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Acronyms

BRAC      Base Realignment and Closure
ITRO      Interservice Training Review Organization
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE
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DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Audit on Service Training for Intelligence Occupational Specialties
(Project No. 4RF-0053)

Introduction

We are providing this report for your information and use. The report discusses the intelligence training at Service training centers. As of September 30, 1994, DoD was authorized 76,000 military positions that require intelligence and related cryptologic specialties. During FY 1994, 25,700 students attended training in intelligence occupational specialties provided by the Service training centers.

Audit Results

The Services effectively managed entry-level training in intelligence occupational specialties. Since 1983, the Services have reduced the number of active duty intelligence training schools from 11 to 5, thereby reducing redundancy and duplication. As of June 1994, only one military construction

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1Within DoD, general intelligence and cryptologic specialties are combined together under the broad function of intelligence. Therefore, the term intelligence training in this report will refer to the broad range of intelligence-related disciplines to include cryptologic specialties.

2Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

3Includes active duty and Selected Reserve personnel.
project for intelligence training was planned or funded by the Services. That project is an addition to the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center in Dam Neck, Virginia. The addition was larger than documented requirements; however, the Navy had already completed the design and solicited contractor bids when our audit work began. We concluded it was not cost-effective to delay the project to permit redesign. Management of and internal controls over intelligence training were generally effective.

Objectives

The overall objective of the audit was to determine whether intelligence training programs and the supporting infrastructure economically and efficiently satisfied projected training requirements. Specifically, the audit evaluated curricula required for intelligence occupational specialties to determine whether unnecessary duplication existed and compared training plans to validated requirements and planned student attendance at intelligence training centers. The audit also evaluated current and planned investment in intelligence training infrastructure and internal controls germane to the audit objectives.

Scope and Methodology

This program audit was performed from June 1994 through January 1995. The audit focused on the training needed for military personnel to attain intelligence occupational specialties and the internal controls associated with managing that training.

Because the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO) was conducting a detailed review of intelligence training for potential consolidations, we examined the ITRO procedures, methodologies, and interim results. In identifying commonality in curricula, we also reviewed the summary Programs of Instruction used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force for basic officer training. In addition, we compared capacities of the Services' training facilities to the planned work load. Our comparison included validating the requirements for expansion of the intelligence training building at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center. The documentation we reviewed was dated from June 1986 through December 1994.

The audit excluded the Defense Foreign Language Program because that program had been reviewed and is discussed in Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 93-INS-10, "Defense Foreign Language Program," June 17, 1993 (see Prior Audits and Other Reviews).

The audit was performed in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD, and accordingly included such tests of internal controls as were considered necessary. The audit relied on computer-processed data from the Services' personnel systems for projected annual intelligence training requirements for FY 1995 and FY 1996. Although the personnel systems were
not audited, limited testing showed that the data were sufficiently reliable to satisfy the audit objectives. Enclosure 1 lists the organizations visited or contacted.

Internal Controls

The audit assessed the implementation of internal management control programs at the four major (see Background section for details) Service intelligence training centers. The audit also reviewed internal controls established at the training centers to ensure that the Programs of Instruction included critical tasks required for intelligence occupational specialities and that effective training evaluation systems were in place. Each of the Service intelligence training centers had an established internal control program. We identified no material internal control weaknesses.

Prior Audits and Other Reviews

Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 93-INS-10, "Defense Foreign Language Program," June 17, 1993. The inspection evaluated the Defense Foreign Language Program by reviewing the adequacy of the program policy and management structure and by examining the effectiveness of program management. The report notes three systemic issues in the Defense Foreign Language Program that were relevant to intelligence training and recommends:

- strengthening guidance for foreign language requirements to include an annual review of language requirements against measurable, quantitative and qualitative objectives in support of Defense missions;

- strengthening financial management controls over total foreign language funds; and,

- developing Defense-wide baseline policies and procedures for managing military personnel who possess foreign language skills.

Management generally concurred with the recommendations and initiated actions to review proposed language requirements against objectives and to clarify financial management responsibilities.

Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 91-049, "Management of DoD Cryptologic Training," February 15, 1991. The audit evaluated whether DoD managed cryptologic training in an efficient and effective manner. The report states that training programs generally satisfied the operational requirements of the cryptologic system, but recommends that the National Security Agency establish procedures to coordinate with the Services in the acquisition and development of training devices, as well as in the development of training for new signals intelligence systems. The National Security Agency concurred and established a technical panel to independently coordinate training and the
development of acquisition and training devices. Management also updated guidance to ensure review and coordination of training development for new signals intelligence systems throughout the acquisition process.

Other Matters of Interest

Foreign Language Deficiencies for Army Reserve and National Guard Personnel. Personnel system data showed that about 33 percent of Army National Guard and Reserve personnel assigned to intelligence billets did not have required intelligence occupational specialties. At two Army National Guard units and one Army Reserve unit, 209 of the 474 personnel assigned to intelligence positions were not fully qualified for their positions. A lack of foreign language proficiency was the only reason that 102 of the 209 personnel were not fully qualified. Because the audit excluded foreign language training, we did not perform additional audit work to determine the extent or cause of the language deficiencies.

Background

The Services have made progress in reducing the training infrastructure and in consolidating and collocating military intelligence skill training. The number of training centers that train active duty military personnel for intelligence occupational specialties decreased from 11 in 1983 to 5 in 1995. The five training centers are:

o U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, Arizona;

o 17th Training Group, Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas;

o Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia;

o Navy Technical Training Center, Corry Station, Florida; and

o Fleet Intelligence Training Center Pacific, San Diego, California.\(^4\)

The Army also operates five small Reserve Forces Intelligence Schools that provide resident training, generally from June to August, for Reserve personnel.

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\(^4\)Training at this location was for Navy intelligence personnel who needed advanced specialty training and who were available while their ships returned from assignments in the Pacific. Only one course was conducted at this location in FY 1994 which resulted in the award of a specific intelligence specialty code.
Discussion

ITRO Study of Intelligence Training. The Services established the ITRO in 1972 as a cooperative effort. The Services participate on a voluntary basis to eliminate training duplication, reduce costs, standardize training, and increase training efficiencies. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (the Chairman) established the Military Training Structure Review in November 1992 to study military training, including intelligence training. The objective of the Military Training Structure Review was to determine whether economies and efficiencies could be realized through consolidating or collocating training. The Chairman tasked the ITRO, which is governed by consensus, to conduct the Military Training Structure Review with the Joint Staff participating in an advisory capacity.

As of November 28, 1994, the ITRO costed 35 options⁵ and 52 suboptions⁶ for consolidating or collocating training for intelligence occupational specialties. However, the ITRO Detailed Analysis Group⁷ (the Group), responsible for the intelligence training review, had “varying degrees of discomfort” with data submitted by subcommittees responsible for computing costs for required staffing, facilities, and other costs. Also, varied interests of the Services hindered the decisionmaking process in making timely recommendations to the Executive Board.⁸

In December 1994, the Group was validating cost results of the training options to ensure that data accurately reflected the cost of conducting intelligence training at potential locations. The Group plans to report its conclusions and make recommendations on the intelligence training portion of the Military Training Structure Review to the ITRO Executive Board in February 1995.

Timeliness of Intelligence Training Review. Because the ITRO did not plan to report its conclusions and recommendations to the Executive Board until February 1995, the ITRO missed an opportunity to share the results of its

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⁵Nine of the options were subsequently eliminated because they were potential considerations for the Base Realignment and Closure process. The Navy desired that its sailors receive imagery training in port at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center; therefore, the ITRO agreed to exclude the Navy from any options for consolidating or collocating imagery training.

⁶Functional training areas within an option were costed separately to show the actual cost of transferring each individual training function to its potential location.

⁷Representatives from each Service, the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Central Imagery Office responsible for recommending options to be costed and for making recommendations to the ITRO Executive Board. The Group is augmented by cost, staffing, and facility experts.

⁸The ITRO Executive Board makes decisions on consolidations and collocations of training in coordination with each Service.
review with the Army, Navy, and Air Force Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) offices for consideration in the BRAC 1995 process. (January 1, 1995, was the cutoff date to submit relevant data to the Army, Navy, and Air Force BRAC offices.) Even though the options that the Group planned to report to the Executive Board were not potential BRAC considerations, the ITRO's conclusions and recommendations on consolidating and collocating intelligence training may have been helpful to the BRAC process.

**Consideration of Options.** The Group's analyses of the 87 options and suboptions showed potential increases in training efficiencies and cost benefits. However, because the Group is governed by consensus, some options may not be considered for recommendation in the final report to the Executive Board. Two examples of options that would not be discussed in the final report follow.

- The Army claimed that consolidation of all Army cryptologic training at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center could reduce Army costs annually by $4.9 million, with a one-time cost of $10.7 million (2.2-year payback period). However, the Group did not consider the consolidation an option because it would separate previously consolidated training.

- The Group estimated potential annual DoD recurring monetary benefits of $3.7 million, with a payback period of 1.8 years, by transferring all analysis and reporting, cryptologic linguist, and electronic intelligence training for the Services to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center. However, the Group did not plan to discuss potential benefits of suboptions in its report to the Executive Board.

The majority of the Group believed that the benefits of further consolidation, collocation, or movement of intelligence training were limited because analysis and reporting, cryptologic linguist, manual Morse, and non-Morse training were already consolidated or collocated. Therefore, the Group decided not to suggest changes in the status quo for any of the options or suboptions.

**Construction to Support Intelligence Training.** In October 1992, Congress approved $13.7 million in Military Construction funds for a 72,300-square-foot addition to the building used by the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center. The project justification stated that the existing facilities were inadequate and overcrowded. However, the Navy Facilities Engineering Command, Atlantic Division (Facilities Command), had not updated the Basic Facility Requirements used to support the space requirements since May 1988. The average number of students attending the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center in FY 1993 was only 286, significantly less than the 731 shown on the DD Form 1391, "Military Construction Project Data," submitted to Congress for approval.

**Update to Basic Facility Requirements.** In March 1993, after congressional approval of the project, the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center requested that the Fleet Combat Training Center, the host activity where the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center is located, update the Basic Facility Requirements. However, the Fleet Combat
Training Center declined, stating that funding was not available to pay the Facilities Command the $12,000 it requested to update the Basic Facility Requirements. In September 1994, when auditors advised the Navy that the requirements for the new addition were not fully supported, the Facilities Command immediately updated the Basic Facility Requirements using criteria in the Naval Facilities Engineering Command P-80, "Facility Planning Criteria for Navy and Marine Corps Shore Installations," (P-80) October 1982.

Using guidance from the P-80, the Facilities Command engineers determined that only about 50 percent (36,000 square feet) of the 72,300-square-foot addition was needed. Because that determination would require redesign of the addition and entail a delay of several months in awarding a construction contract, the Facilities Command engineers rethought their methodology and determined that the existing building had a much higher percentage of "unusable" space than the guidance shown in the P-80. The revised methodology showed that about 77 percent (55,600 square feet) of the approved 72,300-square-foot addition was justified. Because the Facilities Command received a favorable bid for the project that was 21 percent below the Government estimate and because about 77 percent of the requested space was justified, the Navy awarded the construction contract on September 30, 1994.

**School Operating Costs.** The 6th Reserve Forces Intelligence School (Reserve School), at Fort Huachuca, annually contracted with a local middle school for classroom space and student lunches. The contract covered a 6-week period during June and July. Because of recently completed construction, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center had excess classrooms and dining facilities available. The Army could reduce annual contract and meal costs by $37,000 by moving training from the middle school to Government facilities at Fort Huachuca. Reservists would also benefit from training in a more suitable military environment. When we brought this opportunity to the Army's attention at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, the Army expressed a strong commitment to accommodate the Reserve School in FY 1995.

**Management of Training Functions.** Changes in implementing the Army's and Navy's internal management control programs, ensuring critical tasks are taught, and incorporating training evaluations, may improve overall training effectiveness.

**Internal Management Control Programs.** The U.S. Army Intelligence Center implemented an internal management control program to evaluate internal controls. However, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center did not use established internal control review checklists covering cryptologic/signal intelligence training. Further, the checklists did not include essential controls related to general intelligence. As a result, certain training functions may be vulnerable. For example, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center lacked controls to ensure that Programs of Instruction included critical tasks. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center needs to consider implementing supplementary management control evaluations for the training functions.

The Navy Technical Training Center established an internal management control program, but did not review assessable units pertaining to training for all three
"school houses" at the Center. The reviews did not take place because the internal control administrator at Corry Station tasked only two of the three school houses to review specific assessable units related to training. On December 2, 1994, the Commander, Corry Station, agreed to establish a specific functional category for training and to review all training-related assessable units at each of the school houses.

Assurance that Critical Tasks are Taught. The Air Force had detailed procedures that ensured that critical training tasks, those skills considered necessary to effectively perform an intelligence occupational specialty, were measured to the required level of proficiency. A judgmental sample of 7 of the 12 Air Force intelligence specialties showed all Programs of Instruction contained the critical training tasks. The intelligence specialties reviewed were:

- Intelligence Operator Apprentice (1N031),
- Target Intelligence Apprentice (1N032),
- Apprentice Imagery Interpreter (1N131),
- Crypto Linguist Specialist (Russian) (1N331),
- Signals Intelligence (1N431),
- Intelligence Operations Officer (14N1A), and
- Intelligence Applications Officer (14N1B).

The Navy also had established effective procedures to ensure critical training tasks were included in Programs of Instruction. The Navy reviewed course content every 2 or 3 years.

The Army could improve controls to ensure that critical training tasks are included in the Programs of Instruction. For 6 of the 11 enlisted intelligence occupational specialties managed at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, we compared critical tasks with approved Programs of Instruction for entry-level training developed for both the Active and Reserve Components. The comparison showed minor discrepancies between the critical task lists and the tasks identified in the Programs of Instruction. Furthermore, the same or similar critical tasks often had different identification numbers, making the Army's analysis and oversight more difficult. The intelligence occupational specialties reviewed were:

- Intelligence Analyst (96B),
- Imagery Analyst (96D),
- Counterintelligence Agent (97B),

9 Cryptology, Electronic Warfare, and Optics and Instrumentation.
o Interrogator (97E),
o CounterSIGINT [Signals Intelligence] Specialist (97G), and
o Noncommunications Interceptor (98J).

Training Evaluations. The course evaluation procedures conducted by the Training Evaluation Division at Goodfellow Air Force Base were exemplary. Both graduates and their supervisors received survey questionnaires about 2 to 5 months after graduation. In FY 1994, 82 percent of the surveys were returned. The Training Evaluation Division used completed surveys to improve course content and to ensure that critical tasks required in operational units were being taught. The Training Evaluation Division also produced a Training Evaluation Report for each course about every 2 years that summarized graduates' performance against required standards. The report provided an objective overview of each training course and was useful for training staff working groups, such as the Signals Intelligence Training Advisory Committee, in verifying that required critical tasks were being taught.

The Army's postgraduate training evaluation system used at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center was not fully effective because the move of intelligence training from Fort Devens, Massachusetts, to Fort Huachuca disrupted the system. The Army continued to improve the system during FY 1994 after Army intelligence training at Fort Devens was consolidated at Fort Huachuca.

As an alternative to post-graduate survey questionnaires, the Navy encouraged its personnel to identify training deficiencies using a standard form for input into the Navy Training Feedback System (Feedback System). As deficiencies were submitted, responsible personnel forwarded them through the chain of command to the Chief, Naval Education and Training, for input into the Feedback System data base, which was also available to fleet commanders. Additionally, the Naval Training Requirements Review identified training discrepancies, but did not submit the deficiencies to the Feedback System. As a result, the Feedback System cannot identify, consolidate, and resolve all training deficiencies within the Navy. When the issue was brought to the Navy's attention at Corry Station, the Navy agreed a problem existed and planned to take appropriate corrective action to ensure that the Feedback System contained all reported training deficiencies.

Management Comments

We provided a draft of this report to the addressees on February 3, 1995. Because the report contains no findings and recommendations, no comments were required and none were received. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.
The courtesies extended to the audit staff are appreciated. If you have questions on the audit, please contact Mr. Harrell D. Spoons, Audit Program Director, at (703) 604-9575, (DSN 664-9575) or Mr. Marvin L. Peek, Audit Program Manager, at (703) 604-9587, (DSN 664-9587). The planned distribution of this report is listed in Enclosure 2. Audit team members are listed on the inside back cover.

Robert J. Lieberman
Assistant Inspector General for Auditing

Enclosures
Organizations Visited or Contacted

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Reinvestment and Base Realignment and Closure), Washington, DC
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence and Security), Washington, DC
Resources Directorate, Washington, DC
Policy Directorate, Washington, DC
Intelligence Program Support Group, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), Washington, DC
Readiness and Training Directorate, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness), Washington, DC

Department of the Army

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Washington, DC
Personnel Division, Office of the Chief Army Reserve, Rosslyn, VA
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA
U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, AZ
Manpower Activity, Western Region, Fort Sill, OK
Headquarters, Army Reserve Command, Atlanta, GA
6th Reserve Forces Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, AZ
214th Military Intelligence Company, U.S. Army Reserves, Owings Mills, MD
338th Military Intelligence Battalion, U.S. Army Reserves, Fort Meade, MD
Army National Guard Readiness Center, Arlington, VA
629th Military Intelligence Battalion, Maryland National Guard, Laurel, MD

Department of the Navy

Office of the Navy Comptroller, Washington, DC
Chief, Naval Education and Training, Pensacola, FL
Commander, Training Command, Atlantic Division, Norfolk, VA
Fleet Combat Training Center, Dam Neck, VA
Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, Dam Neck, VA
Naval Technical Training Center, Corry Station, FL
Director of Naval Intelligence, Suitland, MD
Headquarters, Naval Security Group Command, Washington, DC
Headquarters, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Alexandria, VA
Atlantic Division, Norfolk, VA

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(Page 1 of 2)
Organizations Visited or Contacted

Department of the Navy (Cont'd)

Commander, Naval Intelligence Reserve Command, Dallas, TX
  Reserve Intelligence Area 15, Norfolk, VA
  Reserve Intelligence Area 19, Andrews Air Force Base, MD
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA

Department of the Air Force

Directorate of Resource Management, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Washington, DC
Force Management Division, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Washington, DC
Headquarters, Air Force Education and Training Command,
  Randolph Air Force Base, TX
  17th Training Wing, Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX
Air Force Intelligence Agency, Kelly Air Force Base, TX
Air National Guard Readiness Center, Andrews Air Force Base, MD

Defense Organizations

Defense Intelligence Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, DC
  Joint Military Intelligence College
  Joint Military Intelligence Training Center
NationalCryptologic School, National Security Agency, Friendship Heights, MD
Central Imagery Office, Vienna, VA

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(Page 2 of 2)
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Audit Team Members

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Thomas F. Gimble
Harrell D. Spoons
Marvin L. Peek
Adrienne B. Brown
Jenniffer F. Wilson
Oscar San Mateo
Lynn A. Bartolotta
Charles R. Thompson
Michael E. Monk
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Nancy C. Cipolla
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