PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE
(REVIEW OF CZECHOSLOVAK MARXIST PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHERS)

by Zdenek Mlynar

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Philosophical discussions occurring since 1956 have shown that the offensive marshalling of socialist forces, which took place after the XXth congress of the KSSS (Komunisticka Strana Sovetskho Svazu -- Communist party of the Soviet Union), is connected in the field of theoretical work with the marxist-leninist solution of several basic philosophic question. Only in this manner can we prevent the theoretical work from lagging behind the developmental necessities of our society. Because of this, criticism of the wrong ideas which appeared in our philosophical work after the XXth congress of the KSSS, was not a singular campaign nor a chance criticism of individual persons. The necessary condition for the development of theoretical work is to overcome the dogmatic heritage from the era of the cult of personality and to confront the revisionist deviation from Marxism.

The primary concern of the XXth congress of the KSSS was not a look to the past but rather an offensive marshalling toward the solution of new tasks on the basis of correction of past mistakes and faults. In a similar way it is necessary to create conditions in theoretical work which would provide for the solution of the new and complex questions of our historical era in which socialism is a world wide system and in which the SSR (Svaz Sovetskych Socialistickeh Republik -- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) has embarked upon extended buildup of communism.

It is obvious that these new tasks of Marxistic theoretical work demand a complete elimination of dogmatism from theoretical thinking. This in turn demands creation of favorable conditions, removal of hesitation and comfort from theoretical work, active support of new and creative ideas, creation of an atmosphere of comradely criticism and mutual trust among theoretical workers which would allow a person who has made a mistake to correct it with further work instead of making work impossible for such a person, etc.

Many of these questions must be repeatedly scrutinized, their correct solution must be emphasized and carried out. This approach is necessary and profitable even in articles which popularize the problems of our current philosophical discussions. We can see the right
In the article of comrade Arnost Kolman "Philosophy and Our Times" published in the Literarní noviny (Literary Newsletter) no. 48/1959. This article is of special importance because the correct approach is here propagated by a scientist who is known for his sincere support and execution of party policies and because he himself strives to use the correct method of theoretical work in his own practice.

It is quite right that comrade Kolman goes back, in his article, to several of the problems of our philosophical discussions not to "review the past" and repeat what has already been said, but rather to show the necessary connection between the struggle against revisionism and the suppression of dogmatism and to point out the necessity of uniting all forces for dealing with contemporary theoretical questions on the basis of criticism of past mistakes.

Sectarian intolerance of different points of view cannot be equated with the basic Marxistic criticism of mistakes because criticism of principles presumes a meeting of different viewpoints. This is one of the leading ideas of Kolman's article. All this is correct and in tune both with the party procedure for solution of philosophical and theoretical controversies and the theoretical work of comrade Kolman himself.

From the same point of view -- that of further development of theoretical work under our new conditions -- we will "return" to some of the questions of our philosophical discussions even in this article. For today it is especially necessary to review the substance of these discussions.

One of the basic philosophical questions in our discussions was the question of the relationship between Marxist philosophy and the revolutionary practice of the working class and the working masses. The Marx-Leninistic solution of this question gave rise to the conclusions of the political bureau of the party's central committee concerning the state of our philosophy and the future tasks. (The basic points of these conclusions were processed by all the party organizations within the sociological establishments and were published in the editorial titled "Further development of philosophical work" in Nova' Mysl (New Thought) No. 6/1959). These conclusions have shown that also the discussion of the relation of science to ideology was truly just a conflict of Marxistic philosophy and the revolutionary rebuilding practice of the working class. This showed that the Marx-Leninist philosophy differs from other philosophies in the fact that it not only explains the world but also changes it: it is the basic instrument of the revolutionary workers' movement and of the communist parties in their practical, revolutionary rebuilding of society and nature.

This viewpoint formed a starting point for the solution of various basic philosophical questions both in statements by party representative (namely, comrades J. Hendrych, V. Koucký, and L. Stoll) and in the work of those theoretical workers who, in philosophical discussions, opposed the tendency to break away our philosophy and sociology from the ideology of the working class.
The discussion of the relation between science and ideology which
began in Literarni Noviny at the end of 1956 and continued in various
forms until 1959 (namely in the criticism of positivist tendencies
occurring in the works of Dr. L. Tondl), was above all a struggle for
objective truthfulness in our study of social phenomena and for the path
to truth in our knowledge.

The substance of dogmatic approach is the separation of theory from
practice. Because of this the very practice of communistic buildup in
the SSR revealed the detrimental effects of dogmatism: the subject of
this practice -- the working masses and their Marx-Leninist party --
were the creators and propagators of the criticism of dogmatic beliefs
as well as of that further creative development in the truthful finding
of reality -- the scientific theory of Marxism.

It looked quite different, however, in the evaluations of some of
our philosophers immediately after the XXth congress of the KSSS. The
cause of dogmatism in theory was sought in its connection with practice
and in connection with the knowledge of the subject within practical
political activity. These philosophers understood social practice
(consciously or unconsciously) in a dogmatic or even pragmatic view;
practice was not to them the unified historical process of buildup of
communism but rather a series of individual isolated political acts.
Because of this, practice appeared to them rather black, usually the
more blacker it seemed to them before 1956. They did not see the light
of objective truthful knowledge in the very process of practical
transformation of the world by man but rather suspended it at
an above-cloud elevation of the "scientists" independence from the
practical process of social change.

The recognition of reality peculiar to the subject of active
change in social relationships (in masses and their party) was designated
by the label of "ideology". To keep this approach "Marxistic" it was
filled with designation of "false consciousness" given to it by Marx
for entirely different reasons /see note/.

/Note/. We do not want to reopen the discussion of the problems
of the understanding of ideology in the sense in which Marx identified
it with "false consciousness". This problem has been clarified in series
of articles. Basically, Marx never designated ideology as "false
consciousness" because it was a recognition of the subject of social
practice in general but rather designated as such the consciousness
(Knowledge) of the subject of a definite historical (class) practice,
a practice of peoples living in bourgeois, materialistic, social
conditions which represent the "wordly basis" of ideology, which itself
is "disjointed".

Thus the Marxistic, historically based analysis of the social
causes of dogmatism was replaced by speculative evaluations of the
relation between ideology and science. This "Marxist" idea of ideology
was expected to solve complex problems of theoretical practice at the time
of the XXth congress of the KSSS. Theoreticians who had lived on
dogmatism for years, now declared in these speculations that dogmatism is one of the attributes of the knowledge of the party (as the subject of practice), while the noble role of truthful recognition they retained for themselves.

Thus the criterion of truthfulness (and therefore of the scientific value) of theoretical knowledge was not practice itself (naturally in the Marxist, not the pragmatic sense), but a method of theoretical work the main requirement of which was not to become subjected to the influence of its own subject, namely, the practical social changes -- the representatives of "ideology as a false consciousness". With all this were connected on one side also timid attempts at a non-Marxist interpretation of the idea of "concrete totality" of social phenomena, an interpretation which lost the determining role of material social relationships (s. soudruh - comrade/ Kosik), and on the other side attempts at some equalization of the Marxist criteria of truth with the constructions of logical positivists (s. Tomel).

Positivist tendencies led in this respect to the denial of Lenin's thesis according to which the criterion of practice "cannot in substance fully confirm or deny any human idea". This criterion is also "indefinite enough", so that it prevents human experience from becoming an "absolute value" but at the same time it is definite in leading an unreconcilable fight against all kinds of idealism and agnosticism.

"The viewpoint of life and practice must be the first and basic opinion of the theory of learning" (Materialism and empirio-criticism, Svoboda 1952, page 127).

The meaning of our discussions on the relation of science and ideology consisted primarily of an effort to show these tendencies as quiet attempts to revise the philosophical bases of the Marxist social sciences (in some cases while proclaiming faithfulness to "scientific Marxism").

It is from the point of view of this basis of our current political and philosophical discussions that I return to some of the opinions concerning the problem of the relationship between science and ideology appearing in the article by A. Kolman in the Literarni Noviny.

While this article successfully popularizes many problems it also stimulates questions among the readers who have followed our philosophical discussions more closely - questions which it does not answer clearly or completely. Whenever some of his theses are presented in connection with the course of our discussions (as is s. Kolman's desire), they do not always clearly point out the true substance of the matter allowing thus an occasional revitalization of many wrong ideas which have been expressly criticized by s. Kolman himself, throughout our philosophical discussion.

It is probable that the simplified formulation of the problem allows the true philosophical problems in the question of the relation of science and ideology to escape, since these problems arise from the relation of our knowledge to objective truth, the relation of partisanship...
and truthfulness and finally the relation of theory and practice. Furthermore all this is not considered from the point of view of conflict between the defenders of the two different theses that "science is (or should be) independent of ideology" or that "science is identical with ideology". In all the instances where we are solving just this conflict we are not contributing substantially to the clarification of the problems of our philosophical discussions. The terminology is not always substantial nor are the concepts of "ideology" and "science" themselves; the true problems of our philosophical discussions can be spoken of without using these concepts and in the same manner we can discuss other, generally obvious matters in the terminology of the current discussion. It is because of this that when S. Kolman writes: "Science and ideology are two parts of social consciousness. In substance science is an objective reflection of the world. Ideology is the sum of the ideas that society has about itself. Marxist ideology is scientific because it is based on science" nothing is contributed to the understanding of the relation of science and ideology, to the objectively truthful recognition of reality. This is so because only science is defined in relation to the object of recognition while ideology is defined in relation to the subject. Thus even such statements as "Marxist ideology is scientific because it is based on science" or many other truthful statements (e.g. "science and ideology have something in common"; "no scientist can escape the influence of ideology"; "to state that philosophy is outside ideology is therefore senseless" etc., etc.) made on the basis of thus defined concepts of science and ideology do not fully explain why we consider as mistaken all those who think that the connection between the sociology and the ideology of the working class is some external joining of two spheres at the expense of the achievement of objective truth, and why we think that their opposition is right.

To answer this question correctly we must define the problem of science and ideology in the same way it's been defined in the current discussions: i.e. as a problem of the relation of science and a certain class ideology to objective truth or finally as the problem of the relation of theoretical knowledge and a certain (class) social practice.

During the course of our philosophical discussions it was shown that the separation of ideology (as the knowledge of the subject of social practice) from science (as the true reflection of reality) leads through the speculative sense of some of our philosophers to a distortion of the bases of Marxist theory of knowledge.

While Marx has seen the final reason for the appearance of false consciousness in the fact that the very "basis of the world is split and is in conflict" and the only way of overcoming this false consciousness (i.e. the only way of true knowledge) in the removal of this conflict by revolutionizing the "world basis" itself i.e. the material social relations, and while he singlemindedly declared that" the question whether human thinking reaches objective truth is not a question of..."
theory but one of practice" and that the controversy about thinking which is separated from practice "is purely scholastic question" (see "Thesis on Feuerbach", IV, II etc.), some of our philosophers arrived at substantially different conclusions.

In the works of comrades who were influenced by the positivist tendencies the process of truthful learning was especially understood only as a process of mechanical "mirroring", as a process of adequate mental registration of reality and not as a part of the process of change in the very object of knowledge (nature or society) through human social practice.

The mechanistic concept of the relation of knowledge and practice is quite foreign to Marxist philosophy. In this concept the unity of knowledge and practice is understood only as an external unity, as a mutual action of both components, each of which however can exist in an isolated state. While this concept can be formally united with the required union of theory and practice, with the idea that science has sense only when practically applied and not when it is "science for science sake," and finally even with the belief that science is a reflection of objective reality, the general acceptance of these broadly correct theses does not change the mechanistic concept into Marxism but on the contrary the mechanistic viewpoint fills these generally correct theses with un-Marxist contents.

The mechanistic concept of knowledge and practice leads to the belief that true scientific knowledge of e.g. social reality can be induced in a subject observing human social practices as a spectator observes the stage. Because of this, the problem of uniting theory with practice appears quite differently than in Marx-Leninist philosophy: it is just the problem of "application" of the scientific knowledge acquired by observation of the activity of the subject of social practice by the subject of knowledge, in practice with the aid of "facilitating agents." Thus, in the historical and social sense (and also the class sense) the subject of truthful knowledge is separated from the subject of practical social activity, while in reality (as in the concept of Marxist philosophy) the subject of social practice is, especially in this sense, also the subject of truthful knowledge.

Of course, in such a mechanistic concept the whole process of correct recognition of the world by man is identified in substance with specialized (naturally necessary and important) work of the intellectual, professional theoretician, the man to whom division of labor "assigns" a certain part of this process. According to this concept the rest of humanity learns the truth of the world only because the intellectual is kind enough to "transmit" the truth to the "ants" of practice.

If this idea was considered progressive among the enlightened of the 18th Century then today it is only a half-baked attempt at intellectual revision of Marxism. Our philosophical discussions have shown elements of this very concept of the relation between knowledge and practice as more or less hidden logical presumptions and results
of evaluations by some of our comrades. These elements were introduced into our philosophy primarily in those cases where in the analysis of gnoseological problems the union of Marxism and positivism in the concepts of "pure" gnoseology was attempted, and where the question of the objective activity of the subject was generally removed from the field of gnoseology. All this was more thoroughly discussed in connection with the criticism of the work of L. Tondl.

These were tendencies directed toward the very concept that Lenin criticizes in the neopositivist philosophy of B. Mach: "To Mach practice is one thing and the theory of knowledge another one; they can be placed alongside each other without conditioning one another" (Materialism and empiriocriticism, op.cit. Page 124). In substance, similar elements were introduced into our philosophy also by concepts according to which the Marx-Leninist party of the working class is only a "mediator" between the truthful scientific theory and the working class and not the very subject of objectively truthful knowledge and the creator of scientific theory.

Wrongness and the limitations of the mechanistic concept of the relation between true knowledge and practice are also seen in the fact that such a view fully precludes an understanding of the different significance of the union of theory and practice for true recognition of reality in progressive or reactionary classes. Because the correct understanding of this question is of prime importance to Marxist analysis of science and ideology we cannot omit a clear discussion of these basic questions of Marxist theory of knowledge, when explaining this relationship.

Man increases his knowledge of nature and society and through this he also increases his ability to actively use, rule and change both nature and society. Objectively true scientific knowledge of nature and society is therefore always limited by the objective, historically defined ability of humans to rule and purposely transform nature and social order. These, historically defined abilities of the people are then in the last instance determined by material social relations which are independent of human will. The transforming social practice of the people is always a historically definite practice of a given socio-economical formation, a practice of a given class or respective practices of society under the hegemony of a given class.

The objective limits of a given historically definite, (class) social practice are thus also the limits of the truthful knowledge of the people at a given time. To allow knowledge to pass beyond such a limit, practice must contain new social forces which reach beyond the limits of the old practice in the transformation of nature and society.

However, this problem cannot be simply understood as a simple mechanical relation of the "limits" of practice and knowledge. We do not deny the possibility of scientific abstraction forging ahead of empirical experience, etc. All we are saying is that the decisive factors of true knowledge and its development are the possibilities of
of social practice, and that even in this province we see the validity of Marx's thesis that humanity gives itself only those tasks for the solution of which material conditions are either in existence or are beginning to appear.

In this, the limits of practice and knowledge can differ within the framework of a single social order in their relation to practical transformation of nature on one side and society on the other. All this is highly complex and cannot be explained in more detail within the limits of this article.

It can be generally said that it depends on whether a given social order and its ruling class are able to revolutionize objectively only the production forces (which opens the way to scientific study of nature), or whether it is also a practical effector of revolutionary social changes which do not stop at its own ruling class (which opens the way to objectively true knowledge of social evolution).

Even in this sense there exists a qualitative difference in the "permeation" of a definite class ideology into the natural and social sciences and not just a quantitative one (as could be deduced from S. Kolman's article on the basis of the statement that ideology "permeates" all scientific fields but to a "different degree"). Correct understanding of these very questions allows us among other things, also to understand the tremendous conflict between the development of natural and technical sciences and the development of general philosophy and social sciences in contemporary bourgeois society.

(In connection with this we note that in this article we are concerned with the problems of the relationship between ideology and social science, and that we are entirely omitting the specific problems of natural sciences emanating from the qualitative differences in the process of knowledge acquisition in regard to nature and society).

Naturally, this cannot be understood considering the processes of true knowledge from the mechanistic point of view as observation of the object of knowledge by the learning subject, as something "beside" or "above" the historically concrete, practical change of the world by man.

Unfortunately this important aspect of the problems involved was not one of the subjects in the article by comrade Kolman. In his article the starting point of the analysis of the relation of science and ideology is not the review of the above-mentioned questions but rather "two basic features" common to all scientific fields. S. Kolman characterizes these features as follows: first, all sciences seek objective truth i.e. the true image of reality and they systematize the accumulated knowledge of the laws of evolution in nature, society and psychology so that humanity could purposely alter the reality. And second, since the true sense of science and its final mission is not "knowledge for knowledge's sake" but practice in its broadest and deepest sense, even science has its historically and socially conditioned side and therefore also a subjective side.
The incompleteness of this formulation rests primarily in the fact that to a certain degree it separates the process of objective, truthful knowledge from the process of objective change of the world by man i.e., from practice. In this concept practice is the "final mission" of science; it is its task. All this is onesided. For practice is in equal measure -- but a decisive one -- also the basic condition of science. The so-called "knowledge for knowledge's sake" is not something "wrong" but it is something fully impossible and not only as a "mission" of science but also as its starting point. Man does not study nature and society in such a manner that he systematizes the accumulated knowledge of the laws of evolution," in order to purposely "change" this reality at a later date. Schematically speaking this is only half of the matter because it presumes that man has "brought" knowledge in a preceding process of "transformation" of reality.

If this partially expressed substance of scientific knowledge becomes the theoretic, logical basis for the analysis of the relation between science and ideology then there necessarily appears the danger that the qualitative differences in the influence of various historically defined class practices (and also ideologies) on the development of true scientific knowledge will disappear. We will leave aside the question of what constitutes an objective, historically conditioned scientific nature of one ideology and the non-scientific nature of another.

S. Kolman's article does not stress these objectively defined qualitative differences between the ideologies of various classes in their relation to true knowledge. This is well shown by his opinion concerning the necessary union of social sciences with the ideology of the classes. Comrade Kolman writes: "It could not be different than that the political, moral, pedagogical, artistic and religious opinions were expressed the views of definite social groups and were thus class views in a class society, that these views whose very sum forms social ideology, permeated the social sciences."

Opinions of this sort are common with S. Kolman, e.g., on classes "in general" without any attention to historical reality. Comrade Kolman also states specifically that the "permeation of ideology into social science does not in this concept exclude "rational grains" of objective truth. In substance, however, the reader of this article concludes that the significance of the "permeation" of social science by class ideology rests in the effect of more or less subjectivistic political, moral, religious etc. opinions of the various class (i.e., the various subjects of social historical practice) on the path of science leading to objective truth. It was thus also in that "golden age" in "Greece" and there's nothing to be done about it.

A man who believes that "the historically and socially conditioned side" of science as well as that all the "subjective," "ideological" etc. "moments" of science are something necessary but
negative in the search for objective truth -- will be shaken in his belief after reading Kolman's article.

In reality, "permeating" of science by ideology -- a process which has always existed -- does not by far mean only the fact that objectively true knowledge is influenced by subjectivistic elements of political, ethical or religious nature etc. The union of science and ideology is primarily a union of that part of the process of learning, carried on by only a narrow class of people due to the division of labor, with the general process of learning which occurs within a historically defined (class) social practice of the people. It is thus a form of union between theory and historically defined (class) practice. Such "permeation" can have both a positive and a negative effect on the acquisition of objectively true knowledge. This is so because the basic limits of true knowledge are the same as the limits of the possibilities for objective transformation of the world by man, which are defined historically by a definite class practice with which scientific learning is connected and by "permeation" of a definite class ideology.

If we do not pay sufficient attention to these problems, it is difficult to understand the relationship between the partisanship of science and truth as an objective and historical relation. It is also difficult to understand why the requirement of communistic partisanship is in harmony with the truthfulness of scientific knowledge while bourgeois partisanship conflicts.

From a truly scientific point of view we are neither concerned with the general justification of the "permeation" of science with an ideology nor with the demand for a partisan designation of science. The scientist must always fight against such "permeation" whenever it connects him with a socially concrete (class) practice which is no longer capable of changing practically (and therefore also of studying the very objects of scientific research -- nature or society -- in harmony with the objective necessity.

It is obvious that we are not defending the union of science with the ideology of the working class, and the communistic partisanship of science (i.e. Marxism) because there's nothing else to do, since the union of science with ideology has always existed. We defend the necessity of the union of science with the ideology of the working class because of a definite quality of this "permeation." This is the union of scientific work with the general process of world study carried out by the practical, revolutionizing activity of the one class whose transforming practice has no objectively defined limits in the fact of its class hegemony. This is so because this class rule is merely a step on the road of practical transformation of society into a classless society, i.e., on the road to a social practice which more and more closely points to a new transformation of the world in harmony with the objective necessity opening thus further unlimited possibilities of exact knowledge.
Of course, this reality does not create an automatic protection against errors in our science or mistakes in our practical attempts at world transformation, nor does it automatically eliminate gross errors. It is also impossible to remove at once all the objective social influences acting in favor of such errors. Leftovers of old social orders, effects of bourgeois ideology etc. will remain for a long time as the main danger to the development of true knowledge of social reality. However, the very nature of social practice in socialistic and communistic society gives rise to the objective need (and also to the objective possibility of satisfying this need) to overcome all the barriers placed on the road toward unlimited evolution of objectively true knowledge. In its connection with this (at this time still class) social practice and the form of "permeation" by the corresponding ideology the true knowledge of society is not at all limited, on the contrary this connection is the only way by which it can be reached.

When these realities are not pointed out then the qualitative differences between the Marxist scientific philosophy and all the remaining philosophies is also not stressed. Thus even in popularizing articles (especially if concerned with the problems of our recent philosophical discussions) it is not enough to state that "Marxist ideology is scientific because it is based on science" or that it is the communist party that "contributes the most to the Marxist-Leninist theory" etc. All these are the rightful expressions of the more general basic relations between objectively true human knowledge and historically defined class practice (and ideology); to understand them properly it is necessary to explain correctly even these more general rules.

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Discussions of the basic philosophical questions are just as necessary as the effort to find the right way of overcoming all the deficiencies and mistakes which were characteristic of our theoretical work during the era of the cult of Stalin's personality. The false conclusions occasionally connected with the criticism of these deficiencies do not impair the rightness of the critical review in general.

Because of this, the resolution of the political bureau of the UV KSC (Ustredni Vyber Komunisticka Strany Ceskoslovenska -- Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) passed in June of the last year, emphasized the close connection between the fight against revisionism and the fight against dogmatism, because in reality dogmatism is not a dangerous enemy of revisionism. Whenever it stifles the creative development of Marxism, it aids directly the revisionist deviation from Marxism under the slogan of "overcoming" of obsolete philosophico-theoretical bases of Marxism.
One of the methods of overcoming past mistakes consists undoubtedly of the creative discussions among the scientists themselves, the basis of which is the meeting of one opinion with another and in which an idea proved by practice will always be victorious over an idea disproved by practice. Because of this, our party in the course of the philosophical discussions opposed strongly all efforts of several individuals to discredit and muffle the discussion by creating an unjustified atmosphere of worry and by talking of "ideological executions" of individuals, etc. At the same time the party demanded that in these discussions of theoretical problems there will be exercised openness, ideological support and thorough criticism of false opinions. It opposes the "neutral" approach to a discussion.

It is right to stress that within Marxism-Leninism itself discussion is necessary, that without exchange of opinion our social science will be endangered by dogmatic stagnation. It is also right to point out that the logical consequences of a wrong opinion should not be unjustly ascribed as subjective orientation to the people who made the mistakes. However, we must remember that there exist necessary and logical consequences to each of the opinions stated and that these must be uncompromisingly fought against according to their objective value.

These are the beliefs expressed and validated by our party and not just the personal views of an individual. As such we must propagate and defend them. In this, it is also necessary to see that our daily scientific work is effectively aided by correct concretization of these beliefs in relation to certain definite problems of our science.

It is here that we are not always thorough. Thus, e.g., in the article by comrade A. Kolman, the reader will find out more about abstract general principles (which are not always fully formulated) than about the concrete meaning of these principles in our current work in social sciences.

For instance the very problem of different views on the "partial questions" within Marxism is much more complex than the brief statement of comrade Kolman allows, especially in the question of the relation of science and ideology which he uses as an example. Had Comrade Kolman pointed out the essence "of several different concepts" of the relation of science and ideology, all of which are "permissible within the framework of Marxism " provided their conclusions are not in direct conflict with the concrete, political fulfillment of Marxism," we could have considered the matter more concretely. As long as we are limiting ourselves to general remarks, however, we must at least explain that Marxism is not a scholastic system in which certain problems will always be main while others will be "partial." In practice you can frequently divide people into Marxists and non-Marxists by a question which appears to be far removed from general philosophical questions but the solution of which in reality expresses a person's opinion of these general principles of Marxism.
As far as we can see the very question of the relation of class ideology and science is one of the main ones and cannot be considered as a partial problem. We have in our current social practice objective possibilities for its correct solution and there is no need to await the judgment of the future.

Comrade Kolman expresses even other basically correct needs in a completely general form: a scientist "cannot pursue fruitful scientific labor according to directions and rules which are pressed on him against his will and against his belief," "scientific mistakes must not be automatically labeled as ideological deviations," etc. The form expressing the general principles used by comrade Kolman is so broad here, that it leads more toward a "neutral" approach to the merit of the matter and allows that these principles be given meaning at will and according to the desires of every person. It is exactly this characteristic that is missing from the exact partisan principles that comrade Kolman is attempting to support in his article.

Today we can and should call all things by their correct names rather than giving them expression in abstract general declarations. For it is exactly this approach which has had a frequent negative effect on our discussions.

It was already said that during the era of the cult of personality some theoretical questions (especially in the province of social sciences) were not solved by open discussion and conflicts of opinion, but rather by administrative methods.

This harmed creative Marxism and fed the fires of dogmatism. Although these phenomena were absent from our philosophical discussions we must be watchful in this respect and do everything possible to prevent their repetition. It is necessary to struggle against mental laziness and comfort which leads to "easier" and "more comfortable" methods of solution than those employed in open discussion where a wrong opinion must be confronted in the evolved right opinion.

However, effective combat against these errors of the past cannot be led by general declarations of "rights and freedoms" of the scientists. An effective control requires a thorough analysis which will reveal the phenomena from the past as something harmful from the point of view of our entire social practice and the policy of the party. This is much more correct because the substance does not lean on the "rights" of scientists as a special group of people as compared to the rest of socialistic society, but it is rather a support of the objective needs of this socialistic society. This arises necessarily from the understanding of dogmatism as an expression of the separation of theory from practice.

If we cover up these problems in slogans concerning the freedom of scientific research in general or concerning "rules and regulations" against the judgment of the scientists etc., this very substance of the matter is allowed to escape. For it there appears that the scientist with his "rights" stands against the social practice of socialism while
in actuality it is this practice which is opposed by the administrative methods used instead of topical discussions. Also the general formulations, identifying the freedom of scientific research with the absence of "regulations passed against the will of the scientist" are not at all exact and can be understood in a non-Marxist way. For instance, the past representatives of the bourgeois social sciences cannot "labor fruitfully" today in our country primarily because the "regulations" making scientific work possible in our society are in conflict with their anti-socialistic and anti-Marxistic belief. There is no question that comrade Kolman has no such thing in his mind. But some of the general limits of his article do not clearly answer even these questions.

Similarly, it is necessary today to take a concrete stand in the interest of further development of positive scientific work even in the question of "automatic labeling of scientific errors as ideological deviations." The positive side of our philosophical discussion was primarily the fact that no such labeling took place. This must be stated if we are to avoid a state in which generally correct principles are filled with willful meaning in concrete connection with our discussions.

Also we must not forget that the very practice of our struggle for socialism allows for clear differentiation between errors which have not the objective meaning of an "ideological deviation" and those which do.

Controversies over general principles of this kind are not the main problems of work in the field of social sciences. The last year's resolutions of the political bureau of the central committee of our party form the basis for further positive labor, a basis which clearly solves all these general questions.

To the fore at our scientific work now appear problems which cannot be solved by discussions concerning the most general questions of the philosophical bases of social sciences. One of the main problems is the struggle against the speculative manner of theoretical work in which exercises at logic and quotations with a priori valuations cover up the analysis of the sum of the facts of our social life in their objective continuity and conditioning.

Marxism-Leninism itself arises lawfully from a whole treasure of knowledge accumulated up to now by humanity in the process of change and learning of the world. Because of this any disrespect of the cultural heritage of the past is foreign to its nature. However, this does not mean, that our social science will find solutions of the basic problems of current scientific learning in the past histories of philosophy and of social sciences.

The sum of the facts of our social life cannot be encompassed by our social science unless it acts in tune with the new quality of our socialistic society. It is a society that is beginning to direct consciously its own development and that in this sense at least is already undergoing a "jump from the realm of necessity to the realm of
freedom." Because of this our social science must gather facts in a basically different way from the methods employed by bourgeois sociology. As the attempts at direction (which are basically a class oppression of the majority by the minority) at social development by the ruling, exploitative class are gradually replaced by conscious direction of the same development by the true majority of the society, the possibility of true and full understanding of this development is lost from all but the independent, self-governing directing process of society.

Conscious, self-governing direction of social development by the majority of the society presumes objectively true knowledge of the general interest of the majority, the true knowledge of the general interest of socialistic society.

The vitality in "seeking" the general interest of socialistic society can be practically surpassed only by the creation of a true avant garde of the new society.

The Marxist-Leninist Party is an organization of such an avant garde; it is a party of a new type. Communists "have no interests which differ from the interests of proletariat as a whole"; on the contrary one of their main peculiarities is the fact that "at various levels of development--------they always represent the interests of the entire movement (Marx-Engels, The Communist Manifesto). Identical principles were entered by Lenin into all the basic features of the buildup of a revolutionary party of a new type. These principles (mainly the requirement of participation of each member in the work of one of the party organizations and the rule of creating a unified will of the party in the active struggle to fulfill the party directives, incompatible with the existence of factions) insure that this very criterion -- the defense of the general interest of the class -- is continuously reviewed not only in theory but also in practice.

All this is of decisive importance in understanding of the role played by the party in the process of correct learning of socialistic social reality and its laws. Because the substance of true recognition of socialistic society is the true knowledge of the laws of its development and because the achievement of this true knowledge is reviewed in practice, the Leninist party is in consequence of its objective social standing the only socially independent subject of the true knowledge of the society, as well as the creator of the scientific theory of social development.

This does not mean, however, that social science in the sense of specialized theoretical work is unnecessary. Scientific, theoretical work in the province of this science, however, cannot be basically anything but the activity of a specially qualified worker who is not and cannot be an "independent" and "self-sufficient" subject of true knowledge. His work has meaning only as a part of the process of learning of the entire avant garde of society i.e. of the Marxist-Leninist party, which is the main creator of scientific theory, as it is the directing power of social practice.
Naturally this frees scientists in socialistic society from false objectivity. No one can set up an "observatory" for the study of socialistic society outside the party without robbing his learning of the possibility to draw on practice and present practice, without sentencing himself to the difficult role of a man who himself desires to be the highest judge of the problems of rightness of his social behaviour.

All this gives possibilities to the social sciences undreamt of in bourgeois sociology. The difference in these possibilities is in the end the difference between the possibilities of practical transformation of the world by the bourgeois class and by the working masses themselves.

Correct understanding of all these questions has a timely and concrete significance for the further development of our scientific work in the field of social sciences. For today we are concerned with the path leading toward the facts of our social life. And the only basic path of our social science (in the sense of specialized theoretical work) toward mastering of the sum-total of the facts of our social life is mainly the most effective inclusion of this specialized work into the activity of the communist party an inclusion not in form of organization but in essence. At the same time this path leads to a still more effective validation of the positive contribution of scientific workshops in the practical direction of the development of socialistic society toward communism.

A clear explanation of these general questions of further development of our theoretical work in the social sciences must never be absent even from articles which popularize the essence of our current philosophical discussions. This is because we cannot consider the relation between these discussions and positive work in the sense that the discussions are over and now begins "positive work." The discussions themselves are also positive work, and their results are part of this work. Further development of positive labor in social sciences especially in the direction of scientific examination of the sum total of the facts of our social life is possible only on the basis of correct understanding of those philosophical questions which were positively solved in the party approach to the current philosophical discussions.