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ALGERIA

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International Affairs

FIS Connections With France ‘Confirmed’
93AF0112B Algiers LIBERTE in French 11 Oct 92 p 4

[Article: “Finally an Admission! The ‘Local FIS’ and Its Supporters in France”: first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]

[Text] The admissions of Hocine Abderrahim have confirmed the existence of a coalition between elements of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] in France and local terrorists to imperil Algeria.

Hocine Abderrahim, the “brains” of the carnage at Houari Boumediene Airport, has revealed, among other things, that a relationship truly existed between the local FIS and its supporters in France.

Contacts between Said Mekhloufi and Kamredinne Kherbane and Sahraoui Abdelkader, his stooges living in France, and Hachemi Sahnouni, spiritual leader of “Hidja oua Takfiri,” were handled by a certain Djamel Hamaz. It was already known that elements of the FIS had never stopped their activities on the two sides of the Mediterranean. However, little was known about Kamredinne Kherbane, also known as Abou Rabah, 37 years old, a member of the fringe group in “exile” in France. Kamredinne Kherbane is reportedly a former Air Force pilot. Arrested in 1985 for being in Bouial’s armed movement, he was released in 1987. He completed his training as a terrorist in Afghanistan, together with Hekmatyar.

When he returned to Algeria, he was a violent preacher in the Casbah. Then he joined the Majliss Echoura [Advisory Council] of the FIS. After the events of June 1991 he fled with Said Mekhloufi and established the splinter group called, “Les fideles au serment” [Those faithful to the oath].

After the the FIS congress in Batna, he was dropped from the Advisory Council and devoted himself to the recruitment and training of what are called the “Algerian Afghans,” thanks to the support that he found in Iran and in Sudan, in particular.

After the legislative elections, he settled in France. He was active in the organization of the Afghan connection and in collecting funds.

He is one of the contacts with Said Mekhloufi, who reportedly is at present “exiled” in Jordan, where he is concerned with the training of young Algerians in Islamist camps.

Kamredinne Kherbane and Said Mekhloufi, who are directly implicated at the present time in acts of terrorism, wanted to set up an organization in France and in other countries that might even bring them to power in Algeria. Hocine Abderrahim had this same ambition.

Salamanque: Content of French Document Noted
93AF0144A Algiers HEBDO LIBERE in French 14-20 Oct 92 p 18

[Boldface words as published]

[Text] In a compromising document, the French Government is revealed to be preparing for an Islamist rise to power. Although the French foreign ministry has played down its confidential memorandum, which was leaked to public knowledge at the time of a meeting between France and Spain attended by Roland Dumas, it is easy to understand why the document is considered highly informative of the way in which Paris views the evolving political situation in the Maghreb, particularly in Algeria.

It analyzes the situation and seems to conclude that an Islamist government in Algiers is a strong possibility, asking its European partners to prepare themselves for that possibility, albeit without presupposing what the future may bring.

A summary of the document is given below. Ever since the Spanish daily EL PAIS published the memorandum, Paris has barely acknowledged its authorship. Let anyone jump to conclusions about the present or the future...

The memorandum, a working paper presented by the French at an interministerial meeting with Spain in Salamanque on 28 and 29 September 1992, analyzes the threats to stability in the Maghreb, the causes of those threats, and remedies.

The first section of the document deals with possible threats to stability in the Maghreb. It lays out three sets of destabilizing factors present in the region. The first consists of demographic pressures, which hinder demographic growth [as published]. Noting that the population has doubled or tripled in the past thirty years in combination with a high rate of migration from rural to urban areas, the document states that the impact of the current decline in growth will not be felt for another generation. Meanwhile, social infrastructure such as housing and schools is falling farther behind; farm output is unable to keep pace with population growth; and unemployment is rising at a considerable rate.

Second, Islamic fundamentalism has gained ground in Algeria and Tunisia. The two countries have differed in their responses to the fundamentalist phenomenon. Nonetheless, the document observes, the factors that allowed fundamentalism to spread are still in place and it may spread further despite governmental efforts to curb it.

According to the document, this state of affairs is compounded by a tendency of the ruling circles in these countries to appropriate power and to cling to their privileges.
Last, under the heading of destabilizing factors subject to external influences, the document finds that income differences between northern and southern Mediterranean countries have fueled a temptation among North Africans to emigrate (even illegally) as well as a resentment of western Europe, which favors former Socialist countries in granting economic aid.

On the other hand, the document emphasizes that the Maghreb is not free from the influence of Middle Eastern countries. It cites the training of Islamists by Sudan, Saudi Arabian financing of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], and Iranian influences.

In its much longer second section, the document focusses on possible responses by the countries of the European Community.

It begins with the observation that emigration from the countries of the Maghreb is no longer an adequate release mechanism for the economic pressures they are experiencing. In any case, France's policy emphasizes limits on immigration. Granting entry to North African political opponents, considered a laxist policy, is viewed unfavorably by these countries and is a source of frustration. Given that context, the document calls for Europeans to study jointly the effects that an Islamist accession to power would have on immigration.

In other matters, the document is more categorical. It states that the massive surge of the Islamist phenomenon must be seen as cultural and spiritual phenomenon, a rejection of the abuses and failings of a governing power incapable of bringing about harmonious social and economic development within a failed political framework. Islamism is seductive and the only country seemingly in control of the situation is Morocco.

In the event that Islamist parties win power, the document recommends close scrutiny of the economic policies of these parties, as the platforms offers few specifics.

In Algeria's case, the memorandum appears to assert that there is a strong possibility of an Islamist rise to power. At least, it is noted that whatever happens in Algeria's still fragile situation will determine the stability of neighboring Maghreb states. The recommended stance? Reserve and vigilance, combined with an effort to secure room for maneuver in the future.

Salamanque: France Warns of FIS Expansion
93AF0123A Algiers L'OBSERVATEUR in French 14-20 Oct 92 p 4

[Article: “Salamanque Meeting As Reported in Spanish Press”; first two paragraphs are L'OBSERVATEUR introduction]

[Text] On 1 October 1992 EL PAIS, the principal newspaper in Madrid, carried the headline: “France Suggests to Spain To Prepare Itself for a Fundamentalist, Islamic Government in Algiers.”

On 2 October 1992 EL PAIS carried the headline: “Paris States It Does Not Share the View That There Will Be An FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] Victory in Algeria.”

France is predicting a rise of Muslim fundamentalism in the Maghreb area, particularly in Algeria, and is encouraging Spain and its other partners in the European Economic Community to prepare themselves to deal with a seizure of power by the FIS in the last of its former North African colonies. This warning was contained in a working document entitled: “The Threats to the Stability of the Maghreb Countries.” It was presented by the French delegation to the Franco-Spanish ministerial seminar held in Salamanque at the beginning of this week and in the course of speeches made by high-level officials of the Quai d'Orsay (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

According to diplomats who attended this meeting, Spain shares this pessimistic view, in large part. In the view of the French delegation, Islamic fundamentalism is making progress in Algeria and Tunisia, despite government repression. This progress is all the more worthy of note since the social and economic causes that favor its expansion not only exist but are growing. External causes are being added to the internal reasons for this progress. In the view of certain observers, these external causes include the financing of the FIS by Saudi Arabian leaders and the military training of its members in Sudan.

In the view of other observers a growing contact with Europe through television (Algerian urban residents receive French television channels) is creating an awareness of the difference between Europe and Algeria and is increasing collective frustration.

Islamic Tide

Faced with an advancing Islamic tide, the reaction of the armed forces and of the dominant groups in Algeria consists of trying to keep their privileges by seizing power. In Algeria, for example, the government formed after the murder last June of President Mohamed Boudiaf is filled with the dogmas of the FLN [National Liberation Front], the single political party. It gives a major role to the state and blocks any opening up of the economy.

The French study proposes to the Spanish side the preparation of a joint review on the repercussions of a seizure of power by the FIS; on immigration from Algeria—this forecast reported a massive flight of university students; what the European reaction should be, taking into account foreseeable restrictions on civil rights; and the risk of contagion of the rest of the Maghreb area. At the same time a question is raised about becoming better acquainted with the economic orientation of the Islamists which, for the moment, is not clear in terms of their program, and to what extent it would be harmful to Western interests.
Anticipating this study, the French delegation, led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas, recommended maintaining a coordinated and vigilant attitude in terms of restrictions on the issuance of visas, on the assumption that the phenomenon of terrorism will appear. However, it recommends maintaining room for maneuver to avoid shocking the FIS immediately.

AFP reports that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared on 1 October that the French study concerning the possibility of a seizure of power by the FIS in Algeria is not an official document and does not reflect, in any way, the position of the French Government.

Juan Lena, the director of the Bureau of Diplomatic Information of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirmed, when he left Madrid, that the paper was “an informal, working document that absolutely does not commit either the Spanish or the French Governments, which do not share its views.”

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that the published text of the document in just a simple study paper aimed at encouraging discussion at a meeting of French and Spanish ambassadors in the Maghreb area, which preceded the opening of the interministerial seminar. He emphasized that the assumptions covered in it were not taken into consideration by the two governments.

Regional Affairs

Ties To Tourabi, Regime Criticized
93AF0149C Algiers LIBERTE in French 15 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Lamine Chikhi: “Barakat!”]

[Text] How are Algeria’s interests served by maintaining diplomatic relations with a country that interferes in Algeria’s internal affairs at every opportunity?

Why should Algeria maintain ties to a country that is known and acknowledged to be a forward base for international terrorism?

The country in question is Sudan. The regime in Khartoum offers sanctuary to “radical Islamism,” to borrow the apt definition by the famous authority on Islam, Bruno Etienne.

The regime has reduced its citizens to mere subjects. In yesterday’s edition, LIBERTE published a full report of the heinous crimes committed by Mr. Omar El-Bechir.

Moreover, the Sudanese people are grappling with enormous domestic problems. The civil war is ravaging the country and the southern John Garang has no intention of surrendering his weapons.

Thousands are dying from starvation and humanitarian aid organizations face extraordinary difficulties in getting convoys of food and medication to their destinations.

This is a far cry from the land once known as the breadbasket of Africa.

In addition, Sudan’s spiritual leader, Mr. Hassan Tourabi, continues to advocate the destabilization of “brotherly countries” like Algeria and Egypt. According to observers, the Islamist International will attempt at all costs to “conquer” Egypt, which it considers a key country.

Indeed, a quick glance at a map of the region reveals that Tehran, as instigator, and Khartoum, as executor, are attempting to encircle Egypt with the ultimate aim of suffocating it.

In fact, the regime in Khartoum is nothing more than a pawn in the hands of the mullahs. The training camps in Sudan, which draw young Islamists from all corners of the Arab world, offer additional proof that Mr. Tourabi’s supporters intend to destabilize the entire region.

Need it be recalled that the revelations by Mr. Hocine Abderrahim (chief of staff to Mr. Abassi Madani) leave no doubt that Sudan had a role in the attack on the Houari Boumediene airport?

What else must happen before we break off relations with Mr. Hassan Tourabi and Mr. Omar El-Bechir?

At this juncture, Algeria needs to restore its international image, which was tarnished by a decade of the politics of prestige in contradiction with the interests of our people.

It is not for the Sudanese or the Iranians to instruct us as to how to behave.

The times call for realpolitik. Let us act quickly to restore Algeria’s lost credibility.

Internal Affairs

Jamaat-E-Tabligh Membership, Ideology Discussed
93AF0149A Algiers LIBERTE in French 14 Oct 92 p 2

[Text] The organization “Jamaat-E-Tabligh” is known by that name in India, although in New Delhi, it used to be called Nizamuddin, after the district where it is based. Jamaat-E-Tabligh, a society whose mission is to propagate the message of Islam, was founded in India by Maulana Mohamed Llyas at about the same time that Hassan El Bana founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1927-1928). But they took different approaches, reflecting their different environments: Hassan El Bana, in the majority Muslim society of Egypt, denounced the regime in power, accusing them of betraying the message of the Koran, and called for believers to overthrow them through violence, if necessary.

By contrast, in an India pervaded by Hinduism, Mohamed Llyas preached that Muslims should follow the example of the Prophet. He instructed Muslims to
display their faith in their outward behavior, including their style of dress, to bring back the marks of distinction that had been lost.

The movement, which attempts to win new followers to Wahhabism and is financed primarily by Saudi Arabia, has seen its activities take on considerable scope in recent years. Those activities have triggered strong reactions from Hindu circles and government officials.

The fundamentalist Jamaat-E-Islami received greater support from various Muslim circles in the period following 1947.

The ideology of these two movements centers on encouraging Muslims to practice their religion. They oppose territorial nationalism and secular government, and they discourage Muslims from taking part in the democratic political process. Jamaat-E-Tabligh spread through Europe in the 1960's under the name of faith and practice [as published]. The latter holds an annual convention in Dacca (Bangladesh) and is active in various countries of the world:

- Asia: primarily in India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burma;
- Europe: primarily in Great Britain and France;
- Middle East and the Gulf: Saudi Arabia and Jordan;
- Africa: the countries of the Maghreb, Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, and Tanzania;
- North America: the United States
- Oceania: Australia.

Jamaat-E-Tabligh receives a constant stream of Muslims visitors from all corners of the globe.

Algerians travel there from France or Algeria. During their stay in India, all their needs are taken care of by Jamaat-E-Tabligh.

Foreign visitors are first welcomed at the headquarters of Jamaat-E-Tabligh located in Nizamudin, Delhi, after which they are divided into groups made up of different nationalities. A leader (emir) is named to head each group.

The group members undergo religious training and are then assigned to a region of India or abroad to propagate the Islamic faith in accordance with pre-established guidelines and a set program.

Prior to the Gulf War, Algerians traveled to New Delhi by taking the following route:

- Algiers to Tunis on Air Algeria;
- Tunis-Moscow-Delhi on Aeroflot.

Since the Gulf War, the following route is taken:

- Algiers to Tunis or Rabat on Air Algeria;
- Tunis or Rabat to Rome on Alitalia;
- Rome-Karachi-Delhi on PIA (Pakistan Airlines)

Others make the round trip on Saudia Airlines, which makes a stop-over in Jidda.

Algerians who belong to “Jamaat-E-Tabligh” usually travel to Rabat or Tunis to obtain the visas required for entering Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. It seems that they avoid approaching the Pakistani and Saudi Arabian embassies in Algiers, fearing that they could be seen or discovered. After they return to their home countries, the members of Jamaat-E-Tabligh are prime candidates for recruitment by Islamist movements.

Jamaat-E-Tabligh is headed by Maulana Inamul Hassan. He is assisted by Asad Madani Syed, Ahmed Hashmi, and Maulana Mohamed Ali Qassimi.

The 70-year-old Maulana Inamul Hassan is also known as “Hazratji.” In 1965, he succeeded the organization’s second emir, the late Maulana Mohamed Yusuf, son of the founder, Maulana Mohamed Llyas.

Figures Show Students Abroad Not Returning
93AF0122A Algiers L’OBSERVATEUR in French 14-20 Oct 92 p 18

[Article by Nachida Benhamour: “Brain Drain”; first paragraph is L’OBSERVATEUR introduction]

[Text] According to statistics provided by the Ministry of Higher Education, 50 percent of the students who leave Algeria for study abroad do not return. Until recently, the state had no strategy to review arrangements to be made to ensure the return of these students.

They tell us that sending students abroad is based “on real needs.” Students in training for a certain number of years are completely cut off from their home atmosphere, often to the detriment of their studies. When they find themselves in positions where advanced technologies are involved, they are, of course, open to recruitment by the countries where they are studying and often by large business firms. The offers of employment made to them are so attractive that they are not at all tempted to return to their country of origin. However, is their country of origin only able to provide them with the material means necessary to take care of them? The absence of an environment adequate to encourage their return home delays their reintegration into their own society.

These are the essential elements presented by responsible officials in the education sector, who add that these problems, in fact, are felt in all of the countries of the Third World.

There is nothing about this, in short, which was not already known.

The novelty probably comes from an increased sensitivity of the Algerian authorities to the phenomenon currently called the “Brain Drain.”

The first signs appeared in 1991, when the Ministry of Higher Education announced a forthcoming halt to long-term training programs abroad. More recently, Ali
Challal, who is on the staff of the Office of the Presidency, stated that, "One of the major concerns of the government is considering ways of bringing back to Algeria scientifically trained people who are living abroad."

In fact, this tendency goes back further. It was noticed in 1987. At that time Decree 87-29 of 8 September introduced more rational considerations for study abroad:

- An end to sending people abroad for undergraduate study.
- Sending people abroad for postgraduate study in better targeted sectors, making it possible also to follow their educational progress.

The results were not long in making themselves felt. Beginning with the school year 1987-88 the number of students sent abroad for training fell by almost half, declining from a record of more than 6,000 students in 1985-86 to less than 3,000 students in 1987-1988 (see table below).

A new stage was reached during the present, academic year. An overall program aimed at stopping the losses began to make some progress. It was based on the reform of the practice of sending student teachers abroad. Moreover, candidates for training abroad must be registered simultaneously in an Algerian and in a foreign university. This pressure is intended to resolve the "classic" problems of degree equivalency.

Furthermore, candidates for training abroad must be sponsored simultaneously by a codirector of research in Algeria and his opposite number in the country providing the training.

The advantage anticipated from this "alternate" kind of training is savings in foreign exchange that will make it possible, on the one hand, to obtain documents and laboratory equipment, and, on the other hand, to obtain invitations of very highly qualified, Algerian lecturers who will supervise the students and will become members of national research teams.

We are told that this experiment began in September 1992 with teachers and will eventually be applied to sending students, for whom standards are under study.

An ambitious project has just been undertaken, which will be the crowning achievement of this new strategy. It will involve setting up a master file of qualified Algerians living abroad. This is the first stage of an effort aimed at making use of this potential, reported to be of considerable size, by inviting, first of all, Algerians living abroad to return to the country as lecturers and finally encouraging them to supervise postgraduate students, in the expectation that these initial contacts will end with the return of qualified Algerians living abroad.

Role, Influence of La Daawa Discussed
93AF0149B Algiers LIBERTE in French 14 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Ghania Khelifi: "La Daawa and Its Support Network in Algeria"—first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]
La Daawa Oua El-Tabligh, the international organization of subversive preachings supported by a host of religious associations engaged in undefined activities [sentence as published]. La Daawa—the political manifestation of the “Islamist International”—opened the way for terrorism and violence in Algeria. Those of its leaders who are still active will not remain so for long. The state will henceforth have “a right to monitor” La Daawa.

The Algerian Islamist movement eventually evolved into political parties—the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], Hamas, and Nahda—but it could not have done so without the extensive groundwork laid by associations and groups engaging in propaganda and indoctrination of future party activists. In a sense, La Daawa is the wellspring of these parties.

Hamas became active long before it gained the stature of a political party, thanks to the charitable organization El-Irchad Oua El-Islah, which lent a facade of religious education and charitable activities to the rallies and meetings (at the Harchal hall, in particular) at which its leader, Mahfoud Nahnah, propounded his political program. The FIS worked through the intermediary of countless religious associations before the party itself was created in March 1989. The FIS accomplished its task of recruiting and infiltrating all segments and levels of society largely through La Daawa. Publications such as “Assuna Wa Charia,” “Ahl Attallah,” “Jamaat Attallah,” and foremost among them “Al Daawa” invaded the streets, the schools, companies, and families.

The current government has realized the danger in leaving La Daawa to the associational movement built by an outlawed political party and by Islamist leaders who pose a great threat.

The proliferation of religious associations during Chadli’s presidency cannot be brought under control unless the state has the right to monitor the content of their educational missions, the source of their funding, and their contacts abroad.

The missions of La Daawa are to preach the good word, to teach and interpret the Koran and the Sunna for believers, and to “initiate the generations” into Islam in an “honest manner.” La Daawa was diverted from those missions by the fundamentalist international and its Algerian followers. The international does not resort to politics, but it has relied on political parties in various countries. Its representatives in Algeria are Djaballah and Nahnah (both of whom are members of the Muslim Brotherhood).

The international organization “Daawa Oua El-Tabligh” has powerful networks in Algeria and in the Algerian immigrant community in France where it is said to have more than 3,000 preachers who use the Omar Mosque in Paris as their base of operations. In the name of working to achieve “Sahwa” [awakening] for Muslims, La Daawa has at times expressed itself through violence in Algeria: punitive raids on “places of debauchery” (hotels and restaurants), attacks against women, heavy-handed remonstrants of lost souls, and a plethora of writings sold in bookstores across the entire country with the blessing of the governmental authorities in the 1980’s. One who distinguished himself at these types of activity was Djaballah, working through his charitable organization Nahda (the name eventually given to the political party).

But it was in the schools and mosques that La Daawa, as advocated by the Islamist movement, won its greatest victories in the effort to achieve Islamist political policies. After gaining a hold over most mosques in the early 1980’s, its leaders revealed their true nature and pursued the goal of an Islamic Republic. With the group “La Daawa” in the west, “Ahl E-Daawa” in the south, and a multitude of associations in the country’s central section, this International of subversive preachings gained a solid foothold in Algeria.

Before the turbulent FIS, its affiliate was la Rabita, led by famous sheikhs such as Abdellatif Soltani and Djebar El-Djazairi, teacher to Ali Benhadj. La Rabita declared Abassi Madani, another member of La Daawa, persona non grata because he disagreed with the group over the political approach to be taken to the Islamic question. The desire for action would later cause several others to break with La Rabita. In the early 1980’s, La Daawa received a new boost from the Iranian example and the accommodating attitude of the Algerian government, including the interior ministry.

The interior ministry granted legal status to every religious association that applied for it during this period. The ministry also permitted fund raising and the organization of special week-long events and exhibitions. Most significant of all, it allowed the mosques to be used for unrestrained activism.

Sermons increasingly called for violence; control over the university was secured through proselytism; and efforts were made to win over the needy. The setting could not have been more favorable to the International of La Daawa: a conciliatory and laxist government, a population outraged by abuses of power, and—most important of all—a generous supply of funds from abroad.

Abassi Madani and Nahnah (to name only two Islamist leaders) openly attended Islamist conferences held in various Western capitals. La Daawa had only to wait for a few political parties to be legalized in order to move into high gear and armed action. By granting legal status to the FIS, Chadli Bendjeddid in effect armed the preachers of La Daawa.

Wilayas Restructured To Consolidate Authority
93AF0122D Algiers EL WATAN in French 7 Oct 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Abderrahmane Hayane: “New Governors Installed in Office; What Are the Prospects for Algiers?”; first two paragraphs are EL WATAN introduction]
[Text] The imposing building on Zighout Youcef Boulevard, in the center of Algiers, has new occupants. Their role in a very difficult economic and political situation is to clear away the old system covering relationships between the administration and the people.

This form of organization and operation of the various structures of government needs change. Therefore, a reorganization was more than merely desirable.

As a result Mohamed Hardi, minister of the interior and of local government, on 6 October presided over the installation in office of Maghlaui Mohamed as governor of the province of Algiers, replacing Meziane Cherif, who had held that position since 1990; Seriak Lahcene, deputy governor for security and public order; and Akkache Nacerredine, secretary general of the province, with the personal rank of governor. Maghlaui, a deputy in the National People’s Assembly from 1987 to 1991, was also minister delegate for housing in the Ghozali cabinet.

Senak Lahcene was chief of the daira [region] of Illizi in 1986 and then chief of the daira of El-Tarf in 1987. Senak is a graduate of the ENA [National School of Administration in France] and was governor of the province of Tiaret in 1990. Akkache Nacerredine is also a graduate of the ENA and was governor of the province of Ain-Temouchent in 1990. The ceremony at which these officials were installed in office took place in the presence of Toiba, minister delegate of public security, officials of the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice, and of the province of Algiers.

According to a communiqué of the Ministry of the Interior, these new appointments will be followed by similar designations in the provinces of Oran, Constantine, and Annaba. They are justified by concern for better handling of the administrative, economic, social, public order, and security areas. The communiqué indicated, among other things, that, “This new organization...has as its principal objective the consolidation of the authority of the state so that it can respond more effectively to the numerous concerns of the ordinary citizen, particularly in terms of living standards, the preservation of the environment, and the reorganization of the systems of public service pertaining to local government.”

This reorganization will be clearly reflected in strengthening and improving the quality of personnel in local government, strengthening the authority of the state, and providing for better administration of the provinces affected by this new type of organization.

We should recall that provisions for the appointment of deputy governors for security and the elevation of the positions of secretaries general of provinces to the personal rank of governor were contained in an executive decree signed by Prime Minister Belaid Abdesselam, dated 14 September and appearing in Issue No. 67 of the JOURNAL OFFICIEL (J.O.).

In Article 1 this decree reconfirms the powers of the governor in the general administration of a province. His authority will thus continue to extend to officials in charge of special missions within the cabinet in the Office of the Secretary General and in the Office of General Affairs and Operations.

The governor will continue to preside over local government and to coordinate the activities of the various administrations. The post of deputy governor for security, on the other hand, will stand alone. This official will have the traditional powers of the governor of a province. Although the new deputy governor for security will act under the supervision of the governor, he will have the same, statutory powers and receive the same pay as the governor.

The changes in the powers previously delegated to governors do not cover their security aspects, at least in the four provinces affected by the decree.

Moreover, the new position of the governor includes under his administrative supervision the principal security services in the four most heavily populated provinces of the country. Finally, informed sources indicate that on 7 October Minister of the Interior Hardi will install Kadri, former governor of the province of Saïda, in office as the new governor of the province of Oran. He will also install Melizi, former governor of the province of Medea, in office as deputy governor for security and public order in the province of Oran, the capital of the western area of the country. Appointments are still pending for the cities of Constantine and Annaba.

**Walis Named To Oversee Security, Public Order**

**93AF0122C Algiers EL WATAN in French 7 Oct 92 p 3**

[Text] In the near future the wilayas of Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Annaba will each have a wilaya delegate [deputy governor] for security and public order.

The reclassification of the function of secretary general in these provinces has also been decided on. Subsequently, they will have a wali [governor].

A communiqué issued by the Ministry of the Interior and Local Communities stated that, “This reorganization principally involves strengthening and improving the staffing of government and management in these provinces.”

According to the ministry, this new organization has, as its “principal objective the consolidation of the authority of the state so that it can respond more effectively to the numerous concerns of the ordinary citizen, particularly in terms of living standards, the preservation of the environment, and the reorganization of the systems of public service pertaining to local government.”
Installation in Office of 3 Governors in Algiers

On 6 October Minister of the Interior Mohamed Hardi presided over the installation in office of Maghaoui Mohmed, governor of the province of Algiers; Seriak Lahcene, deputy governor for security and public order; and Akkache Nacerredine, secretary general of the province with the personal rank of governor. This was indicated in a communiqué from the Ministry of the Interior and Local Government.

Elsewhere in the communiqué it was stated that the minister of the interior and of local government will soon preside over the same kind of installation ceremony in the province of Oran.

It may be recalled that new rules of organization and operation have been approved for the provinces of Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Annaba, concerning their respective organs and structures. This has been done to ensure better control of the various areas under them, including administrative, economic, and social activity, as well as security and public order.

Following are brief sketches of the careers of the governor, the deputy governor for security and public order, and the secretary general of the province of Algiers, who were installed in office on 6 October by the minister of the interior and of local government:


Akkache Nasserredine - Graduate of ENA. Senior positions held include: chief of the daira of Beni-Saf, 1983; chief of the daira of Cheria, 1987; and governor of Ain-Temouchent, 1990.

‘Rights of Man’ Leagues on Antiterrorist Law

Each organization analyzes the text of this law according to its own view of this phenomenon and the means of eradicating it.

In the view of Maitre [Attorney] Ali Yahia Abdenour, president of the Algerian League for the Defense of the Rights of Man, this legislative decree specifically provides for summary procedures and special courts, which will lead to abuses and to improper practices. According to him, “This decree does not respect the constitution and the rules of behavior that it implies. It brings us back to a past that we thought was long gone, with the establishment of three special courts that strangely remind us of the former State Security Court.” Still according to Ali Yahia, “The decree is contrary to the constitution and to international treaties ratified by Algeria.”

Furthermore, the president of the LADDDH considers that Article 43 of the Decree of 30 September 1992 contradicts the provisions of law, because matters under investigation or being tried can be transferred to the special court at the simple request of the attorney general. The other point brought up by Ali Yahia Abdenour concerns the period allowed for arrest without trial and its extension to 12 days. Ali Yahia states that this is a violation of the rights of man, since the constitution, in Article 45, limits detention without trial to 48 hours and to eight days under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The president of the LADDDH thinks that, “The security of the people cannot in any case be interpreted as requiring the violation of their freedom.” He also asked how the HCE [Higher State Council], which holds both executive and legislative power, can change laws approved by a legally constituted National Assembly.” President Ali Yahia concluded: “The security duties that fall on the state must be carried out in respect for the rights of man, the dignity of the human person, and his physical and moral integrity.”

Maitre Fathallah, president of the Algerian League for the Rights of Man, takes a rather favorable view of the antiterrorist decree. He considers, in a statement published by HORIZONS, an evening newspaper, that the text of the decree as adopted relates to an exceptional situation and that the law on terrorism flows from the constitution. He stated: “As a militant supporter of the rights of man, I cannot be either for or against decrees that conform to the law.”

Fairness of New Antiterrorist Law Questioned

[Article by Tahar Hani: “Antiterrorist Law: ‘Rights of Man’ Leagues Split”; first two paragraphs are EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Since the signature of the law on the struggle against subversion and terrorism the LADDDH [Algerian League for the Rights of Man] and the LADDDH [Algerian League for the Defense of the Rights of Man], two organizations supporting human rights, read the text of the decree differently.

[Article by Abed Charef: “From One Hatred to Another”; first paragraph is L'OBSERVATEUR introduction]

[Text] Incapable of speaking to each other and even less of loving one another, the Algerians prefer to hate each other. And it is the most official channels, such as
television, and the political parties that today call on us to hate "the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] of Hatred."

"They should be cut up into little bits." "They should be shot publicly at 5 July Stadium." "They are not Muslims. There is no need to try them. They should be executed on the spot."

This is the way that Algerians from all walks of life and from everywhere in the country expressed themselves after the pictures were shown of the leaders of the attack at Houari Boumediene Airport. The cruelty of the words used by this considerable number of people is largely justified to express their indignation, their anger, and their desire for justice, aroused by the cruelty of the airport attack, a gratuitous act of violence that has no justification, either political or moral or religious.

However, the cruelest aspect in all of that is that things have gone this far, to these extremes, where Algerians kill each other blindly, arousing the hatred of the rest of the Algerian people against them. An airport worker asked us, "How did this pilot, who makes 3.5 million dinars and 500,000 dinars in foreign exchange, become a murderer?" As far as Hocine Abderrahim is concerned, who holds a diploma in political science, with his white 'aaraiqiyah [skullcap] and his desire to explain everything well, he looks more like a teacher at a Koranic school than a terrorist leader. How did these men get this way?

Andre Malraux used to say that condemning people does not mean that you understand them. However, today it seems necessary to understand and to condemn. It is easier to condemn. Moreover, the condemnation of terrorism had been defined as one of the conditions raised by the HCE [Higher State Council] for opening a dialogue with its political partners. No reasonable party can avoid doing this.

Justice or Vengeance

However, moving from that point to turning hatred into a political position is a step that raises problems. When television broadcasts and rebroadcasts these images of hatred, it is a whole state that is turning hatred and anger into absolute values. And no one stands up and shouts loudly and strongly that justice must stand above hatred. Algeria must not take vengeance against those who organized or carried out the airport crime. It must be satisfied with rendering justice. The state is not an organizer of vendettas but is rather the institution that renders justice in the name of justice. And in the case of this figure of speech, there is no kindness in justice. Justice provides the death penalty for such actions.

Even if that were not the case, the new antiterrorist law, signed on 30 September by Ali Kafi, contains particularly severe provisions to fight against violence. The punishments are practically doubled, compared to what was previously contained in the Penal Code. Detention without trial has been extended, and special courts have been established to speed up the procedure. This law strengthens the security aspect of the struggle against fundamentalist violence. However, it raises two problems: it provides a definition of terrorism that can lead to abuses, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it is not accompanied by adequate social and political provisions to reduce the area accessible to terrorism.

For example, the new antiterrorist law defines the following actions as subversive: "interfering with traffic or freedom of movement on public roads and in public places." Here, the reference is clear to the general strike called by the FIS in May and June 1991. However, in a campground where there is no water or in a village where a local leader abuses his power, what recourse do the people have for flagrant injustices? Holding meetings, often organized spontaneously, is a form of protest which has become almost traditional, especially because such actions have become fairly rare today. Is this terrorism?

Another problem: the fact that this action is based almost exclusively on the security aspect of the situation leaves one rather skeptical. In fact, even if the government constantly expresses its willingness to reduce social differences, it seems to have no way of doing that. On the one hand it cannot really improve the living conditions of the mass of the people, because it does not have the resources. Therefore, its efforts cannot be aimed at anything but reducing the living level of the middle class, which seems politically difficult, or punishing those who have money, which is neither enough of a solution, nor is it realistic. The rich are too powerful, too well established in the apparatus of power and in the centers where decisions are made to allow this to go on.

Gaps

This law has no political aspect. Different proposals made in an attempt to broaden the antifundamentalist consensus, including one suggested by Major General Khaled Nezzar, were unsuccessful. A few months ago Gen. Nezzar had spoken of holding discussions with all credible, political partners of the government. However, the dialogue suggested by the HCE remained primarily a monologue, or, what was even worse, a dialogue of the deaf. In fact it is difficult to describe what happened with the FFS [Front of Socialist Forces] in any other way. The FFS published a memorandum addressed to the HCE at a time when the collegial presidency of the country was undertaking a completely different kind of dialogue.

To be able to reach agreement, it is also necessary to talk to each other. That may seem absurd, but when you know the hatreds that have been accumulating among Algerian politicians over the past few decades, the argument becomes a serious one. The term "black decade," used by the new government to describe the Chadli era, is significant. Previously, Chadli's supporters spoke of the "years of lead" to refer to the Boumediene period and the period of Article 120. "Anarchy" was a term used to designate the period of Ben Bella.
The Somali Brothers

Belaid Abdesselam was accused of misappropriation of public funds under Chadli. Today it is Abdesselam who denounces the thieves of the 1980's. He even wrote a book to denounce the "saboteurs" of Algerian industry. Those were the very people who denounced the terrible, external orientation of industry a few years back, which the then prime minister had adopted.

And then, at the top level of the government, Ben Bella called Chadli a thief, and Chadli returned him the favor. So when two of the first three chiefs of state whom the country has had since independence make the same kinds of accusations, there are grounds for having doubts about the politicians who belonged to these groups. Belaid Abdesselam denounced corruption under Chadli, and Belkacem Nabi spoke of corruption during the industrialization era under Abdesselam, without mentioning the "solidarity fund," which allegedly disappeared under Ben Bella. It is so easy to destroy a country and all of its symbols, including its chiefs of state, to advance one's political career. Moreover, this was what the FIS chose to do.

Belaid Abdesselam, Taleb Ibrahimi, Belkacem Nabi, Mohamed Hardi, Chadli Bendjedid, Ahmed Ben Bella, Abdelhamid Brahimi, Sid-Ahmed Ghozali, Ali Belhadj, Hachemi Cherif, and all the others: the hatred accumulated by all of these men generally seems enough to destroy a country. Are they aware of this? Perhaps so, because in the absence of mutual love between Algerian brothers, we have decided to love our Somali brothers. Perhaps this was done to find out what Algeria will be in a short time, if the culture of hatred continues at all levels.

Is all of that pessimistic? Probably so. However, when you see intellectuals of renown, men who have produced generous ideas, fall into step with men fully involved in the hatred of their neighbors, you necessarily ask yourself where our national salvation will come from. So to be able to say that there is always a little hope, let us say that salvation can come from this offer of pardon extended to the repentant. This is, first of all, a political operation that can very well succeed. However, let us find some positive motives in it. Even if it is just to keep up our hopes.

New Law Said To Prompt Terrorist Surrender

93AF0123B Algiers EL WATAN in French
15 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by M.T. Messaoudi: "Terrorism: in Search of Repentance"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] In the view of many terrorists who have joined cells or groups of extremist, the semiclandestine way in which they live, with all of its repercussions on social and family life, has become more and more difficult to bear, and they even find it stifling.

Furthermore, the possibility contained in Article 40 of halting legal prosecution if persons belonging to a terrorist organization surrender to the security services is seen as a way out, to be taken advantage of before the expiration of the waiting period of two months.

Up to now the media have reported three cases of people who "repented" and turned themselves in a few days after the entry into effect of the legislative decree on the fight against subversion and terrorism. In Mila, Batna, and Bordj-Bou-Arreridi three former members of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], who had been actively sought by the security services for the past several months, decided to abandon their uncomfortable position as outlaws, in the hope of finding, once again, the calm of a "normal" life. We are told that, more or less everywhere throughout the country, several persons reportedly have sent letters to the police, to the gendarmerie, and to certain provincial governments in which they expressed their desire to surrender to the courts. The majority of these people reportedly justified their intention by the fact that the ideal in which they believed and that led them to join a terrorist organization, was distorted by "their leaders" to the extent where they were forced to commit acts of gangsterism, such as engaging in rackets, which are contrary to the teachings of Islam. The murderous attack at the Algiers airport and the collusion of the extremist movement with large-scale bandit activity reportedly were mentioned as other reasons for their disillusionment.

On the other hand, search and sweep operations carried out by the security services caught members of terrorist groups still in hiding, with their backs to the wall.

Formation of Armed Groups; Foreign Ties

93AF0112A Algiers LIBERTE in French 10 Oct 92 p 2

[Article: "Armed Groups Have Existed Since the Formation of the FIS; Revelations by Abderrahim"; first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]

[Text] First of all, I regret the loss of human lives, whether the death of policemen, soldiers, gendarmes, or simple citizens. All of these victims were Algerians, children of Algeria. I pray to God that he will grant them his mercy.

Before going into details I would like to look backward and speak of the causes of the present situation. It is well-known publicly that armed groups began to be established during the time when the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] operated within the framework of the law, that is, legally.

It was at that time that the first armed groups were formed. They were set up under the responsibility of Hachemi Sahouni, who was then a member of the Madjles Echoura [Advisory Council], and also Cheikh Ben Azzouz Zebda.
These two men had meetings in the vicinity of Blida, organized by Hachemi Sahnouni, because he was the spiritual leader of the El-hidjra Oua Tekfir group.

Attending these meetings were Meliani, Omar Oulmi, Abdenacer Oulmi, Kamel Ghai, and, at times, Hachemi Sahnouni, Ben Azzouz Zebda, and another brother called Abdelkader Lounis.

Ben Azzouz Zebda, as an influential member and vice president of the FIS, was charged with establishing contacts with Iran and Sudan to set up armed groups, which were to work with Meliani's group. This was as far as the formation of that group was concerned.

After the cancellation of the legislative elections [in 1991] we continued our activities. The Islamic Salvation Front, which was subsequently dissolved but that operated in secret, entered into contact with us through Mohamed Said, Cherrati, Abderrazak Redjam, and Tadjeri. We were not able to meet Med Said for security reasons, as he made clear to us. However, he delegated Cherrati Yekhlef and Abderrazak Redjam, whom I personally met in Hydra, at the home of one of their friends. We talked about the possibility of working together, and they showed that they were ready to help us materially, financially, and morally.

I told them of our desire to obtain weapons—"Klas" [Kalashnikov rifles]. The price for each one was about 5.0 million centimes [50,000 Algerian dinars]. However, I explained to them that we were short of money. Redjam then answered that they were prepared to help us to buy these weapons.

This was done. Redjam sent me 20 million centimes [200,000 dinars] through Laskri Djamel Eddine, one of the brothers. That is as far as my relations went with Redjam and Cherrati, who are representatives of Med Said.

Regarding relations between Said Mekhloufi and Hachemi Sahnouni, the former established contact with the latter through Hamaz Djamel, Hachemi's brother in law, to ask him for help.

Hamaz Djamel set up the contacts when Mekhloufi was in the countryside around Mefia. Sahnouni was then with him.

Hamaz, this same person, was also the "contact" between Mekhloufi and Kamar Eddine Kharben, who represented the armed movement in France. The latter worked in close collaboration with Cheikh Abdelbaki Sahraoui and Abou Aniss, another brother. Sahraoui had the mission of entering into contact with Afghanistan, Iran, and Sudan to obtain weapons and money to supply the groups operating in Algeria. This was the task of Kamareddine, Sahraoui, and Abou Aniss.

Kamareddine sent me a letter stating that the groups in Sudan and Libya were ready to provide us with weapons, but it was first necessary for us to set up a network to transport them between Debdeb and Algiers. That was the only way in which they could send us weapons and assure us of military assistance. That was the mission of Kamarreddine in France.

Azzouza d'El-Oued, another brother who belonged to the Guemmar group, let me know that he was prepared to buy weapons at El-Oued and to send them to the brothers in Algiers. Then I put him in contact with El-Hadj Guettaf Rabah, who had provided the money to obtain the weapons.

The meeting took place at El-Hadj Guettaf Rabah's home on the Rue Khelifa Boukhalfa. Guettaf then sent 3 million pounds sterling to Azzouza.

The weapons were to come through the El-Oued network, which brought them from Sudan and Libya.

However, this operation did not take place, because the network was wiped out, the members put in prison, and the money seized.

However, recently, El-Hadj Guettaf met Azzouza, who repeated his proposal, that is, to obtain weapons from Libya and Sudan, because he knew people in these countries. However, to do this, he had stated two conditions:

- It was necessary to write a letter in the name of the armed movement, signed by Abdelkader Chebouti, to make the transaction official.
- It was also necessary to provide him with six Toyota-type vehicles with drivers, who would travel between Algiers and El-Oued. Once available, they would go to the frontiers to get the weapons.

That is the mission that he was to carry out. He was recently arrested, and, since then, I am not up-to-date on what has happened.

Air Algeria Pilot Suspected in Airport Bombing
93AF0149D Algiers HEBDO LIBERE in French
7-13 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by R. Karimi: "The Terrorist Hachaichi in the Eyes of His Colleagues"]

[Text] The news of Rachid Hachaichi's implication in the bombing of Houari Boumediene Airport has stirred an entire group of professionals: the pilots of Air Algeria. "We knew that he had been arrested. That was a few days ago," two of the pilots told us. "But it never occurred to us that it was part of the investigation into the airport bombing. Hachaichi was an activist in the Islamic trade union, and we thought that was the reason for his arrest."

A captain on Boeing 727s, Rachid Hachaichi was known among fellow pilots as a man of few words, a kind temperament, and keenly interested in the Islamic question. "It is unbelievable that he could have reached such an extreme. It defies the imagination," another pilot told us. "Although we do not all share the same views in this profession, we would never refuse a favor to a colleague."
If Hachaichi had asked me to deliver a parcel to relatives in Paris, Marseille, Lyon, or wherever, I would have done so with complete trust, because among colleagues we have no reason not to trust each other.”

Rachid Hachaichi, a militant Islamist? At Air Algeria, his statements on the subject were not taken seriously, and with good reason: As a bearded man who did not hesitate to talk about taboo matters, Rachid Hachaichi had undergone a radical transformation. Until early 1989, he was known as a veteran when it came to drinking alcohol and spending wild nights in the cabarets of the Algiers coast.

“He could drink two bottles of whiskey in one night. All the barmen and cabaret owners from Bordj-Eil-Kiffan to Ain Taya knew him and will confirm it. So, when he repented and took up prayer, we dismissed his advice as a joke. After all, a man of his past had no right to lecture us.”

Moreover, Hachaichi created a stir at the time of the famous political strike organized by the former FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] in June 1991. “He was an activist in the SIT [expansion not given] and asked us to join in the strike. But he arranged to take his vacation at that time and traveled to Europe with his wife.”

The crowning blow came last Thursday in the report broadcast by ENTV in which Hachaichi is heard responding to questions. “Do you realize what he said? It is an absolute outrage! You have to wonder—Is he schizophrenic? When he was asked to plant a bomb in an airplane, he said that to lose an airplane would be too high a price for his country to pay. He was concerned about the destruction of an aircraft and its economic repercussions, without a thought for the 100 passengers and crew members—his friends—who might be on board.” It is certain that he will not be missed at Air Algeria.

[Box, p 2]

“A Deafening Silence”

It will soon be a week since the revelations about the perpetrators of the bombing at Houari Boumediene Airport, and still nothing has been heard from the political parties and figures (except the PRA [Algerian Renewal Party]). This time, the politicians have kept a low profile, contrary to their usual pattern of seizing every opportunity to gain credit in the eyes of the public.

For months on end, they have pontificated and sputtered about the need to restore the FIS “in one way or another.” They did everything possible to exonerate the FIS of terrorist crimes, planting doubt as to the true identities of assassins. They even attempted to exploit violence “whatever its source” to get back in the saddle behind the FIS.... These bookmakers, in short, now realize that the horse on which they placed all their bets has been disqualified once and for all. The result is total bankruptcy, their entire miserable existence shattered.

The choice now before them could not be more simple: They must leave political life altogether or, if they persist, they might as well openly join the Islamist troops, because no citizen of republican views will be able to trust them.

Status Report on Arrest of Armed Groups
93AF0085B Algiers LIBERTE in French 16 Sep 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: “Twenty MIA Members Still Fleeing”]

[Text] APS—The various operations carried out by the security services seem to be bearing fruit. The Armed Islamist Movement [MIA] is gradually losing its margin for maneuver, and its groups are cut off. In drawing up its balance sheet, the National Gendarmerie gives details concerning the geographical location of these groups and their components.

Members of three groups of the Armed Islamist Movement (MIA)—which are confined to the Algeros region, the Oran region, and the eastern part of the country—are continuing their “subversive” activities by attacking civilians in order to obtain vehicles and money, according to sources close to the High Command of the National Gendarmerie.

The Mitidja group—which has been responsible for the most serious armed attacks, skirmishes, and murders—has been led since the death of Mohamed Allel (“Moh Leveile”) by Abdelkader Layada, a sheet-metal worker by vocation.

Of this group of 42 members only between 10 and 15 remain, according to the Gendarmerie, which says it fears a recrudescence of attacks on civilians “now that the members have lost their principal networks of logistic support.”

According to the confessions of the individuals most recently arrested, members of this group were behind the murder in early September of three [as published] persons, including two gendarmes at Delys, one Gendarmerie commander at Bab-Ezzouar, and one noncommissioned officer at Baida.

Another group of lesser importance—whose existence had not been disclosed previously—consisted originally of from 10 to 15 members. It is operating in the area stretching from Relizane through Tiaret to Oran. Its members—who according to the Gendarmerie have been reduced by half—are led by a certain A. Yahia. The third group—which attempted to base itself in the eastern part of the country—was “neutralized as soon as it was activated,” during the operations at Djemila (Setif) last July. Two of its 12 members succeeded in escaping from the police forces, according to the Gendarmerie.
The same source states that the group "Takfir oua El-Hidjar"—consisting of 20 members—ceased its activities in February 1991. Most of its members—who were originally from Faizi, the old quarter of Bordj El-Bahri (the eastern suburb of Algiers)—have left Algeria.

The security forces estimate the support network for what remains of the MIA's "hard core" at approximately 200 persons.

They believe that this network is composed of unemployed young people or MIA sympathizers whose task is to sabotage the means of production and communication.

The total of weapons not yet recovered is estimated at 170, including 20 Kalashnikovs and Berettas—many of which were stolen from the police forces—and 150 small-caliber weapons supplied by a network that has been identified in the southeastern part of the country.

Of the approximately 19 to 24 hard-core terrorists now being sought, the police forces state that four are classified as especially "dangerous."

To effect their arrest, the gendarmes are planning more operations of the "Khazrouna type" and hope in this way to "surround their hideouts." They interpret the recent upsurge in murders of gendarmes as a desperate reaction to the "severe blow" dealt to the group in the center, which lost 10 of its members in the Bâba Hacene operation of last August.

The Gendarmerie—which has proclaimed itself to be "in a state of war" against every form of terrorism—declares that although most of the terrorists claim allegiance to the Islamist movement, very few of them are members of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]. Instead, it says, they are "manipulated by FIS activists who generally speaking do not involve themselves directly in the armed actions." The forces of the Gendarmerie maintain that the activities of the MIA members are confined to the clandestine leaflets posted in the ablution rooms of the mosques. "The instructions for the acts of violence to be carried out are inscribed in "Minbar El-Djoumoua," "Mihrab El-Djoumoua," and "Enaffr," reproduced by faxing and photocopying.

Still according to the same source, the FIS (which has been dissolved) "has gone beyond participation in acts of violence." Its members have been instructed to use sermons for purposes of indoctrination. In the opinion of the Gendarmerie, the violence that is being expressed today is the result of several years of enrolling members in the majority of Algeria's mosques.

Among those persons implicated in the terrorist actions who have been arrested and interrogated, several chiefs (emirs) have maintained that the "Fatwa" has been issued to "kill all those who wear a kepi" [that worn by police]. Some began their "jihad" at the time of the FIS strike—which they had opposed—in June 1991. Others made their decision after the interruption of the electoral process last December.

Interrogation of Armed Group Members Detailed
93AF0110C Algiers LIBERTE in French 10 Oct 92 p 2

[Article: "On 'Television Journal' at 2000 8 October: Nine Members of an Armed Group Speak..."; first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]

[Text] An armed, terrorist group, important because of its size and the attacks that it has made, has been put out of action by the security services in Constantine. Let us remember that this group was in close contact with another network, which was broken up by the same security services a few days previously.

Among the terrorist acts, which the group in question admitted to having committed, was the murder of Police Commissioner Nabi Rachid, who was killed when he left a mosque on 20 July, and the murder on 9 September of Belazhar Abderrahmane, a university official and a member of the PAGS [Socialist Vanguard Party] and the RPN [National Assembly]. Following is the substance of the interrogation of these individuals, telecast on 8 October at 2000 on the "Television Journal" program.

First suspect:

[Question] State your identity and position.

[Answer] My name is Messaoud Bousouik. I am a primary school principal by occupation. I was a member of the former FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] and after its dissolution I joined the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), which consists of armed groups divided by territorial zone.

[Question] Under what conditions did you join that organization?

[Answer] I was arrested and transferred to the Tsabit Detention Center in the Adrar area, from which I escaped on 26 August 1992. From there I went to Constantine, where I was contacted by a man named Siad and then by Hassan Messai, a leader in the organization who asked me to join them. Which I did.

Second suspect:

[Question] What is your name and occupation?

[Answer] My name is Yallaoui Younes. I am a member of the FIS and a founding member of the SIT [Islamic Trade Union]. I was active in the SNTF [National Railway Transport Company] section in Algiers of the Federation of Transport Workers.

[Question] What was your role in the MIA?

[Answer] I brought leaflets and literature from the FIS in Algiers to Constantine. These leaflets were signed by Hachani or Redjam.
[Question] With whom were you in contact in Algiers?

[Question] To whom did you turn over the documents in Constantine?
[Answer] To Abdelmalek Djeacli, an official at the university.

Third suspect:
[Question] What is your name and occupation?
[Answer] My name is Djeacli Abdelmalek. I am a professor at the Institute of Data Processing at the University of Constantine and I live in the Ziadiya section.

[Question] Do you know Yallaoui Younes?
[Answer] Yes. It is he who turned over to me the leaflets brought from Algiers and for which I was responsible for displaying on the walls of El-Ansar mosque in Ziadiya.

[Question] What else did you do?
[Answer] Together with Yahia, a friend of mine, I set fire to an electricity pole near El-Ansar mosque.

Fourth suspect:
[Question] Your name and occupation?
[Answer] My name is Boutefri Zaheir, and I am a tailor.

[Question] What was your job in the organization?
[Answer] I am not the overall boss. I am the leader of a group that includes, among other people, Djamel and Abdelmalek Djeacli.

[Question] What kind of activities did you carry out?
[Answer] I killed a policeman.

Fifth suspect:
[Question] Who are you?
[Answer] I am Zetti Saouli. I am a member of the FIS and I live in Khouchela, where I am a craftsman.

[Question] What activities did you carry out?
[Answer] I provided weapons to an armed group in Constantine. I obtained these arms from a gunsmith. As far as that is concerned, I put him in contact with Hassan Messai. I am an intermediary.

Sixth suspect: (He did not give his name.)
[Question] What was your role?
[Answer] I was contacted by Zetti Saouli and asked to provide him with weapons, which I did. In fact I sold him 16 automatic pistols, 7.0-mm and 8.0-mm calibers.

[Question] What were they sold for?
[Answer] 14,000 dinars.

[Question] And the ammunition for them?
[Answer] I provided 150 cartridges for 15,000 dinars.

Seventh suspect:
[Question] Who are you?
[Answer] I am Abderhamid Faribel and I am a businessman in Ain M'Lilla. I am a member of the FIS.

[Question] What actions are you guilty of?
[Answer] I collected money for purchasing weapons. In fact, I accompanied Messai to Ain M'Lilla but I did not know the reason for this trip. I did not even get out of the vehicle.

[Question] You state that you do not know the reason for this trip, while, on the other hand, you say that you were collecting funds for the purchase of arms. How could this be possible?
[Answer] (Visibly embarrassed) I know that the weapons were used to carry out attacks against the security forces.

Eighth suspect: (Did not give his name.) I am a neighbor of Nabi Rachi, a police officer. Messai asked me to show him where Nabi Rachi lived.

Ninth suspect:
[Question] Who are you?
[Answer] My name is Abderrazak Boumekab. I am a high school teacher.

[Question] What are you accused of?
[Answer] For several days I provided shelter to two fugitives sought by the police, whom I have not seen since then. Furthermore, Salah Merrouani turned over to me a bomb and a battery, which I hid under my house. Faycal Tebib also gave me a small pistol, and I turned it over to the police.

‘Easy’ Acquisition of Arms Reported
93AF0110B Algiers LIBERTE in French 11 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by Z. Talaouanou: “Traffic in Arms: Shortage of Money? We Know Nothing About It!”; first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]

[Text] A table picturing arms of all kinds has been shown on television during the presentation of a group of people arrested in Constantine.

How can you obtain these kinds of weapons so easily?

The supplier, a businessman from Ain-M'Lila, has admitted on television that he has such arms available.
He establishes contact with one of his neighbors, whom he asks to “find” him some buyers. The neighbor introduces him to a group to which he provides arms and ammunition.

In answer to one of the questions about the number of weapons he has delivered, the merchant stumbles over his words. He speaks of 12 units of automatic pistols and then says that about 10 of them were sold. He is asked, “What was the price?” The arms merchant says, “14.” The person in charge of the interrogation says, “14 what?” To which the arms merchant replies, “14,000 Algerian dinars.”

To a question concerning the price of rounds of ammunition sold, he answered that they were provided for “15.” The police officer asks irritably, “15 what?” The arms merchant says, “150 Algerian dinars each.”

Has the acquisition of arms become so easy at this point? If not, how do you explain the fact that terrorists find it easy to buy weapons, provided “that they pay the price,” as the arms merchant from Ain M’Lilla put it so well. For him the purchase and sale of arms is a normal activity.

The “foreign hand” is everywhere. Did not Hocine Abderrahim, one of those who participated in the despicable act committed at the airport, admit during his interrogation that foreign countries (Sudan, Libya, Iran, and Afghanistan) were supplying the terrorist groups with arms?

These countries also finance arms sales. Did not Abderrahim admit that he had paid 3.0 million pounds sterling to buy arms?

The serenity with which he made these admissions shocked more than one person. The purchase of weapons from a supplier in Barika, El-Oued, or Ain M’Lilla is a “normal” activity. Has Algeria become this vast supermarket where people sell arms as they sell “Lahda” [pepper]?

This new kind of “supermarket” can be found everywhere. Some of them have been discovered. Others will soon be found.

However, the difference is that here there is no shortage of funds, which means “cash” in our country. They have money when they want it.
Government Announces 6-Month ‘Fiscal Census’
93AF0112C Algiers LIBERTE in French 8 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by R. Ikhenoussene: “‘Fiscal Census’ Operation Under Way Since 3 Oct; Outcry About Fraud!’; first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]

[Text] The Algerian tax system contains paradoxes that the ordinary citizen has always considered flagrant injustices. For example, a salaried worker pays more taxes than a businessman!

Taking the bull by the horns, the Abdesselam government has decided to implement “a more just and more rigorously applied” tax policy and has just announced an initial series of specific measures.

In this connection a major census operation has been under way since 3 October at the national level, which is to last for six months.

It consists of making a list of “taxable property”: real estate, including that with and without buildings on it, as well as commercial, industrial, handicraft, agricultural, professional, and other activities.

In terms of real estate, the tax service will prepare a list of those who “can pay taxes.” There are three taxes due the state: a broad tax on real estate, including that with and without buildings on it, a solidarity tax affecting luxury buildings, and a real estate tax which will affect every occupant, whatever his status.

Furthermore, liberal professional and commercial activities will have to report to the tax collector, through a declaration, the nature of their “business affairs” one month after the program enters into effect. Moreover, the tax census will pay particular attention to the importance of the activity, the category invested in (the field of artisan work, industry, commerce), the number of employees, and the amount of their salaries.

It should be noted that to ensure that this operation functions properly, a decentralized organization has been set up. In this way each chief tax inspector will head a network of tax agents, organized in brigades of two elements, one of which will consist of temporary workers.

In fact, this operation confirms the tendency of the government to move ahead quickly on the job, by implementing its action plan in specific terms. This speed indicates a clear determination to make a break with the bad habit of the past of announcing measures with considerable fanfare, but which turn out subsequently to be mere expressions of intention without any followup effort.

However, and despite the importance of these measures, only a radical reform of the tax system will be able to achieve the objective, which the government has set out for it: “The state will determine the amount to be given under the national solidarity tax. This should be considered a contribution by those who have the most to give to the national community and for the benefit of those who have the least.”

It is only by doing so that it will be possible to make a definitive break with the past policy of pious wishes and to move fully into the era of social justice.

Foreign Firms Said Receptive to Economic Plan
93AF0085A Algiers L’OBSERVATEUR in French 6 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Malika Abdelaziz and Hassan Haddouche: “Foreign Interests Are Reassured”; words within slantlines published in English]

[Text] Even if he had wanted to, Belaid Abdesselam could not have done a better job preparing the international financial community for his plan, by keeping his mouth shut for two months following a press conference that was deemed to be rather “blustering” and was given a cool reception.

It is partly because they were expecting “the worst” that foreign affairs circles are rather favorably inclined toward the new Algerian Government’s action plan. The most severe critics in these circles regard the plan as “clarifying,” if only “because even a bad plan is better than uncertainty.” In the midst of the flood of Algerian uncertainties, these critics were sure of only one thing, namely the inapplicability of the agreement with the IMF that the Ghozali administration was contemplating toward the end of its tenure. The political situation was too unfavorable to be subjected to a new—and major—devaluation of the dinar.

The islands of international approval that supported the Algerian reforms appear to have found—in some features of the Belaid plan—reason to renew their support after a period of wavering characterized by various calculations and “perverse interpretations such as the Reuters dispatch that drew from the Algerian prime minister’s ‘refusal to sell’ hydrocarbons at bargain prices, the conclusion that the hydrocarbons law would be repealed.”

The Belaid plan has accordingly met with a measure of acceptance, primarily because it continues on course toward a market economy while organizing a “type of transition that is different” from those negotiated in April 1991 and subsequently in September 1991 with the IMF. This reconsideration benefits from an a priori climate of “indulgence,” because over a period of two years the countries of Eastern Europe—although receiving exceptional support—have demonstrated that regardless of estimates and theories, “systemic changes” have been accompanied by major problems, unforeseen circumstances, and “collective risks” (witness Yugoslavia). Inasmuch as pragmatism has again become a virtue, “this refusal to confine oneself to measures taken in advance” is therefore an aspect that receives positive...
emphasize in the Belaid plan. "The tendency is apparently to operate on a case by case basis."

"There is, however, general agreement on emphasizing the fact that the plan contains an overall framework that takes into account certain political and social aspects of the current situation in Algeria and incorporates them into the economic context."

Here, too, the Belaid plan is encountering a climate that has tended to be indulgent ever since IMF DG [General Director] Michel Camdessus expressed the belief that the "structural adjustment plans" sponsored by the IMF were guilty of having seriously underestimated certain social impacts of the plans.

Despite the favorable opinion currently enjoyed by the Belaid plan, a number of questions have been raised concerning the newer aspects of the working document adopted by the Algerian Government.

Something New Concerning the Debt?

Rejection of the debt rescheduling proposal is confirmed and emphasized and is accompanied by a statement concerning resumption of the strategy of reprofiling the debt, although there is agreement that the government has not staked everything on this option and is preparing to put into effect—in the event its negotiations with the international creditors fail—a reduction in imports and an austerity program believed to be "marketable" because of the emphasis that has been placed on the fight against corruption and on shared sacrifice.

A new element was introduced into the picture within the past few days by the headquarters of the international financial institutions. The signal sent by Camdessus—although its implications for the near future have not yet been measured—is unquestionably an important change of direction.

It is increasingly apparent that the entire international system for resolution of the debt problem is designed to assist countries that do not pay their debts, whereas countries such as Algeria that do pay their debts receive no assistance. The fact that this problem has for the first time been brought up explicitly by the General Assembly of the IMF and World Bank could foreshadow revisions in strategy that currently take the form of a willingness to provide cooperation and assistance to Algeria.

Another message that appears to have been received is the fact that Algerians no longer regard a measure to increase petroleum revenues as urgently necessary. The interpretation of the prime minister's statements in which he refused to sell Algeria's petroleum resources at bargain prices has been corrected. His statements are no longer interpreted as calling into question the Ghozali laws that were passed last year but rather as refocusing the conditions for negotiation.

Green Light for Privatization

Because privatization appeared to be the most seriously threatened of the economic reforms, the decision to take that course was a pleasant surprise. The 51-percent barrier established for the entry of parent companies is not viewed as an obstacle, provided the subsidiary companies are allowed complete latitude. Moreover, inasmuch as privatization was the most decisive obstacle to the conclusion of long-term plans with the IMF—which specifically last spring had blocked the conclusion of a three-year EFF (Extended Fund Facility) desired by the Algerian authorities—an effort is being made to emphasize the prospects thus opened up. This is all the more true because the free zones—a spectacular innovation which in addition to utilizing local manpower represents only a very limited investment by the countries that use them—are for the first time included in the plan of an Algerian Government.

Risks of the Multiple Exchange Rate

However much it shocks the orthodoxy of the IMF, the multiple exchange rate is no longer generally believed to be an obstacle to rapprochement with the international financial institutions.

The coexistence of the official exchange rates and a free market—even though both should facilitate convertibility and even though in practice the free market for currency corresponds to total convertibility—does however give rise to a number of questions about the way this coexistence functions: questions that concern primarily the dimensions and relative importance of each market.

What proportion of commerce can be financed by the parallel market? Will the freedom to utilize foreign exchange acquired on that market be guaranteed?

Will the Central Bank intervene on the parallel market, and will the participants in that market be required to identify the source of their funds?

What is feared is the development of an "Egyptian-like" situation, namely the dovetailing of two disparate economies, with one draining the resources of the State toward those sectors receiving government support, and the other linking together the free zone and the free foreign-exchange market, with the prospects for convergence of the two economies becoming increasingly problematic as time goes by.

Risks of Budgetary Appeasement

Actually, the most acute apprehensions still relate to the size of the budget deficit.

Everyone is aware that the measures provided in the supplementary budget—notably an additional 24 billion dinars, added to the 42 billion already provided for reorganization of the enterprises—threaten to add a bit more to an already large budget.
Because financing the budget by means of credits from foreign sources (the second installment of the EEC loan, or import duties on petroleum) before year's end is very problematic, recourse will probably be had to loans from the bank of issue, possibly coupled with the application of a special exchange rate for hydrocarbons.
Rising Crime in Poor Neighborhoods Reported
93AF0102B Algiers LE SOIR D'ALGERIE in French
15 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by R. Ahmed: "Pickpockets Are Back"—first paragraph is LE SOIR D'ALGERIE introduction]

[Text] They were said to have disappeared in the late seventies, and people believed they would never again meet them or have to deal with them. Pickpockets and wallet thieves are back. In this walk of life, the new wave is essentially made up of unemployed young people living on the edge of society and rejected by their families; they haunt crowded public places. From east to west, from north to south, these young people are stealing to get pocket money far more than to get rich. The capital, Algiers, is powerless against the resurgence of this social phenomenon. Just make the rounds of a few public markets or use public transportation, and you will make this distressing observation: pickpockets are everywhere!

Algiers (LE SOIR)—Wednesday, 1000, a busy time at the flea market of a small coastal town, one of the largest flea markets in the suburbs east of Algiers. A large clientele, mostly women, and a few browsers, come to this market because of the variety of imported clothing it offers at relatively affordable prices. Along the main street, Adidas sneakers and Levi's jeans are displayed here and there. Habitual customers of the souk manage to move through the crowd, jostling each other. It takes many "excuse me, sir" and often they must elbow their way through the human flood. Suddenly, a small crowd formed in the middle of the street, stopping all passersby. A citizen was the target of an attempted theft on the part of three individuals who did not look older than 25. He was ill-inspired to struggle in order to protect the contents of his pocket. One of the young men hit him in the face with his fist and shouted abuse at him, in front of tens of people who did not react. This prompted a shopper standing near me to say: "He should have kept quiet; they wouldn't have beaten him up." In this market, petty thieves come from all horizons and some are unbelievably young. Around 1230, the merchants pack their wares and everybody goes home; shoppers who live in nearby communities use public transportation. At this time of the day, the bus stop, a few tens of meters from the market, is chock full of pickpockets. Their job is made considerably easier by the large number of people who use public transportation, some of whom are loaded down with their morning purchases. Out of curiosity, I walked up to a group of youths who were pretending to look out for the bus while watching possible preys; I asked them: "Well, did you make a good catch?" One of them, a redhead who said later that he was barely 13, nodded with a proud smile, adding that his associates and he were "not doing 'jelda'" (slang for wallets). "We swipe only clothing," he said with no fear as to who I might be and why I was asking. Then he added: "You know, we feel sorry for old ladies, so we target mostly men." In the heat of the discussion, one of them told me that they were from a densely populated neighborhood near El-Harrach and were "regulars" at the "Wednesday souk" (sic).

Friday, a day of prayer and forgiveness throughout the national territory is also the day of the black-marketeers' weekly meeting at El-Harrach.

Talking about black market means talking about a large clientele avid for foreign-made togs. Especially on Friday, the weekly day of rest. The entrance on the east side of the market, at the Baraki road, is strangely reminiscent of Moroccan souks: the rather enticing smell of grilled food attracts even the most indifferent passers-by.

Here, everything can be bought or sold. From the smallest hairpin to the Pierre Cardin blazer, and including aquarium fish and songbirds like goldfinches, canaries, etc., if that is what you want. The space set aside for black-market clothes is covered with shirts, slacks, pullovers, etc., bearing different labels. An impressive sampling of all brands is offered for sale. Poor Inditex [expansion not given] cannot compete!

The El Harrach market has long been known as the pickpockets' favorite operating ground because of its cosmopolitan clientele, which gives these marginals an opportunity to practice their sinister "talents." At every step, you fear to be relieved of your dough, always rudely and with considerable use of force and intimidation. In every corner of the market, you can hear slang words in common use among these petty market thieves. You realize that you are being watched all the time, just in case you should display your money in front of such an audience. At this spot, the most lucrative in town on this Friday, it is quite difficult, even impossible, to recognize the author of a theft and run after him, especially when the temperature hits 30°C in the shade.

Not far from me, a group of citizens set upon a young man, about 20 years old, berating him for his attempt against a middle-aged man. He was saved only by the arrival of a man in plainclothes who claimed to be a policeman. His face covered with blood, he was taken away by the so-called policeman, far from the crowd he had gathered. This incident shows that theft is seldom committed by an individual acting alone, as there is no doubt that he would fail. This is why Algerian would-be professional thieves usually work in groups, so they can cope with any reaction on the part of citizens. This also explains the people's accommodating attitude, which is essentially due to their fear of retaliation. Public transportation is no exception to the rule: busses running at irregular hours and the increasing passenger flow may be mentioned in this connection. Current economic conditions, made worse by unemployment and the social crisis, are more than favorable to the perpetration of such misdeeds, all the more so as police departments concentrate on maintaining the country's stability and fighting terrorism. These types of delinquents, all from
the underprivileged classes, spread fear and enjoy every minute of it. Their happiness is certainly short-lived and illusory, and teenagers who have hardly begun to enjoy their youth may find themselves caught into an infernal system that, sooner or later, will cost them their lives. The esparto-harvesting campaigns of the seventies—which you will remember—do not seem convincing now. The ill that threatens this part of our youth cannot be eradicated unless we rigorously tackle the true problems of the youth. In this respect, juvenile delinquency should constitute the top priority of the Ministry of Youth and Sports.