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EAST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

ECONOMY

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Modernization Settles Individual Differences Within CEMA
(Laszlo Csaba; EUROPÄISCHE RUNDSCHAU, No 2, 1986) .......... 1

ALBANIA

Bavarian Conservative Leader Seeks Closer Economic Ties
(Carl E. Buchalla; SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 21 May 86) ........ 14

BULGARIA

Power Supply, Safety Measures at Kozloduy Described
(Nikola Todoriev; RABOTNICHESKO DELO, 29 May 86) .......... 17

Energy, Power Resources Assessed by Trust Chairman
(RUDNICHAR, 29 May 86) ........................................... 21

Politburo Member Doynov Attends Conference on Metallurgy
(RUDNICHAR, 5 Jun 86) .............................................. 27

Measures To Overcome Recommended Investment Process Weaknesses
(Ivan Angelov; TRUD, 9, 10 May 86) .............................. 32

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

April 1986 Economic Results Summarized
(Marie Hormannova, Alena Polakova; HOSPODARSKE NOVINY,
No 22, 1986) ........................................................... 43

Improved Agricultural Machinery Planned
(Artur Fussek; HORIZONT, No 6, Jun 86) .......................... 47

- a -
HUNGARY

Havasi Confirms Continued Commitment to Economic Reform
(Ferenc Havasi; NEPSZABADSAG, 17 May 86) ................. 50

MILITARY

BULGARIA

Causes for Military Aircraft Accidents Examined
(Blagoy Shtiliyanov, et al.; NARODNA ARMIYA, 3, 4 Jan 86) 58

Profiles of Air Force Academy, Instructors, Training Methods
(NARODNA ARMIYA, 26 May 86) ............................... 64

Air Force Pilot Training, by Dimitur Karadzhikov 64
Air Force Academy Enrollment 65
Pilot Entrance Examinations 66
Air Force Academy Activities, by Ognyan Gotov 67
Information Successes 69

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Military Academy Head Outlines Training Objectives
(Hans-Joachim Wiesner Interview; TRIBUENE, 21 Feb 86) ..... 71

HUNGARY

Achievements, Problems Under Current Draft Law Assessed
(Attila Schmidt; NEPSZAVA, 31 May 86) ....................... 76

POLITICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Editorial Outlines Czechoslovak-Polish Cooperation
(RUDE PRAVO, 29 May 86) ....................................... 78

Socialist Democracy Described, Interpreted
(Tomas Travnicek; NOVA MYSL, No 5, 1986) ................... 82

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Historiographic Biases Assessed, Exemplified
(Johannes Kuppe; DAS PARLAMENT, 17 May 86) .............. 88

POLAND

Messner at 'Katowice' Mine Party Conference
(Aleksy Kalenik; TRYBUNA LUDU, 12-13 Apr 86) .......... 101
130 Congress Delegates Already Selected
(TRYBUNA LUDU, 10 Apr 86) ........................................ 103

Party Daily on Pre-Congress Tasks
(TRYBUNA LUDU, 4 Apr 86) ........................................ 104

Party Pre-Congress Activities Reported
(TRYBUNA LUDU, 25 Apr 86; RZECZPOSPOLITA, 24 Apr 86) ...... 106

National Ideological Conference in Krakow 106
Army Pre-Congress Conference 107
Army Political Academy Conference 107
Beirut Truck Factory Conference 108

Press Personnel Changes, Media Developments
(PRASA POLSKA, No 4, Apr 86) .................................... 109

Catholic Press Comments on Trust in Media
(GOSC NIEDZIELNY, No 14, 6 Apr 86) ............................. 113

YUGOSLAVIA

'Injustices' Against Serbs, Church in Bosnia Protested
(Zarko Gavrilovic; PRAVOSLAVLJE, 1 Apr 86) .................... 115

SOCIOLOGY

POLAND

Psychologist on National Character Issue
(Zbigniew Necki Interview; ZYCIE WARSZAWY, 4 Apr 86) ...... 119

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MODERNIZATION SETTLES INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN CEMA

Vienna EUROPÄISCHE RUNDSCHAU in German Vol 14 No 2, 1986 pp 27-40

[Article by Laszlo Csaba, Institute for Global Economics; Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest. Original title: "Harmonization of Interests in CEMA"]

[Text] Harmonization of the East European countries' economic policies has always been crucial in the 37 years of their integration. This arose from several factors, the most important being the common basic structure of the economic and political systems, the Marxist-Leninist ideology--official in every socialist country -- the same or similar structural conceptions held in each East European country, the common objective of catching up with the developed industrial countries, and not least the tight coordination realized in the field of defense, information and foreign affairs, state security, and so on.

In 1947-1956, these latter activities were coordinated in part by the Information Agency of the Communist and Workers' Parties--dissolved in 1956--, but principally by the bilateral meetings between the senior officials of the CPSU and the other parties in power and, from 1955 on, also by the organs of the Warsaw Pact. All these factors evidently contributed to the extensive similarity of national decisions in regard to economic policy, independent of the institutional framework for the "harmonization" of economic and planning decisions. It is a well known fact, for example, that--until 1956--CEMA had an almost exclusively formal role as a multilateral organization of regional cooperation. Nevertheless, it was in just that period that we witnessed the development of extremely far reaching interlinks between the economies of the Soviet Union and the other East European countries. To this day, these links provide the basic structure of integration. The basic formula of exchanging Soviet raw materials for East European finished products by way of the division of labor has been the crucial factor in the economic development of Eastern Europe in the past 40 years (almost).

A brief retrospective of the common turning points of East European development demonstrates the parallel course of economic decisions as well as economic systems. They are: The reorientation of foreign trade relations and the introduction of planning at the end of the 1940's, the Stalinist overemphasis on industrialization, in particular heavy industry, in 1949-1953. Later we find parallels in the proclamation, implementation and
checking of the "new line" under Malenkov, the reform debates in 1953-1957; the "great leap forward" of the socialist camp and the collapse of the overly ambitious 7-year plans in 1961-1963, the subsequent experiments in regard to the qualitative change in the economic mechanism in 1963-1969; the growth policy of the 1970's (substituting for reforms), that--on statistical evidence--brought about a decisive new opening for the foreign trade of the Soviet Union alone. Finally to be mentioned are the defensive measures for adjustment to the world economy, the decline in growth, the crucial importance of the compulsory import restrictions, the increased role of the directives issued by the central authorities and the relative expansion and promotion of small enterprises.

What happened in Eastern Europe, therefore, did not represent a series of accidentally analogous events. As regards the harmonization in the 1980's of the economic policies of the East European countries with those of the Soviet Union within the framework of the various CEMA institutions and organizations, many leading scholars and business experts have concluded that no genuine integration has been occurring in CEMA. Usually this circumstance is explained by the recurring parallelisms in national industrial policies. As we know, since the second half of the 1970's these have been accompanied by parallel efforts at self-sufficiency in agriculture. The 1956 CEMA Conference was the first to complain about the lack of coordination demonstrated by parallel economic policies. The same topic has since been on the agenda of each and every CEMA Conference.

Integration of Planning--Not of Production

The parallel targets of the present--fourth--wave of industrial development are contradictory in particular because CEMA primarily signifies the integration of planning rather than the integration of production or the market (as sometimes erroneously assumed). The binding international coordination of the regional foreign trade chapters in the medium-term economic plans represents the most important medium for linking the national economies. Relations between direct producers, let alone national markets, are secondary by comparison.

As, ultimately, planning even within the confines of a country may be considered the coordination of interests, this consideration evidently holds true even more at the international level, in the regional economic association of sovereign national economies. At the same time, the fact and sometimes even the preponderance of supplementary regulation (clearly demonstrated by the comparison between medium-term plan and actual data) does not render meaningless the distinction between planning and the market economy; indeed it is possible to contrast them as models. Actually these two concepts also continue to signify two different methods of operation of the economy. This is not changed by the fact that the real existing mechanism of the planned or market economy has not much in common with the simplified textbook model or, to some extent, even with detailed and scientifically constructed theories.

Socialist planning differs not only from the free market economy, it cannot even be considered a mixed economy, because the rules of operation differ from
those prevailing in controlled welfare states and also from Western controlled and planned economies. Decisive in the latter are the basic principles of market economic rules, albeit somewhat restrained in the nationalized sector and, in part, in the distribution of personal income. As regards the East European planned economies, the market has so far held merely a supplementary role. The decisive criterion for the success of the operator has been the satisfaction of the superordinated authority, not that of the equal partner.

The steadily recurring parallelism in the industrial structure of CEMA equally describes not simply the defects of the means, institutions or, sometimes, the objectives of regional-international harmonization. Obviously national economic targets in CEMA differ just as much as in the EEC or any other regional grouping. Differences are also present in the important features of the national management systems. However, it would be wrong to explain the structural parallelisms by these factors. Specialized economic literature demonstrated some time ago (1) that precisely the common features of the CEMA countries' economic mechanisms obstructed the deepening of regional economic cooperation even in the 1950's and 1960's—for example their inward looking "sovereign, self-sufficient and non-monetary nature," the structural differences that arose in the financial system mainly for subjective reasons. As we well know, it is precisely the lack of a properly working regional international market that obstructs the effective coordination of the necessarily differing national priorities. In other words: The inner logic of direct planning—trying to settle all problems by increased centralization, the multiplication of central indices and instructions—occasionally conflicts with the economic and political realities of Eastern Europe, that is in formal terms with national sovereignty expressed in insufficient readiness to compromise with regard to the economic interests involved in domestic net production, due to the absence of a convertible currency.

While, disregarding a few exceptions (such as the coordinated plan of joint investments), "international economic policy," regional planning or even international planning does not exist, the CEMA countries' policies, harmonized internationally and substituting for imports at two levels—national and regional—created such production capacities, motivations, skills, behavioral models and standards as could not have been achieved by world market orientation nor the continued survival of the economic nationalism of the interwar period. Constant and systematic involvement in CEMA cooperation developed among the enterprises the technological, organizational, sales and attitudinal capacities, knowledge and relationships decisive for the managements of most East European enterprises. Outside the national monopoly market, these capacities and motivations are useful solely on this regional market; they make it possible to realize enterprise targets despite the fact that performances lag behind the demands of the world market. This also means that enterprises are under strong pressure to maintain and expand at the national as well as the CEMA level the structures that have thus arisen. We are all well aware that, in the course of plan preparations, instructions are ultimately drafted by those who will later have to carry them out. As the details are properly known to the enterprise alone, the plan text is crucially affected by management proposals, indeed to such an effect that the confirmation and directive by the central organs—overwhelmed by the flood
of data—actually amount to no more than a formality.

From the aspect of the enterprises and the national economy we may therefore assert that the CEMA countries' economic policies in the past 35 years has been characterized by harmonization at several levels and in several dimensions, though in practice this harmonization bears little resemblance to the presentation of CEMA offered in various textbooks as a uniform "bloc" of "command economies."

Regional Coordination and Efforts at Self-Sufficiency

Regional coordination had a vital role in the drafting of approaches to socialist industrialization. The basic formulas for the regional division of labor arose on this basis. Accordingly East European industries evolved on the basis of Soviet raw materials and fuels, paying for their import needs by finished products. This factor decisively—though not exclusively—affect the technical standard, international orientation and manner of the organization, production and sales of East European industries. GDR, CSSR, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian development programs amply demonstrate this connection. In spite of its independent foreign policy, Romania (and Yugoslavia which is not dealt with in this article) have increasingly turned their attention to the CEMA regional market ever since 1976. (In 1984, the latter's share in the total trade of the countries mentioned amounted to more than 50 percent.)

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that Romanian economic policy, assuming the role of outrider with regard to the convocation of CEMA summits since May 1980, is urging regional self-sufficiency measures that are more extensive and comprehensive with regard to the respective sectors and dimensions than the notions of any other country including the Soviet Union. According to Romanian ideas, regional autarchy should concentrate not only on the sectors emphasized as strategically important by various Soviet sources but also extend to food supplies as a whole, high technology, industrial consumer goods, all of machine construction and the entire sector of raw materials and fuels. As we know, the Soviet side regards regional self-sufficiency in this last case as impossible (and unnecessary). The Romanian point of view may, on the one hand, be considered the projection to the CEMA level of the country's domestic development strategy, oriented to self-sufficiency. On the other hand, we note that, in the world economy as a whole, countries lagging behind in the international competition endeavor to compensate the losses suffered on the world market by successes achievable on "softer" (or deemed to be so) regional markets. In clear contrast to the country's largely unchanged foreign policy, this shift in Romanian foreign trade policy serves as an example of the new efforts made by the CEMA countries to more closely harmonize their economic policies.

I must also emphasize that none of the CEMA documents jointly adopted in 1978-1985 includes any concrete proposals intimating a comprehensive and inward looking policy of integration, eschewing the world economy. On the contrary, each document includes statements that expressly propose the maintenance and
even further expansion of relations outside CEMA and respectively cite the mutually profitable trade with Western countries.

Admittedly, unexpected breakdowns in international affairs might induce a CEMA isolationist movement, though this would hurt the interests of every single European people. It is also true that the prospects for the entire world economy, most of all though the East European region, do not look good in the 1980's. This fact, in turn, restricts the opportunities for national as well as external integration. At the same time, the institutional givens and planning methods inherited from earlier times, combined with the insufficient development (in the case of the GDR, USSR and CSSR with a pronounced deterioration) in the international competitive ability of East European industrial exports—mainly the processing industry—generally resulted in an increased emphasis on import substitution in 1978-1984. Even individually, these three factors might cause some kind of about-turn by the CEMA countries and, consequently, a further loss of status on the world market. Still, we must remember that this development has in no case arisen as the result of a jointly adopted decision by the organs of economic integration.

When undertaking the more detailed examination of joint economic harmonization in CEMA, we must assume that such harmonization usually evolves in the discussions prior to the council meetings. The most important decisions are made either at the council meetings or at the bilateral meetings of party leaders. From the standpoint of developments in the 1980's, 1978 must be considered a milestone. The Bucharest resolutions did away with those exaggerated plans that envisaged the radical extension of the joint investments agreed in 1973-1976, a 10-fold or even 15-fold increase in joint investment spending.

With the exception of natural gas, the target programs generally did not result in increasing energy and raw materials, indeed with regard to some important items they could not even ensure the maintenance of earlier levels. The result were significant structural changes in the East European economy. Energy conservation became an urgent necessity at enterprise and national levels. On the one hand this speeded up the use of energy and materials conserving equipment in industry, on the other hand energy and materials intensive operations (such as petrochemicals, the iron and steel industry) suffered cutbacks in all small CEMA countries, though they had formerly counted as prestige industries.

Neglect of Agriculture

The decision of the 1977 CEMA council meeting emphasized agriculture as a common priority, in addition to fuel and raw materials programs. Despite promises in principle by the net farm produce importers in CEMA, even the repeated official efforts by the Bulgarian, Romanian and Hungarian partners did not result in actual measures for greater stimulation of farm exports to the CEMA countries. Consequently the agricultural target program, too, started from the priority of domestic national production. The one exception was the settlement in free foreign currency. Still, the member countries did not arrive at this useful solution within the scope of the target program;
indeed that program did not even institutionalize or guarantee this mutually beneficial kind of cooperation. In many respects that is easily understood, because the volume of possible net exports (arising mainly from the production surpluses of the three countries mentioned above) bears no relation to the net demand within the region, defined primarily by the needs of Poland and the Soviet Union. (It is also interesting to note that even the countries having available a net surplus of farm produce are compelled to import protein feed.)

Supplementary measures were adopted at the 1983 council meeting in Berlin. These, unanimously decided upon at the time, provided for increases in fruit and vegetable deliveries, the better exploitation of agricultural raw materials, the expansion of fisheries and the wider use and modernization of farm machinery. However, the economic document of the meeting at the highest level emphasized that a rise in farm exports was conceivable only in the same conditions as apply to energy and raw materials exports. This reflects the modified standpoint of the importing countries. The drafting of the material substance and concrete conclusions was left to the discussion on 1986-1990 plan coordination. The communiques of the two council meetings since the summit clearly suggest a certain shift in priorities with regard to the uniform treatment of energy and farm deliveries that was emphasized earlier.

Rather as in the period after 1977, energy supply problems came to the fore, while farm issues were relegated to the back burner. This trend was made abundantly clear at the Havana council meeting. The plans then proposed for cooperation and even joint investments had a total value of 45-55 billion transferable rubles, in other words 10 times the nominal value of joint investments in 1981-1985. However, these investments would promote the production of raw materials and energy exclusively; a joint farm program was not even mentioned. A joint Warsaw communique did not so much as touch upon the issue of the preferential development of agriculture. On the other hand, it was revealed in the course of plan coordinations that Hungarian farm products, for example, will have a lesser role than before, that is up to 1985.(3)

Just as in the last 10 years, the net farm produce importing countries seem to back neither the concept of investment participations mentioned at the summit meeting and in the target program, nor the concept of a preferential regional farm price system, proposed on several occasions since then. Instead, the limits of the possibilities for sales in exchange for free foreign currency became evident by way of the problems of the imbalance in convertible balances. It will therefore be impossible in future, too, to press the issue of the planned production growth in the agriculture of net exporting countries by pointing to the regional shortages and getting around economic conditions (as is sometimes done by some senior officials in the branches affected).

In addition to the earlier mentioned fate of the target programs, the CEMA countries were spurred on in the early 1980's by the adverse shifts in international relations and their serious common concerns to seek new approaches and methods for the harmonization of their economic policies and combine this with the concept of the first economic summit since 1969.

Why did Romania express the greatest dissatisfaction with regard to the
development of the CEMA organization in recent years? In view of the fact that Romania was unable to achieve a thorough turn-around in any of the three key sectors of its economic policy in CEMA—agriculture, energy and the development of new markets for processing industry—, the internal evolution of the country has also confronted an increasingly difficult situation since 1979-1980. A highly ambitious and stringent 5-year plan, coupled with an austerity policy as prescribed and strictly controlled by the IMF needed to be fulfilled in order to maintain the country's international payment ability. This turned out to be an impossible task, although the IMF granted the country an enormous loan in July 1981, amounting to $1.5 billion and unprecedented in the case of socialist debtors. Nevertheless—in part due to the deviation from the stipulated policy correction that, incidentally, was more pronounced after 1984, in part due to the effects of Poland's insolvency—Romania was compelled to apply for rescheduling in 1982 and 1983. The international financial terms imposed made impossible the fulfillment of the annual plans and the 5-year plan that had aimed at a 7 percent growth rate. By the end of 1982, it was perfectly obvious that the medium-range plan could not be fulfilled.(4) Given the fact that Romania intended to respond to 1980-1984 developments by radical cuts in Western trade relations (the Romanians targeted complete repayment of their debts within 3-4 years and indeed made extraordinary efforts to do so), it stands to reason that Bucharest considered extensive changes in cooperation within CEMA a fundamental condition for the recovery of the Romanian economy's dynamism and therefore strongly urged the improvement of the work of CEMA.

Differences in Opinion Regarding the Future

While Romania focused on the solution of the three above mentioned economic problems, the Soviet Union considered CEMA modernization from a different aspect. In this instance the two opinions did not differ on the issue of national sovereignty, because even the present-day Soviet leaders emphasize the importance of sovereignty. However, by comparison with Romania, they advocated a reverse sequence. The Romanians advocated making the transformation of the institutions of integration and the introduction of some new fundamental methods dependent on the settlement of the practical issues raised by them. Soviet authors considered the situation from an exactly opposite standpoint. They considered the harmonization of structural policy the answer of the community to the physical lack of Soviet raw materials, in other words called for a specific regional East European adjustment process to actual Soviet conditions. The Soviet proposals published before the summit meeting envisioned a much tighter economic—and sometimes even further reaching—harmonization as the result or, even more frequently, the precondition for coping with present concerns. All of them were convinced that the solution of the concrete day-to-day problems raised by the Romanians was somehow dependent on the settlement of the general and fundamental issues. All such decisions would have involved a certain transformation of the current type of division of labor in CEMA, though the substance of the changes was variously outlined. Soviet, Bulgarian and Romanian views largely coincided with respect to the issue of regional self-sufficiency but these opinions were not shared by Hungary and the GDR officially, nor by the Polish technical press. It may also be worth mentioning that the most extreme harmonization proposals, talking of binding effects in the traditional meaning and extending
to "everything," did not originate with Soviet authors but were formulated by some Bulgarian (5) and Czechoslovak (6) authors.

It is also interesting that, according to official Bulgarian views,(7) CEMA economic policy had been properly synchronized in the past. This viewpoint sharply criticized joint investments, the main direct tools for coordination used in the 1970's. This shows that the efforts for the broad expansion of direct and binding coordination in various forms were not greeted with much enthusiasm in Bulgaria. Romania has modified its earlier categorical rejection of investment participations and is even prepared to join in common investments—though only for additional energy supplies. Well informed GDR authors, on the other hand, are highly critical of the current practice of joint investments. They emphasize that the improvement of the efficiency of international investments, not its international redistribution, is the proper approach to the settlement of the energy problem in Eastern Europe.(8)

No Comparison Possible Without Realistic Prices

What are the prospects of economic harmonization among the CEMA countries? Two areas are of special importance in this connection—investments and foreign trade. Until all conditions for the operation of a convertible currency are in place, it is in fact doubtful whether a "stricter" regional coordination is at all feasible. In the present situation there is no realistic rate of exchange either among the national currencies of the CEMA countries nor between them and the transferable ruble nor between the latter and convertible currencies. Moreover, the structures of the domestic systems of price formation, taxation, financial subsidies and the systems of deductions differ so much that direct international comparisons of these financial categories cannot be carried out at all. As, in practice, the reciprocal exchange of the CEMA countries' national monetary units is inevitable, two different methods were jointly elaborated for indirect comparisons: For investments and for non-commercial (tourist) settlements. Without describing here the methodological and practical difficulties involved, it will be enough to recall that the efficiency of not a single variant of cooperation can be precisely ascertained in present conditions.

The task of settling these issues cannot be transferred from the central organs to the enterprises, because the latter do not have at their disposal the criteria likely to ensure the optimalization of local decisions. Direct interenterprise relations must await the development of the integrated monetary system, they cannot develop either instead of it or ahead of it.

Even minor problems remain unsolved in current day-to-day international trade. In business practice, for example, there is much concern about the fact that nobody knows who is responsible if interenterprise relations—in the final analysis the consequence of international agreements—are damaged by the operational intervention of one country's government organs. A satisfactory settlement of this issue is much more urgent than abstract speculations with regard to the "synchronized" (some authors call it "uniform") structure of integration, in particular because their practical effect might well be neglected for a long time.
Foreign trade is the second main field of coordination efforts. It is by no means so obvious as sometimes assumed (9) that joint action by the CEMA countries is always more advantageous than the exploitation of specific opportunities, available to only one particular country. Not every CEMA country is able to try for such preferential treatment as the GDR enjoys in the EEC due to its "inner-German" status. Unlike Bulgaria and Romania, the CSSR could not very well try to present itself to the EEC as a developing country.

In reality cooperation on third markets is the proper field for the CEMA countries to harmonize their foreign trade policies. As all member countries are greatly interested in this field, such cooperation is promising per se and also as part of the transition to an export oriented model of integration. This conception is organically linked to the comprehensive reform of internal economic management. This reform is also needed so that, among other factors, the CEMA countries may significantly improve their international competitive capacity especially in the matter of industrial exports by comparison with their performances in the 1970's. Another promising opportunity would be their resolute insertion in the East-South division of labor. In such a framework the East European countries might well adopt synchronized measures with regard to the gradual reduction of national and regional protectionism and the promotion of backward industries. The elaboration of flexible methods of regional division of labor and, even more, their successful application among the CEMA countries which now pursue differing priorities and use differing management models, would require greater cooperation than has hitherto been practiced.

Concrete Cooperation After the Summit

The documents unanimously agreed at the 1984 Moscow summit include concrete guidelines on the actual methods, direction and methods of economic coordination. The summit was primarily a significant political event. It demonstrated the fact that various extreme representatives of politico-ideological journalism have always liked to question: The dialectic of differentiation and unity. Notable from that standpoint is the resolution according to which economic coordination at the level of integration affects only reciprocal trade and the sectors connected with joint ventures and investments. In addition it is possible to develop cooperation between the interested countries by methods and in dimensions to be freely chosen. Practical cooperation may therefore develop among the partner countries within the framework provided by CEMA, at various rates of speed and by various methods, without these relations necessarily having to be extended to other bilateral trade relations conducted in possibly very different concrete conditions.

In addition to some basic similarities in the economic system and economic policy, the increase in variety is a characteristic feature of the situation of the countries cooperating within CEMA. In part this arises from the fact that differences in the standard of development and the various methodological differences in economic management have widened in the long term as a consequence of expanded cooperation with non-European member countries. On the other hand, even the smaller East European countries that find themselves
in a comparatively similar situation, are experiencing the spirit of the age, pursuing experiments and seeking new approaches. Since spring 1985 it has been acknowledged at the political level in the Soviet Union, the core of integration, that it is impossible without the qualitative transformation of the entire economic mechanism to speed up the technical progress relevant for the country's defense capability either. An exceptionally large variety of proposals has been submitted in the USSR with regard to the methods and orientation of the solution to this problem. At the present time many very different detailed measures are also applied to day-to-day economic management. It is therefore evident that older conceptions—aiming at the standardization of solutions in national economic policy and management—will have little practical impact on the next stage of development. Though it is likely that they will often be proclaimed in future also for one reason or the other, it seems obvious that the reserves for deeper cooperation in CEMA are not to be traced in that direction.

It follows from the above and the orientations of earlier periods that we will be able in 1986–1990 to observe the reinforcement of the bilateral and radial nature of integration. This means primarily that the significance of the Soviet market for the other CEMA countries will continue to grow steadily. Among the non-European member countries, trade within CEMA has always accounted for about 75–90 percent of their total foreign trade; the exchange of commodities with the Soviet Union achieved roughly 90 percent of the total. The 1970's saw the percentage of the Soviet market rise strongly in the East European countries also. Indeed, this held true both for their entire foreign trade—a market share of more than 40 percent—and for trade within CEMA, where the Soviet Union accounted for half to two thirds of the respective CEMA countries' trade. The rising ruble price level and the compelling need to equalize the convertible balance of payment caused at one and the same time cuts in East-West and, to a lesser extent, East–South trade and, consequently, a specific reorientation in the first half of the 1980's. Bilateralism expanded in this meaning also, not only that of the traditional trade and settlement system. On the other hand, the Soviet Union continues to be the "prime mover" of programs at CEMA level; cooperation among the small European member countries is much weaker.

Limits and Methods of Integration

What, therefore, does economic harmonization involve in the meaning of the resolutions adopted at the summit? According to the document, it means joint operations in the course of which the representatives of the participating countries decide the tasks to be jointly carried out and the ways of implementation—in the specific cases and by the specific methods considered appropriate by the member countries. Moreover, as we have noted earlier, upon considering this to be necessary in a particular instance, two or more countries may cooperate in other fields or within a tighter structure. Mentioned as the means to achieve farther reaching coordination are the regular economic meetings between party leaders who arrive at fundamental agreements and fix the long-range directions of the development of cooperation. The meeting of Central Committee secretaries of the parties in power, held in Moscow in May 1985, provided a good example of this latter new customary and also informal type of collaboration. The CC secretaries were
mainly concerned with exchanging national experiences with respect to the party management of the economy. The Soviets regards this as a promising approach because it not only facilitates greater familiarity with the various management methods but, by strengthening party influence, may also contribute to a significant speed-up in integration.

To achieve better results within the existing framework, two conditions need to be met. One was indicated at the session of the CEMA Executive Committee, held in Warsaw in June 1985: Investigations are needed to settle the questions to be decided at such a high level. On the one hand it is understandable, even inevitable, that, due to the demonetization of the various types of cooperation, an increasingly large part of decisions is made at an unduly high level. On the other hand, it is also obvious why the central agencies, currently overburdened with concrete operational concerns, are unable to fully exploit the new opportunities for economic coordination. A fundamental shift in the appraisal of national planning must be considered the second condition.

We well know that traditional national planning and, consequently, the CEMA practice of plan coordination are oriented to stability and growth. For the longest time the smooth growth of commodity flows within the region appeared just as much a matter of course as the feasibility of forecasts for the next 5-8 years. Though it is indisputable that many (particularly infrastructural and social) factors of economic development require even longer forecast, it is more and more evident that the details and the reliability of the forecasts as required and presumed by traditional planning and coordination methodology, has become objectively impossible. This arises less from the "unexpected" shifts and the now allegedly unstable world economy than from the speed-up in the rate of technical development and product renewal. That is why the traditional plan coordination in CEMA will have to be supplemented by wider economic coordination.

The CEMA flow of trade will increasingly depend on medium-term plan harmonizations carried out largely by the same methods as before. However, even in 1981-1985 the two basic conditions—the growth and stability of trade, valid for 30 years—trade, had ceased to apply, nor can we expect a return to traditional conditions in the coming period. In the course of the CEMA negotiations for 1986-1990 it already became obvious that we could not expect a noticeable expansion of CEMA trade due to inadequate competitive capacity, slow technical development and the inefficiency of the current (slow) change in the product structure. At the same time, the methodology of plan harmonization continues to neglect the above mentioned objective limitations of forecasts. Instead it attempts to use its resources to stabilize the processes. We cannot be surprised that this is achieved to an even smaller extent than before: Plan harmonization is in arrears with respect to its own time schedule, confirmed at the 1982 conference, and even to its own norms. After the summit, agreement would have had to be achieved on the details of commodity deliveries. However, not even the economic plan drafts were ready, though they were required as the basis for coordinating trade.
I hope that the foregoing will show that it would imply great superficiality for anyone to impute to those working on planning a lack of technical knowledge and labor capacity, discipline or devotion. The delays occurring are the outward manifestations of objective processes. The goal of this theoretical article was not the assessment of 1986-1990 plan coordination. However, if processes occur in the economies of the CEMA member countries and in the world economy, that cannot be appropriately taken into account by the traditional planning methodology, it is obvious that we would try in vain to adjust reality to the framework of traditional methodology. Indeed, the reverse would be required: Planning methodology and plan harmonization must be based on these new and crucial real life factors.

The harmonization of economic policy as the conception for cooperation adopted at the summit stays within the framework of the traditional CEMA model. Within it, however, it might provide a solution for the above mentioned concerns of plan coordination. If conditions were in place for the steady and smooth harmonization of interests, it would become possible for the plans for future cooperation to expect that the shortages manifested in the member countries in 1981-1985 have increased rather than decreased, and that this trend is unlikely to change through 1990. This arises mainly from the fact that the priority of the foreign trade equilibrium is maintained, or that this requirement cannot be weakened without disastrous consequences. The reasons are twofold: a) The convertible relation exhausts the easily mobilized and readily available reserves in order to improve the equilibrium, while the product structure, steadily downvalued on the world market, has not significantly improved. b) The motive force of raw materials integration between the East European countries and the Soviet Union is exhausted; precisely due to the above mentioned factors and in contrast to the 10 preceding years, cooperation in processing industry is unable to assume this role at a time when the equalization or even the achievement of some surplus in the ruble balance represents a new and additional task for the foreign trade of the East European countries.

The serious shortages and the qualitatively unchanged mechanism of cooperation necessarily result in a significant weakening of the stability of relations in CEMA as traditionally understood. The conception of economic coordination and constant harmonization of interests, drafted at the summit, takes this reality into account and, provided the above mentioned two conditions are met, offers an opportunity for the better filling up of the traditional framework. Admittedly, this definitely requires a change in the planning concepts in all member countries. Such a planning concept, courageously confronting economic realities, might result in such shifts at the regulators and institutions as would also create the conditions for direct relations between enterprises and the harmonization of interests at micro level.

FOOTNOTES


2. C. Dascalescu, address at the 39th CEMA Council Meeting in Havana, ELORE,


4. This was announced by N. Ceausescu at the 1982 December Plenum of the RCP CC. He remarked that "even if we are unable to accomplish the challenging tasks of the 5-year plan, we need to make every effort to at least come close," SCINTEIA, 18 December 1982. German translation in the Romanian political weekly LUMEA.


11698
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BAVARIAN CONSERVATIVE LEADER SEEKS CLOSER ECONOMIC TIES

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 21 May 86 p 10

[Article by Carl E. Buchalla, Tirana 20 May 86: "Strauss Establishing Ties with Albanians"]

[Text] Some Poaching in Genscher's Preserve

Bavarian minister president makes semiofficial, semiprivate flight to communist Albania.

Whether the visit was private or official is something that remains to be interpreted. But here are the facts: At 1615 on Whitsuntide Monday afternoon, Franz Josef Strauss, at the controls of a chartered Cessna, landed at the airport of the Albanian capital Tirana. Just 2 hours later, he conferred with Prime Minister Adel Carcani and his deputy, Political Bureau member Manush Myftiu. The political conversation was continued during a joint dinner in the evening. Barely 24 hours after his arrival, Strauss flew back to Munich on Tuesday.

Here is the bottom line of his quickie trip to Tirana, as he sees it: the Albanians have removed the barrier which until then had stood in the way of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Tirana. They dropped their horrendous demands for reparations and are ready no longer to tie the establishment of relations in with certain conditions. This settlement, which does justice to both sides—and which enables both sides to save face—appears to be in sight.

No Strings

Just how this settlement might look was outlined by the Bavarian minister president for his Albanian conversation partners and in the process obviously met with interested agreement. Two treaties are to be signed between Bonn and Tirana, without any connection between them: a treaty on the establishment of diplomatic relations and a second treaty on long-term economic cooperation, which would include capital aid and technical assistance. This had been the crux of government-level negotiations between Bonn and Tirana until now: the West German government would have been ready to grant the Albanians long-term loans on favorable terms; the Albanians however were and still are not ready
to accept loans. This is because accepting loans is forbidden, as the Albanian constitution has been stating for several years: the wilful state of the Skipetars [Albanians] does not want to restrict or threaten its political independence due to economic loans; this is like a burned child's fear of fire.

Of course, that the Albanians might deviate from their demands for reparations was something that had become clear already during the latest German-Albanian negotiations early in March in Vienna. It was announced that the Albanian side (represented by the chief of the Western European Division in the Albanian Foreign Ministry) had dropped its demand for reparations as preconditions even then, a demand which Bonn would never accept in the light of the 1953 London debt agreement.

In Tirana Earlier

Albania is the only state in Europe with which the Federal Republic does not have diplomatic relations. The fact that government negotiations between Bonn and Tirana on putting an end to this situation have been dragging on without result for years may be a reason why Strauss is poaching in the foreign-policy hunting preserves of Hans-Dietrich Genscher; another reason is that the CSU [Christian Social Union] boss has good personal relations in Tirana. In August 1984, 2 years ago, he had reached Tirana in the course of a private vacation trip through the Balkans and was received there, not like a vacationer on his way through, but like a prince.

His conversation at that time with Deputy Prime Minister Manush Myftiu, one of the most senior members of the Political Bureau of Albania's "Party of Labor," created the foundation for further contacts. In the autumn of 1985, Georg von Waldenfels, the state secretary in the Bavarian Economy Ministry, flew to Tirana and was courted there like a minister; Bavarian industry is certainly present in the Albanian business even without diplomatic relations.

There are historical and geographic reasons for the fact that the Free State of Bavaria considers itself to be the Federal Republic's gateway to the countries of Southeastern Europe. This self-concept is definitely accepted by Bavaria's neighbors in Southeastern Europe and it is also honored in economic relations. Only Albania was for many years an unexplored area on Bavaria's map of Southeastern Europe: but this situation changed since Strauss' political tourist trip 2 years ago.

Strauss would not be Strauss if, during his political vacation trips, he were not also thinking of Bavarian industry. During his quickie trip to Tirana, he was joined by Munich Mercedes manager Karl Dersch who already 2 years ago had organized Strauss' trip to the Balkans—in the all-terrain vehicle of this automaker with the good star—and who had accompanied him. A preliminary deal had also materialized on that occasion and this deal is now beginning to come through: Mercedes will supply Albania with about 2,000 second-hand trucks and 180 buses; no vehicle is to be older than 2 years. Proud of their politics but poor in foreign currency, this will enable the Albanians to modernize their completely obsolete motor pool. The vehicles running on Albania's roads are ready for the museum: trucks and buses which had been delivered once upon a
time by the Russians and later by the Chinese. But since Albania has been considering itself as the sole representative of "true Marxism-Leninism," since it broke with the Russians at the beginning of the 1960's and with the Chinese in the middle of the 1970's, it has been getting neither vehicles, nor spare parts. This shortage is felt even more in Albanian industry.

Albania lived in self-imposed isolation for decades; Albania's economic and political relations with Greece, Turkey, and most of the Western European countries improved considerably in recent times. This is a trend which began already under Party Boss and Head of State Enver Hoxha who died a year ago; this is a trend which is quite obviously being pursued by his successor Ramiz Alia. That this reorientation is being emphatically denied by official Albanian circles, that there is no talk of an "opening," but rather of a consistent continuation of the policy charted by Enver Hoxha, that is quite obviously a piece of dialectics which is to be concealed by means of pragmatism.

It is thus not surprising that the government officials, who welcomed Strauss at the Tirana airport, included the chief of the Western European Division of the Albanian Foreign Ministry, in other words, that State Secretary Andon Berxholi who is conducting negotiations with Bonn for the Albanian side. And it was also quite natural that political tourist Strauss would not be put up in a hotel but rather in a government guest mansion. After all, he was a guest of Prime Minister Adil Carcani. That of course still does not answer the question whether the CSU boss and Bavarian minister president was in Tirana privately or officially. This is a secondary question for Strauss himself. He was mainly concerned with "continuing to establish ties, getting things moving." Questioned as to whether he was successful, he replied with confidence: "I believe so."

[Photo Caption]

Adil Carcani, chairman of the Council of Ministers is, formally, the head of government; but the key personality is party boss Ramiz Alia.

5058
CSO: 2300/385
POWER SUPPLY, SAFETY MEASURES AT KOZLODUY DESCRIBED

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 29 May 86 p 4

[Article by Corresponding Member Professor Nikola Todoriev, chairman of the Energetika Economic Trust: "Economizing on Energy"]

[Text] Last night Corresponding Member Professor Nikola Todoriev, chairman of the Energetika Economic Trust, spoke on Bulgarian television. The topics of the discussion included problems of power supply. The winter is behind us. Although it was warmer, nevertheless it was a winter season with all of its hardships. The discussion also included the work of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant.

What are the results of the steps taken to normalize the country's power supply? Let me openly say that they are very good, Professor N. Todoriev said in the beginning. I do not wish to burden our audience with many figures, but let me say that during the first quarter of 1986 electric power consumption in the country was significantly lower than in 1984, which was characterized by very frequent interruptions of power deliveries to the consumers. At the same time, I must emphasize that there was absolutely no interruption of electric power over the past autumn and winter, absolutely none. I do not include in this a few breakdowns, which are bound to occur in the operation of such a complex system.

Let me immediately emphasize that despite such a reduced consumption of electric power, there has been a significant growth of economic indicators in our industry in the first quarter, so that we have actually achieved one of the main tasks of our energy policy: a gradual decline in power consumption per unit of output in our country.

Before I say a few words on the preparations we are making for the forthcoming autumn and winter, let me take this opportunity to thank all Bulgarian citizens who showed exceptional understanding for the introduction of this controlled power consumption system.

I would also like to thank Bulgarian television for its continuing and active participation and support of steps taken in connection with the preparations for and conversion to the autumn-winter system, and to all mass information media and public organizations which concentrated all their efforts on the
solution of this problem. Naturally, I also thank the Bulgarian miners and power workers who spared neither time nor efforts to ensure the absolutely normal and rhythmical power supply to the country over the past period.

What could we expect now? We cannot say that everything is in order, for such a system will always have problems which, if ignored today, and if resolved belatedly, would make them very difficult and will sometimes require double the amount of forces and funds. That is why we are steadily preparing for the winter period. Preparations for the next autumn and winter are once again manifested in the increased volume of repair operations. We want to have absolutely adequate and stable power capacities within our system when the cold seasons arrive. Let me also say, however, that it is quite possible, particularly as time goes by, and the dry season comes, that in the next autumn and winter as well we may not have at our disposal the generating capacities of hydroelectric power plants.

Consequently, once again we must be ready to work under more difficult conditions. That is why we are making preparations not only within the power system but also within the systems of all power consumers to be prepared for the winter. I believe that such preparations should be made by every Bulgarian citizen as well. Increasingly, technical solutions are being applied, lowering power consumption even with high-volume industrial output.

Let me point out once again that the efficient and economical utilization of energy, in all its varieties, remains both the strategy and the tactic of our energy policy, the more so after the resolutions of the 13th BCP Congress formulated the type of tasks related to the accelerated development of our economy, demanding that we prevent the wasting of energy, which is so hard to obtain and so costly to the state.

In this connection, we shall continue with the stipulated procedure for regulating and limiting population consumption. We are drawing conclusions based on the limiting of electric power consumption in the consumer sector during the past winter and all the failures and, if I may say so, all special cases which appeared. We tried to solve such problems and to improve the system in order to prevent any kind of harm or injustice affecting the individual citizen. However, I would also like to emphasize that the approach to the solution of energy problems, which was characteristic of the past autumn and winter, should be continued. We are trying to distribute the use of all sources of energy in such a way as to obtain the highest possible results and, above all, a rhythmical and reliable power supply.

How will the Bulgarian power industry develop during the 9th 5-Year Plan? The main trends in the development of our power industry remain the same. It is given priority compared to the development of the other industrial sectors. This 5-year plan the expansion of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant will continue; start-up operations of the fifth block will be undertaken by the end of this year. We shall continue with building the sixth power block. We are undertaking the construction of the nuclear plant in Belene and the accelerated building of the second stage of the Belmeken-Seastri-mo-power storing Chaira plant power system, the first unit of which should be completed by the middle of 1988. A third expansion of the Maritsa-Iztok 2--the Maritsa-
Iztok Combine—is under construction, the first block of which is scheduled for completion in 1989, as well as some additional heat and electric-power generating capacities. We are also continuing the building of additional capacities in our coal-extraction industry. As you can see, in addition to importing energy we are relying on the increased share of local resources to meet power requirements in the next 5 years.

What is the situation with the safety of our nuclear electric power plant?

The first block of our nuclear electric power plant has been in operation for almost 12 years. It was built in accordance with the concepts and technical possibilities of the time when its construction was undertaken. Let me immediately add that the four blocks in operation in Kozloduy are of the core-reactor type, different from those in Chernobyl. Kozloduy has water-water reactors.

All the necessary systems to ensure the safety of the operation of the turbines in Kozloduy are in triplicate, both in terms of cooling, control and power supply. Consequently, all possible steps have been taken to ensure the absolutely safe and reliable work of the plant. Its indicators classify it among the best power plants of its kind in the world.

Let me also mention that many citizens remember the severe earthquake in Vrancea, in 1977. At that time the nuclear power plant experienced and earthquake shock stronger than the one it was designed to withstand. Nevertheless, it did not interrupt its work. Consequently, the equipment in Kozloduy has a certain reserve even for such cases. Nevertheless, all new developments in nuclear technology used in the production of electric power, above all those aimed at upgrading work safety, are being consistently applied in Kozloduy.

After the earthquake the entire equipment was strengthened with additional shock absorbers—reactors, steam pipes and steam generators (I shall not enumerate here all units). Control systems were improved and expanded. A number of additional measuring instruments were installed to record signals of movement in the earth's crust. I shall not go on listing other technical problems.

The Soviet Union, which supplied this equipment, has steadily worked on its improvement. All new developments are immediately installed. I must point out that even before the Chernobyl breakdown, an absolutely identical program was suggested for making some additions during repairs of individual generators, aimed above all at upgrading operational safety. Taking also into consideration the fact that we have a highly trained staff running this plant, which always includes Soviet specialists, who are very well familiar with the systems, we can trust the work of the installed Kozloduy facility. As far as the expansion is concerned, we are undertaking the building of qualitatively new types of reactors of the same water-water type. However, their unit capacity is 1,000 megawatts and they have been built on the basis of exceptionally strict safety requirements. Here as well all cooling, control and electric power supply systems are in triplicate. All processes are absolutely automated. We must also bear in mind that the new units have
safety protection so that whatever breakdown may occur in the reactor part of the plant, even if radioactive steam is released, it will not go into the environment. It will remain in the locked premise inside the reactor, which is of a size able to withstand exceptionally high external and internal pressures. For the sake of comparison, let me emphasize that its dimensions are such that should an airplane crash on the roof of the reactor the roof can withstand the shock. It has been so designed.

Consequently, the problems of work safety of the second section of Kozloduy have been resolved on a qualitatively new level, consistent with current achievements and concepts of work safety of such nuclear power plants.

There is no reason for mankind to abandon the further development and utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, for this is its power alternative, Professor Todoriev concluded.

5003
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ENERGY, POWER RESOURCES ASSESSED BY TRUST CHAIRMAN

Sofia RUDNICHAR in Bulgarian 29 May 86 pp 1-2

[Report: "Decisive Share of Power Industry"]

[Text] A sectorial conference to discuss the tasks of the domestic power industry, based on the resolutions of the 13th Party Congress, was held at the Energetika Economic Trust last week. It was attended by managers of combines and institutes within the trust's system and by Kiril Zarev, BCP Central Committee secretary, Vasil Kalaydzhiev, secretary of the Central Committee of our trade union, and others.

In his report to the conference, Nikola Todoriev, trust chairman, emphasized that our country's energy requirements are being met under conditions of insufficient local high-quality energy sources—petroleum, natural gas and coal. Most of the processed lignite (about 80 percent) is low-calorie, with a high moisture and ash content. Nuclear energy became part of the country's fuel and energy balance in the past 10 years. Equally limited are hydraulic power resources, since the country is located in the part of the Balkan Peninsula which has the least water supplies. The new power sources are in their initial stage of development and their share in meeting fuel requirements is insubstantial, almost symbolic.

This situation seriously conflicts with the structure of our power consumption and calls for importing nearly 70 percent of primary energy resources.

Despite such adverse objective facts, the country's power consumption has reached 45.6 million tons of standard fuel while electric power consumption exceeded 47 billion kwh. The specific consumption indicators (5,190 kg standard fuel and 5,240 kwh per person rate the country as developed. These indicators exceed the world's average by a factor of about 2.5).

The need for electric power is satisfied essentially with the production of electricity by our power plants and with about 10 percent imports. The structure of our electric power production is among the most progressive in the world and is consistent with the existing power base. Electric power produced with low-grade coal accounts for 35 percent and that generated by nuclear capacities, for 32.5 percent. In terms of these indicators, Bulgaria holds a leading position in the world. In terms of the share of electric
power production generated at the AETs, Bulgaria is one of the six leading countries in the world and our achievements in the utilization of low-grade lignite coal have earned international recognition. Liquid fuels and natural gas account for no more than 3.9 percent of the electricity produced by the Energetika SO.

Regardless of such unquestionable successes, however, major difficulties in supplying the national economy and the population with electric power developed in 1984 and 1985. Thanks to the steps taken by the BCP Central Committee Politburo and the government on the most efficient utilization of electric power, no disturbances in electric power supplies to the national economy and the population occurred in the autumn and winter period of 1985-1986; particularly efficient was the application of a control system in electric power consumption.

The results of the first quarter of 1986 illustrate these steps. Compared with the same period in 1985, electric power consumption dropped by 657 million kwh or 4.9 percent. Electric power consumption by the population was reduced by 713 million kwh or 19.6 percent for the same quarter, while electric power consumption by the public sector remained virtually unchanged. Meanwhile, the total output for the country increased by 11 percent. This indicates that the steps which were taken yielded substantial national economic results, bearing in mind that the output of hydraulic power plants was significantly limited because of water shortages.

During the first 4 months of 1986 a positive trend was noted in coal mining, electric power generating capacities and the overall power system. Let us note the qualitative improvements in the structure of electric power production compared with the same period in 1985. While output for the first 4 months showed an overall decline of 105 million kwh, compared with the first 4 months of 1985, the power generated at thermoelectric power plants increased by 157 million kwh. The increase was entirely generated by plants using local coal. Overall coal extraction in the first 4 months of the year totaled 12,135,000 tons, or 188,000 tons above the plan. Compared with the first 4 months of 1985, an increase of 12.7 percent or 1,365,000 tons was achieved.

The new social gains benefiting miners and power workers, based on Decree No 59 of the Council of Ministers of 1985, were of great importance in stabilizing the manpower in the power industry sectors and, on this basis, creating prerequisites for improving the skill structure of the personnel and upgrading the standards of labor and technological discipline.

Without underestimating the unquestionably encouraging results which were achieved, Comrade Todoriev categorically stated, every manager, specialist and worker must realize with extreme clarity that the new targets and tasks set by the party and the requirements concerning the time, place, role and specific nature of the power industry demand of them critically to assess their activities and to work in an atmosphere of intolerance of errors and lagging and to display dissatisfaction with accomplishments.

Can we be entirely satisfied with the work of all of our electric power plants and mines and, therefore, our work as specialists and managers, in the first 4
months of 1986 and during the month of May? Unquestionably, we cannot, the
speaker categorically said. Breakdowns in some plants using local coal remain
frequent. Whereas in this respect we find some justification in the improper
technical condition of the equipment caused by the lengthy and intensive work
at the Republika TETs and the Maritsa 3 TETs, what can we say about the
frankly poor work of the Maritsa-Izток 2 TETs? Despite some objective reasons
which affect the work of the plant, nothing justifies underestimating repairs,
maintenance and preventive maintenance of equipment, as well as the lowered
exigency and criteria in observing regulations and instructions, low personnel
skill and the resulting unsatisfactory technological and labor discipline.
This circumstance does not make accidental the severe breakdown of generator
No 6, which stayed idle for a substantial period of time, and the frequent
breakdowns of many other types of auxiliary equipment.

Nor can we be satisfied with the work of some mines and open pits, Comrade
Todoriev went on to say. The Bobov Dol Combine did not fulfill its brown coal
extraction plan for the first 4 months of the year; compared with the first 4
months of 1985, the combine's overall coal extraction dropped by more than
140,000 tons. The Marishki Baseyn Combine also allowed an unjustified decline
in coal extraction compared with the first 4 months of 1985.

Despite favorable atmospheric conditions, since the beginning of the year some
mines have not fulfilled their opening plans. Lagging in this area has been
allowed at the Troyanovo 1 and Troyanovo-Sever open pits and at the Maritsa-
Izток Combine, totaling 1.3 million cubic meters and at the G. Dimitrov and
Bobov Dol combines, by 300,000 cubic meters each.

We are not satisfied with the results of the organization and the efforts made
by electric power supply combines to reduce losses in transportation,
transformation and distribution of electric power.

Labor resources are used inefficiently. Council of Ministers Decree No 59
created prerequisites for hiring additional manpower in our difficult sectors.
Many of our combine and enterprise managers, however, consider that manpower
problems can be resolved exclusively by solving the quantitative side of the
matter. Instead of undertaking to improve the organization of the work and
the selection and training of cadres, they keep asking the trust's management
for additional personnel and higher wages. The task is to achieve an 8
percent average annual increased in public labor productivity. Unquestionably, increasing the power-labor ratio will play a very important
role in meeting it.

The Bulgarian power industry must develop in such a way as to meet the needs
of the developing scientific and technical revolution in all economic sectors.
So far our power industry has developed in accordance with progressive global
trends—priority development of the nuclear power industry, increasing the
share of local energy resources and pursuing a systematic policy of efficient
utilization of fuels and energy. This line of development will be continued
in the future.

Mastering the production of electric power on the basis of VVER-1000-type
reactors will constitute a new technological updating of the sector, in the
course of which the share of nuclear electric power production will reach 44 percent by 1990 and about 60 percent in the year 2000.

At the present stage, the country's thermoelectric power plants include both most advanced power production facilities, such as the Dimo Dichev, Bobov Dol, Varna and other TETs, as well as physically and morally obsolete ones, such as the Maritsa 3, Republika and Purva Komsomolska TETs. Their labor productivity is based on the capacity of individual units and the type of fuel used (substandard fuels, such as local coal, demand more servicing). Power plants using high-quality imported fuels, such as coal, fuel oil, or natural gas, have the same indicators as those reached in developed countries. Thus, for example, the Varna TETs, which has a labor productivity of 6-7 million kWh per person and a specific outlay of 342 grams of standard fuel, operates on the level of the best plants in the USSR using similar fuel. The situation of power plants using low-grade local fuel is different: their labor productivity is lower by one-half.

Considerable successes have been achieved in the generation of hydraulic power. The developed power systems enable us to collect and utilize a large percentage of the water, thus ensuring their comprehensive use. Here as well the scientific and technical revolution demands some new solutions. The Chaïra PAVETs is a unique installation not only in Bulgaria but in the world. No other power plant with one-step convertible units with a 735-meter drop exists in the world. The commissioning of the first unit next year will ensure the reliable work of the power system. High-level automation will make it possible for the plant to work with virtually no servicing personnel. The comprehensive use of a high percentage of the country's water for purposes of power generating, water supply and irrigation will be achieved with the subsequent completion of the Tsunkov Kamuk VETs-PAVETs, the Mesta power system and the Sofia water supply system. The small and very small hydroelectric power plants, which will meet some local needs, will play a significant role in developing the hydraulic power potential.

Mastering the technology for the production of thermoelectric power for industrial and domestic heat supplies, based on special nuclear power plants (ATsT) will mark a new stage. The building of the first ATsT is planned for the end of the 9th 5-Year Plan, to meet the need for industrial and household heat supplies in Sofia. Subsequently, other ATsT will be built to supply heat to the larger cities and urban agglomerations, thus freeing significant amounts of high-quality organic fuels.

The technology for straight burning of local lignite will be developed further with the building of steam and water-heating boilers with an hourly capacity ranging between 100 and 220 tons and 65-100 gigacalories, for providing heat for Stara Zagora, Pazardzhik, Khaskovo, Kyustendil, Blagoevgrad, Kurtdzhal and others. However, in order to organize the production of such boilers, we must rapidly organize the prompt mastery of their production by our machine building industry.

We are planning the production of thermal energy with the use of various types of water (geothermal, ground, surface, industrial), and air and solar energy.
In our country coal mining meets 20 percent of the energy needs of the national economy. Per capita coal production makes Bulgaria the sixth highest producer in the world; it is 12th in the total extraction of lignite and brown coal. This proves the extensively developed material base in coal mining.

The priority development of open-pit mining and the further technological updating of the sector on the basis of the latest achievements of the scientific and technical revolution are features of the strategy aimed at achieving a qualitatively new growth in coal mining; we are planning for overall coal extraction to increase from 32.4 million tons in 1985 to 60 million tons in 1995 and 66 million tons in the year 2000, in which open pit mining will account for more than 80 percent. This will mean increasing the coal extraction capacity at the Maritsa-Iztok basin to 45.5 million tons per year, in the course of which labor productivity will be doubled. A new large open-pit mine will be opened at the Elkhovo basin, with a planned capacity of 8 million tons per year.

In the underground mines new-quality technology will be applied in mechanizing the extraction and opening of shafts at the Bobov Dol, Maritsa-Zapad, Pernik and Black Sea basins, based on updating comprehensive mechanization facilities.

The purpose of the updating will be to increase labor productivity in accordance with the assignment: by 100 percent by 1995 and by a factor of 3 by the year 2000.

The implementation of assignments ensuring the qualitative growth in the power industry will be achieved in close collaboration and scientific and technical cooperation with CEMA members, within the framework of the comprehensive program for the period until the year 2000. The implementation of this program requires the increased participation of our machine building industry in the application of various technologies. In this respect we must undertake more daringly the application of technologies used in the developed countries, about which we know and which yield good results, Comrade Todoriev pointed out. This will contribute to making qualitative changes along entire technological chains and enhance manpower skills to the level of global criteria. In this respect the institutes face major tasks. Their work must be radically reorganized in terms of scientific research and the development of applied projects.

A sectorial technological center must be developed at the Energetika SO, which would organize and manage activities in the transfer, development and application of new technologies and the technological retooling of coal extraction and treatment, power production and distribution, and solve some problems related to power consumption.

Quality changes must be made in engineering activities as well. Here again a basic reevaluation is needed. The volume of engineering must be reduced by several hundred percent and designers must be freed from huge volumes of exhausting work.
We must objectively determine whether the system of the trust has the necessary forces and facilities to set up machine-building capacities at some of the combines, for the manufacturing of minor yet highly efficient mechanization facilities, spare parts, and others. It may be expedient to organize in some institutes or combines experimental bases for the application of scientific achievements. Each combine and enterprise must have scientific groups or highly skilled specialists.

The speaker reemphasized the great importance of repairs in achieving lasting and high results in the power industry. This requires an upturn in the technologies used in repair production by upgrading the level of repair mechanization and increasing the share of plant repairs.

Comrade Todoriev then drew the attention of the participants to the need for further improvements in the economic mechanism of self-managing organizations within the power industry system, by providing all the necessary conditions for the proper development and functioning of combines and enterprises and the accelerated application of the achievements of scientific and technical progress. The economic management in the power industry should ensure the fullest possible combination of the interests of individual workers with those of the brigade, pit, power plant, combine and trust.

After hearing the views of managers of combines and institutes on the problems under discussion, Kiril Zarev, BCP Central Committee secretary, shared his thoughts on the ways and means for the successful implementation of the resolutions of the 13th Congress in the power industry and the resolutions which the trust's management submitted to the conference participants.

5003
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POLITBURO MEMBER DOYNOV ATTENDS CONFERENCE ON METALLURGY

Sofia RUDNICHAR in Bulgarian 5 Jun 86 pp 1-2

[Report: "Metallurgy in Step With the New Requirements!"]

[Text] The tasks based on the resolutions of the 13th Party Congress were discussed at a conference held at the Metalurgiya Economic Trust, attended by heads of combines, scientific research institutes and trust specialists, which was held on 30 May 1986.

Ognyan Doynov, BCP Central Committee Politburo member, Council of Ministers deputy chairman and chairman of the economic council under the Council of Ministers, took part in the conference.

Comrade Toncho Chakurov, chairman of the Metalurgiya Economic Trust, emphasized in his report that the resolutions of the 13th Party Congress and the new document drafted under Comrade Todor Zhivkov's guidance "On a Qualitatively New Economic Growth," which was approved by the BCP Central Committee Politburo, are manuals for action for all cadres in the struggle for the further accelerated development of the country.

Comrade Chakurov said that today we must reassess our accomplishments of recent years concerning the entire economy and our system, and seek ways and means of creating the necessary economic, organization, management and social and political prerequisites for the total mobilization of collectives, party organizations and economic managements in the struggle for the fast reorganization of the work and for achieving high results as early as 1986.

Indicating the successes achieved in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, for which a number of collectives were presented with government awards, the speaker discussed some negative features in the work of the collectives, as a result of which a number of physical plan indicators were not met. Production quality is unsatisfactory. The infrastructure developed in scientific services is inconsistent with the major tasks. There is a considerable lagging in production automation. Some major problems in supplying the country with new types of materials, metals and ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy alloys and non-ore mineral raw materials, such as materials for the electronic industry, special steels, casting sand, modified products, and others, were not entirely solved.
We must note, Comrade Chakurov said, that some strategically important problems in expanding the national raw material base are being solved very sluggishly. This includes the comprehensive treatment of Kremikovtsi ore, preparations for the development of the manganese ore deposits near Obrochishte, the treatment of tungsten ores, increasing the level of treatment and complex extraction of useful components from ore deposits of nonferrous metals and others. Also unsatisfactory are the work and organization, quality and efficiency in collecting and processing ferrous and nonferrous scrap.

Although our country is poor in resources, we are not acting as good managers. We waste materials and raw materials. We have not mastered the comprehensive processing and extensive utilization of raw materials. Wasteless and low-waste technologies are very few. In this respect, our scientific institutes and development units are in debt to production facilities. In ferrous metallurgy, for example, the consumption of coke, natural gas, electric power and metal units per ton of rolled metal are significantly higher compared with average worldwide achievements. The extraction of lead, zinc and copper and the utilization of sulfur are 1-3 percent below top world achievements.

Major and urgent problems are related to production quality.

The speaker also noted a delay in the implementation of a number of important steps for the technological retooling of sectors in terms of capital construction. The necessary updating of the equipment in open-pit and ground ore mining has not been ensured.

Some success has been achieved by some enterprises in the automation of technology, production and management and the implementation of programs but only in terms of introducing local systems and developing some automated control systems.

Disproportions between basic capacities and the condition of repair facilities have not been surmounted. The shortage of spare parts and replacements has worsened.

This year a total of 39,980 tons of spare parts will be needed and only 63 percent of the needs of enterprise repair bases will be met.

The time for application of developments was not reduced in the area of scientific development activities and shortcomings have become apparent in comprehensive approaches, particularly in application, for which reasons some developments failed to achieve the stipulated quality and efficiency of new technologies and products.

The problems which we must solve, the speaker emphasized, are of exceptional importance in terms of scale and complexity. However, not one of us has the right to forget that these are the tasks of a new and major historical accomplishment of our party.

Comrade Chakurov further outlined the main problems which must be solved and indicated that it is a question of qualitatively new changes in metallurgy and ore mining, which cannot be based on our previous concepts of modernization,
reconstruction and organization improvements in production, but mainly on technological updating.

Technological updating must be comprehensive, starting with raw materials and materials and equipment, and ending with the finished product, the speaker emphasized. All of this must be reflected in the plan, its balancing and concretizing and fulfilling the state orders for the 1986-1990 period. Technological updating and a technological approach in the formulation of the plan are of decisive significance.

In drafting the plan, particular attention must be paid to production quality. The only acceptable standard is the world standard. Nothing else is possible. It is extremely clear that without the organization and total mobilization of scientific and technical cadres no further qualitative growth can be achieved. The solution of this problem calls for the development of a modern infrastructure of scientific services in metallurgy and an integral organization for new technological transfer. To this effect we must rapidly determine the tasks of trusts' technological centers, which must work on the basis of the principle of association with scientific research and design institutes. The Automation Institute must be developed and assigned meaningful activities in the field of automation and provided with proper material facilities. All combines and enterprises must develop bases and production units which, using the existing production automation facilities in our country and in the other socialist countries, can organize comprehensive production automation systems.

Immediate contacts must be established with the BAN, VUZs and corresponding institutes in our country and long-term cooperation contracts must be concluded for scientific activities. This is our urgent task.

The capacities of machine repair plants and the Komsomolets and Vuzkhod plants must be updated with a view to ensuring technological transfers, reconstruction and modernization of production facilities.

The design organizations must rapidly reorganize their work with a view to sharply reduce the cycle of design, equipment procurements and commissioning of capacities.

The material base of our institutes is old and insufficient and we are noting an aging of cadres. No adequate internal information system has been developed.

The fact that we are trying to attain the global technology standard means that the institutes must have facilities and powerful laboratories equipped with the latest facilities and automated means for research, scientific work and experimentation.

The speaker pointed out that we must radically change the approach to resource utilization. This is a strategic problem for us, Comrade Chakurov emphasized. Without its solution the targets of economic growth and efficiency in our enterprises and combines will not be met. If we continue to assess, plan and work on such problems on the basis of the old approaches we are bound to fail.
During the next month, on the basis of a profound analysis, sectorial programs for the utilization of resources must be drafted.

The criteria for the creation of this new raw material base should include not only the development of essentially new materials but, above all, the efficient utilization of available resources, stopping the production of inefficient items and developing a new standardization base which will guarantee maximally possible conservation of raw materials, fuel and energy, not on the basis of previous accomplishments but in accordance with future global achievements.

The main trends leading to the more efficient utilization of metal and lowering metal-intensiveness must be aimed at lowering nonrecoverable losses in metal extraction and processing; utilizing waste metal, slag, powders, etc.

In his speech to the Sofia party, state and social aktiv, Comrade Todor Zhivkov paid great attention to our raw material base, pointing out that that which we have already created and have at our disposal is sufficient, providing, however, that such facilities are reorganized on a qualitatively new level. This includes all that must be done in our metallurgy in the years to come in order to meet the needs of our machine building industry and economy for high-quality and low-cost metals.

In discussing investment policy, Comrade Chakurov pointed out that according to preliminary data 3 billion leva will be invested in metallurgy, ore mining and non-ore mineral raw materials. This is a huge amount which simply obligates us, on the basis of the new stipulations in updating programs and drafting the plan, profoundly to assess the areas in which such investments will be applied and ensure breakthroughs in technological updating, in order to achieve qualitatively new growth and high efficiency.

Managers and specialists in capital construction must more rapidly reorganize their work in accordance with the new requirements. A profound study must be made of all aspects in contracting for equipment design and procurements. The implementation of contractual obligations must be supervised most persistently and no compromises must be allowed.

In speaking of perfecting investment processes, the tasks we face in order to achieve a new economic growth do not allow us to ignore a number of problems of proper maintenance and exploitation of available material facilities. We cannot fail to be concerned with the fact that in a number of areas we are substantially underutilizing our technological and equipment capacities.

Great possibilities are wasted and losses are incurred as a result of production shortfalls, poor quality and huge overruns of power resources, replaceable equipment and spare parts, mainly due to subjective reasons. In many areas the organization, procedures and care for production capacities are poor.

The task set with "For A New Economic Growth!" demands a different attitude toward repairs and maintenance of equipment. Currently repairs are done with virtually no standardized requirements. Particular attention must be paid to
repairs and maintenance. The repair organizations themselves must set up powerful and dynamic design units.

In speaking of metallurgical cadres, Comrade Chakurov emphasized that the new technologies and new equipment require a new manpower structure and an increased share of metallurgical workers trained in automation and holding university degrees, power workers and workers in electronics and specialists with university training in heavy equipment use and maintenance, as well as specialists in the area of new technological problems.

In conclusion, the speaker emphasized that the statement made by Comrade Todor Zhivkov in his concluding speech at the 13th Congress must be taken into consideration in the implementation of the major and responsible assignments:

"Order, discipline and organization are needed. We need purposeful work of tremendous scope, intensiveness and efficiency."

Comrade Ognyan Doynov emphasized in his speech that the country's economy cannot develop intensively without metallurgy. That is why a close survey must be made of successes and weaknesses and steps must be taken to improve results which, let us honestly admit, are not good. This particularly applies to ferrous metallurgy where, compared with worldwide achievements, we are severely behind. That is why we must see to it that within the shortest possible time the conditions governing production are changed and a qualitative change in our growth is achieved. A great deal of funds are being appropriated for reconstruction and modernization. In many cases, however, it is only the old technologies which are reproduced, which yield no economic benefits. A decisive turn must be made in order to emerge on the global level. Exceptional efforts must be invested in updating technologies and lowering outlays per unit of output. We need order, discipline and strict accountability of material expenditures. The task now is for everyone on his job to resolve problems quickly and efficiently, Comrade Doynov concluded, in order to achieve the accelerated growth rates earmarked by the 13th Party Congress.

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MEASURES TO OVERCOME RECOMMENDED INVESTMENT PROCESS WEAKNESSES

Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 9, 10 May 86

[Article by senior scientific associate Ivan Angelov, candidate of economic sciences: "We need an economic climate in the investment process"]

[9 May 86 pp 1,2]

[Text] The investment complex shapes and emits impulses which have a strong long-term effect on the entire reproduction process. In no other sphere of activity in the national economy are poor management decisions so expensive and so difficult to correct. Tomorrow's material and technological base depends on today's investment projects. This will decide the fate of the strategic formulations of the 13th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the document "For a qualitatively new growth in the economy", endorsed by the Politburo, for accelerated rates, overall intensification, high quality and efficiency.

Along with a properly formulated investment policy, the management system for the investment process is at the center of the complex knot of factors determining the efficiency with which the investment complex functions.

1. Results of the highly centralized administrative management of the investment process.

An analysis of the investment process function during the last 10 to 15 years, using qualitative economic indicators, provides a summary of the economic features of its condition and of changes whose time has come. What does this analysis reveal?

Repeated resolutions made at party congresses, conferences and plena over the last 20 years or so with respect to the concentration of capital investment have still not been fulfilled. Or, to be more accurate, these resolutions are flagrantly and systematically violated. The capital construction front continues to expand: during the last 10 years or so, the number of simultaneous construction projects has doubled. At the moment, we are constructing about 18,000 projects simultaneously, employing about 260,000 people overall in construction, or an average of 14 people per project. If we bear in mind that about 100,000 people are employed on 15 to 20 of the largest
national projects, that leaves an average of 8 to 9 people and a minimum amount of equipment on the remaining projects. And, to complete the paradox, the most important construction equipment uses between 26 and 38 percent of their calendar assets. The work time of the construction workers is also misused.

In its turn, the broad construction front creates a pointed and chronic disparity between the investment program and investment capacity. This then leads to slow construction of the projects. Our analyses show that our small projects are constructed in about 3 to 5 years (6 to 8 months in developed nations), the medium-size projects in about 6 to 8 years (1 to 1.5 years in developed nations) and the large project in 8 to 10 years, or more (2 to 3 years in the most developed nations). Occupancy takes years, and is sometimes not achieved, even at the end of the project's economic life. On average, the investment cycle (research, planning, construction and occupancy) generally takes about 8 to 10 to 12 years — more than enough time for even the most modern technology to become morally obsolete.

Unfinished and particularly unexecuted construction continues to be great. Despite the resolution of the 12th congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party to reduce this to 80 to 85 percent of annual capital investment, it has remained steadily above 100 percent for the national economy in general in the post-congress years, and the figure is considerably higher for material production.

Party resolutions to improve the technological structure of capital investment have also not been fulfilled. Consequently, there has also been no improvement in the technological structure of available basic assets.

The average age of our production machinery is not great -- about 11 years -- and its age structure is, generally speaking, favorable. It follows that the technological level of our basic assets should be high. However, this assessment is not borne out if we apply stricter criteria of quality. The technological level of our basic assets is inadequate. A considerable portion of our production machinery, although it was recently built, is morally obsolete. And another, not insignificant portion is physically worn out.

The economic organizations are slowly developing new projects for simultaneous fulfillment of the targeted strategic programs. Completion of some of these programs is already lagging seriously behind the original deadlines.

There are large distortions in the credit mechanism and in the financing of capital investment by private funds. Obligations of economic organizations to the credit bank for capital investment come to about 14 billion leva, not a small portion of which is hopeless uncollected debt.

Massive overshooting of budgeted costs for investment projects is causing considerable and increasing anxiety. Scarcely a project of any description has been completed within budget. Usually, the overshoot is in the order of 30 to 40 percent. In some cases it is 100 to 150 percent and more. The national economy is sustaining enormous losses because of this.
In most cases, the quality of the project decisions is also poor. Part of the blame lies with the design organizations, but a larger part of the blame lies elsewhere. The quality of the machinery and equipment produced by our own investment machine building is inadequate. The quality of machinery and equipment imported from some countries is also poor. Assembly jobs are also of poor quality. The economic rationale for project decisions is still inadequate. The technical and economic expertise is unsatisfactory, proving to be a liberal filter through which ineffective project easily pass. Overall, the investment discipline is at a very low level.

In general, disquieting red warning lights are flashing on all the most important qualitative indices of the investment process. The chief result of all this is that the investment process is still not in any condition to emit favorable impulses which could guarantee the turn we must make from quantity to quality. And until we can make such a turn in the investment complex, we cannot depend on material improvements in other spheres of the national economy. This even throws into doubt fulfillment of the strategic party resolutions for higher rates of economic growth and general intensification during the next few 5-year plans.

The major reason, the factor above all factors which has prevented us for so many years from achieving modern qualitative features in the investment process is the methods of a highly centralized, flagrant administrative government that are imposed on just about every detail in the investment complex. Design and construction of investment projects in Bulgaria are regulated by over 300 normative documents. For just a comparatively simple operation -- obtaining financing -- there are 32. In isolated cases, to incur some expense, 50 to 60 checks are required by different departments and high-ranking agencies. These figures are absolutely improbable for common economic sense, but alas they are true.

These methods of highly centralized administrative management are very expensive to put into practice. First, because they occupy the intellectual energy of a large staff in developing a not particularly useful product -- thousands and thousands of instructions on our conduct, and, second, because an enormous staff is required to impose them and monitor their correct application. Moreover, in keeping with universal human laws, this staff directs its energy toward extensive reproduction of administrative documents, spewing out more and more sources of decrees, resolutions, instructions, regulations, orders, exhortations, norms, quotas, etc. and is always keeping watch that they are followed, taking the spirit and letter of the normative acts quite literally but not the nature of the economic results. There are many known -- and still more unknown -- examples of business managers being penalized for violating some paragraph or other of a quota document, despite the fact that they have achieved a better economic results. We are truly being strangled by such a parasitic staff, which is growing steadily despite the numerous resolutions of the Central Committee and the government calling for cuts during the last 20 years. This element cannot be kept in check because the administrative system of government, by its very nature, leads to an endless bloating of administrative staff. And once created, the bureaucratic machine displays astonishing resilience and ingenuity to justify its existence.
Our investment practices over the past 2 to 3 decades have confirmed time and again that these problems could not be solved using highly centralized administrative methods. Moreover, given the present conditions of inordinately centralized planning, regulation and small-minded tutorship, efficiency is being reduced. All those engaged in the investment process have their hands and feet tied; they are not given the opportunity to display any creativity or to strive toward rational economic enterprise. And the strange thing is that this is done, so it's said, in the interests of our socialist society. But in fact, it inflicts enormous economic and spiritual damage.

The lack of real change in our investment process and the difficulties connected with realization of the strategic party tasks for accelerated economic development and universal intensification must be discussed honestly and unambiguously, with an aim to taking the right steps in good time and competently. If the truth is not discovered today, it will still be a bitter reality tomorrow. But then it will be late to start making corrections, and we shall merely be drawing up a balance-sheet of lost opportunities.

2. The answer lies in creating a suitable economic climate.

The January plenum of the Central Committee pointed to the need to create an economic, political and ideological climate as a major condition for our future development. The treatises at the 13th congress emphasized that this was the profound purpose and the guarantee of our socioeconomic progress. This formulation is further developed in the document "For qualitatively new growth in the economy". Unity between the economic, political and ideological climate is a necessary prerequisite, because this is what will transform our economic climate into a socialist climate.

By an economic climate, we mean the presence of a strongly developed system of economic regulators (prices, taxes, a budget, finance, credit, wages, etc.), developed by the central economic agencies and actively practiced in the relationships between the state and the self-governing socialist organizations and also between these organizations themselves, in a setting of economic competition, with public ownership of the means of production ensuring fulfilment of the strategic parameters of the state plan for socioeconomic development and the respective treaty obligations.

What are the most important features of the economic climate in the investment process?

First. A clear definition of the sphere of budget financing, credit and the use of private funds in material production.

Capital investment for fulfilment of the strategic programs for development of the mining sectors, atomic power, the infrastructure, hydromeliorative schemes and certain targeted strategic programs during the 9th 5-year plan (1986-1990) will be financed totally or mostly (to 60 or 70 percent) by the budget, and the remaining portion by preferential credit (including no-interest credit) and private funds.
Capital investment for development of strategic sectors that have a continuous investment cycle and are capital intensive -- some mining sectors, conventional power supplies, metallurgy, heavy machine building, heavy chemical industry and others -- will be partially financed (20 to 30 percent) by the budget during the present 5-year plan, partially (up to 30 to 40 percent) by credits and the remaining part by private funds. During the next 5-year plan, budget financing of this group of sectors will cease.

Capital investment for all other sectors and activities must be financed by credits and private funds, based on appraisals by the banks and interested economic units.

Self-governing organizations must have the right to determine for themselves (or to contract) the method of financing capital investment within the general guidelines established by the state.

Second. Creation of a valid credit mechanism.

The role of credit in financing capital investment must expand considerably because present credit relations are to a great extent formal and investment credit does not fulfill its all-round economic function. Relations between banks and self-governing organizations involved in the investment process must be based entirely on economic principle, and political, economic, legal and other guarantees must not permit any kind of external administrative or other meddling.

The effect of the credit mechanism on the conduct of self-governing economic organizations also depends on the implicit observation of credit discipline at all levels. Every borrower must be clearly made to understand the the credit granted is subject to unconditional pay-back within a fixed term. Political, economic and legal guarantees are required to ensure that no agency has the right to defer or dismiss their payment. Economic units that experience difficulties in paying off their investment credits may seek additional short-term or medium-term credit with the aim of rationalizing their economic and production activity and restoring their solvency.

Banks must give credit to economic organizations that wish to borrow only after proof of their financial solvency and credit worthiness for the entire duration of the loan period has been provided. Banks must take decisions to allow credit following their own appraisal, guided only by orders of the Council of Ministers on credit policy.

The basic interest rate should be increased to about 7 to 8 percent and preferential and penalty interest should be applied more flexibly. Interest on investment credits must be differentiated, bearing in mind the socioeconomic, scientific and technological policies of the state, the correlation between the supply and demand of respective credit in Bulgaria, and the interest rate on foreign investment markets to which our country has access. A higher interest rate will stem the appetites for indiscriminate launching of new projects and provide an incentive for rapid completion and occupancy of buildings already begun and timely repayment of credits.
The credit system must be coordinated with the tax system if it is to have the proper effect on the conduct of economic organizations. One way to accomplish this is to tie interest and tax rates for a sufficiently long period of time. Economic logic demands the application of higher interest rates at the expense of lower tax rates.

[10 May 1986 pp 2,3]

We also need to take steps to simplify and stabilize the credit system. Considerable simplification will lead to greater efficacy and efficiency and stabilization will create confidence in relations between the banks and the economic organizations.

We need to take effective steps to liberate the banks from the non-essential functions that have engulfed them over the past 15 to 20 years. For example, they must be freed from the obligations to exert control over wages and we must put an end to the present technical control of all phases of the investment process. The banks must exert strict technical control only before taking the decision to grant credit. All further routine technical control would mean meddling in the "internal affairs" of self-governing economic organizations.

The resolution of the January plenum calling for the creation of an Economic Bank is an important step toward perfecting investment capital credits. We must emphasize once more, however, that a radical improvement in the credit mechanism along the lines mentioned is a necessary condition if the new bank is to be efficient. Without such changes, the creation of this bank will prove to be just about senseless.

By preserving the Bank for Economic Initiatives, with considerable expansion of the scope of its operations, and by perhaps reorganizing the State Savings Bank into a Credit Savings Bank, we shall bring about some competitive elements between these banks in the way of granting credit and taking deposits, in providing service and participating in joint initiatives with economic and scientific organizations, etc. We should also be thinking about a gradual increase in the number of credit banks, including the creation of a Cooperative Bank, and strengthening economic competition between them.

It is anticipated that economic integration between the member countries of CEMA will become more active in banking toward the end of the 1980's and the beginning of the 90's. This will be expressed, inter alia, in the creation of joint (bilateral and multilateral) credit banks of the socialist states with branches in Bulgaria and in the other fraternal countries. Our banks will then have to compete with this new type of credit bank too. They should be preparing themselves for that now.

Third. Creation of a simplified and efficient system which will create and use private funds.

The portion of capital investment financed with free private funds from economic organizations must expand. Management in these organizations must take investment decisions to use such funds (in our own and foreign currency).
High-ranking agencies must not have the right to arrange for dispossession or to dictate the manner in which the legally acquired private funds of economic units are used. Economic organizations must dispose of a considerable portion of their currency receipts and be able to lend or sell free private currency to the state, but only as a result of dialogue on equal terms, not as a result of coercion. It is difficult for us to imagine companies such as self-governing organizations, if in the future they continue to be allowed only 1 percent of currency receipts, a portion of which they will have to hand over to their high-ranking organizations.

However, the self-governing economic units must bear total economic responsibility -- and other responsibilities -- for disposing of their private funds, including a very strict legal responsibility for the action -- or inaction -- of managers who inflict losses on the economic organization and the state.

Continuing in this vein, we need to simplify and stabilize the system for creation and use of private funds. We may thus create confidence toward this system within the economic organizations so that they treat private funds as their own. For the moment, they tend more to exhaust them, fearing lest at any moment they be taken by the high-ranking agencies. This is why, until now, private funds are such only in appearance; they are not fulfilling their economic function in the investment process.

Fourth. Application of a truly competitive principle in distributing capital investment.

Capital investment must be distributed to projects via national competitions. The principal competitions will be held for a 5-year period, coinciding with the 5-year plan for socioeconomic development, and will admit only recently begun projects.

We should organize two types of distribution of capital investment for the current 5-year plan:

a) With limited application of the competitive principle and tentative sector quotas. This goes for budget investments and for preferential bank credits for sectors and activities, as outlined above;

b) With full application of the competitive principle. This goes for capital investments (for example, up to 25 to 30 percent of the overall sum for the period 1986 to 1990), granting credit for highly effective and currency projects in material production, irrespective of sector. A major criterion for granting credit must be the high economic and currency efficacy of the project. The share of this type of capital investment ought to grow gradually.

Fifth. Application of a competitive element to planning and completion of investment projects.

Self-governing organizations must have the right to choose their economic partners in a free and equal dialogue with potential candidates arising from
their economic interests, bearing in mind the interests of their partners and acting in accordance with the principles and general guidelines established by the state. Without this condition, it would be going too far to talk of self-governing organizations and manufacturers.

This principle must also be valid for the investment process. But a simple declaration of such a principle is not enough. We must move toward creating material, technological, organizational, economic and other conditions in which it will be possible in practice to choose the designer, constructor, suppliers of machinery, equipment and building materials, and general contractor.

Experience both at home and abroad has long since categorically shown that a competitive environment cannot exist unless the absolute monopoly of those involved in the investment process is abolished. And without a competitive environment, there can be no progress. We must be quite clear about a vital truth — monopoly is the enemy of technological progress; monopolies provide a breeding ground for stagnation and ruin, not innovative demands. Must we recall the brilliant words of Lenin on this point, given that our environment is swarming with thousands upon thousands of such facts.

Introduction of a competitive element to the investment process can began most easily and comparatively soon in the planning sphere. It is generally known that it is precisely in the sphere of scientific research and design that great technological progress is produced and introduced. And mediocre people (research workers and designers) in a mediocre environment (poor material and technical base, lack of competitive spirit) are unable to produce world-class science and technology. In order to generate world-class scientific and technological achievements we need a world-class productive environment. The competitive spirit is one of the obligatory elements of this environment.

We need [word missing] to move toward a gradual reorganization of the design sphere, creating the right harmony between temporary complex design groups and complex design institutes of the modern sort, but with a greatly reduced permanent staff. A public competition should be announced for the development of long-term studies, technical and economic assignments and technical and economic reports for the results of preliminary studies. Both Bulgarian and foreign temporary design groups or design organizations must be able to participate, independently, at their own cost and on their own cognizance, based on their own economic interests.

There is no doubt that the creation of a truly competitive environment in research and design will have a favorable (even if initially painful) effect on the increase in quality in the design sphere, on the creation of a suitable climate for economic, scientific and technological enterprise and on greater expression of the creative capacity of the most talented research workers and designers.

In the present conditions, an economic, scientific, creative spiritual or psychological environment for such expression does not exist within the framework of the basic activity of the research or design organization. The current criteria for material and spiritual incentive are tuned to serve the
intellectual capacity of the mediocre research worker, designer and constructor. They do not satisfy the competent and the skilled. On the contrary, they create an economic, spiritual and psychological atmosphere for transforming the skilled to the unskilled, the competent to incompetent, the talented to mediocre, the diligent to lazy and the socially engaged to the apathetic. And so we are not creating technological progress and we are not achieving world class. Our social practice is full of thousands upon thousands of pieces of such evidence.

There can be no doubt that a competitive environment will also lead to a sharp improvement in the technological and economic level of design decisions.

Similar and still more complex material, technological, economic, organizational, legal and other issues will have to be solved with the introduction of a competitive element into the construction and assembly sphere, with the choice of suppliers of machinery, equipment and construction materials or of a general contractor. Of course, this reorganization presupposes many substantial changes in the organizational structures, with the aim of gradually abolishing the monopolistic situation of the construction and assembly organizations and of the suppliers of machinery, equipment and building materials.

Introduction of a competitive element to the completion of investment projects will be more complex than in the design sphere. If preparations begin now, in 2 to 3 years we should be able to move gradually toward competitive construction of smaller projects, and toward the end of this 5-year plan and the beginning of the next to expand toward medium-sized projects or subprojects.

Sixth. Other features of the economic climate.

The ideas outlined above [line missing] do not exhaust the contents of the economic climate in the investment process. We should also add: substantial changes in the pricing, tax, budget and external trade systems, in the creation and distribution of profit, in the salary and incentive system, in contractual relations, etc. However, these changes are characteristic not only of the investment process, but of all other spheres of the national economy. The reader will probably agree that it is not possible to discuss all these problems satisfactorily in an article such as this.

3. Results expected from the economic climate.

The creation of a healthy economic climate in the investment process will gradually ensure an appreciable increase of the technological level of design decisions, achieve equilibrium between an investment program and building and assembly capacity, limit the construction front, reduce incomplete and particularly unfulfilled construction, accelerate construction of projects and occupancy and, finally, increase the efficiency of the entire investment process.

This is so for the simple reason that no investor will (or can) be indifferent toward these aspects of the investment process when he has signed a contract
for a bank credit at, for instance, 8 percent interest, the pay-back on which begins, for instance, in two years and must be complete within an 8-year term, and when it is out of the question to defer payment or dismiss credit obligations, and when every delay has serious economic consequences for the entire work group, particularly for its management, with no chance that someone will run to their aid and save them because they are "our dear friends". The investor will stop and think far more seriously before seeking a bank credit, he won't squander his energy in constructing many projects simultaneously, he will take more care to see that the design meets a high technical and economic standard and that construction and occupancy proceed rapidly in order to pay off the credit. The same goes for the use of valid private funds.

In establishing an economically rational interest rate and given fixed and stable economic conditions for the use and payback of credits, as explained above, the banks must not interfere and regulate the design, construction, supply of machinery, equipment and building materials, introduction of basic assets, occupancy, the technological structure of capital investment, etc. This must be entirely within the competence of the self-governing organization/investor.

Given such economic conditions, the high-ranking agencies do not need to constantly tutor the investor, to remind him, canvass him and instruct him how important it is to increase the effectiveness of the capital investment or threaten him with some penalty or other. In the economic conditions described, the economic organization will be vitally concerned to ensure that their work goes well without the need for these elementary things to be constantly repeated from the top.

In this condition, centrally determined normative terms (which almost everyone ignores) become superfluous, for example: terms for the duration of research and design, of construction, occupancy, quotas for maximum permissible relative share of architectural and construction work, normative terms for "redeeming" capital investment, demands that the investor has no unused capacity, .................., etc. All this will be the responsibility of the investor. And when economic stimuli unfurl into economic "whips", he will really be concerned to put his economic house in order, and far better than the people who can fix things even with the strictest administrative orders from the center.

This will be done by the sizeable and unnecessary staff that exercises control functions that have multiplied severalfold in different agencies. There is no danger of this staff becoming unemployed. There will be other jobs, where these highly qualified people will perform much more useful tasks that will give them much more professional and spiritual satisfaction.

4. The most important is yet to come.

The resolutions of the January plenum, confirmed by the 13th congress, for the creation of an economic climate in the national economy, are a result of a careful summary of the practice of the social government in Bulgaria, a fruit of continuous quantitative accumulation.
The decisions to grant greater working independence to economic units, and even to transform them into self-regulating systems to practice economic methods of management, were taken earlier by the Central Committee of our party and by our higher economic agencies. There are rather good formulations to grant greater rights and demand more responsibility in the regulations for the economic mechanism. Until now, however, for one reason or another, the party resolutions remained unfulfilled. That these resolutions were not fulfilled is not the fault of the economic companies but of the echelons of administrative structures above them.

The party resolutions concerning the economic climate are timely and correct. Now, the task before us is to translate them into a functional language in the shortest time through a decree for economic activity and a series of quasilegal acts. And then we shall face the most important and most difficult task -- to ensure that they are put into economic practice. If this does not happen, we are in danger of repeating the old models -- the correct principle settings are provided by the Central Committee but they are not put into practice consistently and in their entirety. Unfortunately, the first signs are already visible. Indicative of this are the drafts for some of the newly prepared normative documents.

In the new conditions of business-like attitudes and demands, of greater civil, state and party discipline, there are grounds to believe that all the necessary steps will finally be taken and put into practice, consistently, with adherence to principle, firmness and business-like attitudes. There is no other way! And the sooner the better! Socialist Bulgaria can only gain from this!
APRIL 1986 ECONOMIC RESULTS SUMMARIZED

Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech No 22, 1986 p 2

[Article by Engineers Marie Hormanova and Alena Polakova, Federal Statistical Office, under the "Information on Plan Fulfillment" rubric: "April 1986"]

[Text] Development of the national economy's basic indicators, and plan fulfillment in the economy's principal areas tied in smoothly with the trends observed in the first quarter. The rate of economic development in April was influenced also by an extra workday over the same month last year. The number of workdays from the beginning of the year through April was the same as last year.

In industry, gross output reached 71.1 billion korunas, an increase of 3.7 percent over April of last year. Projecting the effects of continuous operations, average daily output increased by 0.4 percent. During the first four months of this year, the volume of industrial production increased by 3.3 percent, to 277.8 billion korunas, which represents 33.4 percent of the annual state plan. Above-average growth rates of gross output were achieved during the four months primarily in the electrotechnical industry, the pulp and paper industry, ferrous metallurgy, and also in heavy and general engineering. But fulfillment of the breakdowns of the enterprises' economic plans fell short during this period.

Jointly for all enterprises of centrally administered industry, the economic plans for gross output were exceeded by 0.6 percentage point, despite shortfalls at more than a quarter of the enterprises. Overall fulfillment of the economic plans for commodity production during this period was 100.5 percent; fulfillment of this indicator in the annual state plan was 33.5 percent by the end of April. The economic plans for gross output during the first four months were exceeded for all principal products also in physical units, the most conspicuously in the case of steel pipes and crude steel.

Adjusted value added in industry during January-April was 6.6 percent higher than during the same period last year. Overall fulfillment of the enterprises' economic plans for adjusted value added was 100.3 percent; at the same time, there were shortfalls at 28.5 percent of the enterprises.

Primarily the rise of labor productivity accounted for the growth of gross output in April and in the January-April period. In April and during the first
Basic Indicators of National Economy's Development in April 1986.
Increases Over Comparable 1985 Period (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Apr</th>
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<th>State plan</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Centrally Administered Industries</strong></td>
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<td>deliveries for:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- investments, at wholesale prices</td>
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<td>-1.7</td>
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<td>- domestic trade</td>
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<td>at retail prices</td>
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<td>- export to socialist countries</td>
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<td>at wholesale prices</td>
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<td>- export to nonsocialist countries</td>
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<td>at wholesale prices</td>
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<td>-3.9</td>
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<td>at prices f.o.b.</td>
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<td>-2.3</td>
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<td>- other sales for productive consumption</td>
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<td>and operations, at wholesale prices</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>volume of gross industrial output²</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>average number of employees</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>labor productivity based on gross output</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td><strong>Construction</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>construction work performed with own personnel</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>average number of employees</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>labor productivity on construction's basic output</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>housing units delivered by contracting enterprises</td>
<td>-18.2</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>-26.0</td>
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<td><strong>Procurement</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>slaughter animals (including poultry)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
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<td>milk</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>eggs</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<td><strong>Retail Turnover</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>main trade systems</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Trade</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>export to socialist countries</td>
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<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>export to nonsocialist countries</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>import from socialist countries</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>import from nonsocialist countries</td>
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<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
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1. Relative to actual 1985 results; in industry and foreign trade, relative to expected actual results in 1985

four months as well, labor productivity rose faster than what the annual state plan anticipates. Labor productivity based on gross output reached an index of 103.1 in April and 102.6 in January-April, as compared with an index of 102.1 in the state plan. In January-April, labor productivity based on adjusted value added increased by 5.9 percent.
In sales of the industrial output, the planned tasks for deliveries in January through April were exceeded to all principal destinations, the most conspicuously in the case of deliveries for export to socialist countries. However, fulfillment of the planned tasks was not entirely even. In the case of deliveries for domestic trade, for instance, there were shortfalls at roughly a quarter of the enterprises which have this indicator in their 1986 plans; in the case of deliveries for export to socialist countries at wholesale prices, there were shortfalls at more than 24 percent of the enterprises; and in the case of deliveries for export to nonsocialist countries, at roughly a third of the enterprises. While the plan of other sales for productive consumption and operations was fulfilled overall in January through April, there were shortfalls at 40 percent of the enterprises.

In construction, growth of the volume of construction work that the enterprises performed with their own personnel slowed down slightly in April, but for the first four months (with an index of 106.2) it was still faster than what the annual plan (with an index of 102.9) anticipates. During January-April, the construction enterprises delivered 28.5 billion korunas' worth of construction work performed by their own personnel, which corresponds to 29.0 percent of the annual state plan.

In January through April, overall fulfillment of the construction enterprises' economic production plans was 100.2 percent. But even this overfulfillment of the planned production tasks was uneven, with shortfalls at nearly 40 percent of the enterprises.

During the first four months, the construction enterprises fulfilled their plan of adjusted value added 100.6 percent, again with shortfalls at more than a third of the enterprises.

Based on the volume of construction work in place, labor productivity in the January-April period rose 5.8 percent over the same period last year; the planned annual increase is 1.8 percent. Based on adjusted value added, labor productivity rose 7.2 percent.

Public freight transport hauled 57.2 million metric tons of freight in April, an increase of more than 2.3 percent over April of last year. The volume of freight hauled in January through April was 204.9 million metric tons. Fulfillment of the freight transportation tasks for the period was 100.3 percent. By the end of April, the freight transportation tasks specified in the annual state plan were fulfilled 31.7 percent.

In comparison with January-April of last year, the volume of freight hauled by public transport increased 3.9 percent. Within this, the sharpest rise was 37.8 percent in inland navigation. The increase in rail freight was 4.3 percent. The freight hauled by CSAD [Czechoslovak State Motor Transport] was up 2.6 percent. Measured in terms of standard freight car units, the average number of freight cars loaded during a 24-hour period increased 2.9 percent in the January-April period. The average turnaround time per freight car was shortened in January-April by 2.4 percent, to 4.02 days as compared with the 4.03 days planned.
In agriculture, the planting of spring grains has been completed by 13 May. All of the planned sugar-beet acreage has been planted, and 12.4 percent of this acreage has been thinned. Potatoes have been planted on 99.7 percent of the planned acreage; and grain corn, on 102.0 percent.

The April procurement schedule has been overfulfilled for all the principal livestock products, the most notably for slaughter poultry and slaughter hogs. In all, 131,000 metric tons of slaughter animals, 21,000 metric tons of slaughter poultry, 490 million liters of milk, and 243 million eggs were procured.

The January-April procurement schedule was likewise overfulfilled for all livestock products, and especially for slaughter poultry and slaughter cattle. Total procurement of slaughter animals, including slaughter pork, in January-April was 581,000 metric tons, 31.8 percent of the annual plan's target. In comparison with the same period of last year, milk procurement during the first four months of this year increased 1.4 percent (or 24.8 million liters); and the procurement of slaughter poultry, 0.2 percent (or 162 metric tons). On the other hand, the procurement of slaughter animals declined by 3.8 percent (or nearly 20,000 metric tons); and the procurement of eggs, by 4.5 percent (or 46.1 million eggs).

In domestic trade, the retail turnover of all the main trade systems increased 2.2 percent in April, due primarily to the increases at the Department Stores (7.0 percent) and Industrial Goods Stores (6.3 percent). The retail turnover rose also at the Furniture Stores and the Textile Stores. The shifting of Easter shopping to March was reflected in the decline of the Food Stores' retail turnover below the level in April of last year.

In January-April, the organizations of the main trade systems sold nearly 77 billion korunas' worth of merchandise, which is 30.1 percent of the annual state plan. Thus the retail turnover of the main trade systems increased 2.9 percent, which is 0.8 percentage point more than the rate of increase the state plan anticipates for the entire year.

In foreign trade, total export and import rose faster in January-April than the overall rates the state plan calls for. By the end of April, 28.9 percent of the annual state plan's total export and 28.2 percent of its total import were fulfilled.

The currency in circulation on 30 April totaled 58.3 billion korunas, as compared with 55.8 billion a year earlier.
IMPROVED AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY PLANNED

East Berlin HORIZONT in German Vol 19 No 6 Jun 86 p 22

[Article by Artur Fussek: "Agricultural Technology with Better Parameters"]

[Text] The parameters for the development of the national economy of the CSSR in the first half of the 80s which have been published so far reveal that our neighbor has achieved remarkable growth rates. He advanced further in his efforts to carry out the planned structural industrial changes in favor of those industries which contribute to the implementation of scientific-technical progress. Agricultural machinery construction has traditionally played a substantial role in the national economy of the CSSR. Accordingly, its plants were expanded which made it possible to sell increasing amounts of machinery and equipment for mechanization and automation of agricultural work processes domestically, but also to supply them to foreign customers. For years, it has met half of the domestic demand for these means of production, and currently the CSSR ranks eighth among the world's tractor producers.

According to a statement by Jaromil Buchal, director general of the combine Agrozet Brno, by 1990 the agricultural and food complex of the country will receive machinery and equipment valued at 34.3 billion korunas which corresponds to an increase of 25 percent compared to the previous five-year plan. This includes in particular the supply of 44,250 tractors, 8,350 combines, 11,950 drilling machines, 4,180 four-row potato planting machines, 2,750 potato diggers, and 14,800 ploughs.

In the past two years, party and government have repeatedly directed the attention of those involved in agricultural machinery construction to the necessity of improving the parameters of their products in line with the wishes of the users, in particular with regard to weight-performance ratio, lower energy consumption, increased combination capability and a lower pressure on the ground. The 11th Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the CSSR (2/3 Oct 1984) and the X. Congress of Agricultural Production Cooperatives (29 Nov to 1 Dec 1984) dealt with this subject matter. The insights gained here resulted in the "conception for production technology in agricultural machinery construction to guarantee a higher technical level of agricultural technology and means of mechanization" which was confirmed by the government.
According to the document the plan is to start mass production of an advanced "Zetor" tractor, to increase production of small tractors in three versions and with a broader product line, as well as to introduce gradually modern seed drill machines for beets, corn, pulse, and vegetable fields.

The above mentioned combine Agrozet in Brno which consists of 9 plants, 3 trade organizations (responsible for the Czech and Slovak Republic respectively, as well as for assembly and customer service for the whole CSSR) and an organization for the sale of imported agricultural technology is the largest producer of agricultural machinery in the CSSR. The research institute for agricultural machinery in Prague-Chodow serves as the scientific basis for the combine.

However, agricultural machinery construction is the concern not only of the plant of this industry, but also of the automobile plants in Prague and the combine for machinery construction Martin in Dubnica. A few LPG (agricultural production cooperatives) also participate in the production of agricultural technology, e.g. the LPG Slusovice. The products which this LPG has brought to the market in the past few years include disk harrows and balers. Incidentally, in this special field, the LPG cooperates with the Italian firm Fiatagri.

The list of large producers of agricultural technology would not be complete without the firm Sigma (Olomouc). It is the leading producer of sprinkling systems in Europe. Its products are exported exclusively by the foreign trade firm Intersigma. The USSR is the largest importer of these products; since the early 60s it has purchased 11,000 sprinkling systems and 60,000 sprinklers. This is enough to irrigate approximately three million acres of usable agricultural area.

In order to do better on foreign markets the producers are trying more than ever to arrange cooperation and specialization agreements with highly productive foreign firms. In this field, too, the European CEMA-countries are the major partners of the CSSR. The cooperation covers many different types of machinery. The CSSR committed itself to meet the demand of this group of countries for 21 types of machines. These include above all "Zetor" tractors, of which 600,000 have already been exported to approximately 90 countries, small tractors, wheeled tractors for forestry, rotor mowers, potato planting machines, self-propelled top loaders, hop-picking machines, ploughs, and cultivators. In the current year alone the GDR will import 1,500 "Zetor" tractors. From the GDR, the CSSR-agriculture imports primarily combines, self-propelled field choppers, potato diggers with one, two, and three rows, and certain subassemblies as well as spare parts for sugar-beet harvesters.

The measures for guaranteeing mutual deliveries of subassemblies and spare parts for agricultural technology, in particular for the root crop and grain harvests—as they were discussed in August of last year between the GDR and CSSR—will certainly contribute to expanding the exchange of goods.

Additional momentum for the development, design, and production of machines for growing, harvesting, and processing vegetables, fruit (including grapes), and tobacco is expected from the recommendations of the 44th Meeting of
Agromasch (an international economic organization of which Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland, Hungary, the CSSR, and the USSR are members), which are oriented towards the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements between the relevant research institutes.

Partners of the CSSR firms from the non-socialist economic region which participate in the development, design, and/or production of CSSR agricultural machines include the companies Miele, Rapid, and Reform (Austria), Gutbrod and Faehse (FRG), Zweegers (the Netherlands), Fiatagri (Italy), and a number of other companies from France, Spain and Switzerland.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. Sugar beet harvesters are delivered to several CEMA-countries.
2. CSSR agricultural machinery export (in million koronas; excluding spare parts)
3. CSSR tractor export (in units)

12831
CSO: 2300/394
HAVASI CONFIRMS CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC REFORM

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 17 May 86 p 3

[Article by Politburo member Ferenc Havasi: "Twenty Years on the Road of Reform"]

[Text] It was 20 years ago when the MSZMP's Central Committee issued a resolution on the reform of economic management. The decision, which resulted in a new phase in Hungary's practice of the planned development of socialist economy, reflected the principle that the task of policy-making is to make the best use of our social conditions. The timeless Leninist thesis of the theory of the revolutionary worker movement is that, after the seizure of power, the basis of development is consistent and constant reform policies. The fate of the revolution and socialist change themselves depend on the capacity and ability to make reforms. The validity and timeliness of this statement is also corroborated by the experiences in our country's socialist development.

After the post-war reconstruction, the economic foundations of socialist society had to be established, the conditions for socialist production had to be created, and the country's industrialization had to be implemented with historical simultaneity. The economic management of the time, characterized mainly by a compulsory use of plan figures and by quite a centralized management system, was developed for carrying out these historical tasks. At that time it was suitable for a dynamic increase in capital formation and for a maximally concentrated use of the resources in some selected fields. It helped the implementation of significant industrial and infrastructural developments which still play important roles in our social and economic life.

In its own time, the management system adequately served economic progress, helping the development of the forces of production and the efficient management of socialist assets. But, despite the forced pace of growth demanded by the economic policies and the significant structural changes in the economy, this mechanism did not lead to the desired over-all strengthening of the national economy. The primary reason for this was that the policies urged for a one-sided quantitative increase of production and a mechanical implementation of the plans, without adequately considering the circumstances of products and finances and the role of the market.

The political changes that followed the suppression of the counter-revolution affected every facet of social and political life, including economic policy.
The MSZMP's Central Committee amended earlier economic policy in several basic fields. It expressed that an increase in the activity of the working masses on the basis of financial interest and the expansion of socialist democracy and its meaningfulness are indispensable for an improvement of economic efficiency. It also considered a living standard of the people that grows parallel with the economic growth an important driving force of development.

In order to put the new perceptions of economic policy into practice, the improvement of economic management began. In farming, compulsory deliveries were replaced by contract purchases. In industry, the compulsory enterprise plan figures were decreased and interest in profits was strengthened. In inter-enterprise relations, the role of products and money became more important, and the relationship between producers and commerce became closer. The new economic policy abandoned many earlier efforts that were autarchic in many respects, gradually replacing them with a stronger connection with the international division of labor and with more consideration for our capabilities and possibilities in the definition of the goals of our economic policy.

As a result of the development, the Hungarian economy became more and more aware in the mid-1960's of the exhaustion of the resources that were relatively easy to use. Our analyses made it clear that to successfully carry out the tasks of socialist development required a more efficient economy as a whole and the committee considered an overall reform of economic policy a must.

After the Central Committee's December 1964 meeting, working committees were formed which, by the summer of 1965, completed a critical analysis of the situation at that time. In November of the same year, the Central Committee changed the concept that emerged from the evaluations into a resolution. The "initial guidelines" that were accepted in this way essentially defined the reform's character and determined its main directions. The second step was to work out the details of the guidelines. This was completed in the spring of 1966. The final decision was made by the Central Committee in the 25-27 May 1966 meeting. Thus the new economic mechanism was conceptionally complete in May 1966 but, because its practical implementation and its details still had to be worked out, it was introduced only on 1 January 1968.

The new management system recognized the objective laws of the socialist economy, the characteristics of our national economy, the significance of international economic relations, the important role of agriculture, the economy's various sectors and their given level of development, and the necessity of beginning a new and intensive phase of economic development.

The reform of the economic mechanism was a step of great importance, its significance matching that of nationalization and the collectivization of agriculture. On the basis of the socialist ownership of capital equipment, it connected the economy's planned central management with the market's active role through the use of money, credit, prices, profits and interests, thus allowing more room for the unfolding of socialist production.

Through the introduction of the economic reform, the compulsory specifications of the plan were replaced with a planned economic management using politico-economic methods and the natural product circulation was replaced with a trade
of capital equipment. Together with a decrease in over-centralization, enter-
prise autonomy was increased and the economy's institutional system was de-
developed. The decisions of the central economic management were increasingly
transmitted, in addition to official and legal decrees, through economic regu-
lators.

Almost 20 years of experience since the introduction of the reform indicates
that the politico-economic methods of management are well-suited for socialist
planned management and that the central planning of the development of the
national economy can be organically coupled with the existing socialist produc-
tion and finances through the conscious application of the laws of the market.
It became clear that a market regulated by financial, economic and official
means can also create the conditions and requirements for the management that
are as a whole suitable for reaching the goals of the national economy. At the
same time the signals coming from the regulated market also play an important
role in the preparation, correction and supervision of the plans. Thus the
regulated domestic market is not a passive factor of the economic life which
can only be influenced but is an active element that affects the planning as
well.

The reform accelerated the increase of production and productivity, the mobil-
ization of management resources, favorably affected efficiency, stabilized our
national economy's external and internal balance, and made it possible to
rapidly increase the living standards.

The economic reform also had positive social and political effects. Its imple-
mentation aided area and residential developments, the modernization of public
administration, and the increase of local council independence. The unions be-
came stronger and more active, together with the cooperative associations and
other organs of corporation. Society's democratism became stronger, public
political mood improved, and interest in economic issues as well as society's
economic education increased.

In the past 2 decades we have acquired important experience in the functioning
of the economic management system. It is clear today that the concept, formu-
lated in the Central Committee's 1966 resolution, was realistic as a whole but
it was based in certain areas on assumptions that proved to be false in prac-
tice. This also played a role in that in certain areas the implementation of
the reformed economic management system's basic concept was only partially
successful and, consequently, these areas are still on the agenda today. Let
me only refer to the necessity of updating the regulations concerning producers'
and consumers' prices or that of wages and incomes, a necessity that had already
been recognized at that time. The "investment hunger" is still an issue, and
the development of the economy's organizational and institutional system is
still unsolved.

In the period of working out and introducing the economic management reform we
still reckoned with the continuation of favorable conditions in the world mar-
et or with a gradual change in the conditions. Under such circumstances the
consistent coupling of the external and internal markets and the constant
adapting to the changes seemed realistic. The economic management set out from
the assumption that there would be a slight oversupply in the domestic market within a relatively short time and that the prices and profits will be able to indicate enterprise efficiency. Efficiency of central management would be much improved and enterprise autonomy, responsibility and initiative would be expanded. It was to be reckoned that the economic management systems of the socialist countries would be improved pretty much the same way and that the CEMA's mechanism would also be changed accordingly. These were conceptually good assumptions but our expectations with regard to their implementation proved to be exaggerated.

The reform also had some elements that were not adequately thought through such as the headway of import competition, differentiating effects of economic pressures, and possibilities for asset redistribution. These were not implemented in practice. Central management and enterprise organization remained essentially unchanged after the reform's introduction and a decision was made that significant organizational changes would not be made until some years later. The fact that the issue of the state's responsibilities as an owner and those of entrepreneur-type socialist enterprise management were not put on the agenda was the result of the above. Enterprise autonomy was developing slowly and unevenly. The examination of changes needed in economic management and in the relationship between economic and social processes in view of the changing conditions in our development was pushed into the background. We did not adequately look into the question of what kinds of new social conflicts and relations of interest would be brought to the surface by the de-centralization of economic decisions, by the simultaneous implementation of the requirement of total and efficient employment, by the price increases and by the wider differentiation of enterprise and personal incomes. In this situation, the economic management, lacking efficient forums and institutional mechanisms for interest reconciliation, was able to react only by introducing various limitations, prohibitions and special individual arrangements, in other words, by imposing partial and temporary limitations on the effects of the economic mechanism.

The fact that, from 1973, the world economic conditions for our development were changing radically to the worse, also had a significant effect on the operation of the economic mechanism. Not even the economic management was able to provide in time the right answers to the changes. For our economic policy was built on the assumption that our production structure could be changed in a short time and thus we could continue to adapt to the changing conditions by a rapid growth of the economy and, consequently, the living standards could also be significantly increased. This view was also manifest in the applied solutions of economic management.

The enterprises were striving for an unjustified measure of stability, and these efforts were supported by the economic management. It became common practice that decision-making was often shoved up to higher levels of authority, a process that slowed down the required reaction time. The organizational system became rigid. The limitations that were temporarily built into the regulatory system to diminish differentiation between the enterprises were not lifted. Indeed, the weakening of the regulation's normative character even resulted in a lesser differentiation between the production units according to their efficiency.
The October 1977 meeting of the Central Committee resulted in the formulation of important recognitions and epochal tasks, in the identification of our weaknesses in international competition and in the definition of the guidelines for our long-range foreign trade policy and for the development of our production structure. However, the means of implementation were inadequate.

Because of these circumstances, the determination of the required directional changes in the practice of economic management became more and more urgent. On the basis of the Central Committee's December 1978 meeting, the principles of which were also supported by the 12th party congress, significant changes were effected that also influenced economic management. The stabilization of the country's financial balance, maintenance of the attained living standards, and the creation of conditions for a subsequent dynamic development became the central issues of economic policy.

We gradually implemented the corrections needed by domestic consumption. The over-distribution [of resources] that occurred between 1974 and 1978 was essentially halted. The economic organization tasks of state organs became more of an initiating nature but, for the implementation of the most important economic goals (especially in 1981-82, as a result of the rapidly deteriorating external conditions), some methods had to be applied which corrected or substituted for the effects of the regulation. But the system of economic management was developing in parallel to the wider application of special [management] instruments. Significant elements of the regulation were amended, such as the system of pricing and the exchange rate policy. The conditions for enterprise autonomy, responsibility and initiative were improving. Extensive changes took place in the economic management institution and the enterprise organization systems. Industrial management was updated, certain large enterprises and trusts were decentralized, and new forms of small-enterprise management were developed.

The direction followed after 1979 in changing economic policy and in developing the system of economic management proved to be well-founded in light of the experiences acquired in the subsequent period. The measures taken were instrumental in maintaining the country's solvency and in improving our competitiveness in certain areas, but proved to be inadequate for re-establishing, continually improving and stabilizing the external and internal balance and for the evolution of efficient development. To achieve this, we must increase our country's profit producing capacity.

Our party's Central Committee, starting from our social and economic goals and requirements as well as from the expected changes in the external environment, put the analysis and further development of the experiences in economic management repeatedly on the agenda. The tasks defined in its April 1984 policy statement were directed toward 3 important areas: the increase of the efficiency of central management and government actions; the increase of enterprise autonomy and the creation of the conditions for entrepreneurial activity; the development and operation of a system of institutions, organizations and means that would make possible the improvement of efficiency of both government actions and enterprise management.
The main elements of the management system's further development are part of an overall concept which can be introduced through gradual measures. It is comprehensive in the sense that the changes involve the entire economic management, planning, economic regulation, the institutional system and every essential issue concerning the use of production resources, especially human factors.

On the basis of the Central Committee's April 1984 stand, new solutions were introduced in every area of management. The coordination of plans of various terms improved, the democratism of planning became broader and more meaningful, and the national economic plan became more open and more flexible. Regular government leadership became more effective, and management instruments appropriate for short-range management were also expanded. There is a law that codifies the norms of proper management and the limits of improper activities.

The modernization of the enterprise organization system was continued. The banking system was beginning to change, the relations between the organs of state management and the management organizations were changed, and new forms of enterprise management were slowly introduced. Economic regulation underwent some essential changes.

Every one of these measures has the objective of improving the efficiency of management although the results fall short of the plans. This indicates that the impact of the changes is inadequate, they still do not have enough influence in achieving the desired results. True, the efficiency of the new means cannot be correctly evaluated on the basis of experiences of only a year or a year and a half, but in the given situation, the following question cannot be avoided: are the measures taken in economic management adequate for increasing the output of the national economy, or have we done, and are we doing, what was and is necessary.

For the answer we must consider several factors. No doubt we have made the right decision by gradually implementing the changes we decided upon. We also know that the period in which both the old and the new elements are present is thus being prolonged. In practice, this results in renewed debates and, as a result, in some cases the concrete measures taken are not the original ones.

We did not make enough progress in the expansion of the roles of the market mechanisms, in forcing the improvement of enterprise management, and in developing a wage system based on output. Thus, for instance, market control usually deals not with processes of the market but with enterprise complaints, and the interference with import and export activities of the enterprises has not abated either. The development of a pricing system that is in accordance with our principles is also slow in coming. The regulation of enterprise management is being done with much more subsidy and curtailment than had been originally planned. The regulation's system of requirements is "softer" and its elements of encouragement are weaker than what would be necessary for an indispensable selective development. This resulted in a situation in which the ill-managed enterprises still make a living and the good and productive ones do not have enough opportunities for development. There is still no correlation between enterprise output and wage increases.
All of these indicate that in the course of further developing the system of economic management, the coordination of economic policy and means of implementation must be improved. While there is an absolute need for short-range measures serving the coordination of foreign economic requirements and internal consumption, an essential condition of our future development is the preparation and implementation of mid-range measures such as the modernization of the banking system, the reform of the tax and pricing system, the development of the system of enterprise interest in assets, and the development of economic interest reconciliation. The fact that every one of the socialist countries is striving to perfect its own system of economic management and thus we can learn from their experiences may help us reach our goals.

The development of our economic management system affects our entire social and economic life. The division of labor between the enterprises and the government, the change in the right of disposition over state assets, the establishment of new mechanisms for the reconciliation of interests, and the modernization of the representation of interests by unions, by the Chamber of Commerce and by cooperatives may encourage significant developments even within the political institutional system.

These changes also mean new tasks for the party as well. The party and all of its organizations must be capable of recognizing, exploring and synthesizing the various interests in a way that will as a whole serve the progress of society. A democratic working style, rational ideological-political influence, leadership, organization and mobilization must play larger roles in party work. The party's political role is increasing in the economy just as it is in every facet of life. The party must carry out its political tasks more efficiently and in such a way that it will assume no one's responsibility but will create the most favorable circumstances, conditions and atmosphere for everyone's creativity.

We know from the experiences of 20 years that we are not wiser than others and we also see how much we did not accomplish during these 20 years.

Another important lesson based on experience is that the development of socialism can be continued only if the masses identify with its ideals and goals, if the bond between the party and the masses is strong and is based on mutual trust. The development of socialism can be a real social issue and a national program only if people see that their lives and living conditions are improving. But an indispensable condition for this is that society's interests be implemented not through a disregard for, and a fight against, individual interests but through a reconciliation and integration of these interests through management of society.

Practice proved that the socialist economy should not be regarded as static with regard to its institutional system or its methods of management. Our progress has well-defined phases which demand the employment and correct combination of special methods of management and planning. It can hardly be doubted today that several forms and methods are possible for a planned economy. Whether this or that form or method is more suitable for our development depends on the degree of development of the forces and conditions of production, on the historical situation and on the characteristics of the individual countries.
In the last 2 decades the conditions for our socialist production and social development have improved, and the capacity of our national economy has increased. Our country's growth unequivocally proves that our management system is operational. Our economic management system is the creation of our society as a whole. It must always be perfected and improved by adapting to the given situation.

9414/12859
CSO: 2500/290
CAUSES FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS EXAMINED

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 3, 4 Jan 86

[Article by Maj Gen Blagoy Shtiliyanov, honored pilot of Bulgarian People's Republic, Col Milan Khristov, military pilot first class, and Engr-Col Veselin Stoyanov: "Personality Factor and Its Role in Campaign for Flight Safety"]

[3 Jan 86 pp 1, 2]

[Text] "Resolutely and comprehensively upgrading the role of the subjective factor with consideration of the new conditions and capabilities in conformity with the strategic motto of 'High quality and high efficiency in everything and everywhere'—this is the main lesson to be drawn from the work so far at all levels, from the successes and weaknesses, from the accumulated experience."—Todor Zhivkov

How do we view the concrete state of some aspects of the personality-factor in aviation where, simultaneously with rapid development of scientific and technical progress and improvement of aviation equipment, there has been a rise in the requirements set for its proper use on the ground and in the air not only by flight personnel but also by the engineering and technical staff.

Experience shows that even the slightest departure from the requirements may lead to the occurrence of a so-called "special situation" in the air. To complete the flight successfully, the pilot must, as the governing documents require, not only have a good knowledge of all the numerous actions in special situations, but also be able to execute them speedily and precisely in practice.

The question arises: Can the pilot achieve all this?

Yes, he can. But such a question has come to the fore because recent years have raised quite sharply a new barrier that two or three years ago was discussed more from a theoretical perspective—human psychological capabilities. As our specialists and foreigners believe, the secret mainsprings of the psychological barrier lie, on the one hand, in the limited capabilities of man himself and, on the other, in the great torrent of information, the shortage of time, and the high-quality change in the equipment.
Therefore the personality factor in the upgrading of flight safety has become a number one problem, for it is emerging as a leading reason for the incorrect actions of flight personnel and hence also for the occurrence of special situations in flight that lead to emergency situations.

Analysis shows that the fundamental reason for the arising of such special situations lie in an insufficiently high level of the psychophysiological qualities that determine the reliable flight performance of pilots in machines that are new to them, under complex conditions, etc. Therefore it is a must constantly to improve their operational thinking and memory through the proper distribution and shifting of attention, through anticipation of the possible development of the situation on the basis of an excellent acquaintance with the aviation equipment and the laws of aerodynamics, through the capacity to act despite the lack of time, through a fine sense of reaction and coordination of actions.

It is precisely the possession of these invaluable characteristics by experienced pilots that enables them to avoid even an apparently inevitable flying accident. That is why it is necessary henceforth to improve the means and methods of prevention so as to rule out the possibility of erroneous actions by pilots in the event of the occurrence of a special situation in flight.

To be sure, in any specific setting the actions of the crew and flight control officer depend on the character of the special situation, on flight conditions and the time the crew has at its disposal. Whatever the given background conditions, the crew must act with initiative, imperturbably and decisively, the first and foremost concern being to save the lives of the fliers and other people that may be on board.

There are many examples attesting to errorfree actions of pilots in special situations ending happily due to their high professional training, one component of which is readiness to act in an emergency situation. Let us consider briefly only a few of these.

In the course of regular daytime flights under inclement weather conditions with a so-called minimum of time, Honored Pilot Officer Toma Kovachev was performing "pattern" exercises. On coming down to the appropriate altitude and circling twice, in order to continue with the next standard element of this mission the pilot, as is usual, actuated the flaps, but one of them failed to retract fully. The aircraft showed a tendency to turn sharply upside down, which at a low altitude is extremely dangerous. At precisely this moment began the test of the pilot's readiness to act in a special situation in flight. With great physical exertions the flier broke upwards through the clouds in order to clarify to the utmost what to do without permitting any hastiness in his actions. He found a favorable mode of piloting, righted himself and landed successfully, saving himself and the aircraft.

An ordinary flight shift. On the runway a practice combat aircraft, piloted by Cadet Kiril Yordanov, is revving up for takeoff. He has quite recently started to master the jet aircraft and naturally his practical experience is quite slight. That is why the excellent pilot Engr-Capt Dimitur Zlatanov is
in the instructor's cockpit. The takeoff is normal. In the next few seconds at an altitude of no more than 20 meters the engine stalls. There is no time to think. The instructor reacts instantly and successfully lands the aircraft on the outskirts of the airfield. . .

After takeoff, a crew commanded by Pilot First-Class Officer Vasil Milanov found that one of the engines of the military transport plane began to operate abnormally and soon thereafter stalled. The commander retained his self-control completely, immediately banked the aircraft, circled and landed successfully.

We could continue with more cases, in the course of which the bravery of Officers Bachev, Popov and other pilots was fully rewarded: costly aircraft were saved and the reason for the trouble was determined precisely. . .

If we consider every special situation, the dynamics of its development can be expressed in the following cause-effect relationship.

Under given conditions a special situation in flight creates a source of an emergency situation. The pilot takes measures to localize it. The outcome of the flight later on depends on the possibilities that exist for remedying the emergency situation and on the correct and timely actions of the pilot or crew as a whole. Therefore, preventive work to upgrade flight safety must be aimed at the elimination of the known causes of accidents. In the order of their importance they are as follows: violations in the organization, control and piloting of flights; incorrect actions of flight personnel; violations and errors in the preparation and use of aviation equipment; unsatisfactory flight backup. Here, deliberately, we shall not consider all aspects of the problem so that we can concentrate on what is most important.

World statistics show that about 75 to 80 percent of the preconditions and about 90 percent of the flying accidents occur for subjective reasons. Therefore, the main attention of commanders, staffs, political organizers and flight safety officers in aviation units must be aimed precisely at these causes since they are directly related to and are a function of personnel's skills, quality of work and alacrity and, of course, are avoidable.

(To be continued)

[4 Jan 86 pp 1, 2]

[Text] (Continued from yesterday's issue)

The probability of any given cause of an emergency situation arising in any specific flight differs and hence the significance of preventive measures for the avoidance of flying accidents is not identical although a certain interrelationship between the causes of emergency situations exists. Thus, for example, incorrect actions of the officials of the flight control group may lead to complication of the situation due to the pilot's incorrect actions in order to carry out the commands or instructions given him from the ground. Or, conversely, precise and timely commands of the flight control officer may halt further development of the emergency situation.
For a successful campaign against the causes of flying accidents, purposeful command and organizational work is needed at all levels. Of course, commanders, political workers, staff officers and other specialists have as their paramount concern preventive work with flying personnel since the overwhelming majority of special situations are due to the incorrect actions of pilots (errors in piloting and use of aviation equipment, lack of discipline, errors in estimates of the situation and in decision-making in special situations). Therefore, the basic efforts of supervisory flight and technical personnel must be aimed at first-rate advance instruction of the trainees and, first and foremost, at raising the readiness of pilots to act in emergency situations.

In aviation there are a number of courses, guides, manuals, instructions and other documents, compliance with which will guarantee the accident-free performance of flight missions. But in everyday practice one still encounters poor acquaintance with and violation of these documents because of a superficial attitude towards duties, because of inertia, erratic and shallow control, lack of reliability in items of information, etc.

What is needed is a new attitude, a new approach by the entire flying personnel to questions of a zero accident rate in aviation and a further rise in the quality of practice combat activity. It is precisely the results of this activity that manifest the commander's ability to estimate the momentary state of the unit; to discover through systematic and thorough scientific analysis the pre-conditions, the more characteristic failures of aviation equipment, disruptions in flight control and backup; to plan and conduct appropriate preventive measures.

Directly involved with these is the objective necessity of the maximum use of flight trainers to the extent which the governing documents envisage for every pilot, especially during his instruction period. Every real flight in which a young pilot participates should be preceded by a "flight" in the trainer.

In the units in which Officers Kolev, Pavlov, Karemov et al. serve, use of trainers significantly eases the task of commanders and instructors in training cadets and young pilots to perform various exercises and to act in special situations in flight.

What are the questions on which, in our opinion, every commander should focus his attention in training? First, he must accurately determine the actual level of instruction of his trainees, taking into account whether there have been any interruptions. Second, making use, without fail, of data from objective monitoring, he must find the "weak spots," i.e., those stages of flight where the pilot has committed incorrect actions. Only after this can the commander draw up a training plan, in the course of which he will strictly require the pilot to master all the necessary actions in a given special situation.

Ordinarily the complex situation requires of the pilot, besides courage and self-control, that he speedily assess the deviation arising in flight and act without delay to remedy it. This, to a significant extent, depends on the pilot's degree of training to endure the high physical and mental stresses that invariably accompany extreme conditions. Mental readiness for such actions
can be achieved through systematic, purposeful political and psychological measures which must permeate all types of flight instruction.

Two instructive examples of a different nature convince us of the undesirable consequences to which even the slightest disregard of this question may lead.

An experienced first-class pilot from the aviation unit in which Officer Kirtyakov serves in coming down for a landing incorrectly determined the character of the trouble that arose in piloting, believing that instead of the so-called ARU [not further identified; possibly avtomatichesko rulevo upravlenie, autopilot] there was some trouble in the mechanism of the trimmers. But this was half the predicament—anybody can err at a critical moment. What was more distressing was that the pilot failed to conform to the directive which for both situations states explicitly that one must circle twice to gain altitude, calmly determine the character of the trouble and, together with the flight control officer, decide the best alternative for further actions. The case concluded happily only because the pilot was very sturdy physically, and by incredible exertions succeeded in coping with the situation. . .

Another first-class pilot from the unit where Officer Parapunov serves in coming in for a landing incorrectly manipulated one of the valves in the cockpit and landed with an unlocked wheel. . .

Analysis of these and other special situations showed that sometimes even highly skilled pilots commit incorrect actions. This happens because monitoring of their training is poor, because some of them fail to improve their theoretical knowledge and practical skills, because they neglect trainer "flights." The conclusion is inescapable: such leaders set a poor example for their subordinates and do serious harm to aviation. They forget that an aircraft is under the power only of him who strictly observes the laws of flying.

Still in all, the most important course to be followed in the special psychological training of a pilot to take action in special flight situations is practice. . . Under conditions as close to real as possible.

This can be achieved by trainees with flights in practice-combat and simulator-training planes with experienced instructors who are cleared to create the necessary moves. Apart from the motor skills necessary for the correct actions in emergency situations, such drills create in the trainees a psychological pitch such that as a result he treats special situations in flight as events hardly outside the customary limits of flying work. In the course of practice exercises a dynamic stereotype is created as a model of various situations and the actions in the event thereof. This mastered pattern is, when necessary, "overlaid" on a real situation.

As experience shows, in forming readiness to act under extreme conditions special attention must be paid to the pilot's ability to discover in good time failures of aviation equipment and deviations in flying conditions. Experimental research has established that an average of two or three seconds are required to determine deviations from prescribed flying conditions according to onboard instruments, and to make the appropriate decision. That is why in
instructing young pilots under inclement weather conditions it must without fail be impressed upon them that they must not divert their attention for long from the basic piloting instruments, and especially not from the gyro horizon. Everyone must remember that only good practical experience can serve as a surety for the successful performance of flights under such conditions. Moreover, spatial orientation is the basic and most complex activity performed by a pilot in the air. It takes considerable time, for which reason distraction of attention from the instruments is inadmissible.

In final analysis, we must once more stress that the role of the personality factor in the campaign against the causes giving rise to flying accidents is extremely great. If the airman has high moral and political, psychological, physical and combat characteristics, if he is trained to a sufficient extent to act in special situations in flight, if he is excellently prepared for the specific flight, if he has undergone comprehensive and thorough checking, no ordeal will be beyond his powers.

6474
CSO: 2200/61
PROFILES OF AIR FORCE ACADEMY, INSTRUCTORS, TRAINING METHODS

Air Force Pilot Training

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 26 May 86 pp 1-2

[Article by Major General Dimitur Karadzhikov, chief of the G. Benkovski VNVVU]

[Text] Military fliers are making their contribution to defending the peaceful days of the working people in our country and the gains of our socialist homeland. Their profession one of curious, knowledgeable, highly trained people with a strong spirit, infinitely loyal to the people and the party, individuals who are ready at all times to sacrifice their lives for the fatherland. This is a profession and a vocation which is romantic, noble, honorable, difficult and responsible. The work of aviation commanders is needed by society and the people. It is the type of work which requires great stress of physical and moral forces, inner self-discipline and self-control, and creative activeness. The contemporary air force commander is a person with broad political, general and military knowledge. He has the knowledge and tactfulness of the educator, and the skills of the manager and the specialist. He is perfectly familiar with the nature and features of modern combat. The development of the necessary qualities of a commander, such as practicality in the work, self-discipline, the ability to find his way quickly under difficult circumstances and high mental and physical training begins even before enrolling in the Georgi Benkovski Higher People's Air Force Academy.

The Georgi Benkovski VNVVU is located in Dolna Mitropoliya, on the territory of an okrug whose center is the historical city of Pleven, the city of Russian combat glory and Bulgarian-Soviet friendship, bearer of the Friendship Among Peoples Order.

Today the academy is equipped with modern training facilities. School rooms, laboratories and training-technical workshops are being constantly updated and improved. The students are trained by excellent teachers, commanders and instructors with rich practical experience. The flight instructors are experienced method workers and grade fliers.
Our students are being trained in three areas: command-engineering, engineering and political. The command-engineering section trains command cadres for the air force—filers and ground command personnel. The training of pilots and navigators is done with modern training and combat aircraft. Training in the other subjects is done with the help of the latest aircraft control and guidance systems. The trainees learn the most advanced methods of the scientific organization of labor, planning, staff and troop-control work. Such training is also offered to civil aviation pilots and navigators.

Engineering training is for air force engineers. Here they acquire high military and specialized training, based on extensively studied general education and general engineering subjects. In the school they also gain practical experience in the proper organization of the maintenance and repair of all types of aircraft and helicopters, their electronic, instrument and radio equipment, armaments and on-board and ground radar and communications equipment. Such training is offered also to civil aviation engineers.

The political department has a single subject: "Air Force Political Officer."

After completing their training and successfully passing state examinations and defending their diploma projects, the graduates are awarded a higher education diploma with a military and civilian specialty and skill, based on the curriculum. They are commissioned in the rank of "Lieutenant Engineer" and are assigned to antiaircraft defense and air force troops.

The training facilities, scientific research sectors and TNTM clubs enable the students to participate in school scientific research activities.

The Georgi Benkovski VNVVU has created good conditions for mass sports and for meeting the interests of young people and developing young talents. The library has extensive military, technical and sociopolitical works and works of fiction. Physical culture is directed by teachers and sports coaches, and practiced at sports facilities, tennis courts and playgrounds.

The good living conditions and regime at the academy develop the type of rhythm which beneficially influences the mental and physical development of the trainees. It is here that they develop as highly skilled one-man commanders and specialists.

**Air Force Academy Enrollment**

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 26 May 86 p 2

[Text] The admission grade is based on the following:

The grade of the test in the special subject, multiplied by two;

The overall grade of the secondary education diploma;

The grades of two subjects in the secondary education diploma, considered basic for the selected training subject.
The psychophysiological test grade is added to the admission grade of pilot candidates.

The physical qualities of the candidate students will be tested for the following subjects and standards:

Horizontal bar lifts: no less than six;
One hundred meters dash—running start—not to exceed 15.5 seconds;
One thousand meters cross-country run—no more than 4.1 minutes.

Sports clothing (provided by the applicant).

The Georgi Benkovski VNVU offers the following training courses:

1. Command-engineering:
   - Air force and Bulgarian Civil Aviation Pilot. Training period: 4 years and 8 months;
   - Navigator-controller for the air force and Bulgarian Civil Aviation. Training period: 5 years;
   - Air force staff. Training period: 5 years.

2. Engineering:
   - Operating and repairing flight engines for the air force and Bulgarian Civil Aviation. Training period: 5 years;
   - Operating and repairing radio electronic equipment of aircraft for the air force and Bulgarian Civil Aviation. Training period: 5 years;
   - Operating and repairing aviation equipment. Training period: 5 years;
   - Operating and repairing communications and radio engineering devices. Training period: 5 years.

Pilot Entrance Examinations

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 26 May 86 p 2

[Text] Applicants for the "flight pilot" specialty must undergo a psychophysical examination based on a special method. The psychophysical qualities of the candidates are rated on the basis of a six-point system.

The qualities of candidate trainees will be tested and written examinations will be administered as follows: from 5-9 August 1986—testing psychophysiological and physical qualities and medical examination (for the "flight pilot" subject, the examinations will take place between 22 July and 9 August 1986).
The written competition examination in mathematics will take place on 10 August. The written competition examination in social science will be held on 12 August 1986.

The competition examinations will be administered place in the respective military academy and organized by commissions appointed by order of the academy's commanding officer.

The written competition examinations will be anonymous and will cover comprehensive topics. The halls where the applicants will take the examinations and the examination commissions will be announced on the day of the examination. The examinations will begin at 0800 hours and will last 4 hours.

On request the school will issue official notes to the applicants to justify the leave they have taken for the purpose of such examinations.

Air Force Academy Activities

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 26 May 86 p 2

[Article by Captain Engineer Ognyan Gotov]

[Text] The scientific research council of the Georgi Benkovski VNVVU and the TNTM clubs have already achieved some successes and developed traditions in their work. One of the latest developments of the collective headed by Officer Professor Bonev has reached the testing stage and will soon be introduced in the troops and the national economy. It has to do with agrochemical operations and serves sports and sports-tourist purposes. It is the new motodeltاغیدر, developed by the academy's instructors, commanders and students.

"The motodeltاغیدر design is based on modern standards," Officer Professor Bonev said. "We undertook its development on a professional rather than amateur basis. Ground tests were successful and we are now successfully beginning first flight tests. It has good aerodynamic features and our purpose is to be approved for use in the country and to lay the foundations of organized activities for building flight apparatus. To this effect, however, we must also train test pilots..."

In a period of no more than a few months the academy's scientific research council and the student design bureau made a "leap" in their work. Their dissatisfaction with their lag in carrying out some assignments last school year urged the collectives to double their efforts. Students from all departments are participating and graduation papers are put to practical use.

New technical facilities and computers are consistently being used in training students at the Georgi Benkovski VNVVU. The trainees are now working with specialized computers they have made themselves. Furthermore, computers are being extensively used in designing flight engines. A computer was used in designing the new superlight training aircraft for the armed forces and the OSO. It will be tested in September 1986.
An unmanned aircraft with a remote-control system designed on a high modern technical level was created with the help of the students' design bureau. The craft is guided with an automatic pilot system and provides in-flight information on all engine parameters. It makes flight control and fast reaction to changing flight conditions possible.

A combined group (academy teachers and students) developed a new craft floating on an air cushion, used mainly in agriculture and as a all-terrain transport vehicle.

In addition to scientific research, the Georgi Benkovski VNNVU students actively participated in republic student competitions in all training subjects. The student collective headed by Chief Assistant Professors Ignatov, Marinov and Stanchev won first prize in the industrial drafting competition of civilian and military VUZs; student sergeants Petkov, Boev and Videv were rated individual champions.

Student Master Sergeant Sergey Vlahov won first place in the republic student scientific session on electrical engineering. He did his research by solving problems on a personal computer.

An award was given for the Engineering-Navigation Flight Computation Software program developed by Captain Petkov and Engineer Dimitrov. Lieutenant Savev and Assistant Professor Chukanov participated in the national TNTM exhibit and inventions with a "System For Servicing Silver-Zinc Batteries."

Officers Kulev and Tsvetanov presented their project entitled "Fuel Expenditure Measuring Device" at the world exhibit of achievements of young inventors at "Expo-85."

Scientific research activities of officers and students at the Georgi Benkovski VNNVU are developing on an "ascending curve." However, in order for them to be even more effective and to ensure the participation of even more trainees, all problems must be solved and the last bureaucratic obstructions on the hard road to success must be surmounted.

"We need the moral and material support of anyone engaged in scientific work and inventions, mostly the young, those who will continue our work in the troops," Professor Bonev said. "I believe that the creation of a nucleus of scientific associates will enable us to enhance the standards of such activities in the school. We have drafted a proposal on their rights and functional obligations and on the economic side of the problem. We have facilities but cannot solve this problem alone... Our successes achieved so far are the result of the enthusiasm and daring of students, commanders and teachers."

Who are the best? All those who work with their hearts and souls, whose work is aimed mainly at the future of aviation and the development of aviation commanders and engineers. In honor of the patron day of the Georgi Benkovski VNNVU, let us express deserved thanks to Officers Docent Viktor Putov, Docent Veselin Zayakov, Docent Nechko Nechev, Mitko Angelov, Docent Ivan Stefanov, Engineer Zhelyazko Vlaykov, Petko Petkov and Instructor Engineer Rumen Nedkov,
and Student Sergeant Dimo Ivanov, Master Sergeants Ivan Ivanov, Khrislov and Milchev, Junior Sergeants Ivan Stoilov, Yordan Madzharov, Angel Yordanov and many others, among the best, who are marching in the military ranks and are mastering, day after day, flight skills, flight control and services, in order to keep a clear sky over our peaceful socialist homeland.

Information Successes

Sofia NARODNA ARMYA in Bulgarian 26 May 86 p 2

[Text] We live in a time of a substantial volumes of quantitative and qualitative information. We frequently complain that we have too much information, not presented to us in a suitable manner. In some cases we become accustomed to bureaucratism in command work. We even unwittingly promote it but then we continue to complain of the lack of time for carrying our official duties. We must find our own prescription against such illnesses. An example in this respect is the automated control system applied in the unit in which Officer Pavel Kateliev serves.

The concept was developed by Captain Engineer Kamen Kolev. His closest assistants are Senior Lieutenant Engineer Petur Petrov, and now reserve private Iliya Monov. The creative collective is being helped by Officer Petur Ivanov. Its problems have diminished after most of the basic items were obtained, such as multiplexers, integrated circuits, indicators, and printed circuits.

What does the automated system represent?

Signaling panels have been mounted in the command center for the individual operations. Information from the warehouse base, the guardroom for the motor pool, etc., is transmitted by wire and radio. Data processing, however, is automated.

Automation plays an important role in the life of the unit. Data recorders have been installed at the most important points, which trace the movement of transport vehicles. This allows the commander to know at all times the type of vehicles at his disposal and their location.

The automated system has been programmed also for most ordinary things. It deals with opening garage or warehouse doors. It operates a light signaling system which indicates the movement of transport facilities. It dictates the restrictions imposed by the unit commander. It also tracks the stay of technical facilities in specific unit areas.

The entire documented activity of the collective allows its analysis at gatherings or official meetings aimed at upgrading efficiency and ensuring the systematic nature of organized command activities.

This is an item created by the TNTM movement, which is operating efficiently. Its combat effect is unquestionable, for it provides fast information from subordinates to the commander and from the commander to subordinate units. This avoids any subjective distortion of information and the necessary data
are exchanged in half the time. This speed enables the personnel to reduce the time needed for reaching higher combat readiness levels.

Its shortcoming is the use of discrete elements in some assemblies. This lowers the accuracy and complicates the maintenance of the automated system. However, such weaknesses can be eliminated by increasing the number of computers.

We can say that in addition to combat results, this accomplishment is a major contribution to the enhancement of the pride of the developers of this local information success. Senior Lieutenant Petrov believes that everything learned at the G. Dimitrov VNVAU can be put to practical use thanks to the innovative microclimate within which the unit lives and creates.

5003
CS0:2200/128
MILITARY ACADEMY HEAD OUTLINES TRAINING OBJECTIVES

East Berlin TRIBUENE in German 21 Feb 86 p 11

[Interview with Lt Gen Prof Hans-Joachim Wiesner, chief, 'Friedrich Engels' Military Academy by Holger Arnhold and Manfred Strzeletz; date and place of interview not indicated.]

[Text] Lt Gen Prof Hans-Joachim Wiesner was born in 1925, and learned the trade of a carpenter. In 1950 he began his service in the armed forces. He qualified himself in various functions of the KVP and the NVA, in classes, and in his work at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces. Lt Gen Wiesner has been the commander of the Military Academy 'Friedrich Engels' since 1964. It has developed into a center of scientific work in the NVA, and its staff earned great merit in the training and qualifying of socialist officers. Lt Gen Wiesner is a bearer of high awards of our republic.

[Question] Comrade Lt Gen, what was written in the album of the NVA as it was being founded 30 years ago?

[Answer] After bitter experiences in the decades-long revolutionary struggle, the German working class created the first worker-and-peasant state in the history of our nation. This state, the German Democratic Republic, was worth reliably defending. It desperately needed the protection because the forces of imperialism were becoming hopeful in the FRG. The remilitarization of West Germany, its entrance into the aggressive NATO Pact, everything was directed at pushing back socialism and, yes, even destroying it if possible.

We have broken with all reactionary, revengeful and militaristic traditions of the past, and have created a new type of army of completely different character. It is an army not directed toward aggression. We are obliged to only preserve peace and socialism.

[Question] What enabled the formation of our own armed forces?

[Answer] A major prerequisite for that was the help and support of our Soviet friends and comrades. Weapons and tactics, which proved themselves in the Great Patriotic War against fascism and which also corresponded to the demands of that time, were our basic equipment. From the beginning, the
NVA was organized and equipped as a socialist coalition army, and its personnel were trained and developed in this spirit.

The possibility also lay at that time in our own development. I am referring to the economic, but above all political-ideological aspect. Many recognized the necessity of this measure and were prepared to defend our young state. At the end of 1956, over 80 percent of the young army's officers came from workers' families. Over 85 percent belonged to the SED. The NCOs and enlisted men already had their education and development in antifascist-democratic schools and socialist schools, in socialist companies and social organizations, above all in the FDJ.

[Question] How did you yourself experience the founding of the NVA?

[Answer] When our Volkskammer (People's Chamber) passed the necessary law in January, 1956, I belonged to the KVP (Billeted People's Police). We welcomed this law enthusiastically. The unit in which I was a member was then disbanded in the fall.

Enthusiasm was one thing, but there was much to do. Along with the personnel staffing and the creation of unit esprit de corps, housing, camps, repair facilities and training facilities, for example, had to be prepared. Many personnel questions had to be answered: the move to a new location, future assignments, and the training for the various branches of service.

[Question] What, in your opinion, were the basic components of successful development of the NVA?

[Answer] I would like to call attention to three things. One is the effective and distinct leadership of the armed forces by the party of the working class. It gave us and still gives us today the basic orientation in all affairs.

Another is that we had experienced class struggle combatants in our ranks. I am thinking here in particular of Friedrich Dickel, Heinz Hoffman, Heinz Kessler, Kurt Lohberger, and Ewald Munschke to name just a few. Of the 29 generals and admirals who were given leadership functions at the creation of the NVA, almost all were active in the revolutionary worker's movement and were antifascist resistance fighters.

Third, and by no means the least, we could always draw on support again and again from our Soviet friends and comrades. Without patronizing us, they always helpfully stood by us with advice and assistance. And this was not only with weapons and tactics. The first joint exercise with the Group Soviet Forces Germany took place in August 1957. We received assistance in officer training at the Soviet military academies, and our numerous relations to the regiments are part of this, too.

[Question] In the first years, the NVA was a volunteer army. Why did the draft become necessary?
[Answer] At first, the volunteer concept was sufficient to satisfy the demands for protection of our worker-and-peasant force. With the development of the military-political situation at the beginning of the sixties, that was no longer sufficient, and so the draft was instituted in 1962. One further point: with the draft law, each citizen of our republic received the opportunity to exercise his constitutional right and fulfill his honorable duty to protect and defend the Fatherland, if necessary. In addition, we need a supply of reservists along with those in active service, in order to gradually gain the defensive ability to call up all citizens able to fight.

[Question] How did the NVA soldier measure the results of meeting his military obligations?

[Answer] By seeing that we made our contribution as a coalition army in the socialist defensive alliance, that the peace has been continuously and reliably protected in the past decades, that socialism was able to develop and remained inviolable. And we are still doing that today. Finally, the soldier has to prove himself daily—in combat duty just as in guard duty, on the training grounds just as in the classroom. I am reminded of the staff duty system in the Air Force/Air Defense or the deployment of our People's Navy in the securing of our borders.

[Question] The unity of people and army always proved itself as a decisive foundation for the invincibility of a socialist army. Can you name some examples?

[Answer] This unity has been demonstrated again and again for years, when workers visit their soldiers in the barracks. Our people stood behind their army like a single man on August 13th, 1961, and their heartfelt ties to them were again displayed during the "Comradery-in-Arms" ("Waffenbruedershaft") exercises in 1970 and 1980 on the territory of our republic.

Socialist production relationships, socialist state power, the fact that the working class is the same as the producing class and the ownership and influence-exercising classes all insure this.

Once again this winter NVA members are working in the brown coal pits and support the coal-miners, and engineers are helping in construction in our capital. Not a few NVA members are active as representatives in cities and communities. Also belonging to these close relationships are (the situations) when antifascist resistance fighters or work veterans hand over the arms to the young soldiers, when union groups maintain contacts with them.

[Question] What characterizes the NVA's development in the eighties?

[Answer] When I say that the NVA is a modern socialist army which has accomplished all missions assigned to it, that does not mean we can rest on our laurels. The policy of confrontation and the attempt by the aggressive imperialist circles to change the approximate balance of military power in their favor just makes our responsibility for the secured peace that much greater. The personnel of the NVA are always conscious of this.
Within the framework of the socialist defensive coalition, they reliably accomplish their missions.

In all branches of service, new weapons and equipment were introduced. The T-72 tank, the BMP APC, the MiG 23 fighter, new troop anti-aircraft systems and new Parchim class antisubmarine ships are just a few examples. In the NVA ground forces, the degree of motorization has been raised up to approximately 50 horsepower per soldier.

We NVA members see the main avenue to providing greater fighting power and combat readiness in the comprehensive intensification of all associated processes, in greater effectiveness of education and training, in the best possible utilization of the funds spent on defense. New tasks arise out of the advances of science and technology, the application of microelectronics and other key technologies. In command and control functions, the question of cooperation in actions between the various branches of service is gaining importance.

Significant command and control tasks are accomplished with the assistance of automated command systems. Technical and support maintenance has become more multi-faceted and has grown in its overall scope. I would like to illustrate this with one example: the work of "only" 14 various specialists was needed before a pilot could start a MiG 17. With a MiG 21 it is about 60.

The key to overcoming all problems is not, however, the technology, but the man who uses it. His political-moral and psychological firmness, his sense of responsibility and his performance (are most important). The high degree of education of the draftees and their preparedness to do their best is very important for mastering the given class challenge.

90 percent of the draftees have completed the 10th or 12th grade, and 95 percent have completed professional or vocational training. Almost all have run through the paramilitary training in the GST (Society for Sport and Technology). Every third has declared he is prepared to extend his enlistment beyond 18 months. The NVA has a qualified officer corps. 73 percent of the officers have a college education. The 2,400 graduates of the Soviet military academies and 170 generals, admirals and officers who have studied at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces all contribute greatly toward enabling the knowledge of Soviet military science to be thoroughly and productively applied.

[Question] How do the civilian employees of the NVA participate in the secure protection of our land?

[Answer] Civilian employees work in the medical field, in material supply, in supply and technical maintenance, in administration and in staff duty. They are active as scientific colleagues and college professors at our training facilities. Without their tireless and competent work, the NVA could not accomplish its missions. The union for civilian employees is the mobilizing force for the activities of our colleagues.
One example out of our academy: everyone here knows the comrade Dr. Muesch. He is a co-inventor of an electronic ignition system for combustion engines, which is an economic patent which is also useful in the civilian sector. For the excellent work that the civilian employees have provided for years, they deserve thanks and recognition on this 30th anniversary of the NVA.

13071
CSO 2300/329
ACHEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS UNDER CURRENT DRAFT LAW ASSESSED

Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 31 May 86 p 5

[Article by Attila Schmidt: "More Modern Education in a Year-and-a-Half"]

[Text] The Draft Law which appeared 10 years ago offered a legal guarantee for the development of our people's army and the preparation of draft-eligible youth for military service. Colonel General Ferenc Karpáti informed reporters on Friday of experiences and changes in the decade since the law took effect. Also taking part in the information session were State Secretary Rezso Banyasz, the president of the Council of Ministers Information Bureau, and several members of the corps of generals.

The Minister of Defense, who will present observations of the implementation of the Draft Law at the summer session of the National Assembly, emphasized among other things that in this period, in 1980, the draft was reduced from the earlier 24 months to 18 months.

The shortening of the draft time is useful for the people's economy, and no less for the soldiers, who can resume their civilian occupations a half year earlier than before. At the same time, however, this change requires more up-to-date organization and faster-paced instructions from the military. The workload of the career section of the army has increased, because the level of military education cannot decrease, and the new soldiers must acquire the same facility in handling war technology as their predecessors, who mastered the theoretical and practical knowledge in two years.

To NEPSZAVA's question, the Minister of Defense replied that 18 to 23 year old men can be drafted. However, those who received postponements for the completion of their studies or other sufficient reasons, can be drafted up to their 28th year.

Military service is required of all healthy young men, but in certain cases the service must be completed in two parts. For example, those who are admitted to colleges or universities complete 11 months of service before beginning their studies and serve the remaining part of the year and a half after receiving their diplomas. Students admitted to medical school are exceptions, for after completing medical school and basic training, they serve as doctors in their outfits. Miners and transportation workers, for example BKV bus drivers, serve for shortened periods. Athletes spend their 18-month military service at Tata.
Military service is shortened for top athletes, and the most talented are eligible for the exemptions reserved for young artists.

Dealing with previously convicted men is the source of many problems for commanders. A large number of them do not maintain military discipline, and they are not readily accepted everywhere. In the near future, on an experimental basis, the Ministry of Defense plans to organize those previously convicted conscripts who are at all capable of armed service into separate sub-units. And insofar as their behavior merits it, their education will be dealt with more strictly. During his talk, the minister especially emphasized the fight against alcoholism, since drinking cannot be permitted in the army. During his talk, the minister separately pointed out to relatives who visit soldiers that rather than coming up with cunning methods of getting them alcohol, they should try to talk them out of drinking alcohol, since this is in the soldiers' personal interest.

It is a primary goal of the seventh 5-year plan that young men should spend their 18 month service period in the most cultured, comfortable surroundings possible. There is generally no complaint about the provisioning, since every young man gets 3800-4000 calories daily, but the quality of the food should receive more attention at the outfits. Conscripts' salaries were raised 100 percent beginning with 1 January, and various bonuses over the base salary are available. Thus a private's pocket money is 500 forints per month. The size of the sum changes depending on rank and class. Aid for dependent families is also available to soldiers who need it.

A truly new development for the soldiers is that beginning in September, they may wear civilian clothes during leave and vacations, and may travel as hitch-hikers in cars with Hungarian license plates. At the military outfits, prisons are being eliminated. This kind of disciplinary action will only be carried out at area commands, and the right to threaten the undisciplined soldier with detention will be restricted to commanders with higher rank than before. Educational methods more modern than detention are being introduced into the army.

9890/12859
CSO: 2500/301
EDITORIAL OUTLINES CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH COOPERATION

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 29 May 86 p 1

[Editorial: "Higher Level of Czechoslovak-Polish Cooperation"]

[Text] Regular meetings between the highest representatives of Czechoslovakia and Poland result in significant stimuli to the development and deepening of traditional mutual cooperation in all areas. The significance of Tuesday's friendly working visit by Comrade Gustav Husak in Warsaw and the results of the discussions with Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelsky underline the extraordinary period during which these discussions took place.

Our fraternal parties, states, and nations are living through events which have a decisive significance with respect to furthering socialism in both countries—in our country we are already realizing the conclusions of the 17th Congress of the CPCZ and in Poland preparations are under way for the upcoming 10th Congress of the PZPR. In this connection, Comrades Gustav Husak and Wojciech Jaruzelsky stressed the great significance of the recent 27th Congress of the CPSU for the development of the theory and practice of socialist expansion, not only in the Soviet Union but also in the other socialist countries.

Czechoslovak-Polish friendship stems from traditional long-term mutuality; it has deep roots. Fraternal solidarity was firmly forged in the battle against the common enemy—Hitler fascism. The current negotiations have confirmed that both sides ascribe fundamental significance to the deepening of these firm relationships of friendship and cooperation. Both sides consider the close alliance, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, as well as the strengthening of fraternal ties with the USSR and cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Pact to be important factors in the development of both countries, for the development of cooperation and deepening of unity and cohesion for all of the socialist community.

Mutual cooperation in all areas of political, economic, and social life has brought fruitful results. The highest representatives of Czechoslovakia and Poland were able to find with satisfaction at Tuesday's meeting that the implementation of conclusions adopted during the official friendly visit of our party and state delegation in Poland 2 years ago and during the friendly meeting at the highest level in Czechoslovakia in December 1984, have contributed
to the dynamic development of universal cooperation. Significant progress has been seen, particularly in recent years. It was manifested in the rapid growth of commercial exchanges and in the expansion of cooperation in metallurgy, mining, energy, in the electrotechnical and chemical industries, and in transportation.

A positive evaluation is due the results of coordination involving national economic plans for the ensuing 5 years which assures the growth of goods exchanges by more than 40 percent. Demanding tasks, joint efforts at intensification, and higher efficiency with respect to mutual relationships will demand the application of higher forms of cooperation, the expansion of both specialized and coproduction commitments, as well as direct cooperation between enterprises and scientific research organizations. Part and parcel of this effort to improve the quality of economic cooperation is also the recently signed program of scientific-technical cooperation and other agreements.

Favorable experiences with respect to cooperation, and prerequisites for the development of both countries and the principal directions of socialist economic integration are reflected in the document, recently signed in Warsaw, entitled "Long-Term Program of Development for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation Between Czechoslovakia and Poland Through the Year 2000." It creates the prerequisites for the gradual attainment of a higher level in the coordination of economic policy, both as to content and form. It stresses higher forms of cooperation, both in development as well as in research and in production, including prerequisites for establishing joint enterprises and associations.

The program establishes production cooperation in the engineering and electrotechnical industries as the main area of cooperation. Apart from traditional areas, such as the production of heavy tractors, agriculture, the automobile industry, and others, it concentrates cooperation upon the realization of technically advanced solutions of products and technologies in electronics and microelectronics, in the production of centralized machining facilities, robots and manipulators, new products in the special chemistry area and mining machinery. The realization of the tasks set will be an important contribution in implementing the goals and intentions of the Comprehensive Program of Scientific-Technical Progress in CEMA Member Countries Through the Year 2000; it will be a specific contribution to the fulfillment of the joint strategy of intensive development. The program devotes great attention to seeing to it that the adopted conclusions are implemented in practice.

The meeting stressed the decisive significance of close contacts between the CPCZ and the PZPR for purposes of further developing mutual relationships between our countries and nations. Comrades Gustav Husak and Wojciech Jaruzelsky favored the deepening of fraternal cooperation among central committees, territorial organs of the party, and direct cooperative contacts at various levels. Such an emphasis is commensurate to the avant-garde mission of our parties in society.

The effort to intensify mutual contacts finds expression in the high level of cooperation between the parliaments, governments, and other political parties,
between the National Front of Czechoslovakia and the Patriotic Movement of National Renewal (PRON) in Poland, and by trade union and other organizations. The negotiations in Warsaw simultaneously pointed up the possibilities of enriching these relationships, and pointed the way toward a broader mutual familiarity with the successes achieved by both countries.

The primary desire of our nations is to safeguard peace. Together with the other socialist countries, we are striving to eliminate the dangerous tension in the world, the principal cause of which remains the militaristic policy of imperialism. The Soviet-American meeting in Geneva brought some prospects for curing the international situation. However, they are placed in doubt by the actions of the United States which are aimed at achieving military strategic superiority.

Implementation of the so-called strategic defense initiative, which leads to the militarization of cosmic space, is being initiated. It also involves some allies of the United States from NATO. They are also continuing in the other programs of feverish armament. The contradictory approach of the United States on the question which makes all nations uneasy—namely, nuclear disarmament—is attested to by the nuclear explosions in Nevada. While the Soviet Union has once more unilaterally extended its moratorium, the United States continues to test nuclear weapons, fails to utilize the possibilities for making significant steps in favor of the security of mankind.

Comrades Gustav Husak and Wojciech Jaruzelsky express their conviction that it is possible to overcome the tendencies which threaten peace and security and to renew the process of relaxation of tensions. This requires goodwill and efforts on the part of all states—in favor of liquidating nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, creation of a comprehensive system of international security. Both representatives stressed the significance of close cooperation and the coordinated approach with the Soviet Union and with the other countries of the socialist community of states in the struggle for peace.

At the meeting, full support for the comprehensive peace proposals of the USSR, presented this year in January by Mikhail Gorbachev and developed by the 27th Congress of the CPSU, was expressed. Together with proposals for a substantial lowering of conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe and a new extension of the unilateral moratorium pertaining to nuclear testing, these proposals confirm the peace-loving nature of the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State.

These proposals point the effective way toward halting feverish armament, which is definitely also favored by Czechoslovakia and Poland. Wojciech Jaruzelsky also valued the joint initiatives of Czechoslovakia and the GDR to create a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe and fully supported the proposal.

Our countries favor the accelerated achievement of positive results at the negotiations in Vienna and in Stockholm. They are striving for the implementation of all conclusions of the Helsinki Conference.
The respecting of territorial sovereignty and the inviolability of current borders between European countries, which was, among others, confirmed by the Helsinki Final Act, has a fundamental significance for fortifying peace. Czechooslovakia and Poland definitely condemn the efforts of revanchist circles, particularly in the FRG, to change the political-territorial reality in Europe which arose as a result of World War II, the Yalta and the Potsdam agreements, and postwar developments.

We are for the liquidation of foci of international tensions by negotiation. The deepening of conflicts in the world is a specific manifestation of American doctrine—the doctrine of neoglobalism. The aggressive action by the United States against Libya, which threatened world peace, as well as the most recent aggressive actions on the part of the JAR against neighboring states, are condemned by us as acts of state terrorism. Economic discrimination and the abuse of economic relationships for political goals are in conflict with the principles of international coexistence.

The meeting between Comrade Gustav Husak and Wojciech Jaruzelsky confirm the fact that similar foundations, joint goals and ideals join us in a fraternal community. The realization of the current agreements will enrich the content and form of good neighbor relationships of friendship and cooperation. They will be a significant contribution to the further strengthening of unity and solidarity of states within the socialist community.

The friendly working visit of Comrade Gustav Husak in Warsaw laid additional firm foundations for a qualitatively higher level of universal relationships; it provides a stimulus for utilizing new opportunities of broad mutual cooperation.

5911
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SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY DESCRIBED, INTERPRETED

Prague NOVA MYSL in Czech No 5, 1986 pp 31-40

[Article by Tomas Travnicek: "The Deepening of Socialist Democracy--An Essential Prerequisite for the Further Development of Our Socialist Society"]

[Excerpts] The foundation of socialist democracy is participation by the broadest masses of the people in the creation, realization, and control of policy. Its implementation and constant deepening is not a subjective boom-and-bust requirement of the leading force of society—the communist party, its contemporary tactics, but is a strategy stemming from the objective legalities of the development of socialist society. It is a condition for the further development of the society which is impossible without the creative initiative, without the decisive participation and coreponsibility on the part of the masses. This fact was fully confirmed by the negotiations and conclusions of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Significant stimuli and inspiring thoughts for this area of social life resulted from the 27th Congress of the CPSU. In the Political Report from the Central Committee of the 27th Congress of the CPSU, Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev stressed: "Democracy is that healthy and clean air which is essential to the full-value life of the socialist social organism. In other words, if we say that, in this country, we are not yet fully utilizing the mighty potential of socialism, we have in mind that the acceleration of development pertaining to society is unthinkable and impossible without the further development of socialist democracy, all of its aspects and manifestations.... In socialist society, particularly under current conditions, we cannot be guided by the character of a narrow circle of professionals."

Particularly today, when we face significant tasks involved in the acceleration of the social economic development in Czechoslovakia, as it was approved by the 17th Congress of the CPCZ, tasks, the fulfillment of which will be co-determining our life securities, the peaceful prospects of today's and future generations, it is essential to life to deepen socialist democracy, to activate the entire political system under the leadership of the party, to activate all of its components, to develop, on a mass scale, the active creative participation of the working people, of all citizens with respect to thinking through, solving, and controlling all sides of the political, economic, and state life.
The theory and the practical experiences acquired during the establishment of socialism in general and of a developed socialist society in Czechoslovakia, in particular, confirm that, in addition to national committees, which are the most mass-based elected organs of power of the people and state administration, organizations affiliated in the National Front, which encompass almost all adults and the majority of the young generation, are a significant and highly effective factor in the development of socialist democracy and participation by the masses in managing the country. Without them, without their creative and initiative activities and coresponsibility, it is not possible to successfully solve any fundamental tasks involved in the economic, social, and cultural development, it is not possible to assure universal development of a socialist thinking and acting man. Therefore, a still more effective mobilization of their members and the creation of additional conditions for the participation in the political life, in management and administration is objectively one of the most important and permanent tasks confronting the National Front and all the organizations affiliated within it.

The constant development and deepening of socialist democracy, its effectiveness in daily life, are unthinkable, however, without certain fundamental conditions.

This is primarily a matter of seeing to it that in the political system, in our entire society, the leading role of the communist party should be constantly strengthened. The communist party is the leading and direction-setting force of society, the core of its political system. It is the highest form of societal-political organization and, through its entire activity, provides an example of faithful service in the interest of the people, of maintaining the principles of socialist democratism. During the current period of building developed socialism, the leading role of the communist party is even heightened. Without it, without its leading and direction-setting function, the participation of the broadest masses of the people in managing and deciding would not be possible, a threat of weakening the political system would exist and, in certain situations, there would even be the danger of its disintegration.

It is further essential to always take into account the dialectic and mutually enriching relationship between both sides of democratic centralism, whose permanent expansion fortifies the unity and action capability of all of society.

And, finally, it is necessary to respect the dialectic of development of socialist democracy which is manifested by the fact that socialist democracy is primarily realized in the form of development and fortification of the socialist state, whose existence is and will continue to be essential to life, both from the standpoint of domestic tasks, as well as from the standpoint of external conditions of coexistence and competition with states of a differing social order, from the standpoint of securing socialist accomplishments and the peaceful life of the people. Only by recognizing and systematically utilizing these connections is further development of socialist democracy possible, along with the constantly growing participation of the people in creating, realizing, and controlling policy, in management, and in state administration.
The system of the National Front, which embraces political parties, social organizations, and interest groups contributes to deepening socialist democracy in a many-sided manner. It is the very democratism of the internal life which, together with the principle of democratic centralism, is anchored in the statutes of each organization within the National Front.

On the other hand, daily contacts between higher organizations and lower organizations, particularly those with a membership base, which facilitate specific familiarity with the situation and problems of the membership base, and their individual members, contribute to the development of the democratic life of the organizations. This aids the higher organs in determining the correct line to respond, both to the interests of society as a whole as well as those of the interest groups and individual needs and interests of the largest possible number of members of the given organization.

Life currently virtually demands that we systematically and energetically fight against manifestations which would suppress the democratism of life in the organizations of the National Front and weaken it—against formalism in work, against inadequate unity with the interests and needs of members, against bureaucratic procedures and tendencies to pass on conceptual and rational activities to the professional apparatus of the organizations, possibly to individual managers, etc. And, at the same time, to fight against irresponsibility, lack of discipline, the violation of directives, resolutions, and laws, while constantly fortifying democratic centralism.

As the demanding nature of tasks involved in the development of advanced socialist society grows so does the significance of democracy and development of the fundamentals of self-administration in production, in the working process and, in other words, even the tasks of the most mass-based organization of the working people—the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement with its 7.5 million members. Even here, the main thrust is to involve the maximum number of workers in the solution of production problems, to improve the quality of the production process and its control, to accelerate intensification, particularly through the application of scientific-technical findings in production practices. A number of forms serve this purpose—from the regular active participation of workers in production meetings through the most varied economic conferences in enterprises and establishments and, particularly, the activities of trade union organizations aimed primarily at the qualitative development of production and care for workers. An important means of participation on the part of workers in these areas is the organizing of socialist competitions, particularly brigades of socialist workers, comprehensive rationalization brigades, etc. In recent times, substantial reserves with respect to deepening self-administration in production have shown up in the brigade form of organization and in remuneration for work. The development of this form contributes not only to increasing productivity, improving the quality of production, but also to the growth of societal and political creativity on the part of members of working collectives, to increasing the real participation of brigades in managing production.

A significant component in the development of socialist democracy is cooperative democracy. The cooperative movement is a form of socialist ownership and
management which has great prospects; it contains specific features of socialist self-administration. All types of our cooperatives—unified agricultural cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, production cooperatives, and housing cooperatives with their 4.5 million members—fulfill their missions and tasks independently, they make decisions governing the directions and content of their work, and the distribution of their results. They do all of this, naturally, as do the organizations of the National Front, in full harmony with the political line of the CPCZ, the state plan, and the laws of the socialist state.

The deepening of democratism—as a school for participation in political life, a school of management and administration of public affairs—is the primary task of the Union of Socialist Youth and its Pioneer organization, where the coming generation prepares for life and work, prepares to manage all areas of life of society during a period of rapid scientific-technical development.

The Czechoslovak Union of Women, which numbers millions of members and which is creating constantly better conditions for the universal active participation on the part of Czechoslovak women in public life, has great significance for the development of socialist democracy.

Through the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, the Union of Socialist Youth, the Czechoslovak Union of Women, and through the cooperative organizations, workers, women, and young people as decisive groups of our society, have the full opportunity of participating in political public life.

And because the other voluntary social organizations which are united in the National Front are open to all citizens without regard to political affiliation or religious conviction, the conditions for participating in the political and public life in our country are, in fact, not limited by anything. This is a great accomplishment for the Czechoslovak people, for socialism.

The federal arrangement of our state, the constantly more close and more fruitful cooperation between our two nations and all nationalities in socialist expansion is among the provable manifestations of socialist democracy. In the political system of a socialist society, each of our citizens, without regard to his national origin or nationality, has full opportunities to participate in the creation, realization, and control of policy, in the management of public affairs.

An irreplaceable component of our socialist political system are the national committees. They manage the comprehensive economic, social, and cultural development in their territorial areas. They are the principal link connected with the citizenry and their tasks in management and administration are constantly increasing. They employ virtually 500,000 voluntary citizens. This very fact demonstrates the importance of their task in deepening socialist democracy. Rightfully, therefore, they received substantial attention during the discussions at the 17th Congress of the CPCZ. The Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPCZ listed, among others, the requirement that "national committees must more fully utilize their jurisdictions, they must assure the comprehensive development of their territory, and must more effectively harmonize social and local requirements and interests."
Among the fundamental manifestations of socialist democracy in Czechoslovakia is the fact that under the leadership of the communist party, the organs of the National Front, together with organs of the state, are responsible for preparing and implementing general elections to representative bodies at all levels to the full extent. This means that they are responsible for nominating candidates to functions as delegates of representative organs at all levels, for the preparation, realization, and control of election programs, for the entire process of familiarizing voters with candidates and approving election programs, as well as for the elections themselves.

Elections in our socialist society are always a significant internal political event. They are one of the highest manifestations of the sovereignty of the people—one of the principal forms of participation on the part of the broadest masses of the people in management and administration of the state, an important means for the further development and deepening of socialist democracy.

The democratization of our election system is already based in the fact that, a long time before the elections, the National Front election programs are prepared, together with the national committees, the fact that organizations joined together in the National Front propose candidates for the function of deputy from among the ranks of their most active officials and members, that the National Front selects candidates for the position of deputy from the large number of these proposals in such a way that the composition of representative bodies would be responsive to the composition of society, to the conditions of locations, okreses, and krajs and the state in general.

It is clear that our socialist political system and the position and mission held in it by the National Front and its affiliated organizations provide our citizens with broad opportunities to participate in the management and administration of the state, of all public affairs, both directly as well as through the means of the organizations within the National Front.

Nevertheless, not all citizens utilize this opportunity. If we disregard the apathy of some individuals, then the frequent cause is insufficient knowledge of the political system itself, its principles, and its functions. Therefore, one of the primary tasks of political education and mass political work involving all organs of the National Front and the organizations affiliated with it must be the explaining of the principles of the political system, its advantages and opportunities, which are at the disposal of virtually every one of our citizens and should lead to active participation in decisionmaking regarding public affairs of a local and all-societal character.

The fact that virtually every citizen has these real opportunities stems from the fact that in all organizations affiliated with the National Front there are, today, around 420,000 basic organizations and more than 3.5 million elected officials. Just in our largest organization, the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, it is necessary to elect virtually 1.7 million officials, including sector advisers. To this must be added about 200,000 deputies to national committees, some 500,000 national committee officials, more than 100,000 members of city and local committees of the National Front. This is,
in truth, a sufficiently broad base for the participation of virtually every one of our citizens in public life.

There are certain weaknesses in the life and work of the committees of the National Front themselves, particularly at lower levels. It is known that, while the organs of all political parties and social organizations are elected, officials of the National Front are created by the system under which National Front organizations delegate individual representatives to these functions. It so happens that not all of these delegates come to National Front functions with reminders, proposals, criticism, or initiatives from the organizations which delegated them to these functions and, on the contrary, some delegates fail to transmit to their own organizations that which has been agreed at the National Front level. Such a formal approach to their functions naturally does not benefit either side or the common task. Similarly, the realization of good and beneficial intentions, which are worked out at the center, occurs in a number of instances in basic units with considerable delay or even in a distorted manner. Also, the activities of basic links in the system are uneven.

A formal, insensitive relationship with people and their problems, their justified demands, their critical reminders, and their complaints, which continues to be manifested in our country by the officials and workers of some national committees, state organs, and organizations affiliated within the National Front is foreign to socialism and absolutely intolerable. Such a relationship with fellow citizens must be energetically and systematically eliminated because it leads to passivity on the part of people, it deflects them from participating in public life, and in its effects damages and weakens socialist democracy.

The 17th Congress of the CPCZ evaluated the significance of the National Front in our political system and the fact that "the broad socialist base of the National Front has been responsible for deepening the unity of the party with the people, has strengthened the unity between communists and people without party affiliation and members of other political parties."

The key task of all links of the political system of Czechoslovakia, including the National Front and the organizations affiliated in it, in the ensuing period will be to explain to the broad masses of our citizens the results of the 17th Congress of the CPCZ, to convince them of the correctness of the program which was adopted by the congress, to win them over for its active support and conscious realization. This will form an additional step in the participation of the broad masses in management and administration, an additional step toward the deepening of socialist democracy.
HISTORIOGRAPHIC BIASES ASSESSED, EXEMPLIFIED

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[Article by Dr Johannes Kuppe, department head in the Federal Institute for All-German Affairs in Bonn: "Continuity and Change in GDR Historiography"]

[Text] I. Prussia and the SED's Dealing with History

In February 1986, Horst Sindermann, president of the GDR People's Chamber and member of the SED Politburo, visited the FRG. This third-highest party and state functionary of the SED—and the highest in rank who had visited the FRG up to that time—deemed it called for at a press conference, and evidently necessary, to turn down among his hosts the surmise that "we," i.e. the SED leadership, "no longer felt as real Germans." A little later on that occasion came a statement from Sindermann then through which he might have thought he could lend special emphasis to pledging his "being German" while addressing a Western audience: "The GDR has thoroughly dealt with the history of Prussianism, with Bismarck, and Frederick II, and has taken a position on it."¹

That remark was revealing in two ways: For one thing, it confirmed an attitude of coping with history that is typical of all ruling communist parties, not last of the SED: History is not "accepted" over the whole spectrum of the past, is not received— to put it the Marxist way—as what preceded the present, materially or in terms of persons, in its entirety, but the party selects through opportunistic criteria what of historic events, periods and personages in a concrete political situation serves its interests in securing its power and legitimacy. History thus becomes a quarry from which everyone fetches whatever suits him. It is not history which forms the historic principles of the prevailing party doctrine, i.e. the explanations historical materialism offers for the "correct" political course in a given era, but any given party "position" decides about particular sectors, processes, groups, and individuals in terms of what may altogether be rated as an element of history worth mentioning. The complaint here is not, mind you, that history is interpreted in a certain given way (leaving aside for the time being the dogmatic ossifications of such interpretations in states of communist-socialist persuasions), for something like that is by no means typical of real socialism/communism. The issue taken here, rather, is that Karl Marx is turned upside down if—as in the GDR—whole stages of history are screened out from the image of history or may only be
admitted as elements of historic consciousness when the party leadership, ex
cathedra, has "defined a position."

For about three decades the rulers' ideology has determined in the GDR what
would have to be part of the image of history to be taught. Marx had announced,
however, that history would form the ideology of those who had seized power
after having been dominated before and commit them to an active, humanitarian
consummation of history. That may have been one of Marx' concrete utopias,
by and large confirmed as such by the way in which the GDR dealt with history
up to the mid-1970's.

The other interesting aspect of Sindermann's remark is the emphasis on the
peculiar fixating on Prussia, contradictory as it is in GDR history—Prussia
being that state precisely which was supposed to have vanished from the historic
map with the end of the Third Reich. And for the state of Prussia that may
indeed have happened. Yet Prussia as a compound concept for a form of historic
existence, a specific governmental organization and system of standards, for
germane forms of conduct, a career model, a sense of life and understanding
of duty and, not last, as an unmistakable example for coping with domestic,
foreign, and sociopolitical tasks of a large group (people or part of a people)
had never disappeared from the SED's system of ideological-historiographic
coordinates. As people understood their identity in the GDR, "Prussia" had
survived anyway in a strangely conservative and conserving manner. That this
also was sensed in the West, even if mostly under a false perspective, is shown
there by calling the GDR the state of the "red Prussians," meant as a term of
abuse.

Yet did the GDR not bring such a comparison on by itself, through its entire
policy? Leaving aside whether in this equation, the comparison by western
observers meant to be derogatory, a great lack of understanding was implied
of what Prussia and Prussianism were and are. Still, the traditional image of
the state of Prussia—an artificial structure, poor but efficient and highly
militarized; or rather: surviving solely through the military—contains so
many characteristics which, at least at the first glance, certainly seem to
suit their being applied to the state of the GDR.

That now the contours of an image the SED historiographers have drawn of this
Prussia throughout the last 40 years and popularized as binding have changed
in decisive respects, and that this change expresses a turning point, pre-
cisely for the Honecker era, in SED historiography, is to be shown by rough
outlines in the following sketch. Elsewhere we have presented more generally
the course, special traits and major substantive points, as well as the po-
litical inferences that can be drawn from that radical change.

II. Prussia and the Historiographic Debate of Principle in the GDR

Before we sketch the changing Prussia debate in the GDR a few supplementary
preparatory remarks about the political significance of the general change in
GDR historiography and a needed revision of an earlier judgment.

First let us recall a so far undeniably result of our observation of the change
in GDR historiography. In talking of change one mainly means the changing
orchestration—since circa 1949—of GDR historiography on behalf of securing and legitimizing SED rule. No standstill ever here, be it in the official party lead assignments of research fields for GDR historiographers, be it in the forms of issue-taking with historiographic influences from the external geographic or political perimeter. The contended dogmatizations were always due to their solely valid research method, that of historical materialism, with long maintained restrictions on research subjects and whole eras in world and German history and unvariably continued models for interpreting historic processes and personalities.

In view of such dogmatizations it was perfectly natural that West Germans first did not see, or noticed only insufficiently, the elements of change in GDR historiography. Either they did not seem to fit into the popular picture of a monolithic and rigid Marxist-Leninist ideological structure, or those who noticed them in the first place would fail to attribute any fundamental importance to them for the historiography and, above all, the governmental system of the GDR. GDR historians, in turn, attempted from the outset to make the new debate on the image and consciousness of history appear merely as the outcome of a gradual, creative further development of Marxist historiography, thereby letting that development appear as in no way spectacular. That still happened when in the late 1970's and early 1980's, rather surprisingly, old monuments were again put up in the GDR (Daniel Rauch's equestrian Frederick on Unter den Linden in East Berlin) and, in subsequent years, new books were brought out on old personages and subjects, partly licensed to be published in the West as well.\(^3\)

Meanwhile the readiness has evidently grown among leading GDR historians no longer to belittle the clear tendencies of change in GDR historiography by offhanded references to a quasi natural creativeness of their own discipline; rather, they now seem to be willing to furnish adequate explanations and justifications for so significant a trend. It was Prof Walter Schmidt, the former director of the Institute for the History of the German Workers Movement under the Social Science Academy of the SED Central Committee, and since October 1984 the director of the Central Institute for History at the GDR Academy of Sciences (the "pope" of contemporary history in the GDR) who went farther than anyone else in a basic essay in the spring of 1985. He classified the development of GDR historiography in a fairly straightforward manner as follows: "Whereas the first stage (Author: of GDR historiography) served a relentless and harsh issue-taking with the reactionaries, wherefore it at times rather went too far also, and in the second stage the main point was fully to appropriate the revolutionary and progressive legacy, whereby to gain assurance and clarity about the origin, socialist historiography in our own era seeks to unlock fully and appropriate the breadth and variety, the intricacies and contradictoriness, the progressive and the regressive, the national and international in the German historic legacy, and this not 'sine ira et studio,' and yet with a deep comprehension for the holistic quality of the historic process out of which the socialist society of the GDR evolved. The narrowness that was hardly avoidable in the beginning of the transition period is surmounted more and more with the successful socialist transformation of society's principles of existence, until a socialist society developing on its own foundations can take charge of all sides, levels, and domains of its heritage, which is as rich as it is contradictory."\(^4\)
This description removes all doubt as to whether something qualitatively new happened in GDR historiography, even if, for the time being, this innovation has only been in planning stage and has not yet materialized in applied research, as Schmidt has called for. Applied to our own topic: The altered manner in dealing with Prussia is not temporary, not a reaction to external factors (such as the debate on history, identity or nation in the FRG), but is an expression of a relatively pervasive process of change in the SED's sense of historic identity itself, without the initiating and encouraging stance which GDR historians would not have been permitted to take. The qualifier issued for this trend as recently as 1½ years ago as a (merely) "gradual change" in the GDR's concept of history\(^5\) no longer conforms to the political-ideological weightiness of it.

To bolster this argument, another state of affairs ought to be considered: Especially in the 1980's, in parallel with the extended debate on history and the perception of history, repeated warnings have been heard in the GDR that nothing should or would change in the Marxist-Leninist orientation of GDR historiography, to the effect that the "internal cohesiveness and logic of the Marxist-Leninist image of history" were indispensable.\(^6\) To the extent however, that this brings into relief the unchanging or even unchangeable validity of the core dogmas of historical materialism, i.e. the inevitable historic process from lower to higher forms of society, in view of more recent research on the Marx-Engels reception in the GDR, one should at least raise the question whether the change ascertained for historiography, particularly in dealing with German history, might not have a parallel in recent debates as observed in Marxist-Leninist philosophy itself, principally with respect to historical materialism.

Only recently events in the debate on ideology in the GDR were reported that are of such fundamental importance that the postulated (old) "cohesiveness and logic" of the Marxist-Leninist perception of history, it seems to me, could be struck a mortal blow by it.\(^7\) We are referring to the periodization debate that meanwhile is in full swing in the GDR with respect to the whole history of mankind, in the course of which the henceforth dogmatically set 5-step sequence (primitive communism--slave society--feudalism--capitalism--socialism) has for all intents and purposes been replaced by the triad "primitive communism--class society--communism."

This is not the place to analyze the considerable ideological consequences of this revision of a central assumption of historical materialism—if it comes to prevail at all. The reference nonetheless supports the contention of a qualitative change in GDR historiography. Its representatives themselves are referring meanwhile—while clearly identifying the beginning of this phase with the start of the Honecker era, 1970/71—to a "qualitative further development of the perception of history."\(^8\) In all the evidence for that contention is included, explicitly, the fact that "in general history the previous backwardness has been considerably made up for" and that—evidently a first in the GDR—there had been controversial debates such as on the "principles behind the historic-materialistic periodization of German history" and on "revolutionary transition periods among pre-capitalist orders of society."\(^9\)
Especially with regard to this qualitative change, there comes one argument now that indeed is not quite up to par, the one that proceeds simply from a "rediscovery" of Prussia or Frederick II or Bismarck in the GDR. Not so long ago SED general secretary Honecker himself turned against the concept of "rediscovery." With still more justification specific GDR historians do so who, in evaluating Prussia, never proceeded without weighty reservations to the crude cliche of a militaristic-expansionist exploiter state and its dumb caste of Junker blood-suckers.11

III. Prussia and Its Partial Rehabilitation

Since the way in which Prussia and the Prussians were dealt with in the mid eighties in the GDR can not be considered fulfillment of a reasearch goal and also not- as demanded by W. Schmidt- the temporal, thematic and regional expansion of the historiographic field of research, simply because Prussia always has been an important topic in and for the GDR, it still involves a fundamental re-evaluation, an indirect rediscovery of Prussia. In any case all of those features in Prussian history which have thus far been taboo, because they do not fit the condemnation of the allegedly all overshadowing Prussian militarism.

Yet even this re-evaluation only proceeded step by step. Not until the 1980's did it reach a speed which then caused some western observers to take note, not last because in the FRG the Prussia debate had again be revived too. The quality of this re-evaluation becomes clear if we recall the most important stops in this remarkable learning process by those in power in the GDR.

Alexander Abusch, equipped with only a partial education as a leading cultural ideologist in the SED in the Soviet zone of occupation in the first years after the founding of the GDR, determined for two decades and a half the direction in which Prussia should be seen through his book, a mix between propaganda brochure and pamphlet.12 In it--in a view that, incidentally, also was accepted in circles among the Western allies--he drew a direct line from Prussia's "brutal militarism,"conveniently identified with "Prussianism," to fascism and national socialism. Prussia was--from the SED vantage point--from the time of its founding in the 17th century blamed for all bad developments in German history; thus Prussia not only had to be disbanded as a state,13 if possible, all memories of it had to be erased as well.

In this phase of necessarily having, presumably, to settle things rigorously, a few months after the end of the war, no voice of reason and composure was wanted. The blowing up of the heavily damaged city palais of the Prussian kings in the center of Berlin, regretted even officially today, was an expression of that mood. Abusch, not even having given birth to that thought, could in his absolute criticism of Prussia rely not only on Karl Marx himself but, among others, even on the highly esteemed historian of the workers movement, Franz Mehring, who both saw in Prussia nothing but a most deviate species among the German territorial states.

Yet in an effective propaganda manner he reduced the image of Prussia to a few catchwords which, despite a few cautious revisions in the 1950's and 1960's, informed the debate on Prussia in the GDR: Junkerdom, militarism, eastern expansion, exploitation of the working classes, and suppression of science and culture.
Contrary to this blanket coarse enemy image, some personalities of Prussian-German history like Clausewitz, Blücher, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Lützow and, very early, the great Prussian reformers—barons von Stein and Hardenberg—were partially rehabilitated as early as in the 1950's or even given a GDR pedigree. That this rehabilitation first was for the benefit of the Prussian generals mentioned and the leader of the anti-Napoleonic free corps Lützow, could rate as a piquant arabesque in the long history of "reparations" to Prussia by GDR historiography, or rather, by the history propaganda in the GDR.

Another partial, yet tacit, renaissance of Prussian-German elements could be observed at the "founding" of the National People's Army of the GDR in 1956—or rather: at the renaming and reorganization of the formations of the garrisoned people's police, set up since 1949/50, into a regular army. Service regulations (e.g. the order of saluting), color of uniforms ("field-grey") and their cut, insignias and grades of the German Wehrmacht, and thus an image of Prussian-German military appearance cheerfully showed up without any official announcement—only 11 years after the collapse. Prussian drill with the almost 90-degree goose-step, the changing of the guard in front of Schinkel's restored New Guard (now a memorial for the victims of fascism) at Unter den Linden, Prussian military marches (presentation march, the Yorck March), beating the tattoo and retreat (now with new music, of course), and finally (since 1966) new medals with the pictures of Prussian generals on them (the Scharnhorst Medal being the highest military order of the GDR) thus were back, virtually overnight. This was a perfectly staged and at the same time almost unembellished recourse and return to a part of German history totally rejected up to then and most of the political and social representatives of which still fell under the verdict of enmity to the people and militarism.

As in other sociopolitical and ideological domains also, the ousting of Ulbricht and his replacement by Erich Honecker also placed GDR historiography in a new situation—by preserving and partly bolstering the "national" themes, which now however went beyond the history and immediate prehistory of the GDR—defined as the more intensive tie-in of the "progressive and humanistic traditions of German history" with general world history and, since 1917, with the socialist world system. Through such demanded integration of one's own conception of history (and consequently the partial dissolution of its central GDR focus) one had obviously staked out a course to a more unbiased view, under taboo before, or to fields of history the SED had found problematic.

This one can tell by studying how the partial rehabilitation of Prussia then continued: In 1970 already a book had been published in the GDR which added to the up to then black and white picture of Prussia in vogue some grey shades at least. To the authors, to be sure, the Prussian "military despotism" still remained the crucial "characteristic," yet there also came the earliest attempts to explain the working of "temporary progressive social forces" in Prussia, the Hohenzollern dynasty being explicitly excluded from it, to be sure—with the exception of the person of Frederick II, who received credit for some progressive social accomplishments, even though they had been self-serving. The "Outline" of German history which the GDR Academy of Sciences published in 1974 also maintained that line. Prussia as a whole remains
part of German history primarily evaluated negatively, Frederick the Great already becoming partly exempt from it. Frederick's policy on the peasants (his drastic curbing of bondage) and his role as a promoter of the sciences had already received tribute from Vogler and Vetter, in the "outline," his receptivity to the "progressive bourgeois ideology" was then also acknowledged.

Honecker's assertion before the SED Central Committee in 1975, that the GDR was "indeed the work of many generations" and the allegiance he paid on that occasion to the "progressive lines of development" in German history may then somehow have paved the way to a more detailed preoccupation by GDR historiography with Prussia and its history. Even if the SED general secretary not until 1980 (in his first interview with the British publisher R. Maxwell) explicitly included the "history of Prussia" in the GDR's (historic) legacy, the re-evaluation process had attained a new quality already in the mid-1970's, not last on account of needs for argumentation aids in the nation debate. In the fall of 1978 then, Ingrid Mittenzwei, department head in the GDR Academy of Sciences at the time, in a by now exciting article in the FDJ paper FORUM, had posed the question which, from the Marxist view, had not been answered until then (and to this day) how it could have been possible that already in an absolutist Prussia, i.e. prior to 1807, prerequisites could have evolved for future reforms in line with the needs of the early bourgeoisie. In the answers she supplied, which cannot be traced at this point, one is not likely to be able to see a "new scientific handle," because in large parts of her article I. Mittenzwei remains hostage to traditional formulations and clichés ("what Marx, Engels, and Mehring wrote about Prussian history remains valid"). Still there was one sentence by which she went far beyond what had been customary in the GDR till then: "The history of a state cannot be identified with the development of the ruling class. And even it was not at all times reactionary." That ended the phase of the woodblock-type oversimplifications in the style of the unspeakable Alexander Abusch for good.

IV. Prussia—Half of It a Component of GDR-German Tradition

To provide the new history debate on an adequate image of Prussia with the necessary ideological safety pins and further, to prevent a revision of former "insights" from possibly becoming too rapid and thorough, officially, the party and the historians themselves then issued the so-called "dialectics of the two class-lines" as applicable (and needed) even for Prussian history, as a legitimate Marxist scheme of interpretation. That took care not only of the ideologically required demarkation from the lively Prussian debate in the FRC, it also initiated an extended preoccupation with the positive Prussian lines of tradition as the SED leadership would want it and the admission of Prussia to the GDR legacy that was worthy of cultivation.

I. Mittenzwei's Frederick biography already referred to, which often caused quite a stir, from that vantage point, was almost an inevitable consequence of the preceding ideological and historiographic clearing operations. Now Frederick's "religious tolerance" could receive tribute, his role in the formation of the Prussian constitutional state (abolition of torture) could receive a positive rating, and while Frederick's wars received unreserved and permanent criticism, the king could be portrayed as a "gifted" strategist.
The consequences for GDR historiography in the strict sense cannot be dealt with at this point, especially since for the time being definitive evaluation by FRG historiography is not yet available. What mattered solely here was to explain in an exemplary fashion the change in the GDR perception of history of a momentous period of German history lived through together. A bit too subtly perhaps, one might say: By revising the image of Prussia and partly absorbing Prussia and some of its brain trust in the GDR's store of traditions, GDR historiography has lost its orthodox innocence for once and for all. Prussia was "brought home," admitted to the prehistory of the GDR and hence—at least the half of it declared to be positive—placed at the ideological disposition of the power apparatus as a vehicle for legitimizing the SED government system under pragmatic governmental aspects.

Now it should be interesting to observe which further processes were initiated with this development. Does Prussia remain manageable in terms of Marxist historiography? Or, in other words and more generally: If such re-evaluations form precedents in GDR historiography, might that not cause tendencies toward autonomy, or underhanded disengagement manifestations in some research fields, as it were, still under the tight squeeze of rigid leads from historical materialism? Will these leads themselves not (have to) change? "Punctures" of the once indubitable 5-step society development doctrine were already mentioned.

If anyone would have prophesied for the GDR some 20 years ago that, of all things, a deeper manner of dealing with Prussia would (and could) bring it about to produce a perception of history in the GDR that would reach the people's "hearts and minds" (Hager) and produce a new consciousness of history aimed at the GDR as the socialist fatherland that would create more chances for identification than previously, such a prophet would not likely to have been taken seriously. Yet today Prussian-socialist chains of tradition are being knit together in the GDR through which the SED hopes to stabilize the independent German nation in the GDR that it thought up. In this context several rather political questions arise, to which some thought shall be given in our conclusion.

V. Prussia and the Nation Debate

At the first glance it seems to be correct to say that Prussia—i.e. its entity as a state, its living conditions, its ruling political forces and some of its sociocultural, social, and political structures, its traditions and its dynasty—first tacitly and then publicly, by means of political and history propaganda, was partly rehabilitated to the extent that the SED developed a need for it within the scope of the nation debate.

Never yet in human history, after all, had a similarly gigantic and grotesque undertaking been started as the one the SED engaged in by its justification efforts regarding the split of Germany: Within only three decades the members of one nation who felt to be just that and most of whom could not sense the subtle distinction between a political and a cultural nation, had to be argued apart from each other, only because they were forced to live in two different states with opposing government systems. The unavoidable contradictions of this "argumentation," directed by Marxist-Leninist ideologues and enforced by the political leadership, its lack of
credibility and strength of conviction among the members of the nation concerned has been pointed out many times.\textsuperscript{27} Realizing the futility of it, the SED at times—actually up to the present—withdraw from this argumentation campaign and, since the last 1970's, shelved the debate, letting it rest, at present, with the plain contention that in the GDR, simply, the socialist German nation is "developing" (sometimes: "and consolidating") while in the FRG the capitalist German nation "lives on."\textsuperscript{28}

In view of such futility of arguments in the national question, it had to appear enticing to the SED and its historians to bring an influence to bear through the partial recognition of Prussia on the what it deemed insufficiently developed historical consciousness of the population. Behind it stands the assumption, to be sure, which is unproven to this day, that a "correct" historical consciousness also could help provide a "correct" national consciousness (against which there is the realistic observation that in population strata without differentiated historical consciousness there certainly can develop an—occasionally even explosive—national consciousness and then even turn into nationalism), yet ever since its founding the SED has attempted, through a transformation of the traditional sense of history—by way of indoctrination—to foster the sense for the only correct course for the GDR, the one it has been propagating, to define this course as historically inevitable, and to produce consensus for it.

With the controlled "recourse" to Prussia (that conforms to taking hold of "all" of German history), expanding the time of the GDR's longer pre-history by circa 200 years of important history in German core territories, evidently came the hope to be able to enlarge further the maneuverability for effecting the population's historical consciousness by augmenting the admissible historical stocks (men, processes, events as building blocks for the desired yet still missing socialist sense of history).

If one defines the consciousness of history as the readiness and ability to recognize oneself in the stream of one's own history and to identify with its direction and velocity, the readmission of Prussia and its complex legacy into the canon of historic events—as the SED historians might have assumed—could stimulate that readiness and ability. Over the track of "improved chances for identification"—consensus/legitimation—national consciousness, the "socialist German national state of the GDR" and its ruling party would ultimately then also profit from such a functional mechanism. Only a guess? Left unanswered he is mainly the crucial question whether a skeleton Prussia(nism) as held up by GDR historiography—at least up to now—can trigger such legitimation effect as desired.

Is it altogether possible for such an artificially halved aggregate of GDR—Prussia, following the motto, "all of Prussia is our legacy—but only the progressive Prussia is part of our tradition," to develop a consciousness-forming attractiveness? Did the GDR put too much of a strain on itself with its Prussia revival? Might it at best be enough for a neo-Prussian "state patriotism" tailor-made for the GDR,\textsuperscript{29} without gaining any national consciousness-forming profits for the SED? Never having been a nation, Prussia yet was the initiator and executor of German unity in the 19th century. If the SED leadership now seeks, via an altered image of Prussia, to
turn the Prussian legacy, of all things, into a vehicle for its demarkation and divisionary policy, that is a strategy of embarrassment then that promises no lasting success.

VI. Prussia in the Fluctuation Between Population and Government System

Somewhat more cautious one would have to be in assessing the short-term results of this development. The question to ask here is how many of the concomitants of this Prussia renaissance succeed among the population. It must not be forgotten that the new, moderately ideologically secured attitude toward Prussia launched by the SED also was a change in course in the SED's ideological policy that ran into no barriers of principle in the population. When in 1979 for the first time the socialist Academy of Sciences in the GDR introduced itself even publicly as the successor institution of the former Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin, its reputation rather benefited from it. Meanwhile, e.g., the widely welcomed rehabilitation of the officers in the abortive assassination attempt on Hitler, the Stauffenberg group, is continuing. In 1984 they were already called "patriots," "antifascists," and "humanists," and their sacrifice was given tribute as a "courageous act."

The men of 20 July, most of them no doubt staunch "Prussians," even in their antecedents, have thereby been definitely incorporated in the GDR's store of traditions, while Soviet and Polish commentaries on 20 July 1940, e.g., still today speak of anti-Soviet oriented insurgents.

Early this year then came another "victim": Henning von Tresckow, close confidant of Count Stauffenberg who for all that in 1941, during the surprise attack on the Soviet Union was a major general and chief general staff of the central army group, former member of the famous Potsdam infantry regiment, who invented the plan of the assassination attempt, got his first official recognition for his anti-fascist stance as a "patriotic officer on Stauffenberg's side." Also the restoration or reconstruction, in the proper style and expensive, of former monuments and memorials, the architectural legacy of mostly royal Prussian or royal Saxonian architects, continues at a noteworthy rate in the GDR. Especially through these forms of cultivating the tradition, the SED—at least in the older generation—addresses sentiments that conform to the need for finding oneself again within familiar, partly still experienced history. These (side)-effects of historiographic processes of change seem to provide the SED strategy with success for the time being which it cannot achieve the direct way, by forming a new consciousness of history.

Finally one should have to ask whether SED historiography, demonstrating precisely by the example of Prussia its intention extensively to expand its research field, did not indeed make a good choice since so much that is "Prussian" can be relatively easily integrated in the political and social system of the GDR type.

He who thinks he can spot in the GDR an at times strangely conservative looking and typical German "law and order" society or can understand its authoritarian-police state power structures not only as an expression of a system-specific policy that secures its power, he who can grasp, in comparison with the East European states, the socialist-communist shaped
high labor morale and discipline of the people also as an expression of preserved "Prussian" virtues, who has ever seen how tough it is to explain to the generation that lives in the GDR today, say, the readiness and rights for demonstrations by FRG students, whoever may have tried to justify to friends in the GDR the at times excessive habits of parliamentary debates in the FRG as reflecting a new understanding of the state, power, and order, he can also understand why the SED by revitalizing Prussia (and not only in historiography, and even if it is only half of Prussia) did not take too great a risk. In some respects Prussia simply fits in with the GDR, regardless of what the SED seeks to accomplish with its reformed historiography.

Using Prussia as an example, the purpose also was to show that this change, as initiated by the SED and started under pragmatic governmental aspects, is more than a temporary phenomenon, even if its consequences were due to wrong assessments in part or partly not even capable of being assessed. Whether, e.g., Prussia's purified revival by means of Marxism serves the goal of the further rapprochement of the fraternal socialist peoples in the eastern alliance system, can for some good reasons be found dubious.

Continuity and change in GDR historiography: a good balance between these two poles has not yet been found by the GDR historians. Continual change would be welcome. Continuity without adequate or only half-hearted change is risky. Even halfway certain prognoses on the future course of GDR historiography are not yet possible.

FOOTNOTES


10. In his interview with the Hamburg weekly DIE ZEIT; reprinted also in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 31 January 1986, pp 3-5.


12. A. Abusch, "Der Irrweg einer Nation" [The Error of a Nation], East Berlin, 1946.

13. Through Control Council law no 46, thereby binding also on the Western zones, Prussia was disbanded in terms of international law in April 1947.


16. Nothing has for all intents and purposes changed that to this day. H. Kathe's "Der 'Soldatenkoenig' Friedrich Wilhelm I., Koenig von Preussen (1688-1740), eine Biographie," 1976, subjected the father of Frederick II to criticism exclusively.


24. I. Mittenzwei (footnote 3), p 76.


27. Here one proceeds, up to the proof of the contrary through a free expression of opinion by all concerned, from the continued existence of a "primal" sentiment of nationally belonging together as between the FRG and the GDR, while more differentiated matters, such as the vanishing, dual, or "fragmented" identity of the Germans and of the search for and loss of identity are not touched. Cf. the interesting contributions in W. Weidenfeld, ed., "Die Identitaet der Deutschen, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung," Vol 200, Bonn, 1983.

28. "Kleines politisches Woerterbuch" [Small Political Dictionary]. East Berlin, 1983,4, pp 632 ff. A linguistic and logical absurdity ought to be mentioned here: While the "good" German nation in the GDR constantly develops yet evidently has not yet developed, the "bad" German nation in the FRG apparently continues to exist, yet without chances for development. National development yonder--national standstill here, which contradicts at least Honecker's realization that socialism "will make no detour around the FRG either" (1981). The FRG, from that vantage point, would then remain excluded from any evolutionary or revolutionary progress. On the "world scale," in any event, socialism could never triumph then.


30. Similarly in the "Woerterbuch zur deutschen Militaergeschichte," East Berlin, 1985. This dictionary in many passages already pays homage to Prussia and even to some of its military leaders.

31. NATIONAL ZEITUNG, 8 January 1986.

5885
CSO: 2300/401
MESSNER AT "KATOWICE" MINE PARTY CONFERENCE

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 12-13 Apr 86 p 2

[Article by Aleksy Kalenik]

[Excerpts] Within the framework of preparations for the Tenth PZPR Congress individual discussions with members and candidates of the PZPR are taking place in the basic party departments in workshops. The cycle of individual discussions at the factory PZPR organization at the "Katowice" Mine, which has 545 members and candidates, has drawn to a close. On the 11th of this month Zbigniew Messner participated in a party dialogue with "Katowice" miners.

Almost all problems, opinions and concerns of contemporary Poles were mentioned in the discussion--stated those leading the discussion that day: Andrzej Kluza, the secretary of the KZ [Factory Committee] of the PZPR for matters of ideology and education; Henryk Scheopp, secretary for matters of organization and Tadeusz Kolodziej, executive member of the KZ PZPR. The miners revealed their concerns about effectively fighting all manifestations of social pathology. They asked the premier about many details of the government's work. They were interested in the personnel policies of the party, the possibilities for more efficiently shaping a secular world view in society, especially among the young, church-state relations, etc.. The miners gave their own examples of the possibilities for thrift in the economy. A series of comments and opinions concerned various aspects of environmental protection and the chance for improving living conditions in the industrial complex, including health conditions for children living in this region.

It is worth adding that groups of "Katowice" miners have performed their social obligations and duties within the framework of the pre-congress campaigns.

The discussions were conducted seriously but in a very free and candid atmosphere--Zbigniew Messner stated in an interview with a PAP journalist. The miners have formed their own mature judgments, opinions and thoughts on various topics not only about the workplace, but also about the region and the country as a whole.
On Friday Zbigniew Messner met with the active socio-political leadership of the provincial administration in Katowice and with delegates to the pre-congress conference of the party organization administration.

They discussed the tasks of the party and the government which face the state administration in the period before the Tenth Congress. Stressed was the necessity of an efficient realization of the suggestions and postulates of society. They evaluated the progress in establishing laws on the system of national councils and territorial self-rule.

12972
CSO: 2600/427
130 CONGRESS DELEGATES ALREADY SELECTED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 10 Apr 86 p 1

[Text] Almost 90 percent of the basic and departmental party organizations have already elected their delegates for the pre-congress conferences.

E.g. about 112,000 persons have already been elected for the factory conferences. Elections have also been held for community, town, district and provincial conferences, and many of them, with respect to the number of party organizations, are directly electing their representatives to the Tenth Congress.

As Wlodziemierz Mokrzyszczak, secretary of the KC PZPR, stated on the ninth of this month at a meeting with journalists, almost 130 delegates have been elected to the Congress.

About 65 percent of the delegates to the Tenth Congress are workers. Almost 60 percent of the factory party organizations have already held their conferences. They comprise 15 percent of the first level of the party hierarchy.

12972
CSO: 2600/427
PARTY DAILY ON PRE-CongRESS TASKS

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 4 Apr 86 p 2

[Text] The experience and output of TRYBUNA LUDU in the period after the Ninth Party Congress and its tasks before the Tenth Congress was the theme of the session of the Editorial Council of TRYBUNA LUDU on the third of this month. Jan Glowczyk, deputy member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the KC [Central Committee] of the PZPR, participated in the session.

In his introduction to the discussion Jerzy Majka, the editor-in-chief of TRYBUNA LUDU, concentrated on presenting and characterizing the newspaper's plan of activity in the pre-congress campaign. This is a concrete and fully developed form of those tasks of the newspaper which were formulated by Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski at the meeting with newspaper activists on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of TRYBUNA LUDU and which were outlined by the Political Bureau of the KC PZPR.

He then spoke about the subject matter which appears in the columns of TL and informed those present about planned publishing and information campaigns, stressing that the center of attention has shifted to the reports from the meeting in which the plan for the party program and the theses of the Tenth Congress are being discussed. Through the words of party members, non-party members, veterans and youth representatives the paper is trying to present discussions about concrete matter from various environments as well as phenomena and processes which occur in the economy and life of our country.

In speaking of organizational matters, he informed the council of personnel changes which took place after the last term, namely that Czeslaw Rowinski was now first deputy editor-in-chief and that Jerzy Bielecki, Krzysztof Krauss and Antoni Kuczczkowski were deputy editors-in-chief. An Ideological Division was also created among the editors.

In the course of the discussion it was stated that a certain liveliness was evident in the pages of the newspaper, especially in the publication of polemics and criticism. It was said that the search for contacts and dialogue with the readers was heading in a good direction. Members of the council voiced several concrete proposals concerning, among other things, the publicistic enrichment or the comprehensive enlightenment about plans for the documents prepared for the Tenth PZPR Congress. The need was strongly
emphasized for workers and youth to articulate their problems in the pages of the newspaper. Publications must present a real, realistic, untainted perspective, but they should also find out everything that needs to be done to bring this about.

Turning attention to this year's TRYBUNA LUDU Days, which will be celebrated before the Tenth Party Congress—it was suggested that their program should arouse the interest of Warsaw residents in preparations for the congress.

At the end of the discussion, Comrade Jan Glowczyk stated that he shared the opinion of the participants; the range of TL is increasing, but with greater range and greater authority comes greater demands. TRYBUNA LUDU should fill the role of the leading activist supporting the propaganda policy of the party, the main line of this policy. And so it should respond critically to every deviation from that line. This also means continuing the fight against political opponents. This is a permanent task.

Joining those who addressed the subject of criticism in the pages of the newspaper—the secretary of the KC stated, among other things, that TRYBUNA LUDU must create a situation in which criticism is not treated as something unusual, but as something normal. He also spoke about the crucial tasks of the propaganda front in the pre-congress campaign.

Bogdan Jachacz, Henryk Szablak, Czeslaw Stepien and Leslaw Tokarski took part in the discussion.

12972
CS0: 2600/427
PARTY PRE-Congress Activities Reported

National Ideological Conference in Krakow

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 25 Apr 86 p 2

[Article by M. M.]

[Text] A national ideological-theoretical conference, debating subsequent components of a proposed PZPR Program, ended a significant party phase in the pre-congress discussions. Henryk Bednarski, Central Committee secretary, in his Krakow speech called it a "constructive gathering for the 10th Party Congress".

On the second day of the Krawow conference, devoted to discussing and drawing conclusions from part four of the proposed Program ("Shaping socialist attitudes and social awareness: problems of education, science and culture"), the gains of six collective bodies were recapitulated; debates in each were lively and not free from polemic intonations. More than 70 comrades from throughout the country expressed their opinions.

A sharp split between the organizational state of the party and its, using W. Lorenc's term, "ideological conditions: was distressing at a certain point and is significantly felt by aktive and, in particular, party scholars, teachers, artisans, cultural operatives and journalists. The pre-congress debate offered all the participants an immense and unique opportunity to address such problems. The state of social awareness may possibly be a restraining factor as well as a spur to development. Today we can probably say that this opportunity has been availed to a certain degree--with concrete benefits.

This belief was shared by H. Bednarski in his speech ending the ideological-theoretical conference in Krakow. He stated, among other things, that in the course of the conference, as in all nation-wide pre-congress debates, a great number of considerations and conclusions were drawn allowing the party to acknowledge today its Marxist-Leninist identity and gaining from it an incentive to strengthen its guiding role. Despite skeptics, the party in 1980 is capable of working out and presenting a plan for a program simultaneously expressing boldness and realism; a document which takes into account various internal and external conditions, changes in today's civilization and prospects for a technological revolution.
This proposed Program, stated H. Bednarski, has the backing of party members. Furthermore, the party expects that the 10th Congress will ultimately elaborate on and pass such a far-reaching plan. Such a concurrence of support is dependent on passing the program in its entirety, as a vision—spanning the realities of the next 5 years and the prospects for the year 2000. However, specific fragments and expressions brought on repeated criticisms leading to the drafting of new conclusions and demands during the course of the debate. There were no misgivings expressed regarding the PZPR Program's realism or adequacy.

In reference to the conclusions drawn at the Krakow conference, the central committee secretary stated that the realization of goals and party tasks will not be possible without improving both ideology and education.

The Kradow conference was presided over by Krakow's Coordinating Committee First Secretary Jozef Gajewicz; also taking part were the heads of the Central Committee's Ideological Department, W. Loranc, and Cultural Section, W. Nawrocki.

Army Pre-Congress Conference

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Apr 86 p 2

[Text] A PZPR pre-congress conference was held on 23 April in the Gen. of Arms Karol Swierczewski General Staff Academy of the Polish Army.

The discussion centered on the role of the party and PZPR members in realizing tasks faced by the academy, strengthening moral-political uniformity and shaping individual accountability as a group effort.

Marian Orzechowski pointed to the great significance of the upcoming 10th PZPR Congress. While discussing the present state of international relations and existing impediments, he stressed the need for a continued effort in strengthening Poland's role in the world and in preserving peace.

Gen of Arms Jozef Uzycki, head of the Polish Army's General Staff, participated in the conference.

Army Political Academy Conference

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Apr 86 p 2

[Text] The discussion on 23 April at a PZPR conference in the Feliks Dzierzynski Political Military Academy centered on problems of improving the quality of the didactic-educational process, the Academy's gains in party-political work and scientific-research activities to fulfill the needs of the military and society.

As a participant in the deliberations, the head of the Polish Army's Main Political Directorate, Div. Gen. Tadeusz Szacilo, highly praised the work
in educating the party organization during his term of office and its contributions to the campaign before the 10th PZPR Congress.

Beirut Truck Factory Conference

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Apr 86 p 2

[Text] The theme from the PZPR program that "the leading force in socialist transformation is the workers' class" became the principal thought of the ideological conference which was held on 23 April in the Beirut Truck Factory. The participants included worker aktivs from leading provincial industries and members of the PZPR Congress Committee.

Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, taking into account the problems touched upon at the conference, stated, among other things, that the pre-congress discussions, including the one at the truck factory, are proof that the party is changing. It is not like the one which had been weakening over the years, but rather a party convinced that it can be the guiding force in society.

The policy which we are following and should continue to maintain gives us the opportunity to solve our problems. M. F. Rakowski mentioned, among other things, the need for gradually improving our economy and standard of living, the expansion of non-party participation within the administrative structure and lastly the fight against inconsistency in activity which seems to be our national fault.

13090/9190
CSO: 2600/454
PRESS PERSONNEL CHANGES, MEDIA DEVELOPMENTS

Warsaw PRASA POLSKA in Polish No 4, Apr 86 pp 52-58

[Excerpts] 1 February. Tomasz Szymanski was appointed assistant editor in chief of GAZETA ROBOTNICZA.

6 February. Tadeusz Kolodziejczyk was recalled from his position as editor in chief of ZAGADNIENIA I MATERIAŁY in connection with his being named organizer of a new weekly, RADA NARODOWA, to be published by the Worker's Cooperative Publishing House's Modern Publishers.

10 February. The list of 239 members appointed thus far to the Socio-Economic Council of the Sejm's 9th term was published. Among the council members are journalists Waldemar Krajewski (Warsaw television), Jan Plawnicki (CHRZESCIAJANIN A WSPOLCZESNOSC), Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz (POLITYKA), Leslaw Tokarski (PERSPEKTYVY), Kazimierz Zarycki (TAK I NIE) and Ryszard Zielinski (publicist and chairman of the main board of the Christian Social Association.

15 February. Maciej Ziembinski was recalled from his position as assistant editor in chief of SZACHY.


18-23 February. The fifth World Conference of the International Organization of Radio and Television (OIRT) took place in Prague. Problems of expanding cooperation in the exchange of radio and television programs with the help of artificial satellites, the purchase of broadcasting rights, problems associated with the development of broadcast technology, especially satellite technology, and other technical and legal issues were the subject of the conference. The conference spoke out against excessive commercialization of sports events and the enormous increase in fees, especially for television broadcasts.

The conference's radio committee adopted a resolution in the matter of free access by radio networks to sports events, including the Olympic games. A Polish delegation, under the direction of editor Jan Grzelak, vice-chairman of the Committee on Radio and Television, participated in the conference. "Taking
advantage of the experience of our radio network and other OIRT members," Jan Grzelak told a TRYBUNA LUDU correspondent, "I presented at the conference the question of disseminating educational programs for youth and children. The conference demonstrated that, despite differences, the people in whose hands lie the instruments for the mass formation of opinions, knowledge and culture can come to terms on many important issues.

20 February. At the Press House in Kazimierz on the Wisla, the 3-day general assembly of the Federation of Trade Unions of Publishing Workers and Agencies of RSW "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch" was completed. Participating were 70 delegates representing 27 unions affiliated with the federation covering a total of more than 5,000 members. The adopted assembly resolution includes the most important decisions related to improvement in society's social and material circumstances. New federation officers were elected; editor Zdzislaw Derbich of the Interpress agency was re-elected chairman.

20 February. In Serock the Club of Union Publicists and Labor Administration of the PRL's SD organized a seminar on current social and professional problems in Poland. It is anticipated that there will be meetings with the management of the propaganda, socio-professional and socio-legal divisions of the PZPR's Central Committee and with representatives of OPZZ management.

21 February. A protocol on cooperation for 1986-39 between the Interpress agency and the Bulgarian Sofia-Press agency was signed in Sofia. The heads of the two agencies, Stanislaw Glabinski and Stefan Pietrow, signed.

26 February. The second congress of the Union of Polish Writers [ZLP] concluded its session in Warsaw. Proposals and resolutions on the union's program of activity as well as important professional, social and material problems were submitted. New officers were elected. Wojciech Zukrowski became ZLP president and Halina Anderska honorary president.


Deputy Main Board members are Leslaw Bartelski, Romuald Karas, Tadeusz Kijonka, Sławomir Bogusław Kunda, Janusz Przymanowski and Włodzimierz Sokorski.

The only candidate for president was Wojciech Zukrowski. The newly elected board also approached Jerzy Jesionowski, Julian Kawalec and Michal Rusinek about running, but they did not express agreement. In the voting Wojciech Zukrowski received 107 votes of 118 cast.

The Main Board appointed a presidium from among its members. Besides W. Zukrowski it includes Jerzy Jesionowski, Zygmunt Lichniak and Zygmunt Wojcik as vice-presidents; Aleksander Nawrocki, secretary; Andrzej K. Waskiewicz, assistant secretary; Józef Szczawiński, treasurer and Waclaw Sadkowski,
assistant treasurer. Presidium members are Feliks Fornalczyk, chairman of the qualifying committee; Mikolaj Melanowicz, chairman of the foreign committee; Aleksander Rowniski, chairman of the intervention committee and Jan Koprowski, responsible for contacts with departments of the ZLP.

Also established were the ZLP’s Main Arbitration Board and Main Appeals Committee. Juliusz Gomulicki became chairman of the arbitration board and Zdzislaw Morawski will direct the work of the appeals committee.

28 February. Antoni Slusarczyk, in connection with his retirement, was recalled from his position as assistant editor in chief of TEMPO.

28 February. In Warsaw in the Fireside Room of the Palace of Culture and Science, the Philosophical Journalism Club of the PRL's SD, together with the editorial staff of CZLOWIEK I SWIATOPOGŁAD, organized a discussion on the science of philosophy. Editor Boguslaw Czarninski led the discussion. Prof Tadeusz Jaroszewski gave the opening speech and Dr Stanislaw Butrym spoke on the relationship between philosophy and natural science. Scholars and journalists from both Marxist and Catholic circles participated. According to an announcement by CZLOWIEK I SWIATOPOGŁAD editorial staff, the report on the discussion will appear in that magazine.

In February, the Novosti agency, a Soviet information agency known world wide, observed 25 years of operation. Novosti has representatives in over 90 countries on every continent; in more than 110 it disseminates information on the USSR. Agency publications appear in more than 60 countries. In addition to normal press activity, the agency creates and produces video cassettes. In Poland Novosti publishes the weekly KRAJ RAD and an illustrated supplement, MLODOSC. The agency works with 80 Polish editorial offices. At Novosti's invitation, about 30 Polish journalists go to the Soviet Union every year. The agency also cooperates with Polish publishers. (We have taken the foregoing information from a TRYBUNA LUDU interview with the Novosti Warsaw bureau chief, Igor Korzan, editor in chief of KRAJ RAD.

Opinion of the Press Council Committee on Press Law of the Council of Ministers on publicizing the regulations of the "Press Law" statute:

Press law, as the embodiment of Article 83 of the constitution of the People's Republic of Poland, in the part in which it decides on freedom of speech, is one of the major achievements in the work on development and intensification of socialist democracy in our country.

Polish journalism is fully aware that freedom of speech, as one of the basic civil rights, can be used only in full compliance with other constitutional principles contained in Fundamental Law.

As a contemporary medium of the constitutional principle of freedom of speech, the "Press Law" statute should be very well known by every Polish journalist, to all units of state and economic administration and all social entities. It is in the most broadly conceived public interest that the letter and spirit of the "Press Law" status be assimilated on the broadest possibly scale by the entire society.
That is why the Press Council of the presidium of the Council of Ministers turns to the management and employees of all the mass media for more systematic popularization of the new law's regulations. Knowledge of its principles is still not adequate, neither in journalistic circles, nor in official units and social organizations, nor in society.

During the creation of the statute, discussion on its foundations and later in the short period after its passage by the Sejm, the subject of press law was entertained more often in the press and on radio and television. Now, although it has not yet been firmly established in society's consciousness, it rarely makes news columns and seldom appears on radio and television.

The need to formulate, in accordance with press law,

--access to information,

--a proper attitude toward criticism,

--an institution for journalistic confidentiality,

--a basis for special accuracy in carrying out the journalistic profession,

requires a more systematic discussion in the mass media of the issues resulting from observation of the operation of press law in practice, as far as the work of the mass media is concerned, as well as respect for the foundations of that law by all other entities bound to it by the law.

The Press Council express the hope that the management of all editorial groups will share the conviction of the Press Council on the expediency of more frequent, more systematic broaching and explanation of the subject matter associated with "Press Law" in the mass media.

12776
CSO: 2600/394
CATHOLIC PRESS COMMENTS ON TRUST IN MEDIA

Katowice GOSC NIEDZIELNY in Polish No 14, 6 April 86 p 7

[Text] Much has been written and said lately on the subject of the credibility of the mass media. In these comments there was most often a tone of satisfaction, whose source was the increase, as has been asserted, in society's confidence in information communicated by the press, radio and television. Most often in these statements, the results of press surveys were not cited, undoubtedly so that that detail would not excessively distract the consumer who, after, was to be confirmed in his conviction that all is well. The results of fragmentary research were published in ZESZYTY PRASOZNACZE, but this periodical is not in general circulation. It is therefore worth noting the comments of Dr Josef Madry, director of the Journalists' Workshop at Slask University, who in TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA asks, "Do we trust the press, radio and television?" (TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA No 67). Responding to this question, Dr Madry cites the results of press surveys. "Research conducted in the summer of 1984, barely 18 months ago, allowed us to determine that neither the press nor television, but radio enjoyed the most confidence. Expressed in percentages, the ratio of respondents who completely trusted it was 17.6 percent and this clearly varied favorably from the two other traditional media, the press and television. It also showed that the press has much work to do in this field, for 42.1 percent of those participating in the survey decisively did not trust it." It is too bad the author did not give the reasons for which a significant percentage of readers expressed a lack of confidence in the press. It seems then that the expression of a general crisis of confidence in the press did not include every reason. It would be interesting to see an indication of how reader opinions look in relation to the religious press; has it also been touched by the crisis of confidence? And one more thing. Since Dr Madry writes that 17.6 percent of those trusting radio and since this differed favorably from the number of people expressing confidence in other media, I would like to ask how many believed the information offered by television, or specifically programs such as the news?

Farther on in his reflections, Dr Madry cites numbers hinting that more and more people trust the press, especially TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA. But in order not to fall victim to the illness described by one of the classicists as "the giddiness of success," he adds in the form of a delicate admonition: "There are no newspapers anywhere in the world that enjoy 100 percent confidence."
In the same issue of TRYBUNA, there is an article entitled "Coping with the Gale of Falsehood." It takes up, in a fundamental and uncompromising way, the issue of the purge in the ranks of the Communist Party of China. From the party documents cited we learn, for example, that that party is being threatened by "the problem of bureaucracy; some have forgotten that they are public servants, they do not listen to the opinions of the masses, do not concern themselves with the people; as soon as any kind of problem turns up they play backstabbing games with each other; they work inefficiently, apparently working and simulating fulfillment of their obligations; they delight in empty words and even devote their time exclusively to recreation."

Moreover, there are those who "unsparingly distribute positions and privileges to their relative and friends, abuse their authority, interfere in matters with which they should not be concerned, lay claim to the right to settle issues that are not in their field, demand honors, privileges and power and if they do not obtain them, they complain and spread dissatisfaction among others. There are also those who leads an ostentatious life, use public funds for sightseeing and recreational trips and leave the country without proper permission." Very interesting. One wonders what a newspaper in Shanghai, for instance, would write about the situation in Katowice province.

12776
CSO: 2600/394
'INJUSTICES' AGAINST SERBS, CHURCH IN BOSNIA PROTESTED

Belgrade PRAVOSLAVLJE in Serbo-Croatian 1 Apr 86 pp 10-11

[Article by Orthodox priest Dr Zarko Gavrilovic: "While He Shouts at the Wolf, the Foxes Eat the Meat": Ban on Associating With Priests and on Reading the Religious Press]

[Text] It is happening. In SR Bosnia-Hercegovina, strange things, more Balkanic than European, are happening. An ugly trial in Tuzla has given rise to a great deal of alarm among our community, about which we have been informed by way of public means of information. Lawyers have attempted to bring criminal charges against those whose duty it is to watch after the legitimacy of social movements. Specifically, according to an indictment (K 217/85), and a recommended indictment (KT No 204/85), the district attorney—through his deputy, Zivko Gligoric (we would like to believe that he is not a Serb)—is seeking a court sentence for comrade Bogdan Antic, dental school student Jovan Nikolic and retiree Obren Jovic (the public charges are now being brought to bear by a Muslim) among other things because they associate with priests, go to church and read the religious press. The following is a verbatim passage from the ignobly and illegally formulated indictment:

"The accused have exposed themselves to be Serbian nationalists and because of this have recently begun to have contact with Orthodox clerics. They have gone to certain church gatherings, especially those involving commemorations of old Orthodox monasteries, at which there was surely (underlined, Z. G.) talk by certain Serbian priests concerning negative phenomena and situations in our country. To be precise, it is clear that the accused sought out and read certain literature of a religious nature in order to draw from it material for their propaganda and activities. A particular social danger concerning the accused is the fact that they were active in a place where the population is mixed, predominantly Serbian and Muslim, and which borders on the Republic of Serbia..." (page 26 of the indictment). O tempor, o mores!

All of this is disturbing to us, but there are only a few of us who can blush at the thought that such an indictment can be made in our country. In spite of the Constitution of Yugoslavia, which guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, the Human Rights Charter and the Helsinki Accords, which we have ratified and promised to put into practice and which guarantee freedom of belief, of association with priests and freedom to read the religious press, there is an underground among our guardians of the law that is bringing
unfounded and illegal indictments. The defendants have been in jail since 25 November 1985. The legitimate question that is now being raised is why those who ignorantly and illegally wrote the recommended indictment are not themselves indicted?

First of all, this indictment, at least as far as the quoted part is concerned, starts with the assumption of hypothetical guilt and not with the existence of incriminating activity, which it addresses with the words "...at which there was surely talk by certain priests of negative phenomena and situations in our country." It--the indictment--does not claim that they were there. But even if such talking was going on, what are the defendants guilty of? Why do they not call the ones who were talking about "negative phenomena" in our society? And if someone did talk about "negative phenomena and situations in our society," can this, should this and must this be the subject of an indictment? Everywhere today it is proclaimed that we must bring to light injustice and corruption, that it is our civic duty, our obligation to ourselves, to our consciences and to the future--to the generations to come--that negative phenomena be disclosed by public opinion at the very least if justice is blind and deaf to their echoes, and when it happens that people are thrown into jail for talking about "negative phenomena and situations in our country." The insupportable legal formulation of a recommended indictment that has to be directed at those who challenge negative phenomena and situations in our country is indeed not a substitute for the theory, but this indictment is being directed, with all its brutality and inhumanity, at those who talk about this. Is it in fact forbidden in our country to talk about negative phenomena and situations, and if so, according to what legal statutes? And has this silence about the mistakes of estranged decision-making powers, of which the person who raised this recommended indictment is surely one, led us to this situation in which we sink more and more into "negative phenomena and situations" in our country? Is this not the epitome of hypocrisy by the district attorney's office, which is chasing wolves instead of foxes ("While he shouts at the wolf, the foxes eat the meat")? Is this not the inability of the law to use force on those who are causing the negative phenomena and situations, using it instead of indicting a club of innocent people who talk about negative phenomena and situations?

First of all, what kind of court, here or anywhere in the world, would dare condemn someone for having "contacts with Orthodox clerics"? In fact, as far as I know, there is no such thing as Orthodox clerics, but rather Orthodox clergy or Orthodox priests. And how is it that we--Orthodox priests--have offended some estranged centers of power to such an extent that they prescribe us, as if we have mange or leprosy, and condemn people, even believers, if they have contact with us? It amazes us that the priests association, as well as all other reasonable people, does not raise its voice against this type of lawlessness! How is it that the organs of law and order and of the courts permit the law and the constitutional order to be violated so drastically, at the expense of us believers? Is it possible that this society and the legal system do not have the power to deal with those who break the law at our expense to the extent that they cruelly deal with believers who commit transgressions (the affair involving Nedeljko Janjic and others)? To what extent will these authorities be a mean stepmother to us and a benevolent mother to atheists? On what legal basis is the district attorney's office in
Tuzla able and permitted to bring this kind of "formulated" indictment to bear?!

The indictment charges the defendants with having "gone to certain church gatherings... at which there was surely talk by certain Serbian priests concerning negative phenomena and situations in our country..." What can this word "surely" mean, other than a supposition? And might the recommended indictment be based on supposition or on certain, solid evidence of guilt? And which legal regulation is it that prohibits, either Serbian priests or ordinary people, from talking about "negative" phenomena and situations in our society? And what are the dark forces in this country that are afraid when Serbian priests or their believers talk about negative phenomena and situations in our society if they are not anti-Serbian, militant, organized sabotage against the constitutional and legal organization of this country, which unfortunately exist in Bosnia-Hercegovina as well (or demands for a purely Muslim community). Is it possible that this is not written about in our entire daily and periodical press? Is it not the sacred duty of every citizen of Yugoslavia to speak out—not only that, to fight with all means available to him—against all negative phenomena and situations in our society and especially against their supporters and instigators? And now, instead of taking to court the culprits who are perpetrating negative phenomena and situations in this country, Serbs and Serbian Orthodox priests are being declared "sacrificial lambs."

We are sincerely disturbed about the burgeoning anti-Serbian mood in Yugoslavia, including Bosnia, and we are inclined to believe that it is groundless and dangerous. We desire a Yugoslavia of equal peoples that are as close as brothers, where the rights of all will be cherished by all, jealously and scrupulously respected like one's own rights. Is Bosnia-Hercegovina becoming another Kosovo for Orthodox Serbs and Serbian priests?

Since when is it forbidden and punishable by law in our country for someone to maintain contact with his priest (in this concrete case, his Orthodox priest)? Who, and using what legal provision, has banned church attendance and attendance at "commemorations of old Orthodox monasteries"? Is there a court in this country that will put an end to political sectarianism, that persecutes a religion, believers and priests simply because they are what they are, in spite of the law and the official position of the authorities? Who brought the recommended indictment against them, and when and where were they called to account? Who can be accused of having read the religious press, which is permitted by the authorities, and would any Muslims or Croats be indicted in Bosnia-Hercegovina for maintaining contact with their priests, for attending their places of worship and monastery commemorations, for reading their religious press? And is this not, as we intrinsically think, why Serbs and Serbian Orthodox priests are being discriminated against just as they are in certain other states (in Albania, for example)? But the epitome of hypocrisy in the indictment is seen in the assertion that the accused "were active" in a place that borders on the "Republic of Serbia." The illiterate and ostentatious guardian and false spiritual father of Serbs and Serbian Orthodox priests does not know that the "Republic of Serbia" does not exist on geographical maps as if it were, God forbid, the Republic of Austria; there is instead the Socialist Republic of Serbia, which is not a separate state, but
an integral part of the state known as SFRY. And in this case it can be seen to what lengths blindness and egotistical, unrestrained republican statism will go to create an artificial state border between the republics in our country. And this in an official act that represents our legality—in a recommended indictment—which must be handled using expert, legal and official terms.

We cannot believe that it is possible in the 20th century—anywhere, but especially in our country—to compose this kind of illegal recommended indictment and to so falsely throw defendants into jail. Of course, we are not talking about other crimes of the defendants, if there are any, but about those that we have mentioned above. But since the indictment is illegal in this respect (as far as religion, church and monastery attendance and the reading of the religious press is concerned), we have cause to suspect that it is ungrounded in its other assertions as well. Because whoever construes things once might do so always. In this inaccurate indictment, the organs of the district attorney's office in Tuzla, which participated in the writing of the indictment proposal, have become deeply bogged down in criminal liability, and it would now be fair to bring charges against them and to free the innocent people, if they are innocent, as well as to give these gentlemen who are wielding legal articles like sharp swords a "taste" of prison. But who will indict and convict them? We would still have the singular right to turn to the Committee for Human Rights of the United Nations or to the KEPSU [not further identified] and report a violation of the rights which this state has promised to respect, or to appropriately punish the culprits for misuse of their position so that others as well would wonder whether it is worth it to break the law. In any case, a blemish has been cast on this state by the fact that Serbian believers and Serbian Orthodox priests are persecuted while others applaud. The state authorities themselves should, in the interest of their reputation, initiate an investigation into these abuses. We are still awaiting the outcome of these disagreeable events, and waiting to see whether the above-mentioned indictment proposal against the defendants in the unfounded accusations concerning their religion and their religious freedom, to which we have a right, will be withdrawn, or whether the judicial machine will act in accordance with the maxim: "Long live justice, even if the entire world is to perish!"

In any case, charges must be brought against those who have caused negative phenomena and situations in our country, and not those who talk about these negative phenomena and situations, so that we do not start to think that our judiciary condemns innocent people while encouraging culprits in accordance with the saying, "While he shouts at the wolf, the foxes eat the meat"!

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PSYCHOLOGIST ON NATIONAL CHARACTER ISSUE

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 4 Apr 86 p 3

[Interview with Docent Zbigniew Necki of the Psychology Institute of the Jagellonian University by Andrzej Patula; from ECHO KRAKOWA 28-31 March 1986]

[Text] [Question] Is it possible to instill certain positive characteristics into a society, such as reliability, industriousness, responsibility, order and discipline?

[Answer] This question brings to mind the concept defined in the study of mass media as the paternalistic model of journalism. In this model the journalist is one who knows more and understands it better than others, and every one else resembles a group of underdeveloped children who must be led by the hand. Because the children are unruly, he asks a psychologist such a question. The effectiveness of such a model is very slight. Throughout the world the primary function of mass media is to provide information...

[Question] Your objection is justified, and perhaps it is worthy of reflection, but my question concerns the general educational model.

[Answer] There is much talk, e.g., of the necessity for good work. Yet Poles are excellent workers whenever there are corresponding working conditions. We all know this. Therefore, we must rather seek an answer to the question, what should we do to make Poles work well in their own country, what should we do to create suitable conditions for this.

[Question] This concerns the obvious economic realities, which cannot be easily changed.

[Answer] And so you demand changes in people? Yet this is even more difficult. If the mass media wants to shape personalities, my immediate response is that this is not just ambitious but unrealistic. The only tangible influence that mass media has, according to the research, is on the level of anxiety and aggressiveness.

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