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USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No. 11, November 1977

The report contains articles by Soviet public figures, Americanologists, and others, on Soviet-American relations and on political, military, economic, scientific, technological, and other aspects of life in the United States and Canada.

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Sociology
Economics
Geography
Propaganda
USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No. 11, November 1977

Translation of the Russian-language monthly research journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences

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MAJOR EVENT OF THE 20TH CENTURY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 77 pp 3-6

[Summary] The date of 7 November 1977 will mark the 60th anniversary of the major event of the 20th century. No other event of our century can compare with the Great October Socialist Revolution in terms of its effect on the entire world. The 6 decades that have elapsed since the revolution have not provided us with any other event comparable to the October triumph. People throughout the world are still talking, arguing and writing about this revolution as if it had occurred just yesterday. And this is because the October Revolution did not suffer the same fate as many revolutions in the past. It never betrayed its noble ideals and never discarded its great plans for the reorganization of society and the reconstruction of international relations.

The full significance of the October Revolution in Russia can be judged from a brief account of the situation in Russia immediately prior to the October Revolution. During the 8 months between the February Revolution and the October Revolution, the bourgeois and petty bourgeois democrats and liberals who had assumed power in February were not able to lead the country out of war or to institute a single bourgeois democratic reform. They did not even had the courage to end the monarchic regime once and for all.

Bourgeois propaganda still glorifies the February Revolution as a truly "democratic" revolution in contrast to October. It deliberately ignores the fact that the Bolsheviks and communists had to complete the work of the bourgeois revolution before they could begin to work toward their own socialist goals. They destroyed the monarchic order, liquidated the nobility, instituted agrarian reforms, gave equal rights to women, separated the church from the state and legally established the freedom and equality of all nationalities. But this was not all, only the October Revolution could give the nation peace, lead Russia out of the imperialist war and save it from the inglorious fate being prepared for it by its "allies."
The establishment of the Soviet regime provided the gigantic laboring majority in the nation with unprecedented freedom and democracy to a degree that no capitalist nation could ever attain. Under incredible difficult conditions, our nation successfully implemented Lenin's plan for the construction of socialism. Socialist industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture, the cultural revolution and the just resolution of the ethnic problem all changed the face of our motherland within an amazingly short time. Socialism became a reality for the first time in history.

The heroic struggle of the Soviet people and their outstanding accomplishments are indissolubly connected with the activities of the communist party, the guiding force in Soviet society. This party has nothing in common with the bourgeois political parties in the West; it has close contacts with the working masses and performs all of its activities on behalf of the worker. All of the Soviet people's victories have been won under the guidance of the communist party.

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CSO: 1803
[Article by Gus Hall, general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States of America]

[Summary] If the people of our planet are now living in peace, this is precisely due to the efforts of the socialist community with the Soviet Union in the lead. Capitalism has led to two bloody and devastating world wars in our century. The capitalist structure, which derives colossal profits from the arms race and armed confrontation, is not capable of giving the world peace and security. The power of the military-industrial complex in the capitalist nations of the West is a direct threat to all civilization. One of the characteristic features of the capitalist West today is the dangerous game it is playing with the very latest weapon of mass destruction—the neutron bomb, which murders every living thing but preserves material goods so that they can be taken as trophies by the aggressor.

The Soviet Union is completely opposed to the arms race and is proving this with its tireless and purposeful struggle for peace. Graphic evidence of this struggle may be found in the multitude of Soviet proposals aimed at the reduction of arms and, ultimately, at general and complete disarmament. Several proposals of this kind are being discussed at the current session of the UN General Assembly.

Certain groups in the West are waging slanderous anti-Soviet campaigns, attempting to intervene in the domestic affairs of the USSR and making judgments on the Soviet way of life. It is interesting that these are the same groups that gave such a hostile reception to the Great October Socialist Revolution and sent American soldiers overseas to suppress this revolution. The old world has learned nothing during the last 60 years.

The new Constitution of the USSR is a mirror of Soviet life today and a window to its future. The very process by which the new constitution was discussed and ratified exemplifies the spirit of Soviet democracy. It is the product of the creative labor of millions of people. The majority of
Soviet adults participated in its discussion and submitted around 400,000 suggestions in regard to amendments of certain articles, amplifications of others and supplements to the original draft. On the basis of these suggestions, around 150 changes were introduced into the final draft. Naturally, the Constitution of the USSR primarily concerns Soviet citizens, but people of good will throughout the world are enthusiastically applauding the sections pertaining to foreign policy.

The 60 years of the Soviet state's existence have conclusively proved that socialism provides an answer to the most serious and urgent problems. Only socialism is capable of delivering mankind forever from the threat of devastating war and guaranteeing the people of our planet inalienable human rights, prosperity and happiness.
OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND CANADA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 77 pp 10-13

[Article by William Kashtan, general secretary of the Communist Party of Canada]

[Summary] The 60 years that have elapsed since the Great October Socialist Revolution have literally transformed the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. This major event of the 20th century put an end to the exploitation of one class by another, one nation by another and one individual by another. The revolution gave birth to a society which not only proclaimed human rights but also took measures to guarantee their observance. It ushered in a new era in the history of mankind—the era of worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism.

These 60 years have witnessed impressive achievements by the Soviet Union in all spheres, and not only in the USSR. The revolution had a powerful and immediate effect on the movement against imperialism and colonialism. It gave the working class in the capitalist world confidence in its struggle against the monopolies and in defense of its basic rights. Canada was no exception to this rule.

Canadian workers and farmers received the news of the October Revolution in 1917 with great joy and enthusiasm. Lenin's Decree on Peace was praised by the Canadians, who had grown tired of war and were searching for a means of escaping it. Numerous meetings were held throughout Canada in support of the revolution. Collections were taken up to assist the revolution and messages of solidarity were sent to Lenin.

Prior to the time of the October Revolution, Canada did not have a consistently Marxist, truly revolutionary party. October dramatically changed this situation by causing the Canadian workers to begin serious study of the interrelationship between Marxism and the mass workers movement. The revolution in Soviet Russia aroused a spirit of proletarian internationalism in the Canadian working class, which began to realize that the cause of the Soviet Government and population was their own cause.
The Soviet State's consistent struggle for peaceful coexistence has had a profound effect on the Canadian public. The Canadians realize that a thermonuclear war could turn their nation into a wasteland. They realize that the Soviet Union's persistent struggle for peace, peaceful coexistence, detente and disarmament has restrained reactionary imperialist forces up to the present time. The last 60 years have demonstrated that the genuine national interests of Canada can be best served by means of close cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Despite all of the imperialist attempts to denigrate the decisive role of the October Revolution, the truth about the achievements of socialism can neither be concealed nor denied. Imperialist attempts to label the October Revolution a "Russian phenomenon" have also been unsuccessful. Its international significance has constantly grown over the last 60 years and will continue to grow. It is now an established fact that the Leninist course is the only victorious way of achieving, developing and defending socialism.
No other event has had so profound and all-encompassing an effect on the 20th century and historical progress as the Great October Socialist Revolution. In any sphere of life we examine—economics or politics, the spiritual life of society or the issues of war and peace, the national problem or social relations—the tremendous influence of October, the construction and triumph of socialism in our nation, stands out as a factor of worldwide historic significance.

Our topic for discussion today is democracy and humanism. We will discuss this topic primarily in connection with the 60th anniversary of October, in connection with the changes that have taken place in this sphere in the Soviet Union since October and, naturally, in connection with the fact that this sphere itself has become one of the areas of comparison, one of the criteria for evaluating the two socioeconomic systems, and, one of the most important areas. There is good reason for the unceasing ideological struggle over this area.

Certain propaganda campaigns can be planned by U.S. ruling circles in accordance with specific political calculations. Judging by all the evidence, calculations of this kind lie at the basis of the so-called "human rights" campaign as well.

This, however, should not hide the fundamental fact that, in itself, the ideological struggle over the issue of democracy and the correspondence of the chief aims of a specific social system to the principles of humanitarianism, just as the struggle over the very meaning of such concepts as democracy and humanitarianism, is completely governed by natural laws. The merits or defects of any social order are ultimately judged in our era by fundamental
facts—by what the order gives the individual and the majority of the members of a society and by the degree to which it corresponds to the interests and aspirations of the workers. This is the reason for the paramount significance of the nature and developmental level of democracy, the actual position the individual is offered in society and the opportunities provided by the society for his happiness, success and thorough personal development.

The 60-year history of socialism conclusively proves that the new social order has accomplished historic feats in this important area. And it has done this in spite of the difficult legacy it inherited from the strict tsarist autocracy, in spite of the terrible wars fought against the Nation of Soviets by foreign interventionists and then by German fascism and, finally, in spite of the natural difficulties encountered by any nation following an uncharted course and having to be the pioneer in taking this course because its huge size and new historic experience has made it impossible for it to follow any previously tested course.

It is profoundly symbolic that the celebration of the 60th anniversary of October has coincided with the elaboration, nationwide discussion and adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR. In a definite sense, this constitution summarizes the results of the course that has been traveled and simultaneously defines the fundamental characteristics of the present stage in the development of Soviet society.

The new Constitution of the USSR legally secures the present developmental level of socialist democracy and stipulates the basic guidelines for its further improvement and the development of its chief institutions. We have every right to say that no legal document in the world has been permeated more with the spirit of true democracy and concern for the genuine rights, freedoms, success and happiness of the individual. These are the reasons for the paramount international significance of the new Constitution of the USSR. As Chairman L. I. Brezhnev of the Constitutional Commission said in his speech at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 24 May 1977: "The adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR, a constitution of mature socialism and a constitution of incipient communism, will not only be a historic event for our nation, but also an event of enormous international significance. Its implementation will have a profound long-term effect far beyond the boundaries of our motherland."

The participants in today's discussion are mostly experts on American area studies. Naturally, in discussing the heroic course traveled by our nation for 60 years, our achievements in the development of socialist democracy and the new Constitution of the USSR, they cannot ignore their own immediate sphere of interests. I am referring to the problems in American society, including the present situation in the United States in the area of democratic rights and freedoms, as well as the causes and objectives of the American "human rights" campaign, its true meaning and its actual effect on the international situation and Soviet-American relations.
These subjects will most probably be discussed in detail by our comrades here. In this introductory speech, I would only like to point out a few facts.

One of them is that the actual causes and concerns of U.S. ruling circles obviously contradict the moral principles and ideals with which they are trying to "sanctify" the anti-Soviet campaign that has been stimulated by the issue of so-called "human rights." Scandalous violations of democratic rights, even in the narrow, traditionally bourgeois interpretation of the term, have taken place and are taking place in the United States. It is obvious, however, that ruling circles in the nation are not worried about this. They have a diametrically opposed objective: they must make American society, and Western society in general, more "controllable" by restricting democracy and stimulating the social and political passivity of citizens. This conclusion can be drawn from the political practices of the American Government and from the theoretical works that reflect the prevailing views in ruling circles (as one example of this, we can cite the report of the notorious "Trilateral Commission" with the characteristic title "The Crisis of Democracy").

The second fact is that U.S. ruling circles are persistently trying to give a more narrow meaning to the very term democracy by excluding socioeconomic human rights from this category. The reasons for this tendency are self-evident: bourgeois law recognizes the right of ownership as a basic socioeconomic right. But this right, which is still a minority privilege, conflicts with the very idea of federal guarantees for such socioeconomic civil rights as the right to work, recreation, public health care, education, housing and so forth.

Another fact is also obvious: by taking on the role, without any grounds for this whatsoever, of a kind of "judge" or "teacher" in matters regarding international morals, U.S. ruling circles are aiming at specific internal and external political targets, which have been repeatedly pointed out, particularly by Soviet experts on American affairs. For example, they have correctly pointed out the fact that this pose is largely defensive, reflecting a desire to somehow restore the seriously undermined reputation of the American way of life, the American political system and the American form of "democracy," primarily in the eyes of the American public, as well as, naturally, the world public.

Something else, however, is also self-evident: the main target of the attacks that are part of this campaign is the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. There is no doubt that a more active ideological struggle is being waged against these nations and, what is more, it is an ideological struggle combined with the kind of extensive subversive activity that was characteristic of the cold war.
This subversive basis of the "human rights" campaign has been resolutely condemned in our nation and in others. It is particularly dangerous to detente, to normal relations between the USSR and the United States and to the possibility of concerted Soviet-American efforts in the prevention of war and the consolidation of peace.

As for the ideological struggle, we are completely prepared to wage it in this sphere as well. The instigators of the "human rights" campaign frequently argue that the fight for these rights reflects a worldwide tendency that is currently gathering strength.

To a certain degree, we can agree with this, if, naturally, the very concept of human rights is not reduced to the issue of so-called "dissidents," the demand for freedom to disseminate anti-Soviet propaganda and so forth. The democratic aspirations of the masses throughout the world are definitely growing stronger—this is one of the distinctive features of our era.

The organizers of anti-Soviet campaigns are completely wrong, however, in thinking that they will be able to use these aspirations and feelings as a stepping stone to climb to the heights of the "wave of the future." These democratic aspirations do not fit into the Procrustean Bed of bourgeois democracy in general and its American variety in particular. In actuality, these are aspirations which take in political and socioeconomic rights, the demand for the true equality of all races and nationalities and the rights of women and children. This "wave of the future" will increasingly require conscious control over society for the purpose of truly humanitarian objectives which concern all mankind, including the resolution of the increasingly urgent problems of resources and the environment, including planning that can place economic, scientific and technical development at the service of the people and satisfy their demands for food, housing, education and public health care and, finally, including the guarantee of the moral and physical health of society's members and an adequate way of life for the individual.

Western propagandists cannot expect easy victory in any of these spheres. On the contrary, these are areas of ideological struggle that will be extremely difficult for capitalism since it is precisely in these spheres that the great conquests of the new, socialist society are most evident.

And, finally, the last fact: morality can be an extremely dangerous instrument of foreign policy. This was vividly demonstrated by the activities of John Foster Dulles, who represented a model of unyielding puritanical morality when he occupied a responsible political post. It is a short step from this kind of "morality" to the idea of a "crusade," and this kind of idea, which paves the way for the most amoral intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations, could result in a catastrophe in the nuclear age.

We must not forget that the first human right always has been and will be the right to life (incidentally, this is the place it occupies in the American Declaration of Independence). Peace and the prevention of nuclear war are now the most important and highest requirements of democracy and
humanism. One of the greatest results of October was the fact that a state, waging a consistent and resolute struggle for peace and the peaceful coexistence of states regardless of their social order, came into being on our planet. In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union has always been guided by the principles of Leninist humanitarianism. "The end of war, peace among nations and the end of robbery and violence—this is precisely our ideal," V. I. Lenin declared. The special section on foreign policy in the Constitution of the USSR legally secures the invariability of this course of the Soviet Union in the international arena. And this emphasizes the humanitarianism of the socialist society with particular force, the humanitarianism that is equally reflected in every aspect of its domestic and foreign policies.

Great October, Socialist Democracy and the Contemporary Ideological Struggle, R. G. Bogdanov

The Great October Socialist Revolution, the 60th anniversary of which is being celebrated this year by the Soviet people, the people of the socialist countries and all progressive mankind, marked the beginning of a new era in history.

In 1920, in summarizing the first experiences of the young Soviet Republic, V. I. Lenin stressed the fact that the Russian Revolution had certain features which were "not of local, specifically national, Russian significance alone, but international as well." The 6 decades for which our nation has traveled the course of October have completely corroborated Lenin's conclusion. Many of the aspects of the USSR's experience in socialist and communist construction have embodied general tendencies in the establishment of the new, communist structure.

The Soviet Union has constructed the first mature socialist society in the world, a society based on democracy of a new type and governed by concern for the individual. We can say without exaggeration that the achievements of our nation in this area are of worldwide historic significance and signify a new stage in the development of humanitarianism.

These achievements were profoundly reflected in the adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR, which has given a special meaning to the 60th anniversary of the Soviet regime and has defined an important tendency in our theoretical scientific activity and our struggle against anticommunist ideology. "On the whole," L. I. Brezhnev pointed out in his report "On the Draft of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," "we can say that the main tendency in the new content of the draft is broader and deeper socialist democracy."

One of the fundamental, profoundly humanitarian ideals of Marxism is the ideal of free, thorough personal development. When we compare the 1918 Constitution of the RSFSR, the 1924 and 1936 constitutions of the USSR and the new Constitution of the USSR, we can easily see how the Soviet State,
guided by the communist party, has moved toward this goal step by step and how the rights of Soviet citizens have become more extensive and have gained deeper meaning.

Naturally, many bourgeois constitutions, including the Constitution of the United States, also contain articles that consistently reflect a humanitarian spirit and proclaim the rights and freedoms of the citizens of their own nations. These rights and freedoms, however, almost always remain empty declarations because they lack adequate material guarantees and sometimes conflict with the moral values prevailing in the society and the prejudices supported by the bourgeoisie. "Statements alleging that the United States is a nation of political and economic democracy," American historian Howard Zinn writes, "have always fallen apart in any confrontation with the actual values of American society. The power of the corporations and the race for profits have always been more real than any slogans referring to a "state of universal prosperity." The political domination of the bourgeoisie has always been more real than any discussions about "representative government."

One of the fundamental features of socialist democracy, which was personified by the adoption of the new constitution, is particularly evident against this background. This is the existence of firm material guarantees backing up the rights proclaimed by law.

One of the important features of democracy in the mature socialist society is the large group of socioeconomic, political and personal rights and freedoms granted to citizens. It should be emphasized that the socioeconomic rights do not simply supplement political rights and freedoms, but serve as a kind of material prerequisite for the more complete and consistent implementation of the latter.

Bourgeois democracy proclaims the freedom of the individual. But the freedom of the individual is only truly guaranteed and truly universal when the class, nationality and ethnic group to which the individual belongs are also free. Socialist democracy has found—and this is clearly reflected in the new constitution—a solution to this problem by, on the one hand, contributing toward the convergence of all social strata, nationalities and ethnic groups and, on the other, proclaiming and guaranteeing the equality of all Soviet citizens regardless of their origins, social and financial status, nationality or race, sex, educational level, language, attitude toward religion, type and nature of profession, place of residence and other circumstances.

The new Constitution of the USSR is being heartily approved in the fraternal socialist countries and is supported by communist and progressive forces in the capitalist world and the developed countries. The worldwide bourgeoisie, however, is trying to distort the actual meaning of this historic document and eradicate its international repercussions. This has been reflected in the campaign being waged in the West, primarily in the United States, "in defense of human rights."
The issue of human rights has always occupied a prominent position in the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism because the difference between the two outlooks and the two sociopolitical systems is most apparent in the very interpretation of human rights and freedoms. Today, however, this issue is not only in the foreground of the ideological struggle, but has also become a cause of political confrontation in the international arena.

Washington officials have had to puzzle out ways to reinforce the United States' diminished authority overseas and to restore the prestige of "American democracy" in the eyes of the Americans themselves. And this is why expectations are placed on the moral rhetoric and noise over "human rights." The current American Administration is playing the role of an impartial moral judge, acting "by the dictates of conscience" and rigorously condemning violations of human rights, wherever they may be found. When put to the test, however, the impartiality of the self-proclaimed judges turns out to be more than doubtful, since the spearhead of the campaign is directed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

It is a fact that moralizing is traditional in American bourgeois politics and it is possible that the Carter Administration will be able to convince the U.S. citizens for some time that the new leaders in the nation are highly moral people who care about the individual--it is possible because the Americans themselves would like very much to believe this. But the things that might sometimes "work" at home are not always effective when it comes to international affairs.

The Soviet Union has never refused to take part in a serious and constructive discussion of human rights. Sufficient evidence of this may be found in the initiatives and activities of our diplomats in the United Nations or the active part taken by the Soviet Union in the preparations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and in the actual organization of the conference. But our state does categorically reject any attempts at intervention in our domestic affairs, regardless of the excuse given for them. This also applies to the attempts of self-proclaimed moralists to teach us how to interpret human rights, how to conduct policy, what to do and what not to do.

In comparing the relative positions of the individual in the capitalist and socialist societies, our critics are trying to make it appear that there is some kind of single, abstract democracy and that there are abstract rights and freedoms which must serve as the scale for measuring the position of the individual in different social systems. In actuality, their "standard" is, naturally, not some kind of abstract democracy, but bourgeois democracy, and the bourgeois interpretation of human rights and freedoms, which are then mechanically superimposed on the socialist society. When this operation reveals a completely natural lack of correspondence between the realities of socialist society and the norms of bourgeois democracy and morals, our ideological opponents loudly tell the entire world about the
"lack of human rights and freedoms" in the socialist society. This is the nature of the "impartiality" and "objectivity" of the bourgeois moralists.

The gap between the humanistic rhetoric and actual political practices that are characteristic of the bourgeois "defenders" of human rights is clearly manifested in their views on the issues of peace, disarmament and international detente. These are precisely the criteria that are being used today to verify the sincerity of all humanistic declarations, since they pertain to the very existence of mankind.

The great humanitarians of the past dreamed of eternal peace. During the last 60 years, since the adoption of Lenin's Decree on Peace in October 1917, our nation has always followed a course of peaceful coexistence by states with different social structures, universal and total disarmament and the elimination of war from the life of man. The Program of Peace proposed by the 24th CPSU Congress was an important milestone along this course. Now Lenin's policy of peace has been consolidated by the adoption of the constitution of mature socialism. According to Article 28 of the new constitution, "war propaganda is forbidden by law in the USSR." Later, in Article 29, we read: "The USSR's relations with other states are based on the observance of the principle of mutual rejection of the use of force or the threat of force." The Soviet Union's present struggle to promote international detente corresponds completely to these articles in the new constitution and to the policy of our party. The policy of detente is in the interest of the mature socialist society, and this is a fact which we have never concealed from anyone. At the same time, however, this policy is ultimately also in the interest of the American people and all people in the world.

We must say, with regret and some alarm, that many Western politicians who call themselves "humanists" are actually trying to stop the process of detente and are not diminishing the threat of nuclear war. Incidentally, we recently witnessed the emergence of a new variety of "humanism"--the "humanism" of the neutron bomb, the production of which was announced by the U.S. President. Naturally, discussions can be held on the most "humane" way of killing a person--killing him immediately or forcing him to suffer. But please allow us to say that this kind of "humanism" is not only amoral, but also dangerous, since it constitutes a real threat to the cause of peace. This "humanism" of the neutron bomb, when viewed seriously, cancels out all of the humanitarian rhetoric of the bourgeois moralists.

A difficult struggle lies before us--a struggle for the continuation of the course toward detente and for the restraint of militaristic and aggressive forces. Nonetheless, we have every reason to view the future with optimism. We see a guarantee of this in the present international balance of power and the high level of material development and moral maturity of our society, which is entering a new decade in its glorious history.
Some Characteristics of the Crisis of Bourgeois Democracy, V. A. Tumanov

The development of the United States and other nations in the West in recent years has completely confirmed the conclusion of the 25th CPSU Congress on the further intensification of the general crisis of capitalism and the crisis of the state-monopolistic system. The machinery of state-monopolistic power and its main link—government with its expanded functions—have not only failed to eliminate the deep-seated, fundamental contradictions of the capitalist system, but have themselves experienced an ideological and political crisis, which is particularly graphically exemplified by the United States.

History has discredited the fascist and pro-fascist forms of government as the antithesis of democracy. This was corroborated by the collapse of the fascist and pro-fascist regimes in Portugal, Spain and Greece and the reaction of the world public to the tragic events in Chile. Under these conditions, the course of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, which was exposed by V. I. Lenin and has continued to exist, toward a transition from bourgeois democracy to reaction—which invariably accompanies imperialism—is taking more modern forms. The immediate objective of the antidemocratic course of monopolistic circles in the main bourgeois countries apparently does not consist today in a total rejection of the republican-democratic form of government and political regime, but in the retention of this external structure with a simultaneous maximal reduction in the actual political influence of the particular institutions of bourgeois democracy that can be used by the workers to the detriment of the monopolies' machinery of political authority.

One of the areas of this kind of deformation concerns the establishment of extraconstitutional systems of official and quasi-official agencies that are part of the government or close to the government (committees, advisory commissions, etc.), systems which give organizational form to the combination of governmental power with the power of the monopolies. It is precisely this informal, extraconstitutional and uncontrolled political structure that is playing an ever-increasing role in the engineering of policy and the process of responsible political decision-making. The augmentation of the role of government in public life as a result of the development of state-monopolistic capitalism objectively requires the democratization of federal control, which is being insisted upon by progressive forces in society, headed by communist and workers parties. Ruling monopolistic circles are striving for the opposite, as a result of which the bourgeois-democratic forms of government are in a state of crisis.

Another way of deforming bourgeois democracy concerns the institution of civil rights and freedoms and their organization. We are not referring to the particular (let us conditionally call it "objective") deformation of personal rights and freedoms in the capitalist society that is an inevitable result of some of this society's essential features, such as
economic inequality, the exploitation of the labor of others and the acquisition of profits by any means. We are speaking of a "subjective" course followed by ruling circles, in which various political, judicial, socioeconomic and other measures and various types of political and ideological manipulation are used to nullify the social potential of the rights and freedoms won by the workers in a difficult class struggle. The American political scientists who say that McCarthyism is dead are mistaken. To some degree, the overt, imprudent and hysterical McCarthyism of the 1950's is now a thing of the past. The McCarthyism that has remained is "quiet" but constant, and probably, no less effective.

We must also remember that at this time of extensive struggle by the workers against signs of antidemocratism, the crisis of bourgeois democracy cannot be regarded as the cut-and-dried eradication of its chief institutions. It would be wrong to view the process in this way, as if bourgeois democracy had at one time, during the period of industrial capitalism, reached its acme and had then steadily declined. The evolution of bourgeois democracy represents a complex and contradictory process. In a certain sense, we could say that the crisis of bourgeois democracy presupposes its sufficiently broad development, just as the successful utilization of its institutions by the bourgeoisie's class enemies. During the pre-monopolistic period of capitalist society, there was no crisis of democracy as a general process primarily because bourgeois democracy was limited by the narrow framework of "qualified government" and its institutions quite firmly guaranteed the omnipotence of the exploitative classes.

Last but not least, another characteristic of the crisis of bourgeois democracy consists in the fact that it is developing under the conditions of confrontation between the two social systems and, besides this, precisely at a time when the socialist society is demonstrating new and brilliant achievements in the development and perfection of socialist democracy.

Bourgeois ideology and propaganda imply that the international pacts on human rights are a result of the development of bourgeois democracy, which has served as the basic model for these pacts. But this is far from the truth. While the development of the institutional rights and freedoms was influenced by "classic" bourgeois constitutional acts and declarations during the 19th century, the development of this institution in our century has largely been influenced by socialist ideals and the constitutional acts and declarations embodying them. Their international influence has been one of the important factors forcing the capitalistic states to recognize basic rights—the right to work, the equality of men and women, etc. It is with good reason that, in contrast to the socialist countries, the main capitalist nation—the United States—is not prepared to ratify some of the abovementioned pacts.

One event of international significance, which will indisputably have a great influence on many political and ideological processes throughout the world, is the adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR. In the report "On the
Draft of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," L. I. Brezhnev said: "We are opposing the distorted and vulgar interpretation of democracy and human rights by bourgeois and revisionist propaganda with our complete and realistic complex of the rights and obligations of citizens of the socialist society. We are placing the truly epoch-making conquests of our workers, which have been a consequence of our working class regime guided by the communist party, on the scales of history."

Human Rights: Two Concepts, I. A. Geyevskiy

Each concept of human rights has its own historical parameters and class content.

In the United States, the concept of human rights took shape during the first American revolution, the liberation war against English tyranny, and during the years when an independent state was established. The Declaration of Independence (1776) proclaimed such inalienable rights as the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, as well as the right of the people to overthrow the government by revolutionary means if their trust in this government has been misplaced. The Bill of Rights, which was adopted as a set of amendments to the Constitution as a result of active struggle by the masses, proclaims freedom of speech, assembly and so forth.

At that time, this indisputably signified expansion of the rights of the population. Even then, however, the inconsistency of bourgeois democracy in its American form was apparent: it reconciled itself to black slavery and denied the right to vote to women, the poor and other social groups—that is, most of the population. The limited nature of bourgeois democracy was not only apparent in its nonobservance of even the principle of the formal equality of citizens, regardless of their sex, race, nationality and financial status. The legal recognition of these democratic rights required almost 2 centuries of struggle by the masses. The limited nature of American democracy was also apparent in the fact that, from the very beginning, it was based on the principle of the security of private property, which was supported by all of the "founding fathers." They believed that only the owners of private property should be given governmental authority. "Those who own the nation," John Jay, first chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, stated, "should also control it."

The more progressive thinkers of that time realized how much the democratic rights of Americans would be threatened by the unlimited augmentation of the wealth of "those who own the nation." B. Franklin warned: "Power combined with enormous wealth is all that is needed for this power to become absolute."

The subsequent development of the United States corroborated this statement. Under the conditions of state-monopolistic capitalism, the augmentation of the power of the financial oligarchy was marked by an intensification of political reaction in all spheres, a tendency toward the minimization of
formally declared human rights and the intensification of overt and covert struggle against dissidence. This is accompanied by the development of an opposite tendency—the growing desire of the masses to secure and expand their own democratic rights and freedoms.

When Washington announced its spurious campaign "in defense of human rights" as one of the principles of its foreign policy, it ignored the flagrant violation of these rights throughout the United States. No concrete program was proposed to guarantee the rights of Americans. Washington reduced its "exported" concept of human rights to "the free exchange of ideas and individuals," actually interpreting this as the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the socialist countries.

The problem of American bourgeois democracy must be examined in its concrete sociopolitical context. The attempt to represent political procedures in the United States as some kind of universal and eternal standard contradicts the elementary requirements for an analysis of social phenomena.

Great October marked the beginning of a new era in history. Socialism gave a qualitatively new, immeasurably richer meaning to the very concept of human rights and freedoms. "If freedom," V. I. Lenin said, "is not subordinated to the interests of liberating labor from capitalist oppression, it is a fraud."

The implementation of the ideals of October and the triumph of the new social order signified the triumph of true freedom for the masses—freedom from exploitation, from all forms of social and national oppression and from crises and unemployment. Socialism made the people the only master and creator of the new life, since "living, creative socialism is the creation of the masses themselves" (V. I. Lenin).

In contrast to American bourgeois democracy, socialist democracy does not only proclaim and legally secure all human rights and freedoms, but also establishes the necessary economic, political, social and cultural conditions to guarantee the actual realization of these rights by all citizens of the society. "As we build communism," L. I. Brezhnev said, "we will develop democracy more and more. Naturally, this will be socialist democracy—that is, the kind of democracy that encompasses the political, social and economic spheres, the kind of democracy that guarantees social justice and social equality above all else."

The profound changes that have occurred in our society during the last 40 years have been reflected in the new Constitution of the USSR. Theses on the rights of Soviet citizens, including socioeconomic rights and freedoms, have been further developed.
Constitutional Guarantees of Justice in the USSR and the United States,
B. S. Nikiforov

One of the intrinsic characteristics of the constitution of the socialist state is, as the new Constitution of the USSR emphasizes, the realistic nature of the rights and freedoms it proclaims. This is primarily due to the fact that rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the very living conditions in the socialist state. Living conditions, in turn, are secured in one form or another in the constitution and, on this basis, in "applied" legislation, as a result of which constitutional rights are not only materially guaranteed by living conditions but are also legally guaranteed on two levels, including the constitutional level.

For example, the constitutional right to leisure time is materially guaranteed primarily by the concern displayed by the socialist society and, consequently, the state, for the alternation of labor and leisure under the conditions of harmonious personal development both as a goal in itself and as a prerequisite to ensure that the participants in socialist production will be highly capable in their work. Legally, this right is secured by its proclamation in the constitution and by the legal establishment of the necessary social conditions for leisure: a working day of a certain length, annual paid vacations, an extensive network of cultural, educational and health care establishments, etc.

If we bear this general characteristic of socialist law in mind, we can use the same approach even in those cases when the constitution proclaims certain civil rights without listing the social or legal prerequisites for its execution in detail.

This applies to constitutional guarantees of justice, such as equality before the law and the courts (articles 34 and 156 of the new Constitution of the USSR), the inviolability of the individual and his residence (articles 54 and 55), the right of the accused to defense (Article 158) and the right to plead guilty to a crime and to be punished for the crime in no other way than by a court sentence and in accordance with criminal law (Article 160). The practicability of these civil rights is primarily ensured by the growing social homogeneity of Soviet society (Article 19) and the equality of men and women before the law (Article 35).

These conditions, which are also secured on the constitutional level and in "applied" laws, reflect and confirm a state of affairs in which all persons involved in the exercise of justice are not in the position of class, racial or national confrontation with one another in spite of the variety of roles they may play in this process and in spite of all possible social differences between them. Regardless of how contradictory their interests may be in this process, they are citizens of the socialist state of all the people and members of the mature socialist society. For the first time in mankind's history, this kind of social and sociopsychological
situation is proving to be an essential and adequate condition for the existence of a truly legal government, the kind of government in which government agencies and the government itself function on the basis of laws (Article 4) and the reinforcement of the legal basis of state and public life is one of the elements of broader democracy as the major tendency in the development of the political system.

According to the plans of its authors, the Constitution of the United States was not supposed to contain—and does not contain—any reference whatsoever to civil rights, particularly judicial guarantees. The Bill of Rights, which does stipulate such guarantees, was adopted several years after the Constitution at the insistence of the states, despite the reluctance of the central authorities to agree to this. In other words, constitutional guarantees of justice were, from the very beginning of U.S. history, a concession to the public that the central government was forced to make. This was something of a symbolic indication of future events, marked by the negative attitude of the American Government and its agencies toward judicial guarantees. They saw them as an impediment to the scope of their own power. Besides this, prior to the end of the Civil War and the ratification of the 14th Amendment—that is, for almost 80 years—the Bill of Rights only applied to federal institutions. The states only observed judicial guarantees to the degree that these guarantees were stipulated by state legislation.

The situation was made even more undemocratic by several factors. One of them, in line with the statements made above, consisted in the fact that the most important judicial guarantee, which, to a significant extent, summarized all of the other guarantees (for example, the right to have the assistance of counsel for defense, the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, the guarantee against self-accusation, the right to a confrontation with accusing witnesses, etc.), namely the guarantee of "due process of law," which the 14th Amendment extended to the states, was not used by the U.S. Supreme Court for the purpose of intervention in the jurisdiction of states to protect constitutional guarantees of justice until the end of the 1920's. In other words, the state of affairs that had existed prior to the adoption of the 14th Amendment continued to exist even after this for more than half a century—and only because the Supreme Court did not wish to make any changes in the situation. All of these events resulted, as the above statements indicate, that constitutional guarantees of justice have only been in effect to an equal degree throughout the nation for no more than around 50 years of the 200-year history of American law.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the judicial guarantees in the Bill of Rights were formulated as the direct opposite of various ways in which the English Crown had misused the judiciary. In time, these formulas lost some of their relevance to social realities and, for this reason, had to be supplemented with specific, "operational" meaning by means of U.S. Supreme Court decisions: an "actual" constitution developed along with the
"legal" constitution; the Supreme Court formulated "actual" civil rights along with the "legal" civil rights. This process can be observed during different stages of Supreme Court activities, but it is particularly interesting to compare the present conservative leanings of the court with its recent (1953-1969) "liberal-activist" tendency, particularly in the area of guarantees concerning unreasonable searches and the use of illegally acquired evidence.

This provides a basis for a brief political and legal description of the constitutional guarantees of justice in the United States.

In the first place, it appears that, in view of the degree to which they actually influence U.S. Supreme Court decisions and the way to which they have been developed by these decisions, they can only be called constitutional in the conventional sense. The actual significance of this is reflected in the fact that they are not distinguished by the precision and stability that are characteristic of constitutional premises.

In the second place, legal guarantees of justice in the United States are not secured by the economic or political living conditions in American society, where persons involved in the exercise of justice are in a position of class, racial and national confrontation with one another, which creates a state of actual inequality, invariably to the detriment of the poor and members of racial and ethnic minorities.

In the third place, in view of all the statements above, instead of reflecting and securing the prerequisites for justice, legal guarantees of justice in the United States are actually used to enforce inequality in the judicial sphere. Just as other premises of American law, they actually reflect the policies of capital and bourgeois ideology, the ethnic, religious and racial policies of the bourgeoisie. The current situation in this area reaffirms the fact that, "in real life," as famous American socialist Clarence Darrow said more than 60 years ago, "the laws exist to protect those who rule the world."

The American Working Class and the Hypocritical Moralists, Ya. N. Keremetskiy

Bourgeois politicians in the United States are subtly trying to convince the world public that the issue of human rights is a "purely moral" problem unrelated to class considerations.

To what degree are the rights of hired laborers, members of the American working class--75-80 percent of the national population--guaranteed in the United States? This question is particularly pertinent because public interest in this matter in the United States, as public opinion polls show, is greater now than at any time since the 1930's.

The American working class has even less economic and social rights than those stipulated by the laws of other developed capitalist countries. This primarily applies to the right to work, which has now become the major class concern of the American workers.
Contemporary American workers regard the right to work as a concrete government guarantee of full employment. Their own experience has convinced them of the absolute ineffectiveness of the Employment Act of 1946. The vague statements in this act about the provision of "maximum employment" represented the loophole, which, in the 1950's, permitted the government and the ideologists substantiating its antilabor policy to convince the public that full employment meant a 3-percent rate of unemployment. In 1960, the figure had risen to 4 percent, and enough data has been accumulated in the 1970's for the conclusion that a 4.5-5-percent rate of unemployment will be represented to the public as "full employment" by 1980.

At the same time, the government and its ideologists indirectly admit that they are depriving 5-6 million workers (primarily youth, women and the ethnic minorities suffering the most discrimination in hiring practices) of the possibility of exercising their "inalienable rights" of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, which are stipulated in the Declaration of Independence. As Senator Humphrey (one of the politicians who is extremely worried by the working class' leftward shift and tendency toward radicalism due to the high rate of unemployment) remarked with justification, "no man or woman can be free if they are told that they are not needed as workers, that they are superfluous."

Senator Humphrey's opinion deserves consideration because he is the co-author of a bill submitted to Congress in 1975 which envisages certain minimal guarantees of a relatively high level of employment on the part of the government. Even Senator Humphrey admits, however, that this bill has little chance of becoming a new act on "full employment" within the near future, even in the abbreviated form the bill acquired after it had been discussed three times in congressional committees. The present administration completely agrees with large capital's idea that the guarantee of full employment will result in "catastrophic" inflation and, consequently, "democracy in the United States will have to choose either inflation or unemployment."

But if unemployment is chosen, as the economic and social policies of the administration now indicate, this will obviously conflict with the administration's declared devotion to humanitarianism and morality, since unemployment, as we know, causes society to suffer moral harm as well as tremendous economic losses. It degrades the individual and demoralizes him.

By convincing the public that unemployment is the only way of curbing inflation, the American ruling class wishes to deaden the national conscience and to reconcile it to the idea that economic prosperity is impossible without "human expenditures" and without "natural" sacrifices on the part of the working class. In actuality, however, the "anti-inflation grounds" for the impossibility of guaranteeing the working class the right to work represents an ideological attempt to force the public to accept the economic and political power of the monopolies and the government priorities that reflect this power.
Real guarantees of the right to work would not merely threaten the omnipotence of large capital; they represent the main political and socioeconomic prerequisite for the future restriction and eradication of the class supremacy of the financial oligarchy.

Moralists on high official levels realize that any kind of serious attempt to attain full employment would have a direct effect on the balance of class power. The guaranteed right to work would establish the most favorable conditions for the American working class to overcome its ideological and political backwardness and to elevate its class consciousness. Under the conditions of relatively stable high employment, the working class would stop concentrating on the struggle for "economic security" and more jobs and would focus its attention on the need to democratize production relations, to involve the workers more in production management and to elaborate an economic policy corresponding to the workers' class interests. This is attested to by the dramatic intensification of class antagonism in production during the 1962-1969 period, when a relatively high level of employment established the necessary objective conditions for organized workers to demand more from the monopolies. It was precisely during this period that the problem of restricting the prerogatives of the administrative corporate hierarchy became the focal point of the class struggle. This was also the time when great advances were made in freeing the consciousness of the working masses from the narrow trade-unionist ideology and when a greater need arose for political independence of the two-party bourgeois system.

There is no doubt that the present American Administration is waging its campaign "for human rights" mainly to prevent the development of the political awareness of the American working class and to abate its struggle for the guaranteed right to work and to organize labor unions, for a government system of public health care and for other economic and social rights which are regarded as basic rights by the working class of the 1970's.

The Mass Media and Human Rights, V. A. Bogoslovskiy

As we know, the mass media represent a powerful instrument for controlling public opinion. One of the main functions of the mass media in the capitalist nations, as L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, is "to mislead people, to convince them that the capitalist society is almost paradise, and to slander socialism."

The UNESCO Charter states that, since wars begin in the minds of men, the foundations of peace must also be laid in their minds. This is the noble goal served by the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

At the same time, the cold war preachers are trying to mislead the world public and to set up new obstacles on the way to international detente, peace and security. Several bourgeois newspapers, magazines, television
stations and radio broadcasting corporations in the capitalist nations, particularly the United States, have joined the struggle against detente, following in the footsteps of the group of Western politicians and statesmen who express the interests of the military-industrial complex and NATO. During the preparations for the Helsinki Conference and after the conference, many organs of American propaganda began a slanderous campaign over the so-called "third basket" at the request of U.S. Government agencies. This was a planned ideological attack which was directed against the USSR and the other socialist nations and which, in our opinion, had at least three purposes:

Firstly, to divert the attention of the average American from the acute internal social problems of American society (including problems related to human rights and freedoms);

Secondly, to provoke more energetic action and scandalous statements by the few dissident elements in the socialist nations to provide the West with a pretext for its latest uproar over alleged violations of human rights in these nations;

Thirdly, to undermine the Helsinki agreement and the principles of peaceful coexistence, which are legally secured by a document of such historic significance as the Final Act.

In recent years, the campaign "in defense of human rights" has been accompanied in the United States and several Western countries by a frenzied uproar over the mythical "Soviet military threat." Despite certain new accents in the press reports of the United States and other Western nations on the issue of human freedoms and rights and the "Soviet military threat," however, the frontal attack of the Western, including American, information monopolies has not produced the expected results. More and more sober voices are being heard in the Western press and on Western radio and television, demanding an end to this shameful campaign, which, in addition to all else, has acted like a boomerang and has rebounded on the United States and the capitalist West. The WASHINGTON POST had good reason for its recent announcement: "If President Carter is serious about the need to free political prisoners and if he is truly concerned about human rights, he does not have to look to Africa, Latin America or the Soviet Union. He should look at North Carolina and the incredible trial of the Wilmington Ten." As a reminder: ten innocent American citizens were falsely accused and sentenced in North Carolina to a total of 282 years in prison terms.

The recent adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR, which reveals the true meaning of socialist democracy and all the depth of the rights and freedoms of citizens of the Soviet Union, which is now commemorating its 60th anniversary, is a perfect response to the Western "guardians" of human freedoms and rights.

Economic, social and national inequality, the absence of a right to work and education, and uncertainty about the future are still the lot of the workers in the state-monopolistic capitalist society. The American system of social security is the best proof of this.

Bourgeois ideologists represent this system as proof of the alleged radical transformation of capitalism and its metamorphosis into a society capable of smoothing out class conflicts, eradicating the antagonism between labor and capital and integrating the working masses into the capitalist society. By advertising the American social security system as almost a gift to the workers from the ruling class, the bourgeois apologists try to conceal the fact that the establishment of the "social infrastructure" resulted from the emergence of new, socialized ways of satisfying certain demands. But the main prerequisite for the emergence of the social security system and the satisfaction of the new, collective demands was, as attested to by the history of the capitalist nations and, in particular, the United States (where the resistance on the part of large capital was especially strong), the struggle of the working class. The growing demands of the working class, which recognizes the need for improvement in working conditions, are not being satisfied adequately within the capitalist framework, since large capital regards an increase in social expenditures as a deduction from its illegally acquired funds which might be used for the purpose of accumulation. This is why the bourgeoisie has put up constant, stubborn and growing resistance to any expansion of the federal social security system and any increase in social expenditures, a burden it has tried to transfer to the shoulders of the workers.

As a result of a long and persistent struggle during the severe economic crisis of the 1930's, the American class won a concession from the bourgeoisie in the form of social security and insurance legislation. One of F. Roosevelt's main objectives after he took the helm of the American ship of state, "in addition to filling the gaps in capitalism," as W. Foster writes, "was to contain this broad mass movement within a certain framework by means of a few concessions to the workers, which would prevent it from growing into a movement for more radical reforms."

The social legislation adopted in 1935 was an indisputable victory and important conquest for the working class. From the very beginning, however, it contained several serious defects, many of which still exist to the present day. The American social security and insurance system is characterized by a multitude of small-scale programs, the absence of a single federal system and the lack of an efficient procedure for the financing of insurance funds. In the capitalist society, V. I. Lenin stressed, "all expenditures on insurance should be paid by the employers and the state." Although this system is called federal, the government does not pay the expense of insuring the workers; these expenditures are paid by workers and employers and, in the case of some types of insurance (unemployment and disability), only by employers, who, in turn, try to shift the weight of these expenditures to the workers' own shoulders.
The federal system of social security and insurance in the United States does not completely cover all workers with all existing forms of insurance. For example, no insurance is provided for the most needy part of the population—agricultural workers, domestic workers, employees of small enterprises, day laborers, etc. The serious defects of the system include various "qualifications" requirements which restrict the workers' right to acquire pensions and benefits, a high retirement age, restrictions on the size and duration of benefits, the "waiting periods" during which workers receive neither a salary nor benefits, etc. By the mid-1970's, when there were more than 90 million individuals in the civilian labor force, around 4 million of the employed individuals (85.3 million) were not covered by state social insurance benefits for the aged, widowed and disabled; more than 12 million did not have the right to unemployment benefits, more than 17 million did not have the right to collect disability benefits, and 22 million Americans had no health insurance.

American insurance legislation stipulates far from all the necessary forms of insurance. For example, there are virtually no federal sick benefits, there is no system of benefits for large families and there are almost no maternity benefits. The United States is the only industrially developed capitalist nation without a national system of medical insurance and medical treatment. It is also indicative that the United States is next to last among the 22 capitalist nations in the percentage of national income spent on social security. In addition to this, the gap between the United States and the other nations, according to official American statistics, is growing.

The limited nature of the American federal system of social security and insurance forces the workers who are able to save anything from their annual income to resort to additional forms of insurance—private insurance. By the mid-1970's, however, the opportunity of additional pension benefits, for example, was within the reach of no more than 25 percent of all retired individuals. According to the estimates of American experts, this number will rise to 30 percent during the next 10-15 years. The pensions of most retired individuals will be extremely low.

In recent decades, the more organized labor movement and the continuous stubborn struggle of the workers for their rights have caused Congress to make several changes in social security legislation for the purpose of improving federal social programs and expanding their sphere of application. The results of these changes, however, could never be commensurable with the level of material development in the American society, with the size of national income or with the scientific and technical achievements of the United States.

American workers are insisting on the expansion and improvement of the social security system. At this time of dramatically unstable employment, increasing unemployment and inadequate medical care, the working class does not wish to limit itself to minimal concessions from the government. The struggle to achieve guaranteed universal social security and to correct the backwardness of U.S. social security in comparison to that of other nations is becoming increasingly bitter.
The Issue of Human Rights and U.S. Public Opinion, M. M. Petrovskaya

The state of public opinion is one of the significant factors determining the origination and course of the "human rights" campaign being waged in the United States.

The change in administrations in the United States, as we know, took place at a time of profound disillusionment and dissatisfaction on the part of the American public with U.S. domestic and foreign policy. According to one of the President's assistants, Vietnam, Watergate and the exposure of CIA activities within the nation and abroad gave rise to the widespread belief that the "government has no moral foundation." The polls conducted by P. Caddell for the future president showed, in particular, that the issue of human rights (primarily in the United States itself) was precisely the issue that could unite liberals and conservatives.

Instead of raising the issue of human rights in America itself, however, the new administration transferred it to the sphere of foreign policy, giving it a chiefly anti-Soviet purpose.

Speculations about ethical and ideological principles and approaches were made with consideration for the state of public opinion during the change in administrations. Nurtured on many years of repeated references to the "historical destiny" of America, many Americans felt nostalgia for "national pride" and "moral leadership" and were prepared to support the humanitarian moral rhetoric of the new administration. At the same time, as it became obvious that the American leaders' attempts to teach the socialist countries a lesson and to interfere in their affairs were not having the desired effect in the United States, increasingly frequent appeals began to be heard for attendance to matters "at home."

Consequently, we can speak of two tendencies in the public's reaction to the Carter Administration's campaign "in defense of human rights": support on the one hand and extreme restraint, and sometimes hostility, on the other.

When we try to determine which of these tendencies is the stronger, we must remember that public opinion is influenced by many factors. In particular, we cannot discount the influence of the myth that is so current in the United States of the one-sided advantages the Soviet Union is allegedly gaining from detente and of the so-called "military threat" of the USSR. This kind of brainwashing not only evokes messianic feelings in some Americans, but also the desire to "gain the upper hand" and "counteract the growing threat" that is allegedly being presented by the USSR.

Opposite tendencies, however, do exist. In particular, the public in other large capitalist states--France, the FRG and Canada--has unequivocally condemned the Carter Administration's policy in regard to human rights.
But the major role here is naturally being played by the firm and clear stand taken by the Soviet Union in resolutely rebuffing the United States' attempts to interfere in its internal affairs. The Americans are beginning to remember that the present administration's stand will create an unfavorable atmosphere for negotiations with the USSR. For example, almost half of those surveyed (46 percent) expressed the opinion that "President Carter has ruined the chances of reaching an agreement on strategic arms limitation" by waging his campaign "in defense of human rights."

The different reactions of various influential groups in the United States to the domestic policy of the American Government are also having a definite effect on public opinion. Articles are appearing in the press in which more frequent reference is being made to the excessively "aggressive" conduct of the policy "in defense of human rights." Realistic-minded persons are disturbed by the lack of progress in the Soviet-American talks and by the dissatisfaction of their allies.

The effect of these factors on American public opinion is supplemented by the significant differences in the public's assessment of various aspects of the administration's activities. While many support it for "providing moral leadership" and "restoring the pride of Americans," only 45 percent agree that "the state of the nation is good." "The feelings of Americans are so mixed," says famous public opinion poll expert Yankelovich, "that from 25 to 50 percent say that they have no opinion on the way in which Carter is dealing with the majority of issues, from social security reform to the curbing of inflation."

Some surveys attest to the fact that Americans do not wish a return to the past moral "crusades" of W. Wilson for "global democracy." Some experts point out the fact that conditions in the United States will not allow for a new "overseas crusade": any attempt to begin a new ideological campaign would sharply divide the American people instead of uniting them. Besides this, the American public will probably grow more aware of the fact that "a government which admonishes others," as English historian A. Taylor writes, "should first concern itself with guaranteeing scrupulous respect for human rights in its own nation."

Therefore, although the American leaders are relying on the support of the public of their own nation for their campaign "in defense of human rights," they do not have adequate guarantees that this campaign will not have a "boomerang effect" which will ultimately turn public opinion against their inspiring campaign. Under certain circumstances, the latter could turn against those who are trying to use it to weaken the influence of socialist ideals and divert public opinion from the truly serious socioeconomic problems in American society.
The Resolution of the Ethnic Issue in the USSR and the Status of Ethnic Minorities in the United States, S. A. Chervonnaya

The 60 years of the Soviet State's existence have provided an example of a truly democratic solution to the ethnic problem in our nation.

The legal and actual equality of all nationalities is clearly secured in the new Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "the resolution of the problems of the national-state structure in the draft...ensures the comprehensive development and constant convergence of all nationalities and ethnic groups in our nation."

The USSR's success in the area of national construction provides an even more vivid illustration of the monopolistic bourgeoisie's inability to find a truly democratic solution to the ethnic problem. This is attested to by the status of ethnic minorities in several nations of Western Europe and North America, particularly the status of ethnic minorities in one of the most ethnically heterogeneous nations of the capitalist world—the United States of America.

The ideologists of the American bourgeoisie announce the desire to merge all of the peoples inhabiting the United States into a single entity. They regard cultural and lingual assimilation as the starting point for the ethnic consolidation of the American population. As Professor H. Isaacs, American sociologist and expert on ethnic problems, admits, however, "in reality, American society has only united some nationalities (mainly white American Protestants who emigrated from Northern Europe), while other nationalities have only been partially included (mainly white immigrants from South and East Europe) and all others have been almost completely excluded (non-whites—persons with black, brown, red and yellow skin)."

Discrimination in all spheres of life and the racist and nationalistic prejudices inculcated by the bourgeoisie are impeding the process of the cultural assimilation of blacks (descendants of the slaves who were imported from Africa by force) and persons inhabiting territories conquered by the United States (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Indians). The lot of many millions of colored Americans is economic exploitation and inequality, the violation of their civil rights, the frustration of their political rights, the lack of access to participation in politics and the suppression of national cultures and languages.

The right of blacks, Spanish-Americans and other minorities to equality before the law and other judiciary organs, their political rights and their rights in the economic, social and cultural spheres are not only violated because of the arbitrary whims of individuals or institutions; the frustration of their rights is part of the very system by which American capitalism functions. It is true that their stubborn struggle during the last decade has resulted in several legislative acts and legal decisions aimed at the provision of certain rights to ethnic minorities. In practice,
however, the legislation on civil rights is still being extensively violated throughout the nation, even by the government agencies that are supposed to implement this legislation. At the end of 1974, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights accused federal agencies—the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Veterans Administration, the U.S. Civil Service Commission, federal finance agencies and others—of not trying to combat discrimination against ethnic minorities: "The measures they took were either superficial or of a partial nature and did almost nothing to eliminate existing discriminatory practices in the nation."

The laws passed in recent years on bilingual education and the 1975 amendments to the law on voting rights are not secured by the proper guarantees and, for this reason, are not capable of providing members of foreign-language minority groups with a real opportunity to be educated in their native language or to use it in sociopolitical life.

In addition to this, the deterioration of the economic situation since the beginning of the 1970's caused American ruling circles to make substantial cuts and cancellations in social programs, which was particularly to the detriment of blacks and other minorities.

The inability and reluctance of American ruling circles to solve the ethnic problem in a truly democratic way are leading to the preservation of the shameful practice of racism and disregard for the elementary rights and freedoms of a large part of the American population.

Constitutional Guarantees and the Status of Women, Ye. M. Shibarina

In today's world, women are playing an important role in all areas of social life: economics, politics and culture. They are making a significant contribution to the struggle for peace and international detente.

At the same time, there is a fundamental difference between the status of women in the capitalist countries and their status in the socialist countries.

In most of the capitalist countries, there is still a profound gap between the legal rights of women and the rights they exercise; working women are subjected to harsh exploitation and experience overt and covert forms of discrimination. In the United States, any reduction of employment or restriction of the labor rights of blue- and white-collar workers affect women first. Women are discriminated against in hiring practices, professional promotions, wages and educational opportunities.

In 1974, the average income of female heads of households was only equal to 61 percent of the male income. The wages of women belonging to ethnic minority groups are even lower than the wages of white women.

Economic discrimination is intensified by political and judicial inequality. There are certain laws in effect in the nation which place several restrictions on women in respect to certain jobs as well as in the sphere of
property ownership. In 1976, only 18 of the 435 members of the House of Representatives were women. There are no women at all in the Senate.

Monopolistic capital discourages women from becoming involved in trade unions, where they only constitute 21 percent of the total membership.

In addition to this, employers try to make women completely responsible for problems connected with the working woman's performance of a social function as important as motherhood.

The discrimination against American women in political, economic and social life and their unequal status in marriage attest to the incapability of the bourgeois government to ensure the actual implementation of its proclaimed freedoms.

This only becomes possible when private ownership of the means of production is abolished and when socialist production relations are established. The Great October Socialist Revolution not only gave women equal rights with men in all areas of life, but also guaranteed the opportunity to exercise these rights.

The new Constitution of the USSR envisages a large group of socioeconomic rights for Soviet citizens. They have been invested with deeper meaning and the material guarantees backing them up have become stronger. The quality of women and men has been reaffirmed. This is ensured by the provision of equal opportunities for women in education, professional training, labor, wages and professional advancement.

The state has placed motherhood, childhood and the family under special protection.

In the Soviet Union, more than 90 percent of all able-bodied women are working or studying. Women account for 59 percent of all specialists with a higher or secondary specialized education in our nation. The number of women engaged in science has increased by 500 percent in recent years, and women now make up 40 percent of all scientific workers. The number of women production organizers is growing. More than a million women have been elected to local soviets; in other words, half of all deputies are women. Almost one-third of the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet are women.

The equal participation of Soviet women in all spheres of economic and political life is accompanied by an increase in their social activity within the nation and in the international arena.

The example of female emancipation in the Soviet Union is becoming a genuinely material contribution to the social liberation of women throughout the world. This is one of Great October's most important contributions to the progress of all mankind.
The USSR's struggle for disarmament has been an integral and
important part of the 60-year history of the Soviet State and its efforts
to provide peaceful conditions for the construction of a communist society.
This is the general line of Soviet foreign policy. "Disarmament is a
socialist ideal," V. I. Lenin declared even before the triumph of October.

Ideas about disarmament had repeatedly been brought up in the past as well,
but they were inevitably of a utopian nature. Only the appearance of
Marxism and the organized workers movement turned these human utopian
ideals into a political program. The struggle for peace and disarmament
acquired a scientific and social basis. Convincing American workers of
the proletariat's ability to fight against the bourgeois policy leading to
bloody wars, K. Marx wrote the following in his "Message to the National
Labor Union of the United States": "Now, finally, the working class is
entering the historical arena, no longer as an obedient executor, but as
an independent force, aware of its own responsibilities and capable of
dictating peace wherever its so-called masters are shouting for war."
F. Engels conclusively proved the significance of the workers movement as
a powerful factor in the struggle against war, militarism and the arms
race. In his work entitled "Can Europe Disarm?" he regards disarmament
as a reliable guarantee of peace.

When the socialist state came into being, a material basis for this struggle
was established for the first time in history and, in time, produced prac-
tical results. When we examine the Soviet Union's policy in the area of
disarmament, we cannot fail to compare it with the policy of the chief power
in the contemporary capitalist world--the United States of America. While
Soviet policy, deriving from the class nature of the socialist state, has
consistently been aimed at genuine disarmament, the United States, due to
the socioeconomic nature of American society, has followed an extremely
contradictory course in this field. For a long time, it put up every kind
of resistance to any initiative aimed at arms limitation and was only forced in the 1960's and 1970's to take some extremely modest measures.

U.S. policy on disarmament has always been influenced by complex, and frequently contradictory, factors. Naturally, this does not mean that it will be impossible to reach any agreements with the United States on disarmament and the prevention of war. If for no other reason, such agreements are now possible because a war conducted with the use of modern weapons would not only threaten the most important national interests of the United States but also its very existence.

I

The history of Soviet foreign policy begins with one of the most humane documents of the present day—Lenin's Decree on Peace, which showed governments and peoples a just and democratic way of ending World War I. Even during the first years of the young Soviet State's existence, the struggle for peace and disarmament occupied an important place in its foreign policy activity.

In 1922, on the initiative of V. I. Lenin, the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference proposed a general reduction in weapons and armies and a complete ban on the more barbarous means of warfare, the use of poisonous gases, air combat operations and other means of destruction aimed against the civilian population. The Soviet Union was one of the first to sign and ratify the Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925.

The United States did not ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 at that time and at least half a century went by before it became party to this exceedingly important international document.

The first international organization joined by the Soviet Union was the Preparatory Commission for the General Conference on Disarmament. On 30 November 1927, the Declaration of the Government of the USSR on General, Complete and Immediate Disarmament was submitted to this commission. This was the first time in history that the question of general and complete disarmament was given a concrete basis.

In 1928 in the Preparatory Commission and in 1932 at the General Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet Union first proposed the draft of a convention on general, complete and immediate disarmament and then a draft of a convention on the reduction of armed forces and weapons which envisaged a progressive reduction in all types of weapons in accordance with the composition and size of the armed forces of different states. The USSR delegation announced that it was not taking an "all or nothing" position and expressed its willingness to "discuss any proposals on arms limitation." The Soviet delegation proposed that this principle be formulated in a special resolution and submitted a concrete draft of this kind of resolution. Since then, the Soviet Union has always adhered to this realistic principle.
The American delegation in the Preparatory Commission was quick to announce that the U.S. Government could not support "radical proposals on immediate and complete disarmament." At the General Conference on Disarmament, the United States, just as, incidentally, the other Western powers, conducted a line which PRAVDA described in the following way: "Each participant in the conference is not thinking at all about disarming himself, but only of disarming the others and, in this way, becoming the most powerfully armed."

In connection with this, the Western powers were already placing major emphasis on the problem of control. The Soviet delegation adhered to the view that "first it is necessary to agree on what will be controlled (that is, the degree of arms limitation) and then some agreement can be reached on the means of control." Therefore, even then, Soviet diplomacy had formulated a principle to which it has invariably adhered during all the years of its struggle for disarmament: each degree of disarmament should have its own corresponding degree of control. It was precisely this principle that would later form the basis of international agreements elaborated and drawn up on the initiative, and with the direct participation, of the Soviet Union.

At that time, the United States took a sensible stand on the question of control, believing that national funds should be used to finance the control of disarmament measures. For example, when the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons was discussed in November-December 1932, the U.S. representative insisted that control over the observance of obligations to prohibit chemical weapons should only be the responsibility of national governments and not of an international agency. The U.S. delegation opposed any kind of inspections of production sites, reserves or production capacities on the grounds that this could only lead to the disclosure of industrial secrets and increased competition. If the United States had adhered consistently to this approach, it would have been much simpler to conclude many international agreements on disarmament, including agreements concerning chemical weapons. During the postwar period, however, the United States departed from this principle and began to insist on the establishment of international control.

By the mid-1930's, the prospect of military hotbeds in Europe, and not only in Europe, became increasingly evident. Fascism raised its head. The dark clouds of war hung over the world. Under these conditions, Soviet diplomacy attempted to prevent dangerous developments and to work toward a system of collective security, particularly in Europe. On 29 May 1934, at the last session of the General Conference on Disarmament, the USSR proposed that this conference become a permanent, regularly convened peace conference. Western representatives did not support this initiative, even though it was widely approved by the world public. This ended the work of the conference. And it was not the Soviet Union's fault that subsequent events stimulated the arms race and led to the bloodiest war in mankind's history.
The significance of disarmament was multiplied by the appearance of atomic weapons and nuclear missiles. Here it would be helpful to describe the events marking the beginning of the atomic age, which became known to the world after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were wiped off the face of the earth by an American nuclear explosion. President H. Truman later admitted that he regarded the atomic bomb as a "hammer" to be used against the Soviet Union. "The Russians will soon be put in their place," he said, "and the United States will then take on the responsibility of ruling the world the way it should be ruled." The development of the atomic bomb, as H. Truman wrote in his memoirs, "signified a turning point in our policy." The United States began the series-production of these bombs and commenced the first offensive attack of the cold war.

There were different opinions in the United States about the dates of the development of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union. According to Secretary of State J. Byrnes, "it was generally believed that they (the USSR) would learn the secret within 2 or 3 years but would not be able to produce the bomb for at least 6 or 7 years." General Groves, head of the atomic bomb project, said that it would be from 5 to 20 years before the Soviet Union would be able to develop its own atomic weapons. On the whole, the American leaders agreed that they would not have a monopoly on atomic weapons for long; but they did have the illusion that the United States "would remain in the lead" in the race for nuclear weapons.

In order to justify this kind of "leadership," it was not enough to represent American atomic weapons as a means of defending the West against the "Soviet menace"; an additional camouflage of a "peace-loving" nature was also required. This gave rise to the "Baruch Plan." It simultaneously had the purpose of establishing the United States' monopoly on the atomic bomb. It emphasized the establishment of an international control agency unconnected with the UN Security Council, where the principle of unanimity of the five permanent members is in effect. This agency was pictured as an international "atomic supertrust" with the right of exclusive control over all reserves of fissionable materials and all atomic enterprises. It would not only have complete control over research on the use of atomic energy for peaceful and military purposes, but would also be able to intervene in the economic affairs of state. Naturally, the United States would be assured a dominant position in this agency.

Now it is obvious that the engineers of the "Baruch Plan" were proceeding from an incorrect assessment of the amount of time the Soviet Union would require to develop its own nuclear weapons. "We knew that the atomic secret would not last long," wrote U.S. Secretary of Defense L. Johnson in his semiannual report at the end of 1949, "but we must truthfully admit that this happened before we expected it to."
Despite the Soviet Union's success in the development of its own atomic weapons, it was in favor of preventing a nuclear arms race. On 19 June 1946, a Soviet draft of an international convention on the prohibition of the production and use of weapons based on the utilization of atomic energy for the purpose of massive human destruction was submitted to the UN Atomic Energy Commission. The draft envisaged the assumption of the following obligations by states:

"The refusal to use atomic weapons under any circumstances whatsoever;

"The prohibition of the production and storage of weapons based on the use of atomic energy;

"The elimination of all stores of finished and unfinished atomic weapons within 3 months after this convention goes into effect."

It is obvious that it would have been much easier to solve the problem of nuclear weapons at that time than later, after nuclear stockpiles had grown. The Soviet proposal, however, was not adopted.

In June 1947, the Soviet Union took a new initiative by proposing strict international control over all enterprises engaged in the extraction of atomic raw materials and the production of atomic materials and atomic energy. In contrast to the "Baruch Plan," this proposal stipulated that the controlling agency should be subordinate to the UN Security Council, which was in accordance with the UN Charter.

This Soviet proposal was not supported by the Western powers either. Some top-level figures in the United States who expected to retain the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons began to openly talk about the possible use of nuclear weapons against the USSR. They favored "preventive war" and an attack on Russia while Russia did not have an atomic bomb, wrote Secretary of Commerce H. Wallace in a letter to the president, warning him of the danger of this course. But the president, as he himself admitted, "ignored Wallace's letter."

In September 1949, the end of the United States' atomic monopoly was in sight; the USSR was testing its own atomic devise. This had a sobering effect on the advocates of a "preventive nuclear strike." Their militant feelings were replaced by anxiety and fear.

The Soviet Union's development of its own atomic weapons did not change its fundamental course in regard to the prohibition of these weapons. A TASS report of 25 September 1949 stated: "As for the widespread anxiety in some foreign circles in regard to this matter, there are no grounds for this anxiety. It must be said that the Soviet Government, despite the fact that it now possesses atomic weapons, still occupies its old position and intends to occupy this position in the future in regard to an unconditional ban on the use of atomic weapons."
Despite the obvious groundlessness and futility of the United States' attempts to rely on military force as the major means in its relations with the Soviet Union, President Truman ordered that "the work on all types of atomic weapons be continued, including the so-called hydrogen bomb, or superbomb," thereby beginning a new round in the nuclear arms race.

The appearance of first the hydrogen bomb and then rocket-propelled means for the delivery of nuclear weapons in the 1950's completely shattered the myth of the "invulnerability" of the United States. The launching of the first artificial earth satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957 demonstrated the strength of the Soviet economy and the high level of scientific and technical development in the USSR to the entire world.

Gradually, even ruling circles in the United States began to realize the danger of nuclear confrontation with the USSR. This is attested to, in particular, by U.S. President D. Eisenhower's speech in the United Nations on 8 December 1953, in which he acknowledged the ruinous consequences of atomic conflict for all mankind. By that time, however, the military-industrial complex had already become a dominant force in U.S. domestic and foreign policy-making. When D. Eisenhower left the White House, he warned the American people of this danger: "When we make important top-level decisions, we must not allow the military-industrial complex to intentionally or unintentionally gain excessive influence." Today, in the words of prominent American diplomat and historian G. Kennan, the U.S. military-industrial complex has become "something like a national economic addict requiring more than a hundred billion dollars annually to feed its fatal habit."

The changes that had taken place in the international balance of power by the beginning of the 1960's made U.S. leaders more aware of the danger of using the "language of force" in talks with the USSR. There were real opportunities for finally working out concrete measures to eliminate the nuclear threat. The struggle for arms limitation and disarmament entered a new stage. The first concrete results were obtained in this area and, on the whole, disarmament issues were being examined in a noticeable more realistic manner.

At the end of 1961, the USSR and United States agreed on the principles for disarmament talks. On 14 March 1962, the 18-member Disarmament Commission began to function within the UN framework.

At that time, it became completely obvious to many figures in the U.S. Government that the unrestrained arms race conducted by Washington for the entire postwar period had not only failed to give the United States strategic advantages over the Soviet Union, but was also having an increasingly negative effect on U.S. national security. This paradoxical situation was most precisely described by President J. Kennedy in his speech on the American University campus on 10 June 1963: "If total war is resumed today, regardless of how it begins its first targets will be our two nations. It seems ironic but it is a fact: the two strongest powers in the world will be threatened
with devastation." He advocated a "reassessment of relations with the Soviet Union."

The growing military expenditures became a serious obstacle to the resolution of several urgent internal socioeconomic problems by the American Government. The obvious absurdity of the augmentation of weapon stockpiles, which only heightened the danger of a nuclear catastrophe, and the huge funds spent on defense evoked mass dissatisfaction in the United States with the course toward a continuation of the arms race. Gradually, this dissatisfaction engulfed more and more of the American public, including that part of the business world which was not directly involved in the production of weapons. The U.S. Government could ignore this factor. In addition to this, serious concern was growing throughout the world in connection with the continued accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, and this also had an effect on the United States. Nonetheless, any proposal in regard to arms limitation was interpreted by the U.S. military-industrial complex as an infringement of its interests and profits.

Washington's approach to the issues of arms limitation in the 1960's, an approach characterized by great fluctuation and zigzags, took shape under the influence of these contradictory factors.

The Soviet Union, which has always been a consistent and resolute advocate of disarmament because of its lack of interest in the augmentation of weapon stockpiles, an interest which it does not and cannot have because of the very nature of the socialist structure, constantly aimed for progress in the area of disarmament and the cessation of the arms race, demonstrating its willingness to go as far as its partners were willing to go in this direction.

As early as May 1955, the Soviet Union proposed that the nuclear powers promise to stop all nuclear tests as one of the initial measures in the implementation of the program of arms limitation and the prohibition of atomic weapons. In October 1958, the USSR, the United States and England began talks in Geneva on the cessation of these tests. For a long time, however, these talks were deliberately arrested by the Western powers with their unsubstantiated demands for mandatory local inspections.

Calling upon diplomats to juggle words about international control, the American federal departments and the military-industrial circles backing them up, which had a direct interest in the continuation of the tests, actively impeded the resolution of the problem behind the scenes of American political life. As soon as it began to appear that an agreement would be reached at any moment in Geneva, the Pentagon and U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) would begin feverish activity to undermine the agreement. The tactic of procrastination was successful. The East-West agreement was shelved.
Under these conditions, the Soviet Union, true to its flexible and realistic approach, looked for a partial solution to the problem. As a result, the Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water was signed in Moscow in August 1963. It simultaneously imposed restrictions on underground nuclear explosions if such explosions caused radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control the explosions were conducted. Therefore, the treaty prohibited the explosions that were most dangerous from the standpoint of the contamination of the environment by radioactive substances.

After this treaty was signed in Moscow, the Soviet Union continued its consistent line toward a complete nuclear test ban. The United States and other Western powers, just as before, set up obstacles to the resolution of this problem by making unsubstantiated demands for extensive international control which would include mandatory local inspections. The absurdity of demanding local inspections as one of the terms of an agreement on the prohibition of underground tests had been acknowledged long ago by many competent persons in the United States itself.

During the 1960's, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became another important concrete result of the struggle for arms limitation and disarmament.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons indisputably represents one of the most serious causes of nuclear danger. As the number of states possessing these weapons grows, the risk of nuclear war increases. By the mid-1960's, this danger had become absolutely real. The situation was aggravated by the fact that revenge-seekers in the FRG were doing their best to gain access to nuclear weapons. Plans were trotted out for the establishment of multilateral nuclear forces based on the principle of the "division of control" over nuclear weapons. In addition to this, the position occupied by the United States in regard to the non-proliferation treaty was extremely contradictory for a long period of time, which slowed down the process considerably. While verbally favoring the conclusion of this kind of treaty, the United States proposed that only the transmission of nuclear weapons to the "national control" of non-nuclear states be prohibited. This formula, however, did not prohibit the transmission of nuclear weapons to groups of states. Later, in March 1966, the United States agreed to prohibit the transmission of nuclear weapons to "groups of nations without their own nuclear weapons" as well. But even this formula made it possible to establish multilateral nuclear forces in NATO, since this bloc was made up of non-nuclear as well as nuclear nations and, consequently, the ban would not apply to this group.

The energetic struggle of the Soviet Union, the other socialist states and all peace-loving forces against the establishment of multilateral NATO nuclear forces and their promotion of a truly effective treaty on non-proliferation produced results. A solution was found in the fall of 1966 as a result of talks between the USSR and the United States in New York during a session of the UN General Assembly. All of the premises of the
treaty were agreed upon during 1967 and the first half of 1968 and the docu-
ment was ready to sign on 1 July 1968 (it went into effect in 1970).

III

An important place in the total group of measures taken toward disarmament
is occupied by the bilateral Soviet-American strategic arms limitation
talks. Strategic weapons constitute the basis of the fighting strength of
the two states with the greatest military and economic potential.

The talks between the two states began in November 1969. They were preceded
by a long and complex internal political struggle in the United States.
Persons opposed to the talks used any excuse to spoil them or, at least, to
postpone their commencement.26

By the beginning of the 1970's, the work was essentially completed on two
new systems of nuclear weapons—an antimissile defense system and a multiple
independently-targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) for land-based and under-
water strategic missiles. The question of their development was raised.
The appearance of these types of weapons signified an important new stage
in the development of military technology. It was necessary to impose a
limit on the further unwinding of this dangerous and costly spiral. Under
these conditions, the Soviet Union did everything possible to ensure the
commencement and successful conduct of strategic arms limitation talks.

The grand Program of Peace, which directed Soviet foreign policy toward an
even more energetic campaign for peace, was proposed at the 24th CPSU
Congress in the spring of 1971. "In proposing this program," L. I. Brezhnev
said at the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces in Moscow, "we felt that
it was our responsibility to aid in the elimination of seats of tension,
to help mankind escape the impending specter of thermonuclear catastrophe
and to promote detente in every way possible."27 This program was enthusi-
astically received by peace-loving people throughout the world. Its
realization, including its contribution to the improvement of relations
with the United States and other large capitalist states, contributed to
the improvement of the entire international situation.

In May 1972, the first stage of the Soviet-American talks resulted in the
Treaty on the Limitation of Antimissile Defense Systems (which was later
supplemented by the protocol of 3 July 1974) and a provisional agreement on
some measures in the area of strategic offensive arms limitation.28 The
agreement on the compilation of a long-term covenant in this area, which
was reached as a result of the operational summit meeting in Vladivostok
in November 1974, represented an important step toward the further limita-
tion of strategic offensive weapons. It stipulated the basic parameters
of the future covenant, reflecting the carefully weighed balance of inter-
est of the parties in the area of strategic weapons.
The 25th CPSU Congress, which adopted the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, for the Freedom and Independence of Peoples, became a new and important stage in the campaign of the Soviet Union, the entire socialist community and international forces of peace and progress against the heralds of war and the arms race. This program's objective of the cessation of the arms race, a transition to the limitation of arms, and then to disarmament corresponds to the vital security interests of the world public. The 25th CPSU Congress did not simply proclaim this objective, but also proposed several concrete ways of attaining it:

"a) To do everything possible to complete the preparation of a new agreement between the USSR and the United States on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, to conclude international treaties on a general and complete nuclear test ban, on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, on the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and on the prohibition of contamination of the environment for military or other hostile purposes;

"b) To undertake new efforts to stimulate the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe. After an agreement has been reached on the first concrete steps in this direction, the promotion of military detente in this region should be continued in subsequent years;

"c) To ensure that the present constant increase in the military expenditures of many states be replaced by the practice of their systematic reduction;

"d) To do everything possible to promote the rapid convocation of a world conference on disarmament...

"To strive for a worldwide treaty on the rejection of the use of force in international relations."29

The 25th CPSU Congress stressed the exceptionally great significance attached by the USSR to the conclusion of a SALT agreement with the United States.

During the entire year of 1976, however, these talks were virtually paralyzed by the negative stand taken by the American side. The change in U.S. administrations evoked great interest in the world in regard to the effect the new administration would have on U.S. policy, particularly in the area of arms limitation—an issue concerning all mankind. This interest grew significantly in connection with the future President J. Carter's widely publicized campaign statements about his intentions in this area.

The very first steps taken by the new administration showed that the campaign promises of American politicians were one thing while their actions after they had been elected were quite another. For example, the U.S. decision to produce strategic winged missiles obviously contradicts statements made during the campaign. The preparations for the production of a neutron bomb represent another step in the same direction. J. Carter announced that before he made his final decision, "he would completely analyze all of the consequences of
this decision." When he sent his estimate of the required funds for this purpose to the U.S. Senate (which approved the allocation of funds for the production of this type of weapon) on 14 July, however, he already had, as the press reported, the report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency—a report which stated that the decision to produce neutron weapons would have a negative effect on the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons, on the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe and on the entire group of talks on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is obvious that these warnings were regarded as "immaterial" in the White House, but it is also completely obvious that steps of this kind (just as the plan for the modification of the FB-111 bomber, the MK-12A point accuracy nuclear warhead, the new MH strategic missile and others) are steps backward, representing regression from what has already been achieved in this area for the apparent purpose of changing the existing state of equilibrium in favor of the United States.

Attempts are being made in the United States to camouflage these and other steps toward a more frantic arms race by means of "comprehensive analysis" and "careful assessment." The theory of so-called "regulated competition" has been proposed as "theoretical" grounds for the arms race. This course is also being camouflaged by statements about the desire to "go further" in the area of disarmament and about support for radical "comprehensive" disarmament.

In actuality, it is impossible, as A. A. Gromyko, USSR minister of foreign affairs, reaffirmed in his speech at the 32d Session of the UN General Assembly, "to propose various 'radical reductions' with one hand and to sanction the development of new and, frankly speaking, merciless types of weapons—like the neutron bomb—with the other."30

IV

The Soviet Union is consistently and firmly continuing to advocate disarmament measures. "To accomplish the cessation of the growing and dangerous arms race and a transition to the reduction of weapon stockpiles and disarmament"31—this objective was set by the 25th CPSU Congress as one of the major goals of USSR foreign policy today, just as it has been for the entire 60-year history of the Soviet State and the history of post-October international relations. It would be no exaggeration to say that Soviet initiatives in the area of disarmament have been the driving force in the resolution of this exceedingly important problem.

During the postwar period alone, the Soviet Union has made more than 100 different proposals (drafts of UN General Assembly resolutions, drafts of international agreements and so forth) on the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. They include measures on disarmament, as well as on the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the production and accumulation of stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological
weapons, the cessation of nuclear tests, the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other states, the reduction of defense budgets and the prohibition of the use of the sea bed, outer space and the environment for military purposes.

Some of them have formed the basis of existing treaties and conventions. The treaties and agreements concluded and enacted on the initiative of the USSR, with its active participation and, in many cases, as a result of its persistence, constructive and flexible approach and untiring search for an acceptable solution, include the Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water (the USSR has been prepared for a long time to agree to a complete and general nuclear test ban, and it is not its fault that there is still no international agreement of this kind), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Accumulation of Stockpiles of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and of their Destruction (here, for the purpose of advancement, the USSR agreed to separate the issues concerning the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons), and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Means to Influence the Environment (some of its premises are much weaker than they were in the original Soviet draft because of the stand taken by the United States).

The USSR is continuing its struggle for the accomplishment of new disarmament measures in several important areas. In view of the fact that Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament under strict international control have conflicted with the reluctance of the Western powers to agree to these radical measures, the USSR has repeatedly, in 1964, 1968 and 1976, submitted programs of partial measures for international examination; the ultimate goal of these measures is general and complete disarmament.

Last year, this kind of program—the Memorandum on the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament—was submitted to the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly for examination. It takes the views of many nations into consideration and formulates new and concrete considerations. This document attests to the USSR's tireless efforts to find a realistic program for the accomplishment of disarmament and not to simply make declarations. For example, when the Soviet Union proposed a world conference on disarmament, it also supported the proposal that a special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament be conducted, regarding it as a step toward the convocation of a world conference.

Continuing its search for measures to strengthen international security, the Soviet Union submitted the drafts of two important documents—the Declaration on the Intensification and Consolidation of International Detente and the Resolution on the Prevention of the Danger of Nuclear War—to the 32d Session of the UN General Assembly in New York for examination. As a
result of A. A. Gromyko's talks with J. Carter and C. Vance in Washington, the Soviet Union and the United States affirmed in a joint Soviet-American announcement "their determination to conclude a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons and announced their intention to continue active negotiations so that the work on this agreement can be completed within the near future." In separate announcements that were identical in content, the USSR and the United States declared that they would observe the premises of the provisional agreement on some measures in the limitation of strategic offensive weapons, which expired on 3 October 1977, on the condition of identical compliance by the other side.

Soviet proposals on disarmament have always been aimed at the consolidation of world peace, have taken the security interests of all parties to negotiations and agreements into consideration and have been built on the realistic basis of their practicability. "By resolutely rebuffing all intrigues engineered by the opponents of peace and socialism," the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" states, "the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries are striving for the further development of changes in the international situation that favor peace and social progress, the transformation of detente into a continuous, increasingly viable, universal and irrevocable process extending to all continents, a transition to stable and productive peaceful coexistence between states and the attainment of practical successes in disarmament—primarily nuclear." The peace-loving course of the Soviet Union has now been established in the nation's new constitution. This represents further evidence that the struggle for peace, disarmament and the elimination of the threat of war constitutes the principled Leninist course of our state.

FOOTNOTES

6. Ibid., pp 511-512.


24. Extremely eloquent testimony to this effect may be found in a letter sent by Ambassador J. Wadsworth, head of the U.S. delegation at the negotiations, to the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in 1971 (this was already after he had retired): "Several times during the years I spent in Geneva," he testifies, "it seemed as though a test-ban agreement could be concluded with the Russians. Each time, however, obstacles arose, which even the President with all of his power could not overcome."

At the same time, J. Wadsworth underscores the fact that the Soviet side was conducting negotiations with the "serious intention of reaching an agreement" and that it was through the fault of the United States alone that it was not concluded.
Wadsworth's letter states that the Pentagon and the AEC supplied the U.S. delegation at the negotiations with initial data that were known to be untrue and used other tricks to subvert the agreement. For example, according to his testimony, the U.S. delegation was informed by Washington that the first underground nuclear explosion conducted by the United States in 1957 could only be detected from within a distance of 250 miles. Later, when he was called to testify before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, AEC Chairman W. Libby admitted that this figure was actually almost 10 times as great. With the aid of crude falsifications of this type, the United States was trying to prove the need for local inspections. Another time, when the prospect for the conclusion of an agreement was good as a result of the Soviet side's agreement to a certain number of inspections per year, the AEC produced "new data" on the possibility of the artificial concealment of tests ("Prospects for Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Hearings, U.S. Senate, 22 and 23 July 1971, Washington, 1971, pp 5-6).

25. For more detail, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1976; No 5, 1977--Editor's note.

26. The following episode is quite typical of the actions of those opposed to the negotiations. In June 1969, President R. Nixon announced the coming negotiations with the Soviet Union at a press conference. He said that the United States was considering the possibility of a moratorium on the testing of the MIRV warheads as part of the agreement on strategic arms limitation. Literally on the next day, the Pentagon signed a contract with General Electric on the delivery of parts for 68 such warheads, and this action was naturally interpreted in the American press as evidence of a transition from the programming stage to the production phase. Because of the pressure exerted by the Pentagon, the moratorium on testing was not announced.

27. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following the Leninist Course], vol 4, Moscow, 1974, p 315.

28. For more on these two documents, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 9, 1972--Editor's note.


32. See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 2, 1977--Editor's note.


34. KOMMUNIST, No 2, 1977, p 12.

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OCTOBER REVOLUTION, NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND U.S. POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 77
pp 47-58

[Article by V. A. Kremenyuk and V. P. Lukin]

[Summary] Although the CPSU and the Soviet State have consistently attached paramount significance to the construction of a socialist society in the USSR, they have always followed Lenin's instructions to fight against national and colonial oppression in all its forms and to assist the people of the colonial and dependent nations in their struggle for freedom and independence. Reformist elements in the national liberation movement and bourgeois scientists have consistently refused to acknowledge the international significance of the socialist revolution in Russia. It is obvious, however, that bourgeois ideologists, politicians and statesmen have always realized the powerful influence of socialist ideals on the world public. This is why the denial of this influence is accompanied by attempts to prevent the spread of these ideals and to persecute the advocates and propagandists of the ideals of October.

American imperialism has always played the chief role in the struggle against the ideals of October and their influence on the national liberation movement. U.S. imperialism has taken on the functions of a herald of freedom in the colonial states in an attempt to take the historical initiative away from socialism and to pass itself of as an advocate of national independence. Its ideal, however, has been the kind of independence that gives U.S. monopolies a completely free hand in the economically backward and semidependent states. Neocolonial domination has been achieved through anticolonial means, involving the use of economic controls rather than military or political methods.

During the postwar period, the United States has subordinated its own global strategy to its struggle against communism and has transferred to a position of direct confrontation with the national liberation movements. It has elaborated a variety of means and methods for this purpose, ranging from armed intervention to various types of subversive activities.
The approach taken by U.S. leaders to the national liberation movement has been characterized by two policies during the postwar period. One of these has been a rigid, counterrevolutionary policy aimed at the suppression of all liberation revolutions and the prevention of relations between the socialist world and the liberated countries. The other has been a more flexible policy and has been focused much more on the ideological aspects of the struggle for influence in the developing countries. During the Kennedy Administration, the second policy prevailed. This was due to the realization that the power capable of winning public opinion in the developing countries over to its own side would have the deciding vote in world affairs. The United States' interventionist actions in several liberated countries at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's (Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, the Arab nations and others), however, naturally did not win the affection of the people in these nations.

"The U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the exposure of the actual goals of American policy in Indochina and Southeast Asia in connection with the failure of this intervention revealed all of the underlying motives for U.S. strategy in regard to the developing countries. By means of their aggressive actions against the Vietnamese people and their support of the puppet regime in South Vietnam, American ruling circles openly demonstrated to the entire world their desire to suppress the liberation revolutions in the developing countries, to establish a system of dependent and repressive regimes there and to limit the national sovereignty of the young states to the boundaries of a fictitious independence.

"The international campaign against the American aggression in Vietnam also demonstrated something. The entire world and, in particular, the people in the developing nations became aware of the urgent need to reinforce the anti-imperialist solidarity of all revolutionary currents in the world liberation movement. During the war in Vietnam, this solidarity grew much stronger and served as a powerful factor contributing to the victory of the Vietnamese people. 'The heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against the interventionists,' L. I. Brezhnev said at the International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in 1969, 'merged into a single entity with the resolute and effective military and economic assistance of the USSR and the other socialist countries and with the broad popular movement of solidarity with the victims of aggression that began in almost all nations, including the United States.'

"The defeat suffered by American imperialism in Vietnam increased the pressure being exerted on foreign policy leaders in the United States by various groups of the American ruling class which demanded that a way be found to counteract the further convergence of the socialist world with revolutionary groups in the developing countries. 'The fact that these national and social revolutions are connected in our nation with the influence of communism,' renowned American foreign policy theoretician H. Morgenthau stated, 'is only a result of the West's inability to give them moral and material support.'
R. Steele, former State Department official, said that no efforts should be spared in convincing the revolutionary movements in the developing countries that they would benefit more from 'living in friendship with America than from being at odds with it.'

"These statements had a definite effect on the official Washington position. Maneuvers intended to break up the ranks of the anti-imperialist movement became more numerous in the United States' political relations with the developing countries during the Republican Administration (1969-1976). The objective of counteracting the influence of socialism on revolutionary reforms in the liberated countries was not only retained as one of the United States' objectives in the developing countries but was elevated to the even higher status of a priority in Washington's global strategy.

"Some American experts believed that one of the reasons for the Nixon Administration's reassessment of U.S. policy in regard to the PRC was almost un concealed approval for Peking's plans to fight for undivided leadership of the national liberation movement in the developing countries. In contrast to the 1960's, when Peking's growing pretensions to leadership of the Third World evoked only feelings of anxiety and concern in American leaders, now many representatives of U.S. ruling circles are already taking a positive view of the PRC's course, believing that in this case the 'Chinese factor' is acting, on the whole, to their benefit: it is promoting schism in the ranks of the liberation movement, it is weakening its position in the struggle against imperialism and, mainly, it has the purpose of counteracting the influence of the ideals of October, socialism and progress on the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

"In the ideological struggle against the influence of the socialist world and the ideals of the October Revolution on the liberated countries, ruling circles in the United States have relied on the subversive and schismatic activities of Peking in the hope that, after the failure of American aggression in Vietnam, China will be able to accomplish the mission of struggle against the truly scientific revolutionary ideas in the Third World more successfully. In addition to this, as a result of the defective domestic policy of the Peking leaders, the PRC is regarded by American theoreticians and propagandists as a kind of 'negative example' for the developing states. By arbitrarily and indiscriminately equating Maoism with Marxist-Leninist theory and practice in respect to the former colonial and dependent nations, American propaganda is striving to sow confusion and doubt among the revolutionary democrats of the Asian, African and Latin American countries.

"At the same time, ruling circles in the United States are not concealing the fact that they do not intend to concede leadership to anyone whatsoever in the struggle to keep the developing nations in the orbit of the capitalist world, to preserve the system of inegalitarian relations with these nations and to guarantee the free access of large international monopolies to the resources and markets of the liberated states. This was one of the chief priorities of the Republican Administration's global strategy. The Democrats who took power in 1977 have announced their intention to preserve this situation unchanged.
"U.S. policy in regard to the national liberation movement in the first
half of the 1970's has been characterized by a desire to retain the basic
goals of past policy unchanged but to considerably perfect and modify the
methods and means for their attainment. Despite the radically changed
balance of power in the world and the stronger positions occupied by the
worldwide socialist community, the international workers and communist
movement and the national liberation movement, U.S. ruling circles still
believe it is possible to keep the developing countries within the orbit
of the capitalist economy with the status of a junior partner and source
of raw material resources.

"It was precisely due to this change in the international balance of power
that Washington was forced to search for new ways of attaining its goals.
This search took the form, in the first place, of the stronger coordination
of U.S. policy in regard to the developing countries with the policies of
other developed capitalist states within the framework of a 'multilateral'
approach. At a series of meetings between leaders of the largest capital-
list states (the latest took place in London in May 1977), the United States
has tried to define the West's general stand on political issues in the
Third World. The United States has found a second important reserve for
its political course in the possibility of breaking up the united front of
the liberated states into isolated opposing groups—for example, into the
'third' and 'fourth' worlds. Camouflaging their intentions by means of
arguments in favor of the 'natural' division of the developing countries
into those 'possessing valuable resources' and those 'doomed to poverty'
by the absence of such resources, U.S. ruling circles are actually trying
to set the group of liberated states with a capitalist course of development
in opposition to the nations with a socialist orientation and, thereby,
destroy the unity of the total group of states and intensify the struggle
against the revolutionary democratic wing in the national liberation
movement.

"One of the chief positions in the present strategy in regard to the na-
tional liberation movement has been assigned to so-called 'North-South'
dialog. The basic premise of this theory, just as theories of the second
half of the 1960's which divided the world into 'poor' and 'rich' nations,
consists in the idea that the obvious conflict between the interests of
the developed capitalist states and the interests of the developing Asian,
African and Latin American countries is due to the 'level of development'
achieved by the 'North,' including most of the socialist countries, in
contrast to the undeveloped 'South.'

"The term 'South-North,' L. I. Brezhnev said in answer to the questions of
S. Hata, editor-in-chief of the ASAHI newspaper, apparently 'should be
considered applicable to the relations between the developing countries,
regardless of whether they are North or South of the equator, and the de-
veloped capitalist states.
"We have taken a clear-cut stand on this matter. The Soviet Union supports the developing countries' demand for a reconstruction of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis. This means, above all, that the liquidation of colonialism should extend to the economic sphere and that oppression by multinational imperialist monopolies and the exploitation of the developing states' natural and human resources by the developed capitalist countries must cease."

"The developing countries' resolute campaign in defense of their own sovereign rights in the area of economic relations, a campaign supported by the socialist world, has forced U.S. ruling circles to devote even more attention to economic and technical means of struggle against the national liberation movement. While in the past they justified their active struggle against the liberation movements by means of references to communist 'penetration' and 'subversive activities,' now, as C. Robinson, former assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, remarked, they have had to acknowledge the fact that the developing countries are 'escaping' U.S. influence under the effects of economic factors as well."

"The growing severity of the economic crisis in the developed capitalist countries, the immeasurably stronger desire of the liberated states to restructure their economic relations with the capitalist world and their increased ability to achieve this goal in connection with the new balance of power in the world have all forced official circles in Washington to pay more attention to U.S. relations with the developing nations and to continue the struggle against the influence of the world socialist community on the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America as the chief priority of the 1970's. Official and unofficial statements made by various representatives of the American establishment do not conceal their serious worries over the fate of the capitalist world in connection with the developing states' intention to change their status in the capitalist economic system, relying on the growing strength and influence of the socialist world.

"Representatives of certain groups in the United States with the greatest interest in the markets of the developing countries have directed the attention of politicians and statesmen to the seriousness of the present state of affairs. In the foreword to the 'Yearbook of the Overseas Development Council' for 1975, T. Hesburgh, chairman of the board, and J. Grant, president of the council, expressed the view that the United States has been confronted by 'serious world crises,' the consequences of which it has been unable to prevent, in the 20th century. These are World War I, the worldwide economic crisis of the end of the 1920's and World War II. 'Now,' they write, 'we are entering the era of a fourth crisis.' In their opinion, this crisis consists in the developing countries' 'incredible efforts' to achieve 'greater equality' in the system of world economic ties and to destroy the 'existing hierarchy of authority in the world.' They warn U.S. ruling circles not to underestimate the existing state of affairs and insist on the immediate resolution of problems arising from U.S. relations with the developing countries. 'The dependence of each nation on the jointly controlled international system,' they write, 'is so great that deficiencies in the development of these countries frequently constitute a problem for us.'"
"Recommendations and warnings of this kind are important because their authors point up the central element of the problem of the United States' present relations with the developing countries. While most of them are still part of the worldwide capitalist economy due to the historical events affecting the development of their economic structure and system of specialization, the developing countries have now, through the influence of the worldwide socialist community, gained an opportunity to make active use of political controls and their own strong state sovereignty to reconstruct their economic relations with the capitalist world.

"During the present stage in the development of international relations, this prospect is regarded by ruling circles in the leading capitalist nations as an indication of further aggravation of the political and economic crises in the entire capitalist system. And even if they were to find a way of alleviating the economic effects of the developing countries' campaign on the existing system of international economic ties (for example, by reinforcing the 'interdependence' of the economies of the capitalist and 'richest' developing countries), the political consequences of this campaign, which are called the 'destruction of the existing hierarchy of authority' in the lexicon of American politicians, will inevitably lead to a general weakening of capitalism's positions which no imperialist state is capable of preventing.

"The realization of these distinctive features of current relations between the developed countries of the West and the liberated states of Asia, Africa and Latin America is serving as a powerful stimulating factor which is uniting ruling circles in the United States, Japan and Western Europe and compelling them to coordinate their policies in regard to the national liberation movement and to temporarily set aside all thought of competition. The large monopolistic bourgeoisie of the West is placing special hopes on the United States in this matter because American leaders have announced that they will 'not concede' their 'spheres of influence' in the African nations, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Latin America to the Soviet Union.

"These statements are not only intended to have definite propaganda value; they reflect the growing desire of U.S. ruling circles to bring about a confrontation between the two worldwide systems in the developing nations, but this time a much broader assortment of means and methods will be used in place of exclusive reliance on military force, as was frequently the case in the past. Washington has made a definite and extremely important adjustment in its operational strategy in regard to the Asian, African and Latin American countries by augmenting the role assigned to economic, scientific and technical means and by—and this is extremely important—adding a strong propagandistic element.

"Former Secretary of State H. Kissinger repeatedly stated that the American administration intended to reassess its previous approach to economic relations with the developing countries, an approach which had been based on 'egotistical' considerations, and to head the movement for the establishment of a 'stable and just international economic structure.' The purpose of
these wildly publicized declarations was to make use of certain concessions to the nations interesting the United States most in these regions in the hope of attaching them more securely in the economic sense to the economic structures of the developed capitalist states and, thereby, setting them in opposition to the other developing countries, particularly those that had chosen a socialist course of development, and setting the entire group in opposition to the socialist community.

"This underlying motive for the United States' current stand on the issue of a 'just world order' is no secret. It has been actively opposed by the world progressive public and most of the developing states. Even American critics of Washington policy, particularly the representatives of liberal circles, feel that the administration's course is not only doomed to failure, but could also, under present conditions, play the role of an additional factor contributing to the stronger unity of the developing countries."

"The Carter Administration supports this course and is continuing the search for a compromisory settlement of relations with the developing countries of greatest importance to the United States. This is cogently attested to by the fact that this administration has proposed a significant increase in American aid to the developing countries for the 1977/78 fiscal year, an increase which should be used in the capacity of 'political bribes,' in the words of former Under Secretary of State G. Ball, for the purpose of convincing the governments of some developing countries that they should refuse to cooperate with the socialist world and that they should take a stand approved by the United States on the most significant issues in negotiations with the West at the Paris Conference on international economic cooperation, in the discussion of important political problems in the United Nations and so forth.

"The growing significance of economic controls in U.S. policy in regard to the developing countries reflects Washington's desire to make more active use of its own power and resources to preserve the existing 'hierarchy of authority' in the worldwide capitalist system; in addition to this, it only emphasizes the political and ideological importance of this problem to the general position of imperialism.

"Members of official circles in the United States realize the severity of the growing crisis in international capitalist economic relations and the possible consequences of this crisis for the entire capitalist system. They also realize that the national liberation movement that is currently making itself apparent in, in addition to all else, the developing countries' louder demands for changes in the present system of their relations with the capitalist states, is playing an increasingly perceptible role in worldwide socialism's general advance on the positions of international capital. This is the reason for the increased significance of ideological factors and the attempts to denigrate the significance of the ideals of October and the influence of true socialism's accomplishments on the people of the former colonies and semicolonies.
"An overt appeal to the ruling groups of several developing countries, requesting them to overcome the 'national limitations' of their approach to the issue of the 'redistribution of income' and to examine the problem as a whole from the standpoint of the struggle between the two worldwide systems, or, more precisely, from the class-determined standpoint of international capital, can clearly be heard in the speeches and statements of Washington officials. Frightening them with the prospect of 'internal chaos' and 'disruption of the social order,' representatives of the American ruling class see this as a direct way of arousing the instincts of solidarity in the groups ruling the nations that have chosen a capitalist course of development and hope that this motive will play the necessary role in the search for solutions acceptable to the United States for problems in the relations with the developing states. In particular, President J. Carter has said more than once that his government will strive to intensify and develop the parallel interests of U.S. ruling circles and the Asian, African and Latin American states with a U.S.-oriented policy. This was also referred to by Secretary of State C. Vance in his statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress' House of Representatives in March of this year, announcing that U.S. military aid would make it unnecessary for America's allies and friends to worry about their external security and would thereby allow them to allocate funds for economic and social development."

"The practice of making frightening statements and playing on the fears of internal problems at a time when more and more liberated states are viewing socialism as a realistic developmental alternative is, therefore, becoming an integral part of the Democratic Administration's strategy in regard to the developing nations. The strong propagandistic element reflects the reactions of U.S. ruling circles to the changes occurring in the world. The loud declarations about the establishment of a 'just world order' in statements by the President and secretary of state and the demonstrative reduction of aid to some developing countries on the pretext of the 'defense of human rights' provide quite a complete picture of the nature of this strategy.

"At the same time, the search for a community of interests with the ruling circles of some developing countries is also of immediate practical value to U.S. policy. Washington is playing on the nationalistic feelings of these circles in an attempt to weaken progressive forces in the Third World. This tendency can be seen, in particular, in recent armed conflicts, such as the conflicts between Egypt and Libya, the Sudan and Ethiopia, and Ethiopia and Somalia. The imperialists are sometimes able to involve certain nations that have chosen a noncapitalist course of development (for example, Somalia) in their struggle against progressive forces in the developing countries by playing on their nationalistic feelings and their fear of the 'communist menace.'

"This policy has not replaced Washington's practice of using obvious proteges of imperialism, such as Israel and the racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia, against the national liberation movement. In rendering tremendous
direct and indirect assistance to these policemen of the Third World, U.S. ruling circles are providing themselves with an additional guarantee of the success of the 'divide and conquer' policy. At the same time, a fundamentally important element of this strategy and its focal point is still, just as it has been ever since the end of World War II, the desire of U.S. ruling circles to set the national liberation movement and the liberated states in opposition to the socialist world and to prevent their unification on the basis of a common stand against imperialism. Only the methods of implementing this course and its propagandistic trappings have changed; its essence has remained the same.

"At present, however, this U.S. policy usually ends in failure. This is due to the influence of the new balance of worldwide class forces, which, as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev pointed out in his speech at the 25th CPSU Congress, 'has made it completely possible for the liberated nations to oppose imperialist dictates and to achieve just—that is, egalitarian—economic relations.'

"Substantial changes are also occurring within the United States itself. America has progressive circles which take a sympathetic and understanding view of the ideals of October in general and their revolutionary influence on the process of liberation in the colonial and dependent nations in particular. American communists have always taken a consistently Marxist-Leninist stand on this matter. The American student movement and the struggle of black Americans, American Indians and Chicanos for their democratic rights reflect and demonstrate the ideological and political factor of solidarity with the struggle of the Africans, Latin Americans and Asians for their economic and political independence. The heroes of the revolutionary struggle in the developing countries, such as P. Lumumba, E. Che Guevara and A. Cabral, are just as popular with the fighting progressive American public as its own leaders.

"This line, nurtured by many socialist ideals and traditions, opposes the neocolonial imperialist policy and, to some degree, helps the developing countries defend their own economic, social and political conquests.

"The presence and policies of the socialist states, however, constitute the main factor in this area. The socialist community's active policy directed toward the development of friendly relations and cooperation with the liberated states gives all-round assistance and support to all of the developing countries without exception in their relations with the United States and the other large capitalist countries."

FOOTNOTES


16. PRAVDA, 7 June 1977.

17. See THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 22 December 1975, p 888.

18. A private organization founded in 1969 to study the status of the United States in the Third World, catering in general to the liberal wing of American political groups and reflecting the views of scientific and religious organizations and representatives of some monopolies.


CHELYABINSK TRACTOR WORKS AND CATERPILLAR CORPORATION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 77
pp 59-70

[Article by L. S. Komarov]

[Summary] In the spring of 1930, a 60-horsepower tractor from the American Caterpillar Corporation was taken off a train at Chelyabinsk Station. This was a Caterpillar model that had never been seen before in the USSR. The machine was studied, disassembled and tested in Chelyabinsk, the future site of a huge industrial automotive plant and socialist city.

The First Five-Year Plan was a time of intensive industrialization. The tractor industry was growing by leaps and bounds. The new Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant was to produce heavy-duty tractors like the Caterpillar-60, and it was to produce them in a huge quantity—40,000 a year. The equipment for the new plant was coming mainly from the United States. An emissary was sent to the Caterpillar Corporation in the United States to negotiate the purchase of the technological blueprints for the tractor. His mission, however, was not successful.

When the president of the Caterpillar Corporation heard about the future production plans of the Russians, he decided that he would be cutting his own throat if he allowed the Chelyabinsk Plant to acquire the plans for his tractor. Accordingly, he set impossible terms for the transaction. The price of the blueprints was to be 3.5 million dollars and the Russians were to agree not to export any of their machines for the next 20 years. In addition, the Caterpillar Corporation was not obligated to inform the Russians of any technical improvements in the tractor. Later, even this offer was withdrawn, and the Russians decided to open their own design bureau in the United States.

Within a year, the Russians had developed their own tractor. Five years later, the Chelyabinsk Plant was already producing a hundred 60-horsepower tractors a day. During the First Five-Year Plan (1929-1932), the USSR produced more than 100,000 tractors and, during the Second (1933-1937), it produced 444,100.
The Great Patriotic War interrupted the development of the Soviet tractor industry. The Chelyabinsk Plant joined other automotive enterprises in the production of tanks. After the war, the Chelyabinsk Plant abandoned the production of all pre-war models and developed many advanced tractors. The products of the plant began to be exported to more than 80 countries, including some of the highly developed capitalist states.

The United States first received Soviet tractors through Canada, but now these machines are imported directly from the USSR. They are quite popular with American farmers, and the Caterpillar Corporation is now one of the USSR's largest trade partners. During 2 years alone--1975 and 1976--it sold the Soviet Union a total of 143 million dollars' worth of products. Just as several other American companies, the Caterpillar Corporation has opened a branch in Moscow.

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The great attention being paid to the moral and ideological problems of foreign policy not only by specialists in international affairs but also by historians, sociologists, philosophers and political scientists in the United States today is a distinctive feature of contemporary American sociopolitical thought. In America today, issues relating to U.S. relations with other countries are the subject of acute ideological debates during which different and often opposite positions are formulated. As B. Manning, American theorist of international relations, notes, "the paradox is that our 'pragmatic' nation which has been proud that it has always protected policy from ideological passions has nevertheless made foreign policy the focus of profound ideological contradictions." (Note 1), (B. Manning, "246 Years of American Foreign Policy: Doric, Ionic and Corinthian?" "Critical Choices for Americans," Vol 2, ed. by I. Kristol and P. Weaver, Lexington, 1976, p 253)

In reality American philosophical, moral and ethical thought has always paid great attention to the U.S. role and mission in world history. The ideological interpretation of these problems has as a rule been implemented in the form of the concepts of "American exceptionalism [isklyuchitelnost]" and U.S. "manifest destiny."

At different stages of U.S. history these ideas have carried different changes in meaning. Thus during the 1776 Revolution the concept of "American exceptionalism" was the banner of national liberation forces and expressed the difference between the United States, which was struggling to establish a bourgeois democratic setup, and the feudal and bureaucratic regimes of Europe. The same concept later began to embody the self-confidence and optimism of young American capitalism which developed under particularly favorable conditions and which is therefore inclined to regard itself as some kind of universal model of ideal social and moral progress.

This type of optimistic self-image has influenced both the Americans' general ideas of their country's place and role in world history and the government's foreign policy practice. And this influence has been expressed in the forms of isolationism and expansionism--forms which have changed and which have frequently outwardly contradicted one another.

The alternation of isolationism and expansionism has been accompanied by changes in the moral and ideological substantiations of U.S. foreign policy. The range of the fluctuations has been very wide--from the pragmatic ("materialist") line of attaining national goals irrespective of the means utilized to the "periodical fits of moralism" (Note 2), ("What Price Morality?" NEWSWEEK, 14 March 1977, p 8)--that is, the desire in specific foreign policy actions to adhere to some kind of universal moralistic principles to substantiate these actions.

Throughout U.S. history there have emerged the most diverse correlations and combinations of expansionism and isolationism on the one hand and pragmatism and moralism on the other. However, overall, as commentator S. Garrett rightly notes, "historically Americans have never succeeded in finding a satisfactory balance between their moral sense and their attitude toward political reality." (Note 3), (S. Garrett, "Morality at the Water's Edge," COMMONWEAL, 18 March 1977, p 170)
As American capitalism reached the imperialist stage, and particularly since World War II, the outlines of an "imperial messianic" moral and ideological orientation which has been most vividly displayed in the concept of an "American age" have formed. But since the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies the moralistic self-confidence and optimism which fueled the "imperial messianic" ideology which demanded "defense of the cause of freedom throughout the world," including by force of arms, have been giving way to sentiments of uncertainty, anxiety and pessimism. Thus well-known American publicist M. Lerner has pointed out the "Hamlet-like uncertainty" displayed by the United States in response to the question of whether "American exceptionalism" and the "American mission" in the world exist or not. (Note 4), (M. Lerner, "America: Decline and Fall?" DIALOG Vol 8 No 1, 1975, p 21)

The changes in the views of America's role in the system of international relations are connected primarily with the strengthening of the socialist countries' positions, the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, the strengthening of the developing countries' positions and the intensification of the struggle by all progressive forces in the world against U.S. expansionism and interventionism. The failure of the military adventure in Vietnam, the tension in relations with European partners, the fall in U.S. prestige in many regions of the world, the scandals connected with "Watergate" and the exposure of the interference by the U.S. intelligence services in the internal affairs of sovereign foreign states and the buildup of crisis phenomena in the United States itself—in the economy, domestic policy and morality—have also played a great role in changing Americans' perception of the world.

In the seventies increasing numbers of prominent American ideologists and politicians are beginning to realize the self-evident failure of the concept of "American exceptionalism"—which has for a long time constituted the basis of U.S. foreign policy—to coincide with the reality of the contemporary domestic political situation in the country and in international relations. "Neither manifest destiny nor the American mission exist any longer today," D. Bell declares. (Note 5), (D. Bell, "The End of American Exceptionalism," THE PUBLIC INTEREST No 41, fall 1975, p 205)

Accordingly, the forms of moral rhetoric—which were based on the idea of "American exceptionalism" and which earlier were utilized to substantiate U.S. foreign policy (primarily during the cold war period) also became the object of doubt and overt criticism by the mid-seventies. True, this criticism is characterized by varying degrees of profundity and consistency and is leveled from varying positions.

In 1975-1976, when an animated ideological debate was taking place in the United States in connection with the celebration of the bicentennial of the War of Independence, a number of American ideologists of the "leftwing liberal" trends (from N. Cousins and H. Gommager to C. McWilliams) and the "radical liberal" (from E. Genovese to M. Harrington) sharply criticized U.S. foreign policy which was based on the ideas of "American exceptionalism" and "manifest destiny" in their overtly anticommunist, "imperial" interpretation. With reference to the rhetorical substantiations of U.S. foreign policy failures, E. Genovese declared that "the language of American policy is absurd because our policy is itself absurd," (Note 6), ("What is a Liberal—Who Is a Conservative?" COMMENTARY, September 1976, p 59) "the hidden problem confronting the United States...is still the cold war and particularly our own cold war mentality," F. Neal, American specialist on international relations, has written. (Note 7), (F. Neal, "The Limp 'New Left' and Foreign Policy," CENTER REPORT, June 1976, p 27)
The supporters of these views drew attention to the fact that the United States, which 2 centuries ago strove to spread the ideas of enlightenment and the ideals of national liberation, in the 20th century has begun actively to support reactionary regimes and military dictatorships throughout the world. Critically assessing the crisis situation in the country and also the international scandals which caused a fall in U.S. prestige in the world, they reached the conclusion that America today has no moral right to aspire to the role of a "teacher of life" vis-a-vis other people. They also opposed the ideology of a "crusade" under the flag of "global anticommunism" as the foundation of U.S. foreign policy—all the more so since this ideology was the weapon of antidemocratic forces inside the country which, even today, are striving to recreate some renovated version of the ideal of a militarized, "mobilized" society which the late unlamented J. McCarthy attempted to assert in his time.

However, special note should be taken of the fact that a tendency to absolutize and idealize the general democratic trend of the 1776 Revolution and certain aspects of past U.S. history was to varying extents typical of many representatives of this moral and ideological position. They are also characterized by the mistrust and prejudices regarding the practice of real socialism which they display even in their "leftwing" and "radical" works. But is is important to stress that these authors on the whole advocated the relaxation of tension and the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union.

Parallel with the definite strengthening in the United States of the above-mentioned moral and ideological trend, another type of critical attitude toward the principles of foreign policy associated with the cold war traditions and the "imperial" aspirations of American capitalism manifested itself. And here the direct object of the criticism was not the actual "messianic" orientation in U.S. foreign policy of cultivating U.S. ideas as the defender of all countries and peoples from the "threat of communism" but the particular, most obsolete and discredited forms of it.

First, the criticism was leveled primarily at those forms of messianic moralizing based on the idea of "American exceptionalism," which is bound up too closely with certain features of a period that is now obviously over (great and seemingly inexhaustible natural resources, the dynamism and mass nature of entrepreneurial activity, the "geographical" security of the country and so forth). These archaic forms of messianic moralizing are regarded by the supporters of this position as overly optimistic illusions that were perfectly natural for America's "youth" but which are no longer fitting for its "maturity" which assumes a more sober view of the world situation. The article by D. Bell "The End of American Exceptionalism", the work by S. Lipset "The Paradox of American Politics" (Note 8) (S. Lipset, "The Paradox of American Politics," THE PUBLIC INTEREST, No 41, fall 1975) and a number of others are typical samples of this kind of criticism of messianic moralizing.

Second, doubts were voiced as to the possibility of subordinating world history to "American standards" by means of U.S. military-political and economic might. And here the criticism was leveled chiefly and primarily at the moralistic rhetoric which in the United States is associated with the name of John Foster Dulles, who as is well known made wide use of the phraseology of baptism in order to preach a world "crusade" against communism. D. Bell concluded that "the moralism which has inspired U.S. foreign policy for decades and which was displayed particularly vividly in the rhetoric of John Foster Dulles is exhausted." (Note 9), (D. Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," New York 1976, p 183)
(J. Chase) said in 1975 that "if the United States no longer shows a desire to act as the 'world's policeman,' this can be taken as a sign of its maturity and a profound understanding of our military and economic limitations in a world which no longer conforms to the usual outlines of the postwar era." (Note 10), ("America Now: A Failure of Nerve?" COMMENTARY July 1975, p 28) It is also relevant that "we are no longer living in a world in which military action as a means of economic policy is morally justified or politically feasible," (Note 11), (Ibid, p 27) Z. Brzezinski declared at the same time.

Third, the tendency to "moral extremism" or "excessive moralism" in U.S. foreign policy practice and to excessive exaggeration of the role of the moral and ideological factor in making specific foreign policy decisions was declared the main object of criticism. Accordingly, the demand for a more sober consideration of the specific and changing correlation of the different forces in each specific international situation was put forward. Certain prominent American ideologists and politicians drew attention to what was in their view a dangerous tendency in the elaboration of foreign policy actions--to proceed primarily from some kind of "moral absolutes" and from general and highly abstract principles regarded as universal "moral imperatives." These authors upbraided the initiators of foreign policy actions of this kind with failing to assess realistically enough the general world situation and the forces opposing the United States in the international arena. The opposing forces were declared an absolute "evil" and as a result of this there frequently arose unrealistic projects based not on sober consideration but on the dogma of the "moral necessity" of a "crusade" against "satanic forces" in the name of the ideals of "good."

And since within the framework of the given ideological position the criticism of "moral extremism" was supplemented with an indication of the reality of the threat of world nuclear catastrophe and with recognition of the objective fact of the might of the socialist countries, it provided its supporters with a platform, although not a very firm one, for recognition of the policy of peaceful coexistence and the relaxation of international tension.

The foreign policy practice of the Nixon and Ford administrations and their desire to "clear" foreign policy of "moralistic overtones" and to face up to reality more soberly was an attempt to embody this moral and ideological orientation in reality. "Today," H. Kissinger wrote in 1975, "we are seeing for ourselves that, like most other nations in history, we can neither escape this world nor rule over it.... We can no longer rely on moral judgments expressed in absolutist terms encountering broad support.... The time has come to soberly face up to the realities. Our choice is not the choice between moralism and pragmatism. We can abandon neither the one, nor the other." (Note 12), (H. Kissinger, "The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy," THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY QUARTERLY, Fall 1975, p 274)

In their specific context statements of this kind could be regarded as a critical answer to those forces in the United States which refused to recognize the new realities in the practice of international relations and strove to preserve the cold war traditions. Characterizing H. Kissinger's position (and, incidentally, contrasting it with the position of the new administration), TIME magazine noted recently that the former secretary of state's argument was that "policy must be based not on one nation's moral approval of another but on their mutual interests" and that "sovereign nations cannot allow themselves to be publicly spurred on." (Note 13), ("Carter's Morality Play," TIME, 7 March, 1977, p 36)

At the same time the subsequent events of American political life have revealed both the definite weakness and the substantial inconsistency of the moral and ideological position characterized above.
The essence of the weakness and inconsistency of this position are revealed in the fact that, while opposing "moralistic extremism," its representatives defend the idea of a balanced foreign policy dualism including on the one hand a moralistic approach and on the other an approach which they designate as "political realism." However, here "realism" in foreign policy—in complete accordance with the bourgeois habits of thought typical to the United States—was very often identified with "pragmatism." As a result, during the acute foreign policy debate with the supporters of cold war who frequently proclaimed the "primacy of morality" in the system of international relations, the position of their opponents (despite the reservations of the latter) was by contrast taken by a definite part of the American public as an apologia of pragmatism and as a call for the "primacy of pragmatism" in foreign policy. And in its turn this could not fail to weaken the position of the above-mentioned type of ideologists and politicians in the face of the active countercampaign mounted by rightwing forces in 1976 against the policy of relaxation of tension.

In order to clarify the ideological and psychological and the political basis of this interpretation of the moral and ideological position of the Nixon-Ford administrations and the group of ideologists close to them certain deep trends which have been revealed in American public opinion in the last few years should be taken into account. Nowadays in the United States the moral crisis has become extremely acute and at the same time has become more widely realized. It includes both the noisy scandals in the top echelons of government power, the amorality of the American military which was involved in overt forms of genocide in Southeast Asia, the instances of corruption which became evident, the growth of crime and the violations of the norms of morality inside the country and the massive violations of American citizens' rights.

As a result broad strata of the American public began to show understandable concern not only about the actual symptoms of the moral crisis in the United States but also about such a characteristic and traditional particular feature of American political consciousness and action as the dominance of a "double standard." This "double standard" assumes the coexistence of semiofficial moralistic declarations in a "Sunday school" spirit and pragmatism which is understood as moral relativism and egoism which releases the individual from observance of the principles of morality.

At the same time the growth of mass discontent with the dominance of a "double standard" in the United States is by no means always accompanied by an understanding of the genuinely alternate paths of a fundamental moral renewal of society and international relations which are elaborated on the basis of scientific analysis of the laws of world history. For the most part the feelings of discontent are displayed in the United States today in the form of the strengthening of a kind of "populist moralism"—that is, demands that the country's leading political and economic institutions implement their activity "according to the laws of morality" and not in accordance with subjectivism and the tyranny of private interests. In this connection the definite growth of the interest of ordinary Americans in moral and religious problems and also their readiness to implement moral principles resolutely and consistently become understandable.

This characteristic feature of public opinion in the United States today to a considerable extent determined the weakness and fragility of the positions of the ideologists and politicians who, in criticizing "excessive moralism" and advocating greater stress on pragmatism in foreign policy, failed to take into account these mass sentiments.
At the same time this feature of contemporary U.S. public opinion has been utilized and correspondingly amended by certain political and ideological groups in the United States.

In this connection American commentators note the "excessive" stress laid by the Nixon-Ford administrations on foreign policy problems and their scant concern for support of this policy by public opinion inside the country. The events in Vietnam finally disrupted the internal consensus on foreign policy questions and caused the growth of opposition to the government in Congress and public opinion. It can be said that J. Carter's victory to some extent rode on the crest of the mass moral discontent with many aspects of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. Taking these sentiments into account, J. Carter laid more stress on the connection between foreign and domestic policy, calling broadly for morality.

In other words: "The new administration's moralism and sermons...are an attempt to compensate for yesterday's errors and negligence" (Note 14), (P. Ajami, "Human Rights: Sermons of Substance," THE NATION, 2 April 1977, p 390)

It is also necessary to note the following circumstance. The thing is that in the United States in the last few years there has been an appreciable activation of the forces which are striving to direct the wave of spontaneous discontent that has risen in the country and the desire of ordinary Americans to strengthen the norms of morality into the channel of bourgeois moral and religious tradition. And here apologies for the American way of life are combined with an active counteroffensive against all forms and manifestations of social criticism in the United States--something of which B. Wattenberg's opposition to the "psychological failure complex and moral guilt," (Note 15), (B. Wattenberg, "The Real America," New York, 1974, p 13) or Z. Brzezinski's opposition to the "self-hatred syndrome," (Note 16), ("America Now: A Failure of Nerve?" p 27) may serve as characteristic examples.

At the same time considerable efforts by the American propaganda apparatus have been aimed at artificially switching the sense of dissatisfaction with the internal moral and political situation in America to other countries and transferring it into the sphere of international relations. It is precisely this goal which is served by the clamorous campaigns that are obviously inspired and aimed against the USSR and the other socialist countries--campaigns about the "military threat" which supposedly emanates from them and also about "violations of human rights."

Objectively the point of these campaigns is to resurrect to some extent the bankrupt thesis of the official "moralistic" rhetoric of the cold war period which regards the USSR as the symbol of "global evil" and thereby to create a kind of "lightning conductor" for the spontaneous feelings of dissatisfaction and discontent with both the situation in the United States and the place which the United States has occupied in the system of international relations--feelings which often do not have a sufficiently clear social focus [adres]. The political forces which have inspired these campaigns are attempting to speculate on the painful psychological condition (a kind of "national inferiority complex") which has arisen in the consciousness of some ordinary Americans. Speculations of this kind on real ailments and painful conditions in American social consciousness are designed to camouflage the real causes of the given conditions--causes which are connected with the deepening of bourgeois society's internal contradictions. At the same time these speculations are connected with the attempts to artificially stimulate the traditional messianic ideas and sentiments of chauvinism and nationalism. In particular, the clamorous propaganda campaign to celebrate the U.S. Bicentennial served these purposes and the present equally turbulent campaign to advertise the United States as the world's "moral leader" and "moral judge" also serves them.
Overtly reactionary, militarist forces are taking a particularly active part in this campaign and are using it to attack the policy of the relaxation of international tension. (Note 17), (A typical example of this position is retired Gen D. Graham's article "Detente Adieu" in the conservative magazine NATIONAL REVIEW in which he declares in the spirit of the moralistic rhetoric of the cold war period: "It remains as true to us today as it is impossible to be simultaneously for freedom and for communism or even to react neutrally to communism." D. Graham, "Detente Adieu," NATIONAL REVIEW, 3 September 1976, p 950) And as far as the new Washington administration is concerned, at the present time it is attempting to combine declarations on its readiness to continue the detente process with an intensification of its domestic and foreign propaganda activity in precisely the ideological channel characterized by us above.

It must be said that increasing numbers of American authors occupying the most diverse ideological positions have lately been drawing attention to the patent contradiction between the two above-mentioned lines in the new administration's policy. The given contradiction is the source of acute debate which is revealing the different positions on the issue of the moral and ideological foundations of contemporary U.S. foreign policy and propaganda practice.

The position of the supporters of further deepening the relaxation of international tension—those American politicians and ideologists who realize that a halt or stagnation in this process inevitably intensifies the threat of a retreat—should primarily be highlighted here. They see the new attempts to revive the traditional messianic line of U.S. "moral superiority" as a substantial threat to détente. They rightly point out that the overtly anti-Soviet and antisocialist campaign which is orchestrated from above and which operates under the flag of moralism is aimed against the relaxation of tension. Justified fears are voiced that militant anticommunist "messianism" in any form (and even under the slogan of the struggle for "human rights") objectively leads to the strengthening in the United States of the positions of overtly antidemocratic rightwing groups which are attempting to revive the idea of a "mobilized" society and the practice of McCarthyism. "We have grounds for fearing a moralizing foreign policy..." (G. Wills) warns. "Carter's sermons on human rights cause a chill as though the shadow of Wilson's '14 points' had fallen across us." (Note 18), (THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 12 May 1977, p 16)

The American press is featuring materials pointing out that a real strengthening of the opposition by extreme rightwing forces to the relaxation of tension and in particular with respect to the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation talks will be an undesirable but highly probable consequence of the "moralistic orientation" which has appeared today in the new administration's foreign policy. "The linkage of the human rights problem with the SALT problem may impart moral respectability to the growing opposition to the SALT-II talks," (Note 19), (T. Szulc, "The Limits of Linkage," THE NEW REPUBLIC 5 March 1977, p 18) commentator T. Szulc warns.

The essence of the position of those American authors who advocate continuing the relaxation of tension and at the same time reject the present "moralizing" campaign in U.S. foreign policy—a campaign which is anti-Soviet in its main trend—can be characterized as political realism. (But their position must not be confused with the position of the supporters of the school of "political realism" or "power determinism" [silovoy determinizm] since the latter represent the traditional orientation which proceeds from the thesis of the "containment" of communism and "Soviet might" as the determining U.S. foreign policy line. "Realists" of this kind differ from the "moralists" chiefly in that they are convinced that anticommunism as the basis U.S. foreign policy goal must be regarded not so much as a "moral imperative" as the demand of "political reality."
An objective analysis of contemporary history shows that the global anticommmunist strategy which obviously threatens the cause of detente cannot be deemed realistic. The fears which U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT voices about the "new ideological crusade in defense of human rights" which represents an attempt to intensify the ideological "pressure" on the socialist countries by earmarking additional appropriations for the expansion of the subversive activity of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe and also an attempt to impose "new moral rules" on detente are much more realistic. "The issue remains undecided," the magazine writes, "since it must be ascertained to what extent the new rules for detente put forward by the President will prove to be realistic in practice; in other words, can cooperation between the great powers flourish on one level while Russia and America are embarking on a tough and possibly dangerous confrontation on other levels." (Note 20), (U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 4 April 1977 p 24)

Certain realistically minded supporters of detente who criticize the "moralistic rhetoric" draw attention to the fact that the same old "double standard" can frequently be found behind the facade of this rhetoric while the outline of the usual pragmatism oriented toward insuring one-sided advantages shows through the declarations on "moral idealism." In the opinion of a number of commentators, the "double standard" is displayed in the fact that it is mainly the socialist countries and those developing countries which struggle actively against neocolonialism and imperialism (including American) which are chosen as the objects of "moral indignation." At the same time many overtly reactionary, dictatorial and corrupt regimes which rely on terror and violence inside their countries and which here enjoy U.S. military and economic aid are effectively not subjected to "moral condemnation." The selfsame U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT agrees that the fears that the United States is guided by "selective morality" in assuming the role of "moral policeman to the whole world" are valid. (Note 21), ("Moral Policeman to the World?", U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 14 March 1977, p 17) The "selectivity" consists in the fact that the clamorous campaign about human rights essentially does not extend to countries dependent on the United States such as South Korea, Chile and others. In the opinion of American commentators, the "moral idealism" which is being proclaimed is turning into "double standard" or downright hypocrisy.

In this connection THE NATION, a liberal American journal, notes that the mere statement of instances of the violation of civil rights in such countries without revealing the social reasons for them represents abstract moralizing since it is accompanied by the deliberate hushing up of the link which exists between these regimes and the United States. "To support the aims of Juntas and at the same time to censure the means used to achieve them... is either hypocrisy or blindness." (Note 22), (THE NATION, No 1 January 1977, p 5) It is being realized increasingly clearly in the United States that the phraseology of "moral idealism" is frequently utilized to camouflage a purely pragmatic desire for direct interference in the affairs of countries which are struggling for their national freedom and independence.

Doubts not about the essence of the "messianic moralistic" orientation itself but merely about "excesses" and "extremes" in its formation or implementation are often voiced in the debate about the moral foundations of U.S. foreign policy.

Many American authors believe that the role of a "world moral policeman" may prove just as complex, thankless and even dangerous as the role of "military policeman." The misgivings are voiced that the United States, "by assuming the role of moral policeman, may find itself just as isolated as in the past, when it strove to be a military policeman." (Note 23), (U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 14 March 1977, pp 21, 17)
These authors by no means question the U.S. right to be a "moral example" to other countries and peoples. Attention is merely drawn to the fact that, given a "messianic moralistic" orientation, the United States needs to act more cautiously and to assess the international situation and the real "balance of forces" more soberly. "Carter's policy on human rights, if it is pursued with excessive energy, may cause serious friction in Soviet-American relations," (Note 24), (THE NEW REPUBLIC, 5 March 1977, p 17), Szulc warns.

Such are the contradictions characteristic of the consciousness of a considerable number of American ideologists and politicians today. They would like to revive the "messianic" ideology in a new "moral humanist" mantle but at the same time they are afraid of the possible practical consequences of reviving it and implementing it in foreign policy. In some cases this fear is connected with pragmatic considerations stemming from the usual orientation toward the one-sided safeguarding of self-seeking interests. In other cases this fear is connected with a realistic understanding of the fact that the revival and implementation of "messianic" ideology really threatens the relaxation of international tension, and today international tension is fraught with serious danger even for the United States itself.

To some extent all these contradictions reflect the feelings of a considerable part of American society today. It is not for nothing that one of the latest Harris polls showed that 65 percent of Americans support the administration's policy on "human rights" (18 percent opposed it; but here 75 percent of those questioned (as against 10 percent) advocate the continuation of the policy of relaxation of international tension.

One more highly distinctive position which has been revealed just recently during the above-mentioned debate must not be disregarded. It can be defined as the "pragmatic substantiation of moralism" in U. S. foreign policy. Familiarity with this position, in our view, makes it possible to gain a fuller idea of the meaning and real essence of the new administration's present foreign policy doctrine since in the given instance its genuine views and aims are formulated more openly.

The advocates of this position have supported the rhetoric on the worldwide "U.S. mission in the struggle for human rights," seeing it as a practical ("pragmatic") means of preserving and consolidating U.S. strategic positions in a number of regions of the world. Thus in his article "Carter and Human Rights" S. Karnow supports the "messianic moralistic" speculation about "human rights" as a means of pressuring the USSR and socialist countries. Examining the problem of "moral pressure" on U.S. allies, such as South Korea, whose regimes are today characterized by the manifest violation of all the norms of democracy, he admits that the implementation of moral and ideological pressure on such countries may destabilize the antidemocratic regimes existing there--something which entails a risk to U.S. strategic interests. However, S. Karnow believes that the United States should take a certain risk and that, given observance of the necessary caution, it is possible to transform the "moral orientation" of U.S. foreign policy, even vis-a-vis South Korea, into an instrument for protecting U.S. interests. (Note 25), (S. Karnow, "Carter and Human rights," SATURDAY REVIEW, 4 April 1977, p 8 see also D. Fraser, "Freedom and Foreign Policy," FOREIGN POLICY no 26, 1977; M. Reisman, "The Pragmatism of Human Rights," THE NATION, 7 May 1977)

These statements by the American commentator shed light on the real motives behind the "moralistic" and "idealistic" reasoning of U.S. foreign policy strategy.
Familiarity with the contemporary debate on the moral and ideological foundations of U.S. foreign policy make it possible to draw certain conclusions. It is perfectly obvious that in the United States today there is neither the necessary clarity nor any unity on the question of the moral and ideological principles of U.S. foreign policy. (Note 26), ("Unanimity within the country on foreign policy issues which is even remotely reminiscent of the unanimity of the pre-Vietnam period is not a likely possibility," R. Tucker states. R. Tucker, "Beyond Detente," COMMENTARY, March 1977, p 50) Moreover, there are grounds for asserting that the "moralism"-"pragmatism" opposition which is traditional to American political consciousness still retains its force in various trends of contemporary thinking in the United States. In its turn this by no means contributes to the elaboration of moral and ideological principles of U.S. foreign policy which correspond to the reality of the contemporary era and to the objective necessity of peaceful coexistence and the relaxation of tension.

The broad use of "messianic moralistic" rhetoric in itself by no means signifies a substantial change in U.S. foreign policy strategy. As the viewpoint of the "pragmatic supporters of moralism" eloquently testifies, the present U.S. foreign policy orientation of "defending human rights" effectively represents a combination of sham phraseology which embodies messianic and moralistic aspirations with purely pragmatic attempts to safeguard the country's interests one-sidedly.

This orientation cannot lead to a real moral renewal of U.S. foreign policy. The gamble on rhetoric which attempts to represent the United States as the bearer of some kind of universal "moral ideal" and as a "moral judge" on the issue of "human rights" in reality signifies primarily an attempt to camouflage the real crisis processes which are taking place in the United States.

The real dynamics of mankind's development and the problems, contradictions, processes, requirements and potential which objectively emerge here— all this assumes the choice and clear definition of moral positions. These positions cannot fail to include a differentiated assessment of the trends and prospects of the sociohistorical development of the different socioeconomic formations and sociopolitical systems, classes and national liberation movements.

Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the principled unity of morality and the scientific ideology which is based on objective sociohistorical dialectical analysis and from the unity of views and practical action, of ends and means.

The realities of the contemporary world confront all mankind with a number of universal moral imperatives of a general humanist significance. These include primarily: the need to struggle for the reduction and complete elimination of the threat of nuclear catastrophe, for lasting and just peace, for the termination of the arms race and for mutually advantageous cooperation on insuring the security of all sovereign countries and on solving acute global problems. The thing is that the struggle to make detente a really irreversible process is a moral imperative. The acceptance and unswerving implementation of this moral imperative is not only the moral duty of all governments but also a manifestation of genuine political realism.
Although the turn away from cold war to the relaxation of international tension does not eliminate the fundamental difference between economic and sociopolitical systems or between the systems of morality and ideology, nevertheless the demands of moral duty vis-a-vis one's own people and the fate of all mankind, as well as the demands of political realism, today necessitate consistent observance of the principles of mutual respect for the sovereignty of all states and noninterference in their internal affairs and active opposition to those forces which embark on provocations and acts of subversion which really threaten the cause of peace and the relaxation of tension.

CSO: 1803
QUEBEC: A YEAR AFTER ELECTIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 77 pp 82-87

[Article by N. B. Bantsekin]

[Text] The provincial elections in Canada usually do not even hold the interest of Canadian, much less foreign, correspondents for long. But the elections in Quebec last November were an obvious exception to this rule. The election victory was won by the Parti Quebecois (PQ)—a political movement of the French Canadian petty bourgeoisie with nationalist leanings. It openly set the goal of the secession of this Canadian province, the largest in terms of territory and the second-largest in terms of population, from the Canadian Confederation. Since the party's founding, its president has been Rene Levesque, who became the premier of Quebec after the elections.

The election results naturally drew attention to the unsolved and extremely painful national problem in Canada. Separatism has been suggested many times as a solution. Now, for the first time in Canadian history, the provincial administration of Quebec is headed by a separatist party. This is the reason for the heightened interest in the effects of these elections on internal political developments in Canada. The London ECONOMIST declared, for example, that "after November 1976, Canada will never be the same." Many judgments of this kind can also be found in the pages of the American, not to mention Canadian, press. For this reason, it would be wise to trace at least the general features of the path followed by the Parti Quebecois to power, the evolution of its program and tactics and the major trends in its activity for the past year—now already in the capacity of the party in power in Quebec.

The Parti Quebecois entered the political arena a relatively short time ago—in 1968—and largely owes this to its leader, R. Levesque, who was once a popular Canadian journalist. In 1960, R. Levesque was elected a deputy to the provincial Assembly of Quebec from the Liberal Party, which was then the conservative Union Nationale's main political rival (for many decades, these two French-Canadian bourgeois parties had taken turns heading the provincial administration—N. B.). After the victory of the Liberals, R. Levesque became the minister of water resources and public works, and then the minister of natural resources.
The program of reforms elaborated, with the most active participation by
R. Levesque, for the purpose of increasing Quebec's political and economic
weight in Canada required large expenditures, and most funds were con-
centrated in the hands of the federal government. As a result, conflicts be-
tween Quebec and Ottawa were intensified. Nationalized enterprises could
also have served as sources of financing. At the insistence of R. Levesque,
the Liberal Party made the nationalization of hydroelectric stations a
major issue in the election campaign of 1962. This brought the party a
decisive victory. But the later reforms of the "quiet revolution" in
Quebec (this is what Canadian authors call this period of reform) were
resisted by large monopolies and the church and were soon abandoned. This
had a strong effect on the views of R. Levesque and his supporters. Since
1963, their slogan has been "only independence can solve Quebec's problems."

The petty bourgeoisie, disillusioned by the failure of Liberal reforms,
tended more and more toward separatism. Two separatist parties—the Ralliement
Indépendance Nationale (RIN) and the Ralliement National (RN)—put up candi-
dates for the first time, although unsuccessfully, in the provincial elections
of 1966. In 1967, R. Levesque left the Liberal Party and founded the Mouvement
Souveraineté-Association (MSA), which announced the goal of political inde-
pendence for Quebec with economic association (of the Common Market type) with
the rest of Canada. Backed up by this organization, Levesque and his fol-
lowers began to establish a mass-scale separatist party.

The constituent congress of the Parti Quebecois took place in Quebec from
10 through 14 October 1968. It was built on a union of the MSA (7,000 mem-
bers) and RN, led by Gilles Gregoire, with 12,000 members. R. Levesque be-
came the president and G. Gregoire, the vice president of the PQ. Later,
members of the dissolved RIN (13,000 members) joined the PQ.

The constituent congress of the PQ adopted its charter and program. The
party's main objective was proclaimed to be the achievement of political
independence for Quebec by peaceful means within the framework of an eco-
nomic and customs union with Canada. The PQ planned to do this by winning
elections and acquiring a majority in the provincial assembly. In addition,
the program demanded various reforms: tax reapportionment in favor of low-
income strata, augmentation of the state sector, guaranteed full employment,
etc. On the whole, the demands of the PQ can be described as a program of
petty bourgeois reforms, identical in many ways with the platforms of
Western European Social Democrats.

The separatist movements were unified on the basis of the MSA, and this was
not a coincidence. In relation to the other separatist organizations, R.
Levesque's party occupied a position in the center and its program was
moderate enough to serve as a compromise between extreme currents. As a
result, the PQ united all separatist currents of any significant size in
Quebec.
In the provincial elections of 1970, the PQ won 23 percent of the vote but was only given 7 of the 110 seats in the Assembly. At the same time, the Liberal Party, because of the established majority system, took over 72 of these seats after winning only 41 percent of the vote. The elections determined the chief base of the PQ—the large cities, particularly Montreal and Quebec.

The election results evoked disillusionment and confusion in the petty bourgeois opposition. The more extremist young activists revived the underground Quebec Liberation Front and resorted to terrorist actions. In October 1970, English diplomat J. Cross and provincial Minister P. Laporte (who was later killed) were kidnapped. The federal government, citing the law on wartime measures, sent troops to Quebec. During the course of the subsequent mass arrests and searches, the terrorist organizations of the separatists were liquidated.

At the same time, the dispatch of troops to Quebec strengthened the nationalist feelings of French Canadians and increased the influence of the PQ, which absolutely dissociated itself from the terrorists. The party began to search for compromise solutions which would make the idea of independence more palatable to the voters. The process of eliminating radical elements from positions of leadership, a process which had began even before the establishment of the party, was intensified. The program was revised.

The most important changes were introduced into the program in 1973 by the Fourth PQ Congress, which focused on economic problems. According to the resolutions of this congress, taxes and revenues from state enterprises and foreign (mainly American) investments would constitute the best basis for Quebec's economic development. A distinctive "code of behavior" for investors constitutes one of the largest parts of the program. The issues of energy and raw materials occupy a significant part of the program. In particular, the plan calls for Quebec to sell its own hydroelectric power and receive oil and coal in exchange; asbestos mining is to be nationalized.

The program calls for a drastic cut in military expenditures and Quebec's withdrawal, after independence had been won, from NATO and NORAD or, at least, from their military organizations.

In the 1973 elections, the PQ won 30.3 percent of the vote (6 seats in the provincial legislature) and gained the strategically important position of the official opposition.

The results of the 1970 and 1973 elections made it possible to analyze the composition of the permanent electorate of the PQ. It receives the votes of 63 percent of all French Canadians under the age of 35 living in Montreal (and 41 percent of those over 35), 39 percent of the French-Canadian intelligentsia living outside of Montreal, 30 percent of working Anglophones and 21 percent of the rural French Canadians.
In 1974, the Fifth PQ Congress was held. Substantial changes were again made in the program. The major change was a new means for the achievement of independence. While the program had formerly envisaged Quebec's immediate secession from the Canadian Confederation after the party's election victory, now the victorious PQ was to begin negotiations with the federal government and, if these should fail, put the question of independence to a referendum after approximately 2 years. The new program also had stronger premises of a socioeconomic nature. As a result, the PQ's influence grew. For example, according to public opinion polls, it has more support in some rural regions in 1975 than the Union Nationale or Liberal Party. It received stronger support from trade unions: in the summer of 1976, the PQ was endorsed by one of the three largest labor organizations in the province—the Quebec Confederation of Trade Unions.

This was the status of the PQ on the eve of the special elections for the Assembly, set for 15 November 1976. While the voters were abandoning the ruling Liberal Party en masse, due to the economic recession, inflation and unemployment that had reached a record level in Quebec by 1976, the Parti Quebecois, using its new program, could offer the voters a precisely formulated socioeconomic platform. The issue of independence was not emphasized; it was, to a significant degree, "amortized" by the promise of a referendum if the party should come to power. The point on Quebec's withdrawal from NATO and NORAD was omitted from the campaign manifesto for the purpose of attracting voters with conservative leanings. During the campaign, the PQ stressed the unpopularity of the Liberal Government and its leader R. Bourassa, the corruption in the government bureaucracy and the 10-percent level of unemployment. It promised the voters full employment, new relations between employers and workers, better social security and subsidies for farmers. In the area of foreign policy, it promised expanded relations with the United States and French-speaking nations.

The PQ won a strong victory on 15 November 1976: 41.4 percent of the vote and 71 seats in the Assembly. The Liberals won 33.8 percent (26 seats) and the Union Nationale won 18.2 percent (11 seats). On 27 November 1976, R. Levesque appointed his cabinet. The main positions were occupied by C. Morin as intergovernmental affairs minister, J. Morin as education minister (also vice-premier), and J. Parizeau as finance and revenue minister.

Immediately after the election, the emphasis was shifted in the statements made by PQ leaders. On 16 November, R. Levesque announced in a television interview that the achievement of independence for Quebec was the most important objective of his party and government. He reaffirmed the government's intention to hold a referendum, during which time the inhabitants of Quebec would have to vote for or against secession. Despite these declarations, however, the resolution of the problem of Quebec's status is apparently being postponed. After the election, it was announced that the referendum would take place on the date specified in the program, but this was followed by postponements and now the official date would seem to be spring of 1978.
According to R. Levesque's latest statements, this referendum will ask the Quebeckers to specify the government—federal or provincial—to which they would prefer to pay their taxes. In addition, R. Levesque is doing much to augment Quebec's authority in the federal-provincial sphere and in the sphere of foreign relations. At present, Quebec has 15 representatives abroad, including in the United States, England, France, Belgium, Italy, Japan and several French-speaking countries. In May 1977, a preliminary agreement was concluded with Ottawa, according to which the provincial immigration services will have the right to select 50 percent of the immigrants wishing to settle in Quebec. According to earlier legislation, the province was supposed to discuss the candidacy of each potential immigrant with the federal immigration authorities, and the deciding vote was always Ottawa's. Judging by the fact that a special committee was formed to study this matter, it is evident that neither side is satisfied with the compromise (in particular, the Quebec Administration is demanding complete independent authority in this area).

As for the acute language problem in Quebec, the policy of the new government differs little from the policy of the Liberal Government. The French language is still the only official and working language in Quebec. "Law No 101," which regulates this matter and was passed by the Assembly on the initiative of the Levesque Government, essentially recapitulates "Law No 22" of 1974.

During the first days after the election, the Levesque Government was already facing difficult economic problems inherited from the Liberals. A decision was made to reduce expenditures on social needs, raise electric power rates and attract foreign capital to reduce the provincial debt, which had reached 1.5 billion dollars. In carrying out these plans, the Quebec Government encountered serious difficulties: due to the absence of liquid assets, the sum allocated for the creation of new jobs turned out to be insufficient, foreign investments did not increase substantially, and the cut in social programs was sharply criticized by trade unions. In addition to this, as Quebec economists have pointed out, a rise in the cost of electric power can lead to a further rise in inflation, the level of which has temporarily stabilized at 6 percent a year.

Despite these difficulties, the Parti Quebecois is on the rise and has more than 150,000 members. In May 1977, the Sixth Party Congress was held in Montreal. Congress delegates requested the government to conduct a more flexible policy in its relations with Ottawa, including discussion with the federal government on the referendum date, the precise formulation of the issues raised in the referendum and the nature of future relations between an independent Quebec and the rest of Canada. The problem of independence was regarded as a fairly distant one at the Sixth Congress. Emphasis was shifted to the further expansion of the province's rights in the existing political structure. Paramount significance was attached to the demand for autonomy for Quebec, which, as C. Morin, one of the party leaders, said in his speech, "could include almost everything, with the
exception of a separate currency and army." The unanimously re-elected president of the party, R. Levesque, underscored the fact that his government would strive to ensure Quebec "the best possible position prior to the referendum."

Most of the congress resolutions were passed by an overwhelming majority—an indicator of the solid unity of the PQ, particularly when we consider the fact that it represents a conglomerate of various political currents and trends. There were, however, serious differences of opinion on some matters. This applies above all to the decision to remove the point on the granting of local self-government to Indians and Inuit from the party program and to retract—for tactical reasons—the statement on the withdrawal of independent Quebec from NATO and NORAD.

The federal government is attentively observing developments in the province. According to many statements by Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau, it will firmly oppose any attempts at secession by Quebec. At the same time, Ottawa is striving to establish cooperation with the Levesque Government. In July 1977, P. E. Trudeau announced the formation of the federal task force on Canadian unity, which has the responsibility of finding "some kind of course halfway between Canadian federalism and Quebeckian separatism."

The major Canadian parties have already determined their basic attitudes toward the situation in Quebec. The Progressive Conservative Party feels that the victory of the PQ was due to errors in the federal government's economic policy. J. Clark, leader of the party, spoke in favor of a better status for Quebec in the confederation and cooperation for this purpose with the provincial administration; at the same time, he advocated the prevention of any attempts at secession. E. Broadbent, leader of the New Democratic Party, said that he regards R. Levesque as "an honest and responsible individual" who is trying to develop the French-Canadian culture in Quebec—"an integral part of Canada." He put all of the blame for the situation in Quebec on the federal government of P. E. Trudeau.

In the view of the Communist Party of Canada, the workers of Quebec who voted against the government of the Liberal Party on 15 November 1976 were expressing their profound dissatisfaction with its economic and social policy, the continued high level of inflation, unemployment and wage controls; in endorsing the PQ, the voters were not voting for separatism, but for a change. The Canadian communists feel that the first step in the resolution of the French-Canadian problem should be the ratification of a new constitution for the nation, which should be based on the equal and voluntary partnership of both nationalities, including their right of self-determination right up to secession, recognition of the bilingual nature of the state and protective guarantees for the languages and cultures of both nationalities. The communist party is against separatism, which is not in the best interests of the Canadian workers.
The year that has elapsed since the PQ came to power has not provided a clear answer to the question of which course Quebec will take. The governments of Canada and Quebec are both taking advantage of the pending results of the referendum and, possibly, the federal parliamentary elections of 1978. It is obvious, however, that the PQ intends to continue its attempt to achieve greater independence for the province. Only time will tell the form in which this will be achieved and whether it will be achieved at all. The federal government and Parliament will not have the final word in this matter. The views of Canada's southern neighbor must also be taken into consideration. Judging by American comments, the United States would not be overjoyed at the emergence of a new sovereign state on its northern border.

FOOTNOTES

1. The name "Quebec Party" corresponds more to the French "Parti Quebecois" than the "Party of Quebec" usually used by our press—Editor's note.

2. For a discussion of the sociopolitical structure of Quebec, its economy and natural resources, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1976—Editor's note.

3. The national question, or the French-Canadian problem, came into being more than 200 years ago, when Quebec became part of Britain's possessions in North America after France was defeated in the Seven Years War (1757-1763) and its inhabitants, mainly immigrants from France, were placed in an unequal position in comparison to the Canadians of Anglo-Saxon origins. In contrast to the Anglo-Canadians, who have settled all over the nation, the French Canadians live mainly in Quebec, constituting 80 percent of its population. They make up a compact, clearly defined ethnic community with a common religion (Roman Catholicism) and culture and certain national traditions. Their fight against national oppression has been a constant part of Canadian history. For a more detailed discussion of this, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1973; No 3, 1977—Editor's note.

4. As Levesque himself has said, the strike of the French-Canadian personnel of CBC in 1959 played the deciding role in the development of his views. When the strikers were deprived of the support they had been promised by their Anglo-Canadian colleagues, the strike dragged on for more than 2 months and ended in failure. This, in Levesque's words, made him positive that "the French-Canadians are treated exactly like second-rate people."

5. Quebec produces 42 percent of the nation's electric power and, in terms of power supplies, is second only to Norway; almost 50 percent of the capitalist world's asbestos mining takes place in Quebec.

6. For more on the bilingual problem in Canada, see V. A. Tishkov's article in SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1977—Editor's note.
AGREEMENT SIGNED, PROBLEMS REMAIN

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 77 pp 88-91

[Article by Yu. V. Romantsov]

[Text] After years of tense negotiations between Panama and the United States, which have repeatedly resulted in bitter conflicts and heated outbursts, a new treaty defining the status of the Panama Canal has been drawn up and was signed on 7 September in the headquarters of the Organization of American States. A treaty on the permanent neutrality and operation of the canal was signed at the same time.

The Panamanian public regards the agreement concluded with the United States as a great success in the Panamanian struggle to reclaim a part of national territory which was seized by the United States. At a special session of the National Assembly of Community Representatives, the results of the negotiations with the United States were described as a "reinforcement of Panamanian dignity and the return of something that was earlier usurped." O. Torrijos, head of the Panamanian Government, called the new treaty "the beginning of the complete elimination of a colonial enclave in Panama."

For the United States, according to J. Kraft, renowned WASHINGTON POST correspondent, the main reason for the agreement is that it "will aid in preventing a direct outburst of indignation over the canal, which would have far-reaching consequences, not only for U.S. relations with Latin America but also for the entire group of U.S. relationships with the developing countries."

The major positive feature of the documents signed in Washington is the fact that they nullify the crushing terms forced on Panama in 1903, terms which permitted the United States to behave as though it owned the Panama Canal Zone. Washington moved its laws and conventions to a foreign land, stationed its troops there and established 14 military bases. The Canal Zone is used by the Pentagon as a training ground where punitive experts are trained to suppress the national liberation movements in other Latin American countries.

1. See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 9, 1973 (with a map of the Isthmus of Panama) and No 7, 1977--Editor's note.
According to the documents that were signed, territorial jurisdiction over the Canal Zone will gradually be transferred to Panama from the time the treaties go into effect; within 2.5 years, police, customs, postal and other functions will be transferred to Panama. Panamanian justice will be exercised in the Canal Zone on the basis of national criminal and civil law. By the year 2000, Panama will have complete control of the canal. Until that time, a commission appointed by the U.S. Government, with a board of directors consisting of five Americans and four Panamanians, will administer the operations of this important waterway. The agreement envisages preferential hiring practices for Panamanian citizens applying for jobs as canal service personnel. Panama's revenues will increase considerably: instead of the present 2.3 million dollars a year, these revenues will range from 60 million to 80 million, depending on the density of ship traffic. The U.S. military presence in the Canal Zone will also be gradually reduced. The military bases should be phased out during the 23 years remaining in this century. During this period, the "protection and defense" of the canal will be the joint responsibility of both states, and the role and part played by Panama will be constantly augmented. At the end of the present century, when, according to the new treaty, the U.S. will have no military control over the Canal Zone, it will nonetheless retain the right to "defend the neutrality of the canal."

The agreement concluded by the two sides is a compromise which reflects many nuances of the prolonged confrontation and, to some degree, allows for a double interpretation of the documents. For example, Panama was not able to completely rid itself of the "guardianship" of its powerful neighbor over part of national territory; it has retained the role of a "guarantor of the security and neutrality" of the canal. This premise is interpreted in Washington as "partial sovereignty," which the United States can exercise in Panama on a permanent basis. At the same time, R. Escobar Bethancourt, head of the Panamanian delegation at the negotiations, stated that his nation regards the pact on the neutrality of the canal as a guarantee of American nonintervention in Panamanian internal affairs. The Panamanians are well aware, however, that this premise might be used in the future by the United States as a pretext for intervention, since the treaty on neutrality stipulates that the United States can send its troops into the zone if the canal should have to be defended against an external threat. For a long time, the Panamanians objected to the inclusion of this premise in the treaty, but they finally made this concession to avoid another delay in Washington's recognition of Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone.

For its part, the United States had to agree to even more substantial concessions than those expected by White House and State Department strategists when they began the lengthy negotiations with Panama 13 years ago. Washington agreed to these negotiations under the pressure of circumstances, as well as for the purpose of attempting to convince the Latin American countries that a "new era" had supposedly begun in inter-American relations and, thereby, diminishing the struggle in many of these nations against the political and economic domination of the United States and the American monopolies.
The canal issue seriously complicated U.S. relations with Panama more than once, sometimes extending to bloodshed and the severance of diplomatic relations. In the eyes of the Latin American public, this unsolved problem revealed the hypocrisy of Washington's statements about its desire to cooperate with its southern neighbors on the basis of "equal partnership." This was reaffirmed by the results of the August meeting of the heads of state and government of Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama and Jamaica, which was held in Bogota and was convened for the purpose of discussing the course of the negotiations between Panama and the United States. The canal issue, Colombia's President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen said at this meeting, does not only concern one nation; the restoration of Panama's sovereignty over part of its territory is in the interests of Latin America as a whole, as a continent fighting for independence and against colonialism. The colonial nature of American domination in part of Panama was severely criticized, from the rostrum of the United Nations among other places, by a large group of nonaligned nations, which described this domination as graphic evidence of Washington's reluctance to recognize present realities.

Sober-thinking politicians in the United States, as well as businessmen concerned primarily with the fate of their capital in Latin America, played a definite role in this matter. For example, H. Geyelin, the executive vice president of the Council of the Americas, an association of 220 American corporations, said that the settlement of the canal issue would create a "more favorable climate" for American capital investments in Latin America. In other words, the administration in Washington came to the conclusion that the practice of clutching at the obsolete past is not only against U.S. interests at the present time, but, to the contrary, can considerably harm these interests. As a result, the Carter Administration made the canal issue one of this year's major priorities and began to make energetic attempts to settle the issue. In forcing the negotiations, however, the United States did not in any sense cease its attempt to replace a genuine settlement with a formula which would allow the United States to retain practical control of the canal and the Canal Zone. Predictably, this plan did not please the Panamanians. They justly saw it as an attempt to reduce the "Panamization" of the canal to a purely symbolic gesture.

Now that the agreement has been signed and the documents must be approved by a plebiscite in Panama and ratified by the American Congress, a furious campaign is being waged in the United States by influential reactionary and conservative circles for the purpose of perpetuating the United States' "rights" to the Panama Canal.

American "hawks" have repeatedly engineered various blocs and groups to prevent any kind of change in the current status of the Panama Canal, which even the NEW YORK TIMES described as the "most overt demonstration of colonialism." Center stage in this campaign is occupied by the far-fetched thesis of "national security" and trite references to "the threat of communist penetration."
The instigators are Senators S. Thurmond, J. Helms, W. Scott, E. Hollings, B. Goldwater and J. Stennis, Congressmen J. Murphy and R. Bauman and several other legislators. These senators have publicly announced that they will oppose the ratification of these documents by Congress, resorting to the filibuster tactic if necessary. S. Thurmond added the allegation that the canal is "American property" and he "sees no reason to let go of this property." "This is our territory," J. Helms declared. "We bought the land from its owners.... We built the canal.... The revenues from the operation of the canal have now reached more than a quarter of a billion dollars." W. Scott, before his trip to Panama in August 1977, agreed to propose that the Canal Zone be made the 51st state of the United States or be turned into a "commonwealth" like Puerto Rico. By a ballot of 246 to 164, the House of Representatives demonstratively voted against the allocation of funds for the conduct of negotiations with Panama in an attempt to torpedo them in this way.

The congressmen's stand is reinforced by the widespread conservative feelings in the top levels of the Republican and Democratic parties and among influential politicians in several state governments. The "hawks" are not sitting idle. They are waging a furious campaign against the new treaty with Panama, a campaign which became particularly fierce on the eve of the signing ceremony and immediately after the ceremony. The American Conservative Union alone allocated 20,000 dollars at the end of August to the widespread publication of press reports attacking the treaty. These funds have already been used to finance paid announcements in many American newspapers which state: "There is no Panama Canal, there is only an American canal in Panama. Do not let President Carter give it away." In a NEW YORK TIMES interview, the leader of this group, J. Roberts, said that the "union" would display greater energy in the South and in other states known for their conservative views. The newspapers called R. Reagan, the former governor of California, the "most outspoken opponent" of the new treaty.

The administration realizes that it will have to face great difficulties and it is taking measures to encourage the legislators to vote in favor of ratification. President Carter, in particular, sent a personal letter to each senator with the following message: "This is a difficult political question, and I am relying on your help in the coming weeks. I am certain that the treaty will be of the greatest value in the continued efficient use of the canal for trade and the security of the United States." A special operational group, headed by H. Jordan, the President's closest aide and former campaign manager, has been set up to conduct a campaign in what the government considers to be the deciding states.

The press has reported that the administration has already had some success in this struggle. In particular, it has won the support of G. Ford, former U.S. president, who is influential in the leadership of the Republican Party, and H. Kissinger, former secretary of state. The support given to the administration by military circles is regarded as a particularly important factor by news correspondents.
It is disturbing, however, that official Washington is trying to gain the support of "hard-headed" individuals by interpreting the treaty in such a way as to guarantee itself a free hand in the manipulation of legal and linguistic "loopholes." The administration is already claiming the right to continue to establish obsolete colonial conventions in Panama in the future. "We have agreed with Panama," President J. Carter said at a press conference, "that we will have access to the land and water, to military and defensive facilities and installations in the Canal Zone, if necessary, to guarantee its security and defense.... We reserve the right to make unilateral decisions on necessary actions on our part to guarantee the neutrality of this canal." Are U.S. military circles supporting the administration because they hope to keep part of Panamanian territory and the strategically important waterway under the control of the Pentagon?

The struggle over the new status of the Panama Canal is far from ended. Fierce battles were fought at hearings in the foreign affairs committees of the Senate and House of Representatives. The speakers included Secretary of State C. Vance, U.S. negotiators E. Bunker and S. Linowitz, Secretary of Defense H. Brown and other military leaders who argued in favor of ratification. But then the rostrum was taken over by the vehement opponents of any kind of "concessions" to Panama, including Senator R. Dole, former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff T. Moorer and M. Taylor and retired Admiral E. Zumwalt. Moorer, for example, did not waste time beating around the bush and demanded that the United States preserve its control of the Panama Canal Zone in perpetuity. R. Byrd, Democratic majority leader in the Senate, warned that Congress was not ready to make a decision on the treaty and suggested that the balloting be postponed until next year. The administration, however, is trying to deal with this matter as quickly as possible so that the atmosphere of acute conflict will not extend into 1978, which will be a so-called interim election year.

The internal political struggle in the United States over the negotiations with Panama is being attentively observed in the Latin American capitals as well, since the result of this struggle will largely determine the United States' future approach to other, no less complex, issues in its relations with its southern neighbors.
BOOK REVIEWS

AGAINST CLASS AND RACE OPPRESSION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 77 pp 92-93


[Text] This new book by the national chairman of the Communist Party USA, Henry Winston, represents a continuation of his earlier work, entitled "Strategy for a Black Agenda -- A critique of new theories of liberation in the United States and Africa." This earlier book was received with great interest and was translated into Russian by the "Progress" Publishing House in 1975. Winston's new book, published in the year of the 60th anniversary of the first victorious revolution of workers against their exploiters, deals with problems of the revolutionary struggle in the citadel of world imperialism. As an inflexible Marxist-Leninist, wholeheartedly devoted to the international ideals of the Great October Revolution, Winston, in his latest work, continues to wage an uncompromising ideological struggle against all kinds of non-Marxist and anti-Marxist concepts propounded by theoreticians -- both of the right and the ultra-left -- on the topical questions of race and class liberation.

Anti-communism, anti-Sovietism and racism -- these are the basic forms of the strategic weaponry used by American monopolies in their ideological struggle against the workers. Winston calls his readers' attention to the fact that anti-communists today -- much more often than formerly -- can be found in the extreme ultra-left sector of the political spectrum. (p 199). Subjecting Maoism and the Maoists to severe criticism, Winston writes of the growing abyss between their super-revolutionary rhetoric and their actions in support of the fascist regime in Chile and of reactionary regimes in other countries. (p 28).

Much room is devoted in the book also to the importance of the struggle against racism in the United States. Winston emphasizes that the essence of the racist strategy is to create the illusion in the minds of both white and black workers that the differences in their respective living standards are not the fault of capitalism. American racist propaganda seeks to convince
white Americans that the lower life style of their black countrymen is the
result of the blacks' innate inferiority. At the same time, this propaganda
seeks to prove to black Americans that racism is in no way the fault of the
existing system, but is an inherent characteristic of all whites. (p 108)

The enduring character of racist traditions in the country strengthens
receptivity of the blacks to all kinds of separatist movements seeking to
resolve the Negro problem. Supporting such separatist concepts are also
numerous partisans of "internal colonies" -- a theory which has gained
special popularity since the 1960's, and an analysis of which occupies a
significant part of the book under review. According to this theory, black
ghettoes are an "internal colony," while white America constitutes its
imperialistic metropolis. A very large number of supporters of this theory
see an analogy not only in their own condition but also in the problems of
the struggle of Negroes in America and those of their forefathers in Africa.
While recognizing the fact that, in general, the liberation problems of the
blacks in America and those of their forefathers in Africa have a great deal
in common, Winston emphasizes nevertheless that there are certain basic differ-
ences in principle between the two periods, requiring a very cautious approach
to the drawing of all kinds of analogies. Thus the national and economic
liberation which former African colonies were able to achieve would be
absolutely unrealistic in the case of the black ghettoes in the United States.
(p 124) "For black Americans," writes Winston, "the strategy of liberation
implies not a break with the American economy but a struggle aimed at
overcoming the forces which seek to exclude the blacks from their proportional
participation in the American economy. Our aim is complete parity within
the entire economic system." (pp 130-131) The theory of the "internal
colony," he concludes, "leads to a strategy of separatism. It does not clarify
but rather covers up the true condition of blacks in the U.S." (p 195), "and
it must therefore be regarded as a concept which detracts from the solution
of the basic problem -- that of forging a powerful, anti-monopoly coalition."
(p 200)

The thesis stressing the need for firm unity of all workers -- regardless
of their skin color -- in the struggle against oppression by the monopolies,
permeates the entire book. Winston considers it essential to form a mass
people's party led by a multiracial working class and able to challenge
the existing two-party system. (pp 181-182) He writes that this mass party
should provide a place for all anti-monopoly movements -- even though they
may differ in their class or social content. "In the real world in which we
live," writes Winston, "it is impossible to challenge the monopolies without
a union of all those whose interests call for a struggle against the monopolies....
We cannot permit past or present differences of opinion to become an obstacle
to the formulation of such a united anti-monopoly program." (pp 143,181)
The author insists on the need for an independent strategy which would seek
the liberation of the blacks as part of a broader anti-monopoly strategy.
(p 108) For one thing, he severely criticizes leftist attacks upon those
activists of the black movement who, despite their limited possibilities,
seek to improve the situation of Afro-Americans within the framework of the
existing capitalist system. Rejecting in this way the outbursts of leftist
extremists against black congressmen, Winston notes that, on the whole, black members of the U.S. Congress represent the most progressive group among all candidates for elective office at the federal level. (p 95).

Winston writes with pride and respect of the struggle of the working class for its rights in capitalist countries, of the world system of socialism, and of the great Soviet Union as the bulwark of all the forces of peace and progress. During the 60 years of the era which opened with the Great October Revolution, more nations gained their independence than did during the 500 years of the era of capitalism. (p 75). Giving the highest marks to the role of peaceful socialism in the struggle for peace and the relaxation of international tension, the author stresses the disinterested assistance and support rendered by the USSR and other socialist countries to peoples struggling for their own national and social liberation.

The bright, scholarly and publicistic book by the national chairman of the Communist party USA is written from positions of creative Marxism-Leninism, and it represents a considerable contribution to the study of current problems in the struggle of blacks and their allies in the United States on behalf of a truly peaceful and humanitarian society which would be able to put an end to class and racial persecution.

Ralph N. Clough, author of the book under review, is connected with The Brookings Institution and is one of the leading American researchers on the subject of American policy in Asia. In his new book, "Deterrence and Defense in Korea," Clough analyzes in detail the American approaches to the problem of its military presence in South Korea. This analysis is now all the more significant because, in recent years, Washington has been periodically stressing its preoccupation with this problem. Thus, in 1975, the then Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, threatened to use nuclear weapons in the region of Korea in case of an "external threat" to the South Korean regime of Pak Ch'ong-hui. Later, President Carter made a statement regarding plans for a staged withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.

Naturally, official Washington is not so much concerned over the cost of maintaining American troops on foreign territory (in 1977, there were about 40,000 American soldiers and officers in South Korea) as it is over the political aspects of the problem. On the basis of his study of numerous documents, Clough concludes that after the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, Thailand and, partially, from Taiwan, America's military presence in South Korea has acquired "special significance." He believes that South Korea is more important to the U.S. than South Vietnam — primarily because it is directly related to the security of Japan, America's principal ally in Asia. (p 1)

Clough cites the arguments of American politicians who propose to reduce the scale of the American military presence in South Korea in order to "reduce the risk" of a new military conflict in the region of the Korean peninsula. He also cites the opposite position of the Pentagon, which favors the maintenance — or, even, an expansion — of the American military presence in South Korea. The partisans of this approach claim that it is precisely in South Korea that the U.S. has a "favorable opportunity to
demonstrate to the whole world" and, above all, to its Far Eastern allies, its readiness to back up the public pronouncements of the previous Republican administration regarding America's military obligations, by concrete measures to strengthen the "defenses" of the Korean peninsula. This premise -- as one can see from reports in the American and South Korean press, has become the dominant one. Despite plans, over-publicized by Washington, regarding the gradual reduction of American troops in South Korea, what is actually taking place is not a reduction but an increase of the South Korean military arsenal, while the Pentagon is planning to increase by 25 percent the size of the American air force in the south of the Korean peninsula. The theory is even being advanced in this connection that the withdrawal of troops would lead to a "destabilization of the situation."  

Clough writes that the role of the American military presence in South Korea must be considered within the framework of total American policy in Asia. It is entirely clear, first of all, that the U.S. seeks to retain the Pak Chong-hui regime in South Korea, which is vitally dependent upon the American military presence. If American troops should be withdrawn, writes Clough, Seoul's international position would be severely undermined. (p 37). Secondly, the retention of America's military presence in South Korea is designed to have an influence upon U.S. relations with Japan. (p 44). The withdrawal of troops and the "rejection of the obligation to defend South Korea" would, in the author's opinion, undermine the established system of military-political relations between the U.S. and Japan. In the third place, the departure of Americans from the Korean peninsula could, according to Clough, provoke a military conflict which would cause "enormous damage to the security of Japan -- as well as to that of the entire "defense" system of the U.S. in the western part of the Pacific. (p 44). Finally, the retention of the American military presence, recalls Clough, meets with approval also in Peking -- something the U.S. is now prepared to take into account. (p 43).

Speaking generally in favor of the U.S. retaining a military presence in South Korea, Clough does not preclude the possibility of a partial and staged withdrawal of American armed forces from there.

A number of practical conclusions by the author (regarding, for example, the favorable influence of detente between the USSR and the U.S. on the situation in eastern Asia and the staged withdrawal of American troops from South Korea), are evidence of the fact that, in the U.S., there exists today a trend toward a realistic assessment of the relationship of forces in the world. At the same time, the position of the author toward the facts he cites bespeaks also another point: influential circles in Washington still determinedly rely upon the nation's "global military presence" in formulating America's foreign policy -- something which in no way corresponds to America's proclaimed readiness to contribute to the development of detente.

FOOTNOTES

1. ARMY, March 1977, pp 14-17
2. Ibid., p 17

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CSO: 1803
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NEW STUDY OF STATE-MONOPOLY CAPITALISM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 77, pp 95-97


[Text] Transformation of monopoly capitalism into a state-monopoly form first began during World War I and coincided with the appearance and subsequent aggravation of the general crisis of the capitalist system and the constantly changing correlation of forces between capitalism and socialism. All this has left some specific imprints upon the system used for regulating the capitalist economy at different stages of the development of state-monopoly capitalism.

The authors of the book under review set for themselves the task of acquainting the Soviet reader with the organizational mechanism or, as they put it, the "instrumentation" of state-monopoly regulation of the economy of the U.S. In its entirety, this question has never before been reviewed in Soviet literature, although some earlier books have already made mention of certain government organizations involved in regulating the economy. The present book examines the mechanism of regulation which was formed largely after World War II—especially during the last decade.

Even if the present book did nothing but that, it would already be of considerable interest.

The principal merits of the book, however, consist of the fact that it goes beyond the subject of "instrumentation" and its functions, and describes the methods and objectives of the regulation, thereby raising—and resolving—a number of questions of general theoretical significance.

As is known, neo-Keynesianism became the theoretical basis for state-monopoly regulation of the American economy after World War II. It was a concept which called not for direct regulation of production but for indirect influence upon the economy through a system of state taxation and control of credits and money in circulation. An exception in this respect was, for one thing,
the agricultural economy, where the state regulated the size of areas growing specific crops, i.e. intervened directly in the production process; and, secondly, the system of state purchases of goods -- especially, weapons -- from industrial corporations. Here, too, there was a direct influence upon the production sphere. However, starting with 1972, because of the growing demand for agricultural products, the state halted its restrictive policy with respect to areas under cultivation, and this fact, too, is described in the book under review. (p 432 et al.) As for state purchases of goods and services, they are being carried out not only by the federal government but also by state authorities and the municipalities. The total of such expenditures represents a large sum. In official reports this sum is somewhat exaggerated because under "services" are also included the salaries of the government employees involved. But even if one is to overlook the maintenance cost of the government mechanism concerned, even then, according to our computations for 1973, the Federal, state and municipal authorities acquired goods and services (transportation, electric power, etc.) amounting to 12 percent of the nation's total output -- including material services. This represents a substantial contribution by the state which directly influences the production sphere. The chapter of the book under review entitled "The Federal Contract System" partly describes this situation. We say "partly" because it covers only the purchases of goods and services by the federal government.

In various other chapters, the book also speaks of yet another, third form of direct intervention in the production sphere. This consists of hidden state subsidies -- mostly for the benefit of the monopolies -- in the form of accelerated amortization and various forms of tax relief, besides direct subsidies -- as in the case, for instance, of the merchant marine.

However, the most important factor in state-monopoly regulation in the U.S. -- as is correctly stressed in the book -- involves indirect influence upon the economy through use of the budget, the credit area, and the availability of money in circulation.

An enormous role in the system of state regulation of the economy was played by the Keynesian theory of deficit financing. At first -- especially during a crisis or a depression phase of the economic cycle -- this policy had a stimulating effect. However, budgetary deficits became chronic, and, combined with continuous balance-of-payments deficits, they not only undercut the internal monetary system and generated chronic inflation, but also resulted in the collapse of the entire monetary currency system of capitalism. Thus this type of mechanism for regulating the economy had the most deplorable results. This situation, too, is well covered in the book under review.

Deserving of special notice are two important facts accurately cited in the book. In the first place, the abolition in 1968 of the law requiring a 25-percent gold certificate backing for any banknote issues not only opened wide the doors of inflation, but also converted American banknotes into ordinary paper money. (p 238) The difference between government-issued paper currency and credit certificates was thereby eliminated -- something typical of all inflation periods in the history of capitalism.

The second important fact deals with the regulation of the economy by means of "manipulating" discount rates. This technique is represented in bourgeois
economic literature as a method whereby the central bank can control the economy by either expanding or restricting credit. It is true that decisions about raising or lowering interest rates are formally taken by the boards of directors of the banks — in this case, the Federal Reserve Board. However, there was never a case when a bank had lowered its interest rate when there was a shortage of loan capital, or, on the contrary, had raised the rate when there was an oversupply of such capital. Thus the movement of interest rates is actually determined not by subjective factors but by the objective movement of loan capital. The authors are therefore entirely correct in saying that "the credit mechanism of the Federal Reserve system is activated primarily by changes in the economic situation and not by some sort of planning design of the leadership of the Federal Reserve system," (p 217)

Bourgeois economists in the United States have been claiming that they succeeded in discovering a way to regulate the economy which would be certain to overcome any economic crises and ensure stable economic growth. The economic crisis of 1973-1975, however, disproved any such illusions. It provoked a crisis of the entire system of state-monopoly regulation of the economy and of the theoretical premises upon which it was based. The concluding chapter of the book is devoted to this situation. Some bourgeois economists who were always opposed to state intervention as, for example, Frederick Hayek, or the head of the modern monetarists, Milton Friedman, used the collapse of the neo-Keynesian state regulation of the economy as an argument in favor of their own theories. The neo-Keynesian theory indeed suffered a defeat, and it was no accident that the latest Nobel prizes in economics have been awarded not to Keynesians but, specifically, to Hayek and Friedman. At the present time, monetarists are holding almost a commanding position in the bourgeois political economy. But does this mean that modern capitalism, after the collapse of the neo-Keynesianism, will reject state intervention in economic life? The book under review gives a correct answer to this question: the authors write that "objective phenomena of modern capitalism inevitably push it toward a further strengthening of state intervention in the economy, and not to a return to the road of 'free competition', which other bourgeois economists and sociologists are dreaming about." (p 565)

However, under conditions of the present crisis of state-monopoly regulation, the crisis of the bourgeois political economy, and the search for new methods to influence the economy, certain zigzags in this direction are inevitable. In Western Europe, for instance, and even in the U.S. itself, the influence of monetarists has become strengthened, which has resulted in restrictions on the output of paper money. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that an increase or reduction of the amount of paper money in circulation could cure the ills of modern capitalism such as unemployment, inflation, economic crises, etc.

While acknowledging the unquestioned merits of this book as a whole, one cannot, at the same time, avoid mentioning some of its individual shortcomings. These include, first of all, exaggerating the role of small enterprises in handling government contracts and developing new technology or new production-technical processes. (p 321). The great monopolies, which hold in their hands the absolute majority of government orders, indeed do attract some relatively small or medium-size firms as sub-contractors. This is done in cases when it
is not to the advantage of the major corporations to get involved in the production of some specific part or component involved. Even Lenin himself pointed out that in such cases the major monopolies set up smaller companies of their own, totally dependent upon them. The same is also true of the exaggerated role of small enterprises in the scientific-technical progress. (p 322). The broad line of the development of modern capitalism consists of gigantic generalization not only of production and labor, but also of scientific research and inventions. All the principal inventions and discoveries in the modern era (atomic energy, synthetic fibers, electronics, rocketry technology, etc.) were all achieved in laboratories, as a result of the work of thousands of scientists and engineers. This does not preclude the fact that some inventions -- such as, for instance, the zipper or even the Xerox duplicating machine -- represent inventions by individuals. But their role in the modern scientific-technical revolution is very limited.

State-monopoly capitalism is a highly dialectic phenomenon. It combines both systematization as well as anarchy of production. It regulates the economy, but it is incapable of overcoming economic crises. This fact is repeatedly stressed in the book -- much to its credit -- but sometimes this combination of contradictions is "territorially" disconnected. Thus, for example, at the beginning of the book it is stated that "the U.S. today is the land of the most highly developed state-monopoly capitalism, possessing a varied and flexible arsenal of means enabling the state to influence the economy," (p 11), and that "involved here is the conversion of state regulation of the economy to a permanent basis, with long-term prognostication as its basic component." (p 14). And then the book turns around and states that the latest economic crisis has "proved that the instrumentation for state-monopoly regulation formed in the postwar years 'doesn't work' and is proving ineffective in trying to overcome the new and serious difficulties facing the state-monopoly economy of the U.S." (p 194). The quotations cited above show that while the description of the situation is generally correct, the formulations used are not always properly balanced.

Exaggerated, in our opinion, is the significance of the econometric prognostication regarding the overall development of the economy, although in a number of places the book points out the miscalculations of this system. But this is not the main point. Econometric prognostication is still far from having the capacity to plan or program the entire economy -- especially because programming itself, in the U.S., has a sectional rather than a centralized nationwide character. As a matter of fact, despite the enormous concentration of production, there are more than 80 different agencies concerned with regulating the economy, and "in 1970, there were already about 850 different 'coordinating' inter-agency commissions." (p 18). Such an abundance of agencies and commissions shows the weakness -- not the strength -- of state regulation in the U.S.

In this connection, it is characteristic that the law calling for the creation of a centralized Council for Economic Planning as part of the executive office of the President has already been hanging fire in Congress for two years and, according to the American press, is doomed to defeat.

Despite such individual shortcomings, the book, on the whole, represents a piece of profound research into the problems of contemporary state-monopoly capitalism.
POLITICAL ROLE OF THE U.S. TRADE UNIONS

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[Text] The author of the study under review traces the continuous struggle of the two opposing trends inherent in the life of American labor unions, one of them based on the class struggle, and the other -- on reformism and conciliation. At the same time, the author emphasizes that the spectrum of the American labor movement is infinitely complex and many-sided. (p 8). Taking this into account, the author examines the various cause-and-effect relationships affecting specific positions of a given labor union on some urgent matter, and he presents an objective evaluation of the attitude of various elements of the labor union movement toward political activity. The author shows that despite the various levels of rise and decline in the tides of the workers' political activity, the front lines of their political involvement constantly widen, as the trend toward independent political activity gradually widens in the American labor unions.

Exposing the limited ideology and political practice of "pure trade-unionism," the author exposes the myth of an alleged lack of any conflict within the ranks of the American labor union movement. The appeasement-minded labor union leadership involved in policy-making is constantly "forced to bear in mind the mass opinion of their union membership," writes the author.(p 40). He also shows the growing distrust of the masses toward the two principal bourgeois political parties. There is a growing unwillingness on the part of workers to accept the omnipotence of the American monopolies, the excessive military expenditures, the racial discrimination encountered by representatives of national minorities in obtaining jobs, housing and promotion, the continuous rude violations of social and civil rights -- both within the framework of the reformist-minded labor union bureaucracy as well as in the country as a whole.

The book provides interesting new information regarding the struggle within the labor unions on the question of American foreign policy, the growing isolation of George Meany's group from the world labor movement in recent years, and the expansion -- despite the leaders of the AFL-CIO -- of contacts and collaboration between American and Soviet labor unions.
A significant place in the book is devoted to describing the problem of solidarity between American workers and people engaged in a struggle for their liberation. This is probably the first time that research literature exposes the very significant role of progressive American labor unions in revealing the crimes which took place in Chile, the participation of American monopolies in the preparation of the Pinochet coup, and the role of the Meany group in the tragic events in that country. The author notes that "opposition of American trade unions to the fascist coup in Chile, as well as the role in this coup of the American monopolies and the government, were seen by the XXIst congress of the Communist party, USA, as an expression of 'new trends' in the national labor movement." (p 110). The book shows that the movement of organized labor against the racist regimes in Africa is becoming constantly more serious and consistent, as are also its opposition to the policy of economic blockade of Cuba, and that American labor unions are stepping up their activity in taking part in the international movement of peace-loving forces.

The development of mass consciousness among members of labor unions is considered by the author as a complex dialectic process, which still reflects the anti-Communism of the group of right-wing leaders headed by George Meany -- a heritage of many years of the "cold war" and of the continuous negative influence of the state-monopoly propaganda apparatus. And still, concludes the author, at the present time, in the U.S., favorable objective preconditions are beginning to develop for activating independent political operations, which would help American workers to develop a proper class consciousness. (p 129). The Communist Party USA can serve as an example of how each opportunity for participation in the political struggle should be utilized. Its activity is oriented toward creating a broad, anti-monopoly political coalition, of which the American working class must become the nucleus.
The sales technique known as "marketing" represents a system of organizational-technical, commercial and financial functions, shaped into a peculiar doctrine of capitalist production management and oriented toward solving the problem of creating and selling a given product. Discussing the questions connected with the development and extensive utilization of marketing techniques, the authors of the book under review engage in polemics with bourgeois economists such as R. Butler, A. Shaw, P. Cherrington, P. Converse, A. Marshall and others, and, in so doing, they not only refine the very concept of the term "marketing" but also identify the causes which produced this phenomenon, expose its content and basic functions, and show what novel elements the marketing concept has introduced into the system of management of modern capitalist production.

The authors indicate that each new approach, each new treatment of the idea of marketing, reflected a change in the general and specific conditions of the production and sale of some specific product intended for public use at different stages of the general crisis of capitalism. (p 9). Summarizing the various views on the role of marketing under modern conditions, they note that "there has now arisen a central problem of close interaction of all these functions, subjecting them to the principal purpose of capitalist enterprise -- an increase in effectiveness and thus also in profitability of the entire production and sales operation." (p 17).

Discussing the problems and contradictions of the modern capitalist market, the authors show that production and consumption are not actually directly related but are connected by means of a complex mechanism of product development, i.e. by the market itself, where the problem of product formulation becomes all the more critical as the structure of capitalist production grows in scale and complexity because of continuous technological changes resulting in the introduction of new branches of production and the dropping of some older ones.
The book describes the basic principles and functions of "marketing." The term, it says, means, first of all, a careful study of the need, the condition and the intensity of the public demand for the product and the state of the market in the face of this demand. Secondly, marketing implies the creation of conditions under which the product would be best adapted to the market demands and social requirements. Thirdly, it means influencing the market and the potential buyers by all available means -- primarily through advertising. The book describes the role of advertising in stimulating sales and it notes, for one thing, that marketing has lent a new character to capitalist advertising and has raised it to the level of one of the most important means for increasing sales.

Examining the attempts of American monopolies to regulate the effect of the various factors affecting the success of a sales program, the authors explain the essence of the policy of market segmentation, based on the so-called policy of product differentiation. Much attention is devoted in the book to an analysis of the methods for studying consumer demand, and the book also explains the operations of specialized market-research firms.

Naturally, under conditions of a private-enterprise economy, marketing objectively reflects the increasing tendency toward planning the merchandise reproduction process. This has moved some bourgeois economists, such as Joseph Schumpeter and John Galbraith, to assert that the market activity of the monopolies and the economic policy of "mature corporations" can overcome spontaneous market shifts. However, the authors show that the changes which had been taking place in organizational management prove that the productive forces of modern capitalism find less and less room for maneuver within the framework of existing production relationships.

The concept of marketing is built to a significant extent upon the ideological precondition of the "sovereignty of the consumer." It is precisely the consumer who, allegedly, dictates to the manufacturers the terms of their market strategy, determines the taste and assortment of their goods, the technology of their planning, and the production and selling of their goods. It is precisely in the name of consumers' interests that the entire mechanism of the capitalist economy is supposed to function. But the "freedom of choice" on the market, as the book shows convincingly, is an illusion under the capitalist forms of property, and the consumer himself is in no way "sovereign." On the contrary, he serves as an object of the most pitiless exploitation, and the monopolies continuously manipulate his interests. This system of exploiting and cheating the consumer by means of the newest marketing techniques has generated a counteraction of its own -- an organized consumers' movement which is described in one of the book's chapters.

The authors justly come to the conclusion that certain features of modern marketing, purified of their negative factors and filled with a new content, could be used successfully by socialist states in the planned regulation of their market, while specific enterprises could use them in establishing their production and sales policy, their foreign trade, and the organization of a study of consumption and demand.
BOSS RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO

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pp 101-108

[Continuation of serialized translation of the book "Boss Richard J. Daley of
Chicago" by Mike Royko, New York, E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1971]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803
Canada is one of the world's largest maritime states. Its Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic coastline is almost 30,000 kilometers in length. Internal waterways account for around 8 percent of the territory of Canada and some of its fresh-water basins are so large that their development presents the same problems as the conquest of the world ocean.

Since the end of the 1960's, the Canadian Government, business groups and scientific community have been increasingly concerned with the comprehensive development of world ocean resources, the elaboration of a national maritime policy and the accumulation of the necessary scientific, technical and financial resources for the large-scale utilization of oceanic resources. Future plans call for the development of coastal fishing, off-shore oil and gas prospecting, the development of a system for the transportation of fuel from coastal regions to consumers in the industrial centers of the nation, preparations for the development of off-shore mineral deposits and the compilation of a program for the protection of the marine environment.

More than 20 scientific research centers in Canada are engaged in oceanographic studies. Around 100 industrial firms are occupied with off-shore drilling, the development of oceanographic equipment and pollution control devices, the organization of marine exploratory expeditions and the provision of consultative services on the utilization of marine resources. But the nation has no single government agency responsible for the administration of all this activity. For this reason, there is no coordinative approach to the total problem of the world ocean, the organizational and administrative system for the management of maritime operations is inefficient, and businessmen receive little support from the government.

Deposits of silver, copper, zinc, iron ore, nickel and titanium have been discovered on the continental shelf of Canada, and licenses are already being issued for the development of these deposits. Canada possesses
9 percent of the world's potential underwater oil and gas reserves. These are located mainly along the Atlantic coastline and in the Arctic regions. According to Canadian statistics, potential off-shore fuel reserves along the Eastern coastline total 6.4 billion tons of oil and 8.7 trillion cubic meters of gas. It is extremely important for Canada to develop these resources: in 1975, around half of the nation's demand for oil was satisfied by means of imports from Venezuela and the Middle East. Canada's coastal waters are among the world's most abundant and vast fishing regions. Fishing is a traditional branch of the national economy, but the nation's fishing fleet and equipment are outdated and the return on capital investments in this branch is quite low. For all of these reasons, the efforts of the Canadian monopolies and the government must be united for the intelligent and efficient development and utilization of marine resources.
[Summary] America is usually advertised as a model nation where an atmosphere of "freedom of creative expression" prevails. This is an impossibility, however, in any society which regards works of art only as commodities to be sold on the market. The artist is never free of the criteria forced upon him by the consumer, the patron of the arts or the private or government foundation financing his career.

The arts have traditionally been overlooked in American society. Their main source of financing has always been the private foundations, but only 630 of the 37,000 private foundations in the United States regularly allocate funds for art. Besides this, the foundations have tended to reduce the size of these subsidies in recent years. For example, the Ford Foundation, which is probably the most famous patron of the American arts, announced radical cuts in its financing program. The Rockefeller Foundation, another important patron, cut its art budget by almost half.

Some large corporations conduct "philanthropic activity" in the cultural sphere. These sources of financing, however, cannot be regarded as stable ones. They do not guarantee permanent support for any particular group and, for this reason, the managers of artistic troupes and groups have often complained that most of their time and energy is taken up by fund-raising activities rather than by artistic concerns.

Now the U.S. Government has suddenly decided to take a greater responsibility for the development and encouragement of the arts. There is a reason for this. The fiasco of the Vietnam war, the loss of faith in bourgeois democracy and the traditional American system of values and the general mass dissatisfaction in the nation have given rise to exceedingly critical attitudes within the artistic community, and these attitudes have naturally been reflected in the works of writers and other artists. The U.S. Government hopes to win these artists over to its side by financing their work.

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