DOD AND
THE CHANGE PARADIGM:
CHANGE AGENTS VERSUS
ESTABLISHED SERVICE ROLES,
MISSIONS, AND CULTURES

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Little money has been available to modernize combat forces over the past 10 years. How can the Department of Defense reengineer the defense acquisition system to provide modernization? What change agents can be applied to alter the established Service roles, missions, and cultures? The authors provide some background on the issue and look at a small segment of it—the barriers to establishing a single DoD acquisition organization and possible ways to overcome these barriers. They investigate the concept of the merger of individual service acquisition organizations into a single organization under the USD(A&T).

During the last 10 years, increased competition and reduced revenues have driven private industry in the United States to take unprecedented steps such as major reorganizing, consolidating, and revamping and modernizing business practices to remain competitive and become more efficient. To accomplish this, they have discarded outdated and excess facilities, eliminated duplication, streamlined organizational structures, reengineered processes, and overcome the strong resistance of entrenched workforces.

Although the goals of the Department of Defense (DoD) differ from the goals of private industry, DoD faces a similar situation. Budgets of both are declining and competition for resources is increasing. But DoD has not been as quick to revamp and modernize its business practices. Though DoD has downsized and has undergone some reorganization, changes to business practices have been limited to “tinkering around the edges.” For example, DoD’s acquisition workforce has been reduced by almost 50...
percent over the past nine years, but none of the Services have significantly changed the way their acquisition commands are organized or operated.\(^1\) As a result of DoD’s failure to change the way it conducts business, there has been little money available to modernize combat forces over the past decade.

With the worldwide proliferation of military technologies, and relatively easy access to weapons of mass destruction, modernization of America’s combat forces can no longer take a back seat. While many factors influence DoD’s ability to successfully modernize its forces (e.g., politics, engineering practices, goals, and operational scenarios), antiquated business practices and organizational structures are two of the major factors preventing progress.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen made this point to Congress in December 1997, when he stated that the capabilities of our combat forces must no longer be “...held back by a burdensome infrastructure and outdated business and acquisition practices.” To afford to modernize combat forces, DoD must follow industry’s lead and totally revamp its organizational and business processes. Jacques Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD [A&T]), pointed out in his February 1998 address to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces Class of 1998 that the only way DoD can afford to modernize weapon systems for the 21st century is to revamp the acquisition and logistics side of defense. DoD needs to undertake a “revolution in business affairs” (RBA) in order for its revolution in military affairs (RMA) to be successful. According to Gansler, the keys to the RBA are to:

- adopt modern business and commercial practices;
- consolidate and streamline DoD’s acquisition and logistics organizations;
- embrace competitive market strategies; and
- eliminate or reduce excess support structures.

While few would argue against reducing excesses and embracing new strategies, there are many arguments for and against consolidating DoD’s acquisition organization.\(^2\) Perhaps the answer is not consolidating but rather reengineering the entire defense acquisition system. We do not support one side or the other. Rather, we provide some background on the issue and look at a small segment our literature search indicates has not been investigated: the barriers to establishing a single DoD acquisition organization and possible ways to overcome these barriers. For the purposes of our research, a single DoD acquisition organization is defined as the merger of individual service acquisition organizations, into a single organization under the USD(A&T).
BACKGROUND

CURRENT STATE OF U.S. DoD ACQUISITION ORGANIZATIONS

Acquisition of defense equipment in the United States is mostly decentralized. While top-level policies are established at the DoD level, each military department procures the majority of its own equipment. Furthermore, multiple acquisition organizations exist within the military departments themselves. The Department of the Army has an Army Material Command, which is subdivided into four acquisition organizations: the Communications-Electronics Command is responsible for acquiring command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems; the Aviation and Missile Command, responsible for acquiring aviation and missile systems; the Soldier Systems Command, responsible for acquiring all soldier and related support systems; and the Tank-Automotive and Armament Command, responsible for acquiring munitions, armaments, and tracked and wheeled vehicles.

The Department of the Air Force has an Air Force Material Command subdivided into three acquisition organizations: the Aeronautical Systems Center, responsible for acquiring aircraft and related equipment; the Electronic Systems Center, responsible for acquiring C4I systems; and the Space and Missile Systems Center, responsible for acquiring space systems. The Department of the Navy has four acquisition organizations: the Naval Air Systems Command, responsible for acquiring aviation related systems and equipment; the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, responsible for acquiring C4I and space systems; and the Marine Corps Systems Command, responsible for acquiring ground systems and equipment for the Marine Corps. It should be noted that aviation-related systems and C4I systems are acquired by all three military departments and ground-related systems and equipment are acquired by at least two of the departments.

FOREIGN ACQUISITION AGENCY STRUCTURES

Many U.S. allies have consolidated their defense acquisition organizations into a single agency. For example, defense acquisition for Canada is centrally conducted by Public Works and Government Services Canada. France has a General Directorate for Armaments (DGA) which procures all defense-related equipment. In Germany the Directorate General of Armaments (NAD) centrally procures defense equipment through that country’s Federal Office for Military Technology and Procurement. The Chief of Defence Procurement heads the United Kingdom’s centralized defense acquisition organization. A Director General in Israel’s Ministry of Defense heads the Directorate of Defense Research and Development and the Directorate of Production and Procurement, which centrally manage all defense-related equipment acquisitions. In addition, Japan’s Central Procurement Office...
provides major defense articles required by the Self-Defense Force.

The mere fact that the countries we have noted have consolidated their defense acquisition activities under a single agency is by no means a testimony to the productivity of such an arrangement. There are conflicting arguments as to their effectiveness and how well they support the war fighters' needs. Nor does the fact that consolidated acquisition works in other countries mean it would work in the United States. As pointed out by McAleer (1989, p. 51), "our constitutional arrangement is fundamentally different from our European friends," as is the manner in which our programs are budgeted and funded. We cannot assume that what works in Europe or elsewhere will automatically work here. But this report would be remiss if it did not acknowledge such organizations exist, and that some were built from previously independent service acquisition organizations.

**Political Influences**

Politics is an inherent part of our democratic government. The separation of powers creates a natural friction between Congress and the executive departments (in this case the DoD specifically). Alexis de Tocqueville (Mayer, 1969) noted many years ago, "Democracy finds it's difficult to coordinate the details of a great undertaking and to fix on some plan and carry it through...." Congressional oversight of DoD (which some might call micromanagement), on everything from its budget and size to the location of its bases, has a major influence on the department's effectiveness and efficiency. Due to everything from congressional mistrust of the executive branch to congressional pork-seeking behavior, this oversight has increased steadily since the 1960s. However, we do not intend to defend, rationalize, or quantify the degree of oversight that is necessary or appropriate. Rather, we simply acknowledge that some degree of oversight is necessary to sustain our democratic form of government, and we'll leave the arguments over the degree of oversight to political scholars.

**Historical Perspective**

The premise that DoD's acquisition structure and organizations are ripe for consolidation is not new. In 1983 the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control's Task Force Report on the Office of the Secretary of Defense recommended consolidation of the "weapons acquisition process" under an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition; however, no action was taken on this recommendation. In 1986 the GAO looked at centralizing defense acquisition but recommended against such an action due to the estimated size of the resulting organization (GAO, 1986). A bill introduced to the 104th Congress in 1989 by Sen. William Roth of Delaware proposed transferring "...all research, development, and acquisition functions of the secretaries of the military departments...[to] the Defense Research, Development, and Acquisition Agency." Reps. Barbara Boxer of California and Dennis Hertel of Michigan introduced
similar legislation. As happens with many such "radical" proposals, these bills died in committee.

The fervor to revamp defense acquisition seems to have gained momentum in recent years. Consolidating acquisition organizations was the subject of a CNA report in 1995 (DiTrapani, 1995). The issue was also raised during the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. Congress voiced its desires through Section 912 of the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, which directed the Secretary of Defense to "...conduct a review of the organizations and functions of the Department of Defense acquisition activities...." This review is to identify "...opportunities for cross-service, cross-functional arrangements; specific areas of overlap, duplication, and redundancy among the various acquisition organizations; alternative consolidation options for acquisition organizations; alternate acquisition infrastructure reduction options; [and] alternate organizational arrangements...." Furthermore, evidence shows that, in response to the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, the Defense Science Board will recommend consolidation of various research, development, test and evaluation, and acquisition organizations within DoD.

Why the increased pressure to overhaul DoD's acquisition organizations? Perhaps it's because so many previously independent factors have now converged. The big threats (communism and the Soviet Union) no longer exist. The national debt has reached an all-time high. Until just recently the federal budget deficit continued to rise. The public has called for reduced government spending—resulting in significantly reduced defense budgets. And some in DoD now contend that the only way DoD can afford to modernize its combat forces is to revamp its organization and business processes. As Dr. Gansler put it, only through an RBA can DoD's RMA be successful. Yet as we have seen in the past, as our research results clearly reinforce, attempts at major organizational change within DoD, such as establishing a single acquisition organization, face significant barriers from both within and outside DoD. As noted in the introduction, we will soon discuss those barriers and present ways to overcome them. However, before looking at the barriers, we should take a brief look at the process of introducing change in organizations.

**CHANGING AN ORGANIZATION**

Prior to collecting data on barriers to change within DoD, we reviewed literature on the change process and organizational and individual reactions to change. This literature review was conducted to gain a better appreciation of organizational change and to develop some insight into the reactions that should be expected from the research participants. The results of the literature review follow.

**CHANGE AND BUREAUCRACIES**

The word "change" is contrary to bureaucratic functioning. Most bureaucratic organizations have been designed for stability. They were organized and managed with the belief that fundamental change
does not happen—that the future of the organization is basically the same as its past, and the goal of management is to maintain and perfect the model that was originally designed (Hammer, 1996, p. 209).

**WHY CHANGE?**

Change is pervasive in our society and a fact of life in organizations (Goodfellow, 1985, p. 25). The need for organizational change becomes apparent when a noticeable gap appears between what an organization is trying to do or should be doing, and what it is actually accomplishing. Change is especially necessary in organizations that wish to prosper in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment (Steers, 1997, pp. 348-349). The question is no longer whether or not to change—today an organization has no choice but to change if it wants to survive.

From where does the impetus for change come? The simple answer is that it comes from the environment—an environment which is in a constant state of change and over which the organization and its leaders have little or no control. Strong environmental forces pressure all organizations to permanently alter the existing infrastructures, policies, and practices (Bolman, 1991). These forces are found both inside and outside organizations. Internal forces create unstable conditions within organizations and threaten efforts to achieve the organization’s goals (Table 1). When stability and continuity are threatened, an organization must adapt its structure and processes in order to ensure its long-term growth and survival. External forces constantly change the environment in which organizations operate and compete (Table 1). These forces are increasing and organizations must respond and adapt if they hope to remain viable in the future (Steers, 1991, p. 616).

**REACTION TO CHANGE**

We all seek control in our lives and we fear and avoid ambiguity. Change causes ambiguity, and for this reason we fight against it. Change means people must let go of some of the habits, roles, processes, procedures and structures to which they’ve grown accustomed. Roles and relationships often become cloudy and unstable. Uncertainty and concern about the future emerge. People begin to feel incompetent and powerless—they lose self-confidence.

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<th>Internal Forces</th>
<th>External Forces</th>
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<td>Employee goal changes</td>
<td>Economic and market changes</td>
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<td>Job technology changes</td>
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<td>Organizational structure changes</td>
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<td>Organizational climate changes</td>
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DoD and the Change Paradigm

They experience difficulty severing their attachments to the symbols and symbolic activities they have developed over the years, leading to the loss of meaning and purpose. All of this results in anxiety, stress, conflict, resistance, and decreased organizational effectiveness (Steers, 1997, pp. 355–365).

Resistance is the force that opposes any significant shift in the status quo. It is a natural part of the change process and can be found throughout an organization. It’s not the introduction of something new that people resist, it’s the resulting loss of control. In fact, the phrase “resistance to change” is actually a misnomer. It’s not the change people are resisting; it’s the implications of the change—the ambiguity change brings with it (Conner, 1993, pp. 124–126). The reasons for resistance can be either personal or organizational. Table 2 shows some of the personal and organizational reasons for resisting change.

**CHANGE AGENTS**

The manner in which leaders of an organization approach the change process ultimately determines the success of the change. In order for a change to succeed, leaders must become change agents—effective at influencing opinions and attitudes so as to persuade their followers to “release the familiar and embrace the unfamiliar” (Hammer, 1996, p. 220).

**STUDY METHODOLOGY**

**DATA COLLECTION**

The research questions formed the basis for collecting data for this study. The authors employed a focus group, questionnaires, and elite interviews to collect

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<th>Personal Reasons</th>
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<td>Misunderstanding of purposes, mechanics, or consequences of change</td>
<td>Reward system may reinforce status quo</td>
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<td>Failure to see the need for change</td>
<td>Interdepartmental rivalry or conflict leading to unwillingness to cooperate</td>
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<td>Fear of the unknown</td>
<td>Sunk costs in past decisions and actions</td>
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<td>Fear of loss of status, security, power, etc.</td>
<td>Fear that change will upset the current balance of power between groups and departments</td>
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<td>Lack of identification or involvement with change</td>
<td>Prevailing organizational climate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Habit</td>
<td>Past history of unsuccessful change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vested interest in the status quo</td>
<td>Structural rigidity</td>
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<td>Conflicting personal and organizational objectives</td>
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responses to the research questions. The data from the focus group were used to validate the structure of the research questions, familiarize the authors with the type of answers to expect during interviews, and as input for the thematic analysis. The data from the questionnaires were used to help better structure the interviews and as input for the thematic analysis.

The elite interview method was used because it allows the interviewers to define the situation as it really exists (Dexter, 1970, p. 19). We adapted comments and questions to the unfolding interaction with the respondent during the interview. The interview approach focused on:

- stressing the respondent's definition of the situation;
- encouraging the respondent to structure the account of the situation; and
- letting the respondent introduce his or her own notion of what is relevant instead of relying on the investigator.

A copy of the interview questions was transmitted to the respondents in advance as an interview organizer. We authors served as the interview team. While we both asked questions and engaged in the interview process, one of us served as the primary interviewer while the other served as the data recorder. A tape recorder was not used. We compared notes after the interview and then recorded the results by question. In cases where more than one person participated in the interview, results were recorded as if only one respondent was involved.

**Analysis**

The data from the focus group, the questionnaires, and interviews were analyzed using content analysis to identify themes and relationships. Similar statements were grouped and those groupings were given a title that represented the theme.

**Study Participants**

The focus group consisted of seven faculty members from the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC), Fort Belvoir, VA.

The Executive Committee and Plenary Group memberships of the Defense Systems Affordability Council (DSAC) served as the basis for the target population for the questionnaires and interviews. The DSAC Executive Committee is chaired by the USD(A&T). Members of the Executive Committee include senior acquisition and logistics executives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and the Services. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) chairs the DSAC Plenary Group. Members of the Plenary Group include representatives of each Executive Committee member, other members from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Overarching Integrated Product Team (O IPT) leaders, defense agencies, and the Services.

Selected program executive officers (PEOs), systems command (SYSCOM) commanders, and Congressional staffers were also included as part of the target
population for this study. Other acquisition leaders (e.g., PEOs and SYSCOM commanders) were not included due to their geographic location (outside the Washington, DC area), and the amount of time and resources the authors had to conduct the study.

The membership of the selected groups represent the acquisition stakeholders within DoD and serve as the most appropriate people to collect responses to the research questions.

RESULTS

Thirteen questionnaires (42 percent) were returned from the 31 distributed to the target population. Ten interviews (43 percent) were conducted from the 23 requested of the target population. The overall response rate was 42 percent. The following were identified by the study participants as major barriers to a single DoD acquisition organization:

SERVICE CULTURES

This cultural barrier is based upon behavior theory. The data saw this as a tremendous challenge since much of the “old timers” behavior was too ingrained due to years of association with service tradition and values. Lasting change would have to be based on an intrinsic desire to do so. Many did not see this happening; therefore, it is necessary to start inculcating a “new way” within the services.

Our review of literature on the change process discovered that an institutionalized culture often considers change almost unthinkable (Wilkins & Dyer, 1988). Employees, including many managers, who either don’t identify with or don’t understand the planned changes, will passively resist change by dragging their feet. It should be noted however, that many personal reasons for resisting change are not intended to prevent attaining the goals of the change. Instead, resistance often results from fear of the consequences of the change and a preference for the known over the unknown (Steers, 1991, pp. 618–619). Thus the DoD reaction is typical of an organization facing change.

PAROCHIALISM

Parochialism among the services is rooted deep in tradition and cultural values that are more than 200 years old. Change within such an embedded culture is a tremendous challenge. Data suggests that the current structure of the services within the DoD organization prevent such a change from occurring.

Literature on the change process indicates that the nature and character of an organization affects the way in which change is accepted. For example, when departments see each other as rivals they may undermine cooperative efforts at change in order to protect their turf. Also, leaders often choose to live with past decisions rather than admit conditions have changed (Steers, 1991, pp. 618–619). Therefore, the reaction of the services, that each is different and must remain totally independent, is typical of an organization facing change.

TITLE 10 UNITED STATES CODE

Title 10 United States Code states that each Secretary of a military department has responsibility for equipping the forces (to include research and development).
Feedback from the interviews and questionnaires indicated that some view this as a legal barrier preventing the consolidation of the service acquisition organizations into a single DoD acquisition organization.

The literature on change noted that members of an organization with precise regulations that control the way in which the organization operates will be reluctant to accept change (Wilkins, 1988). The desire to continue following the known and accepted rules without challenge avoids ambiguity and uncertainty. Again this DoD reaction to proposed change is typical.

**RETAILING THE LINK BETWEEN SERVICES AND REQUIREMENTS**

Our research uncovered a strong feeling among the services that the generation of, and proponency for, requirements must remain with them. They also felt that movement of their acquisition organizations under a consolidated organization would create a barrier between the “buyers” and the “maintainers.” There was nothing in the literature on change addressing this type of barrier or resistance to change. Thus it is assumed that this reaction is unique to the DoD.

**SERVICE-UNIQUE ROLES AND MISSIONS**

There is a tendency among the services to want to do their “own thing.” There is a difference in the way they fight; in the environments they encounter; and in the equipment they desire. There is a general feeling that these unique roles and missions require unique systems that meet unique requirements. Furthermore, only individuals directly associated with the individual services themselves can adequately fulfill these unique needs. A centralized acquisition organization is considered unable to meet the unique service needs.

This barrier is another example of what the literature on change characterizes as the nature and character of an organization affecting the way in which change is accepted. It exemplifies a situation in which departments see each other as rivals and undermine cooperative efforts at change in order to protect their turf (Steers, 1991, pp. 618–619). This reaction by the services is typical of an organization facing change.

**LEADERSHIP: NO REAL CHANGE AGENT**

Under the current scenario, the data suggest that DoD is unwilling to make the necessary changes itself due in part to:

- no real change agent;
- no imperative (threat) for change;
- insufficient time for a single administration to get incremental changes accomplished; and
- no vision setting (e.g., using 18th-century thinking to fight an asymmetrical threat).

For example, the acquisition workforce has been reduced by 50 percent, yet most
of DoD continues doing acquisition business the same way it was done before the reduction. The DoD has not examined and re-engineered the acquisition and business processes.

Much has been written in the literature on change concerning the need for strong, visible leadership (Steers, 1997). There are examples of many organizations that attempted to undergo change without change agents—most of which resulted in failure. Also, if previous attempts by the organization to change were poorly planned and unsuccessful, employees will assume new attempts to changes will also fail (Steers, 1991, pp. 618–619). This barrier is by no means unique to DoD.

**No Centralized Requirements Organization**

This barrier is characterized by the services not being able to control the requirements process to meet their individual desires. As a result, the requirements may be suboptimized for what is “best” for an individual service. Furthermore, with each of the services determining “their” requirements, there is no organization that can prioritize the overall requirements for the proposed single acquisition organization. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process only looks at acquisition category (ACAT) I programs.

There was nothing in the literature on change addressing this type of barrier or resistance to change. Thus it is assumed that this reaction is unique to the DoD.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

DoD’s reaction to change is typical of any bureaucratic organization. The organization was designed for stability and thus resists fundamental change. Many managers have become engrained with the culture of the organization—they believe the future of the organization is in keeping with its past and that their goal is to maintain and perfect the original model (Hammer, 1996, p. 209).

While it was not our intent to take a stand on consolidating defense acquisition organizations, it is hard to ignore the inadequacies in the current acquisition system. The data collected during our research did point to the need for changes in DoD’s acquisition system and organizations. If the DoD is serious about remaining viable in this environment of diminishing resources, it must change its business practices in a manner similar to that which industry made. These changes, many of which will be unpopular, must include streamlining organizational structures; re-engineering processes; eliminating duplication; and modifying cultures. In order for these changes to take place DoD must have a strong “change agent” willing to take calculated bold moves without overriding concern for political impacts, willing to work to overcome the resistance of an entrenched workforce. The paragraphs that follow provide recommendations from our research that can help overcome the major barriers to consolidation and, in
the absence of a total consolidation, can help implement the changes needed in today’s acquisition system.

**SERVICE CULTURES**

Leaders should be supported and promoted if they model and nourish the “new” behavior of jointness required to overcome these barriers. True jointness, although expressed verbally, is not really practiced. For change to be lasting, it must be fostered by strong leadership and driven from within the individual and not forced extrinsically. While not all tradition is bad, some traditions (e.g., single-service bases, individual academies) would be counter to new joint doctrine and should be removed.

**PAROCHIALISM**

It was postulated that a “Goldwater-Nichols II” was needed. The thrust of such a change would:

- eliminate service secretaries and service department staffs;
- direct service chiefs to report to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS);
- revise and expand joint doctrine under the direction of the CJCS;
- educate and train a joint force that would include joint service academies, joint Reserve Officer Training Corps programs, basic and advanced courses, and capstone courses;
- create joint assignments at the operational level;
- create joint bases; and
- provide joint maneuver exercises (including modeling and simulations).

At the Keynote Address given to the February 1998 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc (AIAA) Conference on Acquisition Reform, retired ADM William Owens suggested that practically everything done within the DoD should be done in a “joint mode.” As an example he suggested that a joint service academy operation would have an individual attend the Naval Academy the first year; followed by West Point for the second year; the Air Force Academy for the third year; and back to the Naval Academy for the final year.

Removal of service secretaries and service staffs (with the service chiefs reporting to the CJCS) might be perceived as a dilution of civilian oversight. However, direct civilian oversight would just be shifted to the Secretary of Defense level. Such a suggestion may best be received from the community if it were supported by previous CJCSs, as well as current and former service secretaries.

**TITLE 10 UNITED STATES CODE**

The data in a related study (Fox, 1994, p. 7) suggests different legal ways of implementing Title 10 statutes in addition to how it is currently being implemented. According to the Fox study, even with a consolidated acquisition organization, the intent of Title 10 would be met if “…the Service secretaries retain responsibility for initiating the acquisition program process to equip the forces, formulating acquisition budgets, and making priority
decisions among acquisition programs competing for scarce resources. The services can also retain responsibility for operational test and evaluation; they would become "customers" who submit orders for equipment to an acquisition organization charged with obtaining this equipment with agreed-to cost, schedule, and technical performance parameters.

Indeed, this type of practice occurs today: the Army is the single manager for acquisition of conventional ammunition within DoD, while the other services continue to establish their ammunition requirements and budgets." However it was suggested by our research that it would take a significant paradigm shift or "metanoia" (Senge, 1990. pp. 13-14) among many DoD players to overcome this perceived barrier.

MAINTAINING THE LINK BETWEEN SERVICES AND REQUIREMENTS

It was suggested that the true proponent for war fighting requirements should be the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) and not the services themselves. Under this scenario war fighting requirements would not be linked to the services but rather to the CINCs. The services would be responsible for ensuring the CINC’s requirements were fulfilled. Making the CINC’s members of the JROC would be the first step toward this change.

SERVICE-UNIQUE ROLES AND MISSIONS

The changes recommended above for service cultures and parochialism were also recommended for overcoming this barrier.

LEADERSHIP: NO REAL CHANGE AGENT

Resistance to change is a natural phenomenon within organizations. To achieve change via a "metanoia," DoD and the services must have a strong change agent willing to take a stand on needed dramatic changes (e.g., ADM William Owens and jointness, VADM Arthur Cebrowski and RMA/C3ISR, Gen William (Billy) Mitchell and the use of aircraft carriers, and ADM Hyman Rickover and the use of nuclear power and submarines).

NO CENTRALIZED REQUIREMENTS ORGANIZATION

As a solution to this barrier, the data suggests that the CJCS should direct CINC membership on the JROC at the appropriate (deputy CINC) level and expand the scope and capability of the JROC by reviewing all ACAT levels. This approach would make for a "true joint process" and would:

- reduce duplication of effort among services;
- give war fighters direct input into the acquisition process;
- be a step toward developing and creating a single DoD acquisition organization; and
- improve "jointness" through the joint development of doctrine, equipment, and forces.

ELIMINATE DUPLICATION

Recognizing that consolidation of all DoD acquisition organizations may be an
impossible task, perhaps taking smaller steps to eliminate duplication is a more palatable idea. For example, C4ISR should be common or at least compatible across the DoD. Thus consolidation of the organizations acquiring these systems should be considered as a test case for further consolidation within the DoD. Additionally, consolidation of laboratories, software development organizations, organizations acquiring aviation systems, and organizations acquiring ground-related systems should also be considered.

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REFERENCES


ENDNOTES

1. Information provided by an OSD staff member during an interview with the authors during March 1998.

2. See Center for Naval Analysis Report (1995, April, CMR 95-64) for detailed information on the pro’s and con’s of consolidating DoD’s acquisition organizations.

3. For additional information on this topic see Houston, C. (1997); Krikorian, G. K. (1992); or GAO (1986, February, Report NSIAD-86-51FS).


5. 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.