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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1275

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COMMUNICATIONS WORK UNDER COMBAT CONDITIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASTAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen G. Grebenets, first deputy chief of staff for the Red
Banner Prircarpathian Military District; "Stability of Communications"]

[Text] I am defining the task more precisely.... During tactical exercises
it is possible to hear these words from the lips of a commander at any level.
Such is the command of modern combat: Its dynamic character and the
increasing maneuverability of the troops taking part in it demand from
commanders and staff officers an ability to sense the situation and a
readiness to respond to any changes in it. This is unthinkable without
firm skills in using various communications systems. Even an individual
tank is not capable of fighting under modern conditions without using these
systems. The passing of combat missions and coordination instructions to
subordinates, its maintenance during combat, the receiving of reports from
subordinates on the carrying out of the commander's orders and instructions,
the receipt of information on the situation from higher headquarters and
from adjacent units, the transmission of notification signals, etc.-- all
this is ensured by means of communications. How important it is for command-
ers and staffs, who are controlling troops on the battlefield, to use
communications systems skillfully and with a consideration for the specific
tactical situation and work conditions!

I recall one tactical exercise. The motorized rifle battalion commanded
by Maj. I. Prikhod'ko was halted by the "enemy" on a water line. The
battalion commander decided to regroup his forces and, since the "enemy"
had not consolidated on the opposite river bank and had not brought up
reserves as yet, to attack him. It only remained to pass this decision on
to the subunits. However, when communicating with the commander of the
company on the right flank, Sr Lt V. Morozov, Major Prikhod'ko was able to
transmit only a couple of words; "I am making the mission more precise...."
At this point communications were broken off. Communications were also
disrupted with the other subunit commanders and with higher headquarters.
The "enemy" in the meantime continued to dig in hurriedly on the opposite
bank and bring up reserves. There was a way out for the commander-- to
use an armored personnel carrier for communications. He did this. But it
was late....
When analyzing the battalion commander's actions, it was not difficult to
determine the reason for the failure. Neither the battalion commander
nor the chief of staff, in preparing for the exercise, had thought they
would have to firm up a mission during the battle under jamming conditions—
though both knew, of course, from personal experience that the "enemy" would
resort to it. Also every opportunity to train company and platoon commanders
to work on communications systems was not used. In particular, they had
not worked at switching from one frequency to another, establishing communica-
tions within standard times, and planning the use of alternate channels
and parallel duplication of one type of communications with another. Some
officers had not learned how to determine the nature of the interference
and the signs of the "enemy's" use of it. No defense against it had been
organized.

Signalmen are normally considered the guilty parties in such cases. Of
course the signal platoon commander is guilty. He was supposed to do every-
ting to insure stable communications. However, the commander cannot
stand aside from this matter. If he seriously thinks about flexibility of
control, he will not forget to provide for the use of other communications
systems besides radio—wire, signals dispatch service, signals. He will
also provide for the best way to pass combat missions to his subordinates.

Of course, the ideal way to assign combat missions is the personal contact
of the commander and staff officers with subordinates. Experience from the
Great Patriotic War shows what strength the living words of a commander had.
However, personal contact is possible for the most part only when preparing
for combat actions. In combat, when the situation can require at any moment
that the mission be made more precise, personal contact cannot be relied
upon. The commander, who is not able to take measures to restore communica-
tions, is in a bad way.

It is understandable that this ability, like other command qualities, does
not come by itself. Practice is necessary. Here, much depends also on
the senior chiefs. When compiling a plan for this or that exercise, they
must create for the students conditions which approximate as closely as
possible combat ones. They must provide each time for the use of technical
control systems in a radio and electronic situation which constantly grows
more complicated.

Experience shows that the improving of practical skills in maintaining
stable communications provides the greatest effect when it takes place
under heavy radio and electronic interference conditions, when emergency
situations are simulated, when the channels are loaded to the utmost, etc.
Such an approach is especially important when training commanders of subunits
acting together to exchange information. In combat, they will have to net
with each other. This requires shifting from one frequency to another and
is accompanied with a certain risk of losing communications. Therefore, the
training of subunit commanders and the crews in command vehicles and on
separate radio stations to shift accurately from one radio net to another
and from an operating frequency to an alternate or reserve one is, in my opinion, one of the most important conditions in training them to struggle for stable communications in combat.

It is possible to see what this brings in the following example. During one exercise, the battalion commanded by Capt V. Malikov was pursuing a retreating "enemy." It arrived at an intermediate line. It did not manage to break through it from the move. The battalion commander decided to seize the line by a simultaneous attack from the front and rear. The "enemy," of course, did everything to disrupt the coordination of the separated attacking subunits. He also did not forget radio jamming. However, the officers were ready for this. They took measures in time to protect the communications systems. The missions of the subunits were formed up. Exactly at the designated time the company commanded by Sr Lt A. Burbenko, having completed an audacious maneuver, arrived in the "enemy's" rear. The battalion seized the intervening line by the simultaneous attack from the front and rear.

This in general ordinary episode was instructive for the officers. Each of them received an excellent opportunity to be convinced in practice that unbroken and accurate coordination is unthinkable without reliable communications between all elements of the combat formation. Now, in this and in a number of other subunits training on ways to operate communications systems under active jamming conditions has become one of the primary directions in the command training of officers. Various forms and methods are used in this training: group exercises on the ground with communications equipment, short tactical exercises, and radio training sessions.

Particular attention during command training is devoted, of course, to those questions which have been practiced poorly. These are, primarily, mutual netting and the multi-use of various communications systems and methods. The past training year showed that not everything is satisfactory for us here. It must be confessed that there were cases where some commanders confined themselves, when training on working with communications systems, to setting primary and alternate frequencies on the radios. There is little of this in stable communications during combat. In particular, experience shows that, besides primary and alternate frequencies, the responsible people must have data on those radio nets in which it is probable their radios will be used during combat. Therefore, it is advisable let us say, for a company commander to have data on the radio nets of attached subunits, support elements and adjacent units. All this can prove useful in the event the battalion's command and observation post is put out of action or the enemy employs jamming.

It is no secret that the basic content of messages in the radio traffic of motorized rifle and tank subunits during a battle are combat instructions and reports on the situation. At this time the enemy, trying to disrupt control, is also creating interference. Therefore, it is also important to develop in commanders the ability to assign tasks to subordinates briefly and to report on the situation quickly. It appears that those commanders
act correctly who require their radiomen to listen to the transmissions of all net subscribers and to report the content of the most important transmissions. This frees them from the necessity of transmitting unnecessarily. It permits them to receive in a timely fashion information on the situation and the nature of operations by all elements in the combat formation. It decreases the number of transmissions.

Concern for the stability of communications—this is also a concern for the training of the specialists. Therefore, it is important during each class to teach the crews of radio stations various ways to defend against active radio jamming. Definite experience has been acquired in this matter within the signal subunits of our district. For example, the method of simulating interference on a broad range of frequencies is used everywhere when training specialists. In this way, the ability to restore communications under any circumstance is developed in the students. It has also become a practice to evaluate the actions of radio station crews under jamming conditions and to take stock of their work. Competition has been organized between crews and subunits.

However, much still needs to be improved. It is important that commanders and staffs, when planning their work, proceed from the fact that skilful mastery of contemporary communications systems is one of the ways to increase the combat readiness of the forces and the effectiveness of controlling them on the battlefield.

8802
CSO: 1801
FOOD PRODUCING CAPABILITIES OF MILITARY COMBAT UNIT PRAISED

Moscow KRAASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Col (Reserve) G. Babkin: "For the Soldier's Table"]

[Text] The unit, which I visited on instructions of the editors, is widely known for its successes in combat training and service. However, something else brought me here. They said that the fighting men had an excellent kitchen farm; their own vegetables, their own milk and meat....

The conversation with the commander was short. He was in a hurry because of urgent business. However, the time which the colonel allotted to me, was sufficient to understand and evaluate his attitude toward the question which interested me.

He said: "The state gives us everything necessary for life and training. It seems there is nothing lacking. However, is it really possible not to use the arable land in the area where we are located? Would it really be thrifty to discard food scraps? Here there are considerable possibilities for economical expenditures and even partial reimbursement for that which we receive."

When the colonel had left, Capt N. Zhostkiy led me to the "rear" of the military coup where a cow shed, sheep pen, and pigsty were located and a hot house sparkled with its glass. Here, there was an unexpected meeting—WO (praporshchik) V. Chibisov, an old acquaintance of mine, in fact directed all this vast complex.

The warrant officer is a thrifty man! Ask him why did they undertake to raise sheep in the unit—with a pencil in his hand he calculates the economic effect. It is indeed profitable. Sheep are simple animals and give meat and wool.

He explains: "We now have a special burden. The younger animals are increasing. Every day, a sheep gives birth or a cow calves. Already, there are 20 lambs."
Ye. Petrakova has now worked for eight years in the kitchen garden. She must like her work very much to bother about the animals and learn their habits and customs. Yekaterina Mikhaylovna complains:

"It seems, they recently built a pigsty and a cowshed and already its crowded in them. The appropriate mechanization is needed."

They have already erected a new sheep pen for 100 head. They intend to build still another cowshed.

They feed the animals with food scraps from the soldier's messhall. These are sorted beforehand and thoroughly boiled a second time in the feed preparation building. Besides this, they use beets, potatoes and hay meal. The hay is pulverized in a special machine, steamed and enriched with concentrated feed. Where does the hay come from? Remember, the commander talked about arable land. The soldiers, warrant officers and officers and their families work enthusiastically in voluntary collectives on Sundays harvesting the hay. Good potatoes are grown in the kitchen garden. Part of them are also used to feed the animals.

Continuous and appropriate care for the animals and their rational feeding permits productivity to be raised. For example, the average daily increase in weight of the pigs is 500 grams. They maintain this, as a rule, until eight or nine months of age. This is considered the most effective rate.

As a result of this what do they receive from this kitchen garden? What is the economic effect? Let us mention that during the past few years meat production has increased two fold. The target for turning it over to the planned provisions has been fulfilled 250 percent. In other words, for several months a year the men in the unit are provided with meat from their own production.

And now about milk. The need for it is continuous. Before, they brought it from far away. Motor resources and fuel were spent on it. Now--with some fifteen of their own cows--these expenditures have fallen. The soldiers have milk. Part of it is turned over to the state and even sold to the military trading organization.

There is, as I have already said, a hot house here. The yield normally is more than four tons of early vegetables and greens. The hot house is now providing the soldiers' table with spring onions.

There is, of course, quite a bit of trouble associated with the kitchen garden. However, the return is also considerable. Last year alone quite a large sum of money was received in the unit's monetary fund from the sale of produce. A portion of this money was spent on additional food for the soldiers on days when training and work were most intense and, for example, each received a gift for the New Year--apples, liver, sweets....
In the unit, they shared with me their plans for further developing the kitchen garden. This year, they plan to get 25-30 percent more meat. Accordingly, the fodder base will be increased at the expense of sowing perennial grasses, in particular clover. They have decided to build a second hothouse and to expand the area of the kitchen garden.

There is still more. The unit's commander pointed out that its farm contributes to instilling in the fighting men a sense of thrift towards bread and other produce. Here one doesn't throw a half-eaten piece of bread on the floor. It is better that it become a gift for the animals. The people try to provide for the complete preservation of potatoes and vegetables.

When leaving the unit, I thought about those enormous reserves for producing food items which are hidden in the skilful organization of such unobtrusive farms like those created near the soldiers' kitchens.
AIR DEFENSE MISSILE REGIMENT COMBAT TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Moscow KRAINSAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Feb 77 p 1

[Article by Maj A. Bedzhyanian: "Progressive Experience"]

[Text] From the first days of the new training year the men in an air defense missile regiment—initiators of competition among the National Air Defense Forces—have persistently struggled to carry out high socialist obligations. The greatest attention in the regiment is being devoted to the organization and quality of the classes, training and exercises being conducted, to the training of young replacements and to their preparation to perform combat tours of duty independently.

These questions are being solved with particular success in the battalion which Lt Col V. Galatenko commands. One must say that the replacements arrived in the battalion in better shape. Almost all the young men had a secondary education. Many had undergone training in DOSAAF training organizations. Now they had to master functional duties on operating the systems in the missile complex. Naturally, thorough specialized knowledge and skills are needed here.

Of course, this task had been performed successfully before in the battalion. But now, in the year of the 60th anniversary of Great October, when all fighting men in the air defense forces of the country are aligning on the regiment, it is necessary to search for new opportunities to speed up the time and increase the quality of the young specialists' training.

Once, the unit commander arrived at the "point" to familiarize himself with the training plans and the obligations of the young fighting men. He carefully inspected the classes and lingered near a trainer for speeding up operators' training. Lt Mikhail Tsyplenkov and Sgt Valeriy Samborskiy had built it.

The regimental commander said to Lieutenant Colonel Galatenko: "You have a good base. Together, we will now think about how to organize the training better."
Soon, with the participation of the unit's staff officers, instructional methods plans for conducting classes on the most complicated subjects were compiled. Lists of inputs were updated. A schedule for the accelerated training of young specialists was drawn up. The young soldiers were involved in performing preventive work on the equipment. They studied the procedures for adjusting and tuning the apparatus.

Training as part of crews proved very beneficial for the new men. Naturally, at first the young fighting men acted in the role of understudies. However, they were already able to feel the breath of genuine combat work. In observing the actions of Sgt V. Samborskiy, Jr Sgt S. Beloohnshko, Pfc M. Svistunov, and other firstrate specialists, the young soldiers burned with lively interest in the job and with a desire to master their functional duties in the same way. Lieutenant Colonel Galatenko assigned to the officers, warrant officers (praporshchik) and sergeants the following task: to end each class with practical training which included a required analysis of the specialists' actions and assignment of ratings.

Check-out classes showed that Pvis M. Rotar' and V. Alekseyenko and many others had learned to carry out their duties confidently and, as a matter of fact, were ready to perform combat watches independently. Many but not all. What was the matter? It was possible, of course, to make allowances for the difference in individual capabilities of the young soldiers. Nevertheless, experience whispered to the battalion commander that the problem was in the instructional methodology of the classes. Therefore, he and the battery commanders decided to study the organization of training within the crews more deeply.

It turned out, for example, that Sr Lt V. Zaytsev trained his subordinates without the necessary consistency, speeding up the time for completing norms. This led to the fact that some young soldiers did not cope with the sharply growing strain. Having experienced psychological frustration, they then made mistakes during an uncomplicated situation.

The careful analysis of the instructional methods errors made by Senior Lieutenant Zaytsev and other officers, warrant officers and sergeants, which were revealed during the check-out classes, became the subject of a serious discussion during a party meeting. Specific measures were outlined. The best instructional methodologists, Maj K. Zverev, Capt V. Bautin, and Sr Lt M. Tsyplenkov, shared their experiences in training the young specialists and in organizing competition on tasks and norms most effectively. Demonstrations and training sessions were conducted in the batteries. All this provided its own benefits. Gradually the problem was corrected.

The third month of combat training is taking place. The missilemen in the battalion where Lieutenant Colonel Balatenko is the commander are firmly holding on to first place in the competition. Good results have also been achieved in other subunits of the regiment. However, if one should rate what has been done with a high measure of exactingness, for which the initiators of the competition are also noted, then it is possible to
conclude that not all reserves are being completely used. Incidentally, a fundamental discussion took place about this during a recent party meeting in the unit's headquarters. Col Yu. Orlov, Lt Col B. Kosachev—a political worker, and other communists talked with concern about the fact that some class leaders are still befogged by the pursuit of imposing numerical scores and percentages at the expense of the quality with which training tasks are worked out.

Similar facts were pointed out in the subunit which officer O. Prokof'yev commands. Judging from the report documentation, all the young fighting men have already mastered their functional duties. However, it was worthwhile creating complicated circumstances and really checking their training. The indices were considerably lower.

It seems that in this subunit they permitted with great timidity young fighting men to work in a practical way on the equipment. This was done with supposedly kind intentions: to avoid mistakes and discrepancies in combat training. But in fact the extraordinary overcautiousness slowed down the formation of the young specialists.

Other shortcomings in the training of the young fighting men were pointed out during the party meeting. The trainer simulation apparatus was not being fully used everywhere. Individual officers, especially the young ones, were trying to speed up professional training by shortening the time allotted for studying several combined arms and technical training topics. This, of course, is impermissible. Here and there the method of individual classes is being underrated although its effectiveness was proven long ago in practice.

At the present time, specific measures are being taken to eliminate the shortcomings which have been brought to light. The experiences of the unit's best methodologists are becoming the property of each class leader. Contests for the title of best subunit specialist are regularly held and their achievements in training and work are being disseminated more effectively.

8802
CSO: 1801
ARTILLERY OFFICER TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Col F. Mikiforov, Red Banner Far East Military District; "Growing Up"]

[Text] Captain Gaziyev, the battalion chief of staff, returned to the camp from Dagestan at the end of his leave. It was necessary to make repairs in his quarters. He had healthfully longed for the unit—he had missed it.

Having quickly changed his clothes, Gaziyev hurried to the regiment. The first thing to which he directed his attention were the vehicles loaded with boxes of ammunition. The artillerymen were preparing to go to the range. Gaziyev without hesitation decided to postpone the repairs to his quarters to a later time.

In the battalion, the chief of staff encountered some unfamiliar young officers.

A short officer with lively eyes presented himself: "Lieutenant Kozoyedov."

The captain inquired how he had finished school and asked several other questions. Valeri Kozoyedov answered calmly and confidently. Gaziyev thought: "He knows his worth. He understands theory.... Well, we will see what he will be like at work."

The usual circle of duties and the dynamic rhythm of preparing critical classes seized the battalion's chief of staff. Impatience to become absorbed more quickly in the elements of combat work took hold of him.

... It is light. Having completed a night march, the artillerymen busied themselves in setting up firing positions. Captain Gaziyev, having given the necessary instructions, made his way to Lieutenant Kozoyedov.

The chief of staff inquired: "How did you perform the survey?"
The officer, having looked up at him with eyes red from lack of sleep, answered: "Using the back azimuth, of course, comrade captain."

The captain calmly pointed out: "I recommend that you select a different survey method. This is an anomalous area. The magnetic needle "shifts." Therefore, it is impossible to orient oneself using it ...."

Turning red in the face, the lieutenant suddenly took exception: "But they taught us this way. I am sure that this method is the most accurate!"

Gaziyev did not take his gaze from the platoon commander. "Aha! ... Is this flare-up caused by tiredness or by his nature." He said with restraint:

"Perform the survey using the radial method. Although it is not the quickest, it is the most reliable in our situation."

Later, when they will begin training and the training battle, the platoon commander will understand that an artilleryman cannot manage without a thorough knowledge of the peculiarities of Far East conditions. The captain will note that the lieutenant for all his pride and hasty can be industrious.

However, during this exercise, everything didn't go smoothly for Kozoyedov. When changing firing positions, the vehicle in which he was the senior man fell behind at one forest crossroad and turned off onto a side road. The others followed after it. The column was broken....

For about ten minutes Kozoyedov, hurrying the driver, tried to catch up with the vehicle in front of him. Then he suddenly became worried and halted. He reached for the map. Here, Captain Gaziyev found him. The chief of staff will say to him: "You should not entertain confidence in yourself, comrade lieutenant. It is important that it not degenerate into self-assurance.... Had this happened in actual combat, we would have paid for it with blood and lives."

He will say this but he will not begin to give a good scolding. He will not even impose a punishment. Gaziyev is convinced that a stern word is sufficient for people with a conscience. The captain also noted the fact that it was not necessary to repeat recommendations and instructions for Kozoyedov twice. The young officer grasped everything quickly. True, he still did not have clearly marked efficiency in work. A comparison with the "backlash" familiar to each artilleryman is appropriate. At the moment when the gun layer begins to work the aiming instruments, the gun barrel still does not move. It will become animated only after the "backlash" is selected.

During his years of service, Gaziyev had met more than once people who were careful and responsive and who, not waiting until they were asked, gave the necessary help on their own initiative at the required time. In
the artillery school. Maj Kukuri Gurgenidze, a battery commander, and student Yevgeniy Tumenko helped him, a working lad from Kaspiysk, to master high mathematics. Capt Yurii Kol’tsov and Lt Col Oleg Kuznetsov taught him instructional methods for training and indoctrinating subordinates.

Recently the communists in the battalion selected Gaziyev to be the secretary of the party organization. Although he had certain experience in social work, it turned out that there was still much he did not know and was not able to do. It was necessary to learn from experienced comrades who without constraint pointed out the "short rounds" in his party work. For example, in the battalion they forgot about individual indoctrination work with men. There was a special request from him, the secretary, for it.

Life does not turn away from Gaziyev, evidently, because he always faces it directly. He received the next military rank early. He has been awarded the order "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd class. The officer considers that major credit in the successes achieved by him belongs to the collective, the party organization, communists, and the advancing pioneers of the competition to greet the 60th anniversary of Great October in a fitting manner.

During exercises, Captain Gaziyev did not watch over the men unnecessarily, but he did not let Lieutenant Kozoyedov slip from sight. He "tossed" him inputs on principle—from simple ones to complicated ones. He gradually brought him to tasks which a battery commander normally solves.

During scheduled firings the commanders of the gun crews had to fire direct fire. It is not easy to carry out such a task from guns and more so from howitzers. Acting as the battalion commander, Captain Gaziyev entrusted Kozoyedov with adjusting and bringing the aiming instruments up to the norm and with organizing several classes for the sergeants. During each meeting with Gaziyev the lieutenant enriched himself with something. He drank in advice and recommendations and immediately brought the knowledge he received to the sergeants.

The sergeants mastered especially carefully the practice of selecting "backlash" when aiming weapons. Kozoyedov achieved uniformity in combat work methods but he remembered that the people subordinate to him were different. Even the captain whispered:

"They must compete in each class. Sergeant with sergeant. Crew with crew."

Kozoyedov burned and his enthusiasm was transmitted to the sergeants. The more inputs the lieutenant gave, the more interested they were. Even tiredness became welcome because they saw that their skill increased with each day.

The artillerymen were gradually accustomed to unexpected tasks. However, the most complicated one awaited them during the check-out class. Having
listened to the report, an officer from higher headquarters looked over the artillerymen and said:

"During the battle three of you remain on duty--you, you and you. Only one weapon is in good condition. You have available five armor piercing shells ...."

Three moving targets appeared in the field.

"Action!"

And Kozoyedov without hesitation gave his first command....

Captain Gaziyev conducted registration using the battalion. He had an intelligence information card in front of him. He spent a lot of time here with binoculurs in his hand. However, the data transmitted from a helicopter located in the air on the execution of the third round caused him to worry. The calculations showed that the round must go far to the side of the target. Gaziyev concluded; "That means the observer is mistaken" and took complete responsibility upon himself, having decided to fire using his own calculations. He turned out to be right. They managed to cut the prescribed time norm in half. The target was destroyed.

Sergeants A. Burdygov, A. Abdurakhmanov and N. Loginchev, on whom fell the selection of the controller, did not let him down. They destroyed the three tanks with the five rounds. Each with one round.... They, on order of the lieutenant, replaced each other in turn at the aiming sight although it was not required by the input. This complicated the conditions for performing the task even more. Valeriy Kozoyedov knew his subordinates and trusted them as Captain Gaziyev trusted him.

8802
CSO: 1801
USING COLLECTIVE OPINION TO ENFORCE PROPER STANDARDS IN UNIT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen V. Mitropov, first deputy chief, political directorate, Strategic Missile Forces: "Public Opinion in the Collective"]

[Text] Instilling missilemen with a feeling of collectivism and high personal responsibility for the assigned job is one of the most important lines of action for the commanders, political agencies, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations of the Strategic Missile Forces. We attach special significance to using the pressure of the collective and molding healthy public opinion. Any misdeed by a soldier is judged morally by his fellow soldiers, and it is extremely important that this judgement help develop strong moral qualities in the man and eliminate everything foreign and negative. But how can we insure that collective opinion is highly effective?

As everyone knows, the commander is completely in charge and bears full responsibility for the training and education of personnel and for the combat and mobilization readiness of the subunit and unit. He must rely on the party and Komsomol organizations and on opinion leaders in performing the large and small missions put before the military collective. Broad use of the force of army opinion leaders in educating the men and strengthening conscious discipline is a command of the times.

It is by no means easy to look after the ideological content of public opinion and skillfully guide it. Those who have thorough knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and military pedagogy and psychology and have mastered progressive methods and forms of education will be successful. Theoretical knowledge absolutely must be supplemented with one's own conclusions based on knowledge of the men, actual individual work with them, and personal reflection and searching. It is also important for the commander to combine his personal know-how with that of his closest assistants, the communists and Komsomol members.

The commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol activists of our leading units and subunits mold public opinion in the collective thoughtfully and creatively. Beginning with the idea that mutual relations in a military collective are built on the solid foundation of the
Soviet state and social order, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, and the principles of communist morality, they persuasively propagandize the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the October 1976 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the CPSU Central Committee decree "The 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," and the lofty assignment of the fighting men who serve as armed defenders of our Soviet land, with their military labor contributing to the common cause of building communism. In our collectives it is very important in molding healthy public opinion to instill pride at serving in the Strategic Missile Forces, the most powerful part of our Armed Forces.

We can refer to the experience of one of our leading units. The commander, deputy for political affairs, and party and Komsomol organizations carry on meaningful ideological education every day, explaining to the missilemen the requirements imposed by the Communist Party with respect to the vigilance and combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the precepts of communist morality and military ethics, and the great social importance of military labor. The unit commander passes his experience as a teacher and methodologist on to his subordinate officer. He teaches them to organize forces correctly and constantly rely on the communists and Komsomol members, to use their help in teaching the men intolerance of shortcomings. It is precisely this approach to the work that distinguishes officers M. Popov, V. Mikhaylov, and I. Lysenko, the leaders in socialist competition.

The unit is a strong, unified collective. In the current training year its personnel initiated the socialist competition within the Missile Forces for a worthy celebration of the 60th anniversary of Great October and they are succeeding in their struggle to fulfill their obligations.

Unfortunately, there are still officers who reason something like this: "I am the sole commander and I have broad rights; I can take care of everything even without enlisting opinion leaders." This is a serious mistake. It is true that the commander is given extensive rights and should use them skillfully. But it is hard to accomplish complex and important missions without reliance on opinion leaders.

That is what happened in the subunit commanded by officer Yu. Marasanov. Its training scores dropped. A thorough analysis of the state of combat training and ideological education showed that the drop in scores was no accident. Rather it was a natural result of omissions by the commander, and the party and Komsomol organizations in working with the men and a result of underestimating the importance of opinion leaders. They failed to study the men deeply enough, their personalities, their successes and failures in training and service. Even among the activists were soldiers who could not boast of flawless behavior and outstanding training scores. Of course, they failed to show the proper adherence to principle when it was necessary to openly condemn the passivity of a comrade, his complacency. Unfortunately, the commander of the subunit was not always aware of these cases and did not take timely steps to combat the indifference and conceitedness of certain servicemen.
We should have better propaganda for the know-how of those commanders and chiefs who, skillfully relying on the force of opinion leaders, are achieving good results in educating the men. It seems to me that this know-how could well be discussed at theoretical seminars for officers. A lively, creative exchange of views would be very useful to all participants in the seminar. Senior commanders and political workers should give the officers, ensigns, and sergeants concrete instruction in the local area concerning how to rely on opinion leaders in accomplishing the missions of personnel training and education.

I would like to underline one more circumstance which is related to a skillful approach to using the force of opinion leaders. Some young officers try to bring virtually every instance of violations of rules of the service by the soldiers up for discussion at a meeting of personnel. The objective given is, at first glance, persuasive: to use the full force of the influence of the collective. But then, a meeting is not the only form of public influence on the individual. It is one thing to criticize an undisciplined soldier sharply at a meeting, but something quite different to review and analyze the behavior of a soldier who has made a mistake through ignorance of the service. In such a case it is possible to involve a narrower group of people, for example, with a hearing at a session of the Komsomol bureau, while in other cases one personal talk may be sufficient. The main thing is to achieve a solid moral influence and make sure that mistakes are not repeated.

We should remember that condemning violators of military discipline is by no means the only function of public opinion. It must be used more extensively to support and publicize examples of unselfishness in work and initiative and activism by the men in combat training.

Our units and subunits receive new replacements regularly. Newcomers arrive to take the place of experienced specialists who have gone through the school of army life. From the first minute these newcomers are surrounded by older comrades who help them in training and work. New fighting men are not drawn into the strict rhythm of army life immediately. They sometimes make mistakes and commit offenses. Here too collective opinion should be heard in full. The new man will understand that his comrades are thinking of the interests of the work and want to help him develop a correct posture in life and avoid problems with work. In time he will come to value the opinion of the collective even more and will himself become an active means of expressing it in practice.

The work of officer O. Malinin, a political worker, offers an example of energetic personal participation by a communist leader in work to establish a healthy moral atmosphere in a subunit and to mold mature group opinion. It became an organic need for him to communicate with the soldiers and officers. His personal ideological level and high principles, close spiritual contact with the men, sensitive attitude toward them, and his strict but fair standards assure him of the love and respect of the personnel. The men come to him for advice and help readily.
Socialist competition is being used extensively in the struggle to observe moral and ethical norms of behavior and to turn the military post into a post of exemplary public order and sophistication. Graphic agitation, the wall newspapers, radio, and amateur artistic activities -- these are all means of expressing collective opinion and promote development of the creative activism of the men.

Unfortunately, some commanders and political workers, in the rush of affairs, do not give the necessary attention to broadening the sphere of useful influence of collective opinion. When you talk with some leaders about using the force of opinion leaders they speak only of the influence it has on soldiers and sergeants. This is a narrow, one-sided idea. In our army opinion leaders among the officers too have a very important role. Their field of activity is very broad; they may approve the flawless work of an officer or deliver a principled criticism of one who permits mistakes and breakdowns in behavior.

We should not forget that educating the educators is a reliable way to mold correct relations between superiors and subordinates. And in its turn, this is an essential condition for establishing a healthy moral atmosphere in the military collective.

The art of the educator lies in the ability to control the dynamics of collective moods and use every means to increase the collective's role in molding high moral qualities in the fighting men. To help every commander and political worker master this art perfectly means to make use of one more mighty lever in the struggle to further strengthen military discipline and raise the vigilance and combat readiness of the subunits and units.

11,176
CSO: 1801
VARIOUS TROUBLES IN UNIT WHERE PROPER MUTUAL RESPECT IS IGNORED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 18 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Maj P. Leonidov: "Hurt Feelings -- Following up a Letter"]

[Text] Four months ago the higher-ranking organization was already receiving complaints from this unit. A commission from higher headquarters went to work there. The problems found in the organization of the training process and socialist competition were eliminated and those to blame were punished on a disciplinary basis. A few communists were called to account before the party for omissions in their work.

And now the editors of the newspaper have received another letter. Some of the problems listed in it refer to the past and have already been eliminated. But recent instances are also given. The essence of the matter is that the leaders of the unit are ignoring individuals who are exceeding their disciplinary authority and treat subordinates improperly. At best they give the offenders mild reproofs, and these have no effect.

I wanted to hear the views of the political worker, Maj V. Shevtsov, on this matter. Our talk took an entirely different direction, however.

"We are doing a lot of work. There are difficulties, of course," Valeriy Ivanovich began his explanation. "But we are overcoming them. However, we have certain individuals who are slandering the collective..."

I had to recall that the author of the letter did not cast doubt on the unit's successes. On the contrary, the examples he gave show that he has a correct assessment of the value of what has been achieved. If he did take a critical approach to analyzing the state of affairs in the unit, it was for just one purpose: to identify unused reserves and raise combat readiness even higher. But how did his senior comrades react to this?

At a certain party meeting communist R. Dubinichev pointed out a number of shortcomings in the work of communist M. Moskalenko, deputy regimental commander for technical affairs. Moskalenko should have listened closely

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to the reasonable advice of his comrade and reviewed his plans for preparation for and conducting vehicle maintenance days. But communist Moskalenko took offense and got mad. Dubinichev himself, he said, is not so perfect, let him clean up his own shortcomings.

Of course, it sometimes hurts to hear criticism. But still, principled, well-meaning criticism is an effective means of education, a way to eliminate shortcomings. And it is hardly necessary to prove that a superior who admits his mistake gains authority in the eyes of his subordinates rather than losing it. But Lieutenant Colonel Moskalenko believes differently. His reaction to well-meaning criticism left Dubinichev deeply offended and hurt.

The letter sent to the editors gave considerable attention to complaints about the rudeness of Lt Col A. Pilipas, unit chief of staff. Unfortunately, he was away on a trip and I could not meet him.

Talking with Lt Col V. Pen'kov and other officers and ensigns I heard many flattering comments on the chief of staff's professional training. They also spoke of his shortcomings. They spoke bitterly of Pilipas's arrogance and rudeness with respect to juniors. In front of a formation he chewed out Ensign N. Buyvolov, a company first sergeant, in very blunt language; a day later he did the same to Ensign V. Zhelonkin.

Ensign A. Artyukhin, who has been in the unit more than 10 years, says bitterly: "In 23 years of service no one ever humiliated me as much as the chief of staff did in front of a formation of personnel one day." Witnesses confirm that this was another occasion when Lieutenant Colonel Pilipas betrayed his lack of pedagogical sensitivity.

Lt Col V. Pen'kov and Maj V. Shevtsov tried to argue that rude behavior is not typical of this officer. If he loses control once in a while, they say, this is a result of his intensity, his struggle for strict regulation order.

This is a strange position. It seems to say that rudeness in service situations can be justified by lofty goals. But no, regardless of how it is clothed, rude treatment of juniors is a negative quality which indicates neglect of regulation requirements. And the commander or staff officer who himself does not set an example of respect for his subordinates cannot expect to be successful in educational work with them.

It is high time for Lieutenant Colonel Pilipas to start thinking about why people are offended by him and write complaints about him. If a man has done wrong he should be held responsible, punished, if necessary, with the full strictness of the disciplinary rights that are given, but there should be no insulting expressions. Then there will be no hurt feelings, no complaints.
Learning that a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent was working in the unit the officers, ensigns, and members of their families came forward themselves to tell me their problems. There were several complaints against Lt Col I. Petrukhin, deputy regimental commander for rear services. More than 20 families in the unit are without apartments. Some of them have several children and need living space very much. Lieutenant Colonel Petrukhin knows this very well. Nonetheless he has illegally assigned three apartments on the side. To whom? To people who have nothing to do with the army.

The schedule for service in the ensign detail has not been straightened out in the regiment. One ensign works 6-7 times a month in the detail while another does not have a single assignment. That is certainly not normal.

Hurt feelings... They spoil people's moods, derail the men from the routine of daily service, and introduce an element of tension in the atmosphere of the collective's life. When one reflects on why they occur and compares events and facts one concludes that they are all a result of incorrect mutual relations in the collective and neglect of regulation requirements. But everyone knows that only strict but fair regulation requirements, sensitivity, and attention to people promote the establishment of a healthy climate, a healthy working atmosphere, in the collective.

11,176
CSO: 1801
METROLOGY TEAM CHECKS RADIO FREQUENCIES FROM HELICOPTER

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 77 p 1

[Article by Cap Yu. Soldatenko, Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "Metrologists Take to the Air"]

[Text] A tactical exercise was under way. I had a chance to visit several subunits: airmen and missile forces. The men were performing their assigned combat training missions with great determination and skill. And all without exception spoke warmly of the help they received from the metrologists.

I telephoned the metrologists. Col-Engr V. Grudin answered: "Consider yourself lucky. Our 'Squirrel' has been given a mission. Who is that? Come over and see," the officer said. "I'll send a car."

While the Gazik was racing to the metrologists' testing laboratory my companion, Maj-Engr B. Gorodiskiy, who heads the lab, introduced me to his organization.

Metrologists are called the guardians of quality. It is perhaps one of the youngest specializations, being born during the revolution in military affairs. No arm of troops today is without radio electronic equipment; the dynamics of battle have changed too and the capabilities of weapons are expanded. The equipment is operated by specialists and the instruments and their readings are a kind of language in which they talk with the machinery. If the instrument is accurate and correctly tuned its signals will be good.

"Suppose you are flying in a plane," Bogdan Vladimirovich cited an example. "The pilots direct it along the entire route on the basis of radio beacon signals. The tuning frequency of the equipment on the plane and that at the airfield must coincide. But these devices cannot be adjusted once and for all. They have to be periodically tested and tuned using special model devices based on the signals emitted by the state time and frequency standards. We metrologists are the ones who do this. We 'attack' inaccuracy and struggle for quality. We teach it to the instruments."
The assemblies of the Squirrel (which is what they call their specially equipped helicopter in the subunit) did not take long. They were faced with the next input (tactical problem): support aircraft landings at a stand-by airfield. Ordinarily control and measuring equipment kept by specialists at the airfield is used to test flight support radio aids. If such equipment is not available a group of metrologists goes out in special vehicles. But now, in the course of the exercises, this possibility was lost: the roads to the stand-by airfield were buried in snow. Furthermore, the umpire limited the time allowed for performance of the order.

I was really lucky. I was going to fly with the very men who equipped this unusual helicopter with the unusual name.

"Why did we call it Squirrel?" the question plainly puzzled Sr Lt A. Lyubvin. "For one, it 'jumps' from one place to another. Then it's white like the winter sky. It hovers above the field and you can't find it. I don't exactly know why. Someone suggested it, we liked it, and so it caught on... Do you think it's not okay?"

The metrological careers of the members of the on-duty group -- Capt-Engr B. Zaborovskiy, Sr Lt A. Lyubvin, and MSgt (Res) radio-engineer G. Glizhan -- as well as those of their comrades in the laboratory are generally similar. They began their service in the radar forces. Before that they worked in laboratories of the USSR State Committee for Standards.

They are also united by their inability to work only within set patterns. In the job thought up by these specialists, re-equipping the helicopter, there were no shortcuts, nor could there have been any. The first thing was the problem of vibration. I tried to make notes in flight. It was as if I was holding a jackhammer, not a pen. But the metrologists had to work in such conditions, and using highly precise and sensitive instruments.

A solution was found. Under the direction of their first leader, K. Nazarov, who is now a reserve officer and candidate of technical sciences, they built a desk with a special surface, called a "layered bun," which absorbed the vibration.

Next another problem was overcome. The intensive work during a flight demanded special physical conditioning. MSgt (Res) G. Glizhan, former captain of the Army Sports Club L'vov soccer team, helped his colleagues acquire this conditioning.

They devised compact reserve power sources.

They refined the electrical equipment system on board the helicopter... There is really too much to mention.
"We are approaching the reference square," military pilot 1st class Capt A. Kiselev, the ship commander, reported on the intercom.

"Got it. We will make the correction from the air."

It was hundreds of kilometers to the homing station whose work they were now checking. But such distances are ordinary for the metrologists; they mastered the contact-less method of measuring and checking long ago. At the control console Capt-Engr B. Zaborovskiy switched on the special antennarelease device. Sr Lt A. Lyubvin froze at his equipment. It was his job to pick out the call signs of the distant station from the mass of different voices on the air and then get maximum resonance for the signals coming in.

"It's tuned!"

Now MSgt (Res) G. Glizhan went to work. A continuous series of readings on the electronic frequency meter at his work position illuminated the true magnitude of the frequency being checked, that of the airfield's nearest distant radio station. Glizhan checked the readings against the tables.

"The parameters are within tolerances!"

"Got it!"

Again the specialists began their precise, strictly calculated actions. The highly precise equipment on board the helicopter worked flawlessly. They found a discrepancy in the frequency value. A report went off to the command post, followed by more measurements, corrections.

A few years ago visitors to the Exhibition of the Achievements of the USSR National Economy witnessed the arrival of the next exhibitor. Carefully avoiding the spires of buildings and having circled the Friendship of Peoples Fountain, an outwardly conventional MI-8 helicopter landed near the USSR Standards pavilion. Inside, however, was a flying frequency measurement laboratory. Medals of the Exhibition of the Achievements of the USSR National Economy were given to nine military metrologists of the testing laboratory headed by Maj-Engr B. Gorodinskiy for development of the first experimental model.

"This is Squirrel," Capt-Engr B. Zaborovskiy, commander of the on-duty group, reported to the command post. "Mission accomplished. The distant stations of the airfield are operating normally. I await further instructions."

"This is Number Three," came the voice of Lt Col-Engr V. Grudin, staff officer of district aviation, from the ground. "There are no criticisms of your work. Your next order..." Our helicopter swung onto its new course.

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CSO: 1801
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COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING CHART FOR IDEOLOGICAL WORK NOT BEING FOLLOWED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 20 Feb 77 p 2

[Article by Col V. Isgarshov: "But What Is Behind the Chart? Ideological Work -- Experience, Problems, Opinions"]

[Text] It is an indisputable fact that there are many commanders, party organizations, and propagandists in the Siberian Military District who are truly concerned with questions of further improving the effectiveness and quality of ideological work among the troops and introducing the comprehensive approach to troop education. The real generator which gives impetus to thinking and creative searching in this important aspect of army life is the district political directorate, primarily its division of propaganda and agitation.

Last year a group of officers from the district political directorate made a special study of ideological work by the commanders and party organization of the Sevastopol' Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy Motorized Rifle Regiment. At the time the personnel of the regiment were preparing for tactical exercises lasting several days. They were going to have to make a long march and then perform complex missions in different types of modern battle. What better time could there have been to check the practical effectiveness of the comprehensive approach to ideological work and better understand the links and relationships among its separate elements and the degree of influence on the actual work of the men as they improved their field training.

The exercises, and the work of the officers from the political directorate, are remembered with great satisfaction in the regiment even today. While they were analyzing ideological work, the last thing the directorate officers looked like to the men was inspectors. No, they all, so to speak, "rolled up their sleeves" and, working with the political workers and party activists of the regiment planned, worked out, and themselves took part in conducting many activities.

And it was then, based on practical experience with the comprehensive approach to accomplishing ideological missions and on the conclusions and recommendations of commanders, political workers, and the propaganda aktiv
at the district political directorate, that the document was worked out, a document which will, according to the intention of its authors, qualitatively improve the whole character of ideological-political, troop, and moral education of personnel.

Last autumn the political directorate published the small booklet entitled "The Comprehensive Approach -- Path to Raising the Effectiveness of Communist Education of Personnel." Along with concrete recommendations for commanders and political workers, the booklet contains a model chart of the basic activities of the comprehensive approach to performing the missions of ideological work in a unit for one month. This is the very document referred to above.

The district political directorate has done and continues to do a great deal to see that the ideas on which the model chart is founded are accepted by all commanders and political workers in the units and schools. There has not been a seminar, assembly, or scientific-practical conference in the district in months where important workers from the political directorate have not spoken on questions of introducing the comprehensive approach into practice in ideological education.

The chief of the division of propaganda and agitation, deputy chief of the district political directorate Col N. Nesterov, is one of the authors of the chart. While explaining its vital importance to me he remarked with some pride that other districts, groups of forces, and fleets have shown an interest in the experience of the Siberians and booklets have been sent to them on request.

We should mention here that at first some of the comrades in the local areas were fairly cautious, and sometimes even critical, with the chart, seeing it as one more sheet of paper on top of many earlier ones. Its 72 boxes would, it seemed to these comrades, demand long hours at the office from a number of officers to fill in. Workers from the political directorate worked hard to convince the people that the proposed chart would help them in both planning and organizing ideological work. At the same time, cautioning them against formalism, they emphasized that the chart envisions only the basic directions of effort for ideological workers; it is not a hard and fast pattern that restricts initiative. If one does not want to fill in the boxes, fine, conventional plans can be drawn up; but one should glance at the chart first, and then take account of the chief missions being accomplished by the unit and provide a job for every organizer of ideological work.

All this is said in the chart, incidentally.

The organizers of ideological work who are obliged to conduct the various activities in the main areas of military life are the commander, political worker, party committee, Komsomol committee, unit propagandist, the councils of the club and the library, and the editorial board of local radio broadcasting. In short, the chart really can be useful to both the commander and the political worker as a practical aid in planning
ideological work on the basis of the comprehensive approach to the missions of political, troop, and moral educational of personnel and in organizing checks on fulfillment of all planned activities in the given phase of training. And in this respect its introduction in practice is unquestionably a positive phenomenon. At least, I did not hear a word spoken against it in talks with commanders, political workers, and party activists at the directorate, the political branch of the N unit, the political branch of the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms School, and the Sevastopol' Regiment.

On the contrary, many comrades spoke eloquently of the real value of the proposed chart. How many large and important missions our personnel are performing today! Active preparations for the 60th anniversary of Great October are under way on a broad scale. Socialist competition to greet this portentous holiday in a worthy fashion is picking up speed in the units and subunits. Ideological work has a growing role in actively mobilizing the men to struggle for new successes in training and work and in further development of the men's initiative and creativity. And everything that is aimed at further improvement of ideological work and insuring a comprehensive approach to the educational process in the military collective — which is the purpose of the chart recommended by the political directorate — serves the common cause.

Maj A. Filimonov, deputy commander for political affairs of the Sevastopol' Regiment, put it this way: "This chart is a good thing. I looked at it and it seemed that our whole ideological life was shown on a screen. Take just one day for example. We look to see what is going on and where. There is a topical meeting for soldiers at the club in the morning, a readers conference for ensigns at the library, and a radio news report is being produced at the motor pool, concerning vehicle maintenance."

The chart, made by the regimental draftsman in different colors on a large sheet of high-quality drawing paper, lay on the political worker's desk. All the columns were indeed filled in. It was just like a screen.

My first acquaintance with affairs in the battalion commanded by Maj D. Chernomazov, however, quickly dimmed the colors of the chart. Not one of the activities mentioned by the political worker had been held.

"No time," Chernomazov explained. "The main thing at the training center is firing and driving..."

The commander was seconded by Sr Lt V. Boykov, secretary of the battalion party organization, Lt Yu. Gordeyev, secretary of the company party organization, and other officers.

There's one for you! No time! But the chart on Filonov's desk indeed shows ideological activities in the boxes under the columns for "fire training" and "technical training." Lt A. Lytkin, regimental propagandist, was supposed to conduct one of the activities.

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"I think he did something..." the battalion commander said uncertainly. "If I remember, he talked with the activists."

I met Lytkin in the evening, back at the unit area. He had, in fact, been at the training center. But Lieutenant Lytkin did not conduct any activities in the battalion. He did not meet with the activists. He did chat with the editor of the operational news sheet and attend the Komsonomol report-election meeting. Who was elected secretary? That Lytkin did not know! He had not stay until the end of the meeting. The more I asked the worse it got. It turned out that the propagandist did not know what organization, the company or the battalion, was holding the meeting. Did he know that the men at the training center had not been able to watch television for a week and that they had not received the newspaper for three days? He did not know about the newspapers, but he was aware of the television set. That, I learned, was why he had gone to the training center. The regimental propagandist repaired the TV set.

Perhaps this was all a chance confluence of circumstances? Insignificant facts? Unfortunately, the battalion worked all week at the training center and not one of the activities envisioned by the "screen" that brightens the office of the political worker was held. Not one of the persons named in the chart as organizers of ideological work even looked in on the battalion, with the exception of the propagandist, who was there as a TV repairman. And not one of the battalion communists received a party assignment from the secretary to organize educational work.

I stood in the tower and watched the riflemen firing from their vehicles. They fired fairly well. But their performance standards were low! It all seemed to be in slow motion. In the time it took for two runs the whole battalion could have done the exercise, if the training periods had been well organized.

Maybe this is precisely because the screen of ideological activities, the one which shines like the rainbow on the desk of the deputy commander for political affairs, went out during the battalion's trip to the field?

This is not a rhetorical question. Becoming familiar with things today in the Sevastopol' Regiment, the very regiment where the practical know-how for comprehensive performance of the missions of ideological work was born and tested (and then it really was practical know-how), I found myself hoping continually that this know-how, the result of the efforts of many people, workers from the political directorate included, was not created for the sake of the chart.

Certainly, when working out and introducing this generally necessary and useful chart, the division of propaganda and agitation of the district political directorate should give at least as much attention and concern to the training of those persons who are named as organizers of ideological work in the chart. In short, they must constantly see not just the chart itself but also those who stand behind it.
ADMISSIONS ANNOUNCEMENTS FOR MILITARY SCHOOLS

KGB Border Schools

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 77 p 4

Excerpts Moskovskoye vysssheye pogranichnoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche /Moscow Higher Border Command School, Decorated with the Order of the Red Banner/. 129328, Moscow, I-328.


Length of training is four years. Graduates of the schools are awarded the military rank of lieutenant and are given an all-union diploma conferring the degree of combined-arms officer with higher general education (at the higher border command schools) or officer-political worker with higher general education (at the higher military-political school).

The military schools accept enlisted men as well as civilian youths who have a complete secondary education, whose health is adequate for study in military training institutions, and who have successfully passed the competitive entrance examinations. The age of candidates—from 17 to 21—is determined as of September 1 of the year of admission.

The military-political school accepts CPSU members and candidate members and Komsomol members with a demonstrated aptitude for political work, upon recommendation from political organs or Komsomol raykoms (gorkoms).
MVD Schools

Moscow KRAZNYAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Mar 77 p 4

/Excerpts7 Vyssheye politicheskoye uchilishche MVD SSSR /MVD USSR Higher Political School7. 198075, Leningrad, L-75.

Novosibirskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche MVD SSSR /MVD USSR Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School7. 630114, Novosibirsk, 114.

Ordzhonikidzevyshanye voyennoye komandnoye
Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni S. M. Kirova MVD SSSR
/MVD USSR Ordzhonikidze Higher Military Command School,
Decorated with the Order of the Red Banner, imeni S. M. Kirov7. 362005, Ordzhonikidze, 5.


Kharkovskoye vyssheye voyennoye uchilishche tyl MVD SSSR
/MVD USSR Kharkov Higher Military Rear Services School7. 310005, Kharkov, 5.

The schools train officers for MVD USSR internal forces. The
schools accept enlisted men no older than 21, reenlisted men
after completion of their first enlistment up to age 23,
warrant officers no older than 25 upon expiration of three
years of service as warrant officers or officers, and
civilian youths from 17 to 21 with a complete secondary
education.

The MVD USSR Higher Political School accepts CPSU members,
CPSU candidate members, and Komsomol members who have
demonstrated an aptitude for political work.

All MVD USSR military training institutions (except the
Novosibirsk and Saratov schools) accept warrant officers
with no less than two years of practical service, either as
platoon commander or company master sergeant (Ordzhonikidze
Higher Military Command School), as freelance political
worker (Higher Political School), or as company master
sergeant or specialist in commissary, motor vehicle, or
artillery engineering services (Kharkov Higher Military
Rear Services School).

The length of training at the higher military training
institutions is four years (three years for warrant officers
at the Ordzhonikidze Higher Military Command School).
Antiaircraft Missile Schools

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 5 Mar 77 p 4

Excerpts Kiyevskoye vyssheye zanitnnoye raketnoye
Inzhenernnoye ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamsynnoye uchilishche
imeni S. M. Kirov  Kiev Higher Antiaircraft Missile
Engineering School, Decorated with the Order of Lenin and
Order of the Red Banner, imeni S. M. Kirov 7. 252048, Kiev-48,
28 Vozdughoflotskiy prospekt.

Orenburgskoye vyssheye zanitnnoye raketnoye komandnoye
Krasnoznamsynnoye uchilishche imeni G. K. Ordzhonikidze
Orenburg Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command School, Decorated
with the Order of the Red Banner, imeni G. K. Ordzhonikidze 7.
460010, Orenburg-10, 63 Pushkin Street.

Leningradskoye vyssheye zanitnnoye raketnoye komandnoye
orden Krasnaya Zvezda uchilishche Leningrad Higher Anti-
aircraft Missile Command School, Decorated with the Order
of the Red Star 7. 197061, Leningrad, P-61, 15 Mir Street.

Poltavskoye vyssheye zanitnnoye raketnoye komandnoye
Krasnoznamsynnoye uchilishche imeni generala armii N. F.
Vatutina Poltava Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command School,
Decorated with the Order of the Red Banner, imeni Army
General N. F. Vatutin 7. 314000, Poltava, 42 October Street.

Smolenskoye vyssheye zanitnnoye raketnoye komandnoye uchilishche
Smolensky Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command School 7. 214027,
Smolensk-27, 2 Kotovsky Street.

The length of training is five years in the engineering school,
four years in the command schools.

Graduates of the engineering school are awarded the military
rank of engineer-lieutenant and the degree of military
engineer in radio engineering or radioelectronics. Graduates
of the command schools are awarded the rank of lieutenant
and the degree of engineer for operation of radio engineering
equipment.

Motor Vehicle Schools

Ryazanskoye vyssheye voyennoye avtomobil'nnoye inzhenernnoye
orden Krasnaya Zvezda uchilishche Ryazan' Higher Military
Motor Vehicle Engineering School, Decorated with the Order


The schools train officers—motor vehicle operators with a higher specialized military education. The length of training is five years at the Ryazan' Engineering School, four years at the command schools. For warrant officers and michmans the length of training at the engineering school is four years, at the command school three years. (Only the Chelyabinsk school accepts warrant officers and michmans for training in the higher military motor vehicle command school program.) Graduates of the Ryazan' school are awarded the rank of engineer—lieutenant and the degree of officer with higher specialized military education: mechanical engineer. Graduates of the command schools are awarded the rank of lieutenant and the degree of engineer for operation and repair of motor vehicle equipment. Graduates of the schools are awarded a medal for completion of a higher military training institution, and an all-union diploma.

Airborne Landing School


The school trains officers with a higher specialized military education. The length of training is four years. Graduates of the school are awarded the military rank of lieutenant and the degree of engineer for operation of armored tank and motor vehicle equipment, and are given an all-union diploma and a medal for completion of a higher military training institution.

Construction Engineering School

Volzhskoye voyennoye stroitel'no-tekhnicheskoye uchilishche /Volga Military Construction Engineering School/. 141980, Dubna-2, Moskovskaya Oblast.
The school trains officers with a secondary specialized military education. The length of training is three years. Graduates of the school are awarded the military rank of lieutenant and given an all-union diploma awarding them the degree of construction technician.

Military Command Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Mar 77 p 4

/Excerpts7 Permskoye vysssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche /Perm' Higher Military Command School7. 614015, Perm', 15.


Serpukhovskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni Leninskogo Komsomola /Serpukhov Higher Military Command School imeni Leninist Komsomol7. 142202, Serpukhov, Moskovskaya Oblast.


The schools train officers with a higher specialized military education. The length of training is five years. Graduates of these schools are awarded the military rank of lieutenant and one of the following degrees: military mechanical engineer, military electrical engineer, military radio engineer, etc.

Communications School


The school trains communications officers with a higher specialized military education. The length of training is four years. Graduates of the school are awarded the military rank of lieutenant and the degree of engineer for operation of communications equipment.
Military Topography School

Leningradskoye vyssheye voyenno-topograficheskoye komandnoye
Krasnoznamennoye, ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche /Leningrad
Higher Military Topography Command School, Decorated with the
Order of the Red Banner and Order of the Red Star7. 197042,
Leningrad, P-42.

The school trains officers for the military topography service
with a higher specialized military education. The length of
training is four years. Graduates of the school are awarded
the military rank of lieutenant and the degree of engineer in
aerial photogeodesy.

Military Engineering Institute

Voyennyy inzhenernyy Krasnoznamennyy institut imeni A. F.
Mozhayskogo /Military Engineering Institute, Decorated with
the Order of the Red Banner, imeni A. F. Mozhayskiy7. 197082,
Leningrad, P-82, 13 Zhdanov Street.

The institute trains military engineers for the USSR Armed
Forces. The institute accepts enlisted and reenlisted men and
civilian youths no older than 21 whose health is adequate for
study in military training institutions, who have a complete
general or technical secondary education, and who have
successfully passed the entrance examinations.

The length of training in the institute is five years.

Graduates of the institute are awarded the military rank of
engineer-lieutenant and, depending on the specialty they
select, an all-union diploma awarding them the degree of
military mechanical engineer, military electrical engineer,
military electronics engineer, military construction engineer,
military engineer-mathematician, military radio engineer, or
other specialties.

Chemical Defense Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 77 p 4

//Excerpts7 Saratovskoye vyssheye voyennoye inzhenernoye
uchilishche khimicheskoy zashchity /Saratov Higher Military
Engineering Chemical Defense School7. 410037, Saratov, 37.

Tambovskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye
uchilishche khimicheskoy zashchity /Tambov Higher Military
Command Chemical Defense School, Decorated with the Order of
the Red Banner7. 392011, Tambov, 11.
Kostromskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche
khimicheskoj zashchity /Kostroma Higher Military Command
Chemical Defense School/. 156015, Kostroma, 15.

The Saratov school trains officers specializing in engineer-
ing for the Soviet Army's chemical forces. The length of
training is five years. Graduates of the school are awarded
the degree of military chemical engineer and given an all-
union diploma and the officer's rank of engineer-lieutenant.

The Tambov and Kostroma schools train commanding officers
for the Soviet Army's chemical forces. The length of train-
ing is four years. Graduates of the schools are awarded the
degree of engineer and given an all-union diploma and officer's
rank of lieutenant.

Rear Services Schools

Vol'skoye vyssheye voyennoye uchilishche tyla imeni
Leninskogo Krasnoznamennogo komsomola /Vol'sk Higher Military
Rear Services School imeni Leninist Red Banner Komsomo/. 412680, Vol'sk 3, Saratovskaya Oblast.

Gor'kovskoye vyssheye voyennoye uchilishche tyla /Gor'kiy
Higher Military Rear Services School/. 603125, Gor'kiy, D-125.

The schools train rear services officers with a higher
specialized military education for units /chast/. of the
Soviet Army and ships and units of the Navy. The length of
training is four years. Graduates of the schools are awarded
the military rank of lieutenant and the degree of engineer-
economist.

Ul'yanovskoye vyssheye voyenno-tekhnicheskoye uchilishche
imeni Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo /Ul'yanovsk Higher Military
Technical School imeni Bogdan Khmel'nitskii/. 432050,
Ul'yanovsk, 1, 30 Karl Marx Street.

The school trains engineers for operation of combat equipment
and storage and transport of liquid fuel. The length of train-
ing is four or five years, depending on the specialty chosen.

Graduates of the school's five-year program are awarded the
military rank of engineer-lieutenant and the degree of military
mechanical engineer or military engineer-technologist.
Graduates of the school's four-year program are awarded the
military rank of lieutenant and the degree of engineer for
equipment operation and repair and fuel handling.
Moskovskoye vysssheye komandnoye uchilishche dorozhnykh i
inzhenernykh voysk /Moscow Higher Road and Engineering Forces
Command School/7. 143909, Balashikha, 9, Moskovskaya Oblast.

The school trains road and engineering forces officers with a
higher specialized military education in construction and
restoration of motor vehicle roads and bridges, and operation
and repair of engineering and road machinery. The length of
training is four years.

Graduates of the school are awarded the military rank of
lieutenant and the degree of engineer in the appropriate
specialty.

Yaroslavskoye vyssheye voyennoye finansovoye ordena Krasnoy
Zvezdy uchilishche imeni generala armii A. V. Khruleva
/Yaroslavl' Higher Military Finance School, Decorated with
the Order of the Red Star, imeni Army General A. V. Khrulev/
150038, Yaroslavl', 38, 67 Bol'shaya Oktyabr'skaya.

The school trains financial services officers for all branches
of the Armed Forces and all arms and services. Length of
training is four years. Graduates of the school are awarded
the military rank of lieutenant and given an all-union diploma
of higher specialized military education.

Kievskoye vyssheye tankovoye inzhenernoye uchilishche imeni
Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza I. I. Yakubovskogo /Kiev Higher
Tank Engineering School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union
I. I. Yakubovskiy/7. 252063, Kiev 63, 9 Parkhomenko Street.

The school trains military mechanical engineers and military
electrical engineers who are specialists in the operation,
repair, and production of caterpillar and wheeled machinery.
The length of training is five years. Graduates of the school
are awarded the military rank of engineer-lieutenant and are
given an all-union diploma.

Leningradskoye vyssheye ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoye
uchilishche zheleznodorozhnykh voysk i voyennykh soobshcheniy
imeni M. V. Frunze /Leningrad Higher Railroad Forces and
Military Communications School, Decorated with the Order of
Lenin and Order of the Red Banner, imeni M. V. Frunze/
190000, Leningrad, 96 Moyki River Embankment.

The school trains officers with a higher specialized military
education. Length of training is four years in the command
departments and five in the engineering department. Graduates
of the school are awarded the rank of lieutenant and degree of
engineer and are given an appropriate all-union diploma.
Construction Schools

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 13 Mar 77 p 4


The school trains military engineers in construction specialties. For resident training the school accepts officers, warrant officers, and michmans with a complete secondary special education corresponding to the specialty of the department they have selected; and enlisted and reenlisted servicemen as well as civilian youths with a complete general or special secondary education. The length of training is five years, and four years for officers, warrant officers, and michmans.

For training by correspondence the school accepts officers, warrant officers, and michmans with a secondary specialized education in the area of construction. The length of training is five years.

Graduates of the school are awarded the degree of military engineer in the appropriate specialty, and those without officer's rank are awarded the military rank of engineer-lieutenant.

Kamyshinskoye vyssheye voyennoye stroitel'noye komandnoye uchilishche /Kamyshin Higher Military Construction Command School/. 403850, Kamyshin, 10 Volgogradskaya Oblast.

Pushkinskoye vyssheye voyennoye stroitel'noye komandnoye uchilishche /Pushkin Higher Military Construction Command School/. 188620, Leningrad-Pushkin, 2 Sovetskiy pereulok.

The schools train officers with a higher specialized military education. They accept warrant officers, reenlisted and enlisted servicemen, and civilian youths. The length of training is four years, three years for warrant officers. Graduates of the Kamyshin and Pushkin schools are awarded the military rank of lieutenant.
Communications School

Orlovskoye vysshoye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche svyazi imeni M. I. Kalinina /Orel Higher Military Command Communications School imeni M. I. Kalinina/. 302034, Orel 34.

The school trains officers in the specialties of electrical conductor, radio, and radio relay communications. It accepts enlisted servicemen and civilian youths age 17 to 21 who have a complete secondary education and whose health is adequate for study in a military training institution. Applications are accepted up to April 1.

The length of training is four years.

Graduates of the school are awarded the rank of lieutenant and the degree of engineer for operation of communications equipment, and are given an all-union diploma.

Military Institute

Voyennyy institut /Military Institute/. 109033, Moscow Zh-33, 3 Volochayevskaya Street.

Admission is to the translating, military-political, and military-juridical departments.

The institute accepts civilian youths, enlisted men, and warrant officers and michmans who have a secondary education and whose health is adequate for study in a military training institution. The age of candidates as well as the documents necessary for enrollment and the deadlines for submitting them are defined by the admissions rules for military training institutions. The name of the department selected must be shown in the applications (reports).

The length of training is five years in the translating and military-political departments and four years in the department of military law.

Graduates of the institute are awarded the military rank of lieutenant and are given an all-union diploma conferring the degree of reader-translator in two foreign languages (translating departments), officer with higher political education and reader-translator (military-political department), or officer with higher specialized military education and lawyer (department of military law).
Military Conducting Department

Voyenno-dirizherskiy fakul'tet pri Moskovskoy gosudarstvennoy konservatorii imeni P. I. Chaykovskogo /Military Conducting Department of the Moscow State Conservatory imeni P. I. Chaykovskiy/. 119021, Moscow G-21, 22 Komsomolskiy prospekt.

The department trains officers—military conductors with a higher military musical education. The length of training is five years.

Physical Fitness Institute

Voyennyy dvazhdy Krasnoznamennyy institut fizicheskoy kul'tury /Military Physical Fitness Institute, Twice Decorated with the Order of the Red Banner/. 194044, Leningrad K-44, 63 Karl Marx prospekt.

The length of training in the institute is four years. Graduates are given an all-union diploma of higher specialized military education in physical fitness and sports.

Antiaircraft Academy

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Mar 77 p 4

/Excerpts/ Voyennaya komandnaya akademiya protivovozdushnoy oborony imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza G. K. Zhukova /Military Antiaircraft Command Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov/. 170022, Kalinin 22, 50 Zhigarev Street, Telephone: 3-22-21, ext. 3-02, 3-43, 4-90.

The academy announces admissions to resident post-graduate work, including specific research work, in specialties announced by directive.

Candidates must be officers up to age 38 with a complete higher education, no less than two years of work experience at the headquarters-command level in the area of chosen specialization after graduation from an institution of higher education, and a demonstrated ability for pedagogical and scientific research work.

8893
CSO: 1801
REVIEW OF SEVENTH VOLUME OF HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Mar 77 pp 2-3


[Text] The last war was a severe test of the strength of the Soviet system which was born by the Great October Socialist Revolution. "In the long and most difficult of wars in the history of our Motherland," it says in the decree of the Central Committee CPSU, "On the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," the Soviet people accomplished an exploit the equal of which mankind has not yet known. They not only managed to defend their freedom and independence but they also made a decisive contribution to the cause of saving European and world civilization from destruction by the fascist barbarians."

The seventh volume of the "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945"¹, which was prepared by the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense USSR jointly with the Institute of Marxism-Leninism with the Central Committee CPSU and the Institute of General History and the History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences USSR which has been published is devoted to one of the decisive stages of the war. The volume encompasses the events which occurred from April through December 1943. It sets forth sequentially the course of the armed conflict in all theaters of military operations and provides a thorough Marxist-Leninist analysis of the most important military, economic, political, and ideological factors which contributed to the completion of the turning point in World War II in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and which determined the further course of the war.

It is absolutely rightful that the authors' collective (editor in chief V. G. Solov'yev) investigates the combat operations on the Soviet-German front

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most thoroughly--on the decisive front of World War II where the Soviet people, in essence, continued to battle selflessly alone in Europe against the main forces of fascist Germany and her satellites. The data which the authors present testify eloquently to the fact that by the beginning of April 1943 the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition had everything necessary to launch powerful blows against fascist Germany. However, the United States and Britain used only a portion of their armed forces for active operations which were conducted primarily not against Germany but against Italy and Japan. A vicious and treacherous course directed toward the mutual exhaustion of Germany and the USSR in war nevertheless predominated in the allies' policy.

The book provides a profound analysis of the military-political goals of the war. The successes of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1942/43 and the growth in the might of the Soviet Armed Forces permitted the Supreme High Command to begin to plan big offensive operations for the accomplishment of the primary mission of this period of the war—the liberation of our Motherland from the German-fascist aggressors.

The plans of the Soviet military command relied on a strong economic base. The book notes that the year 1943 was marked by outstanding achievements in the war economy of the Soviet Union. The total volume of industrial production in the USSR increased by 17 percent in 1943 in comparison with 1942. The Soviet Union surpassed Germany in the output of military equipment and armament. In 1943, the USSR produced up to 35,000 airplanes, almost 10,000 more than Germany. Smelting 8.5 million tons of steel per year at that time, the Soviet Union produced 24,100 tanks and self-propelled guns while Germany, (including the occupied countries), with the smelting of 34.6 million tons of steel, produced only 10,700 tanks and assault guns.

In light of the facts presented in the work, the groundlessness of the assertion which has great popularity in the bourgeois literature alleging that the economic might of the United States had the decisive influence on the course of World War II becomes obvious.

In utilizing their relative strategic freedom of action, the United States and Britain strived primarily to strengthen their positions in North Africa and in the Pacific Ocean and to undertake an invasion of Italy. This corresponded to the political interests of the ruling classes of these countries who intended to create conditions for the domination of the Western powers in the post war world.

In the spring of 1943, the leaders of Hitler's Germany were filled with the resolve to take revenge for defeat on the Soviet-German front in the winter of 1942/43. The German armed forces were intensively replenished with personnel, combat equipment, and armament and, despite the losses which had been suffered, nevertheless represented a powerful military machine capable of continuing the armed struggle and conducting big offensive operations by the start of the period under review.
The overall idea for military operations by the Wehrmacht in the summer period of 1943 consisted of the following: to smash the main forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts and the reserves of the Supreme High Command in the course of the offensive against Kursk (Operation "Citadel"), then to accomplish the defeat of the main forces of the Southwestern Front and, finally, to strike a blow in the rear of the central formation of Soviet troops which would threaten Moscow and contribute to the capture of Leningrad.

The decisive event in the summer of 1943 was the battle at Kursk which placed the German-fascist army on the brink of catastrophe. Naturally, an important place is allotted in the book to this battle for which the Headquarters, Supreme High Command prepared with special thoroughness. For its scope, intensity, and results it ranks among the greatest battles of World War II. More than four million men, more than 69,000 guns and mortars, more than 13,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 12,000 combat airplanes participated in it on both sides. In the course of this battle the Soviet troops destroyed 30 enemy divisions and the Wehrmacht lost about 500,000 soldiers and officers, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns, and more than 3,700 airplanes.

Especially heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy's tank large units. The Hitlerite's hopes which were placed in new equipment—"Tiger" and "Panther" tanks, the "Ferdinand" assault guns, and the "Focke-Wulf-190A" airplanes—were not justified. The new models of tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, airplanes, and antitank artillery which were created by Soviet designers were the equal of similar enemy systems in their combat and technical qualities and frequently surpassed them.

Extremely characteristic is the forced admission of the Hitlerite strategist, General Guderian, which is presented in the work: "As a result of the failure of the 'Citadel' offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. Due to great losses in personnel and equipment, the armored forces which had been replenished with such great difficulty were put out of action for a long time... and there were no longer any calm days on the eastern front. The initiative had gone over completely to the enemy...."

The victory on the Kursk Bulge had the greatest international significance. It had a great influence on the course of World War II. The authority of the Soviet Union as the decisive force opposing fascism which was carrying relief from the Nazi plague to the peoples was raised even higher. The Soviet Armed Forces defeated the last attempt of the German-fascist command to accomplish a great victorious offensive in the East and recover the lost strategic initiative. The fascist leadership was forced to assume a strategic defensive on the entire Soviet-German Front and other theaters of military operations.

The volume notes that after the Kursk battle a general strategic offensive by the Soviet Army was accomplished in the summer and fall of 1943 in the course of a number of big operations. As a result, the following were accomplished from August through December 1943: the liberation of the Left-Bank
Ukraine and the Donbas, completion of the liberation of the Caucasus and seizure of a beachhead in the Crimea, and the liberation of Smolenskaya and part of Kalininskaya oblasts. The Soviet Army entered the eastern regions of Belorussia, forced the Dnepr, and liberated the capital of the Soviet Ukraine—the city of Kiev.

In the summer and fall of 1943 the Soviet Army destroyed 118 divisions, that is, up to half of all the forces of the Wehrmacht which were located on the Soviet-German Front by the beginning of the summer of 1943. From April through December 1943, the German command was forced to transfer 40 divisions from the West to the East.

A fundamental change in the course of World War II was a difficult, many-faceted process and occupied a relatively long period. It was completed by the end of 1943. Determining significance for the profound changes in the strategic situation, as is confirmed comprehensively by the materials of the work under review, was had by the historic victories of the Soviet Armed Forces in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk and in the course of the strategic offensive in the winter and spring of 1942/1943 and the summer and fall of 1943. In single combat with the main forces of fascist Germany and her allies, the Soviet Army inflicted crushing defeats on them whose results already at the end of 1943, long before the opening of the second front in Europe, led to a radical change in the relation of forces in World War II. The mass expulsion of the German-fascist aggressors from our land developed with ever-increasing strength. The general strategic offensive of the Soviet Army could no longer be stopped by fascist Germany and her allies before the end of the war.

The foreign policy course of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition underwent changes under the influence of the Soviet Union’s victories. For the first time in the war, a conference of the heads of state of the three great powers—the USSR, the United States, and Britain—took place at the end of 1943. One of the most important military-political problems was settled—agreement was achieved on the opening of the second front in Europe in the spring of 1944.

The work makes a profound disclosure of the sources of the successes of the Soviet Armed Forces—the advantages of the Soviet social and state system, the moral-political unity of the Soviet people, their tight-knit solidarity around the Communist Party, and vivifying Soviet patriotism. Primary significance was had by the titanic work of the Leninist party in the scientific solution of the problems of political and military leadership, the skillful mobilization of all the country’s material and spiritual resources, and in the creation of favorable foreign-policy conditions for the attainment of victory.

The political organs and party and Komsomol organizations made a large contribution to the cause of ensuring the victories of the Soviet Armed Forces and instilling in the men a lofty offensive spirit, boldness, resolve, initiative and resourcefulness, responsibility for the fate of the Motherland,
and loyalty to their military oath. Together with the commanders, they carried the party banner high. Communists showed themselves as examples of boundless devotion to the Motherland, bravery, and valor, lifting the morale and steadfastness of the men in battle by personal example.

The volume reflects the tremendous organizational and ideological-educational work of the Communist Party which encompassed all spheres of life and activity of the front and rear. The severe tests of the war years disclosed with special force the significance of socialist principles for the organization of our multinational state and the strengthening of the friendship of the peoples and the collaboration and mutual assistance of all nations and nationalities and of all union republics.

A separate chapter in Volume 7 is devoted to the combat operations of the Soviet Navy which accomplished operational-strategic missions both independently and jointly with the Ground Forces in a difficult situation. The primary missions of the fleet in this period were the protection of sea lines of communication, securing the maritime flanks of the troops and covering the coast against strikes from the sea, assisting the offensive operations of the troops on maritime sectors, and their support in the defensive. The Soviet seamen successfully conducted decisive combat operations in three naval theaters; displayed mass heroism, bravery, and military valor; and made their contribution to the winning of the victory.

The pages devoted to the battle for the Caucasus and the landing of naval assault forces in the Novorossiysk and Kerchensko-Eltigenskaya operations are read with great interest. The struggle for Novorossiysk, which continued for almost a year, had an exceptionally fierce character. Victory here had great significance.

"The assault landing at Novorossiysk in which all the services and combat arms took part and which was conducted in September 1943 was one of the biggest classical assault landing operations of the period of the Great Patriotic War," said L. I. Brezhnev in September 1974 when awarding Novorossiysk the Order of Lenin and the "Gold Star" medal.

The authors succeeded in showing the scale and national character of the Soviet people's heroic struggle in the enemy's rear area and the party's measures in ensuring the combat effectiveness of the partisan detachments, improving the effectiveness of their centralized leadership, and the close coordination of the partisan movement with the regular Soviet forces.

The book examines comprehensively the questions of the development of the Armed Forces' military art and organizational development. In particular, the problem of the organization and conduct of the deliberate defense was solved in the summer of 1943. The Soviet Army was enriched by experience in the organization of a deeply echeloned defense having antitank and antiaircraft stability. For the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the total depth of the operational formation of fronts in the defense reached 50-70 km. The big successes of Soviet military art should rightly include the correct
selection of the moment for the transition from the defense to the counter-offensive, the determination of the directions of the main efforts, and close operational-strategic coordination of front groups.

In the book, a significant place is allotted to military operations in other theaters, in particular in Italy and on the Mediterranean Sea, in the Atlantic, on the Pacific Ocean, and in East and Southeast Asia.

These chapters disclose convincingly the decisive effect of the victories of the Soviet troops on the change in the military-political situation and the conditions for the armed struggle in the overall development of World War II and the increased change in the correlation of forces in the indicated theaters of military operations in favor of our allies who made their contribution to the common cause of the struggle against the Hitlerite coalition.

The national-liberation struggle of the European peoples was initiated under the influence of the Soviet Army's victories in 1943. The process of consolidation of the national-liberation forces occurred in the fierce battles against the occupiers and internal reaction. The national-liberation struggle also developed in the countries of Asia and Africa, and the antifascist movement was initiated more widely in Latin America. The book discloses the special features of this struggle and the strengthening of the influence of the left forces led by the Communist Parties which comprised the leading detachments in the liberation struggle of the peoples who made a great contribution to the attainment of victories over the enemy.

The publication of Volume 7 of the "History of World War II" is a large contribution to Soviet military-historical science. Written on the basis of a profound and comprehensive analysis of tremendous archive material and other important sources, the volume provides a complete impression of the principal events of the period of World War II under consideration. In noting the unquestioned merits of the book, we should like the authors' collective, in preparing subsequent volumes, to disclose with great completeness the procedures for the control of tank formations in the course of battles and the problems of rear-services and technical support of the troops in strategic offensive operations.

The book's materials show convincingly that the decisive role in the defeat of the most evil enemy of mankind, German fascism, was played by the Soviet people and their glorious, heroic army which were led by the Leninist party of communists.

6367
CSO: 1801
METHODS OF DEVELOPING PROPER MORAL ATMOSPHERE IN MILITARY UNITS DISCUSSED

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 12 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Col Gen S. Bobylev, Member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Directorate of the National Air Defense Forces: "Moral Atmosphere in the Collective"]

[Text] The 25th Party Congress, which put forth new tasks for communist construction, stressed that the effectiveness of their implementation is determined in considerable measure by the moral atmosphere in the collectives. Life itself confirms the depth of the conclusion by the General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, which he drew from the rostrum, that moral health makes us strong and steadfast.

In the National Air Defense Forces, just as in the other services of the Armed forces, these directions of the party congress are being implemented firmly and consistently. Questions of the rallying of the military collectives and the creation of a healthy moral atmosphere in them are discussed regularly at sessions of the military council, and among the troops scientific-practical conferences and seminars are devoted to them. This permits us to generalize the accumulated experience and arm the military personnel with the knowledge of the principles of pedagogy and psychology and the ability to foresee and evaluate more precisely the moral consequences of decisions which have been made.

Many commanders and political officers realize profoundly that the expansion of the sphere of action of the moralefactor in contemporary battle, the constant complication of training-combat missions, and the improvement in the qualitative characteristics of the personnel oblige them to devote more attention to the improvement of the moral climate in the units and subunits. Moreover, the further development of military affairs and the nature of contemporary armament and combat equipment require with special acuteness the unity of actions, a high degree of coordination of the servicemen's efforts, and monolithic solidarity of the collectives.

In maintaining and developing a healthy moral atmosphere in the collectives, commanders and political organs as well as party and Komsomol organizations
see the key to the solution of the problem in the accomplishment of the close unity of the political, military, and moral upbringing of the servicemen. In our units and subunits, much is being done to explain to the men more deeply the decisions of the 25 Congress of the CPSU, the October (1976) Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU, and the decree of the Central Committee CPSU, "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," and to maintain a high patriotic upsurge in the collectives.

Life proves very obviously that the most direct tie exists between the moral atmosphere in the collective and the personnel's successes in mastering military affairs and raising combat readiness. The morally healthy collective charges the men with spiritual energy, helps them to endure the difficulties of military service more easily, and increases their creative activity.

Unquestionably, the creation of a healthy moral situation in the collective is not a simple matter. It requires from any leader and teacher both the appropriate knowledge and experience and great spiritual energy. For the mastery of moral rules and customs proceeds differently than, for example, the acquisition of work skills on the equipment.

The Communist Party is imposing high demands on the leader of any Soviet collective, on its professional and political qualities, and on its style of work. Under army conditions, naturally, a special responsibility is imposed on the commander who is invested with unity of command. His personal example in service, party responsibility for the entrusted matter and devotion to principle, profound professional knowledge, and lofty style of contact with subordinates based on the strict observance of the laws and regulations are having the most beneficial effect on the moral atmosphere in the unit and small unit.

In accomplishing the tasks of training and education and the solidarity of the collective, the commander relies on the party and Komsomol organizations and public opinion. In the troops now, 90 percent of the personnel are communists and Komsomols. This is the better, most active part and the driving force of the military collective. The communists and Komsomols are conducting important work which is directed at maintaining the high combat spirit of the men in training and service and strengthening a healthy microclimate in the subunit and unit.

The role of socialist competition is great in the moral upbringing of the personnel. It strengthens in the men a pride for their collective, a sense of unity with it, and comradely cohesion. The ideological-educational function of the competition is skillfully utilized in the unit commanded by Colonel Yu. Orlov. Its personnel stepped forth among the Air Defense Forces as the initiator of socialist competition for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the Great October. Here, along with obligations to raise the combat ability and combat readiness the missilemen also assumed obligations which have a direct influence on the development of the soldier's personality and the strengthening of the moral atmosphere in the collective. Such obligations are participation in the preparation and conduct of socio-political
measures, rendering assistance to fellow servicemen, the struggle for observance of moral-ethical norms of behavior, and so forth.

The skillful summing up of the competition's results assists in the moral development of the men's personality. The quality of combat training is analyzed in its inseparable connection with the evaluation of the political self-education of the men and their social activity and their observance of the requirements of the moral code of the builder of communism, the military oath, and the regulations.

However, it should be noted that the possibilities for the moral upbringing of the personnel which are contained in the competition are still not widely and skillfully utilized everywhere. When summing up results, some commanders and political officers mention figures and facts which testify to the growth in the field ability of the men and completely lose sight of their spiritual growth. Sometimes, they refer to the absence of special criteria here. But there are such criteria and they are widely used in practice. In determining the moral shifts which occur in the nature of a serviceman, commanders and political officers consider the degree of his political consciousness, participation in public life, observance of honor and dignity, attitude toward his comrades, concern for the interests of the collective, and so forth. These questions are analyzed most concretely in the section and subunit.

The most important indicator of the moral maturity of the collective is the healthy interrelations of the men. Of course, they are strictly defined by the laws, regulations, and other documents. However, in the course of service people with a different constitution, temperament, and so forth interact. Experienced and thoughtful commanders and political officers delve deeply into the nature of the service ties of responsible personnel and servicemen of different specialties and call-up periods and they adopt effective measures to establish mutual understanding and harmonious, coordinated work.

Of course, service interrelations are always in sight and it is simpler to monitor and direct them. It is much more difficult to keep in the field of vision and influence relationships which form between servicemen outside their service, during leisure hours.

Unfortunately, these relationships do not always receive proper attention in life. If you ask some commander of a subunit or his deputy for political matters, they boldly report how many experts or rated specialists or rated sportsmen they have, but with whom these people are on friendly terms, what their range of interests is, what attracts them during leisure hours—you do not always hear a detailed answer to these questions. It is namely for these leaders that one or another coarse violation of military order is completely unexpected.

The mutual relations of soldiers and sergeants of different call-up periods make a noticeable impression on the state of the moral atmosphere in the collective. As a rule, they are characterized by military friendship, respect, and mutual assistance. But it also happens that the more experienced men
keep aloof in the subunit and some of them do not mind showing their superiority over the newcomers and they even shift some of their concerns to them. Naturally, the young soldiers feel unconfident under such conditions and enter into comradely contacts timidly.

How can these undesirable phenomena be prevented? The main thing, of course, is to explain deeply to the personnel and to show by convincing examples the significance of military comradeship. It is important that from their very first steps the experienced men help the newcomers in their combat development, prepare worthy replacements for themselves, and achieve interchangeability at the work sites.

The following thematic soirees have become an effective form of such work: "Experienced specialists leave for the reserve—the level of combat readiness is maintained" and "The call-up periods are different but the goal and tasks are the same." The practice of manning sections, squads, and platoons with young replacements with consideration of the psychological compatibility of the personnel has shown up well. The biographical data of the newcomers, level of education, special features of their characters, world of attractions, and requirements are thoroughly studied for this.

However, this valuable experience is not finding realization everywhere. For example, officer Yu. Slutskiy was not very concerned about improving educational, in particular individual, work with people and relied more on measures of disciplinary influence. Naturally, violations of military order continued in the subunit. But then, the situation in the collective was analyzed in detail with the aid of the senior comrades and the motives for the unmilitary behavior of individual men were revealed. The proper conclusions followed from the analysis. The service and living conditions of the men were brought into exact conformance with the regulations. Ideological—educational work with the personnel was enlivened. Much was done to organize the sponsoring of individual young servicemen by experienced specialists. And the state of affairs in the collective improved noticeably.

The spiritual strength of the collective is multiplied by the active vital position of each serviceman. This is why commanders and political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations are striving to embrace all personnel with their influence, to help each serviceman to find his place in the collective and gain authority and respect with worthy deeds.

One of the important indicators of the moral health of the collective is its public opinion. It is expressed in the form of a grade, praise, approval, censure, or condemnation. Many commanders and political officers skillfully utilize the great possibilities of the collective opinion for the upbringing of the men and rallying them into a single combat family, and this brings favorable results.

However, we have no grounds for complacency. Collective opinion does not yet evaluate the men's shortcomings in training, service, behavior, and the manifestation of backward attitudes everywhere in a sufficiently fundamental way.
The growth in social consciousness of the personnel requires that the leaders intensify their attention toward collective opinion and the raising of its educational effect. It is important that it be directed more actively toward supporting the requirements of Soviet laws, the oath and regulations, and the norms of communist morals.

A healthy moral atmosphere is formed on the basis of the profound ideological conviction of the personnel, firm discipline, the clear organization of training and service, and true interrelationships between servicemen as set forth in the regulations. It is toward this very thing that the efforts of commanders, political organs, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations are directed.

6367
CSO: 1801
SUPPLY SHORTAGES IN MILITARY EXCHANGES CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Pimenov: "The Unprofitable Button"]

[Text] I witnessed the following scene in the post exchange. Private A. Amal'demirov approaches the counter and asks them to sell him some shoe polish. The manager of the exchange, N. Gavrilenko, replies:

"We only have brown polish."

The soldier apparently ponders, trying to imagine how black shoes will look after being polished with brown polish. Someone in the line advises him jokingly:

"Take it, color it with black India ink—it will do."

Amal'demirov understood the joke and refused the polish. He requested acidol and a case for his tooth brush.

"We have no acidol. Nor case."

Junior Sergeant V. Zemlyanskiy stood next in line.

"You didn't get any galloon?" he asks.

"No, there was none," the manager answers.

I looked at V. Zemlyanskiy's shoulder boards. On them were wide stripes like a senior sergeant should wear. But in order not to violate uniform regulations, he attempted a clever trick: he drew a narrow stripe on the galloon with a ball point pen. What seemed to be two stripes appeared.

I ask the store manager: how can the lack of these articles be explained? In response, she takes from her desk the requisitions which she submitted to the post exchange section and begins to list the articles in which the requisitions were not satisfied: no buttons, collar tabs, shoe brushes, suitcases...."
"And the suitcases are simply a misfortune. We have had none for more than half a year," complains N. Gavrilenko. "In the fall, many soldiers were released to the reserve; they come and ask, but I just don't have any for them. I am simply ashamed to answer like this."

Yes, now is not like the old times—the soldier does not go home with a duffle bag.

By the way, it is not only suitcases that the soldiers of this unit cannot buy in their exchange. The list of goods in everyday demand which cannot be bought is substantial. To understand the reason for their absence, I go to the trade and everyday-amenities enterprise headed by Major V. Kotlyarenko.

The chief was not available, so I talk with his deputy, T. Punina, and the goods manager, L. Kargopol'tseva.

"Shoe polish, brushes, soap dishes?" they are surprised. "Yes, we have plenty of all this in the warehouse. But as regards the other goods...."

They also get their requisitions and begin to read off the military types of goods which they cannot obtain in the required quantity in the trade directorate. This list contains—buttons, acidol, winter caps with ear flaps, shawls, gloves....

I turn to Colonel N. Travin, chief of the trade directorate, for an explanation. It turns out that there are sufficient quantities of buttons, gloves, caps, and many other military types of goods in the warehouses of the retail trade base.

"And as regards suitcases, we also have enough of them."

It turns out that there is an abundance of goods at the base, but long stoppages in the trade system. What is the matter? Everything is explained very simply: you don't fulfill the plan by trading in buttons and shoe polish, and the plan is not only an economic indicator; it is also bonuses and rewards....

Of course, the plans must be accomplished. And the stores accomplish them. But how? Here is one of them as an example.

The month is drawing to an end, and the receipts of the military exchange managed by G. Gerasimenko are still far from the planned. And then, stylish women's shoes are "thrown" into the military exchange. The monthly plan is accomplished in this manner. But no one is much concerned that this store has no uniform buttons, shoe brushes, and other items necessary in the soldier's everyday life. Including the management of the trade directorate. In a talk with the correspondent the chief of the directorate was more concerned that the unattractive facts not receive wide publicity. Therefore, he urgently recommended that they not be written in the newspaper.
"Especially," he says, "since we have undertaken efficient measures and the goods have been delivered to the stores."

The mentioning of the "efficient measures" reminded me of one more fact. Last December, a commission from the Main Trade Directorate of the Ministry of Defense USSR worked here. It pointed out the stoppages in the trade of military articles and goods in daily demand. At that time, the commission was also assured: we are undertaking efficient measures. Three months have passed. And the cart, that is, the goods, are still there now—at the base, and not in the exchanges.
MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION TRAINING PROCEDURES CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Mar 77 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Kir'yazov: "Behind the Shroud of Fog"]

[Text] The personnel of the battalion commanded by Major P. Bondar' was on the range for the second week waiting for weather favorable for firing. Thus far, it did not cause joy. A whitish fog blanketed the towers in a dense veil and made the lines for opening fire and targets invisible.

It would appear that under the circumstances which had developed other lessons could have been conducted: it would have been possible to study the theory of firing, organize competition for the accomplishment of norms, prepare the material base, and work out tactical procedures for the conduct of fire in the assault of "enemy" strong points. But the fog not only complicated the situation but, in a strange manner, had an effect on individual officers and, it seemed, deprived them of initiative, good management ability, and the striving to make effective use of the hours for lessons. Unfortunately, they were spent without proper stress. There can be no talk of a spirit of competition: there was none at all. The soldiers and sergeants had nothing to do for hours. And the leaders spread their hands: "What can be done--fog...."

The battalion commander, Major P. Bondar', who had caught cold in the dank wind, could not be in the field all the time. He assembled the officers in the evenings and demanded initiative and resourcefulness from them.

"If there is fog tomorrow, organize lessons in other disciplines," he said.

They all agreed with the commander and prepared for lessons for any event, but they considered them only as an emergency version. They thought more that suddenly they would be lucky tomorrow--the fog will dissipate. And this attitude affected the quality of the lessons.

The deputy battalion commander for political matters, Senior Lieutenant V. Chumachenko, saw in visiting the training points that the quality of the lessons leaves much to be desired. But his attitude toward the indulgences was one "with understanding."
"Of course, if the lessons were conducted on such a low level in winter quarters, the demand would have been different. But now, the main thing for us is firing," explained the political officer.

At last, the sun peeked through. The fog dispersed. The tactical field could be observed for many kilometers. Things began to come to life and the faces of the soldiers and sergeants who languished with expectation became cheerful. Everyone was heartened by the phrase: "At 0800—the first round!" The representative from higher headquarters went from tower to tower on which the target control panels were located, and he warned the subunit commanders: "We will begin simultaneously. Fire on my command."

The officers nodded in agreement, giving him to understand that they understood the requirements. But on the left flank, they suddenly took the director of the firing aback.

"We cannot begin simultaneously with all the others," said Senior Lieutenant V. Chumachenko.

"What happened?" the staff representative was astonished.

"The targets are not raised on the last line," the senior lieutenant explained. "The operator has already run off to the field. If he can, he will eliminate the malfunction."

"This should have been thought of earlier," the staff officer was filled with indignation.

But Senior Lieutenant V. Chumachenko, as it seemed to him, got out of the situation in the proper manner and presented "convincing" arguments in his justification:

"This is not our concern. We don't control the range crew. Besides, you know yourself, the fog stood here for a week...."

Everyone followed with hope the figure of the soldier which was barely distinguishable against the background of the brown knolls—he ran from pit to pit and inspected the lift mechanisms. No one knew if he would soon succeed in finding the malfunction. On the other hand, it was clear that while he is in the field, not only the left-flank battalion, but also the adjacent one commanded by Major A. Utkin cannot open fire, either. So, the first round did not sound at 0800.

The battalion commander, Major P. Bondar', also arrived at the firing range for several minutes. The deputy reported to him the sequence in which the platoons and squads will accomplish the exercises. Having heard the senior lieutenant, Major P. Bondar' cancelled the orders which he had given earlier, assigned a new order for firing, and departed. Someone ran to the company to redirect the personnel, someone was sent back, and they hurried someone along.
An hour passed, and there was quiet on the range. The same operator ran over the field, looking for the malfunction in the target mechanisms.

The specialists from the range crew unquestionably deserved reproach. But the behavior of the officers who supervised the lessons and did not adopt all measures to eliminate the troubles in the mechanisms for controlling the target situation in such situation was surprising.

Fog is a common phenomenon for these places. We must be ready for it. But the impression is created that the supervisors of the lessons for the motorized riflemen saw in the veil of fog only a means with which to cover their lack of administrative ability, their lack of initiative and, to put more precisely, their irresponsibility.

Having lost three hours of time, it was only at 1100 hours that the motorized riflemen began to accomplish the exercises. But even this is not all. On the left flank, where they never succeeded in eliminating the malfunction in the target equipment, the soldiers stood in formation and waited for the chance to give an account of what they had learned in the last months of winter training. Naturally, such a pastime dampened the ardor of the personnel, reduced their combat spirit, extinguished the light of competition, and did not permit it to flare up.

It is believed that what happened on the range and the serious omissions in the organization of combat training are being thoroughly analyzed in the unit, that everything will be looked into deeply and in a party manner, and they will not take the position of explaining the loss of training time by the dense fog.

6367
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SHORTCOMINGS NOTED IN PRE-DRAFT TRAINING IN THE ESTONIAN SSR

Tallin SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 20 Mar 77 p 3

[Article by I. Buchinskiy, deputy military commissar of the ESSR [Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic]: "Fitting Replacements For the Army and Navy"]

[Excerpts] Sending the young people of our republic off to serve in the Soviet Armed Forces, you feel not only emotion, but pride as well: fitting young lads are off to fulfill an honorable duty. Almost all of the inductees sent to troop units in 1976 had a higher, secondary, and 8-year education, completed basic military training, and became rated sportsmen and GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] badge-wearers. Every third one received a military-technical specialty in DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy] schools and clubs. Two out of every three are CPSU and Komsomol members.

A systematic improvement in the training quality of the young people going into the military is a result of the great organizational and ideological work of party and Soviet organizations, military commissariats and DOSAAF, Komsomol and sports organizations, and public education and health organs.

Fulfilling the "Law of Universal Military Service" and the decrees of the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers concerning education of the rising generation, meetings of party committees and ispolkoms of the Councils of Workers' Deputies in the aforementioned rayons and cities regularly discuss questions involving the military-patriotic education and training of young people for military service, as well as listen to the individuals responsible for mass sports and recreational work, for general education and basic military training.

Normal practice now includes annual convocation of meetings of the defense aktiv and Komsomol committee plenums. Military commissariats keep party and Soviet organs informed of the results of the induction and registration of the young people and provide a summation of the results of socialist competition for the best youth military training program.

The many measures taken by Komsomol, sports, and other public organizations make a lasting impression in the hearts of the young men.
A significant amount of work has been accomplished in the republic to raise the quality of basic military training, improve training facilities and the training process, and better the selection and education of military instructor cadres. The role played by the pedagogical collectives in schools, tekhnikums, and professional-technical schools increased since many young men go into the army right from school. Completing the basic military training course, pre-inductees and draftees are morally prepared for military service, acquire skills in weapons handling and required military knowledge, and possess one of the technical specialties.

In the republic, there are 12 military-patriotic education universities and one future soldier faculty.

The best-organized training was found in the following universities: Za Otchiznu (Narva), Patriot (Kokhtla-Yarve) and Za Rodinu (Kalininskiy Rayon, Tallin), where cycles of lectures on the Soviet Armed Forces, meetings with veterans of the Great Patriotic War and of labor, showing of movies on military subjects, visits to troop units [chasti], trips to battle sites and the hero-city Leningrad, visits to legendary cruiser Aurora, and other things became common practice.

The Zarnitsa and Orelonk games, lessons in courage, and trips to sites of revolutionary, military, and labor glory became a great school of military-patriotic education. Last summer, the Tenth Rally of excursion participants and the final competitions of the Orelonk games in our republic took place on Khuyumaa Island. The winners were Vil'yandskiy Rayon and the Kalininskiy and Leninskiy rayons of the city of Tallin.

The militarized competitions at the Plant imeni Kalinin and at a number of other enterprises, conducted with the motto "Come on, Boys!", play a positive role. A mandatory element of these competitions is fulfillment of the basic military training program norms.

Ties are being strengthened with the troop units bearing honorifics of the Estonian cities they liberated during the war. This is well done in Valgaskiy Rayon.

Great assistance in conducting military-patriotic work is provided by members of the Znaniye [Knowledge] Society, veterans of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, members of coordinating committees attached to military commissariats, officers from troop units and institutions, and veterans' ensembles.

The work accomplished provides positive results. It is a pleasure to note that an absolute majority of the young people of our republic honorably and conscientiously fulfill their military duty. This is reflected in letters and reports from commanders and political workers in troop units and sub-units [podrazdeleniya].

It should also be noted that, in the interests of a further improvement in efforts to train pre-induction contingents for army and navy service, a great
deal of work still is before us, especially in those areas where the requisite attention is still not being placed on this important question.

In spite of systematic improvement in recreational, preventive and sports work, the state of health of some of the young people in Khaapsaluskii, Rakverskiy, Khuyumaaski, and Kingiseppski Rayons does not meet the requirements established for induction into military service. Therefore, along with other measures, it would be advisable to conduct a regular medical check and prophylaxis of the young men, beginning at an earlier age.

Much is being done in the republic to attract inductees to regular sports exercises. But, one cannot fail to point out to sports committees that weaknesses sometimes occur as young men are passing their GTO norms. This means that some of our inductees lack endurance, tempering, and courage.

The role of the physical tempering of future soldiers grew under contemporary conditions. Therefore, we need to see that every young man systematically involves himself in physical culture and sports.

The past few years, the general educational level of inductees in the republic increased significantly. However, one encounters young men without an 8-year education in Khaapsaluskii and Rakverskiy Rayons. The directors of a number of enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes are not exercising sufficient control over those who, in their own time for a variety of reasons, transferred to evening schools, are not creating conditions conducive to their getting a secondary education. Meanwhile, the troops of our army and navy are faced with high demands. They must know and be able to do a great deal. The insufficient educational level of individual inductees and their weak knowledge of the Russian language create additional difficulties as the new inductees attempt to master a military specialty.

There are shortcomings as well in the way basic military training is conducted. At several schools and tekhnikums, training facilities are being improved slowly, and there is no area in which to conduct drill exercises. The lesson methodology at times leaves something to be desired.

Many schools do not have their own firing ranges, causing some difficulties in teaching the students marksmanship and in training rated sportsmen and GTO badge-wearers.

A great deal of serious work lies ahead in order, through the joint efforts of all organizations linked with training young people for military service, to raise it to a new level and to provide fitting replacements for our army and navy during this 60th anniversary year of Great October.

7869
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BAYKAL-AMUR RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT ACTIVITIES

Signs of the New

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Col V. Filatov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "BAM [Baykal-Amur Trunkline] -- The Third Year"]

[Text] BAM is a national construction project. Along its route, 3,200 engineering structures will be built, an average of one per kilometer. Many of these structures are unique. A tunnel 15 kilometers long will be built under the Severo-Muya Range...

The builders of the BAM, like our entire nation, have widely utilized competition for a worthy reception for the 60th anniversary of October. The identical traits about which L. I. Brezhnev spoke at the 16th Trade Union Congress manifest themselves in this competition. They are more and more concentrated around problems of efficiency and quality.

Our special correspondent, who recently returned from the BAM, discusses the competition and the labor heroism of the builders of the BAM in his articles.

When you are somewhere you have been before, you involuntarily compare how it was and what it has become. I visited the Eastern Sector of the BAM more than a year ago. This was my second trip there.

...Not far from a taiga stream stands the garrison of an order-bearing unit [chast'] of railroad troops. There is a volcano nearby. The volcano had no name last year. This year it has a name. A song has been written about it and it is sung over Khabarovsk radio.

I saw the BAM embankment in the following way: we drove out of Chegdomyn along a broken-up winter road. The vehicle bounced and bumped, always trying
to turn. After many kilometers of travel it appeared, the BAM embankment. There, where we saw it, the embankment, with elegance displaying a steep and powerful side, turned smoothly and pushed strictly eastward across the dozens of bridges already built in that direction, towards the ocean. The snowy taiga, impassable volcanoes, and, as if fallen out of the clear sky, the contrails of a high-speed aircraft.

What bravery, courage, and steadfastness were required of man to trace this elegant and inspiring mark of the century, not in the blue sky, but here!

I spoke of this with Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Nikolayevich Matyunin, who accompanied me in the vehicle. He agreed, noting:

"Yes, there is romance here. But, as they say today, you cannot avoid the prosaic. Now, it all involves engineering work..."

Today, in these locales, soldiers have firmly sewn 200 kilometers of heavy rails specially constructed for the BAM to the globe. Two hundred kilometers of track are ready! The song is heard, the song of the wheels along the rails of the BAM. Now, the soldiers and officers are talking about a parallel road about 100 kilometers in length. Its construction will open up through vehicle traffic to Komsomol'sk on the Amur.

Competition under the slogan of the Leningrad Komsomol "60 Shock Weeks to the 60th Anniversary of Great October!" has unfolded on the line. Commanders and political workers consider that, given that tone present today in the subunits [podrazdeleniya], the introduction of the parallel road will significantly exceed the planned date. This road will become one of the gifts of the BAM builders to the Motherland in honor of the glorious jubilee. It will permit starting construction of the main railway immediately on many other hundreds of kilometers. Via this road, heavy construction equipment will gain access to new work areas and the tempo of all construction will rise significantly.

I did not encounter many of the people I met last year when I visited unit X.

Everything in the office of A. Matyunin, the unit commander now, is well established and permanent, everything required for detailed analytical work, for meetings with subunit commanders, his own specialists, visitors, to talk, to discuss things comprehensively, to determine the strategy to be employed by the entire unit...

Matyunin is young. He is a railroad man by heritage. His grandfather was a railroad man in Ryazan', his father served with the railroad troops. The lieutenant colonel, in his own time, graduated from a military school in Leningrad and the railroad transport engineers institute. Then, he passed the candidate examinations. He was diverted from "pure science," first by the bridges over the Tisa: Matyunin built them. Then the bridges in the Sivash area. Now, the BAM.
There were officers in Matyunin's office. The subject concerned planned savings, how to analyze the production cost of work completed, from what sources they are formed, where amortization allowances are directed...

The concerns of the first BAM commander come to mind. Others solved the problems. They were both simpler and more complex. Simpler because they had only just started and the most important construction project was the tents. More complex because first stages are more complex. Now, the commander's log is a large thick book containing everything concerning operational planning and computations, with other books nearby: a variety of works on the economics of construction...

And then I understood. Something new has been added to BAM's Eastern Sector, something that was missing before. The unit no longer has tents or rail cars. The soldiers live in warm barracks, the families in houses. They do not go off to work on construction of tents, houses, barracks, schools, and club as before, but work only on the line itself. The BAM construction project has taken a sharp upturn.

The conduct of "operations," the present work style, hits you in the eye as being noticeably different than what was done 1-1.5 years ago.

On the wall in Matyunin's office are three sheets of Whatman paper, three highly detailed plans. One covers a month of work, another six months, and the third is the long-range plan. Everything in the plans has been envisioned and computed with mathematical accuracy: how much the vehicles will sustain (the number of vehicles here today will be covered below), the relief of every meter of line and the soil beneath every meter have also been considered, as have the caprices of nature and the efficiency of suppliers. The time has come for complicated and fine management tasks, the likes of Matyunin have arrived. Where did he begin? He made a detailed economic analysis of every production decision.

Based on numerous data, exact timing and computations, and studies of the soils beneath the entire sector of the line, he found out how much and what was required per cubic meter of soil in various quarries, in varied equipment working conditions. These were not overall analyses but stemmed from specific production conditions, seasonally, by month, and by shift. The picture unfolded: some cubic meters of soil turned out more expensive than the estimated cost while others were cheaper, many other things came to light...

The picture of the entire production was more completely illuminated by the analytical results. The following became items of debate at open party meetings: indoctrination of initiative on the part of subunit leaders, improvement in the style of their activities. The staff was heavily tasked. Financiers were promoted to primary authorities. They began to count the national ruble with great passion.

Already they began to hit Matyunin, not only with requests but with proposals as well: how to improve, how to achieve greater efficiency. People exhibited their capabilities more rapidly. They noted, for example, that
the chief engineer was a person creative to the very marrow; that the deputy
commander for rear services, for instance, is a person of outstanding talent...

Then Matyunin's order appeared, the likes of which no one here had ever pub-
lished before. The commander ordered use of the index of profits in the pro-
duction plan. This means that the collective, convinced of success, stopped
discussing plan fulfillment and discussed greater things — overfulfillment
of plan assignments, heightened profitability of the entire "economy" on the
basis of engineering analysis and computation.

"If you don't know how to 'use' profitability, that means you are unable to
manage people and equipment," Matyunin said to the subunit commanders and
their deputies sitting in his office at the time.

Drawing the entire officer staff into economic training turned out to be
extremely effective. It happened that, during the time the "theorist" (as
some called Matyunin behind his back), things were much better and more was
built than many had thought possible.

The commander's work day fluctuates enormously: first he climbs up and the
entire BAM is involved in the decision, then he scrambles down and the broken
tooth on an excavator blade or a broken oil pump on a KrAZ truck is involved...
Equipment down times in the quarries became more frequent. Again they
brought the problem to party meetings. A figure of several thousand was
mentioned. A single subunit will incur such financial losses due to the
down time of only one equipment shift. Study of the down times showed that
they could be eliminated by timely dispatch of the spare part to the quarry
and sending over the required repairman. On the other hand, it turned out
that the "missing" part is available at the neighboring subunit and a know-
ledgeable specialist, who can eliminate any such malfunction in a half hour,
is in the office...

Commander, react to the speeches of the communists... A unit management
service was established. A scientific approach to solution of problems which
arise also presupposes flexible management, the ability at the required
moment to fortify the weak link in such a way that the entire organism of the
economy continued to function without let-up. That was Matyunin's approach
in this instance. Thereafter, morning and evening, a report on the condition
of each large piece of equipment upon which the fate of the plan depends is
placed on the commander's desk. And, the commander is immediately able to
react to down times, operationally maneuver reserves, make timely redeploy-
ments of forces and means, influence matters in each quarry.

It is certainly not easy to work with Matyunin. It is not enough, in his
view, for someone working with him building the BAM to be a good guy. That
person has to be a modern specialist, a professional in the highest sense
of the word. And, the facts of the matter are not Matyunin. The times dic-
tate other criteria and another work style. The lieutenant colonel requires
a person to work in a scientific manner, as opposed to being inspirational.
Thus, through the actions of the party organization, they created a commission
in the unit for monitoring the quality of construction and installation work.
The commission went to the construction site and "unearthed" all kinds of deficiencies, omissions, and lapses. Some were insignificant but Matyunin ordered the work redone. Expensive. And, so that the responsible comrades would think about that expense, Matyunin punished one of the leaders: we are not hammering nails into a wall but, for posterity, are driving the spikes of a trunkline. The quality of the work must be irreproachable.

A day later, Major V. Aydinyan, the political worker, visited Matyunin and this instance took an unexpected turn: the struggle for work quality on the trunkline means to not only create strict commissions and issue threatening orders but to be concerned, for example, about raising the professional level of those who work at the installations. Reason prevailed. Of course, no one takes away the responsibility of having to answer for the work quality. But, he also needed help. But how? Among these same geodesists are people with little experience, with weak theoretical backgrounds...

They created something like a higher, continually operative class of geodesy in the unit. The experienced officers became instructors. A special program was developed. The communists did not begin to cite objective reasons. On the BAM, the sky is the limit for initiative.

Today, miscalculations in geodetic work at the installations being erected by Matyunin's subordinates have been reduced to zero. The index of work quality became the main point when summing up the results of socialist competition.

At age 14, Lieutenant Colonel Matyunin's father taught his son how to use a theodolite and level, taught him how to lay out bridges and water pipes, tents and buildings... But, the BAM became the main road in his entire life. And, he does not hide this but says that his entire life to this point was only preparation for the BAM. And, when I asked him what qualities were required of an officer and commander of a subunit on the BAM, he said:

"Everyone who comes here to work must love the BAM very much, love it as the best part of his life. The BAM is nothing less than a heroic page in the labor chronicles of our entire country."

Indoctrinate Character

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 29 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Col V. Filatov, Krasnaya Zvezda special correspondent: "BAM -- The Third Year"]

[Text] It is warm and comfortable in the Lenin Room. Outside the window is taiga. A thermometer is visible through the pane of glass. It reads 53° below zero.

A conference of political workers is underway in the Lenin Room. It is led by Major V. Aydinyan. He has been on the BAM, as they say, since the first campfire. He received a promotion recently.
...It was the day they felled trees. The first tent with walls made of logs took 5 days. But, the brigade headed by Sergeant Nikolay Al'chanov suddenly put up the second in 3 days. No one thought any more about the record, they didn't then anyway. At night, even the campfires failed to keep them warm, their main concern being not to freeze. That conference also took place in the second tent, the one built in record time.

The question was specific -- the know-how in tent construction using the Sergeant Al'chanov method. They sorted it out, discovered the secret, and went to spread the Al'chanov know-how to the other brigades. That was what the first conference was like. They built the tents not in 5 days, but rather in 3, and sometimes even 2. The housing problem then was a vital one...

The conference I am now attending is a 1-day affair. The discussion concerns initiative, skill in achieving clarity in the propaganda of the feats of our revolution for the past 60 years, the special activeness of communists during the jubilee year, strengthening discipline and procedure laid down by regulation in the subunits. Aydinyan made the concluding speech. He spoke about creativity in work, about the search for new forms of influencing people. And, he also said:

"We must aid people in building character as rapidly as possible. The BAM needs people with a BAM character..."

At that conference now almost 3 years ago, they discussed the fastest method of housing construction on the BAM. Now, I am hearing about accelerated development of BAM characteristics.

"Well then, what is BAM character?"

Aydinyan doesn't often get to meet Major Nazarov, engineer in one of the subunits. Several times in Nazarov's office. He saw how Nazarov talks with people, who comes in and who leaves. Several times at construction installations. Then, at a party meeting. The major spoke and Aydinyan noticed how many variations of solutions to equipment repair problems on the unit scale Nazarov proposed. Four. The major selected one, the so-called dispatch method, the most profitable under local conditions. Everything ended up conclusively.

The unit party organization went to the commander to intercede, to have him assign broader responsibilities to Nazarov. The commander agreed. The assignment was made. Not much time has passed since then but, as an example, the periods that vehicles are down for minor repair and maintenance has already been reduced by a factor of four. Using the repair method proposed by Nazarov, expenditure of spare parts, the gold of today, decreased by 10-12 percent. Construction managed by Nazarov has begun on a repair shop. Yury Ivanovich Nazarov looks far into the future. But, Aydinyan looked even farther when he evaluated the capabilities of this communist. Nazarov's organizational talents are working full tilt for the BAM...
Robert Vaganovich Gevorkyan commanded an excellent subunit. Suddenly Aydinyan began to propose his transfer to a rear services job. There would seem to be no reason to do that to a fine commander. Anywhere else but on the BAM, yes. On the BAM, the figure of the rear services officer is special. It is 50 kilometers to the nearest supply base, the roads are unpaved, a strict limit on transport, the difficulty in storing products... It is impossible to enumerate everything that rests upon the shoulders of the BAM rear services officer. He is responsible for heat in the rooms, the water in the latrines, and for the electric lights.

What special trait did the political worker Aydinyan see in Gevorkyan, the subunit commander? The special trait was reflected in his soldiers. Their uniforms were always sharper, they were cleaner, their common table was always more diverse than that of the others, there were no breakdowns of electricity or water in the subunit, it was always warm in the barracks, even in the coldest weather. Far from everyone is capable of doing that on the BAM.

Again, the commander accepted the political worker's recommendation. Communist Gevorkyan was assigned the responsible job. At that time, no one envied Gevorkyan, they pitied him instead, many of them. It was just too tough a job. Will he make it? As time showed, he made it. Besides that, even today there are two hothouses in operation so that there are vegetables year round on the common table; he negotiated with neighboring organizations about hauling in 12 cows so that even the smallest BAM inhabitant would always have fresh milk, regardless of the weather, the roads, or a vehicle breakdown somewhere; a bakery is under construction so there will be sweets on the table; the plans and blueprints reflect a waterline, a new medical shell...

It is a difficult task to find people to whom can be assigned the most complex and responsible jobs, people capable of reliably fusing the military collective and, via the shortest route, independently lead it to success. One has to depend too much on evaluating that which lies beneath the surface, that which you do not always read in the most detailed character reference. But, what do you mean by finding? In life, this means to indoctrinate, to teach. All of the work of the subunits' party organizations are aimed at this goal. Yuriy Nazarov, Robert Gevorkyan... Could it be that only these two learned to take so much upon themselves, so much that no one else will take it on? And, Vladimir Zolotarev, for example? He came to the BAM and, it could be said, began at zero: he knew little and was able to do little. But now? He has been accepted into the party. His breadth of responsibility has been increased three times already. He and his subordinates emerged the winners of the 1976 socialist competition. Or, Senior Lieutenant Sergey Ivchenko, whose path on the BAM is identical to Zolotarev's: in 2 years, he has had three jobs, each more complex and more responsible than its predecessor. He coped. The subordinates are just like their commanders — unimpeachably disciplined, innovators, their entire soul devoted to the job entrusted to them.

I met the smiling and energetic Yuriy Ivanovich Nazarov, the thoughtful and intense Robert Vaganovich Gevorkyan. I asked if their new responsibilities
were difficult. Their answer -- of course. How did they feel when informed of the new assignment? That it was a routine party assignment.

Excavator operator Nikolay Snigura is in the unit. He is a communist. He was once asked what his main party assignment was in the jubilee year. His answer -- to do three annual norms. And, the excavator operator does three plan norms every day.

That is how the party organization indoctrinates its communists.

Aydinsky and I drove another day to a subunit. Major N. Anisimov is the commander. Aydinsky talked and listened in the subunit, read the protocol of the meetings, checked the state of the barracks, checked how the food was prepared, went to the sentry room, the guard boxes, the shops, went through the homes where the officers lived... The subunit commander followed closely. Aydinsky kept his gaze on him, noted how he reacts, how he takes things, how Anisimov views the surroundings...

They returned at midnight. With a sigh, Aydinsky said:

"Anisimov still has not become a commander. He was just assigned this job recently. No high standards, no long-range vision..."

I asked what Aydinsky contemplated doing.

"Draw him out," and, jerking his head, added: "Tomorrow, we will discuss it with the unit commander. We will listen to Anisimov..."

I spent many days with this political worker. He did not stay late in the office. By evening, I already knew that tomorrow we will be heading to the next "point"...

However, once I did find the major, not all shook up but, overall, not himself. A telephone conversation had just taken place. Something bad? On the contrary, everything was very fine...

"Shouldn't we dash on over there?" Aydinsky suggested.

And, we went to the next "spot". This was the situation. The subunit had made an assault landing some time back in the area we were heading for. They began to live around three bonfires. Then they began to build tents. During the summer, the area of dislocation was cut off from supply bases by a bog, swamps, and impenetrable taiga. Even helicopters could not get in for months at a time due to weather. They lived for quite a while simply on their last crusts of bread but overfulfilled the construction plan. The commander and his deputy for political affairs were of one mind. When the first panelled homes were built for the officers, they decisively announced that they would be the last to leave the rail cars. And, each of them had two children.

The collective was close knit. They cut a road to the unit. Life changed completely. The commander and his deputy received an award for heroic labor.
But, as they say, one beautiful day everything changed sharply. Based on the initiative and persistence of the deputy for political affairs... the commander was attracted to party responsibility.

We drove to see that commander and political worker. Aydinyan spent half a day at the "spot". He talked with one in his office, with the other at the dinner table: how are things, how are mutual relations? Both affirmed: "OK", and lowered their eyes. The commander was polite and attentive. But, they had censured him for coarseness with his subordinates, by the way.

Departing, Aydinyan said to them:

"I will be here again tomorrow, I will call on you often from now on."

He spoke and gave each a strong farewell handshake. Both seemed to beam in response.

Already at the unit, Aydinyan said:

"They now have a relationship upon which they can solve anything, more or less. Don't lose it. And, we need to transfer it to the other subunits."

"Can they not find a common language on their own?"

"We will wait and see. A commander has many ambitions. We will help."

I won't name the officers, they have everything ahead of them and, for that matter, the matter does not involve them.

Valeriy Grigor'yevich Aydinyan spoke at the conference about indoctrination of character. And, several days later, I managed to sit in on a stormy party meeting. The discussions were vital, urgent, topical. Someone attempting to turn deserved criticism away from himself, cited "objective" conditions and so on.

When the floor went to Aydinyan, who was presiding, he said the following:

"Regardless of what happened within the unit, a thunderstorm, flood, hurricane, or some other kind of misfortune — all of us together are responsible. You cannot shrug that off on anyone else."

Prior to leaving the unit, I chatted with the commander. He had a few words to say about Aydinyan:

"He has the BAM character."

"What is the BAM character?"

The commander, as if he had thought about this more than once and spoken about it certainly more than once, immediately retorted:
"Party, Soviet," and smiling, added: "But, BAM -- that, you could say, is the local accent."

Concern About a Distant "Point"

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 77 p 2

[Article by Col V. Filatov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "BAM -- The Third Year"]

[Text] The subunit which Major G. Korotkov commands stands on the Gerbi. The Gerbi is a tributary of the Amgun'. Even by BAM standards, the garrison on the Gerbi is a remote "point"; the closest supply base is 200 kilometers distant. The major, one of the "2-year troops", remained in the cadres. A talented engineer and organizer, communist Korotkov found a place for himself in the railroad troops. He came here with the subunit to build the BAM. He was promoted to major below the zone here.

The garrison has not been here long, about a year and a half.

One day while I was there on the Gerbi, a helicopter roared over our heads. Subunit commanders had flown in to copy Korotkov's know-how, besides the fact that the military installation on the Gerbi is a model for the entire district.

How does it differ from the others? First off, there were no rail cars here from the start, they did not erect the famous BAM tents, but immediately built prefabricated panel barracks, dining hall, and other structures. Secondly, planning. It followed all the rules: compact, expedient, comfortable.

They do everything for themselves in the tiny garrison: bake bread, put up road signs, heal the sick, build housing, "pour" roads, there is a pre-work formation on the parade field, red flags fly on holidays over the barracks, club, and homes, they hold meetings, have their own radio station, in a word -- a remote "point". They do not put up the road signs accidentally at road intersections, the equipment is varied. Not what it was 3 years ago, there is a lot of it.

The construction project grows and is gathering strength. In 2 years, the subunit's engineering might has doubled, the total capacity of the bulldozers rose by a factor of 1.5, while the total volume of truck beds increased by a factor of 5. On the other hand, the number of people decreased. And, they are taking on different socialist pledges now in this extremely well-equipped installation. For instance, they promised to process 100,000 m³ of dirt in excess of the plan, and did so. They pledged to fulfill the annual plan prior to 9 September, and did so...

Of course, the equipment here is a tremendous factor. But, even more significant is the people factor, the mood of the people and the strength of their spirit. The communists and Komsomol members on the Gerbi, that is the force which will advance through all the intentions of the people, will lead to the
height of labor feats. The subunit has been awarded the travelling banner of the railroad troops Military Council while the Komsomol organization was awarded the travelling Red Banner of the Khabarovsk kraykom of the VLKSM [All-Union Lenin Young Communist League].

The powerful muscles of BAM construction became a steel force. A single soldier in possession of 300 horsepower is a common sight here. But, such a high equipment saturation gives rise to its own problems.

They strive here, as everywhere else, to take care of the equipment, primarily attempting to build covered cubicles, carry out careful and regular preventive maintenance, always working with the drivers. And, all the same... In one of the subunits, I heard reports about intermittent shortages of spare parts. There were several reasons for this, including the fact that the youth of the drivers and machine operators, their inexperience, did not always permit quality equipment operation. BAM comrades think that the reason also is a certain incongruity of equipment quantities on hand now in the subunits with the amount of spare parts sent to cover repairs.

At one of the subunits I was able to visit, there were several thousand rubles worth of spare parts in the warehouse. They were of no use to the BAM because the low-capacity equipment for which they were once intended had been gone from the subunit for a long time. Is it possible that spare parts for the new equipment are sitting around somewhere just like this, of no special use?...

The headlong growth of equipment available in BAM subunits sharply generated another problem as well — the problem of capital repair. The subunits themselves cannot do capital repair. The equipment is sent to repair enterprises. Unfortunately, repair periods are dragged out today.

"And, repair quality?" Korotkov shakes his head and adds: "A great deal is left to be desired."

If the quarry is BAM's forward base, then the repair enterprises are the rear, those rear services which today are not keeping up with the front lines. Practice clearly shows with what that situation is fraught.

The troop subunits building the BAM are getting replacements, soldiers from the last induction, with rare exception all with a secondary and even some with a higher education. Also a sign of our overall growth. But, specifically, relative to BAM conditions, such a contingent of young replacements will represent additional tasks for commanders and political workers. For example, with such a high overall educational level, many of yesterday's 10th-graders can master one of the construction specialties in a short time. And, this is very important for the construction project. But, they are solving this problem here, they are organizing the training, as they say, from the march. The experienced mechanics and machine operators take a young man along with them to the quarries, on the trips, to the line. That is how the BAM "universities" begin. But, such "universities" require, naturally, extra vehicles and extra fuel.
How do they manage to fulfill plan assignments within such fixed limits? Major Korotkov even moved 100,000 m³ in excess of the plan. Of course, they conserve every drop. A struggle is underway in the subunits to conserve GSM [fuel, oil, and lubricants], people's auditors devote speeches to this subject, it is discussed at party and Komsomol meetings, they speak sharply to those who do not conserve, who are capable of issuing a couple of liters for starting a campfire.

Naturally, it is not easy to keep up with the tempo of a construction project like the BAM. But, they must. They are solving this problem by putting to use acquired know-how.

As an example, the know-how of two winters showed that, during the coldest time (that being January), it is best not to work in the quarries. As they say, you are worth more than that. The equipment reaches its limits at temperatures less than 50° below even in Arctic conditions. The last few years, they worked in January just as in every other month. They analyzed the results of the January work and learned that the most equipment breakdowns occurred then and labor productivity was also lowest in January. Moreover, the next month or two, personnel did nothing but repair the January equipment malfunctions.

This January was completely devoted to combat and political training, theoretical training, model domestic conduct, improving the military appearance of the personnel. Excavators, bulldozers, dump trucks, and portable electric units were placed in full readiness. The subunit readied itself strenuously and according to plan. And, on 1 February, it rose from the "shelters" and went out into the quarries and to the line. The cold diminished, now no longer afraid of a cable parting or an excavator boom breaking, it was possible to storm the plan assignments at full force. And, the storm was a success: the subunit achieved a double work norm. It was the BAM approach to the problem. Construction tempos rose.

"Problems of growth?" Major Korotkov asked. "It is like the folk saying: the larger the log, the farther you must go into the forest. Naturally. The important thing is something else -- to insure that the growth problems do not become chronic, eternal."

And, he began to relate how his problem lately had, for example, become timely receipt of planning estimates. Planning organizations are lagging behind construction organizations. The pattern now has the builders beginning to erect the installations while the estimates filter in bit by bit. Efforts, resources, and time are often expended in vain. They tried sending in expediter... But then, to the city of Urgal, to a non-military organization, came a letter:

"To the Urgal Customer Group, Eastern Sector, BAM. Comrade A. G. Zabara. A claim in the sum of... As customer, you were required to dispatch to us, not later than 1 September of the previous plan year, blueprints and estimates, complete, for the installation as a whole or work stages... As of 1 December,
we have received no documentation... Considering the above and in accordance with... your assessed fine is... per day of delay..."

Never before had anyone sent such letters here, and even then to whom? To the customer himself... What happened? Exactingness with each other increased on the part of those close by, including on the customer's part. Tempos of trunkline construction required special diligence on the part of all production links beginning with the draftsman and ending with the excavator operator.

Speaking in 1975 at a meeting of the voters of the Bauman voting district in Moscow, Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev said: "The scope of operations on the BAM with special force underscores the necessity to intelligently approach all the problems of this great construction project, to solve present problems not influenced by the spontaneous wave of events, but stemming from accurate, scientifically based proposals concerning long-range integrated development of this vast region."

Yes, the construction project is maturing, it is growing!

...The railroad troops submit is preserving as a relic the first pennant presented to it prior to arrival on the Gerbi, a bit more than 2 years ago. They presented the pennant to the same Sergeant N. Al'chanov for beating the construction time for wooden-sided tents, in 3 days vice 5. That was immediately after the assault force landed in the taiga. Now, the scale is different. But, the work motto is the same -- "The Personal Five-Year Plan in 3 Years!" BAM marches head on towards the glorious jubilee of October. Its builders are in the vanguard of a national socialist competition. Here, every day is a labor feat. Two, and at times, three shift assignments -- this is becoming the norm for many collectives. The BAM is calling forth newer and newer names. They are honoring and presenting awards to the victors.

Communist and Komsomol members have often stated their desire that the soldiers also be eligible for award of the medal "For Construction of the Baykal-Amur Trunkline". The fact is that, according to the statute, this award can only be given to those who have worked on the construction project at least 3 years. But, the soldiers serve 2 years. However, they can work as, for example, N. Snigura did when he fulfilled three annual norms in 1 year. And, there are many such people here.

Growth and growth problems... Here, at the distant "point", they are being successfully solved.

When I left Gerbi, Major Korotkov said in parting:

"And the final growth problem? Do you want to know? The soldiers refuse to go home. This year 15 stayed. More wanted to."

"How do you explain that?"

"The BAM is a great construction project and, in great matters, a person also grows, he becomes great. That is what I think," he threw up his hands and smiled. That kind of problem he could take.

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