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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN S & T REVOLUTION, WORKING CLASS EXAMINED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASSE I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 86 (signed to press 16 Jan 86) pp 51-61

[Article by P. N. Fedoseyev: "The Scientific and Technical Revolution and the Working Class"]

[Text] The social consequences of scientific and technical progress in various social systems and the effects of the scientific and technical revolution on the development of the working class and its different segments are matters of constant interest to researchers in many countries. The discussions at the 11th international forum of researchers of the working class and workers movement in Paris in summer 1985 revolved around this subject matter. The forum, which was held in the UNESCO building, was attended by representatives of scientific and workers organizations of various types from a number of countries in Europe, America, Asia and Africa. The Soviet delegation included Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Academician P. N. Fedoseyev, Vice-President of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences and Academician I. I. Lukinov, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Director of the Institute of the International Workers Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences, T. T. Timofeyev, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Director of the Africa Institute A. A. Gromyko, Deputy Director of the Institute of the International Workers Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences, and Doctor of Economic Sciences A. I. Belchuk, department head at the Institute of the International Workers Movement and Doctor of Historical Sciences G. G. Diligenskiy and others. Academician P. N. Fedoseyev presented a report on "The Scientific and Technical Revolution and the Study of the Working Class" at the first plenary session of the forum. Other Soviet researchers presented reports at subsequent sessions.

An article by Academician P. N. Fedoseyev, based on his report, is being published in this issue.
Life in today's society is unimaginable outside the context of the scientific and technical revolution. In essence, it represents a radical and qualitative transformation of productive forces as a result of science's evolution into the most prominent and most dynamic factor in the development of national production. By replacing the physical labor of the human being with the forces of nature and technical devices and by eliminating his direct inclusion in the production process through the operation of humanly controlled embodied knowledge, the scientific and technical revolution is radically changing the conditions, nature and content of the labor of society's main productive force—the laboring public. By changing the features of national production and the forms of social division of labor, the scientific and technical revolution influences the social structure and all facets of life in today's society—education, family life, culture, human mental processes and the relationship between nature and society.

It is understandable that the scientific and technical revolution and its effects on societal life and on the individual are especially pertinent today, are the subject of heated arguments and occupy a prominent place in political debates, in scientific research and in journalistic articles. Various social forces and movements, especially the public organizations of the working class, must define their attitude toward it.

This heightened interest in this facet of societal life also stems from the ambiguous social consequences revealed by several decades of scientific and technical revolution. The unprecedented increase in opportunities for construction and, unfortunately, destruction which are present on the current level of scientific and technical progress and its prospects are motivating not only scientists and politicians but also the common man to wonder and worry who this power can and should serve and for what purposes. For the good of man or for evil? For the sake of universal prosperity and the progress of humanity or for the sake of the selfish interests of privileged groups? The world public is particularly disturbed and is expressing vehement protests about the fact that the results of scientific and technical progress can be used and are being used to escalate the arms race, to the detriment of peace, public security and social progress.

The scientific and technical revolution transforms both the technical and human components of productive forces and represents a complex and multifaceted process with direct or indirect effects on all facets of life in society. A knowledge of the major changes in production equipment and technology and even of changes in the socioprofessional structure of the population and in its education and skills is completely inadequate for an understanding of the nature of this revolution, its causes and its multifaceted effects on societal life. All of this knowledge and other isolated bits of information about the processes engendered by the scientific and technical revolution provide some idea of it, but do not explain its essence or allow for the assessment of future prospects and the opportunities it is creating for human progress. Only a comprehensive approach to the assessment of this revolution in its indissoluble connection with the radical social processes marking the current phase of the world historical process as a whole can define its essence and its historic significance.
Despite all of the integrity and systemic nature of the processes engendered by the scientific and technical revolution, the most important indicator and decisive condition of its successful development, in our opinion, is the all-round development of the individual and of his fundamental strengths and capabilities. However significant scientific and technical achievements might be in themselves, they are of value primarily and mainly because they facilitate human labor and create the necessary conditions for the all-round development of the individual. Viewing it from this vantage point, we immediately see that although the scientific and technical revolution is a worldwide phenomenon, the forms it takes and its social effects differ radically in different social systems. The most direct and striking difference in its social effects in different social systems is the status of the laboring public, primarily in the production process itself and in its system of relations.

In capitalist production, K. Marx noted, "the product...towers above the producer, the object rises above the subject, completed labor is superior to ongoing labor, etc." This is precisely the root of the theories exaggerating the role of technology and science and assigning them a separate life and power—beneficial or demonic—over the fate of the society and people. Both the "optimistic" (representing scientific and technical progress as a universal means of surmounting all contradictions and curing all the ills of bourgeois society) and the "pessimistic" (predicting the unavoidable downfall of the human race as a result of "technical civilization") interpretations of the scientific and technical revolution are distinguished by the underestimation of the role of the masses in the historical process in general and the role of the laboring public—"the human element"—in production in particular. A common feature of these theories is the exaggeration or absolutization of the importance of science and technology in social development—they are portrayed as an absolutely independent and, what is more, decisive factor of contemporary history, a "superhuman" factor towering over society.

By the end of the 1960's, however, both the technocratic-scientific theories and the "romantic," anti-technical ideology had essentially revealed their groundlessness—in the form in which they had been expressed earlier. The facts of societal development revealed that neither could provide a basis for the comprehension and resolution of the fundamental social problems in today's world. Theories attempting a unique synthesis of pro-technical and anti-technical attitudes rose to the surface. Various forms of "objective criticism," minimizing the contradictions between the extreme points of view—the utopian theories of the "technical miracle" and "technical hell"—gained some popularity. The desire to make certain adjustments of a sociopolitical nature in the comprehension of the process and prospects of scientific and technical development became increasingly apparent.

The new phase in the development of the scientific and technical revolution beginning with the second half of the 1970's, however, gave the technocratic interpretation of society, which seemed to have already exhausted its possibilities, a "second wind." In many works, social progress again began to be associated with the latest scientific and technical achievements—this time with computers, microelectronics and robots. The new generation was simply
called the "computer generation." The mastery of computerization techniques served as the basis for the latest varieties of the theory of the "post-industrial" society—the "computer civilization," the "information society," the "robot revolution" and others.

There is no question that these theories had some new features: The communicative ("bringing people closer together") and personal ("securing individual freedom") aspects were singled out, and the important role of science and education was underscored, emphasizing the value of the liberal arts, and especially ethics, for the correct assessment of the role of computerization in social progress. Nevertheless, the main tenet of these theories was still the assertion that computerization represents a means of creating new social, supra-class and supra-national structures making radical changes in the mechanism of societal development. These newest theories are built on the foundation of technical determinism and the separation or isolation of scientific and technical progress from the determinants of socioeconomic development and the actual forces in the historical process. It is also quite indicative that all of these theories, just as the technocratic theories preceding them, are virtually unanimous in their denial of the "worker question," because the working class as such is supposedly disappearing.

It is important to remember that the increasing power of science and technology does not operate spontaneously, but always under certain social conditions and in accordance with the specific goals of a given society, class, party or state. Science and technology are created through human effort, and it is precisely on the human being and on the social organization of his activity that the purpose and nature of the use of scientific and technical achievements depend. Although science and technology graphically reflect a method of the development of productive forces, they do not function without people, and they represent productive forces only in combination with live labor, only in the activity of the laboring public, organized and directed in accordance with the goals of the given society and the prevailing method of production in it.

This is particularly important to remember when we discuss the problems of the working class and the workers movement during the scientific and technical revolution. Attention is usually focused on the changes this revolution makes in the conditions of labor, education and the standards of daily life. All of this is true. The development of the working class and the development of the laboring individual in accordance with the requirements of modern production are the main social result of the scientific and technical revolution. But this is only one side of the matter. The working class is influenced by more than just the scientific and technical revolution, but the activities of the working class represent the basis and essence of the process by which productive forces are radically reorganized. After all, the transformation of science into a direct productive force consists primarily in the technological use of science, in the creation of the kind of production system in which the scientific idea is materialized and through which it is realized, evolving from a potential into an active force. But this would be unthinkable without changes in the working individual, without the development of the relevant knowledge, abilities and skills determining the possible scales and forms of the use of specific technical achievements.
As a salient feature and powerful generator of the colossal progress of contemporary productive forces, the scientific and technical revolution creates worldwide opportunities for material well-being, for a better social structure, for better living and working conditions, for the all-round development of the individual, for a healthier environment for man and for solutions to other global problems. The successes of physical production create the necessary conditions for the expansion of the sphere of spiritual culture, the appearance of new forms of leisure and the growth of the intellectual potential of each member of society.

All of these new opportunities, however, are certainly not realized automatically. The scientific and technical revolution alone, if its processes are not regulated, can give rise to the most serious disparities and contradictions in societal development. The most important task facing mankind, especially the working class, today consists in learning to solve all of the new, constantly arising economic and social problems engendered by the scientific and technical revolution in an organized and purposeful manner and in consciously putting its achievements at the service of social progress. This cannot be done without the active participation and leading role of workers and their organizations.

The social aims of societal development are a crucial matter. We regard the primary ones as the guarantee of the tangible conditions for social equality, the elimination of the gap between poverty and wealth, between the dominant and oppressed classes, and the eradication of differences in the education, living conditions and ways of life of people engaged in mental and physical labor. Scientific and technical achievements, the comprehensive mechanization and automation of production and the extensive use of computers and mechanical monitors establish the physical prerequisites for the resolution of these problems. In themselves, however, they cannot secure the attainment of real social equality or the conditions for the harmonious development of the human laborer. The effects of the scientific and technical revolution on labor, the way of life, family relationships and mental processes are mediated by social and ideological factors. These effects depend on the type and maturity of social relations and the social form of the organization of production and scientific and technical activity.

In the postwar capitalist world the scientific and technical revolution created the material prerequisites for socioeconomic development. In general, it enhanced the well-being of the society. It requires high production standards and workers with higher educational and vocational-technical levels, it improves working conditions and it promotes the development of the individual's creative potential. The expectations of the working class are rising, protests against monotonous labor are growing louder, the working class no longer wants to accept the role of a simple appendage to a machine or to accept various forms of social injustice and it is striving for a more harmonious and sensible way of life. Important changes are taking place in the sphere of consumption; to a considerable extent, mass production has made the physical and cultural wealth and forms of leisure which were once confined to the privileged classes and strata accessible to broad segments of the population.
Displaying an ever deeper understanding of the nature of social phenomena, the working class has taken a lively interest in the further development of science and technology. Its attitude toward scientific and technical progress differs radically from the position of the Luddites. The working class' positive attitude toward scientific and technical progress is far from unconditional, because in the capitalist society it must experience its negative effects. The economy developing on the basis of the scientific and technical revolution is constantly feverish (recessions, monetary upheavals, unemployment, etc.). In general, production has remained subordinate to the interests of earning a profit. Labor is still being exploited by capital, and this exploitation is growing more subtle and is being based more and more on the use of complex labor, capable of creating considerable surplus value per unit of time. The traditional systems of Taylorism and Fordism are being replaced by new forms of operational efficiency, with the aim of increasing the return on the worker's nervous and mental energy and of creating the kind of social and psychological climate at enterprises that will, on the one hand, promote the better use of equipment and raw materials and, on the other, disguise exploitation.

The worker's physical workload is reduced in automated plants, but this is accompanied by the dramatic increase in nervous and mental tension arising from work with costly and complex equipment. There are many industrial accidents and frequent occupational diseases connected with work with chemicals, excessive noise, etc. The worker is turning into an appendage of an automated or, more precisely, semiautomated assembly line, and this gives rise to protests against monotonous and tiresome labor. It is true that methods of "humanizing" labor have been employed at capitalist enterprises since the beginning of the 1960's and they have partially relieved the monotony of some processes: They involve the alternation of labor operations, the grouping of operations of a single type, the mastery of several occupations by workers and various forms of team work. But they cannot change the subordinate status of the worker in the system of social relations in the contemporary capitalist society.

Labor productivity is rising much more quickly than real wages. At the same time, the more intense exploitation of labor, the elevation of profit margins and the use of scientific and technical achievements for lucrative purposes are leading to the rapid growth of businessmen's profits. The government's tax policy is also contributing to the redistribution of national income in favor of big capital. Furthermore, much of the money collected from the laboring public finances various types of government programs (especially military ones) providing monopolies with an income.

The social functions of the bourgeois state vary slightly depending on whether conservative or reformist forces hold the levers of government power: The former make cuts in "non-productive" social expenditures and the latter strive for economic growth while retaining certain aspects of social policy. In general, however, the bourgeois state considers its primary task to be the guarantee of "normal" capitalist reproduction and the creation of optimal conditions for entrepreneurial activity, which gives the laboring public no opportunity to make use of the fruits of scientific and technical progress.
The position of the population strata with an income below the official poverty level is still particularly difficult. In 1984 there were 30 million poor in the EEC countries and 35 million in the United States. The social status of the working class is growing more insecure, the average rate of unemployment is rising and real wages are declining. Between 1980 and 1983 the number of unemployed in the developed capitalist countries increased 1.5-fold, rising from 19.2 million to 29.6 million. And this figure does not include those who have grown discouraged, have given up looking for jobs and are no longer registered with employment bureaus, and young people who are just entering the labor market.

The connection between these phenomena and crisis-related processes in the economy is indisputable. Their present scales stem from the structural and technological reorganization of the capitalist economy, which is "pushing" large segments of the labor force out of traditional sectors (coal mining, metallurgy, the automotive industry, shipbuilding and others). Furthermore, their transfer to the rapidly growing new sectors (the chemical and aerospace industries, computer production and others) is often difficult: Their skills do not meet the demands of the labor market. The capitalist modernization of the economy injures the most vulnerable population strata: the elderly, youth, women and members of ethnic minorities. The status of migrant workers is extremely unstable. According to the forecasts of some economists, the robotization of production can give rise to a critical situation: After all, robots cost less than manpower, their labor productivity is much higher and they can work continuously because they never get tired. The third generation of robots is operating now, the fourth is being designed and the fifth will make its appearance before the end of the century: Robots will "see" and "hear" and will make "independent" decisions. In contrast to previous phases in the development of the scientific and technical revolution, the current one has affected tens of millions of people employed in capitalist production. According to some forecasts, one out of every five workers will face the threat of "technological unemployment" within the foreseeable future.

Along with unemployment, chronic inflation, which has turned into one of the capitalist economy's inexorable features, is destabilizing the status of workers. Between 1967 and 1984 prices tripled in the United States, Japan and Canada and rose more than 3.5-fold in the EEC countries. Inflation is engendered by the growth of non-productive consumption, especially the arms race. The regulation of prices by monopolies in key sectors of the economy also plays an important role. Inflation is nullifying the material benefits the working class won in a persistent struggle. By 1983 real wages had fallen to the 1979 level in the FRG, the 1976 level in Great Britain and the 1971 level in the United States.

Therefore, the modernization of the economy by capital through the use of the latest scientific and technical achievements has a clearly defined social purpose: It is supposed to weaken the organized labor movement, especially its more militant segments. The "technological revolution" of the 1980's is complicating the structure of the working class and intensifying its internal differentiation, which will establish an objective basis for discrimination against the categories of workers who have the hardest time protecting
themselves against the authoritarian demands of employers. These are not only the semiskilled segments of the proletariat and those employed in the old, crisis-stricken sectors. The appearance of a huge manpower reserve is destabilizing the position of all hired workers, including skilled workers in modern occupations and many categories of employees and engineering and technical personnel, is undermining their position in relation to employers and is allowing capital to launch an offensive against the laboring public's standard of living.

One of the main factors with a negative effect on all facets of the laboring public's life in the capitalist countries is the militarization of the economy. The arms race is devouring colossal quantities of material, financial and labor resources. The cost of new equipment is rising constantly. During the first three decades after World War II there was a rise of 10-20 times in the cost of aircraft carriers, of 20-30 times in the cost of destroyers, of 30-40 times in the cost of bombers, of 40-50 times in the cost of submarines and of 100-150 times in the cost of fighter planes. In subsequent years the cost of new and improved types of weapons will continue to rise. The scales of militarization are being expanded accordingly. Whereas in 1970 the NATO countries' expenditures on weapons totaled, according to the London Institute of Strategic Studies, 99.5 billion dollars, with the United States spending 74.4 billion of the total, in 1984 the total approached 400 billion for the NATO countries, including almost 280 billion for the United States. The U.S. military budget for the new year exceeds 300 billion dollars. While they were escalating the arms race, the NATO countries increased their annual military expenditures by 15 times over 30 years.

It is understandable that the gigantic burden of the arms race lies heaviest precisely on the working class, on the laboring masses. But the working class and laborers do not pay for militarism only in direct and indirect material and financial expenditures. There is another, probably higher price—the social price of militarism. The arms race dominates more than just physical production. Science has to work in its interests and to the profit advantage of military corporations. Militarism is deforming scientific and technical progress by assigning priority to military and military-space projects. These are absorbing a percentage of the R & D budget unprecedented in peacetime (more than a third). The results of the increase in military R & D are inconsistent with the need for economical and profitable production and are complicating the resolution of social problems engendered by scientific and technical progress.

Attempts are still being made to prove that cuts in military spending and the conversion of military industry will supposedly lead to higher unemployment and other economic ills. An objective economic analysis, however, attests to the opposite. Large military budgets are not only failing to reduce unemployment in the capitalist countries but are even helping to increase it. Excessive military budgets lead unavoidably to inflation and, consequently, to the reduction of the population's real purchasing power. This leads to production cuts and higher unemployment. According to all estimates, investments in civilian sectors of the economy can create more jobs than equal investments in military production.
There is no question that expenditures on war inhibit the development of civilian branches. The fact that the military industry is a large consumer of the products of the processing and extractive industries (steel, oil, machine tools, equipment and so forth) seems to indicate the probability of production growth, but the diversion of resources to reinforce the military sphere far outweighs the relative increase in the number of jobs and the volume of production resulting from military orders. Back in the 1960's, prominent American economist W. Leontief demonstrated that a 20-percent cut in arms production would eliminate 300,000 jobs but would simultaneously allow for the creation of 697,000 new jobs in civilian fields of production. Each increase of a billion dollars in the military budget, according to experts, is accompanied by a decrease of 11,600 in the number of jobs in the United States.

The intrusion of international problems into the private lives of millions of people and the realization of the actual threat of thermonuclear war, which will affect the vital interests of each individual directly, are motivating the general public, and especially the working class, to seek ways of influencing international relations and opposing aggression, the arms race and attempts to solve disputes with the use of force or the threat of its use. The more active antiwar demonstrations of the working class in recent years are of colossal political significance.

Whereas in some strata the crisis and capital's offensive have aroused worries about possible changes and the desire to maintain the status quo, in others they have stimulated more vehement social demands and strengthened the desire for democratic reforms.

The process of rising expectations, which became much stronger under the influence of the scientific and technical revolution and the labor and democratic movements, has had a profound effect on the public mind. It is reflected not only in the desire of the laboring public to consolidate its financial status and make labor more meaningful, but also in the desire to expand democratic practices in production, enhance the social dignity of the working man and achieve a more harmonious way of life. The new expectations, the rising level of education and the broader outlook are raising the social requirements of the masses and elevating their demands.

In spite of the objectively more adverse conditions of the working class' struggle in the 1980's, it is resisting monopoly pressure with unprecedented inflexibility. As a result, the general state of affairs in the capitalist countries is being influenced considerably by the active struggle of workers for their class goals. Since the success of the strike struggle depends largely on mass strength, the growing scales of the struggle alone represent an important condition for the enhancement of its effectiveness. But the effectiveness of proletarian strikes has been augmented even more quickly than their size. The reason is that the incorporation of increasingly complex and costly equipment, the institution of many technological requirements, the concentration and centralization of capital and management and the increasing interdependence of various production units and spheres of activity have made the contemporary capitalist enterprise and even the national economy as a whole more vulnerable to the concerted attacks of the working class.
Indirect corroboration of the increasing activity and militance of the working class can be found in the fact that ideologists of various currents again had to deal with the problem of the working class as the leading force for social change in today's world in the second half of the 1970's and the early 1980's, a problem which seemed to have been "removed from the agenda" in the industrially developed countries when the scientific and technical revolution began its intense phase of development. Virtually all ideological concepts with this interpretation of the "worker question" with a view to the realities of the scientific and technical revolution had to question or retract the ideas of the "age of economic prosperity" concerning the integration of the industrial working class into the system of developed capitalism and the abatement of the class struggle. As inflation and unemployment rose and real wages declined, as the social distance between the working masses and property owners, members of the administrative network and self-employed individuals increased and so forth, the concept of "deproletarization," which was turning the industrial working masses into a force with an alleged interest in capitalist social relations and diluting them into some kind of "middle" class, was discredited more and more. Increasing numbers of researchers, and not only leftist radicals, are realizing that the "middle" class is a meaningless term, a purely ideological concept, because the differences in the income levels, education and consumption standards of the occupational groups usually included in this class are so great that scientific criteria are inapplicable here. The nature and direction of discussions about the changing class structure of industrially developed countries began to be influenced more and more by critics of the theory of the "post-industrial society" and other theories substantiating the decline of the working class' social role under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution.

In contrast to capitalism, the socialist society—the society of social justice and social guarantees—stimulates the development of the particular fields of scientific and technical progress that establish optimal conditions for the disclosure of the individual's creative essence. Under the influence of scientific and technical progress and purposeful state policy, the social-class structure of socialist society is improving, its social homogeneity is increasing, the gradual convergence of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia is taking place, the boundaries between urban and rural areas are being eradicated and significant differences between mental and physical labor are being surmounted. The income of the laboring masses is constantly rising and their living conditions are improving. In a planned economy, retooling not only does not undermine the material and social status of the worker but even strengthens it. In other words, the social use of the scientific and technical revolution in the socialist society is distinguished by the complete disclosure and development of all of the individual's creative potential and capabilities, by his complete material and spiritual liberation and by the intellectualization of labor.

Of course, even in the socialist society the realization of the objective possibilities created by scientific and technical progress for the improvement of the labor public's status is not an immediate process and it is far from automatic. After all, socialism has inherited a production base created by capitalism and cannot immediately "abolish" the traditional division of labor,
create an abundance of material goods or solve the problem of free time—especially since the majority of socialist revolutions triumphed in countries on the middle or lower levels of capitalist development, countries which had to catch up with other, more advanced states in the economic sphere. We must also remember that the construction of socialism began in a relatively backward country, ravaged by civil war, and that the national economy of the Soviet Union suffered colossal damages during World War II.

Of course, the war also injured many capitalist countries. Today it is wise to remember the high price people had to pay for the resumption of a peaceful life.

It must be said that one of the most important natural tendencies in the development of the working class under socialist conditions is its extremely dynamic nature. Statistics and sociological studies attest to the constant growth of the absolute and relative size of the working class in the USSR and significant changes in its sectorial and territorial structure. It grew from 27.7 million members in the beginning of the 1950's to 78.8 million at the beginning of the 1980's. The working class now represents more than 60 percent of all employed people in the USSR (in comparison to 48 percent at the beginning of the 1950's).

The transformation of workers into the majority of the population considerably changes the nature of reproduction and the appearance of the working class and increases its productive and social potential. As long as the working class represented a minority, its reproduction under the conditions of intensive industrialization was primarily external; working class ranks were augmented less by young people from worker families than by people from outside the working class, mainly from the peasantry—that is, people who had not adapted completely to industrial labor and the urban way of life—and this gave rise to certain difficulties. When the workers turn into the majority of the population, the growth of the working class gradually acquires a natural nature; most new members are young workers. This eventually leads to a situation in which the majority of the working class itself consists of workers with old and strong ties to modern production. This creates more favorable conditions than before for the enhancement of the productive, social and spiritual potential of the working class. In this sense, it forms a social-class prerequisite for economic intensification and better economic management, just as the scientific and technical revolution constitutes its material, technical and technological basis.

A characteristic trend in the changes undergone by the working class under the influence of the scientific and technical revolution is the rapid and even accelerating process of the absolute and relative increase in the number of workers employed in sectors serving the population. Over the last two decades the number of workers increased 1.5-fold in industry and construction and 1.6-fold in transportation and communications, but the figure was 2.1-fold in trade, public catering, public utilities, consumer services, public health, education and other branches of the social infrastructure. Now more than 19 million people, or one-fourth of the Soviet working class, work in these fields.
The agricultural segment of the working class is now growing rapidly. The leading and most advanced group in this segment is made up of machine operators and workers in industrial occupations.

The rapid expansion of all these segments of the working class means that its sphere of productive activity is now actually the entire national economy and that its influence on social and economic processes in the society has grown much stronger. Under the influence of the scientific and technical revolution significant changes are also taking place in the nature and content of the labor of workers, especially those employed in the industrial branches of physical production. The comprehensive mechanization and automation of production are the most important factors in this trend in working class development, and the factors with the deepest and most lasting effects. Extrapolating the development of this process to the future, we can assume that the majority employed in physical production will be highly skilled individuals working with highly productive semiautomatic and automatic equipment.

Obviously, we should also remember that the automation and comprehensive mechanization of production have to go through several successive stages, and it is only during the stage of comprehensive automation that all of the necessary material and technical prerequisites are established for the cardinal enhancement of the content of labor and the development of the laborer's capabilities. It is important, however, that the tendency toward more meaningful labor is already quite apparent. The labor of workers who oversee and adjust the operations of automatic systems is essentially quite close to the labor of engineering and technical personnel in physical production; this is equalizing the social characteristics of the people employed in modern production.

The rapid increase in the number of workers employed in experimental production is a specific example of the working class' development in this direction. In their labor, just as in the labor of the workers of completely automated enterprises, creative elements play a particularly important role in comparison to purely functional elements. This stems from the very object of labor (experimental models of machines, installations and so forth) and from the worker's direct participation in the development of the new models of machines and equipment in close cooperation with engineers and designers. Labor with a highly creative content and a relatively low percentage of monotonous routine operations demands in principle that the workers constantly raise their professional standards so as to cultivate a broad outlook, flexibility and a sense of self-discipline.

Therefore, the quantitative growth of the working class is organically combined with significant changes in the qualitative features of the majority of workers, the enhancement of their skills and the elevation of their general and professional standards. In 1984, for example, 825 out of every 1,000 workers had a higher or secondary (complete or partial) education, whereas at the end of the 1950's the figure was only half as high and constituted 401 out of every 1,000. The majority of young workers under the age of 30 have at least a complete secondary education. In the years to come this process will be influenced directly by the fact that, on the one hand, many of the laborers
reaching retirement age will be citizens for whom the conditions of acquiring an education and professional skills and accumulating production experience were relatively unfavorable. People with low skills will constitute a high percentage of these. On the other hand, the replacements for the retired workers and the slight increase in the number of workers will be secured almost completely by citizens with an excellent educational background and a developed need for creative and active labor.

This will demand the improvement of conditions for the socialization of new generations of workers and for their active and effective inclusion in production and social activities. The present requirements in this area are distinguished by the need to provide all young people with a solid general education and specialized occupational training. In the USSR the rise in the level of general education has noticeably surpassed the development of vocational training until recently, and today the overwhelming majority of young men and women receive a complete secondary education consisting of 10 or 11 years of schooling. As a result, more than 30 percent of all young workers have entered the production sphere without undergoing any solid preliminary vocational training. The present educational reform in the USSR, envisaging universal vocational training, is aimed at the rapid and decisive elimination of this discrepancy. In connection with this, labor training will be offered in secondary general educational schools in combination with the mastery of certain occupations.

The consistent efforts to develop production democracy in the USSR are helping to reveal the positive opportunities afforded by scientific and technical progress. The law passed in 1983 on labor collectives was a new and important step in the expansion of the rights of laborers in production and in all public affairs.

The well-being of the working class is something like the result or the general expression of its socioeconomic development. A rise in the standard of living simultaneously serves as an important prerequisite for heightened activity by the laboring public and represents a step toward the improvement of society as a whole. This adds heightened importance to the perceptible advances in recent years in the USSR and other European socialist countries toward the attainment of goals connected with public welfare. These advances have led everywhere to the considerable improvement of the living conditions of the masses, including the working class. From this standpoint, the tendency toward higher wages is quite significant, especially since the rise has depended not only on the society's capabilities but also on the level of worker skills. The average monthly wage of workers in industry almost doubled between 1964 and 1984. And this was accompanied by no change in the prices of the main consumer goods and services. The improvement of the housing conditions of worker families also provides eloquent proof of the fundamental advance in the social development of the Soviet working class. Now more than 80 percent of these families live in separate dwellings. Furthermore, the level of housing conveniences is constantly rising.

Real socialism has already freed the powerful "social energy" of the masses and revealed the colossal creative potential of national production organized
according to plan. This new social system is destined to raise all humanity to unprecedented heights.

FOOTNOTES

2. Calculated according to data in MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS, April 1985.

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Early in the morning of 19 September 1985 the capital of Mexico, the largest city in the developing world, with a population of around 18 million, suffered an earthquake measuring around 8 points. The historical center of the city and its business district were destroyed within 120 seconds. Thousands of people were buried under the ruins of buildings. Slightly weaker underground tremors struck the city 36 hours later, completing the devastation of surviving structures. More than 400 of the million and a half buildings in the capital were completely destroyed and another 3,000 were partially destroyed, including many high-rise hotels, the capital's medical center and around a thousand schools. According to official data, almost 7,000 people died under the wreckage and another 40,000 were wounded and crippled. Almost 350,000 inhabitants of the capital were left homeless. The majority of industrial enterprises did not suffer, but many establishments and trade enterprises were partially or completely in ruins. As a result, according to the calculations of the National Committee of Trade Unions, around a million people lost their jobs. Total material damages exceeded 5 billion dollars.

This was the most terrible catastrophe in Mexico since the Spanish conquerors led by Hernando Cortez destroyed it in 1521. This time people were killed not by the conquerors but by the raging elements, and these elements were a cruel reminder of the vulnerability of the cultural stratum of Mexican civilization and of the danger of the anarchic growth of modern megalopolises, the ecological and social "sore spots" on the planet that are displaying particularly rapid growth in the developing countries. "Within 120 seconds the earthquake was able to do what we have been trying to do for at least a decade," one Mexican economist remarked. "It demonstrated the danger of this high concentration of industry and people."1

I was working in Mexico not long before this catastrophe, in April and May 1985, mainly in two academic establishments—the Center for Research and Economic Education (CIDE) and the Collegio de Mexico. Just as any other European, I was amazed by the city's size, population density and strange
conglomeration of skyscrapers, palaces, villas and shanties. All of them seemed to be nestled together cozily at the foot of the magnificent snow-capped volcanic mountains of Popocatepetl and Ixtaccihuatl. These sleeping giants, silent but far from harmless witnesses of life in Mexico, were clearly visible from the city in good weather just a relatively short time ago. Now the appalling smog has made these mountains almost invisible. After all, Mexico City is a genuine "smogopolis," where 130,000 industrial enterprises, producing a third of the nation's products, emit 11,000 tons of toxic waste into the air each day. Traffic bears an enormous part of the blame (up to 70 percent) for poisoning the city's atmosphere: The streets of the capital are traveled by around 3 million automobiles, 10,000 buses, 80,000 jitneys and almost a quarter of a million trucks, which emit another 8,000 tons of toxic gases each day.

The rate of air pollution here is 20 times as high as the rate in New York and much higher than in Tokyo. It is no wonder that it is hard to breathe in Mexico City, which is also located at an altitude of 2,240 meters. And this catastrophic pollution of the environment took only three or four decades, when Mexico's growth was irrepressible and chaotic. The plethora of construction projects put an end to parks and landscaped areas. They destroyed 73 percent of the forests and 99 percent of the lakes, and even the famous Chapultepec Municipal Park, which could be called the "lungs" of the capital, was almost closed to the public because the trees could not endure the urban fumes, dust and acid rain.

There is a shortage of water in the city located on the gradually sinking bottom of ancient Lake Texcoco. The construction of a canal and the intensive use of subsoil water depleted aquiferous soil layers, accelerated the lowering of the water table (Mexico is constantly sinking) and weakened the soil, which had a particularly adverse effect at the time of the last underground tremor. It would seem that people should have tried to escape the stressful embraces of the capital octopus, but they actually escaped to the capital, and the number of people wishing to settle here increased with each year. The population of Mexico City has doubled since 1970. It has recently risen by a million each year (more as a result of people moving to the capital from rural areas than as a result of natural population growth). By the end of the century Mexico City could be the biggest megalopolis in the world, with a population of 30 million.

The capital's Eastern Bus Terminal casts around a thousand confused and desperately poor people onto the city streets each day. Most of them are doomed to dirty jobs and many become beggars, thieves or even gangsters. People become peddlers or sell newspapers, lottery tickets, chewing gum, cigarettes and other small items. Whole flocks of these inept merchants attack cars in the intersections of avenidas, the city's main streets. As soon as the red signal light stops the multilane stream of vehicles, the street is filled with dancers dressed up in feathers and Indian costumes or, much more frequently, with young "fire-eaters." In this "job," they hourly kill themselves and kill the city by giving it more fumes and intense feelings of shock.

The crime rate in the capital is climbing dangerously. According to a survey conducted in 1984 by the sociology board of the General Procuracy of the
Federal District, around 90 percent of the crimes in Mexico City are first offenses committed by people who have no jobs or have extremely low-paying jobs (from 5,000 to 40,000 pesos a month—that is, from 20 to 160 dollars), usually have no place of residence (around 60 percent) and are alcoholics (84 percent). The authors of this study stated that the rising crime rate stems specifically from "unemployment and part-time employment."3

The social infrastructure of the city is strained to the limit. Each day it becomes more difficult to feed the inhabitants of the capital, supply them with water, dispose of their garbage (14,000 tons a day) and protect them from diseases and epidemics. The danger of these was especially great just after the earthquake, when sewers and water pipes were damaged, explosions of escaping gas started fires and hundreds and thousands of bodies had to be disposed of as quickly as possible.

During these days the Mexicans, especially the young inhabitants of the capital, displayed genuine heroism, courage and civic solidarity. Along with special rescue teams from other countries, thousands of volunteers cleared the rubble. Special teams were formed by the Confederation of Mexican Workers, the largest labor organization, which put its emergency assistance plan in action, organizing shelter for the homeless inhabitants of the capital in the surviving homes of workers and employees, in trade-union stores and in medical establishments and allocating 10 million pesos for the construction of housing for earthquake victims.

A national commission for the reconstruction of regions destroyed by the earthquake, headed by President Miguel De la Madrid, took control of the restoration work and the distribution of contributions to the restoration fund (around 28 million dollars) from Mexicans and foreign citizens and organizations in 43 countries. The government levied penalties against speculators who jacked up the prices (up to 400 percent) of food and vital necessities. In October the president published a decree on the expropriation of 250 hectares of land in the center of the city and all of the 7,000 buildings located on this land, for which owners are to be compensated over the next 10 years. The government's action, which Mayor Ramon Aguirre Velasquez of the capital called "the most important expropriation in the city's history," was supported by trade unions, leftist parties and the National Congress. But the rent freeze bill submitted to the Congress was rejected. To exert pressure on the government and force it to expand the program of aid to earthquake victims, a protest march by homeless "chilangos" (this is what the inhabitants of the capital are called) and earthquake victims to the presidential palace was organized.

The monstrous tragedy experienced by Mexico City and the entire country seemed to push aside other problems for a time, but in fact it only compounded many of the problems gradually accumulating in the Mexican society—economic, social and political. We will take a look at the most important ones.

The Onset of Hard Times

"Economic crisis" and "debt bondage" are probably the most frequently used terms in Mexico today. Commentators on one of the most popular television
morning news programs discuss crisis and debts each day. The president and ministers of the government refer to them in every statement about the country's urgent problems. Entrepreneurs and merchants blame the crisis for the rapid rise in prices.

The crisis broke out in 1982. It affected the monetary sphere first and then went on to affect virtually all spheres of the economy and the sphere of social relations and also gave rise to serious political changes. It became obvious that Mexico, which had often been held up as a model of dynamic development and sociopolitical stability, had not escaped the fate of other Latin American states, which found themselves in the clutches of the most severe economic crisis since the "great depression" of the 1930's and a stifling foreign debt at the beginning of the 1980's (the total debt of the Latin American countries is 350 billion dollars, and Mexico's share is 98 billion, ranking second after Brazil).

Many hoped at first that Mexico and the other Latin American countries had been drawn into an ordinary cyclical crisis, that it was mainly of a "reflective" nature and that it would be surmounted as the United States and other leading capitalist countries emerged from it. But it was really something else. Whereas the recession in the centers of the world capitalist economy lasted for an average of 2 years, it dragged on for 4 years in Latin America (1981-1984). Its scales were also unprecedented. According to the forecast of economists from the CIDE Latin American Economics Institute, headed by Chilean Pedro Vuskovich (former minister of the economy in S. Allende's government), most of the Latin American countries would not be able to restore their pre-crisis potential in absolute terms until 1986 or 1987, and in per capita terms until 1990.

Mexico's recovery from the crisis was slightly earlier and more successful than that of the other Latin American states. Nevertheless, it was a great shock and its effects are still being felt in every area.

What happened to the country's economic mechanism? What are the prospects of the Mexican economy?

As a result of more than 30 years of dynamic economic development from the 1950's through the 1970's, Mexico became one of the middle-ranking industrial states and one of the most highly developed countries on the Latin American continent. Although it represents only 9.5 percent of the territory of Latin America and 19.5 percent of its population, the Mexican GDP accounts for around one-fourth of all Latin American production. It already ranks 11th in the non-socialist world in terms of GDP. The "Mexican model" began to be praised more and more frequently in economic literature, but it soon became apparent that the "model" had serious defects.

The intensive penetration of the national economy by foreign capital, especially North American (the U.S. share of foreign investments and foreign trade in Mexico is more than two-thirds of the total), the headlong intrusion by TNC's, especially in the processing industry and trade, and the government's extensive solicitation of foreign loans and credit were the main reasons for
Mexico's dynamic economic growth but also heightened its vulnerability to a dangerous extent because they increased, instead of decreasing, its dependence on the flow of resources from outside the country, especially from the United States.

The rapid economic growth intensified disparities in social development. Inequality in incomes became more pronounced. The model of development was social-polarizing: Much of the population, especially in rural areas, had a low and unstable income and represented only limited market demand, but the perceptible rise in higher and middle class income led to a higher demand for durable goods (motor vehicles, refrigerators, electrical appliances and others). As a result, the output of these goods increased by an average of 20 percent between 1960 and 1970, while the output of the vital necessities increased by only 7.4 percent. The high concentration of income caused deformities in consumption patterns.

All of this is easy to see in any store in Mexico, from the popular "Giants," supermarkets built on the American model, to the fashionable "Liverpools." The ingenious and subtle methods used by entrepreneurs to sell their goods are truly amazing. They look so tempting and seem to be of such superior quality that even the customer who does not want them will buy them. This is how the famous "consumerism" criticized by many Mexican intellectuals was born. But only those with money can be persuaded to buy. Nothing can be expected from the poor, and it is not even worthwhile to produce anything for them. This is how the market is diversified to offer more and more new goods to people with high incomes. But however high a person's income might be, he cannot ride in several cars at once or find room for 10 television sets in his home. And it turned out that this market was not at all boundless.

The first signs of crisis were seen in the Mexican economy in the beginning of the 1970's. The industrial sector began to lose its dynamism. The weakness of government investment potential became apparent. Mexican industry, whose competitive strength was never too great, was confronted by the narrow boundaries of the domestic market and the high tariff barriers of the foreign market.

During the presidency of L. Echeverria (1971-1976), who aspired with some success to the role of leader of the "Third World," an attempt was made to surmount a kind of provincialism in development and in economic thinking. Just as in Cardenas' time, priority was assigned to a stronger role for the state in the country's economic and social development. The government proposed an extensive program of industrial construction.

After encountering the stubborn and even aggressive resistance of private capital, which refused to finance the president's projects, and after failing to reform the tax system, the Echeverria government resorted to foreign loans. At that time, Mexico was trusted in the financial circles of the capitalist world, whose credit system was inundated with cheap petrodollars. Their flow into Mexico increased dramatically, and its foreign debt rose from 4.2 billion dollars in 1970 to 19.6 billion in 1976 as a result.
The world economic crisis of 1975-1976 affected the country's economy. Economic growth rates declined perceptibly. In 1976 the national currency, the peso, was devalued for the first time in 22 years: The rate of exchange in relation to the American dollar was lowered by almost 40 percent. This provided momentum for the expansion of exports and the flow of foreign capital into the country. Within the country, however, the devaluation of the peso put Mexicans in a state of shock. Now the visitor to Mexico can hear the complaint: "All of our troubles began with the devaluation of the peso under Luis Echeverria." It is true that the peso has lost much of its value since that time. Here is just one example. Once I asked why the little jitneys which race around the city in a futile attempt to solve the traffic problem are called "peseros." "Because, Senora," I was told, "when they first appeared (in the middle of the 1970's), the far was 1 peso to the end of the line." Now I was paying 55 pesos for just part of the route.

In the middle of the 1970's, however, Mexico was able to emerge from the crisis quite quickly and accomplish a new advance in economic development, mainly as a result of one thing—oil. The discovery of new and truly vast deposits then seemed to be a fortunate and salutary event. The Mexican market began expanding quickly again. The growth rate of the GDP was 8–9 percent between 1978 and 1981. The country acquired its own petrodollars: In 1977 Mexico made a billion dollars on oil exports, and its oil income exceeded 50 billion dollars in the next 5 years (1978-1982). It rose to fourth place in oil production in the non-socialist world, overtaking Venezuela, which had been the leader in Latin American oil production for many years.

This was a time of general euphoria. The unrestrained growth of imports of equipment, technology and consumer goods began. It was assumed that the income from oil exports would pay for everything. The government continued to borrow "cheap money," which soon turned out to be very expensive because credit terms became much less beneficial and interest rates rose (to 13 percent at the beginning of the 1980's). But Mexico, like a drug addict, continued to crave foreign loans. It borrowed more than 12 billion dollars just in 1980 and another 23 billion or so in 1981. Now just servicing the loans took up to 86 percent of all its currency receipts. It had to take the risk of the extensive development of oil production, a move instigated largely by the United States, which was covering one-fourth of its demand for liquid fuel with Mexican oil. Although the Mexican Government recalled the regrettable "petrolization" of Iran and Venezuela and promised to manage oil resources intelligently and efficiently on the strength of the level of industrial development it had already achieved and the control of the national Pemex company, it was unable to keep this promise in its entirety. In spite of its high hopes, Mexico was also unable to "cure" its own oil. The income from it was burned up in the debt furnace (70 percent of the income from oil exports had to be used to pay the principle and interest on state debts) and some was devoured by corruption. Disparities in the economic organism became more pronounced. The country's dependence, especially financial, on the United States and the IMF increased.

In 1982 the country was on the verge of financial bankruptcy. Currency reserves were depleted. The growing state budget deficit escalated inflation,
which soared to 95 percent in 1982. The crisis, economic and financial, caused capital to "flee" the country through the network of private banks. In response, the government of J. Lopez Portillo nationalized the private banks 3 months before the end of his term in office, turning virtually the entire banking system over to the government.

In an effort to prevent the financial collapse of Mexico, which would have been dangerous for the entire capitalist currency system, the United States quickly extended it 3 billion dollars in government credit in the form of an advance payment for additional shipments of oil in the future. The IMF gave Mexico around 4.5 billion dollars, demanding that the government institute an "austerity" program—cuts in allocations for social needs, the reduction of the state budget deficit and the institution of a "floating" exchange rate.

President Miguel De la Madrid, the head of the country at the end of the most critical year of 1982, announced a policy of strict economy, a struggle against inflation and unemployment, the reduction of imports and the elimination of corruption in the government, placing his reliance on the private sector. The growth rate of the debt declined slightly, and the structure of the debt was changed in favor of long-term credit with significant repayment privileges. After long and hard negotiations with creditors, an agreement was signed in September 1984 on the refinancing of 49.6 billion dollars of the state foreign debt (74 percent of the total) with a repayment schedule of 14 years. This revitalized private business: There was an increase of 8.8 percent in private capital investments in 1984, after 2 years of declining investments. At the beginning of 1985 the government announced the sale of 236 of the 900 state companies to private enterprises.

According to official data, GDP growth in 1984 was 3.5 percent. It is too early, however, to speak of long-term economic growth. After all, during the 2 crisis years there was a decrease of 5.8 percent in the GDP and of more than 11 percent in per capita GDP. The current cyclical upswing is still confined to only a few industries. Furthermore, the huge debt is still putting pressure on the economy.

Can the "Social Peace" Be Maintained?

The crisis of 1982-1983 and the present government's "austerity" policy dramatically compounded already difficult social problems. Real wages declined: by 25.3 percent in 1983 and another 20 percent in 1984. According to the estimates of trade unions, wages would have to be increased by 130 percent to restore the purchasing power of the population.

Inflation struck a painful blow to broad segments of the population. Vital necessities did not escape the price rise. There was a rise in price of even tortillas, the flat cornmeal bread the Mexicans eat at every meal.

There has been virtually no decrease in unemployment. In 1984 it stayed on the 16-percent level. The number of jobs increased by only 1.6 percent in 1984 and by 2.5 percent in 1985 (according to official estimates), while manpower increased by 3.8 percent a year. The continued slump in agriculture is causing the massive migration of peasants to the cities.
Even in the most difficult months of the crisis, however, the country did not experience any substantial social upheavals or demonstrations by workers and laborers. The continued existence of relative social stability in Mexico is understandable and stems primarily from the distinctive features of the political system here.

The Mexican state, which was engendered by the intense bourgeois-democratic, popular, anti-imperialist revolution of 1910-1917, rests on three pillars: strong presidential authority, the politico-ideological hegemony and monopoly of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the ideology of "revolutionary nationalism," one of the postulates of which is the tenet of the "historical alliance of the state with the masses," with the working class and peasantry, for the sake of a society of economic prosperity, social justice, political democracy and spiritual freedom for Mexicans.

The PRI, which has been in power since 1929, controls all of Mexican society. Almost all central labor organizations and national sectorial trade unions, uniting the majority of organized workers and employees, are collective members of the party. The largest are the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), with around 5 million members, which has constituted the basis of the party's "labor sector" since 1936, the Labor Congress, which united virtually all labor organizations in 1966 and now represents 34 unions, and the Federation of Unions of Government Workers. Another large collective member of the PRI is the National Peasant Confederation, or the party's "agrarian sector," which controls the entire rural population through the elders of rural communities. Finally, small businessmen, merchants and other petty bourgeois strata are represented in the PRI by the National Confederation of Popular Organizations, cooperatives, youth and women's organizations and other public organizations.

The continuous secretary general of the CTM, Fidel Velasquez, who is as old as the century (he was born in 1900), has outlived seven presidents of Mexico and has been the leader of this largest labor organization for almost half a century, personifying Mexico's official syndicalism. A man with exceptional influence in the party and the government, he secures government control of the labor movement and helps to eliminate critical situations. His probable re-election to the office of CTM secretary general for another term (1986-1992) was recently announced, evoking the following response from the leftist press: "Velasquez' political acumen and the Mexican political system's profound need for it will force him to be the leader of the CTM all the way to his grave."17

When the disruption of the country's economic development began to be felt in the beginning of the 1970's and the first signs of political crisis made their appearance, the corrupt leadership of the trade unions began to be pressured more by the larger and stronger proletariat. Independent democratic trade unions were formed. A radical current gained strength within the Labor Congress, and its members demanded a more active policy in defense of labor interests and established contacts with independent labor organizations. Disagreements also became more pronounced in the stronghold of official syndicalism, the CTM. The whole system of "charrism" was in danger.18
forced the leaders of the labor movement to take more action and update their programs.

A policy of "tripartite participation" (the state, the unions and business organizations) in the resolution of the country's economic and social problems was announced under President L. Echeverria. Under J. Lopez Portillo it underwent some modification under the slogan of "alliance for production."

At the beginning of the 1980's the CTM and the Labor Congress proposed a long-range program of "integral economic reform," envisaging a rise in the income of laborers, the expansion of the state sector and the creation of a "social sector" in the economy, with the encouragement of laborers and their organizations to participate in production planning and management.

The economic crisis of the early 1980's forced the leaders of official syndicalism to support the government program of "austerity" and to sign the National Solidarity Pact drafted by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare in August 1983, envisaging the "restraint" of wage increases as a means of combating inflation and the refusal to demand increases on the condition of state price controls. In June 1984 the Labor Congress submitted a document to the government with 21 demands in defense of labor interests and the poor strata of the population, including the cancellation of the state tax on the added value of items in retail trade, a freeze on prices, on water, gas and electricity rates and on public transportation fares and the establishment of rent ceilings. At the same time, the leaders of the Labor Congress had to withdraw their earlier demand for a nationwide increase of 65 percent in the minimum wage and to consent to government proposals of increases only within the range of 10 to 30 percent. They announced that they were "assuming the responsibility of maintaining social peace in the country, political freedoms and national sovereignty and will not allow the economic crisis to evolve into a social crisis and thereby endanger the legal foundation and the entire national political system."

Official trade unions, which continued to operate in close contact with the PRI, were able to restrain the dissatisfaction of workers with the abrupt drop in the standard of living. Although official syndicalism, just as its uncontested leader, has grown quite old and decrepit, it is still an important factor of social and political stability in Mexico. The government's praise of the CTM leadership was immediately forthcoming. "The alliance between the labor movement and the revolutionary government is growing stronger," one of the leaders of the PRI, Adolfo Lugo Verdugo, declared at a CTM council session. "Labor is taking on the historic mission of saving the country."

But how long can the "peace" on the labor front last? After all, the government's social maneuvering ability was diminished dramatically by the crisis and the "austerity" program. What can the president offer laborers? He can only ask them to tighten their belts or, at best, sympathize with them, as he did when he met with Labor Congress activists in June 1984 and said: "I know that the worker's standard of living has declined perceptibly, I know that you are suffering from the policy of austerity. I share your suffering."
I heard several Mexicans make the ironic suggestion that the president and his ministers be paid the minimum wage. In August 1985 the government approved a group of measures to stabilize the national economy. It includes the reduction of public administration expenditures, including the maintenance of the presidential palace, and a reduction in the salary of the head of state. Questions of social policy with regard to the working class aroused heated disagreements within the government and the PRI leadership between technocrats and party-union bosses. In general, however, they have been able to uphold the old slogan of the "unity of the party and the people," which still prevails in propaganda.

Nevertheless, it has been increasingly difficult for the leaders of official trade unions to maneuver and to restrain the pressure from below. Stronger demands are being made for the democratization of trade unions. The strike movement is growing, strikes by the workers of whole sectors or whole geographic regions are more frequent, and "sequential" or "growing" strikes, the slowing down of work and "hunger" protest marches are being organized.

Social tension has also increased in rural areas, which have traditionally been the strong supporting pillar of the ruling party. Here the manipulation of the downtrodden masses is combined with brutal repression by the rural police, who take reprisals against peasant activists. In spite of this, protest demonstrations against hunger and the suspension of agrarian reforms have acquired more strength in rural areas. In April 1984 and 1985 peasants organized massive marches to the presidential palace under the leadership of the National Coordinating Commission of the Ayala Plan.

Finally, the government is being pressured more and more by the middle strata, which grew strong during the years of the economic boom and are now aspiring to positions of power. The crisis also affected their interests, and the nationalization of the banking system in 1982 seriously frightened them. It is in these strata that rightwing feelings are growing stronger and the opposition rightwing conservative parties and organizations are winning support. The government of Miguel De la Madrid is trying to take their interests into account and include them in the traditional power structure. But its search for a compromise between "economic necessity" and "political reality" has put it between the hammer and the anvil. Its closer convergence with private capital and business circles, the reduction—in response to the demands of technocrats and the representatives of national and foreign business—of the state sector and the cuts in social expenditures, particularly the reduction of state subsidies in the production and trade of vital necessities, transportation and education, could cause it to lose the support of most of the laboring public. The "social pact" between the state and the people, which dates back to the 1940's, to the period of the radical reforms of President Lazaro Cardenas, is in danger. It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain social stability in Mexico today. It is no wonder that many sociologists say that "nothing will happen in Mexico until one fine day when something happens."

Crisis of the Political Leadership or the System?

In recent years, according to many Mexican political scientists, there has been some doubt about the durability and other features of the foundation of
the Mexican political system, "the most democratic of the authoritarian systems in Latin America," as some Mexican researchers describe it.

There have been obvious changes in one of the main institutions of the Mexican government—"presidentialism." The president exercises almost absolute authority in Mexico. He is the unrestricted and sole head of the executive branch and simultaneously has extensive legislative powers. He can actually serve as a substitute for the Congress, which, incidentally, is mainly, just as the Supreme Court, formed by him personally through the PRI network. His authority has always been incontestable and has been based on the support of the entire party-state network, because the president is at the top of this pyramid, the head of the "revolutionary family," personifying the submission of all segments of the ruling class and the entire population to a single will.

At the basis of the institution of "presidentialism" lie the traditions of populism—the president, as the leader of the nation, appeals directly to the people for decisions on important matters. The roots of these traditions can be found in the revolutionary movements of Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata and in the appeals of generals from the "revolutionary family" to the people and soldiers. President Cardenas asked for the support of laborers and workers in 1938 when he made the historic decision to nationalize oil and to institute a radical agrarian reform. Later presidents were more likely to mold public opinion in search of support for their undertakings than to address the public. In any case, this support has been an important condition and indication of the maintenance of the state's "social pact" with the people. This is precisely how several laws were passed in the 1960's to "Mexicanize" the economy, a law was passed in 1973 to restrict participation by foreign capital in Mexican industry, and so forth.

But the traditions of populism in Mexico are obviously disappearing. The last populist president was probably L. Echeverria. His successor, J. Lopez Portillo, openly gravitated toward technocratic circles. Without any substantial party career behind him, he kept his distance from party officials and had little contact with the labor and peasant sectors of the PRI. Current President Miguel De la Madrid has continued the trend of renouncing populism in the party-state leadership and strengthening technocratic elements. Each year government decisionmaking is more likely to be the job of a select few and less likely to involve "consultations" with the people. The image of the president as the "first worker" has grown dim, and his authority is no longer so indisputable. The dissatisfaction of broad social strata—workers, the many employees, intellectuals, university circles and students—is rising to the surface.

Criticism of the president, his government, thieving officials, the greedy North Americans and their Ambassador J. Gavin by people of the most diverse convictions and social origins is heard frequently in Mexico today.

"Presidentialism," said one prominent politician, Governor Tulio Hernandez of Tlaxcala, "played its role in building present-day Mexico. Today the institution of presidential power needs to have the emboli cleaned out of its vascular system."
Tendencies toward crisis can be seen much more clearly in the ruling PRI. Its leadership is still using its old ideological network and traditional methods of communicating with the masses, and these have been less and less effective under the conditions of crisis and the intensification of social problems. The party, which has held a monopoly in the country for more than 50 years, is obviously lacking in social dynamism today. Its position in the power structure has also grown weaker, particularly since the presidents of recent years have acted more independently of the party leadership and have surrounded themselves mainly with technocrats, keeping party leaders further away from centers of power. The practice of "rewarding" party officials on all levels was cut short by the onset of the crisis. The old party "stick and carrot" policy—that is, discipline and submission combined with financial rewards for obedience—is misfiring more frequently. During the years of the oil boom, the percentage of "new politicians" in the party rose. They were more interested in guaranteeing their own income than in securing the support of the masses for the president and the party. The corruption which engulfed the party, especially its leadership, on the central and local levels and the unconcealed cynicism of party leaders led to the loss of the PRI's authority in the capital and in the provinces, where the "bureaucratic diseases" were taking their course in full view of everyone. The PRI's influence on the masses declined and absenteeism increased. There was the danger, according to political scientists from the CIDE and other scientific centers, that the party would cease to be the government's go-between in relations with the masses.

But the PRI is not suited to operate as an ordinary bourgeois party in open competition with other political forces. After all, it acted almost alone for many years, although different currents—rightist, leftist and centrist—within it fought, coexisted and arrived at a single decision, frequently on the basis of a consensus. Therefore, there was a multipartisan element within the depths of the ruling party itself.

Although the election reform of 1977 was quite limited, it "opened" the Mexican political system to new contenders for power or for participation in government, although it never put the hegemony of the PRI in the society in question. The political reform itself (administrative and electoral) arose from the need to bring the political superstructure in line with the changing social structure (the consolidation of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the rapid growth of middle strata and the more important role of the intelligentsia, students and politically active youth). It was necessary to open a valve to vent the opposition feelings of the new social forces that frightened the government so much at the end of the 1960's. At that time the government of Diaz Ordaz resorted to repression, firing on a student demonstration in Tlatelolco Square in Mexico City in 1968. Almost 10 years later, the Lopez Portillo government announced amnesty for political prisoners, the guarantee of the basic civil rights and democratic changes in voting laws. A mixed electoral system was established: One-fourth of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies (100 out of 400) would be elected on the basis of proportional representation rather than by a majority vote. Any party claiming a membership of 65,000 and obtaining at least 1.5 percent of the votes would have the right to campaign for the lower congressional chamber. All parties registered
at the time of a campaign would have access to the mass media and to government financial grants. The elections began to acquire real meaning. Whereas previously they had been only a formal approval of candidates chosen in advance by the ruling party, now the opposition, although it was still weak, had a limited opportunity to challenge the PRI's monopoly in the government.

In the presidential elections of 1982, which were held in an atmosphere of much greater voter enthusiasm, PRI candidate Miguel De la Madrid naturally had no serious rivals and won 74 percent of the votes. But rightists posed a definite threat to the PRI. The candidate of the traditionally conservative National Action Party (PAN), P. E. Madero, obtained 16.4 percent of the votes. There was also a significant leftist presence, represented by the new Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM). Its candidate, A. Martínez Verdugo, won a million votes. In the municipal elections of July 1983, the PRI was defeated by the PAN in 12 districts of Chihuahua and Durango and in Baja California.

The rapid growth and organization of rightist forces probably represented the most significant new event in contemporary Mexican politics. Big capital seems to be making up for lost time by trying to eliminate the gap between its increased economic strength and its political representation in the power structure. The PAN is demanding the reduction of the state sector, broader participation by businessmen in economic policymaking, an increase in foreign investments and better relations with the United States. The reactionary church elite is cooperating actively with the PAN. After many years of "silence" as a result of its break with the state during the revolution, the Mexican church has now regained its influence and represents a unified, strong and well-organized force.

In conversations with Mexican scientists, I often heard the opinion that the Americans would try to put most of their trust in the PAN. After all, in recent years they have interfered more and more vigorously in the domestic politics of their southern neighbor. Of course, the American administration has no interest in destabilizing the Mexican political system, and any attempt to limit the politico-ideological hegemony of the PRI, not to mention its power, would pose precisely this threat. But by nurturing the rightists and by urging the PAN and its leader P. E. Madero, a representative of the Monterrey group, to strive for power, the Americans are exerting constant pressure on the government of M. De la Madrid.

The more active rightists are trying to encourage more vigorous political action by the military. The Mexican Army, in contrast to many others in Latin America, has no political autonomy and is under the control of the ruling bloc and the direct jurisdiction of the president himself. Nevertheless, the possibility of open army intervention in politics cannot be completely excluded, although Mexican political scientists feel that only the extreme polarization of forces and the appearance of a threat from the left will make this possible.

At the beginning of 1985, just before the new parliamentary and municipal elections, leftist parties and currents announced a single platform, signed by the PSUM, the Popular Socialist Party, the Mexican Workers Party and two
political associations which did not have party status yet, Leftist Communist Unity and the Socialist Current. The unified leftist program contained a number of demands in defense of the socioeconomic rights of labor, including cost-of-living adjustments in wages, a 40-hour work week and the revision of pension benefits. A program was proposed for the democratization of political and public affairs: the expansion of the legislative functions of Congress, the further democratization of the electoral system, the institution of proportional representation in all government bodies and the authorization of political parties to form campaign coalitions and to monitor elections. The program also expressed support for the foreign policy line of the government of President M. De la Madrid, its firm insistence on the peaceful political resolution of the conflict in Central America, its active participation in the Contadora Group and its important international initiatives in the sphere of disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the preservation of peace.

The elections held on 7 July 1985 for the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress, state legislatures, local governments and the governors of 7 (out of 31) states turned into a test of the strength of the Mexican political system. After all, just before the elections the rightists had confidently announced that they had finally turned the political tide in their own favor, would take the majority in the Chamber of Deputies away from the PRI and would win a victory at least in the northern states.

During the preparations for the elections the Mexican Government was subjected to much stronger pressure by the Reagan Administration, which asked it for political concessions and for the renunciation of its public condemnation of the interventionist U.S. policy in Central America. The foreign policy line of the government of M. De la Madrid became the target of malicious attacks by Mexican rightists as well.

But the rightward shift anticipated by many did not take place. The PRI again won a conclusive victory, obtaining all 7 gubernatorial offices, 292 (of 400) seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the overwhelming majority of positions in local government, although the percentage of votes it obtained (65 percent) was slightly lower than in 1982 (69 percent). The PAN, which won only 16 percent of the votes (as compared to 17.5 percent in 1982), lost 17 seats in the lower congressional chamber and did not win a single gubernatorial race. Its leader, P. E. Madero, hastened to declare that the elections "were not evidence of the triumph of democracy, but a step backward." Many voters gave leftist parties a vote of confidence, increasing their representation in Congress to 29 deputies.27 Summing up the results of the elections and obviously responding to the pressure from the north, Secretary of Government Manuel Bartlett said that they had reaffirmed the fact that Mexico is an independent country and can rule itself without orders from abroad.

Therefore, in spite of the economic crisis, the exacerbation of social problems, difficulties in domestic politics and the crisis in the political leadership, the ruling party and the Mexican political system in general have retained considerable stability on the strength of their ability to change and develop.
In Which Direction Is the "Most Democratic of the Authoritarian Systems in Latin America" Evolving?

I asked many political scientists this question. Of course, their answers differed depending on their political convictions. In general, however, there were three main types of predictions. The first was that the system could become more authoritarian, technocratic and confined, because the "austerity" program, which will obviously last for more than a year, and the "monetarist" model of economic reorganization the current administration supports will limit the social maneuverability of the ruling bloc and will cause it to respond to the threat of the reduction or loss of its dominion with the establishment of a more authoritarian political regime. The second was that the ruling bloc might seek a way out of the sociopolitical crisis by allowing some changes in the consensus of power, giving representatives of the growing middle class and the more active right wing broader access to it, but it also might resort again to the mobilization of the masses in the tradition of Cardenas, under the slogans of "revolutionary nationalism," if, of course, a new "social pact" is attained for the sake of "national development" and the preservation of Mexico's national sovereignty. Some describe this model as "authoritarian nationalism." The third was that the possibility of the political system's emulation of models of bourgeois democracy with a pluralist electoral system, with the transformation of the current, essentially still unipartisan, regime into a bipartisan (PRI-PAN) or multipartisan bourgeois system, cannot be excluded either.

Therefore, technocratic authoritarianism, "authoritarian nationalism" or development in the direction of the multipartisan political system of the developed bourgeois society are, in the opinion of Mexican political scientists, three possible and seemingly mutually exclusive vectors of Mexican political development. In reality, they are not so much mutually exclusive as they are a reflection of conflicting tendencies in contemporary Mexican domestic politics.

On the one hand, democratic tendencies are obviously growing stronger in Mexico today, the opposition is gaining strength, more diverging opinions are being expressed in the press, and the embryos of new social currents are rising to the surface of political life and are trying to surmount the established tradition of tiresome rhetoric, fossilized "revolutionary" myths and submission of everything and everyone to the all-powerful state and the all-controlling party. On the other hand, there are clear signs of stronger authoritarian tendencies in the policy of the ruling bloc, its desire to respond to the rise of an uncontrollable social movement by stifling it and its attempts to rid itself of campaign rivals by forging and shuffling ballots and by splitting or isolating independent democratic trade unions not wishing to act according to the laws of official syndicalism. This is why the picture of democratic Mexico, a country which has not witnessed any attempts to seize power by force for more than half a century, and whose government, which rests on the bourgeois-democratic constitution of 1917, allows pluralism, freedom of the press and criticism of itself from the right and the left, is actually far from this idyllic. The regime is still authoritarian, there are political prisoners in the country, repression is a common
function of the police—especially in rural areas—and there have been polit-
cical assassinations and the "disappearance" of peasants and their leaders. At
the same time, it is also true that strong and apparently irreversible demo-
ocratic traditions have already been established in the Mexican political
system.

Today the Mexican political system, just as, incidentally, the new liberal
civilian regimes in South America, is faced by a historic imperative of
unprecedented complexity:

It must not only find a way of emerging from its socioeconomic crisis within
the near future and solve its foreign debt problem over the long range, but--
and this is most important--it must also quickly complete its capitalist
modernization, including industrialization and the creation of new industries
capable of competing in the world market, which should be particularly diffi-
cult at a time of structural reorganization in the developed capitalist
countries; it must establish a sufficiently flexible and dynamic mechanism of
social development, corresponding to the new system of productive forces and
the new phase of the technological revolution;

It must accomplish the social modernization and integration of society.
Whereas the objective of consolidating a new power bloc, expanding it through
the greater participation of big national capital associated with TNC's, the
new civilian technocrats, managers and even part of the new middle strata,
seems completely attainable, securing at least relative accord in the socio-
economic sphere in general is much more difficult. The possibilities of pur-
suing a sweeping social policy, particularly the redistribution of income
in the interests of not only the middle class but also part of the laboring
public and the workers, to reduce the polarization of income and secure a
sounder social base for the regime, are also limited, especially since it is
precisely in the sphere of social policy that international capital and, in
particular, the IMF will demand the maintenance of "austerity" in the next
few years, a program which, even in the opinion of American experts, could
turn into a "sociopolitical boomerang jeopardizing the new democracy."28

Finally, it will be just as difficult to establish the political system of
the developed bourgeois society, which would guarantee the bourgeoisie, both
national and transnational, and the ruling class as a whole indisputable
politico-ideological hegemony and the ability, using the party-parliamentary
mechanism and not resorting to force, to weaken extreme opposition forces,
both on the left and the right, striving to change the nature of the government.
In view of the distinctive evolution of social and political structures in
Mexico, it seems that it would be extremely difficult here to form the kind of
civilian society (in Marx' sense of the term) needed for the institutionaliza-
tion of the social activity of strata not involved in decisionmaking—that is,
not exercising any authority in the society. The unification of the social
struggle of the laboring public with democratic and political movements will
probably pose the greatest threat to the ruling regime in coming years.

Present-day Mexico, setting an example of rapid economic development, rose to
the level of the most highly developed states in Latin America and in the
entire developing world. Mexico is the largest producer and exporter of oil
birthplace of the "green revolution." The country has launched its own satellite, is preparing to launch another and has had a unified satellite communication system since June 1985. This is truly a great country. And no matter how acute the problems of its foreign debt, economic dependence and disparities in economic development, especially in the social sphere, might be today, there is no question that Mexico has already assumed an important place in the world community and will probably advance even further, because it is indisputably distinguished in the developing world by its exceptionally dynamic development.

Mexico set a unique example of political administration engendered by revolution. The people of Mexico, in contrast to many other Latin Americans, stormed their Bastille and won the right to include important provisions in the constitution of 1917 with regard to state ownership of the land, its resources and its water and with regard to the right of Mexicans to work and to exercise political freedoms.

As a supporter of national liberation movements and all those fighting for social justice, independence and the right of each country to political, economic and social self-determination, Mexico, understandably, was and is a refuge for many political emigres and Spanish-speaking intellectuals seeking freedom of expression and creativity. Many Spaniards who fled fascism in the 1930's settled here. And now it is the home of many Latin Americans who were forced to leave their countries by the military dictatorships that seemed just recently to reign so strongly in many South American countries. I met several Chilean and Argentine scientists (fortunately, most of them have already returned to their countries) in Mexico. Mexico has given the world many outstanding scientists and gave birth to the original concept of the Ibero-American philosophy, one of the brilliant representatives of which is Leopoldo Zea, who has been awarded honorary doctorates by many of the world's universities, including Moscow State University.29

Finally, the foreign policy position of the Mexican Government, based on the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and judicial equality of states and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts, has won tremendous respect throughout the world. In the international arena Mexico has invariably opposed all forms of reaction and foreign intervention. Its government supported the revolution in Nicaragua, and today, in spite of its own difficult financial and economic situation and mounting pressure from the north, it is continuing to give the revolutionary government of this country material and moral support, respecting its right to pursue an independent course of development. As one of the initiators of the Contadora Group, Mexico proposed a diplomatic alternative in Central America, where one of the most dangerous international conflicts of the present day is still going on. The "Act of Peace" drafted by Mexico with other Contadora members in the last 2 years proposes the resolution of conflicts by means of negotiations, assigning certain responsibilities to all participants, including the United States, which aroused unconcealed irritation in Washington. The United States does not want to accept Mexico's more important role in Central America and the Caribbean, a Mexico obviously capable of proposing its own, irrespective of
The current American administration is also obviously displeased with Mexico's active stand on disarmament, the creation of nuclear-free zones and the reorganization of international economic relations, its active participation in the struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid and its rising prestige in the United Nations and other international organizations.

Only a person who lives in Mexico can gain a real understanding of the kind of constant and intense pressure it is subjected to by its powerful and uncritical northern neighbor. The pressure is exerted through many channels: economic and financial, military and political, informational and cultural. Sometimes Washington threatens Mexico with the restriction or complete cessation of American tourism in the country, which would mean huge losses of currency. Sometimes, and this happened while I was in the country, border traffic is stopped and everything and everyone must submit to humiliating searches. Police actions against the many Mexicans who go to the southern American states in search of work become more brutal from time to time, and sometimes these Mexicans are simply confronted by armed groups of local reactionaries. Mexicans are always humiliated and made to feel inferior, and this is done by Americans in the United States and in Mexico itself.

Mexicans frequently complain that Mexico is being increasingly Americanized and that the irreversible merger of the Mexican economy with the American one, especially in the border states, could jeopardize its independence.

Yes, the American influence in Mexico is tremendous. Each day the radio, television, press and movies publicize, whether they want to or not, the American way of life, American technology, American goods and other American "models." In spite of all this, however, the Mexicans are still Mexicans. They have an exceptionally well-developed sense of national dignity, patriotism, connection with the heritage of ancient cultures, pride in the history of their country and confidence in its great future.

The people and government of Mexico will have difficult tasks to perform in the next few years—they will have to restore and rebuild their ravaged capital, surmount the effects of the economic crisis, find a solution to the problem of their foreign debt, which is a heavy burden on the economy, continue the modernization of the economy, restore stable rates of economic growth and social development and make advances in the integration of Mexican society. But first of all, they must heal their wounds from the earthquake. It has become a tragic milestone or turning point in the history of Mexico City and the entire country. The government has already suggested the decentralization of industry and the bureaucracy several times, but the haphazard nature of capitalist development, the irrepressible stream of migrants from rural areas due to the too obvious gap between standards of living in the capital and the provinces, and the uncontrollable growth of the party-state bureaucracy have frustrated all of the government's timid attempts. Now it has to consider a serious plan for administrative and urban decentralization. The disorganized housing construction in Mexico City will be stopped, and parks will take the place of the ruined buildings. This task, which is difficult in itself because thousands of homeless will have to
be housed within the next few months, is compounded by the government's lack of funds for the truly radical and long-term decentralization of the capital. Nevertheless, this reconstruction could be the beginning of a new Mexico City. "The times call for great feats," said famous Mexican political scientist Lorenzo Meyer. "There is no purely technical solution to our existing problems. The government can restore and strengthen public trust if it reconstructs the capital according to public wishes."

The troubles Mexico is now experiencing, connected with the forces of nature and with the even more brutal forces of the world capitalist economy, are complicating the development of the country's economy and the establishment of modern forms of life here and are interfering with Mexico's evolution into a modern society. "New formulas must be written to solve the problem of the debt," the president said, "because Mexico cannot keep up with its foreign debt obligations and simultaneously make substantial resource allocations for reconstruction." However colossal the damages inflicted by the earthquake might seem—5 billion dollars—this is only half of what Mexico must pay on its debt just in 1985. And in the future it must pay out new and larger amounts to repay its debt of almost 100 billion dollars (according to estimates, 12 billion a year).

Mexico can rightfully expect its partners to show some interest in its economic reconstruction, but the key to solving its problems lies within the country, and not abroad. The Mexican people, who have demonstrated an ability several times in their history to find heroic solutions in the most difficult situations, are again displaying fortitude, courage and profound human solidarity today. We can only hope that Mexico, a country with an ancient culture, will have a truly great future.

FOOTNOTES

1. NEWSWEEK, 14 November 1985, p 23.
2. CAMBIO-16, 30 October 1985, p 114.
4. During the years of the economic rise (1958-1980), the average annual rate of increase was 6.8 percent, including 8.7 percent in industry, 3.4 percent in agriculture and 6.9 percent in the service sphere. In the next decade, despite the economic recession in 1975-1976, growth rates in general remained high—6.6 percent on the average (Sofia Mendez, "The Prospects of the Mexican Economy," EL TRIMESTRE ECONOMICO, 1983, vol I (1), No 197, p 381.
5. Ibid., p 382.
6. Known, "positive" deposits of Mexican oil increased from 800,000 tons in 1971 to 10 billion in 1980, and potential or "probable" reserves increased to 34 billion tons (MEMO, No 2, 1983, p 68).
11. Ibid.
12. EL NACIONAL, 10 April 1985, p 1.
15. EL NACIONAL, 10 April 1985, p 1.
16. Big businessmen are encouraged to apply for individual membership in the
PRI.
17. UNO MAS UNO, 21 April 1985.
18. "Charrism" is the system of bribery and the placement of party function-
aries in trade unions, with which union leaders are turned into large
stockholders and part of the state-party elite. For more detail, see
"Politicheskaya sistema obshchestva v Latinskoy Amerike" [The Political
20. REPORTE DE COYUNTURA, 1985, No 9, p 15.
21. Ibid., No 11, p 6.
22. For more detail, see Ye. G. Lapshev, "The Mexican Variety of Representa-
tive Democracy," in the book "Politicheskaya sistema obshchestva v
23. EL DIA, Mexico, 14 April 1985.
24. The PAN was founded in 1939. It represents big private capital, especially
the rich northern regions of the country, the powerful Monterrey financial-
industrial group and the large and growing middle strata.
25. The PSUM was formed in November 1981 as a result of the unification of
several parties: the Mexican Communist Party, the Party of the Mexican
People, the Movement for Social Unity and Action, the Revolutionary
Socialist Party and the Popular Unity Movement. See LATINSKAYA AMERIKA,
1984, No 3, p 55.
26. The constitution of 1917 separated the church in Mexico from the state and divested it of the right to own land and real estate. It is not allowed to participate in politics or control education.


29. His work "The Philosophy of American History. The Fate of Latin America" has been translated into Russian (Moscow, 1984).


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SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN 1980'S EXAMINED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 86 (signed to press 16 Jan 86) pp 124-141

[Article by B. S. Orlov; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] In our opinion, a brief answer to the question of what international social democracy's concerns have been since the beginning of the 1980's* and what has determined its activities would list three main groups of problems: the continued search for an escape from the crisis which engulfed the capitalist world in the middle of the 1970's and affected all sphere of life—from economics to basic values; the interpretation of new processes and events in the developing countries; a more active search for ways of averting the mounting threat of thermonuclear war. During their attempts to find solutions for these main groups of problems, the social democrats have had to consider such global factors as the confrontation between the two sociopolitical systems—the socialist world and the capitalist world; the widening gap between developing countries and industrially developed countries; the technological modernization in the industrially developed countries with the use of the latest scientific and technical achievements, which has been accompanied by mass unemployment (more than 30 million people); the arms race, which threatens to move into outer space; the continued destruction of the environment, the effects of which are becoming increasingly evident on the planetary scale; the continued change in the social base of social democracy and its basic values. Under these complex and largely unfavorable conditions, the social democrats have tried to work out a policy line differing from the approaches proposed by communists and bourgeois parties. What are the distinctive features of this policy line and to what degree has its pursuit been possible? The main purpose of this article is to examine all of these matters.

In view of the fact that recently published studies have examined the effects of structural changes in the system of state-monopolist capitalism on social democracy,1 the interrelations of social-democratic parties with trade unions and other organizations and social movements2 and the attempts of social democrats to update their approach to economic problems,3 the author will concentrate mainly on the politico-ideological aspects of the activities of social democrats.

* This article is a continuation of the author's previously published thoughts on social democracy. See B. S. Orlov, "The Social Democrats in the 1970's: New Tendencies, Old Contradictions," RK i SM, 1979, No 2.
Outside the Confines of Europe

In the 1980's the social democrats experienced both the joy of victory and the sorrow of defeat. A unique situation took shape in Europe. In northern and central Europe the social democrats of the FRG, Norway, Denmark, Holland and some other countries had to move to the opposition bench. The Labour Party of Great Britain suffered another defeat in the 1983 elections. The Socialists of Austria lost their absolute majority and are now ruling in a coalition with the bourgeois Freedom Party of Austria.

In southern Europe, on the other hand, socialists became the ruling force in such countries as France, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Malta. Italy has a Socialist prime minister. In other words, the political map of Europe seemed to consist of two zones of governmental influence: bourgeois parties in the north and socialist parties in the south. This alignment of forces, however, has already undergone changes. After 6 years in the opposition, the Social Democrats of Sweden returned to the government (1982). They won another victory in the October 1985 elections. The Socialists of Portugal suffered a crushing defeat at that same time. All of this suggests that the European social democrats as a whole are on the defensive and are trying to regain the positions they won in the 1970's.

Outside Europe, parties with a social-democratic orientation are in power in Australia and New Zealand (the labour parties), Africa (in Senegal and Mauritius) and Latin America (in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela and Barbados). In Canada the New Democratic Party is winning one-fifth of the votes in national elections and has experience in government in the provinces. In Asia the activity of parties with a social-democratic orientation in Japan has been most noticeable. There are two of these parties (the Socialist Party and the Democratic Socialist Party), and their combined share of the vote has reached one-fourth of the total in elections.

As we can see, the strongest social-democratic influence was still in Europe in the 1980's, but it was at this time that the Socialist International, the organizing center of international social democracy, made an effort to, as former SI Secretary-General B. Carlsson put it, transcend the bounds of "European isolation." This policy was announced in 1976, when SPD Chairman W. Brandt assumed leadership of the SI. The SI began to pay more attention to regional organizations. In particular, in 1980 it formed a Committee on Latin America and the Caribbean Countries. In 1983 it coordinated the activities of 15 parties in this region belonging to the SI. In 1980 the Socialist Organization of Pacific Asian Countries was rebuilt. The SI took a reserved stand in relation to the so-called African Socialist International (ASU), created in 1981. Besides this, the SI focused its attention on southern Africa, establishing contacts with governments and parties in front-line states and taking part in the 1984 conference in Arusha (Tanzania).

The SI began to send so-called missions to hot spots of the planet and to take part in the activity of various committees. The intensity of this activity is attested to, for example, by the report submitted to the 16th SI Congress (Portugal, April 1983) on SI activities in 1980-1982. During this
period missions were sent to Central America (June 1981), Uruguay and Argentina (July 1981), Morocco (August 1981), Cyprus (February 1982), the Middle East (July 1982), Nicaragua (December 1982) and the Middle East (February 1983).

During the same period meetings were held of the Committee in Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolution (three meetings), the Committee on Latin America and the Caribbean Countries (four), the Working Group on the Middle East (two), the Working Group Overseeing the Fulfillment of the Decisions of the Cancun Conference (where the problems of the developing countries were discussed) and the Committee on Chile.

A new feature of SI activity was the establishment of contacts with the Liberal International and the Christian-Democratic International. The secretaries general of the three internationals met three times in 1981 and 1982 in Mexico, Madrid and Milan. These meetings were also resumed later.

This great variety of activity produced definite results. Since 1976 the SI membership has increased by a third. At the SI congress in Vienna in 1972 it was stated that the social democratic parties then had 15 million members and were supported by 80 million voters. New data were reported at the last congress in Portugal. The parties making up the SI have 20 million members and are supported by 210 million voters.

These facts testify that the SI began to surmount its original Europocentric nature more actively in the 1980's. Parties from other parts of the world, especially Latin America, now have a greater representation and, consequently, greater influence in the SI. For fully understandable reasons, the interests of old and new SI members do not always coincide. This is particularly true of parties from industrially developed and developing countries. The existence of conflicts was mentioned in the accountability report of former Secretary-General Carlsson to the last SI congress. "In connection with the Socialist International's expanded activities on the global scale," he said, "the critical aspect of the activities of members has recently grown stronger.... Ever since disagreements between parties became more frequent, the process of reaching a consensus has been slower and more cautious."

Confrontation with Neoconservatives

However noticeable the more pronounced disagreements within the SI might seem, they do not appear to be the primary concern of the leaders of international social democracy and of individual parties. They regard their confrontation with the neconservative bourgeois parties operating in the industrially developed capitalist countries—that is, precisely where the social democrats have their broadest social base—as a much more difficult problem.

As we mentioned above, bourgeois parties took the place of social democrats in government in several West European countries at the turn of the decade and during the early 1980's as a whole. But this was not the only problem. Confrontations between bourgeois parties and social-democratic parties in general are quite common. For example, there have been several successive Labor and Conservative party governments in Great Britain since World War II.
WHAT IS ABSOLUTE NEW IS THE CHANGE IN THE PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY. Whereas bourgeois and social-democratic parties adhered to almost the same policy line in economic matters until recently, relying on the mechanisms of state economic regulation and acknowledging the need to allocate government funds for social purposes (their policy lines were sometimes so similar that it was difficult for researchers to discern the differences between the social-democratic and bourgeois types of reformism), the differences became quite significant, particularly in socioeconomic policy, when parties with a neoconservative orientation took power. From that time on, bourgeois parties of the neconservative type placed emphasis on the "constructive role of enterprise" and on the limitation of government intervention in economic matters and made substantial cuts in social spending. In other words, the bourgeois parties are now countering the neo-Keynesian policy and practices which became established in the capitalist countries after World War II with an economic line based on other principles ("Reaganomics," monetarism and neoliberalism) and assigning priority to greater autonomy for the capitalist market mechanism.

The widely diverging positions now occupied by social democrats and neoconservatives are complicating the previous practice of the alternation of social-democratic and bourgeois governments. And this is not all. We can agree with A. A. Galkin's statement that, in Western politics, "at the time of the dramatic intensification of the economic and, consequently, the social and political problems of contemporary capitalism, conservatism, both in its traditional and its modernized (neoconservative) forms, assumed a position of superiority, quite firmly and, apparently, for a long time." For social democrats, this actually means that they will have to prepare for lengthy battles with neoconservative bourgeois parties. During the initial stages of the struggle, the social democrats had to face the need for a more effective and, consequently, more convincing alternative. At this time, however, the social-democratic parties were in a much more difficult position than neoconservatives because their social obligations kept them from resorting to the broad-scale "strict therapy" their bourgeois rivals have been practicing in economic matters without any hesitation, declaring all the while that their modernizing policy is more effective.

The Traditional Social-Democratic Line

Whereas social democrats in central and northern Europe have been preoccupied with surviving the political struggle with neoconservatives, the socialists of southern Europe, who have been the ruling force in almost all countries of southern Europe or have headed the governments there since the late 1970's and early 1980's, have another concern in addition to this one—they must bring their previously declared goals in line with their current activities. As soon as they entered government, an opportunity was created to settle the dispute which had been going on for years and decades within the social-democratic movement between social democrats and socialists. The parties of southern Europe which gave themselves socialist names usually considered their ideals and their programs of action to be more radical, assuming with some justification that the social-democratic policy of adaptation can eliminate some negative aspects of the capitalist society but offers no chance of
transcending the bounds of capitalism and beginning the direct construction of a socialist society (for the same reason, leftist social democrats have usually preferred to call themselves socialists). But whereas social democrats had been members of governments or headed governments several times and had consequently had opportunities to act on their promises, the socialists, who were concentrated mainly in southern Europe, had almost no experience in government after World War II. Finally, this opportunity was offered to them. The French Socialists had the most resolute plans. In an attempt to discard the "social-democratic burden" of the dissolved SFIO [French Section of the Workers' International] party, they substantially revised their ideological and tactical aims, announcing the policy line of "a break with capitalism." The FSP's activities after the election victory in 1981 are well known. Several large enterprises and banks were nationalized, social measures were taken to raise the standard of living of low-income laborers, an administrative reform was carried out and the powers of local government bodies were augmented. But this completed the scenario of the "break with capitalism." The French Socialists now prefer not to discuss their main strategic slogan, just as they are saying nothing about their chief aim—"socialist self-government." The FSP government has armed itself with the same principle of the "mixed economy" that it once so severely criticized the social democrats for upholding. Now it is resorting to a policy of economic "austerity," which has given some researchers reason to describe the latest policy line of the French Socialists as "French Reaganomics." L. Joffrin, a member of the staff of the leftist liberal newspaper LIBERATION, analyzed the French Socialists' 2 years of activity in his book, stating that "the leftist rhetoric of the French Socialists conceals ordinary reformism." He also concluded that, "when the leftists assumed power, they planned to make a break with capitalism. They made a break with socialism. All of the drama of their governmental activity consists indubitably in this paradox."10

To be fair, we must say that the French Socialists began their term in government under far from favorable conditions. The multifaceted crisis which had engulfed the world capitalist system, the unprecedented activity of neo-conservative forces in neighboring countries and across the ocean, the difficulties in several sectors of the French economy and mass unemployment—all of this and many other factors played their role. But after all, when the French Socialists were drafting their program, "The Socialist Plan for France in the 1980's," in 1980, they saw all of this. Furthermore, they devoted an entire section of this program to an analysis of the causes of the crisis (the section is entitled "Capitalism's Second Great Crisis of the 20th Century"). What happened? The answer seems obvious: The French Socialists gave in too quickly to the pressure of the bourgeoisie on the national and global levels and displayed no consistency in adhering to their chosen policy line. This was the main reason for the withdrawal of communists from the government. And here are the results of this policy. At their last congress (Toulouse, 11-13 October 1985), the French Socialists were able to ascertain that the number of unemployed in France had risen by a million during their four and a half years in government and had almost reached the 3-million mark. The policy of "economic austerity" and the efforts at modernization were the main topics of discussion at the congress. All of this gave the bourgeois press reason to describe the FSP congress in Toulouse as the first social-democratic congress, as the French "Bad Godesberg."
The French example is most eloquent, but socialists in other countries also took the traditional social-democratic road by choosing a policy of economic "austerity." Analyzing the first years of the Spanish Socialist government, Professor F. Prieto from Madrid University arrived at the following conclusion: In essence, a repetition of the Swedish experience can be predicted in Spain, a situation in which a moderate socialist party dominates the party system. Gonzalez wanted to become the Spanish Olof Palme, Prieto concludes his analysis. This is what happened to the leftist radical programs which were drafted for so many years by the socialists of southern Europe and with which they hoped to surpass the traditional social democrats.

A New Political Rival—the "Greens"

At the turn of the decade the social democrats in the industrially developed countries encountered another phenomenon—the activities of all types of groups united by three main characteristics in spite of all their differing and even conflicting views: They advanced environmental protection slogans, tried to work out "alternative ways of life" based on the rejection of the consumer ideals cultivated by capitalism and launched a vigorous fight against the mounting threat of thermonuclear war. These groups were small at first, but they gradually grew larger and turned into political parties. Within these parties there was (and still is) a constant struggle between various currents, some of which felt that declared goals should be attained within the framework of the existing political system on the basis of compromises with other parties, while others felt that compromises of this kind would distort the very essence of the movement and would never allow for the transformation of capitalism into a society based on the principles of "self-controlled ecological socialism" (in the FRG the former are called "realists" and the latter are called "fundamentalists").

The "greens"—this is the name many alternative groups and parties are increasingly likely to give themselves—were initially most active in the industrially developed countries of central and northern Europe and in Scandinavia, but later parties of this kind made their appearance in the countries of southern Europe and also in Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. In the United States there is no "green" party, but there the ecological movement has millions of members.

At first the social democrats did not attach enough importance to the activities of the "greens." The first to realize that they were dealing with a serious political rival were the social democrats of the FRG. The number of votes cast for the SPD in the Bundestag elections in spring 1983 declined sharply, and the social democrats had to move to the opposition bench. It was big news that the Green Party surmounted the 5-percent barrier in the elections and put 27 of its deputies in the Bundestag. A subsequent analysis of voter behavior in these elections showed that the Greens were supported primarily by people who had previously voted for social democrats. This meant that the social democrats now had another political rival in the leftist political spectrum of the FRG (and not only of this country) and would have to contend with this rival in the future.
What line of behavior should social democrats take in relations with the "greens"? The discussions of this question in the SPD are still not over. Several prominent party activists and theorists (R. Loewenthal, who published his point of view in the form of theses, has been particularly active) believed that the aims of the "greens" (the cessation of economic growth and the protests against nuclear power plants and other large construction projects representing many jobs) conflicted with worker interests and, consequently, the interests of the social-democratic movement, and that the "greens" had no "prospects" but were only groups of young "idlers" feeding parasitically on the "social achievements of the industrial society." Rightwing social democrats also directed attention to the fact that the "greens" were dissociating themselves from traditional leftist parties, asserting that they had exhausted their possibilities and that cooperation with them was therefore impossible.

Moderate and leftist social democrats in the SPD opposed this point of view. Prominent party theorist P. Oertzen also published some theses, in which he argued that the "greens" represented all of the most prominent social groups (accounting for around 5-6 percent of each) and that they would consequently have to be viewed as a long-term political factor.

The initial summarization of these discussions resulted in the adoption of the document "The Workers Movement and Changes in Social Awareness and Behavior" (1982). In this document the social democrats acknowledged that the SPD must conduct a dialogue with ecological movements so as to first arrive at "agreement and understanding between these forces, and then their unification in a new and sound social alliance." All of this indicates that the social democrats are inclined to establish lasting relations with the "greens," who are still having fierce arguments about this matter. Some compromises, however, have also been reached, and this is attested to, for example, by the conclusion of the agreement to create a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens in Hessen (FRG) in October 1985. The future will show how effective this coalition can be and will test its ability to serve as a prototype for the same kind of coalition on the federal level.

Changes in the Social Base

The social democrats are naturally disturbed by the fact that part of their traditional electorate has recently been inclined to support neoconservatives or "greens." A search for the causes of this phenomenon revealed several new trends which, in combination, present a fairly intricate picture with no categorical interpretations.

One of the causes of the abandonment of the social democrats is the dissatisfaction of various population groups with the policy the social-democratic governments pursued in their attempts to surmount the crisis. Public opinion polls in countries where social democrats headed the government when the crisis entered its most severe phase showed that the majority of respondents doubted the ability of social democrats to cope with the new problems. As a
rule, the respondents no longer believed in the effectiveness of the Keynesian instruments of economic regulation. In a survey conducted in spring 1983 in nine capitalist countries (United States, Japan, FRG, Great Britain, France, Italy and others), most of the population supported the neo-conservatives' idea that economic difficulties could be surmounted primarily by reducing government intervention in economic affairs.17

The change in attitudes was particularly striking in France. Prior to the 1981 National Assembly elections, 74 percent of the French favored the "thorough transformation of French society."18 Three years later, however, the abovementioned French researcher L. Joffrin ascertained that the French Right's basic tenet was the priority of the market over the state, and that its rhetoric reflected public opinion more accurately than traditional leftist ideology could. According to a poll conducted at the beginning of 1984, 72 percent of the French favored the reduction of government's role in national affairs.19

These and other data testify that the voters in the majority of industrially developed capitalist countries are convinced that social democrats cannot keep their promises, are consequently having to choose between two approaches to economic problems—neoconservative or social-democratic—and are more likely, however their attitudes might fluctuate, to choose the former, although they are certainly aware of the social cost of this. These attitudes have also spread to part of the traditional social-democratic electorate.

Several researchers (for example, West German political scientist R. Dahrendorf)20 believe that the causes of the diminishing traditional influence of social democrats are more deep-seated. They feel that the political demands of the social democrats essentially reflected the "material demands" of their social base—the broad laboring masses—in the past. As these demands are satisfied, they are "replaced," as it were, with "post-material values" with an emphasis on the qualitative, substantive aspects of life, primarily individual self-assertion, democratic participation, environmental protection and the prevention of a new war. These "post-material values," according to Dahrendorf, are promoted by members of the "new middle strata"—engineering and technical personnel, highly skilled workers in modern sectors of the economy, physicians, teachers, jurists, academics, workers in the mass media, university students and younger students. And since the relative size of the "new middle strata" in the social structure of Western society is increasing, Dahrendorf concludes that the future belongs to the parties which can most fully and consistently express the "post-material values" of this growing social group.

This comparison of "material" with "post-material" values seems oversimplified. Neither type exists in pure form (and never did). The assumption that the reformist-oriented segment of the labor movement supporting social democrats was interested only in material matters in previous decades (despite all of the pragmatism of the policy of social-democratic governments) signifies an underestimation of all that it did to win and defend political and social rights within the framework of bourgeois parliamentary democracy. But in addition to this, R. Dahrendorf, and other Western researchers as well, can
see a growing tendency toward more highly individualized political behavior. Participating actively and directly in the resolution of the most urgent problems within the framework of small and large groups (including parties) and simultaneously striving to maintain personal "autonomy"—this is precisely the behavior pattern of, for example, the "greens," most of whom are members of the "new middle strata."

The social democrats have also encountered this tendency in their own ranks. There are many reasons why the people who formed the Social Democratic Party in Great Britain left the Labor Party. One of the main reasons, in our opinion, is the fact that the new party is supported mainly by members of the "new middle strata," who are displeased with the "Labor model" of collective as well as individual membership in trade unions.

The social democrats have also had to consider the substantial changes in the working class under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution. Federal Secretary P. Glotz of the SPD says in his book "No Escape from Urgent Problems" (we will refer to it later, as one of the few works in which social democrats try to assess their future) that the hired labor force now consists of different and independent sectors: the classic industrial workers and employees of the "post-industrial sector" and the service sector. The faction of industrial workers is still the strongest, but its numbers are decreasing. But this is not only a matter of quantitative changes, Glotz stresses. Differences in labor processes, in the distinctive features of labor relations, in production ethics and in other facets of the industrial and post-industrial sectors also engender differences in the interests of the workers and employees in these sectors. Glotz warns that if the social democrats continue clinging to the traditional sectors of their electoral influence, which are constantly diminishing, they will only perpetuate rightwing power. A "new social alliance," with social democracy as its organizational center, must be created. But to win the forces making up the "new social bloc" over to their side, the social democrats, Glotz says, must be aware of the dangerous phenomena in the contemporary state (technocratic tendencies and bureaucratization) and provide scope for individual personality development and interpersonal communication without questioning the bases of the legal and social state. As we can see, in his appeal for an updated social-democratic strategy, the SPD federal secretary points out the need to consider the attitudes and demands of the "new middle strata."

This idea is expressed more specifically by SPD theorist H. Heimann. When the SPD drafts new programs, he says, it should try to combine the economic interests and goals of the traditional labor movement with the goals of the ecological movement and other new social movements. The SPD should create a new social alliance of workers, the "new middle strata" and youth on this basis.

Program Updating Attempts

The social democrats are trying to reinterpret processes in the world, especially in the capitalist countries, and to substantiate solutions to problems and a strategy of action with theories. An analysis of this
investigative work provides grounds for the preliminary conclusion that we are dealing with something like the third "theoretical wave" of social democracy since World War II. The first such "theoretical wave" consisted of the programs drafted by the Socialist International in 1951, the Austrian Socialists in 1958, the West German Social Democrats in 1959 and other social-democratic parties. These programs, adopted during a period of relatively stable capitalist development, were distinguished by the following features: the rejection of a single ideological basis, the faith in the controllability of processes in the capitalist society, the use of the mixed economy mechanism, the emphasis on economic growth to allow for social reforms and secured employment, the electoral strategy of action and the evolution into a "people's party" supported by various population strata. The Godesberg program of the SPD embodied these features most consistently.

The activities of social democrats in the 1950's and 1960's in the parties obtaining a chance to rule (the Labor Party in Great Britain, the social democrats of Scandinavia, the FRG, Denmark and Holland and the socialists of Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg) testified that the reformist workers parties were essentially coping with government affairs and current economic events and were pursuing, although not always consistently, a policy of reform. These were years of pragmatism, which gave several researchers grounds to call them a period of "deideologization."

This pragmatic policy line, devoid of a socialist thrust even in its reformist foundation, evoked the predictable reaction—at first from the mass youth movements of the "New Left" and then from the social-democratic parties themselves, where the left wing, consisting mainly of youth organizations, was becoming much more active. The discussions which began at the end of the 1960's eventually led to either the updating of programs or their supplementation with policy-planning documents by almost all European social-democratic parties. The debates of the late 1960's and early 1970's can be regarded as the "second theoretical wave" in social democracy after the end of the war. The participants in these debates, particularly leftists, were concerned mainly about two groups of problems: HOW reforms could be filled with new meaning so that they would not simply help to improve living conditions but would also lead to qualitative changes transcending the bounds of capitalism; WHAT kind of reform strategy could motivate party leaders to adhere to policy-planning objectives aimed at socialism and could gain active public support for this policy line. This was precisely the period of the birth of several varieties of "system-replacing" and "system-surmounting" reforms, the strategy of the "break with capitalism," the "dual strategy" and so forth. These theoretical investigations were reflected in new programs (to varying degrees in different parties).

The crisis which broke out in the first half of the 1970's was the jolt that faced the social democrats with the need to revise an entire series of their fundamental tenets, especially the conviction that they had been able to curb the spontaneous nature of capitalism and that the policy of reform would gradually lead to qualitative changes (the 1951 Frankfurt Declaration of the SI asserted, for example, that the "foundation of a socialist society" had already been laid in the capitalist countries). At their last congress in Portugal,
the social democrats already had a different assessment of the situation. The resolution adopted by the congress says: "The euphoric illusions about transformed capitalism and the idyllic belief in unlimited economic growth, which would lead, without any problems or serious changes of an institutional nature, to greater justice for individual nations, turned out to be groundless generalizations of the experience of the 1950's and 1960's, which have now revealed their invalidity."23

Another conclusion the social democrats drew was that processes in today's world are increasingly global and interdependent. Social-democratic parties are acquiring the conviction that, for example, the problems facing the developing countries cannot be solved without radical arms reductions in the world. Phenomena observed in the capitalist world, especially TNC activity, also disturb the social democrats. At the congress in Portugal attention was again directed to the fact that "economic strength and economic control are being concentrated more and more in the hands of just a few multinational organizations."24

The social democrats are also revising their previous assumption that scientific and technical development is primarily progressive. They are growing more and more convinced that the use of scientific and technical achievements in the capitalist society can be good and bad for the individual. Robot engineering, for example, has a substantial effect on the nature of labor and the length of the work day. The social democrats, who want to represent hired labor, are naturally disturbed by the social implications of this phenomenon, just as they are disturbed by the effects of the scientific and technical revolution on the functioning of government institutions and on the social infrastructure of society.

Finally, the social democrats cannot ignore the demands made by new social movements concerned about the possible loss of individuality as a result of the increasing technization and globalization of the individual, who is already feeling the pressure of the imperatives of the consumer society.

The combination of these and other factors is motivating social democrats to seek new answers and to draft new documents, representing, in our opinion, the beginning of the new, third "theoretical wave." The SI is known to have resolved to update its program of principles. In the same way, a decision to update its program of principles was made by the SPD, one of the influential SI parties and the one that has set the tone to date in theoretical activity. Sufficient proof of this can be found in the Godesberg program, which served as the standard of reformist thinking (and was criticized by the Left and the Right).

The draft of a new program of principles, compiled over a period of several years by a commission headed by F. Gonzalez, was distributed at the last SI congress. The Gonzalez commission encountered substantial difficulties. The 1951 Frankfurt Declaration expressed the ideological position of European social democrats (despite all of the diverging views of individual parties). The Gonzalez commission had to coordinate or "join" the views of parties in different regions, especially parties in the industrially developed and
developing countries. A study of the draft distributed at the last SI congress indicates more sober and critical assessments of phenomena in the capitalist world, but it is more of a catalogue of demands and recommendations, with references to the basic premises of the Frankfurt Declaration, than an integral program. Judging by this document, the process of compiling a new program of SI principles is far from over.

The social democrats of the FRG also resolved to compile a new program of principles. The preliminary theoretical work on the program was performed by the "Commission on Basic Values," consisting of theorists of various currents (from the rightwing R. Loewenthal to the leftwing J. Strasser), which completed six documents before 1984. The latest document, "Godesberg Today," is a painstaking analysis of the obsolete and relevant points of the Godesberg program.

A commission was also formed to compile the program of principles itself. It was headed by W. Brandt. The commission published around a hundred questions about the program and has asked party members and all interested individuals to answer them.

The new program is being debated in the SPD. The most diverse issues are being discussed. The abovementioned P. Glotz has singled out six groups of problems for which, in his opinion, there is no answer in the Godesberg program and with which the social democrats of the FRG and of other countries in Western Europe will have to contend in coming years. These are structural unemployment; the need to improve the social security system under the conditions of negligible economic growth and the simultaneous acceleration of production efficiency measures; the need for a fundamentally new approach to environmental protection; the breach of public trust in traditional government policy in the arms sphere; the negative public feelings about the excessive technization and bureaucratization of government; the complete collapse of the family with a male head of household.

This list of problems indicates that fundamental issues of societal reorganization are not being raised by such activists as SPD Federal Secretary P. Glotz.

The Search for a Practical Alternative

Although the drafting of programs usually demands a great deal of time and effort from social democrats, the social-democratic politicians in government do not refer to them often but are primarily guided by practical considerations. The activities of the Schmidt government in the FRG (1974-1982) provide eloquent proof of this. And even the French Socialists, who were once much more radical, now prefer to ignore their 1980 "Socialist Plan."

The crisis which broke out in the first half of the 1970's was a rigorous test for the social democrats in power. They were unable to stop the recession in industrial production or prevent the further growth of unemployment. Under their rule, technological modernization was a slow process; the public debt grew; the social security system proved to be less and less effective. In March 1985 the Paris journal PROBLEMES ECONOMIQUES printed an article
reporting that the total number of jobs did not increase in the EEC countries during the period of modernization between 1974 and 1980, while 15 million jobs were created in the United States and 3 million in Japan. These figures obviously do not testify in favor of the social democrats, in view of the fact that this was precisely the period when they were in power or were members of coalition governments in the majority of EEC countries, particularly the FRG and Great Britain. Their inability to cope with economic difficulties was also probably the main reason why the West German Social Democrats and the English Labor Party (and also their EEC colleagues in other countries) had to move to the opposition bench.

The same social-democratic parties which assumed positions of power in Western Europe after 1980 chose an economic policy of "austerity"—that is, they consciously or unconsciously copied the methods used by their bourgeois opponents, the neoconservative parties deliberately striving for social disintegration and ignoring the growth of unemployment in what they regarded as unpromising sectors. Perhaps the only exceptions were two countries—Austria and Sweden—where social democrats, in spite of all their inconsistency and social costs, tried to adhere to the line of guaranteed employment and achieved definite results in comparison to other countries.

Great difficulties have been encountered by social democrats in the countries where they were succeeded by neoconservative parties. It would seem that the policy of social disintegration and the increasing number of unemployed (2.5 million in the FRG and 4 million in Great Britain) would give them weighty arguments to attract voters to their side. But in spite of this, many of those displeased with the policy of the neoconservatives are supporting either the Greens (FRG) or the Social-Liberal Alliance (Great Britain). An important role is being played by the fact that the social democrats essentially have no economic theory adapted to the new conditions (the SPD is planning to convene a special party conference to discuss the matter).

What directions is this search taking? The abovementioned P. Glotz believes that a clear stand must be taken on three main issues. First of all, new criteria and new indicators of economic growth, with a view to environmental implications, are needed. Secondly, definite decisions must be made on how the individual will divide his time between work and non-productive activity if the substantial reduction of work time, anticipated by the social democrats, should occur. For this reason, Glotz stresses, a new approach must be found in discussions of the terms "labor" and "full employment." Thirdly, it is extremely important to establish who should make decisions and what kind of decisions they should be. In the FRG, Glotz points out, there is the increasingly perceptible danger that all important decisions in the West German economy will be made by the so-called club of "300 powers that be."

With a view to these long-term considerations, Glotz tries to formulate the specifics of social-democratic economic strategy: neither blind modernization nor a static policy of economic equilibrium, but a policy of social control over the incorporation of new technology in the economy.

All of this, in Glotz' opinion, will signify a "change of paradigms" of social democracy in economic policy during the transition "from the mechanical to the
electronic civilization." It consists of three main elements: the market
economy, participation in management and participation in ownership.

What is new about this "change of paradigms"? In principle, nothing. All
three elements are taken from the Godesberg program, and all of them were
once examined sufficiently by the social democrats themselves and by their
critics. A remark made by a party colleague of P. Glotz, also a theorist,
the head of the commission which drafted the "SPD Economic Policy Guidelines
up to 1985," P. Oertzen, seems relevant to us in this context. He wrote:
"One of the chronic weaknesses of all social democracy is the absence of clear
and meaningful statements in its economic programs, although it is objectively
moving toward a point at which it can begin advancing directly toward social-
ism. But only a few social democrats have any idea of where to go, when this
point will be reached and how THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY CAN BE
SURMOUNTED (emphasis mine--B. O.)."

Oertzen's remark is eloquent. It testifies that the problem of transcending
the bounds of capitalism, of making the "break with capitalism" on the level
of theory, not to mention the level of fact, is still an open question for the
overwhelming majority of social-democratic politicians and theorists.

The Social Democrats and the Developing Countries

It was mentioned above that the social democrats have been much more active
in the "Third World" in recent years. After ascertaining the disturbing fact
that the gap between the industrially developed and developing countries is
growing wider instead of narrower, that the debts of the "Third World"
countries are growing (the astronomical figure of a trillion dollars is
already being mentioned) and that hunger, poverty and illiteracy still reign
in these countries, they are trying to find methods of emerging from the
crisis and to formulate the bases of a new world economic order. W. Brandt's
position is indicative in this respect. He is striving to discern the con-
nections between East-West relations (that is, between socialist and capitalist
countries) and North-South relations (the social democrats relegate the indus-
trial countries of capitalism and socialism to the north, groundlessly putting
them on the same level). "We must," W. Brandt explained, referring to the
countries of the West and East, "approach problems with an awareness of their
interdependence and take action—wherever possible—not against one another,
but together." This is the policy of "small steps," something like a search
for mutual compromises leading to the resolution of problems.

The social democrats find an important connection between the issues of
disarmament and aid to developing countries. This is the basis of the recom-
mendations of the independent committee chaired by W. Brandt, set forth in
two reports, and it is also the basis of, for example, the "Program for the
Future Third World," the 1984 SPD document. A reduction of 5 percent in world
arms expenditures, it says, would signify an increase of 50 billion dollars a
year in aid to "Third World" countries.

Another new feature of the approach of social democrats to the developing
countries is that they no longer insist that the "Third World" countries
completely copy the model of "democratic socialism" which they worked out with a view primarily to the characteristics of industrially developed countries. Each country seeks its own path. During the search, in the opinion of social democrats, only three main principles must be observed: a mixed economy, pluralist democracy and a policy of non-alignment.

Adjustments have also been made in the reformist strategy of social democrats. Whereas the social democrats completely refused until recently to support armed actions in conjunction with revolutionary methods, they now make exceptions in cases in which the fighting people have no legal means of liberation. All SI resolutions on Latin America, beginning with the congress in Vancouver (1978), express approximately this view. The resolution of the Vancouver congress states: "The Socialist International resolutely supports the continuing struggle of the Latin Americans for the right to live in peace, for freedom and for democracy and is expressing its admiration for the persistent struggle of the labor movement, democratic political parties and the church in countries with repressive regimes." In the accountability report to the 16th SI Congress (April 1983), this new position is expressed in even more definite terms: "The Socialist International consistently opposes foreign intervention in the revolutionary process in Nicaragua and supports the true aims of the Nicaraguan revolution."

When we are assessing the attitude of social democrats toward the developing countries as a whole, we cannot lose sight of differences of opinion on this matter as well. They concern the underlying motives of the approach to the developing countries (the imprint of neocolonialism on the actions of some social-democratic parties, which is attested to, for example, by the policy of the French Socialist government in Chad), the differing amounts of aid offered to them (the Swedish Social Democrats have been most consistent in this sphere), diverging assessments of events in Central American countries and so forth. The inherent contradictions and inconsistency of social democracy have also been apparent in this sphere.

Questions of War and Peace

Probably the most noticeable feature of social-democratic activity in recent years has been the resolute stand on matters of war and peace. The essence of the social-democratic position is concisely formulated in the Albufeira Declaration, adopted at the SI congress in 1983. It says: "We are living in a time of great fear and great hope. Fear because the escalation of the nuclear arms race is threatening the very existence of the planet Earth, and hope because the increasing awareness of the tragic implications of this situation has inspired millions of people, especially youth, to seek the road to peace through disarmament."

It is significant that although the social democrats have declared their affiliation with the Western alliance, they have departed from their previous position of unconditional support for the U.S. Government. For example, the social democrats have taken an essentially negative view of the U.S. Government's plan to move the arms race into outer space.

The foreign policy positions of such prominent SI parties as the SPD and the Labor Party of Great Britain have undergone even more significant changes.
In the 1970's both parties adhered to a pro-Atlantic line. Furthermore, in 1979 it was precisely the West German Social Democrats who agreed (although with reservations) at their congress in West Berlin to the deployment of new American intermediate-range missiles in the FRG and thereby influenced the general position of West European NATO alliance members on this matter. But just 4 years later, the SPD objected to the deployment of American missiles on FRG territory at its congress in Essen.

After their return to the opposition (1979), the English Labor Party members also revised their foreign policy tenets and stated that the country's defensive strategy should be built on a "non-nuclear basis." This new attitude was confirmed at the last annual LP conference (Bournemouth, October 1985). Conference speakers demanded the withdrawal of American cruise missiles from the country, the cancellation of the program for the modernization of England's submarine fleet by equipping it with the Trident nuclear missile system, and the elimination of England’s "independent" nuclear deterrence forces.

It should be borne in mind that within these two parties, and within other social-democratic parties as well, there is overt and covert struggle between supporters of detente and supporters of a strict pro-Atlantic orientation. One indication of this was an article printed in the SPD organ NEUE GESELLSCHAFT. Its author, G. Schwan, a representative of the right wing, accused W. Brandt and E. Barr of "playing up to the communists" with their conciliatory policy. Schwan appeals for a return to H. Schmidt's foreign policy line. It is significant that one of the reasons that some members of the Labor Party left the LP and formed the Social Democratic Party was disagreement with the foreign policy aims of the new LP leadership.

Analyzing the evolution in the SPD and LP foreign policy positions, we must consider the fact that this revision was undertaken after they had moved to the opposition. And as researchers have repeatedly pointed out, the assumption of positions of power by social democrats has a considerable effect on their behavior. Many demands which sound quite radical, including foreign policy demands, are consigned to oblivion. The governmental activity of the socialists in southern Europe offers further proof of this.

International social democracy is trying to work out a strategy for the prevention of nuclear catastrophe in the presence of these conflicting tendencies. It is based on the creation of a climate of trust and, consequently, on the maintenance and development of the policy of detente with the simultaneous linkage of such global problems as the need to curb the arms race and the need to give developing countries stronger assistance in overcoming their problems. This line envisages steps in different directions: the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons (the social democrats of Scandinavia have been particularly active in this sphere), nuclear strategic arms reductions and arms control in Europe, the support of the "spirit of Helsinki" and constant appeals to the USSR and United States with insistent reminders of their special responsibility for the fate of the world.

A logical extension of these social-democratic aims is their approval of the new initiatives advanced by the USSR at the conference in Geneva and
explained by M. S. Gorbachev during his visit to France in September 1985. The Soviet proposals are supported by the leadership of the SPD and some other social-democratic parties.

The common position of international social democracy, reflected in the proceedings of the second SI conference on disarmament (Vienna, October 1985), was explained by W. Brandt. "Not only I personally," he stressed, "but also representatives of the SI parties attending the Vienna conference, viewed the latest Soviet proposals as an important contribution to the elaboration of decisions on matters being discussed in the Soviet-American talks."35

Problems of Contacts and Cooperation

The issue of the interrelations between two segments of the international workers movement--communists and social democrats--remained relevant in the 1980's.

Relations between the CPSU and the social-democratic parties were described by M. S. Gorbachev at his press conference in Paris. He said: "Our ideological differences will not impede cooperation in the resolution of such problems of vital importance as issues of war and peace.... We have good relations and useful contacts with the social democrats of West Germany, Sweden and Finland and with the socialist parties of Japan and Austria. In general, we are open to cooperation with all forces interested in surmounting dangerous tendencies in world development and putting the world on the road to cooperation, interaction and mutual understanding."36

The issue of cooperation is given the necessary elucidation in the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Program. It says: "The CPSU will continue its line of developing contacts with socialist, social-democratic and labor parties.... However profound the differences of opinion between various currents of the workers movement might be, this cannot impede the productive and regular exchange of opinions and parallel or even joint actions against the danger of war, for the improvement of the international climate, for the elimination of all remaining traces of colonialism and for the interests and rights of the laboring public."37

The social democrats have also made positive statements about the development of contacts with the CPSU. After the meeting in Vienna (October 1985), W. Brandt announced: "We are highly pleased that the CPSU delegation headed by B. N. Ponomarev attended the conference of the Socialist International. This allowed us to continue the extremely useful exchange of opinions of recent years between the Socintern as a whole and the parties belong to the Socintern and the Soviet leadership. I hope that these contacts and dialogue, which serve the common cause of preventing war and consolidating peace and international security, will continue to gain strength."38

In general, it must be said that contacts and cooperation between communists and social democrats were developed quite intensively in various forms in the 1980's. Such events as the delivery of the message from the CPSU Central Committee to the 16th SI Congress and the science conference in Berlin on the
165th anniversary of K. Marx' birth (April 1983) played an important part in this process. The conference was attended by representatives of 18 SI parties. As prominent expert on social democracy W. Paff (GDR) noted in his article, this conference "was a representative discussion forum where the views of two currents of the workers movement on the most important issue of the present day were compared. The comparison showed that, despite the ideological differences between communists and social democrats, the struggle for peace and disarmament can and must become their common cause."39

It is interesting that ideological differences did not prevent the development of contacts even by parties with particularly acute differences of opinion in the past for a number of reasons. For example, representatives of the SED Central Committee attended a discussion organized by the editors of the SPD theoretical journal NEUE GESELLSCHAFT (March 1983). Members of the SED and SPD drafted a joint document proposing the transformation of central Europe into a zone free of chemical weapons.

For a few years in the 1980's there was a leftist government coalition of Socialists and Communists in France. Its positive and negative experiences provide food for thought with regard to the possibilities and limits of cooperation by leftist parties when they are opposed by a strong bloc of neoconservative parties hoping to modernize the economic system of capitalism and its ideological basis.

The facts presented above testify quite conclusively how necessary the coordination of the efforts of the international workers movement on the global level is now that the existence of the human race and its environment is being threatened. In the resolution of this global problem, ideological differences can remain strong but must not present any obstacles. The fact that the social democrats have made definite adjustments in recent years in their position on matters of peace and detente and their attitude toward developing countries is providing broader opportunities for dialogue and joint initiatives. Mankind is quite justified in putting most of its reliance on political forces with the preservation of peace and the guarantee of social progress as the main objectives of their activity.

Some Conclusions

The crisis which engulfed the capitalist countries in the first half of the 1970's took the social-democratic parties by surprise. They were unable to find effective methods of struggle, primarily against the phenomenon of unemployment of unprecedented scales. In several countries they were replaced by neoconservative parties with plans to revitalize capitalist enterprise and make substantial cuts in social spending. By the beginning of the 1980's the social democrats were faced by the need to work out an alternative more convincing and more effective than neoconservative policy, with a view to the technological changes engendered by the continued development of the scientific and technical revolution and to changes in public values. Social democrats are still working on this today, regarding it as their main objective, under the conditions of increasingly intense political confrontations with the Right and the Left.
The social democrats are simultaneously seeking their own answer to such global issues as the prevention of nuclear war, the protection of man's environment and the assistance of developing countries in the resolution of their difficulties, and are trying to actively influence these issues by expanding their sphere of activity in the "Third World," especially in Latin America. Social democracy is quite clearly losing its original Europocentric nature.

Authoritative ideologists from the bourgeois camp, such as, for example, West German liberal R. Dahrendorf, are even stating that the era of the prevailing social-democratic influence with its emphasis on the policy of social reform is coming to an end because the main sphere of social-democratic influence, the industrially developed capitalist countries, has entered a new phase in which "post-material values" predominate, with all of the ensuing consequences in all areas of life--economic, social, political and spiritual.

Social democracy must prove whether it has or has not retained its characteristic ability to adapt to changing conditions. Its activity in the 1980's has shown that it is earnestly seeking answers to new problems. The results of this search will be revealed in the future. One thing is already clear: These problems are mainly of a qualitative nature and, while social democracy is solving them, it will undergo unavoidable changes itself.

FOOTNOTES


5. Ibid., p 160.

6. ZUKUNFT, Vienna, No 13/14, p 1.


30. **NEUE GESELLSCHAFT, 1985, No 9, p 811.**

31. **SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, London, 1979, No 1, p 28.**

32. "**Summary of the Sixteenth Congress...,"** p 144.

33. "**0 mundo em crise...,"** p 31.

34. **G. Schwan, "Gegen burokratische Engstirnigkeit-fuer eine faire Auseinandersetzung um den zukuenftigen Kurs der SPD," NEUE GESELLSCHAFT, 1984, No 12.**

35. **IZVESTIYA, 19 October 1985.**

36. **KOMMUNIST, 1985, No 14, p 46.**

37. **PRAVDA, 26 October 1985.**

38. **IZVESTIYA, 19 October 1985.**


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IDEOLOGY, POLICY OF ITALIAN NEO-FASCISM DISCUSSED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASI I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 86 (signed to press 16 Jan 86) pp 142-155

[Article by A. I. Ryabov]

[Text] Contemporary fascism in Italy is the largest organized group in Western Europe. Its political doctrine is frankly set forth in officially published works by the theorists of neo-fascism and in more than 50 daily and weekly periodicals and is expressed in campaign slogans and leaflets. According to the results of the 1983 parliamentary elections, the neo-fascist party of the Italian Social Movement-National Right (MSI-DN) won 7.3 percent of the votes for the Senate and 6.8 percent for the Chamber of Deputies. In Rome it became the third-ranking political force, after the Christian Democrats and Communists. The administrative elections which were held in May 1985 in the atmosphere of the anticommunist campaign in the country also demonstrated a slight increase in the influence of neo-fascists, who were supported by 6.6 percent of the Italian voters. This is the "legal" side of neo-fascism, which has taken advantage of the bourgeois democratic freedoms restored in the struggle against fascism.

More than 60 secret neo-fascist groups are also operating in Italy and committed more than 3,000 terrorist acts just in 1979, including bombings, attacks on activists of democratic parties and organizations and other types of provocative behavior. Both the "legal" and the "underground" forms of fascism enjoy constant financial support. The neo-fascists belonging to the MSI-DN are adhering to the line of an extensive and diversified organized political movement and are operating not only in various corners of Italy but also in Parliament.

What is the reason for this turn of events? What are the reasons for fascism's vitality? What allows it to retain its influence in specific social strata (the MSI-DN won more than 2 million votes in the June 1983 elections)? A comprehensive analysis of the country's development after World War II can provide complete answers to these questions. Within the confines of a magazine article, however, we can briefly discuss only the socioeconomic and political aspects with a definite effect on the origins and evolution of neo-fascism in Italy.
Above all, it must be said that fascism, both as an ideological current and as a mass movement, is revealed most completely at times of severe and acute social crisis, because it is precisely in this kind of situation that its nutritive medium displays spontaneous and rapid growth—the dissatisfaction of large groups of people, manifested in all spheres of sociopolitical and economic life. An analysis of the political ideology of Italian neo-fascism proves that whenever there is no crisis and when there are no problems giving rise to political discord, the fascists themselves often strive to either provoke this kind of crisis or to create these problems.

When we discuss the willingness of neo-fascists to use the most diverse pretexts to escalate political tension, we must also mention the group of issues that have remained virtually unchanged in their propaganda arsenal and that make up the ideology of the extreme Right. These are ardent nationalism, anticommunism, various forms of antidemocratism, militarism with the glorification of war, the desire for territorial expansion and, finally, racism, both anthropological and spiritual-aristocratic-elitist. These elements constitute the foundation of the political ideology of neo-fascism. During specific stages of history, these elements have occupied different positions of relative importance in the overall ideology depending on the concrete situation, but they are always present. Obviously, they are not always clearly apparent because the ideology of neo-fascism is distinguished by vagueness and the absence of strict consistency and definite statements. But political ideology, which is a concentrated expression of the economic interests of classes, does not necessarily take the form of a program of social reorganization or, in general, the form of a definite, theoretically substantiated and rationally perceived view of the world with which the individual consciously associates his own personal outlook. Ideology can take the form of various stereotypes of mass consciousness—beliefs about good and evil, cultivated political illusions, moral prohibitions, cultural standards, religious biases and various forms of basic values.

During periods of the intensification of the general crisis of capitalism, the psychological state known as mass impotence, feelings of frustration and apolitical attitudes grow stronger. At such times, the bourgeoisie offers the mass mind, filled with a sense of protest, the ideology and practice of fascism as an alleged means of solving problems engendered by the crisis. In these situations, fascism appears to take an extra-class stand, attacking leftist forces and allowing itself to criticize capitalist practices, which actually have led to the intensification of the crisis.

In the most general terms, the social base of neo-fascism consists of people dissatisfied with their status or living conditions and seeking a way out of their present situation. The viability of the fascist ideology stems precisely from the fact that it can be interpreted in any way whatsoever, and therefore can be supported for various reasons.

There were several problems, difficulties and contradictions in the Italian society after World War II, and these established the conditions for the revival of fascism.
"In a paradoxical manner," wrote historian Enzo Santarelli, member of the PCI [Italian Communist Party] leadership, "neo-fascism managed to somehow gain a foothold in the country and establish some contact with the 'masses' by using precisely the negative results of the 20 years of fascist rule: the catastrophic situation in the south, destroyed by the fascist war; the hostility of the declassed and lowest strata of the petty bourgeoisie, suffering from a sense of psychological frustration born of defeat; the psychological experience of the Italian 'nation's' military defeat, inflicted by the capitalist democracy of the West and the country of socialism."5

When they were reviving fascism, the people who breathed new life into it were pursuing two basic goals: They wanted to smother the democratic movement within the country by putting a government with a "firm hand" in power, and they wanted to include fascism among the attacking forces fighting against socialism in the international arena.

The neo-fascist "Uomo Qualunque" movement which made a brief appearance after the war ceased to exist soon after 1946. But it played a role by consolidating the forces which formed the independent neo-fascist party, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), in 1946.6 This party is essentially trying only to "update" the fascist doctrine, and although it verbally professes respect for the Basic Law,7 it is actually working against democracy and progress, against the bases of the anti-fascist alliance and the traditions of the Resistance Movement. Dozens of neo-fascist organizations and their conspiratorial plans have repeatedly been censured in the Italian press, including government organs, but never has this been accompanied by a truly discerning analysis and assessment of their activities, which are contrary to the provisions of the constitution and the laws of the republic. This has been a favorable situation for the spread of the neo-fascist ideology.

There is no question that there are differences between fascism and its contemporary model, neo-fascism, and these have been defined in general terms in the documents of the international communist and workers movement.8 Here we will only discuss the characteristics of Italian neo-fascism, one of which is the desire to create a network of reactionary organizations and to form so-called order blocs (with an alleged autonomous existence and no connections with the activity of the centralized party—the Italian Social Movement). It is these blocs that are supposed to launch a coup in the mechanism of public administration by supplanting the present structure of political and labor organizations. Italian neo-fascism is now also distinguished by other features:

Attempts to portray the MSI as a party "respecting the laws and the constitution," to control public opinion with the aid of constitutional methods, and to use Parliament to publicize the neo-fascist ideology;

The partial transfer of the center of the neo-fascist movement from the industrial north to the agrarian south and, consequently, the issuance of statements calculated to appeal to the most backward population strata—the peasantry and the lumpenproletariat—and to the traditionalist consciousness of large landowners;
The use of the so-called strategy of tension on a broad scale to create an atmosphere of chaos, confusion and fear in the country, capable of causing the conservative part of the population, usually supporting bourgeois centrist and rightwing parties, to become disillusioned with the activity of existing political institutions and organs and thereby give rise to a desire for a "strong government," allegedly capable of establishing order in the economy, in politics and in social relations with the aid of "simple solutions" and "energetic action." Employing these tactics and taking the mental state of the average citizen into account, the neo-fascists are preparing to seize power with the aid of the ultra-rightist military establishment on the pretext of "restoring order" and to pave the way for the legislative acknowledgement of the neo-fascist ideology and policy.

The legacy of "canonical" fascism is indisputably one of the main features of the neo-fascist ideology. Another important factor determining the behavior of neo-fascists is the balance of political power in each specific situation. Relations between different groups within the neo-fascist movement are also of great importance. But neo-fascism's position in the political life of Italy (and not only of this country) depends on the attitudes of reactionary groups of the monopolist bourgeoisie toward it as a potential weapon for the suppression of mass democratic movements in a revolutionary situation. We should recall that the bourgeoisie was able to use the traditional mechanism of power, parliament, quite effectively to neutralize socioeconomic and political conflicts in the industrially developed capitalist countries in the 1970's. As a result of this, rightwing radical forces were relegated to the opposition. The existence of this opposition gave the ruling elite a chance, on the one hand, to portray itself as a "moderate," centrist force guarding society against pressure from the right and, on the other, to substantiate the slogan of the "equal danger" from the right and the left, creating a convenient pretext for the use of unconcealed force against leftists. The contradictions of capitalism became more pronounced in the middle of the 1970's. In particular, the mechanism of "state regulation" of the economy began to break down. All of this led to the instability of the "traditional"--parliamentary--system of government, and today we can justifiably point to the abrupt rightward shift in the domestic and foreign policy line of many developed capitalist states. There were open appeals for an authoritarian form of government, the only form capable of withstanding the discontent of the masses and their class struggle. Rightwing radical parties and organizations moved closer to the heights of power, and even respectable bourgeois parties began to seek an alliance with them. Now we are witnessing the intensive "legalization" of neo-fascism, not only in individual countries but also on the international scale (for example, the drafting of a platform of joint action by the faction of West European neo-fascist parties with conservative parties in the European Parliament).

In the last decade the MSI-DN membership has remained almost the same and the party has, according to its leaders, 400,000 members. The party is essentially the fourth largest political force in the country after the DC [Christian Democratic Party], PCI and Socialist Party. The "Youth Front," the young people's branch of the neo-fascist party, unites 120,000 people. According to data in the press, around 35 percent of the party members are employees and functionaries, primarily from central and local government agencies,
27.7 percent are craftsmen and merchants, 10 percent are workers, 10 percent are peasants and around 14 percent are professionals. Officially, there are few people from the lumpenproletariat substratum or from the armed forces and police in the MSI-DN, but these figures do not include neo-fascist sympathizers.  

The constituency of the Italian extreme Right, however, far surpasses these party membership figures. Furthermore, it is distinguished by definite stability and a tendency, however slight, toward growth. The 1968 and 1972 elections played a special role in the establishment of the social structure of the neo-fascist constituency in Italy. It was precisely then that fascism's present image and its political positions were defined and the theoretical bases of the ideology of the extreme Right were formulated.

Answers to questions about the reasons for the relative stability of Italian neo-fascism's political position can apparently be found in the fairly massive social base of rightwing political forces in the country, represented by a broad spectrum of different political parties and groups. In the narrow sense of the term, the constituency of Italy's rightist parties is made up of voters who support the Italian Social Movement, the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the monarchists who represented a separate group until 1972 and other small political groups accounting for a negligible percentage of the national electorate.

The constituency of the rightwing parties has a clearly defined bourgeois nature (the middle strata and the grand bourgeoisie and landowners account for more than 65 percent of the votes). The declining influence of the Right in the proletariat can be regarded as a general tendency. The loss of this influence has been particularly rapid in the industrial proletariat: Over 20 years (1953-1972) the relative number of industrial workers among the constituents of these parties decreased by 5 percent and there was also a decrease in the number of votes in other segments of the proletariat (rural, office-trade and the urban semiproletariat). An analysis of available data suggests that the Right's successes with proletarian voters in some years were due to new constituents from trade, the service sphere and so forth--that is, the most backward segment of the Italian proletariat and the segment most infected with the petty bourgeois ideology. It is precisely this stratum of the working class that is most susceptible to "fits" of anticomunist hysteria, which usually coincide with the intensification of crisis-related phenomena in the country.

It would be wrong, however, to ascribe the declining percentage of proletarians among the constituents of rightwing and other parties only to their abandonment by some worker voters. For example, whereas the Right lost 541,000 worker votes in 1972 in comparison to 1958, the entire constituency of these parties was augmented by more than a million votes in the same period. Consequently, the declining percentage of worker votes in the electorate of the rightist parties was largely due to the fact that the new members of the Right's constituency between 1958 and 1972 came from other population groups, especially the middle strata. Rightwing parties received 1.7 million more of these votes in the parliamentary elections of 1972 than in 1958.
Therefore, the mass base of Italy's rightwing forces has undergone qualitative changes in recent years. The Right's nutritive social medium since the beginning of the 1970's has been the middle strata, which moved over to the side of the rightist parties when economic difficulties and the political struggle were intensified by the crisis of the bourgeois society in the country. In view of the growth of the middle strata in present-day Italy, this indicates the presence of a serious threat to the Italian people's democratic gains and will require workers parties to intensify their work in the middle strata and launch a more resolute struggle to win them over to their own side.

The neo-fascist party is called the "crisis party" for its attempts to provoke massive sociopolitical and economic upheavals threatening the existing political establishment's ability to function. An analysis of the reasons for Italian neo-fascism's ups and downs in the last decade shows that they have coincided with political and economic excesses in Italy. In the 1970's the appeal of neo-fascism quickly came into being and then came abruptly to an end, only to start growing again in the beginning of the 1980's (see Table 1), graphically revealing many characteristics of the extreme Right and the distinctive features of its activity in specific sociopolitical situations.

Table 1. Percentage of Voters Supporting MSI-DN Candidates in Elections*

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* Prior to 1972, the MSI—Italian Social Movement.

Faced by the real growth of the authority and influence of democratic forces, neo-fascists fuel an atmosphere of anticommunist hysteria, trying to convince the Italian public of the need to create some kind of "neutral" state, having the characteristics of neither the capitalist nor the socialist social system but representing a third model of societal construction, "free of the defects of the two world social systems." This central idea is clothed in a program for the construction of a corporative state, which will allegedly put an end to "the egotism of the monopolies and the trade unions." This state, according to neo-fascist doctrine, will be national, and therefore "just." After it has become the state "of all the people," it can put an end to the process of decline and degradation in all spheres of life: economic, political and moral. It will be a "state of order" (that is, the same kind of order that existed under the Mussolini regime).

But if the political ideology of neo-fascism is stripped of the pompous clothing of demagogic appeals for respect for the law, the constitution and the family and the pseudo-democratic slogans of equality and "class peace," it becomes obvious that neo-fascism is an instrument of extreme reaction. It opposes communism primarily from an antidemocratic position, resolutely
rejecting existing forms of bourgeois democracy, which, according to the allegations of neo-fascist theorists, is the "threshold to communism." Julius Evola, one of the leading ideologists of present-day fascism, wrote about this in his book "Fascismo" with cynical frankness: "The first characteristic of the state we are discussing is absolute intolerance for any kind of democracy and any kind of socialism. The fascist state will put an end to the idiotic flattery and hypocrisy of those who can now only repeat the word 'democracy' over and over again and who praise and glorify democracy. Democracy is nothing other than a regressive, decadent phenomenon."13

The futility of all the discussions of the social structure within the neo-fascist movement throughout the postwar period has forced its leaders to return to "canonical" fascism's concept of the corporative type of state. The importance of "the fundamental principles of the alternative to the existing system, corporativism and the national labor state," constituting the basis of the "concepts of life, society, nation and state," which the neo-fascists regard as "a reflection and guarantee of the necessary thorough revision" of the present Italian society, was underscored at the 14th MSI-DN Congress (November-December 1984).14

The neo-fascists are trying to update one of the main principles of government and nation, defined in the MSI Charter (1946) as loyalty to the "ideals of the social republic of Salo" and the "18 points of the Verona Manifesto";15 updated beliefs of a cultural-anthropological and existential type are being added to these concepts. In particular, the culturological current is trying (although in extremely obscure terms) to define the functions of the neo-fascist culture as a means of cultivating a "rational view of the world" in the individual who is supposed to establish the new fascist state.

A discussion of the functions of neo-fascist culture should include special mention of the plans of the National Right, which state that the government structure should be permeated with the "new right culture." The movement for its establishment will find expression in a "rebellion against the cultural and political technocracy" that has created the "cultural vacuum" characterizing modern man's spiritual world. This rebellion, in the opinion of the National Right, should diminish the influence of social conflicts in interpersonal relations. To this end, it proposes a set of instructions to be recorded in legislation for each population group. For example, the law drafted by the MSI-DN for universities specifically says: "To revive academic traditions based on the hierarchical principle; ...to deprive students of the right to participate in the system of university administration; ...to institute new regulations governing the relations between the administration and the students: In the event of disturbances, the rectors will be empowered to call out the police."16

Criticizing the so-called cultural vacuum, neo-fascists propose "direct and concrete action" as a means of surmounting it, action capable of motivating the individual to take vigorous steps, even if they are of a destructive nature. As part of this process, history is interpreted for speculative purposes and is portrayed in works by neo-fascist theorists as a chain of violence, destruction, suppression and wars, but all of this is sanctified.

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with the "mysticism of sacrifice." The destructive nature of the neo-fascist "right culture," however, has its "own" political content: It persistently implies that in today's world, where the hypocrisy of political forces struggling for power prevails, only neo-fascism is capable of pointing out a real escape from the mental state which causes the individual to feel "lonely in a crowd" and which is having an oppressive effect on the human being, who is gradually becoming a faceless controlled entity in the bourgeois society.

The irrationality of the "right culture" is consistent with the irrationality of the political ideology of the MSI-DN, determining the theoretical and practical activities of this party. For example, campaign instructions sent to low-level organizations of the social movement specifically stipulate the preservation of a sense of free self-expression in youth within the bounds of the "field of irrational action," the only field affording the possibility of the "great choice of freedom," hidden from the eyes of "sacred idols." "The freedom acquired there provides an opportunity to cast off the ideological burden distorted by politicians of the past and to fill the minds of young people with myths in which they can believe."17 For this reason, "the campaign to promote the right culture must be resumed and intensified; but the right culture must be regarded as the culture of civic and moral duty, a culture which is anti-Marxist to the maximum and simultaneously anti-materialistic: This culture should be the spiritual nourishment of the emerging consciousness of youth."18

It must be said that the Italian extreme Right is experiencing great difficulties in the elaboration of a theory of neo-fascism. The main reason is that the historical basis on which they are trying to erect the speculative edifice of the new fascist state and work out the appropriate ideological and moral standards assigning the individual's place in it, has not won mass support due to the political and historical bankruptcy of the fascist doctrine. At the same time, the neo-fascists are essentially rejecting the scientific and technical revolution and the related bourgeois hypotheses about new "technocratic" forms of government and are making a great effort to determine their own methods of solving the problems of the "individual's internal world," culture and ethics as a basis for the indirect explanation of their political program. This change of emphasis has turned out to be favorable for the spread of neo-fascist ideological and propagandistic slogans and appeals. The most "fundamental" explanations of the theoretical premises of the neo-fascist ideology and policy were drafted in the late 1960's and first half of the 1970's, when neo-fascism was departing more and more from orthodox adherence to the letter of the "classic" fascist doctrine. What is more, at that time the theorists of the extreme Right publicly criticized fascism for its "betrayal of the corporativist ideal"—the fundamental element of the concept of the fascist state. During this period, neo-fascism achieved considerable results in national and regional elections, and this necessitated the planning of a long-range strategy for the movement. At its basis lay the objectives of "conquering the mass mind by penetrating into the essence of man's irrational being; here the individual can display the features and qualities that will determine the type of individual of the new fascist state in the future."19 The hackneyed ideas about the Italians as the descendants of the "select" Spartan-Roman racial group were publicized once again in those years in the
works of Julius Evola; fascist philosopher Armando Piebe formulated the concept of the "third path" of socioeconomic development, which would be neither capitalist nor communist, but nationalist (corporativist); National Secretary, Giorgio Almirante published several studies explaining the bases of the strategy and tactics of neo-fascism as a political movement and as a "spiritual instrument" for the rebirth of the new human civilization; the theoretical investigations of the group of neo-fascist theorists culminated in the creation of the school of the "new right culture"—a current of neo-fascist ideology with an important place in the propaganda and policy of the MSI. Since the ideas and premises formulated at that time are still the theoretical foundation of the ideology, policy and propaganda of the MSI-DN, it seems necessary to discuss them in detail.

The neo-fascists regard Armando Piebe as the official ideologist of their party. Piebe once portrayed himself as something just short of a Marxist. Now he is a militant anti-Marxist. In his book "What Marx Did Not Understand," Piebe says Marx defined the proletariat as an "inferior race" and accuses Marxism of allegedly viewing the working class as some kind of proletarian "elite" while consigning the unemployed and the lumpenproletariat to oblivion. Here it is easy to see one of the theoretical premises of the leaders of contemporary neo-fascism and of the ultra-rightists in general—the association of political hopes with declassed elements, particularly in southern Italy.

Piebe severely criticizes the principle of universal and equal suffrage, which was won by the Resistance Movement and is secured in the Constitution of the Italian Republic. In his opinion, voting rights should be distributed in proportion to "the prestige, money and productive activity" of individuals. He repeats Mussolini's statements, particularly those on the equality of people. Whereas Mussolini believed that "people are not each other's brothers" and cannot be, Piebe (contradicting his own "criticism" of Marx) alleges that "eternal inequality" is an inherent part of human society. "There is nothing more ridiculous than equality," he wrote. "I hate democracy," because the country should be governed by "the best, the chosen few."

As a fervent opponent of progress in all spheres of public life, Piebe demands that the idea of social progress, not to mention the revolutionary transformation of society, be driven out of the minds of people by some kind of "discerning imagination" capable of freeing the human intellect from the "monstrous thought of historical progress." Social development, in Piebe's interpretation, does not exist, it is engendered by the "perverted human mind," and progress is possible only in the "visionary imagination."

It is difficult to find any kind of logic or any semblance of ideological harmony in the statements of the neo-fascist "visionary" Piebe. A far-fetched interpretation of the laws of history and flagrant contempt for them are what constitute the basis of the "philosophy" of this poor excuse for a fascist ideologist who rages against democracy and communism.

The postwar theorizing of another neo-fascist ideologist, Julius Evola, is a conglomerate of the ideas of "canonical" and "aristocratic" fascism, spiritual racism and the creation of a "new," ethnically renovated Europe. Even at the
time of Mussolini's fascist regime, Evola was known as an "expert on racial policy." He was the one who attempted the "theoretical substantiation" of the idea that the Italians belonged to the "Spartan-Roman race," which is an "integral part of the German race." In the first years after the war, he became the "spiritual father" of young supporters of the MSI. In the neo-fascist newspaper RIVOLTA IDEALE, Evola zealously criticized De Gasperey's "European concept" as a theory alien to the interests of the Italian nationality, simultaneously insisting on the creation of an elitist fascist Europe. In this respect, his views were close to those of the MSI neo-fascists who proposed the unification of Western Europe in a "single nation" under the auspices of Italian neo-fascism in the first years after the war. One of the ideologists of this current, Capasso Torre, wrote: "We are Europeanists because we are Italians, and Europe is largely a product of the spread of Italian civilization and a result of its development."22 One of the first to proclaim the "Europe of nations" slogan was Oswald Mosley, the leader of the English fascists, who wanted, incidentally, to establish a symbiosis of all European neo-fascist currents after World War II. His views were shared by J. Evola. Evola's theorizing about the alliance of nations and nationalities on an ethnic basis derived from racist postulates and represented an abstract modification of the same inhuman idea of the "great European empire" the Nazis tried to impose on the people of Europe.

The complete subordination of the individual to "society" and the primacy of the allegedly general over the particular, characteristic of Evola's theories, presupposed the ideological, political and social suppression of the masses by an elite group of fascist leaders, closely bound by "extra-personal unity" based on sworn fidelity. Evola supported the corporative state as some kind of establishment for a "healthy and disciplined" nation. He described the new European order in terms of the absolute supremacy of the ideals of heroism and struggle to economic and social values and denied the very significance of the social factor. Universal values, Evola demagogically asserted, can be embodied only in the individual, and their significance depends on the place the individual occupies in the power hierarchy. He categorically rejected all attempts at the hybridization of nationalism with socialism. In this connection he condemned Mussolini, who, in his "demagogic rambling..., destroyed fascism with his own hands by forgetting the principle of the totalitarian state."23 Defending the idea of "elite fascism," Evola criticizes Mussolini and other ideologists of Italian fascism for their demagogy, appeals to the "mob" and flirtation with the masses, and for their desire to acquire a mass social base for their movement at any cost. Evola himself sees the solution to all problems without exception in the unconditional observance of the notorious fascist principle of "power, order and justice."

The ideology of Italian neo-fascism with its invariable eclecticism is expressed more fully in the works of Giorgio Almirante, although he acknowledges Evola as his superior and displays particular zeal in praising him ("one of the outstanding thinkers of the modern era" and "our Marcuse").

Neo-fascism is trying to update fascism, making use of the experience of an order which existed but could not pass the test of durability. This is the reason for neo-fascism's characteristic "nostalgic" feelings about the past,
tendency to romanticize and idealize it and desire to vindicate fascism as an idea. In this connection, Almirante says that Mussolini's 20-year dictatorship was the "logical and necessary form" for fascism to take under the specific conditions of that time, and that this form allegedly provided the best expression of national interests and the will of the people after World War I. He views neo-fascism as evidence of the immortality of the fascist idea. "Fascism cannot die because its basic idea is still relevant today..." Almirante asserts, "...fascism was born as an intermediate doctrine between the Western capitalist and Eastern communist systems. It is still this today, and the term 'intermediate' should not be invested with any kind of fortuitous or opportunistic meaning but should be interpreted as a dialectical succession and synthesis."24

Almirante says that all of the problems of the present-day Italian society can be solved only by a state based on the principle of corporativism. Although "dictatorship is a permanent characteristic of fascism," its main point is not the method of political rule, but the "doctrine of balance between state intervention and personal initiative: The state will not replace private initiative or prevail over it, but will only perform the function of constant and organic control."25

In the opinion of Almirante, the corporative order saves the state from the extremes of liberalism and communism. "Whereas liberalism (or, as Carlyle termed it, "anarchy guarded by police")26 ignores collective interests, pursuing the goal of maximum individual advantage, we fascists view interpersonal relations from the standpoint of the subordination of the individual and the group to the higher national—that is, collective—interests."27 This clearly reveals the fundamental idea of the fascist doctrine—the relegation of the human being to the status of a faceless entity in a comprehensive process of subordinating the interests and needs of the individual to the needs and goals of the fascist state, the governing of which is "entrusted" to a select few representing the elite of the society.

Almirante, the champion of corporativism, then goes on to an attempt to substantiate its historical necessity with sociopsychological motives—alleging that material relations should be subordinate to moral laws and the idea of the kind of social organization that, even if it is "based on production relations, rises morally and spiritually above (pure) economism, justly resolving social conflicts and eliminating the causes of class struggle." Taking his demagogic line of reasoning further, he composes an aphorism about the "merits" of the corporative state—a state which is "national but not nationalistic, social but not socialistic" and which is supposedly instrumental in avoiding "the dangers of both the free market economy and excessive economic control."28

For the Italians who experienced all of the "splendors" of the corporative state during the "two dark decades," however, these remarks arouse suspicion as well as natural protests, which Almirante tries to forestall with his explanation: "We have stressed repeatedly that we are referring to the idea of corporativism, and not to the (former) corporative regime, because an actual return to 'fascist' corporativism presupposes the reassessment and
correction of all that has actually become obsolete or was only incidental to begin with." Almirante feels that the idea of the corporative, superclass state can be updated by reaffirming the old idea of class peace. "Participants in the production process (that is, capitalists and workers) must reach agreements by escaping the vicious circle of the class struggle." The idea of the corporative state has been extensively exploited by neo-fascists in their criticism of state economic policy and class conflicts. Nevertheless, they have been unable to gain the loyalty of any significant part of the working class. In their attempts to infiltrate the worker milieu, the neo-fascists founded their own labor organization in 1950—the Italian National Confederation of Labor Unions (CIZNAL). This confederation unites, according to its leaders, around 200,000 people, whereas the three leading labor organizations in Italy have more than 8.2 million members, representing around 55 percent of all hired labor.

The neo-fascists are conducting a constant campaign of fierce attacks on existing social institutions and the contemporary political system in Italy. This campaign is allegedly being conducted in defense of the common man. It has been accompanied by the assertion that "life might have been harder under Mussolini, but it was nevertheless better because there was more order." In addition, the MSI-DN leader has complained that the Italians making up the "silent majority" are forgetting that Italy in Mussolini's time was "happy, determined, disciplined, self-confident and victorious." In other words, everything is portrayed as its opposite, just as in the allegation that the victory over fascism and the revival of the bourgeois-democratic order in Italy were nothing other than a step backward. "The state and the system are undergoing a crisis; it will be necessary to create the possibility of a free alternative to the present system, an alternative capable of thoroughly updating the constitution and turning fundamental and necessary reforms into laws for their rapid, simple and complete implementation," Almirante declares, and then points to the example of the Pinochet regime in Chile—the present-day embodiment of the theories of government elaborated by "traditional" fascism.

Incidentally, traditional fascism assigned the individual a complete subordinate position as a citizen or member of any human community to which he belonged, including the church parish and the family. Until recently, supra-personal authority was the alpha and omega of the fascist ideology. Times change, however, and the methods of the extreme Right are also being adapted to new conditions, to the growing political awareness of the masses and to each individual's desire to defend human dignity and his own rights. The Italian neo-fascists were among the first to sense the sociopsychological changes in the mass mind. And they were probably quicker than imperialist circles across the ocean to make use of the slogans of the human rights struggle to camouflage the antidemocratic goals of their movement without a twinge of conscience. In the demagogy of neo-fascism, the citizen as an individual, his interests, his rights and his well-being are now portrayed as almost the chief priority. Explaining the reasons for these changes in doctrine since Mussolini's time, Almirante wrote: "I think that the main difference consists in the relationship between duty and law. At that time
the role model for us, for youth, was the man of duty, but now the ideal, especially for youth, is the exacting man, the man of law."33

The change in neo-fascist tactics has been influenced strongly by the scientific and technical revolution, with its perceptible exacerbation of the conflicts of contemporary capitalism. Under the influence of the scientific and technical revolution and the development of state-monopolist capitalism, great changes are taking place in the social structure of the bourgeois society. There has been a decline in the influence of the urban petty bourgeoisie, which cannot withstand the pressure of large monopolies, and some population groups are facing ruin, particularly the peasantry. The transformation of once elite professions into mass occupations is undermining the privileged status of engineering and technical personnel and the intelligentsia. Under certain conditions, these social strata can fall prey to the influence of neo-fascist demagogy, which is employed with a view to the urgent needs and requests of the masses.

These categories of laborers have traditionally been distinguished by some degree of political conservatism. The upheavals caused by scientific and technical progress under the conditions of state-monopolist capitalism are arousing confusion and increasing dissatisfaction with the sociopolitical system as a whole, which often leads to the destruction of established conservative stereotypes. Many members of the wounded strata are beginning to support—with some degree of caution—the democratic and revolutionary demands of the working class and its allies. In combination with the retention of the conservative outlook, however, dissatisfaction with the state of affairs can sometimes promote the acceptance of the reactionary neo-fascist ideology.

Many serious social problems in the contemporary capitalist society established some of the necessary conditions for the spread of the neo-fascist ideology: the higher crime rate and immorality, the sense of insecurity and the fear of political and economic instability. As for the grand bourgeoisie, when the state turns out to be incapable of disentangling the intricate knot of conflicts, some members of monopolist groups see the creation of a strong regime as an escape from this situation. In an effort to impose an authoritarian form of government on Italy, some representatives of the largest monopolies are using the neo-fascists as a striking force, enlisting the services of not only legal neo-fascist organizations but also their extremist underground colleagues. Terrorist attacks and the escalation of tension and fear are being used to instigate the establishment of a fascist dictatorship in the country.

But the "neo-fascist" problem in the country is also being complicated by the fact that the economic crisis in Italy has been combined with a severe and lengthy political, social and moral crisis. This country, just as the rest of the capitalist world, has been whipped by inflation, recession and rising unemployment. Under these conditions, public administration is an extremely difficult matter, and the difficulties have been compounded by attempts to place the entire burden of the effects of the crisis on the shoulders of the laboring public.
This is also the reason why part of the population, after carrying the burden of economic exploitation, has been issuing louder demands since the beginning of the 1980's for a "strong" authority in the country, capable of solving its many problems, and why the discontented members of the younger generation (most of them from the south) want a strong leader and are appealing for the advancement of an "energetic" individual who can put things in "order." At this same time, the extreme Right began eulogizing the "two fascist decades," when the working man allegedly asserted himself by his work and through his work and was not dependent on all of the middlemen who have now turned labor itself into an object of political speculation. It is significant that this primitive interpretation of the principles of the corporative model of fascist state found a grateful audience and even supporters of the line of political and economic development proposed by the theorists and propagandists of neo-fascism. The latter are making every effort to convince the "common" man that the labor state had already acquired a distinct outline in the prewar years and took physical form in the economic "victories" of fascism, indissolubly connected with the name and activities of Mussolini. In this way, Il Duce is once again being put on a pedestal as the "savior of the nation," a "peace-maker" and "a man more able than today's rulers to solve all of the urgent problems paralyzing the country." It was no coincidence, as a comparatively recent sociological survey indicated, that 25 percent of all respondents favored the restoration of Mussolini's name in Italian history and the vindication of Mussolini himself and of all of his actions.34-35

Calling the ideological system the main element and essential feature of neo-fascism, its political leaders are nevertheless striving to dissociate themselves from the crimes of fascism, to "humanize" it and to turn the complex social phenomenon of fascism (consisting of a political movement, a regime and an ideology) into a cultural-philosophical current.

The same goal—the vindication of fascism and the concealment of its inhuman essence—is being served by an abundance of literature, films and "relics" of fascism. Various "theories" based on a group of legends and myths advanced by neo-fascists and other reactionary authors are being introduced into this "brown" wave.

They are trying to give fascism an unbiased and objective historical portrayal. In the beginning of 1984, for example, the Milan weekly PANORAMA felt the need to report the broad scales on which the centennial of Benito Mussolini's birth was celebrated in Italy in 1983. In particular, in the hero of the day's birthplace, there was the opening of a special exhibit on his life and "career." Television joined the celebration by airing a six-part documentary film about Mussolini. Publishers published the memoirs of the fascist dictator's colleagues, scientific treatises, a chronicle of the entire "two dark decades" and, of course, Il Duce's autobiography. In addition to all this, a special prize was established for the best work of literature about the idol of the blackshirts, and seven scholarships (for 10 million lire each) were offered to the students writing the best compositions about "Mussolini and the Italian People." When the MSI leadership held a gathering timed to coincide with this celebration in Amalfi in May 1983, it became the first demonstration of this kind to be attended by parliamentarians from the Christian Democratic, Socialist and Radical parties—a noteworthy fact in itself.37
Something else is also alarming: The line of behavior chosen by the neo-fascists (with a view to the current domestic political climate) is consistent with the plans of a specific segment of ruling circles considering the possibility of a future political coalition with the neo-fascists for the purpose of strengthening mass support for government policy. The possibility of this political maneuver is indicated just by the experience of the 1983 election campaign, when the MSI campaign slogan, "We will not discriminate against those who do not discriminate against us," evoked assurances from government circles that there was "no intention to keep any political force in a political ghetto after it had won representation in the republic Parliament in free and democratic elections."

This domestic political atmosphere and the public attitudes discussed above are making the neo-fascists bolder by convincing them that their party can once again move from the wings to a position on stage. At the 14th MSI-DN Congress (November-December 1984), G. Almirante openly declared the intention to seize political power: "We want power because we have been resurrected for a new life and our birthplace is here, and fascism will exist as long as Italy exists.... I am calling upon the party to mobilize and be prepared.... We are fascists, but I am more of a fascist than all the rest because I am the leader. Many wanted to see the birth of a new moderate Right at this congress, but I can tell them quite definitely that this is not the right time."

Assessing the present political situation in the country, Italian communists note that political indecision and instability were and are the cause of the collapse and disintegration of society, the degeneration of parties and politics and the decline of morality and culture. All of this sustains the hopes and nurtures the plots and conspiracies of various neo-fascist and terrorist groups and of those who support them or make use of their actions in the hope of a rightward shift in the country's political leadership and the related suppression of the workers movement.

FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., 27 February 1980; the neo-fascist "black" terrorist actions with colossal numbers of victims include those committed by militant neo-fascists in the Milan Agricultural Bank (December 1969: 16 dead and almost 100 wounded) and the railroad station in Bologna (August 1980: 84 dead and 260 wounded), the bombing of the Naples-Milan passenger train (December 1984: 17 dead, 70 severely injured) and others.

3. For example, in the 1972 parliamentary elections alone, the neo-fascists spent 1.75 trillion lire—the maximum amount established by Parliament for party campaign funds ("Il veleno fascista," PANORAMA, Milan, 24 June 1973, p 24).

4. UNITA, 28 June 1983.

6. The main objectives of the new party were recorded in the charter and in the "Policy Statement" consisting of 10 points. In February 1972 it merged with the monarchic party. The MSI congress held in January 1973 on the occasion of the merger with the monarchists was called the "First Assembly of the National Right." A new charter was ratified for the party, which began to be called the "Italian Social Movement—National Right" (MSI-DN). In elections the MSI-DN is known as the "National Right." According to published data, the official MSI-DN budget exceeds 5.6 billion lire ("Come facevano prima a far quadrare i conti?" TEMPO, 14 February 1979, No 7, p 29).

7. An interview with G. Almirante, national secretary of the neo-fascist party, was aired on the state national television network on 25 March 1972. Of course, the neo-fascist leader took this opportunity to portray the MSI as the only guarantee of real freedom in Italy.


11. Ibid., p 201.

12. In January 1977, Almirante declared: "The allegation that anticommunism has come to an end in Italy, not to mention Europe, is absolutely false. We could even say that the opposite is true" ("Nuove prospettive," Rome, 1977, pp 9-10).


15. The "Verona Manifesto," adopted at a time of difficulty for the fascists (November 1943) at a congress of the "Fascist Republican Party," founded by Mussolini in the so-called Italian Social Republic (Salo), the Italians were specifically promised that a constituent assembly would be convened after the war to declare all of Italy a democratic republic, that the electoral system would be "democratized," that the "fair distribution of income" would be instituted, and even that the "destruction of the capitalist order" would be accomplished through the "socialization" of enterprises.


17. Ibid., p 144.


19. Ibid., pp 21-22.


26. Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) was an English philosopher, writer and historian. In his philosophy of history, he was the herald of "hero worship." Some features of Carlyle's sociological theories are close to Nietzsche's ideology of the "superman." Idealizing the corporative structure of feudal society, Carlyle tried to pass it off as socialism. Carlyle's feudal socialism was criticized in the "Communist Manifesto" of K. Marx and F. Engels.


28. Ibid., pp 120, 123-124.

29. Ibid.


33. Ibid., p 38.


37. IZVESTIYA, 7 June 1983.


40. Ibid., 26 May 1982.

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TRADE UNION CONFERENCE HELD AT AFRICA INSTITUTE

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASSE I SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 86 (signed to press 16 Jan 86) p 169

[Report by A. L. Arefyev and V. L. Chertkov on meeting of African labor leaders in Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, at the end of September 1985]

[Text] A meeting of the leaders of trade unions in Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Zaire, Congo, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Ethiopia and several other African countries, who had come to Moscow to attend a session of the WFTU General Council, and researchers from the IA [Africa Institute], USSR Academy of Sciences, was held in the institute at the end of September 1985. The researchers were represented by institute Deputy Director and Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences G. B. Starushenko, Doctor of Historical Sciences and Professor L. D. Yablochkov, Doctor of Economic Sciences M. F. Gataullin, Candidate of Economic Sciences V. K. Vigand, Candidate of Historical Sciences O. B. Gromova, Candidate of Historical Sciences V. M. Kirko, Candidate of Historical Sciences O. Z. Mushtuk, Candidate of Economic Sciences G. N. Rubinshteyn and others.

After calling the meeting to order, G. B. Starushenko explained the main fields of institute activity and the topics of current research projects. Explaining the details of Soviet studies of the role and place of the working class in public affairs in African states, he pointed out some distinctive features and tendencies of the trade-union movement in the countries of this continent. In reference to the validity of singling out the young African working class as the leading force in the current phase of the national liberation revolutions, the speaker noted that there is no direct connection between its size and its actual political strength, and it would therefore be wrong to consider the influence of the African working class on the nature of social processes on the continent in isolation from the influence of the international labor movement.

Deputy Secretary-General of the Nigerian Labor Congress B. Obua described the contribution of national trade unions to the struggle of African laborers against the activities of transnational corporations, which are striving to attach the young African states more closely to the world capitalist economy, and problems in the choice of a pattern of socioeconomic development in emerging countries.
Speakers from the IA—V. K. Vigand, G. N. Rubinshteyn, G. B. Starushenko and L. D. Yablochkov—cogently demonstrated the futility of the search for a third, "African" pattern of future social development under the conditions of the internationalization of worldwide economic ties. They directed attention to the more intense economic expansion of Western monopolies in the countries of the continent with the aim of exerting political pressure on them. The Soviet African scholars pointed out the intensification of the ideological struggle over the problems of the socialist orientation and the capitalist pattern of development and noted the role of the working class in the intensification of progressive reforms.

In particular, L. D. Yablochkov analyzed the views of Western sociologists on the patterns and prospects of socioeconomic development in African countries. He said that several sociologists striving to make apologies for neocolonialism are trying to convince the African countries that they cannot surmount their socioeconomic underdevelopment without the help of TNC's. Bourgeois-liberal African scholars are recommending the development of Africa's "own" form of capitalism. Leftist radical theorists believe that the African countries have no need to rely on the experience of developed countries, both capitalist and socialist.

Secretary-General B. Somda of the United Burkinan Workers stressed that the limited influence of the scientific-socialist ideology in Africa is due to the underdevelopment of the proletariat. The basis for the growth of the latter is industry, many of the enterprises of which are operating on a private capitalist basis. For this reason, according to some researchers, the road to socialism will allegedly necessitate the development of capitalist relations. Responding to this, O. Z. Mushtuk said that conditions are ripe in Africa for the combination of the labor movement with Marxism, since qualitative changes in the proletariat are as important as quantitative ones. Today the former colonial countries have a real opportunity to make the transition to socialism without going through the capitalist stage. Historical experience and Marxist science deny the obligatory nature of the capitalist system in Africa.

Chairman D. Ralambotaina of the Federation of Malagasy Trade Unions (FICEMA) discussed the unique features of the development of the proletariat and its ideology in various African countries, especially Algeria and Madagascar, and underscored the importance of considering the distinctive features of national segments of the African working class in analyses of general trends in the development of the union movement on the continent.

Secretary-General A. Mohamed of the Communication Workers of Kenya, member of the executive committee of the Central Organization of Trade Unions, pointed up the Soviet Union's great contribution to the training of skilled personnel for independent African countries. He and several other African labor leaders, particularly Secretary F. Rahingo of the Federation of Revolutionary Malagasy Trade Unions (FICEMARE) and section chief O. Nunu-Kway of the Ghana Congress of Trade Unions, advocated stronger scientific contacts between the institute and research and trade-union organizations in Africa, especially in the study of the working class of this continent.
The people who attended the meeting were unanimous in their assessment of
the importance and value of such undertakings on the scientific level and
on the level of the establishment and reinforcement of contacts between
Soviet researchers of African affairs and the leaders of African trade
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POLISH BOOK ON COMMUNIST MOVEMENT REVIEWED

[Text] The communist movement is the most influential ideological and political force of the present day. "Communists," the draft new edition of the CPSU Program says, "are fighting for the immediate and long-range goals of the working class, for the interests of all laborers and for social progress, peace, disarmament and common security." An important contribution to this fight is being made by the communist parties of the capitalist countries of Europe. Their activities in the 1970's, which are analyzed in this new work by Polish researchers, seem all the more interesting now that the communist parties of Western Europe have suffered some losses but are still the strongest part of the communist movement in the non-socialist world and are having a noticeable effect on the development of the region. In connection with the increasing activity of adventuristic imperialist groups, the responsibility and role of these communist parties are increasing, especially in the movement to prevent nuclear war.

This study, written by a group of specialists from the Institute of the Workers Movement in Warsaw under the supervision of J. Pawlowicz, is distinguished primarily by the broad coverage of the subject matter and by the use of the documents of communist parties, the proceedings of communist meetings and conferences and articles from the press.

The authors of the book were able to surmount the traditional approach to the communist movement of the region as the entire group of communist parties in individual countries and to correctly establish the relationships between common, particular and singular features in communist party activities. Using major documents of the communist movement, statistics and other materials, the authors were able to analyze the main fields of activity of the communist

parties of capitalist European countries during the tense 1970's, focusing attention on the new elements in their theory and practice.

The authors correctly point out the special significance of the communist parties' search for solutions to new problems in the class struggle in accordance with the general trends in the development of the revolutionary movement and the distinctive features of their countries and discuss the far-reaching clarifications of general principles. The communist parties of Western Europe, as the authors write, progressed from a recognition of the possibility of peaceful revolution to explanations of the specific forms it might take and to analyses of the problem of authority, ways of reorganizing the government and the methods and speed of social reforms. They progressed from the declaration of principles of democratization to the compilation of government programs to be carried out in the event of a victory by leftist forces, from explanations of the need for united action by workers organizations to the drafting of platforms of joint action and specific forms of cooperation with social democrats and trade unions representing various currents, from the general idea of uniting all anti-imperialist forces to the specific concept of broad antimonopolist alliances and the drafting of platforms of the common interests and positions of various parties and organizations. In the 1970's they progressed partway toward international cooperation to change the nature of West European integration and to achieve international detente.

The determination of the specific activities of each communist party does much to explain the uneven development of the communist movement in West European countries. The authors' analysis of the distinctive development patterns of communist parties provides some idea of the reasons for the spread of the ideas of "Eurocommunism" in some of them and the negative attitudes of the majority of West European communist parties toward them. They accurately assess the significance of changes in the objective conditions of their activity as a result of the crisis which stunned the capitalist economy in the middle of the 1970's and of its after-effects, as well as the increasing activity of the more aggressive imperialist groups at the end of the decade.

The authors pay special attention to the analysis of the mass movement of the working class and other strata of the laboring public. They describe the important role played in this movement by leftist organizations, especially communist parties. Researching the strike movement, the authors describe, first of all, its growth in Western Europe after 1968; secondly, its increasing strength during the years of economic crisis in the mid-1970's; thirdly, the drop in the number of strikers after 1978; and, finally, the varying intensity of the strike movement in different countries: The leaders were Italy, France and England, with Austria and Switzerland "bringing up the rear." Scrupulously explaining the causes of these differences in various years and in various countries, the authors establish the influence of not only the economic crisis but also the effects of the scientific and technical revolution; they make special mention of new tendencies in the strike movement---stronger demands for the guaranteed right to work and broader participation by labor in the management of production at enterprises, the development of the economy and its rearrangement in the interests of labor—that is, the
politicization of strikes (p 43). Arguments are supported with a review of the strike struggle in the largest West European countries. The authors also analyze other mass movements, making primarily political demands: in defense of Vietnam and the Chilean revolution, for the equality of women, in defense of the special interests of youth, in defense of the environment (the ecological movements), local civic initiatives against weapons and others. The description of the organizations of the mass movement, with trade unions playing the main role, is also of considerable interest. In addition to describing the stronger tendency toward united action by unions, the authors discuss the leftward shift characteristic of the 1970's in the West European trade unions as a whole.

On the basis of an analysis of the programs and activities of West European communist parties, the authors conclude that their heightened interest in parliamentary activity in the 1970's did not diminish their interest in the mass movement (p 82), which they continued to view as decisive, interpreting the "democratic road to socialism" as the development of the mass struggle. The more active parliamentary involvement of some communist parties revealed their differing assessments of the possibility of using parliaments. Their common desire to involve labor in the struggle for democratization and for detente and against monopolies, however, promoted the politicization of the mass movement and the reinforcement of its class nature. In the second half of the decade the communist parties wanted to mobilize a mass movement to surmount the destructive effects of the crisis on the economy, striving to give this movement a class nature (p 94).

The common line worked out by the beginning of the 1970's, which served as a point of departure for the concept of antimonopolist democracy, was based on the acknowledgement of such factors as the increasing importance of democratic objectives and reforms, the convergence of working class interests with the interests of other population strata oppressed by monopolies and the need to create alliances of all antimonopolist forces and expand possibilities for the use of bourgeois democracy and some bourgeois institutions in the interests of labor. This aided in overcoming the attempts to isolate communist parties, in the legalization of some of them, in their cooperation with other political organizations and, finally, in the repulsion of reactionary forces. In the 1970's the communist parties regarded democratization as an essential condition not only for economic reforms but also for the development of the economy, the resolution of crisis-related problems and the transition to socialism. Furthermore, whereas the communist parties in Austria, Denmark, Greece, Norway, the FRG and many other countries regarded the struggle for antimonopolist democracy only as a way of approaching socialism, communist parties in France, Italy, Spain and Great Britain hoped to also attain socialist goals in this manner (p 104). The communist parties of Italy, Sweden, France, Spain and Belgium associated these expectations with the development of representative democracy, individual rights and freedoms, the independence of trade unions and a multi-party system and with rejection of dictatorship by the working class, calling this the "democratic road" to socialism. In the opinion of the authors, the drafting of such programs was combined in some cases with their reformist interpretation or opportunistic implementation (p 108), which cannot, however, obscure the positive features of the communist parties' democratic alternative to monopoly rule as a whole.
Its most important links, in the opinion of the authors of this book, are the democratization of the central authority and other political systems, the creation of democratic governments, the decentralization and democratization of local governments with the exercise of broader rights by elective bodies, and the protection and development of personal freedoms. In line with the conditions of each country, communist parties advocated stronger authority for parliaments and their deputies, the limitation of the powers of heads of state, the institution of fair electoral systems and referendums, the development of self-government and the democratization of the administration, the armed forces and the police, especially in view, on the one hand, of the lessons learned from the tragic defeat of the revolution in Chile and, on the other, of the revolutionary experience in Portugal. They fought against anti-communism and against the discriminatory treatment of workers and for the guaranteed participation of workers and their organizations in the resolution of all problems in societal development.

The communist parties took every opportunity to publicize the principles of democratization, regarding this as a long-overdue immediate objective, and issued corresponding demands in parliamentary and local elections. They suggested constructive steps toward democratization to parliaments and governments, drafted the necessary bills, defended them in debates and opposed rightwing forces. They actively pursued this line in local government, where they promoted resolutions of this kind, and at enterprises, where they had a base of support. Communists organized political strikes and other mass demonstrations and discussions in support of the demands for democratization. The communist parties tried to secure the support of trade unions and other mass organizations for these demands.

The discussions of the 1970's on the role of communist parties during the period of transition to socialism, on the nature of the multi-party system and on the leadership functions of the working class and its allies showed that the communist parties of Western Europe acknowledged the possibility of cooperation with other progressive forces not only in the struggle for anti-monopolist reforms but also in the socialist reorganization of society. One important result of the discussions was the eventual acknowledgement by all communist parties that the concentration of political power in the hands of the working class and its allies is an essential condition for the institution of socialist reforms and their realization that communist participation in a parliamentary majority or even in a coalition government is not enough for this. The communist parties were increasingly likely to associate the prospect of the transfer of power to the working class and its supporters with the creation of broad political alliances (in which the leading role of the communist parties could be combined with the equality of all members) and with the development of self-government. Although the communist parties of Western Europe rejected the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" (and some even rejected the very concept), they essentially continued the creative elaboration of the question of the leadership functions of the working class and its allies.

In this work the place occupied by the communists' economic demands in the common strategy of struggle for socialism is discussed. Considering the
elimination of state-monopolist domination to be their immediate objective, the communist parties demanded the nationalization of monopolies, and not of all private enterprises, and endeavored to unite all antimonopolist forces. Since the beginning of the 1970's all communist parties in the region have been advocating the democratization of state sector administration and democratic control of the entire economy (p 144), in connection with which they have paid closer attention to the reinforcement of trade unions and the expansion of their rights.

The authors present a quite detailed discussion of the new priorities which became apparent in the positions of the region's communist parties on matters of economic policy when attention was focused on ways of surmounting the economic difficulties suffered by the laboring public. The most prominent place was assigned to the problem of curbing and eliminating unemployment and of assisting the unemployed. In the interests of labor, the communist parties began to fight for monetary and tax reform and fiscal reorganization. They began working out alternatives to the system of state-monopolist capitalism, models for the economic development of their countries, reinforced by the demand for the reorganization of international economic relations. Analyzing the position of the communist parties on agrarian problems, the authors distinguish between three types of agrarian policy. In countries with many remaining traces of feudal practices (Portugal, Spain, Greece and southern Italy), the communist parties support agrarian reform in the interests of the laboring peasantry. Wherever there are no significant traces of feudal practices in agriculture and where capitalist relations are highly developed (France, Belgium and northern Italy), the communist parties oppose monopolies and land rent. In Great Britain, the FRG, Holland and Denmark, and even in France and Belgium, their agrarian programs are aimed against state-monopolist capitalism and they are demanding the elimination of the gap between agricultural prices, lower taxes and equal rights for rural and industrial workers (p 164).

The authors present an interesting discussion of the communist parties' own assessment of the economic crisis of the mid-1970's. They saw that the crisis of overproduction was related to the structural crisis stemming from the increasingly severe general crisis of capitalism. They discovered an entire avalanche of crisis-related processes. The programs drafted by the communist parties for an escape from the crisis by means of struggle and victory by progressive forces, which became the central element of various communist party political concepts, were of the greatest significance (p 191).

The idea that united action with the social democrats would be necessary not only in the struggle against the danger of war but also in defense of labor rights and interests became a popular opinion in the communist parties of the region in the 1970's.

The authors stress that the fundamental differences between communists and social democrats both in the interpretation of goals and in the determination of means of attaining them did not diminish, even when certain communist parties began to discuss the "democratic road to socialism" (p 203). The social democrats remained a more influential force than the communist movement.
in the region as a whole and continued to acquire stronger influence, and although they did not change their principles, they did revise some of their politico-ideological tenets. The authors comment on the leftward evolution of the socialist parties in a number of countries, the more pointed criticism of capitalism by social democrats, their more active demonstrations in defense of the socioeconomic interests of the laboring public and in favor of detente, and the slightly stronger tendency toward contacts with communists. All of this furthered the communist parties' efforts to cooperate with social democrats not only "from below" but also "from above"—efforts to form alliances between parties. The tendency to merge with leftist social democrats (in Iceland and Norway), however, proved to be ineffective and dangerous (p 220).

Communists tried to find specific forms, corresponding to the conditions of their country and alignment of forces, of united action and cooperation by workers parties in the struggle for detente, social progress and reforms. This is attested to by the authors' discussion of the experience of the PCF [Communist Party of France], the FCP [Finnish Communist Party] and several other parties. The search for forms of cooperation with social democrats was combined with attempts, not always successful, to find ways of creating broad political alliances—the popular alliance (PCF) and the "historic compromise" (p 226). This search was also accompanied by communist criticism of "social partnership" and other social-reformist ideas hurting labor interests.

In their analysis of the cooperation of several communist parties with social democrats in the 1970's, the authors conclude that the possibilities and productivity of this cooperation depend on stronger communist party influence and successes, on the strength of the mass movement of the working class and other laborers, on their influence on the social democrats and on the intensification of the communist parties' ideological struggle (p 229). The experience of the 1970's corroborated the need for cooperation by the two strongest currents of the West European workers movement; but it also proved, the authors stress, that interaction with social democrats demands fortitude from the communist parties, adherence to ideological principles and a policy corresponding to the development of the class struggle (p 245).

As the authors demonstrate, the policy line of detente was elaborated collectively by the communist parties of all countries, especially the parties of the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe, in the late 1960's and early 1970's. From the very beginning, the communist parties of Western Europe directed the movement for detente as an anti-imperialist movement, associating it closely with demonstrations in defense of the rights of the oppressed minority in Northern Ireland, with the struggle to eliminate the fascist regimes in Portugal, Spain and Greece and with support for the Palestinian Arabs, the sovereignty of Cyprus, the struggle of the people of Vietnam against American aggression and the national liberation struggle of other people in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Insisting on the maintenance of the approximate balance of power between the Warsaw Pact and NATO as an important condition for detente, the communist parties of the region began advocating not the immediate withdrawal of their countries from NATO (as before), but the simultaneous dissolution of the two politico-military alliances at some time in the future. This line was consistent with the
class interests of workers, the internationalist duty of communists and the anti-imperialist solidarity of all progressive forces, the authors write; in the theory and practice of the communist parties of Western Europe, the struggle for detente was directly related to the struggle for social progress and the prospect of peaceful transition to socialism.

The definite successes of the struggle for detente and social progress in the middle of the 1970's were analyzed in depth at the Berlin conference of European communist and workers parties (1976). Diverging opinions were revealed at the same time: Remarks were made (backed up by references to the search for an independent policy for Western Europe in world affairs) in favor of a line "equidistant" from NATO and the Warsaw Pact, from "both superpowers." These remarks were subjected to criticism in the communist movement of the region.

The authors discuss the dynamics of the growth and organizational problems of communist parties in the region and reveal their common view of the mass communist party as a party of the Leninist type. In addition to increased membership (especially in the second half of the 1970's), communist parties in France, Portugal and Spain, as well as in the FRG and Greece, displayed a higher percentage of intellectuals, women and youth among their members. The authors also discuss the lowering of membership requirements in some parties and the decrease in the membership of some.

The attitude of the communist parties toward the economic integration of Western Europe is the subject of one chapter. It tells how the communist parties of the region had elucidated the objective basis of West European economic integration by the beginning of the 1960's and then began working on their own alternative to imperialist integration and paying special attention to the development of international cooperation by communist parties and other working class organizations as a counterbalance to the consolidation of the region's largest monopolies. A significant contribution to this work was made by the 1963 conference of the communist parties of EEC countries and the 1971 and 1974 conferences of the communist parties of the capitalist states of Europe. Communsists determined that the monopolies could be opposed and that progressive forces could influence the EEC mechanism in the interests of democratizing the integration process and in the interests of the struggle for socialism.

The authors describe the specifics of the policy of each communist party in the region on the EEC and their far from common position on the plans for the political integration of Western Europe, especially European Parliament elections. In the plans proposed by imperialist circles for the political integration of the region, the communist parties correctly discerned an attempt to strengthen the hegemony of the most powerful states and restrict the interests of small countries and, in general, the interests of labor. But whereas the PCI [Communist Party of Italy], for example, believed that elections to the European Parliament and the parliament itself could be used to democratize the EEC and the policies of West European states, the communist parties of, for instance, Denmark and Ireland boycotted the first direct elections to the European Parliament (1979). Analyzing the results of these
elections, the authors make the justifiable remark that "the chances for real communist influence on EEC policy and the activities of its organs, as well as on the creation of a strong leftist and democratic opposition in the European Parliament, turned out to be negligible" (p 282). Of course, communists used this parliament to criticize imperialist integration and to defend labor interests, but, as the authors point out, the "preconceived optimism" (p 283) was unwarranted. Something much more important, as the chapter shows, was the series of mass demonstrations by the laboring public against the imperialist integration of Western Europe and, in particular, against the TNC's. The authors analyze various forms of action taken by the communist parties of the region against the TNC's and the use of the EEC by monopolies, the antimonopolist programs proposed by communists and the participation of trade unions and the laboring masses in this struggle.

The book provides an extremely broad overview of the problems the West European communist movement dealt with in the 1970's. It describes the most important aspects of its internal development and the basic directions of its influence on the socioeconomic and politico-ideological development of Western Europe. Nevertheless, some significant aspects of communist party activity and of the development of the region remain, in our opinion, not fully clarified. It seems that insufficient attention was given to the objective bases of the politico-ideological unity of the communist movement in general and Western Europe in particular, or to the factors determining the tendency toward the stronger cohesion of communist parties in the region and the prospects for their interaction. In this collective study, insufficient attention was given to the analysis and summarization of the experience of the Portuguese revolution, the elimination of the fascist regimes in Spain and Portugal and the results of the struggle of communists and the broad popular masses for social progress in the region. The causes of the increased activity of rightist forces and the rightist offensive of the late 1970's and the reasons for the spread of revisionist tendencies in some communist parties are not fully explained. The reasons for the failure of the communist parties in the majority of countries in the region to become mass parties need more detailed explanation. It also appears that more attention should have been paid to the interaction of West European communist parties with communist parties in other regions, especially the socialist community. The concept of the "world crisis" needs clarification (p 184). Furthermore, the analysis of West European integration probably should have focused more on its different forms—the state-monopolist form (EEC) and the TNC form, each of which has its own distinctive features, with important implications for the labor movement and for communist party policy. The relationship of problems in regional integration and the development of the regional communist movement to the changing balance of power in the world and to the development of the socialist community, its influence and its foreign policy requires a more thorough analysis.

On the whole, we must note the importance of the Polish researchers' contribution to the study of the communist movement of Western Europe and wish them new successes.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON BLENDING TRADITION WITH PRESENT IN EAST

Moscow RABOCHIY KLISS I SOVREMEMNYI MIR in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 86 (signed to press 16 Jan 86) pp 184-187


[Text] The subject of this review, a collective study of problems in the formative development of the Eastern countries from the Middle Ages to our day, is distinguished from other works of this kind by at least two important features. First of all, this is the first time these problems have been analyzed in Soviet historico-sociological literature from the standpoint of the synthesis of traditional and contemporary structures; the authors regard this synthesis as the most characteristic feature of the evolution of Eastern societies since the days of the colonial expansion of European states at the dawn of their bourgeois development. Secondly, the book contains a comprehensive study of the basis and superstructure of societal development in the Eastern countries in comparison to the Western experience.

The introduction, which contains a great deal of general theoretical information, explains the meaning of the terms "traditional" and "contemporary." The two terms are examined in connection with the type and level of formative development, or, more precisely, its transitional phases, distinguished by formative heterogeneity or by a synthesized nature—that is, the intermingling and compromisory coexistence of heterogeneous structural elements. In view of the fact that the very concept of the synthesis of heterogeneous social structures is just beginning to be analyzed by Orientalists, the authors extensively substantiate their methodological approach to their subject matter with quotations pertaining to this matter from the founders of Marxism-Leninism, especially K. Marx, who regarded this kind of synthesis "not as a formula, but as a movement"¹ (p 10). Proceeding from this basis, the authors present a comprehensive description of it as a socially antagonistic entity subject to constant changes. They do not lose sight of all of the complex and contradictory features of the interrelations and interaction of internal and external conditions as two aspects of the actual form taken by the "traditional-contemporary" concept. This allows them to demonstrate the impossibility of confining social modernization under contemporary conditions to Westernization, and to reveal the alternative nature of the capitalist and socialist modernization of Eastern societies.

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The informative interpretation of the terms "traditional" and "contemporary" and the phenomena they represent in the categories of the Marxist-Leninist theory of formative development is the strongest aspect of the authors' general methodological approach to their subject matter. Concluding the substantiation of their position, they write: "The concept of synthesis allows for the effective opposition of the prolonged efforts of representatives of Western sociology, and now even of retrograde forces in the developing countries themselves, to prove the inapplicability of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to the conditions of Eastern countries. It reveals the specific forms taken here by the general tendencies discovered by Marxism in the formative development of humanity, the modifications these tendencies undergo as a result of the lack of uniformity in evolutionary processes in various regions and various human societies" (p 18).

The first of the three sections of the work is a study of the Eastern medieval society as a historical category, and of the mechanism of its inclusion in the world capitalist system. The authors conclude that neither in terms of its initial features nor in terms of characteristics acquired during the process of feudalism's development in the East did the structure of the Eastern medieval society during the period prior to the colonial expansion of European countries constitute a suitable basis for the formation of nationalities and ethnopolitical stable entities of the modern type, the type needed for the development of the new bourgeois structure. Only the foreign economic influence of the West in the 19th century and the early 20th marked the beginning of the colonial-capitalist synthesis in the Eastern countries. Colonial capitalism was heterogeneous in composition, however, it was only slightly integrated into the traditional system of society and it therefore did not immediately affect, directly or indirectly, all socioeconomic structures or subject the society as a whole to profound and irreversible processes. "As a result, during the period of colonial-capitalist development in the Eastern countries, a unique synthesis of traditional and contemporary elements on different 'levels' (both the basis and the superstructure) was formed and the multistructured societies were combined with various groups of traditional, transitional and contemporary social-class elements" (p 185). This situation was still present even in the 1950's, in spite of the transformation and modification of the traditional basis.

The second section of the work, "The Synthesis of Contemporary and Traditional Under the Conditions of Independent Development," primarily explains the specific ways in which social synthesis is reflected on the level of the political superstructure, the ways in which government in the East differs from European models and the differences between various countries in the region on this level. The exceptional importance of these matters, as the authors cogently explain, stems from the indisputable primacy of politics over economics during the period of independent development, when the issue of government becomes an urgent matter of primary concern. In addition, the study of this aspect of social synthesis is also of considerable value in the planning of the tactics and strategy of vanguard political forces under present conditions.

In the context of general theory, the relationship between formative development and the government structure is examined in the book through the examples
of the primary (Western Europe), secondary (mainly the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) and tertiary (the Eastern countries—that is, Asia and North Africa) models of capitalism. Their appearance is connected with the process of the uneven development of the capitalist structure on the global level and with differences in eras, specific historical conditions and the forms of capitalism's birth, establishment and subsequent development in various groups of countries. In accordance with this, the authors discuss the different types of government characteristic of each of the three models.

This completely valid methodological approach, derived from all of the analyses of the capitalist structure by the founders of Marxism-Leninism, is also reinforced in the book with substantial quantities of historical information. It is impossible not to see the truly colossal job of summarizing the centuries of experience of many Western and Eastern states concealed behind the somewhat schematic and academic presentation of this information in the book. Attention is justifiably focused on the countries of the secondary model (Germany, Italy and Russia), whose social evolution is similar in many respects to the situation in some varieties of the tertiary model. The fairly complex set of concepts and terminology proposed by the authors is, in our opinion, an accurate reflection, in general and on the whole, of the complex nature of the social synthesis seen in the secondary model.

In this connection, the complex and contradictory sociopolitical phenomenon of "revolution from above" is examined in the book. This phenomenon, which took shape under the conditions of secondary capitalist development and is clearly apparent in the tertiary model, has not been assessed completely and thoroughly in Marxist sociological and methodological literature to date. The premises advanced by the authors fill many of the gaps, although some of the theses they postulate could hardly be called undeniable.

Contrary to some of the remarks made by the author of this review, the phenomenon of "revolution from above" is simply and categorically classified in the book as revolution (and not reform) on the grounds that some of the elements constituting the concept of "political revolution," such as the "class shift" and "violence," can be detected in it (pp 250-251). A complete assessment of the phenomenon, however, requires a broader frame of reference than the one proposed in the monograph, it seems to us. It must be assessed from the standpoint of social revolution and from the standpoint of political revolution. In relation to the concept of social revolution, this phenomenon indisputably represents a revolution, although it is a revolution accomplished by means of reform; it does eventually lead to fundamental changes in the social order. But in relation to the political revolution, this is, on the contrary, closer to a reform instituted by revolutionary means directed against those who interfere with projected reforms.

There is no question that this always entails a class shift. But the first and main basic feature of political revolution is not simply a class shift, but the transfer of governmental authority from one class to another. "History," V. I. Lenin remarked, "tells us that the difference between reformist and non-reformist changes in a given political order consists, generally speaking, in the fact that in the first case power remains in the
hands of the previous ruling class, and in the second case power is transferred from the hands of the previous class into the hands of a new one.\textsuperscript{4} The fact that the substantive transformation of society during "revolutions from above" is set in motion by the old ruling elite is called only a "superficial fact" in this book. The authors admit, however, the significance of the "halfway" nature of the class shift in these situations; furthermore, they say that "revolution from above is not a separate event in the countries of the secondary model, but a link in the mechanism of the class shift set in motion by the political revolution from below" (p 250), and is accomplished "to the detriment of not only the laboring public but also all classes in the emerging bourgeois society" (p 249).

As for violence, it is no secret that it is certainly not among the most significant elements of the concept of "political revolution."

In our opinion, it is also impossible to agree with the statement that the first, unfinished political revolutions in the countries of the secondary model (in contrast to the primary) cannot serve as the "event marking the beginning of the new stage of formative development" (p 238). For example, the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg in the early 19th century in Prussia and the reforms of the 1860's in Russia, the authors believe, "signified an evolutionary transition to a new phase within the framework of the type of formative development in question" (p 251) and "marked the milestones of the transition from one phase of feudal development to another" (p 252). Other statements on the same pages actually suggest that the "situation of interstructural transition" be "moved up" to the time of Bismarck's reforms in Germany and to the beginning of Stolypin's reforms in Russia.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism, who are quite conclusively and aptly quoted to reinforce statements in other parts of the book, made direct references to these matters, but these were overlooked by the authors of this work. "Prussia," F. Engels wrote, "had the unique destiny of completing its bourgeois revolution, which began in 1808-1813 and took a step forward in 1848, by the end of this century (the 19th--S. A.) in the gratifying form of Bonapartism."\textsuperscript{5} Ascertain-
The first category of states includes India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Lebanon. In Oriental studies they are usually examined within the framework of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism; as the authors of this book state, however, "the necessary historical conditions for this type of government do not exist here. After all, this is a case of combined and multistructured societies distinguished by the absence of organic integrity, the required homogeneous civilian society and social consensus" (p 298). The theoretical premises and documented facts cited in confirmation of this point of view seem quite convincing, and this reaffirms the validity of the general methodological approach proposed in the work.

The authors list Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Philippines, as well as Egypt and some other Arab states, among the countries with neo-Bonapartist regimes, or regimes of "controlled democracy." Under these regimes, in contrast to their European predecessors, the system-forming structure, in the opinion of the authors, is not private economic capitalism, but bureaucratic state-capitalism, which has a tendency to evolve into bureaucratic state-monopolist capitalism, bypassing private economic capitalism as a separate phase of development (p 383). The analysis of the actual policy of these regimes also warrants consideration.

Iran is cited in the book as an example of the absolutist-Bonapartist regime. Here profound agrarian reforms were instituted in the early 1960's within the framework of "revolution from above" and eradicated the semifeudal system of land ownership. A simultaneous policy of broad industrialization contributed to the formation of a state-monopolist order. This example, incidentally, does not fully corroborate the abovementioned general theoretical statements in the book about the phenomenon of "revolution from above," especially the beginning of "interstructural transition." It is indicative that the authors state that this began in Iran not at the time of the transition to the Bonapartist government in the early 1960's, but at the time of the first, incomplete revolution of 1905-1911, marking the beginning, the authors state, of bourgeois social revolution in semicolonial Iran (p 391). In connection with the authors' remarks about the nature of the anti-shah revolution of 1978-1979, the absence of an analysis of the new government engendered by this revolution, the regime of Shiite theocracy, is regrettable.

The fourth group of countries, with governments described as absolutist-colonial, consists mainly of Persian Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. The leading structure which took shape here under the influence of an abundant flow of petrodollar revenues is acquiring, in the opinion of the authors, an exceptionally distinctive nature. This is also reflected in the excessively complex term used in the book--"feudal-absolutist state-monopolist capital" (p 398). Its distinctive nature is seen in the integration of the commercial activities of the absolutist state with the operations of Western transnational corporations (pp 398-399).

Various problems of synthesis in the spiritual sphere are examined in the final section of the work—for example, the relationship between present-day scientific and technical progress and cultural dynamics in the Eastern countries during the period of independence, elements of cultural synthesis
in anticolonial nationalism, the ideological forms of this synthesis at the present time, etc.; special attention is given to the place and role of religion in the processes in question, particularly the social aspects of the religious reformation. Unfortunately, the multitude of subjects precludes even a brief discussion of each within the confines of a short review. Of course, this can also be said of many questions raised in previous sections of the work. But even a simple list of all of the problems analyzed in the book attests to its multidimensional nature and, besides this, to some degree of compositional heterogeneity—or, to use the terminology of the team of authors, the "combined" or "synthesized" nature of its structure. This feature of the work, however, is specifically mentioned in the introduction.

The authors also acknowledge the fact that they have "laid only the first stone, and perhaps not the most solid one, in the foundation of one of the most important fields of contemporary Oriental studies" and that "time, debates and new works by other specialists in this field will reveal many flaws and weak spots in the concept of social synthesis" (p 19). All of this could be true, but now it must be acknowledged that the team of authors has not only proved quite conclusively the relevance of this subject matter and not only discovered a boundless field of activity for future researchers, but also seems to have launched a qualitative advance in the incredibly difficult process of comprehending the multifaceted and contradictory world of the developing Eastern countries.

FOOTNOTES


4. Ibid., vol 22, p 374.


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