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The report contains information on the Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.
# TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

**No. 1277**

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IMPORTANCE OF COMPETITION FOR IMPROVING COMBAT TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 77 p 1

[Editorial: "Competition and Combat Training Quality"]

[Text] The continuous development of weapons and fighting equipment and methods of conducting combat, and the constantly growing demands made of the field, air and naval training of the personnel have left a noticeable mark on the nature of troop combat training. The importance of each class with respect to developing the fighters' combat skills and the value of each training hour have increased sharply. The struggle to improve the effectiveness and quality of the training process has become the main trend in the work of commanders, political organs, staffs and party organizations.

Socialist competition is one of the most effective means of intensifying the combat training and stimulating creative initiative among Soviet fighting men. It has become an inseparable part of the training and indoctrinal process in the army and navy. Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, which defined great prospects for the growth of our nation's economic and defensive might, served as a powerful incentive for its further development. The decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee: "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," brought forth a new outpouring of political activity and work among fighting men of the army and navy, as well as among all Soviet people. It is important that each unit (chast), each ship direct the patriotic enthusiasm of the personnel towards quality fulfillment of training plans and programs and the commitments accepted in socialist competition.

The quality of the training and indoctrinal process is a broad concept. It embraces all aspects of the personnel's activities. The struggle for quality is a struggle for the greatest return from each class, exemplary accomplishment of combat training tasks, a struggle to surpass the norms and for precise organization and discipline. Finally, it is a struggle to develop good morale and political qualities in the homeland's defenders, to unite the military collectives and maintain a wholesome moral atmosphere in them.
It is with good reason that the struggle for quality is said to be dictated by the times. Efficiency and quality has become the slogan for the Tenth Five-Year Plan. The struggle for quality is penetrating ever deeper into the various spheres of army and navy life. The patriotic competition for outstanding unit (soyedineniye) in the military district and in the Armed Forces, initiated by the fighting men of Taman, and actively supported in all military districts, groups of forces and fleets, was a new manifestation of this.

Becoming an inseparable part of the anniversary year socialist competition this movement brought new vigor to the competition and set new tasks for commanders and staffs, political organs and party organizations, tasks related to the combining of efforts in the competition by all elements of the military system, from sections, crews and teams to unit staffs. A unit aspiring to achieve the title of outstanding can have no weak elements, because its successes are built with the successes of platoons and companies, battalions and regiments, with the training level of each fighter, the professional knowledge and organizational skills of each commander.

It is one of the commander's primary tasks to insure quality in the combat training of his men and a high level of combat readiness. He is required to thoroughly understand the requirements made of combat training at the present stage and to constantly seek more progressive methods of training and indoctrination of the personnel in order to provide them with a large body of knowledge as rapidly as possible, thereby insuring the most intensive growth of their combat skills.

A high level of training was demonstrated at a recent tactical exercise by motorized riflemen of the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel F. Mambitalin. Through vigorous and purposeful organizational work the commander, party and Komsomol organizations focused the efforts of the men on the quality with which each combat training task was accomplished, whether it be an attack or a march, the resolution of combat support problems or party-political work. Skillfully organized competition by tasks and norms developed the initiative of officers, warrant officers (praporshchik), sergeants and soldiers, and increased the fighters' desire to carry out the commander's order in the best possible manner.

Great intensity of combat training is a characteristic sign of the anniversary year. Having entered into socialist competition for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution the fighting men have doubled their efforts to improve the effectiveness and quality of combat and political training. And today as never before it is important to create all of the conditions essential for the participants to completely fulfill their commitments in each unit, on each ship. In order to achieve this it is first of all necessary to insure absolute adherence to training schedules and the fulfillment of all combat training measures indicated. It is important at the same time to see that each class is of maximum benefit to the trainees. And this is achieved in particular by good training on the part of the leaders and by exemplary material and technical support for the training. Unfortunately,
there are still cases in which the regularity of combat training is disrupted because of omissions by those responsible for support of the training process. For example, a number of field firing exercises at the training facility of which Major N. Pisarenko is in charge were conducted on a low level. The servicing personnel prepared the equipment on the moving target gunnery range poorly. The result was an irreplaceable loss of training time.

Success in the struggle for effectiveness and quality of training, for the fulfillment of commitments accepted in socialist competition is unthinkable without firm discipline, organization and order in the subunits (podrazdeleniya) and units and on the ships. Vigorous and continuous party-political work should be carried out to insure order and organization and quality in the training process. Commanders, political organs and party organizations are expected to thoroughly maintain and develop in the fighting men a feeling of responsibility for the quality of training plan and program of fulfillment, to be demanding in evaluating the results of the military work, to resolutely oppose weaknesses and indulgences in the combat training and formalism in the competition, and to efficiently summarize and disseminate progressive experience. Komsomol organizations should constantly focus their attention on matters of effectiveness and quality in the combat training.

The struggle to fulfill commitments accepted in the socialist competition for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution is inseparable from the struggle for good combat training quality. Raising the quality of the training process to a new level means making an important contribution to the combat improvement of units (chasti, soyedineniya) and ships and achieving further improvement of all qualitative indicators in the Soviet Armed Forces.
Military rationalizers and inventors... Their contribution to the improvement of combat readiness is measured not only by the minutes saved in preparing the equipment, the kilograms of fuels and lubricants or kilowatt-hours of electric energy saved, the effectiveness of the devices lightening the work of the personnel, the visual training aids and so forth. The rationalizers' creativity is also a moral category. It is not surprising that the rationalizers' proposals occupy a prominent place in the organization of socialist competition and the acceptance of commitments.

The effectiveness of the rationalizers' creations is especially eloquently confirmed by concrete figures. In the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, for example, 3,200 rationalization proposals have recently been submitted on the subject: "Damage Control" alone. The time it takes to make the equipment combat ready has been reduced by 10 to 12 percent as a result of various kinds of improvements. The economic effect from the introduction of innovations is measured in tens of thousands of rubles.

Behind the figures are live people. Among them are Warrant Officer (michman) V. Grechikhin, a participant in the All-Union Exhibit of Scientific and Technical Creations of the Youth. A training apparatus proposed by him makes it possible to train turbine mechanics rapidly and especially efficiently. The group of rationalizers headed by Engineer-Major I. Grigor'yev has created a stand which helps pilots to acquire the practical skills needed in special flight conditions: failure of the gyro-horizon, electric power supplies, engines and so forth.

The list of extremely interesting inventions and improvements could be continued. But is everything as it should be in the invention and rationalization work on ships and in the units (chasti)? Are there no rapids along the path of this mighty current?
I recall a conversation which took place on the ship commanded by Captain 2d Rank Yu. Mikerov. When they accepted commitments the sailors had given their word to introduce dozens of rationalization proposals. A commendable desire. And how many have been introduced? "Not a single one," came the answer. We will state frankly that this was an exceptional case. And obviously understanding that the crew was not looking its best the commander began to blame the commission on inventions at higher headquarters for everything: "No matter how many rationalization proposals we submit they are all rejected."

We read document no. 5 of 30 April 1976, which was signed by commission chairman, Captain 2d Rank S. Mikov and secretary, Engineer-Captain 2d Rank V. Osipov. All three of the rationalization proposals submitted were rejected.

"And the reasons for the rejection are especially convincing," we were told by one of the ship's innovators. "We suggested a new system for loading lubricants. It would cut loading time 6-fold. The proposal was not approved, however. The excuse was that the oil would not flow through the filter which we recommended. But this system is already operating!"

Such bureaucratic treatment of the rationalizers' creations naturally restrains them and dampens their enthusiasm. There is also evidence of indifference over the part of the commission for inventions at the higher headquarters and on the part of the ship commander, who could have been more persistent in seeing to it that the work of his men was properly appreciated. There is no doubt about any of this. Another aspect of the matter should be discussed, however.

When socialist commitments are accepted the participants always link them with inventions and rationalizations. And rightly so. After all, the quest of the innovators is an especially visible and persuasive factor for maintaining a vital, creative atmosphere in the collective. The trouble is, however, that commitments are accepted on a grand scale, and when it comes time to total up the results it turns out that all of the work is still on paper.

Naturally, there are various reasons for this situation. They include a poorly thought-out, formal attitude toward the acceptance of commitments, a poor knowledge of the real condition of the equipment on the ship or in the unit, and an indifferent attitude toward rationalization work. The following also occurs. When asked why rationalization work was poorly organized in the subunit (podrazdeleniye) Engineer-Captain Lieutenant N. Mel'nikov, chief of one of the fleet repair shops, answered: "Rationalization is not important and we do not bother with it."

We can say frankly that this example is not a typical one. An actual opponent of rationalization is an extremely rare phenomenon. One does encounter passive and indifferent observers, however. At the same time, rationalization and invention work requires special attention and a well organized, well thought-out, even scientific, approach. The assignment of special areas for rationalization work contributes to such thorough consideration and purposefulness. They must take into account both the real need for this or that improvement, today's level of development of the equipment and future prospects. The level of invention and rationalizational work is good where a completely serious attitude is taken to the formulation of special assignments.
We visited the large anti-submarine ship Ochakov. The selection of areas for the development of rationalization proposals there is handled by a military-technical propaganda council headed by Captain Lieutenant V. Meshcheryakov. The council is made up of competent, technically knowledgeable specialists. During one of their meetings, for example, they discussed ways to better organize the work of the main control room during the search for a submarine. And together they came up with a clever solution. Assisted by the corresponding section of the fleet headquarters they prepared a basically new panel making it possible to reduce the time required to work out battle commands.

We are making no great revelation by saying that purposeful, well thought-out rationalization work must be backed up with a good material base. New things cannot be created using only parts taken from obsolete equipment. However, the rationalizers are sometimes forced to get by the best they can. Reflecting on material support for rationalization work Warrant Officer V. Grechikhin said: "In the training detachment in which I serve we are provided with materials. They are inadequate, however. We are therefore forced to demonstrate personal initiative, bartering and begging." In another subunit the rationalizers complained about the fact that it was difficult to obtain such things as diodes, transistors, modern radio tubes and resistors.

At the same time there is a way out of the situation. It lies in a centralized and planned supply for inventors and rationalizers. They should not have to go with outstretched hands to the supply agencies and not have to dig in equipment which has outlived its usefulness in search of needed parts, but should receive everything necessary for their fruitful, creative work on a legal basis.

Speaking of rapids in the current of rationalization we must not fail to mention the following drawn-out disease. It was summed up by the officers on the large anti-submarine ship Sil'nyy:

"We ship's rationalizers frequently keep to ourselves, not even knowing what is taking place on the next ship."

K. Ivanov, chief of the invention office for the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, regards a lack of duplicating equipment as one of the causes of this disease. "The equipment which we have," he said, "has a small capacity, making it impossible for us to print informational bulletins in good time, not to speak of 'backing them up' with proper drawings."

We will not discuss the subject of whether the office equipment alone is the reason why only a small portion (more precisely, 2.5 percent) of the numerous rationalization proposals received and approved were published in informational reports. There can be no difference of opinion here: after all, we are discussing something detrimental to the common cause.

Take this concrete illustration, for example. A short time ago, in one of the air units, a device was prepared for filling in the seams of runways and taxiways. Labor productivity increased 20-fold as a result. This freed many specialists. The method did not become a commonly used one, however, because information about it was not published.
The publication of informational bulletins naturally has an important role. This work requires centralization, however. At the present time various fleet sections and directorates are charged with the duplication of rationalization proposals submitted. It would be far more practical to centralize all of this in the fleet's inventions bureau.

Party and Komsomol organizations play an important role in the dissemination of progressive experience and the organization of rationalization work on the ships and in the units. As a rule, good indicators are achieved in those collectives in which the communists constantly direct their attention to these matters. A graphic example of this is the air unit in which the commission for inventions is headed by Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel D. Kudimov. In that unit it is seen to that all of the documents are filled out precisely and in a timely manner, that the young innovators are not ignored, that the experience of the outstanding rationalizers is summarized and publicized throughout and that there are no violations of the procedure for payment of monetary awards for the introduction of rationalization proposals.

We should also not forget that there are moral as well as material incentives. It would be difficult to overestimate the role of moral incentives. Even in this area, however, one sometimes encounters indifference and formalism. Those responsible sometimes forget to announce an award or to confer a certificate upon the best innovators. This happened to Engineer-Captain 3d Rank A. Ignatov, for example. He received a certificate from the fleet commander for a rationalization proposal. His immediate superiors, however, have not found the time in a whole year to award this certificate to the officer.

Naturally, the above examples do not contribute to an increase in the flow of rationalization proposals. Like river rapids they restrain this powerful flow. And after all, well organized invention and rationalization work makes it possible to reveal hidden reserves, to arouse a creative attitude toward the work in each fighting man and to achieve good indicators in combat training.

From the editors: In publishing commentary from our correspondents the editors hope to draw attention to the problems raised in them on the part of all those who deal with inventions and rationalization, primarily individuals responsible for the conduct of this work in the units, on the ships and in military training institutions, and to hear their opinions about how to improve the quality and effectiveness of the fighters' rationalizations and inventions.

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PARTY-POLITICAL WORK IN HIGHER MILITARY COMMAND SCHOOL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Col M. Konyshev, chief of the political section at the Saratov Higher Military Command School imeni Hero of the Soviet Union, Maj-Gen A. I. Lizyukov: "The Cadet Became a Communist"]

[Excerpts] The name of former cadet A. Golubev was named in a report and in the speeches at a recent meeting of the school's active party members. It was a thing of the past: Golubev had been expelled from the party and the school. Although this was an isolated case it became the subject of intense discussion based on principle and a serious call for thorough analysis of our work of accepting members into the party and indoctrinating the young communists.

Golubev's case showed that we obviously acted in haste in accepting him into the party. He was not morally ready. As a candidate for membership he sometimes violated military discipline, demonstrated conceit and was rude to his comrades. This was no secret to anyone. Nonetheless, when Golubev finished his term as a candidate and required a recommendation communists Major V. Dubovskiy and Captain R. Chernykh were glad to "accommodate" him. Nor did the subunit (podrazdeleniye) Komsomol members burden themselves with doubts when deciding about a recommendation.

What especially alarmed us, however, was the fact that communists of the primary party organization also did not demonstrate proper principle at the meeting when they were deciding on Golubev's acceptance into the CPSU. None of the communists from his platoon spoke at the meeting. They later explained that they did not want to go against the opinion of those providing the recommendations.

We thoroughly analyzed this incident in the political section, at a meeting of the party commission and at seminars of secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations. Once more we explained the party's instructions on filling its ranks with fresh members from among those who have earned the recognition of their comrades with their active training and participation in the
collective's public life and directed the attention of active party and Kom-
somol members to the need for a principled approach for evaluating the work,
political and moral qualities of those entering the CPSU. There was also a
serious discussion about another matter: how to invigorate the work of in-
doctrinating the young communists.

There are now many communists among the cadets in our school's party organ-
izations. Some of them are candidates for members, others have passed the
test of their work and political qualities and have become party members. We
try not to force the growth of the ranks of party organizations and do every-
thing possible to avoid even the slightest attempt to deal with this important
work in a campaign-like manner.

We carry out the work of indoctrinating the young communists in each party
collective so that they understand that upon receiving his candidate card a
cadet is just beginning the most responsible period. The most responsible
because it is precisely within the laws of the school that the young communist
must acquire his initial skills in party work, understand its peculiar features
and feel confident in the fulfillment of his new duties from the very beginning.
After all, what goes into the foundation of the young person's party biography
can become a reliable support, a reliable reference point for his entire life.

We are doing a great deal to indoctrinate the young communists. First of all,
of course, there are the organized forms of theoretical training. There are
special groups for this purpose in the party bureaus, and a school for young
communists in the political section. We stress the fact that the knowledge
acquired by the young communists should invariably influence their practical
work and serve as a source of public activeness.

The young party members' work in Komsomol organizations is of invaluable assist-
ance. The secretary of every third Komsomol organization is a young communist.
Many of them are performing the duties of agitators and editors of wall news-
papers, and are members of Lenin Center Councils.

The political section devotes special attention to party meetings in order
that the communist cadets might become more fully aware of their personal
responsibility for the situation in their collective, boldly enter into its
multifaceted life and acquire the qualities of party fighters. We begin our
work with the young communists by studying the decree passed by the CPSU
Central Committee, "On The Procedure For Conducting Party Meetings in the
Yaroslavl' City Party Organization." We then conduct a class on the subject,
"The Party Meeting - A School of Political Indoctrination." Experience has
shown that such preliminary preparation accelerates the cadets' adjustment to
active participation in the life of the party organizations.

Taking part in serious discussions on various matters the young communists
learn how to fulfill requirements set forth in the CPSU Charter on a practical
basis and become convinced of the great indoctrinaional importance of criti-
cism and self-criticism. Meetings help them to become more deeply aware of
their personal responsibility for fulfillment of their party and service
duty and tasks facing the party organization.
In short, a great deal of work is being done. In all fairness, however, it must be said that there are deficiencies in this work.

Certain measures carried out by the political section, party committees and bureaus are apparently little effective. It must also be admitted that certain communists forget about a cadet after providing him with a recommendation for party membership and show no interest in how he is getting along, how he is progressing as a candidate or what sort of difficulties he is encountering.

All of our work directed towards indoctrinating the young communists produces palpable results. Subunit party organizations have been strengthened considerably and their militancy has increased. The communists form a reliable support for the commanders in their work to improve training quality and to further strengthen military discipline in the cadet collectives.

An analysis of the work of the political section, party committees and organizations since the passage by the CPSU Central Committee of the decree: "On The Work of Kirgizia's Party Organizations With Respect to Acceptance Into the Party and Indoctrination of Candidates for Membership in the CPSU," has permitted us to derive essential conclusions, to focus all our efforts on eliminating the deficiencies revealed and to indoctrinate the young communists in a more purposeful manner.
Training Activities in Outstanding Signal Regiment Described

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 2 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Vedernikov, commander of a signal regiment: "In the Main Area"]

[Text] For five years in a row our regiment has been an excellent one. Any success, however, like any failure, must be subjected to careful analysis. There is a valid popular saying to the effect that when disaster strikes be steadfast and when you achieve success do not become conceited. The difficulty of holding the positions achieved and advancing to new ones lies in the fact that we begin each training year at a time when experienced and well trained masters of their work depart for the reserve and are replaced by newcomers.

But this is only half of the problem, as they say. The second half lies in the fact that the regiment's officer staff is replaced each year. In addition, the equipment is being continuously improved, which complicates the tasks facing the regiment.

There is no simple answer to the question of what makes up success. A regiment can only become an excellent one as a result of the entire collective's successful resolution of a large group of extremely complex problems. It is perfectly natural that an overall approach must be taken to their resolution.

However, one can isolate an important area of work from this group of tasks: the training of officers and warrant officers (praporshchiki). Narrowing the operating frequency band, however, as the radio operators say, we can discuss the preparation of highly rated specialists.

One of the first points in the socialist commitments of each officer and warrant officer pertains to raising his rating. Based on last year's results almost two-thirds of the officers in the regiment became specialist 1st class. Four commanders were awarded the highest title - master of communications. The rest hold a 2d class rating, and a few individuals - 3d class. By interpreting these figures one can reveal the "secret" of success. In my opinion, it lies...
in the fact that a system has been worked out in the regiment and is being continuously improved for developing highly rated specialists among the officers and warrant officers. We are convinced that a systemic approach and constant concern for the effectiveness of socialist competition can guarantee stable results.

In order to be more specific let us trace the development of those officers who arrived in the regiment in 1975, let us say. Among them were Lieutenants A. Bykadorov, A. Shumilov, M. Odinokov, I. Voylochnikov, V. Yalov, and others. Their commander training plan was outlined at a weekly assembly prior to the beginning of the training year. Under the guidance of experienced officer-specialists the newcomers became acquainted with the organic equipment and with the forthcoming winter training tasks and studied guiding documents, while at the same time revealing their knowledge and capabilities. We discovered that they all had approximately the same level of theoretical training. Bykadorov and Voylochnikov proved to have better methodological skills. Okinokov knew more about the radio equipment and had a weaker knowledge of the telegraph and telephone systems. He was also weaker than the others in methods.

After that assembly an experienced specialist was assigned to each young officer. Lieutenant Odinokov's training was taken under personal control by Captain N. Ostashchenko, specialist 1st class. Captain P. Podakin, master of communications, helped Bykadorov and Major N. Trigubets worked with Voylochnikov. They helped the young commanders to compile realistic personal plans for the new training year and to define their socialist commitments. Incidentally, achievements in the development of their proteges were reflected in a special point in the commitments of the senior comrades. This made Captain Ostashchenko, let us say, twice as interested in Lieutenant Odinokov's success. He saw to it that the young officer regularly attended assemblies and classes for commanders. In the time allocated for the officers to study signal means he worked personally with his subordinate and monitored his preparations for each class, especially for each field training exercise. He helped him to outline plans, giving him specific assignments for his independent training.

The experienced masters worked in approximately the same individual manner with the other lieutenants. By the end of the year, as a result, they had all raised their ratings one level and had acquired a good knowledge of the organic equipment. Lieutenant Odinokov, for example, had acquired an excellent mastery of all the organic apparatuses. All of the lieutenants had also mastered the equipment existing in the company and the procedure for coupling channels and had learned to use the organic signal equipment in an integrated manner. They were all taking part in competitions among the officers and warrant officers to determine the best unit (chast) specialist for the training period. Incidentally, we attach great importance to these competitions. At the end of the year, based on the training results achieved by the young officers in the unit, an order is issued which is the final element of one of the sections in the system of commander training and officer competition.
We recently conducted a military and scientific conference in the regiment, at which we discussed methods and means of providing signal support for the forces. The socialist commitments of a number of officers included the preparation of reports for the conference. During the discussion of the topics assigned the information acquired by the speakers was made available to the entire collective. We used this method for disseminating technical military information, for developing methodological aids and instruction booklets and for summarizing progressive experience, which is also reflected in the commitments of officers and warrant officers.

Competition actively contributes to the development of rationalization work. We consider it a practical continuation of the training. We plan it for each training period, assigning specific tasks to those responsible for the work and monitoring their fulfillment. Several individuals usually work on each assignment. For example, we recently assigned the job of equipping and assembling a table for repairing radio receivers to Major I. Filatov and Senior Lieutenant V. Kalita. They should think this over, read the necessary literature and exchange ideas.

Lieutenant V. Podlesnykh recently joined the unit. He had to be helped to fit into the formation rapidly. At that time we were modernizing one of the classrooms for the training of radiotelegraph operators. It was here that Lieutenant Podlesnykh would train his men in the future. He was made a part of the group of rationalizers. This inspired the officer to exert every effort to learn the radio station and methods of operating it within the shortest possible period of time.

As a result of the large-scale campaign by rationalizers in the regiment it has been possible to create the material base for training highly rated specialists who measure up to the modern requirements of progressive methods. A signal apparatus has been set up in the classrooms which makes it possible to study almost all of the organic equipment in the unit, to conduct tuning, switching, tracking and measuring of communications channels on a practical level, that is, to learn all of the operations which must be performed at a communications center. In addition, it is possible for the instructors to transmit any command or special changes in frequencies and signal transmissions to the positions, to monitor the work orally and by magnetic tape, to introduce any kind or level of interference. All of this contributes to the development of lively competition in the classes and consequently, increases their effectiveness.

Competition is an inseparable part of the work of improving the commander's skill. Goals in the development of the skills of each officer and warrant officer are recorded in the socialist commitments. The communists report to their party collectives on the fulfillment of commitments and share acquired experience. In the process of competing such qualities as communist moral fiber, military honor and great moral responsibility for the common cause are actively developed in the participants.
We attach great importance to the considered employment of moral incentives in the competition. The very best are promoted in rank ahead of schedule and move up in the service. Photographs of the best specialists are displayed in a special corridor in the unit. The master radio operators periodically demonstrate their work for all regiment personnel over the loudspeaker system. We honor winners of the competition for best master of a skill before the entire regiment, presenting them with a red ribbon inscribed with golden letters. All of this rouses and inspires the men, motivating them to conduct a creative quest.

Supporting the initiative of the Carpathian motorized riflemen the personnel of our unit accepted a commitment to earn the right for the sixth time to the title of "excellent regiment" by the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The past months of winter training have brought us closer to the set goal. The selfless work performed by our officers and warrant officers, the personal example that they set in improving the level of their combat skills are a guarantee of success.
NAVAL TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Progress, Problems of Naval Training Center

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 77 p 1

[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Remizov: "Before Testing by the Sea"]

[Text] "Elevation...range...," the operator had scarcely time to report. Constantly new air targets appeared on the screen. The plotting board operator could scarcely catch his breath. The sailors were working under a very great stress, as is always the case even in combat training at sea. And the trainer run by WO ["michman"] A. Fedotov makes it possible to accelerate the pace of training even more.

This experienced specialist had a great deal of work to do on the installation of the trainer and "fitting" it to the station. On the other hand, now there is no need to turn on the regular equipment on the ships for the purpose of training, and there can be no complaint of a lack of targets. If the capabilities residing in the trainer are fully utilized, then only small polishing under ship conditions is needed to improve the skills obtained by the sailors.

Many other classrooms in the training center are capable of providing such a benefit in training the ship specialists. For example, under the control of WO V. Provasnik are mines, torpedoes, mine sweeping equipment and electrified schemes—everything necessary for visual training of the mine sweeping crews. And Lt S. Sinyakov goes up to a control panel which is a copy of a ship one, and begins to perform operations which are immediately displayed on the light panel. The sailors can watch the sequence of actions to locate and destroy mines. Other operations can be "illustrated" as visibly as in the palm of your hand. And much of the training equipment here has been made by the hands of ship specialists and even conceived of by them. In and of itself this bespeaks of strong ties between the ship crews and the training center, a creative attitude by the sailors toward the training process, and a common desire of the instructors and the trainees to achieve the greatest effect in mastering modern equipment.
The ways for achieving this effect, it must be said, are also being sought out in the sphere of improving the training procedures. More than once such efforts have been undertaken by the staff officers of the unit, and in particular by Capt 2d Rank V. Zharov. Courses are regularly conducted with the officer and warrant officer personnel, and here attention is paid to improving the organization of special training and to bettering the procedural organization of the exercises and training. Experienced instructors, for example, Staff specialists, conduct the analyses and assess the practical work of the junior officers and warrant officers in instructing the sailors and petty officers. The main thing to which attention is drawn here is the comprehensiveness of the training.

The high level of a majority of the exercises can serve as proof that all of these troubles are not in vain. For instance, Lt S. Sinyakov, the commander of the combat compartment of a mine sweeper, brought his own subordinates into the classroom. He started the exercise with an analysis of yesterday's sea exercise for setting out a finder in stormy weather. Briefly, but skillfully and completely, he assessed the actions of the crew in which the operators are led by PO 2d Class A. Kirillov. The sailors immediately understood where attention should be focused now. And the officer, although the subject presupposed a theoretical approach, endeavored to develop practical skills in the sailors. He invited them up to the working models for performing various operations, and demanded an explanation of the physical sense of what was happening. The questioning was interesting and lively. Questions such as "What has your neighbor overlooked?" "Who thinks otherwise?" or "Who can answer more fully?" introduced an element of competitiveness and inspired the sailors to work actively.

The initiative of the instructors and a creative approach to their job have made it possible to introduce much that is new and interesting in the training of ship specialists. For example, now two crews can work at the same time in the torpedo firing lab. One crew makes the attack, while the other assesses it and draws lessons for themselves. Then, it carries out the actions considering the noted shortcomings. Thus, the antisubmariners learn from one another, and in an atmosphere of competitiveness and an active exchange of experience.

However, it would be wrong to assume that everything at the training center has already been made perfect. There must be a further improvement in the training facilities, and a more critical attitude is needed for evaluating the labor of the individual training leaders. On the same day, exercises were conducted here at the training station for damage control. The first impression was a good one. The sailors led by Engr-Sr Lt S. Govorko demonstrated very precise work. But with a more attentive approach to the training, its "weak points" became noticeable. For example, all the actions of the damage control party were carried out directly in an illuminated compartment with four lights and an additional search light. But under real conditions, the sailors would most likely have to work with emergency lighting. The inputs given by the commander were also clearly customary for the damage control party.
At the same time, the senior chief the day before noted the insufficiently firm practical skills of certain subordinates of S. Govorko, and particularly in using the oxygen-breathing gas masks. However, the course of the training showed that these comments had been forgotten. The day before, a damage control party from another ship had worked here. It also had comments from the senior chief. And the officer who led the training was able to organize it in such a manner that the sailors in the one time were able to eliminate their failings. Incidentally, this was greatly aided by the instructor, WO V. Doroshenko. However, today his participation in the exercises was very relative as officer Govorko did not come to him for help, and the warrant officer himself did not feel it necessary to offer his services.

Generally speaking, this phenomenon here is a rare one, nevertheless the chiefs and instructors of the labs must not only be concerned with creating training aids and simulators, but also achieve the fullest use of their capabilities in training the sailors. They have the high professional mastery for this, and they possess rich experience in conducting exercises.

Unfortunately, these capabilities of the instructor warrant officers are not properly valued on all the ships, like, incidently, the possibility of the exercises in the special training center. Otherwise there would not be delays in the trainee groups under various pretexts, or gaps in the work schedules of the labs and trainers. Of course, fleet life does not always fit into convenient limits. There are sudden sea exercises and the fulfillment of unforeseen inputs.... However, the reason must be sought as little as possible in the surrounding circumstances. The training facility should be empty as little as possible, and the time allocated for special training should be used strictly according to purpose.

Something else must also be mentioned. Although in the training process elements of competitiveness are observed, the analysis of the exercises and the training at times is carried out without any visible connection with the pledges accepted in the subunit. Certain officers even feel that such a connection is artificial. And here the question rests on the ability to organically link the competition with the training process. To teach this to the officers who are group leaders is the duty of the experienced instructors on the ships, the staff officers and the chief of the training center.

Undoubtedly, the work which is carried out by the unit training center cannot be properly assessed without paying proper due to all its strong points. However, we must not overlook the shortcomings, for they conceal unused reserves which could be put into the service of improving the training process.

Faculty, Program of Naval Warrant Officer School

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 3 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Vedrov: "The Way to the Ocean"]

[Text] Like a majority, probably, my day starts with the reading with PRAVDA. The new furnaces are ready for Atomash [Atomic Machine Building]; select seed
is awaiting sowing; a famous lathe operator has received a prize. Our nation, the motherland of the October Revolution is living an energetic, powerful and vivid life on the threshold of its 60th anniversary!

Under the heading "We Serve the Soviet Union!" was the report "The Torpedo Firing." And this was about us, about the contribution which the military personnel are making to the common cause.

The report was about the submariners. Were these really our graduates? Precisely, as the chief hero of the PRAVDA report was the bold sailor and outstanding specialist, WO ["michman"] Mikhail Pletnev, completed technician school at the Red Banner Submarine Training Detachment imeni S. M. Kirov.

It has been five years now since the institution of warrant officers has been introduced in the Armed Forces. And as the experience shows, the new detachment of military personnel who in their majority have undergone special training have come to play an important role in the life of the Army and Navy.

In one of the fleet formations, around 200 of our graduates of various years are serving. One-half of them, more accurately 98 men, have already won decorations of the motherland. These have been for outstanding fulfillment of military duty, for skillful mastery of new equipment, and for courage and valor during voyages. The first assistant of an officer and high-class specialist—this is what a warrant officer is on a modern ship.

However, it is not so easy to do this. In a comparatively short period of time, a man must not only master a military specialty on a level of a secondary technical education, but also learn how to be a commander and indoctrinator. Finally, he must become a sailor both in skills and in character. And all of this must occur within the walls of a school and by the efforts of those to whom this important job is entrusted, that is, in training, to instill in the future warrant officers a strong love for the sea and for the selected specialty, a desire to serve on a ship, and the aspiration for commander work.

A majority of our officers has experience in ocean voyages. The senior instructor, Capt 2d Rank Yu. Kolchin, came to us from the bridge of a ship. Capt 3d Rank V. Mager, Capt-Lts V. Gritsenko and A. Satirskiy have served long and successfully on the ships. They are becoming expert pedagogues.

Precisely a synthesis of ship experience and a tenacious search in educational practices has made it possible, for example, for Capt 3d Rank V. Shurygin, a former senior submariner, to achieve firm authority in the school, and obtain high effectiveness in his instruction.
In starting an exercise, officer V. Shurygin does not make mistakes which sometimes happen with others, that is, monotonously reading from a piece of paper a description of the unit or the essence of the instructions. He knows his students who are young and interested persons. By a brief and vivid description of the ship and its weapons, of the instance on a cruise, or the actions of the crew, he arouses the interest of the officer candidates, in emphasizing, in so doing, the important role which is played by a warrant officer on a ship in such a situation. Only after this does the officer move on to purely special questions.

Capt 3d Rank V. Shurygin teaches his subject, relying on the modern achievements of military pedagogics and psychology. Foreign to him, if it can be so expressed, is the "faceless-mass" approach to the audience. The officer makes demands upon each officer candidate considering the individual traits of his personality and character.

The instructor is, in essence, the first officer-sailor which the officer candidate encounters in his life. The impression made by him largely determines the attitude toward service and toward others for the future warrant officer. And if at present the North Sea sailor WO V. Vorob'ev (incidentally, who at one time considered leaving the school) writes to V. Shurygin that he is serving excellently "Due to your desire to teach us, and for this enormous thanks!," this means that the officer has done his job as it should be.

Purposeful party political work plays an enormous role in indoctrinating in the officer candidates a love for ship service. Our training detachment has a rich and glorious history. One of the first measures carried out by the officer candidates is a visit by them to the museum of military glory. And it is actually impressive with 31 Heroes of the Soviet Union who are graduates of the training detachment and who have brought fame to the Soviet flag by their deeds. Precisely here, in the Heroes' Gallery, the young officers take their military oath.

Meetings are held regularly with veterans of the revolution and wars, and the heroes of our days. The officer candidates have heard the submariners, Heroes of the Soviet Union S. Lisin, N. Lunin and M. Malinin, the crew members of the famous L-3 and "Lembit" who received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union after the war, and Rear Adm N. Ignatov and Capt 1st Rank L. Stolyarov. The discussion of films and books on the fleet, the visit to commemorative sites related to the October Revolution and the defense of Leningrad leave a profound mark in the memory and heart of the officer candidates.

The meetings of the officer candidates with warrant officers who have graduated from the training detachment also provide a great indoctrinational impact; these meetings have become a tradition for us. WOs Ye. Kharitonov, V. Gerashchenko, A. Prikhod'ko and A. Trufanov, more than three-score able sailors from all fronts have recently visited us. In a frank and comradely manner, they shared their joys and concerns with the young men. And in all there was one notion which was well expressed in the letter of WO V. Stepanov: "If you come with good training from the school, things will go well on the ship."
Sea training is a serious testing of an officer candidate for serving on a ship. Understandably, within the school each of them develops a notion of the sea, life on a ship, and their future work. However, we will be frank in reality, all of this is much more difficult and prosaic. For this reason, special responsibility rests on the officer who is the leader of the sea exercises. Indicative in this regard is the experience of Engr-Capt 3d Rank E. Pavlov.

Having arrived with his group of officer candidates in the fleet, officer E. Pavlov is first concerned that the officer candidates be assigned for undergoing practical training to the best and, most importantly, sea-going ships. Of course, at times the warrant officer on his ship must stand time at dock, under repairs and simply waiting for a voyage. But this will come later on. The first contact of an officer candidate with the sea should be vivid, dynamic and attractive, and all of this he can feel only during a cruise, even though a short one.

It is no sin to admit that in the crews officers are encountered who feel that the officer candidates are only a supplementary reserve. The ship specialist should be allowed to do his job, while the officer candidate is better suited for galley detail, patrol or drilling, as he still has much to learn!

The harm of such an attitude toward practical work consists not only in the fact that the officer candidate does not obtain the needed knowledge and experience. The main harm is that the future sailor may gain a completely distorted notion of naval service, and by essential but secondary jobs he may be kept from the basic thing of interesting work with modern equipment, the instructiveness of a difficult watch, and an awareness of the importance of his profession. For this reason, Engr-Capt 3d Rank E. Pavlov does not refrain from appealing to the highest naval levels in order to provide the best conditions for the practical training of his subordinates.

Thus, in working for maximum effectiveness from each day of work, we endeavor to instill in the officer candidates the notion that they have selected a difficult but important and honorable path in life.

However, it would be wrong to assume that we have solved all the tasks of training and indoctrinating the future warrant officers with equal success. For example, it must be admitted with regret that one or another graduate has not justified our hopes, he has served poorly, and seeks an easy job on shore. Of course, the development of a warrant officer occurs in the fleet, in the process of service, but we are forced to wonder where we have gone wrong and what we missed in the person at the very start of his military biography. A great deal must be done to improve the quality of selecting personnel for training. I feel that an open competitive selection as employed in the schools and in certain army warrant officer schools would provide a great effect in this regard. The sea training of the officer candidates, we feel, must be planned in such a manner that it coincides with the most intensive period of combat training on the ships. In a word, there is much that we must reflect on and work out.
In our school there is a stand entitled "They Have Studied Excellently and Are Serving Excellently." In looking at the stand, one recalls the faces of the present warrant officers who have become winners of orders and medals and masters of military affairs. One's soul is filled with pride as their path started at our school. It is a path leading to the ocean.

Need for Sea Training for Ship Commanders

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank Ya. Kovalev, candidate of naval sciences: "In Order That the Maneuver Be Precise"]

[Text] The combat ships, after an intense stage of a cruise, were to take on supplies. At the designated region, they met up with a tanker and began the approach to it for taking on fuel and water. Capt 2d Rank L. Vasil'yev quickly and precisely brought his ship up to the large vessel, he skillfully controlled the speed and assumed the correct position for bringing on the hawser ends and the hose attachments. Soon on the halyards there was the signal: Taking on of Fuel Started.

Regardless of the fresh wind and the agitated sea, the commanders of the other ships also maneuvered flawlessly, demonstrating outstanding sea skills and confident command of the ship. The Commander in Chief of the Navy, Adm Flt SU S. Gorshkov, in observing the actions of the ships, had high praise for the sailors.

Of course, a ship commander shows his qualities most fully in combat, where one can see his tactical skills, knowledge of weapons, and the ability to use them under the difficult conditions against a strong enemy. However, in an ordinary cruise, the ability to execute a maneuver quickly and precisely, to approach a moving vessel, to moor, to pass through narrows, or to refuel at sea, shows not only high sea skills of an officer, but also his firmness, decisiveness and confidence.

Yes, good sea skills are a very important component of commander mastery. An analysis of cases which could lead to navigation accidents, instances of dangerous maneuvering or unsuccessful moorings shows that a significant portion of them occurred due to the fault of officers who could not fully control the ship. For precisely this reason, Capt-Lt V. Ivanov once was in a difficult position. The ship which he commanded was mooring with its stern toward the pier. Ivanov did not consider the force of the wind, and he dropped anchor in reverse without calculating, and having discovered that he was dangerously close to the moored vessels, showed a lack of decision. It must be said that this unsuccessful maneuver was unexpected for Ivanov's senior chiefs. He was considered to be a well trained officer. It turned out, though, that he was unable to be an expert navigator in all instances.

In order to understand the sources of such mistakes, it is essential to analyze where and how the officer has studied sea exercises, and what stages he has gone through in acquiring the skills of ship command.
In a school, an officer gains rather systematic knowledge on these questions. Practice is essential for reinforcing and developing them. However, this practice becomes real only in assuming the position of first lieutenant or executive officer. In being assigned to these positions, an officer passes exams for independent command of a ship. In the course of preparing for the exams and after them, in essence, he only begins to attain the art of navigation. However, immediately difficulties are encountered. And above all on the level of theoretical training.

We still do not have sufficient textbooks, procedural studies and manuals on organizing the training of future commanders as navigators. A majority of the officers has the "Spravochnik po Upravleniyu Korabilem" [Manual on Ship Command] edited by A. Aleksandrov. But here one can find only very general information. And certainly an officer is trained to command a specific type of ship. He must know first of all the particular features of this ship, its engines, steering, and the lines of the hull and superstructure. A text providing exhaustive information on these specific questions would be a good aid for a ship commander in self-preparation and in instructing officers.

An officer who is mastering ship command also lacks practical skills. Undoubtedly, during cruises at sea and long voyages he has stood watch on the bridge, and this is good practical schooling. However, not all ship commanders use this with sufficient effect for training subordinates in ship command. And precisely the bridge watch makes it possible to eliminate a certain gap in sea training caused by the time required for the promoting of a school graduate up to the first position involving ship command.

In a word, a true navigator is developed from the officer who from his lieutenant years works actively towards this, and in going up on the bridge, continues to study himself, and feels the attention and concern for improving his skills on the part of the command. Certainly it is the most important function of his superior chiefs to instruct the commander in ship command. However, for a number of reasons, they do not always have the opportunity to devote sufficient attention and time to each commander. Moreover, if there are several types and classes of ships under a flag officer, it is unrealistic to assume that he, like his deputies, could command each type equally well. In such instances, it is advisable to use the most experienced ship commanders in training the junior commanders. Such practice already exists. But this training must be given ordered and legitimate forms.

Well organized demonstration exercises in ship command under different conditions provide a great deal for the sea training of the commanders. The dynamics of the actions, with a parallel explanation, is assimilated well. For example, the regularly conducted exercises on maneuvering in the unit where Capt 3d Rank V. Golovan serves, has helped greatly in increasing the sea skills of the commanders.

When it is said that the commander "feels" a ship (and this is one of the most important qualities of a navigator), then it is assumed that the officer
knows its inertial properties and skillfully uses them. Such knowledge and skills come with experience. For this reason, in each commander it is essential to instill the demand to check himself on what was done previously by someone and made into a table or tactical log of a ship. We in every possible way encourage those officers who endeavor to fill out these tables with new data. Such data as the time of picking up or reducing speed in changing the operating conditions of the engines, the diameters and time of a turning circle at various speeds and much else must be firmly known. And not only in a digital form but also in an actual spatial representation.

At times it is asked: Where can one train, and how can one reach the high level of accuracy in ship command? It is possible and necessary to train in any situation. Experienced commanders improve their skills and teach their mates at anchor and in the open sea. There must be the desire and the drive. For example, to learn to moor is a difficult matter and at first entails certain risk. It is not essential to do this by a pier. Any floating object can be used for working on the approach of the ship to it. In such a situation, without fearing the consequences, an officer feels confident and this is transferred later to a real mooring.

Confidence on the bridge is the basis of the successful actions of a commander. But such confidence certainly does not come all at once. This occurs in those instances when the senior chiefs, in giving the officer the legal right to command a ship, do not check the actual training of the future commander with sufficient completeness and thoroughness. It is alright if the officer still is able himself to work out his weaknesses before they appear in difficult situations. However, although rarely, it still happens that insufficiently trained commanders, in getting into a difficult situation, create the prerequisites for a navigation accident.

It also happens that mistakes in ship command are committed by experienced officers. This happens because attention to their training has been unjustifiably weakened by the superior chiefs. At times they do not consider the partial loss of skills after an officer's leave or after carrying out repairs on a ship. And a commander can recover his previous form only by the method of training under the supervision of superior chiefs.

It is rightly said that the maneuver is executed not only by the commander but by the entire crew. By this one understands the precise leadership of its actions, the high skills of the sailors, and the teamwork in the command of the chief control position and the specialists of all the combat compartments. The navigator plays a special role in maneuvers. Here he should be the first officer of the commander. If the navigator does not send up to the bridge any proposals based upon calculations and observations of the dynamics of the situation, then this is already, one can feel, a prerequisite for an unsuccessful maneuver. Hence the importance of proper coordination between the commander and the navigator. This should start with preliminary preparations, when the forthcoming maneuver is plotted out on a chart or plotting board. Such joint calculations increase the guarantee of safety of actions, being at the same time one of the forms of improving the sea training of the commanders.
Finally, I would like to stress the important role of well organized and thought out post-cruise analyses in the development of commanders. Usually these are conducted after the ship has returned from a cruise. However, at times we carefully and scrupulously analyze the actions of the commander, the crew of the main control position and the crew members only when something happens. Then we analyze and strictly evaluate the most insignificant error. This is necessary and correct. It is also important that such all-encompassing analyses become a compulsory matter after any cruise, particularly when a young commander is in command of the ship.

It is an important task of the political bodies and party organizations to instill in the commanders a feeling of responsibility for raising their sea skills and level. It is essential to be concerned that this sphere of training is clearly depicted in the socialist pledges of the officers. Competitions for specific questions of navigation, in particular, are effective.

The sailors and inhabitants of many foreign countries are presently the witnesses of the high sea training of Soviet commanders. Repeatedly they have admired the fine and precise maneuvers of the ships under the USSR Naval Flag. Our commanders, in successfully carrying out the missions of long voyages, in calling at foreign ports, inevitably demonstrate examples of excellent sea skills and mastery. They fully understand that a skillful and finely and precisely executed maneuver is a sort of visiting card of Soviet naval culture. This is a card which should always be flawless for all commanders.

Submarine Training in Rough Weather

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt A. Tkachev: "The Commander's Orbit"]

[Text] Somewhere above the ocean, a very common thing occurred: an atmospheric vortex was born. The meteorologist, having discovered it, endeavored in the birth certificate of the cyclone, to depict its parameters accurately as possible and to predict its development and further path. Although it is very difficult to determine whether the new storm will die out without causing any particular problems, or, on the contrary, having picked up destructive force, will move along the meridians, blocking the mouths of rivers with winds, driving ships into port and measuring with the storm gauge the art and courage of those who are caught in the ocean. This becomes apparent only days later. But still, when a giant hurricane "shakes off its moorings," many sailors begin to be concerned.

Capt 1st Rank Lyulin frowned when he learned about the cyclone. Although nothing around as yet caused alarm. The dawn harbor was full of heavy, quiet water. In it, even the wakes from the submarines were seemingly lost, without spoiling the smooth surface. If Vitaliy Aleksandrovich Lyulin had fewer concerns at those moments when the ship was pulling away from the pier, he probably could have recalled other similar pictures. And far from shore,
the still mirror of Neptune so peacefully reflected the fixity of the stars, that it was hard to believe in the approaching storm. And only experience cautioned him: Don't trust, navigator, in the sleep of nature, as it is brief.

And the commander should have been particularly cautioned, starting the cruise in such weather. Even a brief one, as today's, through the gulf. Even when the forecast did not entail any particular unpleasantnesses. Because any reasonable sailor would scarcely venture to fully exclude the possibility of colliding with a cyclone, once it had been discovered not far off. Particularly as Capt 1st Rank Lyulin is a man with the experience of five ocean voyages.

From his miles spent cruising under the water and on the surface, Vitaliy Aleksandrovich could have compiled more than one trip around the world (for successes in combat training during a long voyage, he, as the executive officer, had received the Order of the Red Banner). He was so experienced that Lyulin the navigator and even Lyulin the executive officer felt it unnecessary to give any special significance to today's voyage.

However, from the commander's viewpoint, a great deal is perceived differently. The missile-carrying submarine was on the eve of a long cruise. And Lyulin involuntarily projected this microvoyage on the "ocean screen." Today he wanted to anticipate how the crew would behave during the long cruise.

During his development as an officer, Lyulin, like many others, assumed as proper that correctness of judgments about people which his commanders possess. He felt this was due by rank. It turned out that the "due" did not come by itself, but was gained by quickness and by analysis of those small traits which under ordinary circumstances would be classified as minor details.

There some distance away were the running lights of a small ship following the same course as the submarine which was picking up speed. And the radio operator reported: "Horizon clear."

Was this an error of the man on watch? Undoubtedly, but to an even greater degree one of the chief of the radio engineering service, Capt 3d Rank V. Dmitriyev. He himself was a sensible specialist, and now he was chary.

"Chief of the RTS [radio engineering service] to the bridge!" The voice of Capt 1st Rank Lyulin was hard. However, he met the officer calmly:

"What are you doing, Vasilii Vasil'yevich?"

"I am putting the documents in order."

"Fine. At the same time put the watch in order. It has not even spotted what the signalman and I can see without binoculars."
A minute later the officer was back on the bridge. 

"Comrade commander, the observation was being made at maximum distance, I have changed the scale and now the target is spotted!"

"It wouldn't be bad, Vasily Vasil'yevich, for you to change the scale for evaluating your work. This by the way will be on the threshold of the ocean. It will require vigilance from us."

The small vessel turned aside, and its lights changed to a different pattern. But the commander did not change his pattern of thoughts. He was to draw a conclusion from the first lesson of this small voyage. Weren't some sailors too complacent? It was essential to raise their activeness. Let the competition help in this. The conversation should be about this at the party meeting which would be held before the long cruise.

As a whole, the crew was engaged in fulfilling the pledges, and competitive-ness could be noted even in details. The sailors were struggling with great enthusiasm to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. This was pleasing to Capt 1st Rank Lyulin, and he saw that here his crew was keeping to the right course. He recalled the speeches at the meeting of Engr-Capt 2d Rank V. Mikhaylov, WO V. Tarasov, and other submariners who were communists and Komsomol members. You could feel that militant mood which now permeated the thoughts and deeds of all Soviet military personnel who were ready to properly celebrate the jubilee of October, and to honorably carry out the tasks posed for them by the motherland.

This is a duty as well as one of the glorious traditions of the defenders of the socialist fatherland. Over all six decades, whether in peacetime or during the hard war years, they spared neither forces nor their lives to carry out any order of the motherland, and on land and at sea to defend the victories of their people and the freedom and independence of the nation.

And precisely 60 years ago the Lyulins entered the ranks of the defenders of October. Ivan, the elder brother of his father, had been the driver of an armored car in a motor battalion of Red Samara. The younger brother, Pavel, had gone through the Great Patriotic War, in commanding an antitank battery. The father for almost 30 years had stood watch on the Central Asian frontiers of the USSR. And the commander's orbit of Capt 1st Rank Lyulin in essence was a continuation of the path blazed in battles and campaigns by the older generation of one of the many dynasties of defenders of October. In truth, the paths of the fathers are the roads of the sons.

"Radio room to bridge..."

The loadspeaker distorted the voice of Capt-Lt Mar'yasin.

"Yes, commander," answered Lyulin.
"Received by radio," reported the commander of the signal department. "The vessel which is more to sea has encountered a squall."

There it is, the visiting card of a cyclone. Lyulin estimated the distance to the storm front. Still they should be able to reach the pier.

If a cyclone occurs at sea, the commander could have a free hand. It would be possible to alter course or dive to the undisturbed depths. Even the improbable "face to face" meeting there is not so fearsome, particularly if you believe in the power of your ship and in the dependable work of the crew.

There was an instance during stormy weather when the submarine on which Lyulin was serving as a navigator had to surface and raise the mast. The maneuver was simple, and the submariners carried it out cleanly, but just before submerging (it must be concluded), a wave wedged the mast in the raised position. It was impossible to lower this "bird house" over the conning tower by hand. Then Lyulin thought: Why not try to eliminate the malfunction caused by the wave using the same force? The commander approved the navigator's proposal. The submarine traveled in a submerged position so that the pressure of the water forced the mast to vibrate and then drop down, finding the slot from which it had been extracted.

Yes, events can be subordinated to the will of that commander who is able to fully engage in solving problems the experience and knowledge of subordinates, and create a situation on the ship when the men themselves, without suggestion or without urging, actively try to help the commander. Now the crew was confronted with the mission of quickly moving to another bay and preparing the ship for a long ocean voyage (and it entered this bay now, being reached by the cyclone). Involved work had to be done as well as a planned preventive inspection of the ship complexes and systems. This process was labor-consuming and extremely delicate. It was not easy to speed it up, and there was such a need. Then the commander was approached by the missileman, Capt 3d Rank Yu. Kavizin.

"In my opinion, comrade commander, there is a way to reduce the time of the work."

The officer's idea was very effective and sophisticated. But, possibly, this was not what pleased Capt 1st Rank Lyulin the most, but rather the profound interest of Kavizin in the common cause, and his readiness and desire to help the commander. Service is not a place of affection, and a commander's vocabulary does not know such turns of phrases as "I like you," or "You are a person after my own heart." But Capt 1st Rank Lyulin experienced precisely feelings of gratitude and satisfaction for the officers who contributed confidence and strength to him and on which he could rely in any situation.

The RTS chief, Capt 3d Rank Dmitriyev again went up to the conning tower superstructure. After the commander's comment, he still was feeling awkward. This was good that Dmitriyev was troubled. He should become a flawless executive officer. Both here, in maneuvering in the bay, and there in the ocean.
In the air there was a sharp smell of algae and the tide was turning. One could already see the pier high above the water, as if warning that the shallow bay would not permit mooring at a high speed.

The shore was approaching. And the sea, as before was undisturbed, stretching before the ship. Literally several score meters remained to the harbor....

"Squall!" suddenly shouted the signalman. Everything grew dark. Something amazing developed above the bay. The outline of the shore quickly dissolved in a purple-black mass of a snowcloud. The air, up to now calm, moved toward the cloud, as water does moving under the crest of a sea swell.

Lyulin understood that the atmospheric swell would now raise the bay, pile water against the ship and push it against the pier....

"Slow speed astern! Mooring crews below!"

The sailors ran along the slippery deck to the conning tower door. The engines stopped the ship, and it began to back up, but the squall had not yet arrived. And this was good. Lyulin, having forgotten about the mooring which was so close, was now concentrating on one thing, protecting the ship.

The wind whistled. The snow fell heavily. The submarine under the force of the squall was again moving toward the shore.

"Medium speed astern! Straight rudder!"

The depth! The lack of it deprived the ship of freedom which was so essential now.

"Add ten turns to the shaft!"

Lyulin imagined how the props were turning dangerously close to the bottom. But now there was danger on all sides! The worst thing was that it was impossible to tell whether the shore was approaching or moving away. The radar at such a short distance could not help, and the signalman could not distinguish anything in the total whiteness. The commander ordered that the sonar readings be reported in order to monitor the depth under the keel, and put on a little more speed.

The hurricane winds lasted several hours along the coast. They caused a great deal of damage. However the submarine did not suffer. Having repelled the attack of the first squall, the ship was able to moor. Then the crew carried out (still ahead of time) the involved work. And while the storm was raging, the commander had an opportunity to assess this small cruise which turned out to be a major testing for them. All its details, all the successes and failures were projected onto the "ocean screen." Certainly the crew was faced with a long and difficult voyage in the underwater depths. And the commander was to be the first to start on it here, in the base.

28
Training Standards for Electromechanical Departments

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Engr-Capt 1st Rank M. Zhitnitskiy, staff officer and candidate of technical sciences: "The Coefficient of Objectivity"

[Text] Let us imagine the situation. The staff was readying the order for the results of combat training on the ships. The squadron mechanical engineer should determine the order of the places of the ship electromechanical departments (BCh-5) participating in the socialist competition. What criteria should he follow?

As is known, the work of an electromechanical subunit is aimed at providing power for the ship, so that its systems and mechanisms obtain electric power, water and cold. And it would be reasonable to assume that the subunit was handling its job when all of this was received without interruption. But was the adjacent subunit doing this. Who was better? And specifically how?

The spirit of competitiveness in the same departments and the effectiveness of the competition between them depend largely upon the clarity and objectivity of the answer to these questions.

The staff of unit X of surface vessels has worked out and is introducing a system of quality indicators to determine the results of training and the competition in the electromechanical subunits.

The first group of indicators is designed for considering such negative aspects, for example, as breakdowns or failures of equipment. And the receiving of even one "penalty point" tells sharply on the chances of the collective to be among the leaders. Engr Lt I. Matveyev had an opportunity to understand this. The BCh-5 headed by him was competing with the subunit of Engr-Sr Lt A. Pinyayev. In summing up the results, the first collective was immediately put back since it had the prerequisites for an accident.

A comparison of the results for the negative indicators is very instructive. If the report graphs are clean, this means the BCh-5 specialists have done a great deal to provide the dependable work of the equipment and their skillful operation.

However, such a situation is typical for a predominant majority of the crews. Consequently, it is essential to have criteria for a more profound analysis of the situation in the collectives where technical failures have been completely excluded. This problem is solved by the second group of quality indicators. Let us explain this from an example.

A ship, in traveling to the area of the exercises, keeps the set course. Hence, everything is normal. But the commander of the BCh-5 must utilize the main engines in such a manner as to provide the highest economy and efficiency in using the service life of the machinery. How successfully this
problem is solved can be judged from the indicator of the "load factor" which is expressed by the ratio of the operating time of each engine to the total number of running hours.

In practice, this is as follows. On the ship where the BCH-5 is headed by Engr-Lt S. Lebzak, the amount of the given coefficient is minimal. This means that when the situation permitted the commander of the BCH-5 provided the movement of the ship by using just one engine. And this is possible in maintaining sufficient power in the engine, with its dependable operation, and hence with the most careful maintenance of it. With such conditions, the motor life of the second engine is saved, and the high level of combat readiness of the entire BCH-5 is affirmed by this.

Engr-Sr Lt I. Nazarov is competing with Engr-Lt S. Lebzak. For this officer the "load factor" of the engines is close to one. This means that the entire main propulsion unit is too often in use. In other words, here there is no struggle to save motor life. And behind this one can see the training level of the specialists as well as the quality of preventive work and the organization of the watches at sea.

Another important quality indicator is the "fuel consumption coefficient." This is derived from the ratio of the actual consumption of fuels and lubricants per mile of distance to the consumption set by the standards.

Planned preventative and navigation repairs on the ship are a significant event in the life of the crew. The staff has considered repair quality, by introducing the indicator of "repair efficiency," that is, the ratio of the time actually spent on the work to the plan. If the indicator exceeds one, this points to the insufficient organization of the work and failures in supplying the ship with spare parts and materials.

The system of quality indicators certainly makes no claim to an all-encompassing evaluation of such a complicated process as the activities of a ship subunit. (Incidentally, far from all the indicators have been named.) Life requires a search for those criteria which make it possible in an objective light to see the strong and weak sides in the activities of the military collectives. This encourages the ship commanders and the mechanical engineers to constantly introduce a scientific organization for military service, and to raise its quality and efficiency. The "objectivity coefficient," as experience shows, helps the competition in becoming a more flexible and effective means for further raising the combat readiness of the ships.

ASW Training Practices

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank M. Khronopulo: "To Find, Attack and Destroy"]

[Text] The "enemy" submarine, in using sonar jamming, was endeavoring to escape pursuit. Even a temporary loss of contact introduced a certain nervousness in the actions of the ship antisubmarine warfare [ASW] crew. In
such a situation, it is important not to lose spirit, to quickly assess one's capabilities and the capabilities of the opposing side, and take the correct decision.

All of this was done by the ship commander, Capt-Lt N. Kochergin. Having executed a maneuver, the ship began the search in a new sector, and soon the flag officer received the report that contact with the target had been restored.

On what did the officer base his decision? As it turned out in an analysis of the exercise, Kochergin endeavored to imagine the thoughts of the submarine commander who, probably, would reason as follows: It is impossible to head south, as the subchaser which detected the sub is there; to the east and north lie shallower depths where vertical maneuvers are very limited for the submarine. Thus the west remains. But here also was a subchaser. However, it had still not "locked on" the sub, and hence, having created jamming, by a course and depth maneuver it would be possible to escape from pursuit. Having imagined all of this, Kochergin was able to thwart the intention of the submariners.

Probably, any experienced ASW commander would arrive at the same conclusions as Capt-Lt Kochergin. Experienced, yes, but Kochergin has been in command of the boat for a little more than a year. And his decisive and skillful actions in the exercise showed the rapid growth of the tactical skills of the officer.

Incidently, at one time, Kochergin, still a senior lieutenant, fell into a similar situation. In that exercise, the first contact with the "enemy" sub was established by another vessel. It was necessary to catch the target in a "ring," and Kochergin received the order for his vessel to occupy the appropriate position, and begin search in the designated sector. Little time remained, and the execution of the maneuver entailed restrictions on the use of acoustics. The taking up of the position required a complicated calculation. It was important not only in a short period of time to change position, but also to maneuver in such a manner as not to disturb the asdic operators of the neighboring boats by one's noise. And if it is considered that the commander of the maneuvering vessel also had to provide leadership for all the teams of the main control position, it is not difficult to imagine in what a difficult situation he was.

The young commander, in being involved with the maneuvering of the ship, paid less attention to the actions of the specialists of the ASW crew who were searching for the target. At the designated time, he could not report that the submarine had been detected. A breach had formed in the planned and already implemented encirclement of the "enemy." The flag officer had to intervene and give the necessary instructions to Kochergin. The "ring"
was closed with a certain delay. The submarine commander was resourceful. Taking cover behind interference, he outsmarted Kochergin, and again was lost for his asdic operators. Only the repeated intervention of the flag officer prevented the "enemy" submarine from finally escaping.

A comparison of the two episodes convincingly shows what the young commander had achieved in the past months.

One cannot help but note the tenacity with which Capt-Lt Kochergin works on broadening his tactical viewpoint, improving the skills of subordinates, and increasing the teamwork of the combat crews. The young communist commander works with true party passion, endeavoring to achieve the unconditional fulfillment of both his own personal pledges as well as the collective pledges of the crew in the socialist competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

At the same time, it is essential to note the important role of the conditions which were created by the command and the staff of the unit so that the abilities of Kochergin were developed and strengthened, as well as those of the other young commanders who during the period of their development encountered similar problems.

An ASW commander. The range of missions which he must carry out during a cruise and in combat requires from the officer a fusion of certain character traits, knowledge and skills, and above all a fusion of high tactical and naval skills, strong will, initiative, tenacity, intuition and calculation.

The staff of unit X, in planning combat training, endeavors to solve comprehensively the problems of training the personnel and readying the equipment and weapons for searching out and destroying enemy submarines within a short time. Here commander training is the leading element.

The same Capt-Lt Kochergin was helped in acquiring knowledge, skills, experience, and also self-confidence, chiefly by intensive tactical exercises, systematic training using simulators, and regular voyages at sea to work on course problems. That is, the entire complex of training for ship commanders. And precisely a complex that is all-encompassing and continuous, and not an infatuation with any one aspect, as is sometimes the case.

Incidentally, something similar happened here. In previous years, for example, the staff, in planning, accentuated attention on carrying out individual and group exercises directly at sea. Of course, at sea it is not necessary to simulate such elements as, for example, waves, limited visibility, or variable hydrology. The ship commanders and the ASW crews are under natural conditions of their combat work, but, on the other hand, it is scarcely necessary to take a ship to sea, when there is the possibility of working through one or another exercise in a training lab. Certainly the struggle to fulfill the party's demand on raising efficiency and quality of the work, under our conditions, presupposes a rapid rise in the skills of the sailors with the economic consumption of the resources of equipment, power and fuel.
Proceeding from this, in the unit they took to work improving the training facilities. Now the labs have all of the necessary equipment so that a ship commander along with the ASW crew can train under conditions close to the realities of sea combat.

However, it was not possible immediately to make full use of the opportunity to intensify combat training on the basis of training labs. Individual exercises without any particular need continued to be carried out at sea, and here inertia in planning was felt. Time was needed to make the planning more flexible and to instill in the ship commanders a taste for base training. The fears of some of them that training in the labs would turn out to be "too oversimplified" were unfounded. On the contrary, experience showed that the number of variations of combat which could be played through on a simulator exceeded the number of standard real situations which a commander could encounter at sea. Consequently, the acquiring of experience and the development of tactical thinking for the commanders occur with increased effectiveness.

At present, the planning of commander training has become more flexible. Here a major contribution has been made by the unit commander, an experienced ASW man. In the not distant past, he was a ship commander, and from his own experience knows what tactical elements are better worked out at the base, and which at sea, as well as to what attention must be paid in organizing training or a demonstration exercise. And he also knows the ship commanders, the level of their tactical thinking and their strong and weak points. All of this makes it possible to plan commander training on the basis of a differentiated approach to them, while the group leader can successfully instill in the officers the range of qualities and skills needed by the ASW men.

For example, an analysis of the failure which befell Kochergin at first made it possible to isolate a weak point in the training of the officer, that is, the inability to encompass the diverse duties of a commander during the dynamics of intense combat. Intensive training in the lab with a subsequent qualified analysis of its course made it possible for Kochergin in a comparatively short period of time to rise to a higher level of commander skill.

Certainly, base training has not obscured nor replaced sea training. What has been learned in the labs is reinforced on the ranges, but on a qualitatively higher level. The working through of training missions is marked by particular effectiveness when several ships operate simultaneously at sea. Upon returning to base, a general analysis is organized. The ship commanders have an opportunity to compare their actions with the actions of colleagues, and to draw conclusions. The analysis is made, as a rule, with the participation of squadron specialists who make comments and proposals of their own. A lively exchange of opinions and experience occurs over questions which are of common interest.
The benefit of such comprehensive analyses is apparent. In the first place, the commanders, as if from the sidelines, analyze their own actions and more clearly see the achievements and failures. Secondly, they learn professionalism in summing up the results. And this aspect is as important as a comparison of the results. It is essential to see how earnestly the officers respond to the conclusions of the senior chief in order to say with confidence that the grain of competitiveness, this most important element of the competition, has fallen on good soil. For from this grows the desire of the commanders to excell in a new exercise in training combat, to surpass the achieved level and be victorious in the duel.

To find, attack and destroy the underwater enemy—each year this mission requires ever sounder preparation from the ASW commanders, and a constant search for ways to improve the effectiveness and quality of commander training on the part of the staff and the flag officer. In particular, the form of preparing commanders for joint operations at sea has proven effective. Prior to the search, each commander offers a solution to the problem not only for his own vessel, as was the case previously, but also for the group as a whole. This provides an opportunity for the officers to fully manifest independence, initiative, and the ability to select the optimum variation for using the forces and means. There are also other innovative proposals which, I am certain, in carrying them out, will raise the tactical skills of the ship commanders, and make their training even more effective.
Rescue Operation of ASW Ship

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 12 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Engr-Capt 2d Rank L. Klimchenko: "Through the Storm"]

[Text] Engineer-Captain 2d Rank Leonid Leonidovich Klimchenko has been designated senior regular correspondent for Krasnaya Zvezda in the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. Today we publish his article on the captain of the large ASW ship "Marshal Voroshilov," the best ship of its type in the Soviet Navy.

The large ASW ship [BPK] "Marshal Voroshilov" ended the verification search. Captain 2d Rank Aleksandr Semenovich Kosov sat in the captain's chair in the pilot house. Just a bit more and then it will be time to rest. The crew had done well. The search turned out to be successful. The "enemy" had not only been discovered in a timely manner but had also been closely "tracked" to the boundary of the assigned region.

The captain gazed through the window at the rosy evening sky hanging low over white caps of the waves. The weather had deteriorated but that did not bother Kosov much now: for all intents and purposes, the ship was en route to base. The captain calmly took the radiogram from the communicator's hand and then immediately banished all thoughts of rest from his mind. Not far from their location, a Soviet vessel was in distress in the very center of a cyclone. Headquarters ordered that immediate assistance be provided.

Captain 2d Rank Kosov called the division commanders together, assigned their missions, and ordered them, as necessary, to prepare for a storm cruise. "Marshal Voroshilov" described a circle and laid a course for the cyclone.

The weather map was delivered. Kosov examined it and involuntarily grimaced. He alone could imagine what the sailors faced. Moreover, even he who had spent so much time in service had never been in such a fix.
The storm immediately attacked. The bow radar station began "to go blind". Kosov ordered it shut down and the malfunction identified. Now the ship had to turn from time to time so that the stern radar station could examine the dead space along the ship's course as well.

At first, the specialists thought that the malfunction was in the equipment but everything there turned out to be OK.

"Comrade Captain, the antenna needs to be inspected," Captain-Lieutenant Vyacheslav Bachurin, chief of the radio technical service [RTS], said decisively. "Permit me to climb the mast".

"Do you understand what you are saying?" The captain was prepared to lay siege to his subordinate. But, he did not lay siege and did not begin to tick off the details. He only thought that, of course, one station would not suffice, that Bachurin understands all that, understands the risk he is taking and what responsibility he is proposing for the captain to take on.

"OK, Vyacheslav Vasil'yevich," Kosov quietly said. "Go ahead".

He himself checked how the sailors tied two safety preservers on Bachurin, already dressed in a waterproof suit and safety vest. He himself watched how the officer, carefully seeking purchase, disappeared into the raging vortex of the night.

The ship rolled from side to side. The top lights, tracing long arcs in the impenetrable night, seemed to draw the swings of the masts above the ocean. It was difficult to imagine that now a person was clambering up one of them.

Several agonizing minutes passed. Unexpectedly, the RTS chief returned. Snow was packed against the glass on his mask and nothing was visible through it. The glass was cleaned off and Bachurin again climbed the mast. He noticed a piece of ice frozen on the antenna. A third ascent was needed in order to chip off the ice. The station began to "see" once again.

Captain 2d Rank Kosov did not leave the pilot house all night, not even for a minute. He tried to remain calm, often joked with his subordinates. He suddenly thought that, along with everything else, a commander has to also be a good actor: to act completely imperturbable when the soul stings with alarm for the personnel and for the ship.

They were to arrive in the area of the stricken vessel at dawn. Headquarters ordered that the stricken vessel be put in tow and brought to port. Taking it in tow during a storm borders on the fantastic. Not to mention the zero visibility. Nonetheless, "Marshal Voroshilov" went full speed to the stricken vessel and the captain used everything available to him to assess the situation. All he knew at this point was that the vessel, dead in the water and covered with ice, was being forced by the wind towards the shore at a speed of several knots, in spite of having dropped anchor.
Captain 2d Rank Kosov always tried to keep the crew informed of all ship activities. This was especially true during difficult times such as those presently facing the BPK. A sailor prepared for a test ahead of time exhibits not only increased stability but will also find capabilities to assist his commander in the best possible manner.

The captain took the microphone:

"Comrade sailors, I have always been sure of you. There are among the crew those with whom I have gone almost around the globe. I have gone through many tests with you all. However, today we are faced with unprecedented work. Today, it is not enough to carry out our orders. Every individual must do everything possible for success, to insure the safety of the ship..."

Aleksandr Semonovich Kosov always gave his all to naval service and, having set his goal to become a commander, he never swerved from that path. As it happened, during the 20 years since completion of school, he sailed aboard large surface ships of all classes. And, he began his mastery of each new ship with the crew. Because, he clearly understood that you cannot feel firm on deck if you are not convinced that your subordinates live with ideas and concerns identical to yours.

Communist Kosov is accustomed to feel the support and backing in the party organization. And, on this cruise, it is these same party personnel in the vanguard of those competing for a fitting reception for the 60th anniversary of Great October.

He always loved it when the life of the Komsomol members aboard ship buzzed with excitement, when the young people are energetic, searching, stable. He was an example of this himself. When designated to be the Senior assistant aboard the BPK "Admiral Zozulya", he moved to the ship. During the day, the officer diligently carried out his new numerous and difficult responsibilities, while in the evenings and even at night he studied. Kosov went ashore for the first time exactly one month after the last test on independent command of a ship had been passed.

Kosov's subordinates respect him for his high personal standards and unlimited love for the sea. He also primarily strives to indoctrinate them as real sailors. It is characteristic that a majority of the officers in "Marshal Voroshilov" rapidly rise in their service. And, all vacant positions on board the ship are filled by its own promotees. This tradition strengthens the crew. And, the captain is strong if the crew is strong.

An additional kicker was added to the heavy rolling seas and poor visibility. The head sea began to heavily beat against the ship, splashing cascades of spray as high as the antennas and it began to be covered completely with ice.

An emergency party went to work when the cover of the forward hatch for the mooring line assembly gave way. Then water began to enter the stern via a broken mushroom ventilator. And, the gale began to increase. Literally like a razor, the waves cut a handrail and shipboard covers were ripped to shreds.
One sailor in the emergency party was slammed against a bulkhead. An exterior door injured the leg of Senior Lieutenant Nikolay Petrov, assistant to the captain, who headed up the struggle to save the ship. Surgeon Viktor Lazarev performed an emergency operation on Petrov in the ship’s sick bay.

The captain could avoid the destructive effect of the waves by changing course, by waiting. But, could the stricken vessel survive nature’s further trials? Will they make it with the assistance?

A new weather map was delivered. The cyclone had changed direction and "Marshal Voroshilov" was in the thick of it. Kosov had difficulty opening the door of the room. Outside, chaos reigned. The hurricane wind at -20° swirled snow flakes around like a tornado. Sea water mixed with snow covered the ship with a skin. The radar had already picked up the vessel. However, it was dangerous to approach it in such seas and such visibility. Nonetheless, the captain was decisive. At first, he attempted to close from the bow but could not maneuver at low speed against the wind. Then Kosov brought the BPK in from the leeside. Working with the engines, he almost brought it right up to the dancing stern of the transport. The captain risked banging into the stricken vessel every second and was unable to take it in tow. The boatswain fired a line across six times before the heaving line was caught. A hawser rope followed, then a strong kapron line. The vessel was secured by the stern and a course towards base laid.

The second night passed and it was already light when Aleksandr Semonovich lay down on the couch in the pilot house, having turned the watch over to the Senior assistant. He had just closed his eyes when again he saw before him the rampaging seas. But not here, in the far off Barents instead. It was there that an unexpected wave almost knocked him over the side. It was a wonder that he had been able to hang on to the handrails. Wrapping his hands around the iron, Kosov withstood the pressure of the water pouring over the side...

"Comrade Captain," Aleksandr Semonovich awoke from a short and hard sleep. The Senior assistant bent over him. "The line is parting".

Several more hours passed while a new tow line was affixed to the vessel’s bow. Another several incredible hours for the captain and the sailors...

They finally reached the edge of the cyclone. A cold crimson light which broke through the clouds illuminated with a rosy tinge the large ASW ship and the vessel it towed on the empty sea. Covered with a white icy armor, both seemed like apparitions. They also entered port that way; covered with ice but alive, having defeated rampant nature in a battle to the death.

A photo of "Marshal Voroshilov" on the smooth surface of a far-off tropical bay had lain under glass on the table in Aleksandr Semonovich’s cabin. Now, a second photo has appeared nearby: an ice-covered ship returning to base after a cyclone.
These photos say a great deal. About how the heir of the traditions of the glorious Black Sea cruiser, the excellent BPK "Marshal Voroshilov", bore its Red Banner Naval flag through the storms of the northern seas and the tempests of the roaring 40° latitudes, that St. Elmo's fire sparkled in its masts in the Indian Ocean and typhoons of the Pacific sang in the mesh of its antennas. They announce that a powerful, experienced crew serves aboard this ship and an experienced, brave captain commands it on its cruises.

Submarine Commander's Educational Background

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank L. Yevtukhov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Dissertation"]

[Text] I succeeded. This was one of those rare instances when Shcherbakov was ashore. "Meet," said the representative from the political department, "Captain 2d Rank Shcherbakov, Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, captain of a nuclear submarine". We shook hands.

Short, smiling, with a short haircut... From outer appearances, he looked almost like a young lad. But, even at first meeting, you sense that fortitude and intensity behind which a commander's character stands. Perhaps this is due to Shcherbakov's restraint, degree of economy in words, even his gestures? Perhaps due to the "reliability" which stood behind his very judgement and which, as I came to understand, was the result of long cruises at great depths.

/Yes, behind the stern of his ship remains a twisted thousand-mile wake which crosses many latitudes and longitudes. But, if you will, the best measure of the path he has followed is the measure of knowledge gained in the captain's chief academy -- the world's oceans. Knowledge acquired on long cruises has been repeatedly confirmed and transmitted to the new generation of naval personnel in a scientific dissertation. Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Shcherbakov is a Candidate of Naval Sciences./ [entire paragraph in boldface].

Conversations with him, his co-workers, and commanders gradually formed a picture of the difficult path of a naval officer who has decided to reach the mainland of great science without leaving the pressure hull of a nuclear submarine.

Creativity has its secrets. Scientific creativity especially. Shcherbakov has the rare gift of merciless sober analysis and incredibly clear fantasy. But, the certain thing, the main thing in this regard, is an inner rejection of standard, it seems, self-evident solutions. For example, if the situation on the chess board is such that mate is possible in five moves, Vyacheslav will unfailingly try to find a way to do it in three.

As early as the days in the Student Military-Scientific Society, he took up the problem of torpedo firing. The results of the effort were good. Vyacheslav's generalizations, in the opinion of specialists, were recognized
as being innovative. The talented youth was noticed by A. Geyro, State Prize Laureate, Engineer-Captain 1st Rank (Retired). He did not hurry Shcherbakov and loved to repeat:

"Find yourself at sea!"

Shcherbakov initially was puzzled: "What use is a dissertation for those who man a periscope, stand watch in the compartments of a submarine, on the flying bridge of a cruiser?" At times, young people characteristically have a desire to immediately, this minute, see the results of their labor. But, this occurs rarely in science.

Today it is probably not possible to trace how that cup was filled, the final drop of which led to the final choice and theme of Vyacheslav's dissertation and to the very concept to work on it. He links this with so-called "indirect losses". This term is understandable in production. But, how do you interpret it from the point of view of military science? Are there such things as indirect losses in war?

Vyacheslav now speaks confidently:

"Yes, there are! Recall history, analyze any combat operation, even one that ended a complete success. How much is sometimes expended fruitlessly, how much ammunition, equipment, weapons, and, finally, human resources are wasted because a commander acts with no confidence? How much is lost when he finds himself in what is usually referred to as a non-standard situation? Doesn't that make the cherished instant of victory remote?"

/Analyzing the facts of the latter (approximately 70 percent of the German submarines perished, not in battle against the enemy, but in transit to assigned areas or en route to base), Shcherbakov found a path to creation of various mathematical models of dangerous situations which can confront a ship. The "theory" was proved in practice. Along with the commander, he experimented and compared the results with what is called for in extant instructions and regulations. The new nuclear ships and new weapons confirmed the concept that several changes in extant rules are necessary./ [in boldface]

Of course, creation of an artificial non-standard situation also has its share of risk. But, the commander eagerly accommodated Shcherbakov and, to accumulate know-how, also asked other officers (as available) to check what they had already achieved.

"They granted me my master's degree," Shcherbakov says. "But, dozens of officers have to sign this dissertation. How many times, despairing, did I decide to chuck the whole venture. As it happened, after a year's break, I entered a scientific research institute and..., it turns out that my efforts -- the trail had for a long time eluded some sort of collective of scientists..."
The call to defend his dissertation came at a most inopportune time. Shcherbakov knew that it would be virtually impossible for him to leave the boat, therefore he sent no report. The captain himself said to him: "Go. I am giving you 5 days."

Everything was a shambles. His name, due to being late, was left off the list of those defending dissertations. Headquarters put in a good word. And, the inner tension! Twenty minutes were allotted for the report. Accuracy in observing the rules is one of the signs of how the aspirant has mastered the theme. A negative opinion of the author's abstract (even one) also engendered some worry. When it was learned that an officer from a nuclear submarine would be defending a dissertation, the council members were alerted. This does not often happen.

During the break, not following the official procedure for announcing the results of a secret ballot, the scientific secretary whispered "Well done". A happy telegram flew to the fleet. The captain's answer was laconic: "I authorize a 5-day extension to your leave".

At first, a torpedo-man, then assistant to the captain, Senior assistant — then he became captain of a nuclear submarine. Now, Candidate of Naval Sciences V. Shcherbakov defended his dissertation before the sea.

...Routine exercises were underway. The main target, the "enemy" ship Shcherbakov was tasked to sink, was underway and screened by ASW ships. Only a captain possessing all the ingenuity of military science could penetrate this "sharp-eyed" armada. This was the "non-standard" situation specially created for the captain-scientist.

Three sleepless nights in the central control compartment. The most precise analysis, previously accumulated knowledge, and cold-blooded computation and audacity led to the desired result. When everything was behind them and the navigator had plotted the return course to base, the ship's doctor unexpectedly reported that a crew member needed an emergency operation. Then, a new report: "Things have significantly deteriorated. It is dangerous to continue the operation. I await your decision!"

The off button of the loudspeaker system clicked sluggishly. Silence fell. Only the deck clocks dispassionately marked off the time in the life and death of the person on the operating table. Shcherbakov went to the microphone:

"As captain, I can guarantee that after... hours, we will be at base. If that is sufficient for the medicine, then I will give the order..."

/As captain, he knew that they had to take the shortest possible route. He knew that the nuclear ship is in water with a temperature of minus 2-3° which, despite the laws of physics, does not freeze, knew... All the same, he guaranteed an accurate arrival time. He did so because, working on his dissertation, he studied not only the operating instruction but was able to squeeze everything possible out of the ship./ [in boldface]
The equipment operated to its limits. The submarine steamed to the base, to the first aid vehicles waiting at the dock. The operation was successfully performed in the base hospital.

What else did the dissertation provide? This cannot be covered in a few words. The knowledge Shcherbakov acquired served as the basis for a change in several instructions and regulations and has become an example for study aboard ships.

Once, after a routine cruise (even the brass band met the 'Shcherbakovites', in spite of the -20° temperature), the fleet commander, having warmly congratulated the submariners and thanked them for their service, asked the young captain:

"When did you graduate from the academy?"

Vyacheslav answered that he was a graduate of a higher school. "You need to continue your education", the admiral stated. Thus, Shcherbakov became a first-year student at the Naval Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko. His last confidential report contains these words: "Can be assigned command positions and is also recommended for work in a scientific research institute of the corresponding profile..." Recently, Vyacheslav Shcherbakov was promoted to Captain 1st Rank by order of the USSR Minister of Defense.

This was already written when I found out that one of the theaters in Leningrad had written a play about the captain of a nuclear submarine, a candidate of naval sciences. I called the director.

"Yes!" he answered. "We contemplated doing the play. But, Captain 1st Rank Ivan Andreyevich Strakhov served as the prototype of the main hero. He is also the captain of a nuclear submarine and a candidate of naval sciences".

Captain of a ship and a candidate of naval sciences. A memorable example of the present-day Soviet Armed Forces!

Guided Missile Boat: Crew Combat Training
Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 77 p 1

[Article by Capt-Lt V. Shcherbovich, Deputy Subunit Commander for Political Affairs: "Missile Attack"]

[Text] The patrol boats burst out of the bay and took a seaward course. Above them flew naval flags bearing Guards ribbons on the panels. Guards Captain Lieutenant P. Chechulin wrapped himself up further in his foul-weather gear and pushed his cap down over his brows. Ahead lay a cruise under complex Arctic conditions seldom encountered at these latitudes.

The waves are already sweeping over the pilot house. The foul-weather gear of those on the bridge is covered with icy crystals. They painfully sting the sailors' faces and make observation difficult.

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Careful maintenance preceded the departure to sea. A party meeting was held and the communists were instructed. All the same, Chechulin continued to contemplate whether anything important had been overlooked, whether everything had been thought through. The first to go to work were the radar personnel. Guards Warrant Officer [michman] N. Bublik, petty officer in charge, was at the radar control panel. Just prior to departure, he informed the secretary of the party organization of his desire to join the party. He was fully resolved to strengthen, through deeds, the reputation of the right-flank watch he is irreproachably standing.

A great deal will depend on the communicators, both while in transit and prior to the attack. The secretary of the Komsomol organization, with his shipboard competitor in the competition Guards Seaman Kh. Shaykhitdinov, prepared the radio station for operation under complex conditions in a spirit of comradely mutual assistance. Unbroken communications are being maintained.

With the communicators, the captain's concept is transferred to the electrical and engineering division. On watch at the diesels is Guards Seaman A. Buryakov, secretary of the Komsomol organization aboard the patrol boat. Prior to sailing, he and the other machine operators changed a diesel generator. Removing the old equipment, installation and adjustment of the new all required a great deal of time. Working diligently, they coped with the task ahead of schedule.

And, finally, the missileers. They will play the decisive role in the attack. At the missile control panel is Guards Warrant Officer I. Gaystruk, secretary of the party organization. He put a lot of effort into preparation for the firing, into activation of the socialist competition. Gaystruk is a master of military affairs. His subordinates are distinguished by their high level of training and the harmony in their operations. For example, they exceeded by 25 percent the norm for loading the missiles aboard the patrol boat.

...Observing how carefully Guards Captain-Lieutenant Chechulin manages the ship, listening to his confident commands, I involuntarily recalled how the officer had matured during the past 2 years. During the initial period after being named captain, there was a certain lack of confidence in his actions, his tactical outlook also seemed deficient. Senior comrades came to his aid. Officer Yu. Smirnov, himself having raised many excellent patrol boat personnel, especially worked with the young captain. And, Chechulin found "weaknesses" in his own training, in his work with people. Along with tactical maturity, he also acquired the maturity of an indoctrinator, no less necessary for a commander. A good troop collective with a strong party nucleus and a combat Komsomol organization has been established aboard the patrol boat.

The crew's socialist pledges for the 60th anniversary of Great October are distinguished by their specific nature. Indicative is the fact that the first pledges listed on the display showing the personal plans of the patrol boat crew members are those of Guards Captain-Lieutenant Chechulin. Even though ship captains are not required to have the class rating of a specific
profile, Pavel Maksimovich nonetheless pledged to achieve the classification of navigator first class. The subordinates could not do less than the example set by their captain. A movement to raise combat qualifications developed aboard the patrol boat. The high degree of tune of the sailors was evident as early as passing of the first year tasking, when more than half of the teams received excellent ratings.

Just prior to the missile firing, they announced in the subunit that the best patrol boat would fire. Competition unfolded among the crews for the right to fire. After diligent analysis of the indices, the crew led by officer Chechulin was designated as best. Yes, you can not keep such a crew down. But, it is not a simple task to realize the high combat capabilities of the people and equipment on a difficult cruise. Considering the variants of the training battle, Guards Captain-Lieutenant Chechulin can not overlook the complexity of the situation which places specific limits on the selection of the tactical decision. The ice itself can become serious interference during maneuver and unfavorably affect the speed of closing with the "enemy". Speed is required, but how do you develop it when there are many floating icebergs in the sea? The engine room reports that the outboard gear is being struck by ice. The engine mechanics still have to clear the kingston adapting ring. The people are hard at work but do not lose their vigor and they report readiness to provide the patrol boat with full speed.

"Comrade Captain, I see the target!" Guards Captain-Lieutenant Chechulin hears the voice of Guards Warrant Officer Bublik.

"Missile attack!"

It seems like the very air in the missile firing control post has been electrified by the stress of battle. The radar situation is complex. However, the high level of mastery of the operator allows him to confidently track the target and determine the basic characteristics of its movement. Complicating the work of the patrol boat crew, the poor radar visibility simultaneously hinders the "enemy" as well. The captain continually takes this into account. Based upon how the target is maneuvering, Chechulin concludes that it still has not detected the attacking patrol boat. But, how long will this hold true? Losing no time, the patrol boat turns to a combat course.

...The thunder of the missile blasts above the ocean, signalling a new victory for the guardsmen.
At the beginning of January I involuntarily became witness to a flight from the Yessentuki Military Sanatorium. It is true that it was done not at night, but in broad daylight. Lt Col (Ret) G. Voronov left for home on his own without having received authorization from the command element of the sanatorium for a premature departure. Just before that he had explained to me: "There are no real reasons, but you understand . . . I spent all I had." I personally did not understand this. What expenditures does a person need who receives both food and treatment free? And still, Voronov left ahead of schedule. The doctor who was treating him, N. Dzilikhov, grieved: only three days were left before the end of the course of treatment.

Alas, as the head of the sanatorium, Col Med Serv S. Dankov, said, one encounters unauthorized departures from the sanatorium, as well as tardiness for the beginning of treatment as indicated in the pass, almost on a daily basis. In the past year, every fourth pass-holder arrived at Yessentuki from one to five days late, while every sixth left ahead of time. As a result, over 5,000 treatment days were lost, i.e., almost 200 sanatorium passes were wasted! These were the very same ones for which another patient would have to wait months.

Just what are the reasons for such a truly flagrant squandering of funds spent by the state for public health? Above all, it is the thoughtless attitude toward use of passes by the patients themselves. Obviously, those such as Voronov are able to count only their own money well, while they have nothing to do with state expenditures for their own treatment. And in the 145th Joint Polyclinic of Baku, which issued Voronov his pass, no one obviously spoke with the person about how important it was, both for himself and for the state to use the capabilities of the resort as fully as possible.
An analysis performed in the Yessentuki Military Sanatorium suggests other possibilities of combating losses of treatment time. It is important, for example, to reduce the number of so-called "burning" passes handed out. This happens where the leave schedules approved by commanders are not adhered to.

Consideration should possibly be given to see that the beginning and end of the pass do not coincide with holidays, when tardiness and premature departures are most frequent. And of course, it is necessary to increase the responsibility of the sanatorium selection commissions for observance of rules of selection of those needing treatment in specialized sanatoriums. For example, shouldn't Capt A. Kalinin have been sent, not to a gastrointestinal type resort, which he did not need, but to a rest home or a tourist base? For he arrived at the sanatorium as if on an excursion: he was four hours late, scorned the treatment regime, and left the sanatorium ahead of the time set.

I am deeply convinced that it is up to those who are involved with organizing sanatorium treatment to make maximum use of every work day of our "health industry."
[Article by Capt V. Goncharov: "Most Important Is Effectiveness and Quality: But Deficiencies Are as Before"]

Last fall the company commanded by Sr Lt P. Neverko received a three for weapons training and became an "outsider" instead of being among the leaders of socialist competition in the battalion. Even now one still recalls the indifference with which people in the regiment then asserted that the company's breakdown was an accident. As confirmation they would refer to the control problems, after which high marks appeared opposite the names of privates and sergeants. But it was in vain that the checkers noted that often what was assessed was only the ability to hit targets accurately under one and the same variation of the target display, on terrain which had been studied down to the last bush. Not considered was an entire range of qualities needed by the soldier in combat: the ability to observe the battlefield, the ability to anticipate the enemy in opening fire and neutralizing targets, the ability to fire at a high rate, and so on.

In other words, those marks were assigned without consideration of the requirements of the present day. And the checker only had to change the range to targets or the order of display of targets and the results of many soldiers, especially those of the rocket launcher men, dropped sharply.

Just what had been done in the company during the time since the fall to eliminate the deficiencies revealed then in the organization of combat training?
I had occasion to attend several problems in the company commanded by Sr Lt Neverko. Strange as it may seem, the problems were conducted as before, according to one pattern. The same amount of time was set aside for working topics of varying complexity. Not considered was the degree of preparedness of the personnel. The trainees were simply broken down into approximately equal groups and sent to the training points, where platoon commanders gave one and the same commands time after time.

Facts from the problems give serious cause for reflection about insufficient effectiveness and quality of combat training in the company. Here is one of them. Pvt G. Shlyakhtin, considered one of the best machinegunners in the company, received a three for performing one of the simplest norms for loading the magazine. Previously there had been no equal of him in the company for this. But neither the platoon commander nor Sr Lt Neverko even tried to learn the reasons for this "hitch" of the best specialist. But these causes actually lie on the surface, reminding one of the sources of the ill-starred three received by the company at the control check. The fact is that Shlyakhtin had become subunit champion by performing norms under oversimplified conditions, at a specially outfitted stand. In this problem, however, he had to work in a more advanced situation, where the checker from the higher staff gave varied narrative situation changes and means of simulation were used.

Again, as in the past year, the weapons training of the motorized riflemen was assessed in a one-sided manner. And again, such important elements of training of the soldiers as the ability to throw grenades accurately, to keep within the norms, to observe the battlefield, and to determine ranges to targets, and a firm knowledge of the equipment portion of weapons and the principles and rules of firing often remain outside the officers' field of vision.

The impression sometimes formed that Sr Lt Neverko and the platoon commanders knew little about an imaginative search for the best methodologists of the regiment, the large unit or the district, or about effective techniques of training and of organizing competition. But this is not so. They know, of course, about the need to increase training points for purposes of intensification of training, and, for example, that it is necessary to set up an intensive moral-psychological atmosphere in problems which is similar to that which might arise in real combat. They also know that they have to vary the placement of targets. And they know about the advisability of a stage-by-stage summarization of competition results.
Then why in this case did they act in the old way? Obviously because it was simpler and more comfortable in that way. And so the very same three training points roamed from problem to problem, the very same commands are repeated, and the very same operations are performed. That is how it was in the company last year, and that, alas, is how things are now. Stereotypes and sketchiness have in fact become an obstacle on the path to increasing effectiveness and quality of the training process.

The conclusion suggests itself that the methodological training of some commanders at the company level in this unit lags behind the present-day requirements. The aforementioned deficiencies also are encountered in other subunits. Therefore the problem of improving officers' methods training goes beyond the framework of the company.

Just what is being done in the unit in this direction? Unfortunately, little for now. Staff officers are well acquainted with the state of affairs in the subunits. They have also visited problems being worked by subordinates of Sr Lt Neverko more than once. We say "visited," because until this time they have not intervened in the organization of training of the subunit's motorized riflemen, considering this situation, if not normal, then fully acceptable, while last year's breakdown was an accident.

It would appear that company-level officers could work on an improvement of their methods skills within the system of command training. But classes are not always held regularly, and training on the terrain at times is conducted in an oversimplified atmosphere. In other words, sketchiness and oversimplification are laid down, as it were, in classes within the system of command training.

Time does not wait. The spring check is around the corner. Must it be said how important it is to set all reserves in motion, and to reject decisively stereotypes and sketchiness in combat training? The effectiveness and quality of training of the motorized riflemen and performance of socialist pledges depends on this.
MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT STAFF WORK CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Shpin', Sr Officer, Department of Combat Training, Red Banner Turkestan MD: "Most Important is Effectiveness and Quality: Effectiveness of Control"]

[Text] Subunits of the motorized rifle battalion were to work a number of topics in weapons training and perform the next exercise of firing under mountain conditions. Several staff officers of the unit, the regimental deputy commander, and also a representative of the large unit command element arrived at the training center. They arrived for control and assistance.

The motorized riflemen did not sparkle with accurate fire. And the senior comrades did little to help subunit officers. And how could they influence the results of firing if some of the privates and sergeants had received insufficient training in observing the battlefield, in firing against moving targets, or in adjusting fire? One cannot eliminate at one stroke the shortcomings in individual training of soldiers. Here one needs regular, day-to-day work.

It cannot be said that the regimental command element and staff had not worked with the subunits earlier. They also had monitored the course of combat training in the battalion in question, but it was learned in an analysis of the reasons for the unsuccessful firing that some problems in weapons training in the companies either had not taken place or had been conducted at a low methodological level. As a matter of fact, even one firing at the training center had been disrupted. Meanwhile, the "ticks" needed for the report appeared in the combat training log. Did the appropriate commanders know about this? No, in spite of the fact that staff representatives Maj S. Doroshev and Maj A. Kamalov were working in the battalion. It was all because their visits bore a superficial character. The officers did not delve deeply into the status of the training process. After gathering the facts needed for report notes to the senior commanders, they considered their mission fulfilled.

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And here is another example attesting to what damage is done by a formalistic approach to organization of control over the course of combat and political training. The staff had worked out a uniform methodology for holding a weapons lesson in the company on infantry combat vehicles with consideration of local conditions. There is no argument that this is a necessary and useful thing. A check of the fulfillment of these methodological instructions was not arranged, however, and field firing showed that the motorized riflemen had been poorly prepared.

This fact surprised the staff officers. They saw the reason for shortcomings in weapons training of personnel in the fact that the acting battalion commander, Capt N. Kovalev, had performed the staff's instructions imprecisely, that the methodology of training motorized riflemen had been violated, and that few practical training sessions with the equipment had been organized.

Well, all this is correct. But where were the staff officers before? Was it worthwhile to rely so much on written instructions concerning the methodology of holding a weapons lesson under conditions of mountainous terrain? It would have been enormously more reliable had the authors of this methods elaboration themselves visited the subunits to see how their ideas were being implemented and to help people eliminate shortcomings. But the trouble is that some commanders and staffs recall one of their basic functions -- control and check of executions -- only when subordinate subunits go out to fire or on tactical exercises, i.e., at times when people are taking a test.

There is no need to show that effectiveness of control is achieved only if it is carried out systematically and begins immediately after a particular decision is made or an order issued. Control is not simply the presence of a senior commander in a particular subunit, or a collection of data for a report, but a profound penetration into the life and combat training of personnel, into the progress of socialist competition, and the accomplishment of all necessary steps aimed at eliminating shortcomings which have been identified. How can one not recall here Lenin's proposition that to check people and to check actual execution of a matter -- here, here again, and only here is now the crux of all work.

It was emphasized at the 25th CPSU Congress that the contemporary leader must organically combine within himself a party spirit with deep competence and discipline with initiative and with a creative approach to things. These requirements also must define fully the work's style of commanders and staff officers in units and subunits. And practice shows that where this is constantly recalled and these demands are used as guides in day-to-day work, success as a rule is higher in competition for a worthy greeting to the 60th anniversary of October and in resolution of all tasks of combat and political training.
Recently I had occasion to check the tactical and weapons training of the 1st Battalion in the Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy motorized rifle regiment. The subunit received a high mark, in spite of the fact that many operational training missions were performed under difficult weather conditions. I learned from talking with company commanders that regimental staff officers headed by Maj G. Tsoy had worked with them twice, and that the regimental commander and large unit commander had familiarized themselves in detail with the training process. Disruption of classes in driving infantry combat vehicles had been noted in the battalion. The regimental chief of staff helped the battalion commander and chief of staff plan classes more precisely. No further disruptions of classes were noted.

The commander himself also carries out control and check of execution in the regiment. He teaches the battalion commanders, and those arm the company commanders with foremost methodology.

"In studying the state of affairs in the subunits," said Regimental Commander Lt Col A. Stel'makh, "I come to know the people and their political and job qualities better."

The regiment has foremost companies, and it has backward companies. Naturally, more attention is given to the latter. The staff officers visit these subunits more frequently, but the foremost companies also do not remain unmonitored. This is because identification and dissemination of foremost experience is no less important than uncovering mistakes and eliminating them. Another positive point is that a thorough analysis of the progress of performance of socialist pledges here is an inalienable component of the control check on any scale.

For example, Maj A. Zubkov, in checking the organization of socialist competition in companies competing among themselves, looked into the methods by which combat norms were being worked and which were being considerably surpassed here. After talking with subunit commanders Sr Lt N. Artyukhin and Sr. Lt G. Khramov, and then following the actions of the motorized riflemen on the weapons of the infantry combat vehicles with a stopwatch in his hands, the officer generalized their experience. The experience was taken in by the commanders of other subunits. Now all companies in the regiment are surpassing these norms by 10-15 percent.

Of course, although personal control of a commander and chief of staff is most productive, it cannot be all-encompassing. Therefore the chiefs of services take an active part in checks. Here the commander and his deputies carefully brief the persons participating in the control and suggest to them how best to perform the assigned mission.
Skillful organization of control in combination with constant exactingness and help to laggards is an invariable condition for further increasing the quality of combat and political training, for increasing the effectiveness of all our work, and for complete fulfillment of socialist pledges in competition for a worthy greeting to the 60th anniversary of the Great October.

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One of the primary tasks facing our military thinking, commanders, staffs and troops is constant improvement in tactics using all modern means of warfare. The military press, especially journals, have an important role in accomplishing this mission. They are called upon in their publications to reveal the most important issues in the theory of tactics, to carry on a broad discussion of its problems, to generalize experience of troop tactical training, and to familiarize readers with the development of tactics in foreign armies.

Our military journals take up these matters to a varying degree. VOYENNY VESTNIK carried on a fruitful discussion of an article by Col Gen D. Grinkevich, "Troop Control at the Level of Modern Requirements." The increased demands on troop control under modern conditions were substantiated in the article and in the responses to it, and ways to accomplish the problem of mastering scientific methods of control on the basis of new technical means were revealed. Without a doubt, the discussion carried on by the journal facilitated a deeper study of the complex and many-sided problem of troop control.

The VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY devotes much space to the question of tactics, in addition to the accomplishment of other missions. The journal regularly publishes theoretical articles on the most current questions of tactics. These include, in particular, articles by Marshal Avn G. Zimin, "The Experience of the Great Patriotic War and Modern Times"; by Lt Gen Avn F. Buturlin and Col Yu. Golodnyy, "Development of Tactics of National Air Defense Forces and Improvement in Tactical Expertise of Commanders"; by Maj Gen Arty L. Gromov, "Surprise in Combat," and by others. The pages of the journal have contained a number of interesting articles about forms and methods of increasing tactical training of commanders at all levels, and about ways to increase the tactical expertise of pilots in conducting aerial combat.
Matters of tactics find definitive resolution in other military journals. The journal AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA devotes much attention to the tactics of air subunits and crews, and reveals the experience of aerial combat in supersonic jet aircraft. In the article "Combat After Takeoff," honored military pilot of the USSR Lt Gen Avn I. Sviridov emphasizes that all theoretical and flight training must ensure improvement in the flying and tactical expertise of pilots.

A number of other articles reveal problems of simulation of operational training flights. The question is posed in this way: without simulation of a combat take-off under conditions of employment of supersonic aircraft and missiles, and employment of modern air defense, it is difficult to count on victory in dynamic aerial combat.

Problems of tactics are purposefully illuminated in MORSKOY SBORNIK. The journal devotes one of its leading directions to the main tactical figure in the fleet -- the ship's commanding officer, his development, and his training as an organizer for combat.

Military journals devote a prominent place to matters of further improvement of tactics both from the experience of the Great Patriotic War and from the experience of combat training under present-day conditions. Readers become familiar with the tactics of foreign armies.

What has been said does not mean, however, that everything is well with the coverage of matters of tactics in the journals.

Above all, it should be noted that some journals, in particular VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY, did not publish a single lead article on matters of tactics for a year. But the sharp posing of this problem right in the lead article would be more resounding, it would stir up military thinking more effectively, and would attract the attention of military leaders, commanders and political workers. By the way, a word about lead articles in journals. At times they are written in a stereotyped fashion, in dry, unexpressive language.

The VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL prints much material which propagandizes tactical experience accumulated by troops during the Great Patriotic War. One would like to see, however, fewer random publications among them which do not facilitate development of a commander's tactical thinking, from the viewpoint of the demands of the modern day.

The theory of air defense tactics, as any other theory, is constantly being developed and improved. The VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY should devote special attention to this very problem, seeking an imaginative discussion of the problem by a wide range of specialists. Unfortunately, the journal has not yet carried on imaginative discussions. For a year it has not published a single response to articles devoted to the questions of tactics.
VOYENNY VESTNIK has its deficiencies. The journal still gives insufficient attention to publishing that material which would teach officers to take a creative approach to accomplishment of combat missions, and to take skillful advantage of capabilities of troops to defeat a strong, technically outfitted, active enemy.

Problems of the interworking of tactics and equipment still are poorly elaborated in the pages of the journal. But in our times, when a revolution has taken place in military affairs, it is especially important to focus the attention of officer cadres to the fact that they must look through the prism of maximum use of capabilities of modern combat equipment and weapons in the accomplishment of any tactical missions. The journal has no thorough display of a commander as an expert at organization for combat, with a well-developed sense of the creative approach to accomplishing tactical missions which brook no stereotypes in this matter. The struggle to raise the quality and effectiveness of tactical exercises has not yet become a day-to-day concern of the journal.

VOYENNY VESTNIK has not yet succeeded in properly attracting the readers' attention to every form of combined-arms combat. Primary attention in it is given to offensive combat. This is as it should be, but the meeting engagement has not received proper coverage. Only two articles were given on matters of defense, which also is insufficient.

The journal AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA still gives little attention to coverage of matters of tactics of interworking between aviation and ground forces. Materials devoted to this problem often view matters of interworking in an oversimplified manner, which at times are reduced to practicing guidance. Articles on tactics are not always illustrated with diagrams of the example being examined, which sometimes does not provide an opportunity to delve more deeply into the essence of the material.

There are also things to be wished for in MORSKOY SBORNIK. One would like to see matters involving the organization and tactics of naval combat find wider reflection in its pages, and for the complexity and the features of elements of naval combat to be shown more deeply.

The military journals must give more attention to matters of the theory of tactics, remembering in so doing that their comprehensive and thorough coverage facilitates a creative development of tactical thinking and a growth in the outlook and expertise of our officer cadres.
MOTORIZED INFANTRY NIGHT COMBAT TRAINING CRITIQUED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 77 p 1

[Article by Col R. Dukov: "Persistently Master the Art of Night Combat: Two Attacks"]

[Text] The winter training period is nearing a close. The soldiers are persistently increasing their combat expertise on the exercise fields, striving to master to perfection all forms of combat actions and tactical movements. Their ability to fight at night is an important component of the tactical training of subunits.

There are no missions in the combat activity of troops which cannot be successfully accomplished at night. Under cover of darkness it is considerably easier to conceal one's intentions, achieve surprise and reduce losses from enemy fire. At the same time, night combat also is one of the most complex forms. The difficulties of orienting oneself on the terrain and the difficulty of observation require a particularly careful preparation. The slightest miscalculations in accomplishment, in organization of coordination, and disruptions and imprecision in work involve serious consequences.

In order to operate successfully at night, one needs specialized training, a high state of training of personnel, faultless cohesiveness of subunits, and resoluteness, initiative and imagination on the part of commanders. But do commanders always thoroughly consider the features in the organization of night combat, and of its preparation and conduct? Unfortunately, not always.

The motorized rifle company commanded by Sr Lt V. Dorokhov was conducting a long, stubborn battle in the forest. It had already begun to get dark when it succeeded in pressing the "enemy" and emerging from the forest. The commander caught sight of a dominant hill ahead of him and somewhat to one side of the direction of advance. It had attracted his attention earlier as well, when he was studying the map. Now, however, it was revealed at first hand in the gathering twilight. The company commander realized the advantages it promised if it were to be taken, and how
difficult it would be to take it if the "enemy" managed to dig in on it and set up a firm defense during the night. In short, he was faced with a dilemma: to attack in spite of the oncoming night, or wait until morning. He decided to attack.

In the situation at hand it would be difficult to rebuke him for this decision. But once it was made, then preparation for night combat should be appropriate -- thorough and comprehensive. Here, however, the commander made a clear miscalculation. The desire to speed up events overshadowed everything else.

He assigned the platoons the mission to attack the hill when visibility had been reduced almost to nothing. As a result, due to insufficient preparation, the two platoons operating on the flanks were not able to accomplish their maneuver, and, having lost orientation, did not arrive at the hill on time. The platoon attacking the hill in the center was not able to neutralize and destroy the "enemy" weapons, and suffered heavy losses. In short, the battle was lost.

"If we had had one hour of daylight then, we would have taken the hill without fail. But it was necessary to make ready and attack in pitch-darkness. We weren't lucky," grieved the company commander after the battle.

It would appear that it is not worth talking about luck here, for not everything was done that could have been done in the given situation: targets were not reconnoitered, the platoons were not oriented as to the direction of attack, and measures of coordination were not taken. The senior lieutenant was counting on the notorious "maybe," but it did not help and could not help.

Another company, under the command of Capt S. Prokhorenko, had to conduct night combat under almost similar conditions. But how dissimilar were the actions of these subunits! On the one hand, we have hopes set on a chance "good fortune," and on the other hand -- thorough work of the commander to prepare for success. Events in this exercise unfolded as follows.

The meeting engagement brought neither side success. Not wishing to take a risk in the twilight which had set in, the opposing sides shifted to a defense and tried through active reconnaissance to seek out ways to accomplish the missions facing them. Capt Prokhorenko studied the map carefully, trying to evaluate the terrain and find a way out of the situation at hand. He realized full well that the success of the entire battalion depended on successful actions of the company. But how could the "enemy" be driven from the line he occupied? If this could not be done in daylight, then couldn't he try to use the advantages of a night attack to accomplish the mission?
At first the doubt arose in Prokhorenko, as it had in Sr Lt Dorokhov: there was no daylight to prepare for it, and to begin preparations blindly was not only risky, but dangerous as well. The absence of daylight had to be compensated for in some way. And Prokhorenko found something.

In his tent, the commander set up a simple terrain model of sand, using intelligence information. He denoted the "enemy" system of defense on it, and highlighted the orientation points easily visible at night. After carefully assigning a mission to each platoon, the officer arranged coordination on this same terrain model. The platoon and squad commanders studied in detail the directions of movement and the attack objectives.

Having completed preparations, the platoons moved out to the attack position, observing camouflage and the strictest silence. The brief but powerful attack by fire of the mortar battery served as the attack signal. The first minutes of combat showed that the company's attack had been a surprise to the "enemy" and that he had not prepared to conduct aimed fire at night.

The success of combat was predetermined. It became possible because Capt Prokhorenko had properly considered and effectively used the advantages of night combat, and was able to reduce to a minimum its negative factors. Also having an effect here was the good preparation of personnel for night actions. The "enemy," however, as it turned out, was not ready for combat and, in spite of the dominant position of the terrain he occupied, he paid for his negligence.

As we can see from the examples cited, night combat requires detailed preparation of a commander. As a rule, the plan of combat actions must be extremely simple, clear and understandable to each performer. One cannot be carried away here by a complex maneuver or use schemes of combat formations suitable only for actions in the daytime. One has to observe the strictest discipline of fire and movement. In short, one has to learn to conduct night combat systematically and persistently. Only on this condition will personnel operate at night just as confidently as they do in the daytime.
At the post-flight critique, the commander asked Lieutenant B. Mayorov why he had been unable to carry out the attack at the assigned line.

"The target maneuvered sharply," the lieutenant answered, attempting to somehow excuse his failure.

"But after all, you had to attack a maneuvering target," the commander pointed out. "And how did you act during the flight? Take a look here at what the flight recorder shows..."

The film read-out depicted the entire intercept. What did it show? The pilot sluggishly maneuvered to close with the target, took too long. It is clear that, in such a case, you might as well forget about an attack at the estimated line and about a surprise strike. And, the reason for the error, as was elucidated during the critique, was that Lieutenant Mayorov did not anticipate active counter-measures from his opponent. He hoped that the crew of the "bandit" would only use maneuver for visibility and there would be no difficulty in attacking him. But, it turned out otherwise.

Would it still have been possible to make the intercept? Undoubtedly. Although the target, having changed course and altitude, increased its air-speed, it could have been overtaken by going into afterburner. But, the pilot showed no combat activeness since he was accustomed to operating in the simplified mode.

During the critique, the squadron commander pointed up the methodological oversights in the young pilot's training. It turned out that the lieutenant had previously made tactical errors when doing combat employment drills. But, Senior Lieutenant V. Popov, the flight commander, was unable to discern in a timely manner the lapses in his subordinate's professional training.
There is a reason why they refer to flight critiques as a school of combat mastery. And, leading officer-directors comprehensively prepare for these exercises. This permits them to analyze in depth the quality of mission accomplishment, errors in piloting technique and combat employment, and, consequently, also to use examples as they train their subordinates in complex types of flights. Here, they also widely use data from objective monitoring equipment [flight recorders]. Through its use, the commander can more accurately judge the degree of an aviator's skill and take effective measures to eliminate deficiencies. Therefore, it is important that flight recorder data be processed operationally in the shortest possible time.

That is how it is done in the unit [chast'] where Senior Lieutenant A. Borisov is chief of the objective control group. Read-out of the flight recorder films [sarpogrammy] is done continuously, during the flying shift. And therefore, the checker, for example the flight commander, can immediately, at the airfield, do between-flight analysis of the actions of the students; having discovered the slightest piloting inaccuracy, he can then forestall a possible error when it comes time to do the next drill in the sequence. Flight recorder data is also widely used to raise the level of competition in training and when comparing the results of a socialist competition.

Senior Lieutenant A. Lukin and Lieutenant V. Bashkirov once took off to intercept a target. In the air, they both showed initiative and coped well with the assigned task. They both appeared to rank equally. Who is given the nod? The flight recorders [SARPP] provided the accurate answer. They confirmed that one of the aviators worked the target, as they say, without a hitch. But, his opponent in the competition, although he also destroyed the "enemy", attacked from a lesser range.

Flying practice convincingly shows that comprehensive, careful analysis of any piloting error or mistake in working out the elements of combat employment is an indispensable condition, both in improving airborne skills and insuring flight safety. And, it is important that the critique of students' activities be based on progressive methodology, with wide use of flight recorders.
TANK REGIMENT COMBAT TRAINING SHORTCOMINGS NOTED

Moscow KRASNYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Pimenov, KRASNYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Success on Paper"]

The tank regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Radzhibayev, one of the best in the Northern Group of Forces, entered into socialist competition for a fitting reception for the 60th anniversary of Great October. Following the example of the Transcarpathian Military District motorized rifle troops, the tankers made high socialist pledges, which were published on the eve of the new training year in the group's newspaper ZNAMYA POBEDY. How are the pledges being fulfilled, does the level of organization of the socialist competition meet the intended goals?

The firing range. According to the schedule, firing should have already begun but no shots were heard. Several soldiers were gathered around the ammunition supply point, others were having a smoke off to the side under the pines. I was interested in why the troops were not busy.

"We are waiting for the company commander," explained Junior Sergeant A. Morozyuk.

The wait was quite long. As was learned later, tactical exercises were underway on the range and firing was forbidden. Lieutenant I. Moneta, the company commander, had gone to negotiate with the chief of the firing range about changing the training to another time. As a result, 1.5 hours of training time were lost. The company finally began the training.

... A group of soldiers under Junior Sergeant Morozyuk's guidance is fulfilling the weapon assembly and disassembly norms. The training was
structured so that one soldier disassembles the weapon while five others observe. This was done taking turns.

Of course, watching the actions of a comrade is also a form of training although, speaking candidly, not the most effective kind. It would not have been difficult to organize things so that all the troops fulfilled the norms simultaneously.

Junior Sergeant Kh. Kuzyayev was no better prepared. Under his supervision, the soldiers executed drills in throwing grenades for distance and accuracy. The supervisor did not know what distances were envisaged in the norms, what evaluations corresponded to them. He eyeballed the range by stepping it off and began the drill. Besides this, the wrong grenades, lighter ones, were mistakenly used...

The sub-unit [podrazdeleniye] spent just a bit more than an hour on firing training, as opposed to the 3 hours set aside in the schedule. The company commander, who was not allowed to fire, is not at fault. But, at the firing line, the soldiers were able to work out the same drills that were done during the firing. However, this was not done.

The evening of the same day, I dropped in at the tank directrix where the company commanded by Captain B. Slikhov executed the drill of firing from the main gun. Without going into details of how the exercise went, I will discuss the results. The tankers had unsatisfactory results. To a significant degree, this is explained by the fact that the equipment was poorly prepared for the exercises. Unfortunately, no sense of real concern about high quality was evinced here. Nor were there, as they say, any traces of competition on missions and norms either.

The tankers wrote in their socialist pledges that they will persistently "struggle to raise the effectiveness and quality of the training process, for precise organization of every drill, exercise, training session". Good intentions but, as is evident, in daily life they are not embodied in practical deeds.

Political worker Captain V. Makeyev, acting deputy commander for political affairs, and I visited several Lenin Rooms. Every room contains well set up displays devoted to socialist competition. They reflected the individual and collective pledges of the tankers and the results of their fulfillment per training month.

The materials displayed are one form of insuring the visibility of the competition, in their own way a summation of the progress of fulfillment of the socialist pledges made. One can only be pleased when looking at them: the columns are filled only with excellent and good grades.

The question involuntarily arises: do they objectively reflect results? The question arises not only because I observed other results in two sub-units. There are other reasons to doubt their objectivity.
Qualification exercises were conducted in January in several sub-units of the unit [chast'] by a commission from higher headquarters. At that time, several young troops had only marginal results. But, predominantly fives and fours are found on the displays reflecting the January results. Thus, do they correspond to the reality of the situation?

"Unfortunately, no," agrees Captain V. Makeyev.

Then why do they reconcile themselves to such an abnormal situation?

In one of the Lenin Rooms, we noticed a beautifully formulated overlay devoted to the results of combat and political training for the current month. It reports that Lieutenant S. Talyshev, Warrant Officer [praporshchik] A. Aitov, and Sergeant A. Butuzov received a rating of excellent in last month's training... Overall, almost one out of every two tankers was found in the list of names. We see a list of the excellent crews who won this rating the past month posted on another board.

You read these agitation visual aids and you think: are the sub-unit officers familiar with the documents governing socialist competition? After all, otlichniki are not determined monthly.

Fulfillment of socialist obligations greatly depends upon the unit staff and its position in questions of competition. Unfortunately, here it is not always correct. Take planning in the training process, for example. Only work left undone by the staff can explain the fact that there was no firing as described above. Planning lapses undoubtedly impacted upon the quality of that training. But, the consequences do not end there. Shifting the firing to the next day brings with it disruption of another exercise. And, all of this has a direct relationship to socialist competition, to fulfillment of pledges made.

The mission of the staff includes not only careful planning but monitoring the preparation and progress of the exercises and fulfillment of socialist pledges as well. It is an accepted truth but people must be reminded of this because some staff officers adopt the role of onlooker. For instance, the battalion chief of staff and regimental staff officer Major A. Gavrilenko were present at that very same night firing of the tank company commanded by Captain B. Salikhov. The exercise, as already mentioned, did not achieve the established goal due to poor equipment maintenance. But, neither one of the staff representatives monitored the maintenance although there was a requirement to do so. Moreover, this was not an ordinary exercise but involved firing the main gun.

We talked with Captain I. Belousov, secretary of the regimental party committee. He described the work of the party committee directed towards insuring the personal example of communists in socialist competition and increasing their role in mobilizing personnel for successful fulfillment of assigned tasks.
Actually, a lot has been done. However, a lackadaisical attitude is creeping into the work of the party committee recently. The facts back this up. In January, the question of the attitudes of the communist officers of one battalion to commanders' training was to be discussed at a party committee meeting. But, the good intentions were to remain on paper. Later, the party committee planned to hear a report concerning progress in fulfilling socialist pledges in the sub-unit from Captain A. Gorb, the secretary of the party organization from another battalion. But, that did not occur. Nor did they discuss the question of personnel fulfilling the technical maintenance pledges, also intended in the plans. Evidently, the facts that certain communists have slackened their attention to the socialist competition of the troops, to the struggle for high quality exercises, explain such a party committee position.

Of course, there are many positive aspects to the regiment. Many exercises are conducted at a high methodological level, in a spirit of competition. The tankers possess all the capabilities required to successfully fulfill the socialist pledges made in honor of the 60th anniversary of Great October. However, the deficiencies encountered cannot but elicit alarm, especially when you are talking about a regiment that has made a patriotic appeal to all personnel in the group of forces. Achievement of high goals requires an improvement in the leadership of socialist competition and eradication of the elements of formalism in its organization.
IN EffectIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST VIOLATORS OF REGULATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Kovtun: "In Order That the Meeting Be Effective"]

[Text] An hour and a half remained until the meeting of personnel at which the conduct of Private V. Gusev, who had committed a disciplinary violation, had to be discussed. Senior Lieutenant S. Katayev, deputy subunit [podrazdeleniye] commander, gathered the sergeants in the office. He wanted to be sure that everyone correctly understood what Gusev had done prior to punishment being meted out. It happens that, if you push things out of view, difficulties of the same sort arise during the meeting. You ask the soldiers and sergeants, for example: "Who wishes to speak?", but silence is your answer. Katayev now tried to insure that there would be more speakers at these meetings. And, on this occasion, he passed out his orders to the sergeants -- "select" speakers.

The meeting began exactly on time and a presidium was selected. Senior Lieutenant Katayev presided.

"Comrades," he said to the soldiers and sergeants. "You now could be watching television. Or writing letters to relatives. Or reading books and magazines. But, we are all forced to sit here, to lose valuable time, because Private Gusev does not value the honor of our collective. You know the violation he committed..."

Heavy words fell like rocks. Gusev, sitting by himself, hung his head lower and lower.

Katayev then stated that the commander was being called to headquarters, so he would therefore speak and then depart. The subunit commander was brief. He gave his appraisal of the Gusev violation and left the meeting.

Corporal V. Stoyanov, secretary of the Komsomol organization, then took the floor. Soldiers began to speak. They all judged Gusev. There were no difficulties. Even if something came up, Katayev would look into his notebook and then make required corrections, statements, give directions.
The meeting ended. Stools were put back in place, the green woolen cloth was removed from the presidium table and put in the cupboard, and the water pitchers were removed. The troops gathered in a circle. Private K. Zaytsev, having just finished his speech chastising Gusev, went up to him and slapped him on the shoulder:

"Don't be displeased with me, Vadim. I was ordered to make that speech at the meeting and criticized you so just for show."

If only Senior Lieutenant Katayev had heard those words! He would have thought: how do you prepare a meeting which has to leave a deep impression in the minds of not only the guilty individual but the other troops as well?

But Katayev did not hear those words.

A year and a half passed and even Katayev himself cannot recall without bitterness that meeting at which the activity was all pro forma... He has learned a great deal, has acquired the skills required to work with people.

A great deal of force has been embodied in the personnel meeting as a form of social pressure. But, do all commanders and political workers really concern themselves about the practicality of such measures, about actively influencing the formation of public opinion, about skillfully directing it towards the struggle to strengthen troop discipline? Unfortunately, no. It happens that a commander and political worker do absolutely nothing prior to the meeting. Silently, the collective itself will understand and will give the corresponding evaluation of the conduct of the violator of procedures set down by regulations.

Laissez-faire in such an instance is undesirable. Public opinion, as is known, can exert a positive influence on an individual if the collective is unanimous in its evaluation of a person's conduct. But, what if "like thinkers" are found in the group?

That is what happened in the company where Captain A. Solov'yev is the deputy commander for political affairs. Private A. Vershinin had gone AWOL. Solov'yev recommended to Lieutenant I. Vasil'zhenko, platoon commander, that a personnel meeting debate the soldier's violation. "Debate as they see fit," the platoon commander decided and did not much concern himself with such troubles. He announced the time that the meeting would be held and took up, in his view, more important matters. He was greatly surprised when the soldiers in their speeches began to sympathize with Vershinin and attempted to find circumstances which would ameliorate his guilt.

"Private Vershinin is a good comrade," one of the speakers stated. "Of course he erred, but that happens to everyone. Let's pardon Vershinin and this meeting will serve as a good lesson to him."

"How can this be a lesson?" Lieutenant Vasil'zhenko rose from his seat, appealing for adherence to principle. "You are only protecting one who has violated discipline!"
But, by now it had become difficult to influence the progress of the meeting. Its tone had been set by Vershinin's friends while Komsomol activists remained mute. That experience taught Vasil'zhenko a great deal.

Experienced, thoughtful commanders and political workers place very close attention to formation of public opinion, to strengthening the healthy moral atmosphere in the collective.

Senior Lieutenant V. Smirnov serves in our unit [chast']. This is a capable commander and indoctrinator. He constantly relies in his work on the party and Komsomol organization, on the force of public opinion. His subunit is rated excellent.

When we say "excellent subunit", that is not to imply that no problems exist there. In leading collectives as well, continual vitalization is underway: experienced troops are released to the reserves and young people replace them. No one specially selects the novices. Among them you can find those not characterized as highly disciplined. As is known, such a person can exert a negative influence on those around him. But, an excellent subunit remains excellent as long as any undisciplined individual who joins it is not permitted to bring chaos into the collective. Exactingness on the part of the commander and high standards set by co-workers do the job and assist a person in adopting the true path.

Senior Lieutenant Smirnov does not always adopt the personnel meeting approach as a form of public opinion. But, when he does, he does it properly.

When Private K. Kalinin violated discipline, the subunit commander conversed with the troops in a cordial atmosphere and explained their relationship to what had happened. One soldier asked:

"Comrade Senior Lieutenant, what kind of penalty will be assessed against Kalinin?"

"I have not decided yet," Smirnov answered. "I would like to hear your opinion about a violator of discipline."

The commander deemed it necessary to consult his subordinates. Senior Lieutenant V. Smirnov's pedagogical capabilities manifest themselves in just such "details" as these.

Senior Lieutenant A. Chernyavskiy, deputy commander for political affairs, at this time discussed the preparations for the meeting with another group of troops.

Warrant Officer [praporshchik] V. Tokar', secretary of the party organization, held a short meeting with the members of the party bureau.

The subunit commander recalled that Private Kalinin had once before disrupted the agenda. One of the soldiers chastised him. Kalinin answered insolently: "Well, OK, the commander requires it, I understand that, he is allowed to. But, who are you to meddle in someone else's business?"
Now it was important to show Kalinin that strengthening procedures laid down by regulations is the concern of every soldier, of the entire collective. Let his co-workers explain to him that he is no different than those with whom he is serving, learning, and carrying out combat missions.

That was how the meeting went — lively, sharp, and emotional. There were no neutrals. Kalinin was ashamed to look his cohorts in the eyes.

His best friend, Private V. Smirnov, had this to say: "We cannot permit anyone to hold the subunit back..." He will not be one to play the hypocrite. That means he will speak out more urgently. He did not listen to his words earlier, but now... During those minutes, the thought was born in Private Kalinin's mind: "am I on the right track?" His comrades aided him in finding this path.

The job is only half done once the violator of discipline accepts his guilt. The meeting only plays its indoctrinational role when the other troops derive a lesson from it. That is the goal towards which officer Smirnov continually strives. One can learn from him and follow his example. Officers M. Mel'nikov and N. Zozulya liberally share their know-how with young officers, teach them the art of indoctrinating subordinates. The troops of the subunit experience emotion every time the announcements on the board contain those simple, but for them far from ordinary, words: "There is a personnel meeting today..."
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICEMEN DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col of Justice I. Vashkevich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Service Interests Demand This"]

[Text] Major A. Kantakov's letter "Do They Know Their Rights?" was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in January of this year. It discussed the fact that some military commandants at rail stations and airports were unable to insure the timely movement of servicemen, even though tickets for immediate train and aircraft departures were available at the booking offices. The author of the letter was amazed to see, for example, how the assistant military commandant at the Krasnoyarsk Airport literally begged the ticket agents to sell a ticket to a serviceman dispatched by his commander on an urgent mission, but "the ticket agents simply turned their backs on him".

The editorial board received an answer from Lieutenant Colonel A. Mironov, Chief of Military Transportation Services, Siberian Military District. Unfortunately, it did not address the facts. Agreeing that such indecisive conduct on the part of the assistant military commandant of the airport actually might occur, Lieutenant Colonel Mironov explained this as being the present manner of ticket sales. Nonetheless, he reported that "military commandants have been ordered to take all measures for full satisfaction of requests by servicemen and their families who are travelling".

At the same time, the editors began to receive comments about the article, including from workers in military transportation services. They state that the activities of military commandants to assist servicemen and their families in obtaining tickets are not regulated in any way and are based only upon "orders" which are not backed up by legal documents.

"Of course," writes Lieutenant V. Nikitin, assistant military commandant of the Ryazan' Rail Sector and Station, "this does not mean that personnel are always without our assistance. And, you dash in, negotiate, and 'come up with' a seat. But, quite often, success depends upon the personal sympathies and antipathies in our relations with the workers at the station. I do not think it should be that way".
Lieutenant Nikitin's opinion is fully shared by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Nesterov, a military commandant, Warrant Officer [mishman] V. Osyk, an assistant military commandant, Captain V. Khudokormov, secretary of the party organization in a military commandant directorate, and others. They underscore that servicemen often are required to make urgent trips on official business. Therefore, a military commandant must have a real capability to assist them to do so. But, his assistance right now depends exclusively on whether the station workers have an understanding attitude towards his request. Nor are the specifics of servicemen's trips considered in the automated ticket sales system presently being introduced.

The editorial board informed Major General of Technical Troops Yu. Vorontsov, Deputy Chief of the Central Military Transportation Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, of this mail. He reported that the question of unscheduled trips by servicemen travelling on official trips by air has been sent to the Ministry of Civil Aviation and "at the present time is being solved positively". But, Comrade Vorontsov was unable to be quite so precise relative to rail travel. Citing the fact that train tickets for the current day are held by senior ticket agents for seat distribution and that they are not always distributed taking the interests of TDY [temporary duty] servicemen into account, he noted only that the workers in military commandaturas are obliged to insure the dispatch of military passengers "through close coordination with the corresponding transportation organs". But, the problem at hand involves those cases where the military commandant does not achieve such coordination with station workers.

Such a position is inconsistent and does not address the problem. The activities of the military commandaturas in rail transport lack precise regulation. We think that the Central Military Transportation Directorate, in conjunction with the Ministry of Railroads, should develop rules on the basis of which military commandants will be able to more fruitfully cooperate with transportation organs to provide timely departures of servicemen on official business.