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The report contains information on the Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.
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They knocked sharply and urgently on the door, like messengers do when each second is precious for them. And when he heard them, Warrant Officer [michman] Ivanchenko guessed that they had come for him.

"They want you on board quickly!" shouted the panting messenger, catching the sound of Ivanchenko's footsteps. "Very quickly!"

Always ready to answer the summons from his submarine rescue ship, the warrant officer dressed quickly, softly kissed his sleeping little daughters, reassured his wife with a joke, and swiftly walked out into the darkness.

"We are faced with a difficult job, Andrey Nikolayevich," said the chief of the diving group, Senior Lieutenant German Pobuzhayev, without mincing words. "A submarine is 'in trouble' in quadrant N. Headquarters has given us this unexpected assignment. We have to make a check."

They set out for the given area long before dawn. While still berthed Warrant Officer Ivanchenko managed to check out the equipment of his divers and talk briefly with each. As soon as they had located the "stricken" submarine and succeeded in establishing communications with it via an emergency buoy, ascertaining first of all which section was in "trouble," Warrant Officer Ivanchenko reported on the complete readiness of the divers for a descent.

The first to dive was Ivanchenko's best trainee, Petty Officer First Class Anatoliy Dvoretskiy. Just as in an attack the bravest influences the others, so in urgent dives he who is qualified by experience begins the search.

Warrant Officer Ivanchenko, meanwhile, saw to the operations. At this moment he showed maximum self-control. His black, thick brows came together over his nose; in his voice was determination, calmness, and
self-assuredness. In his mind he repeated each movement of the trainee. The latter, meanwhile, hit bottom and began a wide, circular sweep. Then the diver cut down on his sweep, leaving deep prints in the soft mud. Short words of advice; precise commands. Then the report: "I'm next to the submarine."

Then Andrey Nikolayevich's second pupil dived; then a third... Each had his own assignment. Each had been given his respective instructions: where to go, what to do and, most important, from where to approach the submarine and how to remain on it. This is no small thing. There had been a case where a rather experienced diver lost his sense of caution for an instant, and was swept from the submarine and driven into its side by the current. Then Ivanchenko had to quickly make a deep dive in order to help the diver who was losing his strength. But this time there were no falls.

Ivanchenko turned over supervision for the dives to the group commander, because it was time for him to get ready to dive. Ahead of him was the culminating and most difficult stage — transferring the case with drinking water, food, and medicine to the submarine. Several divers usually carry out this operation. Ivanchenko handled the case alone, thereby cutting the norm time in two.

"Andrey Nikolayevich, it's not just the rescue ship which is looking at you; the entire headquarters is, too!" smiled the senior chief. "But, perhaps, it would be better if the group made the transfer of the case?"

"Thank you, comrade captain 2d rank! I'll make it alone. I'll not let you down."

Over his head the carpet-like golden spots woven by the beams of the searchlights grew weaker, constantly resolving. In the depths the murkiness surrounded the diver...

/People who are truly brave and strong-willed are those who only have one love in their entire life. Now and then they search for a long time for their life's love, and having found it, remain true to their choice forever. And the more urgent and risky their profession, the more intenseness it demands, the more effort and enthusiasm they give to their business, the more are they drawn to it. Andrey Ivanchenko did not become a deep-sea diver overnight. He was a sailor; he built docks. When he was appointed an instructor in a training unit, someone was heard to say with envy: "He's lucky!" And he really was. He ended up in a large city; lessons were held in lighted classrooms, and at the signal "Lock up the sea" — each morning and day off — he went home. But after a year Ivanchenko put a report on his commander's desk with a request to be allowed to transfer to an emergency-rescue ship unit, which was stationed at a remote garrison. "Can it be that you're not happy with us?" his commander asked with surprise. "Or has someone offended you? You're a natural-born instructor."/ /in boldface/.
"I'm fine here, but I would still like to be released," insisted Andrey Nikolayevich. /in boldface/.

His new life began with a mishap. The first time he found himself under water he was not able to clear his diving suit of the residue of air which had come in through his hoses. And the sea tossed him to the surface upsideward. His friends laughed at his misfortune, but it was no laughing matter for him. He had relied on his sharpness and listened to his instruction "with half an ear." Ivanchenko remembered this lesson his whole lifetime./ /in boldface/.

Misfortune is also experience. Experience and character. Ivanchenko's character turned out to be solid; he committed no further mistakes.

Warrant Officer Ivanchenko was the first in his subunit to reach the level of master. Many are amazed and envy the facility with which the small, smartly-appearing man executes the most difficult of assignments. But only his close friends know: this facility has been achieved by means of dedicated labor, merciless demandingness on himself, and daily exhausting training. In the morning, on board ship or at home, in all kinds of weather, Ivanchenko begins with the usual physical exercises. Then he does special exercises with weighted dumb-bells and bar-bells. Later there are exercises on the horizontal bar which he has fastened to the booms of the submarine rescue ship. He spends much of his time boxing; at home in his basement he has hung a punching bag. But it is not in pursuit of titles that the warrant officer does these training exercises: a diver must have immediate reactions.

There has never been an instance when Ivanchenko "gave up" or failed to carry through a job he has begun.

Even a reminder from the deck of the ship about possible decompensation from an extended regime (this means "hanging" for several hours under water at variable depths) does not make him give up a job he has begun, if it can and must be completed. He has an intuitive feeling for how long his strength will last: experience tells him so.

... The metal boots of the diver hit bottom. The submarine was lying on the sea bottom with its running lights turned on. It was only by means of them that he could reckon where the bow and aft were. However, the lees rising up from the silt-covered bottom shrouded the lights in a thick veil, making them hardly discernible even from a short distance. Step by step Ivanchenko approached the ship with the case. Approaching from the side from which the current would carry a diver toward the ship, he began to take air into his diving suit carefully. Nudged by the current, he climbed up on the submarine, felt for the hand rail in the darkness, and grabbed it with his free hand. In the other he held the line of the case which had to be passed to men on the submarine as quickly as possible. According to the scenario they were out of water and food, and had injured men on board.
Overcoming the current and bracing the boots of his diving suit on the drain holes, the warrant officer crept to where the bow light was shining dimly. There he would pass the case through an opening in the torpedo launcher. Each movement of the deep-sea diver was made with the assurance of an acrobat working at a great height without fear. Momentary confusion or a slight mistake, and the current would throw him from the submarine.

The perspiration seared his eyes and burned the skin on his flushed face. He would have loved to have stopped to catch his breath, but the case had to be transferred as quickly as possible. The torpedo launcher was already opened. With one hand Ivanchenko grabbed for a protuberance, resting his shoulder against edge of the launcher housing, while dragging the case with the other. Deep under the many meters of water and in pitch darkness the diver now hung as if on a wall, while the case, as luck would have it, was unruly. It refused to be pushed through, resisting and moving to the side. "Will nothing obey?" the warrant officer said to himself, then adding aloud for those above: "Give me more air!"

Catching his breath a bit, the diver tried one more time. He made it! From the deck of the rescue time they informed him that he had beat the norm by two and a half times. And this was done alone.

He found himself once more on the sea bottom. As before there was pitch darkness all around, although, probably, far above on the surface, where the sky met the sea, a thin thread of the horizon was beginning to grow pink with the coming dawn. He could let up a bit and recover from the recent struggle. How pleasant were these moments of relaxation in the day. One time he had played with a curious flounder who, on the occasion of this encounter, at first shielded the light of the diving helmet. When the diver veered the flounder turned to the glass and began to look inside the diving suit. It was especially enthralled with the air bubbles. And so it circled, sometimes touching the diving suit, sometimes swimming off when the diver unexpectedly moved a meter or meter and a half. Another time he found a cracked wooden amphora with its drawing preserved...

But now it was dark and there was nothing to admire. His thoughts returned to the deck of the rescue ship, where new cares awaited him, the team petty officer, and the secretary of the ship's party organization.

Poor is the master who does not have trainees! And Nikolay Andreyevich had many. And almost all of them in the year of the 25th Congress of the CPSU had become a first-class specialist. The sailors of this outstanding crew had completely fulfilled the obligations which they had assumed for the winter period of their training. But the finish of the academic year was at hand. Time was precious and it was still necessary, prior to the ship's return to base, to conduct an exercise with a detailed analysis of today's dives: someone had committed a mistake. As part of his Party activity duty Warrant Officer Ivanchenko was faced with
a difficult conversation with a veteran communist who had forgotten his assignment...

He returned home late at night. Undressing quietly, he carefully entered the room. Seeing his wife's questioning look, he smiled: "Everything went perfect. At headquarters they are satisfied. But then how could it be otherwise with such fellows like our divers? What did I do myself? Well, my job was simple -- to train the young ones, to help them and prompt them. The work, understand, is calm and peaceful, just like at a rest home." And he bent over his sleeping little daughters.
First impressions, as it is well known, are remembered for a long time. And I well remember how flying over the future trace of the Baykal-Amur Mainline (BAM) in a helicopter we, above all, were impressed by the beauty of this primeval nature. In the Transbaykal it was truly magnificent: mountains, the multicolored, changing taiga, rushing rivers full of water, marshes, and swamps. Then with uneasiness I thought of how difficult it would be here for those who would be taming these gigantic areas, including the railroad construction troops. How would they handle the heavy machinery in these difficult places? How would they take care of the living conditions and personal services of the railroad builders, and then keep them supplied with all which was necessary?

And now a little later and we are at the BAM again. It is a pleasure to see that much has changed here. The previously-silent taiga is noticeably enlivened and cheerful looking; vehicle points in forest clearings and the cluster of huts and tents are true little islands of liveliness in the sea of the taiga! There appear well-built settlements, their access roads and helicopter pads; bridges are thrown across rivers. By means of the railroad one can now reach several stations which a little while ago only existed on drawings and plans. In a word, in a short time such changes have taken place which might cause even those who have seen much in their lifetime to be amazed.

Here on the BAM there has been a warm welcome for the lines from "Basic Trends in the Development of the USSR National Economy for the Years 1976-1980" which read: "To provide the regions of Siberia and the Far East with cadre, ensure a quickened pace in the construction of living quarters and public amenities in these areas." And much is being done to turn an uninhabited area into one which is full of life.

Providing living quarters in all cases is not a simple matter. On the BAM the problem is complicated by general weather conditions and also by the limited nature of many construction materials and the fierce limit of time.
It should be said, to the credit of the railroad construction troops, that they have not faltered in the face of difficulties, and are not coping badly with the problem. In a minimum time personnel have obtained first temporary housing and then more or less permanent. The commander of a subunit, not without pride, pointed to the food storage works with its bakery and the cold-storage house in which perishables are stored, which was built by his troops. Work was in full swing on the vegetable storage house under construction and the new dining hall facility.

A whole street of well-aligned houses, in which the families of officers and warrant officers [praporshchik] lived, were shown to us by the battalion commander, Colonel L. Bogdanov. Private and sergeant personnel have been billeted here in standard barracks. Only a small portion of the troops remain in tents.

Let me anticipate the question: why, you say, do they still have people living permanently in tents even during biting frosts? In the first place, those who will not be staying long in one place remain in tents. And the tents on the BAM are not like those used on a camping trip. First of all, a log form is cut out and its grooves are packed with tow and moss. Then a warm floor is laid, and only then is the tent stretched out. By the way, it is a multilayered tent, with a warm, white replaceable lining. Inside a brick stove is installed with a special flue. So in such living quarters the frost is not too bad.

"The first winter on the BAM," the unit commander related to me, "was very difficult for all of us. In the next one, making use of our acquired experience, we accomplished much on the everyday facilities; now the winters for us, figuratively speaking, have become warmer."

It is appropriate to mention here that the clothing of the mainline-builders is not the usual kind, but rather takes into account working conditions and climate: long sheepskin coats, hanging below the knees, specially-sewn work clothes, rubber boots with fine-porous rubber insulation, felt boots with vulcanized rubber soles, and special hats with ear flaps.

Food supply specialists face great hardships on the BAM. At first they were forced to cook food only in field kitchens, and now and then simply in a kettle. They are building more and more permanent mess halls now; less temporary ones remain. Food is always prepared on time and, as a rule, is of good quality. True, some cooks manage to turn excellent food into tasteless dishes and shortcomings exist in the feeding arrangement. But this type of thing, of course, is not "in the specific nature" of service for the mainline builders. And the responsibility for such shortcomings must be of the strictest form.

It was not a simple thing to master the supply of bread either. They started with each battalion being given its own means for baking bread in the field, with people being selected and trained for this purpose.
Warrant Officer V. Fedotov recalls, for example, that it was a dreadful thing to be chosen for this job. Although he did his first baking job together with a specialist from Moscow and his second with the latter looking on, it still took him a long time to master the secrets of baking bread. But now their coworkers make satisfactory remarks about the bread-bakers' work.

Now there is talk of establishing garrison bread-bakers on the BAM, not using field but, rather, permanent equipment. This will reduce the number of people involved in baking, and improve the productivity and quality of work.

The mainline builders have been sufficiently supplied with mechanized, portable laundries; in many cities laundry and bath combines spring up among the first projects being built. But in the military unit where officer A. Vetoshkin was responsible for the well-being of the soldiers such an important project was begun only after a great delay. Today Vetoshkin's successor Major Yu. Pan'kov has managed, in a very short time, to see to the regular bathing of personnel, washing of linen, and the repair of clothing.

A sufficient number of medical aid stations have been set up on the BAM. They have been installed in tents, railroad cars, and log houses. In all units the doctors are able to receive and examine, and arrange for treatment in a field hospital. Medical supplies are supplied in good fashion. But this is what is disturbing; other medics expect someone to come and transfer them from the tents to more pleasant surroundings. But Captain of the Medical Service V. Razumov awaits no one's aid. As soon as the unit arrived in the construction area, he personally saw to the building of an aid station. I was in that excellently-equipped hut; right now all needed medical care can be provided there.

Today on the BAM there are already a few good stores, officers' coffee houses, and enlisted tea rooms. It is notable that from the first months of spring this year into the market and planned supply system there came vegetables, greens, berries, and fruits. Much of these vitamin-rich products are now being stored up for the winter. As we see, even in this respect, the builders do not feel themselves cut off from the "big city." A restraining factor in everyday commercial service is a weakness in the material and technical base of military supply. Not a few stores are huddled together in railroad cars and do not possess suitable quarters.

And nonetheless, today the BAM is nowhere near what it was a year ago. The even, clean streets of the little towns dot the taiga. The visible activity is especially obvious against the background of dense forest. In homes, as a rule, there are radios; the "Orbita" System has even brought television to many of them. People regularly see movie films and concerts. There has sprung up among military subunits a socialist competition for best barracks, tent, day room, and best organization of services and amenities in the territory.
... Upon entering the tent I turned my attention to the house slippers lined up in a row. "We don't wear boots in the hut," explained the company warrant officer, Warrant Officer F. Prokopenkov. And, really, in such a cozy place one does feel out of place in boots: the waxed floor shines and the bed linen on the soldiers' bunks sparkles with its whiteness.

It is a good and necessary thing this competition for exemplariness in daily routine. Under conditions on the BAM it is good for two reasons: there is still a lot to be done and sometimes the conditions under which the men building the mainline work and live are extremely difficult. I have already talked about several such contrasts. I would like to emphasize again: if there are no whimperers on the BAM, there are still those who are dependent by nature. Helping such people and teaching them to organize their daily routine intelligently is an important obligation of our service chiefs.

The mainline military construction men are solving unusual tasks. Remembering my encounters with them I am convinced they will successfully carry them out. A well-organized routine should contribute to this.

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The battalion under the command of Major N. Ushakov moved forward vigorously. It was still far to the line where they would probably make contact with the "enemy's" advancing reserves. No one was, obviously, expecting to make use of any maneuver at this point. But unexpectedly for those taking part in the exercise, the major battalion force began to move in the direction of a wooded area a little to the side.

Only one company, after increasing the spread between vehicles, continued to move toward the "enemy."

The question was raised automatically: What was the reason for the maneuver? What caused it? An attempt to get half the unit out from under an "enemy" attack? Or, perhaps, these operations were an element of a more complex plan?

Before the exercise the senior chief spoke about Major Ushakov as a decisive commander with initiative, competent tactically, and accustomed to making original decisions. But in this situation which developed before our eyes the battalion commander's decision was difficult to figure out. It led, so it seemed to us, to a loss of initiative.

Had the experienced officer made a blunder this time, perhaps? However, we did not have to wait long for an answer; and we watched as events unfolded.

The main forces of the battalion commanded by Ushakov entered the forest. Reaching its western edge they took up combat positions and camouflaged themselves. The company, continuing forward to meet the "enemy" shortly afterward also deployed along an unusually wide front, taking up positions which were tactically advantageous. The tankmen were ready to repulse the attacking of the advancing "enemy" reserves.

The latter, it seemed, would any minute discover the companies hiding in the woods, cut off their escape, and eliminate them from the battle. But
surprisingly, this did not happen. As if drawn by a magnet toward the company deployed for a defensive action, the "enemy" attacked it with full forces on the move.

The battle was intense and over quickly. It looked like the "enemy" was just about to be successful when the main battalion force hit his flank and rear. The unexpected attack quickly changed the situation right from the beginning. The initiative, which the enemy appeared to control up to this time, began to pass over to Major Ushakov.

In the end result the battle gave an objective and simple appraisal of the commanders' decisions. Nonetheless, a number of questions which came up even before the battle began still remained unanswered. Why, in the end, did events develop "according to Ushakov's plan" and not contrary to it?

Only a careful analysis could answer this exactly. After the exercise we asked the commanders of the opposing sides to tell us what the basis for their decisions were.

Here is what Major Ushakov told us:

"Our assignment consisted in reducing to a minimum the advantage which the 'enemy' possessing superior men and equipment had in open battle. Having studied the terrain and completely analyzed the data which our reconnaissance provided we looked at several options. We wanted to choose that which, in the 'enemy' viewpoint, would be eliminated."

Further, the battalion commander said that while examining the probable line of encounter with the "enemy" he turned his attention to the forest which was located to the aide of the area where the battle could be expected to occur. This forest had been well examined on their part. The "enemy", on the other hand, was forced to study it from a map. The map immediately convinced him that the area around the forest was not suitable for tank action.

"The access routes to the forest were really difficult," continued the major, "but not so difficult as to exclude them from our plans. I decided upon that option which the most favorable risk. I was convinced that the risk was justified."

"And what if the 'enemy' had been successful in discovering your main battalion force in the forest?" I asked.

"Measures had been taken to avoid this," answered the major. "Through the actions of our combat reconnaissance squads we directed the attention of the 'enemy' to the forward movement of our tanks. These, as you know, were the tanks of only one of our companies. If the 'enemy', nonetheless, has succeeded in exposing our forces in the forest, he would not have been able to break out to the flanks and rear; but, rather, would have had to send his forces in two directions. Consequently, even with the worst turn of events for us, he would have had no advantage. It turned out to be just the opposite..."
This is how Major Ushakov made his decisions in combat. After he explained them, it became clear that he acted prudently, with a calculated risk, and demonstrated completely an ability to anticipate the course of battle. Comparing the "enemy's" capabilities and those of his own sub-unit, and studying the terrain on which both sides presumably would be fighting, he intelligently examined several combat options and chose the most reasonable. His accuracy in predicting allowed him to develop an original plan and successfully accomplish it.

And now let us listen to another combat commander -- Captain S. Zhitnikov, who in this duel made up the opposing side. He said:

"We tried first to stop the 'enemy' from moving up to an advantageous position. This would have given us an added advantage, since we already had the advantage in tanks and artillery. This is why I and my staff did not stop to examine the options which, we were thoroughly convinced, would be of unlikely advantage. The mistake was compounded by the fact that our reconnaissance was comparably oriented. This is why the battle developed contrary to what had been planned."

As we see, commanders take various routes to arrive at a decision. While Major Ushakov began his operations with a study of the terrain and reconnaissance data on the "enemy," Captain Zhitnikov gave a minimum of attention to this. Moreover, an analysis of the data on the "enemy" and his intentions, and a careful study of the terrain and its possible effects on the battle are the most important facts when trying to analyze and make the most correct decision. Acquiring, sorting, and taking action upon this information in a short time is not a simple matter. It requires the coordinated work of the commander and his staff, and an ability to select the most important out of the great flow of information which is coming in. And this, as a matter of fact, is what Captain Zhitnikov did not do. And to make the decision, besides exact data, there is required, naturally, what we call command inventiveness and boldness.

Two decisions... One, at first, seemed to be the wrong one, but turned out, in fact, to be deeply thought out and well-founded. The other, from outward appearances, seemed to answer the customary, "classic" requirements, but failed to come through in practice. One led to success; the other, to defeat. We learn such lessons from the operations of commanders on the field of battle.
YEPISHEV BOOK REVIEWED

Moscow KRASTVA, ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Oct 76 p 2

The book review by Maj Gen N. Pankratov, professor and doctor of historical sciences: "The Party -- Organizer of Our Victories"

The current level of development of science is characterized by an ever deeper and varied research into the revolutionary and reforming activity of the CPSU in the building of a communist society and in the organization of the defense of the achievements of socialism.

After the 25th Congress of the CPSU, taking into account the new, growing demands on scientific research, the process continues to acquire more depth and breadth. Among publications attention is called to the new book of the chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, General of the Army A. A. Yepishev, entitled "Party -- Organizer of Our Victories." It is dedicated to an analysis of the historical decisions of the 25th Party Congress and, based on them, an examination of the basic problems of the military policy of the CPSU, party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces, and organizational-ideological activity of army and navy political bodies and party organizations.

In the first chapter of the book, entitled "CPSU -- Political Leader of the Soviet People," there is a complete characterization of the CPSU as the party of scientific communism, scientific principles of its policy and the source of its power and strength.

In it there is an examination of the basic results of the heroic journey of the builders of communism and evidence that the 25th Congress of the CPSU has uncovered prospects for a future development in all spheres of our country's social life -- economic, socio-political, ideological, and other areas.

In the chapter there is a deep analysis of the activity of the party in the military field in light of the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU; foundation is given to the historical necessity of military defense of the achievements of socialism from imperialist aggressors, basic directions in the strengthening of the country's defense, in a further increase in the military might and combat readiness of the the Soviet Armed Forces, and in the military unity of the countries of socialist solidarity.
The CPSU, being the highest form of social-political organization, exercises leadership over all spheres of life of Soviet society and all its institutions and organizations. The Soviet Armed Forces are no exception, for they form an inseparable part of the nation and express in themselves the principles of the socialist order, and its class nature and ideology. "The theoretical genius of the Leninist party, its perspicacity and will, and scientific approach to solving the complex problems encountered in building the Soviet military," the book emphasizes, "serve as that decisive factor which ensures the reliable defense of the Soviet nation."

Party-political work in the army and navy is a powerful party weapon. Its main aim, as the second chapter of the book points out, is the constant conduct of Party policy among the troops, the implementation of Leninist ideas on defense of the fatherland, and the ensuring of the fulfillment of the demands of the Communist Party on problems of strengthening the defensive capability of the country, and the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

All efforts in party-political work are concentrated in the solution of such a responsible and complex problem as maintaining the army and navy at a constant state of combat readiness. Party-political work is directed toward improving methods in the political approach to solving problems of combat readiness, to achieving higher indicators in training, especially in the mastery of new equipment, to improving party integrity in appraising training fire results, rocket launches, cruises, and flights, and to creating in military collectives an atmosphere of intolerance for disruption in discipline and for very minor instances of over-simplification and permissiveness in the training of personnel.

Carrying out the requirement of the 25th Congress of the CC CPSU military councils, commanders, political bodies, and party organizations of the army and navy are perfecting their party and political work and improving their efficiency.

The third chapter of the book, entitled "Improving the Level of Party Leadership -- Command of Time," is read with great interest. In it there is an analysis of the qualitative make-up of party ranks, methods for improving aggressiveness in party organizations, questions concerning a further perfecting of party leadership by komsomol organizations, and an exposition of the essence of Leninist style in work and its fulfillment in the activity of military councils, commanders, political bodies, party organizations, and questions of party personnel policy.

In the fourth chapter of the book, entitled "Ideological-Educational Work: Problems and Methods for Their Solution," there is demonstrated the huge contribution which the 25th Congress of the CPSU has made in the future development of Marxist-Leninist theory as a great international study. In light of the decisions of the 25th Party Congress there has been an increased demand on developing military theory and on a complete strengthening of its ties to military practice. Under conditions of a continuous development of military affairs we must solve anew many questions in the
and from different positions approach an analysis of the military-political situation and the options for action on the part of the armed forces in turning back potential aggression.

In light of Leninist directives and the decrees of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, the book makes a detailed analysis of the problems of ideological-educational work in the armed forces.

At the heart of all ideological-educational work is the formation in the Soviet troops of a communist world outlook and their education in the ideas of Marx-Lenin.

The fifth and concluding chapter is devoted to a description of the Soviet Armed Forces as schools of moral-political tempering and courage. In the chapter again and again there is emphasized the national character of the Soviet Armed Forces, their basic difference from bourgeois armies, and their historical predestination — to be the guard of the peaceful labor of the Soviet nation and a bulwark of the general peace.

The overriding idea of the entire book is the Leninist idea that the party is the mind, honor, and conscience of our epoch. The powerful, creative energy of the Leninist party, its collective reasoning and titanic activity are directed toward the nation's welfare. It is the organizer and inspiration of all our victories. Under the leadership of the CPSU, the Soviet nation is confidently building a communist society and is taking all the necessary measures for a further strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces and defensive might of the Soviet state.

6851
CSO: 1801
PERSUASION AS AN EFFECTIVE FORM OF PARTY INFLUENCE STRESSED

Moscow KRNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Oct 76 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen V. Novikov, member of the military council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District: "Persuasion -- a Party Method"

[Excerpts] Carrying out CPSU policies in the army and navy and further increasing the combat readiness of the USSR's armed forces--these are the main tasks of army and navy party organizations. Its successful solution depends on how communists, each in his own place, perform their service and party duties and on how actively they participate in forming among the men a high political awareness, a deep understanding of their duty to the motherland, and a striving to master ever newer and newer heights in combat skill in an organized and disciplined manner.

Effective party influence on the combat readiness of subunits and units, the implementation of training programs and socialist responsibilities, the maintenance of strong discipline and regulation procedures are accomplished by effectively influencing a serviceman's mind and feelings.

Here, one must emphasize a distinctive feature of party work with the men. The party organization must not mechanically copy the work methods of commanders and chiefs who, as they say, "prop up" their orders with decisions. Orders do not need this. However, army communists are first of all called upon to bring the content and meaning of a commander's desire to the notice of each soldier, sergeant, and officer, to inspire personnel by impassioned words and striking example to selflessly perform an assigned training or combat mission, and to stand at the head of the formation when necessary. It follows from this that active persuasion methods must lie at the basis of party influence on troop life and activity.

Unfortunately, here and there they forget this. Some party leaders, who are in the habit of impassively discussing things "by and large," are anxious about only one thing: How is it possible to implement a measure "corresponding to the tasks of the men" more quickly and report it around the department. How to lead and how to enkindle the hearts of the people--their hearts do not bleed over this.
Meanwhile, life keeps on reminding us that flaws in combat training and failures in discipline are frequently explained by indifference in indoctrination and by formalism in party work. For example, the party organization, where Capt V. Serdyuk is the secretary often stood aside from the tasks being solved by the subunit until recently. Of course, here as everywhere party meetings are held and decisions taken. However, all this frequently did not provide the proper effect.

We will cite only one example. A party meeting was held in the subunit on the eve of exercises. It is necessary to point out that earlier instances of indulgences and overstating of ratings were tolerated by some communist leaders during field classes. It would seem that the meeting of the communists would have had to give an evaluation based on principle to these shortcomings. However, nothing like this happened. The speaker, Lt Col Yu. Karasev, and the comrades who participated in the discussions avoided the sharp corners and did not display any strict severity towards those due to whose fault the oversimplifications had appeared. No wonder that the meeting voted indifferently for the proposed draft of the decision (which, by the way, was prepared in a hurry, in a "put out the fire" fashion) and quietly broke up.... Do you think it is possible after such a formalized discussion of a serious question to expect the proper return from the practical work of the communists?

The district's political directorate had to correct both Lt Col Yu. Karasev and the members of the subunit's party bureau. As a result of the measures which were taken, this party organization finally faced its real responsibility—active influence on combat training and discipline, on the indoctrination of communists, and on mobilizing all personnel to solve successfully tasks assigned to the subunit.

To bring the party line to the masses of troops, to bring its main essence to the notice of soldiers, sergeants and officers—this is an important and critical mission. A thorough knowledge of their job and a creative approach to agitation and propaganda work are required of communists.

Questions on strengthening party influence on the life and training of the troops and on solving complicated combat training tasks must be regularly submitted for discussion by the chiefs of political organs and the secretaries of party committees and bureaus and by other aktivists. In doing this it is necessary to place at the center of attention those questions which are linked with the mastery of progressive ways and means for the party to influence the activity of troop collectives in units, military training institutes, and staffs. This permits political organs and party organizations to increase in every way possible the responsibility of communists for quality in solving tasks on combat readiness, not by substituting for commanders but by acting using methods inherent in party and political work.
The fighting men in the district's units and subunits now maintain an account of the way they are carrying out their responsibilities during this training year. This busy time coincided with the most important event in the life of party organizations—with the reports and elections in party organs. While discussing the results of the year's work, communists are planning practical measures which are directed toward the further strengthening of party influence on the results of the military labor of troop collectives.

8802
CSO: 1801
Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Oct 76 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank G. Savichev, special correspondent for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "An Engineer From a Nuclear-Powered Vessel"]

I first decided to write a feature story on Stanislav Pavlovich Samsonov ten years ago. At that time the nuclear submarine, on which I found myself, was making a-round-the-world underwater voyage as part of a squadron. Samsonov was the commander of the boat's electro-mechanical department [VCh].

However, I did not immediately find out that he was the VCh-5 commander. There are enough people on nuclear-powered vessels. Everyone is in the same blue overalls. The main point is that you cannot become acquainted with everyone in a single day. However, a lean impetuous officer with a pale, almost waxen, face soon stood out. I will honestly say that at first Samsonov did not make any particular impression on me. I did like his impetuosity or nervousness very much.

However, day after day passed and gradually other features in his character began to appear. Samsonov's omnipresence—his exceptional ability to turn up immediately where things were most difficult and where quick and decisive actions were required—was striking.

I could not help but notice something else as well. Samsonov enjoyed indisputable authority among his subordinates. How had he earned their kindly feelings? Sr Lt Boris Tyutyayev once commented:

"He has the gift—to win the sailors' favor by the simplicity of his contacts, his ability to find a common topic for discussion, and his readiness to show concern for an individual."

The resoluteness in the engineer mechanic won the hearts of the other submariners.
A young sailor, dragging out his words almost like a child, said: "We have an exercise, 'Rescue from a sinking submarine.' It is necessary to climb into a torpedo tube with special equipment. The tube is then tightly shut. It is cramped, dark and damp in the tube. The first time I looked into it there was frost on the skin. Where are you chucked out from this tube? They said: 'To the bottom of the pool. From there one must swim to the surface.' To think about it is to become a little terrified. But the department commander came up to me. He said: 'Have more confidence--I will go with you the first time.' With the commander--it's a different matter. I resolutely climbed into the tube behind him and I felt not a bit terrified."

Only one episode? It seems not. The sailors recall how once it was necessary to perform urgent work in a remote and dark ballast tank. It wasn't so simple to do. It was necessary to work under the great pressure which was created by the pumping in the compressed air tank. Of course, Samsonov could have entrusted the job to the sailors. But no, he inspected the tank himself and participated himself in the work.

Meanwhile week after week was passing of what, it seemed, was an endless underwater voyage—a voyage having a great research character. For the first time in history a squadron of nuclear-powered vessels was encircling the planet under water. It is necessary to say that the most complex and newest for that time equipment operated without a hitch. Happy and proud of this, I could not but help pay the required attention to the senior engineer mechanic on the nuclear-powered vessel—to the individual on whom this smooth working greatly depended.

Once I approached him: "I would like to write a feature story about you very much. Won't you agree to talk with me?" However, Stanislav Pavlovich, pleaded that he was busy and refused to talk.

I then thought: "Perhaps the man does not wish to be written about. O.K! My notebooks are swelled with notes. There will be something to relate about the men in the nuclear navy."

However, when the voyage was over I found out that Stanislav Pavlovich Samsonov had been awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

I thought: "It was to no purpose that I did not insist on an interview." And another consoling thought was born: "Never mind. I will get on that boat again somehow."

However, time spread the submariners from the guards nuclear-powered vessel everywhere. Even Samsonov disappeared from my field of view.

After about five years I again heard of him in this way. The depot ship "Ivan Kucherenko" was returning from a long voyage in the Pacific Ocean. Here is its home port. There is a mass of welcomeers at the moorage. However, there is no one to greet me. The house where I live is thousands of kilometers from here.
Suddenly, I see a familiar face: Lev Alekseyevich Mironov, one of the participants in the underwater round-the-world voyage. He had grown. He had been a senior lieutenant then and now he was a captain 3d rank. However, he was still a lively and sociable individual—one about whom they say: "the spirit of the collective."

We shared our reminiscences all evening long. I asked Mironov: "But where is Samsonov?"

"He moved on to teaching. He teaches in a higher military naval school."

"In a school?" I was amazed. "It hadn't seemed in his nature."

Lev Alekseyevich replied: "Who knows him. His nature is not really an ordinary one."

Mironov told me the following story. Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov, the commander in chief of the navy, arrived on the nuclear-powered vessel on the eve of the round-the-world underwater voyage. He inspected the ship and talked with the sailors. Then he gathered the officers together for a meeting. Even before the meeting Samsonov told his senior chiefs: "The supply people are squeezing me with spare parts. Something should be said to the commander in chief about this." "What do you think?" they answered Samsonov. "He will begin to concern himself with your bolts and screws even if you broach the subject?" However, when the meeting was ending and the commander in chief asked if anyone had any questions, Samsonov got up from his seat—lean, tall, somewhat awkward. He began to pull out a thread. He had ordered electroplate and the bureaucratic suppliers had crossed out something in the electroplate—and he actually began to talk about bolts and screws.

Mironov recalled with a smile: "We sat and thought: 'The commander in chief will now cut off the thread.' But no! The commander in chief listened very attentively to Samsonov. The next morning everything that the engineer mechanic had requested was delivered to the ship. Everything came in handy on the voyage.

Some time after this conversation, I met Samsonov himself. It occurred in a city by the sea. It was a happy meeting. We switched at once to "you [familiar form]", exclaiming: "Do you remember?" Then I asked:

"How about the feature article? There is essentially nothing to interfere with it now."

Stanislav Pavlovich became bored: "That's not the case. Teaching does not come easy." Then he unexpectedly asked: "Do you remember officer Khitrichenko who served with us?"
How could one not remember him. The subunit which Khitrichenko commanded was a leader in competition throughout the round-the-world voyage. Thus my conversation with Samsonov was sidetracked again. However, in return I soon met Captain 2d Rank Valentin Yakovlevich Khitrichenko. We naturally reminisced about the round-the-world voyage and his leadership in competition.

Khitrichenko said: "Honestly speaking, I owe this and much more primarily to Samsonov. He never tied down initiative. He always gave elbow room for independence. It happened that you were the engineer mechanic on watch. This job, as you know, is troublesome. It is necessary to remember a hundred concerns. Different chiefs train the men on watch differently. Some, not moving away from the control panel, pour in so many and all sorts of comments.... At times you do not know what to snatch at. Samsonov, when he was at the control post, conducted himself as if he did not notice you. In return when you changed shifts, he without fail discussed your actions, analyzed them, and pointed out mistakes."

It is not an easy matter to be a senior engineer mechanic on a ship. It is doubly difficult on a submarine. On a nuclear-powered vessel it is even more complicated. The fundamentally new ships required, in the main, fundamentally new skills and new views on operating them from the engineer mechanics. It is possible to say one thing. A nuclear reactor, the miracle of the century, is only part of the power equipment for which the VCh-5 commander has responsibility. Samsonov was always on top of this responsibility.

In this connection I remember the Drake Strait. It was, it seemed, one of the most complicated segments of our voyage. Since the beginning of time, this strait has enjoyed the worst reputation among the world's sailors. It is not by accident that Cape Horn, which is located here, is also called the Cape of Storms and the graveyard of ships. Icebergs, which present a danger even to modern submarines, are often encountered here.

One of Samsonov's immediate chiefs was talking to me: "Even before approaching the Drake Strait I invited the engineer mechanic to my cabin in order to discuss with him whether it was possible to make a preventive inspection of some equipment. You understand—it was necessary to meet the Drake Strait fully armed. Samsonov carefully studied my proposal and reported that such an inspection could be made. I admit that I followed the progress of the matter with some nervousness. It was no laughing matter. Speed would not be reduced. We would not surface. Nevertheless, several pieces of equipment would be inspected. However, I trusted Samsonov. I trusted him first of all as a true engineer and practical worker and as a genuine nuclear submeriner. He possessed special instincts. Let us take only trimming the boat. In order to bring the boat to an ideally suspended position it is not enough to have an exceptional knowledge of its construction. It is necessary to be finely attuned to the ship. This sense was developed in Samsonov to the highest degree. But concerning that memorable preventive inspection, he conducted it successfully. We passed through the strait safely, as you recall."
Several days after this conversation I was leaving on temporary duty. The
night before, I called Samsonov: "Tomorrow, I will be at the school."

However, in the morning I did not find him in the school. I introduced
myself to Engr Capt 1st Rank Aleksandr Semenovich Dement'yev, the depart-
ment chief.

Aleksandr Semenovich said: "Samsonov arrived in our department quite
recently. However, it is already clear that his personality is outstanding.
No! No! He is not a man without shortcomings. Sometimes he is excessively
hasty and hot-tempered and painfully modest. However, on the whole he is a
genuine party man full of principles.

I found out again that it was not easy for Samsonov to master the complicated
profession of a teacher. Besides experience on sailing, which he possessed
to the fullest measure, it was necessary to build up new qualities: learning,
the teaching art, and theoretical skills.

Samsonov undertook to perform this new task with his inherent selflessness
and ardor. He studied theory both during his duty hours and during his
free time.

Now, when the main difficulties are behind him it is possible to say that
his arrival in the school was, on the whole an event in accordance with law.
Who if not he—-one of those who are rightfully called the original travellers
who belong to that galaxy of submariners which were the first to become
proficient on nuclear vessels—should transmit this very rich experience to
the new generation of sailors.

The department chief and I talked but Samsonov still did not appear. I
could not wait for him and left the school. I directed my attention to a
bulletin board in the lobby entitled "The Best Teachers in the School."
Among the names I met one familiar to me, Engr Capt 1st Rank Samsonov, S.P.

I then thought: Perhaps it is possible to write a feature story without
interviewing the hero, himself?

8802
CSO: 1801
COMMAND TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS DISCUSSED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 12 Oct 76 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Kolesnikov: "Who Will Climb to the Bridge?"]

[Text] At first, this question can appear purely rhetorical. Who will climb to the command bridge? Who? He, who has been appointed to a command position and who, as is the custom in the fleet, has passed examinations permitting him to control a ship.

Actually, passing examinations which permit one to perform duties is a traditional navy form of checking an officer's competence and his readiness to fill a new position, be it a group commander, a department commander, or a ship commander. The examinations include a wide range of questions touching on the equipment's construction and operating rules, navigation, tactics, and work organization. The officers' theoretical knowledge and practical skills are subject to testing also.

Both for a lieutenant who has been appointed commander of a launch after completing a school and for an officer who has served in the fleet and is given a large ship, passing the examinations presents quite a bit of difficulty. Modern equipment is complicated. The amount of it on ships grows constantly. Combat exercises become more complicated. Tactics undergo changes.... Thus the broad and, at the same time, strict requirements, which have been announced by the commission for ship commanders, are dictated by the times. Only people with clearly pronounced capabilities, thorough knowledge and a great desire to climb to the command bridge successfully pass such a checking.

The latest examinations have been taken. The concluding interview has taken place with the flag officer. The lieutenant and the captain 2d rank--both breathe with relief. Both are permitted to control a ship on their own. The lieutenant commands a launch and the captain 2d rank a cruiser; however the commission was equally strict with them. To allow an officer to control a ship is not to simply permit him to sail independently and solve training
missions. It means to endow him with the great trust which the party and
the people show to ship commanders who perform their duty on the seas and
on the oceans, often thousands of miles from their native shores. Mothers
entrust their sons to commanders. The country entrusts modern complex
equipment and powerful weapons to them. The command entrusts them with
difficult missions which at times have state importance. An officer in a
command position must deeply feel all this and be aware of it. Therefore,
the licensing examination cannot be limited to the area of determining an offic-
er's knowledge, abilities and skills in the military technical arena. The
licensing examination is also a test of the future commander's political
maturity and a check of his moral, psychological, and mental qualities.

It is impossible to say that this moral aspect of the licensing examination
remains in the shadows. If there exists in the military technical part of
the examination a definite and strict system or methodology which has been
modified by practice and consolidated in documents, the moral permission
takes place instinctively at times. It is not a simple matter to "catch"
its criterion. It is usually easier in life to correct a commander's
military technical blunders than his moral shortcomings. Let us suppose
that a young commander, while berthing, gently leans with all his might
on the pier. Of course, there is trouble. However, in general, no one
considers that it will, in principle, place the commander's future in doubt.
But if a commander, for example, is not able to rally the crew around him
or acquire authority because of some negative quality or other, then the
question of his further service actually arises.

However, even less significant errors by a commander in the moral sphere have
large repercussions both in the collective and in the command element.
Here is one case. Sr Lt N. Simonov, a ship commander, received the report:
"Man overboard!" It would seem that his reaction would be natural: a
"bullet" to the bridge—and routine measures for the rescue. The affair
should have been solved in seconds. However, Simonov wasted them by not
hurrying to put on his fur jacket and by not hurrying to ask some questions.
He climbed to the bridge at normal speed.... A fatal mistake did not occur
only because there was a less "tranquil" commander on another ship. Simonov
could have worked accurately and quickly. It is difficult to admit the
thought that he lost his head when he received the report. His references
were flattering: intelligent, bold, controlled his ship well. At one time
he had passed the licensing examination quickly and easily. But now the
officer lacked moral maturity and a sense of command responsibility for his
subordinates. Even the senior chiefs had not detected this in time.

Of course, to examine nature is a delicate matter. I cannot help but
remember in connection with this my own service on the border of a command
position. I was a senior lieutenant and had mastered the duties of assistant
to the ship commander rather quickly. I liked the work and, therefore,
engaged in it with enthusiasm. Free time cropped up. My old passion—
music—had an effect. I began to be active in amateur talent activities. I
thought: There are no claims by my superiors in this area. One year passed
and I received permission to control a ship and had independent voyages on my record. In short, there was nothing to darken my spirit except one circumstance. The years went by and I was still an assistant to the commander. I often went to sea on my own. I performed missions successfully. However, I was not made a commander. Only much later did I find out that practically the main reason for my seven-year sojourn in one position was... music. My chiefs said: "He is not a serious individual—he plays the accordion..."

At first glance this instance could be included in the ranks of curiosities. However, I would like to emphasize something else: There are no "small details" in the make-up of the man on the bridge. In this sense, the strictness of my senior chiefs, who in those days decided my fate, is without a doubt instructive.

Many years have passed since then. The present time has a different rhythm. It does not provide an opportunity for senior chiefs to rely on the "live and see" method. When solving cadre questions, it is now better to stick to relying not on the duration of observation of subordinates but on the intentness of these observations and on the depth of penetration into an individual's psychology and analysis of his personality. Life requires a little less subjectivism, bias and conjecture and a little more individualization, objectiveness and science in approaching the selection of candidates for ship commanders. Strictness and scrupulousness in analyzing the mental virtues of officers must be especially high now. A very terrible weapon is in the hands of a ship commander today. His subordinates form a modern complex military collective. The missions, which he can solve in combat often exceed the limits of tactics.

Therefore, it is natural that the greatest attention of chiefs and commanders, themselves, is devoted to theoretical and practical preparation for the examination. However, it is very important not to exceed the role of rating the examination sheet. Even the highest total says simply that an officer is only technically ready to fill a command position. You will not find out about moral readiness by a one-act method of questions and answers.

This readiness can be determined as the result of careful observations of an individual during the training and indoctrination process and during various work and living situations. It can be brought to light after an analysis of his actions and deeds, of his relationships in the collective, of his participation in party and political work....

Much is now being done to place the task of training officers on a more dynamic basis which will permit an individual's formation and growth to be analyzed consistently. That means to exert an educational influence more purposefully on him.

Senior commanders and staff workers jot down everything that they notice in subordinates and everything that, in their opinion, is important on
special, we will call them, officer cards. These also contain, of course, general information on the officers. However, the notes on the individual's character, personal observations and the conclusions made on the basis of joint work, indoctrinational efforts, comments of associates, and the opinions of the party collective are the most interesting items.

In time, a rather detailed picture of each officer's activity during periods of combat training and years of service is created. Here are reflected the dynamics of his work to improve himself, the change in his characteristics, the path of his conduct, the tempo of his growth and development. These materials, of course, have a supplementary nature and are very useful not only to the immediate chief but also to the officer himself. From time to time, he has an opportunity to see himself as if from a distance.

Experience has corroborated the value of these notes for the senior chief who examines the question of transferring or promoting some officer or other. At that time, the flag officer must form a concrete and accurate opinion about all the qualities of the candidate for the position and his moral readiness to fill it. Only work achievements by an officer are fixed in his ratings for exercises, inspections and when summing up the results of competition. The careful observations and conclusions of his immediate chiefs reflect his moral formation.

I cannot help but emphasize that that officer will become a good commander who is prepared for this from his years as a lieutenant. To notice the long range prospects of youth and to help them to grow, become stronger, and acquire the necessary qualities—the perspicacity of a senior chief is in this. Using such an approach he will never be faced with the unexpected question: who to promote?

As a result of thoughtfully and purposefully working with youth, such officers as Sr Lt O. Sedov and Capt Lt A. Yemel'yanov were chosen in good time. They proved themselves to be good commanders soon after their appointment.

True, even here one could not do without the help of senior comrades. It is natural that when candidates are selected it is very important not to simply lay out before each one of them a list of questions from the coming examination and not direct their attention only to the tactical, special, and military aspects of the coming work but to give an accurate and complete representation of the command position. A ship commander is not only, as they say in the fleet, a tactician, navigator, and diplomat but is also the leader of a fighting collective. When working with this collective it is important to rely skilfully on party and Komsomol organizations and to set a personal example of high moral fiber and strong morals.

It is possible and, of course, necessary to present a special lecture and conduct an interview with commanders on this subject. However, continuous observance of this policy in individual work and in close contact with an
officer provides a special effect. The importance of such single-mindedness must be clear not only to the large unit commander, the chief of staff, and the chief of the political section but also to each flag specialist. A Soviet ship commander is not simply an excellent military specialist. He is a champion of the party's ideas and an active conductor of its policy. He is for all his subordinates the embodiment of a Soviet officer's best qualities.
They did not allow the ship to fire in competition. Lt V. Bykovskiy was guilty of that. The staff's check revealed slack in the training of the officer himself and in that of his subordinates. The question justifiably arose: How could it happen that a collective, which had been considered an excellent one for a long time and on which great hopes had been placed (only the best of the best are allowed into naval competition), had suddenly blundered so? An accident? No! The staff specialists were completely objective. This means that it was possible to foresee the result of the checking.

Lieutenant Bykovskiy, a recent school graduate, did not think, to be sure, that what had happened to him was such an unpleasant story. A steady and excellent student during his school years, he intended to serve on a ship only in an excellent manner. In time he was permitted to control a submarine independently and had success in solving combat training tasks. All this created the opinion that he was a business-like and forward-looking lieutenant. Bykovskiy's ship commander and immediate chief decided that they were doing their duty with respect to the young officer's formation and, as they say, didn't trouble themselves further.

In time, the independence which is granted becomes a great thing. However, it presupposes help, checking, and influence on the part of seniors. They simply left Bykovskiy to his own devices. Having become convinced that his authority and experience was sufficient, Bykovskiy lost interest in broadening his knowledge and grew cool in his work with subordinates.

And so the reason for the failure which overtook the young officer in the very beginning of his service is clear. The first successes turned his head and the chiefs kept aloof from directing the formation of the new man. Unfortunately, cases still frequently occur where we look for the cause of teaching
errors only in the "chief-subordinate" ligament, forgetting its surroundings. These surroundings are not accidental but are the military collective by name. Therefore, even without going deeply into every fine point in Bykovskiy's conduct, it is possible to say with confidence that the party organization, as the nucleus of the crew, and the officer collective, which is a great teaching force, deserve to be reproached.

Actually, we are used to picturing the troop collective and the officer collective, in particular, as a monolithic unified force which actively and positively influences all its members. However, this happens only if the commander skillfully directs the collective and purposefully exerts an influence on each officer through it.

Unfortunately, the commander of the ship, on which Bykovskiy arrived to serve, had not thought about how to use the power and influence of the officer collective and public opinion for teaching purposes. This was the custom: Each officer on the ship was busy with his job, little interested in the work of his comrades. As the psychologists are accustomed to say, people are drawn together based on the principle of common interests, which at times are not noted for positive trends. Lieutenant Bykovskiy joined the ranks of one of these "informal" groups. Jovial and sociable, he quickly took up with people close to him in age and character. They appeared to the lieutenant to be the spokesmen for wardroom traditions.

The start of service is the most important period in the formation of a young officer. His views and interests are most frequently positive. However, they have still not been consolidated. At this time they undergo rapid changes, overestimations, and adjustments. An experienced commander knows this. Therefore, when conducting individual work with a lieutenant he sees to it that his closest surroundings contribute to strengthening the young officer's positive qualities and to presenting a true picture of military duty.

However, Bykovskiy fell under the influence of an officer who was not the best representative of the wardroom. It should not have been him to "introduce" the new man into the life of the ship. However, no one attached any significance to this. Instead of noble norms of comradely exactingness and service zeal, the lieutenant began to learn the "science" of complacency, formalism, and self-assurance from some "bosom buddies."

We have made such a detailed analysis of the fate of one young officer only to emphasize once again the importance of taking into consideration the indoctrinational function of the officer collective and using it skillfully when working with each individual. It should be pointed out that this is understood and always supported in words. However, in fact, situations similar to the one described sometimes arise.
It would be easy to say that some commanders neglect the use of the officer collective for indoctrinational purposes. However, in actuality it often happens that other commanders, particularly young ones, put difficulties and deficiencies in teaching skill to the test. This is all the more understandable since today's ship's officer, in spite of his youth, is a very intelligent and educated individual well versed in our navy's history. Ten years ago, for example, it was difficult to picture a senior lieutenant in the role of a department commander on a large ship. Now, no one is amazed at this—the more so since this senior lieutenant almost always skilfully manages the most modern equipment. It is more difficult, it is true, for his individual work with subordinates to succeed and, perhaps, what is most difficult is that the role of indoctrinator of one's brother officer does not come easy to some. These difficulties most of all cause trouble for a ship commander. However as soon as they are overcome the formation of lieutenants takes place more quickly and successfully.

The prosaic side of our navy—and this is primarily days of long voyages—provides numerous clear examples of this. The large antisubmarine ship "Vice Admiral Drozd" quite recently returned from a very complicated voyage. The crew had had to solve combat training missions under difficult and stormy conditions. It had occasion to visit foreign ports. All this required great strain on the crew's mental and physical strength and, of course, on that of the officers primarily. The ship coped successfully with all its missions. It received an excellent rating from the commander in chief of the navy. However, besides the successes noted by the command element and marked down in the reports, there was still another success in the score of the "Vice Admiral Drozd." The crew had returned to base more united and solid. The officer collective, having gotten stronger, was able to display its strength, wisdom and skill completely.

Of course, these successes depended primarily on the purposefulness of the commander, the political workers, and the party organization. A combined approach to ideological and indoctrinational work has taken root on the ship. A great deal of attention is paid to forming in the officers common views on fundamental questions concerning the sailors' service in the navy, training, indoctrination, and socialist competition.

In general, all this is characteristic of the majority of officer collectives. I would like to emphasize something else here. A striving to be guided by the recommendations of military teachers and psychologists is distinctly displayed on the ship, especially by Capt 2d Rank V. Barannik. It is now impossible to solve problems in the formation of a collective without this.

This is caused, first, by the increased demands on a collective which at times is involved with powerful nuclear missile weapons. Second, cadre dynamics have increased in the fleet. People grow, are promoted to higher positions and are transferred to other crews quickly. And, of course, there is a long way to go before a commander has time to "eat a pound of salt" with everyone. However, he must know the officers and the collective well.
That is why such forms of work as, for example, studying individual personality qualities, public opinion, the structure and psychology of the collective, informal groups and their leaders... are necessary now. If a commander did this formerly by relying basically on experience and intuition, he must now approach the problem of forming the collective like a researcher—with accurate initial data and with a clearly realizable final goal.

It is necessary to say that many chiefs of various ranks organize their work in this way. A high educational level helps them in this. A significant portion of commanders and political workers now have an academic education. However, the mastery of modern methods in no case must detract from the importance of traditional forms of influencing an officer collective and its formation.

In this connection I would like primarily to recall the role of the wardroom—the traditional and tested form of intercourse and indoctrination for ship's officers. Ship regulations say this about the wardroom: "It must serve as a place of close contact for officers and a cultural center which contributes to indoctrinating officers in the ideas of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and progressive Soviet military science, and to developing common views on questions of waging a naval battle, combat and political training, and organizing service on the ship."

Officers spend almost all their free time, especially on voyages at sea, in the wardroom. However, this time is still far from always used with the greatest return to strengthen mutual relations, influence youth, deepen ship traditions, and create the necessary mood in the collective. The possibilities here are essentially inexhaustible: discussions on the most burning topic, meetings with interesting people, discussion of artistic and naval literature and the experience acquired during to-day's long voyages.

There is no doubt that all these measures must be conducted at a high level.

Once while working in the Central State Archives of the USSR Navy, I ran across extremely interesting records concerning the combat voyages of submariners. For example, Captain 2d Rank R. Lindenberg, an expert in torpedo attacks and the commander of the submarine D-2, always made active use of the wardroom while at sea. He was evidently an expert in this also. He held talks on new tactics used by the enemy—and that border, on which the deadly contest with the enemy was taking place, became more tangible for the officers. He read "Mtsyr" "Ruslan and Lyudmila," "Song of the falcon"—and the officers forgot about their weariness, vividly remembering the motherland. He presented analyses of books about Russian naval commanders—and the officers added resoluteness....

At first glance it would seem—was it so necessary for a commander to engage in this during the occasional minutes of rest for officers? It turned out to be very necessary. The victorious attacks of D-2 were a witness to this.
It goes without saying that the decisive role in training and indoctrinating young officers belongs to the commander. The responsibility of party and Komsomol organizations for their formation is high. However, one must never forget that a lieutenant, like any officer, lives, serves and is indoctrinated in a collective. Where the formation of youth takes place in an officer collective which is solidly based on principles, lieutenants are truly and firmly formed in their views and convictions. They quickly acquire the necessary work experience and gain authority.
I was glancing into the technical training classroom when I saw Lt V. Mironov hastily picking out visual aids for his next class. I immediately recalled that at this moment the lieutenant should be elsewhere, working on a different task. Noting my surprised look, the officer stated, in some embarrassment: "I didn't have time, colonel. I'll try to catch up."

"But Sergeant Popov could be getting the visual aids ready."

The lieutenant first hesitated, then said frankly: "That is correct. But when you do it yourself you know it has been done right."

Instructing the lieutenant to report to my office later, I thought about the matter. Here was a situation of an officer not having confidence in his sergeant. This is essentially nothing new and, one would think, has been sufficiently thoroughly discussed: a good deal is both written and spoken about the authority and role of the NCO.

Nevertheless in a concrete situation this fact once again gets one to thinking. Does Lieutenant Mironov realize that without the assistance of NCOs his job as platoon leader is twice as difficult? If he is aware of this, why does he not fully rely on them? And finally, are we, the superiors of these young officers, doing enough to teach them the skill of directing their subordinates, and in particular their NCOs?

I believe I am correct in saying that in our unit considerable attention has always been devoted to the development of young command personnel. Matters dealing with the training of noncommissioned officers are a continuous concern of staff officers, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations. Upon their arrival at their newly-assigned subunit, young NCOs are surrounded by attentive support, and the most favorable conditions are created for adding to their political, military and technical knowledge and for improving their commander and methods preparation.
Demonstration and instructor-methods classes are organized in such a manner that each and every NCO works in a practical manner on mastering those techniques and actions which he will be teaching his men. NCO days are held twice each month.

The Komsomol organization works vigorously to assist in accelerated NCO development. The unit Komsomol committee holds for NCOs on a regular basis specific-topic evening activities, lectures, and discussions, and develops in them a taste for civic activities. Matters pertaining to strengthening NCO authority and enhancing their role in organizing combat training and competition are discussed in a businesslike manner at meetings of subunit Komsomol bureaus.

In short it would seem that the noncommissioned officers in our unit receive plenty of attention. Why is it then that deficiencies in their practical activities are sometimes noted? Why is it that some of them have poor knowledge of their subordinates and accept departures from the book? Discussion of this matter at a party meeting led us to the following conclusion: no matter what useful measures we conduct for NCOs, we cannot achieve the desired results without intensifying work with individuals.

The party meeting helped us change our approach to indoctrination of lower-echelon command personnel. We began looking into their activities in greater detail and analyzing each and every deficient performance item. On a daily basis we taught the officers, particularly the younger ones, how to rely on their NCOs. Take the example of Lieutenant Mironov. From the very outset he proved to be a conscientious officer. And yet the effectiveness of his work was at times less than desired.

Maj V. Shutilo worked closely with Mironov. It seems that this young officer believed that he simply had no luck with sergeants, that only the rank insignia on the shoulder boards distinguish squad leaders from their men, that they lack independence, expecting instructions at every step.

Major Shutilo displayed a good deal of patience and tact in demonstrating to Lieutenant Mironov how wrong he was. "Put yourself in Sergeant Popov's place," the major said to the lieutenant. "It is true that he lacks certain commander qualities. But your lack of confidence is diminishing his authority among the men to an even greater degree. Haven't you noticed that recently he has simply given up?"

Other Communist officers also spoke with Lieutenant Mironov on numerous occasions. They attended platoon training classes and performance critiques as well as the meetings he held with his noncoms, offering him useful advice. Gradually there was a change in the young officer's opinion of his principal assistants. He was becoming convinced that the more boldly he relied on them, the more interest they showed in their job.

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Sergeant Popov was also noticeably improving and gaining experience. Soon Lieutenant Mironov went home on leave. His duties were temporarily taken over by Sergeant Popov. Was Mironov fully confident in his assistant? "I am a little concerned," the lieutenant confessed to me prior to departure. "But at the same time I do want to test how the sergeant performs on his own, and I have hopes that he will do a good job." Lieutenant Mironov was quite pleased and satisfied when he learned upon returning from leave that things in the platoon were going just fine. This gave the young officer new food for thought. He completely lost his distrust of NCOs; they have become a real fighting support to this platoon leader.

The Mironov example was also edifying to us senior officers. We could see in the individual approach to young noncoms and officers a new reserve potential for consolidating their commander authority. And sergeants determine in large measure the solidarity and unity of the military collective and the moral microclimate in this group.

Of course we did not achieve a breakthrough immediately. Some officers proved insufficiently patient and tactful with their sergeants. Each such instance was dealt sharp, highly-principled criticism.

On one occasion, in a discussion pertaining to a mistake which had been made by Jr Sgt A. Novov, Sr Lt A. Alias said: "What kind of a commander is he going to make? He is timid and becomes confused at every step, as if it were the first day on the job."

A clearly erroneous judgment, and Sr Lt Alias is no newcomer in the slot of subunit deputy commander. I asked him: "Don't you think that the timidity and indecisiveness of Jr Sgt Novov is caused in large measure by your attitude toward him?" The officer raised his brows in surprise. I recalled to him an instance where in the presence of his men he had chewed out Novov for a mistake made by Pvt P. Shikhov.

The most hidden depths of the human character, the most puzzling and unexpected actions on the part of our subordinates are more fully revealed with personal, genuinely frank and friendly contact with them. This is why frank and friendly talks with the lower-echelon commanders have become a rule for the majority of the officers in our unit.

When Jr Sgt S. Konstantinov was made a squad leader, we had no doubt that he would succeed. Excellent training performance, a proficiency-rated specialist, and a friendly fellow -- what more could you want? Soon, however, discipline in the squad dropped off sharply. There occurred instances of wrangling, late arrival to formation, and uniform violations. And the sergeant himself had changed -- he had become somber, withdrawn, and was making more frequent mistakes due to his inattention. On one occasion he failed to take action when a disciplinary infraction was committed by Pvt V. Mel'nichuk.
What was the problem? SrLt Izvozhik, Konstantinov's superior, had noted prior to this time that the sergeant had been quite easy on the second-year men. In the discussions, however, he refused to acknowledge his weakness. But now the lieutenant had a concrete fact with which to proceed. During their next conversation Konstantinov poured out his heart. Yes, he did lack commander firmness in dealing with the second-year men; frequently he pretended not to notice infractions committed by them.

Senior Lieutenant Izvozhik now knew what help Konstantinov needed. He held a meeting of the men in the platoon, with the topic of discussion the role of the second-year men in strengthening discipline and rendering assistance to the newer men in combat training. The officer helped the sergeant develop commander qualities, and things began to improve.

We became convinced that the development of noncommissioned officers depends in large measure on how their superiors treat their mistakes. If the lower-echelon commanders are sure that any error they may make due to inexperience will not result in a dressing down but rather a calm, objective discussion, their actions become more vigorous, decisive, with greater initiative. We are endeavoring to consolidate in our unit such a demanding and at the same time beneficent attitude toward lower-echelon commanders.
COMMENTS ON GRADING COMBAT TRAINING TESTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Oct 76 p l

[Article by Col R. Dukov: "Strictness in Grading"]

[Text] Live-fire exercises were scheduled in several companies in the regiment as part of the final examination. On the day before the exercise we met with the exercise directors at unit headquarters. In examining the scenario -- the exercise for each company was to involve different combat situations -- we could not help but note that the mock engagements were to be conducted on the same section of terrain, introducing insignificant changes into the tactical situation. Questions were put to the exercise directors in connection with this. For some reason the regimental chief of staff attempted to answer these questions. It turned out that he had worked up all the scenarios, that he had specified the target situation for all the subunits to be tested.

Thus we were forced to note even before the exercise began that not all officers see the difference between the terms "assist" and "take over for." In this instance, having taken over that which should have been handled by the exercise directors, the chief of staff, without intending to, merely made their job more difficult.

During the discussion at headquarters, in analyzing the exercise plan, we sensed that the men were mostly concerned with percentage of targets hit. Although we emphasized that principal attention would be devoted to tactics, we were unable to alter the general attitude. This was confirmed by the exercise itself.

The company under the command of Sr St P. Artemenko attacked at a slow speed, straight ahead, avoiding any maneuver. There was no firm fire control.

"But such slow closing on the enemy is out of the question in actual combat," we commented.
"That is true. But at a field exercise one must think of safety," replied the officer who was acting as exercise director.

It was not, however, a matter of "safety measures." The company was forced to move straight ahead by the target situation. And the slow pace of the assault and the excessively-close range at which the men were firing were dictated by the desire to score high.

The men succeeded in hitting almost all the targets. However, the fact that fire was not coordinated with tactics and the excessive simplifications made it impossible to grade the company high on its performance. A mark of satisfactory was given.

As soon as the mark was made known to the exercise director and the senior officers present at the exercise, they proceeded to make it quite clear to the examining officers that one of the regiment's top companies had been involved in the mock engagement, that it has performed well "on the whole," had displayed brilliant marksmanship, and finally that they should not forget the company's tough performance pledges.

These hints of course were not in the form of direct requests. They were intended more for psychological influence, aimed at eroding away somewhat the firmness and conviction of those entrusted with the responsible task of testing.

Of course the veiled hints to give a higher mark could be of no avail. That is not the point. Could it actually be that the staff officers, witnessing the exercise alongside the examining officers, failed to see the deficiencies and were not convinced that the grade had been objectively given? Of course they saw, and they had no doubts about the fairness of the grade. They were simply being controlled by the desire to look good, to be among the performance leaders, although they had to sacrifice principles to do so.

The company under the command of Sr Lt P. Artemenko was not the only case of this kind. One of the tank crews during a tank subunit gunnery exercise was one second late in firing its first round, while another crew exceeded by several seconds the time limit specified for completing the exercise. The first crew's mark was lowered by one point, while the second crew received a grade of unsatisfactory. This grading was fully in conformity with current requirements. But what an angry response it evoked! They even began claiming that the programming unit had erred, although there had never been any complaints in the past on this score. There was even the argument that since the company had been the initiator of competition in the unit, its mark should not have been reduced over a matter of a few seconds.

What can we say? We grade performance on a four-point system, but we measure it with the yardstick of combat. It certainly is not pleasant to
receive an unsatisfactory mark in place of a grade of excellent due to being a few seconds late. But in actual combat a few seconds can cost lives. And when instead of analyzing performance through the prism of combat we begin to be concerned primarily with the grade given, when the emphasis is on receiving the desired grade at any price, we are no longer dealing with genuine commander demandingness.

The fact that a company was a competition initiator tells the inspecting officer much. Such great confidence in the unit is not without reason. Special demands are imposed on those who set the pace in competition. It is very important to ensure that the commanding officer and party organization have succeeded in effectively utilizing patriotic enthusiasm among the men, in focusing the mobilizing role of socialist competition on high-quality performance of practical tasks, and in organizing the training process in an exemplary manner. If verification shows that personnel enthusiasm has not been organizationally buttressed, that the specified performance targets have not been met, the inspecting officer is just as disappointed as are the men themselves.

Great harm is done to the cause of indoctrination by complaints that a certain inspecting officer has been excessively "fault-finding," that a higher mark would have been received if it had been another officer. The complaints are being misdirected. They should be directed to the unit involved, which should work tirelessly to improve its work style, innovatively to seek ways to increase the effectiveness of the training process.

Ahead of us is a new training year, a new entire stage of combat training and socialist competition. Many tests lie ahead, each of which should constitute a school of party principledness for the men who are tested.
METHODS OF IMPROVING COMBAT TRAINING OF GROUND FORCES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Oct 76 p 2

[Article by Col I. Vorob'yev: "Expert Management"]

[Text] The current training year, the results of which are now being totaled up, was distinguished by constant attention focused on problems of tactics and improvement in the effectiveness of utilization of equipment and weapons in various types of engagement. Valuable experience and a wealth of factual material has been amassed. The author of the following article shares his thoughts on the activities of unit and subunit commanders pertaining to troop control on the battlefield and ways to improve their organizer abilities.

The system of troop control in the modern engagement is complex and multifaceted. It is not surprising that control is frequently equated to material factors. In order to gain victory it is without question necessary to possess the requisite forces and means. However, weapons and combat equipment only create the objective possibility of successful accomplishment of combat tasks. Practical realization of this possibility requires effective employment of available weapons and full utilization of all their attack and maneuver capabilities. In other words, skillful troop control.

The greatest success at tactical exercises has been achieved by those commanders who have been best at obtaining their bearings in complex situations, who have taken away from the adversary the fire initiative and time, who have executed maneuver more swiftly, and who have been faster in building up combat efforts. Victory has been won by those who have organized for combat more thoroughly and swiftly, who displayed greater tactical flexibility, foresight, who employed surprise devices and modes of action, and who concentrated at the proper time and place superior forces and weapons in order to mount a decisive attack.

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Troop control encompasses a broad range of diversified tasks. An important element in a troop control system is situation assessment. Swiftness in gathering information, sorting and classifying information, thorough and careful analysis of all data, and the ability to draw warranted general conclusions from this information—these elements of situation estimation influence quality of decision making most directly and strongly.

Practical experience indicates that if a situation estimate fully and objectively reflects the actual state of affairs, the decision reached on the basis of this estimate will determine a realistic way to achieve success. On the other hand, every error and inaccuracy in analyzing the adversary's actions, every miscalculation in determining the combat capabilities of subunits, as well as in estimating the terrain and weather, has a negative effect on the quality of the decision and in the final analysis influences the outcome of combat.

At a certain field exercise a motorized infantry battalion succeeded in capturing an important "aggressor" strong point. Favorable conditions were created for pushing the advance. Soon, however, the battalion commander, Capt I. Pronin, received intelligence that the defending force was hastily advancing reserves from depth. The battalion commander concluded that the "aggressor" intended to retake the captured positions with a counterattack. The company on the right flank received orders to dig in and prepare to repel an attack.

In actual fact the counterattack did not occur in an hour, as the battalion commander had assumed, but rather in 30 minutes, and not on the right flank, but against the subunits advancing in the center. As a result the "aggressor" succeeded in halting the battalion's advance and in pushing it back to its original position. The situation estimate error made by Capt I. Pronin resulted in an incorrect decision and made the task of the advancing force more difficult.

Some commanders spend too much time collecting information, synthesize it too slowly, and fail to utilize all ways to recheck and refine data. Time lost at this stage is later compensated through other measures, which leads to haste. Hence there occur inaccuracies and lack of precision in assigning combat tasks to the subunits and in organizing coordinated action and combat support.

Situation estimate skills are most successfully acquired by commanders and staff officers in the dynamics of mock combat, at training drills involving the control of subunits and units, where the scenario contains an abundance of crisis situations. Required under these conditions are flexibility of thinking, thorough forecasting of development of events, and intelligent utilization of technical control devices. Also tested is the commander's ability to communicate in a precise and well-substantiated manner to his superior conclusions based on his situation estimate, which is of great importance in combat. This must be mentioned, because in place of concise
conclusions officers sometimes relate combat events essentially without analyzing them. The resulting reports are long, lacking specifics, and the higher commander must extract from them those same conclusions without which it is difficult to reach a well-substantiated decision. This of course is a serious deficiency. It is essential in the process of commander training to teach officers the ability to put into their report the most important and essential items, while eliminating information of secondary importance.

Stressing the great importance of intelligent assessment of the tactical situation, we shall note that this is only the initial stage of control activity. The combat decision comprises the heart and core of troop control. It lays a foundation for all subsequent work by the commander and his staff pertaining to planning combat operations and coordinating troop combat efforts.

We know how complex and difficult is the process of reaching a combat decision. The commander almost never has at his disposal exhaustive information, particularly on the nature of actions by and the plans of the adversary. And yet the decision he makes should specify what actions to take, in what combat formation, where to concentrate the main effort, and what maneuver to execute during combat. It must provide a precise, specific, unequivocal answer to these and many other important questions.

Since the decision is usually made under conditions of tactical indefiniteness, it inevitably contains elements of risk and demands of the commander personal courage and firmness. Commander decisiveness should be combined with intelligent prudence and be based on painstaking organization for combat and thorough prediction.

At a certain field exercise the tank battalion under the command of Sr Lt V. Radionov was to mount an encounter attack to smash an advancing "aggressor" column. The battalion commander established through reconnaissance that the "aggressor" intended to launch a frontal attack along the road, and decided to counter this action with a flanking maneuver. In order to execute this maneuver, however, the battalion had to negotiate a swampy section of terrain. The subunit could lose considerable time during this maneuver and be late in deploying. Nevertheless the commander took the risk. Analyzing the reconnaissance data on the terrain en route, he thoroughly calculated march capabilities. Most important, he had confidence in the performance capability of his men and in the preparedness of the tank drivers successfully to meet such a difficult test.

Precisely on schedule the battalion advanced, maintaining concealment, to the edge of a grove of trees and, deploying, swiftly attacked the "aggressor." The attack was so unexpected that the "aggressor" was unable immediately to initiate organized resistance. The tanks succeeded in breaking up the enemy column and in preventing the enemy from deploying into an effective combat formation.
Noting the importance of the commander's decision in the troop control system, one must emphasize that things do not end here. There is a long road to travel from the moment the decision is reached to its execution, requiring of subordinate commanders and staff officers volitional efforts, bold daring, solid skills in troop control, courage and persistence, flexibility and efficiency.

In the dynamics of a mock engagement the situation frequently forces commanders to reach new decisions or to revise previous decisions, to take measures to reestablish a disrupted system of coordinated action and combat support, and to assign additional tasks to subunits and reconnaissance. In general this is a natural and inevitable process. No matter how much talent at prediction, practical experience, and volume of information on the adversary a commander may possess, he is unable to predict all the specific features of a forthcoming engagement. Some things will work out differently from what he thought. It will be necessary to refine the decision, to change its details, and sometimes to change it entirely.

This management activity will be taking place with vigorous opposition on the part of the adversary, with rapid change in the status of the subunits, relative strengths, and under conditions of far from ideal communications. Analyzing the results of this past training year, it is important precisely to determine the commander training prospects for the next stage. One must take into consideration what has been achieved and consider the specific features of the tasks to be performed by the unit, subunit, and the level of individual officer training. Fully justified is the practice of working at a training drill with officers on a narrow range of items, with intensive work, emphasis on qualitative indices and a detailed critique of each exercise. It is also necessary to continue in the future comprehensively mastering the tactics of high-mobility combat and to learn full utilization of the capabilities of combat equipment, arms, control equipment, and constantly to follow the development of military thought.

Supported by advanced know-how, it is important persistently to examine ways to speed up tactical calculations and more boldly to employ mathematical methods in analyzing the operational-tactical situation, scientifically to substantiate decisions, and to implement them expertly. This is insistently demanded by the interests of further improving combat readiness and the quality of troop combat training.

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One way to intensify the training process is to combine training subjects with tactical training. Innovative effort is particularly fruitful in this area. This is indicated in particular by the experience of the Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Red-Banner Znamenka Guards Tank Regiment.

We arrived at dawn in the area where the men of the battalion under the command of Gds Maj V. Filyuk were preparing for action. Work was in full swing. The tank crews were working in their protective gear. Intercepting for two or three minutes a leaflet which was being passed from crew to crew, I briefed myself on the pledges. Here are a few: "Hit the target on the first round and first burst. In the driving exercise produce a result one step higher than your current proficiency rating...."

A major test awaited the tank crews. Subunit final exercises in fire preparation, tank driving, and protection against mass destruction weapons were being conducted on a common tactical background, combined with carrying out purely tactical missions. This is not easy. It is one thing to arrive at the tank training area with fresh personnel to run a tank through a course, while it is another thing altogether to receive the same assignment in the course of vigorous combat actions, without warning, at a time when considerable physical and nervous energy has already been expended.

And the gunnery problems were quite difficult. The targets for the company under the command of Gds Sr Lt S. Rabadanov popped up at distances considerably beyond optimal range. Concentrated fire was required. The tanks crews delivered concentrated fire with great skill.

The tank crews also effectively utilized the capabilities of their weapons at the following stage of the exercise. The company was bypassing a swamp
in its path. At this moment targets popped up. The tanks had to fire at a tough lateral angle. Nevertheless the "aggressor" antitank weapons were quickly neutralized.

The guardsmen of the company under the command of Gds Capt M. Dovgun also performed skillfully and selflessly. While executing a flanking maneuver, some of the tanks were sent across the training area test course. The tank crews, for which the performance of a driving exercise had become an organic component of combat actions, displayed excellent skill in operating their vehicles.

The regimental commander and his staff of course did not decide merely by chance to conduct a number of final exercises combined with tactics. The unit has amassed a wealth of experience in combining activities. At the beginning of the training year, when the men of the regiment enthusiastically took up the patriotic initiative of the Port Arthur motorized riflemen and took tough pledges, the search began to determine reserve potential for increasing the effectiveness of training exercises and drills. They found reserve potential in combined work on many topics and training problems.

Considerable time is allocated by the combat training schedule to such training items as protection against mass destruction weapons, engineer, reconnaissance and other types of training. The items forming the content of these training disciplines are extremely important. Quite obvious is the advisability of working on these items not only at special but also at tactical drills, not to mention field exercises. Practical experience has shown that in a complex situation personnel more rapidly acquire and reinforce reconnaissance skills, the ability to make use of the protective features of their equipment, terrain, to perform combat engineer activities, to read topographic maps, to give first aid to themselves and their fellow soldiers, etc.

This unit has also begun more frequently establishing a tactical background at tank driving drills and in technical training. The time spent traveling from one training installation to another is now being spent more profitably. En route the men would work on such items as deployment into approach march and combat formations, transmission of control signals down the column, correction of "malfunctions," and refueling.

There has also been a significant increase in the percentage share of combined exercises with subunits of different arms.

Understandably this combining has made conditions more difficult for drill and exercise directors and has increased the amount of preparatory work needed. Without this, however, one could scarcely count on increasing the effectiveness of training and actual intensification of the training process. Exercise directors were greatly assisted by staff personnel, party and Komsomol activists.
Combining indicated that personnel, in carrying out various tasks, meeting performance standards, and performing exercises involving the dynamics of a tough field drill or exercise, are not always capable of performing up to standard. The extended state of stress has an effect, and reserve stamina is exhausted. But in actual combat all missions are performed in a combined manner, all subordinated to a single tactical objective.

Time passed. The tank crews became more able to stand up under maximum loads. By the end of the year the subunits had reached excellent results. Today 76 percent of the regiment's officers and warrant officers are proficiency-rated 1st or 2d class. A total of 83 percent of the tank drivers have boosted their proficiency ratings.

The experience amassed during the training year was also successfully utilized in the process of the end-of-year performance testing.
The motorized rifle battalion under the command of Sr Lt N. Il'yushichkin was to crush the "aggressor," who was dug in at an advantageous position. The battalion was supported by attached tank, artillery, antiaircraft, mortar and combat engineer subunits.

These forces were adequate to carry out the assigned mission swiftly. The engagement dragged on, however, and was developing completely differently from what had been planned. And all this was because there was insufficient coordination in the actions of the subunits. The combat engineers, for example, took longer to clear lanes through the minefields than scheduled, and the artillery crews, failing to receive a signal, were late in opening fire, while the motorized riflemen dismounted early and began to fall behind the tanks.

The mistakes and miscalculations of the battalion commander were thoroughly analyzed at the critique, and the main reason for the failure was specified — poor coordination among the elements of the combat formation. In organizing for combat Senior Lieutenant Il'yushichkin was unable to coordinate the efforts of the battalion and the attached subunits comprehensively and in detail, taking into consideration the capabilities of the equipment. Hence the various complications in executing the mission. The lessons of this exercise once again convincingly confirm that the commander who is unable flawlessly to organize coordinated action cannot effectively utilize the combat capabilities of the forces and weapons at his disposal.
This is nothing new. It is confirmed by the experience of the Great Patriotic War. Veteran combat commanders always made sure to coordinate missions, positions and combat timetables of their own, attached and supporting subunits and sought to ensure that coordinated action was stable and continuous.

In connection with the development of new weaponry, increased mobility and maneuverability of subunits, and a more highly-dynamic situation, the role of coordinated action in today's combined-arms engagement has increased greatly. The activities of the commanding officer and his staff pertaining to organization of coordinated action have become more complex and diversified. Today in coordinating efforts it is necessary to take into account particularly precisely and completely the combat capabilities of the employed equipment and weapons.

At the exercise we were discussing Senior Lieutenant Il'yushichkin was for the first time in control of such large and diversified forces and weapons. The young battalion commanders' difficulties in securing their coordinated action are in large measure natural and understandable. Experience and know-how do not come immediately. Field exercises are conducted for the purpose of gaining experience.

At the post-exercise critique the battalion commander was criticized not for lack of experience but for gaps in his theoretical training and shaky knowledge of the combat capabilities of some of the subunits which were under his command. It was noted that he had displayed inadequate purposefulness in organizing coordinated action.

Combined action will be precise and coordinated only if the commanding officer is fully briefed on the plan of operation of the higher commander, on his own combat tasks, the methods to be used in executing them, and if he directs the efforts of his subordinates toward precise execution of the assigned tasks. A most important condition for high-quality organization of coordinated action by a commander is to keep his hand on the pulse of combat, promptly to issue orders and instructions, to revise orders taking into account the changes which are taking place, and quickly to communicate these changes to his subordinates. Naturally this ability does not come automatically. An officer develops it in the process of daily combat training.

The tactical exercises which were held during this past training year, including in the final phase of the year, provide a wealth of material for analysis and make it possible to analyze in an objective manner the results of commander training in the units and subunits.

The final exercise demonstrated that in many units and subunits the ability of commanders to organize and maintain coordinated action has increased. This has been promoted by tactical drills and command-staff exercises held in the field, during which commanders learned to coordinate the
actions of the various elements in the combat formation and all subunits participating in the engagement. Brief tactical exercises and group drills involved working on problems of controlling subunits with the aid of various means of communication and prearranged signals. Drills and exercises would be directed as a rule by the regimental commander or by one of his deputies. The results convince us that the expended labor was not in vain.

I well remember an exercise held in a certain unit. Receiving orders to defend, the regimental commander conducted thorough reconnaissance, in which he involved the commanders of attached and supporting subunits, indicated the probable axes of "aggressor" advance, assigned specific missions to his artillery and mortar crews, and then further detailed the actions of all subunits during a planned counterattack. He indicated in particular the sequence in which "aggressor" targets were to be destroyed and which ones should receive priority, and how to effect adjustment of fire, maneuver of men and weapons. The regimental headquarters staff, under the supervision of Maj V. Kochnev, displayed a high degree of activity in carrying out the commanding officer's instructions.

During the night the regiment established a deeply-echeloned defense, set up a precise fire plan, and performed priority fortification activities. The following morning the men of the regiment initiated a defensive engagement with superior "aggressor" forces, and launched a successful counterattack after regrouping.

This exercise was a model of bold organization of coordinated action and smoothness of execution in the performance of both defensive and offensive missions.

The ability to organize coordinated action is vitally essential to commanders of small subunits as well. Take, for example, today's motorized rifle company. It possesses diversified and powerful organic equipment and weapons. In combat it is assigned attached tanks as a rule, and in some cases artillery as well. The company commander's workload involving command and control of a reinforced subunit has become substantially larger and more complicated.

I witnessed the following at one exercise. A motorized rifle battalion under the command of Gds Capt R. Kayumov was assigned the mission of capturing several commanding heights. The motorized riflemen smoothly initiated the assault. But soon the men of the company advancing on the left flank were forced to go prone under machinegun fire. At this moment there was a danger that the tanks would become separated from the motorized riflemen. This did not happen, however. The tanks, taking advantage of terrain cover, began taking out the "aggressor" machineguns. The gun crews of a supporting artillery battery opened fire on the forward defensive positions. The assault was renewed following neutralization of "aggressor" weapons. The precision of these actions was due in large measure to the fact that the employed variant was worked out in advance.
The foundations of coordinated action are laid when the general plan of operation is elaborated, when the commander makes his engagement decision, and when he is assigning missions. Usually maps, including relief maps, are employed in this process. The most effective results come from working on problems of coordinating combat efforts in a specially-selected area similar in terrain to the area where the engagement will be fought.

At tactical drills and command-staff exercises we endeavor to have commanders work on problems of coordinated action thoroughly and in strict sequence. We devote particular attention to the time factor. One can easily imagine the predicament of attacking troops if artillery fails to open fire when they reach a specified point and if the forward defensive positions are not assaulted on schedule.

A commander's staff should function as a reliable assistant in organizing coordinated action. A statement made by famous Soviet military commander M. Tukhachevskiy is valid even today, we believe. "Of course many problems of the most diversified nature arise in the field activities of headquarters staffs," he wrote. "They should all, however, be grouped around one central question -- the question of coordinated action.... Reconnaissance, situation estimate, elaboration of a plan of battle, execution of the above, plus organization of control, rear services, communications, etc -- all this should be organized in such a manner that it conforms to the fundamental idea of combined-arms combat: coordinated action."

Staff officers collect and synthesize information, draft proposals on organization for combat, and communicate missions to executing personnel. Their work volume is large, and it contains no trivial items. Let us take, for example, information on the adversary and on friendly forces. The greater the quantity of this information and the more reliable it is, the easier it is for the commander to specify the procedure of effective utilization of available forces and weapons. This is particularly important under conditions of contemporary combat, when missions are executed on a tight timetable, swiftly and on a large scale.

We are presently analyzing, on the basis of the year's performance results, the effectiveness of various forms of officer training, and particularly those forms aimed at equipping commanders and staff personnel with the ability to ensure coordinated action and firmly to implement the main idea in the plan of battle.

Utilizing amassed experience, the task consists in comprehensively preparing for the new training year and achieving new levels of improvement in officer tactical skills.
MILITARY-GAMES PROGRAM AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF YOUTH MILITARY TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Oct 76 p 4

[Article by Maj Gen Avn G. Beregovoy, commander of the Orlenok All-Union Komsomol Military-Sports Game: "Orlenok Is a Serious Game"]

[Text] The Second National Finals of the Orlenok Komsomol Military-Sports Game, held in the city of Gor'kii, has become an important youth holiday. The people of Gor'kii, visitors, and local garrison personnel observed the finals with great interest. Having thoroughly analyzed the results, we can now state confidently that this military-sports game will become even more popular and will acquire even more active supporters.

One need hardly argue that Orlenok is a serious game and that it is an effective form of youth mass-defense and sports activity, preparing young people for defense of the homeland. This is clearly evident in the example of those who have been past participants. Take, for example, youth military training participants at Moscow Trade and Technical School [GPTU] No 145, whose team took part in the First National Orlenok Finals. Out of the 190 boys from this school who have been inducted into the army and navy, 160 have recently received excellent marks in combat and political training, 140 are proficiency-rated specialists, while 38 are commanding squads, vehicle and weapon crews.

This is no coincidence. Experience indicates that the Orlenok game promotes comprehensive development of students and working youth, their indoctrination in the revolutionary, fighting and labor traditions of the Soviet people, ideological and physical toughening, and mastery of the fundamentals of military affairs. Today approximately 8 million boys and girls are participating in the military games program. This is approximately 1.5 million persons more than 2 years ago, when the First National Finals were held.

The majority of young people in the program participated in the All-Union Komsomol and Youth Tour to famous revolutionary, war and labor sites. Boys and girls became particularly active and acquired a lively interest in the glorious past history of our people in connection with preparations for and celebration of the 30th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War.
In recent years there has been a substantial increase in the number of boys expressing the desire to enroll in military schools. Many of them are Orlenok military game activists. And this relationship is logical. In the course of this game they become acquainted with the specific features of the profession of military officer and make a final choice of career. We should note that as a rule those former youth army game participants who become officer candidates do a fine job.

Here is a typical example in this regard. Yu. Savelov, a military game participant from Secondary School No 19 in the city of Stavropol' and participant in the First National Finals, stated on the form filled out by the contestants: "I want to be an officer in the Soviet Army." Recently Orlenok game headquarters received a letter from the assistant political section chief for Komsomol affairs at the Stavropol' Higher Military Communications Command School. The letter stated that former military game participant Savelov had enrolled as an officer candidate and was advancing steadily toward his designated objective.

Many participants in the Second National Orlenok Finals dream of a career in the Armed Forces. Most of the boys who came to Gor'kii answered the question of future career the same as had been done by their older comrade, now officer candidate Savelov: "I want to become an officer!" And they back up this desire with concrete deeds: in the competition the boys demonstrated excellent drill performance, athletic conditioning, and the ability to handle weapons.

The Komsomol Orlenok military-sports game helps consolidate knowledge and improve success in basic military training. None have failed this subject among the pupils in the upper grades of the general-curriculum schools, trade and technical schools of the Bashkir ASSR, Altayskiy Kray, Gor'kovskaya, Sverdlovskaya, Kaliningradskaya, Penzenskaya and many other oblasts.

Various competitions and contests promote consolidation of knowledge obtained in training classes. In Odintsovskiy Rayon of Moskovskaya Oblast, for example, competition among military youth subunits is held under the slogan "Today youth military training, tomorrow an excellent soldier in the Soviet Army." Quiz contests held among upper-graders in Sverdlovskaya Oblast has become a fine tradition. Military sports competition among students at the technical schools in the Bashkir ASSR is attracting more and more participants.

We could name many other useful activities aimed at thorough mastery of the basic military training program. But the main point is not an enumeration. The main point is that all these activities have definitely influenced the level of performance of contestants in the Second National Orlenok Finals. A great many teams came to Gor'kii, and every one of them did a fine job of representing their republic, kray, or oblast.

We should like particularly to mention the youth military training squads at GPTU No 8 in the town of Navashino, Gor'kovskaya Oblast, Karachev
Secondary School imeni M. Gor'kiy in Bryanskaya Oblast, GPTU No 28 in the city of Vologda, GPTU No 145 in Moscow, and Secondary School No 7 in Kstovo, Gor'kovskaya Oblast. They took the top five places, demonstrating not only excellent military and athletic training but also fine psychological conditioning and a desire to compete hard.

We are particularly gratified by the fact that this time there were no weak contestants in the final competition. Any team there could have come through with a win. And there were surprise performances. A surprise to many was the outstanding drill performance by the squad from Secondary School No 7 in the town of Baltiysk. These youngsters thrilled both the honored guests and their fellow contestants with their precision and excellent coordination. They were bested only by the squad from Moscow GPTU No 145.

An excellent performance in the combined military-sports relay was put in by the pupils of GPTU No 3 from the city of Kemerovo. Surpassing many of the "favorites" they took second place in this event. A fine job was also done by the squads from Taldy-Kurgan and Saransk, from the town of Mayli-Say, from the Buryat ASSR and the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.

While mentioning successful performances, we should not ignore those deficiencies which were revealed in the course of the Second National Olenok Finals. First of all we should note the comparatively low level of athletic training on the part of the contestants. Among them there was only one master of sports and only nine candidate masters of sports. Many of the boys and girls did not have athletic category ratings. It is true that all are Prepared for Labor and Defense badgeholders, but some of them had not met the performance standards in the triathlon. This same deficiency was noted after the First National Olenok Finals. But evidently the measures which were taken have proven to be insufficiently effective.

The final competitions in the city of Gor'kiy showed that there is still work to be done in the area of improving drill, fire and military-technical training of youth receiving military training. There have been certain changes in this respect, but they should be more tangible.

In this connection we should like to emphasize that the Komsomol Olenok military-sports game is not a one-time activity. It is an entire complex of measures of a military-patriotic and applied military nature. It includes special classes, tours, relays, contests, marksmanship competitions, and tactical games, which are held when school is out or work is over. Continuity must be sought in work with youth; this work must be performed continuously and purposefully.

In accomplishing these important tasks, Olenok activists will certainly need advice and assistance from their elders, who are wise through the experience of their comrades. The military game contestants from Moscow...
are grateful to twice Hero of the Soviet Union Army Gen I. Gusakovskiy, and the pupils of Rostovskaya Oblast to Lt Gen (Ret) Ye. Mayorov, and the young people of Altayskiy Kray to Hero of the Soviet Union Maj Gen (Ret) N. Kozin plus many others for their constant attention to the needs and requests of the young military trainees. We should note fruitful work in this area done by personnel of the military commissariats of a number of oblasts, and particularly Bryanskaya, Vologodskaya, and Penzenskaya oblasts.

A greater effort must be made to recruit experienced officers and non-commissioned officers of local garrisons for consultation work. A number of youth military training subunits already have such consultants. Their counsel helped the pupils from Moscow GPTU No 145 and the schoolchildren from Baltiysk work vigorously and achieve success in the final competitions.

The Second National Finals of the Orlenok Military-Sports Game are over. The game itself, however, is continuing. The young military trainees are storming new heights of accomplishment. Next year Soviet citizens and all progressive people will be celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. This date should become a landmark in the lives and training of young military trainees, in indoctrinating valiant Soviet patriots, strong, agile and skilled defenders of the socialist homeland.
Once again that time has come when the path which has been trodden during the last year is clearly evident. Performance results have been totaled. All pledges made by personnel have been met. This is a result of hard work by commanders and political workers, subunit party and Komsomol organizations, and all personnel. And now, analyzing in detail all phases of the training year, one sees clearly how important is the organizing element, precise rhythm at all echelons of the military collective.

I should like to compare the achieved results with those of 1975. That year the regiment's missile crews demonstrated excellent performance on the missile range, earned a grade of 5, and we were all pleased, believing that at the final examination the regiment would receive the designation of excellent. But we did not quite make it, earning a mark of good.

Why did this happen? Primarily because regimental headquarters and some subunit commanders, devoting their main attention to missile launch training, ignored other important points of training and service. One contributing factor was the lack of commander experience. I was named regimental commander a few months prior to the final examination. It is true that I had been serving in the same regiment as deputy commander, but I saw and assessed some problems one-sidedly, as if two-dimensionally. But when I took over command of the regiment, these problems became quite obvious. It took some time to adjust to my new job, to acquire initial experience, to secure principledness and at the same time mutual confidence in dealing with my deputies and chiefs of services.

Entering the new training year of 1976, the men of this regiment were the first in the National Air Defense Forces to support the patriotic initiative of the motorized riflemen of the Port Arthur Guards Regiment. We realized how much responsibility we were taking on. Frankly, some of the men in the regiment were rather skeptical about the ambitious pledges, for it is easy
to aim too high and then make a fool of oneself. But the unit's attitude was aggressive and optimistic on the whole: we gave our word — we shall keep it! The enthusiastic mood was supported by Communists and Komsomol members.

We began with a campaign to improve the quality of training. On the eve of the new training year we accomplished much in refurbishing training facilities. A contest was held to build the best working models, operating diagrams and other training aids. The methods council examined and selected the best items. In many subunits they were immediately adopted into practical training activities. But not in all. Guards Capt V. Shaparenko, for example, doubted that it was possible to do all the work required to improve training facilities in such a limited period of time.

How could we influence these officers? We prepared and held a demonstration class in the battalion under the command of Guards Lt Col G. Filatov. In this battalion training facilities had already been reequipped according to the new requirements. And most important — the very first weeks of training produced definite success. At the training drill the battalion's missile crews demonstrated excellent knowledge and practical skills acquired in a short period of time.

The lesson was graphic, and the impression was exceptionally strong. Not a trace remained of the former skepticism. Guards Captain Shaparenko and the other officers carefully studied all the best points they had seen in the battalion and adopted them in their own subunits. Of course this was not a simple and easy process — the subunit commanders needed assistance from headquarters and the service chiefs. And assistance was rendered.

The special tactical and technical training classrooms were reequipped under the guidance of Guards Engr-Lt Col M. Zinger. An excellent methods classroom was set up for Marxist-Leninist training and political instruction group leaders, as well as a fine combined-arms training classroom.

What was the result? We were able substantially to intensify training classes, to increase the effectiveness of training time and to shorten the time required to train specialists. Of course this potential remained to be realized, which was totally dependent on the methods skills of the officers, warrant officers and NCOs. From the very first days of the training year much was done to equip them with advanced teaching techniques and methods. At this point I should like to note the productive efforts of the finest methods specialists and indoctrinators — officers V. Gulyayev, V. Dubov, V. Pechliyskiy, V. Yurkevich, V. Sapunov, and others. They generously shared their knowledge and experience with the young instructors. The methods council, party and Komsomol activists actively disseminated advanced know-how.
A big event for the regiment was the invitation to me and the political section chief, Gds Maj V. Gulyayev, to visit the National Air Defense Forces Military Council. We submitted a report on how we organize the campaign to meet pledges in competition. Although it seemed that we had done a fair amount of work, the discussion at the military council indicated that we still have weak points, unresolved problems and unutilized potential. We were given many useful recommendations and much useful advice. After that, when working with the men and focusing them toward unconditional fulfillment of pledges, we constantly sought new forms of organizing training and competition.

We immediately set about to resolve such a problem as that of increasing organization and planning in the activities of all officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers. Staff officers and the political section in one of the subunits made a thorough study of this matter. It was determined that not all commanders are able correctly to plan their work day and to assign tasks to their subordinates in a precise manner. With others there was revealed a substantial discrepancy between planning and actual execution. In other words some officers, warrant officers and NCOs were bogged down in their work; they would lay the plan aside and work on solving problems which would unexpectedly arise. Finally, we discovered such a defect as poor verification of execution of assigned tasks.

I intentionally emphasize the determined deficiencies, although I should note that the check also helped point up the essence of the experience of the top commanders. Therefore, when staff and political section officers were drafting recommendations for all subunits, they naturally based their recommendations on amassed advanced know-how. Problems pertaining to precise, efficient organization of military personnel labor were discussed at party meetings. Headquarters began more strictly monitoring the training process. We gave daily instruction to those commanders who were short on experience and subjected to sharp criticism those who were condoning instances of inefficiency and useless wasting of training time.

We began regularly holding weekly progress meetings with subunit commanders and their deputy commanders for political affairs. At such meetings we bring up one or two agenda items, but we are prepared to discuss them in great detail. For example, what is being done to reduce the time required to make equipment combat ready by a given crew? How is training of proficiency-rated specialists and mastery of adjacent occupational specialties proceeding?

Guards Captain Shaparenko spoke at a meeting on living conditions. According to the captain things were fine in the subunit. But when they made a personal inspection they saw that the report contained exaggerations. Why exaggerate the state of affairs? Naturally this officer was sharply criticized. The detailed analysis of deficiencies occurring in the subunit was also beneficial to the other officers. It was decided on the spot to
conduct such meetings directly in the subunits. This is how we do it now. How does this benefit us? First of all it offers us the opportunity immediately and efficiently to correct existing deficiencies. Secondly, it enables us to secure clarity and specificity in disseminating advanced know-how. Thus the gap is reduced between the leading subunits and those which are currently lagging in performance of training tasks and handling problems of conditions for personnel. Running ahead, I shall state that the subunit under the command of Guards Captain Shaparenko fully met all the year's pledges and earned the designation excellent.

We have also taken a new approach to the monthly competitions for the title of best crew. Now a different crew must represent the subunit each time. This naturally deprives commanders of the possibility of relying solely on the leading crews, with special conditions offered to these crews, and forces them to be more concerned with uniformly-high performance by all the crews.

I shall add that these contests are held in sequence in different subunits. This requires a good deal of their commanders: they must build a suitable base and ensure precise organization of competition. Nobody wants to look worse than the others!

When we announce the position standings of the crews, we consider not only performance in carrying out combat training assignments and meeting performance standards but also the discipline of the men, their observance of moral-ethical standards of conduct, etc. In the battalion under the command of Guards Lieutenant Colonel Filatov there was keen competition among the missile crews for the privilege of loading the launcher during live-fire activities. The best performance was always turned in by one of the top crews, but during the exercise one of the crew members committed a disciplinary infraction. Then the battalion commander quite rightly deprived this crew of the coveted privilege. The live missile which shot down the target was loaded by the crew under the command of Gds Sgt A. Korolev. The other crews of the missile battery would also have performed this task confidently and with excellence — the difference in their performance is very small.

We devote constant attention to officer special tactical and technical training. We have endeavored to incorporate a smooth rhythm in their training. Considerable credit for accomplishing this task must go to Gds Lt Col A. Logazyak. We have developed a smoothly-running system of practice drills and missile crew training activities. Perhaps we should focus particular attention on those training activities which we conduct once a week. The topic of each training drill is determined in advance, proceeding from the commander training program and the officer independent study schedules.

We hold seminars at which the officers discuss current problems of training, mastery of equipment, and socialist competition. Presented at these seminars are the views and opinions of the most experienced specialists as
well as those who are taking their first steps toward mastering their duties or an adjacent occupational specialty. Such an active form of training has won general recognition and approval. It encourages the men to seek, innovate, and analyze. Born at such seminars, for example, was the idea of elaborating a system of simulator devices which would enable each specialist to test his performance skills under the most difficult conditions prior to going on alert duty. This task has now been successfully accomplished.

During the competition first place in the regiment was won by the battalion under the command of Guards Lieutenant Colonel Filatov. The political section and headquarters staff are presently incorporating his experience and know-how into the practical activities of the other commanders. He himself gladly shares his know-how with his comrades. In this we see one of the sources of reserve potential for achieving further progress and greater activation of competition.

A rigorous, critical analysis shows that we still have both deficiencies and unresolved problems. Therefore, in totaling up the results of the training year, we fully realize that the attainment of improved results in this next training year will demand of us even more intensive military labor.

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For more than a year now our Armed Forces have been operating under the new general military regulations. The Internal Service Regulations, the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties, and the Disciplinary Regulations, ratified by ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, have consolidated through formal legislation those substantial changes which have recently taken place in the army and navy. They also constituted an important means of further strengthening military discipline, the significance of which is becoming steadily greater in securing combat efficiency and troop combat readiness.

Prosecutor monitoring of observance of military regulations indicates that wherever there is a thorough understanding of the fundamental newness of many provisions of military regulations, where commanders and political workers engage on a daily basis in political, legal and military indoctrination of their subordinates, there has been an appreciable improvement in the organization and efficiency of personnel, with total elimination of instances of violation of Soviet laws and regulations, as well as more noticeable success in combat and political training.

The soldier is disciplined by the entire system of army and navy life. Precise adherence to daily routine, exemplary order in the barracks, mess hall, on the post and in the field, a flawless appearance on the part of one's fellow soldiers and their strict observance of the rules of military courtesy and the military salute -- all this promotes the forming of requisite qualities in the young soldier and instills in him an affection for military affairs and military service. At the same time the excellent moral-combat qualities of military personnel are a result of persistent indoctrination activities by commanders and political workers. The major principles of these activities are also formalized in military regulations.
One of these is commander demandingness. The Internal Service Regulations state that the commander shall require that his subordinates observe the laws and regulations, and that they shall perform their professional duties and obey the orders of their superiors. Commander demandingness is usually manifested in the form of an order, which has the force of law for his subordinates and which should be executed absolutely, precisely and immediately. Failure to carry out an order is a crime punishable by law. At the same time demandingness is effective only when it is constant, uniform as applied to all subordinate personnel, when it is legitimate in form, and when its content is determined by the interests of military service and discipline.

Such a quality as high demandingness in combination with correct and fair treatment of subordinates is characteristic of the overwhelming majority of our command personnel. They make wise and intelligent use of their authority. But unfortunately exceptions also occur. Sr Lt V. Pivovarov, for example, was incorrect in his relations with his subordinates. He was rude and employed illegal measures against enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers who had violated regulations, and he received just punishment.

Taking into account the higher level of conscientiousness and the moral-political qualities of Soviet military personnel, the new Disciplinary Regulations have reduced the general term of disciplinary arrest of military personnel who have broken regulations and have correspondingly reduced the authority of command personnel to apply this extreme disciplinary measure. And yet for some time officers A. Grudovin, Ye. Kisinas, and I. Snopok were applying the provisions of the former Disciplinary Regulations, exceeding their disciplinary authority.

Departures from regulations on guardhouse facilities and regulations specifying procedures of receiving and handling detained personnel, which are still occurring, constitute gross violations of the law. This diminishes the indoctrinational effect of disciplinary arrest.

Some inexperienced commanders are experiencing great difficulties and are committing serious errors in relations with their subordinates. And yet experience shows that success is more frequently experienced by that commander who, alongside by-the-book demandingness on his subordinates, displays constant concern for them, shows proper respect for their personal dignity, skillfully combines and correctly applies measures of persuasion, and constantly relies in his work on party and Komsomol organizations, fully utilizing the great indoctrinational force represented by the men in the subunit, unit, and naval ship.

Efforts to maintain a high level of military discipline and order do not produce the desired result if the commander himself does not always offer his subordinates an example of observance of moral and ethical standards of conduct, flawless observance of the demands of Soviet laws, the military oath, military regulations and his service duties. The personal example of the commander as the leader and indoctrinator of the military collective is an important means of influencing his men.
The conscious nature of Soviet military discipline presupposes clarification of the essence of military duty and the demands of Soviet laws, the military oath and regulations. Conviction, as our regulations state, is the principal method of indoctrination in the Armed Forces. This by no means excludes, however, employment of measures of coercion on those who are unaffected by words of persuasion, who continue, following efforts to explain and clarify, violating regulations and military law and order. In order to strengthen military discipline and to prevent criminal actions and accidents, regulations require that the commander respond to each and every infraction by a subordinate, and that in case of a criminal action or accident he report such occurrences to his superiors, that an investigation be conducted and that the military prosecutor be informed.

We must also mention the fact that some commanders do not properly appreciate these provisions of military regulations. In the effort to embellish the true state of affairs regarding discipline in their unit, on their ship or in their subunit, these individuals follow the practice of concealing adverse phenomena. By doing this they deprive themselves and their superiors of the possibility of thoroughly examining the circumstances behind what has occurred and to establish the real reasons and conditions which promoted violation of the law and regulations, as well as to correct them. It is quite obvious that such a principles-lacking approach to things and virtual connivance with lawbreakers engender in the latter the attitude that they are immune to punishment, undermine the authority of the law, regulations and the commander himself, and fail to promote strengthening of military discipline.

This is the truth, and no mention would have to be made of it if such occurrences were totally eliminated from the army and navy. Lt Col P. Gromyko was severely punished by the commander of the Volga Military District, at the request of the military prosecutor, precisely for an attempt to conceal the unsatisfactory state of affairs in his subunit.

Some high-echelon commanders, however, not only fail to nip in the bud attempts to conceal an unsatisfactory situation but themselves fail to guide their subordinates in the right direction. Col V. Zinin (Central Asian Military District), for example, issued instructions contrary to the law and military regulations, which hindered prosecutor's office supervision of an investigation. It also sometimes happens that the question of responsibility of persons guilty of committing certain military criminal acts is determined by commanders who are not empowered to do so. Such actions constitute gross violation of the law and military regulations.

There are no "trivial items" in military regulations. Each and every line, each and every provision is of vital importance to the military. The Internal Service Regulations, for example, require that command personnel establish the requisite safety measures in working with weapons, combat and
other equipment, during execution of a march, during conduct of field exercises, live-fire activities, special training drills or activities, and that they ensure observance of fire safety regulations by their subordinates. One can easily imagine the serious consequences of failure to observe or negligent observance of these regulations. And yet violations of this kind are still sometimes encountered.

The same applies to important duties of individuals on guard duty, alert duty subunits and daily details. Vigilant performance of duty by these persons is a guarantee of firm observance of regulations and subunit and unit combat readiness.

All cases of incorrect relations in military units, everything which hinders their unity, should be vigorously combated.

Unfortunately motor vehicle accidents still occur. An important role in preventing these accidents is played by the vehicle (column) commander who, according to regulations, must ensure proper vehicle operation, driver observance of traffic regulations, as well as discipline and safety measures by all personnel in the vehicle. Experience indicates, however, that the performance of such responsible duties is sometimes assigned to individuals with a poor knowledge of traffic regulations and who are unable to maintain discipline and order on the part of those under them. Certain individuals take over the wheel, although they do not possess a driver's license or the needed skills. This is simply asking for an accident.

The new general military regulations have increased the responsibility of command personnel for the state and condition of weapons, combat and other equipment, ammunition, fuel and other supplies, and for indoctrinating personnel to be thrifty toward public property and its economical expenditure. This has had a noticeable effect on reducing the number of cases of loss and damage to military and public property as well as various types of misuse and misappropriations. At the same time, as the experience of prosecutor supervision indicates, economical and thrifty utilization of material and financial resources as well as the proper care and preservation of public property have not yet become a universal standard. In many places they have not yet closed the loopholes used by those who would live at the expense of the state, and there occur cases of spending government funds for purposes other than which they were intended, padding the accounts in government reports by some construction organizations, as well as other violations of financial and governmental discipline. One important area of command personnel activity is the handling of proposals, requests and complaints, as well as receiving visitors. The procedure of these activities is specified by the provisions of the Disciplinary Regulations and the Internal Service Regulations. Some commanding officers, however, pay little attention to suggestions and requests by their subordinates, fail to analyze the reasons behind complaints, and fail to observe the specified deadlines for examining correspondence received by the unit. There are also instances where complaints are forwarded to command personnel and officials against whose actions the complaints have been made.
An analysis indicates that most frequently regulations are violated due to a lack of knowledge of regulations by personnel. Therefore one of the important tasks of commanders, political workers and military lawyers is to step up the dissemination of legal information in the army and navy and to improve its quality and effectiveness. Of great significance is continuous monitoring by senior command personnel and active prosecutor verification of precise observance of laws and general military regulations.

It follows from the instructions of the 25th CPSU Congress that in the campaign against violations of military discipline and departures from socialist standards of behavior incorporated in Soviet laws, military oath and regulations, it is essential also to utilize the weight of opinion within the military collective, the critical printed word, methods of persuasion, and the force of law -- all the means at our disposal.
TASKS OF POLITICAL OFFICERS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Oct 76 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen I. Sviridov, member of military council, chief of political directorate of the Red-Banner Baku Air Defense District: "The Heart of Organizer Activity"]

[Text] At one time disciplinary infractions became a more frequent occurrence in the subunit in which Maj E. Muradyan serves as deputy commander for political affairs. These infractions involved for the most part uniform violations and late arrival at work by certain officers. These infractions were cause of considerable concern on the part of the commanding officer and the political officer. Political section personnel, accompanied by staff officers, went out to the subunit.

They thoroughly examined the process of personnel training and indoctrination as well as the activities of the party organization; they analyzed disciplinary practices. Subsequently discussing frankly with the commanding officer and the subunit political worker the deficiencies which had been noted, political section officers V. Zhukov and B. Kosachev did not limit themselves merely to specification of these shortcomings. A party meeting was held in the subunit, at which the responsibility of each and every party member for exemplary performance of his professional duties was discussed. Then Major Zhukov talked to the NCOs on their role in strengthening military discipline. Major Kosachev helped the subunit political worker draw up a schedule of measures aimed at instilling in the men excellent discipline, strict and precise observance of regulations.

Some time later the political workers again visited the subunit, this time to determine how the recommendations were being carried out.

This personal inspection and verification of decision implementation, as was emphasized at the 25th CPSU Congress, is a most important component part of organizational work, the task of each and every party, soviet and business leader, each and every party official, and each and every primary party organization.
These instructions also apply directly to the activities of our political officers. The effectiveness of their work depends in large measure on how thoroughly they analyze the state of affairs locally, how objectively and self-critically they appraise the achieved results, and the persistence with which they seek to achieve conformity between word and deed.

But are all political agency workers carrying out this party demand with an equal sense of responsibility? Unfortunately the answer is no at the present time. In some political agencies there occur many errors of omission in the content and methods of checking execution. Some places not all decisions are executed fully and carried out on schedule.

What is the problem here? Evidently it lies in deficiencies in work style. One cannot reproach Lt Col A. Chikalov, for example, that he rarely visits the subunits, but these visits frequently do not leave a deep mark, for they boil down principally to giving vague advice and instructions. And the conclusions which are subsequently formalized in appropriate documents contain such vague and nonspecific statements as the following: "Improve discipline," "strengthen indoctrinational work," "raise the level of political instructor training," etc. It is not surprising that such instructions frequently remain on paper rather than serving as a mobilizing element for the subunit's Communists, a subject of acute, highly-principled discussion at party meetings.

Monitoring and verification of execution presuppose first and foremost practical organization of assistance to comrades on the spot, graphic demonstration of how a given problem should best be solved, as well as a thorough analysis of all the occurrences one encounters. It is not enough for political section officers to record positive or negative findings. It is not enough, for example, to state that political instruction is well organized in one subunit but poor in another. Why does this happen and what are the secrets of success on the part of one political instructor and the failure of another? These should be the principal items of concern to a political section officer, should compel him to think about the problem and to take all steps to ensure that lagging performers match the level of the leaders.

I recently talked with Maj S. Azyiev, political section officer in a certain unit. He had just returned from a regular inspection tour of his subunits and had given a detailed report on his findings. It is true that he failed to mention some things due to his modesty, to wit that following his visit to a remote subunit, that subunit showed considerably greater activeness in the holding of party meetings, with a change in the work style of the commanding officer, who up to that time frequently had replaced painstaking individual work with his men by bureaucratic administrationism, and had not always heeded the opinion of party members, which of course did not promote a healthy, productive atmosphere in the subunit.
In short, Azniyev's efforts in the subunit produced real, tangible results. He expressed his opinion in a party manner on deficiencies occurring there and helped correct them.

It is very important that monitoring and verification of the state of affairs on the spot be performed constantly and promptly. When inspection is delayed or is conducted in a random manner, a political officer may find himself in the position of merely a recorder of events. On the other hand, constant contact with the personnel of subunits, including remote installations, and a thoughtful analysis of the processes taking place in the subunits enable the political officer to keep current on the state of affairs and promptly to note incipient indications of advanced know-how or to direct attention to typical errors.

Particularly intolerable is a formalistic attitude toward verifying execution, when judgment is made of individuals and their professional, political and moral qualities at times not on the basis of deeds but on the basis of various report documents. What this leads to in practice is graphically demonstrated by the following example. A certain fighter aviation regiment had a good reputation in the district. But the time came for a thorough review and inspection, and a detailed examination of the state of affairs revealed several flaws in the methods employed to train flight personnel and in organizing flight operations. The inspection indicated that there had been occurring cases of oversimplification and lack of demandingness in working on combat training tasks; undeservedly high marks had been given to some pilots and ground crew specialists, and the possibilities of socialist competition had been poorly utilized to boost personnel performance levels.

Of course we severely reprimanded the unit commander, political worker, and other officers for these deficiencies. The situation was corrected. It seems, however, that no less responsibility in this case is borne by those political agency and staff representatives who, visiting the unit on numerous occasions, reported a no-problem situation. Within a comparatively brief period of time, for example, the unit was visited by political worker-officers R. Gareyev and Yu. Khutornoy. But their activities at the unit involved chiefly a conscientious study of various report documents, and yet these are far from the only source of information. The main thing for the political worker has been and remains work with individuals, live organizer activity directly in the primary party organizations. This was ignored by Gareyev and Khutornoy. They accepted the information obtained from documents at face value and were satisfied.

One effective form of monitoring and verification is the receiving of reports in political agencies from political workers, party committee secretaries and primary party organization bureaus, with subsequent discussion of these reports. At the present time this is a widespread procedure. We should like to emphasize, however, the need of more thorough preparation for these report sessions. In particular, they
should be preceded by a detailed study of the actual state of affairs locally. But unfortunately this is not always practiced. In addition, discussion results are frequently not communicated to other political agencies and party organizations.

An important place in verification of decision execution is occupied by party meetings. It is essential to ensure that these meetings involve maximum activeness on the part of each and every party member and that the discussion of agenda items at these meetings always be of a highly-principled, businesslike nature.

We should like to mention one more thing. Experience indicates that there are no and can be no inalterable forms and methods of organization of execution verification. It requires in each separate case innovative thinking, intelligent initiative, and an individual approach, depending on the nature of the tasks being performed by the military unit, the level of training of personnel, the experience of commanders, political workers, other officers, etc. Also varying are the inspection timetables, scope, aims and tasks of inspection activities. But we feel that one thing should remain constant -- the ability of the political agency's top official to concentrate efforts at the right time in the right area, to work with an eye to the future. A greater effort must be made to delve more deeply into the content of party documents, orders and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, more fully to take into account the specific features of party-political work in the various arms, and to concentrate attention on the root tasks facing the unit and subunit.

The final results of the training year are currently being totaled up. Report-election meetings are being held in the party organizations. All these important measures, in which all party members are participating, are promoting detailed and thorough analysis of the status of verification and monitoring of implementation of decisions and resolutions.

Lenin stated that the key to all efforts and all policies lies in checking individuals and verifying actual execution. Monitoring and verification of execution constitute primarily a thorough study of the professional and political qualities of individuals, the lending of concrete assistance on the spot, and unconditional execution of designated measures and decisions. The main purpose of verification is to ensure a unity of decisions and decision execution, which comprises the heart of organizational activity. It is the task of each and every political officer to be unswervingly guided in his work by Leninist theses, developed in party documents and in its diversified practical activities.
The training year has come to an end. Final drills and exercises have demonstrated that the men have worked hard in the classrooms and motor pools, on the gunnery ranges and in the tank training areas, and that one more step has been taken toward further improving combat readiness and field proficiency. Tireless, hard work on the part of commanders, political workers, staff officers, party and Komsomol organizations can be seen behind the results, which attest to successful completion of training schedules and meeting of socialist pledges by our units and subunits. Looking into the daily activities of officers, one senses how responsibly they perform the tasks pertaining to strengthening ideological work in the line units, maintenance of combat readiness, and the innovative inspiration with which they prepare for training classes, endeavoring to conduct them on a high methodological and organizational level, more fully utilizing the mobilizing force of socialist competition. The final test demonstrated that officers are being more strict and demanding in evaluating military performance, in analyzing achievements, and are paying particular attention to qualitative indices and the search for untapped reserve potential.

The four-times decorated tank regiment under the command of Lt Col A. Tikhonov reaffirmed its fine reputation. The men of this unit demonstrated at the final performance test excellent combat skills. One can scarcely exaggerate the contribution of the regiment's commanding officer to these achievements. Lieutenant Colonel Tikhonov is characterized by high demandingness on himself and on his men, and by an acute, genuinely party sense of personal responsibility for performance of each and every task. The regimental commander thoroughly examines the training process and possesses excellent knowledge of the level of training of each and every subunit and each and every officer in the unit. He is most frequently seen out on the gunnery range, in the tank training area, and at other training facilities, wherever training is being conducted with officer personnel, where commander preparation is being improved. All officers emulate their commanding
officer; they learn from him how to direct socialist competition toward the accomplishment of specific combat and political training tasks, toward improving the quality of the training process and introducing the spirit of competition.

Observing the performance of outstanding commanders, who are distinguished by conscientiousness, cool efficiency and purposefulness, I always recall a statement made by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress: "The essence of organizational matters, to put it simply, lies in each and every individual who is invested with the requisite authority and who bears full responsibility within the limits of his authority, doing his job."

The one-man commander has a big job to do. In order to be in control of the situation and fully to carry out his assigned duties, he should possess a well-developed sense of personal responsibility to the Communist Party and Soviet Government for the combat and mobilization readiness of his unit or subunit. This sense is characteristic of the overwhelming majority of officers. They evaluate demandingly and with party principledness the status of combat and political training of their subordinates, wage a decisive campaign against oversimplification and unnecessarily easy conditions in training, synthesize advanced know-how in a thoughtful and careful manner, and incorporate it into their practical activities in an efficient and flexible manner.

While acknowledging this, we should not ignore those vexing exceptions to the rule where, alongside conscientious officers of strong volition, one encounters an individual whose sense of responsibility for his assigned job has lessened. Sometimes this is an individual with fine abilities, but these abilities are not being realized due to insufficient industriousness, persistence, and absence of a constant effort toward self-improvement.

Take the case of Capt. V. Makar'yev, for example. This officer was considered, and not without reason, militarily well-trained and a good organizer. He was promoted. It would seem that in an effort to justify confidence on the part of his superiors, he would reveal his abilities to an even greater extent. Unfortunately this did not happen. This individual decided that in view of his abilities there was no need to work particularly hard, that the experience and know-how he had already acquired would carry him a long way. He lessened his demandingness and permitted both himself and others to conduct training classes in an impromptu manner, as it were, without preliminary preparation. This young officer's superiors drew his attention to his negligent attitude toward his job, but evidently there was a lack of prompt and strict demandingness. Captain Makar'yev himself took these comments and just criticism as captious fault-finding. The result was that this officer's subunit failed to accomplish its mission at a field exercise.

Basic knowledge acquired at a military training school or service academy, as well as innate intellect will not help if an individual does his job haphazardly, without a full effort and without inspiration. Particularly
today, when troops are being equipped with increasing quantities of more sophisticated hardware and the nature of combat is becoming increasingly dynamic and complex. There should be a corresponding increase in the personal responsibility of the commanding officer, each and every officer, each and every military specialist.

The military council of this group of forces devotes considerable attention to developing in officer cadres a feeling of personal responsibility for the assigned job. Naturally emphasis is on indoctrinating officer personnel in a high ideological spirit and in a spirit of party principledness. Experience shows us that loss of a leader's positive qualities and diminished work effectiveness begin when an officer ceases concern about his own ideological-theoretical development. An individual stops growing as a commander and becomes incompetent in many areas of his activity.

Concerned with the ideological conditioning of officers, the military council at the same time does not diminish its attention toward their professional training. Arming of officer personnel with solid military knowledge and methods skills is combined with organizational work directed toward improving the quality of training classes, effectiveness of the training process, and toward a resolute campaign against excessively easy demands and excessive simplification. Those who fail to maintain proper order in their assigned area are also brought strictly to account. This year, for example, we were forced to demote the commanding office of a certain unit. The deficiencies in his performance were by no means caused by the commanding officer's lack of experience. He was making no effort to determine the actual state of affairs in the subunits and did little work to improve himself. This officer lacked self-criticalness in evaluating his own performance and lacked persistence in carrying out the recommendations of the group of forces military council. Finally it was necessary to assign him a job with less extensive duties. It was stated at the 25th CPSU Congress that we should not leave in a command position persons who display a lack of responsibility and who coast on what they have previously learned and accomplished, in the assumption that the position itself ensures them the requisite authority and respect.

Of course instances where an officer ceases to be adequate to the position he holds and does little to improve himself to the level of present-day demands are extremely rare. Such cases are always treated specifically and separately. Today greater demandingness is also required in assessing the job performance of those who perform their duties within a limited range, for the multifaceted activities of the military unit are increasingly demanding innovative activity on the part of officers, not simply utilization of their knowledge and experience but application of this knowledge and experience with initiative, a tireless search for more effective training and indoctrination techniques.

It is particularly important to elaborate an active life position on the part of young command personnel. Officer V. Fenenko was fairly recently
assigned to a new position. Frankly, he did not "inherit" a smoothly-running machine. This officer, however, did not proceed to blame the mistakes of his predecessors but set about his task enthusiastically and in the party manner. His first steps were not easy ones; he lacked both know-how and practical experience. But party member Fenenko displays genuine commander volition and takes every opportunity to improve his knowledge and methods skills. He learns from his superiors, from more experienced commanders, and is not ashamed to turn for advice in a difficult situation. The men have great respect for their commanding officer. They performed excellently at the final exercises.

An important prerequisite for increasing the personal sense of responsibility of any individual is strict monitoring by superiors of performance of duties. Weakness and lack of systematic nature to verification most frequently engender inefficiency and lack of responsibility.

Much attention in line units is devoted to increasing effectiveness of verification. But monitoring and verification of execution are forms of management activity which must be utilized intelligently. It sometimes happens that verification and assistance are transformed into garden-variety wardship, with senior comrades simply taking over the job burden of a young officer. The company under the command of Sr Lt V. Beznosov, for example, received a mark of excellent for two years running. The officer's efforts were duly noted. He was promoted. Suddenly the young battalion commander began receiving so much "help" that he began to become accustomed to "division of labor," to rely on his superiors in all difficult situations and to lose his sense of responsibility. In short, "help" of this kind brought him only detriment.

In exercising monitoring and verification functions the higher echelon should never make decisions which can be made and executed at a lower echelon. The campaign for genuine efficiency and a high degree of personal responsibility without excuses of youth and inexperience and against excessive work-loading of some higher-echelon officers is inconceivable without this.

Those commanders are correct who, in place of constant wardship over young command personnel, persistently work to develop in this personnel independence, the ability critically to appraise the results of one's labor, to reveal and analyze in a highly-principled manner the causes of failure, and effectively and efficiently to correct deficiencies. Every commander goes through a certain period of development, a period of adjustment to a new and more responsible job. Experience shows that if a young officer strives wholeheartedly to acquire knowledge and experience and attentively listens to the counsel of his superiors, and always relies on the party organization, his period of adjustment is much more successful. Higher-echelon commanders should do everything they can to ensure that the beginning commander or specialist develops rapidly and takes to the wing, as it were.
It is the higher-echelon commanders, carrying out their party and professional duties, who should arouse in an officer the noble aspiration to be a commander who meets the demands of the time, an expert at training and indoctrination. For this it is necessary to utilize each and every training drill and tactical exercise, comprehensively to analyze the performance results of the young commander, assessing performance with our principal criterion -- the measuring stick of combat, to arouse in youth the desire to be at the forefront, through intense, productive labor to earn the respect of their fellow soldiers.

A feeling of personal responsibility for the assigned task, a high degree of discipline, demandingness on oneself and one's subordinates, and initiative are by no means inborn qualities. They are developed and improved. The degree to which they develop is in direct relation to how deeply an individual perceives the greatness of the cause which he serves, the social significance of one's daily activities and the strictness of the demands one places upon oneself.

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On 1 November the Order of Lenin and Suvorov General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces of the USSR imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov is marking its 40th anniversary. The decision to establish this academy was made at the beginning of 1936 by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) and USSR Council of People's Commissars. It constituted one of the links in the overall chain of measures aimed at strengthening our country's defense capability and was dictated by a sharp worsening of the international situation and an increased threat of attack on the Soviet Union. This academy adopted the finest traditions of the General Staff Academy of the Red Army, which was established in 1918 on the initiative of V. I. Lenin and which was subsequently reorganized into the Military Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

The finest military specialists were recruited to work at the new academy. They were faced with the difficult task of preparing highly-qualified commanders for large combined-arms headquarters staffs and high-echelon command entities. In addition, it was necessary to conduct military-theoretical research on a large scale and to take active part in the elaboration of the root problems of theory of Soviet art of warfare. These tasks were successfully performed both in the years of peace preceding the war and during the Great Patriotic War.

Many graduates of the academy were among those who fought the enemy bravely at the battle front, who provided skillful troop command in savage battles against the German-fascist invaders and Japanese militarists. Soviet citizens are quite familiar with the names of outstanding commanders and military leaders A. A. Grechko, A. M. Vasilevskiy, I. S. Konev, K. A. Meretskov, F. I. Tolbukhin, L. A. Govorov, V. D. Sokolovskiy, I. Kh. Bagramyan, M. V. Zakharov, N. F. Vatutin, A. I. Antonov, P. A. Kurochkin, G. K. Malandin, V. D. Ivanov, V. V. Kurasov, A. P. Pokrovskiy, L. M. Sandalov and many others.
The postwar years became a new and important stage in the activities of the academy. Its enrollment increased substantially. In contrast to the pre-war years, they now represented all services and arms. Teaching faculty efforts were directed toward study and synthesis of the wealth of experience of the past war. Alongside this, principal attention was devoted to elaboration of new techniques and methods of waging warfare which took into consideration the radical changes in the organizational structure of the army and navy and the ever-increasing scale of equipment of troops with new weapons and other combat hardware, including nuclear missile weapons.

The scientific and technological revolution in military affairs as well as the greatly increasing complexity of weaponry and modes of weapon combat utilization demanded a basic reorganization of the entire teaching and learning process. An operational-strategy emphasis was placed on training activities. This resulted in a radical reworking of the curriculum and required the establishment of new departments. The academy staff saw their task as keeping in step with the times, as presenting their students with all new and advanced developments engendered by military science. The teaching faculty wrote and published major textbooks and elaborated training problems and training manuals in conformity with increased demands. Classroom facilities and laboratories were completely requipped.

The General Staff Academy today is characterized by a solid unity of learning process with indoctrinational work, with scientific research conducted in the departments. In their practical activities the staff are guided by the instructions and demands of the 25th CPSU Congress.

CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev stated in the keynote address at the congress: "Today's leader should organically combine party-mindedness with total competence, discipline with initiative and an innovative approach to his work." These words fully define the fundamental principles of training of military cadres as well.

Guided by the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress and unswervingly carrying out the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense, the academy command, political section, teaching faculty, and party organization are working hard toward the goal of equipping students with thorough political and military knowledge. This knowledge will help graduates resolve in a manner beneficial to the nation, with party responsibility and a full awareness of what they are accomplishing, complex and multifaceted problems connected with further improving and strengthening the Armed Forces of the USSR and increasing their combat readiness and fighting efficiency.

In organizing the learning process the academy staff bear in mind at all times that a high level of general-curriculum and specific professional training of commanders, political workers, engineers, technicians and all Soviet Army and Navy personnel as well as the continuing process of equipping units and warships with increasingly sophisticated and complex weapons are sharply increasing demands on moral-political, operational-strategic
and military-technical training of top-echelon military command cadres. Their successful performance in any area is determined by the ability to approach from a party position the instilling of excellent ideological-political and moral-fighting qualities in personnel and the resolving of various problems which arise.

All this increases the responsibility of the academy staff for quality of student training and proper student indoctrination. Alongside study of theoretical principles and development of practical skills in troop control under various operational-strategic situation conditions, the main thrust in our activities was and remains concern for the ideological-political indoctrination of those who are enrolled at the academy. Students are armed with thorough knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology and the ability to apply this knowledge in order to solve practical problems connected with preparing troops to wage combat under the most complex conditions with a powerful, well-equipped adversary.

Recently the bond between the academy and line units has become much stronger, deeper and more comprehensive. Department chairmen and instructors always participate in all major troop and command-staff exercises. This enables them to attain a unified understanding of the basic problems of operational art and tactics, an organic combination of theory and practice, and rapid adoption of all new advances in military science. On the other hand, the experience amassed in the course of field exercises helps enrich the curricular process and aids in selecting the most important areas in scientific research activity being conducted at the academy.

In recent years the academy has graduated a great many military leaders. Their level of preparation is indicated by the fact that many of them today occupy responsible positions in the Armed Forces. Academy graduates include first deputy and deputy ministers of defense, troop commanders, military district chiefs of staff, and members of military councils. Many graduates are working successfully and productively in the edifice of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces General Staff.

Throughout the academy's existence, training and indoctrination work has been inalterably combined with scientific work. Contemporary history and the changes which are taking place in the army and navy are constantly advancing new problems which demand immediate resolution. Under the direction of the command and political section, the academy faculty is conducting broad and diversified research and is producing new, basic studies on the major problems of military organizational development, strategy and operational art. The principal directions of development of military affairs are determined and problems advanced by the troops and staffs of all Armed Forces branches are being resolved to a substantial degree in the course of scientific research. The academy possesses all necessary facilities for the conduct of scientific research. Training classrooms and laboratories are furnished with modern equipment, instruments and apparatus. The library's holdings are growing year by year. The main resource of our military training establishment is people, experienced faculty members, a large percentage of whom have experienced the harsh school of the Great Patriotic War.

Making its contribution toward further strengthening the defense might of our homeland and increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the General Staff Academy takes active part in accomplishing another important military-political task. Officers and general officers from the armies of the nations of the socialist community are enrolled here. Carrying out its international duty, the academy not only is helping the peoples of these countries train highly-qualified cadres for their own armed forces but is also promoting the development in the armies of the Warsaw Pact member nations of unified views on all fundamental problems pertaining to the theory and practice of military organizational development.

Many officers and general officers of the brother armed forces who have graduated from this academy have today become prominent military leaders: defense ministers and their deputies, as well as commanders of armed services in their countries.

The work performed by the academy, its teaching faculty and entire staff is greatly appreciated by the Communist Party, by the government of the Soviet Union, and by the governments of the socialist nations. The academy holds the Order of Lenin and the Order of Suvorov, 1st Class, as well as five decorations awarded by brother nations, for its accomplishments in the area of training highly-skilled military cadres.

The high praise for the achievements of the staff at the academy obliges it to perform better today than yesterday, and tomorrow better than today.

Activities of the CPSU and Soviet state directed toward consolidation of world peace, détente, an end to the arms race, and development of international cooperation are bearing fruit. However, as was noted by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, in his address at the scientific-practical conference of top-echelon army and navy political workers, "...the successes of détente, which has lessened the immediate threat of a nuclear confrontation, have not yet become sufficiently solid to guarantee the world from all kinds of provocations on the part of the most aggressive, reactionary imperialist circles." This demands of us unabating attention toward the training of highly-skilled military cadres and further development of Soviet military science.
The academy command, political workers, teaching faculty and party organization are celebrating its 40th anniversary in an atmosphere of general political and labor enthusiasm evoked by the new victories of our party and the entire Soviet people in building communism and in the campaign to implement the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress. All academy staff personnel and students are deeply aware of their responsibility to the party and people, are dedicating and will continue in the future to dedicate all their energy and knowledge to the cause of further strengthening the military might of the homeland, the cause of defending the achievements of socialism and the building of communism.
[Excerpt] This year Soviet citizens are celebrating Motor Vehicle Transport Worker Day for the first time. On the eve of this celebration KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt Yu. Soldatenko met with S. Volkov, Deputy Minister of Motor Vehicle Transport RSFSR, and Col Gen Tech Trps A. Smirnov, Chief of the Central Motor Transport Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and asked them to answer some questions of interest to our readers.

[Question] During the years of Soviet rule our motor transport workers have had a great and glorious history. Could you outline the principal stages?

[Volkov] Today it is inconceivable to imagine our lives without motor vehicles. Every day more than 100 million persons make use of automotive transport, and trucks haul tens of millions of tons of freight. This mode of transportation is served by a huge army of drivers, mechanics, and state automotive inspection personnel.

Our country's fleet of motor vehicles has become so large and well-equipped thanks to constant concern on the part of the Communist Party and Soviet Government. Following the victorious Great October Revolution the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs issued an order on Lenin's personal instructions to establish a Central Motor Vehicle Transport Division.

Subsequent decrees effected reorganization and centralization of automotive transport and secured it a solid place in this country's economy. In 1939 it was noted at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet that all conditions had been created for operating motor vehicle transport as a government enterprise.
[Smirnov] All this was also of enormous defense significance. The Moscow and Gor'kiy Automotive plants, which had gone into operation, began mass-producing motor vehicles. A network of driver training facilities and courses was set up, and automotive engineer training curriculum was established at higher educational institutions. This made it possible by the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War to have a national automotive fleet of more than 820,000 vehicles, 270,000 of which were operated by the armed forces.

Military vehicle drivers contributed many heroic pages to the combat chronicle of our Armed Forces. They accomplished this under incredibly difficult conditions, across trackless terrain and under enemy fire, delivering ammunition, fuel, weapons and food to combat units. Through their efforts they ensured swiftness of our military advance. We shall never forget, for example, the feat accomplished by military truck drivers on the 190-kilometer road across the ice on Lake Ladoga, rightly called the Lifeline by the people of Leningrad.

[Question] Every year new truck and passenger car models are developed in this country, and thousands of kilometers of roads are built. Tell us, please, what tasks have been assigned automotive transport in the 10th Five-Year Plan?

[Volkov] In the postwar years automotive transport has affirmed its position as an independent element within the country's unified transportation system. Today professional motor vehicle driver is one of the most common occupations, running into the millions.

For the 10th Five-Year Plan the party assigned the task of achieving further concentration of automotive transport equipment in large motor transport operations. Centralized freight hauling by common carriers will be expanded, and there will be further development of intercity motor transport services. Total freight tonnage will increase by approximately 42%. To improve passenger service there will be an increase in the production of more luxurious buses and comfortable taxis. Toward the accomplishment of these tasks annual motor vehicle output will be 2.1-2.2 million vehicles by 1980, including 800-825 thousand trucks. Hundreds of thousands of these will be new models from KamAZ, BelAZ, ZIL and other plants. And drivers will be at the helm of this armada.

[Smirnov] Military drivers will also be receiving many new and improved vehicles. New generations of automotive-specialization personnel, including military, are studying hard and are worthyly carrying on the traditions of their teachers, who have distinguished themselves in labor and in combat, such as combat veteran drivers Heroes of the Soviet Union D. Rzyanin, I. Kryukov, P. Nazarenko, V. Artyukh, D. Perov, such as shock workers of the Ninth Five-Year Plan Heroes of Socialist Labor V. Vladik, V. Nazarov, and others.
But today's generation of military motor transport personnel have much more complex tasks to perform than their predecessors. Today automotive equipment has become much more complex. It is utilized not only to deliver supplies but also as a mechanical means of towing various artillery systems and special trailers, as a base for mounting missile and rocket launchers, radio communications facilities, radar facilities and much other military equipment.

The duties of military vehicle drivers have also changed to a certain degree. In many cases the military driver has additional duties to perform. It is no longer sufficient merely to be a driver, to possess driving skills and to be familiar with the vehicle. It is also necessary to master an additional occupational specialty. In the National Air Defense Forces, for example, the driver of a hauling and loading truck is also a member of the crew which readies the missile for firing.

3024
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LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE CHIEF ASSESSES CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING

Khmelnitskiy Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 22 Nov 76 LD

[Talk by Valentyn Fomenko, chief of Khmelnitskiy Oblast civil defense headquarters, date and place not specified—recorded]

[Text] On 1 December 1976 a new training year will begin for the civil defense system, a year when the Soviet people, inspired by the historic decisions of the 25th party congress, will be working with great enthusiasm to fulfill the majestic tasks of the 10th 5-year period.

The preliminary results of the first year of this 5-year period summed up by Leonid Ilich Brezhnev in his speech at the October plenum of the party's Central Committee show that the 5-year period has made a good start. The results achieved in the development of industry, agriculture, science, culture and arts fill the hearts of Soviet people with pride for their Leninist party and inspire them for new labor feats.

Together with our people, the servicemen of the army and navy are fulfilling their duty in a worthy manner. Civil defense has also been improved. The Soviet people remember the words of the great Lenin that as long as imperialism exists, our country will be imperiled by the threat of aggression and that our steps for peace have to be accompanied by the wholesale intensification of our military readiness.

The Soviet Union is firmly marching along the road of relaxation of international tension and establishment of lasting peace and security of peoples. But, so long as a threat of war exists, our party will take measures to strengthen the country's defensive capacity and improve civil defense.

Civil defense is an integral part of the country's general defensive measures. It pursues one humane aim--to organize the defenses of the Soviet people and the national economy against modern weapons.

The training year within the system of the oblasts' civil defense which has just ended saw the further perfection of methods relating to the practical training of the population. The main emphasis was laid on conducting
comprehensive training at the workplace. This is the basis for preparing units of the national economy for implementing civil defense measures without stopping production activities.

The plan for conducting comprehensive training at the workplace has been completely fulfilled. The majority of training exercises were held in an organized manner at a high methodical level. The best results in these exercises were achieved in the towns of Kamcnets-Podolskiy, Shepetovka and also at Novaya Ushitsa, Chmerovtsy, Khmelnitskiy, Volochisk, Izyaslav, Letichev, Shepetovka and other rayons.

The degree of preparedness of paramilitary formations has greatly increased. Attention was paid mainly to insuring the paramilitary formations' capacity for skilful and resolute actions within the stricken areas, and to their psychological preparedness. The working and nonworking population were involved simultaneously. Practical exercises were prescribed as the basis of training.

Regarding the fulfillment of civil defense measures, the role of the commanding and supervising personnel was exceptionally high. Therefore, this training year was a year of further improvement in the instruction courses designed for this section.

The propagation of civil defense knowledge has also improved. During this year more than 1,000 lectures were read to the population and nearly 100 radio programs transmitted. Films were shown on a regular basis. The whole complex of measures carried out assisted in raising the responsibility of the formation's personnel and the whole population for strengthening civil defense.

However, one should evaluate the results of the work done in a self-critical manner. All of us should be governed in our practical activities by Leonid Ilich Brezhnev's directives at the 25th CPSU Congress. We shall act correctly and under the inspiration of Lenin when paying tributes to our achievements, we shall concentrate our attention on the shortcomings and uncompleted tasks which remain.

Such shortcomings also occur during civil defense exercises. Thus, some of the comprehensive exercises at the workplace were held in a simplified practical situation, without the necessary material-technical aids and with the participation of small groups of workers, employees, collective farmers and of the nonworking population.

The plan of training commanding personnel on civil defense courses has not been completely fulfilled. In the Krasilov, Starokonstantinov, Gorodok, Staraya Sinyava and Dunayevtsy rayons cases have arisen when certain leaders absented themselves from courses, substituting others in their places.
The plans for creating and developing the modern material base have not been fulfilled either. In the towns of Khmelnytskyi and Belogorye and in the Vinkovtsi, Letichev and Yarmolints rayons these plans have fallen through, having a substantial effect on the quality of exercises and other civil defense measures.

In the new training year, civil defense will face the new task of improving the preparedness of units on the national economy, the commanding and supervising personnel and the population to the fulfillment of civil defense measures. Special attention will be paid to conducting comprehensive exercises at the workplace. The course toward the practical training of all civil defense forces and the population is the only correct course.

During exercises theoretical knowledge becomes consolidated and practical routines are acquired. But this can be achieved only when exercises are prepared well and when they are conducted at a high level. The struggle for resolute improvement in the quality of training at all levels of civil defense should become the main task in the new training year.

The training of commanding and supervisory personnel is the decisive link in the whole system of civil defense measures. Being deeply aware of the state's need for civil defense, they will solve any task skilfully, methodically and with knowledge. They will be trained at civil defense courses and directly in the workplace.

It should be especially stressed that units of the national economy have been and will remain the central points in training the cadres of the commanding and supervisory personnel of the lower level. At any unit during comprehensive exercises and at [words indistinct] studies the commanders will learn how to control civil defense forces and resources, taking into consideration the peculiarities of their own units.

Thus it becomes necessary to increase the demands on and the responsibility of commanders for training the population and also for their own skill. The training of the working population will be carried out in a 20-hour program held at the unit. It is already necessary now to select course guides, to outline their duties and to create the material base.

As never before, it is important now to introduce into the training process practical forms and methods of training and a greater number of hours directly within economic units, defense installations, training villages and exercise points. It is necessary to introduce on a broader scale the technical means of training and to use in a more effective manner films and slides.

The organization of exercises involving the population is especially difficult—that is, that part of the population not engaged in production and services. It is necessary for their training to use the zhkek premises [zhilishchno ekspluatatsionnaya kontora], house management offices and culture centers.
Experience shows that without the participation of aktivs it is impossible to achieve good results. It is, therefore, necessary to attract civil defense activists, war veterans, reserve officers, members of block committees, older school pupils and students for this work. It goes without saying that there is no need to prolong exercises for several months. Winter is the most favorable time for exercises within the civil defense system.

It is known that the 25th party congress characterized the 10th 5-year period as a period of efficiency and quality. This also applies fully to civil defense. And it is quite obvious that without a material base corresponding to the demands of our times it is impossible to speak about decisive measures to improve the training of the population in civil defense methods. It is precisely because of this that plans to create the material base for training were worked out everywhere. Such plans should also be drawn up for the new training year.

The experience of frontrank rayons and units confirms that if we pay serious attention to this then it will be possible to build excellent training villages quickly, to create good classes, to prepare defensive installations as training centers and to create areas resembling "the real thing" and training [word indistinct]. The creation of the material base for training cannot be delayed. To use training time in a more effective fashion--this is the main task we face now.

Any success in perfecting civil defense and in training the population and paramilitary formations is unthinkable without harder party-political work and permanent influence by party organizations on civil defense exercises. Further improvement in comprehensive exercises at the workplace is also needed. In the course of preparing exercises the main emphasis should be laid on the moral and psychological readiness of the personnel. It is important that all plans should envisage a situation which would help in educating all the participants of the exercises and in instilling in them qualities such as a high work rate, initiative, boldness and endurance, and the capability to endure prolonged physical and moral burdens.

Now deputy commanders for political matters have been appointed in all paramilitary formations. The duty of party organs lies in helping them to master more quickly all procedures and methods and to acquire experience in party-political work among the personnel of the formations, especially during exercises.

The new training year is beginning. A good tradition has emerged recently: the summing-up of results for the past year at party meetings. In some rayons the results of the training year are discussed at party-economic aktivs. At such meetings the floor is given to chiefs of local party organizations and administrative organs, enterprises and establishments and the commanding-supervising personnel of paramilitary formations. These meetings also discuss socialist pledges for the new training year. One
would like to think that the results of the past year will be summed up in every organization, enterprise and kolkhoz and also in rayons and towns. This is a serious measure which is directed at further strengthening and perfecting civil defense.

The year 1977 will be the year of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. It will be a year of strengthening political work in the town and village, a year of struggle to arrive worthily at that glorious date. It must become a year of strengthening the propagation of civil defense knowledge among the wide strata of the population. This date should be met with monthly civil defense meetings and civil defense days. During such meetings it would be in place to check the state of defensive constructions, to mold reviews of achievements in socialist competition between formations, and to show films. All procedures and methods of propagating civil defense knowledge should be used, but the main emphasis should be laid on scientific propaganda as the most accessible and effective form of propaganda.

Civil defense is the concern of the whole people. Its strengthening should involve party and administrative organs, establishments, enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes and public organizations. An especially huge role in propagating civil defense knowledge can be played by trade unions, cultural establishments, (?post offices and banks) and Komsomol organizations. Only the joint efforts of civil defense organs and the armed forces can solve the responsible tasks of guarding the peaceful and creative labor of the Soviet people.

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