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Once, during a tactical training exercise, an unexpected hypothetical situation was introduced. Several of the communications systems supporting this exercise were suddenly cut off. At the same time, due to inadequate camouflage, several functioning channels were subjected to severe jamming. During training classes and tactical-special exercises communications personnel work out similar hypothetical situations. But having a situation occur during an exercise, where combat conditions are maximally approximated, is totally different from having it occur during a training class.

Previously, when units (chast’) and subunits (podrazdeleniye) of the air defense arms of troops were involved in training exercises, the flow of basic control information was not disrupted. Technical equipment functioned reliably and as a result promptly, and transmitted all commands and signals with a high degree of reliability. If a channel or even a group of channels failed, they were replaced on the spot by others. The automated control systems functioned virtually without interruption.

This constituted tense but ordinary everyday work for communications personnel. And all those who used the communications system became accustomed to its excellence. During this exercise, however, when not only every minute but every second counted heavily, success in repelling the attack of the air "enemy" — and everyone sensed this — to a large degree depended on the skill, initiative, and resourcefulness of the communications personnel. And they didn't make a mess of things. They established bypass channels and took measures to restore those that had normal malfunctions.

However, the amount of time required to transmit essential combat information could have been smaller. The main reason, as an analysis showed, was that the working out of communications control decisions, the informing of the persons who were to carry out the decisions, and the assignment of tasks to them took too much time. The organizers of this exercise and the communications personnel themselves were convinced that communications control under these conditions can be improved.
The experience of the last war convincingly demonstrated that communications stoppages impeded control of subunits and units and complicated the carrying out of combat tasks. Under modern conditions, the state and quality of communications as never before affect combat readiness. Communications has become the physical basis of troop control. Life teaches that the efficient use of communications networks can be ensured only if there is continuous and flexible leadership.

Marked success in solving these problems was achieved by the unit commanded by Colonel M. Anishchenko. There each component of the communications center is being fully equipped and modernized with due regard for local conditions and special features. All workers at the site are equipped with the necessary recording devices, which combine into an overall electrical system for monitoring the status of communications and the flow of information through the channels. More precise coordination between individual specialists and detachments is ensured by the distribution and correct utilization of additional measuring instruments. A uniform technical language of norms and parameters used in establishing and maintaining all types of communications has been approved and is intelligible to all.

In order to increase the efficiency of communications control, the unit performed a large amount of work to standardize documents. Control points were set up at all components of communications centers, and a standardized command system was worked out and successfully introduced. For this purpose, a large number of alternative ways of ensuring communications under the most diverse possible situations had been considered and decided upon beforehand. Any shift specialist who receives a command consisting of several numbers immediately selects the corresponding task, which contains a full list of operations and the sequence of performing them.

The detailed working out of tasks, their revision and improvement, constitutes an extremely labor-consuming job. But all expenditures are repaid with interest. The standardization of operational-technical documents and commands and the skillful utilization of technical control equipment, combined with an improved system for objectively monitoring the status of communications substantially accelerate the process of making decisions and transmitting them to the persons who are to carry them out. Also, the amount of time needed to restore communication channels that are out of order is reduced, and the selection of the most suitable form of communications at a given moment is facilitated.

That such a system could be created and constantly improved is inconceivable without the creative initiative of engineers and technicians and good organization of inventive and rationalization work. In the unit commanded by Comrade Anishchenko, thanks to the effective support of technical creativity by the commander, a political worker, and the party and komsomol organizations, all specialists, including sergeants and soldiers, were involved in this work. Within the last year alone, the collective creativity of communications personnel was recognized by the awarding of seven medals of the Exhibition
of the Achievements of the National Economy of the USSR. The most creative contribution was made by officers A. Yermakov, B. Krutov, and G. Smeshko; and warrant officer V. Gordeyev.

Communications control can be improved and standardized and emergency situations can be simulated only if specialists of all categories have a high level of tactical-special and technical training. A new approach to the organization of training and to the establishing of the necessary educational materials base would ensure the achievement of this level.

Training grounds set up according to the "center" principle, have been widely introduced in communications units and subunits. They make it possible to simultaneously train all the specialists who provide the different types of communications and to improve their practical work skills and coordination among them. This overall approach to the training process yields good results.

However, even the "center" principle of setting up training grounds is constantly being improved. Thus, rationalizers from one of the units, officers L. Giner, S. Dotsenko, V. Rad'ko, and V. Ruzhin suggested that the full scope of existing information transmission routes be displayed in the classes. They implemented their proposal in the subunit commanded by Captain A. Litvinov.

The use in training of entire routes and of electric functional information flow diagrams yields good results. The instructor can demonstrate visually how the quality of the work of the entire route is affected by distortions introduced in individual sectors by inaccurate measurements or tuning. The trainees see how the condition of communications depends on the specialists who service the route. They can get a better picture of the role of their detachment or subunit and of their personal responsibility for the quality of the information flow.

It should be added that the equipment of these routes makes it possible to coordinate entire subunits with regard to the complex utilization of the different types of communication channels in an automated control system.

Efficiently organized communications control and an improved system of objective monitoring also make it possible to substantially intensify all practical lessons. Training classes while the trainees are on duty are highly effective. While one type of communications is used to maintain control, on the others, under the most difficult possible conditions, problems of establishing communications, of changing frequencies, of loading channels with the maximum information flow, and so forth are worked out. These training classes are held daily, and at the end of every 24 hours the status of existing communications and the fulfillment of tasks and norms are analyzed. Uniform criteria are used to evaluate the communications centers' detachments.
The development of uniform criteria has made it possible, with the use of the standardized command method, to efficiently inform all subunits and detachments servicing the communications system of the results of the past 24 hours' work. Competing brigades and each specialist are evaluated on the basis of this daily information.

Improvement of the methods of organizing communications control and skillful utilization of technical control equipment and objective monitoring equipment have also opened up extensive possibilities for increasing the reliability and quality of communications. This was confirmed by a tactical-special exercise which took place recently. Suffice it to say that all communications detachments, centers, and subunits that took part in it handled their assigned tasks perfectly. The system as a whole exceeded the norms for providing communications by 10 percent. Moreover, the overall situation in which communications personnel had to function was considerably more complex than the one described at the beginning of the article. There it is — the results of the creative seeking and striving, of the intensive labor of communications personnel!

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After completing the air exercise, the young pilot flew his aircraft toward the airfield. Under the wing stretched fields and meadows, and green oak groves. In a display of wilfulness, the pilot dropped to an extremely low altitude. The violation of flight rules almost ended in a serious accident.

When investigating the reasons for the misconduct, the senior officer in charge asked the pilot what drove him to such a thoughtless, rash step.

"Perhaps you had doubts about the technician's repair work, or you have some other reason?"

The young officer made no effort to act against his conscience. He admitted frankly: "The aircraft had nothing to do with it. I am to blame for the whole thing."

He was severely punished. However, the senior officer in command made an effort to thoroughly go into the reasons for the young pilot's misconduct and his personality traits. Taking into consideration the sincerity of his confession and the depth of his regret for what had happened, he left him in flight work. Time passed and Officer Sergey Chelnokov became an efficient airman, a military pilot 1st class. Since that incident not once, not one iota has he deviated from flight regulations.

The willingness to admit a mistake; the ability to critically evaluate one's own conduct and actions—these character traits largely define the moral make-up of a person, his attitude toward his job and the person he is working for. It is important that the commander, as teacher and educator, keep this in mind when working with men. When arming his subordinates with professional knowledge and skills, he must develop high moral-political and psychological qualities in the soldiers and teach them to self-critically and with strict combat discipline evaluate what they have achieved in flying and tactical skill.
On the basis of my own experience, I can state that this is far from a simple matter. One must display adherence to party principles, have competent methods, and possess the art of approaching each person as an individual. A good knowledge of military psychology and of the principles underlying educational work with subordinates is required. It is of particular importance to handle young officers with sensitivity and tact. One false note and a heart-to-heart conversation cannot take place. And in the future this may lead to a loss of candor in one's relationships.

During my experience as a commander there was a highly instructive case. Senior Lieutenant A. Ivlev without particular difficulty mastered the evacuation program for a more complex type of fighter that was new to him. He flew independently, needing no special criticism. When I passed him for the next flight, I asked: "Is everything clear, can you handle the task?" He answered affirmatively.

But he was not able to handle it: he committed a gross error during landing. Then I remembered: when I was chatting with the pilot before the flight, a note of uncertainty could be heard in his voice. How could I, the commander, fail to attribute importance to this detail? The flier's entire demeanor made it clear that he was beset with doubts as to his readiness for the flight.

As a result of this case I came to the important conclusion that a commander does not have the right to disregard nuances in the conduct and moods of his subordinates. But when such nuances have been observed, he must react to them skillfully and tactfully. I say this because the making of a young commander to a large extent depends on how exacting and demanding of himself he is.

But what else can one note? A young flight commander was a first class flier. As an instructor, he was able to teach his subordinates to fly under the most difficult meteorological conditions. However, at times he lacked the demandingness required of a commander. Sometimes a flier must be strictly questioned about a blunder. When I attempted to clarify the reason for some leniency displayed, it turned out that the young commander was "ashamed" to show the prescribed strictness. You see, the subordinate was his own age, and what is more, a first-class flier. There is another extreme: a young commander is zealous and excessively emphasizes his position as superior officer. This, of course, does not help matters.

A young commander's senior colleagues, who possess great worldly wisdom and a wealth of professional experience, must help him to build the proper relationship with his subordinates. This help, in my opinion, should be aimed at creating an atmosphere of candor and mutual understanding within the military collective. And the commander should be guided toward an attentive and sensitive attitude toward young fliers, who, during the initial period of service, experience considerable physical and psychological strain. It is their combat fitness that makes for the success of flight tasks.
I remember, for example, how hard it was to listen to the blow-ups of a certain instructor after completing a flight with him. He did this, according to his understanding, "for therapy." However, you don't teach by shouting. However, a person may lose faith in his ability or begin to pass over his mistakes in silence in order to avoid being rebuked by the commander once more.

Of course, one should not overload a young flier with praise instead of adhering to principle. This could lead to another extreme—his loss of modesty. Excessive conceit, or even worse, bragging, is harder to eradicate than lack of self-confidence.

This was the case with Captain M. Drachev. His flying ability had been noticed while he was still in school. Initially he was also praised in the unit: he quickly mastered his flying program. But soon the excessive praise went to his head. When they noticed this and began to correct him, he only laughed. In his flight preparation there began to be a hint of negligence and conceit. The rebukes of his superior officers did not help. And so...

Taking off one night from a forward airfield, he had what amounted to a flying accident. When they tried to ascertain what had happened, the flier did not have the courage to state in all sincerity the real reason for his mistake—his unpreparedness for the flight. It was this that preordained the decision as to his fate: he had to give up aviation.

The superior officer in charge then justifiably reproached several of the colleagues of Officer Durachev for not having put him on the right track in time. It must be confessed that many of them had underestimated the influence of the microclimate in the squadron and had not used the collective's power of influencing the behavior of individual comrades.

If a commander is to carry out purposeful educational work with his subordinates, it is not enough that he be highly skilled in military affairs. He must also have a profound knowledge of military pedagogy and psychology. The truth of this is well known, but it is worth repeating. Not long ago I decided to find out what new study aids in this field the regiment library offers to officers, and how often flight commanders and fliers use them. And what did I find out? It turned out that the regiments had published many new research papers in the field of military pedagogy and psychology. But when I asked a young flight commander why he didn't use these study aids, he replied without a trace of embarrassment: "I don't have time to take out everything." I had to remind him that now he was not merely a flier, but a commander who had subordinate to him men with different characters and different attitudes toward flight training.

The decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress direct us to improve our leadership style and to have a complex approach to educational work. We commanders should be equal to these requirements.

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The tactical training exercise was at its very height when, in accordance with the hypothetical situation of the exercise director, the tank platoon commander quit the ranks. Warrant Officer A. Zinchenko assumed command. His subsequent actions proceeded without the slightest hitch. Aleksandr Zinchenko proved to be a resourceful commander, full of initiative. After quickly assessing the situation, the Warrant Officer decided to attack the defending "enemy" where he least expected it — through the marsh-ridden sector. This bold decision was based on the Warrant Officer's accurate consideration and sound knowledge of tank capabilities and on his ability to correctly utilize reconnaissance information. The sudden attack through the marsh and forest on the flank of the "enemy" brought the platoon deserved success.

The unit remembers when Warrant Officer Aleksandr Zinchenko was still a private, one of the best driver-mechanics. Now Zinchenko is the best master sergeant of a tank company. He serves in the highest-ranking subunit of the unit. Zinchenko carries out his duties as a sergeant irreproachably, and he has time and again been commended for this by his superior officers. Although in his capacity as a sergeant he has an ample amount of work to do, he does not stay snugly in the barracks when the subunit goes to the field. Along with officers, sergeants, and soldiers, he actively improves his competence and helps the commander to train and educate tank crew members.

In the regiment there are many warrant officers like Zinchenko, expert at their work and selfless toilers. Along with the best officers, they were mentioned in the order summarizing the results of winter training, and during the summer training period they were commended for progress made in combat and political training. In particular, Warrant Officers L. Sachenko, Yu. Ivanyushchenkov, and N. Tsukanov, commanders of advanced platoons, were awarded certificates.

It is safe to say that warrant officers in this regiment act as reliable assistants to the officers in training and educating soldiers, in unifying military
collectives, and in strictly maintaining the prescribed procedure. This has been made possible by the unremitting attention paid to them by the command and by party and Komsomol organizations. To be specific about the nature of this attention, it should first be stated that the selection of candidates for warrant officers' school and their subsequent appointment to a post is treated as a matter of grave importance.

Before making a decision, the regiment commander personally studies the candidates and without exception listens to the opinion of their immediate superiors, political workers, and other comrades. This is how Private A. Zinchenko's case, for example, was handled. The son of a front-line soldier, even before being drafted into the army Aleksandr Zinchenko dreamed of having a career in the military. When he announced his desire to enter warrant officers' school, the regiment commander invited him over for a talk. The regiment commander's convincing words of confidence sounded like a kind farewell speech to Private Zinchenko, and further strengthened his desire to become a warrant officer. And this was a profound desire, dictated by a young man's sincere love for military service.

And this is how the unit works with each person who decides to become a warrant officer. A special committee headed by the deputy regiment commander selects the candidates for training. There has been no instance of their recommending an unsuitable person. This shows their truly statesmanlike approach to the matter.

It is very important, of course, to select good candidates. But this is far from the whole problem, because the true warrant officer is made by practical work. And a great deal depends on the moral atmosphere in the collective and on an attentive, considerate attitude toward warrant officers.

The regiment we are discussing endeavors to make the warrant officers feel that they are members of a united combat family and to increase their role and authority in every way possible. The entire system of ideological and political training of this category of servicemen develops high political and professional qualities, pride in their calling, and a desire to carry out their military duties perfectly and to serve as an example to soldiers and sergeants in their conduct, training, and work.

Commanders, political workers, and the party organization pay particular attention to warrant officers who have been assigned to combat posts. They are regularly given courses in command training. The best and most experienced officers of the regiment are in charge of this. The party committee periodically discusses the professional training problems of warrant officers. During meetings of warrant officers, the conversation often turns to the problems of becoming an officer. These meetings are conducted by the regiment commander or his deputy in charge of the political unit. During them the successes and shortcomings in the work, combat and political training and socialist competition of the warrant officers and their subordinates are analyzed. There also the best specialists exchange work experience. Together with officers, warrant officers attend work conferences and courses
within the command training system. Many of them are successfully attending evening classes at the Marxist-Leninist University.

The warrant officers' council works actively in the regiment. It is headed by party committee member Warrant Officer I. Guts, one of the most competent persons in the regiment, who has given twenty years of his life to army service. The council has become a support to the commander and the party organization in the education of warrant officers, especially young ones.

Many examples could be cited of dedicated, thoughtful work with warrant officers, of the ability to set them on their feet, figuratively speaking. The units of our group of forces have accumulated a wealth of experience in training and educating the immediate assistants of officers. It convincingly tells us that the formation of a warrant officer on the job is far from a simple process. It requires a great effort on the part of commanders, political organs, staffs, and party organizations to create in units and subunits conditions conducive to the ideological and professional growth of warrant officers and to establish exacting standards for their selection and placement.

It should be pointed out, however, that not all chiefs have such exacting standards. One can still encounter cases of a superficial approach in the selection of warrant officers, leading to all kind of expenses. Now and then men with low moral and professional qualifications are sent to study at warrant officers' schools. There are a number of reasons for this. Sometimes, specifically, this results from the desire to get rid of an objectionable sergeant or soldier under a plausible pretext, with the hope that after training he will not return to the unit.

In connection with this, I cannot but recount such an example. With a light heart, Senior Lieutenant V. Kudryashov recommended for training Sergeants P. Kopygin and M. Kobashyuk, who were not of sound character, shirked difficulties, and moreover had no great desire to become warrant officers. They studied for weeks at the warrant officers' school until they both handed in requests for reassignment.

I came across the following case in one of the units. Junior Sergeant V. Dmitriyev, who had re-enlisted, was known as an undisciplined person. Having decided to "get rid" of him without unnecessary trouble, his commander sent the junior sergeant to warrant officers' school. But as soon as it became known that after graduating from the school Dmitriyev would be sent back to the same unit from which he had come, the commander sent the following official letter: "I request that the student Dmitriyev be dropped from the school since he does not have the necessary qualifications, and that a petition for his release to the reserves be submitted."

Such cases need no comment. They eloquently demonstrate the superficiality of people's knowledge, the irresponsibility of individual chiefs.

Life has convincingly demonstrated that warrant officers carry out their job responsibilities most successfully wherever the Leninist principles of
selecting and placing personnel are strictly observed and where men are held to exacting standards and are at the same time surrounded by concern and attention, assisted in their work and in the acquiring of practical skills, and not allowed to be discouraged by setbacks.

And here it is important to remember that the assignment of yesterday's soldier or sergeant to the post of platoon commander or master sergeant of a subunit always constitutes an abrupt turning point in the young man's service and consciousness, and is accompanied by difficulties of a professional and psychological nature. Not everyone is able to immediately recognize himself in a qualitatively new role — that of warrant officer. Not everyone quickly understands his new duties and that he is now responsible not only for himself, but also for his subordinates, and that he should share their concerns, train them, help them, and educate them. Moreover, sometimes a warrant officer is not trusted to do independent work and another person substitutes for him.

It also sometimes happens that when a graduate of warrant officers' school arrives at a unit he is considered to be in every respect a finished commander and specialist, without need of daily attention and assistance. In individual units, unfortunately, no one bothers to give warrant officers educational work. They are sometimes left to face alone all the difficulties and, at times, the suffering that occurs during the initial period of adjustment. Then the warrant officer does not acquire new knowledge and skills and does not grow as a commander and specialist. Moreover, he also gradually loses what he was taught at school. One sees a man who has lost faith in his own ability and in the correctness of the choice he made, and who makes mistake after mistake. Disillusionment inevitably sets in.

Warrant officers who hold combat posts require special attention. This category of commanders does not have the same training that graduates of military schools receive. This is why it is important that the warrant officer be given daily support and that he be confident that his superiors and the officers with whom he works are not indifferent to his successes and failures.

Unquestionably, the establishment of a warrant officers' institute has had an enormous positive impact. This demonstrates the tireless efforts of the party and the government to further strengthen the personnel of our glorious Armed Forces. In warrant officers, officers acquire qualitatively new and reliable assistants, the overwhelming majority of whom accomplish the difficult tasks entrusted to them with credit. There is no doubt that the role and importance of warrant officers will increase every year. On the level of their training and organizational abilities depend the combat readiness, cohesiveness, and level of training of the subunits. All this dictates the necessity of steadily improving the selection and training of warrant officers and of displaying daily interest in their education and adjustment.
The anti-aircraft gunners were on a march when the order was received to protect the tank column from an air strike. The commander of the anti-aircraft missile subunit, Major Yu. Limorev immediately issued the necessary orders. And immediately the powerful, heavy vehicles turned around on the dusty country road and rushed toward the depth of the forest.

The command "Action!" stopped the vehicles in a gently sloping clearing. Soldiers in black overalls joined in the combat operation. Engr-Lt S. Dygalo and his subordinates prepared the launching equipment. The soldiers headed by Sr Engr-Lt V. Kudryashov kept up with the launcher numbers. The missile guidance station was put in firing position in less than the prescribed period of time.

The firing position was filled with the powerful roar of working units. The radar antennas rotated smoothly, almost noiselessly, and the missiles, like pencils with sharp points, rushed upwards. Precise reports that came to the control panel where Major Yu. Limorev was located testified to that.

However, he was in no hurry to praise his subordinates for quickly and skillfully putting the equipment in firing position. The prompt detection and destruction of the "enemy" is the most important indicator of the quality of the military work of members of launcher detachments.

On the orange screen of the plan position indicator a "glowworm" lit up. Operator Private N. Posokhov immediately determined the location of the "enemy" aircraft and transmitted the appropriate information to Sgt A. Golovin. Pvt P. Misaylov within a matter of seconds prepared the firing data. And the missiles were launched immediately. They accurately hit the target. The combat training task was completed with excellent marks.

If one considers that the subunit has many soldiers whose length of service amounts to two months, this success cannot but cause joy. How was it achieved?
When I visited the subunit, I became convinced that the training aids supply there met modern requirements and that training was conducted on a high instructional level, strenuously, and in a situation that maximally approximates actual combat.

In a conversation with me Major Yu. Limorev said with satisfaction: "The personnel are really enthusiastic about the fight to save time and for accuracy in their work. But it was not always the case."

Strenuousness and intensity marked the exercises directed by Eng-Lt S. Dygalo. But, although he achieved a high pace during training, at times he did not pay attention to mistakes committed by several soldiers. Maj Yu. Limorev, after pointing out this shortcoming to the young officer, shared with him his rich experience in conducting exercises involving the working out of tasks and norms, and taught him methods of quickly checking on the quality of subordinates' performance of each operation.

The subunit commander also helped him in his work with young soldiers. New recruits, having assumed socialist duties, as a rule work with increased energy. They compensate for lack of experience with an enormous capacity for work and by trying very hard. Their readiness for combat increases and they fulfill their socialist duties. However, after a certain amount of knowledge and skills has been mastered, the recruits sometimes begin to slow down their pace, to work without vim, and to disregard accuracy. To avoid this and to maintain the young soldiers' enthusiasm for their work, the platoon commander must constantly be aware of and encourage in every way possible their creative impulses. This is what Maj Yu. Limorev taught Eng-Lt S. Dygalo. It was painstaking, but, as time showed, not useless work. Now no one is his equal in the efficient organizing of socialist competition in the platoon.

The subunit commander had to work a great deal with Officer V. Kudryashov. His subordinates use complex electronic equipment, and for this reason very highly trained soldiers are usually sent there. And if so, the officer decided, all attention should be focused on working out group exercises.

This decision was wrong. In a conversation with Kudryashov, Maj Yu. Limorev gave some interesting reasons. An experienced driver-mechanic takes less than two seconds to start a heavy vehicle moving, while a new recruit takes two to three times as long. An experienced operator can detect a high-speed target two to three times as fast as a new recruit. New skills are not acquired all at once. Experience must be forged by painstaking labor, by constantly devoting individual attention to each person.

Kudryashov heeded Maj Yu. Limorev's good advice. His subordinates now occupy a leading place in socialist competition.

In the practice battle with an air "enemy" the anti-aircraft gunners displayed great skill. But there are no limits to combat perfection. At the height of flight training the subunit personnel continue their urgent struggle to increase the pace and improve the quality of the fulfillment of tasks and norms, for the utmost accuracy, and for the efficient utilization of each minute of training.
SHORTCOMINGS IN TRAINING AND SOCIALIST COMPETITION NOTED

[Article by Col V. Nagornyy, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Exactingness"]

Problems of coordination during the attack of an "enemy" strongpoint were being worked out on a tactical and marching drill exercise of a reinforced motorized rifle battalion. The picture was impressive. Maneuvering on the field of battle, the tanks and armored personnel carriers advanced energetically. It would seem that it was the crowning ability of the soldiers -- the power of the machines, firepower, and the will of people had been merged into one. But the regimental commander returned the subunit, including the tankers headed by Lieutenant S. Yakovlev, to the line of departure for the attack again and again and explained patiently, clearly, and extremely convincingly where errors were committed and to what they might lead in actual combat. At each stage of the lesson, the lieutenant colonel summed up the results of the competition of Platoons and companies in the accomplishment of specific missions and norms.

This in essence simple episode appears to me to be typical of today's routine army days. It testifies to the high exactingness of the officers and their dissatisfaction with the results in training, even if they be high, which have been attained. They show again and again how attention to the quality of combat training and the effectiveness of socialist competition have increased at the present stage. Behind all this new horizons and new opportunities are opening up before commanders. The 25th Congress of the CPSU called the further development of competition our general combat slogan. Under this slogan, the personnel of the unit which was named and which, from year to year, demonstrates high results in combat and political training stably are improving their skill. As the winners of the socialist competition, it has twice been awarded the Certificate of the Military Council of the Group of Forces. Many of the soldiers are first- and second-class specialists. And such experts of military affairs as Senior Lieutenant V. Tkachenko and Warrant Officer (praporshchik) V. Nizhyakovskiy, and others have become masters of combat qualification.
Of course, successes did not come by themselves. Socialist competition in the unit is based on a firm organizational basis and the high methodological skill of the officers and warrant officers. The best among the best are Senior Lieutenant A. Allenov, Lieutenant A. Grishchenko, and Warrant Officer N. Alekseychik. The staff officers participate actively in the training process and execute the strictest daily check of them. The necessity for this check is obvious. In fact, for a number of reasons and sometimes having even yielded to an attitude of complacency (the subunit has high grades), individual officers and warrant officers decrease their demandingness toward subordinates, permit elementary simplifications on the lessons, and do not reflect on how this influences the accomplishment of the obligations which have been assumed.

The following once occurred with Lieutenant P. Pavlov. The subunit where he served has a completely modern training-material base. For example, the radio operators can drill under conditions of intensive jamming. But Lieutenant Pavlov permitted himself to "lift the tension" from the trainees and he drilled them without the introduction of jamming. A staff officer, Major M. Vlasov, pointed out the indulgences to Pavlov and directed the lesson to the required channel.

This case became the occasion for a pointed conversation at the service conference of the officers. It reminded commanders, political officers, and the party committee once again that in the struggle for effectiveness and quality the primary role is played by a high degree of organization, the strictest discipline in the training process, and demandingness.

A stricter approach to the training of the soldiers also entailed great exactingness in the determination of the experts. For an expert in all respects should be an example of the irreprouachable execution of his service duty. In the unit, they also approach the evaluation of the role and place of the expert in the military collective from such positions.

Now, as a rule, you will not see excessively high figures pertaining to the development of experts in the obligations. And it is not a drop in the enthusiasm of people which stands behind this fact but an increase in exactingness in competition and a striving to evaluate what has been attained by the high measure of combat.

Of course, one cannot artificially restrain the stimulation of soldiers who are nurturing good intentions to become experts. However, the skill of the commander as the organizer of socialist competition also consists of tactfully and skillfully showing a person his real capabilities. It is not less important to see that all personnel profoundly realize: the chief criterion of the effectiveness of competition is readiness for battle and a high level of field ability which is directly dependent on the solidarity of the collective and its organization and discipline. The last months of this training year are providing many good examples of such an approach to the organization of socialist competition where problems of effectiveness and quality stand in the foreground.
Unfortunately, there are examples of an opposite nature. In some troop collectives socialist competition hardly glimmers and is perceived only "on paper." One gets the impression that these subunits evaded the new, higher demands for organization of the competition. Here, as formerly, they continue to "chase percentages" to the detriment of quality and the effectiveness of the efforts which have been expended. The reason was well known long ago--formalism.

For example, the following inscription on a display attracted attention in one of the subunits: "The personnel are obliged...to accomplish socialist obligations." It sounds strange, doesn't it? Does this bureaucratic formulation not reflect the true picture of the organization of the competition? Familiarity with the subunit confirmed the worst assumptions. And one of the sources of formalism is poor knowledge of the guiding documents by some of the officers.

It was also necessary to encounter instances of frank light-heartedness in the approach to the competition. If we believe the remarks made by Lieutenant V. Yarokhovets in the combat training record book, it turns out that all his subordinates without exception were required to have outstanding grades in all training disciplines. It cannot be denied--the task is clearly beyond their capability. We do not know what guided Comrade Yarokhovets. One thing is clear, such an approach to the matter is far from today's requirements and from the general course for raising the quality and effectiveness of combat training.

The following example also tells us much. The obligations of the officers and warrant officers of the subunit are reflected in special forms which have been printed by a printing press. The forms were filled out by the competitors and, it is sensed in everything, pro forma. Here, for example, are entries which were made by different people in the column headed "To Improve Work Methods." Warrant Officer A. Suvorin, the chief of the POL [fuels and lubricants] dump, assumed the obligation to improve the "filling-out of trip tickets." Lieutenant V. Lopatko, a platoon commander, gave his word to assist those who are lagging in political and physical training." The same Yarokhovets decided to conduct a lesson with the sergeants on the correct instruction of the personnel." Tell me, what can such obligations lead to?

We are in no way opposed to printed forms and displays which are drawn up attractively. But what is important is what is behind them and how they help everyone to achieve the main goal of the competition--to raise combat readiness, the quality of combat training, and the persistent mastery of new equipment and weapons. For it is the content rather than the form which is important. It is necessary to note that the subunits which do not cope with their obligations are overtaken by failures just because the content of the competition suffers noticeably due to a formal attitude toward it.
Now, when it is becoming hotter and hotter on the fields of summer training, a confident growth has been noticed in the qualitative indices and effectiveness of combat training of those subunits where socialist competition, having become an integral part of the training process, acquired a broad scope and effective character. And it is proper that such military collectives are multiplying their successors in soldierly labor from day to day.
TANKS HAULED TO COMBAT AREA ON TRAILERS

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 23 Jul 76 p.1

[Article by Sr Lt V. Roshchupkin: "From Trailers--Into Battle"]

[Text] It seemed as though the attack would be stopped. In the depth of the "enemy" defense after the breakthrough of the FEBA [forward edge of the battle area], the attackers encountered a strongly fortified area. Fresh forces were needed, a powerful tank strike was needed to smash resistance on this line and move on swiftly. And such forces were committed to battle. The tank attack was irresistible.

The tanks did not expend a single gram of fuel on the long route and entered the attack with full tanks. And powerful wheeled tractors delivered the armored equipment here. Pressed tightly against the trunks of the age-old lindens, they were dependably hidden by the dense green crowns from "enemy" aviation.

These squat machines with the steep fronts are genuine land cruisers. The vehicle drivers call the flat-bed trailers on which they transport their loads trailers. The fine elastic lines of the heavy vehicles in whose silhouettes the latent power is guessed are known to many from military parades when as if along a thin line -- neither a centimeter ahead or to the side -- the tractors convey combat missiles across Red Square....

But in the field, the tractors with trailers are not for a parade. The wheeled rulers of the roads can do much. One of their tasks is the transportation of armored equipment. The tractors can transfer tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, and infantry combat vehicles over hundreds of kilometers. The words of the commander of the tankers are recalled: "You must visit the trailer operators. They are great workers -- they are always the first to go out on the exercises and they are the last to return. You see, many do not even know about this difficult but interesting military profession."

The heavy equipment can not only be simply transported on the trailers but can also be delivered directly to the area of combat operations without
intermediate loading and unloading or refueling. From the park across hundreds of kilometers into battle with full tanks, with fresh forces, and without the malfunctions which can arise during a long march — how much this means for victory in battle.

One of the first who completed the preparation of his tractor for the march, driver-mechanic Private A. Mikhaylov invites me into the cab. Inside, it is like the cab of a regular heavy-cargo vehicle. But, at the same time, there are many innovations in it. There is no customary gear-shift lever and there is no clutch pedal. It is very simple to drive the vehicle: hydraulics help. The tractor goes over broken terrain as softly as a "Zhiguli" goes across the asphalt.

"The difficulty is something else," relates Captain G. Litvinskiy. "Each driver-mechanic of a tractor must 'feel' the vehicle in motion. Especially if it has a load of several dozen tons. It is not so simple to 'inscribe' such a bulky and cumbersome thing in a steep turn, negotiate a hill, or descend a slope. And the main thing, the driver-mechanics should know their equipment expertly so that it does not let them down at the necessary moments. Did you see what kind of roads we have here? If one vehicle stops -- it is a delay for the entire column: you cannot bypass and cannot turn -- there is a lack of roads all around."

Litvinskiy has a weather-beaten, sunburnt face. You do not notice at once that his eyes have turned red from fatigue and lack of sleep. The trailer operators have been operating on exercises for several days, accomplishing various combat-training missions. But the most difficult examination is a march over a great distance with tanks on the flatbeds. And the times are extremely rigid. You cannot be even a minute late. The combat success of the tankers will depend on this to a great extent.

It is not by chance that Captain Grigoriy Arkad'yevich Litvinskiy was entrusted with leading the trailer column. He is a person with profound military and technical knowledge. Litvinskiy saw the mighty machines for the first time when, several years ago, he arrived from the reserve to serve in the army. During this time he learned to drive the tractor well and he passed the examinations without attending lectures at the military school. The former Komsomol worker from Gor'kîy fell in love with the difficult profession of an officer. He remained in the regular army and is now taking correspondence courses in the academy. At one time his father fought in these places and served here after the war. And more than thirty years later after its last volleys fell silent the son is leading a column over the military roads which the father covered on an old ton and a half truck. If only the senior Litvinskiy could see the mighty equipment which serves his son!

A few minutes were required to open the ramps, load the tanks on the flatbeds, and fasten them. The driver-mechanics of the tractors hear the order for the march.

"To the vehicles!" the command sounds beckoningly in the onsetting twilight.
Rocking on the uneven places of the terrain, the tractors get on the right road. Two or three energetic waves of the signal flags and the next trailer takes its place in the column.

This column of powerful tractors with the tanks on trailers is an impressive sight. The trailers depart into the night, gleaming with their running lights. The little lights run above the road like small stars, not getting closer and not moving away from each other. The driver-mechanics maintain speed and distance so skillfully that it seems as if the entire column is connected by a single rigid towline.

The driving of such heavy equipment in a column, especially at night, requires that the trailer operators observe march discipline irreproachably, and it requires special attention and reaction speed. For the combat readiness of the complicated equipment and the lives of the tankers who are moving on the trailer together with their machine are in the hands of the driver-mechanics. The fact that today the soldiers are demonstrating mature skill and high qualities is to the credit of the communists Captain G. Litvinskiy and Lieutenant V. Popov, Komsomols Junior Lieutenant N. Gryaznov, Junior Sergeant V. Kruty, and other experienced specialists. The exercise is a strict check of the effectiveness and quality of combat training and the effectiveness of socialist competition. And this check is passed successfully although the march is taking place under difficult conditions.

One of the vehicles flashed its signal lights in alarm and froze in place. The column which was stretched out along the road was also stopped. In accordance with the special situation, a wheel broke down on the tractor which is driven by Private V. Luk'yanets.

On the march, the replacement of a wheel on a regular heavy-cargo vehicle is not a simple matter, either. On a tractor, it is an entire operation which requires great dexterity and outstanding physical strength. For one such wheel weighs half a ton! Anything can happen in a combat situation. And where, if not on exercises, is it possible to create situations which are close to actual combat situations? It is such situations which are the touchstone on which the soldier's character, will, and soldierly maturity of the fighting men are disclosed.

His comrades immediately hastened to the aid of Luk'yanets: Privates V. Korotkov, N. Lagutin, and V. Zakharenko. Coordinated, sparing movements. Each one was repeatedly adjusted and sharpened on drills. And when the officers stopped the stop watch, the needle had not even succeeded in accomplishing three quarters of the turns called for by the rigid framework of the norm.

The summer nights are short. Dawn swiftly overtakes the column. The speed was calculated correctly: the trailers arrived exactly on time. Here it is, the tank assembly area. But how is unloading to be accomplished if there is no suitable area nearby where the heavy machines could maneuver?
The only correct and simple decision is made: unload directly on the highway. And the trailer operators have worked out such a version. Clanking the caterpillar tracks, the tanks roll from the flatbeds on to the road. And here the last armored vehicle took off to greet the sun rising from behind the forest, past the tractors which are pressed against the very shoulder of the road.

"Thank you, comrades!" the words of the tankers, muffled by the roar of the engine, reach us. And a bouquet of field flowers fell at the feet of the trailer operators. The dusty faces of the soldiers who delivered the formidable combat vehicles shone with the joy of victory over the difficult kilometers of the night march.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES COMBAT UNITS DISCUSSED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 24 Jul 76 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen I. Kolomytsev, deputy commander of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District for rear services and chief of rear services of the district: "Mobility of the Regimental Rear Services"]

[Text] The battalion commanded by Captain V. Konstantinov pursued the withdrawing "enemy" swiftly. The motorized riflemen succeeded in advancing to a considerable depth. However, further advancement proved to be under threat: the battalion commander received information that a large portion of the ammunition in the subunits had already been expended. And he immediately issued an instruction to the commander of the battalion supply platoon, Warrant Officer (praporshchik) I. Kratko, to deliver ammunition to the companies.

The commander of the supply platoon performed a calculation for the delivery and he assigned the missions to his subordinates. The ammunition vehicles reached the attacking subunits in time. Thus, the motorized riflemen could continue the attack and consolidate the success which had been attained. And the supply platoon evacuated "wounded" to the rear on the return trip in the empty vehicles.

The combat operations continued. The subunit of Captain V. Konstantinov managed to repel a counterattack which was undertaken by the "enemy" thereby supporting the commitment of the subunits of the regimental second echelon. But as a result of heavy fire and an air raid by the "enemy" who was striving to stop the battalion's advance at any cost, considerable "losses" again appeared in it. Furthermore, fuel supplies were destroyed from the air.

Captain V. Konstantinov reported the situation which had developed to the regimental commander. The latter, considering the losses suffered by the battalion, made the decision to withdraw it to the reserve and adopt measures to restore its combat effectiveness.

The deputy regimental commander for rear services, Major V. Zhivotov, had foreseen this development of events back in the course of the first stage of
the exercise since he felt the pulse of battle and had a good impression of the state of affairs in all the attacking subunits. And the officer issued instructions to reconstitute supplies in the battalion and evacuate "wounded."

...Having selected the most convenient route, Warrant Officer A. Reyus led the vehicle column with the ammunition and fuel to the battalion rear area. At the same time, a medical group headed by Lieutenant of Medical Service I. Chornyy, arrived here to render medical assistance and evacuate the wounded. On command of Captain V. Konstantinov, the subunit commanders organized the receipt of ammunition and supervised the actions of the crews in refueling the combat vehicles. And the aid men under the supervision of Warrant Officer A. Federovich aided by the medical instructors of the subunits carried out the "wounded" and placed them at the battalion aid station where they were given medical aid.

By the time established by the commander, the battalion had the necessary quantity of fuel and ammunition supplies and was again ready to continue combat operations.

The meaning of such a detailed narration of this exercise is that from its example it is possible to obtain an impression of the volume of the missions and the significance of the regimental rear area in battle. This significance increases sharply in connection with the change in the nature of contemporary combined-arms combat. As is known, it is distinguished by the fluidity and high degree of mobility of the units and subunits. The swift growth in the mechanization and motorization of the troops and the change in the methods of armed conflict led to an unprecedented increase in the volume of missions for material, technical, and medical support and complicated the conditions for their accomplishment. The regimental rear services must accomplish difficult missions in supplying the subunits with ammunition, fuel, engineer and other means, and motor-vehicle and armored and other property.

The probability of the enemy's employment of means of mass destruction and primarily nuclear weapons can be connected with the sharp increase in losses in personnel, combat equipment, and weapons. Therefore, the comprehensive and continuous rear-services support of the regiment is one of the decisive conditions for its successful conduct of combat operations.

It is well known that in the solution of all problems of rear area support, the dominant role belongs to the commander. Here, much also depends on the staff. This means that all commanders and staff officers must possess a depth of knowledge and firm skills not only in the combat employment of the subunits but also in their rear-area support. For this, they must know the norms for the maintenance and expenditure of material resources, the procedure for technical, medical, and material support, and also, as the experience of big troop exercises shows, the organization and capabilities of the rear-service subunits in combat.

The immediate organizers of rear-service support of the regiment in combat are the rear-services officers. And in order to accomplish their duties
successfully, in addition to special knowledge they also need good tactical training. The experience of the Great Patriotic War and the big troop exercises showed that the rear-services officers must have firm knowledge of the methods for the preparation and conduct of various types of combat and the principles for its comprehensive support and they must have firm skills in controlling the subordinate subunits.

In speaking about the importance of the work of commanders and staff and rear-services officers in regard to the comprehensive support of the subunits in battle, I should again like to return to the exercise on which the regiment where officers V. Zhivotov and V. Konstantinov serve distinguished itself.

The commanders devoted great attention to supervision of the work of the rear on all stages of the battle. Reports on the condition of the subunits were sent to the headquarters in good time and this permitted the regimental commander to react to their needs effectively. The deputy regimental commander for rear services was constantly abreast of the tactical and rear-services situation and therefore successfully supervised the actions of his subordinates in regard to the rear-services support of the combat subunits. It is not by chance that at a critique of the exercise it was noted that the successful accomplishment of the combat-training mission by the regiment was caused to a great extent by the clear coordination of the officers of the combat subunits and the rear services specialists and their coordinated work.

We are striving to see that each exercise is a good school for the rear-services specialists and subunits where coordination is developed and knowledge and skills are improved. For example, good experience has been accumulated in the regiment where the deputy commander for rear services is officer Ya. Lashchuk. In the work of the rear-services officers of this unit they draw in accuracy, organization of control, and high demandingness toward all specialists. And this demandingness is always combined with concern for people and for the living conditions of the soldiers in the field.

I could name many more units of our district where the commanders organize rear-services support in battle with knowledge of the matter. This is the result of a creative search for new ways to increase the effectiveness of training.

And here it is important not simply to record the sprouts of the new and advanced, but to arm oneself with it and to introduce it into practice widely. Special attention is deserved by tactical lessons and exercises and trips out to the field. It is here that problems in the rear-area support of the regiment are worked out under conditions which approach actual combat.

It sometimes also happens, unfortunately, that some officers, not having sufficient experience, look upon the role of the regimental rear services on an exercise in a simplified manner. The main thing, individual comrades consider, is that the combat subunits "function" well. One can even hear
the opinion that the "rear" binds the initiative of the commander and paralyzes maneuver. In practice, this point of view leads to where the rear is sometimes reduced to a general column and moves separated from the subunits which are being supported. The solution is simple but it can hardly be considered justified. It also happens that the rear services subunits displace without consideration of the tactical situation and do not deploy for work in time. Such an approach to the matter cannot be called anything other than simplification.

In this connection, it is useful to recall that now the significance of the time factor in supplying troops with material resources has increased sharply. The situation in combat can develop in any minute in such a way that the slightest time delay, even an insignificant delay in delivering all necessities to the combat units, can lead to defeat.

For example, the deputy regimental commander for rear services, Lieutenant Colonel B. Karimov, had to draw bitter lessons from one of the recent exercises. He thought through the problems of controlling the rear services superficially, did not delve into the situation sufficiently, and assigned missions to the rear-services units vaguely. This, in the final analysis, led to the tardy delivery of ammunition to some of the subunits. Furthermore, the "forgetfulness" and, simply speaking, the disorganization of officer Karimov who, when changing position, did not indicate the disposition area of the food, clothing, and equipment supply point, caused a delay in feeding the soldiers.

We should especially discuss the organization of feeding. This is the most important component part of concern for the living conditions of the soldiers in the field. For contemporary battle requires great expenditures of nervous and physical energy from the personnel. Therefore, long interruptions in feeding which lead to a decrease in the combat effectiveness of the troops cannot be tolerated.

The officer personnel obtain certain knowledge in the organization of the work of the regimental rear services in the military educational institutions. But practice shows that to be satisfied with the old store of knowledge, not to renew one's knowledge, and not to study frontline and contemporary experience—this means to lag hopelessly behind life.

In the improvement of knowledge, a significant role belongs to commanders' training, the independent work of the officers, and practical actions on exercises and field lessons. This is especially important now, in the period of summer combat training, when the soldiers are spending a large part of the training time in the field. And each rear services officer who is responsible for the organization of the training process of specialists and sub-units should be concerned for the thorough preparation of the lessons and that they are conducted on the same high level as in the combat subunits. Ensuring the high effectiveness and quality of combat training comprises the main direction of our work. The regimental rear services will always be ready for battle and will make their contribution to the attainment of victory only with such an approach.
A hot and difficult time in the life of the military commissariats has just been completed. We are speaking about the many-months' work in the selection of candidates for the military schools.

Of the hundreds of youths who decided to become officers, it was necessary for us to select the best, conduct the medical examinations thoroughly, draw up the personal files correctly, and send them in time to the most diverse ends of the country where the military schools are located and, receiving the calls from them, to organize the dispatch of the candidates to take the entry examinations. The examinations have already begun and among those who are taking them now there are many youths from Uzbekistan. This year more than previously.... And we see in this the fruits of the purposeful military and patriotic work which was conducted with the students in our republic.

The youths have decided to become officers. The graduates of the school arrive at this decision in various ways. For some, it is a continuation of a tradition: the sons follows the paths of their fathers. For example, in our republic we have the well-known dynasty of the Tikhomirovs. Its head is Aleksey Sergeyevich—now a major in the reserves. Three of his sons—Vladimir, Aleksandr, and Valeri—completed the Tashkent Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni V. I. Lenin and are now serving with the troops. The junior representative of the dynasty—Georgiy—is in the third class of the school. The military dynasty of the Shadzhalilovs is just as famous. Four sons of this family have become pilots, having completed the Orenburg Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots imeni I. S. Polbina.

But however remarkable the family traditions may be, we obtain the majority of the candidates for the military schools through daily painstaking work with the schoolboys. The forms and methods of this work are varied. Here we have meetings with war veterans, thematic soirees, military sports games, and excursions to places of combat glory.... Many of these measures
are conducted with the participation of the soldiers of the district and personnel of the military commissariats. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, the Central Committee of the Komsomol of the republic, organs of public education, and DOSAAF committees render us great assistance in this matter.

Many interesting and attractive measures of a military and patriotic nature are conducted in Ferganskaya, Samarkandskaya, Tashkentskaya, and Namanganskaya oblasts. And it is not by chance that here the planned assignments for the selection of youths for the military schools are accomplished from year to year. The quality of their training is constantly high.

Work on the preparation of the graduates of the schools for entering the military schools is conducted here with various forms and methods. Universities and clubs of future officers are functioning in many cities and rayons of Uzbekistan. Oblast, city, and rayon rallies under the slogan, "Officer -- a heroic profession" have become popular among the youth.

The universities of the future officer are an effective form for attracting youths of draft age for entering the military schools which has been tested by time. Each year, the university with the republic "House of Knowledge," for example, is visited by approximately 600 youths. Here is how one of the lessons was conducted here several months ago. First the chief of the political section of the republic military commissariat, Colonel P. Sheyanov, gave a lecture. Then the youths saw the film, "Officers." In conclusion, a meeting with the command of the Tashkent Combined-Arms and Tank Schools took place. An objective conversation about the romance of military service took place. After this lesson, many youths submitted an application for their acceptance in the school. The thematic soiree, "To be a political officer is a high honor" also proceeded in an interesting manner.

The life of the troops is many-faceted and the more the youths know about it, the more boldly they enter on their selected path. Remembering this, we often conduct meetings with the servicemen of various combat arms. These meetings often take place directly in the subunits where the schoolboys become acquainted with the service, life, and living conditions of today's defenders of the homeland. It should be said that the command of the district renders us every assistance in these problems.

In short remarks, it is not possible to dwell on all aspects of the multi-faceted activity of the military commissariats of the republic in preparing the youths for military schools. However, we also have many unresolved problems. But we see our omissions and we are doing everything to eliminate them. One time, the matter of selecting candidates for entering the military schools in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR did not go well. The party and soviet organs of the autonomous republic understood our concern correctly. The problem of preparing the youths for entering the military educational institutions was examined at a joint session of the Kara-Kalpak party oblast committee and the Council of Ministers of the autonomous republic where the corresponding decree was adopted. Then this question was considered by the board of the
ministry of education of the republic. A concrete conversation took place and the suggestions were business-like. Now the situation has changed sharply for the better.

The youth decided to become an officer. Have a good journey!

6367
CSO:1801
The drill was ended. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel A. Medvedev, announced a break. A critique soon took place. The lieutenant colonel had already basically formed his conclusions and evaluations. But his mind is working as usual. Why didn't the section function very smoothly today? Did the newcomers let it down? This, for example, is what the guidance officer, Senior Lieutenant A. Vasil'yev, believes.

"With the former personnel, the section could not only accomplish the mission with an excellent grade but could even rest," he noted after the drill with a bitter smile.

One senses that his attitude is also shared by other experienced specialists: the newcomers, they say, let us down. But are they really the problem?

Yes, today was the first training battle for the young specialists. The situation was comparatively simple and the density of the "enemy" air raid was low. This is how it should have been: for the training goes from the simple to the complex. Nevertheless, errors were noted in the section's actions.

Lieutenant Colonel Medvedev looks at his subordinates. There is confusion on the face of the young operator, Private A. Trushin. He is already certain that the reason for all the failures on the lesson can be traced to him and to his insufficient training. And the experienced specialists of the section look at him with reproach.

The commander knows that Private Trushin was selected for the operator group by a special committee. His level of education, psychomotor data, and other physiological qualities all met the necessary requirements. At an assembly of young operators in the course of the drills, Trushin displayed diligence and persistence and had good grades. Then what is the matter? Couldn't he overcome the psychological barrier at once? Perhaps this is it.
The lieutenant colonel again mentally games the drill which has taken place. In the dim light of the van he sees the hurried, unconfident movements of the operator. He can in no way "lock on" the maneuvering target and he looks for a low-flying target against a background of echoes from local objects for a long time. Nor does he manage to reliably retain a high-speed, high-altitude small target.

By the way, gaps in psychological tempering were disclosed today not only in Trushin. The indistinct reports of Private First Class A. Gol'chenko and the hasty actions of Private First Class V. Shalakhov crop up in the commander's memory. Colored with dissatisfaction, the commands of the guidance officer, Senior Lieutenant Vasil'yev are heard. Today his usual self-control and coolness also failed him.

Back in the course of the drill Lieutenant Colonel Medvedev drew the conclusion that the unique psychological barrier must be overcome by the entire section which the young soldiers joined. The commander noted that today the experienced specialists were also accomplishing their functional duties more poorly than usual. "However much we try, the results will be poor all the same--the young ones will let us down," they reasoned. And they were not especially zealous. Therefore, the working rhythm was disrupted and the targets were "fired on" late. Serious errors were committed in work, for example, by Junior Sergeant A. Abramovskikh.

This is one aspect of the problem. There is also another. The battalion's experienced specialists assumed the obligation in the competition to help the young soldiers in mastering their specialty. This is very good. But assistance should not be converted into guardianship. Unfortunately, this was observed in the course of the drill. Here, let us say, is Private First Class Gol'chenko. At each step he tried to watch over Private Trushin, thereby paralyzing his initiative. Carried away by the advice and remarks given to Trushin, Gol'chenko himself also committed a serious error.

The critique began after the break. Lieutenant Colonel Medvedev analyzed the actions of each specialist in detail. He showed convincingly that it was exactly the mistakes of the experienced specialists caused by various reasons including those of a psychological nature which served as the main and determining reason for the poor result in the first training battle. At first, the conclusion surprised all the participants in the critique by its unexpectedness but the arguments and force of logic of the commander were irrefutable. The repeated accomplishment of this same training mission proceeded successfully. This means that the critique of the first drill attained its goal completely. This means that the commander found namely those errors which should have been eliminated first of all.

...I have had the occasion to be on lessons supervised by Lieutenant Colonel Medvedev many times. And I have always been convinced of the high skill of the officer as a methodologist and psychologist. I am confident that for this very reason he succeeds in attaining irreproachable combat coordination of the small unit in a short time.
At an officers' call, the battalion commander, Senior Lieutenant M. Rymashevskiy, named the subunits which had achieved high grades and accomplished their obligations. I caught myself thinking that perhaps even our platoon could be among the winners. Could, but.... No, we were not among the worst and I heard great unfavorable criticism directed at us. The overall good grade which the platoon received at the check inspection was a result which gave no grounds for being ashamed. However, I understood that this was not the limit of our abilities.

We struggled for the title of outstanding platoon. We did not attain our goal. Privates S. Davtyan and Sh. Nasibov let us down at the firings for record. And privates A. Bisingaliyev and R. Mutalimov did not cope with the mission on the check lesson for defense against weapons of mass destruction. Of course, it was I who was guilty in this first of all: I did not do enough work and did not teach my subordinates. It was embarrassing to acknowledge this. For I am no novice as a platoon commander: I was graduated from the school almost two years ago.

I was also ashamed of myself. I did not receive the highest grades for commander's training. I more or less read the literature and again reviewed the abstracts of the school lessons. Nevertheless, I "goofed" in some subjects. This happened, for example, in intelligence training. The inspector, a colonel from higher headquarters, posed a question about organizational changes in the subunits of one of the foreign armies. I could say nothing specific. Later, I found the answer in one of the recent numbers of a military journal but it was too late by now.

We drew conclusions from what had happened. In the platoon we agreed that in the summer training period we would return to the collective the title of outstanding. I, myself, undertook to obtain a grade of five in all disciplines and confirm the qualification of first-class specialist in the fall.
Now, returning to the last check, I think: how important it is for an officer to work on himself constantly and expand his knowledge continuously so as not to lag behind life or the innovations in the development of military affairs.

I recall my own school with gratitude. It provided a satisfactory store of knowledge and trained me so that I could train and educate the soldiers. At first, it seemed as if this store would suffice for a long time. And then the passing years and, in particular, the last check convinced me: you won't go far on the school's store of knowledge alone.

Why did I decide to write to the newspaper about this? KRASNAYA ZVEZDA began a conversation about the development of the commander. In my opinion and the opinion of my fellow officers this is a very necessary conversation. And it is desirable that such a mandatory condition for the successful formation of a commander as his tireless work on raising the level of personal training not be left out.

I cannot say that in our regiment there is no concern for the training of the officers. Commanders' lessons and demonstration and training-methods lessons are conducted regularly, and training assemblies are held.... All these forms of instruction provide much. However, not all officers attend the lessons. Assemblies of platoon commanders were concluded just recently. I attended the assemblies for only three days and then received an assignment which did not permit me to continue the training on the following days. This is not the only instance where you miss commanders' lessons through no fault of your own. I remember that in the winter I was also deprived of the opportunity to attend the lessons for a whole month. And how many times in the two years on the very day of commanders' lessons was I sent off on temporary duty or on administrative work.... At times, this was caused by objective necessity. But often the commanders reasoned: "It's no great misfortune if the lieutenant misses a lesson; he'll make it up himself." And much could be made up independently. But you see, there is not enough time for this.

In our regiment, the daily schedule for Wednesdays provides four hours of service time (from 1500 to 1900 hours) for the independent training of the officers. This finds reflection in the company lesson schedule. But the matter goes no further than "reflection." I cannot recall one Wednesday when I could make full use of these four hours: to read the training literature, regulations, and manuals for a little while. We also have rooms for the independent training of the officers. But it happens that you just sit down and open a textbook and a messenger runs in: "Comrade lieutenant, you are being summoned to headquarters." In short, four hours of independent training exist only on paper.

Once while on temporary duty I met a fellow student from school. We talked. I involuntarily envied how independent training of the officers is organized in the unit where my comrade serves. Their regimental commander took this sector under his personal control. During hours for self-training staff officers and chiefs of services conduct consultations, talks, and information sessions on military literature and new equipment. Training films which give
a graphic impression of the nature of contemporary battle and the operating
tactics of subunits in a difficult, rapidly changing situation are shown. And
again my conversation partner said that he systematically receives individual
assignments from his company and battalion commanders and that their accomp-
lishment is strictly checked.

Why isn't the independent training of the officers organized like this in our
regiment? For knowledge is needed not for the sake of "fives" on the checks
but so that we can control our subunits skillfully and competently in combat
and employ weapons and equipment with maximum effectiveness.

The following case occurred in the platoon. A reducer broke down on an armored
personnel carrier. The driver, Private A. Gutsayev, turned to me: "Comrade
lieutenant, I assembled the reducer and I feel that something is not right."
We disassembled the unit again. I looked and could not figure out the hitch.
It was necessary to take the diagram from the technical description and find
where the error was made.

I am able to read the drawings and diagrams. But, it turns out, not to such
a degree as to establish the nature of a malfunction in the equipment while
under way. In battle, of course, there will be no time to look in a book and
puzzle over technical diagrams. If one of the officer specialists had con-
ducted a consultation on the most difficult problems in operating the vehicle
during the hours for our self-training, I would not have had to experience
awkwardness before the soldier.

Other examples can be presented where insufficient knowledge hampers work and
does not permit the successful accomplishment of the mission in a training
battle. Each time, I learned a lesson and filled the gaps in my personal
training independently. At times, sacrificing sleep and rest.

In comparison with others, I am less pressed for time because I have not
settled down as a married man yet. The hours not occupied by service can be
utilized at my own discretion and used for independent study. Unquestionably,
it is more difficult in this respect for officers who have a family which re-
quires attention. And here again, the officer missed the lessons on days of
commanders' training through no fault of his own. As a result, the old store
of knowledge is gradually expended. Well, and without fresh knowledge what
kind of a commander are you?

I believe that continuous work on oneself plays the primary role in the
development of the commander, especially one who is starting out. From my
own experience I was convinced that the authority in the eyes of the soldiers
and successes in their training and education depend on this.
EDITORIAL ON IMPORTANCE OF BATTLE DRILL TRAINING FOR YOUNG OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jul 76 p 1

[Editorial: "Tactical and Marching Drill Exercises"]

[Text] Summer training is in full swing. In accomplishing the important missions which follow from the decisions of the 25th Party Congress, the Soviet servicemen are struggling tirelessly to raise the effectiveness of the training process. The skill of the supervisors of lessons is acquiring ever more significance in the combat coordination of the subunits.

Among the forms of instruction which the commander actively uses, an important place belongs to tactical and marching drill exercises—the connecting link between lessons on various subjects of instruction and tactical exercises. On tactical and marching drill exercises the accomplishment of tactical procedures which pertain to drill and combat formations are polished consistently, by the numbers, and by means of constant repetition, the skills of commanders in controlling subordinate subunits are perfected, and collective combat skill is developed.

Being the first, initial stage of the combat coordination of the subunits, tactical and marching drill exercises permit comprehensive preparation for tactical lessons and exercises, giving the personnel intensive field training, and developing and consolidating the ability to operate dexterously and in a coordinated manner in all types of contemporary battle.

The role of tactical and marching drill exercises has grown considerably in recent years. This is caused by the complication of the nature of contemporary battle, the increasing of the requirements imposed on the field ability of the troops, and especially by the increased variety in the means of armed conflict.

There are many commanders among the troops who possess a high level of methodological preparedness and are able to conduct tactical and marching drill exercises instructively and effectively. For example, the tactical and marching drill exercises in the tank battalion commanded by Captain M. Gavrilo are distinguished by high quality. As a consequence, the tankers achieve stable results in tactical training and are confidently accomplishing assigned missions in training battles.
At the same time, checks among the troops show that many young commanders of platoons, companies, batteries, and sometimes even battalions are experiencing difficulties in the organization of tactical and marching drill exercises and committing errors. In some subunits, these lessons recall a rehearsal for an exercise. All forthcoming actions are worked out in combination, without being divided into elements. Clearly, this distorts the very essence of this form of tactical training.

The preparation of tactical and marching drill exercises should be preceded by great preparatory work. It is very important to plan the training problems to be carried out on the lesson correctly. Strained actions of all personnel are required, let us say, by deployment from march formations into approach-march and combat formations, the working out of the methods of attack, the combination of fire and movement, the execution of a maneuver, the displacement of firing positions and observation posts, and so forth. Unfortunately, at times problems are worked out on tactical and marching drill exercises which are connected with the clarification of the mission, the estimate of the situation, the performance of computations of various types, the use of documents, and listening to reports. This dooms the main portion of the trainees to passive waiting and thereby sharply reduces the dynamism and instructiveness of the lessons.

Great significance is had by the precise computation of the time allotted to the lesson. The director is obliged to consider the degree of importance and complexity of each of the training problems and the necessity for constant repetition of tactical procedures both by the numbers and in combination, and to allocate a sufficient reserve of time for individual and general critiques.

The selection and preparation of the area for the tactical and marching drill exercises is far from a secondary question. The best conditions for their conduct are offered by a tactical field with the necessary equipment. But lessons conducted on other terrain sectors, at times even limited and well known to the personnel, can also be interesting and instructive. For the director can always change the direction of the actions and, where necessary, conduct the exercise over a closed circle. The main thing is that after leaving the disposition area each kilometer of the route be used for training the personnel so that the motor capacities and the time are expended efficiently and, in so doing, that bunching-up of the combat formations is excluded.

On the exercises, a special tactical situation is created for each training problem. It should contribute to the quality working-out of the planned problems and the formation of correct notions about the nature of combat among the personnel. On the eve of tactical and marching drill exercises with officers, warrant officers [praporshchik] and sergeants instructional lessons are usually conducted on the ground or its mock-up and radio drills are held while recapitulation of the provisions of the regulations and manuals and of the signals and preparation of weapons and equipment are organized with the remaining personnel.
The role of party-political work in the course of tactical and marching drill exercises is great. It is called upon to direct the servicemen toward the skillful use of the equipment and weapons, the smoothest possible collective actions, and to instill in each one a sense of responsibility, boldness, resolve, and initiative. It is important to see that in arming the servicemen with the skills for the conduct of battle the exercises become a school for a critical, exacting approach to the evaluation of the level of their training for them.

The spirit of competition is found in the very nature of tactical and marching drill exercises based on a comparison of the results attained with standard results. They presume the constant dressing on the best servicemen and on the platoons, squads, crews, and sections which are functioning more clearly and smoothly than the others. The directors of the exercises are obliged to use such favorable opportunities to organize specific, effective socialist competition in the field, popularize the experience of the leaders, and make it the property of all.

To a decisive degree, the quality of tactical and marching drill exercises depends on the participation of the staff in their preparation and its concern for a steady rise in the methodological horizon of the young officers. Life shows that it is often necessary to begin work on this important sector with an explanation of the essence of this form of tactical training and its place in the overall training process and to fight consistently against various types of simplifications. Well organized demonstration tactical and marching drill exercises on basic subjects and tactical and marching drill exercises conducted by senior commanders on working out the coordination of the subunits of various combat arms and the forcing of water obstacles serve as a good aid for commanders of the lowest echelon. It is clear that an exemplary demonstration, briefing, and assistance should be combined with high demandingness and strict daily checking.

The mission is for each tactical and marching drill exercise to make a weighty contribution to improving the field ability and tactical skill of the personnel, raise the readiness of the subunit for contemporary combat operations to a new stage, and unite the troop collective into a fighting family able to employ its first-class weapons with maximum effect.
COMMANDERS CRITICIZED FOR FAILING TO REPORT DISCIPLINARY VIOLATIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Aug 76 p 2

Article by Col Justice V. Levitskiy: "Commander and the Law: Behind a Convenient Wording"/

Text/ Although they spoke about what had happened in the subunit with alarm, it was barely in a whisper: "Pvt Butakov disappeared! He was the orderly and . . ." Even the company commander did not sound the tocsin, but to the contrary, "soothed" the company commander:

"There is no cause to raise a fuss. He is no needle, and will be found."

And the soldier soon really was found. He came and repented before the company commander for the absence without leave. And the latter noted to himself, not without satisfaction, that it was well and proper that they had not reported what had happened to headquarters, for everything came out as best it could have.

The satisfaction was not long, however; a few days later it was learned that the soldier committed a crime while AWOL which the military procuracy was already working on.

Then the officials of the procuracy were talking with the officers who in one way or another abetted concealment of the AWOL. Why had they done so? What was the reason for their lack of desire to assess what had happened from a sense of principle and in a strict way? And they heard a very frank statement: "But who, tell us, wishes to air our dirty linen? We ourselves would have demanded a stern accounting of Butakov were he not under investigation."

So it was. And as it later was learned, in protecting themselves against possible rebukes on the part of superiors for an unsatisfactory state of military discipline, some officers repeatedly hushed up misdeeds of subordinates and did not show them in accounting documents.
We already have told of the trouble which such a fallacious practice led to this time. But why did a situation arise where officers did not act as prescribed and did not report the unpleasant occurrence through channels? Perhaps, as a matter of fact, a commander's timely and truthful report about misdeeds committed by his subordinates somehow is turned against himself?

Alas, in the regiment we were told about one such old, but memorable incident. Maj V. Bosoy learned about a crude violation of discipline by Sgt A. Yangel'skiy. As prescribed, the officer immediately reported through channels both what had happened and about the steps taken in this regard. And how did the officer's immediate superior react to this report? Maj Bosoy received a reprimand, his political deputy received a severe reprimand, and the battalion chief of staff was cautioned about actions which were not in full conformity with service. And although nothing was said about this directly, some had the thought: was it worth it to air one's dirty linen?

And so it happens at times that an officer is among the leaders although he reports late or unobjectively about what has happened. And to the contrary, one who does not conceal the true state of discipline in the subunit falls into disgrace. In accounting documentation to the senior commander there is not always a noticeable polarity of moral positions of two such commanders, while it is easily seen by those who serve together with these comrades. And already one sees talk going around in the regiment: "In Petrov's platoon violators of discipline are among the otlichniki. You have to know how!"

Isn't it this "know-how" that generates the desire not to air one's dirty linen? One who has assimilated such "experience" later himself surpasses his "teacher" and in an explanatory note reports, for a very joyless reason, that such and such a driver-mechanic did not cope somewhat with control of a tank and the latter, "getting out of control, drove against a house and made a . . . dent in it." Another writes that "as a result of a tilt of the vehicle, the driver hit some roadside vegetation and dislocated his arm." As a matter of fact, it turns out that the vehicle overturned, the roadside vegetation turned out to be an oak, and the dislocation was a much more serious injury.

Such embellishment of reality, which borders on eyewash, does enormous harm to military law and order and to discipline. It is in clear contradiction with demands of our regulations.

Let us take the USSR Armed Forces Interior Service Regulation and have a look at Article 52. It states that a commander (chief) must, within limits of the authority granted to him, "require of subordinates observance of Soviet laws and precise and timely fulfillment by them of military regulations, their official duties and orders (instructions); encourage subordinates for intelligent initiative, zeal, exploits and distinctions in service; and he must severely punish the negligent." And let us also read Article 66, which says that the commander is obligated to report through channels
about all instances of crimes or incidents, appoint an inquiry or investi-
gation of them, and inform the military procurator about what happened.
The Code of Disciplinary Punishment prescribes that a commander "resolutely
and firmly demand observance of military discipline and order and not
leave a single misdeed of a subordinate go without bringing influence to
bear" (Art. 6). By acting in the face of these regulation requirements,
an officer becomes an unwitting accomplice of violators of discipline.
And subordinates moreover will develop an incorrect impression of regu-
lation requirements and of the procedure for performing service. This
often leads them to new misdeeds.

It is understandable that not to leave a single misdeed go by without
bringing influence to bear does not at all mean the obligatory use of
punishments. Here it is important to also make use of the influence of the
collective upon the culprit, and methods of individual work with people.
It is also clear, however, that an officer who reacts in a timely and proper
manner to an instance of a violation of order must always be sure of sup-
port on the part of senior commanders.

More than once I have had occasion to visit the Dvina Red-Banner Twice Order
of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Tank Training Regiment, widely known both for suc-
cesses in training and for high discipline. I will not say that there
are never cases of violations of military order in the regiment at all.
But all of them are nipped in the bud, as the saying goes. It is the rule
here to report through channels about any disorder, even the slightest one,
immediately. All information about the discipline and disciplinary practice
come from this regiment to the higher headquarters without any kind of
adorment. And such rigidly regulation conscientiousness does not belittle
in the slightest either the authority of commanders or the honor of the
subunits. To the contrary, day in and day out, things go better in the
unit. The Dvina men are on the right flank in socialist competition.

It would appear that this good example should be taken up both by those
who try to embellish their successes and by those who judge the status of
affairs in a subunit and the indoctrination work of an officer only by the
number of punishments imposed.

6904
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COMMAND TRAINING OF SERGEANTS AND PETTY OFFICERS EMPHASIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 76 p 1

Editorial: "Firm Command Skills for Sergeants and Petty Officers"

Excerpts// Sergeants and petty officers are representatives of the largest detachment of our command cadres, the reliable assistants of officers and warrant officers in their diverse activities of training and indoctrinating personnel. Under present-day conditions, the role of sergeants and petty officers is growing even more throughout the life of troops and naval forces. This involves the continuously increasing complexity of missions of combat and political training, assimilation of new models of weapons and combat equipment, and the increase in demands on combat readiness of units and warships and the importance of small subunits in modern combat.

In order for sergeants and petty officers to be able to perform the duties imposed on them to the full extent, they require profound military and political knowledge and firm command skills. This knowledge and skills are acquired by the future junior commanders in the training subunits. We must steadily improve in them the organization of the training process and political education work. We must eliminate present shortcomings more persistently and instill in cadets practical skills in training and indoctrinating privates and seamen and in implementing the provisions of combined-arms regulations.

Sergeants and petty officers go through a real school of development in units and on warships. Here they reinforce in practice the knowledge obtained in training subunits and improve command and methodological skills. The role of commanders, political officers and staff officers is exceptionally great in the development of young sergeants and petty officers. They must monitor on a daily basis the junior commanders' performance of their duties, be concerned for their ideological-political conditioning and field, air and naval training, arm them with foremost experience, and keep them from making mistakes. It is important to provide a high ideological level of political classes with sergeants and petty officers and explain to them daily the materials and decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and demands of the Communist Party for combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.
X Unit displays great concern for indoctrination of sergeants and strengthening their authority.

However, not all units and warships have a businesslike concern for the growth and development of sergeants and petty officers. Some officers excessively coddle them and substitute for them in the performance of functional duties. Such mistrust shackles the independence of junior commanders and dampens their initiative. We have not gotten rid of instances where sergeants and petty officers are rudely dressed down before a formation of personnel, in the presence of subordinates.

Such shortcomings demand the most resolute condemnation and sharp, fundamental struggle against them. We must teach and indoctrinate sergeants and petty officers to be exacting, strong-willed supervisors and skilled organizers capable of resolving the missions assigned to them with initiative and imagination. A large part here is played by instructional methods classes. Commanders and staffs are called upon to ensure that these classes are held without breakdowns, strictly according to plan, and at a high organizational and methodological level. We must teach the sergeants and petty officers on a daily basis the best methodological techniques and the ability to organize competition in the squad, team, or crew, to sum up results of combat and political training, and to analyze the status of discipline among subordinates.

As practice shows, sergeants and petty officers make many mistakes, especially at first, in their relationships with subordinates. Some junior commanders display a false shyness, timidity, and inability to demand that privates and seamen go strictly according to regulation in matters of service. Others, to the contrary, are carried away by dressings down, reprimands, and punishments, and do not listen to the voices of subordinates. If both are not corrected in time, mistakes and failures in service are inevitable. And it is here that good advice and the experience of a senior comrade, the commander, political officer or staff officer, is especially valuable. They can and must explain to the junior commander how to maintain and strengthen regulation relations with subordinates, how to work with each of them individually, how to instill an aware attitude toward military discipline, how to uncover and prevent misdeeds in time, and how to make correct use of one's disciplinary rights.

The sergeant and petty officer shape the collective of the squad, team and crew. Accomplishment of this far from simple task requires that they have deep knowledge of combined-arms regulations, the fundamentals of pedagogics and psychology, and well-developed skills as an educator. The sergeant and petty officer is always next to his subordinates in service, during hours of leisure, in the barracks, or in the crew quarters. He can notice the shortcomings in training and discipline of a private or seaman and the negative phenomena in relations among soldiers of different dates of call-up in time and take effective steps to eliminate them. We must teach junior commanders the art of individual indoctrination work and the ability to
correctly rely on the aktiv of the squad, team and crew and make the combat collective cohesive. We must develop in sergeants and petty officers a taste for reading military-pedagogic literature.

Party and Komsomol organizations of subunits, units and warships are called upon to display all possible concern for the development of sergeants and petty officers. Ensuring the personal example of junior commanders who are party and Komsomol members in training, service and conduct; effective help to them in acquiring skills of training and indoctrinating subordinates; bringing them into active public work; and propaganda of foremost experience -- these and other issues must be constantly in the field of view of party and Komsomol activists.

6904
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AIR DEFENSE MISSILE UNITS' TRAINING PROCEDURES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 76 p 2

Article by Maj Gen Arty K. Babenko: "Commander and Modern Combat: Tactical Training of the Firing Officer"

I often have occasion to visit missile firings. It seems it would be high time to become accustomed to the roar of the winged missiles being launched and the flashes of incomparable joy of people who have achieved a military victory.

But still, on seeing this picture, the heart beats in excitement. Such is the specific nature of range routine. Each firing here is a most serious test of soldiers' abilities to fight in a modern way.

Each firing is also the subject of serious reflections and comparison of results. The achievements of the best subunits become a unique standard to which other collectives strive. The bitter experience of failures also is analyzed. And unfortunately, they still happen.

Why does a "spread" arise at times? The reasons can be quite varied. But in my view, the chief and determining one lies in the level of training of the firing officers, the organizers of missile combat.

I recall a very recent case. Two high-speed, small-sized targets operating under the screen of jamming appeared in the zone of vision of the missile guidance station, but it was neither the jamming nor the speed which disturbed some of the crew at the command post. The minimum interval between targets put them on guard. Which of them would enter the zone of fire first? And would the missilemen manage to bring the second target under fire? That was the problem.

But looking at Capt A. Morozov, who directed the men's actions, it was possible to think that these matters did not exist for him. He coolly and precisely chose the moment of the first launch and saved seconds for the second. And this confidence of the commander was transmitted to all the specialists. The guidance officer, Capt V. Zhukov, and his first assistants, the manual tracking operators, functioned faultlessly.
Without a doubt, each of the subunit specialists did his bit for this success. But we also know something else: the outcome of the single combat with an air enemy depends primarily on the firing officer and his self-control, tactical gumption, and ability to find the correct solution in a complex and unprecedented situation.

Moreover, while it is sometimes possible to correct a mistake by a particular specialist in the course of combat work, a mistake made by the firing officer as a rule leads to nonfulfillment of the combat mission. Consequently, we must give the training of this category of officers primary attention.

The scheme of actions of a combat director is to detect the air enemy, estimate the situation and make the decision. This came about long ago, but now, when speeds and maneuver capabilities of means of air attack have risen sharply and the intensity of jamming has increased, this scheme has been filled with new meaning. Demands have risen for timeliness and precision in estimating the air situation. Soldiers of air defense must ensure absolute fulfillment of the combat mission and destroy the enemy before he comes up to the line of attack against the defended installation.

The time factor, which played no little part even before, now has decisive importance. Single combat against the air enemy is built on a phased struggle for seconds. If you have won them, you have won the fight. Thus is the question now posed. That means such qualities as swiftness of reaction and the ability to implement a decision boldly and with initiative play a very important role in the activity of a firing officer.

Where and how can these qualities be acquired? Only under conditions of intensive, day to day classes and practices. But the problem is that in some collectives the firing officer does not have to ponder in practices which target to bring under fire first, how to determine the moment of launch, and what rate of fire to select. All this is known beforehand, as are, by the way, the target routes, profiles of their flight, and other data.

It is not hard to guess what such an oversimplified approach to practices leads to. Maj V. Smal', for example, felt confident before the beginning of one tactical exercise. As a matter of fact, his theoretical training could be given the highest mark. The officer had a firm knowledge of the fire capabilities of the missile complex, combat characteristics of modern means of aerial attack, and the firing drills. It appeared success was inevitable, but then the signals reflected from the targets appeared on the scopes. Several "enemy" aircraft were dashing toward the defended installation at low altitude. And here the errors began. The confidence in the firing officer's actions was replaced by nervousness, which was passed on to his subordinates. The mission assigned the subunit was accomplished with great difficulty.

It turns out that to know and to be capable of something are not the same thing. It is one thing to understand that tactics is a weapon, and quite
another to handle this weapon skillfully. Maj Smal' did not have enough of this capability.

It cannot be said that antimissile maneuvers of means of aerial attack were not denoted or jamming and various types of narrative changes were not used in the schemes of the practices which he directed. They were. The only bad thing is that the "enemy" actions were depicted in an oversimplified manner and were essentially doomed beforehand to failure. This, then, led to where Maj Smal' and the other firing officers gained an incorrect impression of the nature of modern combat.

For in tactics, as in any other science, new lines are constantly being written, since means of aerial attack also are continuously developing. This is why experienced commanders lay stress on the most difficult versions of combat actions, and they naturally do not "forget" about their own training. They do not reassign the organization and conduct of practices to secondary individuals. They personally delve into the elaboration of variations of a raid and strive to create such unexpected turns in "enemy" actions that they themselves, as the saying goes, have to do some sweating.

This creative approach to work is characteristic of Capt Morozov, who was mentioned earlier. Dynamism, instructiveness and diversity of the "enemy's" tactical moves are the most noteworthy features of each problem held in the subunit. And it would appear to be no accident at all that other officers approach the working of particular variations of combat actions with the very same interest as Capt Morozov. Here several firing officers have been trained who can successfully replace the commander in the most difficult situation.

A few years ago it was necessary to criticize those missile officers who directed the actions of subordinates in the old way, by virtue of a mistrust of control means, or more correctly, due to a lack of knowledge of the apparatus which permits a significant time reduction for calculating initial data for firing and other operations. Now the situation has changed. Control systems have found practical application everywhere. The effectiveness of missile firings has risen greatly.

All this is well. The only bad thing is that some officers have begun to downgrade the role of tactical training in the actions of the firing officer with the appearance of the latest technology. It only remains for him, they say, to assess the prepared data and give the appropriate commands. In short, some began to regard field firings as a strictly technical process which included loading the launchers, detection and tracking of targets, the missile launch, its guidance, and so on.

But here is what is interesting: these thoughts are heard most often where tactical thinking is dozing and where one encounters oversimplified situations. If things come down to a serious test, though, all kinds of mistakes, delays,
and excuses begin: we've never been in such situations yet, they say. But one can't hide behind excuses in real combat, and it will be too late to make up for lost time.

How, for example, can we explain the uncertain actions of firing officer Maj A. Benetskiy? His technical culture can be envied. He knows all systems by heart. He also has studied the firing drills well. Then he came up to a control practice, however. Maj Benetskiy did not tear his gaze from the scope. The target approached swiftly with each sweep. The firing officer clearly saw its blip on the scope, but what was he doing? One sweep, a second, a third . . . No target. It had employed some kind of maneuver. Maj Benetskiy feverishly turned over in his mind the possible maneuvers of the air "enemy" by altitude, course and speed, but a firm, confident solution did not come to him. An officer who was more experienced in the tactical sense had to intervene in his actions.

Any cybernetic device, even the most sophisticated one, is not capable of providing ready decisions with consideration of all changes of the air situation, let alone the ground situation, or to assess, for example, the character and duration of attack by the enemy, or provide for all possible versions of his actions. This and much more must be done by the firing officer, and in very short periods of time.

All this once again convinces us that tactics has been and remains the heart of combat control and the basis of competent, confident actions by the firing officers in the most complex aerial situation.

Many forms of training which have proven themselves serve to raise the tactical expertise of the firing officers. The task is to fill them with new meaning and foremost methodology, so that they do not lag behind development of military affairs. I wish to direct special attention to high-quality conduct of complex practices in which several subunits take part simultaneously. It is in such practices that the achievements and mistakes of each specialist are especially evident. They provide rich food for analysis and an exchange of experience.

Such practices are conducted every week in leading units. All instructive points are carefully noted and decisions made by firing officers in similar situations are compared. At the same time, the unit commander gains a clear impression as to bottlenecks in firing officer training, and he sets concrete tasks for eliminating shortcomings.

Competitions also are held here for best team of the subunit CP. To this end, simulation apparatus is put to use and the flights of real targets are used. At the end of each training period, the best firing officer of the unit is determined. Competitiveness and healthy rivalry facilitate the rapid development of directors of missile combat.
As has already been mentioned, exercises with field firing are a real school for testing the tactical training of firing officers and the cohesiveness and expertise of combat teams. During them, the firing officers and all other specialists receive that experience which one never would obtain in ordinary practices.

A detailed critique of firing officer actions and training them on foremost experience is the key to further increases of their tactical training.

6904
CSO: 1801
CRITICISM ON DECLINING USE OF WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN FLIGHT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 76 p 2

Article by Lt Gen Avn G. Pavlov, Hero of Soviet Union, honored military pilot of USSR: "Thinking Out Loud: An Inexhaustible Reserve"

A conversation was going on about methods of overcoming an enemy air defense system at a seminar session on tactics in a subunit. In analyzing the effectiveness of a particular tactical technique, the aviators would reinforce their arguments with mathematical calculations. But what put one on guard? Not one of the speakers mentioned a word about frontline experience. "We omitted it somehow," said the commander later in justification.

This gave me food for thought on the question: haven't we begun to display such forgetfulness too often of late? Not only in seminar sessions, but also in preliminary and preflight training, and at times even in preparation for tactical flying exercises there is less and less mention of frontline experience.

I recently read a long article about the development of young commanders. The author is a general, an experienced person, who in the past was probably a frontlinesman. He thoroughly enumerates the factors influencing the professional growth of an officer. He does not even omit such a detail as the commander's check of class directors' lesson plans. But there is not a word about combat experience.

Perhaps I am declaiming for yesterday? Perhaps the combat expertise of the frontlinesmen, their tactical discoveries and methods of imaginative search have lost their value, instructiveness and indoctrinal force with the further development of technology and weapons? No, the majority of commanders as well as rank and file pilots agree that combat experience has been and remains one of the most important, inexhaustible reserves for further increases in quality and effectiveness of the training process.

Let us take, for example, just one flying day in the Yeysk Higher Military Pilots School. Sr Lt N. Mishenko and Sr Lt V. Dzikovskiy have taken off for an intercept. Sr Lt G. Davydov, an experienced and resolute pilot, flies as
the target. He is not accustomed to giving in to attackers, but no matter how hard the pilot tries, he does not succeed in getting out from under attack. Analysis of both intercepts showed that the ground controller, Lt F. Khabirov, as well as those pilots who played the part of the interceptors, acted boldly and resolutely, just as in a real combat situation. They also employed in the attacks certain techniques from the tactical arsenal of frontlinesmen. The same runs from out of the sun, the same skillful use of altitude and speed in combat, and the same swiftness in closing with the target, only the attacks turned out even more rapid.

The headquarters of the Yeysk School must be given its due. It carefully regards everything of value which was accumulated by our pilots in the war years. Here the combat traditions are sacredly revered. Training and indoctrination of aviators is built on a consideration of the demands of modern combat and of an obligatory study of frontline experience. The tone in this is set by the head of the chair of combat application, Hero of Soviet Union Col P. Galkin, and by Lt Col S. Taroyan. They have assembled a vast amount of material on combat techniques of the frontline pilots. They use this material to train future aerial fighters in tactical thinking.

It is true that even here there are those who are ready to raise a wall between today and yesterday. They do not understand, for example, why in our time, a time filled with all forms of radio and radar support to flights, we teach the flying youth the techniques of visual cautiousness and orientation, landings and take-offs on dirt airfields, giving commands and signals using aircraft evolutions, and so on.

Meanwhile, not only exercises, but day to day combat training provides rich information for reflection. I could cite dozens of examples where we were successful in avoiding serious premises for flying accidents only because the pilots had mastered well not only the latest, but also the "oldest" elements of flying expertise and skills of visual orientation in which, by the way, the frontline pilots were particularly strong. Ignoring the methods tested in a combat situation became a cause of premises for flight accidents.

Maj A. Bakharev, for example, did not monitor the radio compass readings or keep visual orientation in ferrying an aircraft. And the result: an experienced pilot made an error under simple weather conditions.

Our conversation has only touched on flying expertise for now, but frontline experience also is valuable with its spiritual and moral content. In the war years I had occasion to fight wing to wing with A. Pokryshkin, V. Fadeyev, the Glinka brothers and many other renowned aces. Each of them was distinguished by high political conditioning and an unwavering confidence in victory. And herein lay the chief force of our pilots, which strengthened the will, helped overcome the hardships of frontline life, and generated a readiness to perform exploits.
I well recall the atmosphere of high tension at the airfield in a combat situation. In my opinion, it was successfully captured in the movie "Only 'Old-Timers' Go Into Battle." The chief goal of every one of our aviators was to smash the fascist invaders mercilessly. But it was not simple to defeat them. It required highest expertise, and we learned not only from successes in combat, but also from the mistakes. Each sortie was the object of very serious discussion. Even before the commander's critique, we knew all details of the aerial combat which had taken place. We analyzed them to the last minor detail. The experience of one immediately became the property of the collective. In mastering combat expertise, the pilots also achieved the niceties of command art. This is why there was nothing surprising in the fact that yesterday's novices became skilled commanders in a matter of months, commanders who could control groups and personally lead them into an attack while being models of tactical art, courage and valor.

But has the role of the personal example dropped under contemporary conditions? It would appear that even in our days personal example on the part of the air commander is of great indoctrinational influence on subordinates. Which of today's commanders has things going better? As a rule, those who themselves are distinguished by a profound knowledge of combat equipment and weapons, who have mastered tactical techniques with excellence, and who get by without indulgence and oversimplification in training aviators.

Unfortunately, we still encounter instances of commanders, especially young ones, paying little attention to their own training and violating the demands of training methodology. Such comrades, frankly, would have a hard time of it in a combat situation.

By the way, day to day training also does not forgive methodological mistakes. Once we looked into a case where a flight of experienced pilots performed a bombing mission with a low mark. Maj V. Solyanikov was particularly "unlucky." In order to drop his bombs, he had to make three runs, but even after this the accuracy of his strike left much to be desired. What was the cause of such a serious failure? It turns out that conditions for bombing had worsened and so the results had dropped. Here they had been flying for a long while over one and the same route and combat employment missions were practiced only at their own range, under conditions of the ordinary target situation. The tactical background was not brought into play. The pilots who simulated a target would fly only on a straight line, without changing altitude or speed. All these oversimplifications were excused by the demands of flight safety, but here the whole thing was a desire to make it easier to obtain excellent marks for fulfillment of the basic mission. But it is also possible to overcome a conditional "enemy" air defense system in a conditional way, as they believe here. Those who do not think reason in that way, however: how would it be for them in real combat without the necessary skills?

At the front, in spite of our youth and lack of time, we thought a great deal and explored for new methods and courses of action against the enemy.
Suffice it to recall the renowned Pokryshkin "stack." Its idea was born not in the higher headquarters, but in the skies and in hot disputes in frontline dugouts. And so it is now that many tactical discoveries are the fruits of intensive exploration by the air fighters themselves. A display of imagination in any job is, in addition to all else, also a great school for self-education of every soldier.

We noted long ago the close interconnection between the successes of a particular subunit in combat and political training and the attitude toward our national riches: frontline experience. Commanders and party and Kom- somol organizations must not forget that they must turn more often to this great reserve for increasing the combat readiness of troops and for indoctrinating personnel.

6904
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COMBINED REFUELING, BOMBING MISSION ACCOMPLISHED SUCCESSFULLY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Aug 76 p 1

[Article by Lt Col I. Onishchenko: "On Distant Routes"]

[Text] We took off in twilight. The concrete beneath us raced by more and more swiftly and then, finally, the plane flown by deputy squadron commander Capt N. Simonenko broke away from the runway, although it seemed unwilling. It is always hard to take off at full flying weight. And with a high air temperature it requires special attention. But then the landing gear was taken in and the flaps slid under the wing. The engines lifted the military plane more easily.

The mission given was extremely concise: reach the refueling zone and refuel the missile plane. A tense night of flying lay before us. We expected to meet interceptors. On the approach to the zone enemy anti-aircraft guns would probably open fire. There are no easy missions in tactical flight exercises.

The crew members reported that the aircraft systems were working well. In a good mood, Captain Simonenko passed it on to the command post: "This is No 67. All okay on board."

At this minute each individual thought of his personal responsibility for fulfillment of the mission. Captain Simonenko was being tested for combat maturity; crew navigator Capt V. Mel'nik was checking his abilities in a long-range flight.

"Turn. Course 135," he reported.

The crew commander could not see Mel'nik, but he could feel how hard it was for him now. The navigator would not have a minute to relax from now until the landing upon return.

Captain Simonenko and Captain Mel'nik are almost the same age. Their love of their work and creative searching bring them together. Everything the officers find interesting becomes a subject for discussion and
careful analysis. They are especially interested in questions of tactics and elements of combat flying. Their searching benefits them both greatly. It is not chance that the navigator is known in the regiment as a master of bomb strikes and air navigation. His high, steady score for bombing, 4.6, speaks for itself. It is good to have such an assistant with you.

"Descent to altitude," Captain Mel'nik reports.

The crew commander knows that now, before entering the refueling zone, the anti-aircraft maneuver must be carried out. They worked out the plan for the route and maneuvering in detail together. Then the navigator announced over the aircraft intercom: "Switch on active jamming."

Radio electronic pulses engulfed the enormous space above the ground and flooded the screens of the ground guidance stations with "powdery snow." The tanker passed into the refueling zone.

"Sharpen your lookout," Captain Simonenko commanded the crew members.

The moment of meeting with the missile plane, for which we had come hundreds of kilometers, was approaching.

"Comrade captain," the voice of Ensign Yu. Buravlev, air gunner-radio operator, said, "I can see the flashes of air navigation lights behind, to the right."

Captain Simonenko immediately made radio contact with the crew of the missile plane and in a matter of minutes the two heavy aircraft were in refueling position.

"Contact. Turn on the pumps," the plane being refueled was sending the message now.

The few minutes when the aircraft are so close, and at night too, demand great skill from the crews. Both pilots showed precise flying technique and soon the missile plane sent its message: "Our fuel is up to the top. Thanks. I am going to disconnect."

"Have a good flight," Captain Simonenko responded.

The cone was taken up, the cargo hatches closed. Now the crew had another mission: reach the target precisely and carry out the bombing attack. As luck would have it, a storm front lay in front of us. Simonenko skillfully bypassed the danger zone. Now the plane was on its combat course.

"I see the target," the navigator reported, hunching over the radar sight tube. "Corrective turn to the left, three..."
A minute passed and the bombs were dropped. The report came from the range: "Result outstanding!"

Now, with the assignment fulfilled, one would expect that they could relax. Captain Simonenko leaned back and closed his eyes for a second. But just then a new input arrived.

"Comrade captain, transmission from the command post. The stand-by airfield may have to be used because of weather conditions."

The crew commander received this message coolly. Flying work had given him many new inputs before this, and he only commented jokingly, "Did you bring a razor and toothbrush?"

In the beam of the floodlights the streams of water flying off the plane's wheels sparkled like fireworks. As we slowed down they became smaller and smaller and finally disappeared.

"Is the strip clear? Can we taxi to our parking place?" Simonenko asked tiredly.

"Permission granted," the flight control officer responded. And he added, "Good work, boys."

11,176
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TOP-LEVEL MEETING DISCUSSES MILITARY CONSTRUCTION WORK

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 5 Aug 76 P 3

[Article by Col-Engr I. Krupnitskiy: "A Policy of Raising the Efficiency and Quality of Construction"]

[Text] The meeting of management personnel of construction and quartering agencies of the USSR Ministry of Defense has concluded its work in the Red Banner Hall of the Central House of the Soviet Army imeni M. V. Frunze. Col Gen-Engr A. V. Gelovani, deputy USSR minister of defense in charge of construction and troop quartering, presented a report on the results of work by construction organizations for the first six months of 1976 and tasks related to carrying out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress with respect to raising construction efficiency and quality.

Col Gen Gelovani noted that the first half of the current year was an important and intensive one for military construction workers. The all-army socialist competition initiated by the military construction workers of the Leningrad Military District has spread widely among construction units and organizations. During the competition many construction organizations and industrial enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Defense successfully completed their socialist obligations for the first half year. Twenty-one collectives were awarded challenge Red Banners of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Central Committee of the trade union of workers in construction and the building materials industry for high indices in fulfillment of quarterly capital construction plans and socialist obligations in the second quarter of 1976.

But in addition to the successes in capital construction there are still many shortcomings and unresolved problems. The speaker devoted a large part of his report to analyzing them. This refers first of all to the fact that, while the overall results of fulfillment of the capital construction plan by organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense are good, there are still organizations which do not fulfill the given assignments. Not all collectives achieved positive results for such important indices.
as growth in labor productivity, reducing the prime cost of construction and installation work, and economizing on material resources.

In light of the instructions of the 25th CPSU Congress questions of raising the efficiency and quality of capital construction assume special importance in the work of military construction workers today. The speaker gave a detailed analysis of ways to raise construction efficiency and quality, in particular dealing with questions of improving the planning and organization of construction work, rational use of labor and machinery, and introducing progressive know-how.

Participants at the meeting heard a report by Lt Gen V. I. Bychenko, chief of the political directorate of military construction units, on questions of raising the effectiveness of party political work toward fulfillment of capital construction plans, further development of socialist competition, and instilling military and labor discipline.

In this report considerable attention was devoted to questions of the work of political agencies and party organizations to improve the working style of cadres, the management of socialist competition, and the work of the party committees of construction organizations, who are given the right to monitor the activity of the administration. The report gave a detailed review of questions of improving ideological work, raising its militance, and strengthening ties to practical assignments.

Experience with improving the organizational work of construction agencies in light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and instructions from the USSR Ministry of Defense was treated extensively in talks by those at the meeting. The subjects were raising the level of engineering management, reducing construction time and raising quality, and ways to increase the work efficiency of construction organizations in the Tenth Five-Year Plan through maximum use of production reserves. A great deal of attention at the meeting was given to introducing progressive methods of construction and to the activity of military construction collectives under the new conditions of planning and economic stimulation and raising the efficiency of capital investments and the quality of construction.


S. L. Sokolov, general of the army and first deputy USSR minister of defense, spoke at the meeting. He noted that military construction workers, who are doing a great deal to raise the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, have a worthy place among the millions of construction workers in our country. Military construction workers build residential buildings and cultural-domestic structures and establish the necessary conditions for successful combat training for Soviet fighting men. The speaker
gave considerable attention to questions of further improving capital construction and raising its efficiency and quality.

Among the participants in the work of the meeting were Col Gen G. V. Sredin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Gen Arm S. K. Kurkotkin, deputy USSR minister of defense and chief of Rear Services of the USSR Armed Forces, Col Gen-Engr N. N. Alekseyev, deputy USSR minister of defense, Gen Arm S. P. Vasyagin, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Ground Forces, Gen Arm V. I. Petrov, first deputy command of Ground Forces, and others.

Today the participants at the meeting will hear a series of reports on problems of capital construction in light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and on progressive methods of organizing construction work.
RESOURCEFUL PLANS BY REGIMENTAL COMMANDER AT EXERCISE PRAISED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 6 Aug 76 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Parfenov: "Boldness of Maneuver"]

[Text] "Why is the right flank empty? Who's attacking there?"

"Koreshkov's battalion. I'm sure he won't be late. The regimental commander's probably up to something."

In a minute tanks appeared out of the woods. They swept down on the enemy like a wave, enveloping him from the flank.

"Outstanding maneuver! A strong attack," the general noted, setting down his binoculars. "Send Lt Col Troitskiy and all the personnel of the regiment my personal gratitude."

(From a dialog in the command tower at the training ground)

I recall a year and a half ago how Lt Col V. Troitskiy conducted a review of the unsuccessful actions of one of his subunits. He really let the young officer have it.

"I didn't see any tactical boldness in your plans," Vladimir Georgiyevich said harshly. "But without it you can hardly expect victory."

At the time I thought that it would be good to see how the lieutenant colonel himself organized regimental combat. And then at the exercise I had an opportunity to see.

A heavy marsh cut by dikes lay in front of them. On the right a dense, almost impenetrable woods ran right up to the marsh and stretched far to the south. Like a shield it guarded the valley which, it seemed, could only be reached across the marsh. And that was where the enemy expected the attack to come from.
The regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Troitskiy was given the mission of crossing the marsh along the dikes and, cooperating with its neighbor on the left, wiping out the enemy. After studying the proposed route the regimental commander called the deputy in charge of technical matters.

"It's not much of a route, Gay Sergeyevich. The enemy will certainly have the dikes under observation."

"There isn't any other though."

"What about going around the marsh? Through the woods?"

The deputy bent even lower over his map. He shook his head, "No roads. But we would have to move at high speed."

"On the other hand, there would be a chance to hit the enemy in the flank," the regimental commander remarked with animation. He pinned the deputy down, "You aren't confident that the mechanic-drivers can give us the necessary speed?"

"Hold it! If they have to they will..."

"Now you're talking!"

The regimental commander immediately began giving instructions to the chief of staff. Everyone understood the importance of this moment. Only a swift dash would let them reach the valley at the right time. It was a very risky maneuver. And the regimental commander understood this best of all.

At division headquarters they say the following about Vladimir Georgiyevich, "He operates with boldness. The enemy doesn't drive him back. He moves with determination to impose his will on the enemy, to beat him in deploying, opening fire, and taking advantageous positions."

And all of this came out right at the beginning of the exercise. The regiment did not move across the dikes. Troitskiy laid out a longer and more difficult route, but one which would give them surprise and freedom of maneuver upon reaching the valley.

His reconnaissance was active. Scouts reported that the enemy showed little interest in the woods and, judging by everything, did not expect danger from that direction. That was just what Troitskiy counted on. He decided to circle the marsh and attack the enemy with one battalion from the front and another from the flank. The third was the reserve. The senior officer approved the regimental commander's plan, supported his initiative. After this Lieutenant Colonel Troitskiy modified the plan once more to conform to characteristics of the situation.
Swiftly circling the marsh the tankists reached the edge of the woods. By this moment the neighbor on the left had already begun fighting. One of the battalions was supposed to support the neighbor by attacking from the front. It could have been done immediately, but the regimental commander deliberately held up the subunit. He assessed a unique feature of the situation: the bare flank of the attacking neighbor might seem to the enemy to be an attractive point for a counterattack. That was exactly what happened. The enemy took the hook, so to speak, and began redirecting his forces. When the enemy tanks had turned left and started their envelopment Troitskiy sent the battalion led by Sr Lt A. Lanskikh into the battle. In the meantime the second battalion, commanded by Capt Ye. Koreshkov, moved further ahead through the woods and then attacked the enemy from the flank and rear.

The training battle did not last long. But it was impressive, really interesting. Its instructive quality was in large part the result of the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel Troitskiy and the boldness of the maneuver carried out by the tankists.

The training battle was observed by Lt Gen P. Bilaonov, deputy troop commander of the district in charge of combat training and Hero of the Soviet Union. I asked him to comment on the regiment's actions. This is what he said.

"The personnel of the regiment have demonstrated a high level of field training for several years now. The collective's successes are inseparably linked to the regimental commander. Lieutenant Colonel Troitskiy, a strong-willed and experienced officer, understands the nature of modern battle, takes a creative approach to organizing for battle, and strives to make the best use of the combat capabilities of the equipment and weapons in every situation. Today's exercise was convincing proof of the regimental commander's high level of personal training.

"After receiving the mission he concentrated his attention on searching for the most rational methods of action, figured ways to 'outsmart' the enemy, capture the initiative, and not give it up. He evaluated the terrain intelligently and made bold use of its features. It was not easy to decide to change the route of advance; it took exact calculations and faith in the training of the men. The tankists were able to produce a very high march speed.

"To merely say that Lieutenant Colonel Troitskiy adopted an original plan is not enough. When the regiment reached the edge of the woods he made an instantaneous evaluation of the situation and modified the sectors of attack for the battalions once more. Only a bold commander with full confidence in the high level of battle teamwork of his subunits, in their ability to carry out the plan of battle exactly, would have done that.

"Let us also note one other detail. The mission was performed by two battalions. The regimental commander was able to keep the third one in
reserve. In encounter battle, where the situation changes very fast, this is a significant fact.

"The successful actions of the tankists were based on a high level of training in the officers, the ensigns, and all the crews. Every commander in the regiment teaches his subordinate officers well, and this includes organizing socialist competition. The regimental commander, his deputies, and the party committee are always working to improve the quality of command training. They pay special attention to practical organization of actions in the field. The drills for commanders and staffs in subunit control, the short tactical exercises, and the group exercises held before the main exercise were intensive and instructive."

11,176
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EXAMPLES OF EFFECTIVE PARTY EDUCATIONAL WORK, SHORTCOMINGS CITED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Aug 76 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen N. Shchukin, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "A Deep Look"]

[Text] The company commanded by Sr Lt I. Stoderevskiy is well known in our district. It has enjoyed consistent success for a number of years in combat and political training and in moral education of personnel. So it was entirely natural that officers from the political branch, the party committee, and the regimental headquarters were assigned to make a detailed study of the work style of the company commander and party organization. It turned out that the company places great emphasis on mastering progressive methods of conducting training periods and drills and on individual educational work.

Competition is well-organized among the officers and sergeants under the slogan "A High Level of Methodology in Every Training Period." Sergeant's days are held regularly in the company and they are beneficial. Squad leaders give talks on the quality of the training periods which they conduct and on their individual educational work. Communists in the subunit, through individual work, help soldiers reveal their full creative capabilities and find their places in the collectives quickly. The party committee summarized the know-how of the progressive company and recommended that the officers of other subunits adopt it.

Many other examples could be cited which characterize the creative work style of party committees and organizations. Each one confirms again the notion that the activity of party committees and organizations must always be evaluated by the effectiveness of the work, its final result, not by the number of decisions adopted and steps taken. This is one of the demands of the 25th CPSU Congress. Guided by it, each party committee and organization must constantly work to instill high party principles in the men, teach them to analyze reality scientifically, and improve the style, forms, and methods of its own activities. Only a deep look at the true state of affairs and an individual approach to
work with the men make solid, effective party leadership possible. And by contrast, where an uncritical attitude is taken toward results achieved and formalism has not been rooted out we can definitely look for mistakes.

The motorized rifle regiment where Capt. R. Pliyev heads the party organization has been what they call "satisfactory" in recent years. But then at a check inspection several of the soldiers got results below their capabilities and failed to fulfill their socialist obligations. Naturally, a question arose: why did this happen? What caused this failure? Many comrades, including some party activists headed by the party secretary, blamed it all on chance circumstances. Then the unit was visited by officers from the political branch. They made a complete study of party work in the regiment and in the party organizations of the subunits. And it turned out that the trouble was in no way accidental.

In fact, methodologically consistent drills for the motorized riflemen were sometimes handled very superficially, giving rise to simplification and shortcuts. This "disease" developed gradually and unnoticed. At last the quality of officer training periods too frequently failed to meet present-day standards.

And what about the regimental party organization? Is it possible that party activists did not see all these shortcomings? That is just it, they did see them. And they seemed to take steps. According to a decision of the headquarters party organization certain communist staff officers were assigned to assist the subunit commanders in organizing the training process and setting up competition based on missions and standards. Technical study groups for the mechanic-drivers of combat vehicles were formed at the initiative of and with direct participation by activists. Other useful decisions were also made. Everything was correct and looked fine.

But why, then, did this fine and correct approach fail to show up in actual results? Here is why. When they were laying out their actions, which were truly useful ones, the comrades did not take account of the main thing: checking and finding out what the return from these steps would be. In other words, the party organization did not set up practical checks on the execution of its decisions. So it turned out, for one example, that the sessions of the study circle were attended only by good specialists, while those who especially needed these periods were off on details or performing other assignments.

The communist officers who were assigned to assist subunit commanders did attend driving practice and firing, but the method they followed was poor. If a firing session or trip was given a low score, it would have to be repeated. This was nothing more than gross superficiality.

And here is the characteristic feature. Sometimes it is hard to accuse people who have made mistakes of being inactive. Many of them stand
But when you look more closely this activism is often nothing more than pursuit of quantity in activities with no special concern for their quality. Even more often this style of work finds expression in flurries of meetings, called-for and uncalled-for, in working out various decrees and decisions which by no means always rest on carefully thought-out organizational work. At the 25th party congress Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "The essence of organizational questions, to put it simply, is for everyone, having the necessary powers and carrying full responsibility within these limits, to do his own work. This elementary rule of life is at the same time the foundation of foundations of the science and practice of management." It is this style of work which should define the work of all party activists, party committees, and leaders of all levels and ranks.

When speaking of work style and methods of leadership we cannot bypass the important matter of ability to notice new things, assess them thoroughly, and introduce them into practice. It is very important here for party committees and organizations to learn to distinguish between that which is truly new and progressive and that which is merely showy and only seems progressive at first glance.

For example, one of the Officers Houses of the district, following a proposal by communist A. Vlasenko, decided to set up 10 different lecture offices at once. Without a careful analysis the leaders of the party organization latched onto this "idea," and began to spread it as virtually the latest thing in party political education work, saying that its implementation on a broad scale would promote a more vigorous influence on shaping high moral-political and ethical characteristics in the fighting men. It sounds convincing and solemn. But a careful analysis of this "initiative" showed that there was no need for it, that it did not meet the needs of the fighting men or suit the contingent of staff and nonstaff propagandists capable of giving qualified training periods in the 10 lecture offices. So it produced an effect, but it was not effective.

To give attention to new things means to see their essential points, to figure out whether they would promote achievement of assigned tasks, and to thoroughly analyze existing opportunities for successfully putting the innovation into practice. It is gratifying to observe that precisely this style of work is developing more and more, especially since the 25th party congress.

In the Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy motorized rifle regiment a great deal is being done to develop the initiative of personnel in the struggle to improve the quality of the training process and to achieve economy and thrift. Let me give the following example. Each subunit, of course, has a definite limit of engine time, fuel, and ammunition to be used
for combat training. With the consent of the commander the party committee decided to make a detailed study of how this limit was observed in the various subunits. Many party activists and staff officers were enlisted in this project. And soon the commander received a real investigative report containing scientific recommendations concerning when (in which months) which categories of specialists needed to receive more practical training in driving and firing. Guided by the findings of the party committee and staff, the commander outlined the best way to use the resources conserved to improve personnel training and fulfill socialist obligations. At the same time the activists mobilized all the servicemen for a campaign to save fuel and ammunition. In this way the initiative of the party committee had a direct influence on raising the quality of training for specialists.

Here is another example from the same regiment. In terms of number of outstanding soldiers and percentile indices the battalion commanded by communist Capt T. Selimov was considered one of the best in the regiment. At tactical exercises the subunit unexpectedly received lower marks than usual. The members of the party committee did not consider this to be chance. And here is what was learned: in pursuit of a high number of soldiers with outstanding ratings the battalion had directed all its efforts to individual training of the soldiers, sergeants, ensigns, and officers, forgetting about teamwork in the crews, squads, and platoons. The party committee reported its conclusions to the commander. Proper steps were taken.

We can see that sometimes even a fact which, at first glance, is fairly insignificant leads to deep reflection and makes it possible to uncover and then resolve serious problems.

This style of work is unquestionably superior. The political agency or party committee which coordinates all its activity today with the high demands of the 25th CPSU Congress is, by its own example, teaching the party organizations of the subunits to evaluate successes and shortcomings in a principled manner and to skillfully employ the full rich arsenal of forms and methods of ideological-educational and organizational work. And this is one of the essential conditions for successful mobilization of personnel to struggle actively for fulfillment of their obligations, a further increase in combat readiness, and stronger discipline, organization, and order.
DIVISION STRESSES OFFICER TRAINING, TACTICAL SKILLS

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 7 Aug 76 p 2


[Text] Operating at a tactical exercise, the tank battalion commanded by Guards Capt A. Kusik was stopped in its advance. The intermediate line of defense where the enemy stopped them put the battalion in extremely unfavorable conditions from the standpoint of terrain. In front of the strong point, which had a well-organized system of fire, was a marshy sector, a serious natural obstacle. A frontal assault by all subunits in this sector was plainly senseless. The unstable ground would not permit tanks to develop the necessary speed and they might become easy targets for the enemy.

Let me note that this battalion is considered one of the best in the division. All its companies are equally well trained and have high percentages of highly qualified specialists. But in the unforeseen situation which came up during the exercise (and all kinds of complications arising unexpectedly are typical of modern battle) it was obvious that the men's combat skills alone would not be enough. Success in battle now depended primarily on the battalion commander's tactical thinking: would he be able to "find the key" to the heavy-firing enemy defense line? Captain Kusik did find the "key."

After a thorough study of the situation on a map and then on the terrain, Captain Kusik called attention to the thick woods against the right flank of the defending troops. There was probably solid ground there, maybe even concealed approaches. It all seemed simple: deploy the battalion in company columns and head for that, at first glance, most vulnerable flank. But Kusik assessed the situation realistically and correctly assumed that the enemy was not only strong, but also experienced and resourceful, the kind that is not taken easily. Very likely the enemy would have taken care of this flank. A trick would be needed here.
The plan took shape rapidly. The outstanding company commanded by Guards Sr Lt Yu. Romanov was given the mission of maneuvering its vehicles to create the appearance of an attack from the front. A unit of motorized riflemen operated with the tankists in this decoy action, which was concealed by a smoke screen. Artillery fire rained down on the strong point. Every feature of a frontal attack was created, and the enemy concentrated all his forces to repel it. In the meantime Captain Kusik moved two companies onto the flank of the defenders under cover of the roar of the artillery. Their surprise strike against the flank decided the outcome of the battle.

Other examples could also be cited which illustrate how important it is for the modern officer or commander of any rank to have the capability for mature tactical thinking, to anticipate possible complications clearly and direct the battle of the subordinate unit. In the discussion being conducted in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the formation of the commander I believe this quality should be one of the principal subjects. Indeed, even a perfectly trained collective will be unable to handle its mission if the commander shows a lack of tactical intelligence and determination or if he acts without initiative, glancing over his shoulder at the senior officer.

Anyone knows that the necessary skills do not come automatically. Above all they are instilled in the officers in our military schools and refined and given more scope at the military academies. But the officer receives his practical "higher education" in tactical skill among the troops.

With an understanding of this, the division command gives constant attention to officer training, training the actual organizers and leaders in battle. Incidentally, in summing up the results of socialist competition we take account not only of evaluation indices but also the tactical maturity of those who lead the military collectives. Very good scores in combat training are fine, of course. But is the commander capable of making full use of the potential of the company, battalion, or regiment under combat conditions? This cannot be disregarded if one wants to have a complete and objective picture of the unit's combat capability.

During the Great Patriotic War our division had a glorious history. We study experience from the war carefully and draw from it much that is helpful with respect to skillful use of combat equipment, military guile, flexible tactical thinking by commanders whose combat activity provides a remarkable model for the heirs of their military glory to imitate. We also work daily to familiarize officers with material on new developments in military affairs which appears in the periodical press; these things are discussed in the officer collectives. In other words, the officers are up to date and moving steadily forward. Such is the command of the times.

The regiment where Guards Maj B. Virit'ko is chief of staff shows its concern for the development of commanders every day. This unit has a
smoothly operating system of command training for officers. Each tactical exercise or training period in the field is organized with special care, usually on unfamiliar terrain.

Before each exercise the commander of the regiment himself, his deputies, staff officers, and the party committee carry on a series of activities which raise the tactical intelligence of commanders at different levels. But in the vast range of problems undertaken the command does not lose sight of teaching how to organize battle on the terrain quickly.

The ability to analyze events on the field of battle and anticipate the development of actions is an important trait of the mature commander. So when organizing and conducting exercises the regimental commander tries to see that his subordinate officers make their plans not according to a plan worked out ahead of time but on the basis of the situation which is taking shape in the field. The officers are well trained in drawing the tactical situation in on a map from voice reports, they can get and use information on the enemy operationally, and they handle other problems related to thorough preparation for combat actions in an extremely short time with knowledge and skill.

An index of the command maturity of the regiment's officers might be the most recent tactical exercises, where the commanders had to make maximum use of their skill to control the subunits in encounter battle, on the attack, and in defense.

In this and other units of the division the training process is precisely planned, thought through to the smallest details, and well organized. An important place in the process belongs to soundly organized command training and methodological training for officers. Demonstration training periods in tactical and fire training and various drills where the officers take the part of trainees are used extensively.

As an example let me refer to one of the training periods conducted at an assembly of company and battalion commanders. The topic was "Company tactical exercise with field fire." Guards Lt Col M. Arsen'yev, battalion commander, was assigned to organize the period. The company commanded by Guards Capt A. Kuznetsov was enlisted to take part in it. At the exercise the company and battalion commanders acted in the role of commanders of combat vehicles while the platoon leaders took the parts of gun layers and mechanic-drivers.

At such training periods the officers have an opportunity to refine their personal tactical training and driving skills and become more familiar with the capabilities of the machinery and weapons in practice. It is also important that they experience the psychological stresses which their subordinates undergo. It is crucial for the commander to take this into account in working out the plan of battle. And the senior officer, observing the officers' actions, has a chance to determine which questions of professional training his subordinates should give most attention to.
While talking about activities to improve the command training of officers at the subunit and unit level I would like to particularly stress the importance of individual work with each person. Of course, there are some officers who are what we call "natural tacticians," but there are others for whom leading a subunit on the field of battle is a rather difficult matter. This fact must be kept in mind at all times and work with the officers must be structured in light of such differences.

One year ago Guards Capt S. Grobenyuk was appointed commander of a battalion. At first this hard-working and diligent officer did not have sufficient ability in leading the unit while relying on his staff and deputies. The regimental chief of staff became his "sponsor," and attended many training periods in the battalion on the topics of tactical and fire training and defense against weapons of mass destruction. He corrected the new battalion commander and shared his experience. But he did not carry his guidance too far; rather he counted on the officer's developing self-reliance. The result was not long in coming. At one of the most recent exercises the battalion commanded by Captain Grebenyuk operated with exceptional precision, tactical intelligence, and boldness. This unit is now firmly established as one of the leaders in socialist competition. And I should note that the officer won the rank of captain ahead of schedule.

In our concern for officer development we monitor independent study by the officers strictly. Everyone knows that this method, combined with planned training periods in the officer training system, produces the greatest effect. For example, take the tank battalion commanded by Guards Maj V. Il'in. All its officers are true masters of military affairs. Not a day goes by without them improving their professional skills and growing as commanders. And it was no accident at all that the battalion got an outstanding score at the last field fire.

Unfortunately, things are not yet that good everywhere. In two years of service the mechanic-driver or gun layer often rises to be a first-class specialist. But sometimes such a rise does not occur with certain officers. Lt A. Poliakov is in his third year as a platoon leader. However, he has not improved his rating noticeably and contents himself with the skills and knowledge acquired at school. It is difficult for such an officer to train his subordinates, to say nothing of leading them in battle. And this is not the only such case. Much more remains for us to do in the area of raising the professional skill of our officers.

Summer training is going forward at full steam in the units of the division, picking up speed. And we consider improving command training to be one of our chief missions during this important time. This is a key condition for raising combat readiness.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION WORKERS PROGRESS, SEEK MORE IMPROVEMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Aug 76 p 2

[Article by Col Gen-Engr A. Gelovani, deputy USSR minister of defense in charge of construction and troop quartering: "The Policy Is Efficiency"]

[Excerpts] Today the Soviet people, our Armed Forces, the millions of construction workers in our country, and army and navy construction workers are celebrating the national holiday of Construction Worker Day. It is being celebrated in the context of the enormous political and labor enthusiasm called forth by the historical decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress.

The country has entered a new stage of development, the Tenth Five-Year Plan, which in terms of its principal objectives and main directions is a single continuous whole with the Ninth Five-Year Plan. To carry out this enormous building program Soviet construction workers have undertaken energetic, unselfish work to fulfill the instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to "build quickly, economically, and on an up-to-date technical basis."

The Soviet Union is the great building site of the modern world. No other country carries on construction on an equal scale. There are about 10 million construction workers in the USSR; one out of every 15 workers is employed in construction. Each day we put up one large industrial enterprise and more than 6,000 well-appointed apartments. Each year our cities and towns grow finer, their external appearance changing beyond recognition.

The collectives of military builders are participating actively, along with the Soviet people, in accomplishing the tasks set by the party. The military construction units are, of course, a kind of polytechnic school through which a significant share of the new recruits pass. In them they receive good ideological-political and labor conditioning and acquire various construction specializations. Then after discharge many of them work in the chosen specialization and for one out of three it becomes the main occupation throughout life.
The results of the first six months of 1976 illustrate that military construction workers are handling the assignments set by plan, fulfilling the program of contract work by 101.1 percent, the assignment for introduction of fixed capital into operation by 101.8 percent, and the plan for turning over housing space for use by 106.9 percent.

Good indices have been shown by the construction workers of the Lenin-grad, Moscow, Belorussian, Far Eastern, Odessa, and Siberian military districts, the Pacific Ocean and Black Sea fleets, and centrally subordinate organizations headed by comrades A. Fedorov, V. Sukhov, V. Grigor'kin, V. Kostrikin, and M. Gromenko.

For high indices in fulfillment of plan assignments for the second quarter of 1976 21 collectives, winners in socialist competition, have been awarded challenge Red Banners of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Central Committee of the trade union of workers in construction and the building materials industry.

The successes achieved by the leaders are convincing testimony to the enormous opportunities which exist at every construction site for fulfilling socialist obligations in the first year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan.

Work following the method of Hero of Socialist Labor N. Zlobin offers broad opportunities at military construction sites. Brigade economic accountability has shown itself to be a reliable tool for raising labor productivity and construction efficiency. More than 850 brigades are working according to the N. Zlobin method. It is characteristic that last year alone these brigades raised labor productivity more than 12 percent.

The instruction of the 25th CPSU Congress concerning improving the quality of work in all elements of economic activity is a paramount challenge for military construction workers. We have a good material base, technically up-to-date production potential, powerful construction machinery, and highly skilled cadres; this makes it possible to accomplish the most complex military construction tasks efficiently and well.

The Communist Party points out the concrete ways and means to solve the problems of raising quality and efficiency. These are increasing the growth rate of labor productivity, economizing with material resources, fuller and more rational use of machinery and equipment, accelerating scientific-technical progress, and a concern and involvement by every labor collective in improving quality indices at military construction sites.

The increased scale of capital construction and its high level of industrialization make higher demands for the content of socialist competition. The spirit of creativity, of collective searching, is felt more in it today than ever before. The mobilizing role of socialist competition is seen most at those construction sites where a competitive atmosphere is created, where results can be compared and progressive know-how passed on,
and all indices are considered objectively. It is important for us today to develop a more energetic campaign for complete fulfillment of the socialist obligations assumed by both collectives and each individual military construction worker.

While solving the problems of raising the labor efficiency of military construction workers we should give greater attention to strengthening military and labor discipline and creating a healthy work situation in all collectives; we must show concern for improving the conditions of labor, everyday life, and leisure time for military construction workers.

For Construction Worker Day our labor collectives totaled up the results of their activity for the first half-year and first seven months of 1976, the first year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan. They are proudly taking note of the successes which have been achieved, analyzing shortcomings, and outlining new challenges.

In the period which has passed some construction organizations have allowed themselves to fall behind for a number of indices related to fulfillment of capital construction plans, failed to insure timely introduction of projects into operation, and failed to fulfill the assignment for introduction of housing. A number of construction organizations did not fulfill assignments for growth in labor productivity. Construction machinery and labor are still not used efficiently enough, there are substantial losses of working time, machine downtime is allowed, and interruptions occur in the supply of building materials.

The organizations headed by comrades V. Mogushchiy, V. Naumenko, I. Ikayev, L. Kotov, and certain others are not making full use of existing reserves to insure plan fulfillment and fail to put planned residential and cultural-domestic installations into use at the scheduled time.

Losses of building materials and unjustified overuse of them are a sore point for us. Our work to teach each construction worker a sense of thrift is still inadequate. They are operating powerful machines and aggregates, but they do not always use them to full capacity. Machine downtime within shifts is still large. Construction mechanisms and small power tools are inadequately used.

Defects are frequently permitted in housing construction. A great deal of capital is spent removing defects and finishing apartments. Although problems of quality do not depend on construction workers alone, further improvement in the quality of housing is directly and immediately linked to improving the organization of labor of military construction workers and instilling in them a sense of professional responsibility for their construction trademark.

Military construction workers face a major job in improving construction work, eliminating existing shortcomings, identifying and using hidden reserves, and fulfilling the stepped-up plans of capital construction for the current year.
Celebrating their holiday, proud of their successes, and looking forward to new accomplishments, military construction workers are demonstrating their readiness to devote all their efforts, knowledge, and enthusiasm to fulfilling the historical decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and furthering the economic and defensive might of our Soviet State.

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Sr Lt A. Kasatkin, commander of the advance party, never doubted that the enemy would try to prevent fulfillment of the combat mission. And his assumption proved correct.

Shortly before the subunit made the pass it encountered a contaminated sector of terrain. After giving the necessary signal to his subordinates and assessing the situation quickly, Sr Lt A. Kasatkin reported this to his senior officer by radio.

Such a sharp turnabout of events was no surprise for the officer. He had provided ahead of time for steps which would enable the advance party to operate successfully even if the enemy used weapons of mass destruction. To achieve this the officer had correctly put his own and attached means in march formation. Radiation and chemical reconnaissance equipment was in full readiness for combat work. And most importantly, the men were trained for action under the difficult conditions of contaminated terrain. After securing the tank hatches tightly and putting on individual protective gear the soldiers, sergeants, and officers continued to perform their duties with precision.

The party activists and all communists showed the greatest initiative and determination. The tankists led by party member Sr Lt N. Savchenko, using protective armor, were the first to cross the marked zone of radioactive contamination. The high-speed armored personnel carriers led by communist Lt V. Biryukov raced along in front.

The advance party reached the appointed line at the proper time in full combat readiness. The mission was fulfilled.

The success of the subunit was promoted by the great skill of the fighting men and their moral and psychological stability; the latter was in large part the result of well-organized party political work. One subject of this work was preparing personnel for skillful and determined actions under conditions where weapons of mass destruction have been used.
Anticipating that the enemy would use such weapons, the commander, his deputy for political affairs, and the secretary of the party organization had directed the aktiv of the company and attached subunits to mobilize personnel for actions under conditions of nuclear attack and mopping up after it. This was done while the troops were still at the assembly area. The subject was also taken up at a party meeting.

Carrying out the resolution of the meeting, party members held a series of discussions and training periods to study pamphlets for fighting men of the different specializations. Also helpful was the exchange of know-how among the best drivers of combat vehicles, specialists in the radiation and chemical reconnaissance service, and representatives of other combat specializations who had taken part in earlier exercises where the use of nuclear weapons was simulated. As they listened to their comrades the young fighting men became filled with the conviction that victory in modern battle demands high discipline, endurance, initiative, and determination added to military skills.

Their belief in the possibility of victory in battle was bolstered even further when the best specialists gave practical demonstrations of the great combat capabilities of the equipment entrusted to them. Sgt N. Tikhonov, Jr Sgt Yu. Akhmadeyev, and Pvt V. Voytenko familiarized their comrades with procedures for using individual protective gear and ways to carry out missions under conditions of a high radiation level and to mop up cave-ins and fires.

After receiving the battle order, the party and Komsomol activists quickly spread the tactical situation and the characteristics of actions in mountain terrain, including cases where weapons of mass destruction have been used, to the squads and crews. At this time they reminded each fighting man of his socialist obligations, which envisioned outstanding performance of duties under any battle conditions.

As a result of this and other work there was not a soldier in the subunit who would have been confused or lacked confidence in himself, the equipment, or the weapons when operating in a center of contamination. The personal example of communists and Komsomol members helped maintain a high level of combat enthusiasm during the entire time of operations in the center of contamination. While fulfilling the socialist obligations assumed for the period of the exercise Lt V. Biryukov, Sgt. Yu. Kuz'minykh, Pvt V. Yeliseyev, and other party members in the squads, platoons, and crews worked with determination, initiative, and intelligence, leading the other soldiers along.

The exercise helped temper the fighting men even further and strengthen their faith in the force of their weapons and equipment, and in victory over a strong and treacherous enemy. As for the party and Komsomol organizations, they certainly gained valuable experience in working with people.
MASTERING EQUIPMENT, WEAPONS KEY FACTOR IN OFFICER TRAINING

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 10 Aug 76 p 2

[Article by Col Gen P. Lushev, commander of troops of the Red Banner Volga Military District: "The Decisive Factor"]

[Text] Success in modern battle depends on many factors. But perhaps the most important one is the commander's ability to view the accomplishment of all tactical missions through the prism of the capabilities of the equipment and weapons and to use them with maximum effectiveness. You are convinced of this every time you analyze the actions of some particular commander in tactical exercises.

The regiment had successfully overcome enemy resistance and was advancing swiftly into the depth of his defense. It appeared that the first-echelon units were close to fulfilling their assigned mission. But then, as often happens in modern battle, the situation changed abruptly: a nuclear strike was delivered against the attacking forces. It was followed immediately by a counterattack by the defenders. This made the situation even more critical.

Is it possible in such a situation to keep the initiative and continue the attack? The search for an answer to this question forced the commander and his staff to look first of all at the capabilities of their equipment. Specifically, the following plan suggested itself.

While pinning down the enemy from the front, carry out an enveloping maneuver with part of the troops, cross the water obstacle whose far bank, according to reconnaissance, was weakly covered, reach the enemy flank unexpectedly and attack simultaneously from the front and flank. This plan posed several questions of using equipment: would the combat vehicles be able to float across a fairly wide river, would they be able to climb the steep bank? The calculations made by the regimental staff headed by Maj B. Kuzin indicated that they would. The regiment performed its battle mission. In all stages of the exercise the equipment and weapons worked without trouble.
From this example one can see what a large part the tactical and military-technical training of the officer plays in achieving success in modern battle. They complement one another, so to speak, and operate in an organic unity as the key component of command skill.

Yes, equipment and weapons are not simply factors in battle. They are the material base of the great combat capabilities of the troops. Persistent study and practical mastery of the combat equipment and weapons constitute the chief objective of the current training year. It is also perfectly clear that, while accomplishing this task, we must develop our skill in controlling troops on the field of battle. While improving field training during the summer training period and, as demanded by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, regarding improvement of troop tactical training as the main thing, we are striving to see that our forces are ready to perform their missions in the most complex situation, one which demands maximum exertion in battle and full utilization of the capabilities of personnel, weapons, and the combat equipment.

The time when higher technical qualifications were the exclusive privilege of officers in the special services has passed. Today even a small gap in a commander or staff officer's knowledge of the equipment or a weakness in the ability to use it in combat may lead to serious complications on the field of battle. That is why we constantly concentrate our attention on tactical and technical training in the work of training and educating command cadres. Good mastery of the equipment and weapons has become one of the main objectives of the socialist competition which has unfolded among the troops. Officers are the leading force in competition. This can be seen in other examples in addition to the regiment discussed above.

For several years the missile battalion commanded by Lt Col V. Bagurkin has had excellent results in combat and political training. The commander himself is constantly improving his knowledge and has completely mastered missile equipment. During the summer training period, as also in the period just passed, the missile officers consider raising their ratings to be one of the main points of their obligations. The officer must have an ability to understand the theoretical principles of the functioning of the mechanisms thoroughly and possess a detailed knowledge of the weapons and equipment and a careful attitude toward them. It is not accidental that those who recently joined the collective have already won third-class ratings while all the rest are first and second class specialists.

Such fighting men can perform the most complex tactical missions. And they prove it in action. During an exercise the battalion was ordered to move to an unprepared position region and deliver a missile strike against the enemy on the move. The situation was tough for the missile troops: limited time, unfamiliar terrain that was difficult to cross, and bad weather. But the battalion reached the assigned region on time and in full combat readiness. When preparing for the march the commander had taken everything into account: the capacities of the rocket launcher engines, the maximum possible traveling speed on unpaved country roads, and the level of technical training of the mechanic-drivers.
Combat training experience shows that in these and similar situations the one who will forestall the enemy is the one who expands his knowledge and improves his skills every day. And he must do this comprehensively, expanding his professional horizons by deepening his knowledge of tactics, the equipment, and the weapons. Everything needed for this is available. There is not a unit today which does not have, for example, a well equipped tactical field. A great deal has also been done to improve the technical training and firing skill of personnel. Well equipped technical classrooms, firing ranges, tank training grounds, and other training sites significantly increase the effectiveness of training periods.

All that is needed is to use these facilities with maximum efficiency, to value every minute of training time, and to prepare every training period so that it is interesting and instructive. Unfortunately, this attitude toward raising the technical level of officers is not yet universal. Some of our officers are unable to accomplish the objective of improving the technical training of personnel for the simple reason that they themselves have not properly mastered the equipment but have limited themselves to nothing more than studying its tactical and technical specifications. This is not enough for victory. By itself the equipment is not a real force; the men must be able to control it. The main thing is the skill of the fighting men in whose hands the equipment is placed, their knowledge and ability to use this equipment with maximum effect, to get everything from it which it can give. He who forgets this truth will inevitably suffer failure.

Not long ago, during a check on combat training in one of the units of the district, we were forced to cancel a battle drill exercise in the motorized rifle company commanded by Capt Ye. Koveshnikov. The leader of the exercise was given the following objective: making maximum use of the capabilities of the equipment, achieve working harmony and high mobility in the subunit. But the leader could not do this: the combat vehicles and weapons were poorly prepared for the exercise. Such an exercise would not help the soldiers. It could generate lack of confidence in the capabilities of their equipment.

When you analyze the causes of such shortcomings you see that they are primarily the result of a low level of military-technical sophistication in those who are responsible for organizing and conducting the exercise. Some commanders still underestimate the role and place of technical training in improving the combat skill of their subordinates. And the personal obligations of certain officers are not properly aimed at improving professional training and raising ratings.

Study of the equipment is not always given its proper place in the system of officer training. Some leaders forget that modern battle demands of officers not only bold tactical plans but also a high level of technical knowledge which can be relied on in any situation to find the most effective way to use the equipment and weapons.
One way to increase the effectiveness of officer training is to take the knowledge and experience of the officers into account when planning and conducting the training. Only if this is done can one expect that their interest in technical training and their store of knowledge and skills will grow from one training period to the next. The educational value of such training periods will be greater if they are conducted in combination with other topics, above all with tactical training.

The foundations of all command qualities, including technical sophistication, are laid at the military school. Never before have our military schools devoted so many hours to the study of equipment, weapons, and engineering disciplines. These rich opportunities must be used in full. When preparing the cadet for service among the troops we must see that he not only passes the course in the sciences and receives, for example, the rights of mechanic-driver, but also that he becomes a carrier of solid technical knowledge, loves the equipment, and has an appetite for expanding his technical horizons.

Yet it would not be correct to limit ourselves to that knowledge given to officers by the military school or officer training. The role of military technical propaganda, for example, cannot be underestimated. We have officers who are capable of making presentations on any technical subject. One must not begrudge the time required to listen to a lecture, take part in a technical conference, or examine displays made up by efficiency workers and inventors.

Of course, each officer must work independently to improve his political, tactical, and technical level. A correct procedure is followed by those commanders, political agencies, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations who keep constant watch on the technical training of officers and their independent study. And in this it is important not only to keep watch but to disseminate the know-how of leading officers and masters of their work and to manage competition among them creatively.

As was emphasized at the 25th CPSU Congress, our country has mighty economic and scientific-technical potential. This is the priceless capital created by the heroic efforts of the Soviet people. This potential makes it possible to supply our Armed Forces with the most up-to-date equipment and weapons. And we are responsible for how they are handled, for fully realizing the enormous capabilities which they have for further raising troop training and the combat readiness of our units and subunits.

11,176
CSO: 1801
DEFICIENCIES NOTED IN WORK OF PARTY COMMITTEES

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 11 Aug 76 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Trushin: "Objectively and Reliably"]

[Excerpts] Party information always occupied an important place in the internal life of the party organizations. And this is understandable. Without well organized information there can be no correct party leadership. Clearly organized objective information helps the political organ, the party committee, and the party bureau to be abreast of events at all times, to keep contact with life, to supervise concretely, to react to shortcomings efficiently, and to render assistance in time. At the same time, well organized information disciplines the cadres and contributes to their correct upbringing while it strengthens the ties of the political organs and the party organizations with the communists, Komsomols, and all personnel.

Party information is a reliable tool for political leadership. But are all able to utilize it? Is this tool not rusting in some places?

An analysis and study of affairs on the spot shows that many information materials which arrive from the party committees are niggardly and one-sided. At times, they do not have sufficient timeliness. The span of questions located in the "field of view" of the information is narrow. In a number of party organizations, it does not go beyond the framework of mandatory accounting connected with the conduct of various measures and campaigns. Of course, this is also a very important and necessary part of party-political information. But this is not enough today.

The contemporary level of party and military organizational development, the great qualitative changes in personnel and the technical equipping of the troops, and many other factors require more complete and profoundly reasoned party information. It should not only reflect the phenomena and facts of our life today and the training and service more completely but it should also forecast events and disclose with all completeness the multi-faceted activity of the party committee, bureau, and party organization.
Unfortunately, in some organizations there is a formal attitude toward this important matter and sometimes they even put up with the fact that the information materials contain elements of nonobjectivity. For example, in the information which was received by the political section of the Guards Motorized Rifle Proletarskaya, Moscow-Minsk Division from the secretary of the party committee, Lieutenant Colonel N. Potiyenko, there was rather considerable discussion about the successes of the motorized riflemen and about the high grades on firings and on company tactical exercises. Judging from this information, the picture which is formed is extremely satisfactory.

Meanwhile, in a number of subunits some of the lessons were conducted in a simplified situation. The training-material base including the moving-target gunnery range for the combat vehicles was equipped with obvious omissions. And again, it would appear that the party committee did not notice this although we can hardly believe that the communists did not exchange critical opinions with one another: the omissions were too obvious. It hardly remained a secret for the party organization that some commanders improved the methods for the conduct of lessons poorly or that the sequence in the training of the personnel was disrupted. In a number of cases, proper attention was not devoted to the technical training of the servicemen.

All this led to where many servicemen did not accomplish their obligations in the competition.

Of course, it is incorrect to reduce everything to the fact that the absence of information was at fault here. However, this circumstance can in no way be dropped from consideration. Especially as the work style of the party committee as a whole finds reflection in the content of the information. Had the party committee operated on a basis of principle in evaluating the state of affairs and had it informed on shortcomings in time, the results could have been different. But unfortunately, the past achievements turned the heads of some party leaders. They continued to send rose-colored reports upward through inertia which, strange as it may seem, for some reason satisfied the political section.

Perhaps, it is not worth recalling all this: today the motorized riflemen are characterized by a different attitude toward affairs. But how much energy and strength the political organ and the senior chiefs had to expend to eliminate the omissions. So it does make sense to recall that objectivity and reliability, truthfulness and devotion to principles of party information play a large role in all our life. For having available thoroughly checked, reliable, and timely data it is possible to prevent adverse phenomena and avoid serious errors. And conversely, when the information contains doubtful data, "slurs over" shortcomings, and varnishes reality, it can only mislead people and aggravate the shortcomings.

It is believed that omissions in party information are explained primarily by the fact that some leaders study the practice of organizing information in the subunits and units superficially, from case to case, do not aid the party activists and political workers sufficiently in this matter, and do
little to teach them the ability to select and analyze facts and draw specific and clear conclusions. The status of party information is rarely discussed at seminars of the party activists.

The requirement to evaluate the state of affairs locally in a self-critical and objective manner and report to the higher party organ in time everything which requires its attention is one of the important evidences of the maturity of party leadership and its correct understanding of its role and place in the system of political work.

6367
CSO: 1801
FLIGHT TRAINING IN THE FAR EAST MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Aug 76 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Avn V. Pan'kin, commander of aviation of the Red Banner Far East Military District: "Lieutenants' Flights"]

[Text] On exercises, I observed with interest how Lieutenants A. Kosyakov and V. Karpenko accomplished missions in the air in a difficult tactical situation. Overcoming the opposition of the "enemy's" air defense, they broke through to the objective boldly and, changing their direction of approach and combining an active combat maneuver with missile and cannon fire, they accurately destroyed the target. Other young pilots also caused joy with their mature skill.

What assisted in the rapid professional growth of the lieutenants? First of all -- the correct instruction procedure. In the leading subunits, they usually prepare to greet the young pilots long before their arrival. The lieutenants are acquainted with the combat traditions of the unit. Experienced instructors study the requirements of the guidance documents with them and tell them about the special features of the airplane which they are to master. Methodological advice is then refined by diagrams for working out problems and the planning schedule for putting the pilots into formation. The preparatory work permits the young aviators to begin combat training without wavering and creates a businesslike attitude in them.

They say that it is easier to train an unskillful person than to retrain a mature one. As is known, retraining is connected with the breaking of a specific stereotype and requires a complex psychological reorientation. For this reason, it is important to develop the correct skills in a pilot immediately. And who, if not the instructor, and primarily the flight commander, molds the flying style of the lieutenant. It is necessary to select the instructors for the young pilots very carefully and to check their professional qualities comprehensively.

The experience accumulated in this regard in the fighter regiment which was commanded until recently by Colonel B. Lepayev deserves attention. Besides talks on the knowledge of the principles of military psychology and pedagogy,
check lessons are conducted with the flight commanders on the trainer and in the aircraft cockpit. The squadron commanders, deputy regimental commanders, and flight inspectors take the role of the trainees. They check the methodological level of the flight commanders and their ability to note and eliminate the slightest errors in the actions of their subordinates.

Methodological flying assemblies also provide much for the flight commanders. Thus, experienced flight inspectors officers Yu. Ivanov, E. Mkhitaryants, and L. Artem'yev shared their observations, told about typical mistakes of young pilots and ways to eliminate them, and pointed out the special features of piloting from the instructor's seat. The instructors reinforced the knowledge obtained in the course of the lessons on commanders' flights. The instructors began the instruction of the pilots comprehensively trained. The result: the recent graduates of the school became rated specialists in a short time.

The practice of discussing the results of the first three to five flight shifts at the methodological council deserves approval. By this time, the individual features of the young pilots and the methodological successes and errors of their instructors have already been determined with extreme clarity. It is time to introduce corrections into the actions of the flight commanders and to refine the number of flights for exercises with consideration of the individual features of the pilots. The recommendations of the methodological council should be effective and profoundly substantiated. The analysis procedures which are used by the methodological council headed by officer V. Feoktistov are instructive. Here, a thorough record of the mistakes by the lieutenants by flight stages is checked. Then a table is prepared from which one can see in which flight which errors were repeated most often and what their trend is. Young pilots are often invited to the session of the methodological council. Engineering training permits the lieutenants to analyze their actions in flight profoundly and disclose the reasons for failure.

The pilots now have at their disposal electronic complexes, operating mock-ups, and electrified stands. As they say, one can study the construction of a missile-carrier to the finest details and learn to fly pretty well without seeing a "live" airplane. But, it must be admitted, there is much work to be done to realize the increased capabilities of the contemporary training material base effectively. First of all, it is important to improve the procedure for the lessons. Including those on the trainer. It should carry a large instructional load so that the pilots acquire and polish their skills on it and, in a two-seater, in taking off into the air they only strengthen them. They managed to achieve this in the squadron commanded by Major A. Litsovetskiy. Here, the procedure for the lessons is thoroughly worked out. The instructors think deeply about the plan for drills, analyze the errors, and suggest to the lieutenants ways to eliminate them. A strict individual record of accrued time on the trainer is kept in the subunit.

As is known, contemporary methods and means for objective checking permit a profound analysis of the pilot's actions in the air. But the pilot will
correct an error which has been noted only in the next flight. And the leading instructors pondered how to instruct the pilot more effectively in the course of a flight long ago. This is especially important for the young pilot. Such an opportunity was found. Of course, they solved the problem with consideration of the recommendations of military pedagogy and psychology. Now, during the first flights of the lieutenants to work out combat employment on the range, one can also see squadron commanders Majors L. Kvadyayev and V. Zotov alongside the flight controller.

Major Kvadyayev also attentively followed the combat course the time when Lieutenant N. Andreyev made his approach to the target. The young pilot was given the opportunity to train in sighting first. But the lieutenant concentrated all his attention on this and did not notice that the airplane was diving with a bank. When accomplishing bombing, such an error is impermissible. The squadron commander immediately called the attention of the flight controller to it and the latter gave the command to the pilot by radio to pull out of the dive. On the next approach the lieutenant considered the remarks and launched a precise strike.

Of course, the squadron commander does not always have the opportunity to observe the approaches of his subordinates to the target. Therefore, control of the flights on the range is entrusted only to a well trained officer. He is called upon to notice inaccuracies in the formation of maneuvers, in adhering to the assigned flight mode, and to analyze the actions of the aviators from the tactical point of view.

The tactical skill of the aerial fighter is sharpened above the range and the ability to hit a target with a sniper's accuracy is developed. And here, a great assistance in training is television checking-recording equipment. It is difficult to overestimate the effectiveness of its employment, especially in training young pilots. Looking at maneuvers in the target area on the video film, let us say, the pilot will quickly clarify his errors and understand why his rival in the competition could hit the target more accurately. The rationalizers, under the direction of the chief of the range service, Colonel V. Sashko, have done much to improve the training-material base of the range. The training film which they prepared rendered the instructors noticeable assistance in training the flying youth. The enthusiasts also tried to install television equipment. Unfortunately, the efforts of the rationalizers alone here were insufficient; this problem, apparently, should be resolved on a more solid scientific basis and in a centralized manner.

The path to combat skill is not easy. It happens that even a young aviator who is diligent and assiduous in training makes errors in piloting. One must have an understanding attitude toward him. It is necessary to try to find out the reasons for the blunders in a scrupulous manner and to achieve their elimination patiently. Flight commanders Captains V. Alimov, P. Khonyak, and A. Kon'kov just as the majority of the instructors are able to attach an atmosphere of strict demandingness and comradely good will to the competition. Their subordinates overcame difficulties in establishing themselves and worked out a confident flying style comparatively quickly. The
lieutenants accomplished the plan for combat training and their socialist obligations by the planned time. And then a failure befell Lieutenant N. Syrb. And you see, it would appear that he also had every basis to take the position which had been planned for him successfully and to become a rated specialist together with his comrades. However, the professional formation of the young officer was delayed because he was grounded for a long time. It is a severe punishment -- to sit on the ground while your comrades fly. Only a course violation of the laws of flight by an officer forces a commander to ground a subordinate temporarily. It was hardly necessary to apply such stern measures to Lieutenant Syrb because the entire guilt of the young officer was the incorrect use of brakes during taxiing.

Painstaking individual work with young pilots, unfortunately, is sometimes still replaced by strict punishment. This, of course, does not contribute to the quality accomplishment of the flight missions and socialist obligations.

It is no secret the young officers take socialist competition close to their hearts and participate in it actively. A young person feels more strongly the requirement to compete in skill and knowledge. Sprouts of the new rise most often in the collectives where there are more youths.

The Helicopter Red Banner Regiment imeni V. I. Lenina has held the title of outstanding for six years in a row already. There are many young officers here. The political section of the district's aviation headed by Colonel I. Voloshko studied the procedure for organizing competition among the helicopter pilots deeply and comprehensively and worked out efficient recommendations. Now other collectives have received the opportunity to employ the advanced procedures in organizing the competition by tasks and norms for themselves.

But nevertheless, in some subunits the small light of competition hardly glimmers. The reason is often that the young officers are out of the picture in the competition. Their names, of course, are included in the list of those who are competing but they are not seen among the winners. Why? Well, because the young pilots are not always capable of matching their skill with the aces. This pertains especially to the recent graduates of the schools. But how is it in the leading subunits? Here, competitions for best pilot are conducted among the lieutenants. The struggle on equal grounds creates favorable conditions for the display of the creative initiative of the young aviators. And this is the reliable guarantee of the rapid professional growth of the aerial fighters and the further raising of the squadron's combat readiness.

6367
CSO: 1801
OFFICER PROMOTION POLICIES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Aug 76 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Kuklenko, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Promotion in Duties"]

[Text] Captain A. Dushkin left the office of the chief of the political section chagrined: "they did not understand" him here, either. And you see, at first the talk seemed to give great hope. The colonel who invited him in asked the questions tactfully, agreed with some things, and explained some things in a way that was easy to understand....However, he ended the conversation with the conclusion: the captain had not yet matured for the post to which he laid claim.

Why did the chief of the political section draw such a conclusion?

The many years of Dushkin's service cannot be called smooth or, as it is customary to say, without a hitch. There were many "pits and bumps" in it. They were reflected in his personal file by such lines which characterized him: "Little initiative in daily life, does not display zeal in work. Requires constant checking on the part of senior commanders. Instances of a careless attitude toward lessons occur. Displays coarseness and tactlessness toward commanders and comrades...."

For the sake of fairness it should be said that Dushkin later managed to eliminate some of his shortcomings and performed the duties of chief of section of a repair enterprise until recently. Let us be more precise: he performed the duties temporarily although he assumed that only he and no one else could occupy this post. Meanwhile, for an enterprise equipped with contemporary technical equipment and needing scientific organization of labor, another department supervisor was needed -- with an engineering education who, guided by profound knowledge, could organize matters so as to utilize productive capacities more completely and effectively. So it was a completely well-substantiated decision of the personnel organs to assign a graduate of the military academy to the vacant post.
It was then that Dushkin was filled with alarm: he says that they treated
him unfairly. Let us say straight away, this resentment is groundless. If
we analyze the officer's entire service, then besides the "pits and bumps"
mentioned the desire to live only for today and not trouble himself with daily
work and self-education clearly shows through in it. He worked in the mili-
tary school without special zeal. Completing it, he did not experience the
attraction toward a further expansion of his knowledge, assuming that what he
has was also sufficient. And in this way, he fell farther and farther behind
the requirements of life.

Most likely, it is not easy to notice this lagging oneself and screw up one's
courage to admit former mistakes so as then to make up what has been lost
and show by deeds one's maturity in the post which has been entrusted to him.
It is not easy but there is no other way. Consciousness of the state impor-
tance of the affairs which have been entrusted to us and the lofty calling
of our profession, the meaning of which is to defend the homeland -- this is
what is promoted by our deeds first of all and determines our service zeal.

Of course, the desire of an officer to advance in his duties is also completely
natural and proper. As a rule, people become enriched with knowledge, profes-
sional ability, and worldly experience with the years. Professional and
moral-political qualities -- these are what are considered first of all in
promotion. And there must be no doubt that a person who has matured for the
occupation of a more responsible post will not remain unnoticed. I have often
had the occasion to meet with officers whose conscientious, selfless labor
served as a weighty application for advancement. It is noteworthy that
these people did not haunt the threshold of various institutions, did not over-
emphasize their own qualities, and did not remind people: don't forget my
promotion.

This is exactly how Lieutenant Yu. Kudinov's service developed. The regi-
mental commander immediately turned his attention to this young capable
officer. After a rather short time in the unit, they began to think about
promoting the lieutenant to the post of company commander. However, they did
not hurry with the final decision. The senior commanders continued to look
closely at the lieutenant, finding newer and newer outstanding instincts of
a commander -- devotion to principle, high demandingness for himself first of
all, self-criticism in evaluating his own labor. Kudinov demonstrated com-
mand maturity many times on tactical exercises. In short, his advancement
to the post of company commander was a completely proper and natural matter.
Kudinov later became a student in the military academy.

I should also like to name the participant in the Army-Wide Conference of
Secretaries of Party Organizations, Senior Lieutenant M. Belyayev. His
industriousness, knowledge of matters, and closeness to people were evaluated
at their true worth and he was assigned to the post of deputy battalion
commander for political affairs. By the way, Belyayev is very demanding and
approached the evaluation of his capabilities based on principle before he
gave his agreement to the promotion. Such demandingness toward himself is
justified: a promotion in duties also requires a high degree of knowledge
and more professional skills.
I am intentionally emphasizing such a feature of the officer as demandingness toward himself. Because, in the last analysis, this is the decisive condition for his professional growth. And it is very important to be a strict and objective judge of one's own professional qualities and personal merits, especially if they intend a promotion in duties for you. Unfortunately, not everyone succeeds in this....

Soon after he took over command of a platoon Lieutenant R. Nebelevich, as they say, began to "long to be" a battery commander. His service zeal was often for show but, obviously, he deluded someone and the lieutenant received a promotion. And then literally on the first trip out to the range where live firings were to be conducted, Nebelevich saw with his own eyes that he received the battery prematurely. But you see, quite recently it seemed to the young officer that the difference between a platoon and a battery in the plane of leading them is not so great. Life refuted such an erroneous impression and it was necessary for the senior commanders to correct the negligence which had been committed in the assignment.

One day I heard a curious sentence about one officer in the unit headquarters:

"A strange person. They want to advance him in his duties and offer him a post but he refuses...."

Later it became clear that this person who was "so hard to please" was Lieutenant V. Dukhno. Some people even began to say that he simply seemed to be afraid of such great responsibility which, naturally, the high post implies. However, everything was otherwise. Dukhno widely compared his strengths and abilities with the new duties. During his talk with the unit commander and the worker in the personnel organ he justified his decision as follows:

"I feel that it is a little early for me to part with the platoon: I don't have quite enough experience to command a battery. There is someone to learn from in our regiment. I will try to utilize this opportunity to the maximum. And for your confidence -- thank you...."

Clearly, the post of battery commander did not get away from Lieutenant V. Dukhno. In return, he received the opportunity to supplement his store of knowledge with methodological skills and the work experience with people and to raise the level of commanders' training. And by the time of his promotion in his duties he became more mature and better prepared for the new, more important work.

Life convinces us: if someone "stays" on one rung of the service ladder for a long time, the reason should be sought here, as a rule, not in the personnel section but in the person himself and in his professional and moral-political qualities.

I was told about one "pushy" platoon leader. He reminds people at every opportunity: "do not forget my promotion...." Of course, the road
to the post of company commander is not forbidden to him. But the entire
trouble is that for now it is clearly a little too early to pose the question
about this. The officer has many omissions in service and he cannot brag
about irreproachable behavior, either. So all the rebukes which he says
did not pertain to him should be addressed to himself.

True, it happens that some chiefs are lavish with their promises and draw
the prospects of a promotion before an officer without an objective considera-
tion of his capabilities. Others place conditions before their subordinates.
Such as, let us say: "If the subunit becomes outstanding, you will be
assigned to a high post." Later, it becomes clear that such overtures and
those similar to them seldom have real ground under them. And then a double
blow is received -- to the authority of the chief and to the self-esteem of
his subordinates.

...A promotion in duties. Not only does the attention of the chiefs stand
behind this important event in the life of any officer. We find behind it
first of all the stubborn labor of the candidate for the high post himself,
daily enrichment with knowledge and experience, and continuous forward
motion in his professional growth.
INDIVIDUAL APPROACH STRESSED IN YOUNG NAVAL OFFICER DEVELOPMENT

Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 20 Aug 76 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank Ye. Serebryakov: "To See a Person"]

A tremendous place in the training and educational process belongs to individual work with people. The moral atmosphere in the military collective depends on its level to a considerable degree.

In initiating the column "The Practice of Individual Work" the editors hope that commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol personnel will appear in it, will share their experience, and will express their opinions concerning the further improvement of the forms of educational influence on people in the spirit of the requirements of our party and the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU.

In the spring of last year, a political officer who is an acquaintance of mine, on learning that the party organization of a submarine had imposed punishment on communist Senior Lieutenant V. Lishchinskiy, remarked to me with doubt:

"But didn't it treat the person sternly? The commander is so young...."

The submarine recently returned from a long voyage. The crew coped with all its missions confidently and went ashore in a good frame of mind. But, perhaps, this crew brought special satisfaction to Senior Lieutenant Lishchinskiy. After a year's interruption the department which he commanded had again confirmed the title of "outstanding."

He once said to me in confidence:

"I have gone through a difficult year. I resented my comrades who showed me no mercy at the party meeting. I thought that their criticism was unjust. And when I cooled down a little I understood: the communists were right."

Just what happened in the life of communist Lishchinskiy in that now distant spring of last year?
In the outstanding department which Senior Lieutenant Lishchinskiy headed at that time, the requirements of the instructions for the operation of the compartment's combat equipment were violated. In investigating this case, the party organization unexpectedly satisfied itself that the young commander had weakened his control over the training of subordinates, neglected individual work with people, and actually transferred their education to the petty officer of the team.

This was already a breakdown in the work. In which regard, so serious that the communists decided to make him answerable to the party. Yes, they made him strictly responsible. But life confirms -- fairly. And in this case they could not proceed otherwise. Because for Lishchinskiy this was not simply a mistake which appeared as a result of insufficient experience. His "sickness" proved to be more serious: the person became conceited and conducted himself arrogantly. And in such cases we do not have the right to display passivity: we are speaking about authority, about the purity of the title of communist. We are speaking about the approval of the mutual relationships in the military collective as called for by the regulations. Of course, here we should analyze the comrade's act comprehensively and objectively and it is mandatory to understand what stands behind this act: a chance failure or neglect of work with people.

Maximum attentiveness, objectivity, and I would say meticulous consideration of all motives and circumstances in determining measures of punishment are important not only for the wrong-doer. All this has an educational influence on others. We cannot forget that there are many young communists in the party organization. Some of them do not have enough experience to make a correct evaluation of one deed or another or the erroneous actions of a comrade. Some of them are ready to pardon a person with the first words of an excuse, "feel sorry" for him, and get him out from under the blow. While others, on the contrary, display fervor and fight energetically for extreme measures of influence. Here it is important not to make a mistake and to make a just decision. For party punishment is an extreme educational means and it should be used very cautiously, in so doing determining the degree of guilt accurately and clearly.

I believe that the party organization of the submarine proceeded in just this way in regard to communist Lishchinskiy. And it was pleasant to be convinced that it did not err.

But nevertheless, I again return to the personal affair of party member Lishchinskiy. And here is why. You see, the party organization began the struggle for the person only when, figuratively speaking, he began to "skid dangerously on the turns." And why did we not come to his aid considerably earlier, back in those days when the conflict situation in the outstanding subunit had only just begun to develop and the young commander himself had accomplished the first, still insignificant mistakes? The question, I think, is important and it is a pity that it remained unanswered at the party meeting. And really, they did not think of returning to it later.
It is this very circumstance which stimulated me to become interested in how deeply we communists studied each submariner, the strong and weak features of his character, and whether our party influence on them always brings the desired results. I unintentionally came to the conviction that it is necessary to bring this subject up for discussion at the party meeting. In fact, we speak much about the fact that it is necessary to see a person always and to work with him constantly. Think, at each meeting and service conference. And here the actual realization of these good words does not often appear convincing.

Let us say that a young officer, a graduate of a military school, arrived on a ship. And here, at the height of preparation for an ocean cruise, for the accomplishment of firing and practical missions. Time was found only for a short talk with the new person and becoming acquainted with his personal file. Then the lieutenant was shown the ship's facilities, they wished him success in his new post, and things began to turn further -- but not as far as individual talks. Especially since the person left a good impression -- they say that from here on everything will go only for the better.

But it is exactly that from here on the most important thing for the teacher begins: a person really exposes himself not when he tells about himself, who he is, and where he comes from, but in deeds and actions. This occurs more often not under any unexpected circumstances but in a normal, everyday situation. It is only a pity that these episodes, like instants, at times rush past us unnoticed. That is, while all is well we do not look very closely at a person. In this regard, I do not have in mind the striving to discover something adverse in a fellow serviceman. It is even more inexcusable when we do not notice favorable shifts in a person or those situations where his best features were disclosed. It was this very period in the life of Engineer-Captain Lieutenant Yu. Makovskiy which once passed by our attention: I have in mind that active, comradely support which he rendered Engineer-Lieutenant I. Kasprovich.

It is not simple for the graduate of a school to feel comfortable in a new place or service. The period of becoming a commander, as they say, does not pass without a hitch for everyone and at all times. The young officer is to solve many problems which are difficult for him. To study the construction of a ship in depth, to pass tests to be permitted to control a group independently. He must also go on details and participate in social work. It so happened that a young officer has not yet managed to get his bearings clearly in a new place and he was already loaded down with assignments and errands. If an attentive and more experienced comrade does not appear alongside him during these days he is convinced that his development in his very first duty on a combat ship could be delayed.

So here is what happened. Engineer-Lieutenant Kasprovich did not stay too long at the starting gate. And we perceived this almost as something that goes without saying: everything is proceeding normally. Somehow, we did not think that behind this "everything is proceeding normally" there is the labor of our comrade-communist, at times strained even if invisible, who
conducted tremendous individual work with the young fellow serviceman. He felt more acutely than all others when the officer should be supported by deed, when he should be encouraged by word, and when he should be rebuked in a friendly manner.

Seemingly a routine affair. But the abilities and character of the communist sparkled with new facets in this very customary nature. And I will not err if I say: the young officer will retain good feelings toward Makovskiy for long years. To inspire and support the first success, to keep him from errors—this is not forgotten!

But for this, one should be able to see a person. And in order to see, one must work with him individually. And the party organization proceeds correctly when it actively stimulates the communists for this. As was noted at the 25th Congress of the CPSU, the creation "...of an atmosphere of harmonious work and creative search in each collective..." depends to a great extent on purposeful, constant--individual--influence on people.

A communist, senior comrade, a person grown wise with life's experience goes to the crew's compartment, to a thematic soiree or youth debate, or to a session of the Komsomol bureau. He is always ready to initiate a confidential talk with a submariner who unexpectedly became sad and began to seclude himself. He gives to the other that good knowledge which he accumulated during his long years of life not because he had to but in response to the call of party duty. He knows that only a word warmed by sincere warmth will find a response in young hearts.

But if, let us say, a leader separates himself from people and has a coarse and haughty attitude toward his juniors, then however much experience he may possess his positive influence on people will be insignificant. Because of natural considerations I do not want to give the name of one of our officers now, but how many times we communists had to restrain him! He understands the educational goals correctly but he wants to attain them in a way which was discredited long ago: in all situations he maintains a strict if not to say an abrupt tone in regard to his subordinates; he is equally cold with all of them and therefore...inaccessible. The person once believed that it is easier to command people from such a distance. And this is how he operates.

Naturally, the party organization cannot have a tolerant attitude toward such facts, even if they are rare in our fleet reality. It has at its disposal varied means and forms to strengthen the close, organic tie of commanders, political officers, and communists with the personnel. The arsenal of these means is virtually inexhaustible. It is continuously renewed and enriched. Life is posing ever more difficult tasks for us. Actively conducted individual work with people is helping to solve them successfully.
Dear Editors: I completed the Khar'kov Guards Higher Tank Command School imeni the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR a year ago. I often recall with good words my commanders and teachers who taught me to control a subunit in battle and shoot accurately and equipped me with profound knowledge and the ability to work with people.

But today I should like to talk about what worries and disturbs me. When I first began my service as an officer, I found myself insufficiently prepared in such a question, so important in the activity of a commander, as the organization and direction of socialist competition. How could I see that the competition is not formal but really becomes an integral part of combat training? How could I develop a spirit of competition on the lessons?

Unfortunately, I did not receive a clear answer to these questions in the military school. In my opinion, the competition of the cadets of the school should be looked upon not only as an important lever for raising the quality of training. Nor should it be forgotten that the future officers should be taught to direct the competition of their subordinates. I believe that not enough hours are allotted to the study of this subject in the course of party-political work and only one seminar. As regards practical skills in the organization of competition, they can be obtained only in the period of probationary work with the troops.

I am stating all this on the basis of my own personal experience. I don't know, perhaps some of the graduates feel much more confident in questions of organizing competition. If so, I would like to hear their opinion.

Guards Lieutenant A. Gonchakov
Let us stipulate at once: among the graduates of the Khar’kov Guards Higher Tank Command School imeni the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR Guards Lieutenant A. Gonchakov was not the only one who is experiencing difficulties in questions of organizing socialist competition. This was also convincingly demonstrated by the opinions from the troops concerning the school’s graduates.

In the school, they showed me a voluminous file of opinions on the 1974 graduates. The impartial records characterize the young officers comprehensively. How did the graduates of the school with the troops show up in the role of organizers and leaders of competition? Here, for example, is what was written about Lieutenant A. Yermakov: "Has insufficient ability to organize socialist competition. Sums up the results unscientifically...." Concerning Lieutenant Ye. Baranov: "Poor skills in organizing competition...."

Judging by the responses, some graduates are zealous and conscientious in service. Everything they do turns out well except...direction of the competition. In particular, this pertains to Lieutenants A. Zhirnov, P. Matveyev, and V. Il'ich. All three serve in the same battalion and are described favorably. Lieutenant Zhirnov’s only shortcoming: "...he did not firmly master the problems of organizing socialist competition with the personnel of a platoon and company." There was a similar entry in the responses on his comrades.

Commanders and political officers not only note the shortcomings in the training of individual young officers but they also express their suggestions and recommendations which permit reducing the time for their assumption of their posts. Thus, for example, in the response on Lieutenant V. Lyashchenko it is proposed that the cadets become more involved in the practical organization of the competition. "Add time for the deeper study of the organization of socialist competition," it was stated in the responses on Lieutenants V. Yasevich and S. Borovich. Many other recommendations can also be encountered.

It turns out that Lieutenant A. Gonchakov’s letter to the editors did not happen by chance. And the author did not exaggerate one bit. Many other lieutenants and graduates of the Khar’kov Tank School could have signed his letter with the same justification. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask: are all the opportunities really being used in the school to instill skills in directing socialist competition in the graduates? In order to clear up this question, I talked with commanders, political officers, and cadets. I gradually came to the conclusion: no, not all reserves and possibilities are "working" in this direction.

As the author of the letter to the editors correctly noted, competition under the conditions of a military school pursues a double goal. First, it is directed toward raising the progress of the cadets. And second, clearly organized competition and the regular and methodologically competent summing up of the results are, at the same time, a good practical school for future commanders. Following the example of commanders in directing the competition, the cadets thereby learn from them and arm themselves with their experience.
Just what is the status of the organization of competition in the Khar'kov Tank School? Let us take the company commanded by Guards Captain Yu. Obraztsov. As could be expected, the results are summed up regularly here. The obligations of the cadets for the semester are drawn up in the Lenin room. Grades are posted opposite each name. Who is competing with whom is shown here.

This, so to speak, is the outward aspect of the competition, its form. But what about content. Unfortunately, it does not quite correspond to form. When I asked Junior Sergeant V. Kaminskiy who was present in the Lenin room with whom he is competing, thinking for a moment he named cadet N. Bogachev. But on the display, cadet V. Li was designated as his competitor in the competition opposite Kaminskiy's name. Other cadets did not "guess" their competitors, either. This means that when summing up the results no conversation takes place concerning who is competing with whom and the winners and those lagging behind are not named. But you see, publicity and comparability are the soul of the competition. It is not difficult to imagine what "example" of the organization of competition the future commanders carry away to the troops.

And you see, this year already some of them are to meet with subordinates and must in reality become organizers and leaders of competition. Are they ready for this?

"No matter, we'll finish learning with the troops," Junior Sergeant V. Kaminskiy expressed the general opinion.

What remains to be done? Of course, life will force them to learn. Guards Lieutenant A. Gonchakov's letter to the editors and the responses from the troops on the school's graduates are recalled.... Obviously, the predecessors of today's graduates also reasoned this way at one time. But how much time must be spent on finishing their learning? And really, it is always more difficult to perfect one's knowledge than to learn. The graduates should come to the troops with a certain store of practical skills.

For this, it is believed, some commanders of cadet subunits should change their attitude toward the leadership of competition. It is very important that they approach this matter creatively and create a situation so that the competition attracts the cadet, inspires him for new positions in training, and teaches the practice of its organization.

This, for example, is how Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Dudusov, a commander of one cadet company, proceeds. By the way, he is one of the best commanders in the school and many warm words were spoken about him in the political section. To improve the methodological training of his subordinates and instill commanders' qualities in them, Dudusov appoints the cadets squad leaders and deputy platoon leaders for a week in turn, beginning with the third course. Here, the regular commanders remain in place where they help the probationers and correct them.

One can only wish that during this week's probationary period the company commander would draw more of the cadets' attention to problems in organizing
competition. Of course, with the aid of and under the direction of the platoon commander so that the latter can, where necessary, correct the cadet and point out his errors. Thus, within the walls of the school the cadet would obtain certain practice in organizing competition and summing up its results. Unquestionably, this would raise the responsibility of each one for his own training.

It is also believed that there will be much value if the department of Marxism-Leninism will give the cadets the assignment for their probationary period to study the experience of organizing competition among the troops, write papers, and give them on seminars.

All this taken together unquestionably will permit the cadets to expand their knowledge and practical skills in questions of organizing socialist competition in the subunit. Life itself urgently demands this from today's graduates.

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CSO: 1801
On 21 June 1941 Komsomol member Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Mironenko requested leave from his squadron commander to go to a lake. At dawn on the 22nd the unit (chast') was put on alert. They were ordered to load fragmentation bombs onto planes and fly to the Gulf of Finland to search for enemy ships.

From May 1943 the 14th Guards Komsomol Fighter Regiment of the Baltic Fleet Air Force under the command of Guards Lieutenant Colonel Mironenko destroyed 218 enemy planes in air battles for Leningrad and the Baltic area. The regiment was decorated twice with the Order of the Red Banner, the orders of Ushakov Ropshinsko-Gatchinskiy and Klaypedsko-Kenigsbergskiy. The regiment commander himself made 750 low-level attacks and flew cover for troops. He shot down 20 fascist vultures.

Mironenko became a pilot in 1940 after finishing Eysk Naval Pilot School. Before this he studied at the Leningrad Military-Mechanical Institute, and with Komsomol sponsorship, went into aviation.

"Naval aviation .... How does it differ from the usual kind?," we asked the commander.

--Our planes and helicopters operate mainly over the seas and oceans. Consequently, the naval pilot psychologically has to be prepared differently than his army colleague. Judge for yourself. As is known reference points are almost nonexistent at sea or on the ocean. There are no alternate airfields where one can land in case something happens. Besides, a naval pilot does not always know what kind of weather is waiting for him in a given area of activity—the sea is the sea. Targets on water are always moving and very small. They are difficult to find and identify. Consequently, it is necessary for our pilots and navigators to have special training and the skill to apply special tactics and methods for combat with enemy ships, planes and submarines.
I will not speak without proof. A story by three-time Hero of the Soviet Union, renowned ace, Marshal of Aviation Aleksandr Ivanovich Pokryshkin can serve as confirmation of the difficulty of working over the sea. Here is what he writes about his first flight over water: "Every time I looked outside and saw the dark, stormy sea I was cut off for several moments from perceiving the sounds of the motor. I was completely absorbed by the terrible element of water. Through will power I avoided its "magnetism" and returned to the safe little world of the cockpit, to the needles of the instruments. But then, in those first moments, it seemed to me that the motor didn't drone as it had before and the threatening needles moved toward the critical limits .... It was some time before I again became imbued with the steady powerful strength of the machine."

—Comrade General, has naval aviation been a part of the Soviet Navy for a long time?

—In December of 1917 a detachment of volunteer aviators was formed on the Baltic (basically, these were seamen-air mechanics). This detachment helped revolutionary troops defeat the forces of Petlyura and the Kaiser. And regular units of naval aviation sprang up among us after several months. On 27 April 1918, fleet command created a large unit (soedineniye) of naval pilots, the Baltic Special Air Brigade. In three years, after the defeat of Denikin, air units were formed on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

The skills of naval aviators can be useful not only for military duties. Our pilots and navigators often carried out special government assignments of a peaceful nature. For example, in the mid-twenties Baltic pilot Boris Chukhnovskiy first flew reconnaissance of the icebergs around Novaya Zemlya in the Kara Sea. He then took part in the expedition which saved the crew of the dirigible "Italy". In the very same year the Black Sea pilot and Komsomol member A. Volynskiy, in the seaplane "Soviet Union", studied flight conditions in the Far East. The backbone of aviation on the northern sea route (later it became the polar sea route) was also composed of Komsomol naval pilots. Four of them, A. Lyapidevskiy, S. Levanevskiy, V. Molokov and I. Doronin were among the first to receive the stars of Heroes of the Soviet Union for saving Chelyuskintsev. We are especially proud of that.

—How were aircraft of naval aviation used during the war years?

—From the outset of the fighting naval aviation basically supported our ground troops. We protected cities, and assaulted and bombed everything that was on land. Naval pilots began to operate on a large scale right after the battle for Stalingrad. From then on torpedo planes, fighters and low-level attack aircraft directed massive strikes against ships, sea convoys and enemy bases.

—Aleksandr Alekseevich, the operations of low-level attack aircraft or, for example, fighter planes, wherever they have fought are generally clear. But little is known about the essence of the torpedo attack from the air ....

—Of the two methods of torpedo-delivery that existed at the time, the high and the low—I will dwell on the second one. It is more complicated, but also more
effective. Torpedo planes made runs at an enemy ship at an altitude of 25-30 meters. It was imperative not to go lower for the pilot's safety, and no higher either—the torpedo might break apart from hitting the water and sink. Besides altitude, pilots also had to strictly maintain speed and course—this was for precise aiming. Approximately 1,800 meters from the enemy ship the navigator released the torpedo on target. Only then was it possible to try to evade the approaching fire, and then it was, as a rule, very heavy. During the war this was just how torpedo plane pilots sank a major part of the enemy transports and ships destroyed at sea.

--I was told that naval aviators even bombed Berlin?

--And not just once. The 1st Aviation Mine-Torpedo Regiment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of Colonel Ye. N. Preobrazhenskiy delivered a strike 35 years ago on the night of 8 August 1941.

--What can be said of the capabilities of today's weapons of naval pilots?

--Planes and helicopters of different types and designations: supersonic reconnaissance planes and missile carriers, antisubmarine amphibious planes specially designed to operate from water and land, ship aircraft and antisubmarine helicopters meet the latest needs. Navigational-pilotage and radiotechnical equipment and also computerized aiming devices with which naval planes and helicopters are equipped are such that with their help our pilots can accomplish all modern combat missions with great accuracy on the ocean or on land.

--Aleksandr Alekseevich, flying over the ocean is very complicated. What rescue devices do naval pilots have at their disposal?

--Every pilot has with him so-called NAZ (portable emergency supplies), radio-beacon, and a one-man inflatable raft. In the NAZ are stored signal flares, a water distiller for sea water, a selection of medicines (including even for sea-sickness), fishing rods, fishing lines, fishing lures, and of course a supply of high calorie foodstuffs. Each crew member has an emergency radio. A naval pilot always flies in an inflatable life jacket.

--It is known that our military seamen regularly make long-range trips. Naval pilots apparently also carry out similar missions. What is the purpose of these missions?

--Submarine warfare remains as before one of the primary missions of naval aviation. To detect an enemy submarine (long before it reaches a given position for a missile attack) and guide ships to it or even to destroy it alone with the help of on-board weapons—that is the mission of naval pilots. As before an important mission of naval aviation remains the destruction of surface warships and vessels. For this we have at our disposal the necessary planes and weapons. The role of naval pilots in reconnaissance is very large.

--The Komsomol has been the patron of military aviation for over 40 years. Are you satisfied with your patron?
But of course! The Komsomol has always sent the best of the best into aviation. Those who come to us today also serve with honor in combat planes. These are young lads with a highly developed sense of duty, well-versed in engineering and the weapons which the Motherland has entrusted to them. Right now the Naval Aviation Command is deciding on conferring upon one of our squadrons the name of Leninist Komsomol.
The resolutions of the 25th Party Congress received the ardent support and approval of the entire Soviet nation and its servicemen. Outlined in them was the great program for further glorious achievements in the building of communism.

A special point in the Congress was discussion of issues related to ensuring defense of the Motherland and to the struggle against aggressive imperialist aspirations. In the very course of this discussion each of the armed defenders of the fatherland—from private to marshal—understood more fully what an enormous concern the party is displaying about the armed forces. The 25th CPSU Congress again showed that strengthening of the national defense capability and increasing the combat readiness of the army and navy is an integral part of the building of communism. "All these years the party has paid due attention to strengthening our country's defense capabilities and improving the armed forces," said Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. "No one should have any doubt that our party will do everything so that in the future as well the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union will possess all the necessary means to fulfill their crucial mission -- to be the guardian of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and a bulwark of world peace."

The further strengthening of the national defense capability and increase in the combat readiness of the armed forces is an objective necessity. It is conditioned by the complexity and contradictory nature of the international situation. Our party is making a titanic effort aimed at reduction of tension. The Congress worked out a program of continued struggle for peace and international cooperation, for freedom and independence of peoples. However, this program also has many enemies.
The immutability of the aggressive policy of imperialism was discussed with special intensity at the Berlin Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe. It was particularly noted that the increasing relaxation of tension and the growth of the forces of peace and progress have alerted and stirred up the reactionary and militarist circles and all those who would like to return Europe and the entire world to the eras of "cold war" and teetering on the brink of nuclear catastrophe.

Attempting to counter detente, aggressive imperialist forces are still further inflating the arms race, which has already reached unprecedented proportions. The buildup of the number and offensive capability of NATO combat units in Central Europe is continuing. The military budgets of the United States and other North Atlantic bloc countries are constantly increasing. Programs are being implemented for re-equipping the armed forces with so-called "new generation" airplanes, tanks, ships and other types of weapons and combat equipment. The Maoist leaders of China are openly calling for "preparation for a new war."

The following figures speak convincingly of the scale of preparation for a new war. Approximately 600 million dollars are spent daily in the capitalist world for armaments. The U.S. military budget for the 1975-1976 fiscal year was increased to an enormous sum exceeding 112 billion dollars. In 1974 the NATO countries spent 132 billion dollars for military purposes. The United States is the primary supplier of weapons in the capitalist world. According to Pentagon plans, the sale of American weapons in fiscal year 1976 will amount to almost 12 billion dollars. The fact that at present tremendous efforts are being made with regard to the CENTO bloc, the leaders of which, as is well known, are the United States and England, is of considerable significance to us, the troops of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District serving on our homeland's southern borders. To stimulate activity in this bloc, they have resorted to the usual pressure tactics -- scaring their partners with the "communist threat" and "Soviet expansion" in the Indian Ocean. The United States of America attaches paramount importance to strengthening the military organization of this bloc and to expanding CENTO's sphere of influence in the area of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

The United States and England delegate the primary role for carrying out dangerous ventures in this area to Iran. As the western press acknowledges, Iran has recently become the predominate military power in the Persian Gulf region. In the past two years alone, according to official figures, the United States has supplied Iran with various types of weapons with a total value of 6.5 billion dollars. Among them were the "Phantom" fighter-bomber the "Tiger" fighter, the F-14 "Tomcat," helicopters, thousands of air-launched missiles, hundreds of tanks and other combat equipment. Naturally, the country's military budget is rising like leavened bread. In 1973 it was 2.452 billion dollars, in 1974--5.694 billion, and last year--as much as 7.702 billion dollars.
The Pentagon leaders are not losing sight of the other CENTO members. At present, 136 states of the world are customers of American businesses. The turnover of military deliveries since the end of the second world war has reached 100 billion dollars. In the 1974-1975 fiscal year alone, the United States sold weapons worth 11 billion dollars (over five times more than in 1967). In the past quarter century, foreign deliveries have included 866 "Phantom" jet fighters, 2,375 helicopters, 5,000 "Hawk" surface-to-air missiles, 25 [as published] "Sidewinder" air-to-air missiles, 28,000 tanks and a similar number of antitank guided missiles. This is far from a complete list. The arms race is growing, and the budgets of the United States and its partners in the aggressive blocs are continually increasing.

The imperialist desire to stir up the aggressive activity of CENTO against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is a serious threat to peace and the security of countries located in the Near and Middle East.

Under these conditions our party considers that its sacred duty in the future as well is to pursue with redoubled energy a policy of restraining the forces of war and aggression and of strengthening world peace. It has done and will continue to do everything necessary to further strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet state and the entire socialist community. In fact the entire effort of the Berlin Conference was directed toward achieving these worthwhile goals.

Speaking of further strengthening the national defense capability, one should note that its level is directly related to the economic power of the state. The more metal produced, the greater the output of the machine-building industry and the more raw materials extracted, the greater the potential for both quantitative and qualitative growth of the material base of defense capability—equipment and arms. "Without the development of heavy industry," said Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, "it is impossible to maintain defense capability at the proper level, which guarantees the security of our Motherland and the peaceful labor of our people." In this sense, the 10th Five-Year Plan has no equal. Precisely because of the rapid development of all sectors of the national economy, our army is equipped with everything necessary for its vital peacetime activities and for conducting combat operations, should the imperialists unleash a war.

Simultaneously with the economic tasks, the Congress also outlined important socio-political tasks on which the national defense capability also depends. Thus, successful fulfillment of the economic and socio-political tasks of the 10th Five-Year Plan will make it possible to considerably strengthen the defense capability of our Motherland.

Describing the current international situation, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev pointed out that the opponents of detente and disarmament are working actively in different directions and using a variety of tactics. In this regard, the
requirements of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the military sector boil down to the following:

--to demonstrate a high degree of vigilance regarding the intrigues of the enemies of peace and socialism and to maintain the national defense capability at the proper level. From this stem the direct requirements on the defenders of the Homeland, which were embodied in the Soviet servicemen's oath of loyalty to the party and the people at the 25th Congress;

--in fulfilling its international duty and sacred obligation, to be constantly ready, together with the fraternal armies, to take the field to defend the great achievements of socialism and give a crushing rebuff to any aggressor;

--to be prepared to the end to carry out any order in defense of the sacred borders of our beloved Motherland;

--to be constantly at a high state of combat readiness;

--to serve the cause of our own party and the Soviet people selflessly;

--to guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people vigilantly, to contribute in the future as well to the cause of strengthening peace and international security, and to promote the implementation of the grand plans outlined by the 25th Party Congress.

Understanding the full significance of these requirements, this year armed forces personnel with a feeling of great responsibility are improving their combat skill. Socialist competition has been widely implemented among units (chasti) and formations (soyedineniya). The initiators of this competition were the troops of the Guards Order of Lenin Port Arthur Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Transbaykal Military District. The motto of this competition--to make the year of the 25th Party Congress a year of further increase in combat readiness, qualitative improvement of combat training and persistent mastery of new equipment and weapons--has been enthusiastically taken up by all Soviet troops.

The troops of our Red Banner Turkestan Military District also supported this initiative. They have taken a new step toward further improving field training, developing operational and tactical training and increasing the number of distinguished graduates, qualified specialists and experts in military affairs. In the last training and field exercises, they exhibited a high degree of training and an ability to operate in harsh climatic conditions.

The troops of the Turkestan Military District, wholeheartedly devoted to their party and to their government, throughout the entire history of their military district have been models of courage and bravery. They fought to
the death against numerous enemies in the Civil War years and staunchly de-
fended their Motherland from the hordes of Brownshirts in the Great Patriotic
War. During the war years our district formed, trained and prepared officer
cadres, sent huge reserves into active duty and at the same time ensured the
inviolability of the southern borders of the Soviet Union.

The people of Turkmenistan also made their own worthy contribution to vic-
tory over the enemies of our Motherland. The Turkmen Independent Rifle Bri-
gade and the Turkmen Cavalry Division participated actively within the
Soviet Army, besides which, tens of thousands of Turkmen troops fought hero-
ically as part of other troop units and combined units.

The main strength of the army and navy lies in the people who have completely
mastered combat equipment, who are tempered physically and in a moral and
political sense and who are totally dedicated to the party and the Mother-
land. And such people are serving in the forces of our district. The
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev,
noted that the modern army, navy and air force now need educated, ideologi-
cally stable, physically fit people who are able to combine their fathers' tradi-
tion of selfless courage with complete knowledge of the latest combat
equipment. The republic party, soviet and Komsomol organizations are giv-
ing daily attention to the problems of the military training of youth. This
task is constantly before the Turkmenistan Communist Party Central Committee
and the republic government. The Turkmen SSR is a border republic, hence,
training of youth for army service is a matter of paramount importance.

The problems of military-patriotic education have begun to be considered
more frequently in the oblast', city and rayon committee bureau sessions of
the party and executive committees and in the primary party organizations
of educational institutions and industrial enterprises, in schools and at
scientific-theoretical and methodological conferences. In the republic com-
prehensive plans for military-patriotic indoctrination of youth have been
developed, and soviets and departments for military-patriotic indoctrination
have been created and are actively operating on a voluntary basis.

The republic, oblast' and rayon "Znaniye" [Knowledge] societies are making
a major contribution to the training of youth for service in the armed for-
ces. During this and the past year they have prepared and presented more
than 6,000 lectures and reports on the subjects: "The Behests of V.I.
Lenin to Soviet Youth," "V.I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Defense of the
Socialist Fatherland," "The Soviet Army—an Army of Friendship and Brother-
hood of Peoples," and others. Sections of the Republic "Znaniye" society
have published dozens of brochures on the Leninist military-theoretical
legacy, on matters of CPSU military policy and on the branches and arms
of the USSR Armed Forces and their combat traditions.
In the Turkmen SSR dozens of universities for future soldiers are operating as well as hundreds of lecture bureaus and 180 detachments of Young Friends of the Soviet Army have been established. One hundred eighty museums and 265 rooms of combat glory have been opened.

The sponsorship relations between secondary, special and higher educational institutions as well as between enterprises and troop units are well established. Hundreds of officers, warrant officers, soldiers and sergeants of the district conduct military training exercises with youth, assist in the study of combat equipment and weapons and in the acquisition of military specialties, lead groups in military-technical types of sports, acquaint youth with the conditions of military life, and study the oath of allegiance and military regulations with them. Recently in the republic, with the aid of troops from the Turkestan Military District, 185 lessons on courage, 120 military-sports games and many other para-military exercises were conducted.

All of this has contributed to the fact that well prepared, morally strong, physically developed and technically competent youth are conscripted into the service from Turkmenistan.

In performing the task of preparing youth for military service, pre-conscription training is of great significance. At present in all secondary schools of the Turkmen SSR, special training establishments conduct basic military training. Military departments in institutions of higher learning perform considerable work in training highly qualified officer cadres. Overall in the republic substantial successes have been achieved in pre-conscription training.

At the same time there are many unresolved problems in preparing youth for military service. In particular, it is desirable for young people conscripted into the service to have a firmer knowledge of the Russian language. Mastery of Russian enriches a person and raises his potential for mastering the heights of knowledge and culture. Russian is the language of Lenin. As V. Mayakovskyi said figuratively,

"Were I a Negro getting on in my years, 
Neither lazy nor filled with remorse, 
I'd learn to speak Russian—the reason is clear—
In that language did Lenin discourse."

The civil defense staffs and courses of Turkmenistan play an important role in strengthening the defense capability of the country, and primarily of their own republic. Under the guidance of party and soviet organs, they have begun to be more thoroughly occupied with training supervisory and command personnel and with improvement of training facilities. In the republic the comprehensive installation exercises stipulated by the plan are being successfully carried out. These exercises have become the basis
for preparing all enterprises of industry, construction, transport, power engineering, communications, kolkhozes and sovkhozes and training institutions for performing defense tasks. In Turkmenistan observance of Civil Defense Day has become widespread as a method of preparation for defense of the Motherland. They are especially instructive in Chardzhou, Tashauz, Kizyl-Arvat and other cities. During these days people demonstrate increased special training, precision and coordination in the operation of all sections, detachments and services.

As all servicemen in the USSR Armed Forces, the troops of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District are improving their military and political knowledge daily, attaining excellent results in combat and political training and are ensuring a high state of combat readiness, security and peace on earth.

They are responding to the historic resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress by closing their ranks still more tightly around our party's Leninist banner and laboring more earnestly to perform the task of defending the southern borders of our socialist Motherland in a worthy manner.

Our party and government directly and openly warn all advocates of the "cold war" that the peace-loving attitude of the USSR and its consistent struggle to eliminate hotbeds of military tension are not signs of weakness. A firm desire for peace and constant readiness to decisively rebuff any aggression merge in the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state.

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