except for a change in the electoral system? It is possible that in the next elections the Democratic Movement for Change will emerge as a relatively strong party. However, success in elections is the means, not the end. The heads of the Democratic Movement for Change will certainly agree to this. They occupy their chairs in the Ninth Knesset, their ideological viewpoints will begin to be revealed. Apart from the economic field, where there is a wide unanimity of opinion among most members of the Democratic Movement for Change, the movement will be divided on every question, beginning with the establishment of the borders and ending with allocations for families with many children and insurance against unemployment. Therefore, it is to be expected that its fate will be the fate of the protest movements of 1974. They emerged in order to replace the leadership and they succeeded. Later their ideological sterility destroyed them and today, if young people are told about the movement that brought down Golda and Dayan, most of the young listeners will ask: "Moti who?"

If after the elections HADASHOT BE'ATIQOT is not revived, when Yadin is mentioned, people will ask: "Which Yadin? Yigal or Yosi?"
ARTICLE by Arye Kinerti: "The Rozolio Committee Begins To Draft the Political Platform"

"During the debate held by the subcommittee for political affairs of the Labor Party's convention there was no proposal to include in the party platform readiness for territorial concessions in Judea and Samaria as part of a settlement that is less than peace. On the other hand, no one in the subcommittee disputed the need to conduct negotiations and to reach a peace settlement with readiness for a territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria as well."

Dani Rozolio, chairman of the subcommittee, presented this summary at the meeting held last Friday, when the subcommittee ended the general debate on the principles of the political chapter in the draft resolutions for the convention.

This week the subcommittee will begin to draft paragraphs, primarily the paragraphs subject to a dialogue between the Labor Party and MAPAM within the framework of the Alignment.

The first part of the Friday meeting, which lasted more than 3 hours, was devoted to the opening address by Minister Yisrael Galili, who responded to remarks by several participants, including Golda Meir, the prime minister, Gad Yaakobi, Shlomo Hillel, Yigal Allon, Moshe Karmel, Yitzhak Navon and Yehoshua Rabinowitz, who also requested clarifications. Minister of Justice Chaim Zadok also spoke at the meeting. He responded to Golda Meir's statement in connection with the obligation to hold new elections before an agreement on a compromise in Judaea and Samaria. There was an exchange of words between the two.

Opening the debate, Galili stated that most members of the subcommittee supported the idea that the negotiations on Israel's eastern border should be with Jordan, whose delegation can also include Palestinian figures from
Judea and Samaria. But it is possible that Yitzhak Navon will submit another proposal on this matter, which is not supported by most members of the subcommittee. It seems that Galili referred to the "Yariv-Shem-Tov" formula, which is not likely to get considerable support.

Against "Private Statements"

Galili opposed the "private statements" made at the expense of the accepted positions of the Labor Party. He noted that years passed since the party platform was adopted and "it is possible to reflect and to undermine, because we are not a church, but, at the same time, not a Tower of Babel either." Galili said that he invited all those that undermined the party platform to present their protest "paragraph after paragraph in an orderly way and thus we will bring down the political debate from the abstract." Galili asked: "Is Shimon Peres submitting the federal solution he proposed for a debate and resolution?"

Peres answered: "I do not submit it for a resolution, although it is known that this matter was proposed to Jordan."

Golda Meir interjected here: "There was never such a thing."

Galili added: "The government or the party never decided that we would make a territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria for less than a peace treaty. Both in the government of Golda Meir and in the government of Rabin we declared and stated: There will be a territorial compromise only after we receive a mandate from the people."

Galili also said that the following should be added to the 14 principles and included in the platform: "readiness for negotiations in all sectors with a territorial compromise in order to reach a peace agreement, as well as readiness for negotiations to end the state of war. The government will decide to what it is ready to commit itself in exchange." Galili expressed his opposition to a decision by the Labor convention that with the end of the state of war, which is less than peace, we will agree to a territorial compromise.

Prime Minister's Remark

Prime Minister Yizhaq Rabin remarked that "since the Six-Day War we have not changed the status of the areas in Judea and Samaria, except for Jerusalem. We agreed that the population in Judea and Samaria would have Jordanian citizenship. I know of no proposal stating that IDF control in Judea and Samaria should be changed or given up. I do know that there were proposals for mainly symbolic and administrative changes."
We Must Not Find Ourselves in Negotiations With the PLO

Galili proceeded to the matter of the Palestinians' representation in settlement negotiations, saying that we must oppose a participant in negotiations who wants to establish an additional state between the sea and Jordan, that is, a Palestinian state. However, as stated above, the Jordanian delegation can also include Palestinian figures from Judea and Samaria. It is true that there may be PLO figures in the Jordanian delegation, but there are matters against which we cannot protect ourselves in advance. Galili added that "not the personal identity of one representative or another interests us. But it is clear that we will not agree to a deception perpetrated on us, in which we will find ourselves decisively in negotiations with the PLO."

Galili urged great caution in evaluating the readiness of the Arab states for a peace agreement, although there are signs of this, such as, for example, Jordan's return to the political arena in the context of a settlement in the region and agreement of the Arab states to Israel's existence within the 1967 borders. "But all this is accompanied by very harsh terms and rigid hints as to preparations for war against Israel."

Not To Burden MAPAM

At the end of his speech Minister Galili proposed that MAPAM not be burdened with the special definition of the matter of Judea and Samaria. To a question by Yitzhak Navon he clarified that MAPAM does not demand a territorial compromise in a settlement that is less than peace and quoted from the document submitted by MAPAM to the Labor Party which talks about "readiness for a territorial compromise in all sectors for the sake of peace within security borders."

Zadok: The Platform Permits Negotiations With Jordan

Minister Zadok, who spoke after Galili, stressed that he did not see a need to include in the party platform a paragraph making it obligatory to hold new elections if we conduct negotiations with Jordan and there is a possibility for a peace agreement involving a territorial compromise. According to Zadok, the existing party platform also permits negotiations for a compromise in Judea and Samaria. Therefore, he sees no need to change the 14 principles. But if it is decided to interpret that readiness for a compromise applies to the three sectors, he will vote for this despite the fact that, for all practical purposes, this was also included in the previous platform.

Zadok-Golda Debate

Zadok is strongly opposed to including elections in the matter of Judaea and Samaria in the Labor platform. Zadok claimed that "MIFDAL demanded this at one time and we agreed to this for coalitional considerations."
Golda Meir interfered here, saying that this was not true: "I demanded this without any connection with MIFDAL."

Zadok pointed to a letter by Y. Galili to G. Meir dated 8 March 1964 on the eve of the presentation of the government, which summed up the coalitional negotiations with MIFDAL and, indeed, showed that this was a coalitional agreement. He also quoted additional documents on this matter and established that "a formulation made for the need of an interparty agreement must not be raised to the level of a basic principle of the party itself." If in the future it becomes clear that an additional agreement in the same spirit is needed, it will be possible to accomplish this during negotiations on the composition of the government, but a mandate to hold new elections should not be sought from the voters.

According to the minister of justice, the principles as they are give the government full flexibility in all the sectors and for all the types of agreements except for the establishment of a third state and concessions in Jerusalem.

Nor did Golda Meir, who again received permission to speak, propose that the obligation to hold special elections in the matter of a compromise in Judaea and Samaria be included in the platform, but stressed that this was a serious question which could not be viewed only in the context of coalitional negotiations conducted with MIFDAL at one time. In her opinion, even if this matter was not included in the platform, it should be treated as though it was.

Questions to Galili and His Answers

Minister Gad Yaakobi sought to clarify and to remark and also to ask Galili several questions: "Since you have said that a decision on territorial concessions in Judaea and Samaria as part of an agreement that is less than peace has not yet been adopted and since you propose that we say that we are ready for an agreement on the abolition of the state of war, I understand that we will also be ready for an agreement with Jordan on the basis of any functional settlement."

Galili: "A functional agreement does not contradict the framework of the agreement on the abolition of the state of war with Jordan."

Yaakobi said that he saw no need to change the paragraph in the platform stating that "we are in favor of negotiations with Jordan, which in our eyes is a Jordanian-Palestinian state, because most of its citizens are Palestinians." Yaakobi also believes that, if Jordan decides to include Palestinian figures in its delegation, it will be able to do so. "I don't understand the need for this emphasis, which is self-evident; our emphasis weakens our position," said Yaakobi.
We Will Write in the Platform: Compromise in All the Sectors

Moshe Karmel asked: "If we recognize the existence of the Palestinian problem, how can we not conduct negotiations with the Palestinians--authorized representatives who recognize Israel and who have renounced terrorism against it?"

Yitzhak Navon asked: "Is it realistic that it will be possible to achieve an end to the state of war without a territorial compromise? Is it realistic that there could be an agreement with the other Arab countries without Jordan?" Minister Yehoshua Rabinowitz asked: "Will we write in the platform that we agree to a compromise in all the sectors?" Galili answered to this: "Yes."

Rabinowitz asked further: "What about the end to the state of war?" Galili answered: "In this matter the government and the Knesset will decide to what the State of Israel is ready to commit itself in this case." Galili dealt with these questions, saying that he did not know any Palestinian address for negotiations. In the meantime there is the PLO. Galili was sure that both Karmel and Navon did not propose that negotiations be conducted with the PLO. He also said that he did not propose that the components of the end to the state of war be defined in the platform.

Minister Shlomo Hillel believes that the Palestinian problem was not born in 1967 after the Six-Day War. Hillel remarked that we used to maintain that the problem would be solved in the Arab states "and if this is not disputed, this should be stated." Hillel also believes that it should be stated that negotiations would be held only with states.

Allon asks Zadok: What Are You For?

Minister Yigal Allon asked Zadok to state what he was for. Minister Zadok answered that he was for a territorial compromise in all the sectors. He also wants the existence of the alignment with MAPAM. He opposes negotiations with the PLO, because such negotiations imply that we agree to the principle of a Palestinian state and to a third state.

The following were also present at the Friday meeting: A. Eban, A. Yariv, M. Zarmi, A. Bequer, H. Bar-Lev, Rina Dotan, Uri Agami and Mordekhay Nisihu.
Peres, Harish, Yadlin, Bar'am Discuss Election Issues

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 23 Jan 77 p 15

Article: "Peres: We Have Sunk Into a Relaxation of Tension and Complacency With What We Have and We Have Neglected Initiatives for Growth and Intensification"

Text: "One of the reasons why I am throwing my hat into the arena of the political contest is the feeling that we have sunk into a situation of a relaxation of tension and complacency with what exists and have neglected initiatives for further growth, development and intensification," said Minister of Defense Shimon Peres during his appearance before the engineering club in Tel Aviv on Friday.

Peres said that there was a time when a candidate was nominated secretly and the voting for him was done openly. This time a candidate presents himself openly and one can vote for or against him secretly.

The minister of defense protested the passive resignation to the decline in immigration. "This is not a fundamental debate," he said. "No one opposes an increase in immigration. However, it is possible to offer new solutions that will correspond to the new circumstances in this area." Peres proposed to put Jerusalem, as a historically and morally drawing factor, in the center of immigration.

According to Peres, there are two trends in the area of settlement. "There is a determined, hidden, authorized or unauthorized Arab settlement and there is a dynamics of established and hesitant Jewish settlement. A total of 5,000 unauthorized structures have been built in the Galilee in the last few years. Masses of young Arabs are drawn to Jerusalem and the Negev has not remained empty either. Those who think that the country is waiting for us ignore the events in the area. We must settle the Galilee and the Negev between Rafiah and Qadesh Barne'a, where there is a level strip of 2 million donums, which can serve as the country's wheat granary in the future," he said.
To Go Back to an Economy Marked by Optimism and Development

Peres believes that it is possible to go back to an economy marked by optimism and economic growth. In this connection Peres noted that, when he began his job in the ministry of defense, defense exports totaled 90 million dollars. Today exports have increased to 400 million dollars, including profits of 160 million dollars, all of which will be invested in research, development and establishment of new enterprises.

Referring to the political developments in the region, the minister of defense said that "we did not foresee the Yom Kippur War and Egypt and Syria certainly did not foresee that they would have to ask Kissinger for an urgent ceasefire. No one expected the terrible war in Lebanon, in which 60,000 people were killed and 200,000 were wounded, and Lebanon's surrender to the Syrian armored force, except for southern Lebanon, which remained an independent and quiet area free of Syrians and terrorists."

Peres said that in the same way in relations with Egypt and Syria it is possible to reach solutions that are not formulated in any party platform.

Territory To Protect Independence

Peres also said that in view of this situation Israel must guard several principles, the most important of which is the preservation of its political and economic independence. He said that our territorial position also results from our desire to be independent. "A hip 14 km wide will gnaw at Israel's independence. We do not need territory for its sake, but to protect the nation's independence," he said.

Peres noted that the Arabs need peace just as Israel does and it was precisely the war that brought the Arabs closer to the way of peace owing to the suffering and big losses they experienced. "Skepticism with regard to the result of a future war will lead the Arabs to the desirable alternative," said Peres.

Mikha Harish: Peres Will Save the Alignment

Knesset Member Mikha Harish, coordinator of the Leshiluv circle in the Labor Party, warned against a significant decline of his party in the coming elections if the existing team continues to lead. However, if there is a change of leadership and Shimon Peres is elected as a candidate for the post of prime minister, the party will achieve stability and recovery.

Harish spoke on the "seventh column" radio program on Saturday night. In an answer to a question he said that the preference for Peres over Rabin is not because of his political stand, but because of his ability to lead the party and the state better. He is the best head of the team that the party can now nominate in order to mobilize most of the public support for the government and its activities and this is the reason for preferring him.
In an answer to another question Harish said that "Peres did not promise me anything for my support, just as he did not promise anything to anyone else and this is one of the good things that he is doing."

Yigal Yadin--Super-Shulamit

Harish believes that Likud constitutes the main alternative for the Alignment, but the great danger from the point of view of attracting votes is mainly on the part of the Democratic Movement for Change. He called Yigal Yadin "Super-Shulamit," whose intention is to attract protest votes of those fleeing from the Alignment, just as Shulamit Aloni attracted votes during the previous elections. According to him "a collection of people noted for extreme individualism, people who in the past split from all kinds of movements," have gathered in the Democratic Movement for Change. If the Democratic Movement for Change wins support, there is a danger that a complicated parliamentary network will be created after the elections, which will make it difficult to form a stable government.

Against MAPAM's Rejection of Peres

Harish came out against MAPAM's rejection of Shimon Peres as a candidate of the Alignment for the post of prime minister and claimed that this rejection was surprising and evoked opposition even among those that opposed Peres in the Labor Party.

Minister Yadlin: There Is No Reason To Reject Rabin

"In view of the turmoil that seized the Labor Party, I can say only this: There is no reason to reject Yizhaq Rabin as Israel's prime minister," said Minister of Education and Culture Aharon Yadlin at a meeting with the activists of the Kibbutz Movement in the Labor Party held in Tel Aviv on Friday.

The minister said that Rabin proved himself in the political battles and backed far-reaching economic decisions that saved the balance of payments of the state. "I don't understand why the party should look for another candidate after a relatively short term in office. Is there another way in the name of which confidence is sought?" asked the minister of education.

Yadlin added that "raising a personal or colorful banner cannot lead a movement to external battles."

Moshe Bar'am Against a Contest at the Convention

Yesterday Moshe Bar'am severely criticized the trend to elect a candidate for the post of prime minister at the Labor Party convention.
At a meeting of the members of the Labor Party in Qiryat Yuval Bar'am said that the prime minister is the first among equals, but no more than that, whereas his election at the convention means that the pyramid is turned upside down and the prime minister is placed above the party.

Bar'am also said that the party center is the supreme institution between conventions.

Minister Bar'am added that "it is strange" that there is an agreement on this matter between Rabin and Peres, but this matter is not their private domain.
Galili, Shemtov, Burg Discuss Election Issues

Tel Aviv Davar in Hebrew 23 Jan 77 p 15

Article: "Galili: The Convention Will Not Decide on a Territorial Compromise in Judea and Samaria for Less Than Peace"

Text: On Saturday Minister Yisrael Galili said that the decisive majority of the members of the Labor Party believe that peace negotiations should be conducted with Jordan with readiness for a territorial compromise in Judaea and Samaria. At the same time, he estimates that the Labor Party convention will not adopt a decision making possible a territorial compromise in an agreement that is less than peace.

Galili spoke on the "weekly dairy" over the radio. He stressed that neither the government, nor any party institution agreed to propose or to initiate a territorial compromise in Judaea and Samaria in exchange for less than peace, including the abolition of the state of war. He added that, indeed, there are such views, but thus far a proposal in this spirit has not been made in the committee preparing the platform principles. He also clarified that the committee was not discussing the formulations on this subject, nor MAPAM's formulation.

In an answer to a question he said that in the preparatory committee of the Labor Party no one supported the establishment of a third state and no one expressed readiness to conduct negotiations with the PLO. Galili said that there was no opposition to the principle that Jordan was the eastern border. He expressed the opinion that the Labor Party platform would include an agreement to an inclusion of Palestinian figures from Judaea and Samaria in the Jordanian delegation to the Geneva Conference.

An "Imaginary" Debate

Galili defined the matter of inclusion of the need for a territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria in exchange for peace as an "imaginary debate," because since 1967 the Labor Party and the Alignment have been conducting a policy based on readiness for such a compromise. "For some reason" this formulation of a commitment to a compromise in Judaea and Samaria for peace was not included in the Alignment platform for the previous elections.
"I believe that the definitions that will be given in connection with the platform for the Ninth Knesset should put MAPAM's mind at rest," added the minister.

In an answer to a question Galili expressed his view that the party would not include in its platform a commitment to hold new elections or a referendum if and when a peace agreement including withdrawals from Judaea and Samaria is discussed. He recalled that such a commitment was not included in the Alignment platform for the Eighth Knesset.

Shemtov: A Year of Decisions

"The year 1977 will undoubtedly be a year of decisions and, therefore, there must be a political move toward settlements during this year. If there is no such political move, another war is foreseen." This statement was made by Minister of Health Victor Shemtov during a lecture at the Bet Brener Club in Tel Aviv on Friday.

Shemtov expressed his opinion that in view of this concept this government is focusing on several steps and the government that will succeed it will do the same, that is, implementing measures that will lead to non-Islamization in the region, lowering the profile of the Arab-Israeli dispute and creating constructive motivations in the Arab world that will lead to preference for the political option over the military option.

The minister listed three options opening the possibility for peace:

- attainment of an overall peace settlement with the Arabs in 1977-1978;
- end of the dispute, that is, end to the state of war;
- the option formulated by the Brookings Institute, that is, the two parties will reach an agreement on the final peace, but it will be implemented only in years to come, in stages, so that we may now know what the final price that Israel must pay for that peace will be.

The minister said that the preparations for the elections are now made against this background. In his opinion, the prime minister's step to advance the elections accelerated various processes in parties seeking to quickly create new combinations.

"Yadin Is a Good Archeologist"

The minister harshly reckoned with several figures now heading various parties. "What is now happening in the political market is one big absurdity. I think that Prof Yadin is a good archeologist, but from here to wishing to form the next government is too pretentious. It is also difficult to define who Yadin is and what his party is, because on one side he has Prof Rubinshtein, who is the dove of doves, and on the other, Meir Zore'a, who
is a follower of Undivided Land of Israel. Therefore, it is difficult to know who will represent Yadin's movement in the elections: Mr Zore'a or Mr Rubinshtein?"

In mentioning Maj Gen (Res) Ariel Sharon, the minister of health quoted from a statement by Simkha Erlikh who called Sharon "a dictator like Batis-
ta." Shemtov noted that "Mr Sharon is a talented general, but can the fate of the state be placed in his hands?" In this connection the minister men-
tioned the rushing about by independent generals who seek to establish one forum with Sharon.

The minister of health did not talk much about health matters.

Burg: There Is No Intention To Oust Raphael

On Friday Knesset Member Dr Yosef Burg said that the establishment of an alignment of four factions in MIFDAL was not aimed at ousting Knesset Mem-
ber Dr Yitzhak Raphael or someone else and, therefore, there was no room for "a campaign for a split" that began by various circles.

Dr Burg, who was a guest at the press club in Bet Sokolov in Tel Aviv, em-
phazised that following the four-way agreement the factions would not be abolished, so that the basic idea of every faction would not be erased in the new alignment. In his opinion, there will be a balance between the right and left in the new alignment. "I told the Youth Faction that the line of Lamifne is quite progressive and not extreme right," said Dr Burg. He added that the joining of the Religious Kibbutz and Religious Moshav factions with this alignment will ensure a balanced political line.

In this connection he clarified the position of his faction on the country's borders. "We intend to fight for every inch and those who are rushing to make concessions would do well to slow down and not talk about far-reaching concessions," he said.

Bitterness Over the Composition of Religious Councils

The speaker categorically rejected the arguments that the agreement had been reached deceitfully when Dr Raphael was abroad. He emphasized that the ne-
egotiations among the factions and the debates in their secretariats went on for a long time and were accompanied by publicity in the communication media, so that there was no room for the argument that the alliance was formed sec-
retly.

In an answer to a question Burg said that one of the reasons for division between his faction and Raphael's was the great bitterness in his faction over the way the religious councils were set up. According to him, unity among the four factions will help to prevent an organizational split in the party. Moreover, all the institutions of the movement are formed according to the factions' ratio of strength.
With regard to the possibility of MIFDAL's participation in the government coalition after the elections Dr Burg said that "political mathematics" is not yet clear. At the same time, however, he is in favor of a national unity government.

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The minister of defense explains his challenge to the prime minister by saying that he would do a better job. The truth is that internal venom and destruction are the main causes of the weakness of the Labor Party. Moshe Dayan, who certainly is popular with Peres, also said the following the other day: "There is no reason for it (the Labor Party) to lose its rule, unless it continues to destroy itself and to squander public confidence in its methods and personalities." I must note regretfully that Shimon Peres, whom I, like many others, respect and esteem, has a significant part in the "squandering of public confidence in the methods and personalities" of the Labor Party.

For about a year now he has been directly and indirectly undermining Rabin's position (while Rabin has been losing his temper and reacting angrily and without control). Peres and his supporters do not deny the statement by Minister Zadok that a situation where a minister engaged in a contest with the prime minister does not first resign from his post is unprecedented in enlightened countries (of course, this does not apply to the term of office of an interim government in which a minister cannot resign). Peres prefers to enjoy both worlds, thus hurting the prestige of the state and causing a dispute and demoralization in the party. Now, owing to the party's difficult situation, he demands the mantel of prime minister for himself.

In order to correctly evaluate the seriousness of the step taken by Peres, suffice it to visualize what would happen to the state and society if his action served as an example to other public figures in our country. For example, if a year before the elections one of the members of the coordinating committee would argue that he was more capable and more popular than Yeruham Meshel and, therefore, he should be appointed secretary of the Histadrut, or if (a year or two before the elections) deputy mayors demanded to be mayors, and the same applies to workers' councils. Would the state not turn into a jungle then?
Shimon Peres has been in a rush since he became a public figure. It could have been assumed that he would be happy in his lot after he received the defense portfolio, a post held by great Israeli figures: David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan and Levi Eshkol. As an outstanding defense figure seemingly he should have been happy in the job of an official in charge of the country's defense forces and perhaps pondered sometimes whether he was quite ripe to bear this heavy responsibility, because in special circumstances his consideration could determine the fate of the State of Israel. And indeed, when Dayan transferred the defense portfolio to him, Shimon Peres said that he accepted this portfolio as a temporary deposit. He said that he knew that he would have to return it to Dayan.

In a conversation with me Peres said that he now sees only a beautiful Israel, because he is constantly in contact with the IDF. His deep and sincere love for the IDF gave basis to assume that if he faced a dilemma—to hold the defense portfolio or to head the government—he would choose defense.

In my humble opinion, personally Peres also makes a bad bargain when he assaults the post of prime minister, because many of Rabin's internal difficulties do not result from his personality. The same lot fell to all the prime ministers of Israel, because since we have ascended the world stage we have been known as a nation that makes the life of its leaders miserable. We never reward our leaders according to what they deserve. It is not difficult to make an outline of what Shimon Peres can expect if he wins the post of prime minister. Large, concentrated blocs in his party and in the Alignment, with which he has ideological differences, will grumble against him from the first day of his post. Not many days will pass before the problematic section among party activists will show its claws. A lack of peace and unrest are the daily bread of these activists who are mostly gray personalities. They also regularly demand "refreshing and changing," thus, for the most part, aiming to climb the ladder of activism.

Moreover, it is almost a general weakness of ours that we expect the prime minister to have superior power, like a ministering angel, in any case, to be without any human weakness. Among other things, these general negative characteristics now help Peres in his efforts to oust Rabin, but he too will not escape swallowing these bitter pills.

It should be noted that Rabin opened the election war as part of an ideological and political debate and rightly determined that Likud was the main opponent. On the other hand, Peres placed emphasis on the internal personal debate. Why? Does the Labor movement not have any uniqueness? Does the Labor Party not have a banner or an idea? With regard to the political aspect, the Labor Party has a consensus, which the chairman of its political committee has recently defined well: Everyone is also in favor of readiness for territorial concessions on the Jordanian border.
Peres does not mention the words "territorial concessions" as far as Judaea and Samaria are concerned. On this decisive problem there is no difference between his position and the opinion of Herut. Begin will also not oppose a "functional compromise," as Peres proposes, a proposal which Yigal Allon rightly defined as a "South African concept."

The hesitant members of the Labor Party should ask themselves: Is it indeed possible to elect as head of the government and the party a member whose position on the presently decisive question is totally opposed to the views of the party and is identical to the views of the rival party? Peres' argument that he will implement every party decision would perhaps be reasonable if it were a question of a candidate for a secondary post. There is no doubt that the promise made by Peres that he would act in accordance with his party's decision was honest, but there is no certainty that he will be able to uphold it as far as his conscience is concerned if he sees a contradiction between his duty to the party and his concern for the fate of the state. In every coalitional crisis Likud offered the post of prime minister to Peres. Thus far this move has been part of the war of nerves, because from the parliamentary point of view this has not been enforceable. But if there is a change in the balance of power in the Knesset and there is a crisis on the question of territorial concessions, Peres, with the help of several other Knesset members from the Labor faction, will be able to form a government from right-wing forces. Perhaps he will do this out of loyalty to his political viewpoint.

Moshe Dayan keeps saying openly that, if the party decides on the question of the Jordanian border against his viewpoint, he will leave it. On this point Peres' position is actually more extreme than Dayan's. Although Dayan is not a member of the government, he often publicly dissociated himself from settlement opposed by the government and by no means gave a blessing of encouragement to Gush Emunim. Not so Peres, who actually helped them in his capacity as minister of defense and greatly identified himself ideologically with Gush Emunim and prophesied in their style: "Not only do I consider the settlement temperament of Gush Emunim not faulty," he said, "but it is part of the hardship of Zionism and I prefer Zionism with hardship than without it." And also: "I did not find it written in the Bible or in another place that Jews are forbidden to settle in Judaea and Samaria."

Even Likud was not caught by this mysticism. Only Herut (without 'Ezer Weizmann) and the extreme wing of MIFDAL adopted it. What does this approach have to do with the political views of the Labor Party? Many members of the Labor Party ought to take moral stock and to ponder as to where they lead the party and the state when they now help Peres to oust Rabin and to succeed him.

In the election of a prime minister the consideration of an alliance with MAPAM must not be ignored either. It is clear that a decision in favor of Peres abolishes the Alignment, because MAPAM will leave it then. Perhaps
this will be the end of the workers' hegemony in the state and society, because it is doubtful whether Labor will be the largest faction and whether its representative will be invited to form a government. Dismantling the Alignment will also severely affect the situation of Labor in the Histadrut, because it is a minority there. The renewal of the historical rivalry with MAPAM will have its own dynamics and it is difficult to know where it will stop.

Why are the voices of the Labor members in the Histadrut not heard? Why does the secretary of the Histadrut keep silent? Why does Yeruham Meshel not tell the party what it can expect in the Histadrut without the alliance with MAPAM? Why does he not call upon the active party members in the Histadrut to side with Rabin, whose loyalty to the Labor movement is beyond any doubt?

MAPAM is not only an ally in the leadership of the state and the Histadrut. For two generations the workers' movement strove to reach this alliance which withstood the test during a stormy period. Why should MAPAM be pushed out?

Owing to the lack of social and spiritual instability, which affected part of the public during the recession, the Eshkol government was undermined on the eve of the Six-Day War. For the same reason Golda's government was undermined even before she resigned. Now is Rabin's turn. In a year or two the ousting of Peres will be demanded in the name of the need for refreshing and changing. How will the state stand in such an undermined society? Perhaps we will yet stop on the brink of the abyss?
UNITY AMONG RELIGIOUS PARTY SEGMENTS STRAINED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Jan 77 p 19

[Article by Avraham Tirosh: "A 'Marriage' With Agudath Yisrael Laborites May Bring Split in the 'Aguda'"]

[Text] Two issues are endangering the integrity of Agudath Yisrael in the face of the forthcoming elections to the Knesset--a continuation of the partnership with the Agudath Yisrael Laborites and the positioning on the Knesset list following the outcomes of the internal elections to the party convention which took place several months ago.

The party is divided regarding both issues: on the one side stand the Central Faction (the Gur Hassidim) headed by Rabbi Pinhas Menahem Alter and Knesset Member Rabbi Yehuda Meir Abramovitz, Shlomey Emunim headed by Rabbi Menahem Perush, the Unified Faction headed by Knesset Member Shlomo Gross and small factions which hold altogether about 70 percent in the party. On the other side is the Unified Bloc of the Ziyut and Hagshama [Discipline and Implementation] Faction led by Knesset Member Rabbi Shlomo Lorenz and the Oriental Communities Faction headed by former Knesset Member Rabbi Ya'akov Mizrahi, which control about 30 percent.

From the time of the convention it had been clear that any one of the two issues mentioned which might be brought up for a decision in the Agudath Yisrael might lead to a defection by MK Lorenz and his people, were the decisions to go contrary to their wishes. At the end of last week the Agudath Yisrael Central adopted a resolution whose clear meaning is continuation of the partnership with the PA"Y [Poale Agudath Yisrael = Agudath Yisrael Laborites] in the Religious-Torah Front, in contravention to the view of the Unified Bloc and the party thereby took a serious step toward split.

The Religious Torah Front was established in anticipation of the previous elections on the basis of the resolution of the Torah Scholars' Council which serves as the top authority in Agudath Yisrael and is headed by the Admur of Gur [Title of Hassidic Rabbi].
Clear Reservation

However, the extremist circles in Agudath Yisrael, led by the heads of the Lithuanian Talmudic academies and their students in Be'ei Brak were even then opposed to the "marriage" with PA"Y. Although Rabbis Kaniyevsky and Schach, who are the supreme authority in the view of the Talmudic academy people, did not come out openly against the combined list, their reservation was clear. Rabbi Schach even withdrew from the Torah Scholars' Council for that reason. In that situation most of the Lithuanian Talmudic academy people did not even vote for the Religious-Torah Front in the previous elections, which explains the loss of representation by the two parties (which, when they appeared separately in the Seventh Knesset, had a combined total of six representatives).

The people of the Lithuanian Talmudic academies—the Torah People, as they call themselves—are a central element in the Ziyut and Hagshama Faction of MK Lorenz. The second of its elements is the Agudath Yisrael Youth Organization. This faction accepts the authority of Rabbis Kaniyevsky and Schach. Nevertheless, MK Lorenz appeared during the previous elections at the head of the Front because, by his account, the Rabbis had instructed him to do so.

Now, in anticipation of the upcoming elections, it appears that there will no longer be such compromises. Rabbi Kaniyevsky made it unequivocally clear to his adherents that if Agudath Yisrael appears together with PA"Y he will issue a specific directive not to vote for that list.

In fact, after the resolution in the Agudath Yisrael Central, one of the leaders of the Torah People group in Lorenz's faction told me: "We have finished with Agudath Yisrael. Presently we are discussing going it alone to the elections."

At the beginning of the week representatives of the Unified Bloc gathered in the Agudath Yisrael Council and there, too, the tendency was that because of the uncompromising stand of Rabbis Kaniyevsky and Schach the Bloc would have to appear on an independent list for the Knesset elections if in fact an agreement between Agudath Yisrael and PA"Y on joint appearance were to be signed.

In fact, the leader of the Bloc, MK Rabbi Shlomo Lorenz, is still attempting, by exerting his good offices, to influence his colleagues in the party leadership to back off of the idea of a continuation of the partnership with PA"Y. He is even stressing that the party central adopted an additional resolution which calls upon the elections staff—which was charged with the task of negotiating with PA"Y—to operate in a manner that would not impair the integrity of the movement; he interprets this resolution as concurrence by the leaders of the various factions in Agudath Yisrael to meet with the Torah Scholars of all the groups in order to bring about a meeting of the minds among them in connection with the question of partnership with PA"Y.
But even he stated, prior to the vote at Central that an agreement on cooperation with PA"Y means, this time, the departure of his faction from Agudath Yisrael and its independent appearance in the elections for the Knesset. Supporters of a continuation of the partnership with PA"Y contend that there is no need anymore to seek the Torah Scholars’ Council opinion on this issue, since their resolution prior to the previous elections which went along with partnership, is still in full force and effect.

Nevertheless, at the first meeting of the elections staff of Agudath Yisrael on Monday of this week, it was decided to postpone for several days the start of contacts with PA"Y and to set up a committee which would meet with the Torah Scholars for the purpose of bringing about a meeting of minds. This procedure, while being interpreted as a temporary victory for Lorenz and his people, is seen by the other side as a mere formality, the purpose of which is "to conciliate, but not to re-inquire of the Torah Scholars inasmuch as their resolution of three and one-half years ago still stands," according to MK Abramovitz. By his account, the staff will again assemble tomorrow and "decide finally to initiate negotiations with PA"Y."

Supporters of the agreement with PA"Y believe that in the final analysis Lorenz and his people will pull back from a rift and will not defect. Lorenz believes that Agudath Yisrael will not want to give up 30 percent of its membership and for that reason will finally appear in the coming elections in an independent manner.

Yet the truth is that all is not smooth in the camp of the agreement supporters. In the Shlomey Emunim faction there is controversy associated with a continuation of the partnership with PA"Y and the leader of the faction, former MK Rabbi Menahem Perush, is in a bind. On the one hand he is signed on an internal agreement with the Central Faction of the Gur Hassidim, the ardent supporter of the agreement with PA"Y and it is difficult for him to violate this agreement for fear, also, of his assured place in the coming Knesset; yet on the other hand, there are in his faction rabbis and Talmudical academy people who are sharply opposed to a partnership with PA"Y and are even threatening to withdraw and to join the Lorenz faction.

The opposition by extremist circles and the Talmudical academy people to a partnership with PA"Y stems primarily from an unmistakable separation from the Zionist Line of the Agudath Yisrael Laborites. They allege that PA"Y presumes to undertake activities which are rejected by the Torah Scholars, such as joint participation by boys and girls in its Ezra Youth Movement.

Yet, even if the controversy regarding PA"Y is settled, Agudath Yisrael faces a rift when the time for putting together a list for the Knesset arrives. Up to the time of the internal elections the Lorenz faction was considered the leading one in the party, and he was at the top of the list of candidates for the Knesset. In the internal elections he attained only third place, with about 21.5 percent. First place was taken by the Central Faction with about 29 percent and second place by the Shlomey Emunim faction with about 24 percent.
Compromise Proposals

According to the results of these elections, Lorenz would have to be in third place in the list for the next Knesset. His faction will not accept that. It has joined with the Oriental Communities faction which received about 8 1/2 percent in the elections, and contends that the joined faction is now the largest in the party, with about 30 percent, so that it is entitled to first place.

The Lorenz faction has not even accepted the results of the elections to this day. It has repeatedly alleged that there have been improprieties in the election procedure and that votes were bought and that as a result the results should be nullified in a number of settlements.

In recent weeks there have been behind-the-scenes efforts to reach a compromise on the issue of listing the candidates for the Knesset. There have been several compromise proposals some of which discussed placing MK Lorenz in first place and others placing him in second place, behind a Talmudical academy dean acceptable to all. But all of the proposals fell because of the opposition of Rabbi Menahem Perush to the appearance of MK Lorenz ahead of him on the list of candidates.

If a compromise is not reached on this issue, the controversy on the matter of placement of the candidates on the list is likely to lead to a departure by the Lorenz faction; unless MK Rabbi Shlomo Lorenz decides to withdraw from political activity and another candidate from among his list is proposed for the Knesset list, or if the agreement between the Central Faction and the Shlomey Emunim is abrogated and the former supports the advancement of Lorenz on the list.
The clear and unambiguous formulation of the political section of the Labor Party's platform regarding the readiness for territorial concession in Judea and Samaria is an important innovation. It is true that earlier it was apparent to any domestic or foreign political observer that the Labor Party was not adhering to the line of "not one inch" or that of the Greater Israel Movement. But words were uttered in a stuttering and clouded fashion, so that even followers of the Greater Israel Movement could claim, or at least attempt to claim, that their position was supported by a majority within the Labor Party. The obfuscation increased further with the creation of the Likud, at which time one of its components dared to characterize itself as the "Labor Movement for a Greater Israel." And so, the innocent voter could well ask himself--what is the difference between these and those? One cannot forget those times when the word "withdrawal" was taboo, and the long and protracted contortions until the government agreed to accept Security Council Resolution 242 according to the Israeli interpretation. Therefore, the very mention of a territorial compromise with reference to Jordan in an official document of the Labor Party is an important step forward. In this very mention, there is an important educational element with regard to both the coming elections, as well as to the very preparation of the people for the possibility of withdrawal.

The readiness for territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria is in accord with the political line of the historic MAPAI, from the very beginning of the state. When MAPAI accepted the partition plan, it was not a tactical step, but rather the pragmatic recognition of the need to settle for less than was desired for the sake of the creation of the Jewish state. If the Arabs had accepted the partition plan, and had agreed to live with us in peace, then we would be living even today within the borders of the partition. This is the case with regard to the armistice lines. The Israeli Government was ready for a peace settlement with Jordan on the
basis of the cease-fire lines, with some mutual minor adjustments, yet leaving the control of East Jerusalem in the hands of the Jordanians, if they would have guaranteed the right of access to holy sites for Jews. It was against the background of contacts along these lines with Israel that King Abdullah was murdered. But Israel's readiness for such a settlement continued. It should be kept in mind that until 1967, the principal roadblock for the Arabs to a peace settlement with Israel was the issue of the refugees, and not the issue of the borders. At that time, the Arabs demanded that we accept back all the refugees who wished to return. It may be assumed that even on the morning of 5 June 1967, Israel was ready to sign a peace settlement, or at least an agreement of non-belligerency, on the basis of the existing borders.

It is clear that the Six-Day War changed the security position of MAPAI and the Labor Party. But it did not change the party from a practical and political movement to a mystical and messianic movement. In terms of security, the prevailing view was that the cease-fire line borders as they were did not assure sufficient defense for the state of Israel, and that there was a need for significant adjustments and proper security arrangements, which would reduce the danger of aggression and the temptation to launch a surprise attack on Israel. This was the line of the Labor Party, and this was the line presented in contacts, both direct and indirect, with the Jordanian Government. Because of the existence of the National Unity Government, and other pressures, this line was presented by those who spoke with Husayn as private opinion, but it was obvious to everyone that if Husayn would accept one of the peace plans which were drawn up by people within the Labor Party, then the whole plan would have been accepted by the Labor Party, by the majority of the cabinet, and by the Knesset and the people.

It seems to me that the lack of clarity in public expression of this line stems from the psychological reservations of several of the leaders of the Labor Party, for whom the doctrine of their teachers Berl Katznelson and Yizhaq Tabankin is still very much a part of their consciousness. Berl Katznelson died before the establishment of the state was on the threshold of reality, and we cannot know how he would have related to the partition plan against the background of its proposal. Yizhaq Tabankin remained consistent in his opinions on the integrity of the land, and on that issue he was in the minority. But it was easier for their students to concede on the integrity of the land as something theoretical, pre-state, then it is for them to concede territories which have already been taken by the IDF. Therefore, perhaps there was a correctness in the position of those who, in May 1967 wanted to concentrate the attack only as a retaliatory action against the Egyptians, who did not want to go to Suez and the Golan Heights, who did not want to take over the whole West Bank, but proposed an immediate and unilateral withdrawal to a defensive border suitable for us, while avoiding having to govern a large Arab population. But in any event, in spite of all the reservations and problems, the Labor Party never adopted the line of the Greater Land of Israel, in any form. Its mistake was that
it did not clearly articulate its readiness to make territorial concessions in exchange for peace, just as it did not clearly articulate its social and economic philosophy, and paid dearly for that in two elections.

At the same time that we have the blessing of a clarification of the basic political line, we are also witnessing the beginning of a "hawkish" interpretation, according to which there will be no willingness to make territorial concessions to Jordan in any settlement which is less than a peace settlement. The 14 points of the alinement have not prevented an interim settlement with Jordan, even on the basis of territorial concessions. Both during the period of the Meir-Dayan-Galili government, as well as in the period of the Rabin government, Israel has not denied this possibility; and it certainly was clear when the principle of non-belligerency with Jordan was accepted that it could lead to some kind of territorial concession. Logic argues that it is almost impossible to achieve any kind of settlement with Jordan without stages of an interim agreement, including certain territorial concessions. If we do not want to leave an open territory to the PLO, and if we do not want the negotiations with Jordan to collapse because of the problem of Jerusalem, it will be necessary that a settlement with Jordan, based on something less than peace, not be a settlement for the short term, but be something for a substantial number of years in the course of which the enmity will be reduced, and mutual credibility will increase. In that way it will be possible at a later time to deal with the difficult problems of Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, and the security border.

But in contrast to the aspect of the principle of a readiness to make territorial concessions, which must be stated explicitly, the question of interim settlements is a question having a more tactical character, which does not require explicit mention in a platform, as long as the platform does not reject it from the outset. Therefore, it would be wise for the moderate leaders of the Labor Party to check every word in the formulation of the platform so as not to close the door to a possibility of interim settlements with Jordan—both functional and territorial. Likewise, they would be wise to avoid the trap of a commitment to have new elections on the issue of Judea and Samaria.

Perhaps in the next Knesset a parliamentary situation will develop in which no other way will be possible, but the Labor Party must not surrender at the outset its freedom of political maneuver, and in this matter it must seek the trust of the voter. Only by sharpening the political debate can the Labor Party succeed in the coming elections. Only in this way can it avoid external pressures. The resolutions of the Political Committee of the Labor Party are not only important in themselves, and for the purpose of dialogue with MAPAM, but also for the coming visit of the new American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and the coming visits by friendly Europeans during the convention of the Labor Party.
CONTINUED MAPAM PARTICIPATION IN ALINEMENT CONDITIONAL

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 31 Jan 77 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Alinement To Continue if Labor Party Convention Accepts MAPAM Demands"]

[Text] By a vote of 527 (62.8 percent) to 313 (37.2 percent), the MAPAM convention, at its second meeting at Holon, passed a motion presented by a majority of the standing committee, which determined that the joint appearance of MAPAM with the Labor Party, in the framework of the Alinement, for the coming elections is to be conditioned on certain stipulations made by the political committee (see the motion below). A minority motion made by 16 members states that MAPAM will appear in the coming elections as an independent list, and if political developments in the meantime require an additional evaluation of the situation, the center will convene and make a decision accordingly.

The secret vote, which took six ballots, took place after a full day of discussion participated in by dozens of members. At the end of the vote, the chairman, Y. Patish, called upon all convention delegates to go out as one united camp to prepare the party for the coming election campaign.

In summarizing the discussions, Meir Talmi noted that the formulation of Labor's position differs from prior formulations. The Alinement's platform for the 1973 elections spoke of territorial concessions, without referring to the territories involved. There were those in the Labor Party who argued that "not ceding one inch" of Judea and Samaria was not in contradiction to the platform. Today, the language is clear.

On the other hand, the Palestinian issue is absent. It is incorrect to say that no change has occurred in the Labor Party's position on this issue, but it is not as MAPAM desired. Yet, according to opinion in the upper echelons of the Labor Party, a change has occurred. There was a debate within the Labor Party as to whether additional elections should be conducted in Judea and Samaria. A decision was reached, and nothing was said about it in the final formulation, according to the wishes of members of the Labor Party who had threatened to leave the party.
In response to those who argued that nothing had been achieved, M. Talmi argued that we must view the matter in its totality—including what is present and what is lacking. Certainly things have come to a head within the Labor Party, and achievements were made not only because of pressures from MAPAM, but no doubt such pressure did have an effect, especially after the MAPAM convention passed its resolutions.

M. Talmi also made a point of the initiative of the young people of Kibbutz Artzi, who out of concern for the future of Kibbutz Artzi decided to go into the election campaign according to the decision which would be taken—either within or without the Alinement. In terms of the principle of territorial concession in Judea and Samaria, the formulation is unambiguous. On the question of the prime ministry, an answer is still awaited. The opposition to the creation of a National Unity government is unambiguous. He asked how all of this is related to the "eulogies" over MAPAM.

M. Talmi rejected claims to the effect that the government has done nothing. He said that the situation cannot be described in black and white terms. Reality is more subtle, and it can be said that the government has achieved certain things, such as the interim agreement with Egypt, the position taken in regard to events in Lebanon, etc.

As for the matter of Qadum, M. Talmi said: I am impressed that the prime minister would like to remove from Qadum. I have complaints that he has not done this. But the lesson of Qadum was learned at Jericho.

He said: "I have a sacred principle, and that is the united front of the workers. The Alinement is one of the devices for realizing this principle. But the Alinement is not something which is to be preserved at any price. At every step we must consider whether it is serving the interests of the workers and the country.

"At this convention we must end the debate and make a decision. Later we will need a more limited forum—the political committee—to decide if the conditions for continuing the Alinement have been fulfilled or not.

"We should draw all of the conclusions regarding an independent deployment. It is obligatory that the whole camp be united around the resolution which will be made. Even those who affirm the Alinement admit the possibility that we shall have to go to the polls by ourselves. We can do it by ourselves, and there are many who will support us. We must make an unambiguous decision which will be an expression of the whole group."

The last of the participants in the discussion, Prof Rafael Mahler, warned of formulations which have not been subjected to analysis. He said that it was no accident that such cabinet ministers as Peres and Ya'agovl voted for the new formulation of the Labor Party's position. It is a formulation which requires nothing, and so they were able to vote for it.
In connection with territorial concessions, mention was made of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, but not of additional factors—not the Palestinian factor. This formulation is based on a perspective of a situation which is assumed to be without an end. Galili said that the Arabs will adjust to the situation. This is dangerous. We must not count on time playing in our favor. We have been presented with a non-recurring historic opportunity: the events in neighboring countries have created a situation in which dialogue is possible. Who knows when such a possibility will be created again?

Our position in the Alinement is poor. They have not taken us into account. This situation cannot continue. We must seek collaboration in another way, and not through the Alinement.

Before the balloting, Arye Yafe explained the position of the minority motion in the political committee:

The Alinement is not an appropriate framework for the existence of workers' parties. The Alinement is not the only form of collaboration. After a period of threat to the existence of the Alinement, a response to our demands became apparent.

There are those who say that the Alinement has not bothered us, but that we alone have been restraining ourselves, so as not to endanger the Alinement. I do not believe in the continuation of the Alinement in the shadow of the threat of its breakdown.

The coming elections will be different than those before. There is a public which will vote for MAPAM, without MAPAM realizing it.

An independent appearance will require a great effort. If we do not take up the burden today, we will be unable to do it in another 4 years.

Without MAPAM and the Kibbutz Artzi, a Zionist-socialist force of the left will be unable to exist. Many are hanging their hopes on us. Let us not disappoint the younger generation, which expects the strength of decision from our party.

Resolutions

1. The convention approves the recommendations of the political committee of MAPAM of 16 January 1977 as follows:

A joint appearance in the elections within the framework of the Alinement is conditioned:

a. on a resolution of readiness to make territorial concessions in all sectors, including Judea and Samaria, in order to achieve a peace with defensible borders which are recognized and agreed upon.

b. on the election of a prime minister who will be faithful to the implementation of the policy stated above through identification with it.
c. on the readiness of the Labor Party to accept our proposals in the socioeconomic sphere, on the issue of the Arab minority, on the use of the institutions of the Alinement, and an honest cooperation with representatives of MAPAM in the executive institutions of the government, the Histadrut and other institutions.

2. The convention has decided that the proposal of the preparatory committee of the Labor Party expressing a readiness for territorial concessions in all sectors, if it is approved by its convention, will assure for Israel a contribution in the expected political struggle, will achieve for the Labor Party the representation of its unique quality against the chauvenistic right wing, and will constitute an achievement for MAPAI, which did its share in the formation of the above-mentioned proposal.

3. The convention empowers the center to examine the resolutions of the convention and institutions of the Labor Party, and their degree of response to the above-mentioned conditions, and accordingly to decide on the continued existence of the Alinement and the establishment of a joint electoral staff within its framework; or on the dismantlement of the Alinement and its institutions, and an independent appearance in the elections by MAPAM. The convention charges the institutions of the party to continue to review the possibility of an independent appearance in the coming elections.

4. If, in the coming elections, MAPAM appears as an independent list, it will not conduct negotiations with other parties on the creation of a joint list. MAPAM calls upon all sympathizers and those who share its positions to join it directly in the struggle at the polls.

5. As in the past, so in the future MAPAM will be faithful to its basic position which affirms a united front of workers' Zionist-socialist parties, and it will work on behalf of the collaboration of such a front with the government, the Histadrut and local authorities.

6. MAPAM will not join any government in which one of the components is Likud.

7. The convention calls upon all party members to unite behind the resolutions of the convention, and to join the activity in a comradely spirit.

Minority Proposals

In discussions thus far with the Labor Party, we have not received satisfactory responses to our demands, which have within them the prospect of recreating a basis for a joint appearance within the framework of the Alinement.
The convention resolves under these conditions:

a. MAPAM will appear as an independent list in the elections for the ninth Knesset.

b. If there occur political developments which call for a reconsideration of the situation, the party convention authorizes the party center to make decisions in accordance with those new developments.

MEIR AMIT EXPLAINS DEPARTURE FROM LABOR PARTY

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Feb 77 p 17

[Interview with Avraham Tirosh: "'I Have Concluded That the Labor Party Is Unable To Effect Necessary Changes'"

Question: How and why did your decision come to abandon the position of power as Director General of Koor and to enter the political life?

Answer: The decision was not reached against a background of calculating how worthwhile it is or of the personal possibilities. Essentially, all of the calculations and all the logic and all close friends said: Don't jump into the political arena. You're not constructed for it. Your skin isn't thick enough and you won't be able to get accustomed to the special atmosphere which is, to a great degree, dirty. I'm coming into something unknown. I am giving up one of the nice things in the country, a post in which I feel a sense of accomplishment. This year we should be exporting $270 million....

Question: Yet, why then enter political life?

Answer: What impels me is something in the emotion, a kind of inner drive to lend a shoulder at this time in order to carry out what has to be carried out in the country, to repair and improve on the national level. All my life I never did calculations for personal gain, I rather did what seemed to me had to be done. I cannot be hypocritical. For years I have spoken out, I have been on the alert, I have criticized, I have demanded changes, and today with the moment of decision approaching—should I cover myself with a blanket and say "Not I?"

Question: Why can't you function within the framework of the Labor Party which you yourself call "My home?"
Answer: I have reached the conclusion that the Labor Party is unable to bring about the required changes. The nation is confronted by gigantic problems which are almost insoluble. The required changes are on three levels:

a) A change in the power structure. On the one hand to grant authority to the prime minister and on the other hand to limit and change the structure of the ministries. The government must be peopled by professionals who are capable of carrying out programs, not by people who have been selected because of long time activity.

b) The level of the method. There is a need for more democratization in our political life, starting with the internal structure of the parties--fewer nominating committees and more internal freedom which is not conditioned upon special-interest pressures--and including elections on the national level, by a system which will increase the involvement of people, which will give expression to the people on the line and will assure more openings and democratic involvement.

c) Changes in personnel. These hold the answer to the question, "Why not the Labor Party?" I do not believe it is capable of effecting the required changes. It is composed of a system of persons some of whom share a common past and some having an interesting present. This is a closed system without openings and without sufficient potential power to effect the changes. I say this with utmost regret. I am not denigrating the values of the party. Its platform is acceptable to me, both in the area of foreign policy and in the internal area. But I raise the issue of implementation. What good is a platform which is not being implemented?

Exposed to Pens

Question: Are you disregarding all the accomplishments of your party to date?

Answer: No, I am not disregarding the accomplishments of the Labor Party. But I think it has not succeeded in two things: To inculcate the nation with a sense of authenticity; to inculcate a sense of social justice.

Question: How long have you been a member of the Labor Party? And to which of its institutions do you belong?

Answer: I have been a party member essentially for as long as I have been on my own two feet. At the age of 18, after completing secondary school, I left home and joined Kibbutz Alonim, where I was a member for 14 years. Since joining the kibbutz I have also been a party member. Up to the time of my departure I was a member of the Central and the economic committee.
Question: Have you tried, in general, to function within the party for the changes you are talking about? Hadn't you been offered various operational assignments in which you might have been able to exert influence, and you refused?

Answer: I know that now many complaints will be leveled against me. It is clear to me that emerging from the shell exposes me, and all the sharpened pens, some of them dipped in poison, will now attack me. In effect, what has been offered me in the past is to change this person or that one in this or that task. The people who spoke with me see only the personnel changes. That is no reform--X in the place of Y--that is nothing. Who stood in the way of the government's changing its structure? Of course, I am not disregarding the coalitional problem, but we are in a closed circle from which I do not know how to burst forth without a qualitative change. Changing one person with another is not the solution. There is a need for a shakeup and radical change which will not be carried out without extraordinary forces, not necessarily internal.

Question: When you talk of personnel changes do you also mean changing the prime minister? Are you on the side of one of the two candidates of the Labor Party?

Answer: I won't go into that for the moment. I don't feel that the two candidates are qualified to effect the change. Both know the situation well and do not assess it in a way different from what I do. But I think their hands are tied.

Question: Is it correct that both candidates pressured you and attempted to prevent you from leaving?

Answer: Yes. Both came and pressured me and offered me various tasks, more specific, less specific, within the framework of the Central Staff.

Question: How do you assess the blow which will be dealt the Labor Party with your departure?

Answer: In sum, this constitutes a sort of "market" for the party, a shock which will require a radical internal reform in the Labor Party. It is clear to me that from within I would not be able to shake up the party as from the outside.

Question: Has something concrete been promised you in DAS"H [Democratic Change Movement], such as a high level assignment after the elections?

Answer: Nothing was promised me in DAS"H.

Question: Yet, you will surely want to have in the future an assignment which will afford you influence and the wherewithal to effect the changes in which you are interested?
Answer: Definitely. I am striving for a position of influence on the national level, not because of a personal desire for a career but rather in order to do more than what I am doing today on the quasi-national level. I'm taking on a bet. I know what I am giving up, but I don't know what I'm getting into.

Question: After you decided to enter political life, why did you choose DAS"H in particular?

Answer: This movement is the closest, ideologically, to my life style. In addition, the advantage in this movement is that it is still primitive, not crystallized, and its image can be moulded.

Misleading Metaphor

Question: You say that DAS"H is close to you from an ideological standpoint. Doesn't it have a "supermarket of opinions?"

Answer: This is the case in every political entity today, even in Likud. Certainly, if DAS"H were more homogeneous in opinions it would be easier. Yet, in 80 percent of the issues there is a common denominator, and particularly in the wish to effect the internal changes and to change power structures....

Question: What is the common denominator of the Amit Group? Isn't it once again a group of "generals?"

Answer: It is true that the group has a base of military people—-the Itgar [Challenge] Circle in the Labor Party. But that is a misleading metaphor. Aside from the officers there are other people and this is a group with great specific gravity. In addition to the names which were made public there are also among them the poet A. Hillel, the economist Eltan Ya'akovson, Dr Moshe Kalman (who was a regimental commander in the War of Independence); Brigadier Gen (Res) Menahem Aviram, and others.

Question: Your parents were among the founders of the Labor movement, and your mother among the heads of the Women Workers' Council. How did your mother react to your cut off from the Labor movement?

Answer: It is true that I grew up in a house that was not a mere Labor Movement house, but one with two of the founders of the movement. My 84-year-old mother is in full possession of her wits and faculties. She has some criticism for what is taking place in her party but she does not understand and cannot accept that I, who was raised by her and was educated in the same milieu can today change my way. I have recently gone through a considerable path of agony. I had penetrating discussions with all leaders of the party. But the greatest difficulty for me is to commit this act against mother, who is unable to digest it. But there is no alternative, which is also what I must, to my great regret, take into account.
### Comparative Pre-Election Poll

*Tel Aviv HA'AREZ in Hebrew 1 Feb 77 p 1*

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BRIGADIER GENERAL BAREKET ENTERS POLITICS

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV Weekend Supplement in Hebrew 4 Feb 77 pp 8, 9

[Article: "Brigadier General Yesha'ayahu Bareket Leaves the IDF After 25 Years of Service"]

[Text] Brigadier General (reserves) Yesha'ayahu (Shaike) Bareket, young, energetic, highly capable, is getting out of uniform after 25 years of service, to enter politics. Even at the start he already has problems: all his credits, praises, reputation, anecdotes of what he has done, his successes—were achieved during his military service which he started at the age of 18. It is only natural that he would want to take all this credit to utilize in his new career, credit that was accumulated so painstakingly, as a way to find some shortcuts.

Natural? Yes, but almost impossible. The man who joined Arik Sharon in the Shlomzion movement, an air force pilot, a base commander, chief air force intelligence officer, air force attache in Washington, deputy military attache—the man has had so many positions where secrecy was the rule, then, as well as now.

His underground days go back to his childhood. He says: "I was born in Warsaw, Poland in 1935. When I was 10 months old my family moved to Israel. For a number of years we lived in Nakhalat Ganim (a Tel Aviv suburb) and in 1940 we moved to a southern Tel Aviv neighborhood. My father was a small manufacturer of purses, a modest, traditional man. When I was 10 years old I had a deep personal conflict and went "underground": My father and my sister were active in the Haganah. My brother-in-law belonged to LEHI. The British intelligence was looking for him. These were the days when Jews were after Jews. Both British and Jews were looking for this brother-in-law. I was torn between my pro-Haganah home and the LEHI-member brother-in-law. The family considered the brother-in-law an outcast. I was drawn to him and became the liaison between him and his commander in LEHI. We used to meet secretly and in strange hiding places. I used to bring him orders and arms. Only a few years ago I found out that he had a nickname in LEHI—Paganini. Why? Simple. I was studying violin then, but instead of the violin I carried unassembled guns in my case, or some ammunition for my hiding brother-in-law."
A Walk With a Personal Detective

"There were days that a British intelligence man, whom I learned to recognize, used to constantly accompany me to school, wait for me for long hours, follow me on my way home, in order to trace my brother-in-law. I even joked with him. One day on my way to school, I stopped, approached my "private detective," and told him: 'Excuse me, but as long as you walk with me all the time, could you, perhaps, carry my briefcase...it is so heavy.' He smiled and did not answer."

In the end the youngster was drawn not to guns and the underground, but to flying and planes. His parents registered him to the Tikhon Ha’adesh high school. He was rebellious even then (a characteristic which would show up later in his life, as well) and only after one semester did his estounded parents find out that he had registered to the Max Fain trade school where he was studying aircraft mechanics. Another side of his affinity to planes: At the age of 16 Shaike received a civilian pilot’s license from the Flying Club, and thus his way to the air force was paved. He was first in his class at the air force pilot course (he was slightly over 18 then), he took an instructor course (which he also completed with honors); he was an excellent combat pilot, and then...an event which placed a serious question on his entire career.

Yesha-ayahu (Shaike) Bareket: "It happened in 1961. Almost at the end of my career. I was then a major. I was driving in Wadi Milek when I saw a horrible sight: Two military half-tracks, overturned, with injured soldiers all over the road. I stopped to find out what had happened. It turned out that there were some trapped soldiers under the overturned half-track. A very difficult situation. I acted fast. A few of the soldiers, with a tremendous effort, raised the half-track enough for me to crawl underneath, praying that their strength would hold a few seconds longer, I pulled out the trapped and badly injured soldiers, and then, together with the others, I started treating the victims.

The Incident With the VIP

"Just then a Lark with a blue license tag (an official's car) passed us. In it was a Member of Knesset who then held a high position, and who has died since. I will not tell everything. I did so in the past. The man is no longer with us and we ought to respect the dead. I will skip the harsh words. But the fact can never be altered. The official government car did not take the injured to the hospital....

"I could not make my peace with that event. A deputy minister, of the education ministry of all ministries, and injured Israeli soldiers, badly mauled, strewn all over the road...I simply could not! I was offered an award for good citizenship, for endangering my life in order to save others. I rejected it. I was not interested in that. All I demanded was just one thing: that the immunity of the deputy minister be revoked in order that he may be tried. People were sent to appease me, but I rejected them angrily--there was no room for compromise!"
"I was the one who leaked the story to the press. This was the first and last time I acted this way. I was afraid of a cover-up. I was called to the chief of the manpower section, I was threatened with a court martial. Some twist. I would be court martialed for what I did...I went to Ezer Weitzman, then air force commander. I took off my uniform, my rank insignia, my pilot's wings. I laid them on his desk and announced: 'I am not willing to serve a country and an army such as this, nay, I cannot!'

"I sat home for 2 weeks and was considered AWOL. I wrote a bitter letter to the then Chief of Staff Zvi (Chera) Tzur and demanded: Let justice be done!

"Justice was not done. Good friends came over and talked to me asking me what purpose my leaving would serve. They convinced me that the image of the state and the IDF can only be improved from within and that the young generation cannot be educated outside of a framework. I gave in and returned to the service."

In 1962 Bareket took a leave of absence, finished his studies in economics and political science at the Hebrew University and in 1965 was appointed commander of the air force intelligence. That turned out to be a major success: He developed the small section, improved its working methods and advanced it, with specialized equipment to a high degree of sophistication. "I was there for 5 years, to the end of the War of Attrition in 1970. I still cannot, and maybe never will be able to tell all the stories, all the projects. I got to know the Arabs and their armies inside out. We build up the reputation of the air force intelligence in the 'international intelligence community,' as this fascinating business is commonly referred to. After the Six-Day War in 1967 and the unprecedented successes of the IDF and the air force, which intelligence can take partial credit for, we had, as visitors, intelligence chief's from all kinds of unlikely places, some that even the wildest imagination could not even dream of. I myself visited many countries, east and west, I learned a lot and had many experiences, If only I could talk...."

"Then came the waiting period before the Six-Day War. It was one of the most difficult periods in my life. Suddenly there were so many who were not strong and who did not believe. I never knew that such a small nation could have so many of those. After the war, of course, there were only victors, those who succeeded, the heroes.... The time will come when I can tell how much effort I put into convincing military officers and civilian leaders that we could indeed beat the Arab armies handily."

The Non-Conventional Zero Hour

"The last thing to do before an attack is to set the zero hour. I recommended, contrary to any doctrine, to attack at 0800 hours, rather than at dawn or at nightfall. The joke going on in the air force then was that I knew what was going on in the Egyptian air force better than I knew what went on...in the Israeli air force. True, I did, in fact, know what the Egyptian pilots would be doing when we attacked on Monday at 0800 hours."
Dado, the late Lieutenant General David El'azar, who, after the Six-Day War became commander of the northern region, used to refer to Shaike Bareket as "the magician." Maybe because of his personal contribution to the planning and carrying out the fantastic operation of lifting an Egyptian radar installation and bringing it to Israel: "This was the epitome of the operations following the Six-Day War. Oh, no, no wizards and no magic. Simply careful preparation and excellent performance of those in the field. First, when the idea of lifting a Soviet-made Egyptian radar installation dawned on me, for very important reasons which I cannot divulge...I assigned a talented officer to find out where we could find the type of radar we wanted in the most remote part of Egypt. When he presented us with his findings we realized that we could not do it because we did not have the equipment which could fly such a long distance and then lift such a heavy cargo.

"We waited impatiently for the American CH53 helicopters. When they finally arrived we completed the preparations and the detailed plan. On Monday it was placed on the desk of the chief of staff and on Friday of that week the operation was carried out with complete success.

"After the Six-Day War I did one more thing which was not so much part of my job, but I am proud of it, nevertheless: I constantly acted for the release of our POW's that the Arabs were holding. The Syrians had one pilot and we had 700 Syrian POWs. The agreement with the Syrians stated that they would first hand over our prisoner in Kuneitra and then we would release their soldiers. We arrived at the site. We waited. The Syrians did not show up. A Red Cross representative arrived and said that the Syrians had changed their mind and wanted their 700 soldiers first, before they returned our pilot."

A 'Visit' to the Other Side

"Completely mistrusting the Syrians, we could not agree to that. I took off my uniform, put on civilian clothes and a hat, and with the aid of the Red Cross and the UN representatives, in their car, I crossed over to the other side. I told the Syrian generals that I belonged to a civilian humanitarian committee in Israel that acted for the benefit of prisoners of both sides. The truth is, I was scared to death. Most of all I was afraid that the Syrians would produce our pilot, who, after all the torture, would recognize and identify me.

Then I told the Syrian commanders that the Jews had gone crazy and that they wanted to forfeit the whole agreement if the Syrians did not abide by it. I returned to the Israeli side. There passed 10 very tense minutes, then an ambulance arrived with our pilot in it and we sent the 700 Syrians back home."

When he left the intelligence post, Bareket was appointed commander of an important air force base. When the air force attache in Washington, Joseph Allon was assassinated, he left, in August 1973, to take his place,
for a while. In the summer of 1974 he even became acting military attache until Major General Adan arrived to take over. "I learned a lot...I got to know the 16.5 miles of the Pentagon hallways. I met American commanders and politicians. I also got to know...the pencil. What is a pencil, you might ask? A writing implement, that writes with one end and has an eraser on the other. This is all there is to it. A pencil. You come to a meeting with some important Americans. They have a pencil holder on their desk. They write and erase, write and erase. You understand, this is very symbolic: until it is time to sign with a pen, they study the problem, they consider, they come with an open mind to hear you and they can change their mind. The meeting does not begin with their mind already made up, so that your effort is not futile. They are willing to listen, and to learn. They are always learning. And therefore they write and erase, with the other end of the pencil. We have no use for a pencil. We write it all in ink, everything is final, decided upon. Talk my friend, talk. I have already made up my mind. This pencil is a big thing. I wish we learned it from the Americans.

Blue, Light Blue and Red

He had great times in Washington, as well as some very difficult times. "Thus, on one of the first days of the Yom Kippur War, when we were very depressed...you know, from a distance of 10,000 km the war looks so much worse, that all you want to do is quit all the talks and discussions and fly right into the war, to be with your friends and subordinates. But this was not possible. Because in Washington I was in the front of what was considered of no less importance: American weapons, American support. If I live to be 1,000 I will never forget this feeling. The fourth day of the war. The time, 2300 hours. We were in Kissinger's office. News from home was bad. What do our American counterparts talk about? What image the United States will have if it turns out that they are sending us weapons while the war is still going on! I thought I was going crazy. They were discussing whether the supply planes that were to bring the weapons were to be painted light or dark blue...I could not hold myself. I said: 'I really cannot say whether it is going to be light or dark blue. But right now that blood being shed in Israel is very red indeed...'

"I can only tell you one thing in that perpetual argument of what role Kissinger had in the air lift:he held it back, at first. Once he decided to send the planes, things moved in a typical American pace, because there was a sense of urgency in the Pentagon, as if enemy forces had invaded the United States. There was an unusual willingness on all levels to help us fast and efficiently!

Bareket was in uniform for 24 years. Close to 60 percent of his 43 years.... "No, it is not difficult to part. One has to recognize facts of life and adjust to them. There are young people coming up, as good as myself and maybe better. I am finished with my service in the IDF, but since I have
Sotten used to serving the people and the country since my childhood, I now want to serve on the political arena. At the state we are now, on the brink of disaster, I consider this as another national calling. Other parties have also approached me. We sat and talked, and discussed. Shlomzion's goals intrigued me. I have known Arik Sharon for 23 years, his strengths and weaknesses alike. I have decided to join him because there is no doubt that he is a real leader and Israel now badly needs this kind of leadership."
ZADOK ANNOUNCES HIS SUPPORT FOR PRIME MINISTER RABIN

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Feb 77 p 15

Interview with Minister of Justice Chaim Zadok by Chaim Izaq: "I Advised Peres That I Will Vote for Rabin"

Text Camps are being readied for the contest in the Labor Party over the candidacy for the post of prime minister and right now, several weeks before the decision, many see a need to declare whom they support—Rabin or Peres.

Minister of Justice Chaim Zadok, who more than once was mentioned as a potential candidate, today declares explicitly: "I will vote for Rabin as the party's candidate for the post of prime minister.

"I have been a member of Rabin's government from its inception in June 1974 and I don't believe that there are sufficient reasons for the party to decide to replace him. If I thought that there were such reasons, I would not have hesitated to resign from the government so that I might see myself free to support another candidate and perhaps even to consider the possibility of presenting my own candidacy."

Is this not an expansion on the rule he expressed at one time that a government minister who wishes to challenge the prime minister of the government in which he serves should first resign?

Zadok: "There is nothing new in my position. In an interview published in one of the newspapers several months ago I said that, as long as Rabin served as prime minister and wished to continue in his job, while I serve in his government, I will not support another candidate and I don't see myself as a candidate for the post of prime minister. Rabin's lines in foreign and defense policy are acceptable to me and during the period of my tenure in his government I learned to value his judgement in these fields."

As far as the contest itself is concerned, Zadok says that at first he did not think that it was desirable, although it certainly was legitimate. "But now, when it is clear that this contest exists, I don't think that it will
necessarily harm the party. On the contrary, it may even be beneficial to it and may strengthen it if the fight for the candidacy is waged fairly, focusses on ideological and political subjects and avoids personal attacks as befitting members of one party who even at the height of the contest should remember that they must stand united in the external election war. I would like to see the candidates conclude a silence agreement in connection with what is allowed and forbidden in the contest."

What will he do if "his" candidate is not elected?

Zadok: "In any case I will stand behind the person that will be elected as the party candidate and I will give the party and him my full support. I reject the threats by the party members who say that they will leave it if a candidate undesirable to them is elected. Party membership cannot be conditional and whoever participates in a democratic contest must accept the results of the contest."

Nor is Zadok in favor of meetings of identification with one candidate or another. "These meetings were designed to bolster the position of those that initiate them more than that of the candidate." He adds: "It is not my style to blow a big shofar about my 'identification' and 'support.' The first person whom I told about my intention to vote for Yitzhak Rabin was Shimon Peres during a conversation we held on his initiative in connection with the contest."

What is his opinion of the conditions made by MAPAM for the continuation of the Alignment in order to try to impose decisions on the Labor Party in this way?

Zadok: "I think that the Labor Party has the right to name in a democratic process its candidate for the post of prime minister and that MAPAM does not have the right to veto the candidate that the Labor Party will elect. It does not befit the relationships between the two Alignment parties that the smaller partner makes the continuation of the Alignment conditional on the identity of the candidate that will be elected by the bigger partner, who, by agreement between the two partners, has the right to elect a candidate for the post of prime minister on behalf of the Alignment. In its resolution MAPAM demands that the Labor Party elects a candidate for the post of prime minister who 'can be trusted to implement the agreed policy, while identifying himself with it.' I assume that the political chapter in the platform of the Labor Party will be determined at the party convention before the election of its candidate for the post of prime minister and, therefore, it may be fairly assumed that the person that presents his candidacy at an authorized institution of the Labor Party and is elected can be trusted to implement the platform policy and will identify himself with it. I don't believe that MAPAM has the right to assume the function of one that can read man's thoughts and determine the extent of loyalty of the Labor Party's candidate for the post of prime minister to party policy and the degree of his identification with it."
To what extent does he consider the continued existence of the Alignment vital? Is there no surrender to MAPAM's ultimatum in the formulation of the political chapter by the committee preparing the Labor Party's platform?

Zadok: "I favor the continued existence of the Alignment and I am glad that in the main paragraph of the political chapter in the platform there is a formulation satisfactory to MAPAM. But I don't think that MAPAM has the right to interfere in the democratic process of electing a candidate for the post of prime minister by the Labor Party."

In the debate on the question as to who will elect the party candidate—the convention or the center—Chaim Zadok's reasoned opinion is that the party center is the institution suitable for this election. "The authority and procedure for electing a candidate for the post of prime minister should be determined in the party laws as a permanent arrangement and we must not deviate from it only because by complete accident the party convention is meeting close to the time when, owing to the fact that elections will be held early, the party is to nominate its candidate for the post of prime minister."

Here Zadok distinguishes between what is accepted in the method of presidential rule and in the method of parliamentary rule. In presidential rule, for example, in the United States, the party convention meets once in 4 years close to the general elections and elects its candidates for president and vice-president. When these officials are elected, they serve for a fixed period of 4 years. Zadok says that in presidential rule there is never the need to nominate a candidate for president during the period of 4 years. Not so in parliamentary rule. When the prime minister resigns or dies in the middle of his term of office, the party must nominate—without any connection to parliamentary elections—its candidate for prime minister who immediately assumes his post. Zadok adds that in parliamentary rule a party may decide in the middle of the period to replace its candidate for the post of prime minister without any connection to new elections. Hence, he believes that in parliamentary rule party laws must be arranged so that the party is ready and willing to elect its candidate for the post of prime minister at any time. Therefore, Zadok sees the need to elect the candidate for the post of prime minister in the party center, because the authorized institution must be permanent.

What about the argument that the party center is an institution too limited to make such a decision?

Zadok: "The number of the members of the Labor Party center, which is more than 600, is big enough and representative enough to elect a candidate acceptable to the majority in the party. For example, in England the leader of the Labor Party, who is also the party candidate for the post of prime minister, is elected by the Labor faction in the Parliament, whose members, according to the parliamentary strength of the faction from time to time, number around 300."
Zadok sees another argument in favor of a candidate's election by the party center. He fears that the need for a convention for this election may be a deviation which can hurt the party's power and authority over its candidate for the post of prime minister. He explains: "If in a certain case the candidate is elected by the convention, some day, if the party wants to replace him, he will be able to claim that the center has no authority to replace him, because he was elected by a higher institution—the convention—and he derives his position from it."

Zadok participated in the work of the committee preparing the Labor Party platform for the Ninth Knesset. Is this platform more flexible than the 14 principles of the election platform 4 years ago?

Zadok: "The committee dealing with the preparation of the political chapter of the platform for the Ninth Knesset decided that the chapter concerned with a peace agreement should include the following paragraph: 'Israel will continue its political efforts to reach a peace agreement with Egypt, Jordan and Syria within defensible borders with readiness for a territorial compromise with each of them and for peace with Lebanon within the existing border.' I completely agree with this formulation. It contains no fundamental change as compared to the corresponding paragraph in the 14 principles, which states that 'Israel will strive for a peace agreement that will ensure... defensible borders... based on a territorial compromise.' This formulation could not prevent the possibility of a territorial compromise in each of the three sectors, but, if some doubt arose on this question, it is good that the new formulation was made in order to clarify the matter and to remove any doubt."

Question: "This paragraph refers to a territorial compromise within the framework of a peace settlement alone. Don't you see here a more rigid formulation as compared to what was stated in paragraph 11 of the 14 principles concerning temporary settlements?

Zadok: "The paragraph that has been accepted thus far by the preparatory committee is only one of the paragraphs in the political chapter and the formulation of the remaining paragraphs is still before us. Perhaps we should clarify the essence and function of a party's political platform for elections. A political platform is not a specific political decision, but general policy lines, which will constitute a framework within which from time to time the party and the government that it will form will have to make specific political decisions at their discretion in accordance with the conditions and circumstances. A platform must not answer in advance every specific question that might arise during the years of office of the government that will be elected on the basis of this platform. The platform is not designed to determine what the government must do, but to define the boundaries within which it is authorized to act at its discretion."

Question: "That is, the complete political chapter will explicitly include reference to the situation that is less than a full peace agreement, such as the abolition of the state of war?"
Zadok: "Yes. Consolidation of the paragraph designed for agreements and settlements that are less than a full peace agreement, such as an agreement to end the state of war, is still before us. Paragraph 11 of the 14 principles, which you mentioned, refers to 'interim settlements that will be agreed upon between Israel and its neighbors as temporary settlements on the road to peace.' After the elections to the Eighth Knesset we signed three 'temporary settlements,' two with Egypt and one with Syria, and each of these settlements involved a territorial compromise. I again stress that in the formulation in the 14 principles concerning interim or temporary settlements there is no restriction with regard to one of the sectors. Of course, at its discretion a government can decide that in one of the sectors it is not ready for a territorial compromise or for an additional territorial concession within the framework of an agreement that is less than a full peace agreement. However, its hands are not tied in advance by the platform paragraphs. The flexibility of consideration and decision must also be preserved for the next government. We must beware of formulation in which the benefits of clarification with regard to the paragraph concerning a peace agreement are outweighed by the drawbacks of hardened positions with regard to the possibility of agreements and settlements that are less than a full peace agreement."

What is his opinion of the members' intention to explicitly include in the platform a paragraph according to which a territorial concession in Judaea and Samaria will be conditional on holding new elections?

Zadok: "My answer is unequivocally negative."

Question: "But the present government committed itself to new elections in such a case?"

Zadok: "The paragraph on holding elections in case of a territorial concession in Judaea and Samaria is included in the coalitional agreement signed when the government was established after the elections to the Eighth Knesset. I would like to recall the exact formulation of this paragraph in the coalitional agreement: 'No peace agreement with Jordan will be concluded if there are territorial concessions in Judaea and Samaria without the matter being submitted to the nation's consideration in new elections, if one of the factions participating in the coalition demands this.' This paragraph was conceived and originated in the negotiations with MIFDAL on its joining the coalition."

Question: "In the preparatory committee of the Labor Party Golda Meir claimed, and Galili supported her, that this paragraph was included only because MIFDAL demanded it as a condition for joining the coalition."

Zadok: "I can bring to this matter only the statements recorded in black and white at one time. In the letter of Minister Galili to Prime Minister Golda Meir dated 8 March 1974, 2 days before the formation of the government,
he advises her of the above-mentioned paragraph as 'summaries of the debate with the representatives of the National Religious Party concerning the paragraph of Judaea and Samaria in the coalitional agreement.' When Golda Meir introduced her government on 10 March 1974 and announced the content of this paragraph, she first said that 'in the course of clarifications in connection with the formation of the government the question arose as to how the government would act if after the negotiations with Jordan the hour of decision comes.' Hence it is clear that the possibility of holding new elections in connection with territorial concessions in Judaea and Samaria first arose in the negotiations with MIFDAL on the formation of the government in March 1974. This was about 1 year after MIFDAL adopted the principle of Undivided Land of Israel at its convention and the above-mentioned paragraph in the coalitional agreement was designed to bridge the gap between the Alignment's readiness for a territorial compromise in Judaea and Samaria according to the 14 principles and MIFDAL's devotion to the principle of Undivided Land of Israel. In my opinion, the difference between an inclusion of such a paragraph in a coalitional agreement after the elections and between its inclusion in the platform before the elections is essential and fundamental, going to the root of the problem. In the platform the Alignment establishes its position and announces to the public what it would do if it should win the majority and form an Alignment government. On the other hand, a coalitional agreement is a compromise with other parties in order to create a common basis for the formation of a government. If the Alignment had received a majority and had formed an Alignment government, there would have been no need for a coalitional agreement and the 14 principles would have become the government's basic lines. If not for the coalition with MIFDAL and if MIFDAL had not adopted the principle of Undivided Land of Israel, no one would have thought of including a paragraph in the coalitional agreement making a territorial concession in Judaea and Samaria conditional on holding new elections. Whoever now proposes that the Alignment undertakes this obligation before the elections, in fact, wants to elevate the paragraph that we were forced to accept as a compromise with MIFDAL to the degree of one of the Labor Party's policy principles."

Zadok recalls that the possibility of a territorial compromise in Judaea and Samaria was not first mentioned in March 1974. In its international relations, as well as in its contacts with Jordan, more than once Israel submitted the Allon Plan based on a territorial compromise in Judaea and Samaria for an informal debate. "We were also careful and we added that the government has not yet formally adopted this plan and that this plan is subject to government decision in the Knesset. But we never said— for foreign or domestic consumption—that, before we sign an agreement based on the Allon Plan, we will hold new elections."

To substantiate his argument, Zadok recalls the chain of events that led to the departure of GADHAL from the government in August 1970. "At that time we accepted the initiative of American Secretary of State Rogers on a settlement with Egypt, on the one hand, and with Jordan, on the other. This
was the first time that we explicitly adopted the Security Council Resolution 242 and uttered the word 'withdrawal,' which until then had been a bad word in the Israeli political vocabulary. We declared then that we would be prepared for a 'withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from the areas occupied in the 1967 war to secure, recognized and agreed borders to be defined in a peace agreement.' The significance of this agreement in the Jordanian context could be only one: readiness for a territorial compromise in Judaea and Samaria. Owing to this government decision GAHAL left the coalition, because it saw in it, and rightly so, readiness for a territorial compromise in Judaea and Samaria. At that time we did not make conditions and we did not say—for foreign or domestic consumption—that, before we sign an agreement with Jordan involving a territorial concession in Judaea and Samaria, we will ask the people through elections. Perhaps if we had said this, GAHAL would not have left the coalition. MIFDAL agreed with this decision. This was before MIFDAL adopted the principle of Undivided Land of Israel at its convention in February 1973.

Now I would like to draw attention to the paragraph in the coalitional agreement concerning elections to be held if one of the factions participating in the coalition demands this. The significance of these words is that there was no absolute, but a reserved, commitment to hold elections if one of the coalitional factions makes such a demand. Which faction could make such a demand? Certainly not Independent Liberals, who, like the Alignment, are in favor of a territorial compromise in Judaea and Samaria. Nor did the Alignment need this paragraph in the coalitional agreement, because it was the majority in the government and at any time could decide, if it saw the need for this, to hold new elections. MIFDAL was the only faction from which such a demand could be expected and the addition 'if one of the coalitional factions demands this' shows that this paragraph was created because of and for MIFDAL. If we had reached an agreement with Jordan involving a territorial concession in Judaea and Samaria and MIFDAL had changed its position, accepted the agreement and not demanded that new elections be held, there would have been no need to hold such elections according to the coalitional agreement."

Question: "In principle, do you object to including a similar paragraph in the coalitional agreement in the future?"

Zadok: "I don't know what the makeup of the next coalition will be and it is possible that, in order to form a government, we will again be forced to agree to a similar paragraph with regard to Judaea and Samaria. However, such a paragraph in our platform, or such a commitment before the elections, is a departure from our readiness for a territorial concession in Judaea and Samaria as determined in the 14 principles and in the presently formulated political chapter. It is also possible that in the 4 years of office of the Ninth Knesset we will not have to make a decision with regard to Judaea and Samaria, but it is very possible that we will be confronted with the need to make such a decision in the near future and we must not tie our hands in
advance. We are now going to the people and telling them: This is our platform, these are our policy lines and within this framework we demand confidence in our political judgement in the different situations that may arise during this period. We are asking the public to agree to the way we outlined in the platform and to have confidence in the leadership that we will produce, so that it may act within the framework of the platform principles according to its best judgement. The Alignment, which is the central power in the state, cannot come to the people and say: Don't give us a full mandate, restrict us, tie our hands with regard to Judaea and Samaria and do not rely on our judgement. A party that addresses the people in this way expresses no confidence in itself."

Does Zadok see himself a candidate for membership in the next government? Or will his decision depend on the identity of the prime minister?

Zadok: "If the person who forms the next government on behalf of the Labor Party offers me membership in his government, I shall weigh the offer on its merit and my decision will not be affected by the identity of the person who forms the government and makes the offer."

Does he think that the candidate for the post of prime minister must announce the team that will accompany him? Does he himself have ideas with regard to the desirable makeup of the next government?

Zadok: "I am not among those who toy with the makeup of governments. This will be the job of the person to whom the president will entrust it. I believe that, when the next government is formed, it will be necessary to make an effort to reduce the number of ministries and ministers considerably, as compared to the number accepted thus far, and, as far as this concerns the representatives of the Labor Party in the government, I believe that the party should send to the government the best and most capable leadership group it can produce from its membership, both from those members serving today as ministers and those that do not serve in the government. Hence it is clear that the number of members that are now members of the government on behalf of the labor Party will no longer be able to be members in the next government. In my opinion, those that are to form the next government should adopt these criteria and even announce them to the general and party public."
POLITICAL GROUPINGS REALIGN IN PRIME-MINISTRY CONTEST

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 6 Feb 77 p 13

[Article by Moshe Meisles: "Ahdut Ha'avoda for Rabin, RAFT for Peres--The Struggle Is Now for the Votes of MAPAI"]

[Text] The headquarters of prime minister Yizhaq Rabin and defense minister Shimon Peres are presently involved in mathematical analyses and strategic planning.

Material from all parts of the country together with lists of delegates to the party convention from all branches are flowing into the headquarters which are operating in offices and hotels in Tel Aviv and in Jerusalem. Each name is marked with a Plus, a Minus or a Question Mark, the certains for, the certains against and the doubtfuls. The intention is to initiate speedy contacts with all of them and not to overlook any name as if it were "in the pocket." "They'll work on all of them" up to the last minute, up to the time of the party convention on 22 February.

Everything at the headquarters is under the heading "Who Is for Rabin and Who Is for Peres." As if there were no general elections in the offing; as if there were no need to direct the strength, the energy and the barbs against the external adversaries. "As long as it is not decided who will be the candidate of the party for the prime ministry, it is not possible to conduct an external election campaign," they are saying at the headquarters of Yizhaq Rabin. "It is not possible to know how to direct the external election campaign. The contest for the prime ministry in the party is not only personal, it is a contest of ideology and method. And as long as that is not decided, there is no knowing which ideology and which method..."

Conclusions

This places a burden, of course, on the activity of the election headquarters of the Labor Party headed by minister Haim Bar-Lev, who is seeking to get into high gear against the Likud and Democratic Change, but who is unable to disengage himself from the internal personal contest between Yizhaq Rabin and Shimon Peres.
Each side has totally different conclusions regarding the results of the internal elections. It can be assumed that even if they hold similar conclusions and assessments about the votes of the delegates chosen for the convention, they adopt a psychological strategy: "We have a clear majority," in order to confuse and disconcert the adversary and the public.

Each headquarters contends, for example, that its supporters are a majority in Tel Aviv, in Bat Yam, in Migdal Ha'emek, etc. And it is difficult to determine the truth of the contentions, for, except for those who are definitely one way or the other there is still a certain percentage of uncommitted who prefer "to sit on the fence" to the very last moment and thereby to increase their prestige, their value and their price. It is quite possible that in the situation that will be created, they in particular may prove to be the tippers of the scale.

However, there are also a number of facts which are not disputable. In the Haifa, Kibbutz Ha'me'uhad and Ihud Hakibutzit districts, and among the Arab and Druze delegates, there is a clear majority for the supporters of Shimon Peres. On all other fronts each side claims a majority, and the truth lies somewhere in between. There are districts and there are branches in which Rabin has a majority, and there are those in which there is a majority for Peres. And at the same time there is not even the assurance that the convention will resolve the contest.

The preparations committee was relying on the choice to be made by the Central, but since the decision on this issue will be transferred directly to the convention, both sides assume that this will not remove a decision such as this from the convention.

Doves

The headquarters of Shimon Peres is attempting, in the psychological struggle for the voice of the voter, to break away from the hawkish image which has been attached to the candidate in the past. That is why the thrust of his public relations is an intention to create the impression that the doves of MAPAI in particular are the ones who are coming over to his side in droves. The outstanding example: Knesset Member Abba Eban, who gave up his candidacy for the prime ministry and decided to get behind the candidacy of Shimon Peres. And there are doves such as Knesset Members Micha Harish, Avraham Silberberg and the secretary of Jerusalem District, Uzi Bar'am. The headquarters promises additional doves, such as Knesset Member Yosi Shrid, secretary of Tel Aviv District Eliahu Shpeizer and others.

Those who contend that the groupings in the Labor Party have passed on are in error and are misleading others. The Ahdut Ha'avoda group is in its entirety on the side of Yizhaq Rabin, and the former RAFI group in the side of Shimon Peres. The struggle is being conducted for the soul and the vote of MAPAI.

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The question being asked in the Labor Party today is: Who is MAPAI? The MAPAI of Golda Meir and Yehoshua Rabinovitz which endorses Yizhaq Rabin, or the MAPAI of Abba Eban, Micha Harish and Uzi Bar'am which endorses Shimon Peres?

The headquarters of Yizhaq Rabin points to a historic, ideological and value controversy and brings up the Lavon Affair and other stormy struggles. Yehuda Gotthelf even said at the meeting in the home of Abba Eban that the controversy is still current...the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. Whereas the headquarters of Shimon Peres is sticking to the biological label struggle and projecting a gallery of oldster leaders such as Golda Meir, Yisrael Galili and Yehoshua Rabinovitz as supporters of Rabin. As if the battlefront is between the past and the present and that only the latter has any prospect.

Shimon Peres was damaged by the "memorandum" of MAPAM which announced that it would leave the Alinement if he is to be selected as the Labor Party candidate for prime minister. He points out that he agreed to a version of territorial concessions even in Judea and Samaria in the party platform. He and Knesset Member Eban are trying to project an "elegant" image by announcing that the contest must cease on the day following the decision at the convention.

Both headquarters are trying to spring surprises. On the very day on which the identification meeting takes place at the home of Abba Eban, and Uzi Bar'am proclaims his support of Shimon Peres, the Minister of Justice Chaim Zadok comes out in favor of Yizhaq Rabin. It can be assumed that this trek of personal identifications will continue and will even intensify in tempo, and both sides promise news and surprises.

The rival lists, which are tensely following the struggle of the mighty in the Labor Party, have gone into high gear for the election campaign, whereas the Labor Party is "mute" by reasons of the internal storm.

Those following the struggle from the outside are unable to assess who the victor is and it can be assumed that this will become known only at the time hands are raised at the convention. But one thing seems practically certain: This time the difference in the ratio of forces will be smaller than at the time of the previous decision in the party central in May 1974—that is, in percentages of less than 45:55. Until then it is certain, also, that it won't be boring and that many other surprises are in store for us from both headquarters.
DEFECTIONS FROM LABOR PARTY DECRIED

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 6 Feb 77 p 3

[Article by Yizhak Ronkin: "Escape of the Generals"]

[Text] The resignation of a group of persons led by the Director General of Koor, Meir Amit, from the Labor Party aroused considerable regret—and this was expressed by the Secretary General of the Histadrut Yeruham Meshal, who added: A person's wish is to be respected! However, wish is not the only thing under discussion. What was said comes within the objective context related to resignation.

Meir Amit enunciated a sacred oath that he is still loyal to the values of the Labor Movement and the workers' administration. Yet with whom—within the new movement—will he maintain loyalty to the values of the Labor Movement? With those who reject the public-Histadrut enterprise in the administration and prophesy in strong-arm style, a style of forced obedience and compulsory arbitration for regulating economic and workers' affairs?

No, this subjective wish is merely a bridge—a narrow bridge—over which groups and persons from the Labor Movement have recently been passing to the right....

Defection—A Passing Phenomenon

This spectacle of defection from the Labor Movement is not new among us. The previous act of ideological defection was during the days of the establishment of RAFI [Israel Workers' List]. That one waved the flag of statehood which was attempting nothing less than taking over the worker and pioneering dream. Groups and portions have since deserted MAPAI. Most of them stopped midway, reversed themselves, or took a fence-sitting position. But some of them arrived at the last station: they developed into a consolidation under the leadership of Herut to the militant right which has for a generation been striving to demolish the Workers' Movement. Let it be said, then: the end of those was evidence of their beginning....
To our regret, this process of defection from the Workers' Movement has not ceased. It is a sad sight to behold people who grew, blossomed, rose within the Labor Movement; people whom the Labor Movement had caused to blossom, had elevated them from a precious human reservoir, had afforded them a space in which to function, had provided them with an anvil for their hammer—now defecting, turning away, removing themselves from their origins and thereby strengthening, perforce, the hands of the Right in the battle for overpowering the Labor Movement.

The Sociological Content

What we are confronted with is a class struggle—of that there is no doubt. The Democratic Movement for Change is the messenger of the new Right, of neo-bourgeoisie, which has blossomed forth in Israel and whose banner is Liberalism. It is a faded and tattered banner for Liberalism, from a historical perspective, has bequeathed its great values, the values of preservation of human rights and freedom to democratic-humanistic Socialism; and what has remained of Liberalism in our day has branched off into two streams: on the one side it is the expression of the extremist right which rejects any intervention by the state in the marketplace, which is hostile to the rising power of the trade union, and which advocates a "free" interplay of forces—free of all restraint in class exploitation and in extortion of society as a whole by the economic giants, while simultaneously liberalism has become the fig leaf and camouflage for a reverse goal: technocratic intervention in the marketplace, state-implemented intervention by the new elite, representatives of the neo-bourgeois Right which is striving to achieve authority. The Democratic Movement et alia is paving the road for this Right.

Indeed, it is a depressing drama this, that people who have quenched their thirst at the well are now kicking dust into it; people who have had roots are now cutting them away. But perhaps their roots in the Workers' Movement were not deep to begin with?

The blurriness between the workers' administration, an administration of the laboring and creating person, and the capitalist administration, a blurring of the unique labor-social characteristic, is what has spawned and continues to spawn the phenomenon of defection and abandonment. If there is no difference between an enterprise under capitalist ownership and an enterprise under Histadrut ownership—why not serve the capitalist administration?

The passing of parts of the Labor Movement, by way of the bourgeois consolidation, accompanied by the unending growth of a stratum of "white collar" people is the deep root of the escape phenomenon, including also persons who did not attain their aspirations and were left with only half their desires fulfilled....
From Class to Nation?

It has already been said: Everything reaches us late. The technocratic-decelerated capitalism—and that is its "upper" stage—is in deep crisis worldwide, in western Europe as well as in the United States: top theorists, planners, economists, and sociologists see no way out for this regime except to turn to the left, to a socialist organization of the market and of society. Whereas with us it is the opposite: groups in the Workers' Movement are cut off at the root and are turning right at a gallop toward the capitalist-bourgeois camp which has lost its way and lacks perspective.

"From a class to a nation," David Ben Gurion once theorized. This was a concept which bit off a great deal, for it neglected, on the way to nationhood, the class struggle; but that was the projection of the grand goal and seeing the horizon. In our day we are witnesses to a reverse process at the borders of the camp: from a nation to workers—to a bourgeois class new in form but old in content....

Time for a Stand

This is not, as stated, the first escape in the history of the Labor Movement. However, it is taking place during a most difficult reality, internal and external, which is in part the result of objective conditions and partly the result of governmental and social lapses.

But those who bring tidings of change—is it so? Already at the start they are pulling in different directions: some pulling toward the hawks, and others toward the doves; this one wanting a narrowing of the gap and that one wanting a widening of the gap; this one demanding freedom of the individual and that one calling for compulsory arbitration; these advocating application of the system of military commands to the life of society, and others maintaining the sanctity of civil rights; these demanding democracy and self-determination, and others proposing the idea of the technocratic elite, which is quite the opposite....

They will not solve the problems facing us, but will rather exacerbate them; they are liable to intensify the despair in the nation. Out of the despair and the false hope a way is apt to be opened toward the victory of that chauvinistic fanaticism which kindled conflagrations during our history from the days of the Second Temple to the time of Sabbatai Zevi [a false messiah].

The Labor Movement in Israel, the Histadrut and the Zionist-Socialist parties are enjoined to recruit all of their strength and vision, their ideological unity and statesmanlike image in order to preserve all that we hold dear, all that is precious to the nation, to its future, its peace and its security.
COMING CONVENTION SEEN AS THREAT TO LABOR PARTY

Tel Aviv HA'AREZ in Hebrew 6 Feb 77 p 9

[Article: "Nomination for Prime Minister May Take Place at the Convention. Challenge to Rabin May Split the Convention"]

[Text] Whoever tries to predict today who will win the nomination—Yizhaq Rabin or Shimon Peres— is like an expectant father who makes promises in all directions that his wife will give birth to a son. There always is a 50 percent chance. This is the assessment of a Labor Party member in Shimon Peres' campaign headquarters. But there is a basic difference between the two situations. Guesses of the expectant parents have no bearing on the outcome. On the other hand, early guesses and the rumor mill on the political arena may very well have a psychological effect on the division of support, which may determine the results, even before the confrontation. This is the method now adopted by both Rabin's and Peres' camps.

The first few days after the internal elections passed and the question of where the decision will be made has resurfaced. Even at the party's central committee everyone is now convinced that it will be difficult to wait for a decision until the next central committee can be convened, as this can only be done after the convention, which will pick it. The special circumstances of the internal elections and the 3,000-member convention with the challenge to the party's leadership and the nomination to prime minister, all taking place at the same time, has taken the wind out of those advocating strict adherence to the party constitution. The latter names the central committee as the organ to elect the party's head and its nominee for prime minister. It is rather far-fetched to assume that the convention, which has sovereignty over its affairs, will agree to give up this unique opportunity to let the delegates themselves determine who the party's nominee for prime minister will be.

The vote of about 160,000 members is also significant when it comes to deciding where the confrontation should take place. The assumption is that this time all those members bothered to vote (without transportation being provided) because they knew that the elections will, in the end, determine
who the next prime minister will be. Anyhow, the decision of those in charge to bring 40 voting machines to the convention clearly indicates that the inclination is to have the confrontation there. No other resolution of the convention will call for a secret ballot.

"Manhunt"

There are other apprehensions accompanying the resistance to decide between Rabin and Peres at the party's central committee. The assumption is that if the confrontation is handed over to the central committee, the convention will become secondary in scope and its last 3 days will turn into a "manhunt" affair for both sides. No one will pay attention to the proceedings, everyone will be absent from the meetings. They will all congregate in the hallways examining the delegates for their support. The danger is that if the confrontation is not faced at the convention, those elected to the central committee will be "sifted" according to their support of Rabin or Peres. According to some observers within the Labor Party this is the surest way to split the party, when, following the decision at the central committee there will be one unsatisfied wing that will have been elected only because of its support of one of the two candidates.

A question of tactical importance and which has not yet been resolved is the timing of the confrontation at the convention. Will it be on its first day or upon concluding? On 2 June 1977 the convention will be opened with an official ceremony at Binyenai HaUmah in Jerusalem. Discussions will start the next day in the Mann Auditorium in Tel Aviv. It is safe to assume that Peres' side will want to resolve the issue right away. Rabin's supporters will probably want to delay the vote to the third day, toward the conclusion of the convention, when the party platform is voted on. The main debate at the convention at the Mann Auditorium will therefore be—when will the vote take place. One of the questions that will probably be asked is how can the convention proceed with the threat of this vote over its head. Rabin's people will argue that decisions on the political and social stands that are represented by both candidates have to be resolved first, before the 3,000 delegates vote on the party's nominee for prime minister.

Some MAPAI's doves joined Peres' camp. Among them are Members of Knesset Abba Eban, Yossi Sarid and Micha Kharish, as well as the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv party secretaries, Uzi Bar'am and Eliyahu Shpeizer. They thereby refuse the attempt to represent Rabin as the leader of the doves in the party.

Breakup of the Convention?

To rebuff the above group—and no one as yet knows how much power it can exert at the convention—Foreign Minister Yigal Allon made some hasty preparations even before the internal elections. The week of 31 January 1977 the political organs of both Kibbutz movements met for the first time. This is an
ideological and electoral power that has a lot of influence on decision of the Labor Party. It is also intended to exhibit its clout at the convention and back Rabin. This group, which represents dovish trends too, will be represented by almost 400 delegates. The man who acted for its establishment was Yigal Allon, who is now continuing his efforts in the more leftist direction of the kibbutz movement of MAPAM, in an effort to unite all three kibbutz movements of the Alignment.

The main arguments of MAPAI's people, who are regarded as doves and who back Peres, will be that their support of the candidate is not because of their political views, just as Golda Meir's, Yigal Allon's and Yizhaq Ben-Aharon's support of the prime minister is not because of identical political views. There is no doubt that Peres' supporters will try to present the confrontation as being a personal one, while attempting to isolate any other considerations. It is obvious that from this point of view it is better to have the confrontation on the first day, before political, economic and social discussions are held. It is entirely possible that the breakdown of the votes on specific issues will be quite different than on the Rabin vs. Peres vote.

It is more difficult to unite the delegates around a nominee who is not identified with the party platform. The question is what will happen if Peres' camp succeeds in forcing the showdown vote to before the discussion and if it succeeds in defeating Rabin. Can the convention be continued after effectively ousting the prime minister? How will Rabin's people react at the discussions and to what extent can the whole convention be saved? The reverse results, an effective confidence vote, will also not ensure a quiet convention. An almost equal vote for Rabin and Peres does not even ensure truce between the camps.

First Among Equals?

Postponement of the vote to the last day has many inherent dangers too. The main one is that in spite of the attempt to associate the confrontation with an ideological reason, the convention will be poorly attended. Everyone will be busy soliciting support for either of the sides and the process of picking the central committee (which concludes the convention) will again pass the sieve of a vote for Rabin or Peres. This is actually a variation on the theme that the next central committee may face if the confrontation takes place there.

The real torpedo of the confrontation lies with the stands which now seem uncompromising. A convention vote turns the nominee for prime minister from first among equals to first within the party. If Rabin is elected at the convention, it is doubtful whether Peres will again be his defense minister. Peres' people and the RAFI faction know that and the question is whether more resignations from the Labor Party may be expected.

It seems, though, that the largest pill to swallow will be if Peres defeats Rabin. It is not unlikely that MAPAM will then establish a separate faction, to act at the eighth Knesset. Ben-Aharon's threats in case Peres is nominated, and Akhut HaAvodah's position do not rule out the possibility of a surprise move by this faction, headed by Yigal Allon, a move intended to ensure Rabin's victory, or head off his defeat.
GETTING READY FOR CONFRONTATION IN LABOR PARTY

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 8 Feb 77 p 3

[Excerpt: "MAFDAL's Assessment of the Labor Party Convention"]

[Text] The whole political mess today revolves around one question: Who will Labor's candidate for prime minister be? Tension, because of the decision to take place on 23 February 1977, is rising. Delegations come and go to and from the offices of the prime minister and defense minister. There is a struggle on each member of the party's central committee.

At first it was by telephone only (this was initiated by Shimon Peres and Rabin's people said jokingly: 'Perez was communications minister after all...'), then it was all in personal talks, face to face. Now comes the stage of personal identification in preparation for the decision on 23 February at the party convention.

This decision has a lot of implications. MAPAM is waiting to see who will be elected. One of its conditions for continuing in the Alinement was that Peres not be the nominee. Tension in Likud is also high. They prefer Rabin. First because Rabin is a dove and it would be easy to attack him on the political level. This is not true about Peres, who can help them on this score.

Second: Rabin represents the failing, torn up government, lacking backbone. It would be easier for Likud to attack a candidate with an undistinguished record such as Rabin's, than someone like Peres who will be presented by Labor public relations people as a person standing for change and revision. As was said by Ezer Weitzman, chairman of the election committee of Likud: "Rabin will be attacked with arrows, whereas Peres will get the sword treatment."

MAFDAL is also anxious to find out the results of the vote, since Rabin exhibited that his concern for a partnership between the labor camp and the national-religious camp is not very deep. In private conversations MAFDAL's people voiced their opinion that they would prefer to see Peres nominated.
Some of his recent statements hinted at the fact that he did not approve of Rabin's step in ousting MAPDAL from the coalition and in severing the partnership between labor and MAPDAL.

More than anyone Labor people themselves are waiting for the decision. This confrontation has virtually paralyzed the external campaign and funneled all funds to the internal struggle. One member of Knesset, who is opposed to Peres' challenge said: "Instead of healing the wounds and patching up the gaps, the internal cruel struggle continues and this is what causes further deterioration within the party." Yonah Yagol, one of the leaders of the defunct movement Min HaYesod, said: "The party is under heavy fire of scandals and resignations, ineptitudes and forced action, and Peres behaved as if everything was all right, 'rest period,' when he announced this personal, internal and prolonged struggle. All this is supposed to lead us to victory in the May 1977 elections."

But Peres exemplifies the idea of a democratic confrontation and he is gathering momentum. Polls show that the public would rather have him as the nominee, but among party activists—and they are the people to make the eventual decision—the "bulldozer" effect that Rabin has adopted utilizing Golda Meir, Yehoshua Rabinowitz and others, is still very strong. They remind everyone that the nomination of Peres means getting closer to Likud and Gush Emunim and the loss of the traditional historical MAPAI line.

All these arguments did not help Rabin foil an argument that weakened many of his assertions: the defection of many party members to the Democratic Movement for Change, which is gradually assuming the appearance of a new labor party. If people like Ma'ir Amit, Aharon Yariv and David Golomb are foresaking the "greenhouse" where they grew up, this is a clear declaration that they are sick and tired of the present leadership and its leader, and, by default, it is a weighty victory for Shimon Peres, who is also after change and revision in the leadership. One of Peres' advantages is that Member of Knesset Abba Eban is on his side. This fact is enough to reduce the weight of the arguments of Rabin's people that Peres does represent historical MAPAI, because if Abba Eban bows out of the race and introduces Peres at the convention, Peres can take a lot of credit. For many in the Labor Party Eban represents historic MAPAI much more so than Rabin....

If we were to examine the division of the camps we can see that Peres can take credit for many new supporters in the last 2 weeks, some that he did not even count on.

The dominant supporters in Rabin's camp are Mrs Meir, Minister Yehoshua Rabinowitz, the Haifa region secretary, Uri Agami, Dov Tzamir and probably also party secretary Me'ir Zarmi. The United Kibbutz movement has resolved on 5 February 1977 to support the prime minister and it seems that all of Akhdut Ha'Avodah (with the possible exception of LeShiluv man, Member of Knesset Amorai) will follow suit.
Peres' camp, as was mentioned, has been growing recently, quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition to Abba Eban, he has the support of the heads of the Tel Aviv and Haifa region leaders Eliyahu Shpeizer and Dov Ben-Me'ir, most of the Jerusalem leadership (Uzi Bar'am, Teddy Kolek), communal town representatives (headed by A. Zilberberg) and, of course, former RAFl people. It seems though, that all of the cabinet ministers (with the exception of Gad Ya'akobi who has not made his position known, but Rabin's people claim he is "theirs") support Rabin and it would seem that this is quite significant. To counter that, Peres has the support of Members of Knesset Yossi Sarid, Ester Herlitz, some of the younger generation, and it is even possible that David Kalderon of the defunct Gush will support him. Two more names should be added to the list, Refa'el Bash and Shlomo Bahat, members of the central committee of the Histadrut.

At this point the balance is just about even and there is no way to predict the outcome. One thing is clear; the decision will have far-reaching implications, not only for the Labor Party, but for the whole country.
COLLECTIVES' COUNCIL ENDORSES RABIN

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 6 Feb 77 p 3

[Article by Meshulam Ed: "The Kibbutz Hame'uhad Decided To Support Rabin"]

[Text] The Kibbutz Hame'uhad [United Collectives] Council meeting during the weekend at the Bari Kibbutz in the Negev under the slogan "United, Persistent and Alert Effort" aligned themselves behind Yizhaq Rabin as the candidate for prime minister in the elections.

Almost all the participants in the discussion expressed themselves sharpenly against the candidacy of Defense Minister Shimon Peres for the prime ministry and several of them proposed that "the Kibbutz Hame'uhad should not go further right than Rabin" and also "should threaten with an alliance with MAPAM." Statements of the members expressed sharp criticism on what is taking place in the Kibbutz movement: "For 4 years no one can see the kibbutz secretariat between elections," and several of them demanded rotation in functions and that Knesset members representing the movement not serve more than two successive terms.

Prime Minister Yizhaq Rabin delivered the main speech at the council that focused attention following the surprise announcement of the secret meeting in Geneva. Rabin reached Bari after 2100 hours, an hour late. But he hardly touched upon the meeting with the president of the Ivory Coast.

Rabin: Participation in the Elections--A Smashing Reply to Slanderers

Rabin said that participation in the elections for the Labor Party of about 160,000 members was a smashing reply for all slanderers of the party and those who trample upon its reputation. The elections once again proved that this is not a mere summit movement. About the resignation of the Amit group from the Labor Movement, he commented: "Quite a few bureaucrats who have captured headlines in the press reflect the situation in the Labor Party. Not one of them was elected. They were appointed to their posts in accordance with administrative success on a non-elective level, and it is proper to say to them: It is not you who represent the Labor Party."
Rabin mentioned at that opportunity that the communications media "feel no affection for us" and provide disproportionate coverage to individuals.

While mentioning his meeting with the Ivory Coast president, Rabin commented that he would not discuss the continuation of relations with Africa following Golda Meir as foreign minister, "because it is connected with a person to whom I do not wish to refer here."

He said that the main goal of his administration was peace through readiness for territorial compromise. "We went to an interim settlement and I believe that to have been a proper historic decision," and noted that the gap in the balance of payments was narrowed by $600 million.

On the recent affairs, Rabin said that the government is not a court room, and that it is obligated to enable the investigative apparatus to investigate, "and all are equal before the law and there are no privileged persons, neither privileged by money nor privileged by family."

The Labor Party must prevent any effort at besmirching between it and the Likud, said Rabin. He noted that the Democratic Movement for Change had not even introduced its platform.

Ben-Aharon: Inhibiting Cohesion

Yitzhak Ben-Aharon said: "There is no greater fraud than the assumption that it is possible to reach decisions on questions such as party leadership by a contest method such as is now being foisted upon us. Evidence for that is RAFI whose key members announced after the war that they would accept any candidate of MAPAI for the prime ministry but that they would not agree to a candidate from the ranks of the Kibbutz Hame'uhad and Ahdut ha''avoda. Placing the party within the framework of the RAFI program means inhibiting the cohesion process."

Allon Warns Against "Skilled Political Foxes"

Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon said that the party must unite behind Rabin and warned against "skilled political foxes who wish to exploit mechanisms seemingly to improve democratization but with the goal of gaining control of the mechanisms," and against "the attempts to drive a wedge between us and the moshavim movement with the assertion that if we, the kibbutz movement, support Rabin, then the moshavim movement must support the opposing candidate." He spoke against the Charisma Fashion whose greatest danger lies in "the charismatic one beginning to believe in his own charisma. That has already led to disaster in various countries, and among us as well."

The Resolution: To Unite Forthwith Under Rabin's Leadership

The Council's resolutions stated: "The Council calls upon the party to unite forthwith under the leadership of the prime minister Yizhaq Rabin in the election campaign for the ninth Knesset and to assure him his full support by the Labor Party and its convention."
SEPHARDIC FEDERATION DEMANDS BETTER REPRESENTATION

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 9 Feb 77 p 19

[Article: "The Sephardic Federation Demands Better Representation and Even Advantageous Spots on the Parties' Candidate Lists"]

[Text] They do not ignore progress made but at the same time they sharply protest the failures. Some voice their disappointment mildly, others were angry at everything and everybody. They accused the government of inept-ness and discrimination, which may bring about a situation where there are "two peoples" in Israel.

They are the presidents and delegates of the worldwide Sephardic federation who came to Jerusalem to hear and be heard. In the course of their 3-day debate different proposals were made and some harsh words were uttered. The purpose was one: How to improve the lot of Mid-Eastern and Sephardic Jews in Israel, thereby closing gaps.

The Sephardic federation was founded in 1951 in a special ceremony in France, in which delegates from many countries took part. At that time it was decided to demand of the World Zionist Organization to accept the Sephardic federation as a wing, but only in 1971, in the 28th congress was the resolution to do so adopted.

A special department was established in the Zionist Organization to deal with Sephardic congregations in the diaspora, representatives were even sent in order to organize them and to encourage immigration to Israel, as well as to strengthen the connection and association with the Zionist movement.

"Since Nissim David Ga'on of Geneva took over as president of the federation," says David Siton, chairman of the Sephardic community in Israel, "the federation has made quite a bit of progress, especially in organizational matters and in various activities in the diaspora. He has been most successful because of his influence and power both among cabinet members here, and among Jews abroad."
The Sephardic federation has set itself a number of goals: A struggle for overcoming the gaps in Israeli society, free education on all levels, and providing financial help to those of oriental ancestry in order that they may continue their studies in academic institutions, so they can take their place in the country's leadership.

Have these goals been attained? The question was directed to some of the delegates, among them the president of the federation Missim David Ga'on.

Mr Siton, deputy chairman of the federation, thinks that there is a definite trend within the parties to place more Sephardic candidates on their lists. "It is a fact," he says, "that today there are three Sephardic ministers (Hillel, Shem-Tov and Ozen) whereas during the premiership of the late Ben-Gurion there was only one such minister, the late Bekhor Shitrit."

According to him there is even more significant change in local authorities. The scene in many localities is changing and hundreds of Mid-Eastern Jews now run communities where the majority of the population is of Mid-Eastern ancestry. "When the state was established," according to Mr Siton, "the rule was to appoint Ashkenazim [of European ancestry]."

David Missim Ga'on sounds less pleased: "We have not yet achieved the goals we have set for ourselves. When we achieve them I do not think there will be any need for the federation. Except if we want it as a vehicle to maintain tradition and keep the rich Sephardic heritage."

Mr Ga'on admits that the federation purposely picked this time for its convention because of the upcoming elections. "Our goal in this convention is to enable us to voice our demands to the government and the parties. We demand a fair chance for the Sephardic community, proper representation in the parties' candidate lists, maybe even preferential treatment. We have found out that the only way to achieve reforms for Mid-Eastern and Sephardic Jews is by actively participating in the activities of the various institutions."

In Missim Ga'on's opinion the federation ought to exert pressure, in any way possible, in order to achieve real progress for oriental people. First of all free education, from kindergarten to the university level. In his opinion the only way to attain social integration is by raising the educational level of needy people, especially those from Asia and Africa. At the same time federation members will work for providing proper housing for young couples, many of whom, of Mid-Eastern origin, are forced to live with their parents.

Dr Joseph Missim of California, thinks that the convention's purpose was to draw attention to the conditions of Mid-Eastern and Sephardic people in the country. "The problem is very complex. It is the government's responsibility to ensure the existence of institutions for controlling gaps. The only natural resource of this country are its people. Those
of Mid-Eastern ancestry are not given a fair chance, especially not in the area of education. The only place they are welcome and equal is the IDF."

Question: What have you, federation members, done, to solve the problem?

"The Sephardic federation," answered Dr Joseph Nissim, "collects money all over the world in order to send to Israel to ensure its survival, against both external and internal enemies. The social problem in Israel, has, in the past 2 years, become known to the Ashkenazi world as well. I hope that we are now on the verge of a new chapter in the history of the state."

There are 600,000 Jews in France today. With the exception of Israel this is the second largest Jewish community in the free world. Of these, 350,000 are from North Africa. There was a complaint made against Moroccan Jews, that the elite went to France and the remainder went to Israel.

Albert Ben-Atar, president of the Sephardic federation in France, rejects this complaint outright. "It was the Israeli authorities that jeopardized the immigration of the well-to-do to Israel. Israel of the 1950's was in no need of an elite, it only needed masses. Working hands to fill development towns. There was a definite policy to discourage the immigration of the well-to-do. We have definite proof for that. There were cases where immigrants, some of the most educated of the Moroccan community were told to return to France, to prosper and then immigrate. It is very easy to blame us..."

Ben-Atar also points to activities of the Sephardic federation in France for immigration. Among others, it has decided on special projects in Jerusalem and Tiberias, in order to absorb immigrating families from France. "The problem," he says, "is that it is impossible to convince people when they know that the gap between what is promised and what is delivered is still very wide."

Lilian Vein, president of the Sephardic federation in the United States, represents 150,000 people. She announced that her organization intends to disassociate itself from the Jewish Agency and it plans on becoming an independent organization. According to her, the reason is that not enough has been done.

The problem is very familiar. Much has been said about it. But many of the participants ask: "Will this convention bring about a change, or will it be just another convention?"
SCIENTISTS ENTER POLITICS

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Feb 77 p 25

[Article: "More and More Scientists Are Entering Politics Trying To Solve Socioeconomic Problems by Scientific Methods"]

In the forthcoming elections, and even now, we can observe a relatively new trend in Israel: Scientists are leaving their ivory tower and plunging into the "cold water" of politics.

Quite a few scientists, from varying academic disciplines, are now actively involved in political struggles and are participating in the election campaign. Professor Yiga'el Yadin, Prof Ezra Zohar, Dr Bo'az Morav, Professor Erns and more. Some additional candidates to enter politics are mentioned recently. Among them Prof Chaim Ben-Shakhar, president of the Tel Aviv University and Prof Michael Bruno, the Hebrew University economist. The association between the general manager of the foreign ministry Prof Shlomo Avineri and Dr Mati Peled and Prof Shevakh Weiss of the Haifa University should also be mentioned in this context.
Professor Katzir Was First

The participation of scientists in politics is new in Israel. The man who gave the tone in this respect may, perhaps, be the president himself. Professor Ephraim Katzir who, a few years ago, left the Weitzman Institute (partially so) in order to assume the highest office in the land.

It should be mentioned that Professor Katzir renewed an old tradition, because our first president—Chaim Weitzman—was also a scientist. But from then on Israeli scientists stayed away from politics. This reservation may now be on its way to a compromise.

The Sabbatical Year of Professor Yadin

After long years of being on the sidelines, archeologist and second chief of staff, Professor Yiga'el Yadin plunged into politics. He entered the maze of Israeli politics directly from the Kumran caves declaring: In order to revitalize this country we need an election reform.

One may, of course, ask: What is Yadin's source of strength, his military career or his scientific accomplishments, or, perhaps, both of them? It is true that no matter what he has already gained a lot of momentum. Even after his movement became what is known as the Movement for Democratic Change he has maintained the No 1 position in his organization.

His political activity is carried out in the midst of his Sabbatical year. There is no doubt that he will be a member of the next Knesset, possibly also a member in the new cabinet. The question is, to what extent will Yadin return to archeology?

Ezra Zohar Is Rising

Whoever read Prof Ezra Zohar's book "Why Does No One Rise? (against the government)?" could predict it: the administration now has a sharp opposition man. True, shortly after his book was published—in which he claims that under his administration party priorities take precedence over the country's needs—the chief of internal medicine and administrator of the Heller Institute for medical research in Tel-HaShomer, entered politics, with his usual energy. He, too, demands election reform.

Professor Zohar resigned recently from his post as chief of internal medicine in Tel-HaShomer, since he intends to run with the Shlomzion movement. He will retain his position as administrator of the Heller Institute, because the latter is not a government agency.

Recently Prof Michael Tortan resigned from the biological institute in Nes-Ziona. He, too, intends to run with the Shlomzion movement.
Ro'az Mo'av Takes Rabin's Advice

Member of Knesset Dr Bo'az Mo'av, a biologist and professor of biology in the Tel Aviv University was among the founders of RATZ. He has long shown his interest in public and state affairs. It is possible that the beginning of that can be traced to his days as president of the student council in the Tel Aviv University.

When he studied in the United States between 1965 and 1969, Member of Knesset Bo'az Mo'av met the then ambassador to the United States Yizhaq Rabin. The scientist asked the ambassador: "Do you have any plans for an election reform in Israel?" Ambassador Rabin replied: "Come back and fight for it." Dr Mo'av seems to have taken the advice of the man who was to become prime minister and now he is fighting for election reform.

His various political activities do not hinder his research in biochemistry at the Tel Aviv University. Even while he was in the United States he learned that scientists have to descend from their ivory tower and contribute to society.

Member of Knesset Eras, of Likud, claims that it is a good idea to involve scientists in politics. In his opinion scientists should be represented in all facets of the decision making process both in politics and in the economy. Moreover, he even recommends establishing a ministry for science and technology.

Engineer Eras Reaches the Knesset

An aeronautics engineer, an expert on missiles and weapon systems, a man who was chief engineer of the aerospace industry and who won the Israel prize for designing and developing various weapon systems, has recently devoted much of his time to public-political affairs. He complains that Israel does not fully utilize its scientific human potential for the construction of the soon-to-arrive nuclear plant.

It seems that Member of Knesset Eras learned from the American scientists--after a long stay in the United States—who do not consider it below themselves to get involved in public and political affairs. He is active not only on the national level but also in the Tel Aviv Herut branch.

Professor Eras appeared recently with Professor Ron of the Technion in Haifa and they both warned: "Contracting the construction of the nuclear plants to foreigners is a mistake." Professor Ron, recipient of the Israel prize, is dean of the Department for Aeronautic Engineering in the Technion. He earned his reputation by developing supersonic air tunnels, useful in many defense applications and in industry as well.
Professor Ron Has Gone Down to the People

In recent years he "descended" from space and air corridors to problems of the country. His theory is that a social and economic policy, industrial development and political independence are all intertwined. He brought his ideas to Likud where he is currently active.

It seems that the trend of scientists entering politics will continue. It is also possible that some of the scientists will also find out why it is that most scientists who have so far entered politics are right of center, politically (according to today's definition which may not pass scientific scrutiny), and only a few are left of center.
The election battle in the Arab sector is no less interesting and tense this year than it is in the Jewish sector. Here too are expected new organizations and new faces—different issues and different methods. And this struggle will probably have an important effect on the balance of power in the ninth Knesset, if only for the fact that the Alinement has in the outgoing Knesset four members of Knesset who were elected by the Arab vote, and it is not clear how many of them will win back their seats.

Apparently, a situation has been created in which the expected strengthening of RAKAH will work in particular to the benefit of Likud and Democratic Change. The "leftist" trend among the Arabs will reinforce the "rightist" trend in the next coalition. Someone has already suggested a slogan for the Labor Party: "A vote for RAKAH strengthens Likud!"

About 200,000 voters from among the minorities are able to determine the fate of 11-12 mandates. And if the rate of participation in the vote exceeds 80 percent—even 13 mandates. This is the importance of an intermediate faction in the present Knesset.

Among these 200,000 voters, the decisive majority is young: 65 percent are under age 39. These are "sabra" Arabs, who grew up and were educated in the state of Israel. About 40,000 of them are voting for the first time.

How will these votes be distributed?

Some experts are convinced that within the Arab sector there are few "floating votes." In their opinion, the distribution of votes is apparent along general lines from the beginning, and there is little room for large fluctuations. For example: there is broad agreement among workers in the Zionist parties that RAKAH—with one or another composition—is assured on 17 May no less than 55-60 percent of the Arab vote. So the practical
question is how the Alinement should arrange its lists, so they will get over the cutoff point and reach the Knesset, with the aid of the largest share possible of the remaining 40 percent of the votes.

Other politicians have a different opinion: the number of variables which will affect voting is greater now than ever before, and there is a relatively high rate of "floating votes"—about 20 percent or more, a fifth of the Arab electoral power. These "floating votes" will determine the manner of their vote on the basis of the organizational form of RAKAH and the Alinement, the political circumstances at the time of the election, and other considerations.

In RAKAH, optimism prevails. They are talking about 6-7 mandates, or even more, as compared to the four places which RAKAH has in the eighth Knesset. In 1973, RAKAH received in the Arab sector less than the Alinement and its lists—37.1 percent—a little less than 50,000 votes. For the Emet list, the Alinement received 17,000 votes (one mandate), and close to 40,000 votes for the DA and AA lists, in all 42 percent. Now RAKAH is shooting for 60 percent of the vote, and there are those in it who believe in an even greater victory.

It is difficult to follow the preparations made by RAKAH. An air of secrecy and evasion preceded every question which I put to them. Nevertheless, we were able to glean some details:

Apparently, there was a tough debate within RAKAH about how to proceed to the elections. On the one hand, there were circles who believed that RAKAH would have to go alone, as in the past, with a strong communist line, under the letter "vav." These circles argued that RAKAH was assured of a victory in the Arab sector, and significant growth in representation in the Knesset, and that there was no reason to share the booty with other factors. It was of concern that there should not appear in the elections lists competing with RAKAH in the Arab sector, seeking the approval of various nationalist circles.

In the first stage, this approach was supported by most of the leadership—including Meir Wilner and Tawfiq Tubi. But even before the 18th convention of RAKAH, which took place in December in Haifa, a change occurred. A decision in principle was made to create a "democratic front for peace." This meant seeking partners for a list, with a desire to reach an agreement even with Zionist bodies. The idea was—and remains—to limit the platform to issues of a political settlement, support for a full withdrawal, and a Palestinian state led by the FLO, without "ideological color."

RAKAH chased after possible partners: Lova Eliav and his friends; Uri Avneri, the "panthers" of Shalom Kohen; small groups of university leftists, etc. The approaches were rejected to such an extent, that some of the RAKAH people were angered and insulted. One of the RAKAH leaders, David (Uzi) Borstein, told about these approaches on the radio. Uri Avneri, for example, made a special announcement that he was not ready to consider a joint appearance with RAKAH.
Understandably, these responses did not come as a surprise to RAKAH. For their part it was important to demonstrate that they were ready to establish a broader front. Currently, they are making a supreme effort to enlist some Jews who are not part of RAKAH, for the joint list. This cosmetic treatment is important to them, in order to give some life to the term "front" and apparently RAKAH is ready, for this purpose, to give up a sure place in the next Knesset.

Yet, the principal course was in a totally different direction: towards the Arab sector. On 22 January, the leadership of RAKAH passed a secret resolution to officially approach the committee of Arab municipal council heads, with the proposal of joining in a "front," in exchange for which RAKAH proposed giving up the symbol "vay" and two sure places in the Knesset. And no less important, a promise of support and partnership in local elections.

On the next day, 23 January, a number of the members of the committee met with the director general of the Ministry of Education, Eliezer Shmueli, in Jerusalem. One of the participants was a member of RAKAH, the mayor of Nazareth, MK Tawfiq Ziad. At the end of the meeting with Shmueli, Ziad invited his colleagues to a luncheon in Ramallah, where he transmitted the proposal to them.

This proposal had the purpose of responding to hesitations from direct and open partnership with RAKAH. If "democratic front for peace" is used, and if there are new faces from the Jewish side, it makes it easier for the council heads to accept the plan.

Among the council heads, there are enthusiastic supporters of the idea, especially the chairman of the committee, Khana Muyis, a Christian from Rama, who was personally promised the third position on the Knesset list. A few other council heads, who are close to the Alignment, or even declared to be part of it, did not reject the idea: for example, the council head of Tira, Tarik Abd-al-Khai, or the mayor of Shefar'am, Ibrahim Nimar Husayn.

In recent days, there have been feverish discussions between members of the committee, and representatives of the negotiating committee which was formed by RAKAH. Yesterday, the committee was about to convene for the first discussion of a response to the proposal. All signs point to an agreement, but it is not yet clear whether it will be an agreement between the committee of council heads in that capacity, or an agreement for a joint appearance on a personal-group basis. For example, will Muyis appear on the "front" list as the representative of the committee, or in theory, on his own behalf. The difference is not only formal, but it is not especially significant.

There are, of course, considerable difficulties in the formulation of this agreement. Aside from personal questions—who will appear in which position—there are also problems of platform and approach. But at a convention held in Nazareth last Saturday, a great degree of coordination was already apparent: RAKAH and the committee members jointly defeated a motion to
conduct a strike on the anniversary of Earth Day, 30 March. It was agreed to conduct memorial ceremonies at 'Araba, Taiba and Dakat-Dumia, with a public decree condemning the sale of Arab lands. Tawfiq Ziad said that "conduct should be intelligent" and this suits the members of the council heads committee, who are interested in a consistent public struggle, cautious and sophisticated.

Such a union of RAKAH and the committee of council heads will increase the prospects of the "front" for Knesset seats. There are those who speak even of a landslide in the Arab sector, of as much as 70-80 percent of the vote. But it is too early to accept such presumptions, because it is not yet clear as to whether there will be a "front" and who will participate in it.

In any case, RAKAH has allayed its fears that it will have to face a leftist-nationalist list in the Arab sector. Contacts regarding the possibilities of composing such a list were conducted by supporters of Matzpan (which is strong in villages of the Triangle); the group of Attorney Muhammad Kiwan, an ex-member of El-Ard from Um-al-Faham who heads the "Sons of the Village" group; and a group of activists from Arab student committees, who last year conducted a relatively successful struggle in ousting RAKAH from the committees in the universities.

The proclamations being issued by these groups are cause of concern to RAKAH. This was the case at the ceremony dedicating the monument for those killed at Kfar-Kasem, and this was the case at the meeting on Saturday at Nazareth. The RAKAH paper EL-ITIHAD has not ceased attacking these "childish adventurers." But in the ballots, there is no threat to RAKAH from this quarter. At least at this stage of the game.

In other words, RAKAH has a good chance of becoming the majority party in the Arab sector, for the first time in its history, leading a partnership of non-communist elements which have influence in the villages. This will reduce the strength of the Jews in RAKAH, and in spite of the term "front," the direction will be towards representing the Arab minority.

The RAKAH "front" will come to the Arab voter not only in the name of a program for a Palestinian state, but also as the party demanding recognition of the Arabs as a "national minority," fighting for its rights and against oppression. And the great hope of RAKAH is that by the time of the elections, there will be a positive turn in Soviet relations with Sadat. Its leaders fear that their attacks on Sadat, and his anti-communist campaign, will cost them votes, which is what happened in the Nasser-Moscow split of 1959. At that time RAKAH (then known as Maki) was forced to support the Soviets against Nasser, and it suffered a severe defeat. Now, the fear is not the actual loss of votes, but a deceleration of growth. In short, the bad feeling between Sadat and Moscow is not helping RAKAH, and it is not convenient for RAKAH leaders to attack Sadat, as they are supposed to do, and in fact are doing.
RAKAH is appealing to the Druse with the slogan of an end to their conscription in the IDF, claiming that the Druses are Arabs for all purposes. The work of RAKAH is being done principally by the "initiating committee," a group headed by the Imam of Rama, Farhud Kasem Farhud, as well as Ali El-Khatib and others. They are setting up chapters and conducting propaganda for RAKAH, without publicly joining it. Recently, RAKAH dedicated its new chapter in Peki'in--as the opening of its campaign in Druse villages.

In 1973, RAKAH received 2,700 Druse votes, out of 14,500. Now RAKAH is trying to double that number, to reach one-fourth of the 18,000 Druse votes. For this purpose, RAKAH must put one of its Druse activists in a real position, and he is the poet Samikh El-Kasem.

Likud, too, which has its own Druse member of Knesset (Amal Nasar-ad-Din, from Dalia) hopes to increase its share from 1,500 Druse votes to more than 2,500. The condition is that Nasar-ad-Din return and be placed on a real spot on the list.

The "strong man" in the Druse community remains MK Jabar Ma'adi. According to estimates, he has 5,000 votes in the community, and the Alignment has another 3,000 Druse votes. Several people from the community are pressing for their placement in good positions on the list of the general Alignment. But their prospects are dim. One of them--Kemal Kasem, an aid to the minister of commerce and industry, failed in the internal elections for the Labor Party convention. Another, the journalist Nidan Atasha, followed Shmuel Toledano to Democratic Change. One of the two other candidates--Kemal Mansur and Nawaf Khalebi--will be assured a place on the Alignment list, but it is doubtful whether it will be a significant position.

Ma'adi himself will run again on the RA list, together with MK Saif-ed-Din Zu'abi from Nazareth. This will be the "traditional" list, linked to the Labor Party. In earlier elections, this list received 22,000 votes. Now it too has a good prospect of getting over the cutoff point (about 18,000 votes). As was said, Ma'adi is assured 5,000 Druse votes, and he also has supporters in the Arab villages. Zu'abi himself is assured of a similar number of votes, just from the villages of the Zu'abi clan and his family in Nazareth. Both of them will get a substantial number of votes from the villages in the Galilee and somewhat less from the villages of the Triangle. One of the factors which will determine the fate of this list is the identity of the candidates in third and fourth place on the list, and the possibility of an agreement on rotation.

The prospects of this list would increase substantially if Zu'abi and Ma'adi were able to bring to it--as they have wished--Shaykh Muhammad Husayn al-Gadir, leader of the Bedouins in the north. It is estimated that Gadir has at least 6,000 votes, but after much thought he has decided to run again with MK Hamad Abu-Rabi'a, representative of the Bedouins in the Negev. Gadir and Abu-Rabi'a have not paid attention to the claims of the Labor Party, that the prospects of the Bedouin list getting over the
cutoff point are not certain. They believe that with the help of Khamzi Zakhalka and others, they will succeed in getting enough votes in the Triangle to make up for their shortage in votes.

A third list which will run, apparently under the aegis of the Labor Party, will be the list of the intelligentsia, headed by the writer Mahmud Abbasi. The prospects for this list are cloudy. Apparently, its success will be determined by its ability to enlist support in the Triangle and to attract young voters. In any case, the leaders of the Labor Party are convinced that a new Arab list must run, both as an investment in the future and as a sign of change. This matter was discussed by the party leaders one Saturday at a meeting in the home of Yizhaq Rabin.

The upshot of all of this is that the minority lists have, on paper, the prospect of winning three seats this time around. The conditions for realizing this is proper organization of the lists. According to all involved, two lists are preferable to three. The director of the Arab Section of the Labor Party, Ra'an an Kohen, is currently trying to complete the delicate and complicated work of setting up the lists. With the same number of votes, the minority lists could either send 2-3 people to the Knesset, or none at all! For the Alinement, improper organization could send 30,000 votes down the drain, since they would fall short of the cutoff point.

This time, the Labor Party will build its program on independent propaganda for each of these lists, by means of district staffs which have already been set up. The success of the enrollment campaign in the Arab sector—about 10,000 members were enrolled—assures a cadre of workers in the field.

It is still unclear whether there will also appear small independent lists. There are rumors that a one time member of Knesset, the Druse Salah Khanaifas, is considering such a possibility. There is also talk in the Triangle about an independent list—but so far the rumors have not yielded anything real.

Another problem is the matter of the Christian candidate. Catholic political workers are trying to organize so as to assure their representative a proper place on one of the minority lists close to the Labor Party. It is said that even the Bishop Maximus Solum supports, behind the scenes, such an action. But, in the meantime, nothing has been completed. It appears that joining a Catholic candidate to the list of Abbasi, for example, could strengthen that list.

MAPAM is keeping a significant spot for an Arab candidate—both independently and within the framework of the Alinement. There are three candidates struggling for position: Muhammad Watad, a writer; Sabri Khoury, from Kfar Yasif; and Ibrahim Shebat, a journalist from Nazareth. If MAPAM remains within the Alinement, there will not be much of a change in the number (relatively few) of Arab votes which it will get. But an independent appearance by MAPAM could change the picture and restore MAPAM to its one time position within the Arab sector. MAPAM lost this position during the years of the Alinement, but it still undoubtedly has a certain drawing power in the Arab sector and a cadre of veteran activists.
The other parties are essentially trying to "hunt" as many votes as they can, on the margins of the confrontation between the Alinement lists and RAKAH.

Democratic Change hopes that Toledano—who left his post as advisor for Arab affairs—will exploit his connections and influence to enlist several thousand Arab votes. Toledano is said to be attractive to Arab circles which are linked to the Alinement, who will be dissatisfied with the preparation of lists. In other words, he will try to cut off some of the "traditional" territory of the Labor Party. Toledano is already making contacts in this matter, but has not yet gotten any concrete results. It is assumed that Democratic Change will get more votes in the Arab sector than Likud.

The NRP is trying to preserve its strength—9,500 Arab votes in the last election. The "Kanig Document" and the strengthening of the group of Zebulun Hamar are not helping the head of the Arab Section of the NRP, Moshe Levi, in his tour of the villages. The current estimate is that the number of Arab votes for the NRP will substantially decline, but it will still get several thousand, without including an Arab candidate in its list.

Shlomtsion, thanks to the personal connections of Arik Sharon, hopes to get 1,000 votes from the Negev Bedouins, and others here and there.

In 1973, Likud received 4,000 Arab votes. Its prospect of increase is very small. But there are Negev Bedouins who will vote for Likud. Apparently, there are 1,500 votes from Abu-Raqaiq and the western tribes.

A similar number of votes in the Negev will go to Moked, which has worked energetically in the matter of land arrangements, through the attorney Lom. Past experience has shown that the small left wing lists have little success in the Arab sector, in spite of theoretical prospects. So it seems that this time Moked, Uri Avneri, and other lists will not be able to get serious support from the Arab voters.

In the most general terms, the prediction at this stage is:

The RAKAH "Front"—about 90,000 or more votes (double the number of votes it received in 1973).

The Alinement and minority lists linked to it—about 50,000 votes (similar to the number in 1973)

All the rest of the lists—about 20,000 votes.

These are the figures on which lists are currently being calculated. There is no dispute between experts on all sides that this is the current picture. Most of them believe that there will not be a dramatic change in these numbers on election day.
ELECTIONS WITHIN LABOR MOVEMENT

Tel Aviv AL-HAMISHMAR Weekend Supplement in Hebrew 11 Feb 77 pp 4-5

[Article: "The Background of Some 'Personal' Feuds Within the Labor Movement Is Traced To Some Deep Political Differences"]

[Text] Reacting to the resolution of MAPAM's convention, Defense Minister Peres said that he is surprised that MAPAM neglected urgent national and social problems that the country should deal with, and concentrated its efforts on "personal issues." This is a rather strange remark for a man who, during the fateful days preceding the Six-Day War, when our very existence was at stake and Arab armies closed in on us from three sides, directed his attention to demands for a "personnel change" in the Defense Ministry, and who, now, is not necessarily worried about national and social problems but is too busy with a personal struggle against the prime minister. But the defense minister's surprise, strange as it may be, is also rather clear: Only the obliteration of the ideological-political campaign and diverting it into a personal challenge may gain wide support for Peres within the Labor Party.

The idea of these articles is to go over the ideological and political content of the various struggles within the labor movement since the establishment of the state, struggles of which this campaign is but a continuation. These struggles often assumed a personal tone--Ben-Gurion vs. Moshe Sharet, Levi Eshkol vs. Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan vs. Yigal Allon, Shimon Peres vs. Yizhaq Rabin--and the political end of the challenge was not always clearly understood by the public.

The personal aspect of the challenge is no surprise: People have ideas, which are then translated into political terms and practical policies; later other people carry out these policies. There are those who deal only with the personal-psychological side of political challenges, thereby contributing to the obliteration of the ideological-political content of these struggles, turning them into meaningless brawls of those hungry for "chairs" and authority, pitching one against another. To be sure, there are personal ambitions and they are necessary for the political process, as they are for any other process. Sometimes this power hunger is too overwhelming and Abba Eban is one such example of a politician for whom a cabinet post is more important than a route, a belief, an idea. Those
who only see things from this point of view will conclude that politics is a "dirty business," meaningless and pointless. But this is not the whole picture. Only exposing the ideological and political meanings of the personal confrontations and the party maneuvers, may help us understand the political scene, find out what the actual alternatives really are, and arrive at a rational political conclusion.

From Sede-Boquer to the Sinai

From the establishment of the state, and more so in the 3-4 years preceding the Sinai Campaign, there was a sharp conflict within MAPAI, between two approaches. Those were defined by the late Moshe Sharet as "the language of power" and "the peace issue." During Sharet's short tenure as prime minister, when the late Ben-Gurion was forced to spend his first vacation in Sede-Boquer, there were some serious attempts made to communicate with leaders of neighboring countries in order to promote peace in the region. Most of these efforts (to be detailed later) were directed toward Egypt. The efforts were derived from a change in the total conception of foreign and defense policies. Moshe Sharet expressed his basic understanding in a Knesset speech:

"There is a price that we will not be able to pay for real peace.... At the same time we will deliberately and inexhaustibly strive to attain peace with security, stability and honor...which will enable the nations of the Middle East not only to return to peace, but to initiate a new era of cooperation for real independence and economic progress. For our part we have to do our best in order to convince the world surrounding us, within which we are destined to live forever, that we honestly strive for peace and stability." (SHA'AR HA'UMOT, pp 374-375)

With this political conception Moshe Sharet worked for lowering tensions in the region by political action, both via the United Nations and through mediators of Western countries. He opposed preventive wars whose goal was not the security of Israel but targets on the other side of the border. He started building ties between Israel and the emerging African countries, he thought that Israel should be integrated in the development process of the Middle East in an atmosphere of coexistence between the different regimes, and that is why he opposed the route that eventually led to the Sinai Campaign, while relying on France.

Sharet's policies were not always consistent. First because he headed a weak coalition with the General Zionists. Second, because some of his own party members opposed his policies and to make things worse, they received inspirations and support from their secluded leader in Sede-Boquer, who, just prior to leaving, made two significant appointments: Moshe Dayan was appointed chief of staff and Shimon Peres, general manager of the Foreign Ministry. The two constituted the core of the opposition to Sharet within his own party.
The scandal that happened in 1954 foiled Sharet's efforts. The complaint was that the spy network intended to strain relations between Egypt and the United States, but actually they foiled the contacts between Israel and Egypt. Sharet's investigation of the scandal (the Olshan-Dori committee) did not come up with an unequivocal accusation of Pinkhas Lavon, who was defense minister, but neither did it accuse Benjamin Gebeily of giving the order for that unfortunate act. Lavon, who insisted on his innocence, was forced to resign and Ben-Gurion returned to the Defense Ministry in February 1955. Ten days after his return the retaliation raid into Gaza took place, and that returned the Middle East to a situation of escalating clashes.

Moshe Sharet's faction was weak and he had to keep making concessions. After the elections to the third Knesset in July 1955, Moshe Sharet gave up the premiership and on the eve of the Sinai Campaign his opposition became such a hindrance to Ben-Gurion's policy that the prime minister had to demand Sharet's resignation. The leader of the "peace issue" retired from politics. He was to appear at the MAPAI convention in February 1965, in a wheelchair very sick, in order to exert all his influence in favor of the dual alignment with Akhdut Ha'Avodah.

The Unchanging Hate

While Sharet believed that the Arabs' hate may pass—whether because of changes in the Arab countries or because of proper actions by Israel—Ben-Gurion's supporters started out from a diametrically opposed position. In a Knesset speech on 2 July 1963, on defense matters, Shimon Peres assumed that "the Arabs' hate of Israel is not a changing entity." Because of that, and because it is independent of either political and social changes that may take place in the Arab world, or of activities of Israel, there is no choice but to concentrate on building such a power that will "deter the Arabs from turning their hate into an annihilating power." Peres expressed the philosophy of his mentor Ben-Gurion. The latter also defined his position by saying that there is one basic fact of Jewish existence, a fact "that has also not changed, and that will not change, a fact that also fills a crucial place in our life and destiny, here and abroad; namely, our loneliness...we have been alone throughout the generations, everywhere. This is the central and most dominant fact in the history of the Jewish people throughout the generations. This is what, to a large extent, determines the security and the policies of Israel."

The Goal: Maintaining the Status Quo

It follows from this philosophy that because the Arabs' hate of Israel is a constant factor (throughout the generations, at all times), then the danger they pose to Israel is increasing, as they manage to attain economic and cultural advances, as they overcome their backwardness and achieve their countries' potential economic and political might. It follows that we have to maintain the "status quo," not only in the area of armaments, but in the general balance of power. Unlike Moshe Sharet, who based his policy on the progress of the Middle East, maintaining the status quo was one of the first goals of Ben-Gurion's policy, and one of the main goals of the Sinai Campaign, as he himself said:
"Another goal of the Sinai Campaign was to belittle the Egyptian dictator, and do not underestimate this. As one who was responsible for defense matters even before the establishment of the state, I have always had one serious worry: We know the weakness of the Arab rulers and their corruption, which is one of the major reasons for their military inferiority. I have always been afraid that some day a leader might emerge, as happened in the 7th century...who raised the spirit of the people, encouraged their self confidence, and turned them into a fighting nation. This danger is very much here and it seems that Nasser is the man." ("What Did We Fight for, Why Did We Withdraw, What Did We Accomplish?" published by MAPAI)

Since Israel's security, according to this philosophy, is dependent on the weakness and corruption of the Arab leaders, the logical political conclusion is obvious: Israel should seek partners from among those in the Western world who wish to maintain the political and social status quo of colonial times. That is what brought about the political joining of forces with the French leadership, which was then conducting the war in Algeria and was trying to prevent the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Moshe Dayan expressed this identity of interests very clearly. He maintained that "at that time the French had not yet adopted the policy of evacuating Algeria. Nasser's nationalistic policy of an Arab Middle East with no foreigners was, therefore, in direct opposition to the French policy, and France had a definite interest in defeating this leader and his policy. This is how Israel and France came to cooperate so closely. The French could regard the IDF, to a large extent, as an army fighting the same enemy, on a different front." (Dayan, "Between Palma and Kadesh," HA'AREZ 17 Apr 64)

Ano-intrigue Political Style

Shimon Peres was the faithful executor of the philosophy that maintains that Israeli security and existence will be ensured only by the inevitable turn of events of the 20th century. In a region of perpetual hate, armament is the only possible answer to Israel's defense problems. Therefore, rather than integrate into the Middle East, Peres is trying to build "a bridge over the Mediterranean," to weapon-producing, far countries—a bridge of political and military association, as well as an emotional tie. Micha'el Ben-Zohar, one of the defense minister's supporters writes: "Peres fought hard against the integration of Israel into the Middle East. Israel's ties with the region are but geographical and therefore Israel should try and leave the region, so to speak, and try to make its ties with Europe. 'I am not crazy about Middle Eastern culture,' so he said, 'and I am not looking for Yemenite records or Egyptian books'..." ("A Bridge Over the Mediterranean" pp 192-193)

This is the basic philosophy that was behind Peres' stubborn opposition to discontinue the military rule, and his effort to acquire atomic weapons, as well as his opinion that "it is impossible to keep nuclear weapons away from the region." As Ben-Zohar writes, this conception of Peres' brought about a clash between the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry, headed by Moshe Sharett. Since the Foreign Ministry was not willing to approve of
Shimon Peres' policy, the Defense Ministry started conducting a foreign policy of its own. Separate delegations were established in a number of European countries—contrary to any democratic processes—and those ignored the policy of the Foreign Ministry, and acted contrary to it. Even during the short period that Ben-Gurion was in Sede-Boquer and Peres' plans were put aside, he often met with the French ambassador Pierre Jilbert, planned Dayan's visit to France, and did not always bother to report to Defense Minister Pinkhas Lavon regarding procurement and other financial matters of his own office.

Intricate connections were made with the reactionary officers that ran France's Defense Ministry. With Sharet's resignation Peres' policy received Ben-Gurion's blessing and the road to the Sinai Campaign was paved with a number of activities to which the Foreign Ministry, headed by Golda Meir, was not a part, activities which were considered by Shimon Peres and his supporters not as being defensive but as "taking advantage" of the situation. This period of preparation for the Sinai Campaign and nurturing the connections with France, can be an example to a "political style without intrigues," and conducting policies in democratic ways, such as Peres' promises to bring to our political life should he win the nomination.

Eshkol's Drawbacks as a Politician

Until 1960 it was Ben-Gurion's faction that dominated MAPAI. After the Sinai Campaign the nurturing of relations with France continued. Relations were also formed with Franz Joseph Strauss of West Germany "just in case." West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt defined Strauss as a "militant person and an extreme proponent of the cold war," and one of the greatest supporters of atomic armament. This man was invited to Israel by the Defense Ministry without prior consultation with the Foreign Ministry.

In 1960 when the 1954 scandal resurfaced, there was another bitter struggle, when Ben-Gurion and his young followers were challenged by Golda Meir, Levi Eshkol, Zalman Aran and Pinkhas Sapir. In 1963 Ben-Gurion finally resigned, for good. In an article titled "Courage To Change Before It Is Too Late" he postulated the ideological principles for establishing the Alinement, which was to form such a combination of power that Ben-Gurion and his followers lost the authority. Shimon Peres, like his mentor Ben-Gurion, opposed the Alinement bitterly. When it became a fact in 1965 he and his supporters left MAPAI to form RAFI and received enough votes to make it impossible for Eshkol to form a coalition. But RAFI had a big disappointment in the elections when the Alinement ended up with 45 mandates, as opposed to 10 of RAFI and 26 of GAHAL. Thus RAFI had to remain in the sidelines for a while.

Eshkol claimed, for a while, that his was a government of "continuation," but gradually Sharet's approach began to emerge. The government started showing restraint and worked for relaxing tensions in the region. Retaliatory raids were carried out only when it became clear that all political
avenues had been explored. The political orientation changed—relations with France cooled off, relations with the United States improved, and that also meant a shift in the source of weapons for the IDF.

This shift raised RAFT's opposition. This was expressed in an article by David Livshitz in DAVAR. In it he claims that the main weakness of Eshkol's government is that the prime minister, in his speech at the MAPAI convention, based Israeli policy on "three legs," when he added one more leg—"our desire for peace as a final goal to all our other endeavors, including the defense effort"—to the traditional two of strengthening the IDF and international support. Peace—that was the danger! Livshitz proposed a return to the old policy of "living dangerously, in tension." This approach was developed by Dayan after the Six-Day War. In a speech in which he concluded that "we were destined to live in a state of perpetual belligerency with the Arabs and there is no escape from sacrifices." Peres was part of the criticism of Eshkol's government and claimed, in a speech to students, that "Eshkol is excited with Bourgiba's declarations; this is his weakness as a politician." (28 May 1965)

The Plugged-up Well

With the encouragement of RAFT, Levi Eshkol was attacked as a weak person who cannot lead the nation. Ben-Gurion went around saying that Eshkol was guilty of a serious "security ineptness," on which he refused to elaborate. Reporters created an atmosphere of lack of confidence in the government. Many "Eshkol jokes" were going around and the lone stutter before the war turned into a clear-cut proof of his "hesitation," as if there is any connection between being inarticulate and being able to arrive at a decision. Even Sharet was portrayed as someone who "hesitated." This is precisely what the press is now doing to Rabin, whereas while he was chief of state or ambassador to the United States he apparently had no weaknesses. As soon as he became prime minister it turned out that he cannot speak, his diction is terrible, he cannot make decisions, he has no authority in his party, etc. This will be the lot of any dovish prime minister in a country where the press and the rest of the media are controlled by the right wing.

The disputes described up to this point, are the basis for the confrontation now going on in the labor movement. More facts will be pointed out in the course of these articles. One can only be sorry for Abba Eban, whose ambition to become foreign minister is so strong, that although in 1967 RAFT demanded that he be fired and replaced by...Shimon Peres, he decided to betray his own philosophy and take on the job (in a rather unintelligent way, totally not befitting the man) of ironing out the differences and then become foreign minister, who will defend before the "gate of nations" [UN] the defense and foreign policies that Peres will determine.
How much longer the prime minister and defense minister will cling to the moderate image which they have acquired for themselves, no one knows.
In the meantime, they enjoy the best of both worlds: while everyone knows that the fire of contention is burning in their hearts, and their associates engaged in argument, they struggle hard to control their "evil inclination," and they will not say publicly what is on their minds.

Only a person who has not seen them this week can envy them. Anyone who has seen them knows that the struggle for the prime ministry is exhausting their strength and fraying their nerves. Their counting of supporters among the thousands of delegates to the Labor Party convention is a strange mathematics—according to their figures, each is assured of a substantial majority.

I interviewed Prime Minister Yizhaq Rabin on Wednesday, at 7 a.m., at his home in Jerusalem. A pleasant warmth permeated his house, and the peaceful quiet created the illusion of a routine day. Rabin is less ready for a struggle of this sort than his opponent. Chasing votes and persuading the party functionaries at all levels are not exactly his cup of tea or his favorite pastime.

I interviewed Defense Minister Shimon Peres on Wednesday in the afternoon, at his office in Tel Aviv. Here was a mixture of high tension and excitement. Telephone reports of new supporters for Peres quickened the hearts. Peres, a seasoned and experienced politician, handles the task as routine, his lips thirsting for battle, happy at the prospect of struggle.

If there are substantive differences between them on foreign and domestic issues, the personal dispute pushes those differences aside. Rabin charges that since April 1974, Peres has been laying the foundation to push him out. Peres answers that no other prime minister has enjoyed the loyalty that Rabin has had.

This is the finest hour of the functionaries at all levels. Suddenly their stature has increased, and in their eyes their value has gone sky-high. If both candidates are careful not to make personal promises to them, then Peres will come out on top—he knows how to flatter the small ego; Rabin believes that by virtue of his qualities as a serious and profound prime minister who was thrown into the office at the most difficult time, the scale will tip in his favor.

I more or less posed the same questions to both candidates, with insignificant changes required by their different offices or the course of the discussion.

Rabin

Question: Mr Prime Minister, M.K. Abba Eban's joining the camp of Peres has given him the stamp of approval of the old MAPAI, a kind of pardon for his having left MAPAI to found RAFI. What do you think about the Peres-Eban alliance? Have the two been able to find a common language, aside from Mr Eban's hostility to you and his intention to be rid of you for your not having included him in your cabinet?
With the establishment of the government in June 1974—it was part of my approach to maintain both continuity as well as renewal in the composition of the cabinet and the distribution of portfolios. I thought it necessary that Eban—after having served as foreign minister for 8 years—should be replaced by Allon. I see nothing wrong with replacing a minister after he has served two full terms. Rotation in our public and political life is something both important and positive. I proposed to Mr Eban that he serve in my cabinet as either minister without portfolio or minister of information. Mr Eban refused. He definitely was entitled to do so, for his own reasons, but the fact that he was not included in my cabinet is the direct result of his refusal, and not because of my unwillingness to include him.

It is quite possible that his frustration has led him to take steps which I am convinced he himself will recognize as mistaken. I have no doubt that Mr Eban's past, and the fact that he was part of the old MAPAI, are being exploited by the principal force in Peres' camp—the old RAFI faction. Without denigrating Mr Eban's seniority in MAPAI, I must say that he is not exactly the man who symbolizes that MAPAI which grew up here in Israel, in its action and living experience, in settlement, in society building, in the workers' economy, and the other symbols of its recognition. He is certainly not the expression of the original MAPAI, as were Ben-Gurion, Berl Katznelson, David Remez, Pinhas Sapir and Golda Meir, Haim Givati, Moshe Baram, and others still alive.

Question: How do you explain the fact that your enthusiastic supporters, such as Yosi Sarid, have changed their minds, and announced their support of the candidacy of Mr Peres?

Answer: Without mentioning names, I can say that here and there have occurred changes in position and approach on the part of some people in their relations with me, as well as in their relations with Peres. I do not believe that Yosi Sarid was an enthusiastic supporter of me. He was a disciple of Pinhas Sapir, and he worked more out of his association with Sapir and his positions. I do not understand how Sarid is able to bridge between his political and social positions, which are opposed to those of Sapir, and his support of that man—except that the system of considerations of Sarid and others who think like he does and support Mr Peres, is not a system of principles and values, based upon choice of the candidate for the prime ministry according to his positions on the central issues in the life of the country and the movement.

At the same time, in order to put Sarid's support of Peres into proper perspective, I do not believe that Sarid represents the public or anything else, except himself.

Question: As a man whose favorite pursuits do not include "chasing around" and soothing people, have you recently engaged much in attempts to give some life to your candidacy among members of the party?
Answer: I do not like the expression "to give life" and I do not believe that I have engaged in it, as you describe it. In light of the struggle which is being conducted by Mr. Peres against me—and I view the challenge as an explicit call for an expression of no-confidence in me, for there is no other possible explanation—I have called upon a large number of people for personal discussions. I am still doing this. I have likewise met with a broad community of party members throughout the country in order to explain to them my positions, to tell them about the achievements of the government, to talk with them about what we have not yet accomplished, what we still want to do, and how we can realize our plans.

In the last 2 years, there has been a revolution within the Labor Party. The organization of districts, the counting of members, the internal elections—and in my opinion, the standing for elections of 165,000 members was one of the most magnificent demonstrations that the party is still alive, in that the members were announcing: "We are here!" These were events which breathed new life into the party. The Labor Party is alive and well, and enjoys the loyalty of an enormous number of workers and members; its continued existence does not depend on whether a small group of five or ten bureaucrats decides to leave it.

But unfortunately, because of the challenge for the prime ministry, and everything which has accompanied it, these magnificent phenomenon have been foiled and cast in the shadows. Many of the achievements of the government, and the leadership of the party, have been reviled and distorted.

This challenge did not begin with Peres' announcement of his decision to "run" but rather started almost on the day after I was chosen as the candidate for the prime ministry in April 1974.

Question: In your opinion, how did the struggle between you and Peres, as you describe it, influence the leaving of the party by many loyal members?

Answer: The struggle, which had such a sharp quality, was not as it should have been, between forces within one party, but was as though it were between contesting parties. In general this hurt the strength of the party. As part of the struggle, Mr. Peres' manner of criticism of me was not only in the personal sphere. It became a critique of what had been accomplished by the government and the members of the party in the last 2 and a half years. If there is a need to change things and remove me from the prime ministry after so short a time, the members should receive an explanation, and be given reasons. My opponents have been forced to emphasize how serious the situation is, and how much worse it will get if, God forbid, I am not replaced.

It is in the nature of things that when this is the direction, and this is the drift of propaganda, both in private discussions as well as in the published communications media—it is impossible that the party will not be damaged, along with the image and credibility of party members in central positions. The party cannot demand credibility among the voters on election
day when people come and say: "Look, until now we have done badly and have not succeeded, but if there will be a personnel change, from now on we will be good..." That is no way to convince someone to support the party.

Undoubtedly, the very activities on the eve of the election has stimulated party workers and members, as well as contact between them and the party leaders. I only hope that as a result of the personal challenge, and its becoming a central issue in party life, dividing the party into two opposing camps, that there will not be too severe and irreparable rifts left in the body of the party, after the declaration in the coming convention.

Question: Your colleague, Zvi Zamir, past head of the Mosad, told me that for years you had been isolated in the upper echelons. Is that true, or do you feel that you have succeeded in forming around yourself a leadership group, behind which the party stands, and in which the public believes as to the ability of leadership?

Answer: There are state positions in Israel, and I assume in other countries, where the one who holds them is to a certain extent isolated with himself and the enormous responsibility which the position imposes on him. I bore such responsibility when I was chief of staff in the IDF, and I have no doubt that it is a type of responsibility which is, a fortiori, imposed on the prime minister.

The responsibility of the prime minister may not be formally defined, but it is impressed in the very substance of the position. It is an accumulation of responsibility greater than that of any one cabinet minister. The excess responsibility and the high tensions which stem from it and are involved in it, sometimes put the man in a position of isolation. The prime minister is isolated because he sees, more than any other man, the general responsibility of leadership. It is not the departmental responsibility of one ministry. As chief of staff he must give a comprehensive answer regarding himself, the people, history, the party and the voter.

During my tenure as prime minister, there were better times and times not so good, in terms of the government working as a team. There were times when team work was deficient, and I have no doubt that the veiled personal challenge, over a long period of time, made team work that much harder.

Moreover, the Israeli prime minister has no legal authority to force the resignation of a cabinet minister—a situation which, to my knowledge, is unique when compared to any other parliamentary system in the world. Without getting into a discussion of whether there is need for a change in the laws on this matter, which would enable a prime minister to dismiss one of his cabinet ministers, undoubtedly the present situation makes it difficult for team work, especially when we are talking about a government which was formed after such a deep personal shock, and such a great change, which was this case for this government.
Question: Tell us the truth: if you could have known in April 1974, after you became the Labor Party's candidate for prime minister, that things would develop as they did, would you have agreed to the appointment of Mr Peres as defense minister, or would you have said them: either he or I?

Answer: I do not deal in hypothetical questions. It is a fact that I did not do so then, and there is no reason today to answer that question.

Question: Will you answer it now, if you are chosen to serve?

Answer: In my view, there is a substantial difference between the struggle for the candidacy in April 1974 and the present struggle. In 1974, the decision by the party center was linked to the voluntary resignation of Golda Meir, and the party selected a candidate to fill an empty position. That was the first time in the history of the party that there were two candidates presented, one of whom was directly elected by the center. That was a proper challenge.

Today, the situation is completely different. I was selected by the party center. I have been serving in my post for a little more than 2 and a half years, and I view the present challenge as an attempt to express no confidence in me. There is no other way of interpreting this action.

One may draw conclusions from this attempt. I have already said that I view Mr Peres as a cabinet minister, of which I am the prime minister, without now entering into a discussion of defining his role in the next cabinet.

Question: Aside from the challenge itself, has Mr Peres attempted to damage your authority as prime minister, to bother you, to minimize your value, or to damage the authority of your government?

Answer: I cannot give a direct answer to such varied and specific questions of that sort. But I do not doubt that the challenge has been going on for the last 2 years. Mr Peres laid the foundation for an open challenge, and this has had an effect on the image of the government and its ability to form a good and reliable working team.

Question: And have you always been scrupulous about not damaging the respect of Mr Peres and not damaging his authority as the defense minister, who is in charge of an area critical for our existence?

Answer: Whenever there are tensions--mistakes are made. I will not say that I have not made mistakes here and there. The question is: what and who has created the situation which is one of tension? In my opinion, it was the laying of a foundation for an open challenge which caused the tensions.

Question: Are there significant differences between you and Mr Peres on domestic and foreign policy issues, or is the struggle between you really just a question of who is better qualified to carry out the same policy?
Answer: I think that the differences essentially are in the approach to the principal problems of the country, in the national emphases and priorities which should be given to the different issues, and of course in the style and method of work and personal leadership.

I brought my approach to political and defense issues to expression in setting the route of the government from its very beginning: the decision in 1974 to concentrate on interim agreements and not to look to Geneva, knowing that a convening of the Geneva conference then—if it would have been at all possible—in circumstances of Israeli inferiority, both political and defensive, would not have been in Israel's interests.

And in that same area of setting the course of the government, giving absolute priority to reaching an interim agreement with Egypt— and not doing as proposed by circles close to Mr Peres: conditioning negotiations with Egypt on parallel negotiations with Syria. If we had gone that route, we would not have achieved any interim settlement. We would have created a freeze which would have been opposed to our own interests. Our relations with the United States would have been damaged.

These principles, which were set by my decision, and not always following the inclination of Mr Peres, enabled us to garner a lot of support in the United States in all areas: political support, supply of arms and financial aid, in huge proportions. 1976 was a year of understanding and dialogue with the United States and there were few years like it in the relations between the two countries.

I believe that I left my stamp on the conduct of defense policy, in the approach to the problem of the civil war in Lebanon, in the general conduct of action of Israel in liberating the hostages at Entebbe.

Although to a lesser extent than in foreign and defense affairs, the government also had successes in domestic affairs. I have sought to achieve a balance in the economic and social system. There is still a lot to be done, but we have set the correct priorities, and we have brought to expression a great readiness to struggle with negative phenomena and in no way to cover them up. It is difficult for me to deal with the differences between me and Mr Peres on socioeconomic issues, because I do not yet know precisely what his positions are on such issues.

Question: If the convention selects Mr Peres, you will have to serve for 3 months as a transition prime minister who will not be the next prime minister, while Mr Peres will have to lead the party in the coming elections. Two questions in this regard: 1) Will this negatively affect the prospects of the party? 2) Will you take Mr Peres with you on your coming trip to the United States before the elections, so that the new president there will meet him, and he will be able to present his positions?
Answer: I prefer not to move on the assumption that the convention will select Mr Peres, so I consider myself exempt from answering questions on that assumption.

Question: What do you think about the opinion expressed by Mr Peres' supporters that the party under his leadership will get more votes?

Answer: I do not know what kind of authoritative information supports that assumption. Naturally, the Likud people prefer Mr Peres over me. It only indicates that they do not appreciate his positions.... The possibility that Mr Peres will lead the party appears preferable to them in view of their reckoning that I will not talk much about them. I believe that the Labor Party and the Alinement can maintain their strength in the coming election, and even increase that strength—under my leadership.

Question: In thinking about it after the fact, wasn't it a mistake to dismiss the NRP ministers from the cabinet, to dismantle the coalition, to remain a minority in the Knesset, and to face an election at a time when the public has a growing sense that this government is weak and cannot serve properly?

Answer: As I have said, both in the cabinet and in the party center, I am now convinced that I had no alternative to taking the steps which I did. A government which would acquiesce to a party which is a partner in the coalition not expressing confidence in the government, and voting for no confidence with the opposition, would give a strong push to the trends of disintegration and a greater challenge to the authority of the government. A government cannot function in that way, and authority cannot be exercised under such circumstances.

I will likewise demand strongly in the future that just as there is a need to maintain full freedom of debate before the decision, and to insure that decisions are democratically made—the condition for the proper functioning of a government is the full support of all members after the decision has been made. One of the defects of the present government was that even after the decisions were made, the members were not fully behind them.

Question: If the results of the election require a coalition between the Alinement and Likud, or between the Alinement and Democratic Change, which possibility would you prefer?

Answer: The principal struggle over the elector's vote is between the Alinement and Likud, which represent conceptions which are opposite in every sphere. Unfortunately, the development of Gahal, and later Likud, prevented the formation of an intermediate group, a kind of liberal center, which in the past was formed by the General Zionists, or the Liberal Party. The position of such a body has been taken by the NRP, which became the balance between the two principal bodies in recent years. I see neither the need nor the possibility for a coalition between the Alinement and Likud, which would mean the paralysis of the whole political, economic and social system.
I do see the possibility of a coalition between the Alinement, the NRP, the Independent Liberals, and Democratic Change, if and when the latter formulates its positions so that we can know what they are.

Question: In an earlier interview you told me that you would oppose any candidate for the prime ministry within your party, and that you would win. Now, with your convention approaching, what do you think of your prospects?

Answer: I am aware of the fact that the challenge is a tough one, but I am certain that I will win with the support of my party.

Peres

Question: Mr Defense Minister, in having assured yourself of the support of M.K. Abba Eban, you have received a "bill of clean health," a kind of pardon from the MAPAI veterans for your having left the party to establish RAFI. What do you make of the claim that you and Mr Eban would not have been able to find a common language, but for the hostile attitude of Eban to Mr Rabin, because the latter did not include him in his cabinet? In your opinion, is that a good basis for building a political partnership?

Answer: I did not accept the support of Mr Eban. We are marching together in a common struggle. I do not view the candidate for the prime ministry as one who goes about collecting supporters. We are members of a party of variety, and its list should reflect the variety, and permit a broad spectrum of views. The political partnership between Mr Eban and myself—together with a group of others—began as early as the end of the 1950's. Included in our group were Moshe Dayan, Giora Yoseftal, and others. The road parted with the departure of Ben-Gurion. Abba Eban served in the cabinets of Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharet, Eshkol and Golda Meir, and no one overlooked his unusual talents. It was a mistake for the present government to give them up.

Question: How do you explain the fact that enthusiastic supporters of Mr Rabin, including M.K. Yosi Sarid who in 1974 was numbered among the most prominent people working for his election, are leaving him and going over to your camp?

Answer: Every one of them has his reasons. They feel as I do, that if there is no change within the party, by the party, there will be change from outside of the party, at the expense of the Labor Party. Three years ago Yizhaq Rabin received a lot of credit. He won a majority within the party center. Those who are leaving him now do so after a lot of soul searching. They want to know how much of the credit was justified. They draw their own conclusions.

I am very happy that many party members, young and old, who perhaps before were in a quandry as to whether to support Rabin's candidacy or mine, have now come to a conclusion opposite to that of 3 years ago....
Question: Is there any truth to the claim of the prime minister, that not recently, but on the day after his election as candidate of the party in 1974, you started the challenge for the prime ministry, and that prevented the formation of a leadership team?

Answer: I have never heard such a claim from the prime minister. There is a public record of what has been said and done. I do not think that you will find anything wrong in what I have said or done, in this respect. This true with regard to my relations with other members of the cabinet, the Knesset, and in all other institutions.

As a rule, I do not accept the proposition that we have a presidential regime, where cabinet ministers are the servants of the prime minister. This is a cabinet regime, and all members of the cabinet are publicly elected, and should be judged by their public actions, positions, and the credibility which the public has in them. The role of the prime minister is to create for himself a special collegial authority. No member of the cabinet has to be asked to bow down to him. He is only asked to conduct himself according to proper rules, to properly carry out his task, to maintain a responsible style, to express his opinion, and to stick to it in times of test. Our world would be a poorer one if cabinet members were servile, carrying out the message of the ego of the leader.

Question: Can you honestly say that in the last 3 years you have been loyal to Mr Rabin, as a minister in his cabinet, that you have never tried to undermine his authority, to minimize his value, and to hurt the position of the government which he leads, so as to lay a foundation for your claim that it would be better for the party to choose you instead of him?

Answer: For the last 3 years, I have been involved in matters of defense, and all other issues have been secondary. I am happy to hear that the prime minister has said that our work relations have always been correct. In sum, if I were asked to characterize the last 3 years, I would say that Mr Rabin has had the opportunity to carry out his tasks with a minimum of disturbance--if indeed there was any disturbance--under conditions better than those of any other prior prime minister.

Question: And Mr Rabin's attitude towards you? Has he always treated you with the proper respect and consideration, both personally, and also in terms of the important position which you hold within the cabinet?

Answer: I go by the English proverb: "Never complain and never apologize." I have no complaints, in spite of the fact that there were several things in Mr Rabin's expressions and conduct which did not suit me. Only once did I react publicly--regarding the interview in HA'AREZ, by an "internal source of the prime minister." I have not always been happy about public expressions uttered about me. The public knows what happened, the statements were made in public....
Question: Perhaps you could detail the statements to which you refer?

Answer: No. It is not my intention to go into details. Didn't I say to you: I have no complaints. I do not consider the challenge for the prime ministry as an arena in which to settle personal scores. I have been able to live with this part of the problem, without difficulty....

Question: Has Mr. Rabin formed an authoritative leadership team, supported by the party, which the public considers reliable, or has he been, as was said by Gen (Res) Zamir, isolated at the top?

Answer: It is clear to me that in the last 3 years the party has suffered a partial paralysis, which has hurt the government. In a parliamentary system it is very difficult to accept far-reaching decisions without a prior clarification within the party, and without its constant support. As for the leadership team, I have already said on a number of occasions that it is demanding some changes.

Question: In what way do you think that you are better than Mr. Rabin for the candidacy for the prime ministry? How will you be better if you are chosen for the position? Has he failed in his office, and should he be replaced? Are there significant differences between you and him in domestic and foreign affairs, or is it merely a question of which of you is better able to carry out the same policy?

Answer: We stand on the eve of the elections, and in party terms, the principal problem is to enlist the largest part of the public on behalf of the Alinement. I estimate that a change in leadership will increase the number of supporters of the Alinement.

The role of the prime minister is to coordinate the leadership, to maintain collegiality, to....

Question: Excuse me, are you listing the deficiencies of the present prime minister, or his virtues, or is this a neutral academic inquiry into the qualifications of any prime minister?

Answer: Wait, perhaps when I finish it will be clearer as to what I refer. So, to maintain collegiality, to be able to arouse the faith of the public, and to maintain that confidence. But most important—to establish the real national and social priorities.

I would like to tell you some of my thoughts in the last area, that of priorities: I have always thought that two schools have struggled among us: the distribution of what there is, and the building of the new. Because of personal temperament, and on the basis of experience in various posts, I have considered myself to be a member of the school which considers building as having greater potential than consolidation. Our national priorities are determined in practice, and not always according to a platform. If you
analyze the platform, you will not find one among us who is opposed to immigration, to closing the social gap, to changing the method of elections, to a healthy and growing economy. You will find no one who supports bureaucracy, or worse than that--corruption.

Over the years, a gap has been created between the platform of ideas and reality. For example, for a quarter of a century, there has been a debate in the workers' movement regarding the "world of tomorrow," Leninism, Marxism, Soviet Russia. The idea has been developed among us that only one who believes in Soviet socialism is a true "leftist," while one who identifies with the socialism of the democratic world is a "rightist." And because I have never been seduced by any sort of dictatorship, and because a dictatorship of the proletariat has been as despicable to me as any other--I have been branded as a "rightist..."

Today, it can be said that this was an empty debate, that the real issue was not our relations with Soviet Russia, but its relations with us. And it is also obvious that those who looked to the "sun of the peoples" never really intended to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat in Israel. But consider the rich and stormy literature on these issues which was published over the years in Israel....

On the other hand, all of the stormy events in our life--mass immigration, great wars, the war in Lebanon, the settlement of the Lachish region, the development of the Negev and the Galilee, the open bridges with Jordan, the settlements with Egypt and Syria, relations with the United States, and even the "good fence" with Lebanon--these were never foreseen in the platforms, and ultimately the platforms only confirmed what had already happened in reality.

I am also very much concerned by the loss of faith, or its weakening, among us. I am not ready to accept any exegesis which attempts to explain to us why we "must" accept the fact that immigration will decline, while emigration will increase, so that demographic problems begin to be the decisive consideration in making policy. There is no Israeli-Zionist-Jewish policy without a burning faith in immigration, and without the repeated and stubborn attempt to renew it, even under changing circumstances.

Of course, immigration depends on absorption in Israel. It is incumbent that we nurture the absorption climate in Israel. The issue of immigration is also linked to the genuine national attempt to confront the social gap. It will not be confronted and overcome only by fiscal allocations. The conception must be comprehensive.

This is also the case in economic matters. Israel has always been a daring country, with great longings to be a country of constant growth, beyond the bounds of geography or its population. That was its great strength. That was its captivating magic. I am not satisfied with ourselves. If I am elected as prime minister, I--together with others--will try to breathe a new spirit of greatness into us, to undertake great deeds, to spread our wings, to fulfill the true objective of any great policy.
You can see that there is no necessity of great unbridgable differences between me and Mr Rabin to justify my candidacy for the prime ministry. It is enough for me to claim that I believe that I will be able to contribute my part, as the head of a team, to breathe a new spirit into Israeli policy, which is essential for us.

Question: If the convention selects you, Mr Rabin will have to serve as a transition prime minister for 3 months, but will not be the next prime minister. You will have to lead the party in the coming elections. Two questions: 1) Will this hurt the prospects of the party? 2) Will you consider it essential that you travel with the present prime minister to the United States, before the elections?

Answer: 1) Definitely not. As long as Mr Rabin serves as prime minister, I will work in his government, both as a candidate for the prime ministry of the coming government, without disturbing him in any way from fulfilling the task of his post.

2) Definitely not. If Mr Rabin is invited, and he goes—I see no reason why I should accompany him for domestic political reasons, except if I am asked to go with him as defense minister and in that capacity only.

Question: What is the basis for the assumption that the party under your leadership will get more votes in the election than under the leadership of Mr Rabin?

Answer: The only tool for measurement—public opinion polls; and the fact that many members with whom I have consulted hold this opinion; and the fact that there has already begun a leaving of our party, and a shifting to other parties. It all stems from an analysis of the situation of the party, according to the vast information which I can obtain, after many discussions with central members of the party, secretaries of district chapters, secretaries of workers-councils and others.

Question: Should the prime minister be given authority to appoint and dismiss his ministers, on the basis of his own considerations?

Answer: No. Members of the cabinet must be chosen from among central figures, elected in the party districts and its center, for the list of party candidates for the Knesset. The party's candidate for the prime ministry must consult with all parts of the party membership, including those who disagree with him, to assure proper representation of all parts of the party in the government. In a democratic party, majority will and rule must be respected. But at the same time it is important to afford representation of the minority, so as to preserve the integrity of the party and its varied character.

It is worth mentioning that in the past, the practice was for the prime minister to consult with a special committee of the party on the question of cabinet ministers from the party—and the center would confirm the list of cabinet members.
The choice of people for central positions is the real decision making process of any democratic body. What was wrong with appointed committees and various types of "kitchen cabinets" was that a small group held the reins of government for itself, appointing cabinet ministers and members of Knesset; what was called in delicate language the loyalty of those selected towards the leadership became in reality absolute dependence on a small group whose identity was not really known, and which was never elected by anyone for that task.

If I am selected to be candidate for prime minister, I will propose that at least for four central positions--the candidate for the chairmanship of the directorate of the agency, the candidate for the prime ministry, the secretary of the Histadrut, and the secretary of the party--be chosen by all members of the party. The candidates, before and after their selection, will go out among the chapters, preserve constant communication with the members, and know whom they are representing. My view of the prime ministry is not heroic, but only democratic.

Question: Both in national terms and political-electoral terms, wasn't it a mistake to dismiss the NRP cabinet members, to dismantle the coalition, to leave the government a minority in the Knesset, and to stand for elections at a time when there is a growing public sense that the government is weak and unable to serve properly?

Answer: Yes. It was a mistake.

Question: If the results of the election require a coalition between the Alinement and Likud, or between the Alinement and Democratic Change, which possibility would you prefer?

Answer: A coalition between the Alinement and Democratic Change. First of all because I want to carry out, in theory and practice, a change in the electoral method.

Question: At this point, what do you think your prospects are?

Answer: I don't know what they are, but they do not look completely bad. My true experience, which I still have, is having met with hundreds of party workers, and I am continuing to add spontaneous support from unexpected quarters, which is without strings. Of all of the people who have offered their support, none has asked for any special promises for himself. We are a large group, entering this struggle, and we have a common denominator, but no common debt.
There are many in the defense network today asking of the man who will direct the Israeli defense realm after the elections will be Shimon Peres. This depends, of course, upon the coming contest at the Labor Party convention between Rabin and Peres, as well as the results of the elections for the Knesset. Mr Peres' favorites in the department's key positions, those who speak with certainty of Peres' victory at the convention being practically in his pocket, also say that he is destined to be the next prime minister and will pass the defense portfolio to someone else. This means that Shimon Peres will not follow the system of Ben-Gurion and Eshkol (prior to the Six-Day War), both of whom held a combined position of prime minister and defense minister. Minister Peres personally related to this matter. When, at a press conference, I asked him if it is not desirable that the prime minister be the defense minister also, he replied that these two offices are serious and difficult, for which reason it would be desirable that they be divided between two individuals. In addition, according to him, it is good to have another watchful eye on defense matters.

Several of Peres' close colleagues say that it is reasonable to believe that if he wins the candidacy for the prime ministry, he will offer the defense portfolio to Yizhaq Rabin. This would be an exchange of seats. However, these same people also believe that Rabin would probably reject the offer. One way or another, Yizhaq Rabin's name is the first to be mentioned as a candidate for defense minister in the event that Peres becomes prime minister. A rejection of Peres' offer by Rabin would bring to light the names of other candidates, from the Labor Party and from other parties.

Labor Party Weaker

The question of whether Peres will be the next defense minister remains even if Rabin wins the contest for party candidacy for the prime ministry at the party convention. Even in such a situation the deck will be shuffled with the establishment of the new government. As regards the distribution of portfolios, Rabin will certainly act on the basis of the lessons he
learned during his first term of office. He will attempt to be more of a "leader" than an equal among a group of senior ministers. Some sources close to him maintain today that one of his mistakes was in not heeding warnings not to give Shimon Peres the defense realm.

It is, therefore, natural that Yizhaq Rabin himself will want to return to Ben-Gurion's system, according to which the prime minister holds the defense portfolio too. Rabin has not expressed his opinion on this matter and has promised nothing. It is difficult to imagine that he will go one step further and state, as some believe, that he must give himself the defense portfolio because he lacks personal confidence in Peres. He will more probably attempt to maneuver Peres to another portfolio: that of the Foreign Ministry, for example, which is an important portfolio during a year when negotiations with the Arabs may take place. He may also offer the defense portfolio to other personalities. In this connection, the names of two other former army men in the Labor Party are being mentioned, the first, a major general and the second, a former chief of staff: Yig' al Allon and Chaim Bar-Lev.

This by no means completes the list of candidates for the defense portfolio. The Labor Party following the 1977 elections will not be the same party we have known in the past. According to every indication, the Labor Party will be weaker and more dependent upon its coalition partners. It is reasonable to assume that it will not be able to continue holding all four of the principal portfolios: prime ministry, defense, treasury and foreign ministry. Rabin could, therefore, decide that in the framework of the maneuvering it would be more important not to cede the defense portfolio to the main partner in the coalition, than the foreign ministry or treasury portfolio.

In such a circumstance other names of candidates for the defense portfolio arise. If the Democratic Party for Change becomes the main partner of the Alinement in the formation of the new government, and if its strength is great enough to enable it to demand one of the principal portfolios, two names are being mentioned: Here too one of them is a former chief of staff and the second, a reserve major general. I am referring to Yig' al Yadin and Meir 'Amir who recently joined the Democratic Party for Change. If the chief partner of the Labor Party is to be the Likud, a lesser likelihood, though not utterly impossible, Ezer Weizman, the man who will undoubtedly take second place in the Likud, is mentioned as a possible candidate for defense minister.

The Break-up of Power

Certain people close to the minister of defense reject the possibility that Rabin may succeed in maneuvering Peres. They accept the fact that this will be his aim if he wins at the convention, but this in no way implies that he will succeed in realizing his plan.
"It isn't up to Rabin. If he tries to banish someone who almost won the prime ministry from him, it would mean the break-up of the party," they explain. According to them, Peres likes his present post and if he desires to remain in this position, he has enough support to realize his will.

This is probably the way things stand. Thus, in the event that Rabin remains prime minister and Peres retains his post as defense minister, Rabin will try to reduce the scope of the defense realm as much as possible, and in so doing, reduce Peres' power. He will seek to reduce the imminent danger to him of a competitor who will undoubtedly seek a third time to become the candidate for prime minister. Yizhaq Rabin's close associates are already discussing the path he will take in such a course of events. They clearly see that he will do everything possible to remove the occupied territories from the Ministry of Defense's jurisdiction. The issue of the territories will be an issue unto itself, and according to the plan, a different minister will be in charge of them. But, they say, this is not all he intends to do. The second objective concerns the defense industries. The goal will be to separate these industries, to as great an extent as possible, from the Ministry of Defense and its direct control. This is to be achieved through the establishment of public corporations of TA'AS [The Military Industry] and others.

From all this it becomes clear that whoever wins the contest for prime minister, the struggle between Rabin and Peres will continue. It seems that it will continue after the convention and after the elections to the Knesset. Even if one of them doesn't want the struggle to continue, he will have no choice but to defend himself and fight back fiercely.
RABIN AND PERES WOO THE DELEGATES

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 14 Feb 77 p 15

[Article by Moshe Meisles: "The Rabin-Peres Battle Is Narrowed to Some 300 'Undecideds' Among 'The Most Sought-after Persons in the Country'"]

Three thousand citizens have these days become the most sought after persons in the country. These are the "Darlings of the Labor Party," who have been chosen as delegates for the convention of decision.

The staffs of both candidates--Yizhaq Rabin and Shimon Peres--are "pursuing" them day and night. They are trying to persuade them, to convince them and even to change their decision. The struggle began with the system of the "telephones" and passed on rapidly to face-to-face talks. Both candidates are brought before each delegate, whether in a personal conversation or in a group discussion.

The "battle" is over several hundred undecideds, over those who are still fence sitters, over "the suspects" who have given an affirmative promise to both camps (Why upset anyone? The vote is secret anyway...). They are even trying to convince ... those who are already convinced.

Both staffs are utilizing all tricks of psychological warfare. Each side proclaims, according to the data and the figures in its possession, that it is the winner. Each day they publicize the names of personages identifying with them, of districts, branches, circles. According to the announcements of the staffs, both have long since passed the 100 percent of supporters, and even the 200. And no wonder. According to what they are promising everyone, many of the delegates are promising their precious vote to both and appear on both lists simultaneously.

In this struggle of the mighty, which is keeping the entire party in tension (as if there isn't still the Likud, the Democratic Change and the rest of the parties), the candidates and their supporters are changing their identity and their image, in order to reach every heart and vote.
Shimon Peres, who has the Not-So-Socialist camp in his pocket, tries to appear as a socialist, mentions Brenner and Beri, talks about the need for an assault on the workers' committees, and emphasizes the importance of the supremacy of the laborers. The one who stood at the head of RAFI, and at one time had resigned from the MAPAI, talks of the historic MAPAI, of the readiness for territorial concessions—even in Judea and Samaria—and of the establishment of a government of national unity only during a period of crisis. The one who was a member of a number of governments speaks of renewal and change.

The beleaguered Yizhaq Rabin, who is identified with the old guard, with Golda and Rabinowicz, promises changes which he is not yet able to proclaim because of the need for preserving morale in the staff and comity in the existing leadership. He advocates continuity and substitution at one and the same time and preserves the image of a "dovehawk" who aspires for peace but insists on secure borders, defined, and is unprepared to conduct negotiations with any Palestinian element that is prepared to recognize Israel.

Shimon Peres assaults the doves who are in MAPAI, whereas Yizhaq Rabin does not want to lose the hawks who are in Ahдут Avodah.

Both candidates "till the ground" and both staffs "work" on the media. The contest cuts through every district, branch, circle, cell and even house and family.

Fathers and sons stand on opposite sides of the barricade (such as Minister Moshe Bar'am who supports Rabin, and his son, secretary of the Jerusalem District, Uzi, who supports Peres), husbands and wives (such as the secretary of the Youth Guard Natan Ra'anani who supports Rabin, and his wife, Daniela, secretary of the Guard in the Zionist Labor Movement, who supports Peres), the Kibbutz Movement (the Ihud and the Me'uhad, which in its decisive portion supports Yizhaq Rabin) and the Moshavim Movement (whose decisive portion supports Shimon Peres).

Avowed "doves" such as Member of Knesset Abba Eban, MK Yosi Sarid and Uzi Bar'am have gone over to what only yesterday was considered the cote of the hawks in the party and have taken a stand in the campaign in favor of Shimon Peres. Those who were once among the leaders of the RAFI group, Yosef Almogi, Avraham Wolfenson and Uri Agmi, support Yizhaq Rabin.

The entire party is in the shadow of the confrontation. Government, Histadrut and party apparatus are being activated. All ministers of the party except for Gad Ya'akov (who is among the supporters of Shimon Peres) have identified with Yizhaq Rabin, and two only—Haim Bar-Lev in the capacity of chairman of the elections staff, and Shlomo Hillel, in the capacity of chairman of the convention presidium—are observing neutrality and silence.
Both candidates have waived the original program, of being "introduced" to delegates of the convention prior to the balloting. Yizhaq Rabin supporters feared that introduction by Golda Meir and Yizhaq Ben-Aharon might drive away the young people, while supporters of Shimon Peres feared that introduction by Abban and Yosi Sarid might drive away hawks. And so, the candidates will introduce themselves.

But the controversy (which, possible may be silenced only at the time of the convention, by its president) still goes on about who will introduce himself first. Both candidates fear that the second introducer has the advantage of replying to the contentions of the one who preceded him and of the "last word."

The contest will reach a climax when both candidates appear evening after evening before the delegates of the Tel Aviv District and before 100 Arab and Druze delegates.

Visitors From Abroad

Planners of the convention "tailored" it in such a manner that the contest will not embarrass the contestants and the party before the visitors from abroad who will include, among others, heads of state, former prime ministers and heads of parties who look forward to being prime ministers in the future. Their speeches to the convention, and the international evening in their honor, will take place before the results of the balloting are known, so as not to place the hosts and the guests in a vexing situation.

Supporters of Yizhaq Rabin contend that the challenge of Shimon Peres constitutes an attempt to mislead. Rabin was elected less than 3 years ago in a democratic process as the party's candidate for the prime ministry and a new choice before the end of the term constitutes a violation of this process. Furthermore, it has the defect of a member of the Rabin government challenging the prime minister for leadership.

No Defect

Supporters of Shimon Peres reject this contention out of hand. In their opinion, the conducting of new elections created a situation of the end of a term and there is no defect at all in a new process of challenge between the prime minister and a minister in the highest and broadest institution of the party.

Leaders of the Labor Party are already uneasy about what is likely to take place following the contest. They are hoping that with the struggle at an end the contestants and the camps will unite--for the external election campaign against the Likud, the Democratic Movement for Change, etc. But there is no doubt that the matter will not be so smooth and simple. It will be much easier, for example, for Peres to come to terms with Rabin if the latter is again chosen as the candidate for the prime ministry--than the other way around. One of the questions is, how will the Ahdut Avodah group react if Peres is chosen as the candidate?
Almost certainly, MK Mordechai Ben-Porat and perhaps other RAFTK Knesset members will resign from the party if Rabin is chosen; and MK Yizhar Ben-Aharon again announced that he will have to weigh certain conclusions if Peres is chosen. In any event an "erosion" from the left or from the right is in prospect. And MAPAM is straddling the fence, awaiting the results of the contest, while the continuation of the existence of the Alignment is cast in doubt.

Both staffs contend that the contest has narrowed in effect to about 300 delegates from among the 3,000. These will decide on how they will vote at the last moment, and they will determine who the candidate will be.

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LABOR PARTY URGED TO REEXAMINE ITS PATH

Tel Aviv HA'AREZ in Hebrew 18 Feb 77 p 13

Article by Poles: "The Decline of the Gods or a Healthy Shock?"

What is happening to the Labor Party these days is reminiscent of what happened to the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages: It amassed wealth and lost its original character as an institution devoted to its true function, that is, to prepare the believers to face the heavenly court. The poverty that existed among the Christians during the period of the apostles was forgotten and bishops and heads of monasteries were comparable in the splendor of their external appearance to barons and princes. In a spirit similar to that of the Franciscans in the 13th century today one can ask the leaders of the Labor Party: Where did the virtues of two generations of pioneers disappear?

The question whether the Labor Party will be able to purify its tanks, to shake itself and to justify its claim to be the factor leading the State of Israel concerns primarily the party itself. It is very easy to try and dismiss the manifestations of public anger at what has been proven in Asher Yadlin's trial thus far as a reaction of public hysteria, which the opposition parties and movements do their best to spur. But the delegates to the national convention of the Labor Party will do well to make a clear distinction between the defense and controversy statements that they are preparing for the arena of parliamentary debate and what they face as a duty of the utmost importance, that is, to perceive the severity of the party condition and to draw practical conclusions from this perception.

To be sure, there is no shortage of people who for political considerations or even due to their evil nature are ready to be led astray by every suspicion. However, it is very difficult to assume that the public ready to believe the arguments voiced by Asher Yadlin when he stood on the witness stand in the courtroom is totally erroneous. It is not an accident that the public is ready to believe, because Asher Yadlin himself, who denied all charges for many months, was compelled to confess to most counts of the charge sheet (and it is possible that the series of his confessions has not yet ended). After all, Asher Yadlin is not the first crook who enjoyed the favors of the Labor Party leadership for a long time.
The feeling that the Labor Party has ceased to live according to the dictates of its period of glory has been entrenched among wide sections of the public for years. Since Levi Eshkol of blessed memory uttered the unfortunate quote "you shall not muzzle the ox when it treads out the corn," leniency toward deviations from the permissible boundary consumed and gnawed at the party (and the public institutions it controls) until the first criminals faced the court. The series of scandals has been increasing so that it is impossible to regard Asher Yadlin's trial as another, but still isolated, case.

As long as the Labor Party could cite achievements to its credit, the people avoided condemning it. It conducted the fight of the Jewish population against the White Paper. It led the Jewish population during the War of Independence. It dared to bring hundreds of thousands of Jews to the country under very difficult absorption conditions. It built the IDF which won the wars in 1956 and 1967. There are exaggerated generalizations in all these statements, but they also contain the truth. The truth was expressed in the fact that in all the elections to the Knesset the Labor Party (previously MAPAI) came out as the biggest party (although it never won the absolute majority).

But the series of great achievements that left their imprint on the image of the state in the eyes of the people of Israel and the world nations ended after the Six-Day War, whereas the signs of moral decline continued to increase in the last decade and now threaten to relegate past privileges into oblivion.

This is the gloomy background against which the Labor Party will face the people in the elections to the Ninth Knesset. The party must give reliable answers to a long series of questions which the voting public will ask. The voting public is likely to decide whether to vote for the Labor Party or for other lists according to the impression it gets from the answers that the Labor Party candidates will give—whether they are worthy or unworthy of confidence.

The people are disgusted with the plague of moral corruption felt in government and public institutions. The subject of party financing is not the only vulnerable point. The people grumble about the chaos created in the field of labor relations and the strikes and sanctions which result in a loss of hundreds of thousands of work days. The people are afraid of the galloping rate of inflation and the accelerated process of price increase. The people are well aware of the fact that in the last 10 years all the governments have not succeeded in acquiring international legitimation for the 1967 conquests, nor have they endangered themselves by giving most of them up in order to remove the danger of a renewed war. It is not unfair that it holds the Labor Party primarily responsible for all these oversights, even if the opposition parties do not have the right to exonerate themselves, especially with regard to the fourth problem.
It is natural that under these circumstances people, who despite their doubts have preferred the Labor Party thus far, ask themselves if once again they could vote for the Alignment. The Democratic Movement for Change has joined the veteran opposition, which is the right hand of the Alignment. A significant part of the elite stratum identified with the Labor Party in one way or another has joined the Democratic Movement for Change and lends it prestige.

The question at this moment, that is, on the eve of the Labor Party convention, is not of the value of the slogans that the opponents of the Labor Party espouse and of the practical significance that can be attributed to them. The Labor Party convention will not do its duty if it is misled to transform its debates into an arena of controversy against the political forces seeking to inherit it as the factor around which the next government will organize itself. The Labor Party convention should deal with itself, that is, it should examine its past way and shape its future. Its chances at the polls on 17 May depend mainly on the way it will perform this function, not on the sharp battle of words against the Likud and the Democratic Movement for Change.

The Labor Party must demonstrate that it has definitely decided to dissociate itself from all the people who cannot prove that the charges leveled against them are not based on facts. Any attempt to obliterate the gloomy impression left by the Asher Yadlin case will backfire on the party. Its leadership must act for a basic and extensive investigation of all the accusations expressed by Asher Yadlin, even if this source is muddy. Let the delegates to the convention not talk about a "witch hunt." There is something to hunt and this must be done if they do not want the pus to consume the bones of the living body.

The Labor Party must again demonstrate that it is capable of guiding the wage earning public with all its circles and strata—clerks, academicians and workers. If the Labor Party is not able to restore to the General Federation of Labor its authority with regard to trade unions in sectors that are not "labor," it will not be able to continue to thwart the wish of the Knesset "to interfere in labor relations" through legislation that will impose state authority where the voluntary organization reveals helplessness.

The Labor Party is asked to stop dealing with the inflation problem by homoeopathic methods. This need also obligates it to lean on cooperation with Histadrut, just as there is a close connection between the inflation problem and the problem of foreign policy and security. The state will not be able to carry the burden of the defense budget for a long time, a burden resulting from the state of no peace and no war, which, of course, necessitates preparedness in an event of a renewed war. In a certain sense all these three subjects form one unit.
Whoever seeks to lead the Labor Party before and after the elections will have to answer these questions. General talks about the need for a change will not be enough. The voting public is not likely to decide on the basis of feelings of disappointment alone, nor on the basis of personal likes or dislikes toward an individual. The opposition lists can also reveal this. However, the Labor Party is especially asked not to pretend that it is enough to have a few scapegoats, or to present new faces which, when examined closely, are well known. The convention must decide not only about personalities—this is impossible in any event—but about its path.

There is no small danger that the convention will try to run away from the area of substantive debate and to look for salvation in the rivalry between the two candidates. We will not belittle the importance of any of the two, just as we will not ignore the shortcomings of both of them. But even in a time of outstanding personalization of political life, a phenomenon whose source is largely due to television, a party that demands a mandate from the voting public must present several guiding ideas (if the term "program" is no longer worthy of mentioning), according to which it intends to act in the government, assuming that it sees itself worthy of this and does not despair of the chance that the people will think likewise.

The Labor Party is urged to make the following choice: either to paint its face and to appear in the election campaign for the Ninth Knesset after cosmetic repairs, or to purge itself on a personal level and to refresh itself in the field of thought on foreign and defense matters, labor relations, society and economy—all this while removing all the wild grass that climbed on the party tree.

If it does not choose the second way, a shock is in store for it, from which there is no doubt that it will not be able to recover, because an opposition is not a sanitarium. If a party has inner strength, it may still be able to prevent the decline of the gods and to transform the present crisis into a healthy shock. The decision is in the hands of the delegates to the convention.
PARTY RIFT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO HEAL

Tel Aviv HA'AREZ in Hebrew 22 Feb 77 p 11

[Article by Amnon Barzilai: "Decision With Scars"

One of the fears shared by all of those who pull the strings in the Labor Party, on the eve of decision is: what will happen the day after the confrontation. A day before the secret vote by 3,000 delegates to the Labor Party convention, the estimate is that the results of the struggle between Prime Minister Rabin and Defense Minister Peres will not only have ramifications for the future of relations between them. The division of the party into two camps, practically hostile to one another, adds a new dimension, which did not exist at the time of the first challenge in the party center in June 1974.

What at first was represented to be a democratic struggle between two primary personalities within the party, in the last few months has descended to a struggle in the lower echelons of the party, a struggle in every district and chapter over every delegate, with all of the signs that accompany "persuasion." The battle between Rabin and Peres has become what is now called a war of "an eye for an eye." The question which concerns the few party people who are not involved is whether the future of relations between the various components of the party will not be determined according to the results of the confrontation. In other words, in the event that it is impossible to close up the breach between Rabin and Peres, will there be domestic tranquility within the party.

Peres' supporters have presented his primary motive for seeking the candidacy of the party as being a desire for change and new faces in the party. It is not impossible that this explanation was intended for public consumption more than for internal party purposes. For if these are the reasons for the challenge, why didn't Mr. Perez and his supporters use them in 1974. The unforeseen success of Mr. Peres 3 years ago, when he garnered 45 percent of the vote, was presented among other things as a protest against Pinhas Sapir, the man who ultimately was behind the selection of Rabin. But at the same time it must be remembered that about half of the members of the Labor Party Center said "no" to Rabin, even before he was prime minister, even before he was able to prove himself in a governmental post.
The Labor Party Center, in which the whole apparatus is housed, split in two on the vote. One also gets the impression that half of it rejected Rabin in spite of his governmental "record" as chief of staff in the Six-Day War, and as Israeli ambassador to the United States for 5 years. This means that the 45 percent against Rabin was not an expression of non-recognition of Rabin's talents. It could have been an automatically created front against a man who was a stranger, who had not been a part of the political life beforehand. For it is not a compliment to the party or its senior members if it must seek an outsider to lead it. It is natural that the party focii of power would unite in groups of various colors in order to block an "invasion" from outside, especially with regard to the top position.

The success of Rabin and his supporters in breaching every barrier in his way can be attributed to the trauma which the party experienced in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. Rabin has said more than once that were it not for the war, he would never have been selected to be prime minister. For the heads of the Labor Party were forced in the middle of 1974, after the publication of the Agranat Report, to shake off the image of the government of "oversight" and to find a person who had not been involved in the war. The "crowning" of Rabin as head of the Labor Party, an unprecedented act in the history of Israeli political life, was one of the first public confessions regarding the difficult situation of the Labor Party. It was proof, to those who did not believe, that the Labor Party had changed from a framework which in the not distant past had concentrated a rich cadre of leaders, to a party of brokers and powerless leaders. Its reservoir of people had become so poor that not one person could be found around whom the whole party could unite, with confidence that the public would also support it. Undoubtedly, the lack of available people stems from the lack of internal democracy within the party over the years, and the blocks to replacement of people in the upper echelon and the introduction of new faces.

One of the contradictions which accompanied the Rabin-Peres struggle was the images which were attached to each of them. Rabin was presented as a "historical MAPAI man," while Peres was presented as someone who expressed "renewal and change." The truth was the opposite. Shimon Peres is the veteran MAPAI man, while Rabin, until 3 years ago, was not active in the party. In the debate between the two camps, both sides acknowledged this fact. But the claims voiced were that Rabin had stuck with the veteran leadership of the party, typified by Yehoshua Rabinowitz and Golda Meir. On the other hand, Peres had depended for his support on younger people, like Elishu Speiser, Uzi Bar'am and Yosi Sarid.

But the confrontation between Rabin and Peres cut across what was called the historic MAPAI. While the RAFI faction supported Mr Peres and the Ahdut Ha'avodah faction supported Mr Rabin, within the center of the party opinion was divided. But not only the younger people supported Peres. Some of the veterans of the MAPAI apparatus support Mr Peres, among them being: Shraga Natzer, Yehudah Weismann, Avraham Zilberberg, Santa Yoseftal, Akiva Guvrin,
Rafael Bash, Ester Herlitz, Shalom Levin, Mikha Shavit and David Kaldron. On the other hand, among the supporters of Rabin was a substantial group of younger people, among them the two most prominent women in the party: Ora Namir, Na'ava Frekh and Moshe Shakkal, Uri Agami, Yehiel Ieket, Aharon Nakhmias, Zvi Aldorti and Nathan Ranan.

All of Mapai was divided against the background of the contention between Rabin and Peres. Parallel to the struggle over the prime ministry is an unceasing war for control of the party (since the death of Sapir). It is reasonable that the desire of Mr. Uzi Bar'am, for example, to be secretary of the party, ultimately drove him into the arms of Peres. His opponent for the position is Yehoshua Rabinoiwitz, who apparently is not to be a cabinet minister in the next government, and will replace Secretary General Meir Zarmi, who already announced his intention to leave his post after the convention. In the event of a struggle over the position, Mr. Bar'am is assured of the support of the whole Peres camp. Even if Mr. Rabin wins, Bar'am can depend upon some support in the camp of Rabin for his selection. On the other hand, Bar'am's prospects are not so good in a confrontation with Rabinoiwitz, were it not for the crossing of lines into the Peres camp.

The battle for hegemony of the party, which has lasted for years, reached its peak on 2 February, one day after the internal elections. Then the fight began between the Rabin and Peres camps over the 2,972 convention delegates. In 22 days, the two candidates traveled throughout the country, shaking hands, meeting with thousands of party people of whose existence they had never known, and making speeches in distant chapters.

On the surface, both candidates showed a lot of confidence in the campaign. The predictions of the two staffs who worked tirelessly in the American method were always optimistic. Both the Rabin and Peres people responded to every inquiry with assurances of "decisive victory," "large majority," "massive support." The idea was to project confidence on all of the delegates, to convince them to join the winning camp. What is interesting is that neither side backed down from its claim of more than 60 percent support. This is certainly an indication of the struggle which was being conducted all of the time between the two camps.

With all of the curiosity aroused by the struggle and its results, a number of organizational headaches will plague the convention tomorrow. One of them will endanger the very existence of the convention, when the delegates will be asked to change the party constitution in order to assure the "armor" of the members of the center, who were not elected to the convention, so that they may participate in the vote between Rabin and Peres. The delegates will also be asked to vote that, in one way or another, 60 to 80 percent of the present members of the center be assured of being members of the next center. This is one of the bitter pills which the delegates will be forced to swallow. It will be interesting to know if one of the delegates, or one of the 250,000 members of the party will get up, and by means of litigation attempt to prevent these measures, or at least postpone the confrontation.
About 2 weeks ago, MK Yizhaq Ben-Aharon warned of the confrontation, and said that it was no sporting competition. It is no friendly game, at the end of which the members of both teams will exchange shirts and leave the field hand in hand. Tomorrow, unlike the prior confrontation, the decision over the fate of the candidacy for the prime ministry and the leadership of the party may leave deep scars, and it is doubtful if the party will be able to heal itself in the 3 months before the elections for the Knesset.
Yizhaq Rabin has just added one more decoration to the many he already has—a decoration for winning a political fight. The latter is now added to those he has earned for being a young PALMAH officer, for being the victorious chief of staff of the Six-Day War and for being a successful diplomat in Washington. He has just added one more victory to his career, following a stubborn and tiring struggle, in which one of his basic characteristics was so well expressed: Yizhaq Rabin likes to win. In any confrontation, military, political or even in sports, he throws himself right in with the laurel of the victor being his main goal.

This time victory was particularly important for him. Never in the past 34 months did he forget that he was not elected prime minister, but got there because of a majority vote in his party's central committee. Although he did not underestimate this, it was for him more of an appointment, not the outcome of a democratic process of going to the polls. Rabin would like to be elected prime minister. In order to do that, he first had to overcome the obstacle that Defense Minister Shimon Peres presented.
Decades at the Helm

This obstacle is now out of the way. The way to the elections, where he hopes to win the nation's support, is now open.

Moreover, the Labor Party voted Yizhaq Rabin to be its uncontested leader. No other leader of the largest party in the country, a party that has been at the helm for decades, has ever had such an obstacle-laden road. From Ben-Gurion's time and on, the custom was to elect the leader at the central committee. The larger institutions were meant to only approve that decision. It was Rabin's lot to first be voted in by the committee and then by the delegates to the national convention.

No Additional Concessions

The 3,000 convention delegates were elected in local branches. When they voted, they must have been aware of the fact that first of all they were voting for their leader; a leader with whom they will now go to the 17 May elections.

It was Rabin's fate to get into an area which he detested in the past. When with the armistice negotiations 28 years ago, Lieutenant Colonel Yizhaq Rabin sent a note to his commander Major General Yigal Allon at the southern command saying: "I am fed up with diplomacy and politics." Just like that. One day before the signing of the armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt he left. His signature was not affixed to the agreement, because he believed that the Egyptians were so eager to arrive at an agreement that no more concessions were necessary.

Rabin, the soldier, hated politics and diplomacy, but 10 years ago, when he took off his lieutenant general's uniform, he started a new chapter, that of politics and diplomacy.

Rabin requested the ambassadorship on 22d St. in Washington, because he believed that relations between Israel and the United States are vital for Israel's future. Since he had been more in control of defense matters than any of his predecessors (because this is what happened during the late Levi Eshkol's premiership), he wanted a key position, that has bearing on the life of the nation and the country. Washington then seemed to him to be the right spot.

Later, when he realized that in the long run, considerations and decisions are in the hands of the prime minister, and only there, he started considering that as his next goal. From the minute he decides on a target, plans the approach, details all the tactical moves, he resumes his role as a military officer. He removes all likes and dislikes, all peripherals, and concentrates on the main effort.
Yizhaq Rabin appreciates diplomatic goals only as they are dictated by the national interest, uppermost in his mind and which he defines clearly. He never thought much of ceremonial amenities, external glitter and all other diplomatic ingredients. It was said about him that he is an "anti-diplomat." He was an ambassador who detested grins and small talk. At the same time, he was willing to come to a cocktail party if he had an appointment with someone from whom he hoped to learn something.

It was Golda Meir, when she was prime minister, who suggested that he actively enter politics. She discussed with him the question of joining the cabinet and heading a ministry. Although he did not discuss it even with his closest associates, it was clear that he aimed for the summit. Rabin considered the suggestion an opportunity to attain his goal.

Application To Join the Party

Upon one of his returns from Jerusalem to Washington, when he told associates that he was offered, by Golds Meir, to become development minister, there arose an unexpected problem: "Are you at all a party member?" he was asked. Stunned, Rabin hit his head and said: "Oh, no. I had better apply immediately." He rushed to his office to mail an application to the Labor Party secretary of the Tel Aviv branch.

A Typical Party Home

Neither Golda Meir nor any other leader ever conceived of the possibility that Yizhaq Rabin, son of Rosa and Nehemia Rabin, would not be a registered party member of the Labor Party. Because the son of these two, who were veterans of the labor movement in Tel Aviv, was born into a typical party home, where he breathed the atmosphere of a national mission from the day he was born.

It is possible that it was precisely this home, which was run with the idea of sharing the burden and ideological principles, which made the son Yizhaq detest politics so much. It is possible that all this political activity deprived him of his parents, mostly his mother, in those years when he needed them most. From the day he can remember, the family got up early, everyone rushed to work, and the children had to fend for themselves.

From Giv'at HaShelosha to Kadduri

Even when his mother returned home from work in the Tel Aviv workers' council, where she was a representative of the Histadrut, she did not stop her public work. There were always people around who asked for her help, advice and guidance. She never ceased helping and did her most for those who needed it.
Yizhaq was an introverted child whose way in life was dictated by his parents' world outlook. He graduated from the workers' elementary school, then went to high school in Giv'at HaShelosha, and from there to Ka'duri. This was his educational career where his character was formed, somewhat introverted but very deep. His lack of openness requires a lot of confidence to form opinions and relate his analyses. Rabin, who talked little as a child, later discovered this sense of confidence which gave rise to the qualities of leadership which he needed when he joined the PALMAH and became a young officer.

The military framework agreed with his personality. It did not require flexibility and it was enough for the professional, for the higher ranking person, to make the decision. Ones opinions did not play a role, no side interests were required.

A Mission and Little Recreation

To this day Rabin is not too candid. He likes familiar faces around him. When he is in front of an audience, he looks for somebody familiar and concentrates on that person. It may be that this is a vestige of his shyness, which was famous among his friends. "See how he blushes," they used to say when he got red in the face upon hearing a "spicy" joke. This was the blushing of a man who himself never used dirty language, always maintained proper decorum, a man who is almost puritanic.

This is how he was raised. It was a home with a mission, but which had little time for recreation.

His inability to use smooth language so as to avoid taking a stand, made it difficult for Rabin to become a politician. His natural inclination for concentrating only on the major issue further encumbered him. There are those who think that without this inability he would not have had to face the struggle for the leadership, and the nomination.

It was inevitable for all Israeli prime ministers to devote most of their energy to defense and foreign affairs. In this respect Rabin did not differ from his predecessors. But in the past 2 and-a-half years of his tenure as prime minister and up to his nomination, interior matters, the economy and social affairs were "hot" items that could not be ignored. A more seasoned politician would have sensed it long ago and would have found time to deal with them. Not so Rabin. As much as he appreciates these matters, his priorities are still with defense and foreign affairs. In other words, as long as there is no peace, he is not willing to give internal matters any priority. This is what differentiates him from a professional politician.

New Face

Recent months have established Rabin as a professional politician. He went to all party branches, met more members and activists than at any time prior to that. While listening to them he got to know them and probably learned a lot about what they think. This, no doubt, gave him the upper
hand. The experience will not be forgotten and probably will be expressed in the coming campaign months.

Friends and foes alike forget, during the internal campaign, that Yizhaq Rabin is actually a new face on our political arena. Peres, who challenged him, has a lot of seniority. When Rabin was still in uniform, Peres was already deputy defense minister. When Rabin was ambassador to Washington, Peres was already a cabinet member.

A "Family" Affair

From a historical point of view the nomination of Rabin was inevitable, being that he is a disciple of the elders among Israeli leaders. But the struggle at the Mann Auditorium remained a "family affair." It overshadowed the principles and guidelines for the future. These will become a major issue in the main campaign still ahead--the general elections.

Yizhaq Rabin came out of one of his most difficult campaigns. He came out victorious.
VOTING POLL SHOWS WIDE INDECISION

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 23 Feb 77 p 4

[Article: "More Than Half of Urban Jewish Voters Are Still Undecided"]

[Text] About 50 percent of the urban Jewish population eligible to vote are still the "unknown factor" that has not yet decided as to how to vote.

These figures were revealed in a survey conducted by the communications institute of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

The survey was conducted in November and December of last year and January and February of this year. It shows that hardly any changes have taken place in decisions of those eligible to vote as to how they are going to cast their vote. All this is going on against the background of public events like the suicide of Minister Of er, Ya'el's conviction and the confrontation between Rabin and Peres.

The survey shows that 56 percent of the adult urban Jewish population still does not know how to cast their votes. Only 37 percent responded positively that they know which party they are going to vote for. About 5 percent responded that they will either not vote or that they will insert a blank ballot. Some 2 percent refused to answer. The survey points out that the percentage of voters who still have not made up their mind is the same--more or less--for all educational levels.

About 6 weeks before the elections to the eighth Knesset the undecided constituted a relatively high percentage, which fluctuated between 41 and 48 percent, whereas now, as was mentioned above, it is 56 percent.

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