NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.


Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.
Except where indicated otherwise, in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, published in Moscow by the Oriental Studies Institute and the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Contents

English Summaries of Major Articles (pp 218-221) ......................... 1

Information on Authors (p 217) ......................................................... 7

New Trends in Export of Capital to Developing Countries (pp 3-13)
(S.A. Bylinsky) ................................................................. 9

Defeat of the Kwantung Army, 1945 (pp 14-20)
(Yu.M. Shchebenko) (not translated)

Urban Lower Strata: Social and Class Structure (pp 21-29)
(A.I. Levkovskiy (deceased) (not translated)

Role of State Management in Social Evolution of Afro-Asian Countries of
Capitalist Orientation (pp 30-38)
(R.G. Landa) (not translated)

Social, Economic Reforms Still Needed for Indian Government (pp 39-48)
(P.V. Kutsobin) ................................................................. 23

Forms and Rights of Property in China in the 7th to 12 Centuries (pp 49-58)
(Ye.I. Kychanov) (not translated)

Typology of Early Forms of Expansion (pp 59-68)
(Yu.I. Semenov) (not translated)
On Arabs and Persians (pp 69-79)  
(Abu Hayyan Al-Tawhidi) (not translated)

The "Spirit of Bandung" and the Anti-Imperialist Struggle of the Developing Countries (pp 80-86)  
(Ya.Ya. Etinger) (not translated)

The Philippines: Migration of Manpower Abroad (pp 87-93)  
(V.Ya. Arkhipov) (not translated)

Popular Education in Tanzania (pp 94-100)  
(L.S. Gaynullina) (not translated)

Colonial Literature of the Republic of South Africa in the Sixties and Seventies (pp 101-107)  
(A.G. Cheremin) (not translated)

The Han-Muslim Conflict in Yunnan in the First Half of the 19th Century (pp 108-114)  
(V.L. Larin) (not translated)

SCIENTIFIC LIFE

Africa Institute Research on Economic, Social Development (pp 115-118)  
(A.M. Vasilyev) .................................................. 36

Studies on Africa at Leningrad Unversity (pp 119-123)  
A.A. Zhukov [Leningrad], S.L. Milyavskaya (not translated)

The Tokyo Institute of the Economies of the Developing Countries of Asia (pp 124-126)  
(I.I. Vasilyevskaya) (not translated)

CURRENT EVENT NOTES

Soviet, Afghan Historians Hold Conference (pp 127-128)  
(Unattributed) .................................................. 41

Africa Institute Visited by Italian African Expert (p 129)  
(Unattributed) .................................................. 44

International Conference on Ethiopian Studies Held (pp 134-136)  
(Unattributed) .................................................. 45

DEFENSE OF DISSERTATIONS (Second half of 1984) (pp 136-140)  
(Unattributed) (not translated)

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reviews

(A.G. Pondopulo) (not translated)
Religious-Mythological Semantics in the Scythian Bestiary Style: a History of Research (pp 151-160)  
(D.M. Dudko) [Kharkov] (not translated)

Book Reviews

IEMSS Book on Transition to Socialism Reviewed  
"Theoretical Problems in the Transition to Socialism by Countries with an Undeveloped Economy" edited by A.P. Butenko, with contributions by A.P. Butenko, N.L. Lushina, T.I. Snegireva and A.S. Tsipko, reviewed by L.I. Kononenko [Chelyabinsk] (pp 161-165) .............. 48

Japanese Book on Japan's Role in World Economy Reviewed  
"Kokusai keizai kokka: Nippon" [Japan: a World Economic Power] by H. Kanamor and D. Vada, reviewed by V.B. Ramzes (pp 165-170) .... 55

The Big Bourgeoisie In Egypt on the Eve of the 1952 Revolution (pp 170-172)  
(by V.I. Dyatlov, reviewed by V.V. Chernovskaya [Yaroslavl] (not translated)

A History of Malay Literature from the 7th to the 19th Century (pp 173-182)  
(by V.I. Braginskiy, reviewed by B.B. Parnikel, Ye.V. Revunenkov [Leningrad] and A.K. Ogloblin [Leningrad] (not translated)

Competing Equalities, Law and the Backward Classes in India (pp 183-189)  
(by Marc Galanter, reviewed by A.A. Kutsenkov) (not translated)

Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: the Transfer of Power 1942-1947 Vols I-XII (pp 190-197)  
(reviewed by G.B. Goroshko) (not translated)

COMMENTS ABOUT BOOKS

Review of Book on Nonaligned Movement  

Reference Book on Political Parties of Modern Africa Reviewed  
"A Handbook of Political Parties in Modern Africa" by a collective led by M.Yu. Frenkel, reviewed by V.V. Masksimenko (pp 200-202) ... 64

The Ayar Samak, or the Deeds and Exploits of the Ayar Samak, Who Served the Kings, Swayed Their Destinies and Was Bold and Skillful. Book 1. translated from the Persian and with an introduction by Nataliya Kondyrev; Book 2. translated from the Persian and with an introduction by A.M. Mikhalev (pp 202-203) (not translated)

Tracks in the Sand of Arabia (pp 204-205)  
(by T.A. Putintseva, reviewed by M.Yu. Roshchin) (not translated)
List of the Main Scholarly Works of Doctor of Philological Sciences L.Ye. Cherkasskiy (on the 60th anniversary of his birth) (pp 206-207)
(Unattributed) (not translated)

List of the Main Scholarly Works of Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor A.D. Zheltyakov (on the 60th anniversary of his birth) (pp 208-209)
(Unattributed) (not translated)

Obituary for Iosif Davydovich Levin (p 210)
(Unattributed) (not translated)

In Memory of Nikolay Aleksandrovich Syromyatnikov (pp 211-213)
(I.F. Vardul, L.R. Kontsevich and V.M. Alpatov) (not translated)

In Memory of Yuriy Konstantinovich Lekomtsev (pp 214-216)
(I.F. Vardul and T.Ya. Yelizarenkova) (not translated)
S.A. Bylinyak

The 1970s were marked by the growing role of developing countries in the world capitalist economy. The major shifts were caused by the energy crisis. The role of the developing world in the industrial international division of labor was also enhanced. This part of the globe is drawing attention of more and more TNCs [transnational corporations]. Radical changes occurred in the system of loan capital export due to the fact that developing countries joined the international money market. New states became more attractive as they offered their export markets. And, finally, the enhanced economic role of the developing world gave rise to the struggle for a New International Economic Order.

Since the 1980s, however, these processes [have] slackened to a great extent as the result of the crisis both of a cyclic and structural nature. In this regard the article analyzes the changes in the policy of neocolonialism and the transformation of the mechanism of international exploitation and the significance of the economic periphery. It gives prominence to the modifications in the export of capital.

Many developing countries have entered a period of slackened growth in their international trade. It is likely that some of them will see a decline in the share of export[s] and import[s] in their gross national product. The reason for this lies both in the structural crisis of the world capitalist economy and the fact that by the early 1980s many developing states had exhausted their potential and at present are unable to join the world economy through increasing their share of export in the gross national product.

At the same time, however, many of them will have a chance to follow an "intensive" way, that is, to introduce changes in the structure of the stream of goods, financial services and so forth.

The occurring changes permit diversification in the economic policy of developing countries. The fact that the mechanism of the developing countries' integration
into the world of capitalist economy became more complex did not diminish	heir vulnerability as regards international crises. This became clear after
the cyclic crisis of the 1980s.

DEFEAT OF THE KWANTUNG ARMY

Yu.M. Shchebenkov

The capitulation of Germany in May 1945 brought peace to Europe. In the Far
East, however, Japan was prolonging the war, seeking favorable peace treaty
conditions and keeping its 5.5-million-strong army as a deterrent.

The Western allies did not expect that they would defeat Japan alone in a
short time. More than once they expressed their eagerness to see the USSR
take part in the war against Japan. At the Crimean Conference the USSR agreed
to help the Allies two or three months after the end of the war in Europe.
Due to constant violation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact by the Japanese
side the USSR denounced it in April 1945. On 28 July 1945 Japan rejected
the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration and stated its readiness to carry
on war to the end. Neither did it cease fire after the American atomic bombs
were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

On 8 August 1945 the USSR declared war on Japan. In the course of a brief
campaign the Soviet Army together with the Army of the People's Republic of
Mongolia defeated the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and the Japanese troops in
Northern Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

Having lost one of its best armies and industrial and resource bases in Manchuria
and Northern Korea, Japan capitulated on 2 September 1945.

The defeat of Japanese militarism gave rise to the revolutionary and national-
liberation struggle in East and Southeast Asia. This struggle brought political
independence to many countries.

URBAN LOWER STRATA: SOCIAL AND CLASS STRUGGLE

A.I. Levkovskiy [deceased]

The article analyzes social changes affecting the urban population of developing
countries. It tackles demographic growth, structure, social and economic
functions and dynamics of functioning of lower urban strata.

The article goes into the arguments of foreign researchers dealing with
urbanization in the developing world. It characterizes various groups of
lower urban strata and examines their evolution trends. It is the author's
contention that the urban lower strata of these countries constitute a numerically
growing and qualitatively changing social entity of a transition society.
This society is passing through a stage of a formation breakthrough.

The article also notes the heterogeneity of the composition and social vagueness
of this entity. It points out that new class forces and conflicts are maturing
within it.
ROLE OF STATE MANAGEMENT IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION OF AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES OF CAPITALIST ORIENTATION

R.G. Landa

The social role of the management of the Public Sector of Afro-Asian countries has been ever enhancing. It is operating in a complex context of class struggle, confrontation and overlapping social movements and interests. This breeds various patterns of social and economic behavior in management and makes it concentrate on resolving problems of national development.

For want of a developed national entrepreneurship, the management of the Public Sector takes over the responsibility for the transformation of traditional precapitalist structures. More often than not it serves also as a channel through which the national bureaucracy is transformed into the bourgeoisie. In case this process is delayed it serves as a basis for the evolution of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, a substitute of its kind for the national bourgeoisie engaged in provate entrepreneurship. Concomitantly, the bureaucratic capital plays at times the part of the nonexistent big national private capital. In this case it suppresses and supersedes middle and lower strata of the national bourgeoisie.

Imperialism and neocolonialism promote bourgeois and bureaucratic development trends in every possible way. The progressive section of management in the Public Sector opposes it, however, for it advocates national interests, including those of the private entrepreneurship. It is here that the patriotically minded section of management encounters numerous obstacles.

Socially, the image of management varies and is subject to conditions prevailing in each individual country. But under certain circumstances and in due time management can turn it into a factor of progressive changes.

POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN INDIA AT PRESENT STAGE

P.V. Kutsobin

The article deals with the situation in India on the eve, during and after the parliamentary elections held in December 1984. It notes that in the context of a growing activity of those who stood for the dismemberment of the country, the safeguarding of unity and territorial integrity, restraint of separatists and extremists, consolidation of democracy and order became the main concern of the masses. The unprecedented victory of the Indian National Congress (I) in the parliamentary elections is accounted for in the article by the fact that the ruling party had understood correctly the sentiments of the masses at large and expressed its readiness to stabilize the situation.

The bourgeois parties of the opposition, which had claimed to offer "a national alternative" to the Congress, suffered a serious defeat in spite of the maneuvers undertaken. Following the elections the right parties have been opposing the Congress, trying to form a reactionary political block.
The article highlights the political platform of left forces, in particular the CPI and the CPI/M, their slogans before the elections and their stand vis-a-vis the government of Rajiv Gandhi. Both parties supported his activities to preserve peace and order in the country. The articles examines the decisions of the Plenum of the CPI National Council (January 1985) and other documents formulating the policy of left forces. It is the intention of the CPI to support positive steps of the Government in the interest of national unity and integrity. At the same time the CPSI shall oppose the antidemocratic actions of the Government and resolutely fight the reactionary forces of the right.

The article points out that various public elements supporting the INC(I) associate with its rule different, at times diametrically opposed hopes. Big capital, which had reinforced its economic position in the post-independence period, shall no doubt apply pressure upon the Government, seeking to satisfy its class interests. At the same time, the leadership of the Party shall find it hard to neglect the aspirations of the downtrodden sections of the population which, by and large, cast their vote in favor of the INC(I). It is for the future to show to what extent the ruling party shall be able to fulfill its promises and resolve crucial national problems.

ON FORMS AND RIGHTS OF PROPERTY IN CHINA OF THE 7TH TO 12TH Century

Ye.I. Kychanov

The traditional Chinese law divided the objects of property into mobility and immobility. Land was considered as immobility, for essentially it differs from other things.

The Chinese law knew three kinds of property: ssy (private), kwan (state) and kung (public). The analysis of private property is related to the problem of whether there existed family property in China. The article suggests that this problem cannot be resolved in legal terms alone, for it is essential to take account of the traditional ideology. The latter, on the one hand, did not recognize any property rights of children but, on the other hand, considered them as natural successors of their father. Hence, both the traditional ideology and the law recognized sons as would-be property owners.

The problem of whether there existed the supreme land ownership of the Emperor remains also unresolved. The period of the land allotment system under the T'ang is of crucial importance in this regard. The article maintains that the traditional Chinese ideology, according to which the power of the Emperor was sacral and unlimited, admitted in certain circumstances that land belonged to the Emperor, that is, the state. Despite this fact, legally the Emperor did not own all the land. He did not possess any fief until after the 17th century. The state acted as supreme land sovereign and realized its right to sovereignty but not property.
TYPOLOGY OF EARLY FORMS OF EXPLOITATION

Yu.I. Semenov

The article analyzes the forms of exploitation which emerged in the preclass and early class society. Exploitation, strictly speaking, is an uncompensated appropriation by one group of a part of the social product produced by another group. It may take place, inter alia, in the course of production, the very process of which constitutes exploitation of man by man. In a case of production relations of this type forming a social and economic tenor, we have a certain mode of production which at the same time is a way of exploitation. In the case where production relations do not form an independent tenor, we have a manner of production, and thereby a manner of exploitation. In a case where exploitation takes place not in the course of production but after its completion, we have a certain method of exploitation which is parasitic in relation to these of other modes of production.

The article examines in greater detail the early methods of exploitation. It distinguishes systematic military plunder, tribute-paying, intermediary trade and usury.

The help-dominate and credit-dominate relations belong to the early manners of exploitation. The other forms of exploitation can be both a mode and a manner of exploitation.

The dominate mode of exploitation was one of the major modes of exploitation. Its essence was that the exploited was fully employed in the household of the exploiter.

There also existed another early mode of exploitation, a magnate one. The land of the exploiter in this case was given to the laborer to be cultivated.

The third early mode of exploitation was known as the polity one (from polity). It was based on the supreme private class property, which took the form of state property.

ON ARABS AND PERSIANS

Abu Hayyan Al-Tawhidi

The present extract from the 10th century "Kitab al-imta' wa-l-muanasa" (for the biography of Abu Hayyan and the analysis of his book see NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 5, 1984, pp 100-110) deals with the Arab-Persian cultural rivalry. These were two peoples who had exerted the most profound influence upon the moulding of Arab Muslim culture.

The text, which is of a high literary standard, provides an insight into the spiritual and psychological atmosphere of the discussed period. It is also a reflection of the Arab mentality which enabled the Arabs to preserve their cultural identity in confrontation with other peoples and establish their position in the world of Muslim culture.
The introduction touches upon the history of Arab-Persian relations from the ancient period to the 10th century.

Introduction, translation from the Arabic and commentary by D.V. Frolov.

'SPIRIT OF BANDUNG' AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Ya.Ya. Etinger

The article draws attention to the everlasting significance of the decisions adopted by the Conference of Afro-Asian countries in Bandung. It was the first meeting of leaders of African and Asian countries. Held under the slogan of the struggle for peace and international security, against colonialism and neocolonialism, this conference had a great impact on the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle and consolidated the positions of newly liberated states in the international arena. The emergence of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement and formation of the principles of nonalignment bear direct relation to the "spirit of Bandung."

Today, in the context of an escalating imperialist subversion against the developing world, the fidelity of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries to the principles and traditions of Bandung is of special importance as regards their struggle for peace and international security, against the threat of nuclear holocaust, for the cohesion of peoples on the basis of an antimalitaristic and anti-imperialist platform.

HAN-MUSLIM CONFLICT IN YUNNAN IN FIRST HALF OF 19TH CENTURY

V.L. Larin

The article examines the conflict between the Han (Chinese) and the Hui (Chinese Muslims) and the policy of the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911). It ascertains the genesis and nature of the conflict which erupted into Muslim pogroms in the 1830s and 1850s and gave rise to the Hui rebellion in the 1850s and 1870s.

The article demonstrates that the communal and religious riots were instigated by the local gentry (Shensi) and provincial bureaucracy. The conflict broke out in the economic sphere. It was the policy of the government which led to its expansion to the political sphere.

The local bureaucracy encouraged by the Ch'ing dynasty set poor peasants, mining workers and tramps against well-to-do Muslims. They not only took advantage of this conflict to get rich but tried to undermine the influence of the Muslim community and even to do away with it. The conflict was also used by the government to divert the people's attention from the antifeudal and national struggle.

The article underlines the traditional nature of this policy and draws a parallel with the similar Han-Muslim conflict in Northern and Eastern China in the 1850s and 1860s and the Boxer Rebellion.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

CSO: 1807/079
INFORMATION ON AUTHORS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 85 p 217

[Unattributed author information]

[Text] Bylinyak, Stanislav Arkadyevich, doctor of economic sciences, scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies.

Shchebenkov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, scientific associate at the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of Military History.

Levkovskiy, Aleksey Ivanovich (deceased) (1924-1985), doctor of economic sciences, professor, section chief at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies.

Landa, Robert Grigoryevich, doctor of historical sciences, scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies.

Kutsobin, Petr Vasilyevich, candidate of historical sciences, vice-president of the Soviet-Indian Friendship Society.

Kychanov, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, doctor of historical sciences, deputy chief of the Leningrad branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies.

Semenov, Yuriy Ivanovich, doctor of historical sciences, professor, chief of the Department of Philosophy at the Moscow Physico-Technical Institute.

Frolov, Dmitriy Vladimirovich, candidate of philological sciences, teacher at the Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov Institute of Countries of Asia and Africa.

Etinger, Yakov Yakovlevich, doctor of historical sciences, professor, chief researcher at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations.

Arkhipov, Vsevolod Yakovlevich, doctor of economic sciences, professor, scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies.
Gaynullina, Lina Semenova, postgraduate student at the Moscow State Correspondence Pedagogical Institute.

Cheremin, Aleksandr Georgiyevich, candidate of philological sciences, scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies.

Larin, Viktor Lavrentyevich, candidate of historical sciences, docent at the Far Eastern State University.

Vasilyev, Aleksey Mikhaylovich, doctor of historical sciences, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa.

Vasilyevskaya, Irina Ivanovna, candidate of historical sciences, scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies.

Pondopulo, Anna Georgiyevna, postgraduate student at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History.

Dudko, Dmitriy Mikhaylovich, teacher of history at a secondary school in Kharkov city.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

9642
CSO: 1807/079
NEW TRENDS IN EXPORT OF CAPITAL TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 85 pp 3-13

[Article by S.A. Bylinsky: "The Export of Capital to Developing Countries: New Trends"]

[Text] During the Seventies the role of the developing countries in the world capitalist economy grew and the importance of a number of them increased in the international division of labor; international monopolies engaged in neocolonialist expansion started to allot increasing importance to the periphery of the capitalist world. Radical shifts occurred in the system of exports of loan capital as the result of the developing countries' entry into the international money markets; their attractiveness as markets increased. And finally, as a result of the growing economic role of liberated countries, their struggle for a new international economic order was developed.

Since the early Eighties, however, these processes have slowed down as the result of crisis phenomena of both a cyclic and a structural nature. In this connection a number of questions arise: first and foremost, how is the altered situation affecting the inclusion of young states in the capitalist world economy and how is it influencing the mechanism of their international exploitation and economic dependence? How is the economic significance of the periphery changing the capitalist center? And finally, what are the changes that the policy of neocolonialism is undergoing?

The Instability of International Economic Relations and the Inclusion of the Developing Countries in the Capitalist World Economy

During the postwar years the entanglement of developing countries in the world capitalist economy took place for a long time against the backdrop of the rapid internationalization of production and the growing export of capital. Growth rates for foreign trade and the export of capital steadily outstripped production growth. The economies of many countries included in the world capitalist economy became more "open." This can be seen, in particular, in the indicator for the so-called export and import quotas (the proportion of exports and imports in the gross product). The export quota for all countries included in the capitalist world economy rose from 10.6 percent in 1950 to 12.5 percent in 1970 and 19.6 percent in 1980. For the developing world this indicator grew more rapidly, with figures of 12.8 percent, 15.9 percent and 26.8 percent for 1950, 1970 and 1980 respectively.[1] The sharp jump occurring
During the last decade was largely the result of the increased prices for oil. However, the export quotas also grew in many countries that import oil.

During the early Eighties, however, a sharp drop occurred in world trade (see table 1), resulting in a decline in the proportion of exports and imports in the gross product of a number of states. This shift took place under conditions of the longest postwar period of cyclic upheaval—a crisis that rocked both the center and the periphery. However, the reasons for the changes were fundamental and also caused by the structural crisis in the world capitalist economy.

Table 1 Dynamics of Production and Foreign Trade (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Region</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>GNP (with export volume)</th>
<th>Purchasing power of imports*</th>
<th>Import volume (constant prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GNP (deflator corrector)</td>
<td>(constant prices)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World capitalist economy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-80</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983**</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries importing oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-80</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983**</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries exporting oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-80</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-14.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-14.0</td>
<td>-14.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed capitalist countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-80</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Export volume corrected for changes in "trading conditions."
** Estimate

The slowdown in the rates of world trade was associated primarily with the difficulties being experienced by the developed capitalist countries. To some degree, however, the dynamics here were also affected by the foreign trade of the developing countries. True, for the developing countries importing oil,
exports in constant prices in recent years rose more rapidly than GNP. However, because of the deteriorating conditions in trade, purchasing power declined and imports were also cut back. With regard to the countries importing oil, despite the falling volumes of exports, thanks to the improved trade conditions they managed to maintain growing purchasing power for exports and imports. In recent years, however, their foreign trade indicators have sharply fallen off.

An especially severe economic crisis has affected Latin America, the most developed region at the periphery but with an extensively ramified network of foreign monopoly capital. Africa is passing through a tragic period; there, extreme economic backwardness combined with adverse climatic conditions and internal crisis upheavals have led to mass starvation. Asia is in a somewhat better position, although it too has experienced the destructive shocks of crisis; this has led to a slowdown both in growth rates and in the rates at which foreign economic links are being developed. Notwithstanding, in isolated cases the crisis has not had a fatally destructive sequel because fewer of the Asian countries have been entangled in the world capitalist economy (the best example of this is India). Other have succeeded in cushioning the shocks thanks to the relatively high competitive nature of their exports of labor-intensive articles (which, incidentally, are now falling). Such states includes first and foremost some of the countries of Southeast Asia and the Far East. And finally, the main oil-producing countries are in the East and their economic situation, although shaken because of falling oil prices, is nevertheless stronger than oil-importing countries.

In general, however, many of the developing countries have entered a period of slowed GNP growth and slowed foreign trade turnover and, possibly, even a declining proportion of exports and imports in GNP. The latter is the more likely since in the years immediately ahead a number of countries must spend a considerable part of their foreign exchange earnings to pay off debts. These trends, and also the increased stress being laid on the development of sectors working for the domestic in the strategies of some states, tend to support the view that their economies will become more "closed" against foreign influence. However, this view describes only one aspect of the prevailing situation. A comprehensive analysis should also cover all the directions of foreign economic relations and, of course, the export of capital, which during the postwar period assumed enormous scales as the result of the intensified expansion of the international monopolies and the unprecedented scale of international credit operations, which now increasingly also affect the periphery.

A comprehensive approach to analysis of the nature of the developing countries' inclusion in the capitalist world economy assumes a consideration of the following factors, which to some degree or other are interlinked: the structures of export (and import) flows; the mechanism and scales of international exploitation of the developing countries; their economic dependence on the capitalist center; the combined role of domestic and foreign factors on economic growth; and the possibilities existing in the developing countries for maneuvering relative to the effect of outside factors.

In fact, the proportion of exports in GNP cannot be raised in an unlimited way. If it were to reach 100 percent this would in principle (given comparable indicators) mean that any given country was selling everything that it produced.
and buying everything it needed in the world market. And so the economically advisable limit for the export and import quotas (for each individual country) is much lower than the 100-percent mark. And it is thought that by the early Eighties a number of the developing countries had already passed or were approaching this limit. Consequently, the "extensive" path to association with the world economy, whereby a country advances by building up the flow of exports (or imports) but keeping the structure and mechanism relatively immobile, is restricted. But the "intensive" path, which assumes primarily changes in the structures of flows and the link mechanism, is unrestricted.

During the colonial period the structures and mechanism of foreign economic links in Asia and Africa changed only slowly. In the first years following the achievement of political independence by the countries in the East, the mechanism of their links underwent major restructuring. This was reflected primarily in the establishment of protectionist barriers and the active use of measures to regulate the activities of foreign capital. These changes were less felt in the African countries that had gained political independence later than the Asian states; many of them were associated with the Common Market and lay within the franc zone. However, prior to the early Seventies the structures of flows in both regions did not undergo serious changes; with one exception, namely the emergence in the system of the export of capital of "official development aid." However, since the start of the last decade significant changes have taken place both in the structure of flows and in the mechanism of foreign economic links. Accordingly, many of the developing countries have now been locked into the capitalist world economy in ways other than those seen not only during the Fifties but also the Sixties. However, since the impetus for changes came primarily from the world market economy and the movement for a New International Economic Order had not yet led to any effective shifts, these changes were not accompanied by any corresponding democratic restructuring of international economic relations.

In general, by the beginning of the present decade, when a sharp slowdown began to be seen in links within the framework of the capitalist world economy, many of the developing countries found themselves in a complicated economic dependence on the imperialist centers. And such complicated relations not only serve the interests of the strategic goals of neocolonialism but also help the West to exploit the periphery. It is precisely on a complicated mechanism of economic relations between the center and the periphery that the sophisticated policy of neocolonialism relies. Its multiplicity of elements and its ramifications enable the West to make up the losses in one direction through cruel exploitation along other lines; of which the export of capital may be cited as an example.

The Neocolonialist System of Export of Capital

The export of capital fulfills important political, social and economic functions within the system of neocolonialist relations. When it occurs, the foreign debts of the developing countries increase much more rapidly than the assets of the transnational corporations at the periphery. During the period 1971 through 1980 the medium-term and long-term indebtedness of the developing countries rose from $90 billion to $465 billion (that is, by a factor of 5),
while direct capital investments made by the transnational corporations at the periphery during the same period grew from $45 billion to $119 billion (that is, by a factor of 2.5). [2] Whereas at the beginning of the last decade the ratio between them was 2:1, by the early Eighties it was 4:1. True, the level of entrepreneurial profit often exceeds the rate paid for loans. However, in recent times the loan conditions for developing countries have hardened, and this has led to an equalizing of the levels of entrepreneurial profit and the interest rate.

Table 2. Outflow of Financial Resources from Developing Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total outflow $bill.</th>
<th>Total outflow %</th>
<th>loan depreciation $bill.</th>
<th>loan depreciation %</th>
<th>interest payments $bill.</th>
<th>interest payments %</th>
<th>amount of loan repaid $bill.</th>
<th>amount of loan repaid %</th>
<th>transfer of profit to direct investment $bill.</th>
<th>transfer of profit to direct investment %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It can be seen from the figures in table 2 that most of the outflow is now accounted for by payments to reduce foreign debt, while at the same time the transfer of profits for entrepreneurial capital has fallen from 41.6 percent in 1970 to 14.1 percent in 1983. Of course, it is essential to bear in mind here that the volume of earnings officially transferred by the transnational corporations differs from the actual size of profits; this results primarily from the use of transfer prices. According to some estimates, resources pumped through the transfer price mechanism into the imperialist centers from the periphery are actually 1.5 to 2 times greater than from the legal transfer of profits.

These shifts in the structure of resource outflow from the developing countries are associated with changes in the flow of capital in the entire system of the capitalist world economy. In the years immediately following World War II, the markets for loan capital were disorganized and serious obstacles to their re-establishment were presented by the foreign exchange restrictions imposed by leading capitalist countries, except for the United States, through to the late Fifties. As a result, the structure of the world capital flow in the period 1950-1954 looked as follows: 52 percent was accounted for by state resources, 35 percent by direct private investments and only 13 percent by private loan capital. With regard to the developing countries, in their imported capital, the proportion of private loans was even lower at 8 percent; the overwhelming mass of resources were in the form of state loans and subsidies,
at 63 percent. Some 28 percent of the total flow of capital was accounted for by direct investment. [3] However, after the late Fifties, when economic conditions enabled the developed capitalist countries to introduce convertibility for currencies, international private credit started to expand rapidly, reaching its acme in the Seventies and early Eighties. During the Seventies and Eighties almost two-thirds of capital in the capitalist world economy was private loan capital; the figure for official development aid and direct capital investment together was one-third. And here, there was first and foremost an increasing switch from short-term loans for foreign trade to medium-term and even long-term funding.

Table 3. Correlation of Main Flows of Capital within the Framework of the Capitalist World Economy (billions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Growth in bank assets in the Euro currencies (net)</th>
<th>Official development aid</th>
<th>Movement of direct capital investments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The structure of capital movement in its three main directions, as shown in table 3 above, indicates, first, that the size of loan capital considerably exceeds the size of entrepreneurial capital, and second, that in credit flows the dominant role is being played by private loans. This situation which prevails in the present-day capitalist world serves as a graphic illustration of Lenin's thesis that "one inherent feature of capital is its separation of ownership of capital from the use of capital for production, and the separation of money capital from industrial or production capital... Imperialism or the domination of financial capital is the highest stage of capitalism, when this separation reaches enormous dimensions." [4]

The developing countries, and in particular the Asian and African countries, have for a long time been locked into the international flows of loan capital predominantly through the official development aid mechanism. And while they remain on the sidelines from the main mass of capital and the international money market, they are, as it were, "pushed out" of the capitalist world economy.
Privatization of the export of loan capital to the periphery became practical during the early Seventies and has subsequently accelerated significantly through this half of the current decade. Since 1982, however, growth in the foreign assets of the transnational banks has been slowing down, and this has been felt in particular in the oil-importing developing countries. In all likelihood the period of accelerated bank loans for the periphery (when loans increased by an average of 20 percent annually) is behind us. There are many reasons for this, but first and foremost it is because of the reduced solvency of a number of major debtors, as a result of which bank credit at the periphery has become extremely risky. Notwithstanding, it is probable that the privatization of loan capital will continue, although at more moderate rates, involving new countries in the international banking network. This assumption is made on the following grounds.

First, the privatization of export capital noted on the world scale can scarcely remain forever locked at the center of the system, leaving the periphery out in the cold. Practice shows that at definite periods, as the result of surplus capital in the banks the need arises to expand the sphere of their influence. And since the East is weaker than Latin America and involved in the international banking network and not burdened with such an enormous debt as the Latin American continent, it is thought that reserves lie hidden there for the future expansions of the transnational banks.

Second, state loans, which can be regarded as an alternative to private loans, are cheaper than the latter, and this explains their attractiveness for young states, particularly those with a low level of economic development. But the sizes of state loans are limited, the procedure for providing them is complicated and prolonged, and loans are usually strictly conditional upon deliveries of specified commodities and services. It is difficult to overcome the dis-proportions that constantly occur in the economies of young states by relying on state loans alone. Third, the banks often expand their international activities as they follow the expansion of the transnational corporations. The links between the transnational corporations and the transnational banks have been strengthened in recent times, and this enables the industrial monopolies to make increasingly extensive use of the credit mechanism to finance their activities. Under conditions of the threat of nationalization, this method is preferred over the joint-stock type of participation. In the use of credit the transnational banks are also increasingly prompting and making use of "non-joint-stock" forms of expansion, of which more below. This mechanism will also help in entangling the Asian countries in international banking credit because Southeast Asia and the Far East are now spheres of vigorous action by the transnational banks.

Bank loans are spread very unevenly among the developing countries. Thus, about two-thirds of bank debts owed by states not exporting oil are accounted for by only 8 debtors, which also include three Asian countries (South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand)[5]. The concentration of bank loans is being overcome only slowly. But a process can be seen behind it: an increasing number of countries are being included in international banking business. In 1971 only 13 of the developing countries resorted to syndicated bank loans, but 10 years later the number exceeded 50. The loans taken by many of them
are still small, but most of the developing countries have experience in conducting business in the international loan market and are gradually being drawn into these operations.

At one time V.I. Lenin remarked that "as banking develops and its operations become concentrated in just a few institutions, the banks develop from their modest role of intermediaries among the all-powerful monopolies, making arrangements for almost all the monetary capital for the entire aggregate of capitalists and petty bosses." [6] The processes now taking place in the capitalist world economy are now to one degree or another also affecting the periphery and convincingly confirming this conclusion.

As was stated by those participating in a discussion on the theme "Latin America in the Vise of International Financial Capital" conducted by the journal PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, whereas early in the century V.I. Lenin established that a turnaround was taking place from the dominance of capital in general to the dominance of financial capital, this trend has now become a reality. And today it is a question not so much of the aggregate of national blocks of financial capital as of the obvious signs of a new community—financial capital—whose integral elements are the transnational corporations and the transnational banks. Whereas during the Sixties the main instrument of international dominance for international financial capital was direct investments by the monopolies, subsequently the main lever in this has become foreign debts. [7] It is obvious that the trend noted during the course of this discussion mostly affects Latin America rather than Asia and Africa. However, even the East has also been affected by the growing expansion of international financial capital.

The scales in the increase of the developing countries' foreign debt stagger the imagination. Many of the developing countries are in no position to meet their obligations and are falling behind in their payments. Whereas 10 years ago such cases were isolated, now they make up a mass phenomenon. In this connection, the question is often asked: will the periphery be able to repay its debt? The answer is of fundamental significance, because if it is thought that the West will not obtain a corresponding return from its investments in the form of loan capital to the periphery, then the financial exploitation will turn out to be nonexistent. Let us consider the actual state of affairs in the developing world.

Since the flow of loan capital into the developing countries is uneven and individual kinds of credit are made available only for specific functions, then we must take this into account when we approach the problem of debt repayment.

Loans for developing countries through official development aid are offered on favorable and, as, a rule, stable conditions. They are made available for terms up to 30 years at an annual interest rate of not more than 3 percent. However, despite the favorable nature of these loans, some part of them will not be repaid at all. This applies mainly to the "least developed countries," which include primarily African states. Moreover, these long repayment periods will be partially prolonged by the fact that under conditions of inflation the debt will be depreciated. However, these losses are "programmed" into the policy of economic neocolonialism, within whose framework official development
aid occupies an important political and social place. Of course, it by no means follows from this that imperialism is totally indifferent to the fate of loans provided under official development aid. It is common knowledge that the developed capitalist countries have invariably turned down proposals from the developing countries that state loans offered on favorable terms be totally written off.

Export credits are designed primarily to stimulate trade and are therefore often used as a weapon in the competitive struggle. In order to moderate this struggle the developed capitalist countries periodically conclude "gentlemen's agreements" under whose terms the lower limit of interest is established (under the terms of an agreement in July 1984, the figure of 10.7 percent was set for loans with a repayment period of more than 5 years). In addition, we must also take into account the special features of export credits: possible losses for the capitalist center can be completely offset by withdrawals through other channels (commodity prices, rates for services and so forth).

As a rule, loans from the international financial organizations are repaid at the proper time and in accordance with the terms of the agreements. And there is little doubt that in the future, too, the developing countries will refrain from conflicts with these institutions, which have great power.

And finally, the most complex problem—the repayment of bank loans. Cases of postponement of payments on these loans are now seen frequently, and this is leading to a considerable depreciation of the amount of debt. However, these losses for loans are now being offset by the high interest rates, which are raised even more when debt re-scheduling takes place. It is precisely this that is largely the reason for the relative "tractability" of the banks during the re-scheduling of loans. Consequently, the high interest rate in the money market is still being maintained and the banks are guaranteed adequate levels of profit in their operations even if the nominal capital is not repaid at the proper time. Through the high interest rates the banks are more than adequately compensated for the fact that the loans are not repaid fully. "Debt re-scheduling is essential in order to avoid a formal moratorium that would cut off a country's access to the capital market. But this re-scheduling simply transfers the burden of repayment into the future and increases the flow of interest payments": this is how the World Bank formulates it attitude toward this problem. [8] Despite the fact that payments made by young states to repay capital debt fell 12 percent in 1983, the oil-importing developing countries paid the banks $13 billion more than they received from them, because of the high interest rates.[9]

Thus, although the nominal capital amount of the developing countries' debt will not be fully repaid (part will be written off and a larger part will be depreciated through inflation), this in no way eliminates the high degree of financial exploitation of the periphery since the role of interest rates grows as a mechanism for transfering resources.

Features in the Expansion of the International Monopolies in Developing Countries

Since the young states achieved their political independence, the international monopolies have been resorting with increasing frequency to a mixed type of
entrepreneurship, refusing for one reason or another to take full ownership of shares, and later using non-share forms of activity. The essence of this latter is that although not possessing the right of ownership, the transnational corporation exerts every possible kind of influence (in the construction of projects, in the management of the enterprises, the introduction of new technology and marketing of output), thus cooperating with national capital. Like the earlier renunciation of full ownership of shares, the switch to mixed entrepreneurship has also been a forced move in the policy of the international monopolies. However, even so they continue to obtain considerable income and they still have the opportunity to control the enterprises on which they exert their influence. And in this case, since the "transnational corporations operate in accordance with their own global strategies, effective control over local enterprises," UN experts state, "is not merely a problem of ownership. What is much more important is that this control does not rely on technology, trade marks, marketing, the provision of intermediate goods and so forth. In many cases managerial control and contractual or corporate agreements make it possible for the transnational company to exercise effect control over the enterprises." [10]

Payments made by the developing countries for the technical services they receive are growing rapidly, considerably exceeding the outflow of profit for direct capital investments. They increased from $0.6 billion in 1970 to $2.6 billion in 1980. And although this equals a total of only one-fifth of total dividends for direct investments, for some important sectors this indicators is higher: it has reached one-third in machine building and three-fourths in transportation machine building; enterprises in the extractive sectors in the developing countries make even greater payments for technical services--one-fourth of their incomes are paid out to American raw material transnational companies. This high degree of technical dependence, and also the possession of levers in the marketing field, enables the monopolies to use prices as a powerful tool for redistributing incomes in their favor. As a result, the developing countries receive, for example, only one-tenth to one-seventh of the final price for nonenergy mineral resources. [11] In the developing countries whose strategy is based on actively attracting technological, managerial, construction and other services from the transnational companies, payments for these services are reaching colossal dimensions that greatly exceed the transfer of income to direct investment. Thus, in South Korea, in the early Eighties the incomes of foreign firms obtained as the result of providing various kinds of services exceeded the profits from direct capital investment ten times over. [12] This kind of mechanism for pumping resources out of the developing countries is particularly convenient for the international monopolies because it virtually eliminates all risk.

Over the past decade agreements for "turnkey" construction projects have become widespread in the relations between the developing countries, particularly the oil-producing countries, and the developed capitalist countries. This circumstance is largely explained by the rapid growth in exports of equipment from the center to the periphery (an average annual increase of 20 percent over the past decade). Construction business is usually engaged in by companies that have no great interest in acquiring shares. But the relationship between the client and the contractor does not end with the completion of construction. Further links may be formed, in particular, on the basis of an agreement for
"the product in hand," which provides for help in the event that the production or marketing conditions change. Under the terms of the "market in hand" agreement, the foreign partner may assume an obligation to sell part of the product. Other forms of cooperation are also used.

Naturally, the introduction of new forms does not mean that the old methods of exploitation have been discarded. Thus, export-oriented enterprises in industrial export zones are often totally foreign-owned. And if the foreign owner of the capital possesses technical secrets, the accepting country can expect no concessions. But the essential nature of the new methods of expansion is that its mechanism is becoming varied and sophisticated and better adapted to the new conditions. Thanks to this the transnational corporations are building up the transfer of incomes from the periphery even with the relatively low growth rates in the switch of profits to direct capital investment. Both "legal" and "illegal" (mainly value) methods are used for this.

Expansion by the international monopolies is now seen both in the transformation of share-owning forms of participation into non-owning forms, and vice versa. In particular, in the manufacturing industry, agreements for services are often used for the more remote goal of acquiring a right to create a mixed enterprise. The transnational companies often demand payment in shares for the transfer of scientific and technical experience. At the same time it happens that when the period of a limited term for the operation of a mixed company expires, the transnational company manages to retain production and other links with the national firm. This policy is usually pursued with regard to enterprises that are producing for export.

Since the methods used by the international monopolies to penetrate the developing countries have become very varied, the index for direct capital investment cannot be a universal measure of the scales of their expansion. And the conclusion that the transnational companies are "leaving" any given country, based only on figures for direct capital investments, can be incorrect since even the monopolies that decline to buy shares for one reason or another usually try to strengthen their positions in the accepting country through the use of other mechanisms.

One target in the growing expansion of the transnational companies in the developing world is, mainly, the manufacturing industry, and in this connection, in recent times the role of the extractive industry has declined.[13] Since the last decade the U.S monopolies have been showing the greatest proclivity toward investing capital in the manufacturing sectors of industry at the periphery. They have been forced into this largely because of the declining competitiveness of U.S. goods abroad. Japanese entrepreneurs have been actively engaged in taking industrial production to the developing countries, mainly the Asian countries, from even earlier, in the Sixties; this was also associated with the need to increase the competitiveness of goods, whose export was being hampered, in particular, because of the rising value of the yen. But the significant difference between Japanese and U.S. capital is that as far as the United States is concerned, it is mainly the major companies that are participating, while in the transfer of production from Japan, even small firms that do not possess up-to-date technology are taking part. This also explains why Japanese capital has made the greatest concessions to the accepting
countries. And it is largely for this reason that Japanese entrepreneurs have started to repatriate investments during the Eighties, when competition in the world markets has become particularly fierce and the factor of a cheap labor force has somewhat reduced the role played by the introduction of labor-saving technology, and when the value of the yen has also become more settled.

Table 4 Structure of Direct Capital Investments in Developing Countries by Leading Capitalist States, 1980 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exporting country</th>
<th>Chemicals</th>
<th>Metal smelting</th>
<th>Electronics, electrical goods, machine building</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Textiles</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN. Transnational Corporations..., p 142

Table 4 shows figures on the structure of direct investments in the manufacturing sectors for three of the major exporters of capital, namely the United States, England and Japan. The first thing that catches the eye is the fact that in terms of investment in the "modern" sectors (machine building, electronics, the production of electrical goods) the United States is far ahead of England. Japan also lags behind the United States in the export of capital to these sectors. Moreover, the transfer of more advanced technology enables American capital to secure itself more firmly in the economy of the accepting country.

Direct foreign capital investments in textiles production in the developing countries is small if we bear in mind that this sector accounts for a significant part of production for export. This to some extent testifies to the effective competition being offered by national capital, primarily in some of the Asian countries that are the main suppliers of textiles in the world market.

As a result of the growing expansion of American capital in the industrial sectors of the developing countries, the proportion of the periphery in direct industrial investments by the United States abroad has risen from 17.6 percent to 20.9 percent. This is most remarkable because previously Western capital invested only little in industry at the periphery. The proportion of Japanese direct investment in industry in the developing countries, mainly Asian countries, has always been high, reaching two-thirds of the total volume, and during the last decade the trend has been toward further growth. However, the share of the developing countries in the export of capital by the leading European exporters has continued its decline. [14] As Yu. Yudanov writes, "the monopolies of West Europe were unable to determine in good time and in a strategically correct way the great opportunities opened up as the result of investment in these countries in order to improve overall competitiveness and the structural
transformations in national production." [15] This has to some extent been influential in the fact that West Europe, in which the proportion of all the traditional kinds of production is great, has been affected more seriously with crisis than have the other two imperialist centers.

This circumstance is promoting the intensification of interimperialist contradictions and the struggle for the sphere of expansion for capital in the manufacturing industries of the young states. This applies primarily to Asia and Latin America, since in more backward Africa the conditions are not yet ripe for transfer on any significant scale even for the "lower stages" of the manufacturing industries. And in turn, the differences between Asia and Latin America result from the fact that the most important centers of industrial production for export at the periphery are located in Asia, while in Latin America the transnational companies are exerting their main efforts to monopolize the domestic markets in the major states of the region.

* * * * *

The different mechanism being used to include the developing countries in the capitalist world economy has not made them less involved in the upheavals that are the result of external influences. This was demonstrated with great clarity by the world cyclic crisis in the early Eighties. As was noted in the declaration adopted at the economic conference of the CEMA countries, "making use of all means of political and economic pressure, the imperialist states are shifting onto the shoulders of the people in these countries (that is, the developing countries--author's note) the burden of the economic crisis and they are continuing to intensify their neocolonial exploitation and trying to create conditions that help the penetration of foreign capital into the economies of those countries." [16] It is precisely the search for a solution for economic difficulties at the expense of the developing states and the increasing scales of their exploitation that give rise to the greedy interest of the imperialist centers in the periphery and serve as the main motive for neocolonial expansion.

FOOTNOTES

7. For further details see PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 11, 1983, pp 54-60
10. UN Transnational Corporations..., p 68.
11. Ibid., p 163.
12. Calculated from figures in "International Financial Statistics."
13. The share of the developing countries in direct capital investments of raw-materials transnational corporations (excluding oil companies) fell from 63 percent in 1950 to 32 percent in 1977. However, capital investments in the raw materials sectors in developing countries began to be effected to a considerable extent through foreign loans and mobilization of domestic resources. According to some calculations referred to, inter alia, by the discussion, in 1960 the developing countries accounted for 53 percent of all capital investments in the raw materials sectors, while in 1979-80 it was 61 percent ("World Development." L, 1982, Vol 10, No 1, pp 40-45).
15. MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENiya No 2, 1984, p 31.
16. PRAVDA 16 Jun 84
COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985
9642
CSO: 1807/079
Before independence, the class interests of those taking part in India's national liberation struggle were relegated to a secondary place behind the common goal of achieving independence. It is precisely this that explains the fact that forces that were different in terms of their social nature got along together mainly within a single, broad political organization—the Indian National Congress Party—whose dominant ideology was anti-imperialist nationalism. In the graphic words of J. Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi succeeded in gathering "all classes and groups in a variegated crowd to move in the same direction." [1] However, after the declaration of India's independence, this "variegated crowd" began to be affected by centrifugal forces and a multitude of problems, large and small, and contradictory class and ideological-political aspirations flared up on its surface. This resulted in the emergence in India's political arena of a large number of parties and groupings defending the interests of particular classes, castes, communities and so forth.

Opposition between class-political forces is particularly intense during periods of elections for the country's central parliament and for the legislative assemblies of the states. This was seen graphically during the last parliamentary elections—the eighth since independence—which took place late in December 1984. They took place in an extraordinarily complex situation. For a number of years preceding the elections, the ethno-national and religious-communal contradictions in the country had been increasing and centrifugal forces growing in strength. The activities of the separatist and dissident forces receiving massive outside support had been galvanized, reaching such proportions that a real threat had been created to the country's unity and territorial integrity. It had become obvious that these forces were interested in destabilizing the situation in India and in weakening the country and pushing it from the independent path of development. The murder of the prime minister Indira Gandhi by Sikh terrorists in October 1984 was the culmination of the violence in their subversive actions. Preserving the country's unity and territorial integrity, repulsing the dark forces of separatism and extremism, strengthening the democratic foundations of the state and maintaining law and order—these were the main problems worrying India's multimillion-strong
masses, who had to decide whom and what political party to vote for in order to extricate the country from the crisis situation that had been created.

The leadership of the ruling Congress correctly perceived the mood of the popular masses and this determined this party's election strategy. It appealed to the electorate to vote for the Indian National Congress candidates, assuring it that it was precisely this party that would be able to cope successfully with the problems that had arisen, stabilize the country, and insure its unity and territorial integrity. The call from the Indian National Congress found a broad response among the electorate and was in tune with the aspirations of the broad strata. As a result, in the elections, the Congress won a number of seats in the Lower House (House of the People) unprecedented in India's independent history--401 out of 508.

The fact that during the run-up to the elections India was passing through exceptionally complex times did not alter the disposition of the main forces in the political arena. As before, during the elections there was sharp conflict between the ruling Indian National Congress and the opposition bourgeois parties, which had set as their main goal defeating the Congress, removing it from power and creating an "alternative national government."

Three major bourgeois parties laid claim to the "national alternative" to the Congress, namely the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party (DMKP) and the Janata Party (JP). In addition, several small groupings that were splinter groups from the above-mentioned parties were also active, as were the so-called regional parties, which enjoy a certain influence in particular states.

When characterizing the bourgeois opposition in India it is essential first of all to note that its determining feature is political opportunism and lack of firm political and ideological principles that are in line with the interests of the popular masses. Notwithstanding, the leaders of these parties tried to suggest to the country's population that it was precisely they and the parties they lead that should become the "democratic national alternative" to the Indian National Congress since the latter had allegedly "exhausted" itself as an influential political forces and was steeped in corruption and internecine discord and because of this was allegedly incapable of ruling the country. They engaged in vain efforts to create a unified election front and defeat the Congress. But they could in no way create such a front on the basis of any kind of constructive socioeconomic and political platform; they were united only in their hostility toward the Congress and their thirst for power.

In order to achieve their ends these parties often resorted to truly vertiginous maneuvering. Thus, the leadership of the BJP, which has entertained a ferocious hatred of socialism throughout its entire history and sharply criticized not only scientific and real socialism but also the "socialist experiments" of the Congress, unexpectedly proclaimed itself a loyal adherent of socialism of the "Gandhi type." This was done in order to attract to its side a majority of the people who consciously or spontaneously had denounced capitalism and advocated a noncapitalist road, and were in favor of creating in India some kind of egalitarian society. The leaders of parties on the right were forced to take this sentiment into account. The leader of another opposition grouping,

24
Charan Singh, representing mainly the interests of the rich peasantry and other prosperous strata in the Indian countryside, announced, literally on the eve of the elections, the dissolution of the Lok Dal Party that he led and the formation of a new party--the Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party (the Workers' and Peasants' Party). The purpose of this whimsy was to dampen class antagonisms, particularly in the countryside, and to unite the peasantry under his leadership, including those of its strata that belong to the low castes and traditionally vote for the ruling Indian National Congress. Closely affiliated with these two parties was the Janata Party, which at various times had included some former members of the Congress who for one reason or another had broken with the Congress, and also rightist socialists.

The main opposition bourgeois parties fielded a total of 467 candidate deputies for the parliamentary House of the People. Some 225 ran for the Bharatiya Janata Party, 190 for the Janata Party and 154 for the Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party. The leadership of the BJP had particularly high hopes in the elections. It considered that this party would at least be the main opposition in the House of the People, and that in the event of a defeat for the Congress at the elections would play the main role in creating a coalition, non-Congress government, as happened in the 1977 parliamentary elections, when the opposition parties succeeded in defeating the Congress and seizing power. Neither did the BJP leadership exclude the possibility that the Congress would win with only a very small majority, which would make the government it formed unstable; the BJP reckoned that this turn of events would clear the way for the opposition to come to power.

As they directed the main blow in the election struggle against the Congress, the opposition parties thought that that party was in a state of crisis and demoralization, and that following the death of Indira Gandhi it was "without leadership," since Rajiv Gandhi was a "novice in politics" and, in their opinion, "did not possess adequate political experience" to save it from final disintegration. Proceeding from this assumption--which turned out to be far-fetched and false--they asserted that the country's interests demanded the removal of the Congress from power and the creation of a "capable" coalition, non-Congress government. As the election results showed, these calculations and assessments were castles built on sand and the electorate decided otherwise, demonstrating political maturity under complex conditions; it was not about to risk handing over the helm of state to an ill-assorted coalition of opposition parties, especially at a time when the country needed a government that could deliver a decisive rebuff to the forces of internal and external reaction and reliably safeguard the country's unity and territorial integrity.

All the main opposition parties suffered major defeats at the elections: the BJP, which had laid claim to the role of leader of the opposition, won only 2 seats in the parliament (against the 16 it had in the previous parliament), the DMKP won 3 (instead of 25), and the JP 10 (instead of 22). And the leaders of most of these parties were also defeated: A.B. Vajpayee, president of the BJP, Chandra Shekhar, the leader of the Kanata Party and others. Of great importance here was the circumstance, mentioned above, that the opposition bourgeois parties, while loudly criticizing the policy and actions of the
Congress government, were unable to offer any kind of constructive program showing that they were capable of solving the problems of the development of the country and its people. Their unsuccessful and in many respects negative experience in their short-lived stay in power in 1977-1979 also played its part and undoubtedly influenced the behavior of many voters.

Following the elections the representation of the communists in the House of the People was also reduced: the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI/M] went from 36 to 22 deputies, while the Communist Party of India [CPI] went from 13 to 6 deputies. However, the communists did succeed in the main in retaining their mass base: CPI/M and CPI candidates gained 2.73 percent and 5.8 percent of the electorate’s votes respectively. A total of 19.6 million people voted for communists.

Long before the elections the CPI and the CPI/M characterized the foreign policy of the Congress government as basically progressive, while domestic policy was "antidemocratic" and "antipeople." This assessment of government policy also predetermined the tactics of the communist parties in the elections: they spoke out in favor of defeating the Congress and strengthening the positions of leftist and "secular, democratic" forces in parliament. The differences in the election tactics of the CPI and CPI/M amounted to the following: the CPI fought the election under the slogan "Defeat the Candidates of the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party"; it appealed to voters to "vote for the candidates of the CPI and other leftist parties and the representatives of secular, democratic forces." [2] With respect to the CPI/M, it called upon voters "to vote for the CPI/M candidates, defeat the Congress, isolate dissident forces and strengthen secular, leftist and democratic forces." [3]

Thus, although the communist parties worked against the Congress, their attitude toward it could not be regarded as identical to that of the main bourgeois opposition parties. The CPI acted, as it were, on two fronts: against the Congress and against the extreme rightist Bharatiya Janata Party. Moreover, in the exceptionally difficult internal political situation prevailing after the murder of Indira Gandhi, the CPI took positions on a number of issues taking this circumstance into account, and tried not to permit any further complication of the situation. In particular, the CPI leadership reacted positively to the appointment of Rajiv Gandhi as the country’s prime minister. In contrast to the BJP, DMKP and other bourgeois opposition parties, whose leaders saw in this a "perpetuation of the dynasty of power," and cast doubts on the constitutionality of naming the head of the government without any official decision by the parliamentary faction of the ruling party, the CPI not only welcomed this step taken by the Indian National Congress as the "best" solution to the questions provoking contradictory opinions during the critical situation that the country was experiencing. The general secretary of the CPI National Council, R. Rao, stated that the question of the handover of power was a matter of internal policy for the ruling Congress. In an exceptionally crucial moment in the life of the country, the CPI stated that it was essential to act with extraordinary care in order to normalize the political situation.

Although the CPI/M did not support the appointment of Rajiv Gandhi to the post of prime minister, it did not condemn this action [4]; it also announced its full support for the actions taken by R. Gandhi and his government to
maintain peace and calm in the country. It is also important to remember that both parties participated in the meeting of opposition political parties that took place in Delhi on the eve of the election in 1984, devoted to working out a common election strategy aimed against the Indian National Congress.

As was noted at the January 1985 CPI National Council Plenum, the communist party "did not support the slogan of the opposition parties to create a coalition government of the center." [5] In taking this position the CPI was motivated by the fact that although it was "firmly convinced" of the need to replace the Congress government, it did not consider that the country's main problems could be solved by some other kind of bourgeois government: "for this, what is needed is a leftist and democratic alternative." [6]

According to the CPI assessment, the success of the Congress at the election was explained by the fact that "the acute problems of unemployment, poverty, rising prices and other similar problems were temporarily shifted into the background by the popular masses. The murder of Mrs Gandhi was a profound shock for the people and it forced them to recognize the internal and external danger." As a result, the CPI considers, "there was a sharp change in the political consciousness in the country," because "the people were deeply disturbed that the country's unity and integrity was under serious threat." In its analysis of the parliamentary elections, the CPI recognized that it "did not fully recognize the depth of these sentiments among the people." Moreover, the CPI leadership stated that "the electorate expressed its trust in the Indian National Congress in the absence of any viable and reliable alternative." [7]

The leadership of the CPI/M has offered a similar evaluation of the election results. In particular, it has stated that the dominant factor "prompting the electorate toward the Congress was the national concern for the maintenance of the country's unity and the threat of destabilization of the situation after the tragic death of Indira Gandhi." [8] The CPI/M Central Committee concluded that in a situation in which the mind of the people was dominated by concern for the country's unity, the call to form an alternative government of the center had no realistic basis. In the opinion of the CPI/M leadership, this call was also unrealistic because of the inability of the opposition parties to achieve unity and demonstrate to the public in the country that they could be an effective alternative to the Congress.

Notwithstanding, the CPI/M Central Committee considered it apropos to emphasize that despite the great success of the Indian National Congress, which won four-fifths of the seats in parliament, the number of votes cast for the opposition parties was no less than the number cast for the candidates representing the Congress. The CPI/M Central Committee concludes from this comparison that the deep concern for the unity of the country nevertheless did not induce considerable masses of the electorate to vote for the candidates of the Indian National Congress, and that the votes received by the Congress "in no way signify support for the economic policy and other polices of the ruling party." At the same time, the CPI/M leadership noted that the parliamentary elections "showed a major shift in the attitudes of the electorate toward the Indian National Congress." [9]
Many people in India are by no means indifferent to the kind of policy on the country's main problems that will be pursued by the communists in the new situation, and how their relations will be developed with the ruling Congress with R. Gandhi at its head. And this is understandable. The experience gained by independent India shows that constructive relations between communists and the Congress people and the unity of their actions on important questions in the country's life can exert a major influence in helping the struggle against rightist, reactionary and pro-imperialist forces, maintaining and strengthening India's unity and independence, and developing it along the road of economic and social progress. Contrariwise, confrontation and opposition between them has always been used, and still is, by rightist, reactionary and pro-imperialist forces in order to strengthen their positions, with all the consequent implications for the country's future.

The position of the CPI and its political course, including its attitude toward the ruling Congress, can be judged on the basis of an analysis of decisions adopted by this party's National Council in January 1985. It is noted in these decisions that the government led by Rajiv Gandhi has engendered new hopes among the broad masses of the people that the nation has acted correctly by expressing its support for the prime minister's statement of his government's intention firmly to adhere to a foreign policy course of peace, nonalignment, and friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, and also a course toward averting nuclear war. The communist party "is firmly convinced that questions of the country's unity and integrity, the defeat of external aggression and the maintenance of peace throughout the world are problems of common interest to all patriotic, anti-imperialist and secular-democratic forces, including those within the Indian National Congress." The communist party "will strive for the unity of all forces in these matters." The plenum resolution expressed readiness to support "all positive steps taken by the government in the interests of the country's unity and integrity and its security and the defense of peace throughout the world, and equally, steps taken in the interests of the people." At the same time the CPI leadership has stated that "since the present government still follows the capitalist path of development, which is in crisis, it is unable to solve the acute economic and political problems facing the country." In this connection, the CPI intends to play the role of a leftist opposition and it "will wage a struggle against all antipeople, antidemocratic and other similar measures and policies of the government"; at the same time the CPI will always dissociate itself from the "retrograde" positions of reactionary rightist forces in the opposition and struggle against them. The CPI National Council has adopted a decision to put forward a concrete socioeconomic program that will "be in line with the aspirations of the people." And here, the CPI is ready to cooperate with other leftist parties, particularly the CPI/M, in drawing up such a concrete program. [10]

It follows from the decisions of the CPI National Council that the party's strategic goal is, on the basis of this program, to achieve the unity of leftist forces, which in turn will become the basis for uniting all democratic forces in the country. It notes in the resolution of the CPI National Council plenum that "only the organization of powerful and cohesive leftist forces that would lead the actions of the popular masses throughout the country in defense of economic and social demands, and equally the struggle on political questions
such as safeguarding democratic institutions, national unity and security, can lay the road for the emergence of a left-democratic alternative to the Indian National Congress or any other combination of bourgeois forces." [11]

The CPI/M leadership takes a similar position on many questions, although there are certain differences between the positions of the two communist parties. For many years the CPI/M sharply criticized the Indian National Congress and its government and frequently acted in concert with the bourgeois parties, including the parties of the right, in the struggle against the ruling party. E. Namboodiripad, the CPI/M Central Committee General Secretary, announced in December 1984 that while in general supporting the foreign policy of the Congress government, the CPI/M has always spoken out decisively against its domestic "antipeople policy." Hence, E. Namboodiripad writes, "our tactics are to unite with other opposition parties with the aim of removing the Congress from power." [12]

Following the parliamentary elections, the CPI/M leadership did not declare its attitude toward the policy of the R. Gandhi government, promising to do this later when the main features of this policy became clearer. "We do not want to draw hasty conclusions," E. Namboodiripad stated in January 1985. Nevertheless, the CPI/M Central Committee welcomed the assurance of the new government that it will pursue a policy of nonalignment, anticolonialism and the development of friendship with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and continue the process of normalizing relations with the PRC. [13]

With respect to the bourgeois opposition, its leaders still state that their main goal remains the same: struggle against the Congress, its removal from power at the center, and the formation of a "national" non-Congress government. As before, it accuses the Indian National Congress of corruption, antidemocratic forms of government and the "inability" to solve the country's problems of socioeconomic and political development "by democratic means," and properly to safeguard and defend its historical and cultural values.

In order to bolster their claims to power, the leaders of the opposition assert that the victory of the Indian National Congress in the parliamentary elections is merely the result of the coincidence of a number of unforeseen circumstances, the chief of which was the murder of Indira Gandhi, which evoked among the electorate a "wave" of sympathy for the Congress and its new leader; even here, the leaders of the opposition parties assert, the Congress would have been unable to achieve a impressive victory if the opposition parties had acted in a cohesive way and on a united front at the elections. Thus, A.B. Vajpayee, the president of the Bharatiya Janata Party, has said that one of the main reasons for the opposition's defeat was that "the electorate's vote was divided because of the opposition's inability to achieve mutual understanding." [14]

We noted above that the shock of millions of Indians at the villainous murder of prime minister Indira Gandhi and their sympathetic attitude toward the Congress which she had for many years headed, undoubtedly influenced the outcome of the elections. However, more fundamental causes were decisive here. Paradoxical though it may be, the truth is that although the Congress had been in power for many years, and had repeatedly disappointed those who
traditionally voted for it, failing to keep many of its promises, especially with regard to the struggle against poverty and to improve the position of the popular masses, it is precisely with the Congress rather than with any other party or combination of parties that the broad strata of the population still link their hopes for a better future, the preservation of the country's unity and integrity, and its advance along the path of economic and social progress.

Great importance also attached to the fact that despite the multitude of unresolved problems facing India, over the previous 5 years the government of the Indian National Congress had achieved progress in its economic development. Thus, the production of grain for food had risen from 109.7 million tons in the 1979/80 fiscal year to 151.5 million tons in the 1983/84 fiscal year. The volume of industrial output rose more than 20 percent, the generation of electric power 32.6 percent, coal extraction 32.8 percent and recovery of crude oil 121 percent. The Indian National Congress government had succeeded in somewhat reducing the rate of inflation, which at the end of 1984 was running at an annual rate of 5.4 percent against 10.7 percent at the end of 1983. The country's balance of payments situation had improved. As the Indian president, Z. Singh, stated in parliament, in recent years certain measures had been implemented to comply with the 20-point program designed to improve the position of the poor peasants. This all undoubtedly helped to create favorable conditions for the ruling party's election victory. The first steps taken by Rajiv Gandhi, who took the helm of power at an exceptionally complicated moment in India's history, made a great impression on the broad popular masses. The murder of Indira Gandhi was not only an enormous shock for the country. It resulted in a debauch of religious-communal clashes, accompanied by a breakdown of law and order on a scale that might have plunged the country into the chaos of political instability. During those days the new head of the government showed decisiveness, restraint and skill in rapidly adapting to the situation. The statesmanlike qualities he had demonstrated enabled him in several days to normalize the situation in the country and then insure that the parliamentary elections were held in a relatively calm atmosphere. Millions of voters belonging to the most varied strata of the population undoubtedly assessed this very highly.

At the same time it is obvious that representatives of the various classes and strata of the population voting in the election for the Indian National Congress candidates linked with the victory of that party in the elections and the assumption of power by the government led by Rajiv Gandhi with different and sometimes diametrically opposed hopes. One of the paradoxes of the election was that even though during the election campaign Rajiv Gandhi himself repeatedly emphasized his intention of continuing the policy of Indira Gandhi, in the eyes of the voters he had become a symbol of change, although such change was perceived in different ways. Representatives of big capital suggested that under the leadership of R. Gandhi, India would leap forward into the "technology of the 21st century," and that it was precisely they, the "captains of industry," who would derive maximum benefit from this. Others--those who do not think in such bold terms and who think first and foremost about their daily bread--fervently hoped that the Congress and its new government would save them from overpowering need and poverty and make their lives more tolerable.
The contradictory hopes and aspirations were graphically demonstrated during the course of a poll conducted by the journal INDIA TODAY among Indians belonging to diametrically opposed strata of society: big businessmen, whose profits run into multiple figures, and out-of-work textile workers in Ahmadabad outside the gates of the factories and hence doomed to an existence of semi-starvation. The director of the Rustom Mills Company, P. Annubhay, for example, told a journal correspondent that he expects the new government "to carry out a radical review of policy in favor of business." [15] Another representative of the business circles, chairman of the Chloride India Company, J. Sengupta, said that "the government should continue the liberalization of economic policy, particularly in the field of industrial licensing and import and tax policies." [16] Some representatives of big business expressed the hope that, following the example of England, the new government will not appoint "bureaucrats" to key posts in the management of country's economic life but "capable industrialists" from among leading Indian private companies. Statements by many other representatives of the industrialists were mainly in the same vein: India should be developed along the lines of and similar to the industrialized countries of the West and in close cooperation with them (and this means, let us add, with all the consequences for Indian workers stemming from this). It is possible that those who now stand at the top of India's social ladder have evidently interpreted incorrectly the words of R. Gandhi, who in his election speeches actually talked about the "modernization" of and future changes in the country. However, he also added here that what he had in mind was the modernization made possible by bringing the latest scientific achievements to the 500,000 Indian villages, where people still use oxen and live in pitiful shacks.

Representatives of big capital yearn for the kind of "modernization" of India that would signify a "leap into the 21st century" only for the elite, the upper strata of multilayered Indian society, giving no thought to the fate of those whom the official statistics relegate to the category of citizens living "below the poverty line." [17] The unemployed textile workers in Ahmadabad undoubtedly fall into this category. According to INDIA TODAY, almost the only source of support for them is free meals provided by a private benevolent organization at one of the city's temples. The journal notes that in Ahmadabad alone, during the last 2 years, unable to withstand the competition, 16 of the 60 textile factories have closed down, resulting in 49,000 people being thrown out of work. One of the unemployed, Karim Allahbah, told a journal correspondent: "It is only we, the powerless workers, who are in trouble. The factory owners have lost nothing. They still drive around in their limousines and give no thought to the hungry." [18]

In the words of INDIA TODAY, in Ahmadabad and Gujarat State in general, the workers in the textile factories have traditionally always been "the most obedient workers"; over the past 100 years there has not been a single major strike there. This is explained mainly by the fact that the workers were united in a Gandhi-type trade union. Following the principles of Mahatma Gandhi, the Textile Labor Association has confined itself to passive methods in the struggle against the owners, acting mainly through negotiation. To judge from everything, this situation has now come to an end. The president of the trade union, A. (Buch), has spoken of the wretched lot of the textile workers: "We are unable to do anything. We are reluctant to use force... But
as long as we conduct ourselves peaceably no one listens to us." [19] Many workers have quit the ranks of the trade union. The Bharatiya Janata Party has tried to take advantage of this, setting up the Bharatiya Komdar Parishad trade union in Ahmadabad. Its leaders have proclaimed themselves "more decisive defenders" of workers' interests. However, most workers have rejected these leaders; the disillusionment of the textile workers continues to grow. One unemployed textile worker, Danabhay, stated: "Everyone lets us down. The factory owners, the Textile Labor Association, the government and the opposition parties--everyone uses us for his own purposes." [20]

The greatest question for the thousands of unemployed textile workers like Danabhay is the following: will the situation change for the better or will thousands of new people, who are now employed, swell the ranks of the unemployed because of the threat of further closures of the textile factories?

The textile workers are placing high hopes in the government of R. Gandhi, who has promised to take steps to overcome the crisis in the textile industry. Speaking before a 100,000-strong election meeting in Ahmadabad in December 1984, he said: "As soon as the parliamentary elections are over we shall try to resolve the crisis in the textile industry... The prevailing situation is a problem not only for Ahmadabad because textile factories are closing down all over India." [21]

The hopes and aspirations of the unemployed textile workers and many millions of other unfairly treated people in Indian society on the one hand, and the plans and wishes of the representatives of the privileged classes on the other all make the tasks facing the Indian National Congress extremely complex. It faces the problem of how to realize in its practical activity the very varied and even frankly opposed desires of the various strata of Indian society. It is quite clear that the representatives of big industrial and trading capital, who have become firmly entrenched in their economic positions in the country since independence, will apply enormous pressure to the government, trying to make it pursue a policy that meets primarily their own class interests. At the same time it is clear that it will be difficult for the leadership of the ruling party to fail to respond to the aspirations of the most unfairly treated strata of the population that gave their vote en masse to the candidates of that party and its leader, on whom they pin great hopes.

The prescription for Indian monopoly circles and all whose economic interests are closely linked with them is simple: force through economic development along the capitalist road at any cost. To achieve this end, many of them are not above relying on the transnational monopolies. The representatives of the upper wealthy classes give little thought to the fact that the model they are proposing for the country's development will lead to a further intensification of social inequality and, consequently, to increased social tension. The experience of other developing countries shows that following this kind of prescription has not led to any general upsurge in the economy (this has occurred mainly in those sectors that serve the elite strata of society), nor to any improvement in the people's lives. Moreover, social inequality has deepened, causing further social tension and political instability. In some of these countries, military dictator regimes have seized power.
J. Nehru repeatedly said that in the 20th century India cannot allow itself to follow "the British, French or American paths," because it does not have 100 to 150 years available to it... "This," he stressed, "is quite unacceptable. In that event we shall simply perish." [22] Indira Gandhi repeatedly stated that a country like India needs a policy that can be expressed in the formula "economic growth plus social justice." "Only a policy left of center," she remarked, "can insure for the government the trust of the people." [23] Under the conditions prevailing in India today, a policy "left of center" and "economic growth plus social justice" can mean nothing but the practical implementation of the programs proclaimed by the Congress aimed at dealing with poverty and reducing social inequality, and also the implementation of other measures in the interests of the broad popular masses.

In recent times eminent economists, sociologists and politicians and the influential press organs have started to speak more insistently about the need to eliminate the contradictions that have built up in Indian society and effect major socioeconomic transformations. For example, the journal LINK writes that India cannot avoid structural reforms that "would pave the way for essential and urgent changes in society." [24] Even the conservative TIMES OF INDIA, which has traditionally stood aside from the urgent problems of the life of the popular masses and the interests of working people, is now writing about the need for changes that would lead to a lessening of social contrasts and improvements in the situation of the unfairly treated strata of society. It has been forced to state that "in his everyday life the simple Indian encounters a mass of contradictions and double standards." On the one hand, he sees luxury and abundance, while on the other, there is poverty, ignorance, sickness, coercion and so forth. In other words, the newspaper writes, the simple Indian "sees that there are two India's--the India of the rich, who have political influence and privileges in the social sphere, and another India--a country of the poor and the weak, of the oppressed." [25] In the newspaper's opinion, most of India's problems can be explained by the fact that at one time it adopted western models of economic and social development alien to it--models that "elevate economic growth to the level of a cult." However, the TIMES OF INDIA notes, the people do not need development just for the sake of development, but social reforms "that would lead to decisive changes in people's lives." The newspaper concludes that in order to achieve real changes in social life in favor of poor people, "it is essential to reject western models of development and work out our own to match our needs, our spirit and our culture." [26]

In his program speeches during the course of the parliamentary elections, and since, Rajiv Gandhi has expressed his determination not only to safeguard India's unity and integrity and wage an uncompromising struggle against religious and communal dissension, but also "to insure economic development and social justice and maintain loyalty to socialism." [27]

"The new prime minister," writes the newspaper NATIONAL HERALD, which is close to the government, "has promised not only to implement the programs and policies drawn up and willed by Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, but also to take immediate steps to remove the obstacles hampering and slowing progress in the spheres of the economy and social relations." The government will take the necessary steps and "our main tasks for development with guarantees of justice will be tackled in due time," R. Gandhi has stated. [28]
The future will show how the ruling Indian National Congress and its leadership succeed in keeping their promises and resolving the country's fundamental problems, which in his appeal to the country in January 1985 R. Gandhi graphically described as "a war against India's age-old enemies--poverty, unemployment, sickness and ignorance." [29] It is quite obvious that although India faces many other problems that cry out for resolution, in the final analysis it is precisely on success in the "war" against the basic evils listed by the prime minister in the socioeconomic sphere that not only the prestige of the ruling Congress and its position in India's party political system but also the general political climate in the country and its advance along the path of economic and social progress will depend.

FOOTNOTES


2. NEW AGE 23 Dec 84.

3. PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY 13 Dec 84.

4. PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY 23 Jan 85.

5. NEW AGE 27 Jan 85.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY 15 Dec 84.

9. PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY 27 Jan 85.

10. NEW AGE 27 Jan 85.

11. Ibid.

12. PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY 27 Jan 85.

13. PROBE INDIA 20 Jan 85.

14. Ibid.

15. INDIA TODAY 15 Jan 85.

16. Ibid.

17. Several years ago the Indian Planning Commission defined the "poverty line" as a per capita income of 76 rupees per month in rural locations and 88 rupees per month for people living in urban regions. According to figures published in the Indian press, about 40 percent of the country's population is living "below the poverty line" (THE TIMES OF INDIA 21 Jan 85).
18. INDIA TODAY 15 Jan 85, p 144. According to the official figures, in 1984 a total of 22.9 million people were registered as unemployed in the labor offices (MAINSTREAM 7 Dec 84, p 12).

19. INDIA TODAY 15 Jan 85, p 144.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


23. LINK 6 Jan 85.

24. Ibid.

25. THE TIMES OF INDIA 29 Jan 85.


27. NATIONAL HERALD 10 Jan 85.

28. Ibid.

29. NATIONAL HERALD 6 Jan 85.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki" Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

9642
CSO: 1807/079
[Excerpts] During 1984 the Institute of Africa continued its comprehensive work on the urgent problems of the African countries, paying special attention to raising the scientific-theoretical level of research. During this period 20 collective and individual monographs were published, together with a collection of about 320 printed pages (the papers preceding the 4th All-Union Conference of Africa Specialists are not included). Some 27 rotary-press papers totaling 138 printed pages were prepared.

As in previous years, the institute combined basic research with work on problems of direct practical significance.

The need to struggle against the threat of nuclear war and the arms race and the African countries' political stance vis-a-vis the USSR's peace initiatives were analyzed in a collective work entitled "Globalnyye posledstviya yadernoy voyny i razvivayushchiyesya strany" [Global Consequences of Nuclear War and the Developing Countries], in the book "Novoye myshleniye v yadernyy vek" [The New Thinking of the Nuclear Age] by An.A. Gromyko and V.B. Lomeyko, and also in a number of other works. Among work dealing with the unmasking of imperialist policy in Africa and with neocolonialism, mention should be made of a collective monograph "Belyy dom i Chernyy kontinent" [The White House and the Dark Continent] (Moscow 1984, chief editor Ye.A. Tarabrin), S.S. Kozitskiy's monograph "FRG v Afrike: strategiya sotsialnoy ekspansii" [The FRG in Africa: the Strategy of Social Expansion] (Moscow 1984), and several rotary-press papers.

The institute conducted research on the main trends in and prospects for the economic development of African countries, the development strategy of African countries, and their struggle for the new international economic order [NIEO] against the policy of the transnational companies. These problems were reflected in a collective study entitled "Afrika v borze za perestroyku mezhdunarodnykh ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy" [Africa in the Struggle To Restructure International Economic Relations] (Moscow 1985), and also in the rotary-press paper "Perspektivy ekonomicheskogo razvitiya stran Afriki do 2000 goda" [Prospects for Economic Development in the African Countries through the Year 2000]. The former offers
an analysis of the attitudes of African countries toward NIEO, reviews the difficulties in restructuring foreign trade relations with the developed capitalist countries and in overcoming scientific and technical, financial and currency dependence, considers the evolution of relations with the trans-national companies, and criticizes bourgeois concepts of NIEO. The socioeconomic problems of the African countries are dealt with in the collection "Strany Severnoy Afriki" [The Countries of North Africa] (Moscow 1984). A monograph by L.N. Aksyuk entitled 'Syryevaya politika razzivayushchikhsya stran' [Raw-Materials Policy in the Developing Countries] (Moscow 1984) shows the role of the raw-materials industry in the overall development strategy of the African countries.

An important place was occupied in the institute's research by studies of the political, economic, scientific, scientific and technical and cultural relations between the USSR and African countries and enhancing their effectiveness.

One of the main directions of research was work on the theory and generalization of practice in socialist orientation. The collective monograph "Afrika: strany sotsialisticheskoy orientatsii v revolyutsionnom protsesse" [Africa: Socialist-Oriented Countries in the Revolutionary Process] (Moscow 1984, chief editor An.A. Gromyko), and other works were published. They considered the present-day revolutionary process in connection with the switch by a number of liberated African countries onto the path of a socialist orientation; an analysis was made of the features of these countries' political, economic and social development and their role in the contemporary world in the struggle against imperialism and racism and to restructure international economic relations.

The typical basic directions and trends in the economic and sociopolitical development of the African countries, including countries moving along the capitalist path, are dealt with in a number of works, in particular I.V. Sledzevskiy's monograph "Formirovaniye sotsialno-ekonomicheskoy struktury sovremennoy Nigerii" [Formation of the Socioeconomic Structure in Present-Day Nigeria] (Moscow 1984). This monograph successfully combines study of the country with an analysis of general theoretical problems in the capitalist-oriented development of a number of African states. A monograph reference book entitled "Respublika Zair" [The Republic of Zaire] was published (Moscow 1984, chief editor L.V. Goncharov).


Studies continued on the situation in the south of Africa. The collective monograph "Krizis na Yuge Afriki" [Crisis in the South of Africa] (Moscow 1984, chief editor An.A. Gromyko) was published; it reviews problems in the crisis situation arising in the south of the African continent during the Seventies and Eighties, and the policy of the ruling circles in the Republic of South Africa is shown.

The African specialists paid much attention to criticism of bourgeois, reformist and revisionist concepts of economic and sociopolitical development on the
continent. This theme was reflected in the work "Ekonomicheskaya mys\l\ v Afrike" [Economic Thinking in Africa] (Moscow 1984) and in a number of the monographs mentioned above. A criticism of bourgeois sociology and its development models for the liberated countries was offered in the collective monograph "Sotsiologiya razvitiya Afriki" [Sociology in the Development of Africa] (Moscow 1984, chief editor G.B. Starushenko).

The Documentation and Scientific Information Section did work in the following directions: documentation, African studies abroad, bibliography, dossiers, publication of subject collections in the series "Afrika: issledovaniya sovetskikh uchenykh" [Africa: Studies by Soviet Scholars] (in five languages) and collections of documents, and automation of data processes in African studies.

About 80 foreign periodicals, the Soviet press and numerous materials from Soviet and foreign African centers are processed for the dossiers. In 1984, this section together with other institute sections and the editorial office of the journal OBRUCHESTVENNYE NAUKI I SOVREMENNOST jointly published foreign-language editions of collections of articles by Soviet scholars on problems of the ideology of the revolutionary democrats, ethnocultural development and so forth. A bibliographic yearbook was published, and the "Bibliografiya trudov sotrudnikov instituta za 1979-1983 gg" [Bibliography of Works by Institute Associates 1979-1983] was published jointly with the library to mark the 25th anniversary of the institute.

Important work was done by this section and a number of other sections on the joint publications by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a collection of documents under the title "SSSR i strany Afriki" [The USSR and the Countries of Africa] and "SSSR v borbe protiv kolonializma" [The USSR in the Struggle against Colonialism], and also a collection of documents on the Nonaligned Movement.


During 1984 the Institute of Africa and the USSR Academy of Sciences social sciences section of the Council on Problems of Africa held a number of conferences and sessions. The main event was the 4th All-Union Conference of Africa Specialists "Africa in the Eighties: Results and Development Prospects," which coincided with the 25th anniversary of the institute (for more detail on this see NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 2, 1985, pp 137-146).

An out-of-town session (in Tashkent) "The Significance for Developing Countries of the First Revolutionary Socioeconomic Transformations in the Republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (Experience in the Twenties and Thirties)" (see NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 1, 1985, pp 120-125), and a scientific-practical conference "Basic Directions and Ways To Improve the Economic and Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the USSR and the Countries of Africa and Asia" (Moscow) took place. The Social Problems Section held a scientific symposium "The Way of Life and the Quality of Life in the Liberated countries" in which associates from the National and Cultural Problems Sector and the Criticism of the Ideology and Policy of Anticommunism Sector also took part.
In order to further strengthen links with the institutes of the union republic academies of sciences, associates from the institute visited Ashkhabad, Tashkent, Frunze and cities in the RSFSR to present lectures on the urgent problems of Africa. Seminars were conducted for African students studying in the USSR, and also lectures for the professorial and teaching staff. In addition, each year the institute offers prediploma practical work for African and Soviet students studying in higher educational establishments in Moscow.

At the sessions of the institute's Scientific Council (18 sessions were held in 1984) reports and information were presented on urgent economic, social, political and other problems in the development of African countries.

During 1984 the institute implemented a number of international measures. The following meetings took place: a Soviet-U.S. meeting on Angola and Namibia, during the course of which scholars exchanged opinions on the situation in the south of Africa; and also on questions of giving Namibia its independence (the American side was represented by a delegation from the Rockefeller Foundation); a Soviet-U.S. conference within the framework of the American association of cognitive societies on present-day sub-Saharan Africa (the U.S. delegation was led by professor K. Rozberg); the first Soviet-West German dialogue with scholars from the Ebert Foundation (the FRG delegation was led by the director of the international section of the Dr. (Ernst-Y Kerbush) Foundation), during which there was discussion of the socioeconomic problems of the developing countries and the significance for them of the struggle for peace and international security, and also the situation in the south of Africa.

The institute held a scientific conference devoted to the 10th anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution. A collection is being prepared for publication, based on materials from this conference. In November 1984 the 8th international conference on Ethiopian studies took place in Addis Ababa (see NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 4, 1985, pp 134-136).

International scientific links with the socialist countries were maintained mainly within the framework of the problem subcommittee for multilateral cooperation between the academies of sciences of the socialist countries "The Economies and Politics of the Countries of Africa." Scientific centers in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia took part in the work of the subcommittee.

In accordance with the 1984 plans for the problem subcommittee a regular meeting of the problem committee and its subcommittees took place in Cuba. In accordance with established tradition, during the course of the meeting a scientific session was held, at which reports from the Cuban and Czechoslovak sides were presented and discussed; the subjects were "Features of the World Revolutionary Process in the Developing Countries" and "Problems of the Revolutionary Process in the Developing Countries in the Seventies and Eighties." In accordance with an agreement between the Institute of Africa, the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Institute of International Relations, a monograph entitled "Afrika: problemy mira i bezopasnost" [Africa: Problems of Peace and Security] was prepared and will be published in English and Russian. The Institute of
Africa took part in the regular meetings of young scholars from the socialist countries. The regular "summer school" was devoted to problems of the structural changes in the economies and foreign economic relations of the developing countries (Bulgaria). During the year the institute was visited by 236 scholars and public figures from the socialist, developing and capitalist countries. Eight foreign scholars spent time working at the institute. The institute maintained its book exchange with 300 centers for African studies located in Africa, Asia, Europe and the United States.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

9642
CSO: 1807/079
An international conference devoted to the 20th anniversary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA] took place in Moscow 24 and 25 December 1984. This conference was the first major measure implemented by the Soviet-Afghan commission of historians. At the conference scholars from the PDPA were represented by the scientific secretary of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Academy of Sciences Dr A.S. Gafari, Dr A.M. Zakhma, the president of the juridical faculty at Kabul University A.V. Karar, the director of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies Dr A.L. Jelami, and the heads of the faculties of the history of the Middle Ages and of modern history, Drs Mir Hussein Shah and G.S. Humayun. The ambassador plenipotentiary of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the USSR Habib Mangal also presented a report. The Soviet scholars participating in the work of the conference included the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies Ye.M. Primakov, Yu.V. Gankovskiy, G.F. Girs, A.D. Davydov, M.R. Arunova, V.V. Basov, V.G. Korgun and others, scientific associates from the Moscow State University and representatives from practical organizations, and journalists.

Opening the conference, Ye.M. Primakov noted that the vanguard parties of the workers are playing an enormous role in insuring the forward-looking development of countries with a socialist orientation along the path of social progress under conditions of the struggle against internal and external counterrevolution. The PDPA is the leading political force in Afghan society. Over a relatively short span of time the party has traversed in full the difficult road from a numerically small, persecuted, illegal organization to a 120,000-strong ruling party—the first on the land of a democratic Afghan republic.

Stressing that the PDPA is the inheritor of the heroic traditions of its people's anticolonial struggle, the antidespotic aspirations of the young Afghan movement of the 20th century and the democratic trends of recent years, Mir Hussein reviewed the birth and creation of illegal organizations and groups made up of the intelligentsia, and he analyzed the nature of their press statements. He characterized the activity of Mahmud Tarsi—ideologist of the young Afghan movement—and noted the enormous influence of the Great October Socialist
Revolution on the destinies of countries in the East, particularly Afghanistan, which gained its independence in 1919. V.G. Korgun devoted his speech to an analysis of the 'strategic' and tactical line of the PDPA under the monarchy and its struggle against the antipeople policy of the ruling circles.

V.V. Basov characterized the activity of the PDPA during the regime of M. Daud (1973-1978). Habib Mangal described the leading role of the PDPA in consolidating and uniting national patriotic forces, the preparations for and triumph of the revolution, and the struggle by healthy forces in the party against the dissident and criminal activity of H. Amin, followed by the struggle to overcome the negative consequences of this activity. He also dealt in depth with the main transformations effected by the PDPA and the Afghan government in the socioeconomic, political, cultural and other fields. He spoke about the activity of the party in the field of strengthening the armed forces, the struggle against counterrevolution, the expansion of contacts with the population in the tribal zone, and the enlistment of broad strata of the population (including along the line of the National Homeland Front, the trade unions, the youth and women's organizations and the creative unions) for public and creative work and to defend the gains of the revolution. A.D. Davydov devoted his speech to the implementation of the land and water reform--a most important point in the PDPA program in the national democratic revolution.

A.V. Karar (Afghanistan) traced the main stages in the development of the workers' movement in Afghanistan. Analyzing the activity of the trade unions, A.V. Karar characterized important directions in their activity such as labor competition, the movement to save assets, the movement to eradicate illiteracy and so forth. The workers are being enlisted increasingly not only for work in the management organs at the local level but also for direct participation in defending the gains of the revolution in the self-defense detachments. The fact that 30 percent of the PDPA members are now workers is of great political importance.

A.S. Gafari and G.F. Girs reviewed PDPA policy in the fields of science and culture. The main tasks in the field of developing culture and science are being tackled in accordance with the 1980 Main Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Action Program for the PDPA adopted in 1982. These documents provide for the gradual elimination of the differences in the levels not only of the socioeconomic but also the cultural development of the various regions of the country, and the creation of favorable conditions for the activity of the creative intelligentsia and insuring true equality for all nationalities and tribes and the development of science and culture.

G.F. Girs devoted much attention to culture and literature in postrevolutionary Afghanistan. Analyzing a number of prose and poetry works, he showed, using specific examples, the continuity in the development of revolutionary-democratic and patriotic ideas in Afghan literature.

The PDPA's struggle to insure favorable foreign policy conditions for the development of the revolution was dealt with in M.R. Arunova's speech. She noted that the party and government leadership in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is taking steps aimed at a political settlement of the Afghan problem.
The peace-loving foreign policy of the PDPA and the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is producing positive results. Thus, according to figures for the end of 1984, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan maintains diplomatic relations with more than 80 states. Trade and economic links have been re-established with a number of them. Afghanistan's position in the international organizations has been strengthened: 15 UN special institutions are participating in 24 programs for the development of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Since 1983 Afghanistan has again been a member of the coordination bureau for the nonaligned movement.

Yu.V. Gankovskiy, chairman of the Soviet section of the mixed Soviet-Afghan commission of historians, closed the conference.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985
AFRICA INSTITUTE VISITED BY ITALIAN AFRICAN EXPERT

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 85 p 129

[Unattributed report]

[Text] In February 1985 the institute was visited by the director of the Rome Institute of Italian Ties with the Countries of Africa, Latin America and the Near East, G. Kalki Novati, who familiarized himself with the scientific research of Soviet Africa specialists, presented a lecture entitled "The Policy of Italy and Other EEC Countries in the Developing States of Africa and Other Continents" for the associates of the Institute of Africa, and talked about the basic directions of the work at the establishment he leads.

The Institute of Italian Ties with the Countries of Africa, Latin America and the Near East (Instituto per relazioni tra l'Italia e i Paesi dell'Africa, America Latina e Medio Oriente--IPALMO) was set up in 1971 on the initiative of the main Italian political parties—the communists, socialists and Christian democrats. The main task facing IPALMO is to promote the development of Italy's relations with the developing countries and work on the theoretical and practical principles of the foreign policy course of the Italian government in this field. In the activity of the institute much attention is also paid to general questions of the relaxation of tension and relations between East and West.

IPALMO's international ties are broad and varied. On its initiative, international conferences and seminars have been organized on urgent problems of international relations, in particular questions connected with the establishment of a new world economic order and Euro-Afro-Arab cooperation. The institute cooperates with similar scientific establishments in France, Spain, Yugoslavia and other European countries. IPALMO is now participating in an Italian Foreign Ministry project for cooperation with the Eduardo Mondplane University (Mozambique).

Ten associates work full-time on the institute's staff. In addition, researchers from other scientific establishments are enlisted to carry out various tasks.

IPALMO publishes the journal POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE, which comes out monthly in Italian (circulation 3,000), and twice annually in English (circulation 1,000). G. Kalki Novati is the director of publishing.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

9642
CSO: 1807/079
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ETHIOPIAN STUDIES HELD

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 85 pp 134-136

[Unattributed conference report]

[Excerpts] The 8th International Conference on Ethiopian Studies took place in November 1984 in the capital of Socialist Ethiopia, Addis Ababa (conferences on Ethiopian studies have been held since 1959. Soviet scholars took part in the third, fifth, seventh and eighth conferences). More than 200 scholars from 26 countries took part in its work. The Soviet group of scholars was led by the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences An.A. Gromyko. An.A. Gromyko's report "Soviet-Ethiopian Relations at the Present Stage" was presented at the plenary session.

Many of the reports presented at the conference dealt with the historical-ethnographic theme. Among the reports dealing with present-day problems, those devoted to the spread of Marxism-Leninism in Ethiopia and the role of the Ethiopian Workers Party [WPE] were worthy of attention. A number of reports by Ethiopian scholars considered the role of the masses in the revolution and their politicization from Marxist-Leninist positions. The establishment of the WPE and its leading role at the present stage were pointed out in a report by the Ethiopian scholar Tesfaye Shebaye.

Discussion was provoked by questions connected with the drought in the country and overcoming its consequences, and by the difficulties at the present stage of the revolution. The head of the Ethiopian government commission on providing aid and for rehabilitation, Dawit Wolde Georgis, noted that in solving the problem of hunger a major role can be played by scientists, who should find adequate methods for overcoming the catastrophic consequences of the droughts that periodically afflict Ethiopia. Here, the main task is to make it possible to switch from humane help for the starving to effective measures to limit the dependence of farming on the weather conditions, in particular by restoring the land in the afflicted regions or by resettling people in the fertile regions in the south and west.

Eight reports, including four from Ethiopian scholars, were devoted to various, mainly social, aspects of the agrarian transformations. Thus, Yosef Gebre Egziabher (Ethiopia) noted in his report "The Reform of Farming: an Effective
Measure of Socialist Transformation in Agriculture" that the removal of land from private ownership was a basic prerequisite for the switch to "cooperative farming." At the same time, further advance along the path of socialist transformations in the countryside will depend on providing the peasants not only with land but also machines, draft power, seeds and fertilizers. In the report of O.A. Dolgovoy (USSR) "On the Question of the Agrarian Transformations in Ethiopia," the main thrust was on the formation of peasant cooperatives in the light of Leninist teaching. Others participating in the discussions on this problem also spoke of the need for help from the state in improving the productiveness of the peasant farms and for more preparatory work in order to accomplish the collectivization of agricultural production.

General matters were considered at the conference; such as the problem of optimizing the balance between the creation of a major state industry or the retention and reinforcement of small-scale private enterprise, providing incentives for individual peasant farms or forcing through collectivization, and the attraction of external resources (foreign capital) in order to increase capital investment or cutting back on the national investment programs. The discussions showed that within the framework of traditional Ethiopian studies (history and ethnography), the economic direction was poorly represented, particularly in the reports by western scholars. Only the report of M.K. Seti (Italy) was devoted to the balanced development both of big industry within the framework of the state sector and small-scale enterprise, which under the conditions prevailing in Socialist Ethiopia can promote general growth in industrial production in order to satisfy the needs of the urban and rural populations for finished articles.

The report of V.K. Viganda (USSR) "Problems in the Socioeconomic Development of Ethiopia: Difficulties and Prospects" offered an analysis of the present situation in industry and strengthening its links with agriculture, and also dealt with questions of the use of foreign capital under state control.

A number of reports considered various questions connected with the separatist movements in Ethiopia and the tension in relations with Somalia and the Sudan. Many scholars noted that Ethiopia's domestic economic problems are connected with the tension on its borders and that it is essential to solve the complex questions of national construction.

M.V. Raym and V.S. Yagya (both from the USSR) presented a report entitled "Ethiopia on the Path of Socialist Orientation," which characterized the difficulties accompanying progressive transformations in Ethiopia at the various stages of the national-democratic revolution, and also the motive force of the revolution and the role of the Commission for the Organization of the WPE and the WPE in overcoming these difficulties.

Previously noted trends such as the greater attention to contemporary matters, the application of Marxist-Leninist theory in studying the problems of Ethiopia's socioeconomic development, and the considerably broader participation by Ethiopian scholars in studies of the history of their country and its present-day development were further developed at the conference.
The holding of the 8th International Conference on Ethiopian Studies right there in Addis Ababa testifies to the growing attention being paid by scholars throughout the world to the studies being conducted in Ethiopia itself. The work of the conference attracted much attention from the Ethiopian leadership.

Along with the objective elucidation of Ethiopia's problems by most of the conference participants, in the statements made by some western and pro-western Ethiopian scholars one could detect a tendency toward belittling the achievements of the Ethiopian revolution and ignoring the role of the vanguard party in building the new society. Such tendencies were rebuffed by many of those participating in the conference, including the members of the Soviet delegation, whose reports and statements during the discussions pointed out the real achievements of the Ethiopian revolution and the role of the WPE in the comprehensive resolution of the tasks of developing the country along the path of a socialist orientation and the mutual benefits of Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation.

The decision of the 8th International Conference on Ethiopian Studies to hold the next conference in the USSR has set for Soviet scholars the task of preparing in a worthy manner for the meeting with foreign Ethiopian experts, and particularly of insuring that they will familiarize themselves with the rich archival and cultural monuments on Ethiopian studies that have been gathered in our country.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

9642
CSO: 1807/079
IEMSS BOOK ON TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 85 pp 161-165


[Text] The reviewed monograph was written by a collective in the Section for General Problems in the Building of Socialism at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System. This relatively small work makes a solid contribution to generalizing studies on the socioeconomic and historical-cultural realities of countries that have set out to build the foundations of socialism and are continuing to resolve general democratic tasks (Vietnam, Laos and so forth), and countries that have chosen the road of socialist orientation (Angola, Mozambique and others). Thus, the subject of the authors' analysis is social practice in those developing countries whose political leadership is exercised by Marxist-Leninist parties and workers' vanguard parties.

The goal that the authors have set themselves is to develop the concept of the transition to socialism by economically undeveloped countries (page 6). In my opinion, the successful realization of this goal places this book in a special place in the extensive oriental and philosophical-sociological literature dealing with this subject.

As many researchers have recognized, the methods of extensive description and a general sociological explanation of the experience gained in noncapitalist development, which were fruitful during the initial stages of research, are no longer adequate. The need now is for broad theoretical generalizations of the accumulated material and for more specific conceptual work on individual problems. Problems concerning the typology of revolution in the liberated countries and the nature of political power and the reasons for its radicalization are now being resolved at a higher level in the scientific literature, a typology is being developed for the historical forms of noncapitalist development, and so forth. The key to theoretical development and the generalization of available experience is sought in the book in the problem of the law-governed transition to socialism by economically weak countries in the contemporary era.
and the essential and adequate conditions are defined for the realization of this. The first section of the book deals with the international conditions for this transition, while the second part is devoted to internal conditions.

Special attention is paid precisely to the conditions and means, for the authors clearly recognize the interconditionality of the nature of the goal and the nature of the means used to reach it. Inexactly selected means or the mere mechanical copying of experience are capable not only of slowing down movement toward the intended socialist goal but also of distorting the direction of social development. What, then, are the means essential for the stage-by-stage gradual transition to socialism? What are the means for transition where certain subjective conditions have taken shape while the material prerequisites are far from ready? In other words, what are the essential and adequate means whose use would enable the countries selected for this analysis to realize, in the final analysis, the scientific, humane ideal of socialism rather than a model that is deformed by the influence of limited means? This is the pivotal question whose answer makes up the content of this book.

Having set the complex and in many ways compelling task, the authors have approached the general methodological questions with proper attention and clarified the sequential steps in elucidation of the problem.

"... The first step... is a precise definition of international conditions" (page 12) essential and adequate to effect the transition to socialism by countries with undeveloped economies (chapters 1 and 2).

After clarifying the international situation, during the second stage (chapter 3) a determination must be made, on the one hand, of the "set of indicators and characteristics, both general and national-specific, that reflect the initial boundary from which the advance to socialism begins" (page 13). On the other hand, there must also be clarification of the set of indicators expressing the ultimate boundary of "foreshortened development," that is, socialism. In this regard, profound methodological significance attaches to the definition of socialism, developed from the positions of the natural sciences, as a social order (pages 67-68). It "leads to a recognition of the monistic essence of socialism... Differences cannot extend beyond the framework of socialist social quality, that is, the orientation of the entire system of social relations on vital material, social and spiritual blessings for the working masses..." (page 71).

For the next, third, stage of the study it is important "to define as accurately as possible the main lines of the development that must be made from the initial boundary toward socialism" (page 13), or outline a strategy for "foreshortened development." (chapter 4).

And the formulation of the concept is completed with the fourth and last stage, at which the specific means and methods to be used for the transition to socialism are clarified, an objectively determined sequence is established for the tasks, and the optimal version is selected for solving them, according to domestic and international conditions. Chapter 5 of the book deals with these problems of tactics.
The result of the complete and sequential realization of all four stages of the study is the concept of "the theoretical expression of the substance of the most important lines of development, and also the associated essential transformations and measures, implemented at a definite rate and insuring a transition from the initial boundary to the ultimate boundary" (page 13). In their approach, the authors draw attention to two ideas of special importance.

First, there is an appeal to the historical past of the subject of the study, associated with the rejection of "uniform economic determinism forming the basis of the historical-philosophical scheme, according to which all peoples move along one and the same historical path, repeating in all countries the ascending development of production forces and the progressive replacement of their social relations..." (page 35). Under the conditions now prevailing in Asia and Africa other paths to social progress than the European path are possible and even inevitable. Accordingly, here we must find "those forms for the development of material production and scientific and technical progress that, without repeating the path of capitalist industrialization, would bring dozens of the economically undeveloped countries to the leading boundaries" of socioeconomic development (page 37).

The historical conditionality of the original forms of social progress in the countries of the East has its roots deep in ancient times, in the period of transition from the initial formation to the second period, that is, from the nonclass society to the class form; which transition was accomplished in several different ways. Clarifying the line (or lines) of historical evolution passed through by the Afro-Asian peoples makes it possible to organize work on strategy and tactics in the building of socialism in those countries in the existing historical context, and it helps in creating a new model for the world division of labor, "which would make it possible to place the very favorable natural and geographic conditions and very rich natural resources of the developing countries in the service of mankind as rapidly as possible" (page 38). The authors perceive the specific line of historical development in Asia and Africa as an eastern form of land ownership (pages 62-65) or a recently established tribal order. "And this means... that the problem - there is not only that these countries have not passed through the capitalist stage of development, but even that because of the original development of their peoples, they... have not felt the inexorable need to move toward capitalism and have not developed in a capitalist direction" (page 62).

Another important aspect of the authors' approach is the importance that they attach to analysis of the relationship between objective conditions and the subjective factor in the transition to socialism by the economically undeveloped countries. The book reveals to what extent and in what aspect this transition is possible, actual and part of a law-governed pattern. "The disproportion in the localization of objective and subjective prerequisites for the transition to socialism in countries with an undeveloped economy takes precedence over the objective opportunities for making the transition. The essential thing here is not that in the economically undeveloped countries themselves there are no or almost no objective material and technical prerequisites for the transition to socialism, or no organized workers' movement... but that because of the prevailing situation, for real socialism... there are inadequate material..."
means for any kind of full international compensation for the objective prerequisites lacking, without which the successful building of socialism in the economically undeveloped countries cannot be accomplished... Historical experience shows that it is precisely because of the lack of a number of objective conditions that the possibility of building socialism in individual countries does not become a reality" (page 40).

Within the context of a single country, because of the inadequacy of existing objective and subjective prerequisites, the transition to socialism occurs not in a natural, historical, objectively inevitable way but as one version of social development whose realization is conditioned to some extent by the favorable coincidence of circumstances, at random. It would, however, be profoundly erroneous to regard in the same way the path of noncapitalist development in general, which in our time has become a living reality for many peoples. The transition to socialism by the group of economically underdeveloped countries is different in nature: it is an expression of the transitional nature of the contemporary era as applied to a social condition in which capitalism has not become dominant; it is "the law-governed result of the interaction of international and internal conditions in the development of these countries, an inalienable feature of the contemporary era, and the natural consequence of the worldwide-historic transition from capitalism to socialism on the international scale" (page 41).

It is a question of "the foreshortened development of a society from precapitalist relations to socialism." The essence of this development differs substantially from the transition period from capitalism to socialism. The "foreshortened development" in question includes not only a socioeconomic turnabout (the replacement of family and tribal, feudal, semifedual and semi-capitalist relations with socialist relations), which, it is true, is to some extend inherent in the transition period from capitalism to socialism, but also a material and technical and, particularly, a cultural and ideological turnabout. Here, the development of production forces, that is, the material and technical turnabout, is the core of all these processes. It requires much greater efforts than in the relatively developed countries. The resolution of all other tasks—whether earlier forms of ownership should be retained or discarded, the allocation of internal and external resources, the choice of the relationship between accumulation and consumption, and the rates of transformation in all spheres—is accomplished only with consideration of to what extent this promotes the most rapid resolution of the key task—creating the production forces essential for socialism, in the form of a large-scale machine-based production.

The duration of the transition to socialism for economically undeveloped countries will be considerably greater than for the transition from capitalism to socialism, and the transition itself evidently consists of three stages: the vitalization of the economy and initial accumulation, laying the foundation for socialism, and creating the bases of socialism, signifying the start of the phase of socialism. The main difficulty during the first stage is demolishing the torpid forms of inherited production based on manual labor and insuring conditions for initial accumulation, essential for the subsequent development of production forces (see pages 125-126). The key significance of these initial
transformations becomes obvious if we remember that "a change in the form of ownership on the available foundation of production forces can initially offer for the most part a formal rather than an actual socialization" (page 85).

In the social-political literature the thesis was long ago formulated on the need to form a material-technical base on the path of noncapitalist development. However, it would be difficult to name any study in which this thesis has been systematized, and in which it would be not simply an initial list of measures but rather the pivot and foundation of work in the strategy and tactics to be employed for the multistage transition to socialism. The need for the timely compilation of precisely such a realistic and carefully considered concept is the more graphic because in the countries we are talking about, the sincere desire of the workers to overcome economic backwardness as rapidly as possible and lay the foundations of a socialist system runs ahead of the actual opportunities of the available material-technical base in the society and is often accompanied by a passion for administrative and political methods to the detriment of economic methods. And this, by giving rise to a number of negative phenomena in all spheres of public life, must slow down the rate of progressive, socialist-oriented transformations.

With regard to tactics in the transition to socialism by this group of countries, they are developed as a counterweight to the derogation still shown toward the role of light industry and the food industry in their development, and likewise toward the extractive sectors. Within the framework of the concept put forward by the authors, the need is convincingly argued for consideration of the climatic conditions of these countries, and of their present, and even more their prospective, role in resolving global problems such as food, energy and raw materials. At the same time, it is difficult to consider realistic the task of developing heavy industry in backward countries up to a level at which it is competitive with the corresponding sectors in the imperialist centers. This is confirmed by the widening gap between the levels of industrial production in the developed countries and the developing countries over the last decade. Hence, the realistic way to effect an upsurge in the material-technical base is the intensive development of agriculture, adapted to local conditions, and initial industrialization mostly through the development of a secondary subdivision; and also development of the raw material sectors for whose progress favorable opportunities exist (see pages 128-164).

I would like to make one observation. When talking about social-class structure, the authors remark that "one thing common to all countries is the presence of numerous middle strata that occupy an intermediate position between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—handicraftsmen, artisans, petty traders, servants, various groups of the intelligentsia and the officer corps" (page 51). This definition of the position of the middle strata would cause no objection at all if we were talking about the social-class structure in the highly or moderately developed capitalist countries; but its use as applied to the Afro-Asian countries is difficult to restrict only to those that have not lapsed into a "Europeanized" social structure. In the East the petty bourgeoisie actually comprises an intermediate stratum between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but only one part of it. The other is a stratum that lies between contemporary and traditional structures (see "Razvivayushchiyesya
strany: zakonomernost, tendentsii, perspektivy" [The Developing Countries: Law-Governed Patterns, Trends, Prospects] Moscow 1974; pp 273-274)--a stratum brought into being by the dissolution of patriarchal ties under the growing influence of capitalism, but far from fully liberated from the patriarchal traditions in its way of life. The dual nature of the political behavior of the African petty bourgeoisie is seen not only within the framework of its position between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat but also to some extent within the framework of the struggle between the old and the new, between contemporary and traditional mores.

Of course, the conceptual work in the field of development in the direction toward socialism offered by the authors is not the last word on the matter. The propositions that they have formulated will be made more precise and will be augmented by the further course of research. Moreover, resolution of the specific range of tasks offers opportunities for the postulation and resolution of new ones. If in the book being reviewed convincing proof is shown of the vital necessity for young states of a qualitative upsurge in their production forces by means of developing agriculture and a secondary subdivision--and, this means, the creation of a material-technical base for the transition to socialism--the next stage in development of the concept will logically be linked with a study of the basic relationships of this transition and a determination of their characteristics. In other words, the question arises of studying the new economic structure on whose basis the new noncapitalist economic system will be built, and which comprises the economic foundation for the transition to socialism from undeveloped capitalism.

Soviet researchers have already turned to the characterization of this economic foundation (see, for example, "Gosudarstvennyy sektor i sotsialno-ekonomicheskii progress v razvivayushchikhся stranakh" [The State Sector and Socioeconomic Progress in the Developing Countries], Kiev 1980; G.F. Kim's "Ot natsionalnogo osvobozhdeniya k sotsializmu" [From National Liberation to Socialism], Moscow 1982, pp 166-168; Yu.G. Sumbatyan's "Obshchestvo i armiya stran sotsialisticheskoy orientatsii Afriki" [Society and the Army in African Countries with a Socialist Orientation], author's abstract of doctoral dissertation, Moscow 1983, p 18; V.F. Lu's "Sotsialnaya revolyutsiya i vlast v stranakh Vostoka" [Social Revolution and Power in the Countries of the East], Moscow 1984; and others). Studies in this direction require work on the conceptual apparatus, in particular a precise discrimination of the concepts of "sector" and "structure" [uklad]. If the former is acceptable for defining the material boundaries of the economic possessions of a state, then the latter is acceptable to signify the socioeconomic form of the economy, based on a specific type of production relations and a specific level of production forces.

In the scientific literature elucidating the problem of the state sector and the new, let us call it noncapitalist, structure, preference is always given to the former (and to the detriment of work on the problem of the structure), and it is precisely the state sector that has been declared the economic basis for noncapitalist development. In the early Eighties doubt has been thrown on the correctness of this assertion. A contradiction is being seen with increasing clarity: on the one hand, the state sector, which embodies the economic and organizational function of the state, is the result of the action of a subjective
factor; on the other hand, the economic basis for advance along the noncapitalist path should be the objective restructuring of the system of production relations. Clarifying the place and role of the state sector in the economies of countries with a socialist orientation forces us to turn to a study of the new basic relations making up an integral element of the new economic structure. This, in my opinion, is a promising direction for further research.

This innovative work by the associates from the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System offers an example of the synthesized approach to the problem, in which a new level of conceptual generalization is organically combined with resolution of the specific socioeconomic and political tasks facing the young progressive states.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

9642
CSO: 1807/079
JAPANESE BOOK ON JAPAN'S ROLE IN WORLD ECONOMY REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 85 pp 165-170


[Text] The uncertainty of the economic dynamic, intensified many times over by the crisis of 1974-1975, divided Japanese forecasters into two main groups. The first is represented by implacable criticism both of the very concept of unreserved acceleration in the growth of GNP and of the political measures with whose help this concept was implemented during the Sixties and early Seventies. In making their predictions for further economic developments, the supporters of this view are trying mainly to shield the national economy from conjunctural "overheating" with all the negative consequences stemming from it. They therefore vie one with the other in proposing a whole system of restrictions designed to replace unrestrained quantitative expansion with qualitative improvements in the socioeconomic mechanism.

The forecasters making up the second group share the opinion that there is a need for this kind of reorientation. However, from their standpoint, it cannot be accomplished under conditions of strict market control and the continuing sluggishness felt in both supply and demand. In the texts of the forecasts, these views are clothed in the form of specific recommendations aimed at a certain relaxation of restrictions, untethering spontaneous market forces, and the unleashing of entrepreneurial initiative.

It goes without saying that those representing the first group include in their forecasts lower GNP growth rates that those in the second group. On this basis, in the press, and also in the scientific publications, there is a demarcation into the "pessimists" and the "optimists." H. Kanamori, president of the extremely authoritative Japanese Center for Economic Studies, which is close to the government and business circles, heads the "optimistic" direction. The book that he has written jointly with an associate from the center, D. Vada, is the subject of this review; it contains a developed evaluation of Japan's economic development through 1990. In my opinion, for a number of reasons this evaluation is of considerable scientific-cognitive and practical interest.
First of all it should be said that the conclusions drawn by the Japanese Center for Economic Studies are extremely weighty and authoritative for state and private institutions that exert decisive influence on the determination of Japan's general course and key aspects of Japan's industrial-agrarian policy. This means that the latter half of the Eighties is more likely to be marked by energetic attempts to manage the country's economy according to the scenario set forth in the book by H. Kanamori and D. Vada.

There exists another factor worthy of close attention, namely the nature of the authors' "optimism" embodied in the forecast. It is far removed from the self-assured forecasts that enjoyed popularity during the era of superhigh GNP growth rates. Then, as is known, most of the calculated indicators were covered, and this created a basis for advancing increasingly bold outline plans. The "optimism" of H. Kanamori and D. Vada seems unusually restrained against this background, perhaps even timid. True, they do propose that average annual GNP growth rates during the current decade will be about 5 percent, that is, about 1.5 times greater than the "pessimistic" forecasts.

This conclusion, however, is accompanied by many reservations and assumptions, which testifies to the colossal difficulties standing in the path to this target. Analyzing these difficulties in depth, the authors clearly show that there is also no reason to think that there will be a repetition of the prolonged boom on the Japanese economy. The most that can be counted on is a revitalization, given a successful conjuncture of circumstances and more or less stable but moderate growth.

It might be remarked that work on making the forecast was not an end in itself for the authors. They use the entire exceptionally laborious process of building up the voluminous "package" of forecast indicators as a convenient peg on which to hang meaningful and nontraditional judgements about present and future positions and the interconnections and interdependencies of the world economy and the Japanese economy. It seems to me that the most significant thing here is the comprehensively substantiated conclusion that Japan's final consolidation in the status of an economic complex of world importance has been completed. The country does not belong to any single specific economic or geographical locale, and this is eloquently confirmed by the scales on which it is involved in the network of worldwide economic contacts, its effect on the central and peripheral wings of the world market, and its susceptibility to "outside" influences. To judge from the material in the book under review, its transformation into a "world economic power" took place thanks to Japan's particularly intensive involvement in the scientific and technical revolution and the fact that it seized and held strategically important bridgeheads along the main directions of scientific and technical progress.

The Japanese technological challenge is seen in various ways. Electronics plays plays a paramount role at the present stag. In the production sphere, for example, the ability to adapt to the achievements of electronics is rightly considered pivotal for the further fate of the sectors. If any sector is totally unable to organize electronics-based output or lags in this field, it is immediately relegated to the category of "structurally sick," that is, there is simply no place for it in the industrial structure. In the
sphere of foreign trade electronics is stimulating Japan's transition to advantageous participation in the international division of labor along the horizontal. High-class finished articles distinguished by low energy intensiveness and materials intensiveness and by their high degree of scientific input are making up an increasing proportion of Japanese trade turnover. The concomitant relative weakening of the country's raw materials dependence is altering the geographical distribution of its exports and imports, moving deals with highly developed and newly industrialized states to the forefront.

Finally, electronics is rapidly industrializing the sphere of personal consumption. Under the influence of this process, household economies are becoming highly mechanized elements of the economic structure. Naturally, the need for reliable control over the complex systems with which daily life is becoming saturated, first and foremost telecommunications, is raising for consumers the acute problem of improving their knowledge and practical skills. And many specialists consider that this is nothing other than the preparations for the era of a computer civilization.

Explaining the initial targets in their forecast, H. Kanamori and D. Vada, of course, do not restrict themselves merely to the characteristics of the technical revitalization. Among other factors that they select in order to analyze expected trends in the Japanese economy they single out oil prices. During the Seventies the doubling of oil prices provoked a serious crisis in Japan. However, as the authors show, the shocks sustained by the price jumps also had positive consequences. In the final analysis is was precisely the price increases that led to the formation of an impressive backup oil reserve. The buildup of the reserve took place under conditions of reduced demand during the crises and the sluggish recoveries following them, and also with the help of conservation measures, switching to other energy sources, and the opening up of new deposits in parts of the world in which cartel-imposed restrictions were not in force. To judge from everything, the situation that promoted the buildup of the oil reserve will prevail into the foreseeable future. And it should be said that the authors are quite realistic in their assumption that "the opportunities for using oil prices as a factor in the destabilization of the world (and the Japanese--author's note) economy have been palpably circumscribed," and that the burden on Japan's energy balance has been somewhat lightened (pages 43, 53).

It is another matter with another assumption made by the authors, according to which the upsurge in the U.S. economy, which maintains its leadership in the world capitalist economy, will during the late Eighties start a chain reaction involving first the highly developed countries and then the developing countries. Here we have the latest attempt to use the "locomotive" theory, according to which one country that extricates itself from crisis can drag others along with it. But the revitalization of the U.S. economy seen during 1984 can in no way gain the necessary firmness, the enormous U.S. budget deficit is not being resolved, unemployment remains high, and by and large bank rates remain at a high level. Accordingly, the stimulation from the U.S. economy is manifestly weak. Placing one's hopes in the "locomotive" theory really requires great optimism!
Moreover, H. Kanamori and D. Vada have an extremely mistrustful attitude toward the practical possibilities of the monetarist concepts that have been embraced in both the United States and Britain. The authors write: "... the continuation of a monetarist policy can hardly automatically result in a revitalization of the economy," and "the interests of imparting a stable 'expansionist' trend to the world economy evidently require a re-examination if the 'anti-Keynesian' policy, which has gone too far" (page 68). But how can we talk about this kind of re-examination when the leadership in the United States and Great Britain defend the correctness of this policy and firmly uphold its principles in their practical activities?

The more obscure the hopes on the multiplication effect generated by the "locomotive" state, the more marked the role of potential within countries as a means of extricating themselves from the zone of intermittent crisis. From this viewpoint, Japan finds itself in a relatively favorable position. The powerful internal potentials for its economy include preferential labor productivity growth on the basis of the fruits of the scientific and technical revolution, the accelerated concentration of capital investments at points where the latest scientific and technical innovations are being introduced, and the efficient utilization of manpower.

And here we must dwell on a thesis that is repeated time and time again in the book, namely on the "pacification" of industrial relations at Japanese enterprises and the contribution made by this factor in curbing inflationary increases in prices and the return to stable economic growth (see, for example, pages 24 and 139). The present status of the trade union movement in Japan requires comment. The years of crisis and depression repeatedly confirmed that the organization of the trade unions on a firm-by-firm basis places them in an extraordinarily dependent position vis-a-vis the administration and offers broad opportunities for spreading quasi-family relations at the enterprises and for developing cooperation between labor and capital. The latter part of the previous decade and the start of this one were marked by a cooling in the springtime actions and the strike struggle by the trade unions. Moreover, the right wing in the trade union movement promulgated the "Main Concept"--an outspoken program calling for the abandonment of class positions. De facto or de jure its proposals have been taken up by many of the trade unions included in the national union. This all indicates that although the obvious shift to the right by the trade union movement is undoubtedly a temporary phenomenon, industrial relations will evidently not be a limiting factor in the development of Japan's economy through 1990.

The start provided for Japan by these trends is not eliminating the numerous difficulties that it constantly encounters. The chief of these difficulties are those of an international order, so to speak. But Japan's outward-looking orientation toward the outside world simultaneously makes them severe difficulties for the Japanese economy. Demonstrating a fine understanding of this circumstance, H. Kanamori and D. Vada accurately define the reasons for the problems of indebtedness by the developing countries, the unstable nature of the international currency system and foreign trade contradictions, and also the forms in which they will influence Japan's economic development during the forecast period. Thus, they point out that the indebtedness of the developing countries
is explained primarily by the disequilibrium between payment balances, the unstable nature of the international currency system—an imperfect mechanism for floating rates—and foreign trade contradictions—periodic deterioration of the hiring situation (pages 101, 109, 116).

The developing countries' burden of debt is undermining even their very modest opportunities for paying for foreign exports, including Japanese exports. The chaotic fluctuations in the exchange rates, which more than anything still hamper uniform structural reshaping of the Japanese economy, hamper their growth. Foreign trade contradictions constantly threaten the outbreak of protectionist war. In addition to everything else, these difficulties are causing alarm and uncertainty in government and business circles and even among the population at large. These attitudes are partly determined by the line taken in entrepreneurial behavior, namely the investment decisions made, the volume of output, exports, imports and so forth. Consideration of the psychological factor in economic development is another of the reviewed book's undoubted achievements.

H. Kanamori and D. Vada entertain no illusions about the possibilities for eliminating the difficulties burdening the Japanese economy. Nevertheless, they do offer suggestions on the methods for reacting to the most acute manifestations. Many of these suggestions are connected with collective steps by the leading capitalist countries: cooperation for the purpose of normalizing the situation with respect to the indebtedness of the developing countries, agreed interventions in the currency markets in order to damp down currency fluctuations, joint demarches aimed at reducing foreign trade protectionism (pages 105, 110, 120). It is considered that all of this is wishful thinking with no solid foundation. The reality of the capitalist economy often presents irrefutable evidence of the dominance of contradictions over cooperation. The problem of protectionism in foreign trade, to which, in addition to the other capitalist countries Japan also actively subscribes, serves as an eloquent illustration. Appeals to deal with this serious obstacle on the path toward the expansion of world trade are heard in abundance. But it would be naive to expect that in the years immediately ahead Japan will abolish its protectionist regime with regard, for example, to kinds of agricultural output such as citrus and beef, or that there will be collective actions by the main capitalist countries, aimed at asserting free trade. Sluggish competition, the requirements of the struggle by political parties to improve their parliamentary representation, and the efforts by powerful pressure groups will make it impossible to abandon the hothouse conditions prevailing in many of the low-productivity sectors.

The authors' suggestions connected with the status of state finances and the thrust of administrative and economic reform are interesting but debatable. For example, H. Kanamori and D. Vada think that reduction of the budget deficit should not necessarily be a priority measure in government economic policy. They recall cases in which extreme concentration on solving this problem has led to deepening crisis. Emphasizing the differences between the problem of the budget deficit in Japan and in other countries (the fact that Japan has no foreign debts but, on the contrary a major fund of personal savings that can be used to finance the deficit), the authors ask: "should we not... permit a short-term increase in the budget deficit so that through energetic
steps on the political plane, including finances, we may first restore the normal function of the economic mechanism and then balance the state budget?" (page 241).

This suggestion is interesting and alluring for the creators of economic policy, and it is in line with the concept of removing the restrictions hampering economic growth; but is it not happenstance that the authors propose this in the form of a strictly rhetorical question. The fact is that the former prime minister T. Fukuda, who in 1977-1978 encouraged the situation using essentially the same recipe, was notwithstanding unable to reduce the budget deficit. Of course, H. Kanamori and D. Vada remember these unsuccessful attempts and this is why they express their idea in this uncertain way.

They propose with much more decisiveness that any direct link between the administrative and financial reform and elimination of the crisis in state finances should be rejected. "The administrative and financial reform," we read in the book, "is aimed at eradicating inefficiency in the state apparatus, and it... should be implemented constantly, regardless of whether or not there is a budget deficit. At the same time any increase or decrease in budget expenditures must be effected depending on the current situation" (page 244). The problem of dealing with bureaucratic waste is extremely urgent, although under this slogan attacks are organized on the workers' gains in the field of education, public health, pensions and so forth. These problems are largely problems of expenditures, including budget allocations. It is precisely those detachments of the state bureaucracy that the administrative and financial reform threatens, at least with a reduction in their "cash allowances," and they are resisting this most energetically. And of course, this resistance also explains the authors' desire to lay emphasis on the strategic aim of the reform (dealing with inefficiency), separating it from the tactical means by which it is achieved, including the normalization of state finances.

Taking into account the difficulties characterized here, it would be rash to assert that realization of the forecast given in the book--a forecast whose basic idea is, let us repeat, insuring an annual average 5-percent GNP growth rate throughout the Eighties--is guaranteed. This, strictly speaking, is acknowledged by the authors, who emphasize that forecasting is a thankless task and that its substance lies not in guessing figures but in discerning trends (page 14). Whether or not they have succeeded in doing this the future will show. But it can already be stated that both the superficial and the hidden motives for the shifts in the Japanese economy have been investigated with almost exhaustive thoroughness. The reviewed book will undoubtedly help in debunking the "extremist" ideas and spreading the more balanced ideas about Japan's economic prospects.

In conclusion I would like to support in every possible way the conviction of H. Kanamori and D. Vada that maintaining peace throughout the world and "recognizing the senselessness of the arms race, and a general reduction in military expenditures" (pages 15-16) are most important prerequisites for the realization of any forecasts.
REVIEW OF BOOK ON NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 85 pp 198-199


[Text] During the years of its existence the movement of the nonaligned countries has become a solid positive factor in world politics. The objectively anti-imperialist and general democratic substance of the theory and practice of nonalignment determines the historically progressive place of the movement in the system of present-day international relations.

The deepening socioeconomic differentiation among those involved in the movement, the clash of different ideological-political trends, and the intensifying internal contradictions—all these things are the cause of Soviet and foreign researchers' growing interest in the subject. The collections under the title "The Nonaligned Movement in Documents and Materials" published by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa are an important aid for them. Their importance lies in the fact that scholarly translations of documents on the nonaligned movement are not published on other countries. The work of Soviet oriental experts has been hailed by specialists and the periodical press in the USSR and other socialist countries (see reviews in the following: KOMMUNIST No 7, 1976; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA No 5 1975; MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA, Sofia 1980, Vol IX No 3; and NOVY ORIENT, Prague 1980, No 7).

The collection being reviewed follows on chronologically from the preceding volume, which has now gone into two editions (1975 and 1979). It familiarizes the reader with the main documents of the nonaligned movement covering the period 1976-1981 (the 1978 Belgrade conference of foreign ministers; the 1979 Havana 6th summit conference; and the 1981 Delhi conference of foreign ministers). The published documents graphically reveal the internal dynamics of the movement and the nonaligned countries' increasing involvement in the resolution of all of mankind's urgent problems, and they testify to the durability of the basic principles of nonalignment. Those participating in the Havana forum emphasized that "the quintessential policy of nonalignment is the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid and racism, including
Zionism, and against all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference and hegemony, and against great-power politics and bloc policies" (page 104). The foreign ministers gathering in India's capital again expressed their determination to take "all practical steps that can be realized" to these ends (page 286), and to base their own international activity on the principles of active peaceful coexistence with all states, "regardless of ideology or differences in the political, social or economic system" (page 286).

One resolution of the nonaligned movement speaks of the growing political maturity of the member countries, and of their recognition of their not inconsiderable share of responsibility for the destinies of all peoples. Merely glancing at the list of questions figuring in the documents of the nonaligned states (the problems of peace, disarmament and the reshaping of international economic relations, the situation in the south of Africa and in the Near East, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, in Central and Latin America and so forth) is enough to make obvious the solid contribution that the movement is making in the struggle by the peoples against imperialism and for social progress and normalization of the international climate.

"The most terrible danger facing the world today is the threat of destruction as the result of nuclear war," the foreign ministers in Delhi stated. "Some states that possess nuclear weapons are trying to propagandize the exceptionally dangerous concept of limited nuclear war. In this connection the nonaligned states should coordinate their actions so as to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and ultimately remove nuclear weapons from the arsenals of states" (page 267). The nonaligned countries also intend to encourage any effort to relax tension in general and to oppose any foreign interference and intervention in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe (page 287).

Questions of the struggle by dependent peoples for self-determination and independence remain on the agenda. The nonaligned states rightly suggest that the future of their movement is inseparably bound up with the prospects for national liberation revolution and the deepening of its general democratic essence and the intensified cohesion of its individual detachments. It is, therefore, not happenstance that the movement focuses attention on the problems of regulating crisis situations in the developing world exclusively by peaceful means. The Delhi conference noted: "Conflicts between the nonaligned states themselves, apart from resulting in enormous suffering by the peoples of these countries, threaten the unity of the nonaligned movement and weaken its ability to function" (page 285).

At the same time, the movement documents also reflect the negative trends that intensified in the late Seventies and early Eighties: attempts by certain forces to introduce into the concept of nonalignment the pseudotheory of "equal remoteness" and "the two superpowers," and a desire to complicate relations between the nonaligned countries and their reliable and powerful ally—the socialist community. In practice this turns on the vagueness and lack of direction in some of the movement's resolutions, laying equal responsibility for crisis phenomena in the world on the two opposing military alliances and their leaders. For example, those participating in the Delhi conference considered that the main cause of increased international tension is competition between the great powers and a "continuing struggle for spheres of influence" (p. 266).
Elements of subjectivism in the foreign policy world-outlook of leading forces in some of the nonaligned states are leading to an exaggeration of the role of the movement. "The policy of nonalignment and the movement of the nonaligned countries play a decisive role in the struggle for general peace... There is evidently no other force except that of the movement of nonaligned countries that could take upon itself the initiative to settle the present threatening situation" (pages 261, 267-268).

It seems that these and similar processes are symptoms that it is high time for change in the political makeup of the nonaligned movement, which is now embarking on its third decade of development. Obviously, within the foreseeable future the scales of socioeconomic and foreign policy differentiation in the nonaligned countries will grow, and this will introduce new correctives in the disposition of strengths between those involved in the movement and will reveal the essence and potential of the various ideological trends in it. It would therefore be advisable to follow through on the useful initiative of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa so as to keep all researchers interested in the problems of the national liberation struggle au courant with the events taking place in the nonaligned movement.

I would like to ask the collective working on the collections regularly to accompany their publications with introductory articles that generalize the results of the activities of the nonaligned countries during the review period, as has been the practice in the past. It would also be desirable to enhance the immediacy of the publication of documents and reduce the intervals between publication of the collections.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

9642
CSO: 1807/079
REFERENCE BOOK ON POLITICAL PARTIES OF MODERN AFRICA REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 85 pp 200-202


[Text] At one time V.I. Lenin characterized parties as "both the condition for and the indicator of political development." (Complete Collected Works, Vol 32, p 190). This is also fully applicable to the zone of the national liberation revolution. The emergence of the parties, their organizational establishment, interparty and intraparty struggle, demarcations, merges and splits in party forces are of interest for the researcher not only in and of themselves but also as a sensitive indicator of the broader sociopolitical and, in the final analysis, even formative processes (naturally, insofar as the party phenomenon is associated with the contemporary type of class formation). It is also obvious that parties are also a condition of political development and a prerequisite for it, because the viability of parties in the developing countries is one way of forming, albeit an extremely contradictory one, non-traditional social ties. To the extent that parties in the developing countries act as the ideological or political spokesmen of a general national cause or class struggle (or even a complex combination of national and social interests), they influence in a most direct way the course and character of the social process.

In other words, parties in modern society, including those in developing African society, constitute the cell in the social organism that by studying it is possible to considerably extend and clarify ideas about the entire organism. Therefore, publication of the book being reviewed, which contains an extensive body of information about the political parties of modern Africa, is a gratifying phenomenon in the science of the developing countries.

This book is the fruit of the efforts of a large collective of authors (52 people). And although the publication qualifies as a handbook, it contains more than mere references. In additional to the individual articles dealing with the parties in 54 countries and territories on the African continent, the book contains a large section in which the historical process of the establishment of political parties in Africa is characterized and a typology is offered for party organizations existing in the region and their main types examined.
While including in the publication many data of an historical nature (the prehistory of the African political parties), the authors at the same time have carefully—as far as the publishing process allows—worked on that part of the material that requires constant updating. Thus, the addenda included at the end of the book have made it possible to offer the reader reference material on party evolution in Africa through March 1984.

Much attention is paid in the handbook to the revolutionary parties. "African revolutionary democracy," the authors write, "is a special kind of political coalition, a bloc of progressive forces that act from anti-imperialist positions under the slogan of socialism" (page 19). This constant in the coalition makeup of revolutionary-democratic power and its bloc social nature are extremely important. The next step—analysis of the revolutionary-democratic power blocs according to the specific and actively changing makeup of their integral parts—can offer much, particularly for an understanding (both retrospectively and prospectively) of the fates of socialist orientation in Africa.

In a detailed chapter on the communist parties it is shown that the communist party tradition in the most developed subregions of the continent—in the north and the south—is today the oldest of all political organizational forces, while in some cases the communist parties not only preceded the nationalist parties but even influenced them (see pages 32-34).

In the section on parties of the bourgeois type it is rightly emphasized that in the developing countries of Africa they are not organizations for a single class but express the interests of "a bloc of social strata and groups (page 47). Essentially, the material in the handbook leads to the conclusion that the absence of a single-class party basis is a political constant in the varied structure of the social reality.

The book also rightly notes that under authoritarian rule there is an inevitable gap between the legal system and the actual system of political life: "as a rule, a party system regulated by law does not in fact match the party system" (page 57). This mismatch is typical not only of countries with the ruling party of the bourgeois type but in general for a situation in which the super-structural and ideological regulators for development are formed more rapidly than the basic prerequisites.

There is no doubt that the handbook being reviewed will be useful not only for Africa experts but also for a broad range of specialists dealing with political problems in the developing countries. Of course, when publishing a handbook of this nature, it is impossible to meet the same requirements as made of, for example, a theoretical monograph. To satisfy his interest on certain question not covered in the handbook the reader can sometimes turn to other sources (for example, "Partiya i revolyutcionnyy protsess v stranakh Azii i Afriki. Sb. statey" [The Party in the Revolutionary Process in the Countries of Asia and Africa. A Collection of Articles], Moscow 1983). Unfortunately, however, studies on a number of problems connected with the formation of parties are still poorly developed here. Let me cite one example. Although the key role of the professional military is always prominent in the establishment of revolutionary regimes and in the genesis of the vanguard
party structures in the countries of north and tropical Africa—from Egypt, Algeria and Libya to Ethiopia, the Congo and Benin—this has still not been studied in the Soviet literature on the theoretical plane.

The compilers of the handbook evidently encountered the same kind of difficulty when introducing party typology. In the foreword it is rightly noted that "there is still no general typology for the political parties in the liberated countries" (page 4). Undoubtedly, another reference point by which the authors were guided when working on the draft of their typology was the social-class essence of the parties. But here, in my view, there is a fundamental difficulty.

On the one hand, the authors have not always been consistent in using the class criterion in distinguishing the types of parties; thus, its significance is obviously reduced when it is a question of parties in the revolutionary spectrum, which, of course, is understandable: in revolutionary creativity the act of political will often prevails over the formation of class relations. On the other hand, the social situation in Africa is characterized by "lack of maturity in social relations" (page 3), or, more accurately, by an interweaving of class and preclass ties, and also by the specific node of contradictions that occurs when simultaneously resolving (at the same time incompletely) both national and social tasks in development. In this kind of social medium, "the material conditions of life do not permit clashes between groupings, religious-ethnic communities and so forth, to grow into open attacks by the classes in society (that is, to reach a high degree of social maturity)" (see AZII I AFRIKA SEGONDY I No 5, 1983, p 5). It is therefore natural that when providing a typology for the African political parties, criteria cannot be applied a priori since they have not been corrected for the specific, single-structure reality (including not only the socioeconomic reality) in individual countries and subregions.

It is obvious that the particular shortcomings of the book are connected with the inadequate work done on general questions. For example, the comparison of "probourgeois" political parties and "bourgeois parties of the capitalist (?) countries of north Africa" is inexplicable. Are we to understand from this that the notorious "proclivity toward the bourgeoisie" is a specific feature of the tropical zone? If "national socialisms" are peculiar to the groups of "bourgeois and probourgeois" and at the same time "national-democratic" parties (see pages 11 and 50), then how is it possible to talk about relative social-class criteria separating these two main types?

In addition to the five "main" typological groups (communist parties, vanguard workers' parties, revolutionary-democratic parties; national-democratic parties and bourgeois-nationalist and probourgeois parties), another two, obviously not "main" groups are distinguished: "probourgeois organizations of right-extremist and left-extremist trends" and "parties expressing the interests of family-tribal and feudal elites, and of a clerical and ethnoreligious nature" (page 4). If we add that this group of "bourgeois and probourgeois" parties contains a subgroup of "reformist" parties, and also a "special variety" of racist parties, while the group of revolutionary-democratic parties is subdivided into "two varieties"—the "mass revolutionary-democratic parties of the national front"
type and the "vanguard revolutionary-democratic parties," then the terminological excess reaches a point where the reader simply loses any sense of demarcation between the groups, subgroups and varieties offered by the typology.

In conclusion I would like to note that the compilers of the handbook have done a great deal of work whose complexity and innovation should not be underestimated. And if, in the section on theory they have not passed beyond the confines of empirical generalizations and their ideas are still obviously mere outlines, in the part of the handbook in which the reference material is worked and systematized according to individual political parties and party systems, they have prepared and published a work of undisputed usefulness.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985