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Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 158-159


The editorial "Lenin on the Great October Socialist Revolution".

V. Zagladin in his article "The Great October and the Two Trends in World Politics" concentrates on the two diametrically opposed social systems--socialism and capitalism since their inception. While peace is the slogan and essence of socialism, war is the slogan and essence of capitalism. The author holds the view that the struggle of the two trends on the world arena is nothing but a reflection in international relations of the transition of mankind from capitalism to socialism. It is objectively preconditioned reality with a precise social character and clear-cut social-class content. Hence the peace-loving trend in international politics engendered by socialism and backed by it objectively expresses the interests of ever broader social and political forces being thereby of a law-governed nature, substantiated by Marxism-Leninism. The article dwells upon the present stage of struggle in world politics and notes that preservation of the existing military-strategic parity of the two systems constitutes a new feature of the entire strategy of averting a world war. The prospects of further development of the world revolutionary process are also connected with prevention of war as a prerequisite for further social progress. The author notes that the difficulties experienced by capitalism effect its policy including foreign policy. Visibly more active of late are the opponents of detente, of limiting armaments and of improving relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. But the policy of the Soviet Union as always is dedicated to detente and to the strengthening of international security.

International tension has considerably aggravated as a result of the politics of the aggressive imperialist forces, particularly the American, with all the dangers this implies for the cause of peace. S. Madzojewsky and D. Tomashevsky in their article "Growth of International Tension and Western Europe" believe that the correlation of the general and the specific in the foreign strategy of the main centres of imperialism emerges beyond the framework of imperialist relations and is of paramount practical importance in solving the cardinal
problems of modern world politics. Centrifugal tendencies are being revealed ever more clearly in the present stage. This predetermines various contradictions in the imperialist blocks and alliances, some of them rather grave, in foreign strategy and tactics—the key spheres of international relations. America's hegemonic aspirations encounter growing opposition from other imperialist centres. The authors believe that essential shifts in the correlation of forces not only between the two systems but inside the capitalist world are at the root of this process. Of late the lack of concurrence of economic interests between Western Europe and the USA has been revealed ever more distinctly. The same applies to discrepancies in nuclear arms buildup, observance of principles of peaceful co-existence, admission of the legitimate desire of the developing countries to economic independence and social progress. Hence the fate of detente and peaceful co-existence of the two systems depend at large on the acuteness of these discrepancies on the ever more realistic approach of Western Europe to the key issues of world politics.

A. Svetlov in the article "New Stage in Nuclear Arms Race" focuses attention on the neutron weapon race being pursued by the USA and the preparations for its installation in Western Europe. This monstrous weapon is considered as a means of waging the so-called "limited war" being planned by the Pentagon. The author emphasizes the profoundly man-hating and anti-human nature of such a weapon and draws a parallel with Hitler's aspirations to develop "the depopulation technique". The author brings to light the atmosphere of extreme secrecy in which this weapon had been created. He shows the way the USA resorted to gross deception and pressure in an attempt to impose this weapon on their West European allies. Special attention is paid to the arguments with which the U.S. administration is trying to justify the necessity of producing the neutron weapon and installing it in Western Europe.

R. Borisov in his article "Middle East and Global Strategy of American Imperialism" examines thoroughly the U.S. imperialist approach to the Middle East which has long been considered by Washington as a region of "global collision" with the world system of socialism, a spring-board for "exerting pressure" on the USSR, for militarist actions against the national-liberation movements and a source of strategic raw material—oil. The article dwells upon the U.S. military plans in the Middle East, shows the extent of American military presence there, exposes the extent of arms supplies to Washington's military partners, primarily to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The author offers ample data when analyzes the U.S. oil politics and the doctrine of "access" to the Middle East oil, its evolution and the sphere of its present application by Washington. The article describes the Camp David system as an American-Israeli model of imperialist settlement of the Middle East conflict, discloses the mechanism of the system and its uttermost negative consequences for a just settlement of the Palestine problem and for the cause of peace in the Middle East as a whole. The author emphasizes that the Israeli aggression in Lebanon in 1982 is a direct result of the Camp David conspiracy and of American-Israeli "strategic cooperation".

General deterioration of the principal conditions of the capitalist reproduction is features by the acceleration of cyclical processes translated into recurrent recessions. In the article "The Rate of Return and the Postwar Business Cycle"
A. Poletaev examines the cyclical fluctuations of the rate of return in the postwar period taking the example of the USA where these processes have taken the most demonstrative forms.

Despite the countercyclical regulation and the monopolistic price practices, the rate of return has discovered considerable upswings and downswings. On the basis of the profound theoretical speculation the author traces the long-term and short-term factors of these fluctuations supporting his analysis by abundant statistical data. He pays special attention to such factors as the cyclical evolution of prices, influenced by the petrol shock, and shifts in the production costs, in wages in particular.

The increasing monopolization involves the emergence of the new notion of the monopoly potence namely the cyclical stability of the rate of return, promoted for by the state policy.

The postwar cycles give evidence to the fact that the excessive accumulation of capital now occur before the beginning of the slack phase. This results in the prolongation of the disguised overproduction period at the expence of the "normal" rise during the expansion phase.

Classifying the three periods of the postwar evolution of the developing world, V. Vasiliev in the article "Developing Countries within the International Capitalist Division of Labour" characterizes the crucial shifts in the North-South relationship.

The domestic reproduction process of the imperialist states, especially of the USA, affects seriously the international position of the developing countries within the existing and progressing level of interdependence. In order to secure their interests the developing counries undertake certain moves which are targetted to a great extent to offset the neocolonialist schemes.

The stratification of the developing countries and their mounting differentiation, on one hand, and the aggravation of the imperialist rivalry along with the growing competition of the new industrializing states, on the other hand, contribute to the transformation of the international capitalist division of labour, reflecting the shifts in the balance of power. This transformation intensifies the confrontation of the imperialist states with the developing world leading to recurrent economic and political crises.


CSO: 1812/74-E
CAUSES OF EAST–WEST RIVALRY SEEN IN SOCIAL SYSTEM, DELIBERATE POLICY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSTENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 29–41

[Article by V. Zagladin: "The Great October and the Two Directions in World Politics"; capitalized passages printed in boldface]

[Text]

I

Great October.... Just two words. What inexhaustible content there is in them, however!

This content may be revealed ad infinitum in actual examples—but this would take volumes, and not tens but hundreds of volumes. For literally a myriad facts of the most recent history of all countries and peoples reveal the inexhaustible influence of the first victorious socialist revolution in man's history on the economic, social, political and ideological processes of the 20th century.

Let us, however, attempt to approach the question of October's significance and influence from a different, philosophical–sociological angle. It is well known that in evaluating the influence of any historical event on the general course of world development it is particularly important to take two aspects into account. The first is the extent to which it reflected and imbued the main characteristics of social life. The second is the extent to which and the direction in which it has influenced these characteristics.

In speaking of the Great October Socialist Revolution today it is extraordinarily difficult (if not altogether impossible) for any sober-minded person free of prejudice to deny that it, this revolution, indeed imbued the most deeplying and most basic trends of the development of the world social organism. "A new world has arrived, and not only for Russia," the American public figure Lincoln Steffens once correctly wrote. "Soviet Russia is only the start. The Russians are only the first leading people and mass hero of world revolution. They have been the first to learn to do that to which all peoples have always endeavored and hoped to do."

* LITERATURA MIROVOY REVOLYUTSII Nos 9–10, 1932, p 147.
In our day not only those who are for revolution and socialism but also those who occupy positions on the other side of the social barricades, who by their own actions, frequently performed in spite of themselves, prove daily and hourly that, yes, the socialism born for the first time of October and its ideals and methods—this is what is determining the future of the individual and mankind! Lest what has been said sound paradoxical, let us give an example. An inestimable number of theories of convergence (in varying interpretations) have now appeared. SUBJECTIVELY the antisocialist meaning of these theories is obvious. But something else also is no less obvious: OBJECTIVELY their authors are incapable of entirely repudiating socialism and the methods and ways of economic and social development which it has formulated, which have proven their indisputable effectiveness.... 

So the Great October and the path that it has laid have faithfully reflected the deep-lying trends of world history.

And now concerning the other aspect. Have October and its revolutionary consequences influenced the further course of social development and its objective characteristics? The experience of the past 65 years shows that this influence has been tremendous and has proceeded, to speak in summary form, mainly in two directions.

On the one hand the victory of October led to an expansion and acceleration of social processes worldwide. The effect of the objective characteristics shaking and undermining capitalism and bringing about its replacement by socialism has accelerated and intensified. It has become more diverse, differentiated and more complex and multi-aspectual. This is also indicated, incidentally, by the fact that for 65 years it is along this path that peoples constituting one-third of mankind have proceeded and that now hundreds and hundreds of millions of people in other countries are gravitating toward it, this same path.

On the other hand, the October Revolution also led to the appearance of new characteristics of social development reflecting the essence of the historical era that had begun—the era of the coexistence and struggle of two opposite social systems and the era of world socialist revolution.

It is primarily a question of the characteristics of the new, socialist mode of production and the new, socialist society as a whole. It is a question, further, of the characteristics determining the increasing variety of possible ways of the transition to socialism (primarily characteristics of the noncapitalist development path). It is also a question of the characteristics of the struggle of the two social systems in the world arena. In the course of this struggle both systems are exerting a definite influence on each other. The impact of socialism on capitalism here is growing continuously and its influence on all world processes is increasing. Capitalism, on the other hand, as a system, has been on the historical defensive for more than six decades.

K. Marx's observation in "Das Kapital" that the laws of capitalism may be modified by numerous circumstances is well known. Many circumstances modifying the effect of the laws of capitalism's development have arisen—both in the intracapitalist and international planes—in the decades since October. And in the
overwhelming number of cases they have operated in one and the same direction: in the direction of curbing the most antihuman, antihumane manifestations of the nature of the old system.

In the internal political plane this is expressed primarily in the fact that the tyranny of the bourgeoisie in respect of the proletariat now has a framework and limits. As far as the international aspect is concerned, the main thing is the following: the might of socialism and all the forces of peace are now making it possible to prevent imperialism unleashing a new world war.

"There are two forces on earth which can determine the fate of mankind," V.I. Lenin wrote. "One is international capitalism, and if it is victorious, it will demonstrate this force with infinite atrocities—this can be seen from the history of the development of each small nation. The other force is the international proletariat, which is struggling for socialist revolution...."* "We have a right to be proud and consider ourselves fortunate," the leader of October said elsewhere, "that we were the first to cast aside in one corner of the world that wild beast, capitalism, which has covered the earth with blood and brought mankind to the point of starvation and degenerate wildness...."**

And just this is the inimitable greatness and inexhaustible vitality of October.

II

The fundamental contrast of the two social systems—socialism and capitalism—was manifested immediately in the foreign policy sphere. In fact, in the economy, social affairs and transformation of the political system—time was needed everywhere for revelation of the fundamentally new features of the socialist system. Neither the economy nor the political life of a huge country could have been recarved in one day. The Soviet state's foreign policy, however, was reorganized precisely in one day and by a single legislative enactment—the Decree on Peace, which was immediately followed by the appropriate effective actions.

"The worker-peasant government created by the 24–25 October revolution and based on the soviets of worker, soldier and peasant deputies proposes that all warring peoples and their governments immediately begin negotiations on a just, democratic peace."*** These were essentially the first words of the newly born Soviet socialist state addressed to the outside, beyond the country.

The reaction which they caused was by no means synonymous. The democratic, left, progressive and peace-loving forces greeted the first step of Russia's socialist government with enthusiasm. The Decree on Peace gave them real, long-awaited hope for an end to the war. On the other hand, those who were the organizers of the mutual extirpation of the peoples, which had been going on for more than 3 years by that time, perceived Lenin's decree as a challenge and impermissible encroachment on the sanctum sanctorum of imperialism, the most

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** Ibid., p 396.
reliable source of the enrichment of the capitalists and the "customary" method of solving questions and conflicts. In a word, as an undermining of the foundations of not only their, the capitalists', prosperity but also their very existence.

It was at that time that the main features of the new world situation were determined. "Now," V.I. Lenin wrote, "two camps in complete awareness stand against each other, on, without the least exaggeration, a world scale."* The principle, essence and slogan of the policy of one of these camps--the socialist--was PEACE. The principle, essence and slogan of the other--the imperialist--was WAR. Thus began the struggle of two opposite policies in the world arena, a struggle which continues to this day.

And not simply continues. Evaluating the situation that had taken shape in the international arena by the start of the 1980's, Marxist-Leninist communist and worker parties and the representatives of other peace-loving forces concluded that its characteristic feature was the pronounced intensification of the struggle of the two directions in world politics.

"The policy of the United States and those following it is a deepening of tension and the maximum exacerbation of the situation," L.I. Brezhnev said on 27 October 1982. "They are dreaming of the political isolation and economic weakening of the USSR and its friends. They have initiated an unprecedented arms race, nuclear particularly, and are attempting to gain military superiority. Having embarked on this path, imperialism is irresponsibly playing with the fate of the peoples. Our policy is detente and the strengthening of international security. We will not retreat from it and will increase our efforts and retain the initiative in international affairs."

We say: the struggle of two policies in the world arena and two directions in world politics. But to what do we refer here? Is it a question of some phenomenon of an objective nature or of a concept of political science reflecting the subjective aspect of the historical process?

There is a very intensive struggle of opinions, in the environment of the democratic forces included, under way surrounding this question. For this reason it is impossible to separate a study of the set problem from if only a cursory mention of the standpoints being expressed in this connection.

It may sometimes be heard, for example, that the struggle of the two directions in world politics is a phenomenon of a purely subjective nature. More, it is asserted that speaking of the need for and inevitability of the struggle of the two policies in the world arena is almost a mistake and virtually a disregard for the real conditions and requirements of our era. Understandably, such a mistake is ascribed primarily to the socialist world.

It is impossible to agree with this viewpoint, however. Of course, the struggle of the two directions in world politics is a complex phenomenon; it is the

intrinsically contradictory unity of subjective and objective features, aspects and factors. Inasmuch as "... in politics ... it is sometimes a question of extremely complex—national and international—mutual relations between classes and parties ..."* and inasmuch as it is a question, in other words, of the conscious activity of certain political forces, parties, organizations and figures, we are undoubtedly dealing with a subjective phenomenon. But since it is clear that in the course of the struggle of the different political directions different decisions may be adopted, dissimilar approaches to this problem or the other may be revealed. And, of course, it is very important to analyze in depth these approaches and decisions and the extent to which they correspond to the "requirements of the age".

However, in our view, any such analysis should primarily take account of the fact that any policy, being a relationship between classes, always has a most profound objective basis. "In politics, as in science, it is necessary ... to learn to perceive things objectively,"** F. Engels wrote. This was how V.I. Lenin approached this problem. Elaborating the political measures of the young Soviet power, he demanded that we "look at the general, fundamental background of the picture on which we are now sketching the design of certain practical measures of policy of the present day."***

As far as the "general, fundamental background" of the picture of man's present-day life is concerned, it is obvious that only either a person who is blind and deaf and completely divorced from reality or a hopeless hypocrite could deny the indisputable, namely, that the essence of this background is the unswerving, albeit not simple and not rectilinear, movement of mankind toward socialism. As V.I. Lenin said, in our era "... politics is the relations of the proletariat struggling for liberation against the world bourgeoisie."****

In other words, while being a process to a considerable extent related to the sphere of the subjective, the struggle of the two directions in the international arena is primarily an essential reflection of the objective processes of historical and world development and a reflection of the all-embracing struggle of the two social systems and the two policies and ideologies corresponding to them.

So, in its objective, that is, not dependent on us and our consciousness, content THE STRUGGLE OF THE TWO DIRECTIONS AND TWO POLICIES IN THE WORLD ARENA is not something that can be simply cast aside and ignored and something above which it is possible to rise and then hover, as in a vacuum. IT IS AN OBJECTIVE FACTOR. IT IS THE SOIL AND MEDIUM IN WHICH CONTEMPORARY MANKIND EXISTS AND LIVES AND FROM WHICH IT CANNOT BE TORN AWAY, AS IT CANNOT BE TORN AWAY FROM THE REALITY OF CLASS RELATIONS AND CLASS STRUGGLE.

* V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 41, p 52.
**** See Ibid., vol 41, p 406.
True, in connection with an analysis of the current situation in the world arena it is also possible to sometimes come across considerations to the effect that the struggle of different policies in international politics is not a novelty and that it occurred in the past also. Matters are frequently portrayed here such that even the present struggle of the two policies in the world arena is in no way fundamentally different than, say, the struggle of the two power blocs on the eve of WWI.

It is true, of course, that before October also instances were encountered (and not that rarely) of the confrontation of different approaches in world affairs. Situations also arose when one power or group of powers acted from frankly aggressive positions and the other from more or less peace-loving positions. Nonetheless, this was by no means a struggle of the two directions in world politics with which we are dealing in our time. They were clashes of different diplomatic procedures and different political tactics and methods, BUT BASED ON ONE AND THE SAME, COMMON, EXPLOITER CLASS BASIS. And despite all the difference of the methods, in its social nature the policy of all participants in world intercourse prior to October was identical. In the 19th and at the start of the 20th centuries THIS WAS ONE AND THE SAME CAPITALIST POLICY.

After October, however, it was then a question of an entirely different, qualitatively new phenomenon--THE STRUGGLE OF TWO Socially Opposite Systems.

We have already adduced above Lenin's extraordinarily striking utterance of the "two camps" which since 1917 have been standing opposite each other on a world scale. And here is one further proposition of Lenin's: "... All the events of world politics are inevitably concentrated around a single central point, namely: the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Soviet Russian Republic, which inevitably groups around itself on the one hand the soviet movements of progressive workers of all countries and, on the other, all the national liberation movements of the colonies and oppressed nationalities...."* "The unification of all the world's powerful capitalist countries against Soviet Russia--this is the true basis of present international politics. And it must be recognized that the fate of hundreds of millions of working people in the capitalist countries depends on this,"** V.I. Lenin wrote.

These words of Lenin's have acquired particularly profound meaning today. For today, in the course of the universal, all-embracing struggle of the two systems in the international arena, one of the confrontational parties, namely, socialism, is pursuing a consistent policy of peace and international cooperation which corresponds entirely to the interests of present-day mankind and the requirements of our nuclear age. The other party, imperialism, however, holds to an adventurist policy which is capable of bringing mankind to the brink of nuclear catastrophe.

There is sometimes the objection, it is true, when the question is posed thus: you are preaching a "Manichean approach," that is, dividing the whole world into black and white, good and bad. But there are other colors in the world. And,

** Ibid., p 401.
generally, there is good and bad in everything. In any event, it is not only imperialism which is to blame for the present complications of the situation....

The question has been posed repeatedly precisely thus in talks with us by representatives of social democratic parties. And from the Soviet side there invariably follows the answer: of course, no one in the world is insured against shortcomings and mistakes. But there are certain mistakes which socialism has never made, is not making and will not make. Thus, for example, the Soviet Union has never attempted to gain world domination or military superiority; and has not taken such false steps as to threaten war against any country whatever or the intention of solving its own problems at the expense of other countries. We have never declared as a zone of our interests any other regions or territories and have not endeavored to ensure our security at the expense of our allies or by encouraging some countries to aggressive actions against other countries. We have never advanced the proposition of the legitimacy of nuclear war or the salutory nature of the neutron bomb....

It is sometimes also said that it is not a question of socialism itself, it is not to blame, it is merely a question of the "logic of bloc politics". One bloc does something or other, the other responds. And then the first reacts to the response and so on. A kind of vicious circle transpires. What can be said in this connection?

Of course, the existence of blocs imparts its coloration to the course of international political life. But it would evidently be mistaken to endow blocs as such with some supernatural force. The more so in that the present blocs have a distinctive character which is different from many similar organizations which have existed in history.

Let us take, for example, NATO. Its creation was explained by the need to repulse "Soviet aggression". But this explanation was simply false. And here is one of the latest pieces of evidence of this.

In the last 5-7 years a considerable number of top-secret papers relating to the period from 1945 through the end of the 1950's has been made public in the United States. It can be seen from these that throughout this time aggressive circles of the United States were making active preparations for a war against the Soviet Union. But what is characteristic is something else—the papers of that period contain an acknowledgment of the absence of any aggressive plans in the USSR. In August 1945 a paper of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee had been prepared which set forth a plan of the preparation of an atomic war against the USSR by way of hitting it with a nuclear first strike. But the compilers of the plan—and this is attested in documentary form—believed that "the Soviet Union does not represent a direct threat." Similar papers of that period note that the USSR did not have aggressive intentions with respect to other countries and was not preparing for war but engaged in the restoration of the economy. In 1948 the U.S. National Security Council acknowledged: "The Soviet Government is not planning any deliberate military operations aimed at involving the United States in a conflict."
Consequently, a military threat on the part of the USSR did not and does not now exist. But the legitimate question then arises: what explains this hostility of American leading circles with respect to the Soviet country? What are the real goals of the plans for an anti-Soviet war which have been developed in the United States? The above-mentioned papers are perfectly precise on this score: neither socialism nor the Soviet system are to the liking of this country's ruling elite.

In all its papers of 1947, 1979, 1956 and 1957, that is, the papers which contained plans for war against the USSR, the U.S. National Security Council systematically pointed out that the purpose of the war was destruction of the Soviet social system and the Communist Party and, particularly, the undermining or discrediting of the Soviet state's peace-loving foreign policy.*

So, the NATO bloc was created not to defend itself against mythical Soviet aggression but for the struggle against socialism in the USSR and everywhere and for struggle against progressive forces in the nonsocialist world. It is a class-based organization of imperialism. It will remain such. And as such only one historical analogy to it can be found—the Anticomintern Pact.

As far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned, it was created 6 years after the appearance of the NATO bloc and, furthermore, as a response to its creation. The Warsaw Pact is not an instrument of the rivalry of some grouping of countries with another grouping of a similar nature and is not an instrument of struggle for the division of the world and for colonies or sales markets. It is an instrument of the class defense of the gains of socialism.

Thus behind the blocs which exist today are two opposite social systems, and this imparts to each of them their own special character. Equating them, identifying their policies and putting them on the same footing is not simply wrong but profoundly mistaken.

There is no need, I believe, to show that the dominants of the policy of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are polar opposites. And this is primarily a class contrast and their diametrically opposite attitude toward the problem of war and peace ensuing therefrom and the attitude conditioned by this of the two blocs toward their very existence.

The very text of the Warsaw Pact contains a point about its temporary, enforced nature. It has long been proposing the simultaneous liquidation of the two blocs or, as a first step, their military organizations. NATO has responded with a refusal.

Further, the Warsaw Pact countries have proposed and continue to propose no expansion of the existing blocs. NATO has responded to this by incorporating Spain.

* See N.N. Yakovlev, "TsRU protiv USSR" [The CIA Against the USSR], Moscow, 1979, pp 26, 31, 38 and subsequently.
Recently the Warsaw Pact countries proposed nonextension of the blocs' range to the regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America. NATO policy, however, consists of the gradual, de facto extension of its range to these continents or parts thereof.

Thus recognition of the class essence of the policy of the United States and NATO and the concrete actions determined by this is by no means a Manichean approach but simply a class position. Of course, it is true that in life there is a mass of other colorings besides black and white. And in politics and ideology there is, together with proletarian and imperialist positions, also a mass of intermediate shades. But whoever defends the interests of the working class and working people and the interests of the struggle for socialism has a right to occupy JUST ONE POSITION—THE CLASS, PROLETARIAN POSITION. In any event, this is what we believe.

III

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO ORIENTATIONS ON THE WORLD ARENA IS AN OBJECTIVELY CONDITIONED PHENOMENON OF AN EXPLICIT CLASS-ORIENTED NATURE. But it is not enough simply to state this. In real life all processes unfold in an equivocal and contradictory manner. Yes, the struggle between two directions in world politics is of an explicitly social and social-class nature. But can the essence of these directions be expressed in actions that vary extremely broadly, not only in form but sometimes also in content?

For example, we perceive explicit differences in the policies of discreet capitalist governments or statesmen. If we consider the United States in the past there are the well-known differences in technique and approach between, say, Roosevelt and Truman. The political realism of the former is in sharp contrast with the blindly reactionary outlook of the latter.

History also records differences—and considerable ones at that—between the foreign policies of other countries of the same social type. Such differences always had and have to be considered even though this concern divergences within a bloc that [as a whole] is opposed in social philosophy to the other bloc on the world arena.

It is perhaps precisely now, in the nuclear age, that subjective differences in political strategy and tactics among countries with the same system of society acquire such a particularly great significance. It is perfectly clear, for example, that a relatively liberal and relatively peace-loving tendency in the capitalist circles is of definite service to the cause of peace. From the standpoint of averting the nuclear war, it is absolutely necessary to take this tendency into account.

Hence, along with the clear general statement of the class-oriented opposition between two directions in world politics and their direct relationship to the conflict between two systems of society, there also exists an explicit need to make allowance for strategic and tactical differences that may arise in the course of their evolution. But that still is not all.
In 1917 the line of peace on the international arena had been represented by just one country—the Soviet Union. Today, on the other hand, this line is championed by the socialist community, by the other countries of socialism. But is not, in principle, this line being also championed by the revolutionary-democratic countries? Is not this the line to which adhere forces of varying social and political nature in the capitalist world? Together with communists, this line is supported also by many elements, strata and groups that are very far from them.

How does all this relate to the question of the objective social foundation of the line of peace and progress on the world arena? Does not something change here? Yes, it is sometimes claimed so. It is being said that now the "old" class-oriented approach to, in particular, international affairs and problems of solidarity and struggle against imperialism is a thing of the past, no longer needed.

In this case, too, there is not and cannot be an unequivocal answer to the question.

And indeed, the social base of peace-loving policy, whose initiator and motive power is socialism, has become broadened. The growing threat of war provoked by imperialism is prompting the social and political forces which had previously hesitated to assess events to occupy a more definite position and define their place on the chessboard of international relations. The early 1980's have become a period of an unprecedented polarization of these forces regarding the main question—war or peace.

But this fact hardly alters the important consideration that it is socialism that remains the objective foundation and the initiator of the line of peace in international affairs. What is more, actually the broadening of the front of the forces of peace in our times reflects precisely THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF SOCIALISM AS A FACTOR IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE DANGER OF WAR. And indeed, in our complex transition era when socialism has actually become an urgent imperative for the evolution of the world as a whole, when the struggle for socialism is largely identified with social progress as such, THE PEACE-LOVING DIRECTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ENCENDED BY AND BASED ON SOCIALISM, HAS BEGUN TO REFLECT OBJECTIVELY THE INTERESTS OF INCREASINGLY BROADER MASSES OF PEOPLE, INCREASINGLY BROADER SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FORCES.

This is a manifestation of a law, discovered by Marxism-Leninism, according to which the most vital interests of the working class reflect in the final analysis the correctly understood interests of an overwhelming majority of mankind. And this yet again demonstrates the correctness of the constant and immanent principle of communist policies in general and policies in international affairs in particular—the principle of the class-oriented approach to the assessment of events and occurrences. What is more, today the importance of the class-oriented approach, of an explicitly class-oriented assessment of the problems of world development, is even greater than ever before. Here is why.

It is known from the history of international relations that crises in world politics have often arisen for reasons due not to vital social processes, not
to the class struggle, but to such phenomena as, for example, a contest between two colonial powers for ruling some territory or even a collision among interests of various dynasties. However, the current exacerbation of the conflict between two directions in world politics, the present-day international tension, originates precisely from the class struggle. In other words, we are dealing not with an ordinary crisis in international politics but with a deep crisis of a socio-political nature. Actually, THIS CONCERNS THE REFLECTION, IN THE SPHERE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, OF THAT STAGE OF THE DEEPENING OF THE CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM WHICH IT NOW FACES. THIS IS A FORM OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE EXACERBATION OF THE GENERAL CRISIS OF CAPITALISM.

What does this involve? Without going into detail, let us attempt to trace THE LOGIC OF IMPERIALIST POLICIES during the 1970's.

EARLY 1970's. Owing to the new ratio of forces, imperialism was forced to agree to the detente, that is, in practice, to admit the justice of the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of two systems. This principle, which until then had been officially rejected and which imperialists would not admit on any official document, became officially admitted in the early 1970's. And even American presidents (not just once but twice or thrice in a row) declared in one way or another that there is no alternative to this principle.

MID-1970's. The detente became a fact, tension declined, peace strengthened somewhat, and the spectre of the nuclear war receded. This corresponded to the interests of the entire mankind and every nation, the interests of the forces of social progress. But this contradicted the interests of the forces of militarism and reaction.

The 1970's showed that the competition between the two systems in the presence of a consolidation of peace—even though to socialism, then entering a new stage of development, the 1970's were far from the simplest period—was accompanied by the growing superiority of the new system of society. As for imperialism, and primarily its most aggressive circles, it turned out to be hardly ready to compete with socialism in the presence of peace. K.U. Chernenko stressed: "The American ruling class did not withstand the test of the detente, the test of peaceful cooperation."

And indeed this was so. The detente is a multifaceted and multidimensional process. The detente is incontestably the path toward peace and cooperation. But it is also more than that. The Soviet Union proceed from the premise that the detente unlocks the vistas for the democratization of international life in general and energizes the political activity of the broad masses. The detente is inseparable from the recognition of the right of every nation to decide its own destiny, to choose its way of life and the direction of its social development.

The hope that the socio-political status quo can be preserved and "frozen" is a reactionary utopia, nothing more. And life convincingly demonstrates this.

THE LATE 1970's. Third element in the logic of imperialist policy: the reactionary, aggressive circles of imperialism undertake the attempt to retrogress,
to abandon the detente, TO CONVERT FROM THE STRATEGY OF ADAPTATION TO THE SITUATION TO THE STRATEGY OF FORCIBLY CHANGING THE SITUATION.

At the 26th CPSU Congress it was declared in this connection: "The difficulties being experienced by imperialism influence its policies as well, including its foreign policies. The struggle around the fundamental aspects of the foreign-policy course of the capitalist countries has grown sharper.... Adventurism, readiness to gamble with the vital interests of mankind for the sake of selfish gain, are clearly bared by the policies of the most aggressive circles of imperialism.... They have truly set themselves an unattainable goal—that of barring the path to progressive changes in the world and regaining the role of rulers of the destinies of nations." Analogous analyses are contained in the documents of the congresses of the communist parties of Bulgaria, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Cuba, and the fraternal parties of France, the FRG, India, Mexico and other countries.

Thus, imperialist policy has evolved within the framework of a class logic—a logic that had subsequently been openly identified as the logic of a "crusade" against socialism. And if that logic is pondered, the otherwise mysterious facts that had occurred in the mid-1970's become clear.

Consider just some of these facts. The turn toward a drastic increase in armaments, including the development of new types of medium-range nuclear weapons for Europe—the Pershing-2 and the cruise missiles (later christened a "response" to our SS-20 missiles) had originated in the United States as far back as in the beginning of the 1970's, that is, at a time when no one had even heard anything about SS-20 missiles! The increased allocations for new military programs had been requested in the winter of 1974, that is, immediately after the meeting in Vladivostok between L.I. Brezhnev and President G. Ford, immediately after agreement had been reached on drafting the SALT II terms. More, immediately after Helsinki, in November 1975, the Congress of the United States approved a consecutive budget that manifested a trend toward a limitless increase in military expenditures. And even then the American Secretary of Defense began to make declarations about the need to increase [military] might with the object of achieving political goals and the President of the United States proposed discarding the term "detente" since it conflicts with the interests of the United States, so to speak.

In other words, the current exacerbation of the international situation is not a random event. It is a result of the class strategy of imperialism, an expression of its attempts to strengthen its positions and continue its existence. The current state of tension has been long, deliberately and purposefully planned by imperialist forces.

Naturally, the gauntlet hurled by imperialism at socialism, at all progressive and peace-loving forces, had to be taken up by them. It has to be admitted that it was no simple matter to decide on the nature of that response and find the proper forms of reaction to the increased aggressiveness of imperialism. By its rude, sharp and violent actions, imperialism has been provoking socialism. Our enemies went so far as to directly attempt to prompt the countries of the socialist community to make a hasty, spontaneous response which would essentially be only in accord with the interests of imperialist aggressive forces.
But the CPSU and the fraternal communist and workers’ parties of the socialist community have COLLECTIVELY WORKED OUT THE CORRECT RESPONSE WHICH ESSENTIALLY CONSISTS IN COMBINING FIRM RESISTANCE WHERE NEEDED WITH A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, WITH THE OFFER OF CONCRETE INITIATIVES CONCERNING ALL BASIC QUESTIONS OF WORLD POLITICS. As for our country, precisely such a line was reflected in the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress.

On assessing the whole of the recent foreign-policy initiatives of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, certain common features of these initiatives, essential to a deeper understanding of the line for peace and social progress followed by these countries, can be isolated.

FIRST, ALL THE INITIATIVES OF THE COUNTRIES OF SOCIALISM, without exception, ARE FOCUSED ON PREVENTING THE MAIN DANGER, THE MAIN THREAT—THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR WORLD WAR.

SECONDLY, and accordingly, THE BASIC DIRECTION OF MOST OF THE INITIATIVES ADVANCED BY THE COUNTRIES OF SOCIALISM IS TOWARD HALTING THE ARMS RACE and starting a reduction of armaments.

A shining example of this is the set of proposals offered by L.I. Brezhnev following the 26th CPSU Congress. These proposals concerned the problems of abandoning the use of nuclear weapons, curtailing and reducing strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons and halting their tests, refraining from the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space, assuring a secure development of nuclear power industry, achieving progress in the restriction and curtailment of conventional armaments in Europe, etc.

Of historic significance is the initiative advanced by L.I. Brezhnev at the second special session on disarmament of the UN General Assembly in June 1982. The Soviet Union took an unprecedented step, pledging itself unilaterally not to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons. Had the other nuclear powers adopted such an explicit and clear pledge, this in practice would have been equivalent to the total prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons.

Of major importance also is the proposal, offered by the USSR at the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly, "On the Immediate Cessation and Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests." The total cessation of nuclear weapon tests by all countries and in all media would have been a major step toward reducing the nuclear threat. This long overdue step would have been a major obstacle to the development of ever newer types and systems of nuclear weapons and the rise of new nuclear countries.

At the same time the USSR had proposed the halting (freezing), by all nuclear countries, of the production and expansion of nuclear warheads and means of their delivery as well as of the production of fissionable materials for the development of various types of nuclear weapons.

THIRDLY, the foreign-policy initiatives of the countries of socialism concern all those regions of the world that are war foci and sites of conflict. This concerns STRIVING TO PUT A STOP TO THESE CONFLICTS AND ELIMINATE THESE WAR FOCI.
The principal example deals with the new Soviet ideas on the Middle East—the region where Israel, supported by the United States, has committed a crude and unprecedented aggression against Lebanon, with genocide of Lebanese and Palestinians.

On 15 September 1982 L.I. Brezhnev advanced six basic principles for the solution of the Middle East problem. These principles do not harm the interests of any country and nation in that region, and they take into account all the aspects of the problem. Principles of this kind can, indisputably, underlie the general approach to the settlement of the Middle East problem, underlie the positions of all those who want genuine peace in the Middle East. It is important that the Soviet proposals not only outline the basic ways of a peaceful regulation of the conflict itself but also indicate a way of implementing it through the convening of a conference with the participation of all the concerned parties (including, of course, the Palestine Liberation Organization), along with the full utilization of the possibilities of the United Nations.

FOURTHLY, the proposals of the countries of the socialist community are intended to normalize relations with the countries with which they lack normal relations. This concerns, in particular, the United States. This also concerns China, with respect to which the principal line of the USSR was, following the 26th CPSU Congress, restated in the speeches of L.I. Brezhnev in Tashkent and Baku.

FIFTH, an important feature of all the proposals and initiatives of the countries of the socialist community is that they invariably take into account the slogans of the mass anti-war movement as well as the positions of Western partners on talks. No one can say that the USSR or any one of its allies and friends is deaf. On the contrary, in the capitals of the countries of the socialist community everything that others say is heard and whenever possible attempts are made to find a mutually acceptable approach.

Consider a characteristic example. When the USSR stated its position regarding medium-range nuclear arms in Europe and proposed a marked reduction in their numbers, certain circles in the West expressed the view that while they have nothing against talks, these would mean little so long as the Soviet Union continues to develop its new systems supplanting the old. In reply, the Soviet Union announced a quantitative and qualitative freeze on all medium-range ballistic nuclear missiles. What is more, it took a new step demonstrating its will for peace and faith in the possibility of a mutually acceptable agreement—it began on its own initiative to reduce the number of its medium-range missiles deployed in Europe.

Quite a few other such examples could be cited. The goodwill of the Soviet Union with respect to a genuine solution of the problem of strengthening peace is not subject to doubt.

And lastly, SIXTH, the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community strive to tie their concrete initiatives on problems of military detente to the solution of the social and economic problems that are most urgent and essential to the masses. In particular, they constantly link their ideas and proposals on disarmament to the solution of such problems as unemployment and overcoming the backwardness of the former colonial countries.
Thus, the response to the actions of imperialism that was worked out by the socialist countries is a response combining, we repeat, two sides: resistance where needed and a constructive initiative in all directions. It is precisely owing to such an approach that socialism consistently succeeds in keeping in its hands the initiative in international affairs.

The activities of the USSR and its allies in the period following the 26th CPSU Congress resulted in disrupting many plans of imperialist aggressive circles. They contributed to unmasking and isolating the imperialist groupings most dangerous to mankind. On the other hand, these activities have incontestably broadened the possibilities of all the peace-loving countries and social forces favoring the prevention of a nuclear war.

Currently the Western press and comments by individual statesmen pursue the idea that supposedly the postwar period is over and has been replaced by a new prewar period. Such a pessimistic statement of the problem is gambled on by the "hawks" in discussing the inevitability of a nuclear war and the possibility of winning it.

The CPSU in principle rejects such a view. Soviet Communists perceive all the dangers of the present-day situation and discuss them honestly and openly, concealing nothing from their people. The CPSU explicitly declares that there can be no victor in a nuclear war. This is the official view of our party, more than once stated by L.I. Brezhnev, the general secretary of its Central Committee.

At the same time, even now we regard as valid the conclusion inferred by the communist movement a quarter century ago: there exist real possibilities for averting and preventing war. L.I. Brezhnev declared in his Baku speech: "The detente is a historic accomplishment of nations. It should in no case be abandoned for demolition by narrowminded egotistic politicians in the imperialist camp. It should be safeguarded, developed and deepened. And that will be a victory, because we believe in human reason or, if you prefer, in the instinct of nations for self-preservation." It is precisely on achieving the victory of reason that all foreign-policy activities of our party and country are focused at present.

The objective conditions existing in the world and the deployment and ratio of forces on the international arena offer broad possibilities for the struggle against war. The subjective desire of the masses and the will to struggle against war also are present—this is demonstrated by the continuing and broad growth of the anti-war movement.

The trends of further socio-political development are such that the next few years will inevitably bring new shifts in favor of the cause of peace and social progress. That is why, while in no way belittling the danger of the military threat created by imperialism, communists can all the same look optimically to the future. Of course, the implementation of the possibilities of preventing war hinges on the active struggle of the masses and, in particular, on the actions of their communist vanguard.
History shows that the huge wave of the social transformations in the 20th century prompted by the Great October Socialist Revolution was engendered in the course of the struggle to end World War I. Everywhere in Europe—and not only in it besides—an exceptional role had been played by anti-war demonstrations of broad masses of the people.

The tremendous wave of social transformations subsequently occurring in 20th-century Europe was a result of the smashing of fascism and the most aggressive forces of the imperialist world. Truly deathless was the feat of the Soviet people, which the victorious October Revolution had raised to peaks of heroism and humanist service in the interest of the entire mankind.

Under present-day conditions, however, the cause of social progress is linked not to war but to the prevention of war. The prevention of the ballistic nuclear missile war is a prerequisite and a premise for preserving civilization.

Mankind has no choice but to struggle for eliminating the danger of war. Mankind has no choice but to mobilize its energies and resources for the struggle for a firm peace and a genuine restructuring of international relations on the basis of a peaceful coexistence of a universal peaceful and constructive cooperation of all countries.

Now that it is coming close to the new 21st century, mankind faces the categorical imperative: only the triumph of the Leninist line in world affairs, whose foundation was laid by the October Revolution, can provide a secure guarantee of a lasting peace, social progress and unprecedented flowering of science and culture—on a genuinely global scale at that.


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U.S.-WEST EUROPE DIFFERENCES ON EAST-WEST TIES, THIRD WORLD

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 42-51

[Article by S. Madzoyevskiy, D. Tomashevskiy, "The Growth of International Tension and West Europe"]

[Text] The development of events in the world arena is providing increasingly new corroboration of the proposition put forward at the 26th CPSU Congress to the effect that as a result of the policy of aggressive forces of imperialism, primarily American, there has been a considerable increase in international tension with all the dangerous consequences for peace ensuing therefrom. Under these conditions the question of the correlation of the general and the specific in the foreign policy strategy of the main imperialist centers goes beyond the framework of interimperialist relations and acquires paramount practical significance for a solution of the cardinal problems of world politics of our day.

Whereas at the time of the cold war the trend toward the unification of all imperialist forces under the supremacy of the United States manifestly prevailed, a trend which expressed the class solidarity of the West's ruling circles in face of the fact of the strengthening of the positions of world socialism and other revolutionary forces, a centrifugal trend is being revealed increasingly strongly at the current stage. True, being displayed in the gamble of the West's aggressive groupings on the use of military strength as a means of pressuring the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, that same class solidarity today also affords the United States--the most powerful nuclear power in the capitalist world--additional opportunities for consolidating its status as leader of the military-political blocs and alliances aimed against the socialist community and the world revolutionary forces as a whole. At the same time Washington's policy of spurring tension is itself engendering within these blocs and alliances conflicts--quite profound at times--in the sphere of foreign policy strategy and tactics in key spheres of international relations. The United States' hegemonist aspirations are encountering the growing resistance of the other imperialist centers.

The basis of this process is the appreciable changes in the correlation of forces not only between the two systems but also within the capitalist world. Fundamental significance in this connection is attached to the proposition
advanced by the 24th CPSU Congress concerning the formation by the start of the 1970's of three main centers of imperialist rivalry—the American, West European and Japanese—among which "economic and political competitive struggle is becoming increasingly serious," and also the trend toward a change in the correlation of forces of these centers not to the benefit of the United States noted by the 26th CPSU Congress. As the Central Committee report points out, "Interimperialist conflicts are being exacerbated, and the struggle for markets and for sources of raw material and energy is intensifying. The Japanese and West European monopolies are competing with American capital increasingly successfully."

In the international-political sphere the long-term trend toward a change in the correlation of forces, particularly between West European and American imperialism, is leading to a gradual, but constant reduction in capitalist Europe's dependence on the United States. The integration process is operating in the same direction also. The Common Market Six which originally formed the nucleus of the West European center has become the Ten, which now incorporates the four leading powers of the region—the FRG, France, Britain and Italy. Despite all the seriousness of the conflicts within the EEC, foreign policy cooperation among the member-states is developing dynamically. The range and, in a number of instances, the effectiveness of their joint actions and concerted statements in the international arena are gradually increasing.

The level of independence of West Europe in relation to the United States which has been achieved today is in striking contrast to its subordinate status in the first postwar years. At that time the United States enjoyed unique temporary advantages enabling it to impose its policy on its partners. Now, however, the United States is hardly in a position to achieve its goals without West Europe and, even less, contrary to it. "America," the well-known American observer S. Karnow acknowledged, "can no longer dictate its will to the allies, as was the case after WWII. Whereas then the allies' survival depended entirely on American assistance, now they are pursuing their own goals in the sphere of the economy and security."

Deserving of particular attention in this context is the fact that in recent years relations between West Europe and the United States have been marked by, together with the "customary" differences in economic interests, intensifying disagreements in the approach to such cardinal demands of our time as an end to the nuclear arms race, observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence in the relations of states of the two systems and recognition of the legitimacy of the aspiration of the peoples of the developing countries to independence and social progress.

By its actions West Europe may now to a considerably greater extent than before contribute to or impede the solution of these urgent problems of world politics. Consequently, increasing significance for the fate of peace is attached to the question of the direction in which and the extent to which the West European states will realize their independent foreign policy potential. "There is no doubt," L.I. Brezhnev observed, "that the world political climate will largely depend on the state of Soviet-American relations. But this is not the whole truth. Other states, European included, also have great political significance and influence in the solution of world problems. Their say could even be decisive."
The Dual Approach to the Problem of the Nuclear Arms Race

The ruling circles of the West European NATO states regard nuclear weapons as a means of preserving capitalism's positions on a world scale, primarily within the confines of the European continent, and as a key instrument in the confrontation with the states of the opposite socioeconomic system. Although Britain and France have nuclear weapons which they have produced themselves, in the determination of the West European bourgeoisie it is the American nuclear potential which is regarded as the best prepared for performing the role of such a means and such an instrument. Whence the conclusion that maintaining and improving this potential is justified and necessary and, therefore, the participation of the United States' West European partners in supporting the deployment of American nuclear forces is justified and necessary. True, certain NATO members (France, Norway and Denmark) do not permit the deployment of foreign armed forces and bases on their territory. But this does not change the fundamental essence of the said states' policy: they, like the other participants in the North Atlantic alliance, support retention of the American "nuclear umbrella".

It is obvious that, given the present level of military equipment and with regard for the destructive power of modern weapons, the unleashing of a nuclear war against the Soviet Union would have disastrous consequences both for the United States and for West Europe. However, the degree of influence of each of these imperialist centers on the adoption of decisions on which the fate of the countries and peoples depends is far from identical.

True, in pursuing the policy of "nuclear pressure" on the Soviet Union the United States has been forced to reckon with the fact that the West European countries might consent or might not consent to the retention on their territory of the very considerable proportion of American nuclear arms deployed there. However, this by no means signifies that the United States' very existence depends on the will of the West European states. Yet the latter, relying in policy with respect to the Soviet Union on the nuclear forces of the overseas partner and permitting the deployment of these forces on their territory, are thereby putting themselves in just such a situation: they are affording Washington the chance of determining the fate of West Europe at its discretion.

The evolved asymmetry of the objective position of West Europe and the United States in the nuclear confrontation of the states of the two systems is causing the intrinsic contradictoriness of the policy of the majority of West European states in this sphere and the duality of their approach to the role of the United States in this confrontation and to the problems of the stepping up of the nuclear arms race in general.

The ruling circles of capitalist Europe—in the overwhelming part of it, at least—are, of course, aware of the fatal consequences which would be entailed for all classes and strata of their states by the United States' use of nuclear weapons. For this reason they fear that their own gamble on American nuclear potential which is not under their control could prove to be not a consolidation of the positions of the capitalist system on the European continent but the devastation of whole countries and peoples. Whence their interest in the achievement of accords aimed at a diminution of the danger of the unleashing of a nuclear war.
The said dual approach is making itself felt in today's alarming situation, when the world stands on the threshold a new twist of the nuclear arms race spiral and the United States has begun to dismantle the accords with the Soviet Union on limiting nuclear forces which were arrived at in the first half of the 1970's. As before, the West European capitals are adhering to the line of preservation of the West's military might, primarily the American nuclear potential, as a means of pressure on the socialist states. However, in the eyes of many responsible figures the "preservation of military might" and "increased level of military confrontation" are today far from synonymous concepts. The West European states' concern at the course of events has increased markedly in the time since the adoption at the NATO Council session in December 1979 of the decision to deploy a new generation of American intermediate-range missiles in West Europe. And there are more than enough grounds for this.

The reckless behavior of the R. Reagan administration, its refusal to ratify the SALT II Treaty, the decision to produce neutron weapons, intended for deployment on the territory of West European countries, which was not coordinated with the allies, statements concerning the possibility of a nuclear war "limited" to Europe and the policy of a sharp increase in the might and range of American strike forces—all this together has led, inter alia, to a certain shift in the views of many statesmen on the intensification of the nuclear arms race on the European continent earlier outlined with their direct participation. Responding to the question of "what our allies think of us," former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State G. Ball recently wrote: "They are terribly frightened by the (U.S.—S.M., D.T.) administration's bellicose speeches and are afraid that we will drag them into war unnecessarily. They are frightened by the evidence that the ideologues in the administration regard nuclear bombs not as a means of restraint but as weapons necessary for waging war." The disquiet of Washington's allies was dispelled neither by the meeting of leaders of the seven biggest capitalist countries in Versailles nor the top-level NATO Council session in Bonn in the summer of 1982.

The consistent and clear-cut position adopted by the Soviet Union on the question of a reduction in nuclear weapons in Europe is operating in the same direction. Implementation of the concrete proposals put forward by the Soviet leadership in this sphere could lead to a reduction in or, at least, a stabilization of the level of nuclear confrontation on the European continent, in which the West European states have a direct interest. New confirmation of the Soviet Union's consistent policy of the removal of the danger of nuclear war was its unilateral adoption of the solemn undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

A substantial factor with which the governments of the West European countries has to reckon is the rapid upsurge of the public movement against the Pentagon's nuclear plans. There is also importance in a circumstance which in the postwar period has contributed repeatedly to a deepening of the conflicts between the positions of the United States and the West European states, namely: the historical experience of the two world wars with their mass sacrifices and devastation has left a far deeper trace in the public mind of West Europe than
of the United States. The memory of peoples which experienced the horrors of war is insistently demanding the prevention of a new military clash on the continent incomparably more disastrous in its consequences.

Noting the scale of the antwar demonstrations in West Europe, the SUNDAY TIMES wrote in June 1982 that the reason for them is "the belief that the Washington administration is possessed by an aspiration to rearm and is consenting to the need for negotiation only for appearance's sake. Both the forces of the left and of the right in Europe feel a common mistrust which goes beyond traditional anti-Americanism."*

Under these conditions a certain shift in accents in the approach to a further escalation of the nuclear arms race is under way in the ruling circles of a number of West European countries, and signs of increased interest in the achievement of constructive results at Soviet-American negotiations on limiting nuclear arms in Europe can be observed. The governments of the Netherlands and Belgium, for example, are linking the question of the deployment of new American missiles on their countries' territory directly with the progress and outcome of these negotiations. Certain representatives of influential circles of Great Britain propose agreement with the position of the Soviet Union, which provides for the inclusion of Britain's nuclear forces and all NATO's "forward-based forces" within the framework of these negotiations. Under the influence of antimissile sentiments within the ranks of the SPD in the FRG the party leadership has been forced to put off defining its final stance on nuclear issues.

Of course, such facts should not in themselves be regarded as evidence of a serious turnabout in a constructive spirit which has occurred or is imminent in the immediate future. However, they reveal the possibility of a further evolution of the views of the ruling circles, which, in sum with the impact of other factors, could be reflected even more appreciably in practical policy.

Stabilization or Destabilization of the Situation in Europe?

And on another key question--the fate of European detente--Washington's position is coming into conflict increasingly markedly with West Europe's long-term interests. As is known, U.S. ruling circles have not only adopted a policy of acceleration of the arms race but have also embarked on a path fraught with the danger of destabilization of the entire set of mutual relations of the socialist and capitalist European states. The events in Poland are primarily being used to this end. By its actions Washington has directly and unequivocally jeopardized the basic principles of peaceful coexistence embodied in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which was adopted in 1975. Yet the approach of the majority of West European countries to present and future relations between states of the two systems has been far from rectilinear.

Whereas in the first postwar decade the West European states adhered to a policy of pushing the borders of the socialist system in Europe eastward, primarily at the expense of the territory of the GDR, subsequently, with delays and zigzags, it is true, they gradually adopted more realistic positions. Under the impact primarily of the changes in the general correlation of the forces of

* SUNDAY TIMES 6 June 1982.
socialism and capitalism they were forced to recognize de facto and de jure the territorial-political status quo which had taken shape as a result of WWII and subsequent development, that is, recognize the existence and the borders of the socialist community states. This was accompanied by an appreciable reorganization of their foreign policy strategy in a key sphere of international relations.

The essence of this reorganization was transition to the "Eastern policy of limited goals". Taking account of the irreversible nature of the historic changes, influential West European forces ultimately realized that restoration of the capitalist system in the socialist community countries was an unattainable goal and the continuation of the hard line with the use of military-power methods contained serious dangers. The adaptation to realities, stable, smooth relations between the two parts of the continent and the development of mutually profitable political, economic and other relations with the East were in capitalist Europe's own interests. Of course, this did not mean the West's political leaders' reconciliation with the ideology and practice of socialism and total abandonment of hopes for its "internal evolution". However, in actual policy they began to proceed from the fact of the Central and Southeast European countries' membership of the socialist community and to seek points of concurrence of the interests of the European states of the two systems in the foreign policy, economic and other spheres.

The reorientation of the West European states' policy to more realistic positions which has been occurring for the last two decades has borne positive fruit for both sides. As a whole, it may be said that the majority of West European states has demonstrated repeatedly its support for the preservation of relations of constructive peaceful coexistence. Although in embarking on the path of detente each West European country has also pursued its own specific goals, with which, just as with the degree of their realization, this nuance or other of the position of individual countries is connected, they have been united by a long-term interest in peace and stability on the European continent, particularly in such fields as the entire set of relations with the Soviet Union, the mutual relations of the FRG and the GDR and multilateral cooperation in the solution of energy problems.

Together with attacks on the socialist states the echo of the words of French President G. Pompidou uttered 10 years ago can be heard distinctly in the present statements of West Europe's political leaders. Despite all the importance of close relations between West Europe and the United States, he observed in a speech at a meeting of heads of state and government of EEC countries in October 1972 in Paris, their preservation "should not hinder the development of economic, technical and trade relations between the two parts of our continent." At the start of 1982 the leaders of the FRG and France declared that they were not about under U.S. pressure to renounce contracts concluded with the Soviet Union. Speaking, in particular, of the long-term agreement on gas supplies from the Soviet Union to West Europe, the FRG chancellor said in a speech on radio on 1 March 1982: "...American interference in this sphere would not influence our position in any way—we, just like the French, will keep to this agreement." A similar line is being followed by the governments of Great Britain and Italy.
The EEC countries adopted an even tougher position subsequently, when Washington announced sanctions in respect of West European firms participating in fulfillment of the "gas-pipes" contract. "This action," an official statement of EEC foreign ministers said, "which was taken without any consultations with the community, represents the exterritorial application of American law, which is contrary to the principles of international law." It is significant that together with economic profit motives political motives occupy an increasingly large place in the West European leaders' arguments. "West Europe's anger has essentially been caused by political factors and not the possible loss of industrial orders," London's OBSERVER noted.

And in fact a profound difference in the approach of the United States and West Europe to the broader problem of relations between the states of the two systems and the imperative of peaceful coexistence is making itself felt here. Describing this difference, D. Watt, director of the Royal Institute of International Relations in London, wrote on 3 September 1982 in THE TIMES: "The Reagan administration believes that we are in a state of permanent semiwar with the Soviet Union and that it is our implacable foe which needs to be opposed by all possible means."* Europeans, however, he continued, proceed as a whole from the fact that the West cannot wage war against the Russians constantly and should, while "adopting precautionary measures," attempt to continue to normalize business relations.

The basis of the present exacerbation of disagreements on both sides of the Atlantic is not only the nonconcurrency of the economic interests of West European and American capital and the dissimilar perception of the imperative of stable peaceful coexistence in Europe but also to a certain extent the historically evolved differences between the United States and the West European countries in the correlation of internal class forces, the level of political consciousness and the nature of ideology.

All these circumstances underpin the direct interest being displayed by the West European states, as distinct from the United States, in business cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and the preservation and continuation of detente. And this is an important element of an evaluation of the trends and prospects of the development of the current international situation as a whole.

West Europe the Flashpoints in the Developing World

There has been a far-reaching reorganization of the foreign policy strategy of the West European states in Africa and Asia under the impact of the process of the collapse in the postwar years of European colonial empires—first the Italian, then the British, French, Dutch, Belgian and Spanish and subsequently the Portuguese. Under the conditions of the universal upsurge of the national liberation forces the task of organizing with the new independent states and the political forces which had come to power in them relations which could best secure West European capitalism's political, economic and other interests in

* THE TIMES 3 September 1982.
the postcolonial era came to the forefront for the former metropolis. The basic direction of the reorientation that had occurred was expressed sufficiently accurately at the start of the 1960's by British Prime Minister H. MacMillan. "The growth of national self-awareness in Africa has become a political fact, and we must accept it as such," he said. "This means that, as I believe, we must come to terms with it."* Subsequently such events as the oil-exporting states' manifold increases in the price of oil and the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa, which revealed as graphically as could be the entire depth of the changes in relations between the imperialist powers and their former colonies and semicolonies, confirmed even more in the eyes of West Europe's ruling circles the need for application of the "bridge-building" strategy in the system of relations between the capitalist North and the developing South. At the same time another, traditionally colonialist, trend, which runs counter to the new strategy, is still present in the policy of Britain, France and other former colonial powers.

The correlation of the new and the old in the policy of the West European states is not stable. It varies, of course, depending on the interests of their monopolies in this part of the developing world or the other, but the general thrust of this policy is taking account of the current sociopolitical realities of Asia, Africa and Latin America to a greater extent than the policy of the R. Reagan administration.

Much has changed in this respect compared with the first postwar years. Endeavoring to squeeze the European colonial powers, primarily Britain and France, out of all their still vast possessions, the United States initially attempted to portray itself as the "friend" of the peoples struggling for liberation from colonial oppression. To this end the United States strove to weaken the already moribund "classical" system of colonial domination. The culminating point in the pursuit of this policy was 1956, when Washington, endeavoring to establish its own undivided sway in the Near and Middle East, declined at the final, decisive stage of the Suez crisis to support the Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression against Egypt.

Subsequently, however, West Europe and the United States switched roles, as it were, in respect of the choice of means of preserving and expanding their political and economic positions in the developing world. The European capitalist powers are taking into consideration to a great extent the need to adapt to the new correlation of alignment of forces following the collapse of the colonial system. However, in the policy of the present U.S. leadership, despite the harsh lessons of the Indochina war, the dangerous illusion of the possibility of "replaying" the history of the African, Asian and Latin American peoples with the aid of such means as gunboat diplomacy and alliance with the Israeli extremists, the champions of "white supremacy" in South Africa, the Pinochets and so forth is not only present but predominant.

Although as a whole the approach of ruling circles in West Europe to the acute international-political problems of the developing countries is distinguished by greater flexibility, the gamble on the use in certain cases of the military fist and bloc-forming with repressive regimes and groupings is retained as a component of the policy of capitalist Europe in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Thus in the most explosive region—the Near and Middle East—the West European powers, following the downfall of the shah's regime in Iran, directly or indirectly contributed and continue to contribute to the concentration of large detachments of American armed forces in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, which is a direct threat to the national independence of all adjacent states. In Southern Africa the political leaders of the majority of West European states are pursuing a policy of "appeasing" the racist regimes in South Africa—the oppressor of its own people and the people of Namibia and the most malicious enemy of all the neighboring states. In Latin America Britain engaged in a direct military conflict with Argentina for the sake of preserving the colonial status of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

The policy of the West European powers in respect of the Near and Middle East and other "flashpoints" of the developing world remains inconsistent and contradictory. From the viewpoint of the global struggle of the imperialist and anti-imperialist forces they are interested in the United States' retention of political, military and economic levers of influence on the dynamics of the international and internal political situation in this zone. Whence their support for the policy being pursued by Washington, Britain's inclusion in American military preparations in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean and also the participation of French, British, Italian and Danish contingents in the "multinational force" headed by the United States which is stationed in Sinai in accordance with the Camp David deal.

At the same time the priorities of the foreign policy of the two imperialist centers—the West European and the American—coincide in far from everything. The West European ruling circles see more clearly that the consolidation of mutual relations with the states and influential political forces of the Arab East and the Persian Gulf is impossible without a change in Israel's position on the question of the political future of the Palestinian people, which is unacceptable to the entire Arab world.

The disagreements between the United States and the West European NATO participants at the height of the Arab-Israeli war in the fall of 1973 are indicative in this context. When Washington demanded of its partners practical assistance in rendering military aid to Israel, they refused and came out—without U.S. participation—with their own calls for an immediate cease-fire. Also characteristic are certain, albeit timid, attempts of the West European states to find more promising paths than the Camp David deal of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. The so-called Venice initiative of the heads of state and government of the EEC countries in June 1980 differed from the U.S. position in that it recognized both the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the right of the PLO to participate in talks on a settlement of the Near East crisis. Although some specialists regard the EEC's decision in favor of the participation of troops of some of its members in the "multinational force" headed by the United States in Sinai as being contrary to the said initiative, subsequent events have testified that the West European ruling circles are by no means abandoning the idea of a
settlement of the Near East conflict on the basis of the provisions of the declaration adopted in Venice.

This discrepancy between the American and West European line on the Near East was revealed even more manifestly in connection with Israel's recent invasion of Lebanon. Whereas Washington not only covered up but also directly encouraged the Israeli aggression, the leading West European states occupied a different position, particularly in the United Nations. These differences evidently cannot fail to also be reflected in future peripeteias of the struggle for a Near East settlement, particularly in connection with the so-called "Reagan plan" on the one hand and, on the other, the proposals of the Arab summit in Fez, which are not at variance with those for which the Soviet Union has been struggling for many years.

The preference of the leading West European states for comparatively less aggressive versions of imperialist policy in the former colonial world is manifested not only in the Near and Middle East but in other regions also. In particular, the irresponsible interventionist policy of the U.S. Administration in Central America and Washington's gamble on fascistizing elements in El Salvador and other countries of the region are causing them considerable doubt and disquiet. French President F. Mitterrand's statement following talks with the U.S. President is significant in this respect. "I am opposed to the American policy of confrontation in the Central America region," he said. "I support the plan proposed by the Mexican Government for a search for a solution of this region's problems by way of mutual concessions by the United States and the other parties concerned."*

Such manifestations of moderation and flexibility cannot, of course, be considered characteristic of all directions of the West European states' policy in the developing world. It preserves imperial trends which are dangerous to the cause of peace and the fate of the peoples and which are contributing to the growth of international tension. At the same time if the current approach of leading West European circles to the key international-political problems of the zone of the developing countries is compared with the American approach, we cannot fail to note its greater realism and greater caution, which is of considerable significance under the conditions of the present exacerbation of international tension.

It is frequently asserted in the West that the Soviet Union is trying to "drive a wedge" in the North Atlantic alliance and drive the United States and the West European states apart from each other and exaggerating the conflicts between them. The authors of these assertions do not see or do not wish to see the differences between a dialectical-materialist approach to foreign policy and petty intrigue. Marxist-Leninist teaching, on which Soviet foreign policy is based, proceeds from the objective nature of interimperialist conflicts and the existence of various trends in the policy of the capitalist powers, which is of very considerable significance for the fate of peace. The USSR evaluates the policy of Western countries with the aid of the main criterion: to what

* LE MONDE 14 March 1982.
extent and how is it contributing or, on the contrary, impeding the solution of key international problems. And from this viewpoint it is not the question of the degree of unity or lack thereof itself which is of interest to the Soviet state but the question of the real content and basic direction of the general and specific features in the goals and practical activity of the imperialist powers in the world arena.

The Soviet people and the peace-loving community of all countries welcomed the predominance of realistic trends in the policy of the capitalist countries and their turnabout from the confrontation of the cold war period to detente. Today, however, it is no less obvious that the capitalist states' alignment with Washington's military-hegemonist aspirations would have negative consequences for the cause of peace. And, on the other hand, the present more realistic approach of West Europe to key questions of world politics, with which the United States is forced to reckon in one way or another, constitutes an important resource of the policy of the peaceful coexistence of states of the two systems and of the preservation of peace in the world.

The significance of this resource will grow as the real facts convince West Europeans of the groundlessness of the proposition of the "Soviet military threat" and the danger and hopelessness of the policy being imposed by Washington of an unrestrained arms race, hardline confrontation of East and West and suppression of the liberation movements in the developing world. Under these conditions the consistent line of the Soviet Union aimed at dialogue and cooperation with all peace-loving forces and its constructive position on questions of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament, the preservation and continuation of detente and the settlement of explosive conflicts, wherever they arise, by way of negotiation—a line which has already borne for the peoples considerable fruit—serves and will continue to serve the interests of our planet's peaceful future.

HISTORY OF NEUTRON BOMB DEPLOYMENT DEBATE SURVEYED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 52-64

[Article by A. Svetlov: "New Stage in the Nuclear Arms Race"]

[Excerpts] Hitler once said to Rauschning, one of his close associates: "We must develop depopulation technology."* He then explained that by "depopulation" he meant the extirpation of whole peoples of conquered countries. The mass annihilation of hundreds of thousands of people by the old methods was no longer to his liking. New technical resources were required which would correspond to a program of such tremendous scale and blasphemy.

Hitler's words were not a hollow phrase, they were converted into practical deeds. Incinerators and death machines—murder buses—Cyclon A and Cyclon B fast-acting lethal preparations and others were created and activated in pursuit of the villainous goal. It is well known that work on the creation of nuclear weapons was performed in the period of fascism in Germany. Fortunately, the author of the "depopulation" program did not have sufficient time to create this "superweapon," which he would have used, without a minute's thought or hesitation. The most irrepressible imagination cannot conceive of what a tragedy this could have proven to be for the peoples of Europe, America and, perhaps, other continents.

History ordained differently. Under the mighty onslaught of the Soviet Army, which decisively determined the course and concluding periods of the war, Hitlerism collapsed, not having had time to inscribe in the Nuremberg criminal information one further and, possibly, most terrible crime. It was, on the other hand, perpetrated by another capitalist power—the United States—which exploded atomic bombs over the heads of the civilian population of Japanese cities, without any military necessity for this, furthermore.

Having let the nuclear genie out of the bottle, the United States unleashed a race in nuclear arms—the most dangerous of the known means of mass destruction. And no one has written off nor will write off its historical liability before mankind for the fact that this race, which is being spurred on by Washington

constantly, has led in our day to the possibility of an irreparable catastrophe for mankind. The world has lived without war and has lived in a state of war, but it has never faced such a threat. The American diplomat and historian G. Kennan wrote in one of his works that the United States has conferred "a dubious benefit" both on itself and on the world as a whole "by tying the concept of its own security and the security of the Western world to this repulsive, useless and unusable weapon, which is capable of serving no political purpose."

In this connection it is fair to assume that had Hitler Germany not capitulated in time and had the war lasted a further 3 months or so, which was what the U.S. Administration required for the production of the first atomic bombs, it is possible that mushroom clouds would have risen up above it also, turning German cities to ruins and bestrewing them with radioactive ashes. We can only guess what impact this would have had on the frame of mind of Europeans. It is probable that certain of today's West European politicians and statesmen would have pondered one hundred times over whether to consent to the deployment of thousands and thousands of American nuclear explosives of various types and systems on their countries' territory and would have evaluated with greater realism all the disastrous consequences of the unprecedented nuclear arms buildup by the United States and its endeavor to turn Europe into a beachhead for a "limited" nuclear, neutron and chemical war.

The phrase of the raving lance corporal quoted above spoke of the extermination of people. There was no question in it of the absolute devastation of all material values, although Hitler did intend to raze to the ground and submerge a number of Europe's biggest political and cultural centers. But even he did not conceive of Lebensraum as a completely scorched desert. In extirpating people Hitler's vandals intended to avail themselves of the fruits of the labor of the dead and the wealth which they had created.

The level of development of science and military equipment of that time did not afford German militarism the opportunity of creating the "ideal" means of "depopulation" of which Hitler dreamed. But where Hitler failed, American imperialism was successful. Taking advantage of the fruits of scientific-technical progress not to people's benefit but to their misfortune, it imparted to the existing weapon of mass annihilation—the nuclear weapon—the most monstrous and refined properties, giving birth to the neutron bomb. This shameful creation of the U.S. military-industrial complex incinerates some people alive, condemns others to a long agonizing death and sentences yet others to deformed progeny, but, on the other hand, leaves private property and material values, which are sacred to capitalism, inviolate.

The creation of the neutron bomb revealed for the umpteenth time the entire misanthropic essence of militarism, which is prepared for the sake of its aggressive, expansionist goals to admit of any crimes, which in monstrousness and barbarity would eclipse memories of the gas chambers and murder buses of the Hitler executioners. In his book "The Neutron Bomb. Clean Weapon Which Kills Only Life" the West German pastor K. Luebbert wrote: "It is as if an

Auschwitz augmented many times over with all its instruments of torture and death, gas chambers and incinerators is being erected. Its operating manual is being disseminated at the same time."

I

Whereas the J. Carter administration resorted to some maneuvering in foisting neutron weapons on West Europe, the "Reagan team" decided to go straight ahead and, as one American journalist put it, "shove them (these weapons--A.S.) down the West Europeans' throats." At his first press conference even, on 3 February 1981, U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger announced the revival of plans to produce neutron weapons and deploy them in West Europe. This was a trial balloon to guage the reaction of the allies. When it turned out that their reaction was sharply negative, as before, Washington resolved to lessen the secretary's ardor somewhat. U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig disavowed his colleague's statement, counseling the United States' allies not to attribute any significance to it. To back up his words he even sent his colleagues in the NATO countries a special telegram promising to hold "exhaustive consultations" when any decision would be made on the production and deployment of neutron weapons.

However, later--and by no means unexpectedly--President R. Reagan resolved that he should not stand on ceremony with the allies and made the decision on the full-scale production of the neutron bomb without any, let alone "exhaustive," consultations. A. Haig's promise went unfulfilled. The Americans merely notified NATO representatives of their decision. Quite an amusing and instructive story: first A. Haig disavowed C. Weinberger, then R. Reagan disavowed A. Haig. Such crude U.S. actions elicited the manifest dissatisfaction of its West European allies, which was reflected in the press also. For example, the newspaper SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG observed: "The Europeans now know that Washington's conservative wing regards them as the executants of its orders who should not even be consulted." The British DAILY MIRROR had quite a sharp reaction to this decision: "President Reagan should remember that he is dealing with his allies and not the air traffic controllers."*

Incidentally, this practice of the United States' attitude toward its allies was long since elevated to the rank of official policy. Some European statesmen and politicians frequently pretend that they do not notice such treatment. This was also how they behaved in the history of the neutron bomb, declaring that the production of this weapon did not concern them, and that it was purely an internal matter for the United States, as if it were not a question of the appearance of a new type of weapon of people's mass extirpation but of some trifle! Naturally, such a position cannot be evaluated other than as a policy of connivance at and encouragement of the arms race unleashed by the United States. It is not difficult to imagine what a noise would have been raised in West Europe and what speeches would have been made by West European figures if it had been the Soviet Union which had announced the start of the production of such a weapon. The race in neutron weapons is far from an internal matter of the United States; it is a most vital concern of West Europeans: after all,

* DAILY MIRROR 11 August 1981.
neutron weapons (and no one conceals this) are to be billeted precisely in their quarters. The Americans will not be firing neutron weapons in California or Florida. What today is termed an "internal matter" of the United States could tomorrow prove disastrous for millions of people.

Like the Carter administration, the Reagan administration has not yet managed to get authorization for the deployment of neutron weapons in West Europe. Nor has Washington succeeded in its attempt by the "neutron gambit" to distract the public's attention from the plans to deploy new U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles on European soil. The antiwar movement has merely strengthened, having become a strong barrier to the United States' militarist plans in Europe.

We cannot overlook one further fact in the history of neutron weapons. The U.S. President made the decision on production of neutron weapons on the day of remembrance of the victims of Hiroshima—6 August. This was hardly a chance coincidence. It would be naive to suppose that White House advisers and U.S. State Department officials had forgotten about this date and that they altogether do not measure the actions of their government against what has occurred or is going on in the international arena. Such coincidences have begun to occur somewhat often. For example, in May 1978 the NATO countries adopted in Washington a decision on a long-term arms buildup. This occurred at a time when near at hand, in New York, the first UN Special Disarmament Session since the war was being held. No, 6 August was chosen specially to show everyone that the United States has not heeded and does not intend to heed any public opinion and will, as before, pursue its policy of an arms buildup. By this act American militarism once more convincingly demonstrated to the world its complete amorality and open disregard for the will and interests of the peoples.

It is pointed out repeatedly in the Western press that R. Reagan chose an "extremely unfortunate" time for his decision. The opinion has been expressed that it would have been "better" to have waited until the antiwar movement in West Europe was on the decline and until the United States had managed to realize its plans to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear missiles there and only then to have "presented" Europe with the neutron bomb. However, there altogether was not nor could there be an "ideal" or "suitable" time for the decision on neutron weapons: the European peoples are categorically opposed to any plans to increase the military confrontation on their long-suffering continent.

II

For ideological cover for development of the production of neutron weapons and the intention to deploy them in West Europe the U.S. propaganda centers organized a mass campaign aimed at the West European public. A number of trite arguments has been put forward whose common denominators are unscrupulousness and falsehood. That of least worth, for example, is the assertion that the neutron bomb is the United States' "trump card" at the disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. Such an assertion is put forward by the United States on each occasion that it has adopted programs for a buildup of arms of various types and systems. However, not a single type and not a single system of these arms has come to be under an international ban. When, on the other hand, it has come to the point
of concrete businesslike talk at the negotiations, the United States has openly blocked and stalled them on any pretext and sometimes simply broken them off until, as a minimum, the corresponding new system has become a part of the armament of the U.S. Army. Advocates of the neutron bomb have also attempted to publicize it as a "humane" weapon, although the mere application of the term "humane" to this means of people's mass annihilation seems monstrous, considering its impact on the human organism.

Two false propositions occupy a particular place in this campaign: first, that neutron weapons are an allegedly essential means of defense for NATO against the "tank threat from the East" and, second, that these weapons are of a purely defensive nature.

As far as the first claim is concerned, we must immediately cut out the part of it which speaks of an imaginary Soviet threat inasmuch as there is absolutely no such threat either to the West European countries or anyone else. This has been stated repeatedly from the Soviet side at the highest and most authoritative levels.

The Warsaw Pact countries do indeed have somewhat more tanks, although NATO has plenty also. But the point is that NATO specialists, when this suits them, count for themselves only the tanks which are under the joint command of the bloc's armed forces in Europe. They thereby understate their available tanks --12,000 altogether, they say. But in actual fact directly in the armies of the NATO countries there are more than 16,000. In addition, approximately 1,500 American and 6,500 West European NATO country tanks are concentrated at depots. When this is taken into consideration, the NATO countries are only slightly inferior in total number of tanks (24,000) to the Warsaw Pact states (25,000).

The structures of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have their own particular features, and there is not absolute equality either in the weapons or their combat specifications. These disproportions are logical and have taken shape historically--both by virtue of the historical factor and as a consequence of the singularities of the development of these alliances' armed forces. But in terms of overall potential, as was also acknowledged recently by the West's leaders themselves, there is general military equivalence in Europe, even given certain discrepancies in the composition of the two groupings' armed forces. In addition, as is known, combat operations are conducted not by tanks alone. Why, then, deliberately exaggerate their role? The NATO countries are persistently speeding up a qualitative improvement and quantitative buildup of various antitank defense weapons, which fully compensate, according to former U.S. Secretary of Defense A. [sic] Schlesinger, for the Warsaw Pact countries' superiority in tanks. Thus according to the NATO modernization programs which have been announced, the total number of antitank missiles alone is to be increased to 200,000. If these missiles were to be deployed along a line from the North Sea to the shores of the Adriatic, there would be one missile every 5 meters! This is not counting the thousands of helicopters and aircraft and tens of thousands of antitank mines and other weapons at the disposal of the NATO countries. This potential could, furthermore, be appreciably increased thanks to nonnuclear arms. For the resources which the United States is spending
on the production of two 8-inch neutron shells it could provide itself with three M-60 tanks, 50 of the latest nonnuclear antitank guns or 5,500 nonnuclear artillery shells.

Certain Western military specialists also claim that neutron weapons are of little value as an antitank weapon. They believe that they could be effective during strikes at large concentrations of armored equipment and, on the contrary, ineffective in a fight against dispersed tanks. In the latter case use of neutron weapons against the tanks would require tens and hundreds of rounds to be fired, and this would be tantamount to the annihilation of everything living over large areas of densely populated Europe. Another claim is also advanced frequently in this connection. W. Buckley wrote, for example, in the NEW YORK DAILY NEWS that the neutron warhead will only kill soldiers "in huge Russian tanks thundering over European soil." Deliberate silence is maintained here about the fact that the crews in the tanks and other forms of armored equipment can be given sufficiently effective protection by special materials, about which the American press itself writes.

The neutron weapon does not, naturally, possess selective destructive properties. It destroys both its own and others and is particularly dangerous for the civilian population. In its lethality the neutron weapon is, as scientists of Britain, the FRG, France, the USSR, and United States and other countries correctly assert, not so much a weapon for combating tanks as a weapon of mass destruction, and a monstrous weapon at that.

One further argument. If the West were really seriously concerned by the "tank threat," one wonders why such a step of the Soviet Union as the 1979-1980 unilateral withdrawal from GDR territory of thousands of tanks and other military equipment has not been supported. Finally, the following fact of considerable importance. At the Vienna talks the Western powers once put forward a proposal on a reduction in Soviet tanks stationed in Central Europe in exchange for a reduction in American nuclear missiles. It is well known that as soon as this proposal was accepted, the NATO countries removed it from the negotiating table. All this indicates that it is not "tank fear" from which the advocates of the neutron bomb in the United States are suffering. Just one thing concerns them—that the universal anger in Europe not disrupt the American plans for the deployment of neutron weapons there.

A principal point in propaganda of the "advantages" of neutron weapons is the assertion that they are purely defensive and represent a so-called "means of restraint". It is well known, however, that all arguments about the defensive or offensive nature of almost all weapons are quite relative. More often than not, they can be used for both purposes. This also fully applies to neutron weapons, which was acknowledged by none other than FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt, who declared: "Neutron weapons cannot be considered purely defensive. Like the majority of weapons, it is, of course, perfectly possible to use them offensively." This opinion is held by the vast majority of public figures and politicians and statesmen and also military specialists of the West.

If neutron weapons are ineffective in combating dispersed ground forces in the field, it is, naturally, preferable to use them in offensive operations. Is it not tempting for a potential aggressor to strike the personnel of the enemy
with neutron weapons and conduct offensive operations immediately after? And, furthermore, there would not even be obstructions for the transit of the troops, and plant and factory production capacity would remain unharmed.

The neutron weapon is a weapon of aggression. As L.I. Brezhnev emphasized on 7 April 1978, "arguments that it would be of a 'defensive' nature do not correspond to reality. It is a nuclear offensive weapon and aimed, furthermore, predominantly at the annihilation of people."

"The neutron weapon is an offensive, not a defensive weapon," the Italian general, N. Pasti, claims, "and is intended to make a breach in the enemy's defense through which NATO armed forces would be able to penetrate in the course of their invasion without the threat of being held up by radioactive contamination of the terrain or serious interference, which would have occurred as a result of the use of a 'normal' nuclear bomb. For this reason the deployment of neutron bombs in Europe would be an incentive to waging war and by no means a means of restraint."

American propaganda is vainly trying with all its might to conceal the neutron weapon's offensive nature—and understandably. If Europe recognizes the true essence of the new weapon, American plans of preparation for the unleashing of a "limited" nuclear war on the continent would thereby inevitably and immediately be laid bare and the role of the Pentagon's missile beachhead which Washington has assigned Europe would be revealed.

While being the instigators of the postwar race in arms in each area thereof, the United States has invariably referred to the Soviet Union's imaginary superiority in this weapon or the other. But in the case of the neutron bomb even such arguments are lacking: the Soviet Union does not have such a weapon. The development, production and proposed deployment in West Europe of neutron weapons has not been and is not now dictated by any political, military or military-technical considerations other than one—the adventurist policy of the United States, which is extremely dangerous for the European peoples, aimed at the achievement of military superiority over the socialist countries.

III

The United States' development of the production of neutron weapons is opening a new field in the arms race. Prior to this decision by the U.S. President, such weapons of mass destruction as atomic, hydrogen, chemical and bacteriological weapons were known. Thanks to the many years of persistent effort by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the latter were, it is true, outlawed in 1975 by a special convention. With respect to each of the remaining unbanned types of weapon of mass destruction the Soviet Union has proclaimed and continues to proclaim its readiness to conclude an agreement on their prohibition and has submitted drafts of corresponding treaty documents for international discussion. In addition, in 1975 the Soviet Union put forward a proposal on banning the development and production of all new types of weapon of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons altogether. However, despite all the consistency and constructiveness of the Soviet side, it has not been possible to move forward at the negotiations. Washington's decision
to develop production of neutron weapons shows for the umpteenth time why at the negotiations on these problems the United States first engaged in diplomatic maneuvering and then blocked any possibility of progress altogether.

Now a new, third variety of nuclear weapon—the neutron weapon—is being added to these types of mass destruction, and the arms race is moving to a higher and more dangerous stage. And it is not only a matter of the further quantitative buildup of the United States' nuclear arsenals. The neutron weapon possesses a number of specific combat characteristics which considerably lower the so-called nuclear threshold, that is, make the outbreak of nuclear war more likely. Compared with the existing types of nuclear weapon, it does indeed have less blast and heat radiation, which brings it closer, as it were, to conventional types of armament. However, it must not be forgotten that the lethal effect of the hard radiation which forms upon the explosion of a neutron warhead is considerably greater than from a "conventional" nuclear weapon. A neutron warhead with a yield of 1-2 kilotons is the equivalent in terms of the lethal strength of the radiation released at the time of explosion of a 10-kiloton atomic bomb.*

The appearance of neutron weapons is also a most dangerous step in the sense of the development of the nuclear weapon miniaturization process. It is not only a question of the fact that it would now appear possible to destroy large cities with a multimillion-strong population with only a few rounds from a single howitzer. The miniaturization of armaments renders the problem of reliable supervision extremely complicated and thereby objectively makes the future achievement of agreements on their limitation or reduction—if subsequently some occupant of the White House shows a readiness to seek such agreements—more difficult.

The production of the first, comparatively low-power neutron warheads is evidently only the beginning, considering that the United States is endeavoring to put at the service of militarism every conceivable achievement of scientific-technical progress. The history of nuclear weapons also began with atomic bombs with a yield of several kilotons. Then the count was in megatons. Who will guarantee that under a veil of secrecy work is not being performed in the United States on a further refinement of neutron weapons and an increase in their man-killing yield? Reports have already appeared in the Western press about the possibility of the creation of a strategic megaton neutron weapon capable of destroying everything living in a zone with a diameter not of 1.5 but 30 kilometers. Citing the opinion of French experts engaged in the neutron weapon, the French newspaper QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS wrote of the possibility of the creation of a 150-kiloton neutron warhead with a radiation yield equal to a 1-megaton hydrogen bomb.**

The appearance of the neutron bomb contains the threat of the ultimate undermining of the practice of nuclear nonproliferation. The hands of the Israeli aggressors and South African racists, who see this weapon as a suitable means

** See QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS 8 June 1980.
for dealing with the Arab and African peoples, could be reaching out for it. Back in 1977 U.S. Senator M. Hatfield suggested such a possibility. "When we begin production of this weapon," he declared in the magazine U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, "our friends in other parts of the world will begin to put pressure on us to obtain this weapon. For this reason it is wrong to believe that we will be able to guarantee its limited deployment or limited use."

On the eve and at the outset of the 1980's the United States adopted an adventurist policy of the accelerated buildup of all types and systems of weapons—from strategic through conventional—with the obvious purpose of breaking up the existing balance of forces in the world and achieving military superiority over the socialist world. The neutron weapon occupies a special place in these plans. Like the intermediate-range nuclear missiles and also chemical weapons, it is assigned the role of a means of waging "limited" nuclear war in Europe. Furthermore, the policy of preparing for such a war is being pursued actively and purposefully by the U.S. Administration. Its main directions have now been discerned distinctly. By 1983 the United States intends to have deployed the nuclear missiles in West Europe. The Pentagon has begun to talk concretely about the mass saturation of Europe with chemical means of warfare. Finally, production of neutron weapons, which, as is officially acknowledged in Washington, are specially intended for Europe, has begun.

Thus, a saturation of Europe's territory with weapons of mass destruction of all types and delivery systems thereof unprecedented in its history is taking place, which entails a progressive increase in the military danger. All this is occurring against the background of the general exacerbation of the international situation, which is being created intentionally by Washington with deliberate political provocations against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and also unbridled propaganda of the "Soviet threat".

The calculations of the Washington administration are obvious: to endanger its allies while itself lying low across the ocean. But these are absolutely groundless illusions. There cannot be any "limited" nuclear war. "If a nuclear war breaks out, whether in Europe or elsewhere," L.I. Brezhnev emphasized, "it will inevitably and inexorably become universal. Such is the logic of war itself and the nature of modern arms and international relations."**

It would be profoundly mistaken to artificially enclose the increasing military threat connected with the appearance of neutron weapons within European borders. A nuclear conflict on this continent would of its own accord undoubtedly grow into a global conflict and have unpredictable consequences for all mankind. However, these weapons, while constituting a component of the United States' aggressive armed might, also play an independent part in the Pentagon's plans being drawn up with reference to "policing" actions in the so-called "spheres of the vital interests" of the United States. And, as is known, these spheres are determined in Washington as it sees it, as earlier the gold-panning areas were staked out in the Wild West.

** PRAVDA 3 November 1981.
It is not difficult to imagine how the United States' Rapid Deployment Force, bases for which are already being created in the Near East, in Africa and in other parts of the world, will use neutron weapons for the mass annihilation of a population which does not submit to the American diktat and for the seizure of the developing countries' natural resources. The well-known Indian public affairs writer O. Narain writes about this, in particular, in the brochure "Cannibal Bomb."* On 12 August 1981 in an interview with West German television none other than C. Weinberger, the U.S. secretary of defense himself, openly declared: "No, it cannot be said that this weapon is intended exclusively for NATO in Europe.... We will use this weapon anywhere in the world, if necessary—even in the United States, if it is necessary to ward off mass attacks."

C. Weinberger sugared the truth about the United States' intention of dropping neutron bombs "anywhere in the world" with a pill of lies—concerning their use on U.S. territory. Who, one wonders, intends to organize "mass attacks" on the United States? The Canadians or, perhaps, the Mexicans? Perhaps Cuba is preparing to attack the North American giant? Hard to believe. Consequently, the Russians. One needs to have C. Weinberger's unhealthy imagination in order to seriously imagine that the Russians will carry out landings on U.S. shores and that the poor Americans will have neutron shells fired at them.

How the United States could use the neutron bomb against non-European peoples was described by French admiral (ret'd) A. Sanguinetti in his book "The Duty To Speak Out". According to him, the neutron weapon is an "excellent means of putting a stop to subversive activity or hostile demonstrations in Africa or the Middle East without harming the sources of raw material...", for example, poisoning the "Katanga gendarmes or bringing troublesome ayatollas to their senses without destroying either the mines or the drilling installations."**

In speaking of the neutron bomb as a instrument of aggression and a means of the establishment of the United States' "leadership" in the world and its achievement of military superiority it must not be forgotten that in the hands of reactionary and fascizizing forces it could represent an attractive weapon for reprisals against their own population, for the suppression of mass popular movements and, finally, simply for removing "superfluous" people forming the armies of unemployed and destitute in the citadels of the capitalist system. We have to mention in this connection a public statement by General [Meri], chief of the general staff of the French Army (made on 24 April 1980 in the parliamentary National Defense Commission), that "the neutron bomb could meet our requirements" inasmuch as, if necessary, it could be used by the authorities against possible antigovernment protests of the masses dissatisfied with the existing system.***

An interesting thought is contained in a statement by Adm A. Sanguinetti: "Thanks to such a pearl of modern technology as the neutron bomb, Hitler could have avoided futile killings in the Warsaw ghetto and Franco would not have

* See Dr Onkar Narain, "Cannibal Bomb," New Delhi, 1981.
*** A. Sanguinetti, op. cit., pp 228-229.
had to mark time for many months at the campus of Madrid University. And if we look even further back into history, Thiers could have crushed the Paris Commune without having destroyed the castles of the Tuileries and Saint-Cloud, the accounts department, the city hall, in a word, all these precious historical monuments."

The appearance of neutron weapons in the United States throws a clear light on the aggressive essence of American imperialism parasitizing on the achievements of scientific-technical progress. The plans for the creation of the neutron bomb, which were conceived at the time of the cold war, were preserved in the period of detente also. They have passed through the hands of seven U.S. presidents: D. Eisenhower, J. Kennedy, L. Johnson, R. Nixon, C. Ford, J. Carter and, finally, R. Reagan. Presidents changed, made high-touting speeches about a love of peace, pontificated about humanity, fought "for human rights" and declared their allegiance to the ideas of disarmament. But not one of them said a categorical "no" to the monstrous new weapon and each played his part as its midwife.

Currently the American press sometimes expresses the opinion that if the Republicans had been in office in the United States in the period of the "maturation" of the neutron weapon, it would have been produced and deployed in West Europe long ago. Particularly sharp reproaches are leveled in this connection at J. Carter, who is accused of not having been sufficiently stern in his treatment of the allies and not having decided on full-scale production of neutron weapons. It is forgotten here that J. Carter did not halt the process of production of these weapons but merely modified it.

All these years each new U.S. President has taken over, upon taking office, as a baton from the previous administration the cumbersome militarist luggage together with the neutron weapon at various stages of its development. Not a single President wished to part with this luggage. R. Nixon's acknowledgment is interesting: "In the sphere of national strategy every President is only one link of the chain. Every administration inherits the existing armed forces. The capital investments of previous administrations geared to a protracted period limit the capacity for changing these forces in the short term."* In other words, the arms race unleashed by the United States--including the neutron arms race--acquires a kind of force of inertia. A vicious circle is created: while the process of the development of weapons that have undergone testing is under way, new plans for even more devastating and destructive means of war are born and harnessed in the course of scientific-technical progress. And so on ad infinitum.

Political courage, official willpower and, finally, wisdom and a sense of special responsibility and realism are essential for impeding the process of the arms race, which is dangerous for peace--and ultimately for the security of the United States itself--and for pulling out of the vicious circle. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its position with respect to neutron weapons is scrupulous and invariable. "Creating neutron weapons is not the problem," L.I. Brezhnev declared. "The real problem--political, humane--is how to prevent

* WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1 March 1971, p 356.
the appearance and use of these weapons."* Back in 1961 the USSR warned the United States of the danger of adding twists to the neutron spiral in the arms race. The Soviet proposal on states' mutual renunciation of the production of these weapons and on their prohibition is widely known. In conjunction with other socialist countries on 8 March 1978 the Soviet Union submitted to the Disarmament Committee a draft international convention banning the production, stockpiling, development and use of nuclear neutron weapons. But the representatives of the Western powers have not shown the slightest desire to discuss this draft seriously.

From the high tribune of the 26th CPSU Congress it was again authoritatively stated that the USSR is ready to conclude an agreement banning neutron weapons once for all. This position is shared by the broadest people's masses. Testimony to this is the more than 600 million signatures collected in different countries to the new Stockholm Appeal. Sharing the universal concern at the production and planned development of neutron weapons expressed by numerous UN members and also nongovernment organizations, on 9 December 1981 the UN General Assembly adopted on the initiative of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries a resolution banning the antihumane neutron weapon. In this document the General Assembly requested that the Disarmament Committee "begin talks immediately within the appropriate organizational framework for the purpose of concluding a convention banning the production, stockpiling, development and use of nuclear neutron weapons." This same document included the question of the banning of neutron weapons on the agenda of the UN General Assembly 37th Session which had just begun.

Twice in the last 5 years the United States has attempted to foist neutron death on West Europe and twice it has been emphatically rebuffed. But it would be premature, evidently, to rest content. The production of neutron bombs is in full swing and the first of them are already coming off the production line and being neatly packed in sealed containers ready for shipment to Europe, and it is only a few hours flying time to the continent. According to the well-known FRG politician E. Bahr, "one fine day pressure will be put on the European countries to force them to consent to their (neutron weapons--A.S.) deployment."** The British political commentator L. Freedman is more specific in his forecasts on this score: he believes that the neutron bomb will be kept in "cold storage" until the saga of the American intermediate-range nuclear missiles is over.***

It might have seemed that the categorical "no" expressed by West Europe to the United States' neutron plans would have brought those unyielding in the policy of unrestrained arms race to their senses somewhat. By no means. In the wake of the decision on the production of neutron weapons followed another: on the accelerated buildup of chemical weapon stockpiles. And this is still not all. New types of nuclear arms are already being developed on the drawing boards and in the laboratories of the research centers of the Pentagon. H. Brown, secretary of defense in the J. Carter administration, observed: "We are at the same

* PRAVDA 3 November 1981.
** DIE ZEIT 14 August 1981.
time working on new types of nuclear weapons which will replace some of the present ones. If the neutron weapon is not produced, some of its properties may be imparted to the new types of weapons which are being developed." The American press had already reported a kind of alternative to neutron weapons—a nuclear bomb with diminished radiation, but increased explosive power. Please, West Europeans, choose the bombs of your choice: if neutron death does not suit you, take the blast.

Thus neither the neutron, missile nor chemical threat has passed Europe by. Therefore, the task of combating it remains acute and urgent. This threat must give way before the wave of millions. Sense must triumph over madness.


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THE NEAR EAST AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM'S GLOBAL STRATEGY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 65-77


[Text] For several decades now the Near East has been a dangerous center of international tension and a source of interstate armed conflicts and confrontation. In recent years, the CPSU Central Committee report to the 26th party congress observed, as a result of the importunings of the United States to achieve a dominant position here which took the form of the policy of Camp David and that of splitting the Arab world and organizing a separate deal between Tel Aviv and Cairo, "there has been a new exacerbation of the situation in the region. A Near East settlement has been thrust back."

A direct consequence of the Camp David deal was the Israeli aggression against Lebanon this summer and the monstrous outrages of the Israeli military in this country. Tel Aviv's barbaric actions, perpetrated with Washington's actual complicity, have made even deeper the gulf dividing the Arab peoples and Israel, bringing the explosiveness of the situation in the region to the limit.

Responsibility for this is borne by the imperialist circles of the United States and its "strategic-partner"—Israel. The question arises as to the driving forces and motives of Washington's Near East policy and the role assigned Tel Aviv therein and also the reasons for the U.S. Administration's refusal to seek an all-embracing settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on a just basis.

The Military-Strategic Aspect

The Near East is a target of the military-political and economic pretentions of imperialism, primarily American. Great Britain was deprived of the oil concessions in the first half of the 1970's and, completing the evacuation of its military bases and strong points "east of Suez," ceased to play an active part in the imperialist "game". France also lost its oil concessions in the region; its present Near East policy is being constructed in the channel of the regulation of commercial-economic relations with the Arab countries and Iran. Their threat to halt or cut back oil supplies has forced France to depart somewhat
from past unconditional support for the United States and Israel and to make certain adjustments to its Near East policy.

Washington strategists assign the military-political component a paramount place in their long-term calculations in respect of the region. For militarist circles of the United States the Near East is on the one hand a beachhead of the "power confrontation" with the USSR situated at the intersection of three continents--Asia, Africa and Europe--directly on the Soviet Union's southern borders. The buildup of the United States' military presence in this part of the world is designed, on the other hand, to facilitate the realization of American imperialism's neocolonialist aspirations, impede progressive social and political change and block the national liberation processes in the Arab East for the purpose of maintaining monopoly capital's exploitation of its natural resources.

The United States' imperial ambitions were the basis of the "Carter doctrine" proclaimed in 1980--the concept of increased American military presence in the Near East and the Persian Gulf region and the establishment of imperialist control over them. Having arbitrarily declared the region a sphere of the United States' "vitaly important" interests and having included it in the zone of its "responsibility," which implies the use of all resources, "including military force," Washington thereby openly proclaimed an interventionist approach to Near East problems.

This approach was confirmed by the new administration in the White House. More, R. Reagan is going to extremes in his endeavor to adapt Washington's Near East policy to American imperialism's global, anti-Soviet, anticommunist strategy. The White House regards the region as a region of the deployment of the armed forces of the United States and its allies for defense of their notorious "vitaly important" interests in this part of the world. Whence Washington's present policy of the utmost increase in the American military presence in this region for changing the correlation of forces in favor of the United States and the NATO bloc.

The nature of the United States' military presence in the Near East has evolved with the passage of time. From predominant reliance in the 1950's and 1960's on military blocs the United States has switched in the 1970's to a broader, more diversified set of relations with countries of the region. This "flexible" presence is frequently not supported in treaty-legal form but based on indirect means of influence. Washington's unilateral declarations concerning the "guaranteed security" of certain states (Israel, the shah's Iran, Saudi Arabia), increased arms supplies to them and activity of U.S. military missions on their territory, joint exercises and maneuvers, American warships' regular calls at ports of Persian Gulf states, the temporary stay of U.S. Air Force subunits in these countries and "military privileges" afforded them, meaning the right to use the military bases in "emergencies," have, inter alia, served these purposes.

* See DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN February 1980, p B.
With the collapse of the pro-imperialist shah's regime in Iran Washington embarked on a buildup of the direct American military presence in the region. In 1979 the United States markedly increased its naval strength in the Indian Ocean. Large-scale naval formations (approximately 50 ships), including 2-3 carrier groups with marine subunits, have been committed here. Expansion of the military base on Diego Garcia, which is designed to serve as a "forward basing" boundary, a moorage for the carriers and a strong point for strategic aviation, has begun. The allocation of $159 million has been outlined for the base's modernization in the 1982 fiscal year--more than for any other base in this region.* The United States has broken off negotiations with the Soviet Union on limiting the two powers' military activity in the Indian Ocean region and has refused to resume them subsequently.

The so-called Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) made up of air force, navy, marine and army units has been created for interventionist actions. Its strength could reach 300,000 men. An RDF headquarters has been functioning since March 1980 and a commander has been appointed. This force is equipped with special transport aircraft and assault-landing craft, exercises have been conducted to polish up operational tactics under the conditions of a "crisis situation" and bases have been created for the advance deployment of arms, ammunition and personnel.

As of the present time the Pentagon has been granted for use on a more or less permanent basis bases for the direct deployment of RDF units in Egypt (Ras Banas), Oman (as-Sifah, Tamarid, Muscat, Salalah and Masirah) and also in Somalia and Kenya. A decision has been made to create a joint regional RDF command "responsible" for the Persian Gulf zone. The total cost of the program of bringing the RDF up to full strength and equipping it for the period 1980-1984 is approximately, according to foreign press estimates, $10 billion.**

Appreciable significance is attached to military assistance to pro-West regimes, arms supplies to them and the dispatch of various military advisers and specialists. The region's share of America's total arms sales abroad (this volume itself increased from $1.8 billion in 1971 to $15 billion in 1978) amounted to 75 percent in certain years.*** As a result the Near East has become a principle area of the arms race. The military spending of the states located here (excluding Turkey) increased (in 1978 prices) from $11.2 billion in 1971 to $37.9 billion in 1980.**** The biggest recipients of American arms are, besides Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt; until recently they also included Iran. The region's states are sent all types of modern (apart from nuclear) weapons, including combat aircraft, tanks and artillery pieces, ships and helicopters, missiles and electronic equipment.

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* INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE 9 February 1981.
** NEWSWEEK 4 February 1980, p 11.
U.S. military assistance is contributing to the militarization of the partner-
countries and the strengthening of their military and police apparatus.
Furthermore, the arms supplies are affording Washington an opportunity for
interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient states, influencing their
foreign policy and extending the sphere of imperialist expansion.

Since the arrival in the White House of the R. Reagan administration Washington
has been attempting to impart a global anti-Soviet thrust to American-Arab
military cooperation. To this end during a trip to the Near East in April 1981
then U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig persistently dragged out the idea of a
"strategic consensus" directed against the USSR, the three fulcrums of which
would be Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Washington's efforts to create a new military-political grouping in the region
were intensified following the final collapse in the 1979 of the CENTO bloc.
Different versions of a new bloc were examined with regard for the situation
that has evolved here, which is characterized by, inter alia, the reluctance of
the majority of Arab states to permit foreign armed forces on their territory
on a permanent basis, the creation of military bases, the establishment of
direct allied relations with Western states, primarily the United States, and
the organization of a new military alliance with the participation of the
imperialist powers. Among these options, a plan for the creation of a "regional
organization for the security of the Persian Gulf" which would incorporate the
conservative Arab monarchies is being worked up. The United States would like
to see as the leader of such an association Saudi Arabia, which is cooperating
with it closely in the military sphere. Plans for the creation—within the
framework of the Camp David deal—of a military-political alliance between
Israel and Egypt with the participation of the United States were another
version of the contemplated bloc.

However, the conservative Arab regimes are not fully justifying American
calculations. The United States has been unable to realize in full its
neocolonialist strategy in respect of Saudi Arabia, nor has it managed to turn
Riyadh into a "power center" in the Persian Gulf, which would compensate for
the "loss of Iran". The Saudi leadership rejected Washington's solicitations
concerning the deployment of permanent American military bases in the country
or other forms of the U.S. military presence. It also refused to support the
Camp David deal. Like the overwhelming majority of Arab states, Saudi Arabia
condemned the capitulationist policy of Sadat and participated in the pan-Arab
political and economic sanctions against Cairo.

As far as Egypt is concerned, following the death of Sadat in October 1981 and
particularly in connection with the latest Israeli aggression in Lebanon, certain
new features have emerged in American-Egyptian relations. Having achieved the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai in exchange for the deployment there
of a "multinational force," H. Mubarak is seeking possibilities of a
rapprochement with the Arab states and Egypt's departure from political isolation
in the Arab world. The American journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS observes in this
connection that Egypt is interested in reconciliation with the Arab countries.*

* See FOREIGN AFFAIRS Spring 1982, p 781.
H. Mubarak has not yet consented to official legalization of the understanding with the United States on "military privileges" and the granting of military bases on a permanent basis. In connection with Israel's invasion of Lebanese territory Egypt announced in June 1982 a suspension of its participation in the negotiations on "administrative autonomy" for the Palestinians. According to the journal FOREIGN POLICY, "after Sadat, there will be increasing difficulties for the United States in relations with Egypt" because "Mubarak will not be an exact copy of Sadat."* Nonetheless, the Egyptian president has confirmed Cairo's allegiance to the "Camp David process".

At the same time the Arab states have been unable to counterpose effective countermeasures to the policy of American imperialism in the Near East, which is aimed at undermining their unity of action. Differences in the political system of individual states of the region, conflicts between progressive and conservative regimes, inter-Arab disagreements on the ways of a Near East settlement and solution of the Palestinian problem and other factors have been reflected here primarily. A negative influence on relations between Arab states is being exerted by the continuing Iran-Iraq conflict. Nor have the Arab countries moved to use against the patron of the Israeli aggressors—the United States—the "oil weapon" or other such reprisals (the withdrawal from American banks of their currency deposits, for example).

As a result the Arab states did not duly repulse the Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinian people in the summer-fall of this year and did not take any joint, coordinated practical action aimed at defending the Lebanese and Palestinians against Zionist genocide.

The Oil Factor

The Near East was and remains unique in its oil potential. Back in 1950 its interior (including Iran) contained, according to estimates, 6.7 billion tons of liquid fuel.** In 1981 proven oil reserves were assessed at 49.7 billion tons,*** and their overall value could be fixed in current world prices at $11-12 trillion. Throughout the period 1973-1981 the annual level of oil production in the region was the equivalent of approximately 1 billion tons.**** But even this level is not the limit. Assimilated capacity, both by virtue of OPEC policy on holding down production and in connection with the "glut" on the world oil market in 1980-1982, is not being fully utilized. In addition, the possibility of the discovery of new deposits cannot be ruled out.

The basis of Washington's Near East strategy in the J. Carter presidency was the proposition concerning the need to secure for the United States "access" to the oil, given all conditions and any means, even military, on the pretext of the "depletion of national oil resources" and the "vital importance" of the region's natural resources for the normal functioning of the American and the capitalist economy in general. H. Brown, secretary of the defense in the

**** Estimated on the basis of the data of the supplement to MEMO No 8 for 1979-1981.
J. Carter administration, asserted in almost every speech of his that "access" to the oil of the Persian Gulf was for the United States a "vitally important interest." R. Reagan has not only confirmed the White House's adherence to the idea of the permissibility of military support for the "access" to Near East oil. This solution of this problem is regarded by the present U.S. Administration as an inalienable component of its global foreign policy course aimed at changing the correlation of forces on a world scale to its advantage. Thus a Pentagon directive to the U.S. armed forces which ended up in the press said that defense of Persian Gulf oil comes immediately after the defense of North America and the NATO countries in order of importance.*

For political purposes the United States is deliberately exaggerating its dependence on Near East oil. The country itself has extraordinarily big energy reserves—coal, uranium, oil-bearing shale and "difficult" oil in mountain areas, on-the-shelf and in the Arctic zone. However, instead of accelerating the production of energy resources in the country, monopoly capital is endeavoring to develop the more profitable, from its viewpoint, natural resources of the Near East.

American imports of Near East oil grew constantly throughout the last decade. Its proportion in total U.S. liquid fuel consumption was 13 percent in 1980 (we would point out for comparison that the analogous indicator amounted to 75 percent in France, 45 percent in the FRG and 75 percent in Japan).** However, the picture has changed at the start of the 1980's: together with a drop in oil consumption in the United States total American oil imports are declining also. Thus whereas in 1979 they were the equivalent of 400 million tons, in 1982 they amounted to only 250 million tons.*** This has been caused by the reduced demand for energy in the United States under the conditions of economic recession. The U.S. Administration's measures on implementation of the energy program adopted at the end of the 1970's have also had an effect to some extent. A certain part has been played, in particular, by the complete lifting at the start of 1981 of federal controls on the price of oil, which has led to an upward spiraling of the price of liquid fuel and a drop in its consumption in the country.

The leading positions in the sphere of exploitation of the natural resources of the Arab countries and Iran are occupied by the so-called big five American transnational oil corporations: Exxon, Socal, Mobil, Gulf Oil and Texaco. These companies' total assets increased from $52.3 billion in 1970 to $172.9 billion in 1981 and net profit from $3.6 billion to $13.6 billion respectively.****

A gradual falling off of the U.S. oil corporations' investments in the countries of the region began in the latter half of the 1970's. On the eve and at the outset of the 1980's the volume of these investments was being adduced in American statistical sources with a minus sign. This is explained by the fact that the Near East countries' measures to nationalize the oil and implement a 'system of

* See INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE 3 June 1982.
** DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN May 1980, p 63.
participation" led to the complete or partial elimination of the American transnational corporations' rights of ownership of the oil assets (in exchange for compensation payments which were transferred to the United States). Nonetheless, even under the changed conditions the monopolies have been able to adapt to the situation and continue to obtain high profits from their activity in the sphere of the shipment, refining and sale of a large part of Near East oil, technical services in the organization of production and so forth.

Washington's policy in respect of the region's oil producers is based on the neocolonialist "interdependence" concept. It proceeds from the proposition concerning the "rapprochement" of the interests of the United States and these states as their financial might grows. The ideologists of monopoly capital assert that the oil-exporting countries should ensure for the United States long-term guaranteed oil supplies at an "acceptable price"; the latter will, in exchange for petrodollars, assist in the implementation of the Near East countries' development programs and exports of modern technology and weapons to them. In fact it is a question of the imperialists' endeavor to enmesh the region's oil producers in the snares of dependence, pin them more firmly to the world capitalist economy and take deeper root in the young national economy.

There is also a neocolonialist thrust to the long-term energy program put forward by the previous U.S. Administration and now being implemented under R. Reagan with greater emphasis on private-capitalist, market factors. Its promotion ensued from the conclusions drawn by U.S. ruling circles from an analysis of the changes which had occurred in the region in the past decade. These were the deteriorating positions of the American oil monopolies and the Near East states' increased opportunities for pursuing a more independent foreign policy. The fact that the Arab countries had twice—in 1967 and 1973—embargoed exports of their oil to the United States and also repeatedly raised oil prices, despite Washington's attempts to frustrate the corresponding OPEC decisions, showed that the Arab oil exporters by no means wish to subordinate their interests to the aspirations of American imperialism.

With regard for this the energy program set the task of a reduction by means of a number of measures aimed at energy economies and the development of American power engineering in the United States' dependence on imported, primarily Near East, oil. It is expected, furthermore, that realization of the program will be reflected negatively in the oil exporters' export potential and undermine OPEC's opportunities for determining the oil price. Washington's hopes of pursuing a tougher policy in respect of the oil producers which is less dependent on the oil factor are connected with the energy program.

Nonetheless, according to American forecasts, in the 1980's the Near East will retain its important role in the United States' energy supplies inasmuch as no significant increase in oil production either in the United States itself or in other parts of the world beyond the region which could be an alternative source of liquid fuel imports is foreseen in the foreseeable future. Under these conditions the energy requirements of the United States and, even more, Japan and West Europe will be satisfied to a considerable extent thanks to oil exports from the Arab countries and Iran. Thus the Near East will remain a target of neocolonialist expansion and the acute confrontation of the forces of imperialism on the one hand and the peoples and countries of the region on the other.
The United States and Israel—"Strategic Partners"

Israel performs the role of main executant of the plans of American imperialism in respect of the Near East. This state has with its powerful militarist machinery become a main instrument of the pursuit of U.S. policy in the region.

Relations between Washington and Tel Aviv are built within the framework of the military-political alliance which has actually taken shape between them. In their reliance on such an ally imperialist strategists proceed primarily from the fundamental concurrence of the hegemonist aspirations of the United States and the expansionist claims of the Zionist leadership of Israel, the anti-Soviet thrust of their foreign policy platforms and the close relations of the Israeli economy and the U.S. military-industrial complex. An exclusive role here belongs to the so-called Zionist lobby, which has a ramified system of agents in Congress and other echelons of power in the United States, including the "Reagan team".

The United States is building allied relations with Israel in such a way as on the one hand to untie its partner's hands as much as possible and, on the other, to provide timely political and diplomatic cover for its aggressive actions. The White House or State Department emphasize in essentially every important government document that the United States has "firm and unshakable commitments" to guarantee Israel's "survival" and "security" on a long-term basis.

The American-Israeli alliance is also based on bilateral "executive agreements," that is, joint documents which are not subject to ratification by the Congress. The latest of such documents was the American-Israeli "Memorandum on Mutual Understanding in the Sphere of Strategic Cooperation" signed on 30 November 1981 by the defense secretaries of the United States and Israel. This agreement provides for the military cooperation of Washington and Tel Aviv not only on a regional but also global scale and has an anti-Soviet thrust.

What are the tasks which the United States is attempting to tackle by relying on an alliance with Israel? What concrete goals does this alliance pursue? Washington is using its "strategic partner" as an instrument of neocolonialism and imperialism in the struggle against the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples, thereby counting on slowing down the course of the liberation process in the Near East, weakening the progressive Arab regimes, winning unconditional support for its policy in the region from the so-called moderate Arab countries and ultimately inclining the Arabs in the direction of capitulation before the hegemonist pretensions of Washington and the annexationist aspirations of Tel Aviv.

The material basis of the alliance of "strategic partners" was and remains the United States' tremendous military-economic assistance to Israel. It goes to cover the budget deficits, the upkeep of an inflated army and a developed military infrastructure and to pay for arms purchases. Its militarized economy and powerful military machine are maintained thanks to this assistance. Israel's very existence as a state would be simply inconceivable without regular financial injections. It is sufficient to say that total American assistance per capita constituted approximately $1,000 in 1979, given an Israeli GNP the equivalent
of $2,100 per capita.* Tel Aviv is ahead of other of Washington's partners in the amounts of aid it receives. In the period 1978-1982 it has been granted $2-3 billion annually, of which for military purposes approximately $1 billion in 1980 and $1.4 billion in 1981.

With respect to contracts concluded in 1978 and later alone Israel has received from the United States 30 F-15 and 75 F-16 fighters, 25 helicopters with antitank weapons, 5 reconnaissance aircraft, 200 power-driven howitzers, 800 armored personnel carriers, 200 medium tanks, 2 rapid patrol craft and also air defense and antitank weapons, ammunition and other weapons and military equipment.**

Washington is attempting to smooth over the "rough edges" of Israeli policy and impart to it forms more acceptable to American diplomacy. But even such a line of the U.S. Administration, although it has never reached the point of real pressure on the Israeli leadership, is eliciting a sharp rebuff in Tel Aviv, which, by relying on the influential Israel lobby in the United States, is striving to get from Washington unconditional support for its expansionist policy. As an example we may recall Tel Aviv's sharply negative reaction to the United States' supply to Saudi Arabia of AWACS aircraft and other equipment within the framework of the so-called comprehensive package for the sale to Riyadh ofarms to the sum of $6.5 billion sanctioned by the U.S. Congress in October 1981. In order to calm its ally Washington concluded with it, as compensation, in November 1981 an agreement on "strategic cooperation," this time causing the discontent of conservative Arab circles.

The Dangerous Blind Alleys of Camp David

Why for many years has Washington not moved toward an all-embracing settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on a just basis? The answer to this question again brings us back to the essence of Washington's Near East policy.

Driven primarily by considerations of a military strategic nature, the United States regards Israel as an inalienable component of its presence in the region. This aspect of Washington's Near East policy was mentioned by the American scholar and diplomat W. Quandt in his book "Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976". "Israel," he writes, "is the United States' sole dependable ally in the region (the Near East—R.B.). In extreme circumstances Israel could employ its might to defend the interests of the United States and, possibly, even offer bases for American military operations. Given less serious circumstances, Israel is of value as an anti-Soviet bastion in a region where radical Arab states are located.***

The fact that the continuing unsettled state of the conflict is contributing to a split in the Arab world, fostering conflicts between different political regimes and complicating Arab states' concerted actions in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism also corresponds to imperialist interests. Washington thus rejects the principle of an all-embracing settlement and is opposed to a

* FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1979, p 1013.
solution of the key problem of the conflict—the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state—inasmuch as this runs counter to its hegemonist aspirations.

The American position on the problem of a Near East settlement is reflected most fully in the so-called Camp David process—a long-term policy aimed at realization of the United States' imperial plans in the Near East. The basis of it are two documents signed by Carter, Sadat and Begin at the U.S. President's country residence in September 1978—"Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel" and "Framework for Peace in the Near East". The first of them was subsequently embodied in the separate "Peace Treaty" between the two countries signed on 26 March 1979. The second document, which served as a kind of copula between the separate deal and the Palestinian problem, contained pretensions to an all-embracing approach. However, its content has an anti-Arab, pro-Israeli thrust. It circumvents entirely the question of Palestinian statehood, restoration of Arab control over East Jerusalem (and, as subsequent events have shown, not fortuitously) and an end to Israeli occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. Substituting for the question of the creation of an independent, sovereign Palestinian state are promises to grant the residents of the occupied West Bank and Gaza "administrative autonomy" with the retention in disguised form of Israeli occupation.

Together with the "Peace Treaty" between Egypt and Israel, which was witnessed by the American side in the person of J. Carter, a number of bilateral (United States-Israel, United States-Egypt) and trilateral (United States-Egypt-Israel) documents which made the United States a direct participant in and guarantor of the Camp David deal were signed.

The essence of the Camp David system is thus an endeavor to create an alliance of imperialism, Zionism and rightwing Arab regimes, undermine the national liberation movement of the peoples of the region and split the anti-imperialist front of Arab states. This is why the United States frustrated the convening of a Geneva peace conference, declined to continue talks with the USSR on the Near East and turned down the initiative for the convening of a special multilateral conference for settlement of the conflict put forward by the 26th CPSU Congress.

As a result of Camp David a new alignment of forces has taken shape in the region, there are broader opportunities for American interference in Near East affairs and a direct U.S. military presence in Sinai has been secured.

Taking the Camp David route, in 1980 Egypt established diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with Israel. The withdrawal of occupation forces from Sinai territory had been completed by April 1982. So-called multinational armed forces with a total strength of 2,500 men, which had been created in accordance with the "Peace Treaty," were brought here, to the areas adjacent to Israel. The American military contingent numbering 1,200 men of the 82d Airborne Division, which is part of the RDF, constitutes the backbone of these forces. The "multinational force" monitors strategically important points of the Sinai—the Gulf of Aqaba, the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea.
Fulfillment of the second part of the Camp David deal—negotiations on the establishment of a regime of "autonomy" on the West Bank and in Gaza, to which Washington, in its attempts to reduce the seriousness of the Palestinian problem, until most recently has paid much attention—is essentially deadlocked. These negotiations were a propaganda-diplomatic maneuver of the United States aimed at concealing the separate nature of the deal between Cairo and Tel Aviv and legalizing the occupation of Arab land, thereby removing the Palestinian problem as the pivotal component of a Near East settlement. Nor have American diplomacy's intensive efforts to include other Arab states, particularly Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, in the "Camp David process" and turn the capitalism-oriented deal into a broader agreement been crowned with success. Damascus and Amman have rejected Washington's solicitations and confirmed their fidelity to the pan-Arab line of opposition to the separate deals formulated at top-level meetings of Arab countries in Baghdad (November 1978 and March 1979) and participated in the political and economic sanctions against the Egyptian regime. The Palestinians living on the West Bank and in Gaza also emphatically rejected the Camp David deal.

The policy of Camp David, as might have been expected, encouraged the Israeli expansionists. In 1980 the Israeli Knesset (parliament) legalized the annexation of East Jerusalem, the Arab part, and proclaimed the city the "single and indivisible" capital of Israel. In 1981 the writ of Israeli law was extended to the Golan Heights, which were captured from Syria in 1967. The Tel Aviv leadership is speeding up the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza regions. For this purpose measures are being implemented to change the demographic composition and economic structure of the captured territories and the network of Israeli settlements is being expanded. Some 94 settlements, in which 12,000 persons live, had already been created on the West Bank by 1982. The construction of the settlements is being accompanied by the confiscation of Arab land and the dispossession of water resources. In this way the present Israeli leadership is endeavoring to accomplish the Zionist fantasies of a "Greater Israel"—by means of the seizure and subsequent annexation of primordial Arab land.

Escalation of Aggression

The ominous nature of the Camp David deal and the American-Israeli "strategic cooperation" was manifested as clearly as could be in the summer-fall of this year, when the Tel Aviv hawks, with the direct complicity of the United States, unleashed carefully planned, large-scale aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance movement. This small country, which is in addition experiencing an acute internal political crisis caused by the activity of rightwing Christian forces cooperating with Israel, was invaded by large-scale military contingents of the aggressor equipped with the most modern American weapons, including barbaric means of mass annihilation. Almost half the territory of a sovereign Arab state was captured, and totally unconfessed genocide against the Palestinians and Lebanese is being perpetrated which has already led to the death of thousands and thousands of people, mainly of the peaceful population—women, children and old men.

The intervention in Lebanon, which demonstrated the fundamental coincidence of the Near East policy of the United States and the expansionist course of the Tel Aviv rulers, pursued far-reaching goals. The primary task was the physical
destruction of the armed formations of the Palestine resistance movement deployed in Lebanon and liquidation of the military and political infrastructure of the PLO. The essence of the plan was to thus "remove" the Palestinian problem from the agenda as a pivotal component of a Near East settlement. This corresponded fully with the policy of Washington, which is refusing to recognize the PLO and conduct any negotiations on Palestinian statehood. Washington and Tel Aviv assigned a considerable place to the hopes of putting military pressure on Syria, destabilizing the political situation in this country, having Syrian forces withdraw from Lebanese territory and, as a whole, weakening Syria's activity in the field of the pan-Arab struggle for liquidating the consequences of Israeli aggression. The United States and Israel also endeavored on the pretext of the creation of a "strong government" in Lebanon to hand over power to a rightwing Christian puppet government. Finally, the task was to enlist Lebanon in the "Camp David process," that is, having Lebanon, by analogy with Egypt, conclude a separate "peace treaty" with Israel. By the "successes" in the Lebanese field Washington would like to resuscitate the deadlocked Camp David policy and remove the obstacles that have arisen in the way of it.

Throughout the armed phase of the Lebanon drama the United States took no effective steps to curtail or stop Israel's armed actions. It continued to obtain the latest American weapons. Washington did not resort to the reprisals required by American law in connection with Tel Aviv's use of arms obtained from the United States for openly aggressive purposes. In addition, Washington provided political and diplomatic cover for the Israeli aggression. It was the United States which blocked the Security Council's adoption of sanctions against the aggressor provided for by the UN Charter.

The United States' "intermediary" diplomatic demarches in Lebanon undertaken in June-August of this year by the U.S. President's special representative, Ambassador P. Habib, also corresponded to the goals of defense of the Israeli aggression. The essence of the "mediation" was in the atmosphere of the threat of total physical annihilation hanging over the Palestinians to have them "peacefully" evacuate West Beirut, "neutralize" the Lebanese national-patriotic forces and hand over power to a government which would join the Camp David system. As a whole, U.S. diplomacy operated in a course in parallel with the Israeli military pressure aimed at liquidating the Palestinian and Syrian presence in Lebanon. The result of P. Habib's "mediation" was the accord reached on 19 August between the PLO, the Lebanese Government and Israel on the evacuation of armed Palestinians and Syrians from West Beirut (approximately 10,000 persons) under the observation of a multinational force (2,000 men in American, French and Italian contingents) which had been brought in. The PLO decided on the withdrawal of its fighting formations from Beirut guided, as its official representatives declared repeatedly, by humane considerations in order to prevent deaths of the peaceful population as a result of the aggressor's incessant bombing and having taken into consideration the guarantees with respect to the security of the inhabitants of the Palestinian camps given by the United States and Israel. Subsequent events showed what these "guarantees" were worth!

Upon completion of the evacuation President R. Reagan put forward on 1 September a plan for the "settlement" of the Near East conflict, which was extensively publicized as a major peace-making step by Washington. Put forward in the
atmosphere of extensive condemnation by the world community of the Israeli aggression and the United States' complicity therein, the American "initiative" was aimed at dissociation from the extremist excesses of Israeli policy and a demonstration of Washington's "equidistant," "balanced" approach to both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its endeavor to also take account in the settlement process of the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian Arabs.

However, in reality the Reagan plan represents merely a slightly renovated version of Camp David and is, as a whole, of an anti-Arab, anti-Palestinian nature. Like the Camp David outline, the Reagan plan proceeds from the principle of separate settlement. It rules out any participation by the Soviet Union in the process of achieving peace. The main emphasis is put on the problem of Israel's "security". The "security" needs of the latter are put on an exaggerated scale and a self-sufficing nature is imparted to them. At the same time, however, the problems of the security of the Arab states are completely ignored.

But the essence of the Reagan administration's plan is that it fails to provide for a just solution of the two key components of the Near East conflict: the question of the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territory captured in 1967 and the Palestinian problem. It does not contain concrete pointers to the need for the complete withdrawal of the forces of occupation from this territory. Not a word is said, in particular, about an end to the occupation of the Golan Heights and the return of East Jerusalem to the Arabs. The concept of the establishment of "defensible" borders of Israel with the contiguous Arab countries, which in the American-Israeli lexicon means the augmentation of Israeli territory thanks to the inclusion of strategically important Arab land, including that in the West Bank region, which is illegal (contrary to fundamental resolutions of the UN Security Council) and baseless from the military viewpoint, is being put forward anew.

As far as a solution of the Palestinian problem is concerned, the Reagan plan does not even mention the PLO—the sole legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine. It also rejects the idea of the Palestinians' self-determination and recognition of the right to create their own sovereign state. "The United States," the U.S. President declared, "will not support the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza." R. Reagan sees as the solution of the Palestinian problem the establishment of "self-administration for the Palestinians living on the West Bank and in Gaza in some form of association with Jordan." The plan thus substitutes for the principle of Palestinian statehood fictitious, limited and truncated self-administration. Nor does it lead to a complete end to the Israeli military presence in these territories; the fate of the Palestinians, including the refugees, living in other Arab countries is not broached at all. This resuscitated "Jordanian option" has already been turned down by the Arabs.

A complete contrast to the Reagan plan are the new Soviet proposals on a Near East settlement and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Near East put forward by L.I. Brezhnev on 15 September 1982. A just and lasting peace in the Near East can and must be based on the following principles:
"First, there must be strict observance of the principle of the impermissibility of the seizure of others' land by way of aggression. And this means that the Arabs must have returned to them all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967—the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the Jordan and Gaza Strip and Lebanese land. The borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors must be declared inviolable.

"Second, the Palestinian Arab people's inalienable right to self-determination and the creation of their own independent state on Palestinian soil, which will have been liberated from Israeli occupation—on the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip—must be secured in practice. The Palestinian refugees must be afforded the opportunity, as provided for by UN decisions, to return to their ancestral parts or receive appropriate compensation for their abandoned property.

"Third, East Jerusalem, which was occupied by Israel in 1967 and where one of the principal Muslim shrines is located, must be returned to the Arabs and must become an inalienable part of the Palestinian state. Freedom of access to the places of worship of the three religions must be secured for believers throughout Jerusalem.

"Fourth, the right of all states of the region to a secure and independent existence and development—given, of course, observance of complete reciprocity, for it is impossible to ensure the security of some while flouting the security of others—must be secured.

"Fifth, there must be an end to the state of war and peace must be established between the Arab states and Israel. And this means that all parties to the conflict, including Israel and the Palestinian state, must undertake to mutually respect each other's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and resolve disputes which arise by peaceful means, by way of negotiation.

"Sixth, international guarantees of the settlement—the role of guarantor could be assumed by, say, the permanent members of the UN Security Council or the Security Council as a whole—must be formulated and adopted."

The Soviet proposals correspond strictly to documents of international law concerning a Near East settlement, primarily the fundamental UN Security Council resolutions of 22 November 1967 (Resolution 242) and of 22 October 1973 (Resolution 338). They are also in accord with the decisions of the 12th Arab Summit in Fez and correspond to the interests of all parties to the conflict.

The Israeli aggression in Lebanon, perpetrated with the participation of the United States, did not lead, nor could it have led, to "removal" of the Palestinian problem. Washington and Tel Aviv did not succeed in accomplishing their main mission—liquidating the PLO. Israeli hopes of conducting a "Blitzkrieg" failed. There has been a rise in the international prestige of the PLO—the organizing force of the Palestinian liberation struggle. By its complicity with Israel the United States incurred serious moral and political losses in the Arab world. The majority of Arab countries have received the new American "initiative" negatively. For the first time since 1967 they succeeded at the Fez meeting in coordinating their positions and adopting a single pan-Arab plan of a Near East settlement. The meeting confirmed the status of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine.
A most tragic consequence of Washington's tolerant position with respect to an aggressor who had gone too far was the mass slaughter of Palestinians and Lebanese organized by Tel Aviv and its assistants in the Palestinian refugee camps in West Beirut after the departure of the PLO fighting formations. The Israeli military's crimes in Lebanon, which are on a par with the outrages perpetrated by the fascist executioners on occupied territory in WWII, caused a storm of indignation and angry condemnation throughout the world. Protest demonstrations many thousands strong took place in Israel itself even.

The entire history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is more than three decades old now, teaches that the key to its solution cannot be found on the paths of expansion and the seizure of others' land and with the aid of a policy of diktat and hostility in respect of neighboring peoples. "The way to lasting peace in the Near East," A.A. Gromyko emphasized at the UN General Assembly 37th Session, setting forth the Soviet proposals for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, "lies through the collective efforts of all parties concerned, including the PLO. And the best method for this is the convening of an appropriate international conference."

THIRD WORLD TRAPPED IN ROLE IMPORTING MANUFACTURES, SUPPLYING RAW MATERIALS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 91-106

[Article by V. Vasil'yev: "The Developing Countries in the System of the International Capitalist Division of Labor"]

[Excerpt]

II

The mid-1960's were a new boundary in the development of the international division of labor as a consequence of the complex processes which were occurring both in the industrially developed and developing countries. Economic integration within the EEC, which was accompanied by the development of the West European countries' relations with the developing countries, Japan's conversion into a new center of economic power and the structural changes in the economy of the United States not only required an expansion of foreign markets but also appreciably changed their role in the social reproduction of the industrially developed countries. The exacerbation of competitive struggle and increased costs of production created incentives for the developed countries, not content with maintaining nonequivalent exchange, to endeavor to use foreign markets to optimize their own production by way of the transfer of some of their production capacity to the developing countries.

On the other hand, the experience of industrialization over the two postwar decades had given rise to serious doubts among the emergent countries as to the possibility of the successful reorganization of the national economy on the basis of a policy of import substitution and demanded the concentration of efforts on the expansion of export potential in every possible way. It is significant that even in such a comparatively more developed country as Brazil the export sector was up to the mid-1960's in a state of stagnation and that only in subsequent years did its rapid development begin.

Inasmuch as the multinational corporations [MNC] had in these years firmly incorporated in the range of their activity the organization of production in the developing countries both for consumption on the domestic markets of these countries and also for export it transpired that these countries and the MNC were interested in expanding exports of finished products and, consequently, a change in the international division of labor.

Indeed, as of the mid-1960's the proportion of the products of processing industry in the developing countries' exports began to increase. Whereas in 1960 it had
constituted 11 percent, by 1975 it had reached 26 percent. However, as a number of studies showed, the policy of the MNC was of a distinctly selective nature, and the programs for development of the production of finished products for export did not extend to all the developing countries. Interesting facts in this connection are adduced in a work by S. Furtado (see Table 2).

Even in the Latin American countries MNC investments in the export sector of processing industry constituted a negligible proportion of total investments. In regions which are the richest in raw material resources (Africa, the Near East) there was complete preservation of the previous trend, that is, the bulk of the flow of exports of capital was channeled into sectors of extractive industry.

Table 2. Areas of MNC Investments at the Start of the 1970's (%)

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<th>Africa</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Near East</th>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw material sectors</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>sectors oriented toward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the domestic market</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing industry's</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>export sectors</td>
<td></td>
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The selective nature of MNC capital investments in the export sector of the developing countries' processing industry is particularly obvious if this question is examined not from the regional but per-country angle. Thus the proportion of Singapore and Hong Kong in total exports of finished products of all the countries and territories of Southeast Asia in the latter half of the 1970's amounted to 22 percent, whereas the population of these two industrial enclaves constituted only 0.3 percent of the region's entire population (excluding Japan). According to data of a Common Market commission, at the end of the 1970's almost 80 percent of the entire industrial product of the developing countries and territories was concentrated in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, while the entire Indian subcontinent and Black Africa, which account for approximately one-third of the world's population, produced less than 2 percent of finished industrial products.

All this testifies convincingly that the "averaged" overall indicators of economic growth do not clarify but obscure the actual processes occurring both in the developing countries and in the system of the capitalist international division of labor. Despite the trend toward the diversification of the developing countries' exports thanks to products of the processing industry sectors which has indisputably emerged, we at present lack data which might serve as a basis for forecasts of the possibility of radical changes in the position of these countries in the international division of labor. The process is proceeding intensively only in a narrow group and does not characterize shifts in the export structure of the vast majority of countries.
However, if the said trend is, nonetheless, occurring, does not this indicate that the possibility of the developing countries' further gradual evolution from predominantly producers of raw material to producers of industrial products exists?

In order to answer this question correctly it is essential to distinguish in the many aspects of MNC activity and also the factors giving rise to this activity those directly connected with the formation of the international division of labor. The four following aspects are of particular significance.

First, as already mentioned, a principal goal of the MNC is, as before, securing for themselves stable sources of raw material. This undoubtedly limits the sphere of the investment of capital in industry's processing sectors.

Second, the location of individual stages of a single production process in different countries characteristic of the MNC (so-called "vertical integration"), which secures the possibility of the optimization of production thanks to reduced costs, presupposes the accessibility of the sources of raw material and the availability of cheap low-skilled manpower, which the developing countries, with their unsolved problem of agrarian overpopulation, are today also putting at the disposal of these companies. For this reason the MNC are interested in a preservation of the specific conditions of reproduction and the social institutions in the developing countries impeding the implementation of radical transformations in their economy.

Third, internationalization of the production process within the framework of the MNC is seriously complicating for the developing world the use of the advantages connected with the development of intra- and inter-sectorial cooperation relations, and this is limiting the possibilities of the products of the processing sectors of national industry not connected with the MNC reaching foreign markets.

Fourth, while making extensive use of the local capital markets the MNC are diverting part of the internal accumulations of the developing countries, limiting the already modest investment resources of the latter. Their national plans are subject to considerable deformation, the solution of the most urgent questions is put off and the overall conditions of underdevelopment and dependence and continuation of the agrarian–raw material orientation of their exports are preserved.

All this emphasizes that the possibilities of the developing countries' use of agreements with the MNC for the implementation of structural changes in their economy and an improvement of the situation on the world markets are limited. It is highly material for the emergent countries whether their processing industry is developed on the basis of their own active efforts or under the control of the MNC. The further transformations in the international division of labor connected with the developing countries' increased share of the production of finished products under the control of the MNC go, the greater the benefit derived by the international monopolies from the optimization of production and the fewer the opportunities these countries will possess.
The developing countries' preservation as sources of industrial raw material has been mentioned by Ye.M. Primakov.* In the period of the 1970's their share of world exports of raw material commodities declined only negligibly (from 30 percent in 1970 to 29 percent in 1977). The absolute volume of raw material supplies continued to grow rapidly here, having increased by a factor of 2.5 in 7 years, and constituted 70 percent of the total value of exports in 1977. True, if oil is excluded, the developing countries' share of satisfaction of the industrial powers' demand for the majority of types of mineral raw material constituted approximately 30 percent. However, the significance of this figure should not be minimized. Thus, for example, the developing countries account for one-third of the world production of iron ore, but 85 percent of it is consumed by the industrially developed countries. The French economist Pierre [Zhale] has drawn attention to the fact that France, while processing big reserves of iron ore with a low iron content, prefers to develop metallurgy in the coastal areas with an eye to the rich African ore. The situation concerning bauxites is even more graphic: while concentrating 69 percent of their production, the developing countries export nine-tenths of the output. As far as a number of metals (chromium, cobalt, tin, manganese and others), on which the development of the technologically advanced industrial sectors depend to a considerable extent, is concerned, their principal resources are concentrated precisely in the developing countries, and these types of raw material are practically entirely exported.

Finally, despite the programs to reduce the consumption of energy resources which are being implemented, in the 1980's West Europe, according to estimates, will import oil in amounts constituting more than 40 percent of its energy consumption. No less interest is displayed by the West European countries in stable and diversified sources of uranium supplies.**

Whereas for the West's industrial countries imports of raw materials and energy carriers serve, as before, as a material prerequisite of economic development, for the developing countries raw material exports remain the principal source of their currency receipts. The "interdependence" here is by no means equivalent. The favorable balance of the young states in the trade in these commodities increased from $5.4 billion in 1970 to $9.5 billion in 1977. However, like food exports, the industrial raw material exports were unable to secure for them equilibrium in trade with the industrially developed countries and, consequently, an equal position in the international division of labor. Total liabilities in these countries in trade continued to grow.

Of no less significance than the activity of the MNC for preservation of the agrarian-raw material specialization of the developing countries were the structural changes in the economy of the industrially developed countries. The influence of these changes was manifested in full in the 1970's.

Having completed the lengthy process of the creation of a highly productive agrarian-industrial complex, the United States and a number of EEC countries are

* See Y. Primakov, "The Place of the Emergent Countries in the World Economy" (MEMO No 3, 1982, p 17).
becoming interested in grain exports. On the other hand, having encountered the need to pay for increasing imports and pay off the incurred debt, the emergent countries have been forced to accelerate the development of the traditional export sectors to the detriment of the expansion of food production.

That grain imports from the United States and other capitalist countries are not changing the developing countries' agrarian-raw material specialization can be seen from the data of Table 3.

Table 3. Food Trade Between the Industrially Developed and Developing Countries ($, billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exporters</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Industrially developed countries</th>
<th>Including North America</th>
<th>Developing countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrially developed</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries including North</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrially developed</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As can be seen from the table, despite the increased imports, the developing countries have by no means become net importers of food.

On the other hand, their exports of food commodities have increased at a preferential rate, which has led to the formation of and an increase in a positive balance in their trade in these commodities with the industrial countries. Whereas in 1970 it constituted $5.2 billion, in 1977 it amounted to $13.7 billion. Material of the EEC Commission notes that the proportion of food commodities supplied from the developing countries increased from 43 percent in 1972 to 55 percent in 1977 in the Common Market countries' total food imports and that this occurred, furthermore, thanks to a corresponding decline in the proportion of imports from developed countries.

An official document of the Development Aid Committee points out that aid "is too often channeled more into the development of production for exports than the production of food products for the local population."

One further line of impact of the structural changes in the economy of the industrially developed countries on determination of the role of the developing

world in the international division of labor has been arms exports connected with the development of the military-industrial complex and imperialist circles' policy of militarization. In the period 1965-1980, the developing countries' arms imports increased by a factor of almost 11, reaching $15 billion in 1980. These figures do not take account of secret sales and reexports. The arms trade is becoming a means of the imperialist states' establishment of control over the developing countries' military industry. On the basis of material pertaining to the EEC American experts on this issue have shown that "the European countries' interest in the transfer of military technology amounts to a potential, broader sharing of the cost of experimental design, augmentation of the series nature of production, a reduction in costs per unit product and an expansion of markets."* It is fitting to mention that the United States, which in the period 1960-1980 accounted for approximately one-half of all arms supplies to the developing countries, has also had no less interest in achieving the said goals. The interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex thus become a factor of the formation of these countries' trade and subsequently industrial relations determining their place in the international division of labor.

There were no fundamental changes in the developing countries' international specialization in the 1970's as a whole, but the trend toward an increased imbalance in their trade with the developed capitalist countries strengthened. By the time when the MNC's share of world trade had reached one-third, the emergent states' balance of payments deficits had already begun to assume threatening proportions. Against the background of the general shortage of liquid assets characteristic of the start of the 1970's, this phenomenon reflected the progressive instability of the system of the international capitalist division of labor. Whereas the developed capitalist countries managed to overcome the difficulties connected with the shortage of liquidity, for the developing countries they become increasingly worse. The currency-financial crisis of the start of the 1970's was at the same time also a crisis of the existing system of the division of labor inasmuch as the young states, remaining in their former position, were unable to find the resources to regulate their current balance of payments deficits. Economic relations between the two groups of countries encountered increasingly big obstacles. The inexorable logic of the system led to an explosion. And it occurred in the sphere in which the strain in the economic relations between the developing and industrially developed countries was the greatest. This sphere was the oil market.

III

Now, when almost 10 years have elapsed since the time of the "oil embargo" which OPEC imposed in 1973, certain conclusions may be drawn with regard to the consequences which it had for the position of the developing countries in the system of the international division of labor. OPEC's dramatic action led to a considerable reduction in the disproportion between the production and consumption of energy resources in the world capitalist economy. At the same

time, however, it separated the oil-exporting countries from a large detachment of states, making them a highly distinctive center of economic influence whose position in the system of the international division of labor is becoming extraordinarily complex and contradictory.

Table 4. Changes in the Reciprocal Trade of the Industrially Developed and Developing Countries ($, billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importers/Exporters</th>
<th>Industrially developed countries</th>
<th>Oil-exporting developing countries</th>
<th>Oil-importing developing countries</th>
<th>All countries</th>
<th>Share of world exports (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrially developed countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 105.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>141.5</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 172.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>224.2</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 516.1</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>105.2</td>
<td>727.8</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 899.5</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1,276.5</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil-exporting developing countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 9.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 14.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 112.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>150.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 227.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>301.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil-importing developing countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 19.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 26.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 92.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>137.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 15156</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>247.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 139.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>203.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 220.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>312.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 751.1</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>176.2</td>
<td>1,123.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 1,339</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>337.2</td>
<td>1,988.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 1970's were characterized by profound changes in world trade of very appreciable significance for the further evolution of the developing countries' role in the international division of labor.

It can be seen from Table 4 that in the period from 1966 through 1980 the industrially developed countries' share of world exports declined from 69.6 percent to 64.2 percent, although in absolute terms exports increased ninefold. Exports from the oil-importing developing countries increased by a factor of 9.5, but their share of world exports declined somewhat. At the same time there was a sharp change in the positions of the OPEC countries, whose exports increased by a factor of 24 in absolute terms and increased relatively from 6.2 percent to 15.2 percent.
It is even more important to analyze the position from the viewpoint of the direction of the main commodity flows. The trend toward imbalance in exchange between the developed and developing countries in the 1970's strengthened: the excess of exports from the industrially developed countries in 1980 constituted $38 billion, having increased almost eightfold compared with the mid-1960's. Together with this there also emerged a huge deficit in the young states' trade with the OPEC countries. In 1977 it amounted to $20.7 billion and in 1980 to $46.1 billion. The overall result of these changes, which marks a qualitative deterioration in the developing countries' position in the system of the international division of labor, is obscured by the fact that the group of industrial countries had a big and ever increasing deficit in trade with OPEC, which amounted to $126 billion in 1980. However, as can be seen from the table, the oil producers' dependence on the industrial powers continued; as before, three-fourths of exports are realized on these countries' markets. In practice the developed states had an opportunity to cover a considerable part of their deficit in trade with OPEC (almost one-third in 1977 and 1980) thanks to the assets in their trade with the oil-importing developing countries.

There was also importance in the fact that the increase in the developing countries' exports was secured to a large extent thanks to products of processing industry, whose production, as already mentioned, was concentrated in a comparatively small group of countries. In addition, under the conditions of the general deterioration in the state of the economy of the capitalist world and the sharp exacerbation of competition the young states had to resort to an expansion of the extension of credit for exports, which also could not have failed to have led a deterioration in the state of their international payments.

In the latter half of the 1970's the excess of exports of processing industry products from the developed to the developing countries constituted $90-95 billion on an annual average, and machinery and equipment accounted for roughly $70-75 billion, furthermore. The excess, on the other hand, of supplies of food and raw material from the developing countries was only $23-25 billion. The oil-importing young states' proceeds from exports of raw material and agricultural commodities were insufficient to cover the cost of the equipment purchased on the capitalist market.

It must be mentioned that the sharp increase in the deficit in the developing countries' settlements both with the developed and the oil-exporting countries occurred at a time when the annual diversion of financial resources to pay off their foreign debt constituted approximately $50 billion dollars annually. It may therefore be considered that in the latter half of the 1970's the deepening imbalance in trade between the developing and industrially developed capitalist countries occurred simultaneously with an increase in the latter's exports of state and private capital, which in the period 1975-1978 alone increased from $40.4 billion to $69.7 billion. As a result the oil importers' total foreign debt had risen to $450 billion by the end of 1981, having increased by a factor of 4.2 compared with the 1973 level.

The net inflow of loan capital, which in 1973 constituted $11 billion, amounted to $62.7 billion in 1980, while long-term foreign loans increased from $11.4 billion to $48.1 billion.* In other words, in terms of its rate the inflow of

long-term capital lagged behind the growth of external borrowing as a whole in this period. Thus the amounts of these countries' short-term debt showed a trend toward a disproportionately rapid increase, while their financial position became increasingly worse. Whereas in the postwar period exports of American capital played a decisive part in the stabilization of the system of the international division of labor inherited from colonial times, under current conditions there is no analogous effect and the imbalance in the commodity flows between the developed capitalist and the overwhelming majority of developing countries continues to increase. The stabilizing significance of regional trade balances has declined also (see Table 5).

Table 5. Balance of Commodity Flows Between the Oil-Importing Developing Countries and the Main Economic Centers of the Capitalist World Following the Exacerbation of the Oil Crisis ($, millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oil-importing developing countries</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>EEC</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>OPEC</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African countries</td>
<td>+10.8</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asian countries</td>
<td>+7.2</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The distribution of the developing countries' current deficit in trade with the main centers of the capitalist world is of an even more uneven nature than in the preceding period. The American market is gradually adapting to considerable imports of various industrial products produced at lower cost in Southeast Asia or Latin America. As a consequence of large-scale purchases of raw material in Africa, given the limited nature of this continent's domestic market, which is, furthermore, traditionally connected with West Europe, the United States has a very considerable negative balance in trade with the African countries. However, the extensive trade expansion of Japan and the EEC countries competing with it practically entirely liquidated this advantage of the African states. As far as the Southeast Asian countries are concerned, the deficit in payments with the oil-exporting countries which arose there reduced to nothing their positive balance in trade with the United States and the EEC.

The developing countries hopes connected with the recycling of petrodollars also proved without foundation to a considerable extent. The structure of the recycled resources and the mechanism of their movement are such that in the period 1974–1980 approximately only 15 percent of the total sums of petrodollars distributed by the OPEC countries was accounted for by credits to the developing countries, a further 4.5 percent went to IMF and IBRD accounts, while the remaining 80 percent were returned to the United States, Britain and other industrially developed countries.* As consequence the recycling

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contributed primarily to the development of financial-economic relations between the industrially developed and oil-importing developing countries, easing the seriousness of the conflicts between them to a certain extent and forcing the latter to independently seek a way out of the difficult situation in which they found themselves. In the majority of cases their efforts were aimed at the maximum development of exports at any price, including here by way of new agreements with the MNC, and this led to a consolidation of their unequal position in the system of the international division of labor. As a whole, recycling contributed to maintaining the viability of the system, which is being undermined by the U.S. balance of payments deficit, the conflicts arising among the three centers of economic power (the United States, Japan and the EEC) and the decline in the solvency of the majority of the oil-importing developing countries.*

The increase in oil prices did not entail fundamental changes in the correlations of prices of other products of the developing and developed countries. However, the structural changes which they brought about in the capitalist economy are having far-reaching consequences for the position of all developing countries in the international division of labor. The new proportions in the prices for energy carriers and processing industry products are stimulating the growth of the technically advanced sectors, which are characterized by high capital-intensiveness. The development of nuclear power engineering and a whole number of petrochemical works and the accelerated development of the continental shelf are being reflected in a change in the cost structure of capitalist production as a whole. This is on the one hand reinforcing the developed countries' monopoly of the technically advanced sectors and, on the other, shifting nonequivalent exchange to a qualitatively new level, as it were. The correlation between the prices of processing industry products and food and raw material commodities unfavorable to the raw material and food exporters was gradually being restored by the start of the 1980's even. As a result, under the influence of the difficulties arising in the emergent states both in settlements with the industrial and the oil-exporting countries, they were forced yet again to put great emphasis on the development of their traditional exports, again "entering" the changing structure of capitalist reproduction as food and raw material producers.

This is affording the industrially developed countries an opportunity to build their economic strategy by proceeding from the international division of labor concept which is reminiscent more than anything of the "brave new world" of A. Huxley's pessimistic utopia. This plan has already been implemented partially: there is a hierarchy, at whose summit the United States counts on consolidating its hold, and a delineation of functions is under way among other big capitalist states, which has been reflected in the separation of their own "periphery," including South and North Europe. The countries of these regions are assigned an intermediate position in the world economic industrial complex and the role of main competitors of the emergent countries which have already

* It is fitting to cite in this connection an utterance of a politician of the Arab world—M. Mehdi—who said apropos recycling: "The irony of the situation is that at a time when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was asking the United States for $5 billion in military assistance, U.S. Secretary William Simon was traveling to the Arab countries and asking the Arabs to invest $10 billion in the U.S. economy in order that the United States might help Israel" (THE NEW YORK TIMES 1 October 1974).
moved ahead in the development of national processing industry. It is hoped in this way to ease somewhat the growing seriousness of the conflicts between the leading industrial and developing countries and impart to these conflicts a more concealed form.

For the developing countries this strategy of the imperialist powers and the MNC is connected from the viewpoint of their position in the international capitalist division of labor with distribution according to "castes". On top are the oil-producing countries, whose industrial complex is fully integrated with the economy of the leading industrial states and which would actually depend on the directions of its development and create a market for new technological sectors, whose relative significance in the production of the United States, Japan and the EEC is growing increasingly. Then the developing countries producing industrial products, whose lot is to provide the MNC with cheap manpower, frequently specializing either in operations which require lower skills or which are environmentally harmful. Finally, at the lower levels of the pyramid are the countries producing raw material and supplying agricultural products, which remain a living reminder of the international division of labor of the colonial period based on the "raw material-finished product" plan.

A common feature of the processes which have occurred in the system of the international capitalist division of labor throughout all three stages of the postwar period is their increasingly close dependence on domestic reproduction in the United States and the other industrially developed centers. The steps being taken by the developing countries to protect their interests are for the most part connected with counteracting this concrete manifestation of neocolonialism or the other. Particular significance is attached to the strengthening of the developing countries' economic relations with the socialist countries and also the extension of economic exchange between the developing countries themselves both within the confines of individual regions and on a broader basis. The principal objective obstacle in implementation of imperialism's economic strategy in the sphere of the formation of the international division of labor is its failure to correspond to the direction of the development of the developing countries' socioeconomic structures and the struggle of the peoples of these countries against imperialist policy and their endeavor to solve urgent socioeconomic problems on the paths of independent development.

It is in this plane that we should view the question of the role of the world socialist system in the transformation of the international division of labor. The powerful impact of socialism on the course of world history, the significance of the socioeconomic model of real socialism for social movements in Asian, African and Latin American countries and the socialist states' material assistance and support for the countries liberated from colonialism—all this is an important factor of world economic development. The position of the developing countries in an international division of labor entirely subordinate to the interests of the Western monopolies would signify for them a hopelessly conflicting situation, a sharp disturbance of the entire social balance and the rise and ultimately political and economic domination of newly engendered comprador groupings and their total integration with the MNC.
The changes in the system of the international division of labor in the direction of the creation of a new hierarchical structure is an expression of the objective process of the internationalization of production within the framework of the world capitalist system. They cannot remove the conflicts inherent in the capitalism of the era of its general crisis. On the contrary, it is in this sphere, where the reproduction cycles of the developing and industrially developed countries intersect and where they are brokered by world economic relations, that the internal contradictions of the capitalist economy are becoming even more acute. The ongoing transformation of the international division of labor is intensifying the confrontation of imperialism and the states which have been liberated from colonial oppression.

This same process is also leading to an exacerbation of interimperialist conflicts. The rigid control of the markets on the part of small groups of MNC is not creating new prerequisites for an expansion of economic regulation but complicating it even further, intensifying competition.

Economic strategy does not exist in isolation from international politics, and in an endeavor to underpin this strategy imperialism is taking the path of mobilizing all resources, including militarization and power politics. This is a serious manifestation of the crisis nature of the current transformation of the system of the international capitalist division of labor.

Real changes in this system will also be determined together with the interaction of national economic systems by the assertiveness of broad progressive movements and the struggle of the peoples for a genuine accomplishment of urgent socioeconomic tasks and against the imperialist policy of militarism and diktat.


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CSO: 1816/4
PROBLEMS FACING EEC VIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 107-133

[MEMO Roundtable: "Problems of West European Integration"; opening remarks by M. Maksimova]

[Excerpt] We have gathered at the round table to exchange opinions on the main results of the activity of the EEC. A quarter of a century has elapsed since it was founded. Essentially this is a very short time. But it has undoubtedly had a pronounced impact on the history of West European capitalism. Without a consideration of capitalist integration and its creation—the community—it is impossible either to understand or, even less, explain many phenomena and processes in the development of contemporary capitalism and the deepening of its general crisis.

I would like to emphasize first of all that in an analysis of such complex and contradictory phenomena as the Common Market Soviet international affairs experts possess a reliable theoretical basis—the Marxist-Leninist concept of integration. This concept is the fruit of many years of creative effort of scientific groups in our country and the fraternal socialist countries and the efforts of Soviet and foreign Marxists. It is based on Lenin's theory of imperialism and the conclusions and generalizations formulated in the material of congresses of the CPSU, the fraternal communist and worker parties and the international communist movement with respect to cardinal problems of contemporary world development. All this affords an opportunity to approach an evaluation of the economic and sociopolitical consequences and contradictions characteristic of the present stage of capitalist integration in West Europe from genuinely scientific Marxist-Leninist, class standpoints.

To speak of the principal proposition constituting the essence of the Marxist concept of integration, it briefly amounts to the following. Integration under capitalist conditions is a profoundly contradictory phenomenon. The basis thereof is the more general process of the rapprochement of national economies and the internationalization of economic life engendered by the objective requirements of the development of the production forces and the international division of labor and the requirements of the scientific-technical revolution. But the conditions of capitalism—private-monopoly and state-monopoly—put this process within a rigid framework and impart to it a crisis and, sometimes,
conflict nature. While contributing, given certain conditions, to the amalgamation and expansion of national markets, capitalist integration simultaneously leads to an intensification of the old and the appearance of new conflicts organically inherent in capitalism as a social system.

Integration groupings of the Common Market type serve the interests of the monopoly bourgeoisie, primarily the international concerns and trusts, and the interests of the ruling upper stratum of the corresponding group of states. Monopoly capital endeavors to rely on the integration associations for strategic purposes—for preserving its own positions in the face of the strengthening community of socialist states, the national liberation movement and the world revolutionary process. These groupings act as means of the monopolies' competitive struggle and rivalry among the three centers of power of contemporary imperialism.

We have deemed it necessary to recall these relatively well known Marxist propositions on integration precisely now, when a kind of result of EEC activity is being summed up. This appears to us all the more important in that the Common Market, as its leaders themselves also acknowledge, is experiencing the most protracted crisis in its history. A fair question is: how profound is this crisis? What are the singularities and main sources and causes? What is the future of the Common Market?

Such questions are not rhetoric. Raised with all seriousness by the entire course of the present economic and political development of West European capitalism, they serve as the subject of the acute ideological-theoretical and political disputes and debate of bourgeois scholars and politicians and statesmen in the West. While recognizing that the community has practically come to a halt in its development, bourgeois ideologists and politicians disagree, however, in the evaluation of its future.

Some of them see no way out of the situation at all, prophesying a sorry end to all in any way radical integration efforts. Others, however, are, on the contrary, not abandoning their attempts to revive the "idea of Europe" and restore to the EEC its former dynamism, putting their hopes, as before, in the Treaty of Rome, which is the legal foundation of the entire edifice of the community and a kind of political credo of its former and present leaders. Yet others are venturing to encroach on this "sanctum sanctorum," proposing the Treaty of Rome's replacement by a new status which would correspond to the changed conditions and be capable of initiating a "new generation" of West European integration.

In order to evaluate the present situation in the community let us turn to the retrospective. The development of integration was never rectilinear. Each step of the West European political leaders in the direction of the states' economic and political association has been taken with difficulties and at a price of enforced concessions and compromise and, sometimes, at a price of retreats from what had been achieved.

We recall 1 January 1958—the day the treaties on the creation of the EEC and Euratom took effect. It was regarded in the West as a kind of landmark opening a "new page" in the history of West Europe and a symbol of the victory of the idea of "European unity" over the disagreements and quarrels between states so
But we recall something else also. The supporters of the "idea of Europe" reached the creation of the EEC only after the big defeats which had marked the 1950's. The program of the creation of a European political community had failed. The plan for a European defense community collapsed also. And this despite the fact that by that time there was already certain experience of the creation of integration groupings* and, what is most important, despite the tremendous efforts of the ruling circles of a number of the main West European countries at that time.

Let us turn to the 1960's—the "golden age" in the community's history. It was in these years that the six original participants succeeding in implementing a number of far-reaching measures. A customs union was created, a uniform agricultural policy was introduced and the unified coal and steel market functioned actively. Large-scale joint programs were initiated in the sphere of nuclear research and a start was made on standardizing the participants' taxation, budgetary and currency-credit policy, coordination of the standards and rules regulating the activity of private companies and the migration of manpower, capital and services. Joint regional and other projects were implemented. Relying on the advantages of the Common Market, its leaders were able at this time to conclude to the benefit of the Six a series of trade agreements with a large number of capitalist and developing states. Taking advantage of the economic dependence of former colonies, the EEC authorities imposed on them the so-called "Eurafrica" agreement, which at that time represented the "latest word" in the policy of neocolonialism.

As a result private business and, particularly, the large-scale international monopolies discovered new possibilities for assimilating the markets of the partner-countries. Henceforward they regarded them as a sphere of their own interests, simultaneously obtaining impressive advantages in the competitive struggle on the world capitalist market.

There is another characteristic feature. Even at the time of its "prosperity" the community did not escape acute political crises. The first erupted in 1965-1966, when de Gaulle's France recalled its representative from the Common Market's highest body as a sign of protest against the FRC's intention of imposing a supranational path of this organization's development. The crisis revealed the profound conflicts between the main participants on the question of the very principles of the functioning of the "European Six". And this was not the sole crisis. It is sufficient to recall the history of Great Britain's entry, when its attempts ended in failure twice (in 1963 and 1967).

Nonetheless, these serious malfunctions had not then shaken the edifice of the community. As is known, the question of the entry of Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland was finally settled at the very start of the 1970's. The extension of EEC practices to them lent new impetus to integration and stimulated economic

* The Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union had been created in 1921, the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951.
exchange between the old and new participants to the direct benefit of the big concerns. The creation of a so-called free trade zone between the Common Market countries and a number of other West European states and a series of new trade agreements with various states and groups of states also corresponded to these goals.

But by the mid-1970's the stimulating effect of integration began to peter out. The community was in acute need of new, more powerful impetus capable of breathing a "second life" into it. This mission was earmarked for an economic and currency union, plans for the creation of which had been drawn up with feverish haste by various political figures over a number of years.*

This union was, in the intentions of its ideologists, to have crowned the EEC edifice. It was seen as a means if not of the solution, then of an easing of the tremendous difficulties and contradictions which the community countries had encountered in connection with the very grave economic crisis of the mid-1970's. Finally, it was believed that currency-economic union would automatically open the way to political union.

In what these efforts of the EEC leaders culminated is well known. The plans for economic union were not realized. The European currency union only appeared several years later, in 1979, in far from its original and in a heavily truncated form. As far as the transition to political union is concerned, there was, naturally, no automatism. Matters were limited to the creation of a few institutions for consultation, exchange of opinions and debate on problems of the Common Market and foreign policy (regular meetings of the heads of state and foreign ministers of the member-countries and sessions of the European Parliament).

A characteristic feature of the 1970's and, particularly, their latter half was thus the fact that there was a sharp diminution in the community in the scale of the integration measures themselves, their depth and scale and the effect of their influence on the economy of the participants. Submerged in routine disputes and discussions surrounding secondary technical issues, the governments proved incapable of implementing any large-scale plans or programs of an integration nature, as was the case in preceding years.

Relying, as before, on the "magic power" of the Common Market mechanism, its leaders did practically nothing either to seriously adjust it or, even less, radically reorganize it.

Yet is it well known that this mechanism was created under conditions appreciably different from those of today. It was a time then of favorable economic conditions, cheap raw material and energy, comparatively high employment and a comparatively stable international currency system. In the years that have elapsed the situation has, as is known, changed sharply. The West European countries have been confronted with such vitally important problems

* These included the "Barre Plan," the "Schiller Plan," the "Werner Plan" and the "Tindemans Plan".
as unprecedentedly profound cyclical and also structural crises, unparalleled inflation, an unprecedented scale of unemployment, major currency disorders and the growth of international protectionism.

To a greater extent than other capitalist states the countries of the community have encountered the negative consequences of global problems. There has been a sharp exacerbation of competitive struggle on the part of the United States and a rapidly strengthening Japan. Profound changes have occurred in relations between states of the two opposite social systems, between the developed capitalist and developing countries and in the world as a whole.

Entering the 1980's, the community has greeted its 25th anniversary without a constructive action program. It has displayed an incapacity for responding actively to the serious changes occurring in the participating countries, on the world capitalist market and in the international situation. And it is here, it would seem to us, that the crisis currently being experienced by the EEC is manifested.

What are the causes of the situation? What are the deep-lying factors which have essentially "fettered" the initiative of the leading bodies of the Common Market and impeded the processes of West European integration?

The first group of factors is connected, we believe, with the intrinsically contradictory nature of capitalist integration itself. The activity of the European Community contains an attempt to combine two mutually contradictory principles—freedom of competition and its limitation and the liberalization of economic exchange and its regulation. And to the extent that competition and the market, which remain the basis of monopoly capitalism, do not tolerate limits and limitations, so a constant cause of contradictions within the very mechanism of state-monopoly integration is maintained.

The creation of the Common Market stimulated mutual economic relations among the participants. But the effect of the removal of a number of barriers in reciprocal trade operated only up to a certain limit. This limit arrived as soon as the state of the capitalist economy changed. Under the conditions of profound economic recessions the common market turned from being a stimulator of economic development to a conduit of such negative phenomena inherent in capitalism as increased inflation, currency instability, the growth of balance of payments deficits and so forth. The negative effect of the EEC grew as the synchronism of the phases of the member-countries' cyclical development increased. The crisis of the mid-1970's and the start of the 1980's confirmed this convincingly.

The leaders of the Common Market attempted to find a way out of the situation, and not without reason, on the paths of the closer coordination of national economic policy in various spheres of economic life. At the same time, however, under the conditions of increased economic and social instability in the community there was a strengthening of centrifugal tendencies, which was expressed in the endeavor of the governments of each country to tackle primarily their own problems, often to the detriment of the interests of their partners.
Further, with its inherently protectionist nature the Common Market reliably protected many sectors of the participants' industry (primarily the ferrous metallurgy, chemical and textile sectors) against outside competition. But in time all this led to the conservation of obsolete structures of their national economy. Now, when the world is on the threshold of a new stage of the scientific-technical revolution and when the industrially developed countries are confronted in full measure with the question of the creation of new sectors and types of production and an appreciable modernization of the old sectors on a fundamentally new technical basis, the EEC protectionism has largely proven to be an impediment in the way of the structural reorganization of the participating countries' economies.

An important component of the community's activity is the creation of a so-called common pool of manpower and the removal of a number of barriers in the way of international migration of the population. West European monopoly capital has derived much additional profit from the exploitation of cheap foreign manpower. But now, when the army of unemployed in the EEC countries is over 11 million, the said measures are merely exacerbating the already tense social situation in the region.

Consequently, everything that constituted the essence of the Treaty of Rome and its philosophy has been seriously shaken by the pressure of the changes that have occurred. Capitalism itself, with its economic crises and social instability, imposes perfectly definite limits on the development of integration.

Another group of factors closely connected with the first is to be found in the specifics of state-monopoly trends. The governments of the community's countries were able to implement a number of state-monopoly measures in the sphere of coordination of national economic policy and the formulation of concerted actions only in the fields where and to the extent that it was possible to reach mutual compromise. This possibility has diminished sharply under current conditions. Because in a crisis situation no government of a participating country wishes to or can forgo "national" interests and channels the main efforts into the solution of its own most acute problems, without regard for the interests of its partners. Because the policy once adopted by the community of an enlargement of the number of participants, mainly for political purposes, has sharply impeded the whole decision-making process in this organization's leading bodies. And because, as already mentioned, there has been an immeasurable complication of the very nature and an increase in the scale of the problems needing to be solved which have confronted the EEC.

The need for a profound structural reorganization of the economy, the development of fundamentally new technologies, processes and materials, savings of energy and the creation of alternative sources thereof, reorganization of the foundations of agricultural policy and so forth—all these new problems have arisen under conditions where a low rate of economic development, profound currency-finance contradictions and growing social tension continue in the countries of the community.

Finally, and this is what is most important, the incapacity of the leaders of the Common Market to effect joint actions is a direct reflection and integral part of the crisis of state-monopoly capitalism. The ruling circles of the Western countries are persistently seeking a way out of the crisis. But in
different directions. Some, like the M. Thatcher government, for example, by following the so-called monetarist doctrine, others, like the F. Mitterand government, by strengthening state control. The different priorities and specific goals and, sometimes, methods of state-monopoly regulation on the EEC countries have all seriously complicated the processes of West European integration.

A third group of factors emanates from the community's mutual relations with the outside world. The point being that the development of an integration grouping is determined not only by its internal dynamics but also by its capacity for resisting the negative influences of the external environment and making a constructive contribution to the solution of urgent international problems. Here also we observe a highly contradictory picture.

West Europe, like the world as a whole, is to a certain extent experiencing a critical period. The international situation has deteriorated. There has been an intensification of the struggle of the two opposite trends and two courses in world politics: the course toward the peaceful coexistence of the states of the two systems and dependable security, which is actively pursued by the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries and extensively supported by the world's progressive public, and the course toward disruption of the policy of detente, a deterioration in relations with the socialist countries and the arms race, which is being pursued by the reactionary forces of imperialism, primarily the ruling circles of the United States.

The struggle of these two trends permeates the entire fabric of international relations. It is also directly reflected in West Europe's mutual relations with other states, primarily the United States of America. These two regions of the capitalist world are connected, as is known, by the close intertwining of capital, the growing interdependence of economic development and allied commitments. At the same time, however, never before in postwar history have American-West European conflicts been so acute as today.

In its ambitious endeavor to restore its past role of leader in the capitalist world and dictate its procedures the U.S. Administration is engaged in actions which are directly detrimental to the economic and political interests of the West European countries. The American policy of high interest rates has delayed the process of their extrication from the present already protracted economic crisis and intensified this crisis, having caused a massive outflow of West European capital across the ocean, and complicated the social situation.

The Reagan administration is putting unprecedented political pressure on its West European allies. It is endeavoring to involve them as deeply as possible in the process of the arms race and international local conflicts, persistently urging them on to the path of confrontation with the socialist countries and imposing the notorious policy of "sanctions" in respect of the USSR and Poland.

The danger of this course for West Europe is obvious. It not only entails an ever increasing burden of military expenditure undermining the very foundations of the West European economy and not only makes a solution of the most acute social problems here more difficult but represents a real threat to peace and international security. And it is perfectly legitimate that the peoples of West Europe are responding to this with a powerful antiwar movement which is unprecedented in scale and intensity.
All this has undoubtedly placed the community under new conditions. Its leaders will have to look for answers to the most acute international problems affecting the vital interests of the West European countries and their mutual relations not only with their overseas ally but also with the socialist countries and with the main group of developing states.

In this situation the ruling circles of the EEC countries are attempting to proceed along the path of coordination of foreign policies and the formulation of a common position with respect to the most acute international issues. However, in real life such attempts frequently encounter disagreements within the community, primarily among its main participants—France, Britain and the FRG. Many differences in their foreign policy interests are at the basis of their disagreements and the main one is the intensifying struggle in these countries' ruling circles between the realistic representatives and the reactionary forces.

Such, we believe, in most general outline are the economic and political factors predetermining the singularity of the crisis situation being experienced by the EEC.

In evaluating the prospects of West European integration we are not disposed to share the viewpoint of those economists who say that the EEC will not survive the burden of difficulties and conflicts. It is more legitimate to put another question: in which direction will it develop? Will it be able in the foreseeable future to develop integration "in depth," along the path of the creation of an economic union, or will it hold at what has been achieved and confine itself to regulation of current problems and extension of the common market mechanism which exists currently to new countries?

Something else is no less important—the role which the EEC will perform in the solution of international problems. It is primarily a question of such cardinal questions of the present day as normalization of the international situation, an easing of tension, removal of the threat of war and the expansion of all-European and international cooperation. The constructive position of the leading grouping in West Europe on these issues could make a real contribution to their positive solution.

BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 144-145

[V. Kortunov book* review: "Uncompromising Struggle"]

[Text] The transition from capitalism to socialism as the main content of the modern era in the spiritual life of mankind is reflected primarily in the struggle of the bourgeois and socialist ideologies. This struggle encompasses all spheres of social consciousness and affects all the major phenomena of our time—from general problems of a world-outlook nature through entirely concrete questions of present-day domestic and foreign policy. Its scale and seriousness grow increasingly from year to year.

"It may be said that in our day THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA has acquired a new dimension, as it were, and HAS BECOME A LEADING SPHERE OF THE CONFRONTATION OF THE TWO SYSTEMS AND THE STRUGGLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING CLASS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL AND ALL THE FORCES OF PEACE AND DEMOCRACY AGAINST IMPERIALISM AND REACTION" [Boldface type] (p 6). This proposition reveals the main content of the monograph in question, which presents a broad, multi-aspectual panorama of the ideological struggle in the modern world. A characteristic singularity of the book is the comprehensive approach to an analysis of the ideological confrontation between socialism and capitalism and the authors' endeavor to embrace all its main aspects and reveal the general regularities and also specific singularities in the most important regions of the world.

On the basis of material of the 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU congresses and a large number of Soviet and foreign sources, many of which have been used for the first time in national literature, the work analyzes a very broad spectrum of bourgeois ideological currents and provides a comprehensive critique of the rightwing-radical, conservative, liberal, leftwing-radical, reformist and revisionist interpretations of the most important problems of international relations, primarily the question of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and a relaxation of international tension—a most important aspect of the ideological struggle at the current state of world history.

The book provides a cogent critique both of the bourgeois concepts of detente linking this process with illusory plans for exerting pressure on the socialist countries and ideological penetration and interference in their internal affairs and the views of the most aggressive circles of the monopoly bourgeoisie rejecting detente as a "one-way street" and endeavoring to break up to its benefit the military-strategic balance which has taken shape in the world.

The monograph examines the main features of the profound crisis being experienced by bourgeois ideology, an expression of which is the constant devaluation of its once fashionable ideological concepts like "state of universal prosperity," "mass consumer society," "single industrial society" and so forth. The authors show that none of them withstands the confrontation with real life and that they reveal their theoretical baselessness in one way or the other, lose their force and are hastily replaced in imperialism's ideological arsenal by new and the "most recent" concepts, which, in turn, are again consumed in the fire of reality. On the other hand, an obvious manifestation of the crisis of the bourgeois philosophy of life is the ideological mimicry to which Western theorists resort. It is a question, in particular, of the tactics of intercepting the slogans of their ideological opponents for the purpose of embellishing capitalism and artificially endowing it with the features typical of the socialist society.

Many bourgeois theorists recognize the shortage of positive ideas which they could counterpose to Marxism-Leninism and the practice of real socialism. Whence their vain appeals for the advancement of new concepts which would be more attractive to the masses. "But," as the monograph rightly emphasizes, "the monopoly bourgeoisie does not have and cannot have such ideas. And it is not a question here of the capabilities and talents of its ideologists but of the fact that the monopolies' goals are in irreconcilable conflict with the objective requirements of social development and the interests of the people's masses" (pp 221-222).

The authors convincingly reveal the fundamental contrast of the two approaches in an understanding of the correlation of the ideological struggle and foreign economic policy of states with different social systems. The socialist countries consistently advocate the extensive and diverse cooperation of all states on the basis of the principle of equality and mutual benefit. The political leaders and ideologists of imperialism regard international economic relations as a means of pressure on the socialist countries for winning ideological and political concessions from them. The work exposes the hopelessness of such pretensions and their economic baselessness from the viewpoint of the state interests of the capitalist countries themselves and also the groundlessness of attendant ideological speculation.

Examining the struggle of the developing states against the unjust system of international economic relations which has been imposed by imperialism, the authors concentrate attention on exposing the bourgeois falsifications of the attitude of the USSR and other socialist countries toward the young states.
The portrayal of the ideological struggle surrounding the problem of the scientific-technical revolution is connected in the book with a criticism of "technological determinism" and a characterization of the influence of the scientific-technical revolution on the social consciousness in the bourgeois countries and the ideological concepts of their ruling circles. Of undoubted interest in this connection is the section devoted to the influence of the development of science and technology on the mass communications media and the struggle for a "new information order," the more so that the significance of these problems is growing.

The ideological confrontation of the two sociopolitical systems is analyzed in the work not only at the global but also the regional level. It has to be mentioned, however, that the ideological situation in different regions is not reflected equally amply by the authors, although the special attention to the European region seems justified. The latter has become the center of the struggle of the opposite trends in questions of war and peace and the obdurate confrontation of the peace-loving forces championing the gains of detente and supporting disarmament and security and cooperation on a concerted good-neighborly basis and those who in making material preparations for war are bringing Europe and the world to the brink of catastrophe. There is great significance, we read in the book, in the fact that it was here, thanks to the political weight of real socialism and in spite of the efforts of the enemies of detente, that an appreciable advance along the path of security and cooperation was achieved in the 1970's (p 110).

It is well known that there has been a pronounced exacerbation of the situation on the continent in recent years and that new trends dangerous to the cause of peace have appeared. Thus under the influence of U.S. imperialism part of the ruling circles of the West European countries has proceeded along a path leading to increased confrontation with the socialist states and has turned toward antidetente. At the same time the policy dangerous to the cause of peace has given rise to a powerful upsurge of the mass antiwar movement in West Europe, where an increasingly active coalition of public-political forces demanding removal of the threat of nuclear war is taking shape. The authors examine the singularities of this movement at the current stage and its driving forces and ideological reference points.

Revealing the unending struggle of the two opposite ideologies through the prism of international relations, the work in question persuades us yet again that there are no nor can there be compromises therein. The work, which has been written by prominent Soviet social scientists, will, we hope, be greeted with interest by international affairs specialists and broad circles of lecturers and propagandists.


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BOOK ON HISTORY OF SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 146-147

[V. Umnov book* review: "Good-Neighborliness, Cooperation, Solidarity"]

[Text] Soviet historians and economists, beginning with the founder of Soviet Afghan studies, I.M. Reysner, have done much to illustrate the traditional friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. But there has not hitherto been a work which traced the history of their mutual relations in all its diversity. The monograph under review fills this gap; the relations of the Soviet state and Afghanistan are for the first time examined comprehensively.

Relying on the works of V.I. Lenin, CPSU and Soviet Government papers and the texts of Soviet-Afghan treaties and agreements, the author traces against a broad background of international events and in close connection with them the coming into being and development of Soviet-Afghan relations from 1919 through our day.

There is no doubt about the timeliness of the appearance of the work: since the 1978 April revolution Soviet-Afghan relations have been the subject of the most acute diplomatic, political and ideological struggle in the international arena and for this reason require particularly in-depth scientific analysis.

"A treaty unknown to history"—this is what the book calls the treaty between the RSFSR and Afghanistan of 28 February 1921. This was the first agreement in international practice in accordance with which a great power undertook to render an oriental state defending its national independence military-economic and other assistance. Based on the principles of genuine equality and mutual respect, principles which subsequently became generally recognized standards of mutual relations between states with different socioeconomic systems and were enshrined in the UN Charter and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, this treaty holds good today also.

The book consistently traces the development of economic cooperation between the two neighboring countries—from individual acts of disinterested financial and technical assistance in the first years of Soviet power to the present diverse economic and scientific-technical cooperation on the firm basis of long-term agreements embracing practically all the most important spheres of the national economy.

On the basis of specific examples the author shows that, as distinct from imperialist states, the Soviet Union has exerted great efforts to contribute to the development of Afghan industry and the training of skilled national personnel. Mutually profitable cooperation has strengthened and continues to strengthen the positions of the partner-countries in economic relations with the capitalist countries.

There is particularly close study of the 1978 April revolution, which, as L.I. Brezhnev observed, "abruptly changed Afghanistan's centuries-old history. And there is nothing surprising in the fact that under such conditions the traditional good relations between our countries have acquired, I would say, a qualitatively new character. This is now not simply good-neighborliness but profound, sincere and firm friendship imbued with a spirit of comradeship and revolutionary solidarity."

The book's final sections are devoted to Soviet-Afghan relations under the conditions of the undeclared war against the Afghan people which has been unleashed by the forces of international imperialism. The all-around analysis of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Treaty, which was signed on 5 December 1978, reveals the international-law aspects of the bilateral relations, which are strengthening from day to day on the basis of the principles enshrined in this treaty: complete equality, mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

The numerous facts adduced in the book convincingly testify that the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) are true to the commitments they have assumed in accordance with the treaty and are firmly following a policy of strengthening friendship, good-neighborliness and cooperation.

The author's comparison of the positions of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan on the most important international problems proves irrefutably that the two friendly neighboring states are consistently and unswervingly defending the cause of peace. The DRA invariably supports the peace-loving Soviet initiatives aimed at preventing nuclear catastrophe and curbing the arms race. For its part, the Soviet Union pays tribute to the efforts of the DRA, which is making its contribution within the framework of the nonaligned movement to the peoples' struggle against imperialism and colonialism and for peace and the relaxation of international tension.

The book emphasizes that relations between the USSR and the DRA have stood the test of time and graphically demonstrate the permanent part being played by the alliance of the forces of socialism and the national liberation movement in the world revolutionary process.

L. Teplinskiy's new work is a notable contribution to the scientific development of an important and topical problem.


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BOOK ATTACKING BOURGEOIS THEORIES OF WAR REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 147-148

[A. Ryabov book review: "Against the Apologists of War"]

[Text] The problem of war and peace in the modern era excites all mankind. As L.I. Brezhnev emphasized from the tribune of the 26th CPSU Congress, "there is now no more essential, more important question for any people than the preservation of peace and securing each person's primary right--the right to life."

The book in question is devoted to a critical analysis of the broad spectrum of "arguments" of modern bourgeois ideologists attempting to substantiate the inevitability of wars, including a world nuclear catastrophe. Irrationalism and mysticism, neo-Freudianism and social ethology, social Darwinism and reactionary clericalism, neo-Malthusianism and geopolitics and fascism and revanchism in combination with bellicose anticomunism and the defense of crude force--such are merely certain aspects of the ideology of imperialism which the authors with complete justification call the "philosophy of aggression" (p 16).

The monograph observes that the more refined versions of the proof of the inevitability of wars, cruelty and violence emanate from the comparatively young "shoots" of the bourgeois philosophy of life in the shape of neo-Freudianism and social ethology, which are in principle in no way different from the rectilinear judgments and conclusions of "classical" orthodox social Darwinism. Its representatives derive their arguments from the long discredited concept of the identity of biological and social regularities. In an evaluation of the prospects of the preservation of peace they are all unanimous in their world-outlook pessimism and prediction of an apocalyptic end to human history.

A critical examination of the views and concepts of a relatively influential group of bourgeois experts which in its comprehension of man's "aggressive nature" occupies an intermediate position, as it were, between neo-Freudianism

and social ethology is assigned an important place in the book. Revealing their scientific groundlessness, the authors of the work correctly emphasize that despite all the outwardly scientific, more precisely, pseudoscientific respectability, the ideas of the representatives of neo-Freudianism, social ethology and various modifications of these currents suffer from a single fundamental defect: an incomprehension of man's social essence and the fundamental irreducibility of this essence to a sum of factors of a biological and psychological nature (p 33).

Analyzing the views of a large group of bourgeois ideologists who regard war as a "universal law of nature and society," V. Zamkovoy and M. Filatov concentrate attention on the theoretical groundlessness of the concepts of the apologists of "peace from a position of strength" and the "nuclear deterrence and preventive war" doctrine constructed on the basis thereof. They rely in their critical evaluation of these concepts on a developed exposition of the Marxist-Leninist comprehension of the role of force and "violent means" in the development of human society. The monograph observes, in part: "Under the conditions where mankind is threatened by nuclear catastrophe what is needed to prevent it is not a sophisticated search for increasingly new modifications in the use of force but the mobilization of all man's material and spiritual resources and their purposeful use against the threat of war" (p 84).

The gamble on nuclear weapons as the "main means of preserving peace" is essentially an attempt to justify the arms race policy being pursued by the ruling circles of the imperialist powers to the benefit of the monopolies controlling the production of arms and deriving colossal profits from this business. On the basis of an analysis of the vast amount of literature which has appeared in the United States, Britain, the FRG and other capitalist countries the authors familiarize the reader with the prevailing ideas of bourgeois ideologists and military theorists on the nature of nuclear war and its consequences for mankind, expose the danger of the militarists' indications of the possibility of winning a war involving the use of weapons of mass destruction and show the senselessness and utter futility of such plans. The book critically examines the ideological prerequisites of the global strategy of American imperialism and provides a critique of modern militarist ideology in the FRG; the reader's attention is drawn, in particular, to the attempts at the revival and ideological-political rehabilitation in West Germany of geopolitical and neo-Malthusian doctrines and the strengthening there of the connection between nationalism and a dangerous growth of revanchist trends.

Many philosophers, sociologists and military theorists in the West have been raising the question increasingly often and insistently recently of the limits to the possibilities of resolving this political problem or the other by way of war and of whether nuclear war may be an instrument of policy and whether it is legitimate in this respect to speak of nuclear war as a continuation of policy.

In answering this question the book's authors believe that the appearance of nuclear weapons accompanied by the continuous growth in their might, their increased delivery speed and the sophistication of combat equipment has led to the point where in a certain sense they have come to be a denial of themselves
and at the same time of nuclear war as a method of resolving this political problem or the other. The destructive power of nuclear weapons has now reached a limit whereat its further growth loses, many experts believe, any real meaning. Even now the big nuclear powers have the possibility, in the event of war, of inflicting on each other such devastation that "in the light of this prospect the senselessness of attempts to resolve the political conflicts between them by way of the use of military force becomes perfectly obvious" (p 270).

We can agree with the point, the authors write, that nuclear war is not a continuation of policy in the sense that it cannot help resolve the conflicts of the modern world. On a planet of people there is no contentious problem which would justify the use of nuclear weapons, but, as V. Zamkovoy and M. Filatov emphasize, "this by no means signifies that war has changed its socioeconomic and political nature. This in no way means that war has essentially ceased to be a continuation and instrument of policy" (p 275). Many bourgeois theorists, the book observes, readily state the existence in the world of "nuclear deadlock" or "military stalemate" conditioned by the balance of nuclear forces of the USSR and the United States, but none of them wants to admit that the state of international relations which has evolved today is a direct result of the bankruptcy of the aggressive foreign policy of imperialism.

Certain bourgeois experts adhere to the viewpoint that the very fact of "nuclear deadlock" rules out any active policy and fetters the activity and maneuverability of the great powers. Reality, however, refutes this conclusion. Noting that an intensive economic, political and ideological struggle between the forces of peace, progress and socialism on the one hand and the forces of imperialism and reaction on the other is under way in the world, the authors of the monograph in question dwell particularly—and this is its undoubted merit—on an analysis of the imperialist "strategy of indirect action," a principal theorist of which is the well-known British expert Liddell Hart. "This variety of strategy," the work observes, "is currently gaining recognition and popularity among the most reactionary and radical representatives of anticomunism, who under the conditions of nuclear 'balance' are seeking forms and methods of undermining and weakening the might of the socialist countries as much as possible without resorting to nuclear weapons" (p 289).

Under the conditions where mankind is threatened by a world nuclear catastrophe a critical analysis of the "works" and views of bourgeois authors acting as the apologists of war and attempting thereby to create an ideological screen for aggressors is of particular significance. It is this which is reason to consider V. Zamkovoy's and M. Filatov's book a useful study. It will help a broad circle of readers in the search for cogent answers to urgent questions of such an important sphere of the ideological struggle as the problems of war and peace.


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