Audit Report

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTERS' SUPPORT FOR OPERATING FORCES

Report No. 95-163

March 31, 1995

20000128 053

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Acronyms

ACOM U.S. Atlantic Command
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DoDIPP DoD Intelligence Production Program
JIC Joint Intelligence Center
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE)
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
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SUBJECT: Audit Report on Joint Intelligence Centers' Support for Operating Forces
(Project No. 4RF-0039)

Introduction

This final report is provided for your information and use. It discusses the Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs), the intelligence support they provide to the operational forces, and the reductions of intelligence staffs that occurred after the establishment of the JICs. In March 1991, the Secretary of Defense approved the Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence (the Plan) to enhance intelligence functions while coping with budget reductions. The Plan directed the establishment of the JICs at each unified command to consolidate intelligence assets, eliminate duplication of intelligence, and reduce intelligence staffs.

Audit Results

Although the JIC concept is still evolving, the components of the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) were generally satisfied with the intelligence support the JICs provided. However, because the CENTCOM JIC has not reached full operational capability, the CENTCOM components continued to rely on their own Military Department
intelligence organizations for support the JIC should be capable of providing when fully operational. Furthermore, the CENTCOM JIC had responded to 45 percent of an Air Force component's requests for information after the date required.

The JICs were not comparably staffed, and the staffing was not yet well correlated to mission requirements. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had reallocated staffing to provide additional support to those JICs that were not fully operational. Overall, the number of General Defense Intelligence Program billets decreased after the JIC concept was implemented. The reduction was an expected benefit of the JIC concept and the restructuring of DoD intelligence. However, the DIA needs to perform detailed analyses periodically to rebalance staffing levels to match changing circumstances.

Because of the general satisfaction with JIC intelligence support, the decrease in intelligence billets after the JIC implementation, and DIA initiatives to alleviate known issues, the report contains no recommendations.

Objectives

The objective of the audit was to evaluate the JICs' effectiveness in support of operating forces. Specifically, the audit evaluated whether the JICs satisfy intelligence requirements of the Joint Task Forces, unified command components, and principal subordinate elements. The audit also evaluated whether expected reductions in the size of intelligence staffs occurred after the implementation of the JIC concept. Further, the audit evaluated internal controls germane to the audit objectives.

Scope and Methodology

Components of the Unified Commands. We visited a total of nine ACOM and CENTCOM components to determine whether the JICs met each component's intelligence requirements. We determined component intelligence needs by interviewing intelligence users and by examining FY 1994 requests for information logs, which the components manually maintained. We also reviewed the logs to identify frequently requested intelligence support and to evaluate the timeliness of the JICs' responses to the requests.

Unified Command JICs. We visited JICs at ACOM and CENTCOM. We also visited the U.S. Special Operations Command, although at the time of the visit, the U.S. Special Operations Command had not yet established a JIC. At each location, we reviewed FY 1994 missions, production responsibilities, and
staffing to determine whether the JICs have identified issues in providing intelligence support to customers and whether the JICs have performance measurement standards.

**Intelligence Billet Authorizations.** We reviewed FY 1992 through FY 1995 intelligence billet authorizations for the General Defense Intelligence Program to identify intelligence billet reductions since the JIC concept was implemented. We obtained historical billet data from a DIA study, "Intelligence Support to Warfighters: Responding to a Changing Environment, Phase I: Assessment of Joint Intelligence Center Functions," July 20, 1992, and current and planned billet data from the FY 1994 and 1995 Congressional Budget Justification Books.

**Audit Standards.** The audit was performed from April through October 1994 at the organizations listed in Enclosure 1. This program audit was conducted in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD, and accordingly, included such tests of internal controls as were considered necessary. We did not rely on computer-processed data for this audit.

**Internal Controls**

**Internal Controls Reviewed.** We evaluated the internal controls for providing intelligence support to the unified command components. Specifically, we reviewed procedures for logging and tracking requests for information.

**Adequacy of Internal Controls.** The internal controls applicable to the JICs were deemed to be effective in that the audit identified no material weaknesses. However, procedures for logging and tracking requests for information did not preclude the submission of duplicate requests for information. As of September 1994, the CENTCOM JIC was evaluating its procedures to determine whether changes were needed. The audit detected no deficiencies in the internal management control programs at the JICs visited.

**Prior Audits and Other Reviews**

The Inspector General, U.S. European Command, report ECIG (20-1a), "Office of the Inspector General Command Inspection of Joint Analysis Center," June 8, 1994, discusses the effectiveness of the Joint Analysis Center in carrying out intelligence missions and identifies areas requiring improvement by the U.S. European Command staff or appropriate agencies. The inspection rated the mission performance of the Joint Analysis Center as outstanding, but noted security awareness and accountability of classified materials as two areas
that needed attention. The Commander, U.S. European Command, concurred with the recommendations for security awareness and accountability of classified materials.

The DIA performed a study of the DoD intelligence structure and issued two reports. The first report, "Intelligence Support to Warfighters: Responding to a Changing Environment, Phase 1: Assessment of Joint Intelligence Center Functions," July 20, 1992, identified intelligence support the JICs and the Military Department intelligence organizations provide. The report also identified intelligence shortfalls and deficiencies in resources and capabilities of the intelligence organizations. The second report, "Intelligence Support to Warfighters: Responding to a Changing Environment, Phase 2: Building the Military Intelligence Base Force," October 1992, recommends consolidating and reallocating JIC resources, which resulted in monetary benefits, to remedy shortfalls in intelligence requirements among the unified commands. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred with the report recommendation to reallocate JIC resources among the unified commands.

Background

**Joint Intelligence Centers Established.** In March 1991, the Secretary of Defense approved the Plan. The objective of the Plan was to enhance Defense intelligence functions while coping with budget reductions. The Plan directed the unified commands to consolidate intelligence assets into JICs, based on the U.S. Pacific Command model. The purpose of the consolidation was to provide primary intelligence support for operating forces and allow those forces to rely on the JIC as a single point of entry into the DoD intelligence structure. Centralization of intelligence support on a theater basis was expected to eliminate duplication and reduce the size of intelligence staffs of the unified commands and the Military Departments.


Discussion

**Adequacy of Intelligence Support for Components.** Overall, the nine ACOM and CENTCOM components were satisfied with the support the JICs provided. The ACOM JIC had reached full operational capability. Although the
components were bound by procedures imposed by their respective Military Departments, the components primarily used the ACOM JIC, rather than their Military Department intelligence organizations, for intelligence requirements. The CENTCOM JIC had not reached full operational capability, and the components continued to rely on their own Military Department intelligence organizations for support the JIC should provide when it reaches full operational capability.

480th Air Intelligence Group. Central Command Air Force relied on the 480th Air Intelligence Group for imagery intelligence support. According to Central Command Air Force, the response time from the 480th was quicker than from the CENTCOM JIC, which had answered 45 percent of Central Command Air Force requests for information after the date specified. Also, the 480th has imagery data exploitation and print capabilities that exceed those of the CENTCOM JIC. In FY 1995, the CENTCOM JIC is programmed to receive the Imagery Data Exploitation System. When the CENTCOM JIC receives the system, the JIC should have the capability to satisfy Central Command Air Force imagery requirements in a timely manner.

513th Military Intelligence Brigade. Army Forces Central Command relied on the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade for intelligence support and transmits quarterly messages requesting the support. The January 1994 quarterly message to the 513th requested political analyses in the CENTCOM JIC area of responsibility. CENTCOM JIC personnel stated that the 513th merely provides data that are already in the CENTCOM JIC data base and that Army Forces Central Command and the CENTCOM JIC personnel coordinate the quarterly messages. However, no record of formal coordination existed at either location. In FY 1997, the CENTCOM JIC will reach full operational capability and should be able to meet CENTCOM components' intelligence requirements. Formal coordination between the CENTCOM JIC and the Military Department intelligence organizations should prevent duplication.

JIC Operations

JIC Missions. The mission of the JICs is to provide intelligence, including indications and warning, and intelligence assessments that support the commanders in chief of the unified commands, subordinate commanders, and components. The structure of the organizations within each JIC depended on commander in chief requirements, area of responsibility, and stage of development of the JIC. As of September 1994, the ACOM JIC had not identified issues that adversely affected its capability to support operational forces since the JIC became fully operational in FY 1993. The CENTCOM JIC, which is in the early stage of development, had received missions from DIA, but had not received the staff needed to perform the missions. Although
the CENTCOM JIC will receive additional staffing on an incremental basis, the missions were not imposed incrementally. Receiving the missions without the staff affected the capability of the CENTCOM JIC to provide effective support to components. Neither the ACOM nor the CENTCOM JIC had developed performance measurement standards to determine whether the JICs are effective in responding to customer requirements. Performance measurement standards would assist the JICs in improving intelligence support to customers.

**Intelligence Production Requirements.** The JICs produce intelligence for operations and for planning purposes. The components were satisfied with the intelligence support but were not aware of available JIC products. The DoD Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP), effective January 1, 1995, covers intelligence production that components use for planning purposes. The DoDIPP is the capstone document for intelligence production within DoD that establishes policies, procedures, and relationships for the DoD Intelligence Production Community to ensure the best quality intelligence support to the warfighter in the most complete, responsive, and effective manner. Further, the DoDIPP requires that all production plans and products be reported to the Defense Intelligence Production Functional Manager. The DoDIPP will inform the intelligence community of intelligence producers and products and should minimize duplication of intelligence data among the producers. Through the DoDIPP, the components will be aware of available JIC products.

**Varied Number and Types of JIC Billets.** According to the FY 1994 Joint Table of Distribution, the number and types of intelligence billets varied significantly among the JICs. Billet authorizations ranged from 100 billets at U.S. Transportation Command to more than 900 billets at U.S. Pacific Command. Also, the billets at the ACOM and CENTCOM JICs varied significantly. The ACOM JIC had more than 700 billets, and the CENTCOM JIC had about 218 billets. At full operational capability, the CENTCOM JIC will have about 328 billets.

**Initial Billet Allocation.** In its study of the DoD intelligence structure, DIA identified intelligence resources available within each unified command and recommended billet allocation for the JICs based on the resources available. No detailed analyses existed to justify DIA's billet allocation or to correlate billets to missions and functions. Methods such as management engineering studies or statistical analyses, provide a sound basis for allocating resources.

**Military and Civilian Billet Mix.** According to the DIA, about 80 percent military and 20 percent civilian staffing would comprise a reasonable billet mix at a JIC. The ACOM JIC has a billet mix of 78 percent military and
22 percent civilian. The CENTCOM JIC has a billet mix of 93 percent military and 7 percent civilian. Civilian billets at other JICs ranged from 7 percent to 45 percent of total billet authorizations as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Military and Civilian Personnel Mix by JIC

(As of April 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JIC</th>
<th>Military (Percent)</th>
<th>Civilian (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Space Command/NORAD²</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Strategic Command</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Transportation Command</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹The U.S. Special Operations Command did not have a JIC.
²North American Air Defense Command

Civilian billets provide needed continuity in intelligence operations because military personnel are subject to transfer after a 2- or 3-year tour. However, the DIA and unified commands have not formally defined the appropriate billet mix for the military and civilian billets at each JIC, even though the billet mix could adversely affect the effectiveness of intelligence support to customers.

JIC Operational Staffing. Full staffing for each JIC will be achieved in FY 1997 when all the JICs are scheduled to be fully operational. However, the DIA and the unified commands have not completed detailed analyses to justify JIC staffing requirements at full operational capability and cannot ensure that optimum staff allocation will be achieved. Staffing engineering studies provide a valid means to correlate missions and functional requirements to staffing needs and can assist the DIA and the unified commands in determining how best to allocate available resources among the JICs. The Army Force Integration Support Agency conducts studies to determine staffing. Those study results are an option available to the DIA and the unified commanders in determining the optimum allocation of JIC personnel and in correlating JIC staffing to JIC missions. Also, the studies could assist DIA and the unified commanders in obtaining maximum productivity from staffing assigned to each JIC.
Unified Command Intelligence Billet Reductions

One expected benefit from establishing the JICs was to permit reductions in defense intelligence billets commensurate with reductions in the supported forces. Intelligence billet authorizations reflected in the Congressional Budget Justification Books for FYs 1994 and 1995 indicate that reductions have occurred each year since the Plan was issued. Table 2. shows a steady reduction of unified command intelligence billets funded by the General Defense Intelligence Program.

Table 2. General Defense Intelligence Program Billet Authorizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unified Command</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 1992</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 1993</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 1994</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 1995</th>
<th>Number of Billets Changed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>(29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>(192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
<td>1,439</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>1,157</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>(288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Space Command/NORAD</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Strategic Command</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>(691)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Transportation Command</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4,998</td>
<td>4,699</td>
<td>4,214</td>
<td>4,093</td>
<td>(905)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Based on the Congressional Budget Justification Books for fiscal years 1994 and 1995.

The reductions represent a net decrease of 18 percent in intelligence billet authorizations for the General Defense Intelligence Program since FY 1992.

Conclusion

The unified command components were generally satisfied with the intelligence support the JICs provided. Also, the number of intelligence billets was reduced after the JIC concept was introduced. Although the audit identified issues, the JIC concept is still in the early phases, and neither the DIA nor the unified commanders have had the opportunity to identify and correct all the issues associated with it. DIA has allocated additional staff to those JICs that are not
fully operational to correct staffing inequities among the JICs. Also, DIA has issued the capstone document for the DoDIPP to identify intelligence products and intelligence producers. Those actions will assist customers in determining available intelligence products and should limit duplication among intelligence producers. However, DIA has not correlated JIC staffing to JIC missions nor established an optimum mix of military and civilian personnel in the JICs. As implementation of the JIC concept continues, formalizing procedures for correlating staffing and missions and defining appropriate military and civilian billet ratios will assist DIA and the unified commanders in maximizing JIC support to customers.

Management Comments

Although this report contains no recommendations and management comments were not required, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence); the Defense Intelligence Agency; and the U.S. Central Command provided comments. The full texts of those comments are in Enclosures 3, 4, and 5.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) Comments. The Assistant Secretary concurred with the DIA comments, which were provided separately and are discussed below.

DIA Comment. The report conclusion that the audit identified problems conflicts with the statement that the components of the U.S Atlantic Command and U.S. Central Command were generally satisfied with the intelligence support the JICs provided.

Audit Response. The report conclusion summarizes all topics presented in the report. Customer satisfaction with JIC support was only one topic the report discussed. Management’s defensiveness is unwarranted.

DIA Comment. The creation and staffing of the JICs were based on an analysis of the requirements of each unified command and an understanding of the intelligence functions that every command would require. The draft report suggests that the JICS were not equitably staffed and that JIC staffing was not correlated to JIC missions. Those assertions are completely false and misrepresent the JIC study.

Audit Response. Neither the unified commanders nor the DIA conducted detailed analyses to determine or support staffing requirements based on missions at each JIC. The initial allocation of staffing among the JICs may not be appropriate. Detailed analysis of workload and skill requirements on a
periodic basis would provide an objective, documented rationale for staffing levels, which logically will require refinement and rebalancing as circumstances change.

**DIA Comment.** The report notes that the purpose of the consolidation of theater intelligence assets into the JIC was to provide primary intelligence support for operating forces and allow those forces to rely on the JIC as a single point of entry into the DoD intelligence structure. The objective of the JIC concept was to create a single focal point for intelligence support to the theater. Components will continue to rely on Military Department intelligence organizations for specific requirements, even after the command JICs are fully operational. In many cases, the Military Department intelligence organizations can provide unique capabilities; moving those capabilities to the JIC would be unwise and would cause inefficient duplication.

**Audit Response.** The CENTCOM JIC is a theater asset and, at full operational capability, should be capable of providing intelligence support to its components for the CENTCOM area of responsibility. One of the goals of the Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence, approved by the Secretary of Defense on March 15, 1991, was

"... to strengthen intelligence support to Combatant Commanders and enhance jointness through consolidation of existing Unified and Specified Combatant Command and component intelligence processing, analysis, and production activities into regional Joint Intelligence Centers; reshape the unified commander and Military Department component staffs into small, high quality groups that can provide focused intelligence evaluation support to the Combatant Commander, ..."

We agree that it would be unwise and inefficient to attempt to duplicate certain unique Military Department intelligence capabilities at the JICs. However, the effectiveness of the JICs cannot be reliably assessed when component commands bypass the JICs to request intelligence support directly from the Military Departments. Since the CENTCOM JIC was not fully operational, CENTCOM components routinely requested intelligence information from their Military Department intelligence organizations.

**DIA Comment.** According to the report, "The JICs were not equitably staffed, and JIC staffing was not correlated to JIC missions." The JICs were equitably staffed. The commanders concurred with their allocations of staffing for their JICs. Each commander had the opportunity to reclaim the staffing allocations and several did so. In each case, the DIA reviewed the staffing requests and made changes agreeable to both sides. JIC staffing was totally correlated to JIC missions and functions. The audit team was given full information on how the DIA correlated staffing to JIC functions and missions.
Audit Response. The DIA reviewed four existing intelligence production centers at the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. European Command. After review, each command submitted requirements and negotiated staffing for each JIC. In spite of that negotiation process, neither the unified commanders nor the DIA conducted detailed analyses to determine whether the staffing requirements were valid. Management engineering studies will assist DIA and the unified commanders in determining ultimate staffing allocations for the JICs.

DIA Comment. Problems discussed in the report can be categorized as misconceptions about JICs and are attributable to the use of erroneous data or are outside the scope of the JIC study. The JICs are no longer a concept, but a reality.

Audit Response. The scope of the audit extended beyond the scope of the DIA JIC study. Our report makes reference to the DIA JIC study only for purposes of providing historical staffing data and to show other DoD reviews of the JICs. However, the audit was not a follow-up review of the DIA JIC study as DIA's comments indicate. The report discusses the results of the audit of the ACOM and CENTCOM JICs and intelligence users at nine components of those two commands.

DIA Comment. If the objective of the audit was to evaluate the JICs' effectiveness in support of operating forces, and only two JICs were evaluated, the evaluated JICs should have been mature commands with fully operational or almost fully operational JICs. A review of CENTCOM was a poor choice because its JIC does not reach full operational capability until FY 1997. Obviously, any Command having only 50 percent of authorized staffing cannot be effective in unilaterally supporting its operating forces.

Audit Response. We chose to initiate the audit by visiting both a fully operational JIC and a JIC progressing toward full operational capability to review customer support provided at the different stages of development. When it became apparent that no reliable performance standards or measures existed to assess overall JIC effectiveness, we visited the major components of those two JICs to ascertain customer satisfaction. Although shortfalls were noted, the customers of both JICs were generally satisfied with the support provided. Because only subjective data concerning JIC effectiveness were available, we terminated the audit.

DIA Comment. The report infers that Phase 2 of DIA's JIC study states that JIC resources were reallocated to obtain monetary benefits, which is misleading and inaccurate. Phase 2 does not make that statement. It states, "There was no resource target established prior to the review." Monetary benefits resulted from the restructuring and were not predetermined.
Audit Response. We revised the report discussion of Phase 2 of DIA's JIC study to show that consolidating and reallocating the JIC resources "resulted in monetary benefits," thereby eliminating any inference that the benefits were predetermined.

DIA Comment. The report basically states the obvious rather than new problems. Since the CENTCOM JIC does not have the staffing resources to completely fulfill its missions, its components continue to provide intelligence support. The report repeatedly states that at full operational capability, the CENTCOM JIC should be able to satisfy intelligence requirements. Fulfilling missions at full operational capability is a goal of the JICs, not a problem.

Audit Response. The intent of our report was to provide the DIA and the unified commanders the status of issues to consider as JIC development continues. Because we did not consider the issues to be systemic problems, we made no recommendations. Regarding the CENTCOM JIC, the report states that it has not reached full operational capability to recognize that the service provided is affected by the stage of development.

DIA Comment. The CENTCOM JIC has received missions from DIA commensurate with programmed staffing increases provided by the DIA JIC Study. Those missions have been imposed incrementally to coincide with staffing increases as requested by the command. CENTCOM chose the type of staffing it desired by year to best fulfill its missions and requirements. Every effort was made to assist CENTCOM in seeing that authorized staffing matched mission responsibilities. DIA and the CENTCOM JIC commander agreed on the timetable for receiving new missions (shared production). Much of CENTCOM's production responsibilities have yet to be assumed by the Command.

Audit Response. CENTCOM personnel stated that the work load at the CENTCOM JIC is event driven and that they are not yet in a position to prioritize the work load. About 90 percent of the JIC's efforts supports the unified commander and deployed forces. The JIC is now beginning to tailor the work load to support current operations. Also, Naval Forces Central Command, the Navy component of CENTCOM, was assigned responsibility for maritime intelligence in March 1994. However, the CENTCOM JIC is scheduled to receive 10 additional billets for the Oceanographic Surveillance Intelligence System from 1996 through 1998. Those billets are for the maritime intelligence responsibilities assigned to the command in March 1994.

DIA Comment. The report incorrectly states that the CENTCOM JIC will have 328 billets at full operational capability. At FY 1997 full operational capability, the CENTCOM JIC will have 500 billets.
Audit Response. We obtained the CENTCOM JIC billets from the Joint Table of Distribution, which showed that the CENTCOM JIC will have 328 billets. We did not include the billets for the unified command intelligence functions because the JIC is separate from the unified command intelligence office at the CENTCOM JIC.

DIA Comment. Briefings provided to the audit team fully documented billet justification and correlated billets to missions and functions. Statistical analyses were also used for allocating resources.

Audit Response. DIA reviewed four existing intelligence production centers and requested unified command requirements for other production centers. The JIC staffing plan was based on available resources instead of more analytical methods.

DIA Comment. Although it is true that the DIA and unified commanders did not formally define the billet mix, DIA's JIC study did attempt to increase the number of civilian billets for the new and growing JICs. Each command had the opportunity to define its billet mix to include civilians. Requests for increases in civilian billets were met wherever possible. In the case of CENTCOM, 28 of 31 requested civilian billets were granted. Congressionally mandated civilian reductions of 23.5 percent, however, severely eroded civilian billets at the small and new JICs. Basically, the Military Departments cut unfilled billets (primarily those received from the JIC study) to meet civilian ceilings. DIA had no control over those cuts.

Audit Response. Although the military and civilian billet mix is not yet defined, with an established percentage of military and civilian personnel, the JIC would be in a stronger position to maintain civilian billets when the unified command is faced with cuts.

DIA Comment. Table 1 does not explain the affected year, and the numbers are wrong. The U.S. Transportation Command JIC, for example, is authorized 95 billets of which 20 are civilian, representing 21 percent of authorized billets, not 45 percent as shown.

Audit Response. We inadvertently omitted a date from Table 1, which shows the percentage of military and civilian personnel at all of the JICs. As of April 15, 1994, the U.S. Transportation Command JIC had 55 percent military and 45 percent civilian. In contrast, the CENTCOM JIC had 93 percent military and 7 percent civilian. Although the percentage of military and civilian mix could adversely affect continuity of operations if the military percentage is too high, DIA and the unified commanders had not defined the appropriate percentage of military and civilian personnel for each JIC.
DIA Comment. Full documentation is available to justify JIC staffing at full operational capability. This information was given to the audit team. However, the paragraph on "JIC Operational Staffing" infers that the JICs were established with no clear definition or structure.

Audit Response. As previously stated, DIA reviewed four existing intelligence production centers, then asked each unified command to provide staffing requirements. The requirements for the unified commanders were based on available resources, not detailed analyses.

DIA Comment. The section on intelligence billet reduction compares apples to oranges in portraying reductions. The basis for the data is the Congressional Budget Justification Book, which portrays data by expenditure code and not by functional area, such as a JIC. Also, the JIC study reduced the overall General Defense Intelligence Program billets by a modest 5 percent through 1997, not the 18 percent as the report states.

Audit Response. We changed the section heading from "Intelligence Billet Reductions" to "Unified Command Intelligence Billet Reductions" to show that the discussion on billet reductions refers to the unified commands and extends beyond the JIC. The General Defense Intelligence Program billet authorizations for the unified commands decreased after the Plan was issued in 1992. The net reduction is 18 percent.

CENTCOM Comment. The report states that the CENTCOM JIC answered 45 percent of the Central Command Air Force requests for information after the date specified. This statement reflects a superficial understanding of our longstanding and validated request for information procedures established during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. The auditors used 1993 data to derive the figure of 45 percent. CENTCOM personnel analyzed the data and found that approximately 30 percent of the responses to Central Command Air Force was received after the initial date requested, which is not to say the responses were late. The 30 percent statistic was based on the information log kept by the JIC's Production Management section. The log reflects only the initial receipt of a component's request for information with its initial requested due date. The due dates are often arbitrarily assigned and must be modified, with the requestor's concurrence, for a variety of reasons.

Audit Response. Central Command Air Force gave the audit team an analysis that showed the requests for information tasked to the CENTCOM JIC from January 1, to August 15, 1994. According to the analysis, the CENTCOM JIC responded to 74 percent of the imagery requests for information and 50 percent of the political analyses requests for information after the date required. However, we conducted our own analysis of the Central Command Air Force 1994 request for information log and determined that CENTCOM was late for
29 of 65 area of responsibility requests for information. Our analysis reduced the late responses for imagery from 74 percent to 45 percent. Also, the Central Command Air Force component gave the audit team copies of requests for information that were originally submitted to CENTCOM, then subsequently canceled and later resubmitted to the Military Department Intelligence organization because CENTCOM could not meet the required due dates. We reviewed 1994 request for information logs at the components and CENTCOM, not the 1993 logs, as referenced by CENTCOM.

CENTCOM Comment. The report recommends formal coordination between the JIC and the Military Departments to prevent duplication of intelligence. CENTCOM managers who are responsible for requests for information are in daily contact with their counterparts at Army Forces Central Command and are aware of all production tasks at a given time. Ninety percent of the JIC's scheduled production is reoccurring, (that is, reports or summaries sent on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis). The remainder of the JIC production effort concerns one-time products of which only a few dozen are produced annually. Given the daily contact with the Component managers, coordination does occur and any duplication of effort would be immediately recognized.

Audit Response. The draft report suggested that the CENTCOM JIC and the Components formally coordinate production to prevent duplication of effort. At the August 31, 1994, Intelligence Management Briefing, participants also identified procedural problems in handling requests for information. The participants proposed that CENTCOM examine request for information procedures and, if necessary, modify procedures to inform components of submitted requests for information and preclude duplicate submissions.

CENTCOM Comment. The audit report incorrectly states that the CENTCOM JIC has no performance standards by which to measure effectiveness in responding to customer requirements. Our request for information tracking procedures result in constant daily monitoring of component requests for information from initial receipt to completion. This essential production manager to production manager contact allows for instant feedback, and any shortfall is handled immediately to the component's satisfaction.

Audit Response. Although the request for information tracking systems, reports, and daily feedback could provide indications of activity levels, those devices are not performance standards. If the JIC establishes performance standards and measures itself on the accomplishment of those standards, the JIC can readily determine whether it meets the needs of its customers. Also, the JIC can determine whether adjustments are needed to improve service.
Request for Comments

Because the report contains no findings or recommendations, no comments are required of management.

The cooperation and courtesies extended to the staff are appreciated. If you have questions on this audit, please contact Mr. Harrell D. Spoons, Audit Program Director, at (703) 604-6575 (DSN 664-6575) or Ms. Dianna J. Pearson, Audit Project Manager, at (703) 604-9576 (DSN 664-9576) or telefax (703) 604-9475. Copies of the report will be distributed to the organizations listed in Enclosure 2. A list of the audit team members is on the inside back cover.

Robert J. Lieberman
Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing

Enclosures
Organizations Visited or Contacted

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), Washington, DC
Joint Staff, Washington, DC

Unified Commands
U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, VA
U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL
U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany
U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, HI
U.S. Southern Command, Quarry Height, Panama
U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL
U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE
U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL

Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Washington, DC
Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, VA
Army Forces Atlantic, Fort McPherson, GA
Army Forces Central Command, Fort McPherson, GA
18th Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC

Department of the Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence, Washington, DC
Office of Naval Intelligence, Suitland, MD
Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, VA
Naval Forces Central Command, Bahrain
Marine Corps Forces Atlantic, Camp Lejeune, NC

Department of the Air Force
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Washington, DC
Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA
Air Forces Atlantic, Langley Air Force Base, VA

Enclosure 1
(Page 1 of 2)
Departments of the Air Force (con't)

U.S. Central Command Air Forces, Shaw Air Force Base, SC
Eighth Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, LA

Defense Agencies

Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC
Defense Mapping Agency, Fairfax, VA
National Security Agency, Fort Meade, MD
Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Joint Staff

Unified Commands
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command

Department of the Army
Auditor General, Department of the Army

Department of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management)
Auditor General, Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force

Defense Organizations
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, Defense Mapping Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Inspector General, Central Imagery Office
Inspector General, National Security Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange

Enclosure 2
(Page 1 of 2)
Non-DoD Organizations

Office of Management and Budget
Technical Information Center, National Security and International Affairs Division,
   General Accounting Office

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of Each of the Following Congressional
   Committees and Subcommittees:

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice,
   Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Committee on National Security
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Joint Intelligence Centers' (JIC) Support for Operating Forces

We have reviewed the draft of the proposed audit report for Project No. 4RF-0030 On Joint Intelligence Centers' Support for Operating Forces, dated December 27, 1994. We concur with the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, comments which were provided separately.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

[Signature]
Keith R. Hall
Acting

Enclosure 3
Defense Intelligence Agency Comments

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20311

U-007/DM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Joint Intelligence Centers' Support for Operating Forces

1. The creation of the Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) at the Combatant Commands represents one of the most important steps in the development of theater intelligence capabilities and the integration of the military intelligence community. As the architect of the JICs, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the General Defense Intelligence Program would like to correct a number of factual inaccuracies in the draft audit report, as well as some misperceptions of JIC functions and resources.

2. There are serious inadequacies in this draft report that fundamentally misrepresent the objectives and methodology of the JIC study, confuse the purpose and nature of JICs, and ignore the context in which the establishment of the JICs occurred and the continuing challenges facing military intelligence. There is some danger that, despite its overall positive appraisal of the JICs, this report could be used to disrupt a highly successful and effective program. In addition to these overall issues, a number of specific comments and corrections are provided as an enclosure.

3. DIA would be happy to provide more details to the Inspector General Team for this report. The point of contact for this action is Mr. Paul Ingholt of the Director Military Intelligence Staff, (703) 693-5695.

JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

1 Enclosure
DIA Comments on Draft Audit Report on JICs Support for Operating Forces, 1 Cy

CC:
ASD/CII

Enclosure 4
(Page 1 of 5)
DIA Comments on DoD Inspector General Audit Report on Joint Intelligence Centers’ Support for Operating Forces

General Comments:

1. The conclusion of this draft report states that "Although the audit identified problems, the JIC concept is still in the early phases, and neither the DIA nor the unified commanders have had the opportunity to correct all the problems associated with the JIC concept." Yet, the "problems" in the report appear to be based on the IG team’s misunderstanding of the JIC study methodology and the manpower accounting provided to them. Moreover, this statement appears to conflict with the introductory statement that "...the components of the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) were generally satisfied with the intelligence support the JICs provided..." (p. 3).

2. The creation and manning of the Joint Intelligence Centers were based on an analysis of the requirements of each Combatant Command and an understanding of the intelligence functions that every Command would require. The primary factors that were considered in this process were the size and character of the area of operations (AOR) of the Command, the level of threats in the AOR, the number and operations tempo of the military forces assigned to the Command, and the extent of intelligence collection, production, and infrastructure responsibilities assigned to each Command. Yet, this draft audit report suggests that the "JICs were not equitably staffed" and that "JIC staffing was not correlated to JIC missions." These assertions are completely false and misrepresent the JIC study. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the substantial documentation of the JIC study and its implementation with these unsupported statements.

3. The report notes that "...the purpose of the consolidation [of theater intelligence assets into the JICs] was to provide primary intelligence support for operating forces and allow these forces to rely on the JIC as a single point of entry into the DoD intelligence structure." Neither DIA nor the Commands had any illusions that the JICs will be able to provide every conceivable type of intelligence support to theater components. The objective of the JIC concept was to create a single focal point for intelligence support to the theater. The statement that USCENTCOM Components "...continued to rely on their own Military Department intelligence organizations for support the JIC should provide when it reaches full operational capability..." is inaccurate and misstates the purpose of the JIC. Component headquarters will continue to rely on Military Department intelligence organizations for specific requirements even after the Command JICs are fully operational. In many cases, the departmental intelligence organizations can provide unique capabilities that would be unwise to move to the JIC and inefficient to duplicate. The 480th Air Intelligence Group is a

Enclosure 4
(Page 2 of 5)
good example of a departmental unit that will continue to provide important support to USCENTCOM components, through the coordination and management of the USCENTCOM JIC.

Specific Comments:

A. Page 2, para 1: "The JICs were not equitably staffed, and JIC staffing was not correlated to JIC missions." The JICs were equitably staffed. Each Command J3 concurred in their JIC allocation. Each Command had the opportunity to reclama their JIC target number and several did so. In each case, we reviewed their numbers and made changes agreeable to both sides. JIC manning was totally correlated to JIC missions and functions. The DoD/IG team was given full information as to how we correlated manpower to JIC functions and missions.

B. Page 2, para 2: "Nonetheless, the problems discussed in this report will help the DIA and the Unified Commanders to facilitate the JIC concept development toward full implementation." Problems discussed in this report can be categorized as misconceptions about JICs, attributed to the use of erroneous data, or outside the scope of the JIC study. The JICs are no longer a concept, but a reality.

C. Page 2, Objectives: If the objective of the audit was to evaluate the JIC's effectiveness in support of operating forces, and only two JICs were evaluated, they should have come from mature Commands with full or near full JICs. A review of CENTCOM was a very poor choice because their JIC does not reach Full Operational Capability (FOC) until FY97. Obviously, any Command having only 50 percent of authorized manpower cannot be effective in unilaterally supporting its operating forces.

D. Page 4, para 1: Second to last sentence infers that Phase 2 of the JIC Study states "JIC resources were reallocated to obtain monetary benefits." This is misleading and inaccurate. Phase 2 does not make this statement. It does state, "There was no resource target established prior to the review." Monetary benefits resulted from the restructuring. They were not predetermined as the above statement would infer.

E. Page 4/5, Discussion: These three paragraphs basically state the obvious rather than problems. Since the CENTCOM JIC currently does not have the manpower resources to completely fulfill its missions, its components continue to provide intelligence support. Each paragraph ends by stating that by FY97 FOC, the CENTCOM JIC should be able to satisfy intelligence requirements. This is a goal of the JIC study, not a problem.

F. Page 5/6, JIC Missions: The CENTCOM JIC has received missions from DIA commensurate with programmed manpower increases provided by the JIC study. These missions have been imposed incrementally to coincide with manpower increases as requested by the Command. CENTCOM chose what type of manpower (production, collection,
etc.) it desired by year (FY94-97) to best fulfill its missions and requirements. Every effort was made to assist CENTCOM in seeing that authorized manpower matched mission responsibilities to include a Production Functional Management (P-FM) staff visit in Aug 93. At that time, DIA and the CENTCOM J2 agreed upon the timetable for receiving new missions (shared production). This paragraph also is written in the past tense which is misleading because much of CENTCOM's production responsibilities have yet to be assumed by the Command.

G. Page 6, Types of JIC Billets: The report states that the CENTCOM JIC will have 328 billets at FOC. This is incorrect—the FY97 FOC number is 500.

H. Page 6, Initial Billet Allocation: This paragraph is totally incorrect and without basis. P-FM materials and briefings provided to the DoDIG team fully documented billet justification and correlated billets to missions and functions. Statistical analyses were also used for allocating resources.

I. Page 6/7, Military and Civilian Billet Mix: While it is true that the DIA and Unified Commands did not formally define the billet mix, the JIC Study did attempt to increase the number of civilian billets for the new and growing JICs. Each Command had the opportunity to define their billet mix to include civilians. Requests for increases in civilian billets were met wherever possible. In the case of CENTCOM, 28 of 31 civilian billets requested were granted. Congressionally-mandated civilian reductions of 22.5 percent, however, severely eroded civilian billets at the small and new JICs. Basically, the Services cut unfilled billets (primarily those received from the JIC study) to meet civilian ceilings. DIA had no control over these cuts.

J. Page 7, Table 1: This table is incomprehensible. It does not explain the year described and the numbers are wrong. The TRANSCOM JIC, for example, is authorized 95 billets of which 20 are civilian. This represents 21 percent, not 45 percent as shown on the chart.

K. Page 7, JIC Operational Staffing: Full documentation is available to justify JIC staffing at full operational capability. This information was given to the DoDIG team, but it seems they chose not to use it. This whole paragraph infers that the JICs were established with no clear definition or structure. In fact, the JICs were modeled after an operational, clearly defined JIC at USACOM. Having visited the AIC, this should have been readily apparent to the DoDIG team.

L. Page 7/8, Intelligence Billet Reductions: This section and chart compares "apples to oranges" in portraying reductions. The basis for the data is the Congressional Budget Justification Book which portrays data by Expenditure Center (EC) and not by J2/JIC. The EC in many cases is far more comprehensive than the J2/JIC. These numbers also include JCS 5 percent per year reductions for
which DIA/Commands have no control over, and in many cases do not affect the J2/JIC. GDIF billets at the J2/JICs have been protected since implementation of the JIC Study, and the only reductions to them have been those programmed during implementation of the JIC Study and those mandated by Congress and the JCS. The latter two reductions have, in many cases, been backfilled to assure that the authorized JIC levels remain constant. The JIC Study reduced the overall GDIF billets by a modest 5 percent through the year 1997, not the 18 percent that this section states.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Draft of a Proposed DoD IG Audit Report: Joint Intelligence Centers’ Support for Operating Forces

1. I have reviewed the draft of the DoD Inspector General’s audit regarding the USCENTCOM Joint Intelligence Center’s support for our operating forces. While this report contained no recommendations or findings, I believe that three areas in the report imply that the USCENTCOM JIC was not supporting its components properly.

2. In the first instance, pages two and five of the report had statements that the "CENTCOM JIC...answered 45 percent of the Central Command Air Force requests for information after the date specified." This statement reflects a superficial understanding of our longstanding and validated RFI procedures established during Desert Shield/Storm. Contact with the DoD IG revealed that they used 1993 data to derive the figure of 45 percent. We analyzed the data and found that approximately 30 percent of the RFI responses to CENTAF were sent after the initial date requested. This is not to say they were late. Evidently this statistic was based on information contained in the RFI Account Log kept by the JIC’s Production Management section. This log reflects only the initial receipt of a Component’s RFI with its initial requested due date. The due dates are often arbitrarily assigned and must be modified, with the requestor’s concurrence, for a variety of reasons. For example, requested imagery may be cloud covered and another image must be collected. A new due date would be assigned. This information is recorded on the very detailed RFI cover sheet which lists every action taken on the RFI and its present status. It is not recorded on the RFI Account Log which only maintains initial receipt information. We also looked at the first quarter of FY 95 to measure our current efforts and found that only two RFIs were answered after the due date. Both of those had been sent to DIA for resolution and were answered within a week of the due date to CENTAF’s satisfaction.

3. Secondly, the DoD IG report, on page five, recommends formal coordination between the JIC and the military departments to prevent duplication. Actually, the USCENTCOM RFI managers are in daily contact with their counterparts at ARCENT and are aware of all production tasks extant at a given time. Ninety percent of the JIC’s scheduled production is reoccurring; (i.e., reports or
summarizes sent on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis). The remainder of our production effort concerns one-time products of which only a few dozen are produced annually. Given our daily contact with the Component RFI managers, coordination does occur and any duplication of effort would be immediately recognized.

4. Finally, the DoDIG report stated on page six that the USCENTCOM JIC has no performance standards by which to measure our effectiveness in responding to customer requirements. This is also incorrect. Our RFI tracking procedures result in a constant daily monitoring of Component RFIs from initial receipt to completion. This essential Production Manager to Production Manager contact allows for instant feedback and any shortfall is handled immediately to the Component's satisfaction.

JAMES C. KING
BG, USA
Director of Intelligence

Enclosure 5
(Page 2 of 2)
Audit Team Members

This report was produced by the Readiness and Operational Support Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD.

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INTERNET DOCUMENT INFORMATION FORM

A. Report Title: Joint Intelligence Centers' Support for Operating Forces

B. DATE Report Downloaded From the Internet: 01/28/99

C. Report's Point of Contact: (Name, Organization, Address, Office Symbol, & Ph #): OAIG-AUD (ATTN: AFTS Audit Suggestions) Inspector General, Department of Defense 400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801) Arlington, VA 22202-2884

D. Currently Applicable Classification Level: Unclassified

E. Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release

F. The foregoing information was compiled and provided by: DTIC-OCA, Initials: VM Preparation Date 01/28/99

The foregoing information should exactly correspond to the Title, Report Number, and the Date on the accompanying report document. If there are mismatches, or other questions, contact the above OCA Representative for resolution.