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GOVERNMENT TO CLOSE EAST TIMOR 'PENAL ISLAND'

Bangkok THE NATION in English 5 Sep 86 p 13

[Article by Bill Tarrant]

[Text]

ATAURO ISLAND, East Timor — A notorious chapter of East Timor's often bitter history will close at the end of this year when rebels fighting for independence from Indonesia are no longer detained on the Island of Atauro.

Only 886 men, women and children remain of the 5,732 who were forcibly shifted to this hilly equatorial island south of the fabled 'spice islands' in the Moluccas from 1981 to 1984.

Indonesia has been releasing large numbers of detainees over the past two years because it believes the separatist movement on the main island of Timor is under control.

It says the rest will be relocated by the end of this year. But diplomats have greeted the promise cautiously, noting that the government had earlier promised to release all detainees by the end of last year.

The detainees were suspected of having ties with Fretelin, the leftist revolutionary front for an independent East Timor, which has been fighting Indonesian rule since President Suharto annexed the former Portuguese colony a decade ago.

London-based Amnesty International says the detainees are political prisoners held without trial.

In a report last year, the human rights group said conditions were deplorable when the first detainees arrived in 1981. Hunger and disease were widespread, they said.

Indonesia has also been bringing to trial hundreds of political prisoners who have languished for years in Comarca Prison in Dili, the capital of East Timor. About 110 still await court dates.

East Timor's Government Mario Viegas Carrascalao bristles at the term political prisoners.

He told Reuters Atauro was 'a temporary resettlement area. They are not political prisoners. They were taken from their homes for helping the rebels.'

The Timorese governor admits to being slightly sensitive about the subject of Atauro Island. His father was banished to Portugal's former penal colony on Atauro for writing critical articles about the Salazar regime in the 1920s.

Carrascalao said conditions on the island were tough at first because its arid soil and poor water supply could not support a doubling of the island's native population of 5,000.

Within a year, the International Committee for the Red Cross had begun sending emergency food and medical supplies to the island. That first year, according to government statistics, 176 detainees died.

Conditions seem far from deplorable today. There are five elementary schools, a newly-built junior high school and a health centre with a Red Cross nurse.

The detainees mix freely with the island's 5,500 permanent residents, and fish with them in Dili Bay. Some live in long wooden dormitories, others in the traditional thatch huts found in most East Timorese villages.

The island seems lightly guarded with just 12 Indonesian soldiers and 10 Timorese policemen, who say peace is only disturbed when someone drinks too much homemade palm brandy.

The soldiers have already laid a football field and are working on a tennis court.

"You're not talking about a concentration camp," said one Western diplomat based in Jakarta who has visited the island.

"Conditions there are better than in some of the villages on the main island," he said.

About 160 of the detainees apparently agree because they have opted to settle on the island rather than return to an uncertain future in their home villages, Carrascalao said.

Dili has set aside one million dollars this year to develop Atauro. A harbour and ferry are planned to link Atauro with the capital, some 45 km (28 miles) away. A mountain reservoir is also in the budget and Jakarta has promised a television relay station.

Carrascalao said he wants to rid Atauro of the bad image it has acquired as a penal island under both Portuguese and Indonesian rule.

"I hope in five years time Atauro will be completely developed as a weekend resort for Dili," he said. — Reuters
BRIEFS

SOLDIERS SMUGGLING COFFEE TO THAILAND—A DAO SIAM reporter in Ubon Ratchathani Province reported that Police Col Chatraphon Khatchoknophat, the superintendent of the Zone 3 Border Patrol Police in Unbon Ratchathani, learned that a smuggler was planning to enter Thailand at Ban Pak Saeng, Phalan Subdistrict, Khemarat District, Ubon Ratchathani Province. He ordered Police Lt Col Yongyut Muniwong, the deputy superintendent, and Police Sublieutenant Bunsong Phimon, the leader of BPP Platoon 332, to take seven officials and set a trap beginning at 2000 hours on 30 July 1986. At 0400 hours on 31 July, the police officials hidden there saw a gray Isuzu truck, license No N7541 Ubon Ratchathani, drive out of the village and turn onto the Khemarat-Khong Chiam Highway. They intercepted the truck and found three gunny sacks filled with coffee seed. The sacks weighed approximately 300 kg. They also found forest products and python, tiger, and deer skins valued at 100,000 baht. The driver was identified as Mr Kan Thikha, age 48, who lives in Ban Pak Saeng, Phalan Subdistrict. He confessed that he had purchased the items from Lao soldiers. They had met in the middle of the Mekong River. He was on his way to sell them to another merchant when he was arrested. The suspect and evidence were turned over to investigation officials at the Ubon Ratchathani provincial police station in Khemarat District for further handling of the case. [Excerpt] [Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 1 Aug 86 pp 1, 16] 11943

CSO: 4207/326
LANGE SAYS DEFENSE TALKS WITH AUSTRALIA 'INEVITABLE'

Wellington THE EVENING POST in English 12 August 86 p 5

[Article by Tony Garnier]

[Text] Defence talks between Australia and New Zealand are inevitable in the near future, Prime Minister David Lange said yesterday.

Speaking on the possible shape of post-Anzus defence relationships, Mr Lange said talks were "inevitable" after New Zealand's defence review. The review is due to be published shortly, the POST understands.

On the eve of the expected U.S.-Australia announcement of its reshaped defence ties, Mr Lange said he expected the Anzus Treaty to remain unaltered, despite the United States initiatives. He then expected the U.S. and Australia to say they were working together under Anzus, and New Zealand and Australia would say they were working together in defence terms, "but without referring to the word Anzus."

Mr Lange said he envisaged "an easy relationship," with the U.S. but it would not be close in defence terms.

CSO: 4200/1438
ACADEMIC BLASTS AUSTRALIA OVER CAMBODIA STANCE

Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA in Thai 3 Aug 86 pp 22, 23

[Article by Professor Khian Thirawit, the director of the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University: "Thailand and the Fate of Cambodia: the Role of Australia in Solving the Cambodian Problem"]

[Excerpts] As of July 1986, it has been 7 years 6 months since Vietnam toppled the government of Democratic Kampuchea and occupied the country. On the battlefield, Vietnamese troops are still engaged in a guerrilla war. On the world political stage, the United Nations continues to condemn Vietnam for invading Cambodia. Almost all of the Western countries have stopped giving economic aid to Vietnam. The struggle on the battlefield has expanded to diplomatic and academic circles.

I received an invitation from the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to participate in a conference at Griffith University during the period 30 June to 2 July in order to discuss ways to solve the Cambodian problem.

During the 3-day conference, I noted that Australian and American scholars, who claim to be experts on Indochina or who have degrees in that field, actually know very little about the Cambodian problem. Almost all of them said that Thailand is Vietnam's enemy and that Thailand is obstinately refusing to negotiate with Vietnam. They said that the root of the problem is Pol Pot and that the problem will disappear if Pol Pot and his faction are eliminated. Thailand is helping the Cambodian resistance groups, and this could result in Vietnam attacking Thailand. China poses a greater danger than Vietnam. They said that Vietnam has already won or is on the verge of winning the Cambodian war.

These people were sure that they were right. The three American scholars were not experts on Indochina, but they had probably read 5-10 books on the subject and so felt that they had a good knowledge of the subject. The Japanese and ASEAN scholars acted better. If they didn't know something, they didn't say anything. They didn't act as if they knew more than everyone else.
The Role of Australia in Solving the Cambodian Problem

Australia has many problems. The Liberal-Country government supported ASEAN's policy on solving the Cambodian problem. But the present Labor Party government wants to be friends with both Vietnam and ASEAN. Australia's leader knows very little about the Cambodian problem and has to rely on university scholars and data provided by his Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Labor Party government cannot separate international diplomacy from human rights affairs. As a result, diplomacy is a jumble. This conference on solving the Cambodian problem just increased the confusion. Because those attending the conference didn't know who was hosting the conference, Griffith University or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that paid for the transportation of the scholars from seven countries (the United States, Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia, the host country). But it's difficult to say who paid for the other expenses and who managed things. No one explained what the purpose was or who had formulated the objectives.

Several days before the conference, Mr Bill Hayden, the minister of foreign affairs, said that an international criminal court should be established to try Pol Pot. And at the conference, the group of Mr Ben Kiernon tried three times to have the conference pass a resolution on this. But this was defeated by the ASEAN group each time. Thus, the ASEAN group suspected that there was some ulterior purpose behind this conference.

During the first day and the afternoon of the final day of the conference, those attending met in general conference. The remaining time was spent in section meetings. Each of the three sections had one representative. The others who attended the sectional meetings were observers, who slightly outnumbered the conference. Most of the observers were foreign affairs officials and scholars on Indochina. They had about the same right to speak as the conference.

The sectional meeting that I attended was probably the most lively. Mr Ben Kiernon, Vietnam's mouthpiece, represented Australia. There were two professors who were interested in Indochina and a foreign affairs official. They all said the same thing. I was impressed by how "efficient" their educational system is in producing experts who all think alike. They had probably read the works of four or five university scholars and believed everything that they had read. It's no wonder that Mr Bill Hayden believes them, too.

The ASEAN representatives got along well together. The Japanese were all polite. They agreed with ASEAN and said humorously that Japan was ASEAN's insurance. An American scholar in the field of international relations knew very little about Indochina. Initially, he took the Australian position. But later on he sided with ASEAN and didn't say much.

Summarizing the results of the first day, a foreign affairs official and his team presented a conference report that took the Australian position. ASEAN refused to accept the report and so they had to throw it away. The general
summary was a resolution by the ASEAN representatives, who were in the majority. This was drafted by Mr Lao Teksun, an associate professor at the University of Singapore and a member of parliament in Singapore.

The ASEAN group may have won at the conference, but no one knows whether we influenced the views of the Australians in any way. The problem was that no one there was interested in learning. Everyone just wanted to change the views of everyone else. This was probably just a waste of time.

In my view, many (but not all) of the Australian and American scholars can be called academic imperialists. That is, they think that they know everything. Everyone else refers to "Cambodia" as Kampuchea. But they insist that it should be called Cambodia, the name given by the French imperialists. These people want to set up a court to try Pol Pot. They want to hang him. Why don't they let the Cambodian people make the decision? They don't agree that the Cambodian people would reject Pol Pot if a free election were held. They are misguided patriots. If academic imperialism spreads, we will be in trouble. They will decide everything for us.

11943
CSO: 4207/311
ACADEMIC ARGUES FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF POL POT

Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA in Thai 17 Aug 86 pp 16, 17

[Article by Dr Khian Thirawit, the director of the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University: "Thailand and the Fate of Cambodia: The Cause of the Cambodian Problem"

[Excerpt] The reason why Vietnam used the evil behavior of Pol Pot as an excuse to invade and occupy Cambodia was that the Pol Pot government had such a bad reputation. The mass media in the United States and the Soviet Union helped Vietnam spread terrible reports about what was happening in Cambodia. Naturally, human rights activists and those who are pro-Vietnam all protested loudly.

What is detestable is that people who had once written books or articles praising Democratic Kampuchea suddenly began attacking Pol Pot in accord with Vietnam's mouthpiece following the open split between Vietnam and the Pol Pot government in 1977. They did not mention Vietnam's role in the barbaric assassinations that took place in Cambodia. Instead, they disseminated pictures of skulls and bones produced by Vietnamese officials. Vietnam is very clever at fooling the people of the world. They are calling on people to help them eliminate Pol Pot and his followers before they will withdraw their forces from Cambodia.

Eliminating Pol Pot and His Followers

At a conference held at Griffith University [in Australia], several people said that Pol Pol is at the root of the Cambodian problem. Thus, they recommended that Pol Pot and his followers be eliminated by sending them to China, forbidding them from participating in the negotiations to solve the Cambodian problem, and preventing them from taking part in an election should one be held. This is the same demand that Hanoi is making. Besides being groundless and distorted, this is also impossible. Thailand will suffer greatly if it makes a mistake.

First, even if Thailand could eliminate Pol Pot and his followers, it should not do so. Vietnam is not afraid of reasons. It fears power. And the power
that Vietnam now fears in Cambodia is the Pol Pot group. If the Pol Pot group is eliminated, there is no need for Vietnam to negotiate. There is no one else to fear.

Second, Vietnam cannot eliminate the Pol Pot group by itself. It wants Thailand and China to help. If Thailand and China are fooled and allow Vietnam to use them as tools, Pol Pot and his men may be assassinated while traveling in one of these countries. Vietnam used an underling to assassinate Malcome Colwell, an Englishman, and then spread propaganda to the effect that it was Pol Pot who had ordered the killing. After they do something, they can put the blame on anyone.

If Thailand or China use cunning tricks like the leaders in Hanoi or use barbaric assassination methods like those employed by Vietnam, those governments will be acting like bandits. And it would please Vietnam even more if we sent troops to capture Pol Pot and his men in order to show Vietnam that other countries are cleverer. Even if we didn't capture Pol Pot, Vietnam would be happy because they would have allies. From then on, Thailand and Vietnam would be enemies of the Khmer Rouge, which is exactly what Vietnam wants.

Third, people should know that Pol Pot does not hold any important political positions or play much of a political role. His role in military affairs has declined, too. But under the leadership of Khieu Samphan, the Pol Pot forces, whose official name is Democratic Kampuchea and whom foreigners refer to as the Khmer Rouge, are still a tightly knit group. Negotiations to find a solution to the political problems are doomed to fail if the Khmer Rouge does not participate. The decisions made will be meaningless if they do not agree. No one can do anything to them. Don't forget that they are still the strongest group in Cambodia. Even Vietnam admits that if Vietnamese troops are withdrawn, the Khmer Rouge will again take control of the country.

Fourth, something worth thinking about is that those who have called for the elimination of Pol Pot in accord with Hanoi's line say that Pol Pot is evil and that the Cambodian people hate him and don't want him to return to power. But they don't agree with allowing the Cambodian people to decide the issue by holding a free election. If you say that the Cambodian people would never elect such an evil person, they don't agree. This indicates that they are either underlings of Hanoi or ideological imperialists who think that only they are correct. They don't think that the Cambodian people are capable of deciding for themselves. They don't think they aren't smart enough.

Fifth, those who recommend that Thailand help eliminate Pol Pot hope that Thailand will use the following measures to oppose the Khmer Rouge:

1. Send troops to help suppress Pol Pot.

2. Hire additional officials to control the distribution of food supplies along the border. If those who come for food are members of the Pol Pot group, they should not be given food (humanity according to Hanoi's standards).

3. Hire additional officials to determine which refugees are members of the Khmer Rouge, Son Sann, and Sihanouk groups. These people should not be given
food and shelter because they are enemies of Vietnam. If they are given food and shelter, Vietnam will think that the Khmer reactionaries are using the refugee camps as sanctuaries.

That would be fine. Thailand would not have to accept any refugees. If the refugees liked Heng Samrin and Vietnam, they wouldn't flee to Thailand. Is Hanoi aware of the fact that Vietnamese soldiers have been deserting from their units in Cambodia disguised as civilians? This is another group that opposes Vietnam.

4. Once they have been put in a refugee camp, they should not be allowed out. That is, Thailand should act docile. Before taking in refugees, it should wait for orders from Hanoi. Before repatriating them to their country, Thailand should make sure that they will not do anything to endanger the Vietnamese troops occupying Cambodia. We are Thai. Let's not be stupid.

Sixth, Vietnam wants Thailand to stop the flow of supplies and weapons from China. Thailand could do this. But if we do, we will become an enemy of China and the Khmer Rouge, which is what Vietnam wants. Would Vietnam have friendly feelings toward us for doing that? Vietnam would probably say that that was our duty even though it was Vietnam that created these problems.

Another question is whether the Khmer Rouge would disappear. Vietnam will not help Thailand answer that. If Thailand becomes an enemy of China and the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam will have gotten what it wants. The fact is, although this might weaken the Khmer Rouge, it would not eliminate this group. In the long term, they might purchase weapons along the border and create problems for Thailand in controlling weapons trafficking activities. And if other countries continue sending weapons to the Son Sann and Sihanouk groups, these groups will sell the weapons to the Khmer Rouge.

Seventh, if we believe Vietnam and help them eliminate the Khmer Rouge, regardless of what method is used, it will not be possible to eliminate the Khmer Rouge completely. That would be impossible even with China's help. The reason is that the Khmer Rouge is making using of nationalism.

What would we gain? Don't think that peace would be restored to the Thai-Cambodian border area. Instead, we would be enemies of China and the Khmer Rouge. It would be even easier for Vietnam to intimidate us.

Suppose that Thailand could eliminate the Khmer Rouge. Don't become a tool of the Vietnamese. Vietnam will never withdraw from Cambodia if the Khmer Rouge has been eliminated. But in the long term, Vietnam will be forced to withdraw if the Khmer Rouge and the nationalist groups kill more and more Vietnamese soldiers.

11943
CSO: 4207/319
COLUMNIST ASSAILS CAMBODIA POLICY

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 18 Aug 86 p 9

[Article by Chen Charik: "An Explosive Situation Along the Border, the New Administration Should Review the Foreign Policy"]

[Text] The army has finally admitted that heavy losses have been suffered in fighting the foreign troops operating along the Thai-Cambodian border. It has called on the sectors concerned to cooperate with the army and the Engineer Department in finding a way to reduce the casualties.

"Today, in fighting the enemy, regardless of whether it is fighting the communists within the country or defending our sovereignty along the border, 60-70 percent of our casualties are caused by mines and explosives. These losses have had a great effect. Many people have to spend months in the hospital. People have lost arms, legs, eyes, and other organs. This will create problems for society in the future," said Gen Chawalit Yongchayi, the RTA CINC, to officers assembled in the army auditorium on the morning of 7 August.

We have suffered heavy losses as a result of the problem in that country. If we analyze this truthfully, it can be seen that these losses have all been in vain. This should not have been allowed to happen. The reasons are as follows:

First, the previous administration's foreign policy was wrong. The country's policy has been tied to to certain great powers such as the United States and the People's Republic of China. And the ASEAN countries have secretly been involved. The principles on which ASEAN was founded have been twisted. The original objective was to restore and develop the economy. But in the past period, the Thai government has made a great effort to involve the ASEAN countries militarily.

At the same time, it has given support to the guerrilla forces of the Khmer coalition, which is composed Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Mr Son Sann of the splintered Khmer Serei, and Pol Pot of the Khmer Rouge, whom the world has condemned for committing genocide in Cambodia. The Khmer coalition has secretly been receiving financial and weapons support from the United States and the People's Republic of China for 6 years now.
As for what has happened, diplomats throughout the world know that these Khmer coalition guerrillas have tried to use Thai territory as a base from which to wage war against the Heng Samrin-Vietnamese forces. Every time there is a clash between these forces, it is the Thai villagers living near the border who suffer. Artillery shells fired by the enemy land in their villages. People have been killed, and houses have been destroyed. These are facts that are difficult to deny.

Second, when these Khmer coalition troops enter Thailand and use Thai territory as a hiding place, they always set mines around their base. But when they move somewhere else, they don't recover the mines that they set for the enemy. They leave them there. Thus, when Thai soldiers, border patrol police, thanan phran irregulars, and guard team volunteers go out on patrol along the Thai-Cambodian border, they often step on the mines set by the Khmer coalition forces. This is one reason why Thailand's forces have suffered such casualties.

The two reasons that I have discussed above are facts. It can be said that these foreign forces have set mines along almost the entire length of the Thai border from Ubon Ratchathani Province on south to Sisaket, Surin, Buriram, Prachinburi, and Hat Lek Subdistrict in Khlong Yai District, Trat Province. During the rainy season, trees are toppled during the strong storms. Some of them land on these mines, setting off an explosion. Are the people responsible for national security aware of this problem?

Another thing is that these explosions damage the trees, which are a valuable national resource. Also, when peace finally is restored, there will be a major problem all along the border. That is, Thailand will be responsible for recovering all the mines. It's impossible to recover all the mines and that means that villagers will have to worry about them for years to come.

What has happened is the fault of past administrations, which have failed to implement an independent foreign policy. Instead, they have tied Thailand to certain great powers. I hope that people will give up such a mistaken idea and work together to solve the country's problems. People should not worry about the interests of groups or individuals. The interests of the nation should come first. It will then be possible to solve the country's problems. Simply continuing to condemn each other like this won't benefit us on either the political or international diplomatic fronts. The international situation has changed greatly. Even the United States has openly reached agreements with countries in Indochina. And about 6-7 months ago it cut the amount of financial aid given to the Khmer coalition. It is thought that the United States will soon establish diplomatic relations with the Indochina countries just as it did with the People's Republic of China when it engaged in "ping-pong diplomacy." Ping-pong players were sent to China as "ambassadors." After that, the United States established diplomatic relations with China.

As for Thailand's way out, the new administration should change the country's foreign policy. Thailand should take a neutral position. It should not side with anyone. The nation's independence should be foremost.
What is very important is that in changing our foreign policy, emphasis must be placed on economic development and on finding more foreign markets for our goods. The diplomatic line must focus on economic matters and on moving closer to the countries with which we now have diplomatic relations.

As for our military policy for the border area, we should take immediate steps to reduce the level of violence. We should try to bring about peace all along the Thai border. Stirring up trouble along the border and engaging in clashes is bad for the economic development of the country. No developing country in the world wants to wage war to solve the problems. It's only the great powers, the imperialists, that want to stir up regional conflicts for their own commercial interests.

Thailand is a developing country. We should find a way to avoid the effects of the local wars in this region. That would strengthen our national security. Because national security depends on the country's economic position.

Thai politicians and soldiers, I ask you to remember the lessons of history. You should realize that the greatest threat to our country is poverty. Everyone should join together and take resolute action to put an end to poverty.
ATHIT: SPECIAL SECURITY UNIT TO REMAIN

Bangkok NAOE NA in Thai 12 Aug 86 pp 1, 16

[Unattributed report: "Athit Confirms That Norasing Unit Will Remain"]

[Text] Athit confirmed that the Norasing Unit will not be abolished. However, it will return to its former base. This is an ordinary troop rotation. The army secretary said that it will be moved in order to be ready for any eventuality.

On the morning of 11 August at Ban Thakonsuk, the home of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikhachon, Maj Gen Naritdon Detchaphadiyut, the secretary of the army, issued a statement about the transfer of the Norasing Unit from the Sua Pa Camp. He said that the unit was not being abolished. The unit is just being returned to its former base, where it will stay on the alert. In the present situation, it is no longer necessary to base the Norasing unit at Supreme Command Headquarters, Sua Pa camp. It will move back to its former base, where it will remain on the alert for any eventuality. The people should not become alarmed by this move, because this is an ordinary matter.

On the same occasion, Gen Atiit Kamlangek, the supreme commander, said that the Norasing Unit will not be abolished. It is just being moved back to its former base. This is just a normal troop rotation.

The units that have been on 24-hour alert at the Sua Pa base, Supreme Command Headquarters, ever since the events of 9 September 1985, include: the Norasing Unit; the 1st Long-Range Reconnaissance Company; the 3d Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment; and the 17th Tank Battalion from Saraburi. In his capacity as the commander of the Bangkok Peacekeeping Command, Gen Athit Kamlangek ordered these units to return to their regular bases on 11 August. These units all returned to their bases at 1100 hours on 11 August.

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CSO: 4207/319
LIQUOR MAGNATE PROFILED, ARMY-POLITICAL LINKS SEEN

Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 2 Aug 86 p 4

[People Today column: "Wan Chansu, the Chairman of the Board of the Maharat Liquor Company"]

[Text] In the new administration being formed by Gen Prem, who has new economic plans, there are two people worth watching with respect to the position of minister of finance.

One is Mr Wan Chansu, who was born on 16 August 1923. He is the third of the four children of Rong-ammat Tho-ekyu, the owner of the well-known Saphan Luang Legal Affairs and Auditing Company. His Chinese name is "Choen Chi-win."

He is a lawyer, accountant, banker, and industrialist. He is also the person behind many very successful businesses, both large and small. At present, he is the chairman of the board of 16 companies and a member of the board of directors of 40 other companies. Among these, he is the chairman of the board of the (new) Maharat Liquor Company. He was behind the merger of two large liquor companies several months ago. He serves as the deputy managing director of the Thai Oil Company and is a member of the board of the Wang Phetchabun Company.

He is very close to the Techaphaibun family. His father was the lawyer of Chao Sua Chupian, the father of Chao Sua Uthen. He now holds the same position as his father before him. That is, he is the legal advisor to the Si Nakhon Bank and its subsidiaries. He is a close friend of Chuti Bunsung and Phong Sansin. His son is married to the daughter of Gen Chawalit Yongchayut, the RTA CINC. He keeps to himself and has refused appointment to several political positions. But this time, perhaps....
COLUMN PROFILES NEW TNP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER

Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA in Thai 3 Aug 86 p 16

[MATICHON Profile column: "Somchai Rukworarat (Sia Yae), a member of the Thai Nation Party Executive Committee"]

[Text] He was born on 7 November 1937 in Sala Chaorongthong Subdistrict, Wiset Chaichan District, Ang Thong Province. He is the second of the six children, four boys and two girls, of Mr Ngeksua Saekhow and Mrs Heng Saekhow.

In 1945 he entered the Wat Nang Nai School. After completing Grade 4, he dropped out of school, because his family could not afford to send him to school anymore. After dropping out of school, he went to work for his father, who worked as a bicycle repairman in Wiset Chaichan District. In 1954, when he was 17 years old, his father died, and so he took over his father's business.

In 1964 his bicycle repair business was doing well and so he expanded operations and became a building contractor. As a result of expanding into this field, his financial situation improved greatly, and more and more villagers in Ang Thong Province came to know of him. Soon after that, he started many other businesses in Ang Thong, such as sawmills and construction companies. As a result, everyone in the province knew him by the name Sia Yae.

In 1985 he began expanding his business operations to other provinces, such as Chaiyaphum Province. Together with friends, he invested in several business ventures and became well known in Chaiyaphum Province. He was asked to serve on the Joint Public-Private Committee for Solving the Economic Problems.

Besides his economic role, he also plays a major political role in Ang Thong Province. He is a very important supporter for candidates. He cannot run for election himself because of his lack of a formal education and because he is the son of a foreigner. Those candidates whom he supports usually win. He began backing candidates during the 1976 election. He supported the Social Action Party candidate, who won. In 1979 he supported the Thai Nation Party candidate, who won. In 1983 he again backed the Thai Nation Party candidate, who won again. As a result, the Thai Nation Party appointed him to the party executive committee. He is responsible for finding candidates to run for election in Ang Thong Province.

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THAILAND

WRITER COMMENTS ON MILITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA in Thai 3 Aug 86 pp 18-20

[Article by Surachat Bamrungsuk: "Thai Military Administration and Military Self-Sufficiency"

[Excerpts] Today, military administration has become much more complex than in the past. This is due in part to the development of modern technology and military science. This is a direct result of research, experimentation, and the development of science, which has advanced continuously. This can be seen quite clearly by looking at the advanced weapons systems used by the militaries of the industrialized countries (including the United States, the Soviet Union, and the NATO countries). These militaries have used advanced technology to develop their weapons systems.

The Period of the Vietnam-Cambodia War

The government that came into power in the wake of the events of 6 October 1976 did not survive very long. It was toppled in a coup by a military group. Even though the new government came to power in a coup in October 1977, it tried to create a freer political atmosphere in order to improve Thailand's image in the eyes of the United States. It was hoped that if the domestic human rights situation improved, the United States would step up the amount of security aid given to Thailand.

The United States was aware of the Thai military's need for more aid. U.S. military aid began to increase. During that period, the types of weapons brought in were of a more modern variety. They were no longer weapons for use just in domestic terrorist suppression operations.

Thus, beginning in 1980, Thailand began to import larger quantities of modern weapons. It can be seen that U.S. military aid increased every year:

16
U.S. Military Aid to Thailand

1977-1986

(in millions of U.S. dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of military aid</th>
<th>Loan</th>
<th>Grant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>102.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This increased U.S. military aid to Thailand has been given mostly in the form of credits or yearly loans. The amount given in the form of grants has not increased. One of the basic policies of the United States is to give military aid in the form of a loan or credit instead of a grant. The United States feels that national defense is the responsibility of each of its allies. It no longer feels that it alone is responsible for the defense of allied countries.

As a result of this, the country's administrators realize that relying solely on weapons from abroad may lead to both economic and military problems. Economically, this will lead to increased amounts of money flowing out of the country. And at present, the country is in no position financially to give the military everything it wants. Militarily, this could lead to limitations. For example, if there are shortages of weapons or ammunition, the military will have to wait for shipments from foreign sources. As a result, the military might not be able to operate as effectively as it should.

Step Up the Development of the Domestic Arms Industry

People began thinking about making the military more self-sufficient. This was stated explicitly in the Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan, which called for developing greater military self-sufficiency by developing an efficient arms industry in the country.

However, Thailand's arms industry has not made much progress. The shortage of basic industries, such as iron smelting, the production of certain metals used to produce weapons, and the electricity and electronics industries, makes it difficult to develop a domestic arms industry.

Furthermore, in producing military equipment, we are still highly dependent on other countries. For example, we have to rely on their technology in producing certain types of military equipment that use advanced technology. However, great advances have been made in producing items that do not require advanced technology, such as ammunition. In particular, producing these items
domestically is much cheaper because wages are much lower in Thailand than they are in Western producers. But the quantities produced are still not sufficient.

The War Reserve Weapons Stockpile Project

At a time when the country cannot achieve real military self-sufficiency and must continue to rely on the United States for military aid, one solution is to cooperate in establishing a "war reserve weapons stockpile" in Thailand (which from here on will be referred to as the reserve weapons depot).

The establishment of a reserve weapons depot does not mean that Thailand will be more self-sufficient. But this is one way of satisfying the Thai military's need for weapons more quickly. It also guarantees U.S. military support for Thailand.

However, doing things in accord with the agreement on establishing a reserve weapons depot will have some effect on the self-sufficiency of the military. Because in establishing this reserve weapons depot, the United States must support certain types of weapons industries in Thailand, such as the production of ammunition. But if this depot is established and certain weapons industries are built, these industries will focus on producing ammunition. We will not have industrial plants to produce heavy weapons. Thailand will have to continue importing such weapons from abroad, particularly the United States.

Besides this, the weapons in this reserve weapons depot are not free. The user must pay for them later. This can be referred to as "shoot first, pay later." Thus, the establishment of this reserve weapons depot is the same as establishing a U.S. "weapons sales service" in Thailand. Opening such a direct service will relieve the fears of Thai military leaders about a sudden shortage of weapons during a military crisis or confrontation. This will no longer be a problem. The reserve weapons depot will lay this fear to rest.

Thus, although the reserve weapons depot will not increase the self-sufficiency of the Thai military, it will have a great psychological effect. This depot will help increase morale. People will not worry about Thailand having to face a crisis with a shortage of weapons. There is also the feeling that if the Thai military has access to the reserve weapons and can draw weapons from the depot whenever it needs them, this will "warn" enemies not to invade Thailand. The idea of relying on weapons and military equipment from this reserve weapons depot indicates that we must continue to take steps to become self-sufficient militarily.

Trends and Problems of Self-Sufficiency

From the above discussion on the self-sufficiency of the Thai military, it can be seen that it will be difficult to achieve real self-sufficiency. Because Thailand receives military aid from the United States, it will not be forced to rely on itself as was South Africa. There is no indication that foreign sources, particularly the United States, will stop giving military aid to Thailand. In addition, Thailand's base for building an arms industry is still
undeveloped. Even though we have begun bringing in more advanced technology for use in the military, the lack of a production base means that we must continue to rely on others.

Some people may think that we can produce the weapons domestically. But we cannot produce weapons equal to those imported from Western countries. That is a fact. This is because this advanced technology, or new military technology, is kept top secret. Thus, the development of weapons in the developing countries always follows behind weapons development in the industrialized countries.

There is still no clear solution to this problem. Thailand will continue to rely on weapons from abroad. And unless some answer is found, administering the Thai military in the future will not be a complex matter. Because if we are highly dependent on weapons from the United States, military leaders will probably rely on U.S. administrative methods, too. But it should not be forgotten that the economies of Thailand and the United States are different. What is important is that the U.S. military is totally self-sufficient. Perhaps the answer is that the Thai military can rely totally on the United States.

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CSO: 4207/310
POLICE: TAMCHAI PROBE TO CONTINUE

Bangkok NABO NA in Thai 4 Aug 86 pp 1, 22

[Unattributed report: "Suppression Division Will Continue Investigating Tamchai Case; Questioning of Witnesses Will Be Completed by the End of the Year"]

[Text] The Suppression Division is still investigating the case even though Tamchai Khamphato is now an MP. The witnesses concerned have been issued summonses to appear for questioning. Evidence has been gathered and will be submitted to the prosecutor. The investigation should be concluded by the end of this year.

"The investigation will continue. The Suppression Division is still questioning witnesses," said Police Col Sanga Runruang, the deputy commander of the Suppression Division, to NABO NA on 3 August. He is heading the investigation of the complaint filed by the Krung Thai Bank, which charges that Mr Tamchai Khamphato, an MP from Uthai Thani Province, the secretary general of the United Democracy Party, and the former managing director of the Krung Thai Bank, and Mr Worun Kanchanakunchon, a Credit Department official, violated the Act on Violations by Officials in State Units.

The deputy commander of the Suppression Division also said that the Suppression Division has to carry out its duty when someone files a complaint. It doesn't matter whether the person is an MP or not. Investigation officials have to conduct an investigation. At present, the division is questioning witnesses and examining various documents turned over by the Krung Thai Bank. The police have issued summonses to several of the people concerned. It is expected that the investigation will be completed by the end of this year. The case will then be submitted to the prosecutor, who must decide whether there is enough evidence to issue an arrest warrant. If there is, a warrant will be issued immediately. But whether or not he will be arrested right away depends on whether parliament is in session. "There aren't any problems. The investigation won't be curtailed," said Police Col Sanga in conclusion.

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CSO: 4207/311
PERSONNEL SHIFTS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY NOTED

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 17 Aug 86 pp 1, 12

[Unattributed report: "Personnel Shifts in Foreign Ministry Work Out Evenly"]

[Text] Personnel changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have worked out well. Sowanit Khongsiri has changed positions with the ambassador to Singapore. Arun Phanuphong will again serve as an advisor to Sithi on international political affairs.

A report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that October is the time when government officials are reshuffled. This year, many foreign ministry officials are retiring and so preparations are being made to carry out the reshuffle.

The senior officials in the Information Department who will be transferred include Mr Sowanit Khongsiri, the director-general of the department. He will become Thailand's ambassador to Singapore in place of Mr Sarot Chawanawirat, who will take over as director-general of the Information Department. Besides this, the position of deputy director-general is vacant because of the resignation of Mr Pratchaya Tawethikun. He will be replaced by Mr Somphan Kolilanon, the Thai ambassador to the People's Republic of China. Mr Tet Bunnak, the deputy under secretary, will be appointed ambassador in his place.

Prior to this, a report stated that preparations have been made to appoint Mr Asa Sarasin, the present under secretary of foreign affairs, ambassador to the United States in place of ML [Royal title--FBIS] Kasemsamoson Kasemksi, who will be appointed under secretary. There have also been reports that Mr Arun Phanuphong, the former deputy minister of foreign affairs, will be made an advisor to Gen Sithi Sawetsila, the minister of foreign affairs. He will serve as an advisor on international political affairs.

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CS0: 4207/314
PAPER PROFILES NEW FINANCE MINISTER

Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 2 Aug 86 p 4

[People Today column: "Mr Suthi Sinsane, the Acting Deputy Minister of Finance"]

[Text] He is another person who has a good chance of being appointed minister of finance in the new administration, which intends to change the economic structure and implement new economic policies under the old prime minister.

Mr Suthi was born on 22 July 1928. He is the son of Mr Lani Sinsane. After receiving his degree in commerce and accounting from Thammasat University, he attended the University of Illinois in the United States, where he earned his master's and Ph.D. degrees in accounting and business administration in 1957.

He began his government career as a first-class official with the Office of the Auditor General of Thailand, where he worked for 9 years. He was then appointed director-general of the Comptroller-General's Department, which at that time was subordinate to the Ministry of National Development. In 1976 he was appointed director of the Bureau of the Budget, Office of the Prime Minister.

In 1979 he became a political official when he was appointed deputy minister of finance during the administration of Gen Kriangsak Chamanan. He served in this same position during the administration of Gen Prem Tinsulanon, replacing Dr Phaichit Uathawikun. He has served as deputy minister of finance twice in his career. This time he has a chance to become minister of finance.

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FOREIGN TRADE CHIEF ON FARM ACT, TRADE BARS, COMMERCE MINISTRY

Bangkok HI CLASS MAGAZINE in Thai Jul 86 pp 29-32, 37-41

[Interview with Oranut Osathanon, the director-general of the Department of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce, and one of the vanguard in economic diplomacy; date and place not specified]

[Text] Ever since Thailand encountered a host of economic problems, including appreciation of the baht, devaluation of the baht, and unequal import-export quotas stemming from the Jenkins Bill, the Farm Act, and the cassava treaty, those responsible for controlling the country's economic position have had to change the strategy while maintaining a friendly policy in order to save the country. The Ministry of Commerce has appointed a woman director-general of one of the departments, and she is playing a leading role in international economic negotiations. The director-general of the Department of Foreign Trade is demonstrating her capabilities and sense of responsibility as a force that must join with other forces to serve as the vanguard in economic diplomacy using the policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for support. "This department does other things besides facilitating things for exporters. We also promulgate various regulations. Sometimes, people are unhappy with the regulations. But in this position, you can't please everyone. At present, we have very little bargaining power on trade matters. Other countries have implemented protectionist policies. I know that I will encounter many problems. But this is a challenge." Oranut Osathanon, the director-general of the Department of Foreign Trade, is one of Thailand's 'shock troops' in the economic war. She has 7 years left before she turns 55, which in when she plans to retire. Her father, Udom Bunyaprasop, was a provincial high commissioner in the south. Her mother, Lady Raem Phonmobon Bunyaprasop, was the first female lawyer in Thailand and the first female MP from Phuket. She serves as a role model for women who refuse to "fade away" as they grow older. She attended Mater Dei and Triam-udom Suksa schools. She then went to the United States to obtain her bachelor's degree in economics. On
returning to Thailand, she went to work at the Office of the Board of Export Promotion, a new unit subordinate to the Office of the Prime Minister that was established in response to the economic and social development policy of Field Marshal Sarit in 1961. Later on, this unit was abolished and it duties turned over to the Ministry of Commerce. Thus, she was transferred to this ministry and appointed secretary to Minister Osot Kosin. She was assigned to the Ministry of Industry temporarily when her "boss" was transferred there in 1972. On returning to the Ministry of Commerce, she was assigned to the Department of Foreign Trade, where she has served for 11 years. She has served as the chief of the Export Promotion Division, the chief of the Trade Policy Division, the deputy director-general of the Department of Foreign Trade, and a commercial advisor. Now, at age 48, she is the director-general of this department. She is only the second woman to serve as a director-general in this ministry. She is married to Wira Osathanon, the former deputy secretary general of the National Economic and Social Development Council. They have three children. She is also attending the National Defense College, where one of her classmates is Lt Gen Phichit Kunlawanit. "I work very hard. But I enjoy it. I do my best," said the director-general about the secret of her success. Although her philosophy is not profound, it's very difficult to put into practice.

[Question] You are the second woman in the Ministry of Commerce to hold the position of director-general. Are there any problems that worry you?

[Answer] Before I was appointed director-general, I served as the deputy director-general and as a divisional chief. I have served in the Department of Foreign Trade for many years. Thus, I am aware that this department faces many problems. Although this worries me, I also regard it as a challenge. If I had never worked in this department before, I might be more excited and view everything in a positive way. I don't foresee any major problems. But this department always has problems to solve. That is, new problems arise every year. The rice problem, for example, comes and goes depending on the season. This happens year after year. We have to work constantly to solve the problems. There are many problems, but I regard them as a challenge.

[Question] You have been appointed to this position at a time when Thailand is facing the "Farm Act" problem. What can be done to increase our bargaining power on trade matters?

[Answer] I think that our bargaining power will decline even more. Other countries have implemented trade protectionist policies. In the past, as ... ally, we could negotiate and get them to show some sympathy. But now, every country is trying to implement protectionist measures. Thus, in negotiating with them, it is becoming more and more difficult to sway them. As a small country, there is only one way for Thailand to make itself heard. That is, we must work together closely with the other developing countries, such as the ASEAN countries. This is what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is trying to do
today. The countries that have been affected must join together to fight back and voice opposition at international conferences. We have to tell them what effects the Farm Act will have. If we speak out individually, we won't be heard. Besides having to help ourselves, we must cooperate with other developing countries.

[Question] Besides rice, the Farm Act is also having an impact on many other crops, isn't that right?

[Answer] That's right. It's not just rice that has been affected. Corn has been affected, too. They promulgated this law in order to help their farmers. Sugar will be affected, too. They have reduced the quota on sugar imports. As for textiles, we don't know whether the Multi-Fiber Arrangement will be extended or whether the United States will implement the Jenkins Bill again. These are problems that haven't been solved yet. As I said above, we have to keep working and try to solve these problems.

[Question] According to reports, the units that are playing a direct role in this are the Department of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Commerce and the Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What are the responsibilities of each of these departments?

[Answer] I can't speak on behalf of the Economic Department. But as for the Department of Foreign Trade, we are responsible for promulgating rules and regulations and issuing import and export permits. The minister of commerce has entrusted us with this power. We submit ideas to the minister on import and export policies. However, when we encounter problems such as the Farm Act or such as the United States collecting an unfair tax on steel pipe without considering the facts, we inform the Economic Department about the problems. They are responsible for discussing such matters with the United States. In short, the Department of Foreign Trade focuses on operations. But conducting negotiations on policy matters, which requires giving attention to international political problems, is the job of the Economic Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Another thing is that the embassies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs outnumber our commercial attaché offices. In some countries, we don't have either a commercial advisory office or a commercial attaché office. Our embassies in those countries send information on economic and trade matters to the Economic Department, which passes the information on to us.

[Question] Would you give an example in which the two departments cooperated?

[Answer] One example concerns Japan. Japan purchased rice from Thailand and donated it to poor countries. But one country said that it didn't want any rice from Thailand but that it would accept rice from other countries. We told Japan that as the country paying for the rice, Japan should bargain with the country receiving this aid and persuade it to accept half of their allotment in Thai rice. But Japan wouldn't do that. In such cases, their policy is to accede to the wishes of the receiving country. I asked the Economic Department to help negotiate. They have greater weight, because they aren't involved only with trade matters. They also look at things from the standpoint of international politics. Thus, we help each other.
[Question] What can be done to make Thailand strong economically?

[Answer] There are many obstacles. Our economy is based on agriculture. Prices fluctuate constantly. We are in a more difficult position than are the industrialized countries. We do have certain advantages. For example, labor and production costs are lower here than in other countries. We must use these advantages to promote processing agricultural goods and exporting industrial goods such as canned pineapple and ready-made clothing. Labor is cheap here, and our workers do better work than others. We can make use of these advantages. But we must go slowly. Because our economy is based on agriculture.

[Question] Is there any way to speed up things?

[Answer] I don't think so. Because there are several factors, including money and investments. And an important factor is the marketing problem. A country can't transform itself into an industrial country overnight and start producing whatever it wants. We have to look at the market situation and determine what our capabilities are. If we don't, that will just be a waste of investment money.

[Question] Your job requires you to travel abroad frequently to discuss trade matters. How do you feel about this? Do you get tired or worry about anything?

[Answer] These days, I have to travel frequently. Because we are holding negotiations on the rice and textile problems. There are also ASEAN conferences. I try not to make too many trips. My three deputies take turns going. But sometimes we all have to go. Someone is always away. Everyone has to travel. And as our trade expands, we will have to travel even more frequently.

[Question] The department's work directly concerns the interests of exporters. Are there things that bother you?

[Answer] To be frank, the Department of Foreign Trade doesn't always act in a kind manner. We also use our power. We promulgate rules and regulations. Sometimes, people are unhappy with what we do. Complaints are made frequently. We can't always do what they want. We sometimes offend people unintentionally, which is like making an enemy. Sometimes we issue a permit to their enemy. We do things according to the regulations. But this displeases those who don't get what they want.

[Question] Would you give an example of a major problem?

[Answer] Take the textile problem, for example. Quotas have been limited. The quotas are set by the importing country, not us. We can't increase the quotas to suit ourselves. But at the same time, there are a large number of exporters. The other countries have given us these quotas. We don't have any definite policy on the number of exporters. In Malaysia, for example, new exporters cannot ask for a quota if the quota has already been filled. In effect, the market is closed. But we can't say that the market is closed. That
would upset people. Everyone has to be given a chance. They end up fighting for a share of the quota, which does not benefit anyone. Those with factories can sell only small amounts. Some go out of business. It's like when we allow people to build hotels. Many hotels are built. The tourists haven't yet come, but there are many hotels waiting. Those in the private sector become upset. The same thing is true in our case. There are a large number of exporters. The policy is unclear on future expansion. Officials aren't happy in carrying out their duties. Some people have not asked for permission in accord with the regulations. There are complaints that the department gives special treatment to those who give the department something in return. Some people say that they have a Letter of Credit or an order. But when they ask for an export permit, they don't have these things. How can the Department of Foreign Trade promote things? Quotas aren't available.

[Question] What is the real problem?

[Answer] The problem is that before they can export goods, they must study the market to see if it is a closed market. They must see what the rules and regulations are. Anyone can accept an order. But there are quotas. And so some people feel that those given quotas made a deal of some sort. Even though my boss knows that I am an honest person and has assured people that that does not happen, they don't listen. And the matter can become a major problem if a superior does not trust us. If my superiors ever lose their trust in me, I think it would be better to leave the department. In some cases, we don't have a chance to explain things. The exporters watch to see which the wind is blowing and who will be appointed director-general. If the person appointed does not have the trust of his superiors, he is torn to pieces.

[Question] Has anyone ever tried to use inside force or political influence with you?

[Answer] It depends on the individual merchant. If he thinks that he can use his influence, that is his affair. I follow the rules. I always remember that I am a regular government official. If the minister issues an order that violates the regulations, I feel that it is my duty to inform him. It is then his duty to make the decision. I think that everything will go smoothly if everyone carries out their duties. If we do something that benefits an exporter, we don't view that as a favor to him. It is our duty to facilitate things. But sometimes it is necessary to promulgate regulations that upset people. We have to remain neutral. We can't do special favors for people just because we know them. Thus, the person who holds this position can't gain the love of all the merchants. All you can expect is to break even or earn their hatred. I am still in their department. This proves that if there was anything "dangling," I would be too embarrassed to face the exporters again.

[Question] In the past, the director-general of this department was replaced quite frequently.

[Answer] That's right. If your superiors don't trust you, you should transfer immediately. If my superiors don't trust me, I will leave this position. That's better than remaining in a position in which you don't feel comfortable or in which people are suspicious of each other. I could not work
in such conditions. If the exporters lose all confidence in you, they will start making complaints and stir up trouble.

[Question] Do you feel that you have to employ a variety of tactics in dealing with the various interest groups?

[Answer] It's probably the same as in other units that have to work with interest groups. The various interest groups oppose each other. We have to be very careful. If someone proposes something, we have to consider his reasons for proposing that. We have to consider whether he had any ulterior motives. Did he make the suggestion to help the majority or to further his own interests? We can then make a decision on whether to follow his suggestion. We have to sift things. Everything is a matter of interests. We discover such cases quite often. Few of the large merchants engage in this. But in the case of certain people, we know that we must be on guard whenever they come to see us.

[Question] You have many responsibilities and are probably under much pressure. What do you do to relax?

[Answer] Actually, I worry and fret a lot. If I have a job to do, my mind won't stop working, even after I go to bed. On the weekends I like to get together with relatives. I like to sit and chat with them to relieve the tension. I try not to talk about serious subjects. I also like to garden. That relaxes me.

[Question] Your plants are probably good friends. Everything looks so green and fresh here at your home. I hear that you like to collect plants from abroad.

[Answer] Most are plants that I obtained while attending conferences abroad. Many are plants that we have here in Thailand. But I brought them back anyway, because they remind me of places that I have been. There is one plant that I brought back from Africa. I went to Holland and then rushed back to Thailand. I felt sorry for the plant. But it is still alive after many years. There is another plant that I brought back from the Philippines. It's not an expensive plant. I don't like to spend a lot of money on plants. We can plant them and get cuttings ourselves. Occasionally, I exchange plants with others and so don't have to buy the plant. But few people want any of my plants. I give my plants a lot of attention. Others probably think that they would have to spend too much time caring for the plants. Thus, my house looks as if it were in the jungle. I grow whatever I want here and there. I don't have to do much landscaping.

[Question] You have many souvenirs from abroad. You apparently like to collect souvenirs.
[Answer] I always buy a few items whenever I go somewhere. I like to buy native goods, such as Peking ducks from China and dolls from Nigeria. They are so beautiful. They are different. But when I was in Africa, I had to go to some trouble to get these. They set up a tent beneath a tree. It was not very clean. Both the sellers and the location were dirty. Sometimes lizards ran past us.

[Question] Do you like to read or attend performances?

[Answer] I don't have very much time. I sometimes do so when I am abroad. But here I watch video tapes. I like light movies. I don't like to watch serious or sad movies. I already have a lot to think about at work. I like to watch musicals or variety shows with singing and dancing. Watching serious programs just makes me feel worse.

[Question] Do you like to go out to dinner or go to see musical performances?

[Answer] I rarely go to a restaurant. We usually eat at the home of a relative.

[Question] Do you often bring work home?

[Answer] Not very often. I try to finish things at the office. But if I can't finish the work there, I have to bring it home. I don't sign much of the routine work. One of my deputies does that for me, or the divisional chiefs can sign things. But if the matter is going to be submitted to the minister, I have to sign it. When it is something that I have to know about and that requires careful consideration before being submitted to higher echelons so that problems don't arise, I have to spend a lot of time studying the matter. There may not be too much paperwork, but I have to consider things very carefully.

[Question] Do you usually go to bed late?

[Answer] I usually go to bed between 2300 and 2400 hours. But right now I am attending the National Defense College and so I have work to do for both the college and the department. Sometimes I don't have time to concentrate on the paperwork at the department. Sometimes I am in conference all day. Or subordinates come to discuss things and explain policies. Only after work do I have time to concentrate. Some days, reporters assigned to the Ministry of Commerce come for an evening report. And so it's already late when I get started on my reports. I have to bring the work home.

[Question] Are you an impatient person?

[Answer] I am usually a calm person. I get impatient only about matters that concern my work. I want to understand things right away. But I don't get very angry. I try to stay calm.

[Question] Would you talk about your family a little, particularly Mr Wira? Has he played a role in your rise?
[Answer] Actually, he does not want me to work. But this seems to be my fate. He is very supportive. He has never prevented me from doing anything. He supports me. But sometimes he worries when he sees how tired I am.

[Question] Do you ever talk to him about your problems at work?

[Answer] Usually not. I try to keep the problems at work from affecting things at home. But if some problem is really bothering me, I do tell him about it. If it's a trifling matter, I don't bother him with it. He is a quiet person. If he grows tired of something, he is really tired of it. For example, when he resigned as deputy secretary general of the Development Council, he was tired of the work. He can't hide his feelings. And so he decided that it would be best to resign.

[Question] How does your daughter feel about having a mother who holds a high position?

[Answer] She is happy. She says that she probably can't succeed like her mother because she isn't smart. I tell her that I am not that smart. But we all have to try. We can't just tell ourselves that we aren't smart and give up. I tell her that she doesn't understand and that there are many people who aren't geniuses but who have scored achievements. However, those who think they are a genius but who aren't won't have a chance to advance. Because those who realize their limitations will listen to the views of others. And I tell her that I don't expect her to be this or that.

[Question] Your mother, Lady Raen, is an intelligent woman whom people have long admired. Was she a model or force that pushed you to achieve?

[Answer] She is a very energetic person. She is very active and doesn't let age get in her way. Now, we have the same circle of friends. She lets me call her friends "phi." We are like sisters now. She is so active. I can't keep up with her. As for my appointment to this position, I just happened to be in the right place at the right time. My mother did not pressure me in any way. She wanted me to help her with her business. She sometimes says that she has few children and that I should come and help her. But I excuse myself by saying that I am still in government service. When I was still a low-ranking official, she urged me to quit and help her. By chance, my first boss was Mr Osot Kosin. He refused to let me quit. He told me to tell my mother to hire someone else. He said that I should remain in government service. As I rose higher in the bureaucracy, my mother decided that I should be allowed to stay. But she still complains and says that she would like me to quit and come help her.

[Question] In what business is your family engaged?

[Answer] We own the Wiang Tai Hotel. It's not a large operation. But it's ours. My younger brother helps with the business. My mother complains that she is too old to run a hotel. But if it is a social event, she is ready to go and never complains. She is always very vigorous. At the hotel, she even helps do the cooking. A team of people who have been with her for over 10 years help her manage the hotel.
[Question] We don't know very much about your father.

[Answer] My father died a long time ago. He served as the commissioner in Phukhet. After that he was transferred to Chiang Mai. He served in the Ministry of Interior for many years. His last position was regional commissioner. He was responsible for the entire southern region. When the position was changed to inspector and placed under the Office of the Prime Minister, he transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister. He died of a heart attack. Few people remember him. He was very nice and very handsome. He was liked everywhere he served. His subordinates had great respect for him. My mother ran for parliament in Phuket. The people there wanted my father to run, but he let my mother run instead. Even though we were not from Phuket, she was elected MP for two terms. Then, Field Marshal Sarit staged a coup and dissolved parliament in 1957. My mother doesn't have any contact with Phuket anymore, because we don't have a house there. When she was campaigning, she used to stay at a friend's house.

[Question] Why does your mother use the surname "Phormmobon Bunyaprasop?"

[Answer] "Bunyaprasop" was my father's name. "Phormmobon" was my mother's maiden name. She worked in a legal office, which was quite uncommon for a woman at that time. Everyone knew the "female lawyer" by the name "Raem Phormmobon. When she campaigned for office, so that people would remember her, she used both names and so became known as "Raem Phormmobon Bunyaprasop." She has told me that she and my father met at law school. She was the only woman at the school. My father was her classmate. She thought he was very handsome and as the only girl she had the chance to choose the most handsome man. Even today, when I say that this or that man is handsome, my mother always says that he isn't as handsome as my father. I have to admit that I am not as modern as my mother. She is a scrapper. Otherwise, she would not have been able to run for parliament. She has struggled a lot. I really admire her.

[Question] Do you have any political ambitions?

[Answer] No. None at all. I can't fight like that.

[Question] Is it because you have been close to politics and know what goes on?

[Answer] I don't like politics and so I am not interested in it. When my mother was campaigning for office, I saw how people attacked each other. People were very unfair. I want to stay out of politics. But if you ask my mother whether she would like to run again, she will say yes.

[Question] Do you think that you have reached the highest position? Or will you rise even higher in your career?
I haven't thought about any higher position. I think that I am at the top. When I first entered government service, I thought about earning a sash. I have done that now. There isn't any reason to struggle. I will keep working as long as I enjoy it. If it isn't fun, I will resign and go help my mother with her business.

You still have 12 years left before you reach retirement age. Do you think that you reached this level too soon?

No. It's good. I will have a chance to do something else. Actually, I think that I have always been ahead of others. I was ahead of others in school. Maybe that's why I am growing older faster. But it's good to have to a chance at the end. If I don't die soon, I will have time to think about what to do or about which direction to take in life.

It sounds as if you don't plan to remain in this position until age 60.

That's right. I definitely plan to retire by age 55. That's 7 years from now. But that's not definite. I might retire before that. As I told you, I am satisfied with what I have achieved. If the job becomes boring, I may follow my husband's example. There will probably be work to do.

Is there anything you would like to achieve or do that you haven't?

As far as the Department of Foreign Trade is concerned, I would like a new, more spacious office so that I could serve the people better. The people who work there and the people who contact us would have a better mental outlook. Our present offices are very crowded. There aren't any parking spaces. Many people complain when they come to see us. The government officials who work there feel confined. Even the library had to be removed to make an office. We have to find a place to build a new library. This is the dream of almost every person who serves as director-general of the Department of Foreign Trade. But the problem is the budget. And we can't move our offices too far away. That would be inconvenient for the businessmen who contact us. As for policy, I dream of a time when government units will have coordinated policies.

To which policies are you referring?

Take rice, for example. We are the gateway to exports. Thus, our dream is to see crop prices rise. We hope that we will be able to export large quantities. Although we are selling large quantities, the problem is that prices are still low. Various units must work together to solve this problem. The Ministry of Commerce can't solve the problem by itself. We don't have either the money or the personnel. In the past, the purchase of paddy has been under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture. We purchase milled rice. Thus, we dream of a time when we will have a coordinated policy. I have seen cases of the various ministries taking different paths.

You have been in this department for more than 10 years. Would you like to be the director-general of any other department?
[Answer] I can't answer that. The director-general of that department will think that I am trying to steal his position (laughs). But he knows. Because I once told him quite frankly that I would like to work in that department. But I have remained in this department. It's nice here, because I have worked with the people before. I can learn the work quickly. I don't have to start from scratch. If I am assigned to some other department, that's all right. I just want to be happy in my work. I like to work with others who are willing to cooperate. I want a boss who trusts me. Wherever I am, I just want to feel comfortable.

[Question] Can you summarize what stratagems you, as a successful female administrator, have used?

[Answer] I don't know. All I know is that you have to work hard. If you want me to give you a formula or stratagem, I would say that you have to like your work and be willing to struggle. I am the type of person who does everything I can. If I can do a job, I do it. When I was a divisional chief, I was a member of the Thai delegation at a conference to discuss various problems. I helped draft the conference report. I helped mimeograph the report. I helped in every way I could. I struggled and took pleasure in my work.

[Question] Who have been your models?

[Answer] I have been fortunate to have good bosses. Many of them have set an example for me. I often speak of my first boss, Mr Osot Kosin. I talk about him a lot because he is no longer in government service. He served as the secretary general of the Export Promotion Board. Later on he was appointed minister of industry. He worked very fast and was very diligent. He was very frank. He gave his subordinates opportunities. He was an important model for me. There are many others whom I admire. One is former Minister Suthi Nathawonthat. He was very thoughtful and calm. He did not try to cling to his position. The work styles of these men had a great influence on me.

[Question] You hold the highest position in the department. Do you have any trouble working with the men in your department?

[Answer] The matter of promotions is a problem. This can be discussed from several angles. This is a troublesome matter. There are few senior positions. In particular, the people in this department have to work very hard. I understand this. Because I worked as a lower-ranking official in this department. I know that all the people in the departments work very hard. There are very few slackers in this department. Thus, at promotion time, everyone hopes to be promoted. But there are few positions. We have to consider seniority, capabilities, and suitability. All the factors have to be taken into account.

[Question] Would you say a few words about your preferences in dress?

[Answer] Like most other women, I like to dress attractively. I like to get new dresses. But I don't spend a lot of time getting dressed. I don't have a
lot of time. It isn't difficult for me to make a decision because I know what
I like and don't like. I also ask friends to make suggestions. But I don't
adhere to fashion. Anything that looks nice is all right. I change colors
frequently. I like bright colors, because I have a dark complexion.

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CSO: 4207/318
HAN SETS SCOPE OF AGRICULTURE POLICIES

Bangkok NABO NA in Thai 17 Aug 86 pp 1, 13, 16

[Unattributed report: "Han Will Ensure That Farmers Have Land To Work, Will Not Reassign Senior People in the Royal Forest Department"]

[Text] The new minister of agriculture, Gen Han Linanon, said that he is making preparations to solve one of the country's important problems. He wants the farmers to have their own land. Most now have to rent land to work. He will try to carry out a land reform and promulgate a law to make the farmers the owners of the land. People who are not farmers should not own much farmland. At the same time, urgent action will be taken to prevent the destruction of the forests. As for forest preserves, if the forests have already been destroyed, people will be allowed to enter and work the area. He confirmed that he will not change the order to transfer Phong Leng-i, the acting deputy director-general of the Forest Department.

Gen Han Linanon, the minister of agriculture, was interviewed by NABO NA at his home on the morning of 16 August before beginning his new job on Monday, 18 August. He said that he wants to solve the problem of farmers not owning their own land. Only 20-25 percent of the farmers own their own land. The rest must rent land. As a consequence of this, the farmers must remain in poverty. There is no way for them to improve their economic position. "I think that we have to carry out a land reform. The contracts on renting farm land must be converted to mortgage contracts. It will probably be necessary to promulgate a law. I think that we must take serious action to help the farmers so that they have ownership rights to the land. Those who are not farmers should not own large tracts of land. If the farmers own their own land, they will be able to obtain investment capital by putting up collateral to obtain loans at low rates of interest. This will improve their standard of living. We have to do this."

As for the forest preserve problem, much of the forest area has already been destroyed, but the land is still classified as a forest preserve. The new minister of agriculture said that the "same thing is true in this case. When I served as a soldier in the northeast, I rode in a helicopter over the Phu Phan area. I could see that only the trees near the roads were left. Away from the roads, the trees had all been felled. It really wasn't a forest anymore. Because the forests have already been destroyed, I think that this land should
be given to the farmers to work in order to improve their standard of living. But at the same time, the forests that are still in good condition must be preserved. We must not allow any more forest area to be destroyed. In the past, people may not have acted resolutely in carrying out their duties. I think that we have the personnel and tools to preserve the forests. We have to do this. We cannot allow any more of the forest area to be destroyed."

Before he left office, Mr Narong Wongwan, the former minister of agriculture, issued an order transferring Mr Udorn Hiranphruk, the deputy director-general of the Forest Department, to a ministry inspector slot and appointing Mr Phong Leng-i, the chief of the National Park Division, to the position of deputy director-general. People have criticized that order. The reporter asked whether this matter would be reviewed. Gen Han said that "this matter will not be reviewed. He had the legal authority to make those transfers. I am sure that he had reasons of which we, as outsiders, aren't aware. Those who were transferred are good people. They are capable people who have always done a good job. I think that capable people can work on behalf of the country wherever they are. Don't worry. I will look after things myself," said Gen Han in conclusion.

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CSO: 4207/319
EDITORIAL WANTS CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT FOR PRIME MINISTER

Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 7 Aug 86 p 3

[Editorial: "Take an Honest Look"]

[Excerpts] The issue of whether to require the prime minister to be an elected official is being hotly debated today. But the fact is that the present constitution does not require the prime minister to be an elected official. The purpose is to prevent us from reaching a political "dead end." That would be bad for the country, because it would not be possible to form a government.

Some are demanding that the prime minister adhere strictly to the democratic line just like the civilized countries—unless there are hidden factors. But the fact is, none of the political parties won enough seats to form a government. Thus, they had to form a coalition government. These political parties could not agree on which party leader to appoint prime minister and so they reached a political dead end. They had to find a neutral person whom they felt could coordinate the interests and ideals of the various parties to head the government, which must take urgent action to solve the problems facing the country.

We support the principle that the prime minister should be an elected official. That is in accord with the democratic system. But our present political situation does not permit this. This is another factor that must be considered. However, having an elected prime minister is the goal that we should be trying to reach. Thus, the MPs must lay the groundwork for bringing about a perfect democracy. That is, they must try to revise the constitution to have an elected government. They must also find a way to keep from running into a political dead end.

11943
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VOTE BUYING IN PARLIAMENTARY POLL DESCRIBED

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 14 Aug 86 p 7

[Article by Kenphong Phonlakhon: "'Representatives' or 'Vote Buyers?'"]

[Text] On 5 August 1986, I read an article in MATICHON written by Professor Likhit Thirawekhin. He said that democracy in Thailand is improving. As evidence of this, he cited the fact that the Ministry of Interior stepped up public relations activities in an effort to persuade people to vote, that more party candidates were elected MP, that more use was made of the door-to-door campaign method, and that those elected had better qualifications. From this he concluded that democracy in Thailand is improving.

I think that he may have been trying to improve the morale of the people or the units concerned. But as a candidate who waged a campaign and suffered defeat, I want to express a different viewpoint in order to give readers a broader picture. But don't think that I am just being a sore loser. Because I am not at all sorry about being defeated.

What I am very concerned about is that in the very near future, our House of Representatives will be filled with "vote buyers." Candidates who had excellent qualifications, who ran an excellent campaign, and who have dedicated their lives to society but who did not buy people's votes lost their bid for election. I saw that with my own eyes. At least 70-80 percent of those who won election to the House this time bought votes. Few of these people campaigned or met with the people. All they did was print posters and put them up in the villages. Vehicles drove about announcing their names. And their party drilled their names into the people so that they wouldn't forget the names of the party's candidates.

At the same time, in the subdistricts and villages, they appointed 1 zone chairman [hua khanaen] for about every 15 votes that they thought it would take to win the election. For example, if they thought that they could win the election with 60,000 votes, they appointed 4,000 zone chairmen in the various districts. Each zone chairman was responsible for finding at least 15 people to vote for the candidate.

They distributed money to the people in the villages where they had appointed zone chairmen. They gave each family 10 baht. They recorded how many voters
there were in each family. After that, the zone chairmen kept in contact with
these families and carried on public relations activities. The candidates
rarely had to meet or talk with the people. Instead, they stayed at home
making plans. The zone chairmen were responsible for monitoring things and
seeing which candidates were the most popular. They kept the candidates
informed about which villages and subdistricts supported them so that more
money could be poured into those places.

About 3-4 days before the election, hundreds of pickup trucks and small trucks
transported sacks of money to the villages. They did this both during the day
and at night (but usually at night). This was done in order to ensure the
loyalty of those to whom they had already paid money or to buy more votes.
This time, they paid each person 20 or 30 baht depending on the strength of
the opposition.

On the night before the election, more money was poured into those places
where the opposition candidate was strong. Furthermore, on election day, zone
chairmen carrying baskets filled with money stood about the villages where the
polling units were located. They gave 30-50 baht to each of the voters
entering the polling place in order to get them to vote for the candidate.

In some districts, the zone chairmen paid people 5 baht apiece to ride in the
vehicle readied by the candidate. As they rode to the polling place, the zone
chairmen urged them to vote for the candidate alone. That is, they were asked
to vote for a single number in order to reduce the votes of other candidates
in the party. In such cases, they had to pay 50 to 100 baht per voter.

Thus, each of those who won this time had to pay at least 4-5 million baht to
buy votes in their constituencies. It was as if they were buying cattle or
buffaloes. Thus, instead of calling them "representatives," I prefer to call
them "vote buyers."

If parliament is filled with vote buyers, Thai politics will come to resemble
a "business." Those MPs who have invested large sums of money buying votes
will have to find some way to recover their investment and make a profit so
that they will have money to invest in the next election. When things reach
that point, will the word "democracy" have any meaning here? And the people
who will suffer will be the uneducated people.

I do not think that Thailand's democracy is improving. I think that things are
getting worse, not better. In my view, democracy in Thailand is afflicted with
cancer. And it could die very soon.

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NESDB OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON STATE FIRM'S INVESTMENTS

Bangkok NABO NA in Thai 4 Aug 86 pp 7, 10

[Unattributed report: "Sixth Plan Prohibits 70 State Enterprises From Investing More Than 170 Billion Baht"]

[Text] During the next 5 years, the 70 state enterprises will be prohibited from investing more than 170 billion baht. The maximum will be kept at the same level as during the period of the Fifth Development Plan. All projects must provide a return at least equal to bond rates. The wage system must be changed. Today, low-level state enterprise employees earn 55 percent more than government officials and employees in the private sector. But senior administrators earn 5-10 times less than their counterparts in the private sector even though they are responsible for assets worth billions of baht. The goal is to make this system more "suitable."

Last Friday at the auditorium of the Civil Service Development Institute, Mr Phisit Phakkasem, the deputy secretary general of the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, spoke about what will be done to develop the state enterprises during the period of the Sixth Development Plan. He said that the 70 state enterprises left today have increased investments to more than 300 million baht a year, which exceeds the national budget. The money spent by just seven of the state enterprises—the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, the Metropolitan Electricity Authority, the Provincial Electricity Authority, the Telephone Organization of Thailand, Thai Airways International, and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand [as published]—accounts for 75 percent of the money spent by all the state enterprises combined.

The debts of the state enterprises have increased 60-70 percent. These loans are guaranteed by the government. The state enterprises used to turn over 75 percent of their profits to the state, but this has now dropped to only 42 percent. They are using this money to increase investments. During the period of the Fifth Development Plan, the number of employees increased at a rate of 3 percent a year. Today, the state enterprises employ a total of 256,000 people. In most cases, there are surplus workers and so efficiency is low.

During the past 5 years, 59 state enterprises made a profit of 57 billion baht. This is a return-assets ratio of only 4.2 percent, which is below the
interest rate on government bonds. The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand had a return of 8 percent, the same as the Metropolitan Electricity Authority. As a result of investing in order to expand operations, the Provincial Electricity Authority had a return of just 2 percent. There were 18 state enterprises that were operating at a loss at the start of the Fifth Development Plan. Their losses totaled 2,292 million baht. By the end of the Fifth Development Plan, only 11 state enterprises were operating in the red, with losses totaling 2.1 billion baht. Two enterprises, the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority and the State Railway of Thailand, lost more than 500 million baht. The metropolitan and provincial water works authorities have adjusted their rates and developed their markets and so both are now operating at a profit.

State enterprise investment budgets have doubled from 89 billion baht to 170 billion baht. Most of the money has been invested in communications and energy. Of this, 76 billion baht was borrowed from abroad.

During the period of the Fifth Plan, many of the state enterprises adjusted prices on goods and services. In particular, some of those enterprises subordinate to the Ministry of Interior increased prices so high that this had an effect on private-sector business. For example, rates were increased on long-distance telephone calls, and natural gas and oil prices were raised. But subsidies declined from 10 percent to 7 percent of investment funds. In the future, the government will stand security for smaller amounts. The state enterprises will have to take loans at higher rates of interest just like private companies. In considering state enterprise projects, much attention will have to be given to the return on investment, because the interest will be high, too.

The debt servicing problem between the state enterprises has grown worse every year. The Petroleum Authority of Thailand is owed the most, 2 billion baht. Major debtors are the State Railway and the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority. Government units owe approximately 1.6 billion baht to state enterprises. The units that owe the most are the ministries of defense, interior, and public health. At the state enterprise board meeting held in July, a resolution was passed to have the Bureau of the Budget prepare a budget to pay off this debt within 3 years by repaying 500 million baht a year.

The state enterprises lack senior administrators. More than 86 percent are civil servants and soldiers. Five percent are retired government officials. More professional administrators should be found. The salaries and other benefits paid to employees are very large. The salaries of mid-echelon and low-level employees are 55 percent higher than those paid to government officials. And they are even higher than those paid to employees in the private sector. The rate for working overtime is 15 percent, and some are paid as much as 50 percent. But senior administrators earn three to four times less than their counterparts in the private sector. For example, the managing director of the Krung Thai Bank is paid only 50,000 baht per month. But the managing director of Bangkok Bank earns 500,000 baht per month. The governor of the Petroleum Authority of Thailand is paid 40,000 baht a month from revolving capital of 42 billion baht.
Mr Phisit also talked about the state enterprise policy plan that has been included in the Sixth Development Plan. He said that the main goal is to preserve financial stability. Caution must be exercised for at least another 3 years. We have to reduce foreign loans and increase domestic revenues. The size of state enterprise investments have to be limited. The quality and efficiency of management must be improved. Standard prices must be handled like a business. The state enterprises must be supervised and controlled more closely. The private sector must be encouraged to invest in these enterprises in stages. The rules and regulations must be revised to facilitate operations.

During the period of the Sixth Plan, state enterprise investments must not exceed 170 billion baht, the level at the end of the Fifth Plan. Investments must not exceed 11 percent of export revenues. The rate of return on investments must not fall below interest rates of government bonds, that is, 9 percent. Investments in on-going activities that can be handled better by the private sector must be reduced. There are several units that refuse to allow the private sector to play a role. They do everything themselves. Unnecessary benefits must be curtailed. Private-sector services, such as transport vehicles and hospitals, should be used instead. The government will reduce loan guarantees, particularly for projects not included in the policy lines of the state enterprises. Service charges must cover costs. Personnel changes and salary adjustments must be made as appropriate. Administrators must be given time to carry out their jobs instead of changing people every time the government changes. Changing the status of the state enterprises must continue. At present, preparations have been made to establish a committee to stipulate definite stages for selling shares, renting out operations, or granting concessions.

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CSO: 4207/311
EDITORIAL WARNS OF GROWING DEBT BURDEN

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 16 Aug 86 p 8

[Editorial: "The Country's Debt"]

[Excerpts] Before he was appointed deputy minister of finance, Dr Suphachai Phanitphak talked with reporters about some of the pressing problems. He said that one of the problems that disturbs him greatly is the country's financial position. More than 50 billion baht a year must be spent to service the country's foreign debt.

A country is like a person. If you have a lot of debts, you have to spend part of your income to pay the debts. And an important part of revenues comes from borrowing. That is, more money is borrowed to pay old loans. Thus, there is no way to get out of debt. You must remain a slave to loans.

Thus, we ask that the country stop borrowing money and pay its debts. We ask that the government review the large projects that will require borrowing billions of bath to see if it is really necessary to build such projects. If we don't build these large projects, for which future generations will have to help pay, will the country collapse? Can't we develop the country gradually by being frugal and saving?

The government talks constantly about being frugal. But its actions are never in accord with its words. In every instance, government projects always cost more than private projects. If the government thinks that a project will benefit the company of a national leader, it never hesitates to go ahead with the project. If the government stops doing things that way, the country's debt will decline and we won't have to worry so much.

11943
CSO: 4207/314
DEPUTY DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER PROFILED—Because the Democrat Party holds 100 seats, the election of an MP to the position of Speaker of the House, which is one of the first things on the agenda after parliament convenes tomorrow, will probably be won by the Democrat Party. A deputy party leader who is said to be suited to this position is Mr Krison Tantiphong, who was born on 12 March 1930 in Chiang Mai Province. He is the son of Mr Hiran and Mrs Thongsuk. He is married to Thong-in. They have two children. He attended Ketu Dara School, Yupharat Withayalai, and Prince Royal, all of which are in Chiang Mai Province. He once worked as the manager of a life insurance company in Chiang Mai Province. After that, he set up his own business selling native goods. He ran for election for the first time in 1957 as a member of the Democrat Party. He has won every election since then, including the recent election on 27 July. He served as the deputy minister of agriculture and cooperatives for about 10 days during the Seni Prem administration. He was appointed deputy minister of agriculture and cooperatives in April 1976. He was reappointed to that position in October that same year. He served as the deputy minister of industry in the Prem I administration. He did not hold a cabinet position during the period of the provisional government. His only position was deputy party leader. He would be happy to serve as Speaker of the House. [Text] [Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 3 Aug 86 p 4] 11943

ABOLISH SUPREME COMMAND IN PEACETIME—The position of supreme commander was created during the Indochina War. Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram held this position until he lost power. The question is, is it necessary to have a supreme commander in peacetime? It is essential to have a supreme commander in time of war. But in normal times, there is absolutely no reason at all to have a supreme commander. The RTA CINC, RTN CINC, and RTAF CINC can control their branches of service. The government should consider making this change. We feel that Admiral Supha Khotseni should be the last supreme commander. The position of supreme commander can remain, but it should be left vacant. Then, if it becomes necessary, someone can be appointed supreme commander immediately. But in peacetime, having a chief of staff officers to coordinate matters between the three branches of service is sufficient. [Editorial] [Excerpt] [Bangkok NNEO NA in Thai 13 Aug 86 p 4] 11943

ARMY SLOT UPGRADED—The army has upgraded a position within the Office of the Army Secretary. The position of assistant army secretary, which was a position for a colonel, has been upgraded to deputy army secretary. This is a slot for a special colonel. The position of assistant secretary will be abolished. It is thought that this will be announced officially next week. The matter has
already been approved by all levels. In 1983, in his capacity as RTA CINC, Gen Athit Kamlangek raised the rank of the army secretary from special colonel to major general. There was no deputy army secretary. There was only an assistant secretary. Now there will be a deputy secretary but no assistant secretary.

[Text] [Bangkok NABO NA in Thai 8 Aug 86 p 2] 11943

CSO: 4207/311
THAI POLICE: MOST ILLEGAL WEAPONS COME FROM CAMBODIA

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 21 Aug 86 pp 1, 16

[Excerpts] Police Maj Gen Phot Bunyachinda, the secretary of the Police Department, discussed the control and suppression of guns, war weapons, and explosives in accord with the policy of Gen Prachuap Suntharangkun, the minister of interior, who has ordered the Police Department to take quick action to control war weapons and prevent bombings at public places. He said that even though the Police Department has constantly worked to suppress this, the desired results have not been achieved. Thus, in order to achieve good results and increase efficiency, Police Gen Narong Mahanon, the director-general of the Police Department, held a meeting with the deputy and assistant directors-general of the Police Department, the commissioner of the metropolitan police, the commissioners of the police provincials 1-4, and the heads of the units concerned in order to formulate lines and measures concerning this matter.

Police Maj Gen Phot said that at the meeting, a work committee was established in order to consider ways to solve this problem. It is to submit its conclusions to the Police Department. Police Lt Gen Phao Sarasin and Police Lt Gen Sawang Thirasawat, the assistant directors-general of the Police Department, are the chairman and deputy chairman respectively.

Police Maj Gen Phot also said that the Police Department has formulated the following measures:

1. The possession and distribution of weapons will be controlled by controlling the stores that sell weapons to ensure that they do things in strict accord with the laws and regulations. This includes ensuring that they adhere to the import quotas and follow the regulations on storing and distributing weapons. In addition, the requirements for obtaining a permit to possess and use a weapon must be tightened. Such permits should be issued only when a person needs to carry a weapon for protection. This should be done to help prevent weapons from falling into the hands of other people. The permits of those who use a weapon to commit a crime or allow someone else to use their weapon to commit a crime will be withdrawn.
2. The flow of war weapons and explosives, of which large quantities have been found recently, will be blocked by focusing on the border areas and various other places discovered during investigations.

Police Lt Gen Sawaeng said that the committee is responsible for studying the spread of war weapons and other weapons to determine what the situation is like. For example, most of the war weapons come from Cambodia. Some come from Laos. They are sold to minority groups along the Burmese border in the north. As for the war weapons in the country, the locations and producers must be found in order to make recommendations, join forces, and coordinate things with the various units. This includes the producers or sources of the explosives. The committee must determine where these weapons come from in order to find a way to intercept them at the source.

11943
CSO: 4207/326
KHMER TROOPS LINKED TO WEAPONS TRAFFIC IN THAILAND

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 31 May 86 pp 1, 15

[Excerpt] A DAO SIAM reporter in Trat Province reported that navy Cpt Phanit Nainanan, the commander of the Marine Special Affairs Unit in Trat Province, learned that weapons traffickers were going to smuggle in a shipment of weapons from Cambodia and sell them along the border in Mae Sot District, Tak Province. He asked Police Lt Col Sorawut Hutawattana, the deputy police superintendent in Trat Province, Mr Sakprasot charoenprasit, the deputy district officer in Pongkan District, and Mr Phetcharat Chaumnak, the deputy district officer in Muang District, Trat Province, to cooperate in setting up a checkpoint near the border at Ban Tha Kum, Village 3, Tha Kum Subdistrict, Muang District, Trat Province. They set up the checkpoint at 0900 hours on 29 May 1986.

At 1930 hours that day, Cpt Phanit and the soldiers, policemen, and civilian officials who had set up the checkpoint saw a white Toyota pickup truck, license No Chonburi B-4419, with three men in it drive across the border into Thailand. They signaled it to stop. When the truck stopped, one of the men managed to escape. The police arrested the other two, who were identified as Police Master Sergeant Sutham Kinnari, age 33, a former squad leader attached to the Trat provincial police station in Muang District who was dismissed from government service in 1984 on charges of aiding a suspect, and Mr Champi Dibanthao, age 41, who lives at 49 Ban Nong Muang Subdistrict, Taphraya District, Prachinburi Province. The middle section of the truck had been modified for storing weapons. The compartment had been covered with a cloth. When they removed the cloth, the officials found 10 rounds of 40mm RPG ammunition, 10 bars of RPG propelling charge, 2 fuses, and 1 RPG tail. The suspects and evidence were turned over to Police Sublieutenant Winai Nutcha, the officer on duty at the Trat provincial police station in Muang District for further investigation.

During the interrogation, Police Master Sergeant Sutham confessed that he and his accomplices purchased weapons and ammunition from Khmer troops and sold them to Karen soldiers in Mae Sot District, Tak Province. They then used the money to purchase heroin, which was sold abroad. Police are looking for the man who escaped.
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES IN COMMERCIAL SECTOR DISCUSSED

Hanoi TIEN PHONG in Vietnamese 15-21 Jul 86 p 4

[Article by Xuan Nam (from an investigation in the Ha Bac circulation and
distribution sector: "Why Were They Fired?")]

[Text] Making Moonshine at the Song Thuong Hotel

The moonshine case at the Son Thuong Hotel in Ha Bac has stirred up things
around Bac Giang City. Customers discovered that 1,500 bottles of kahlua were
filled with moonshine. The alcohol had been mixed with coffee, and state
labels had been attached to the bottles. Many people who have purchased this
moonshine have written letters to NHAN DAN and the Ha Bac Commercial Service.

According to the deputy director of the commercial service, who is in charge
of the Ha Bac Market Control Unit, one of the principal culprits in this case
was Nguyen Thi Chuyen. When she was arrested, Chuyen said that she had
purchased the goods at a liquor production cooperative in Hanoi. Later, a
number of witnesses who knew Chuyen said that Nguyen Thi Chuyen had produced
the moonshine at her house. Many people had seen many trucks carrying bottles
stop at her house, but they didn't know why. What is surprising is that Chuyen
was not an employee at the Song Thuong Hotel. She worked as a cashier at the
Ha Bac Sundry Goods Corporation. She had teamed up with a number of hotel
cadres and employees to engage in this illegal activity.

From what we know, a number of other cases took place at the Ha Bac Sundry
Goods Corporation during that period. Five youths from the warehouse and
transport office stole 100 meters of cloth while transporting goods to a
customer. Their job was to protect the goods, but instead they stole goods.
There was also the case involving the warehouse custodian, Hoa. Hoa was
originally a commodity technician but was then transferred and made warehouse
custodian at the sundry goods corporation. Making use of the loopholes in the
records, Hoa connived with the accountant, Tuyen, to steal 600 meters of cloth
form his warehouse.

According to a report issued by the Ha Bac Market Control Unit during
the recent self-criticism and criticism campaign, about 10 percent of the
state store employees and cadres in the Ha Bac circulation and distribution
sector violated discipline and had to be fired or transferred out of the

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sector. In this sundry goods corporation alone, more than 10 state store employees and personnel have been dismissed.

We talked with Nguyen Cong Bo, the director of the sundry goods corporation, where a large number of serious offenses have taken place recently. He said that "our shortcoming is that we have handled things too loosely. We don't know where the cadres go or what they do. We have not maintained strict control. This has made it possible for negative phenomena to occur."

Are There Any Deeper Causes?

When he was arrested, warehouse custodian Hoa cried and said: "I was a commodities technician. But because I couldn't define the service motives, when I was made warehouse custodian and came in contact with the commodities, I couldn't control myself. I saw only the immediate rewards and forgot about my future. I am very sorry."

Even before she entered the commercial sector, state store employee K's motive was to "make money." K used to work as an accountant at a state construction corporation. K did everything she could to secure a transfer to the commercial sector, because she thought commerce was "lucrative." After she became a state store employee, K connived with private merchants in order to sell cloth and cigarettes on the outside and profit from the price differential. After her arrest, she was dismissed and forced to return to her native area. Nguyen Thi K told another worker in the sector that "I took the wrong path. I aimed for the wrong target. I didn't think."

Because their motive in entering the circulation and distribution sector was to make money, these people engaged in corruption when they came in contact with the commodities and money. In many instances, the collectives have given reminders and contributed criticism to state store employees prior to their dismissal. But they refused to correct their mistakes. They found ways to handle this and looked for even cleverer ways to steal things. An example is H, a state store employee who sold meat. H put a few extra pieces of lean meat on the scale in order to increase the weight. But when he gave the meat to the customers, he did not give them all the meat.

When working with us, a cadre in the commercial sector told us that selecting people to work in the commercial sector is not done well. They are not selected carefully and so a number of people who want to "make a profit" enter the sector. They are like insects that bore holes from the inside. Many of those who have been fired got into the sector because of "knowing someone." They were the children of "this man" or "that woman" in the sector. For example, Nguyen Van D was the son of a service director; Chu Van H was the nephew of the head of an organization office; and Nguyen Thi H was the daughter of a store manager.

We talked with Do Van Phuong, the secretary of the integrated commercial corporation youth union. This corporation has the best record in the Ha Bac circulation and distribution sector in terms of number of violations committed by youths. From working with this youth union, we learned that the reason why this youth union has the best record is that it emphasizes educating its
members and regularly carries on a struggle within the sector. Education is coordinated closely with other control measures. The youth union here put forth a good state store employee management measure and received support with this. This measure uses state store employee control coupons. Each state store employee is issued a control coupon consisting of five squares. Each square corresponds to a disciplinary form publicly disclosed at the stores in order to inform the customers. If an employee commits an offense, one of the squares is punched. If all five are punched, that state store employee is disciplined severely. The customers have welcomed this, because they have the right to make suggestions to the control board in "punching the coupons" of the state store employees.

Do Van Phuong confided that the "commercial environment is a 'muggy environment.' Here, the struggle against negative phenomena takes place every day and every hour among the youth union members. Although we have taken this resolute action, there are still youth union members, and even youth union chapter secretaries such as state store employee H, who violate discipline."

At a number of other corporations in the sector, the union's educational activities are very loose. Many youth union members said that the youth union mobilizes members to work overtime loading and transporting commodities. Few worthwhile activities are organized. Union activities have been organized only a few times, and the activities have been worthless. The union does not educate people or struggle against those who engage in negative phenomena.

From the moonshine case at the Son Thuong Hotel to the fact that 10 percent of the state store employees and cadres, of whom two-thirds are youths, have been dismissed or transferred out of the circulation and distribution sector, urgent problems for the sector's youth union are, as a corporation youth union secretary said, ideological education and control. These must be carried on regularly and seriously using a variety of forms in order to improve the youth union members' concept of support.

This clearly shows that it is essential to change the management mechanism and support formulas and strengthen market management with the aim of putting a stop to negative phenomena in the circulation and distribution sector, a very active front today.

11943
CSO: 4209/819
HA TIEN DEVELOPS PRODUCTION OF EXPORT GOODS

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 25 Jun 86 p 2

[Article by Mai Thanh: "Ha Tien Develops Export Goods Potential"]


Why did Ha Tien undergo such a great transformation in mobilizing export goods?

Affirming that the strengths of the districts were agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry, and services, the Ha Tien district party committee adopted policies to make appropriate investments in developing the sectors and trades and in exploiting the district's potential and strengths. Ha Tien, the number-two district in the province (after Phu Quoc), has a pepper area which yields approximately 30 tons, in 1985 signed contracts with the villages to purchase pepper and mobilized nearly 10 tons of pepper in the district, nearly one-third of its total pepper output. Although that figure did not fulfill the requirements, in comparison to previous years it represented a positive transformation.

In addition to pepper, Ha Tien is also capable of mobilizing cashew nuts for export. In 1984 Ha Tien mobilized 25 tons of cashews, the greatest amount ever. Although Ha Tien's land area is large, more than 70 percent is mountainous land and wasteland. That undeveloped area is capable of growing industrial crops with export value, such as cashew nuts, pepper, etc.

In addition to purchasing export goods in the province, Ha Tien has also expanded joint operations and alliances and has invested step by step in developing sources of export goods, exploiting the existing potential, and contributed to balancing the district budget.

Building on the results of 1985, in 1986 Ha Tien received the norm of mobilizing 15 tons of pepper and 40 tons of cashews. By the end of May 1986
Ha Tien had mobilized more than 15 tons of pepper, 25 tons of cashews, and many new products with export value, such as 76 tons of watermelons, more than 33 tons of leather, nearly 4 tons of cotton and cotton seeds, etc.

In order to ensure the victorious attainment of the 1986 norms, since the beginning of the year the export goods supply corporation has cooperated with the agricultural sector in surveying the existing pepper and cashew areas, while at the same time drafting preliminary plans in order to have plans for investing in long-range development. Furthermore, the corporation has stepped up the signing of contracts to purchase products and has supplied materials in advance to peasants in pepper-growing areas, applied a rational purchase price policy, sold goods on an exchange basis, etc. At present the district is preparing to plant 20 additional hectares of pepper in the villages of Thuan Yen, Binh Yen, Binh An, and Duong Hoa. With regard to cashews, the district is also planning to invest in about 100 additional hectares in 1986, concentrated in the villages of Vinh Dieu, Binh An, Hoa Dien, and Kien Luong. If the district carries out that plan, within a few years it will not only have several thousand hectares of pepper and tens of thousands of hectares of cashews, but will also contribute to restoring the district's ecological environment and transforming wasteland into areas which grow the various kinds of industrial crops and further increase the sources of export goods.

In addition to mobilizing export goods in the localities, the export goods supply corporation has also imported a quantity of materials and goods, including steel, insecticides, diesel oil, cloth, soap, MSG, etc., in order to meet part of the consumption and production needs in the district. Ha Tien has also boldly imported the various kinds of medicine which are not yet produced in Vietnam in order to serve the people in the district.

Although it is still very young in comparison to the other production sectors in Ha Tien, the export goods supply sector has made definite contributions to balancing the district budget and to promoting the production of industrial crops which are appropriate to the soil in Ha Tien and which for a long time have been only potentialities.

5616
CSO: 4209/768
MORE READERS OFFER IDEAS FOR FORTHCOMING PARTY CONGRESS

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 7 Jun 86 pp 1, 4

[Contributing Ideas to Party Congress column by Bay Kham of Dien Bien Phu, 3rd Precinct: "'Profit-and-loss' in the Task of Organizing Cadres"]

[Excerpts] Since 5 April 1986 your newspaper has been printing a wide variety of ideas from the people, as many as 2-3 letters a day.

I have paid more attention to the task of organizing cadres because if we have good and very capable cadres, we can fulfill anything.

During the French colonial rule, all public and private offices, companies, and stores owned by the French or foreigners in the Saigon-Cholon area had been calculating very carefully the good of employing people. Any newly hired employee usually had a probational period of 3 months and would be paid higher wages if he did his work brilliantly, paid the same wages as the contract indicated at the beginning if he did it correctly, and fired if he did not do a good job.

It seems that we have lately failed to calculate to see whether our cadres would deserve the pay scales they are getting. We do not make calculations because we operate under the mechanism of bureaucratic centralism and state subsidies—profit and loss is a matter of concern for the state only. We do not figure out how many cadres make profit for the state. How many cadres make the state compensate for the losses they have caused. Which one, profit or loss, is greater.

In my opinion, from the economic standpoint, the total number of cadres who make the state compensate for losses is many times larger than that of the ones who make profit for it. This is one of the important reasons leading to our country’s present economic difficulties.

A director working for a classical or modern theatrical group must have spent a few years to learn his professional skills; a head of an office in charge of organizing cadres may not have learned much and, as a result, often do things in a very unconventional manner while placing cadres in various positions. On the other hand, he may do things unconventionally because of class affiliation, localism, selfish interests, or indirect directives from
his superiors suggesting that certain positions be given to relatives of important persons.

To do work related to cadres today must be very different from what used to be because the historical background of the two stages was very different. For instance, we can say that during the 9 years of resistance against the French in Nam Bo very many cadres had to rely on state subsidies, but these subsidies had been inexpensive because only daily allowances for food were given. In zones 8 and 9, every two or three people working on some assignment had just one motor boat to use. Very many cadres used "family expenses" and "relatives' allowances." The only losses involved those who had been fighting the enemy and then sacrificed their lives, and sometimes had lost their guns. The Saigon-Cholon Special Zone had been totally free of rumors about any cadres being corrupt or having stolen public properties.

We have just talked about the organization in relation to cadres, and now let us talk about cadres in relation to the organization.

In the past, in the Shuo Tang story, Cheng Yao Jin had been king for 3 years and then decided to give up his throne because he felt he had not deserved it as much as somebody else would have. In our time, in Cuba when the economic situation encountered difficulties, Fidel Castro offered his resignation and proposed to the masses that they should appoint another person to hold the office of the premier. But the Cuban people were wise enough to know that there could be nobody as talented as Fidel Castro and thus unanimously reelected him. We can say that Fidel Castro is a progressive man who knows his times and does not want to cling to his position. Queen Mother Yang Yun E in 979 did not keep the Ding Dynasty throne for her son, Ding Hui, 6, but instead turned it over to the top military commander, Li Wan (i.e., she abdicated in favor of Li Wan and then assumed the position of regent).

In our country today, nobody has ever offered to resign or to change his position by reason of capabilities, knowledge, or revolutionary morality.

Those who are in charge of organizing cadres do not behave the way a director of a classical or modern theatrical group does—to choose actors through their actual acting and to replace them on the basis of capabilities. Those who organize cadres promote them without checking and doing any follow-up work; if these cadres are capable, the state will benefit from their work, but if they cannot do their job well, the state will suffer from their inefficiency.

The revolutionary cadres and party members who have good qualities must "strike a labor balance of your own"--how much you are paid, what work you can do, the state which pays you gets a profit or has to compensate for a loss. In your village, subward, precinct, district, province, or municipality, how many people make profits in favor of the state's expanded reproduction (C.V.M. in political economy), how many people make the state compensate for losses. The "political officers" of villages, subwards, precincts, and districts must know the cadres who make profits and the ones who require compensation of losses in order to do economic accounting. The matter cannot be left to society as a whole to take care of. Or it cannot be a matter of passively accepting whatever happens to be—profit or loss.
If one has done a good job for the revolution, one should be rewarded; on the other hand, there is no reason to promote people to being chiefs if one knows they lack the knowledge and capabilities necessary for such positions, and in many cases even lack the morality of party members.

Because we do not practice profit-and-loss accounting, we certainly deserve suffering from losses, being poor, and encountering difficulties!

5598
CSO: 4209/723

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AN GIANG CARRIES OUT SELF-CRITICISM, CRITICISM

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 30 Jun 86 p 3

[Party Building column: "Self-Criticism and Criticism Experiences in An Giang"]

[Text] Deficiencies Must Be Realized, But the Important Thing Is To Correct Them

Self-criticism and criticism in the basic party units in An Giang Province during the recent period have demonstrated that places in which the basic party units and party members, especially the key leadership cadres, do a good job of preparing their self-criticism reports, are sincere, tell the truth, are explicit about their deficiencies and the reasons for them, and propose good corrective measures, create an enthusiastic, sincere atmosphere internally and the masses contribute opinions about party building. For example, the party chapter of Vinh Hoa village in Phu Chau District had long-standing problems to which it had not paid much attention. The masses dared not contribute opinion. In the course of self-criticism and criticism the chapter told the truth about its deficiencies and remaining problems and the masses boldly contributed opinions about the party chapter, the key comrades, and the party members. For example, the masses contributed the following opinion: the party chapter secretary lacked a sense of responsibility in leadership, allowed rice to die and the harvest to be poor, allowed public security policemen and guerrillas to arrest innocent people, and allowed cadres to do as they wish and sell goods to private merchants instead of bringing goods back for the people. There was a lack of internal solidarity, bad people were allowed to do so they wished, and new party members were admitted without soliciting the opinions of the masses. The deputy secretary sold POL, MSG, and machinery parts to take advantage of price disparities in order to build up financial reserves instead of serving the people. Just after he entered the party he was close to the masses and visited the people, but when he became deputy secretary he was arrogant and said, "I'm not accustomed to drinking rice alcohol, only beer." In the course of that self-criticism and criticism campaign 5 of 23 comrades voluntarily asked to be disciplined and the party chapter agreed.

In Vinh Thuan village (Chau Thanh District) the party chapter adopted the policy of lending 550 hectares of 10th month rice land in order to collect
land rent. After carrying out self-criticism, and because of the opinions contributed by the masses, the party chapter realized its errors and took corrective steps. In Can Dang Village (Chau Thanh District) the masses contributed the following opinion: the party chapter secretary hired servants and farmed land in many different places. The party secretary strictly admitted his deficiencies and voluntarily asked to be disciplined.

The masses were also very enthusiastic when the cadres and party members boldly criticized themselves, were allowed to contribute opinions about party members, and were able to speak about everything they were previously reluctant to speak about. When they saw that the cadres and party members accepted the criticism and promised to overcome and correct their deficiencies and mistakes, the people forgave them and requested the party to be lenient in disciplining them. The people sincerely said, "If you had realized your deficiencies earlier it would have been better for us."

Meanwhile, in some places, such as Phu Hung Village in Phu Tan District, self-criticism and criticism were not carried out well. When criticizing themselves before the masses the key comrades did not make good preparations and the party chapter secretary had a bad attitude and sought revenge against people who made criticisms, including party members in the party chapter, which resulted in the masses not daring to contribute opinions and seldom saying anything.

There was the bad phenomenon of cadres, workers, and civil servants in the economic sectors, especially in the commercial organs, not boldly contributing opinions. The masses were reluctant to criticize their bosses and were afraid of being subjected to harassment and revenge, or of losing their jobs at a time when the number of employees was being reduced. The main reason was that adequate attention had not been paid to the cadre work, the mastership right of the cadres, workers, and civil servants had not been brought into play, and the relationship between the organ leadership committees and the mass organizations was not yet good.

The standing committee of the An Giang Provincial Party committee realized those thing and guided the district party committees, the party chapter committees, and the key cadres in repeating or supplementing self-criticism and criticism which did not meet requirements. Twenty-three basic party units in the districts had to repeat their self-criticism and to solicit opinions from the masses. The provincial party committee directly guided the self-criticism and criticism in the basic party units and paid attention to correcting deficiencies.

Practical Revolutionary Activities

Nearly all of the basic party chapters in An Giang province have essentially completed the first self-criticism and criticism cycle.

The present self-criticism and criticism campaign has shown that in places with good guidance the masses contributed opinions to the party chapter, all key cadres and party members were very sincere and frank, and even contributed opinions about corrective measures. In the village and subprecinct party
chapters there are still many complicated problems, serious violations of the collective mastership right of the working people, bureaucracy, commandism, aloofness from the masses, and problems regarding the leadership and guidance of the district party committee. The self-criticism and criticism campaign also demonstrated that the task of building and consolidating the basic-level party chapters and party committees is an extremely urgent matter at present.

Ten districts and cities and 50 percent of the provincial sections and sectors at the provincial level submitted opinions to be provincial party committee to be included in the draft of its self-criticism draft. The standing committee of the provincial party committee is soliciting opinions to supplement its self-criticism draft, so that it can be submitted to the coming conference of the provincial party committee, and reply to the opinions that have been contributed. With regard to cadres who took advantage of their authority to buy high-quality goods at low prices in many places, or who used housing contrary to standards, such goods and housing were resolutely confiscated.

The summer-fall season concluded with nearly 80,000 hectares, according to plan, and 70,000 hectares of 10th month rice, which was 82 percent of the plan. There were 18,035 hectares of subsidiary food crops, an increase of 2,837 hectares over the 1985 summer-fall season. Mung beans increased especially rapidly, to 8,050 hectares (a 460 percent increase). At present there is a serious shortage of phosphate fertilizer and insecticide, which are supplied by the central echelon in insufficient quantities. Although the province has made maximum efforts to provide them, they are still inadequate.

The winter-spring rice mobilized amounted to 185,445 tons, which was 82 percent of the plan norm and 95 percent of the amount at the same time last year.

The province is concentrating its guidance on the functional sectors to rapidly receive manufactured consumer goods from the central echelon and obtain additional ones in order to continue to exchange them for rice, and is endeavoring to attain 200,000 to 250,000 tons during this year's winter-spring season.

During the past week market prices in An Giang did not undergo notable change. The spring-summer subsidiary food crop harvest is in full swing. The period of shrimp mobilization has begun. The standing committee of the provincial party committee fully understands the conclusions of the Party Central committee regarding prices and salaries, and on that basis has drafted a practical action program and is determined to gradually stabilize the local economic-social situation and fulfill obligations to the state.

5616
CSO: 4209/743
EMPLOYEE FIRED FOR CRITICIZING DIRECTOR

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 1 Jul 86 p 3

[Article by NHAN DAN reporting team: "A Case of Revenge Against a Person Who Criticized the Director"]

[Text] A Letter of Denunciation

On 26 June 1986 the newspaper NHAN DAN received a letter from an accounting cadre of the Hai Hung Apiculture Corporation, accompanied by a denunciation of the misdeeds of the corporation director. The letter's contents were as follows:

"To the editorial board of the newspaper NHAN DAN:

"My name is Tran Thi Ngoc. I work in the financial office of the Hai Hung Apiculture Corporation. I recommend that the editorial board of the newspaper NHAN DAN examine for me the following unjust matter:

"By reading the newspaper NHAN DAN we learned that our entire party is carrying out a self-criticism and criticism campaign, in which the opinions of the masses on building the party are solicited. On 28 May 1986 Cao Van Than covered seven members of the party chapter of the corporation's financial office to evaluate party members and criticize the corporation's party committee and director. I was one of three people who expressed opinions, with the following contents.

1. On the organizational work:

Bui An Tinh, the director and secretary of the party committee, took advantage of his position to bring his children and brothers into key positions. He assigned them as follows:

His oldest son was appointed head of the scientific-technical office.

His second son was named deputy head of the corporation's organization-administration office.

His daughter was placed in charge of sales receipts and materials receiving and shipping invoices."
The daughter-in-law of the wife of the second son was brought in from a rural area to be a typist.

His nephew was named deputy head of the financial office.

Another nephew was named deputy head of the accounting and supply office.

An uncle was employed to keep the keys to the warehouses.

A nephew was put in charge of the materials and products warehouse.

A nephew and a sister-in-law were put in charge of the secondary products processing element of the office.

A cousin was appointed as a department supervisor.

The two drivers were his cousins.

2. The special preference and rewards-punishments systems regarding cadres and workers.

A. Rewards: When he went to purchase cloth to be used in making awards, he announced that anyone who was an advanced worker would receive a pair of pants or a shirt, but when he distributed the awards, things were far different. For his children, grandchildren, brothers, and other relatives, he wrote a memo for the administrative to issue them a complete suit or a pair of pants. The other workers, who were not relatives, received only a shirt, and some people got nothing at all, although they had been elected advanced workers.

B. His son, who was in charge of the honey extractor, was ineffective and harmed the organ's materials. He was also in charge of the alcohol distillation machine. But the casks of alcohol were turned into water because he had previously sold casks of alcohol into which he had poured water. His daughter colluded with the deputy supervisor of the processing department to steal liquor belonging to the organ. The director was aware of those things but forbade the people in authority to report them.

3. The party development work.

His children had the above-mentioned deficiencies and caused the plan not to be fulfilled. He had a fifth son who had an arrogant personality and took advantage of his connections, but the director brazenly brought him into the party without seeking the opinions of the mass conference. Within a year after starting to work at the corporation, his nephew, who had accomplished nothing, was also admitted into the party. Meanwhile, when other party chapters recommended the admission of good members of the masses he disagreed.


Several years ago he went to the south to make a deal with a private merchant to make ointment from water buffalo hides and the bones of various kinds of animals, so that he could take it north and sell it by the ounce or bottle
under the "Son Duong Honey Ointment" label, with a picture of a goat. Thus customers thought that it was truly goat ointment and bought a good deal of it.

Honey is the corporation's principal product. However, it only harvests about 20 tons a year. He obtained honey from an organization which had obtained it from people in Le Chau and Hong Nam, then mixed sugar water with real honey to attain the figure of 40,000 to 50,000 tons, thus fulfilling the plan and adding to his prestige. The organs which bought the corporation's honey found out about its poor quality. The Central Honey Corporation analyzed the money and refuses to buy Hai Hung honey as a matter of conscience and because it is aware of its quality.

The quality of its fruit liquor and wine is even more unacceptable. The director was proud of thinking up the trick of diluting the liquor with unboiled water, which saved the corporation tens of tons of coal a year. According to regulations, the liquor should be 30 proof, but in fact it is only 25 to 26 proof. The excess liquor was "consumed" by the director and his sons.

5. Abuse of authority.

He abused his authority as director to sign contracts with private merchants in the south and lent them money belonging to the organ. Meanwhile, the organ had to pay interest to the bank.

6. Assisting bad elements.

The director helped bad elements steal from the Hai Phong Glass Factory tens of thousands of bottles, which they sold to him at the price of 10 dong (old money) each. During the recent Tet period he sold them for 50 dong each. Because his daughter did the invoicing and selling for the organ, he could easily doctor his books. She did one invoice for the organ's bottled liquor and a separate one for his bottles. He collected the money for his bottles immediately, but the money for the organ's bottled liquor has not yet been paid. When will the corporation collect the money for that bottled liquor?

7. Taking advantage of and managing state capital and property.

He himself advanced a total of 100,000 dong (new money) belonging to the organ and owed his customers more than 300,000 dong. As a result, there is no surplus in the organ's bank account. The workers haven't been paid in months.

8. Every year he forces the units to pay him tribute in money and products. When he took goods out of the warehouse he said that he was going to given them as gifts, or sell them to obtain money to buy refrigerators, radios, etc., to give to the upper echelon! But he bought a refrigerator from Mr. Bich, who was a sales agent for the corporation, then sold it elsewhere and put the money in his own pocket. He did not give it to the upper echelon. He was involved in all kinds of schemes to make a lot of money. Not only that, but during the recent Tet he had much money and let his children take time off from working at the organ to buy gold and motorbicycles. One of them
had three morbicycles. Among the father and his two children there six or seven motorbicycles, the sound of which reverberated throughout the city.

On 2 June, i.e. 5 days after the party chapter convened a meeting to obtain the opinions of the masses who criticized the leadership, I was ordered by the director to stop work, i.e. I was fired.

On-the-Spot Investigation

One day after I received that letter, on the morning of 27 June, a NHAN DAN team of reporters immediately departed for Hai Hung and went to Hung Yen city, the location of the Hai Hung Apiculture Corporation, to carry out an on-the-spot investigation.

When we arrived at Hung Yen City we immediately went to meet with Miss Ngoc and her family, and met with the secretary and deputy secretary of the Hung Yen City Party Committee, the two deputy directors, a number of cadres and workers of the Hai Hung Apiculture Corporation, and a number of retired cadres in that city.

The opinions of everyone, including the standing committee of the Hai Hung City Party Committee, were in accord with the criticisms in accord with the criticisms in Mrs. Ngoc's letter.

We also learned that Mrs. Ngoc's was a captain in the People's Army that two of her brothers were killed in war, and she was the mother of four small children.

Director Tinh brought a total of 16 children and other relatives into the office of the provincial apiculture corporation and of a total of 35 cadres and employees.

In the disciplinary decision issued on 6 June 1986 and signed by director Tinh said, in Article 1, "Miss Tran Thi Ngoc, an accounting cadre with the financial office of the Hai Hung Apiculture Corporation is disciplined by dismissal because she opposed the resolution and decision of the corporation to transfer her."

The reason for dismissal given in the decision was entirely incorrect. We learned that:

In October 1985 director Tinh said to deputy director Can Van Than and the head of the corporation's financial office that he wanted Mrs. Ngoc to do accounting work at the Chi Linh breeding farm. She explained her family circumstances, that she had four small children, and asked the deputy director and the head of the financial office to intervene on her behalf. Finally, Mrs. Ngoc was allowed to remain at the corporation office to do accounting for the secondary production department. After that Mrs. Ngoc continued to work contentedly and the deputy corporation director told us that there had never been a decision to transfer Mrs. Ngoc, and that therefore she did not "oppose a decision to transfer her."
The deputy directors, the party committee members, and the head of Mrs. Ngoc's office realized that the decision to dismiss her was incorrect and encouraged the director to immediately withdraw that unjust decisions, but Bui An Tinh disregarded them and went ahead with his decision. The same day he issued the decision to dismiss Mrs. Ngoc, director Tinh sent an employee of the administrative office to cut off the rations, even the food rations, of Mrs. Ngoc and her children. Director Tinh also ordered the protection personnel to forbid Mrs. Ngoc or members of her family to come to the office, and to announce that everyone was forbidden to have anything to do with Mrs. Ngoc. According to Mrs. Ngoc, director Tinh also regarded her as a "bad element" and threatened to "deal with a number of others after dealing with her."

A Serious Mistake

By investigating the actual situation at the basic level, and from much specific evidence, we see that many of the negative phenomena on the part of the director of the Hai Hung Apiculture Corporation that were brought out in Mrs. Ngoc's letter were correct, and that there were some things that were even more serious. The decision to discipline Mrs. Ngoc manifested the evil of the "family rule" by director Bui An Tinh (his second son drafted the decision, his daughter typed it, and the father, i.e. director Bui An Tinh, signed it), the despotism and arbitrariness of director Tinh, and his seeking revenge against cadres.

Our team of reporters noted that there were many negative acts by the director of the Hai Hung Apiculture corporation. Within the scope of this article we have not dealt with matters having to do with his economic and property management, but have only concluded that it was true that director Bui An Tinh carried out revenge against Mrs. Ngoc during the recent self-criticism and criticism campaign. That was a very serious mistake and was contrary to the directives and circulars of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee with regard to self-criticism and criticism.

While we were in Hai Hung investigating that revenge case we learned that the Standing Committee of the Hai Hung Provincial Party Committee had just directed that director and party committee secretary Bui An Tinh immediately issue a decision allowing Tran Thi Ngoc to return to work.

We believe that allowing Mrs. Ngoc to return to her job is insufficient, but that the improper acts of director Tinh must be dealt with appropriately.

From the criticisms of Mrs. Ngoc and the results of the initial investigation, we can see that there were many negative phenomena with regard to director Tinh's economic management. We recommend that the Hai Hung party committee and people's committee, and the competent party and state organs, carry out an investigation and promptly reach conclusions about the negative acts of the director of the Hai Hung Apiculture Corporation, promptly administer strict and fair discipline for the improper acts, and inform the people by means of the newspaper.

5616
CSO: 4209/743
TURNOVER RATE AMONG YOUTH UNION CADRES REPORTED

Hanoi TIEN PHONG in Vietnamese 15-21 Jul 86 p 5

[Union Activities column by Dao Quan: "S.O.S."]

[Text] Implementing Resolution 26 of the Political Bureau on strengthening the youth movement, youth union activities, and the youth movement in Nam Dan District, Nghe Tinh Province is making many new changes.

Along with organizing emulation movements for youths, the Nam Dan district union is giving attention to perfecting the organization, concentrating on solidifying the weak bases, building union bases in the "empty" places, and strengthening the three youth branches in the Catholic area.

In particular, the Nam Dan district union recently conducted a very interesting and useful sociological survey on the turnover rate among union cadres. The following are a few specific figures and a few observations and proposals:

In 1983, 11 of the 24 village union secretaries in the district, or 45 percent, changed jobs.

In 1984, 10 of the 24 village union secretaries, or 42 percent, changed jobs.

In 1985, 13 of the 24 village union secretaries, or 51 percent, changed jobs.

During the first 6 months of 1986, 15 of the 24 village union secretaries, or 61 percent, changed jobs.

In 1983, 283 of the 461 union chapter secretaries, or 62 percent, changed jobs.

In 1984, 315 of the 462 union chapter secretaries, or 68 percent, changed jobs.

In 1985, 360 of the 462 union chapter secretaries, or 77 percent, changed jobs.
During the first 6 months of 1986, 210 of the 462 union chapter secretaries, or 46 percent, changed jobs.

Thus, on the average, there is a complete change of village union secretaries every 2 years and of union chapter secretaries every 8 months.

Reasons: A number of cadres are promoted, some go to attend school, and some are transferred to new positions. For example, during the 1st quarter of 1986, of the 676 people who left to fulfill their military obligation, 210 were union chapter secretaries.

Observations: Union cadres are good models in fulfilling their military obligations.

The turnover rate among union cadres is too rapid. This has affected the union movements at a number of bases.

Union cadres are maturing. This must be recognized.

Proposals: In order to ensure that the union bases and youth movements are maintained well at all times:

The material base must be strengthened for the schools that train union cadres in order to train people and promptly provide talented union cadres for the bases.

The turnover rate among union cadres in Nam Dan is very rapid. But what about the other bases? The situation is better at other bases, but this is a warning. Plans must be made to remedy this situation in time.

11943
CSO: 4209/819
CONCEPT OF 'EVERYTHING FOR THE PEOPLE' DISCUSSED

Hanoi DOC LAP in Vietnamese 9 Jul 86 p 2

[Article by Tao Hoai: "For The People"]

[Text] The slogan "Everything for the people" was emphasized at the 27th Congress of the CPSU. In general, recently people have dealt with the "factor of man." Sometimes the matter is stated specifically--"Everything for the people's lives"--and sometimes it encompasses a "human strategy." Some people ask why, since a socialist regime is evidently intended to serve the people, is it necessary to set forth the slogan "for the people"? But actual life is not that simple. A considerable number of people are always saying "for socialism," "for the party's policy," or "for the state plan," but in their actions they are seldom truly "concerned about people." At times the reverse is true: they forget that the content and final goal of policies and plans is to serve the people.

What does "for the people" mean?

When, in the course of the people's daily life, they go to a state store to buy rice but receive only rice mixed with husks and sand, or when at night the electricity goes out just when they are ready to eat and they find matches to light a kerosene lantern but strike several matches without getting a flame, or when workers who live on their monthly salaries anxiously await payday but the people who pay the salaries are arbitrary and pay them anytime they see fit, etc., and if with regard to such necessities of daily life alone such a way of working and way of serving" is allowed to exist over a long period of time, how can we say that that is "for the people"?

"For the people" means above all meeting the people's needs, including both their material and morale needs, needs which are extremely varied and continually expanding. To meet those needs it is of course necessary to develop social production. If production falls short there will no way to fully meet the needs of society, but even when there is much production that does not necessarily mean that the right needs of society have been made, if there is no spirit of truly being concerned for the people. At times the warehouse is full of goods but the people still lack items used in daily life. There are even instances of "coercion in buying and selling," such as in the case of state retail clerks who, because they are only concerned with
fulfilling their plans, pressure customers who buy one thing to also buy something else, or of state restaurants which pressure customers who order one dish to also order another. Sometimes the development of production adversely affects the lives of the people, especially when corruption pollutes the environment, such as a rock-crushing installation that was set up in the midst of a highly populated area. It machinery ran noisily and there was thick dust all day long, with no consideration for the people's health or tranquility. There have even been such unreasonable things as cadres holding back production labor because they fear the people will become rich and that "private ownership" will develop.

At a high level, "for the people" means developing their personalities and creating conditions for them to develop harmoniously and comprehensively, in correct accordance with communist ideals. The purpose of social management is to create social-economic conditions for people to increasingly realize their potential. On the one hand, it is necessary to clearly realize that in the present era, when the production forces are developing at an increasing rate against the background of the scientific-technical revolution affecting the social revolution, in socialist management there is not only the problem of developing technology to increase labor productivity and improve quality and production effectiveness, but also the parallel problem of regulating to a maximum degree all physical, psychological, and intelligence capabilities and even the people's aesthetic taste, with an extremely complicated technical system, especially concern for creating favorable conditions for forming a personality that is harmoniously developed and liberate man from heavy, inconvenient, or tedious labor in order to bring into play man's creativity. Furthermore, under the light of modern ecology, it it necessary to pay special attention to opposing both the physical and moral pollution of the environment and maintain and improve a social-natural environment that is wholesome, pure, and favorable for the development of man's personality. In that sphere, something worthy of attention is that it is necessary to be concerned with the ecological education of the people to cause everyone to be fully and profoundly aware that their daily acts and worthily contribute to determining whether that environment (including the family environment) is good or bad, positive or negative, and that "prosperity" or "calamity" depend in part on their own acts.

5616
CSO: 4209/827
OFFICIAL EXPLAINS REASONS BEHIND RICE SUPPLY PROBLEMS

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 7 Jun 86 p 4

[Article by Nguyen Thi Thi: "The Municipality's Grain Sector Changes the Way To Distribute Rice, Ensures Supply of Rice to All Recipients"]

[Text] Editor's Note: Recently SAIGON GIAI PHONG has received letters from many readers offering various ideas about supplying rice to different recipients, about rice prices, quota criteria, method of distribution, and so on adopted by the municipality's grain sector. We have forwarded them to Nguyen Thi Thi, director of the Municipal Grain Corporation, and requested an answer to our readers from her. Here it is, an answer from Nguyen Thi Thi.

In recent months the supplying of rice to people in the municipality encountered many difficulties. Rice was not sold on schedule, in proper quantities, and on time. Some stores still "owe" the people the rice they were supposed to get in the last month, which will be sold this month. This has been due first of all to a serious lack of balance in prices between the industrial and agricultural sectors. Since prices had not created a proper encouragement for producers, difficulties were encountered in making purchases and mobilizing grain. With guidance provided by the Municipal CPV Committee and Municipal People's Committee, the municipality's grain sector was trying to work closely with provinces in order to get paddy and rice from them in accordance with the norms set by the Ministry of Food and to quickly ship it to the municipality. But so far results have been limited because the people's committees of those provinces have been encountering difficulties themselves as they are short of materials to exchange with farmers for their paddy.

In such a situation, rice prices presently are somewhat higher than before. The fact that rice is sold at higher prices while wages of workers and civil servants, and the income of working people, have not increased has created more hardship in the daily life of the working people. We totally sympathize with you but we cannot do things differently. The reason is that only appropriate purchase prices of grain can encourage farmers to grow rice and bring grain prices somewhat closer to those of handcraft products sold to farmers. We hope you would sympathize with rice producers who now encounter many difficulties in connection with agricultural materials.
In order to stabilize rice prices, in the time to come, we must together untie this knot. With the materials and handicraft products provided by the central administration and with the municipality's efforts, we must increase the quantities of industrial, small industrial, and handicraft products, as well as export goods, that are sent to the provinces; along with the latter jointly resolve problems; and achieve two-way exchanges with farmers in order to get hold of paddy and rice.

In the present difficult situation, the municipality's grain sector has been doing its best to ensure supplying different recipients with grain and to maintain and keep rice prices from rising. However, as we serve you, we still have shortcomings: Some stores and sales centers still have a poor sense of responsibility and an inadequate concept of service, cause inconveniences, and make people waste their time. The quality of rice, which is not offered in many varieties for the people to choose from, sometimes is poor; after delivery rice is stored rather than sold immediately; the attitude toward purchases and sales is far from good; and the questions the people have raised are not explained in a clear and thorough manner. The fact that some rice stores recently provided incorrect answers have made many cadres, workers, and civil servants understand that the corporation has reduced the rice quotas. These shortcomings were the results of bureaucratic centralism and state subsidies being very serious and affecting the way work was done. Our corporation honestly admits these shortcomings and is determined to overcome them early so as to serve you better. Our corporation hopes you would understand, offer your constructive ideas, and verify and control our stores and sales centers in terms of rice quality and compliance with price discipline (in accordance with the price list authorized by the State Price Commission). We believe that with your concern and assistance based on a constructive spirit, the grain sector will quickly overcome shortcomings and properly fulfill the task of taking care of our people's living conditions.

About the sales of grain in the time to come, we would like to bring the following points to your attention:

- In compliance with Notice No 200/LT issued on 23 April 1986 by the Financial Service in conjunction with the Municipal Grain Corporation and defining the formula for selling grain and the procedures for granting allowances to compensate for rice prices to cadres, workers, and civil servants and their dependents, the grain sector strives to ensure full distribution of grain based on the quotas set for cadres, workers, and civil servants and on the 9 kilograms/per person to be granted the working people in the municipality.

- Because the management capabilities of rice agents and the work area are both limited, if these agents are assigned sales for 6-12 different quota levels, their bookkeeping will be very complicated. Therefore, the lady agents are selling rice for only 2 quota levels: 13 kilograms to cadres, workers, and civil servants, and 9 kilograms to dependents and working people at the uniform price of 8 dong/kilogram.

In order to give those people who are entitled to more than 13 kilograms (who can get price-compensation allowances at the rate of 3.8 dong/kilogram) the opportunity to buy more rice, the quantity of rice above 13 kilograms will be
written on their rice coupons. Those who need to buy additional rice can bring these coupons to any rice sales centers and buy rice at the price of 8 dong/kilogram. (If they want to buy a better rice variety, they can pay the difference and get it.) If they do not need to buy additional rice, they can spend the money given to them as price compensation on other things. These price-compensation allowances are provided only once by the financial sector for their convenience.

- Precinct and district wounded soldiers-social services offices make a list of the people under their management who are entitled to allowances, such as retired and disabled cadres, wounded soldiers, persons having done good work for the revolution, and dependents of dead heroes. These lists made in duplicate show downwards in alphabetical order and are brought to precinct and district finance offices to get allowances for rice-price compensation based on wages. These allowances are paid once every quarter so that recipients would not have to travel many times to these offices.

- As for the families having few members and elderly people, precinct and district grain stores and sales centers will try to sell rice and other processed grain products to them right in their localities.

Some people have raised questions about the average-sales method and asked why a child less than a year old and a child 15 or older both are entitled to 9 kilograms/month. Let us answer them as follows: The rations and compensation allowances that workers and civil servants are entitled to are set by the state. As to the working people, the average-sales method of selling 9 kilograms/person is aimed at letting them use one ration to cover another. In a family having an infant the mother can eat more in order to have more milk for it; in a family having more grown-up children, they can use the rations of the younger ones. While the grain situation remains difficult, this is a rational temporary way to solve the problem. For the time being, we must move toward gradually using other processed grain products in the place of rice to raise the nutritional value of our meals, making our meals richer, and reducing the costs of fuels and labor on the part of women in families.

In order to contribute to this, the Municipal Grain Corporation is trying to open additional sales centers in hamlets and to increase the number of processed grain products available to serve the people better. In the present situation, we suggest that people consume rice in a more economical manner and gradually change their meals by using other grain varieties. We believe that in the time to come, with the attention of the Ministry of Food, the close leadership of the Municipal CPV and People's Committees, and the wholehearted assistance of the Mekong delta provinces, the municipality's grain sector will try hard to ensure satisfying the people's grain needs.

5598
CSO: 4209/723
TWO BANK OFFICIALS ACCUSED OF MISDEEDS

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 26 Jun 86 p 3

[Article by "M.C.": "On Negative Incidents in the Leadership Board of the Precinct 11 Bank"]

[Text] According to information we have recently received, the Precinct 11 party committee has issued a document dismissing the party chapter secretary and recommending the administrative warning of Mr Ngo xuan Thiem, deputy director of the Precinct 11 Bank. As for the case of Mr Ngo Tan Thanh, former director of the Precinct 11 bank (prior to February 1986), Precinct 11 and the Municipal Bank are coordinating to ascertain the facts and will take disciplinary action in the near future.

Both of those people committed the crime of abusing their authority to act contrary to the management principles of the banking sector by lending money and paying money out of sentiment and for personal benefit.

Mr Ngo Xuan Thiem had been deputy director of the Precinct 11 Bank since the end of 1982. During the period between September 1984 and September 1985, due to the common difficulty with regard to cash throughout the city the Precinct 11 Bank adopted the policy of only paying cash to the production and commercial installations in accordance with a set schedule. Mr Ngo Xuan Thiem was authorized by the bank's board of directors to make the payments. Abusing his authority, he many times gave "priority" to a number of installations by making cash payments that were not in accordance with the set schedule. Specifically, on 31 May 1985, the day fixed for monetary payments to the state sector, Mr Ngo Xuan Thiem ordered the personnel to cease making payments to a number of state units in order to give "priority" to cashing eight checks valued at 1.8 million (old money) for small industry-handicraft installations with which he was on good terms. It is noteworthy that five of the checks were cashed on an "urgent" basis between 1100 and 1130, during a period that it would temporarily suspend payments so that it could clear up internal documents. The urgent nature of the cashing of those checks was also manifested in the fact that the customers were paid at the receipts window. That was contrary to principles because payments must be made at the payments window.
During the money exchange in September 1985, Mr Ngo Xuan Thiem also took advantage of his authority to write a note to a money exchange table in Precinct 11 which ordered that "priority" be given to a small industry-handicrafts installation. That violated the money exchange policy, of which such a banking cadre as Mr Thiem could not but have been aware. In addition to his violations of principles there are certainly other matters which the responsible organs must investigate further.

The case of Mr Ngo Tan Thanh was more complicated. During the same period, between September 1984 and September 1985, Mr Ngo Tan Thanh was assigned as acting director of the Precinct 11 Bank. In that capacity, Mr Thanh had full authority to approve loans or to give priority to installations in making cash payments.

One of corporations to which Mr Thanh gave "priority" in providing assistance was the General Retail Commercial Corporation of Precinct 11. At the end of the fourth quarter in 1984 the corporation signed a contract to sell goods to three units of Cuu Long Province, the Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone, and the central aquatic products export sector. All three commercial transactions had to be settled in cash (as requested by the seller). The goods were worth millions of dong, a sum of money which according to principles and its capabilities the Precinct 11 Bank could not provide.

In view of the urgent need to control the sources of goods, the board of directors of the General Retail Commercial Corporation of Precinct 11 took the initiative of going to meet Mr Thanh and recommend that the bank take steps to overcome that problem. In the process of drafting a plan to borrow capital, the two sides secretly negotiated to achieve mutual benefit. Thanks to the perspicacity of Mr Thanh, the Municipal Bank provided the General Retail Commercial Corporation of Precinct 11 the capital to carry out the three above-mentioned commercial transactions. The capital was later repaid as scheduled. Keeping its promise, the General Retail Commercial Corporation "showed gratitude" by paying Mr Thanh and the precinct bank money deducted from the bonus fund for the corporation's purchasing personnel, at the rate stipulated by the unit—0.2 percent of its income. According to a report by the corporation, that "gratitude" money, which was given directly to Mr Thanh or via the head of the credit office of the precinct 11 bank, totalled 88,500 dong (old money), and was paid in many payments. On the part of the Precinct 11 bank, in the document sent to the People's Organ of Control of Precinct 11 only confirmed that three payments, totalling 51,000 dong, of which Mr Thanh received 26,000 dong, were received from the General Retail Commercial Corporation. According to Mr Thanh, that money was not recorded in the books but was spent directly to buy ornamental mirrors for the bank's offices.

Mr Ngo Tan Thanh was also implicated in a number of instances of accepting bribes in the course of approving loans, which are being investigated and verified by the People's Organ of Control of Precinct 11. The evidence that has already been presented is sufficient to affirm the arbitrary nature and the degree of violation of bank principles by Mr Thiem and Mr Thanh. According to an evaluation by the Precinct 11 Bank, those incidents have caused a lessening of confidence between the customers and the bank, which cannot be calculated in the form of figures. In Precinct 11, more than 1,000 accounts of the production installations, including some units with the
largest small industry-handicrafts accounts in the city. The bad acts of Mr Thiem and Mr Thanh have caused customers to think that they must "play the game" to fulfill their production needs. That is contrary to the policy of the board of directors of the Municipal Bank: "Customers are the creditor and the bank is the borrower."

Thus what was the reason for the negative acts at the Precinct 11 Bank. Taking advantage of the fact that the bank was always short of cash and could not meet the installations' needs for loans, people with positions of authority in Precinct 11 abused their authority for personal profit. The case of Mr Ngo Tan Thanh was a model with regard to profit-seeking. After actively "intervening" so that the General Retail Commercial Corporation of Precinct 11 could receive its loan entirely in cash, Mr Ngo Tan Thanh requested permission to buy a 14-inch NEC color TV from a frozen foods export enterprise (which was also a customer of the Precinct 11 Bank). Three days after receiving permission to buy the TV, Mr Thanh asked the General Retail Commercial Corporation to sell him one. The corporation immediately sent a car to take a TV to Mr Thanh's house and returned to him its profit of more than 8,000 dong (May 1985). When he was asked about that, Mr Thanh gave a rather simple reply: "That was a legitimate transaction. If he doesn't like an item the purchaser has the right to sell it." If the seller and not been a customer of the precinct bank and if Mr Thanh had not given "priority" to helping the General Retail Commercial Corporation, would Mr Thanh have found it so easy to buy a TV? In the case of the loan to the General Retail Corporation Corporation of Precinct 11, if there had been no "secret" negotiations between to two sides would Mr Thanh have actively urged the Municipal Bank to make the loan to the corporation?

Here it is necessary to state a rather delicate problem: at present the relationships between the customer units and the bank is not yet one of equality. When requested to comment on the bank with which they do business, nearly all request the reporter not to give their names because they fear the bank will cause them trouble in the future. That explains how the negative acts at the Precinct 11 Bank could have gone undetected for 2 years. Investigations of other incidents encounter difficulties because many witnesses to bribery ask to remain anonymous or remain silent.

The banking sector's cadre management regulations are also a matter worthy of attention. The negative acts by Mr Ngo Tan Thanh and Mr Ngo Xuan Thiem have been confirmed but both are still on the job (they have only undergone initial proceedings with regard to the party). That causes much confusion among the customer units. When investigating that matter we learned that the reason why Mr Thanh and Mr Thiem are still on the job is that only the General Director of the Central State Bank has the authority to demote, dismiss, or manage cadres at that echelon, and that the municipal echelon could not do so.

Because of the negative acts at the Precinct 11 Bank, the Municipal Bank believes that the following steps must be taken:

Positively encouraging the Central Bank to change the sector's operational rules so that they can be appropriate to the present economic situation, with
special attention to resolving at the source the problem of rationally making loans and cash payments.

Creating and widely applying equal relationships between banks and their customers, and creating conditions for customers to participate in overseeing the banks' activities.

Closely coordinating management and supervision by the organ quadrumvirates and bringing into play the collective mastership right of the cadres, workers, and civil servants.

A matter that should be pointed out is that the workers' inspection committee and the mass organizations of the precinct bank took the initiative in uncovering and struggling against both negative acts by Mr Ngo Xuan Thiem and Mr Ngo Tan Thanh.

5616
CSO: 4209/768
RENOVATION OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT DISCUSSED

Hanoi DOC LAP in Vietnamese 9 Jul 86 pp 2, 5

[Article by Le Hong Tam of the Vietnam Social Science Commission: "Thoughts on Renovating Economic Management"]

[Text] At present we are studying and applying the party resolutions on renovating economic management. In that very important, but also very new and important sphere, it is extremely useful to research the documents approved at the 27th Congress of the CPSU relevant to that matter.

The 27th Congress of the CPSU set forth the mission of raising economic management to the level of the new missions and affirmed that the new economic missions cannot be fulfilled if the economic mechanism is not profoundly reformed and there is not created a complete, effective, and flexible management system that permits the fuller use of the capabilities of socialism. It is necessary to carry out a fundamental reform the true nature of which is to enable all production to serve needs of society and satisfy the needs of all people, and to orient management toward increasing effectiveness and quality, accelerate scientific-technical advances, heighten the concern of workers and civil servants for the results of their labor, and bring into play the initiative and socialist commercial mind in all aspects of the national economy, especially in the labor collectives.

The viewpoints and contents of the missions of reforming economic management and fully utilizing resources in economic development of the CPSU include many points which are in accord with the resolutions of the Vietnam Communist Party with regard to eliminating the bureaucratic centralism-state subsidy management mechanism, correctly implementing the principle of democratic centralism, and completely changing over the economy to economic accounting and socialist commerce, on the basis of planning and making productivity, quality, and economic effectiveness the yardsticks for measuring all economic activities.

Those resolutions are being studied and experimented with in actual situations. There have been initial accomplishments, as well as missteps and mistakes, which are being analyzed and corrected, with determination to apply comprehensive measures and make solid progress in the spheres of strengthening the administrative management of the state economy at all levels, ensuring the
autonomy of the economic units in production and commerce, renovating planning, and implementing economic accounting and the price, financial, and salary policies. The use of existing resources, the improvement of product quality, and economizing in production and consumption, are being emphasized and are beginning to be applied to perfecting measures management, stimulation of the economy, and administration, education, and law.

In studying the renovation of management in accordance with the resolutions of the VCP, in the realm of theory and within the ranks of the leadership cadres it is very clear that, as affirmed by the CPSU, it is necessary to begin with transforming consciousness and abandoning imitative thought and actions. It is now more important than ever necessary to rely on science. We must base ourselves on the requirements of life in reviewing a number of concepts and theoretical viewpoints.

Something that is especially useful for us is the criticism of the CPSU regarding the baseless nature of the viewpoints that under the socialist regime the appropriateness of production relations and the nature of the production forces is all but automatically ensured. It is correct that the socialist production relationships create the capability to broadly develop the production forces. But if that is to be accomplished it is necessary to continually perfect the production relationships, i.e. to promptly uncover the outmoded business methods and replace them with new methods. Criticizing the widespread viewpoint of regarding all changes in the management mechanism as moving away from socialist principles, the CPSU has stressed that the highest principle for evaluating the task of perfecting management and the entire system of socialist production relations, to accelerating economic-social development and the consolidation of socialism based on actuality.

With regard to socialist ownership as the foundation of the socialist regime, the CPSU made a profound interpretation with a practical significance, which has rich contents and encompasses a system of varied relationships in using the means of production and the results of production, in distribution between individuals, collectives, sectors, and national regions, and even the sum total of economic benefits. The complexity and complexity of those relationships demand that there be a certain combining, and continuous guiding, of those factors, especially because they are constantly changing. If those new theoretical concepts are not fully understood it will not be possible to make correct decisions and it will thus be possible to set forth timely measures to create an attitude of true mastery with regard to socialist ownership.

On the basis of that interpretation, the CPSU believes that words alone are insufficient to teach workers an attitude of mastership, to enable them to become increasingly more concerned with making better use of and increasing social wealth. The attitude of mastery with regard to socialist ownership is formed first of all by the actual conditions, in which people mature, and by the capability of man to influence the method of organizing production, distribution, and the enjoyment of the results of labor, and thus further develop the system of socialist self-management in the economy. That system heightens the role of the labor collectives in using social ownership in accordance with the principle of the enterprises and federations bearing full responsibility for ensuring that operations are profitable. The state is not
responsible for the commitments of those collectives. The labor collectives must bear full responsibility and must be concerned with further increasing social wealth, and the increase or decrease in wealth must be reflected in the income levels of everyone in the collective. That is the true nature of the system of economic accounting and of an attitude of truly mastering the nation on the part of the workers and the worker collectives. It will be necessary to apply the full strength of the law and society's condemnation of people who steal public property, even small items, and people who abuse their authority to engage in corruption.

The CPSU has also affirmed that in adjusting the socialist ownership relationships it is necessary to ensure the absolute superiority of benefit to all the people over benefit to the sectors and regions. The ministries and the local organs are not the owners of the means of production but are only state management organs which are responsible to society for the effective use of the people's wealth. Therefore, partialism and localism cannot be allowed to impede the full utilization of the superiorities of socialist ownership.

The matter of cooperative ownership has also been further clarified. That capabilities of that form of ownership have not yet been fully brought into play in socialist production and in fully satisfying the people's needs. Therefore, wherever there are needs it is necessary to go all-out in helping form and develop the enterprises and cooperative organizations, especially in the spheres of producing and processing products, building houses and creating gardens, and in the service and commercial spheres.

With regard to the important matter of the relationship between goods and money, the CPSU has emphasized that the time has come to eliminate prejudice and not to disregard its role in the actualities of planned economic management. To negate the importance of the positive nature of the goods-money relationship vis-a-vis increasing the people's concern for the results of their labor and the results of production is to weaken economic accounting and bring about other adverse consequences. And vice versa, the wholesome activity of the goods-money relationship on a socialist basis can create an atmosphere and commercial conditions in which economic effectiveness will be entirely dependent on the quality of collective labor and on the understanding and initiative of the economic leaders and managers.

As people engaged in economic research, we are also coming to grips with those matters. For that reason, when presenting in an abbreviated form the interpretation of the CPSU on those matters we want to say that they are matters which are very new and are extremely useful for our work.

5616
CSO: 4209/827
READER COMPLAINS OF DIFFERENT ELECTRONIC GOODS PRICES

Hanoi DOC LAP in Vietnamese 9 Jul 86 p 13

[Readers Write column: "Why Have Prices of Electronic Goods in Ca Mau City Not Been Unified?"]

[Text] Recently the price situation in Ca Mau City (Minh Hai) has become increasingly complicated. Prices have changed continually, with the tendency to steadily increase. The phenomenon of competition in buying and selling (even by organs without commercial functions), which has caused the prices of many goods to become even more chaotic. In the same area a product sells for many different prices, which causes confusion among consumers with regard to the value of goods. That situation is manifested most clearly with regard to such imported goods as radios, cassettes, and Honda parts.

The Cultural Products Corporation of the Minh Hai Culture-Information Service was formed with the mission of dealing in the various kinds of cultural products. However, the corporation's prices are not unified, especially the prices of electronic goods. The same kind of cassette player sells at three different prices in three different stores. At the store on Le Loi Street a Rising radio-cassette model 7070 sells for 30,600 dong, at the cultural products department store (near the Ca Mau market) the price is 30,800 dong, and in Bac Lieu City the corporation's store sells it for 27,000 dong. When customers enquire about that, all employees in the stores reply that the prices are set by the corporation. Those considerable price disparities have created opportunities of which dishonest merchants have taken advantage and corrupted cadres. An investigation showed that a store had six or seven machines for sale for which it did not have invoices from the corporation. It is extremely important to maintain strict price discipline in the present situation. The Provincial Price Commission and the cultural products corporation must investigate and correct that lack of uniform prices, while strengthening the management of goods and prevent the situation of bringing in goods from the outside to sell.

5616
CSO: 4209/827
DISTRICT'S PORK-BUYING EFFORT LAUDABLE DESPITE DIFFICULTY

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Jul 86 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Cac: "Purchasing Pork in Tu Loc"]

[Text] Tu Loc is a district in the key rice and pig region of Hai Hung Province. Each year, Tu Loc regularly has the most amount of grain mobilized in the province, some years mobilizing 28,000 tons of paddy. The food obligation has long been a way of life and every year Tu Loc completes the plan. The stable level of mobilization for the past several years is 1,800 tons (with 1,459 tons designated for the central government). In 1984, Tu Loc mobilized 1,916 tons of pork, including 1,537 tons for the central government. In 1985, it mobilized 1,975 tons, delivering 1,600 tons to the central government. Entering 1986, Tu Loc District, despite many difficulties in cost and the chaotic market, still maintained the tradition of contributing to the state. In just 5 months, Tu Loc District has delivered to the province and central government 705 tons of food, exceeding the plan norm for the first 6 months of the year by 55 tons of pork. In this, mention must be made of the emergency mobilization drives in April and May. Phase 1 of the plan assigned 100 tons of pork and 133 tons were achieved; phase 2 assigned 108 tons and 152 were achieved. In both phases, Tu Loc delivered 285 tons of pork, equivalent to 118 percent of the food mobilization plan for the second quarter of 1986.

Like other places, the pork management and purchasing effort in Tu Loc has encountered many difficulties and complications. Tu Loc has solved this difficulty by connecting pigs with rice, rice with pigs district wide, each cooperative and each cooperative member family. Everyone clearly understands that for intensive cultivation of rice to get higher more pigs must be raised to have both fertilizer for the crops and an additional source of food. The Tu Loc District Party Committee and People's Committee affirm that to buy a lot of pork the entire district must raise many pigs. Obviously then, the livestock raising movement is the factor determining the volume of food production and the level of the food contribution to the state. Tu Loc has some 70,000 pigs. The volume of pork production is approximately 3,000 tons per year. In addition to the amount of pork consumed by the raisers, the requirement for the trade sector is to manage
and procure approximately 2,000 tons, including approximately 1,500 tons for delivery to the state and the remainder to support requirements on the spot.

Through many years of satisfactorily procuring pork, those doing the food mobilization task in Tu Loc have acquired valuable experience. We have had leaders of the district trade service state: to manage and purchase pork well, one must solve two basic problems -- stimulate the growth of livestock raising and deal relatively satisfactorily with the interests of the raisers, and have a unified pig management and purchasing mechanism district wide.

Since 1985, procurement of pigs has been increasingly difficult without the food obligation system. Many sectors, organizations and units bring money and material to hustle purchase of pigs. The livestock raising sector frequently sells pigs to whomever offers the higher price. In the face of this situation, the district people's committee has clearly defined the functions and responsibilities of each sector, standardized the pig purchasing formula, and assigned the pork mobilization plan to villages and cooperatives. District and village cadres and trade cadres have explained to the people that, like a grain of rice, pigs are the strategic product of the locality and of agriculture. The state should manage to meet the needs of the armed forces and the workers in industrial regions and large cities. The district stipulates that sectors and organizations buying pigs go through the trade sector. For pigs which have had owners managing the purchasing, the situation of avoiding buying and selling no longer exists. Management of the pork marketplace is getting on the right track. Food stores and marketing cooperatives in villages are buying pigs for slaughter; opening 70 stalls selling pork at stipulated prices. In the town areas of the district, each day organizations slaughter 6 quintals of pork, satisfying the consumer needs of the people. The entire district has only several private merchants slaughtering pigs but is managing them according to general stipulations.

The district is instructing cooperatives to set aside fully 10 percent of the volume of grain production for livestock raising. With this percentage, Tu Loc will have approximately 9,000 tons of paddy each year, which could produce approximately 1,200 tons of pork, excluding that set aside for sows, cattle and ducks. This is the primary source of pork set aside for food mobilization. The villages of Dong Ky, Ngoc Son, Nghia Hung, Gia Khanh, Hong Hung, Quang Nghiep, Dai Hop, Quang Phuc, and Hung Dao have satisfactorily used the amount of paddy set aside for livestock raising, frequently completing the food mobilization plan with volumes of from 30 to 60 tons.

The district trade corporation is improving pig procurement methods by means of purchasing volume contracts which are tied to salary scales with bonuses accruing monthly and quarterly for purchasing cadres. Buying many pigs means high income; failure to
meet the purchasing norm means low wages. Each purchasing cadre is in charge of two villages and each store buys pigs in from five to seven villages. Purchasing cadres promise the date and weight of the pigs, settle with cooperative members, and turn over to the state third hand, avoiding waste and loss. Quarterly and semiannually, the corporation reviews and awards units and individuals that satisfactorily mobilize food. Because the market is in price turmoil, the corporation, with the guidance of the district people's committee, is setting aside extra money and goods for people buying pigs to cut losses. In the first quarter of 1986, the corporation set aside more than 1 million dong to pay 3 dong more for each kilogram of pork sold to the state, a small amount but a high effort by the district for the livestock raiser.

In the present situation, the purchasing of pigs is still fraught with many difficulties. Many times when buying pigs there is a shortage of money and goods and the livestock raiser must be owed. Many times the corporation cadres must go to each village apologizing to the people because money or goods have been owed for so long. These difficulties and entanglements the trade sector alone cannot solve. The district party committee and people's committee have encouraged sectors (e.g., planning, finance, banking) which have considerable dong, to actively contribute. The people of Tu Loc also clearly see that the state has many difficulties in money and goods. Bringing the tradition of a patriotic homeland into full play, the people have determined that selling pigs to the state, despite a price lower than the market, is the contribution of a citizen to the fatherland, the masses to the party. The people of Tu Loc still lead in fulfilling the grain obligation, the military obligation, and the food mobilization obligation to the state.
SHRIMP RAISING IMPORTANT ADJUNCT TO AGRICULTURE IN MINH HAI

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Jul 86 p 3

[Article by Duy Dai: "Effective Formulas for Raising Shrimp in Minh Hai"]

[Text] The favorable natural characteristics of the fatherland's extreme southern region has given Minh Hai the country's leading marine product potential. In this, shrimp is the front running product which is processed into one of the locality's strategic export items. The export value of the province's marine products in 1981 was only 2,215,000 dollars, rising to 12-15 million dollars in the last several years. Of this, frozen shrimp accounts for between 80 and 90 percent.

Minh Hai's shrimp output is obtained from two sources: shrimp that is raised and shrimp that is obtained naturally. Every salt water, fresh water and brackish water breeding area of Minh Hai is rich in food for shrimp. The highest year for output in Minh Hai was 20,000 tons of shrimp, primarily obtained naturally. In recent years, the shrimp raising movement in Minh Hai has developed strongly in all three sectors: state, collective, and family. Output of raised shrimp accounts for up to 30-40 percent.

The experiences of models specializing in raising shrimp, raising shrimp in coordination with afforestation in Nam Can and Ngoc Hien, and with growing rice in Long Dien Dong K (Gia Rai), and raising shrimp and fish in coordination with producing salt on the Bac Lien seashore, in coordination with restoring pineapple forests destroyed during the war, etc., have been widely accepted throughout the entire province. With the raising area more than 50,000 hectares, which ranks second after the area growing rice, the province is becoming the largest shrimp raising area in the country.

The area specializing in raising shrimp and raising shrimp in coordination with afforestation is the popular model in the saltwater-inundated forest area of Nam Can, which consists of the districts of Ngoc Hien, Dam Doi, and Cai Nuoc. Introducing shrimp for raising in this area has brought twofold results: provided shrimp for export and stopped the destruction of forests through slash and burn of upland fields, introducing thousands of
hectares of previously destroyed forests to shrimp raising and reforestation. Ngoc Hien is the district with the largest shrimp-raising area in the province -- more than 20,000 hectares. In Dam Doi District, the raising of shrimp for export in inundated forests on the seacoast is becoming the second occupation after rice production. Annually, in addition to obtaining shrimp naturally, Dam Doi sells to the state more than 1,000 tons of shrimp for export. Cai Nuoc District has restored the shrimp area famous during the two wars of resistance against France and America in Sao Luoi, more than 2,500 hectares. Shrimp raised in salt-water-flooded areas is very valuable and includes dozens of different types. In addition to the famous "the" shrimp and blue "cang" shrimp, there is also the "su" type of shrimp, which averages from 5 to 10 shrimp per kilogram. Sometimes two may weigh a kilogram. This type leads in value for export compared with the types of shrimp raised in Minh Hai. This shrimp-raising area gives the highest output, 300 kilograms per hectare annually. In some places the output rises to 2,000 kilograms of shrimp and fish per hectare annually, with the percentage of shrimp being relatively high.

Raising shrimp in coordination with growing rice, a fairly unique production model in our country and throughout the world, has become fairly widespread in marshy, muddy areas along the river banks of Minh Hai. This type of farming can produce high economic results immediately and, at the same time, can gradually restore sulfate soil to fertile soil for high output.

In Long Dien Dong K, Gia Rai District during the America-puppet era, there was inactivity around salt water, marshy fields and people were poor and starving the year round due to routine crop failures. Since introducing the new, short-term, high-yield variety of rice, which is sown and transplanted during the rainy season, and taking shrimp larva from fresh and salt water for shrimp raising until it rains again and the rice is plowed, the shrimp-rice cycle has turned Long Dien Dong K into the province's most bountiful region currently. In addition to the area specializing in rice cultivation with 4.5 tons per hectare each year as well as obtaining 300 kilograms of shrimp for export, there are fields getting 1,000 kilograms of shrimp per hectare. This model thus far has expanded to virtually all of the marshy areas of the districts of Gia Rai, Dam Doi, and Thoi Binh, raising the rice-shrimp area from 800 hectares to 5,000 hectares and putting it on the springboard to vigorous expansion.

In the Dong Hai, Vinh Hau state farm belonging to the Bac Lieu seashore region, a rice monoculture previously existed. Every year capital was lost and the life of the cadres and workers was fraught with many difficulties. In recent years, the state farm has grown rice and produced salt in coordination with raising shrimp and fish and has had profits of millions of dong. It had been the habit of the people in the Bac Lieu seashore region to produce salt only during the six sunny months of the year. During the 6 months of the rainy season they would live an
itinerant life going from place to place and working for hire to eke out an existence. The present salt-shrimp production model has become widespread from the Bac Lieu sea to Gach Hoc with thousands of hectares, bringing economic effectiveness and creating additional products for export while creating more jobs for people producing salt throughout the months of the rainy season.

In areas of barren land resulting from the bombing and chemical agents which destroyed thousands of hectares, pineapples are again being planted in coordination with raising shrimp and fish, bringing high economic results. While newly-planted pineapple forests do not yield products, shrimp and fish exist under the shade of the pineapples from the very first year.

Presently, Minh Hai is building new models such as the Nam Can and Song Dac marine products joint venture, is investing in the building of shrimp-raising villages such as Vien An Dong in Ngoc Hien and the Ganh Hao-Ho Rui seashore in Dam Doi, which are becoming joint venture economic clusters, is linking up with sectors in the central government and in Ho Chi Minh City, and is opening up fast directions and building the province into the country's largest marine products raising, fishing, and processing location in which shrimp is the front-running export item, befitting its tremendous potential.

6915
CS0: 4209/746
HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

VIETNAM

PHO CAO REPEATER STATION BROUGHT INTO OPERATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 30 Jun 86 p 1

[Article: "Hai Hung Brings Into Use Pho Cao Repeater Station and 110KV Hai Duong-Pho Cao Transmission Line"]

[Text] Hai Hung Province recently brought into use the Pho Cao repeater station, with a transformer capacity of 25,000 KVA and the 110KV electrical transmission line from Hai Duong to Pho Cao, which is more than 30 kilometers long. The project was carried out jointly by the central and local levels, with the assistance of Soviet technicians.

In cooperation with Electric Power Corporation No 1 (of the Ministry of Electric Power), for the first time the electricity grid construction corporation and water conservancy construction corporation of Hai Hung successfully constructed the station's foundation, a machinery building, and a 110KV electrical transmission line, and ensured technical standards and the construction rate. The provincial electricity grid construction corporation was responsible for constructing the 110KV electrical transmission line, with 141 poles, seven of which cross a river and a marshy area. The total evacuation volume was 115,000 cubic meters of earth and nearly 1,000 cubic meters of concrete were poured. The provincial water conservancy corporation was responsible for constructing the foundation, which involved the excavation of 6,700 cubic meters of earth, the pouring of 3,100 cubic meters of concrete, and for the construction of hundreds of square meters of machinery buildings, housing, and work buildings for workers. Phu Tien District contributed tens of thousands of bricks and thousands of work days to that project. In the construction process, the two provincial corporations applied many innovations to improve production techniques and saved millions of dong for the state.

The Pho Cao repeater station and the 110KV Hai Duong-Pho Cao electrical transmission line have begun operations and served the irrigation and drainage of water for agricultural production in Kim Thi and Phu Tien districts, and are providing part of the electricity for production and consumption in Hung Yen City.

5616
CSO: 4209/743
HO CHI MINH CITY DEVELOPS LIGHT INDUSTRY

Hanoi DOC LAP in Vietnamese 9 Jul 86 p 4

[Article: "Ho Chi Minh City Stimulates Development of Individual Production, Family Production, and Secondary Family Trades"]

[Text] The decision of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee on encouraging individual and family handicraft production and secondary family trades has received the attention, sympathy, and response of the city's people.

Over a period of more than 5 months nearly 1,000 households, most of them families with skills and raw materials, or have conditions for receiving capital or raw materials sent by relatives abroad, requested permission to register to produce. However, although the people were prepared to organize production but they are still confused about a number of specific problems in the course of earning their livings along those lines.

On the basis of the spirit of resolutions 6, 7, and 8 of the Party Central Committee and the recent draft resolution of the Political Bureau, the Committee of Ho Chi Minh City recently promulgated a guidance document for the individual and family handicraft producers and the secondary family trades. According to that guidance document, the category receiving priority is households with technical skills which produce goods for which there is great social need but which state production has not fully met, and households which produce goods from domestic raw materials and from valuable and scarce materials that can be brought in from abroad. They are not allowed to produce or do business in sectors and trades over which the exercises a monopoly, such as liquor, tobacco, printed materials, pharmaceuticals, beer, fermented beverages, etc. They may not set up additional installations in sectors and trades for which the city has a surplus production capability which is not fully utilized. Producers who are incapable of ensuring product quality, will not accept management by the state, take no steps to ensure industrial sanitation, and pollute residential areas must cease operations and are not be allowed to register.

The individual and family producers must fully observe the registration regulations, including the registration of products, labor, trademarks, and quality, in accordance with the common stipulations. If producers are engaged in secondary trades requiring the use of electricity or materials managed by
the state, they must report to the subprecinct or village, but if they are engaged in simple handicraft trades they need only report to the neighborhood team.

With regard to materials for production, the city has adopted the policy of strengthening and consolidating the commercial, materials and export goods supply organs, and precinct and district stores which buy and sale scrap materials, and of some materials to producers so that they can purchase their products, while at the same time encouraging the producers to utilize all forms of joint operations and federations in order to produce in accordance with current regulations. The city has recommended that the central echelon not restrict the number of shipments and quantities of materials and raw materials sent by relatives from foreign countries. While waiting for permission from the central echelon, when the producers submit requests the Municipal People's Committee and those of the precincts and districts will, along with the customs sector, consider and act upon those requests. Family producers and people in secondary trades may be given unused equipment by enterprises or state enterprises.

Individual and family producers supplied electricity in accordance with common regulations must fulfill their obligation to pay taxes, or must be granted tax exemptions in accordance with the customs sector, consider and act upon those requests. Family producers and people in secondary trades may be given unused equipment by enterprises or state enterprises.

Individual and family producers supplied electricity in accordance with common regulations must fulfill their obligation to pay taxes, or must be granted tax exemptions in accordance with the current industrial-commercial tax regulations. Export products, especially those being exported for the first time, are considered for tax exemption or reduction in accordance with regulations. Producers who have just invested capital may, depending on the product, be considered for tax exemptions or reductions for the first year or two. With regard to people in secondary trades, because their output is not large and they are not professionals, they are exempted from all taxes. The initial shipments of machinery and materials sent by relatives abroad are exempted from taxes, and future shipments will be considered for exemption or reduction of import taxes, depending on the type. With regard to products the prices of which are not set or guided by the state, and the materials to produce which were obtained by the producers, contracts may be signed at negotiated prices. The state does not fix the prices of products which are produced on a trial basis or are produced on a trial basis or are sold to test the market, but the producers must register their prices and sell them at the registered prices. Incentive prices are applied for products which meet high, sophisticated technical and artistic standards and have export value. With regard to export goods, producers are allowed to use foreign exchange, as do cooperatives, and must observe the state's foreign exchange management procedures.

The Municipal People's Committee has affirmed that the family economy and secondary trades play important roles, and that their development must be encouraged. The individual economy is one of the five economic components in the period of transition in the south, will continue to exist throughout the
period of transition, will be organized and guided in earning its livelihood on the path of socialism, and will be assisted by the governmental administrations, the mass organizations, and the Front in developing its positive aspects and overcoming its negative aspects so that it can increasingly contribute to the great undertaking of building socialism. Producers who do a good job of implementing the policies are regarded as having merit in contributing to the enterprise of building socialism and have legal equality. Their political and economic rights, and their children's education, are guaranteed.

The Municipal People's Committee has also reminded the subprecincts, villages, precincts, districts, and functional organs to create all favorable conditions for private producers while, in the process of guiding production, ensuring that they do not adversely affect the development of the other economic components, building up the state economy so that it can play the leading role, and ensuring that the collective economy is strong and develops more strongly than the individual economy.

5616
CSO: 4209/827
MUNICIPAL SMALL INDUSTRY-HANDICRAFTS SECTOR UNDERFULFILLS PLAN

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 26 Jun 86 pp 1, 4

[Article by "L.S.": "Municipal Small Industry Handicrafts Sector Attains Only 90 Percent of Its Total Production Value Plan for First 6 Months of Year"]

[Text] To date, according to preliminary statistical data from the Municipal Cooperative Federation, during the first 6 months of this year the small industry-handicrafts sector in the city attained nearly 90 percent of the plan with regard to the value of products and goods delivered. They attained only 87 percent of the plan norms regarding the production and marketing of products during the first 6 months of 1986.

The greatest difficulties of the small industry-handicrafts production installations during the first 6 months of the year were that the contracted prices for many products were too low (the municipal organ which sets and approves prices made adjustments and implemented a system of price supports for some products, but was unable to keep up with the prices of essential goods which serve the lives of the working people); on many days there was a lack of electricity for production; there was a lack of cash (the production installations were only allowed to withdraw production capital little by little, so they were unable to meet the needs of production), etc. Those were some of the factors which exerted an adverse effect on production and extended over a period of many months but have not been promptly resolved by the leadership echelons and the relevant factors.

However, in comparison to the same period last year the total value of production during the first 6 months of this year increased nearly 9 percent. That was because the precincts and installations took the initiative in all aspects of production. After the municipality expanded their authority to approve the prices of some products (according to regulation), many precincts have reduced the period required to set prices and have improved the method of approving contracts (by eliminating some unnecessary steps), so the installations have conditions for promptly fulfilling contracts and concentrating their capabilities on production.

The production installations encountered difficulties regarding money (the bank only allowed them to withdraw money little by little), so a number of
cooperatives and production collectives boldly mobilized the cooperative members to contribute additional capital to production. However, that was only a temporary, "fire-fighting" measure. The installations also encountered the situation of the capital contributed by cooperative measures being used to pay bank debts, as during the first months of the year. Furthermore, because the production of the municipal small industry-handicrafts, sector in recent months has not been uniform, but has usually been concentrated in certain periods of time, the electricity sector charges the installations high prices (paid every month), which is irrational and prevents many installations from stepping up production and affects the fulfillment of the production plan. The working people recommend that the electricity norms and payments be quarterly instead of monthly, as they have been in the past.

5616
CSO: 4209/768
NEW PASSENGER SERVICE OPENED BETWEEN HANOI AND XIENG KHOUANG

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Jul 86 p 1

[Article in the column "New Products, New Projects": "Opening of the Hanoi-Xieng Khouang (Laos) Multimode Transportation Passenger Route"]

[Text] Carrying out communications cooperation between our country and the Lao People's Democratic Republic and with the permission of the ministries of communications and transportation of the two countries, Passenger Transportation Enterprise 12A had previously transported passengers on the Hanoi-Muong Khoa (Laos) route and the Hanoi-Samneua (Laos) route, and had opened the periodic Hanoi-Sepone bus route, running monthly from Hanoi on the 2nd and the 16th and from Sepone on the 5th and 19th. To meet the travel needs of the two countries' cadre, soldiers and students, the enterprise has, since 8 July, begun opening additional Hanoi-Xieng Khouang multimode transportation passenger trips. Initially, passenger pick-up will be accomplished in Nong Het District through the Nam Can pass on Route 7. There will be two departures and two returns monthly on this route. Departures from Hanoi will occur on the 8th and 22nd; return from Nong Het (Laos) will be on the 11th and 25th monthly. During the 2 1/2 days on the road, the enterprise will make arrangements for the passengers to rest overnight at Do Luong and Muong Sen.

Each day the enterprise sells tickets in advance to passengers at 7 Dang Thai Than Street, Hanoi.

6915
CSO: 4209/746
EFFECTIVE USE OF LABOR IN CENTRAL HIGHLANDS DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI DAN TOC HOC Oct-Dec 85 pp 49-53

[Article by Le Duy Dai: "Sources of Labor and Their Effective Use at Present in the Central Highlands"]

[Text] When analyzing and evaluating the economic-social conditions and the material bases in the initial phase of the enterprise of building socialism in our country at present, comrade Le Duan said, "Our most important capital include land, forests, the sea, natural resources which have not yet been developed, and a rather large labor force, which has not yet undergone a division of labor and is not yet well utilized. We must use that capital to build and advance. The first step must be to exploit that potential in order to create the initial material bases of socialism in agriculture and industry, gradually advancing from a small scale to a large scale."(1) Therefore, with regard to the nation in general and in each region in particular, the evaluation of capabilities, natural conditions, and existing labor is an important mission, one of strategic significance in the present phase. With regard to the natural resources of the Central Highlands, a number of research projects have received attention, most notable of which is Central Highlands Research Project I, but researching labor sources has not received adequate attention.

In the Central Highlands, in recent years, especially in the years since the liberation, the simultaneous effect of two processes--natural population change and mechanical change--in which the second process plays an important role, the Central Highlands population in general and the number of Vietnamese there in particular, have clearly increased. From 1936 to October 1979 the population of the Central Highlands increased 250 percent. During the same period, the number of Vietnamese increased even more rapidly. The increase in population has been accompanied by the rapid increase of the number of workers. At present, according to statistical data there are more than 675,000 people of working age, which is 45.6 percent of the total population of the Central Highlands.

Since the complete liberation of the nation, that plentiful labor force has been used relatively effectively in carrying out the nation's strategic missions and has contributed to changing the economic-social situation and improving the living conditions of the ethnic groups in the Central Highlands.
But it must also be realized that in the process of implementing the policy of transferring population to supplement labor in the Central Highlands provinces and use the existing labor there a considerable number of difficulties have been encountered and the results that have been attained have not corresponded with the capital that has been invested and with the plan goals. That situation, of course, is due to many reasons, both objective and subjective, among which it is necessary to mention the deficiencies of the economic development plans and failure to take into consideration the social factors that have arisen in the process of using local labor and those who have just arrived. There is still much waste in using that labor, and labor productivity is not yet high.

When carrying out the redistribution of labor and population, the number of people and the population density must be brought into consideration. Karl Marx pointed out that "It's precondition (the division of social labor) is that the populating must have increased to a certain level and there must be a certain population density."(2) But it should not be forgotten that man is not a sum total. In bringing together different groups of people (from different ethnic groups, from the same ethnic group but living in different localities, different religions, etc.) it is necessary to take into consideration the population structure (the male-female ratio, the age composition, etc.) as well as the psychology, sentiment, customs and habits, etc., of those groups in the new community so that in the future they can attain unanimity in carrying out the revolutionary missions.

Let us return to the actual situation in the Central Highlands. The Vietnamese who have emigrated there since the end of the 18th Century have come from many areas, for many different reasons, and at different times, so they do not yet constitute a single community. Each component has its own way of life, sentiment, and way of thinking, and usually lives by itself in rural areas or mixes in with the other ethnic groups when living in the municipalities, cities, and towns, but there is a lack of blending. There are still differences in their ways of thinking, behavior, way of life, and love between men and women: there are local people (who arrived before 1954), the "54" people (who arrived in 1954), the resistance war people, people, the new economic zone people, etc. They seldom intermarry. That is especially true with regard to the Vietnamese who settled there prior to the liberation and those who arrived after the liberation.

The Vietnamese who have gone to the Central Highlands have also done so for many different reasons (3) and they have come from many different localities.

In the initial phase, ordinarily people from the same locality (village, district, or province) are bound together in a community by both neighbor and family relationships, with the neighbor relationship being especially important. Because they are bound together by the sense of a unified local community, they have separate customs and characteristics. In all individuals, in addition to the family relationships local relationships are always manifested as one of their natural, essential needs. In the North of our country—which has provided most of the labor forces for the Central Highlands since the liberation—socialism had been developing for more than 20 years and there had been basic changes in the consciousness of the people, but
the community way of life and the community spirit of people from the same locality had been retained to a notable degree. Therefore, if people from many different localities are concentrated to develop a new economic population center, no matter in what form—individual, collective, or state—but the people have not been well-educated, those could easily arise of localism and of jealousy, which could result in a loss of internal solidarity. If it is necessary to recruit people from two different localities attention must be paid to deploying and investing in cadres, materials and living and working facilities for them in a fair and rational manner, while at the same time stepping up the teaching of a spirit of collective mastership and a spirit of mutually sharing and loving solidarity to the worker masses.

People who have just arrived in the Central Highlands often encounter initial difficulties, especially when preparations have not been meticulous. For example, they have not adapted to the climate or the way of livelihood, or to the problems posed by life: education, medical care, cultural activities, recreation, and family building.

Because of the above-mentioned deficiencies, in recent years nearly 20 percent of the households, 15.5 percent of the population, and more than 10 percent of the workers (in some places even half) have returned home. That situation forces us to think much more when drafting and implementing plans, as well as the other matters relevant to the material and cultural-moral lives, and the legitimate demands of the people who go to develop the Central Highlands.

During the coming period the needs of economic, cultural, and social construction and development in the Central Highlands will require a large number of people and workers. That not only has significance with regard to the distribution of population among the various areas but also has a specific and explicit effect in economic, cultural, and social construction and development there. In addition to measures and policies to ensure the material and morale lives of the people who arrive to settle, the leadership organs and planning organs must clearly determine who should be sent, where they should go, and what they should do. It is not necessary to send in Vietnamese from the lowlands to do work which the local people are capable of doing. In fact, in recent years many state farms and enterprises in the Central Highlands have proved that.

In the present phase, when the conditions for ensuring the living conditions of the people in new economic zones are still beset with many limitations and difficulties, we should send party and governmental leadership cadres, scientific-technical cadres, doctors, technicians, people engaged in cultural and educational work, and workers who have good technical skills and quality and who are expert in the sectors and trades the receiving localities do not yet have. Those people must have good political quality and good virtue and must set for themselves two explicit missions: going to make a living and working with the localities in economic-social development. Therefore, if in the past people were sent arbitrarily and no or little consideration was given to economic effectiveness, now a principle that must be set forth is that people should only where they are needed.
The sending of a large number of workers to the Central Highlands in the future will pose the urgent problem of using labor more effectively, in which the central concern will be finding ways to create sufficient jobs that are appropriate to the local strengths. The matter of creating jobs, in the opinion of many people, depends on both the capital invested, the production tools, and the object of labor.(6) In the Central Highlands and in other areas, when the ratio of the agricultural-forestry sector (with regard to both the national income from agriculture and forestry and the number of workers) is predominant and investment derived from the national income is still limited, the matter of resolving the objects of labor (land and forests) and the labor tools has an important significance in creating jobs for the people.

Outstanding characteristics of agriculture in the Central Highlands prior to the liberation were that the average per-capita land area was very low and the level of land use was not high.(7) Therefore, after the liberation bringing into play the labor factors in expanding the cultivated area to ensure that the people had sufficient land not only expanded and developed agriculture but also provided jobs for the people. The Central Highlands provinces regard that as one of the central missions at present. By setting up new economic zones, the state farms and projects to clear wasteland, create fields, etc., have begun to meet the local needs of production and the principal agricultural production means requirements of workers. In comparison to the period prior to the liberation, the cultivated area in Gia Lai-Kon Tum Province (as of the end of June 1979) has increased more than four-fold. More than 25,000 hectares were developed into fields, including more than 5,000 hectares of two-crop wet rice paddies. In Lam Dong Province, in comparison to 1973 the cultivated area increased four-fold by 1979. However, in many places there is still a shortage of cultivable land for workers although the developable land area is still great. But in the development process it is necessary to gradually reduce the deficiencies of past years caused by carelessness, lack of close guidance, failure to tie in land clearing with developing specialized, intensively cultivated fields along the lines of large-scale production, the fact that many places have not closely combined land clearing with water conservancy and transportation, etc., a considerable amount of cleared land has been abandoned not brought into use.(8) That has not only caused the loss of manpower and materials and, in many places, a shortage of fixed production means, but has also caused the people to lack confidence and contentedness.

With more than 3 million hectares of forests, in future years the development of forestry, including afforestation, the protection and improvement of forests, and the exploitation and processing of forestry products, will be one of the urgent demands of the national economy. At present, in three Central Highlands provinces there are still too few forestry workers (fewer than 5 percent of the total number of workers). Therefore, the development of forestry still requires workers and the lessening of the temporary difficulties in providing jobs for local workers, especially with regard to the rather large populations in northern Cong Tum, the tri-border area, the Lang Bang plateau area, who are still practicing nomadic cultivation and
population. They are a force which is appropriate to the characteristics of forestry and has experience in afforestation and in exploiting and protecting forests.

With regard to the Central Highlands, the development of traditional handicrafts will not only develop the existing capabilities but will also have significance in deploying and using labor. Each of the ethnic groups has its traditional handicrafts, and some trades, such as the lace-making trade of the To Dra (Sedang) people, have a high technical level. During 30 years of war those trades were neglected and it is regrettable that we have not paid adequate attention to restoring and developing them in order to increase the incomes of the people and the production of valuable export goods.

A special characteristic of agricultural production is that it is seasonal. In the Central Highlands, there are two distinct seasons: the dry season and the rainy season, so the seasonal nature is even more marked. The labor needs during the seasonal and nonseasonal periods are distinctly different. In many state farms in the Central Highlands labor, which is always insufficient, becomes even more insufficient during those months, especially in the state farms growing mulberry, coffee, rubber, tea, etc. For example, the Bau Can tea state farm in Gia Lai-Cong Tum Province has 1,200 workers but during the seasonal months it needs 2,600 workers. At the Bao Loc tea-coffee federation enterprise in Lam Dong there is normally a shortage of 800 to 1,000 workers a year, but during the seasonal months the shortage amounts to 1,200 to 1,500. The individual and collective production sectors observe the same rather tight agricultural schedule, which is appropriate to the weather characteristics of each season of the year. During the seasonal months, the labor needs double or triple in comparison to the average labor requirement during the year. On the other hand, the labor needs during the non-seasonal months are less, only one-third or even one-half of the average labor needs. If, in the course of a year there are, in addition to such busy months as those in which the land is prepared for planting or in which crops are harvested, there are months in which the workers have little to do or in which they only have a good time, such as the "ning nong" month (rest from production month) of the Bhanar and Sedang people, and the "bian vor" month (month for "forgetting" the use of hoes, mattocks, knives, etc.) of the Jarai people, etc. The "ning nong" and "bian vor" periods often extend to 2 months after the harvest. Clearly, the rather plentiful labor time during those periods has not been utilized, at a time when the state farms lack labor. In order to overcome that situation, we of course must find ways to reduce the labor requirement during the seasonal months by means of mechanization, the use of improved implements, and the arrangement of a crop structure that is appropriate to the biological characteristics of each period of time in order to spread out the season. In that regard, the distribution of labor and the signing of seasonal and contracting-out contracts between the state farms and the cooperatives, and between the state farms and the peasants, also have a clear effect. Many state farms in the Central Highlands have signed contracts regarding seasonal labor, the assignment of land, growing seedstock, etc., with the cooperatives, production collectives, and peasant families, which have not only resolved the labor shortage and ensured the fulfillment of the state plan but have also brought about rather clear economic effectiveness. The cooperatives, production collectives, and families carrying out the contracts

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have considerable capital with which to equip their material-technical bases and increase incomes. Furthermore, the signing of those contracts has also served to consolidate the solidarity between the local people and those who have just arrived, and between the state farms and forests and the cooperatives and production collectives. But in order to accomplish that it is of course necessary to have alliances among sectors and among localities, and there must be appropriate specific policies.

Labor implements have posed a problem for many years but it has not yet been resolved. Many workers do not yet have tools with which to produce. At present, in the Central Highlands there is a shortage of tens of thousands of hand tools, and in places and at times there are serious shortages. In some Vietnamese production units there is only one to 1.5 plows and 0.5 to one harrow for each pair of draft animals. Therefore, the peasants must still use pointed stakes to make holes in which to drop seeds.

The principal reason for that situation is that we have not yet correctly evaluated the role of hand tools in the period of transition from manual labor to mechanized labor, so no appropriate plans and measures have been adopted, even plans to invest capital in the production of such tools. Furthermore, those tools are usually produced in the cities and in the lowland provinces, so they are inappropriate for the cultivation customs, familiarity of use, and physical strength of the people. Nor are they appropriate to the special characteristics of the terrain, soil, etc., of that plateau area. Although the production implements of the Central Highland ethnic groups are still primitive, they have attained a certain level of specialization that is appropriate to each kind of cultivation, each kind of terrain and soil, and the strength of workers, depending on their age groups and sex. Therefore, the production bases must undertake studies in order to have, at an early date, a system of tools that is appropriate to the natural conditions and people of the Central Highlands and contribute to increasing labor productivity.

Another measure that has contributed to providing jobs is to carry out a redistribution of population and labor among the various areas, districts, towns, and villages, with the central focus on shifting part of the population from overpopulated municipalities, cities, and towns to the rural areas to participate directly in production. In Gia Lai-Cong Tum Province, during the 3-year period of restoration and construction (1975-1978), 14,000 people were sent from the city of Pleiku alone to clear wasteland and build up fields and the new economic zones. As of October 1979 Dac Lac and Lam Dong provinces had redistributed and transferred nearly 50,000 people to meet the requirements of local economic, cultural, and social construction and development. However, because the redistribution rate has been slow, at present some cities and towns are still overpopulated. Population is clearly poorly distributed among the various areas. The people living in such densely populated areas do not have sufficient land to farm. That situation can be resolved by redistributing population and labor many the various areas. Zoning and overall planning must keep a step ahead and there must be appropriate policies.

In future years economic, cultural, and social construction and development in the Central Highland will require more than the present number of people.
Millions of workers will be needed to "master the Central Highland" and master the rich natural resources of more than 5 million hectares of forests and mountains.(9) What can be done to cause people who have just arrived in the Central Highlands to regard that area as their second home, and ensure that that labor supplementation is not simply a matter of increasing the population density but has a real effect on economic, cultural, and social construction of the Central Highlands? If that it is to be accomplished, specific steps must be taken to provide jobs for all workers and make rational use of existing labor. The steps that we have taken and are taking to create production means (land and labor implements) for workers, the redistribution of population among the various areas, the development of additional sectors and trades, providing seasonal labor, etc., must be studied so that they can be improved. Only thereby will it be possible to bring into play the two principal strengths of the Central Highlands--land and labor--in order to create many commodity products with which to serve the lives of the Central Highlands people and the enterprise of national development.

FOOTNOTES


3. Consisting of: people who go to develop new economic zones (57.2 percent); people who are reassigned and recruited (19.6 percent) or return to their home areas (3.5 percent); and other reasons (19.7 percent).

4. In 1978 the La Nhìn rubber state farm in Gia Lai-Cong Tum received more than 500 cadres and workers from Hai Hung but within a year 60 percent of them had returned home.

5. At the tea, coffee, and rubber state farms the productivity, discipline, technical skills, and quality of the ethnic minority workers are usually higher than those of Vietnamese who are sent from the lowlands.

6. Employment is expressed mathematically by the following formula:

\[ Y = F (x, z, w \ldots \infty) \]

\( Y \) is the number of jobs; \( X \) is investment; \( z \) represents labor implements; \( w \) represents the objects of labor. See Phung The Tuong, "An Economic Development Strategy With the goal of Creating Many Jobs in Vietnam," in "Rationally Distributing and Using Labor--a Strategic Problem," Hai Hung Labor Service, 1985, p 12.

7. For example, in Lam Dong in 1973 only 14,740 hectares--10 percent of the natural area and a per capita average of 0.09 hectares per person--were cultivated.
8. For example, the cleared area in Nam Village (An Khe) amounts to 520 hectares and 600 hectares were cleared in All Ba Village (Mang Giang), but only 50 hectares were used in Nam village and only 100 hectares in Al Ba village. In a period of more than 3 years, nearly 60,000 hectares were cleared in Gia Lai-Cong Tum Province but 15,000 hectares were abandoned.


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METHODS OF TEACHING KHMER LANGUAGE DISCUSSED

Hanoi NGHIEN CUU GIAO DUC in Vietnamese May 86 pp 26-28

[Article by Tran Thanh Pon: "On Methods of Teaching Khmer to Khmer Students"]

[Text] With regard to the general education work in the ethnic minority areas, our party and state and the Ministry of Education have issued many specific guidance documents. The Fifth Party Congress and Resolution 73/HDBT also pointed out the direction of the general education sector and education in the ethnic minority areas in carrying out the education reform, solidly developing education, and endeavoring to improve the over-all quality of education. The contents of curricula and teaching methods must be appropriate to the actual situation in the mountain region and the ethnic minority areas.

Those requirements demand that leadership and management have dialectical viewpoints that are appropriate to the actual developments in the ethnic minority areas. Especially, the teachers who teach in the general elementary schools in the Khmer ethnic group areas in the Mekong Delta must grasp the key problems in order to fully understand and resolve them cleverly and appropriately on the basis of examining the contents and curricula, distributing the instructional periods, and especially methods for teaching both languages (Vietnamese and the ethnic language) that are coordinated with one another, are complete, are not too complex, and do not confuse the ethnic minority students. They amount to an art of instruction which is receiving the attention of teachers.

The schools and teachers in the Khmer ethnic group areas in the Mekong Delta play a major role and have a heavy responsibility when teaching ethnic minority students two languages at the same time, in which the students are encountering difficulties. The reason for that is that since they were born the students have been accustomed to life in the villages and hamlets. The formation, development, and solid consolidation (the physiological mechanics of pronunciation), and especially their assimilation of vocabulary, phonetics, semantics, and grammar, have generally been in their native languages, and their abstract thought is in accord with their ethnic customs and has become a potentiality deep within everyone. Therefore, the mother tongue is regarded as the primary language and Vietnamese is regarded as the secondary language. It is necessary to teach a second language the general schools, but in fact teaching it is more expensive, and there is a long period of "inconvenience"
when first come into contact with a secondary language. The general school curricula and textbooks must of course be in the national language. The national language obviously the primary tool in relations and for assimilating modern science and technology. At present the Khmer students are accustomed to starting school later than others in the Class 1 category (in some places pupils 8 or 9 years old, or even 10 to 12 years old, are only in the first or second grade). Thus the first period of language training lasts an average of 3 to 5 years. That consolidates the durability of the native language and creates "linguistic divergence." Clearly, "the influence of the native language on mastering the second is understood as negative. The negative influence of the native language is manifested most clearly in the first phase of assimilating a second language."(1) Therefore, a very correct recommendation is to continually train the ethnic minority students to hear, speak, and understand the national language. "The education management cadres and instructors should encourage the ethnic minority students to speak the national language, and hold competitions in speaking Vietnamese among ethnic minority students in the schools."(2) That is an effective method for eliminating the "linguistic divergence." Furthermore, from the point of view of the psychological characteristics of children (who begin Level-I at the age of 6), who are still too young to endure the burden of studying two languages at the same time (the national language and the ethnic language), that task is too difficult, is not appropriate to their age group, and adversely affects their thought and knowledge. It is necessary to provide children in that age group with easy and simple material at first, but solid progress should be made and the situation of study not attaining the requirements should be avoided.

In recent years (1975-1984) language teaching for the Khmer people in Cuu Long and Hau Giang has developed well:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Number of Khmer students studying the ethnic language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>25,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>33,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>36,920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the teaching of the ethnic language in the Mekong Delta is not yet unified.(3) Furthermore, the vocational level of the corps of instructors in that regard is not yet uniform. A survey of 67 classroom periods of Khmer language instruction and 30 classroom period of instruction in the national language in classes 1, 2, 3, and 4 in 22 general education schools in 10 districts in four provinces (Cuu Long, Hau Giang, Minh Hai, and Kien Giang) showed that:

a. Rather good results were attained in teaching the Khmer language in 15 of the classes, average results were attained in 10 classes, and 42 classes were deficient.

b. Good results were attained in teaching the national language in 5 classes, average results were attained in 10 classes, and 15 classes were deficient.
The reason for that situation was that more than 90 percent of the teachers responsible for teaching the national language knew nor or very little Khmer.

In order to improve that situation, in addition to arranging for instructors to study Khmer, it is necessary to pay attention to changing the instruction methods. The direction for studying and creating practical methods for teaching Khmer must include the following principal, indispensable requirements with regard to the process of teaching and studying the national and ethnic languages:

a. When teaching a language lesson to ethnic minority students (national or ethnic), it is necessary to ensure that:

Individual words (both the national language and ethnic language vocabularies) to teach and explain to the students, so that they can easily learn the words, handwriting, and type fonts, and use them in teaching synthesizing methods to students.

Colored chalk is used to distinguish among the strokes, sounds, words, and syllables that have just been studied, to help the students remember them.

The guidance of lessons must be in correct accordance with the stipulations of the reformed instructional methods, and it is necessary to have the paintings, photographs, and charts necessary to illustrate each type of lesson in a manner appropriate to the contents of lessons in the ethnic minority areas.

The classes must be guided through clear steps, with the setting aside oft time periods for each step that are appropriate to the stipulated order.

Students must be guided so that they know how to use textbooks at school and at home.

Train students to write both languages in correct accordance with standards.

There should be appropriate question-and-answer periods and students should be encouraged to observe, compair, and analyze letters, words, syllables, and semantics (both languages), both old lessons nd new lessons. Lectures must be concise and meaningful, and not overly long. It is necessary to promptly correct pronunciation and point out the similarities and differences between the national language and the ethnic languages with regard to pronunciation, sounds, and words. When teaching the two languages should be intermingled so that the students can clearly understand the reciprocal relationships.

When applying the interplay of two languages in the same class period, two unfavorable tendencies should be avoided:

The first tendency that should be avoided is teaching in only one language from start to finish.

The second tendency that should be avoided is not mechanically observing a ratio of 50 percent for each of the languages in teaching during a classroom period. When teaching Vietnamese language lessons 80 percent of the time
should be used to teach, reinforce, and instruct entirely in the national language. During the remaining 20 percent of the time ethnic language should be used to reinforce and emphasize. The same is true with regard to the time used to teach the ethnic language. The following is a chart for apportioning time in an instructional period (Vietnamese or Khmer):

Subject: Use National Language: Use Ethnic Language:

Vietnamese 80 percent 20 percent
Ethnic Language 20 percent 80 percent

b. When concluding a lecture, the teacher instructs the students to observe the following regulations at home:

Maintaining an interplay relationship between the two languages with an 80 percent ot 20 percent, and not with an average ratio of 50-50.

It is necessary to select the appropriate amount of knowledge of the national and ethnic language that should be retained by the students. For example, during the Vietnamese instruction periods the quantity of knowledge to be retained by the students should be represented by a large square or a large X. The part that should be retained by the students in the ethnic language should be represented by a small square or a small X. That method can also be applied when teaching the national language. We call that method the mutual reinforcement method.

Teaching the Khmer language by the mutual reinforcement method in the general schools in which two language are studied in accordance with the above-mentioned formula can help attain effectiveness in teaching Vietnamese and the ethnic language to Khmer students.

FOOTNOTES

1. Nguyen Minh Thuyet, "Bilingual Factors Influencing the Ability of Ethnic Minority Students to Use Vietnamese."

2. Vi Hong, "Teaching Literature in General Education Secondary Schools in the Mountain Region."

3. See "Organizing the Teaching of Khmer in the Mekong Delta."

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